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Karshan, Donald.
Conceptual art and
conceptual aspects.



CONCEPTUAL ART AND CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS

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**CONCEPTUAL ART
AND CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS**

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INFORMATION 1

ART AFTER PHILOSOPHY*

'The fact that it has recently become fashionable for physicists themselves to be sympathetic towards religion . . . marks the physicists' own lack of confidence in the validity of their hypotheses, which is a reaction on their part from the anti-religious dogmatism of nineteenth-century scientists, and a natural outcome of the crisis through which physics has just passed.' —A. J. Ayer

' . . . once one has understood the Tractatus there will be no temptation to concern oneself any more with philosophy, which is neither empirical like science nor tautological like mathematics; one will, like Wittgenstein in 1918, abandon philosophy, which, as traditionally understood, is rooted in confusion.' —J. O. Urmson

Traditional philosophy, almost by definition, has concerned itself with the *unsaid*. The nearly exclusive focus on the *said* by twentieth-century analytical linguistic philosophers is the shared contention that the *unsaid* is *unsaid* because it is *unsayable*. Hegelian philosophy made sense in the nineteenth century and must have been soothing to a century that was barely getting over Hume, the Enlightenment, and Kant.¹ Hegel's philosophy was also capable of giving cover for a defence of religious beliefs, supplying an alternative to Newtonian mechanics, and fitting in with the growth of history as a discipline, as well as accepting Darwinian Biology.² He appeared to give an acceptable resolution to the conflict between theology and science, as well.

The result of Hegel's influence has been that a great majority of contemporary philosophers are really little more than *historians* of philosophy, Librarians of the Truth, so to speak. One begins to get the impression that there "is nothing more to be said." And certainly if one realizes the implications of Wittgenstein's thinking, and the thinking influenced by him and after him, "Continental" philosophy need not seriously be considered here.³

Is there a reason for the "unreality" of philosophy in our time? Perhaps this can be answered by looking into the difference between our time and the centuries preceding us. In the past man's conclusions about the world were based on the information he had about it — if not specifically like the Empiricists, then generally like the Rationalists. Often, in fact, the closeness between science and philosophy was so great that scientists and philosophers were one and the same person. In fact, from the times of Thales, Epicurus, Heraclitus, and Aristotle to Descartes and Leibnitz, "the great names in philosophy were often great names in science as well."⁴

That the world as perceived by twentieth-century science is a vastly more different one than the one of its preceding century need not be proved here. Is it possible, then, that in effect man has learned so much, and his "intelligence" is such, that he cannot *believe* the reasoning of traditional philosophy? That perhaps he knows too much about the world to make those *kinds* of conclusions? As Sir James Jeans has stated: ". . . When philosophy has availed itself of the results of science, it has not done so by borrowing the abstract mathematical description of the pattern of events, but by borrowing the then current pictorial description of this pattern; thus it has not appropriated certain knowledge but conjectures. These conjectures were often good enough for the man-sized world, but not, as we now know, for those ultimate processes of nature which control the happenings of the man-sized world, and brings us nearest to the true nature of reality."⁵ He continues: "One consequence of this is that the standard philosophical discussions of many problems, such as those of causality and freewill or of materialism or idealism, are based on an interpretation of the pattern of events which is no longer tenable. The scientific basis of these older discussions has been washed away, and with their disappearance have gone all the arguments . . ."⁶

The twentieth century brought in a time which could be called "the end of philosophy and the beginning of art." I do not mean that, of course, strictly speaking, but rather as the "tendency" of the situation. Certainly linguistic philosophy can be considered the heir to empiricism, but it's a philosophy in one gear.⁷ And there is certainly an "art condition" to art

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preceding Duchamp, but its other functions or reasons-to-be are so pronounced that its ability to function clearly as art limits its art condition so drastically that it's only minimally art.⁸ In no mechanistic sense is there a connection between philosophy's "ending" and art's "beginning," but I don't find this occurrence entirely coincidental. Though the same reasons may be responsible for both occurrences the connection is made by me. I bring this all up to analyse art's function and subsequently its viability. And I do so to enable others to understand the reasoning of my – and, by extension, other artists' – art, as well as to provide a clearer understanding of the term "Conceptual art."⁹

THE FUNCTION OF ART

"The main qualifications to the lesser position of painting is that advances in art are certainly not always formal ones."

–Donald Judd (1963)

"Half or more of the best new work in the last few years has been neither painting nor sculpture." –Donald Judd (1965)

"Everything sculpture has, my work doesn't." –Donald Judd (1967)

"The idea becomes a machine that makes the art." –Sol LeWitt (1965)

"The one thing to say about art is that it is one thing. Art is art-as-art and everything else is everything else. Art as art is nothing but art. Art is not what is not art." –Ad Reinhardt (1963)

"The meaning is the use." –Wittgenstein

"A more functional approach to the study of concepts has tended to replace the method of introspection. Instead of attempting to grasp or describe concepts bare, so to speak, the psychologist investigates the way in which they function as ingredients in beliefs and in judgements." –Irving M. Copi

"Meaning is always a presupposition of function." –T. Segerstedt

". . . the subject-matter of conceptual investigations is the meaning of certain words and expressions – and not the things and states of affairs themselves about which we talk, when using those words and expressions." –G. H. Von Wright

"Thinking is radically metaphoric. Linkage by analogy is its constituent law or principle, its causal nexus, since meaning only arises through the causal contexts by which a sign stands for (takes the place of) an instance of a sort. To think of anything is to take it as of a sort (as a such and such) and that 'as' brings in (openly or in disguise) the analogy, the parallel, the metaphoric grapple or ground or grasp or draw by which alone the mind takes hold. It takes no hold if there is nothing for it to haul from, for its thinking is the haul, the attraction of likes." –I. A. Richards

In this section I will discuss the separation between aesthetics and art; consider briefly Formalist art (because it is a leading proponent of the idea of aesthetics as art), and assert that art is analogous to an analytic proposition, and that it is art's existence as a tautology which enables art to remain "aloof" from philosophical presumptions.

It is necessary to separate aesthetics from art because aesthetics deals with opinions on perception of the world in general. In the past one of the two prongs of art's function was its value as decoration. So any branch of philosophy which dealt with "beauty" and thus, taste, was inevitably duty bound to discuss art as well. Out of this "habit" grew the notion that there was a conceptual connection between art and aesthetics, which is not true. This idea never drastically conflicted with artistic considerations before recent times, not only because the morphological characteristics of art perpetuated the continuity of this error, but as well, because the apparent other "functions" of art (depiction of religious themes, portraiture of aristocrats, detailing of architecture, etc.) used art to cover up art.

When objects are presented within the context of art (and until recently objects always have been used) they are as eligible for

aesthetic consideration as are any objects in the world, and an aesthetic consideration of an object existing in the realm of art means that the object's existence or functioning in an art context is irrelevant to the aesthetic judgement.

The relation of aesthetics to art is not unlike that of aesthetics to architecture, in that architecture has a very specific *function* and how "good" its design is is *primarily* related to how well it performs its function. Thus, judgements on what it looks like correspond to taste, and we can see that throughout history different examples of architecture are praised at different times depending on the aesthetics of particular epochs. Aesthetic thinking has even gone so far as to make examples of architecture not related to "art" at all, works of art in themselves (e.g. the pyramids of Egypt).

Aesthetic considerations are indeed *always* extraneous to an object's function or "reason to be." Unless of course, that object's "reason to be" is strictly aesthetic. An example of a purely aesthetic object is a decorative object, for decoration's primary function "to add something to, so as to make more attractive; adorn; ornament,"¹⁰ and this relates directly to taste. And this leads us directly to "Formalist" art and criticism.¹¹ Formalist art (painting and sculpture) is the vanguard of decoration, and, strictly speaking, one could reasonably assert that its art condition is so minimal that for all functional purposes it is not art at all, but pure exercises in aesthetics. Above all things Clement Greenberg is the critic of taste. Behind every one of his decisions is an aesthetic judgement, with those judgements reflecting his taste. And what does his taste reflect? The period he grew up in as a critic, the period "real" for him: the fifties.¹²

How else can one account for, given his theories – if they have any logic to them at all – his disinterest in Frank Stella, Ad Reinhardt, and others applicable to his historical scheme? Is it because he is ". . . basically unsympathetic on personally experiential grounds."¹³ Or, in other words, their work doesn't suit his taste?³

But in the philosophic *tabula rasa* of art, "if someone calls it art," as Don Judd has said, "it's art." Given this, formalist painting and sculpture can be granted an "art condition," but only by virtue of its presentation in terms of its art idea (e.g. a rectangularly-shaped canvas stretched over wooden supports and stained with such and such colours, using such and such forms, giving such and such a visual experience, etc.). If one looks at contemporary art in this light one realizes the minimal creative effort taken on the part of formalist artists specifically, and all painters and sculptors (working as such today) generally.

This brings us to the realization that formalist art and criticism accepts as a definition of art one which exists solely on morphological grounds. While a vast quantity of similarly looking objects or images (or visually related objects or images) may seem to be related (or connected) because of a similarity of visual/experiential "readings," one cannot claim from this an artistic or conceptual relationship.

It is obvious then that formalist criticism's reliance on morphology leads necessarily with a bias toward the morphology of traditional art. And in this sense their criticism is not related to a "scientific method" or any sort of empiricism (as Michael Fried, with his detailed descriptions of paintings and other "scholarly" paraphernalia would want us to believe). Formalist criticism is no more than an analysis of the physical attributes of particular objects which happen to exist in a morphological context. But this doesn't add any knowledge (or facts) to our understanding of the nature of function of art. And nor does it comment on whether or not the objects analysed are even works of art, in that formalist critics always by-pass the conceptual element in works of art. Exactly why they don't comment on the conceptual element in works of art is precisely because formalist art is only art by virtue of its resemblance to earlier works of art. It's a mindless art. Or, as Lucy Lippard so succinctly described Jules Olitski's paintings: "they're visual *Muzak*."¹⁴

Formalist critics and artists alike do not question the nature of art, but as I have said elsewhere: "Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is questioning the nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art. If an artist accepts painting (or sculpture) he is accepting the tradition that goes with it. That's because the word art is general and the word painting is specific. Painting is a *kind* of art. If you make paintings you are already accepting (not questioning) the nature of art. One is then accepting the nature of art to be the European tradition of a painting-sculpture dichotomy."¹⁵

The strongest objection one can raise against a morphological justification for traditional art is that morphological notions of art embody an implied *a priori* concept of art's possibilities. And such an *a priori* concept of the nature of art (as separate from analytically framed art propositions or "work" which I will discuss later) make it, indeed, *a priori*: impossible to question the nature of art. And this questioning of the nature of art is a very important concept in understanding the function of art.

The function of art, as a question, was first raised by Marcel Duchamp. In fact-it is Marcel Duchamp whom we can credit with giving art its own identity. (One can certainly see a tendency toward this self-identification of art beginning with Manet and Cezanne through to Cubism,¹⁶ but their works are timid and ambiguous by comparison with Duchamp's). "Modern" art and the work before seemed connected by virtue of their morphology. Another way of putting it would be that art's "language" remained the same but it was saying new things. The event that made conceivable the realization that it was possible to "speak another language" and still make sense in art was Marcel Duchamp's first unassisted *Readymade*. With the unassisted *Readymade*, art changed its focus from the form of the language to what was being said. Which means that it changed the nature of art from a question of morphology to a question of function. This change — one from "appearance" to "conception" — was the beginning of "modern" art and the beginning of "conceptual" art. All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually.

The "value" of particular artists after Duchamp can be weighed according to how much they questioned the nature of art; which is another way of saying "what they *added* to the conception of art" or what wasn't there before they started. Artists question the nature of art by presenting new propositions as to art's nature. And to do this one cannot concern oneself with the handed-down "language" of traditional art, as this activity is based on the assumption that there is only one way of framing art propositions. But the very stuff of art is indeed greatly related to "creating" new propositions.

The case is often made — particularly in reference to Duchamp — that objects of art (such as the readymades, of course, but all art is implied in this) are judged as *objets d'art* in later years and the artists' *intentions* become irrelevant. Such an argument is the case of a preconceived notion ordering together not necessarily related facts. The point is this: aesthetics, as we have pointed out, are conceptually irrelevant to art. Thus, any physical thing can become *objet d'art*, that is to say, can be considered tasteful, aesthetically pleasing, etc. But this has no bearing on the object's application to an art context; that is, its *functioning* in an art context. (E.g. if a collector takes a painting, attaches legs, and uses it as a dining-table it's an act unrelated to art or the artist because, *as art*, that wasn't the artist's *intention*.)

And what holds true for Duchamp's work applies as well to most of the art after him. In other words, the value of Cubism — for instance — is its idea in the realm of art, not the physical or visual qualities seen in a specific painting, or the particularization of certain colours or shapes. For these colours and shapes are the art's "language," not its meaning conceptually as art. To look upon a Cubist "masterwork" *now* as art is nonsensical, conceptually speaking, as far as art is concerned. (That visual information which was unique in Cubism's language has now been generally absorbed and has a lot to do with the way in which one deals with painting "linguistically." [E.g. what a Cubist painting meant experientially and conceptually to, say, Gertrude Stein, is beyond our speculation because the same painting then "meant" something different than it does now.] The "value" now of an original Cubist painting is not unlike, in most respects, an original manuscript by Lord Byron, or *The Spirit of St. Louis* as it is seen in the Smithsonian Institute. Indeed, museums fill the very same function as the Smithsonian Institute — why else would the *Jeu de Paume* of the Louvre exhibit Cezanne's and Van Gogh's palettes as proudly as they do their paintings?) Actual works of art are little more than historical curiosities. As far as *art* is concerned Van Gogh's paintings aren't worth any more than his palette is. They are both "collector's items."¹⁷

Art "lives" through influencing other art, not by existing as the physical residue of an artist's ideas. The reason why different artists from the past are "brought alive" again is because some aspect of their work becomes "useable" by living artists. That there is no "truth" as to what art is seems quite unrealized.

What is the function of art, or the nature of art? If we continue our analogy of the forms art takes as being art's *language* one can realize then that a work of art is a kind of *proposition* presented within the context of art as a comment on art. We can then go

urther and analyse the types of "propositions."

J. Ayer's evaluation of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic is useful to us here: "A proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience."¹⁸ The analogy I will attempt to make is one between the art condition and the condition of the analytic proposition. In that they don't appear to be believable as anything else, or be about anything (other than art) the forms of art most clearly finally referable only to art have been forms closest to analytical propositions.

Works of art are analytic propositions. That is, if viewed within their context — as art — they provide no information whatsoever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in that it is a presentation of the artist's intention, that is, he is saying that that particular work of art *is* art, which means, is a *definition* of art. Thus, that it is art is true *a priori* (which is what Judd means when he states that "if someone calls it art, it's art").

Indeed, it is nearly impossible to discuss art in general terms without talking in tautologies — for to attempt to "grasp" art by any other "handle" is to merely focus on another aspect or quality of the proposition which is usually irrelevant to the art work's art condition." One begins to realize that art's "art condition" is a conceptual state. That the language forms which the artist frames his propositions in are often "private" codes or languages is an inevitable outcome of art's freedom from morphological constrictions; and it follows from this that one has to be familiar with contemporary art to appreciate it and understand it. Likewise one understands why the "man on the street" is intolerant to artistic art and always demands art in a traditional "language." (And one understands why formalist art sells "like hot cakes.") Only in painting and sculpture did the artists all speak the same language. What is called "Novelty Art" by the Formalists is often the attempt to find new languages, although a new language doesn't necessarily mean the framing of new propositions: e.g. most kinetic and electronic art.

Another way of stating in relation to art what Ayer asserted about the analytic method in the context of language would be the following: The validity of artistic propositions is not dependent on any empirical, much less any aesthetic, presupposition about the nature of things. For the artist, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way (1) in which art is capable of conceptual growth and (2) how his propositions are capable of logically following that growth.¹⁹

In other words, the propositions of art are not factual, but linguistic in *character* — that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental objects; they express definitions of art, or the formal consequences of definitions of art. Accordingly, we can say that art operates on a logic. For we shall see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical enquiry is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions (of art) and not with questions of empirical fact.²⁰

To repeat, what art has in common with logic and mathematics is that it is a tautology; i.e., the "art idea" (or "work") and art are the same and can be appreciated as art without going outside the context of art for verification.

On the other hand, let us consider why art cannot be (or has difficulty when it attempts to be) a synthetic proposition. Or, that is to say, when the truth or falsity of its assertion is verifiable on empirical grounds. Ayer states: ". . . The criterion by which we determine the validity of an *a priori* or analytical proposition is not sufficient to determine the validity of an empirical or synthetic proposition. For it is characteristic of empirical propositions that their validity is not purely formal. To say that a geometrical proposition, or a system of geometrical propositions, is false, is to say that it is self-contradictory. But an empirical proposition, or a system of empirical propositions, may be free from contradiction, and still be false. It is said to be false, not because it is formally defective, but because it fails to satisfy some material criterion."²¹

The unreality of "realistic" art is due to its framing as an art proposition in synthetic terms: one is always tempted to "verify" the proposition empirically. Realism's synthetic state does not bring one to a circular swing back into a dialogue with the larger framework of questions about the nature of *art* (as does the work of Malevich, Mondrian, Pollock, Reinhardt, early Rauschenberg,

Johns, Lichtenstein, Warhol, Andre, Judd, Flavin, LeWitt, Morris, and others), but rather, one is flung out of art's "orbit" into the "infinite space" of the human condition.

Pure Expressionism, continuing with Ayer's terms, could be considered as such: "A sentence which consisted of demonstrative symbols would not express a genuine proposition. It would be a mere ejaculation, in no way characterizing that to which it was supposed to refer." Expressionist works are usually such "ejaculations" presented in the morphological language of traditional art. If Pollock is important it is because he painted on loose canvas horizontally to the floor. What *isn't* important is that he later put those drippings over stretchers and hung them parallel to the wall. (In other words what is important in art is what one *brings* to it, not one's adoption of what was previously existing.) What is even less important to art is Pollock's notions of "self-expression" because those *kinds* of subjective meanings are useless to anyone other than those involved with him personally. And their "specific quality puts them outside of art's context.

"I do not make art," Richard Serra says, "I am engaged in an activity; if someone wants to call it art, that's his business, but it's not up to me to decide that. That's all figured out later." Serra, then, is very much aware of the implications of his work. If Serra is indeed just "figuring out what lead does" (gravitationally, molecularly, etc.) why should *anyone* think of it as art? If he doesn't take the responsibility of it being art, who can, or should? His work certainly appears to be empirically verifiable: lead can do and be used for many physical activities. In itself this does anything but lead us into a dialogue about the nature of art. In a sense then he is a primitive. He has no idea about art. How is it then that we know about "his activity"? Because he has told us it is art by his actions *after* "his activity" has taken place. That is, by the fact he is with several galleries, puts the physical residue of his activity in museums (and sells them to art collectors — but, as we have pointed out, collectors are irrelevant to the "condition of art" of a work). That he denies his work is art but plays the artist is more than just a paradox. Serra secretly feels that "arthood" is arrived at empirically. Thus, as Ayer has stated: "There are no absolutely certain empirical propositions. It is only tautologies that are certain. Empirical questions are one and all hypotheses, which may be confirmed or discredited in actual sense-experience. And the propositions in which we record the observations that verify these hypotheses are themselves hypotheses which are subject to the test of further sense-experience. Thus there is no final proposition." ²²

What one finds all throughout the writings of Ad Reinhardt is this very similar thesis of "art-as-art," and that "art is always dead, and a 'living' art is a deception." ²³ Reinhardt had a very clear idea about the nature of art, and his importance is far from recognized.

Because forms of art that can be considered synthetic propositions are verifiable by the world, that is to say, to understand these propositions one must leave the tautological-like framework of art and consider "outside" information. But to consider it as art it is necessary to ignore this same outside information, because outside information (experiential qualities, to note) have their own intrinsic worth. And to comprehend this worth one does not need a state of "art condition."

From this it is easy to realize that art's viability is not connected to the presentation of visual (or other) kinds of experience. That that may have been one of art's extraneous functions in the preceding centuries is not unlikely. After all, man in even the nineteenth century lived in a fairly standardized visual environment. That is, it was ordinarily predictable as to what he would be coming into contact with day after day. His visual environment in the part of the world in which he lived was fairly consistent. In our time we have an experientially drastically richer environment. One can fly all over the earth in a matter of hours and days, not months. We have the cinema, and colour television, as well as the man-made spectacle of the lights of Las Vegas or the skyscrapers of New York City. The whole world is there to be seen, and the whole world can watch man walk on the moon from their living rooms. Certainly art or objects of painting and sculpture cannot be expected to compete experientially with this?

The notion of "use" is relevant to art and its "language." Recently the box or cube form has been used a great deal within the context of art. (Take for instance its use by Judd, Morris, LeWitt, Bladen, Smith, Bell, and McCracken — not even mentioning the quantity of boxes and cubes that came after.) The difference between all the various uses of the box or cube form is directly related to the differences in the intentions of the artists. Further, as is particularly seen in Judd's work, the use of the box or

cube form illustrates very well our earlier claim that an object is only art when placed in the context of art.

A few examples will point this out. One could say that if one of Judd's box forms was seen filled with debris, seen placed in an industrial setting, or even merely seen setting on a street corner, it would not be identified with art. It follows then that understanding and consideration of it as an art work is necessary *a priori* to viewing it in order to "see" it as a work of art. Advance information about the concept of art and about an artist's concepts is necessary to the appreciation and understanding of contemporary art. Any and all of the physical attributes (qualities) of contemporary works if considered separately and/or specifically are irrelevant to the art concept. The art concept (as Judd said, though he didn't mean it this way) must be considered whole. To consider a concept's parts is invariably to consider aspects that are irrelevant to its art condition — or like leading *parts* of a definition.

It comes as no surprise that the art with the least fixed morphology is the example from which we decipher the nature of the general term "art." For where there is a context existing separately of its morphology and consisting of its function one is more likely to find results less conforming and predictable. It is in modern art's possession of a "language" with the shortest history that the plausibility of the abandonment of that "language" becomes most possible. It is understandable then that the art that came out of Western painting and sculpture is the most energetic, questioning (of its nature), and the least assuming of all the general "art" concerns. In the final analysis, however, all of the arts have but (in Wittgenstein's terms) a "family" resemblance.

Let the various qualities relatable to an "art condition" possessed by poetry, the novel, the cinema, the theatre, and various forms of music, etc., is that aspect of them most reliable to the function of art as asserted here.

Is not the decline of poetry relatable to the implied metaphysics from poetry's use of "common" language as an art language? ²⁴ In New York the last decadent stages of poetry can be seen in the move by "Concrete" poets recently toward the use of actual objects and theatre.²⁵ Can it be that they feel the unreality of their art form?

We see now that the axioms of a geometry are simply definitions, and that the theorems of a geometry are simply the logical consequences of these definitions. A geometry is not in itself about physical space; in itself it cannot be said to be 'about' anything. But we can use a geometry to reason about physical space. That is to say, once we have given the axioms a physical interpretation, we can proceed to apply the theorems to the objects which satisfy the axioms. Whether a geometry can be applied to the actual physical world or not, is an empirical question which falls outside the scope of geometry itself. There is no sense, therefore, in asking which of the various geometries known to us are false and which are true. In so far as they are all free from contradiction, they are all true. The proposition which states that a certain application of a geometry is possible is not itself a proposition of that geometry. All that the geometry itself tells us is that if anything can be brought under the definitions, it will also satisfy the theorems. It is therefore a purely logical system, and its propositions are purely analytic propositions." —A. J. Ayer²⁶

Here then I propose rests the viability of art. In an age when traditional philosophy is unreal because of its assumptions, art's ability to exist will depend not only on its *not* performing a service — as entertainment, visual (or other) experience, or decoration — which is something easily replaced by kitsch culture and technology, but rather, it will remain viable by *not* assuming a philosophical stance; for in art's unique character is the capacity to remain aloof from philosophical judgements. It is in this context that art shares similarities with logic, mathematics and, as well, science. But whereas the other endeavours are useful, art is not. Art indeed exists for its own sake.

In this period of man, after philosophy and religion, art may possibly be one endeavour that fulfills what another age might have called "man's spiritual needs." Or, another way of putting it might be that art deals analogously with the state of things "beyond physics" where philosophy had to make assertions. And art's strength is that even the preceding sentence is an assertion and cannot be verified by art. Art's only claim is for art. Art is the definition of art.

¹ Morton White, **The Age of Analysis**, Mentor Books, New York, p. 14. ² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

² I mean by this Existentialism and Phenomenology. Even Merleau-Ponty, with his middle-of-the-road position between Empiricism and Rationalism cannot express his philosophy without the use of words (thus using concepts); and following this, how can one discuss experience without sharp distinctions between ourselves and the world?

⁴ Sir James Jeans, **Physics and Philosophy**, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., p. 17. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 190. ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁷ The task such philosophy has taken upon itself is the only "function" it could perform without making philosophic assertions.

⁸ This is dealt with in the following section.

⁹ I would like to make it clear, however, that I intend to speak for no one else. I arrived at these conclusions alone, and indeed, it is from this thinking that my art since 1966 (if not before) evolved. Only recently did I realize after meeting Terry Atkinson that he and Michael Baldwin share similar, though certainly not identical, opinions to mine.

¹⁰ **Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language.**

¹¹ The conceptual level of the work of Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Morris Louis, Ron Davis, Anthony Caro, John Hoyland, Dan Christensen et al. is so dismally low, that any that is there is supplied by the critics promoting it. This is seen later.

¹² Michael Fried's reasons for using Greenberg's rationale reflect his background (and most of the other formalist critics) as a "scholar," but more so it is due to his desire, I suspect, to bring his scholarly studies into the modern world. One can easily sympathize with his desire to connect, say, Tiepolo with Jules Olitski. One should never forget, however, that an historian loves history more than anything, even art.

¹³ Lucy Lippard uses this quotation in a footnote to Ad Reinhardt's retrospective catalogue, p. 28.

¹⁴ Lucy Lippard again, in her **Hudson Review** review of the last painting exhibition of the Whitney Annual.

¹⁵ "Four interviews," by Arthur R. Rose, **Arts Magazine**, Feb. 1969.

¹⁶ As Terry Atkinson pointed out in his introduction to **Art Language** (vol. 1, no. 1), the Cubists never questioned **if** art had morphological characteristics, but **which** ones in **painting** were acceptable.

¹⁷ When someone "buys" a Flavin he isn't buying a light show, for if he was he could just go to a hardware store and get the goods for considerably less. He isn't "buying" anything. He is subsidizing Flavin's activity as an artist.

¹⁸ A. J. Ayer, **Language, Truth, and Logic**, Dover, New York, p. 78. ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 57. ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57. ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 90. ²² *Ibid.*, p. 94.

²³ Ad Reinhardt's retrospective catalogue (Jewish Museum) written by Lucy Lippard, p. 12.

²⁴ It is poetry's use of common language to attempt to **say the unsayable** which is problematic, not any inherent problem in the use of language within the context of art.

²⁵ Ironically, many of them call themselves "Conceptual Poets." Much of this work is very similar to Walter de Maria's work and this is not coincidental; de Maria's work functions as a kind of "object" poetry, and his intentions are very poetic: he really wants his work to change men's lives.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

Frederick Barthelme

To outline the present situation in art we must first agree that the bulk of substantial information in and about the modern world is commonly held by all. We must also agree that in any sub-system (e.g. art, law, finance), the bulk of relevant information in and about that system is commonly held by those persons participating in it. In this situation what the artist has in mind is never very foreign to any audience member, and as a result virtually every presentation is rhetorical. The tendency of recent art toward the elimination of unwanted meanings, toward the imposition of an intentional, "real" meaning on an audience member, makes little sense in view of this new situation. If the audience member already knows in substance what the artist is trying to "tell" him (either as experience or idea), then the artist's effort is superfluous.

Additionally, the conventional communication system involving an object or object-substitute is uncomfortably clumsy. Although it may be the case that one cannot communicate without communicating *about* something (just as one cannot think without thinking

of something), it must be possible to economize the mechanics of the process. In art the communication is further compromised by being forced through a physical object or its substitute. Instead of A to B, the communication must travel A to A', then A' to B. Even this tiny complication plays havoc with the precision of the communication.

In order to avoid this object constriction, and the problem of isolated meanings, most of my work locates the presentation/perception process in the individual audience member. He must present the art to himself, and perceive it for himself. But so that there is nothing left of my action to act as an art object (e.g. an instruction, a document), it is necessary to break apart the communication of the art and the art itself. The presentations of the "being" pieces describe the art in conventional literary terms. As a result of this descriptive function the presented information specifically rejects the role of art-object-substitute (by defining its role in relation to the art, the information avoids being confused with the art). The conditions described by the presented information are intrinsic to the potential experience, but they are not necessarily its essence.

My role is that of a person nudging a friend in mutual recognition of some peculiar roadside sight, as distinguished from trying to describe the same sight to the same friend some time later over the telephone. The "art" or "meaning" of the work does not come directly from the presented information (the nudge), but must be inferred individually by each audience member (the friend) from his experience of the described conditions. In these works I am not interested in presenting anything for people to see, experience or think about. I am interested in suggesting conditions which, defining an art context, allow the inference of any meaning.

On Kawara

'I Am Still Alive'

Christine Kozlov

(1) For the duration of the show the tape recorder will be constantly on record. The recorder is equipped with a loop tape so that as new sounds are recorded the previous sounds recorded are erased. (2) A series of cables sent during the exhibition supplying information about the amount of concepts rejected during that time. (3) Figurative work which is a listing of everything eaten for a period of six months. (4) 271 blank sheets of paper corresponding to 271 days of concepts rejected. (5) Recorded sound of Bell Telephone operator stating time (duration 24 hours). (6) Information drift: combined recordings of news bulletins of the shootings of Andy Warhol and Robert Kennedy. (7) Film no. 2 white leader-16 mm-100 feet. (8) Film no. 1 all black (exposed) 8 mm-100 feet. (9) Practice Project, learning how to type and ending with non-prose non-poem language, system/structure: context of learning how to type, accomplishment: 1. learned how to type, 2. conceptual non-conceptual 'art'. (10) Compositions for Audio Structure – a coding system for sound.

Terry Atkinson
Michael Baldwin
David Bainbridge
Harold Hurrell

1. *NOTES ON SUBSTANCE CONCEPTS (ART OBJECTS)*
2. *368 YEAR OLD SPECTATOR*
3. *SUNNYBANK (TEXT ONLY)*
4. *NOTES: HAROLD HURRELL*

NOTES ON SUBSTANCE CONCEPTS (ART OBJECTS)

Art object is not a substance concept, yet, coincidence under the concept Art Object might give satisfactory ways of answering identity questions for art objects. But there is no definite way of counting art objects.

It's controversial whether painting or sculpture are substance concepts: the complexity of any counting thesis gives rise to the possibility of serious ambiguity of intention with respect to any strict standards governing substantialization of particulars. But the distinction remains, whatever the position of 'countability', between the requirement of saying 'one' or 'two' for x and y fs which are identified and referred to in a context and the problematic requirement of a general method of enumeration of fs

All this is incidental to the examination of the capacity of an object to have this or that sortal applied to it. It might be asked of what concept the concept SCULPTURE could be.

If some sort of spurious Lockean conception of a sculpture is held-out and emphasis on physical structure, etc. is pushed to the extent of making a radical distinction between sculpture and other art objects, then the open answer that SCULPTURE straightforwardly restricts OBJECT implicitly proposes either a relativised identity or some sort of simplistic criterion. If SCULPTURE is in some use a (non aesthetical) qualification of ART OBJECT, there is nothing in the use of it that could prevent its turning-out to be, in some sense, a cross classification with respect to aesthetical classifications, and to include paintings etc. But if ART OBJECT which SCULPTURE qualifies in this way, already by itself had an autonomous individuating force which was simply equivalent to that of object of aesthetic appraisal then either object continuity would have to arbitrate identity questions about sculptures or one would be presented again with the logical possibility of relativised identity.

There can be suggested two complementary replies to questions of 'equivalence'. The first one might be to refuse to equate ART OBJECT with OBJECT OF ESTHETIC APPRAISAL, adapt the sufficient individuating procedures to things no-one has regularly etc. asserted art objecthood, and extend this procedure as far down a 'tree' so long as there remain discernible functional differences between different members of any one 'species' of objects.

The other thing is that ART OBJECT is not really individuating in the same way that SCULPTURE PAINTING, RELIEF etc. are supposed to be. What coincidence under the concept art object amounts to differs according to the kind of art object. And this is to suggest that the 'genus' sortal is less fundamental than the 'species' one. And this is an essentialistic move (but one whose initial points and methodological bases are exclusively extensional: it is Leibniz and a rejection of QUA). But none of this has to lead to an Aristotelian apotheosis of THE SPECIES in particular. (This concept is an insecure one in plant taxonomy, and as Woodger pointed out, is threatened even in zoology by such phenomena as ring species and the imperfect transitivity of the

relation 'interbreeds in the wild with' – the operational test of identity of species.) The thing that does now acquire some sort of privileged status is the highest genuine sortal concept in any chain of restrictions appetent to it, which carries with it autonomous individuating capability sufficient to determine without reference to lower sortals the coincidence and persistence conditions for any object covered by it (any g for highest sortal gn). If sculpture might cross classify lump of stone and, say, painting, then either the cross classification must be resolved in some one sortal classification, genuine and higher of both sculptured and lumps of stone or sculpture has no classificatory purport at-all. The only way this dilemma can be coped with is through judicious explication and this is not settled, when someone denies that the cross classification can be resolved, in the second aspect of the dilemma, by saying that SCULPTURE may be a concept which only becomes fully determinate as an individuating concept when one is told what sort of sculpture, e.g. lump of stone sculpture, or painting sculpture. And neither is it fully resolved (qua context) by pointing out that it is only in this way that high genera can be said to individuate individuals or give covering concepts for their identities.

368 YEAR OLD SPECTATOR

A note on a notion of a 368 year old spectator

When we are talking of seeing an event such as a play, a football match, or a sheepdog trial we implicitly refer to such entities as temporal wholes. For example, when we say 'We've seen an exhibition of gymnastics', the assertion of a 'beginning' and 'ending' is strongly attached. But when we say 'We have seen an exhibition of paintings' the emphasis seems to attach more to the spatial characteristics of the situation rather than to the temporal ones. Perhaps the implicit emphasis in this latter case is more that we started and finished at some place rather than at some time. The contrast might be elucidated perhaps if we use the verb 'watch' rather than the verb 'see'.

Thus, if we insert 'watched' in place of 'saw' in the sentence 'We saw a football match', giving 'We watched a football match' there does not seem to be any great alteration in the (common usage) sense of the sentence; both sentences seem pretty well interchangeable. If we insert 'watched' in place of 'saw' in the sentence 'We saw an exhibition of paintings' giving 'We watched an exhibition of paintings' we seem to have altered the reference toward emphasising the 'beginning' and 'ending' of our seeing the paintings. Rather like a sentinel's watch is measured off as a temporal slice. This reference is, obviously, embedded in the sentence 'We saw an exhibition of paintings' but at a more hidden or obscure level.

Some philosophic constructs that might be relevant here are those of 'substance sortal' and 'phase sortal'. A substance sortal is a concept under which are classified material bodies (e.g. table, tree, arm, etc.). A phase sortal is a concept under which are classified events (e.g. boyhood, football match, interval, etc.).

A material body can sensibly be discriminated by sight, hearing, touch, etc. For example 'Julius Caesar' can name both a material body and an event, depending on how we use it. If we talk of 'Julius Caesar's body' we refer to the spatial form of the body named Julius Caesar. Such an entity can be classified as once being a member of the class 'substance sortal'. If we talk of 'Julius Caesar's life' then we refer to the length of time that the material body named 'Julius Caesar's body' existed. If, for example, we had observed Julius Caesar's life from his birth to his death we might have required only one identificatory concept named Julius Caesar, such a notion is plain nonsense but perhaps useful in this context. Perhaps we can proceed as follows.

As our empirical experience stands it seems that we require the two identificatory concepts of 'substance' to denote a spatial entity and 'event' to denote a temporal entity. And yet it is possible to place ourselves in a theoretical position where the ramifications of such a question as the following one can be considered. Is the question of whether or not we assign an entity to

the class 'substance sortal' or to the class 'phase sortal' simply a question of how long we continuously observe it? The answer is clearly 'No'. If we direct questions towards an art object of a parallel nature to those we have directed towards Julius Caesar we might, for example, come up with the following:

1. Can we (and if so, how) discriminate between the material body named 'art object' and the event named 'art object'? (Obviously this does not convincingly spirit away the name-description dichotomy, i.e. 'art object' can be used as either name or description.
2. Does the word 'object' itself already contain, concealed, the type criterion we use to distinguish particulars?

It is feasible that the colour of, say, a Rembrandt painting may now be a different colour to the colour it was in 1668, say December 12th 1668. Let us now further suppose a spectator who has lived for 368 years, and is apparently in robust health, with good eyesight and an efficient memory. We are listening to him talking about the aforementioned Rembrandt painting as he observes it in front of him.

'On this painting I see in front of me now the colour on the area representing the man's hat has changed during the time I have intermittently observed it over the past 300 years.'

Assuming our long-lived spectator has normal, good, vision, the area of the painting will have changed colour at a rate too slow for our spectator to perceive directly, i.e. he will not have perceived any direct 'changing'. The logic of the interaction between the spectator and the painting would have to account for the following factors: spectator S will simply remember that at time t_1 , the area A of the painting was colour X, whilst at time t_2 the area A of the painting was/is colour Y. (This is analogous to the way we detect a slow puncture, although the temporal factor involved is much more extensive.) In the case of the slow puncture we can ask (at the risk of appearing deranged), 'Is the tyre down the same tyre as the tyre up?' In practical matters we are, plainly, obliged to answer 'Yes', but in certain theoretical contexts we can offer other possibilities. This will entail questioning our notion of 'substance', and further in context of art questioning our notion of 'substance' entails questioning our notion of art object. A theoretical spectator who sees time-slices rather than material continuants would hold out a marked contrast of viewing (perusing)-process to that entailed in our present processes. It seems to have been blandly and numbly assumed that the emphasis in fine art practise will remain upon the ancient procedure of 'shallow' context object making.

Suppose 'things' to have a branching structure in their temporal dimension. We may for instance, suppose that the earlier temporal parts of a certain four dimensional object are undivided spatially, whilst its later temporal parts are divided spatially. Thus suppose we have triptych A constructed at time t_1 and at time t_2 (say, now) there is object B (say, in the Prado), object C (say, in the Louvre) and object D (say, in the National Gallery, London). A rudimentary logic of the extension in time of objects of this sort has been developed by logicians. Such developments might well be examined in context of questioning the norms of art-making and procedures of 'viewing' art objects or art works.

NOTES: HAROLD HURRELL

In preliminary notes for 'Concerning the interpretation of the Bainbridge/Hurrell models', Atkinson argued that "The engineering supplies the object with a function apart from the visual form; this function links the spectator as a transient component of the system."

In fact, in the case of Fluidic Device I, the engineering supplies the function (fA) with a (physical) model (having function fB, that is mentioned at by Atkinson) having visual-tactile properties.

However, it is not the prime function of the engineering to provide visual-tactile participation, just as it is not the prime function of the (physical) model to exhibit visual-tactile properties.

The prime function of the (physical) model is to exhibit similarities with one in which it is the prime function to exhibit visual-tactile properties, and it is the prime function of the engineering to be employed in a way similar to its employment in a work in which it is the prime function to provide visual-tactile participation.*1

Bainbridge has argued the unimportance of the physical object (MI)*2 and has also discussed the importance of the unimportance of the condition 'working' as a necessary attribute of MI's exhibitability.*3

Part II of Fluidic Device articulates in categorical terms the working and not-working condition and the functioning and malfunctioning condition of the theoretical engineering model for Fluidic Device I. Part II consists in a set of truth tables setting out the conditional behaviour of the model's component part functions.

Part II is not obtained by 'direct (single levelled) read out' from Part I (the object). (The variety involved is of the order 3,500+ states; the truth tables are obtained using a computer.) This strategy may be taken as indicating certain objectives in the function (fA) of the work as a whole.

Part II describes all conditions of function and malfunction of the (engineering) functions of Part I. Though Part I may or may not assume during its life all of these conditions, it is quite beyond its capacity due to its theoretical and engineering similarity with other Cybernetic/Kinetic art objects to *show* directly (by single levelled read out from the object), and discriminate between, the many states of malfunction.*4

Concern is felt for *order* and *kind* in state description. Single levelled direct read out from the object may show one or other of these classes of description but not both together. Traditionally, Cybernetic/Kinetic works are concerned for *kind* of state description (visual-tactile variety). Assumption of *order* in the description ('working' as opposed to 'not working') is usually placed on the observation that kinds of (working) variety actually occur; no provision is made for kinds of not working variety. (from *4) In the work referred to as 'traditional' malfunctioning variety is indiscriminable from functioning variety; that's not to say that it may not be reclassified as indeterminate variety, but even this strategem (if strategem it be) does not account for the omission of access to variety of the malfunction kind in the 'not-working' order.

As far as 'read out' from the work as a whole is concerned, Part II renders Part I redundant, indeed part of the function fB, of the physical model is to be so rendered redundant, in favour of the fulfillment of fA through Part II. If the 'display' of the work as a whole is under consideration, Part I is not redundant since its being displayed would not represent a redundant objective in the work. (*1) Another function of Part I was to serve operationally in deriving the work, on this basis the redundancy of Part I is open to discussion.

Both MI and Fluidic Device may be considered as intending to draw attention to the concepts 'functioning in' and 'functioning as', in', art discourse.

*2 'Notes on MI'. *Art-Language*, vol. I.

*3 On the occasion of Part I's being exhibited (Birmingham G.B.) the *Guardian* critic, Myfanwy Kitchen, wrote "The invention is not aesthetic, it is functional, or apparently would be if only some oxygen cylinders had arrived."

Cybernetic Artwork that nobody broke . . .

(If the participant had put A equal to B and B equal to either 1 or \emptyset , A would then be defined.)

'TELCOMP' designers hold that the application of the variable entails the assignment of the value to it. It is assumed that the programmer does not contest this.

Though discussion of works purporting to establish 'interaction' between an 'observer' say, and a 'work' say, in these categorical terms obviously yields fruit, the exclusive application of this method soon renders discussion desultory.

See Mike Thompson's article in *Art-Language*, vol. 1, no. 2.

Cybernetic Artwork constructed with the computer language 'TELCOMP'

The language 'TELCOMP' provides the variety, the programme "designs" the work and participation with the work by a "spectator" takes place at the teletype keyboard connected on line to the computer.

Programme;—

TYPE ALL PARTS

1.1 TYPE "YOU HAVE RED"
1.2 TYPE "YOU HAVE GREEN"
1.3 TYPE "YOU HAVE BLUE"
1.4 TYPE "YOU HAVE YELLOW"
1.5 TYPE "YOU HAVE NOTHING, OBEY INSTRUCTIONS!"

3.06 TYPE # FOR PP=1:1:3

3.1 TYPE "TYPE EITHER 1 OR \emptyset IN BOTH A AND B."

3.15 TYPE #

3.2 DEMAND A

3.3 DEMAND B

3.4 DO STEP 1.1 IF A= \emptyset AND B= \emptyset

3.5 DO STEP 1.2 IF A= \emptyset AND B=1

3.6 DO STEP 1.3 IF A=1 AND B= \emptyset

3.7 DO STEP 1.4 IF A=1 AND B=1

3.8 DO STEP 1.5 IF A \rangle ₁1 OR A \langle 1 OR B \rangle 1 OR B \langle \emptyset

3.9 TO STEP 3.06

DELETE ALL

TYPE EITHER 1 OR \emptyset IN BOTH A AND B.

A=1

B=1

YOU HAVE YELLOW

TYPE EITHER 1 OR \emptyset IN BOTH A AND B.

A=8

B=3

YOU HAVE NOTHING, OBEY INSTRUCTIONS!

TYPE EITHER 1 OR \emptyset IN BOTH A AND B.

A=1

B= \emptyset

YOU HAVE BLUE

TYPE EITHER 1 OR Ø IN BOTH A AND B. B=1 YOU HAVE YELLOW	A=1
TYPE EITHER 1 OR Ø IN BOTH A AND B. B=Ø YOU HAVE RED	A=Ø
TYPE EITHER 1 OR Ø IN BOTH A AND B. ERROR AT STEP 3.2 R IS UNDEFINED	A=R

Linguistics and Toys at the ICA', Jonathan Benthall. Studio International, January 1970, Extract:—

'Apart from Mike Chilton's 'lantern for outdoors' — not seen to best advantage in a lighted interior — the electronic exhibits were disappointing, and too many seem technically unreliable. One knows that such exhibits are exposed to a great deal of wear and tear from visitors and one knows that often it is expensive to build high reliability in. However, the problem must be looked into, for an exhibition of kinetic or electronic devices which don't work is about as interesting as an athletic contest where the athletes have broken legs. The E.A.T. paper 'Techne' contains statistical information on the performance of 75 pieces (electronic, electro-mechanical and mechanical) at a New York exhibition a year ago. 37 pieces were operative for 100% of the time, 12 for 90-99% of the time, and the remainder for a small percentage. At any given time, an average of 13 pieces were out of order. 5 pieces were broken by the public and not repaired.

'E.A.T. suggest that specially trained engineers are needed to ensure efficient running of such exhibitions. Where I strongly disagree with E.A.T. is their statement that 'if aesthetic values are assigned to reliability then some of the best works could never be shown to the public'. 100% reliability is a logical impossibility. However, aesthetic values are quite rightly assigned to good engineering, whereby reliability is brought to a reasonable level in a given operating context. (If the operating context requires that a button be pressed once a minute by small sticky fingers, then this must be taken into account at the design stage.)''

The proposal that Cybernetic/Kinetic Art Shows need the supervision of tool-kitted mechanics derives from an operationalist standpoint towards appraisal of the objectives underlying the works featured at these events.

The operationalist outlook is not stated, only implied, but categorical terms of the sort — 'unreliable', 'operative', 'out of order', 'broken', 'repaired', can only have, without quantifiers, incomplete application in operationalist theory (and 'objective' is a relativistic term in operationalism). Given this shortcoming, the efficacy at least, of the engineering concepts, might indeed be more readily guaranteed by exchanging some of the tools for ideas.

One's not out to discredit operationalist strategy but strategy is not theory. Ensuring the (engineering) reliability of a Cybernetic/Kinetic work may 'get it over to the observer' but raises the status of the work only in so far as this strategy exposes to theory what it is that is so got over (et al.).

'Work-observer' is a categorical distinction and must be framed in exposition of a categorical nature.

Were E.A.T. to carry out a statistical analysis of the performance of 'observers', some basis for operationalist theory might be established.

SUNNYBANK

The initial assertion is that a wall between 26 and 25 Sunnybank *is* an art object. Now the possible outcomes of what's going on include the building of a wall between those two houses; such a wall is an art object.

This raises the possibly jejune question whether any vestige of the formal properties of identity is to be salvaged. And this question is asked not necessarily from the point of view of 'essentialism'. The point is that it looks as if one is individuating something as an art object, but what he appears to individuate it as may in some sense determine what's singled out, but any connection with a principle of individuation is, to say the least, tenuous. And even the postulation of surrogate contemporary objects of future ones doesn't hold singling-out on the rails for long. It looks as if it will have to be shown how the singling out is done if an essentialistic view is to be supported. It's worth while making at least a glossy survey of these problems (and others) so as to propound the efficacy of developing a theory of the esthetic domain. And this also to show that such a theory is not inevitably committed to revisionary metaphysics or circumlocuted by the novel. And if identity has no place in the domain of art objects then there is every reason to show that it has none.

Now, the possible outcomes of what's going-on don't include the starting to exist of an individual individuated as 'the wall between 26 and 25 Sunnybank'. Those outcomes do include the possibility that there shall be an individual built, etc. and that it will be singled out as 'the wall between 26 and 25 Sunnybank'. Any individual's starting to exist and being a wall between 26 and 25 will amount to a realization of this possibility. But it can't be said of an individual that it is possible that it should begin to exist and things happen to it etc. A. N. Prior points out in his book *Papers on Time and Tense* that there just can't be a possibility of this kind except with respect to what already exists . . . 'and so no possibility of this sort of existence itself'.

And it can't just be got out of by the plea (and perhaps the apology) that one is a prophet. The remark that the wall between 26 and 25 is a supposititious individual remains to be analysed in extraneous contexts (e.g. Mereology). And it is only one limb of the assertion that deals with the 'merely' possible i.e. the necessarily general (Peirce). There's no more than lip service to that anyway, if the desiderata about identity are to remain.

Prior, in *Time and Modality*, asks what is wrong with the Barcan formula $CM \ x\phi \ x M\phi$ when it is taken to mean 'if it is, will be or has been the case that something ϕ s then there is something which is ϕ ing, has ϕ d or will ϕ '. A sense of identity has been preserved here. Prior asserts that the counter example to it would also suffice to refute the more elementary formula, taken to mean 'if it will be the case that something ϕ s, then there is something which will ϕ '. The first form entails the other. What's wrong with it is that the consequent asserts that something already existing will ϕ , whereas the antecedent doesn't assert its existence. The only grounds for agreement are in the view that whatever is going to exist in the future is already in existence. And this is to hold out for sempiternal individuals. And even if it were the case that matter, as well as being indestructible was also uncreated, it would still be silly because one would have to hold-out for some unfair construals and interpretation of 'is' (a constitutive one?). The point is that there wouldn't be an 'is' of identity at-all; it's not suggested that what will constitute W is A. Metaphysical justification is academic. Even if it were the case that whatever exists at any time exists at all times, there is no inconsistency in denying it. And recognition and statement of time distinctions is a necessary element of a theory (of the art object here considered). It must be remembered that a wall can at least be a value of bound variables — so far. It looks as if it is in this position at all times, then it is at all times an object. Comprehensive objecthood just informs one that there are already facts about these objects even if they are not yet existent: although an object may occupy only a finite stretch of space-time it stands in a variety of relations to all space-time stretches timelessly.

Prior's objection to this attenuated form of the sempiternity hypothesis runs: The form 'x exists' must be equivalent to and definable as (logically equivalent) 'there are facts about x'. That it is hard to see what they are, if there are facts about x (present tense) is no indication that there are no facts about x. And it may be a necessity for tense logic that 'there are facts about x' is entailed by 'x exists', it is yet to be shown that it is for the present considerations. That people are happier about granting that objects which don't exist can't be properly named and that there are no facts directly about them than they are about granting the

one thing for past existents is no indication that if things were e.g. the other way round they would be queer and irrational. Professor Grunbaum has suggested that 'the flux of time consists in the instantaneous awarenesses of both the temporal order and the diversity of the membership of the set of remembered (recorded) or forgotten events, awarenesses in each of which the instant of its own occurrence constitutes a distinguished element'. The happiness doesn't emanate from any presupposition of the categorical nature of time.

The ameliorated situation in which it is asserted that logical possibility and necessity are independent of the 'passage' of time is not one of oversimplification. Whilst it might be granted that it is a contingent necessity that there are no distinguishable truths (not even logical ones) until there are things to be the subjects of these truths, the 'passage' of time only eliminates certain possibilities (in the sense of outcomes of states of affairs in actuality, etc.) it doesn't follow from this that the opposite 'change' occurs with logical possibility: this only contingently effects statements of logical possibility. The point is, anyway, that the 'passage' of time doesn't cause anything to be unalterable which might have been otherwise, and there is no logically compelling multiplication of the different subjects to which one's predications are attached.

There's a requirement that one remain with 'continuants' (Cf. Woods) since the individual variables of e.g. tense logic are supposed to be about them. Walls are supposed to be typical individuals of this sort. And the original classificatory assertion was tense-bound.

The non-existence of a wall doesn't imply that the assertion about the art object (A) is of the same type as 'The King of France is bald'. (Some of the early questions of tense may be answered with regard to a less hieratic interpretation of 'possible than that' mentioned later: and this may entail yet other quantification 'over'.)

The remark that the sentence which contains the predicable 'is an art object' isn't a referring one, does not indicate that what isn't referred to isn't an art object. Nor does it preclude the appearance of a theory of a grammatical criterion of 'introduction'. The other thing, here, is that the use of a special type of instantial (if it is in any way strange or special) doesn't carry along with it a background of ghostly objects. A theory of A, (either an assertoric taxonomically placed one, or an aesthetic, 'positioning' one) doesn't involve the business of entification.

The non-satisfaction of a presupposition of existence won't make 'A' fail to 'refer'. It isn't necessary to give any intransigent theoretical explanation of categorical criteria. But if one is to consider the elements of the assertion as 'terms' (Cf. Geach), then the conditions of introducing particular and universal ones into propositions must be examined. And this is appropriate because it is within the range of a theory's exegesis that it is decidable which terms are capable of use inside.

Strawson (*Individuals*) says that 'In order for an identifying reference to be made to a particular, there must be some true empirical proposition known, in some not too exacting sense of those words, to the speaker, to the effect that there is just one particular which answers to a certain description. Mutatis mutandis, a similar condition must be satisfied for a hearer, in order for it to be the case that there is some particular which the hearer takes the speaker to be referring to'. He adds that a neutral terminology of 'term introduction' may be used without in any way altering the efficacy of what's said there. It is evident that on Strawson's criteria (empirical proposition) there is a failure of identifying reference. (Though this is on a relatively parsimonious interpretation of 'empirical' and of 'known'.) But the question is raised whether or not the failure to introduce a particular term is any bar on the statement of a 'quite definite fact' about the world. It is commensurate with the earlier interpretation of 'empirical' to suggest that there is then no statement of any 'quite definite fact'. But what this really says is that characteristic factual questions are empirical ones. It is shown in 'Reference and generality' that to ask the question 'which garden?' in response to the statement that 'our piece of land is a garden' is to make an apparently absurd remark. The point is that it would be to ask a question at the wrong end of a redundant list. Another point about reference which Geach makes centres around what he calls 'Buridan's Law': 'The Principle that the reference of an expression E must be specifiable in some way that does not involve first determining the truth value of the proposition occurring in E'. And this involves 'first knowing what the proposition is about' and the production of evidence of the satisfaction of a criterion of identity.

Geach asserts that 'a logical subject need not be in the nominative case'. In Russell's terms, the object named by a name may be called its bearer. There is no temporal reference involved in questions whether a proper name in a given use has a bearer, and whether this or that object is that bearer. But the relation of a predicable to what it applies to does admit of temporal qualification. But this is not to say that it is a logical matter to decide (or to show the way to reach a decision) what can and can't be TRUE of a man who doesn't exist yet: (assuming that the use of his name is just not [at present], possible).

Frege pointed out that if 'every mammal is a vertebrate' is turned into 'the class of mammals is included in the class of vertebrates' the predicate is no longer 'vertebrate' but 'included in the class of vertebrates' and 'is included in' is not the copula but the copula plus a bit of the predicate. (Mentioned Geach, *Reference and Generality*, p. 37.) If a tensed proposition has a copula, the tense is with that copula only because the copula is grammatically a verb. But, as Geach points out, a tensed proposition need not contain copula. If the distinction between a disjunction of proper names and a disjunction of propositions is used to explain the difference between the two 'modes of reference' then there have to be cases where quantification is irrelevant to the truth value of the proposition: so 'a wall' and 'some wall' might coincide in inferential strength.

Some rule of inference is required which does not involve presupposing a mode of reference (or supposition) of a term, and which would not limit the use of terms on epistemological or existential grounds. And this would be much the same thing. The point is that one hasn't even got 'confusion' of a referring mode of a 'phrase', so any discussion of inferential 'force' or 'weight' of a proposition is precluded. And this is considered through an examination of purported reference (i.e., not a discussion of the conditions sufficient for referring, but one of those necessary for reference).

Now, it's possible to consider the relation between the question of the existence or non-existence of an 'element' (about which there was preliminarily no question of its existence) and the position of purported reference to it in a context (Theory) in which there is talk about it. The possibility which comes out of this is that it is possible to refer to X when the contextual assumption which makes such reference possible (partly) is that X exists; also that it is possible to refer to XY when the contextual assumption which makes that reference possible (partly) is that XY doesn't exist. The point is that these assumptions have to be preliminarily made: where the notion of reference is preserved in a given context. Also, given the existence or non-existence of X is assumed for a context in which there is purported reference to X, the denial of one or the other changes the position of such purported reference. And it's only such a denial of contextual assumptions which in rebus alters the purported reference to X. It must be asserted that this is necessarily one way traffic; the notion of inference which may be based on the facts above is limited, but it isn't just a strategical one. It isn't a theoretical task to provide a rule (or rules) in terms of which one can infer the existence or non-existence of an art object, when the particular context is not shown. The only point which can be sorted out is that if one infers that the existence of art object A is assumed for a purported 'act' of reference to A, then to contradict that assumption is to require an adjustment in the position of the purported reference to A in the given context (theory). One says that a wall which will be (possibly etc.) between 26 and 25 Sunnybank is an art object; if reference is implicit in making such a statement, then with respect to one sort of inference, it is necessary that it be deducible that there is something to which reference is made. The question is what that is said to be. To make reference in the above statement is to appear to define a sufficient condition of being an art object. The contextual inference is that there is nothing in making the statement to establish such a condition. And there's nothing around to enforce the condition. And this is not just showing up arbitrarily where the question could be raised as to where the lines circumscribing the theoretical interests of the artist are to be drawn. But such contextual assumptions (at least in the tensed situation and when one is looking for identity statements) are pretty useless. That there is not an established place for the 'group' outside the theory (and won't be one) is just an indication that the assertion can be made even when the truth and falsity of the statement is irrelevant.

One can't but have some determinate wall, when one has it. And anyone can hang around and wait for a determinate wall. But it might be argued that one waits around for only a wall. When it gets built there is no in rebus disjunction. A wall when it gets built may not be identical with a number of walls non relationally combined. But this is O.K. so long as there are already a number of alternative walls already in existence. The problems arise when anyone gets to raise a disjunction concerning the determinacy of the theory of the art object. There's also a problem here which must come from staying with the romance of 'absolute becoming'

o-called). The difficulty of the 'other directional' identity arises when the walls 'will exist' – i.e. exist in the future. And the same follows for the art object: and the haecceity of a wall is not what holds the art object on the rails. In fact the art object immediately comes off them when someone comes along and sorts out 'the wall between 26 and 25 s' etc.

o statement of art can come into distinct logical conflict with a statement of observation so long as they remain stratified in terms of a common level of logical relations. But the possibility of 'porose schlusse' informs one that the connection(s) which are possible aren't arm-twisting ones: and this is because of the (contingent) incompleteness of data. There is the possibility of porosity in chains of inference.

The point is that empiricism (and empirical method), even, don't hold-out for the improper supposition that 'there is no more to the content of a statement than the total evidence which would warrant its assertion'. But that verifications and contents are epistemologically related is not at issue in empiricism.

A determinist dismissal of the theoretical possibility inherent in the initial artistic assertion must founder when it is stated, truly, that there can be theories which are either deterministic or self-consistent. This is definitive of a situation in which causality is unambiguously confounded as a Kantian necessary condition; it loses form. The other point which emerges from the above disjunction is that Lord Russell's desideratum of the preservation of 'a feeling for reality', remains, if there's anything to recommend its remaining, systematically ambiguous. It's no argument that the artistic (classificatory) assertion is not significant, though it may be claimed that it has little classificatory purport (and this might come from its apparent theoretical harmlessness). There are as yet no theoretical limitations on the 'internal' extension of the term.

Playing with anthropocentric arguments (which serve to characterize the assertion in a way in which more agreeable ones would not): that there neither is or has been a time at which a wall exists is irrelevant, as has been stated above, to the significance of the assertion question. The use, and significant use at that, of the definite article of 'art object' is no indication – i.e. it can't be inferred from it that Russell's existential conditions are fulfilled. It remains to be answered whether one can determine the 'individual' in mind (through context of use).

is at the moment a situation in which an 'in the theory operator' is avoided. And the theory is a context. Such operators are more readily employed anyway, and at a much earlier point in dealing with the characters of a novel, because of the relative surprisingness of delineating them. Though one might like to look at the whole thing sub specie aeternitatis, it must be remembered that the notion of an object in some possible future was important preliminarily, and the notion is not radically modified by the adoption of say a tenseless vocabulary.

makes no difference to what is asserted here whether time is conceived of as merely dense (like the series of rational numbers) or strictly continuous. And it was only a vitalistic deduction that there are no facts about the future for propositions to accord or discord with: (Broad's). As has been said, there's no reason yet to dispense with 'past' 'present' and 'future'.

ossible identity questions are considered only when there is some identification of what terms might make up the limbs of identity statements. Back to a wall. Buridan showed that 'I can promise you a horse without there being a horse that I promise you'. Similarly, what God does (according to Geach) in creating a man out of nothing is not to say 'let this man be', but to say 'let a man be'. A man acquires no haecceity until he is already there: but this doesn't prevent a detailed specification. If individuals have distinct identity (assuming that there isn't such a thing as a wall etc.) before they exist, God would be able to make decisions about what doesn't ('yet') exist, and about what will never exist. The point is that alternatives in the 'future' are not distinct. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, a noun like 'man' mostly stands for a presently existing man (or presently existing men) in the sense that only a presently existing man's coughing will verify 'some man is coughing'. But where the verb is tensed, the mode of reference of the subject is widened (in Prior's account 'ampliated') in line with the tense of the verb: 'some man will be running' could be verified by some man's running in the future, even if he doesn't 'yet' exist.

Professor Geach pointed out (*Mind*, vol. 58, April 1949) that such expressions as 'at time t' are out of place in expounding scholastic views of time and motion. For a scholastic, 'Socrates is sitting' is a complete proposition, ENUNTIABILE, which is sometimes false, not an incomplete expression requiring a further phrase like 'at time t'. The question is raised whether any classificatory assertion in the present context might be theoretically enuntiabile. But this would suppose another theory. And it's not a very great way to forestall charges that the present tensedness of the classificatory assertion (at least) comes from some obscure and convoluted belief in the eternity of truth. That A is not the eternal truth which is the contemporary object of a thought about the future (McTaggart's feeling) is too obvious to require elaboration. But it is hard to get away from the remark that one is generating a surrogate contemporary object, and that he is thereby engaged in the spurious reduplication of objects. The thing isn't that 'tomorrows' wall is somehow a contemporary thing – but that's what identity would seem to insist on And that is to make A's theory primitive. A wall hasn't got any ontological diploma, the art object has a putative one.

It has been suggested by A. J. Kenny that the naming of past 'individuals' is easier than the naming of future ones, simply because of the indeterminacy of the future. There can be facts directly about future individuals, according to Kenny, just as there can be facts about past ones, just so long as their future existence is as definite as the past existence of others. The point here is the misuse of 'individuals'. The other thing is that the theory of A doesn't require (necessarily) individualizing names at all, and could make do with the individualizing propositional forms of tensed ontology (at its least neutral). And this acknowledges (just as much) the tense requirement.

(The forms e.g. E'ab would as a matter of course be taken to entail that there is or has been such a thing as a [or the only thing ever to be an a]. And this might be reducible to instantials or any individuating sortal concept. It would be possible to lay down the prescription of a stronger E, an E so used that the corresponding forms aren't true unless there has been, is, or will be such a thing as a. The trouble with such formalities is that eccentricities arise (possible ones) when the description 'the a' might be satisfied by some object that does exist, though it is not a matter of determination, or ([it is not yet definite] which [presently existing]) object will satisfy it. Those alternative solutions (disinterested metaphysicians) which treat past and future alike involve *non-standard* quantification theory. But it just looks like amelioration to provide the clues for a description of the logic of a discrete temporal sense in which 'a is identical with b'.

The insistence upon tense goes well with the sense of 'possible' which avoids intuitive extensiveness: possibilities are divisible into those which are realized and those which are not: and this is all the division of the content of possibility. And the relations of states of affairs (given a fair agreement that one's considering 'states of affairs', generously interpreted) other than actual ones to those which are actual is expressible initially (whether one makes sense or no) in a tensed form. But there's no need for anyone to worry much about 'the index of an instant' – there'll be one which has the art object disappearing.

Another thing which makes some examination of identity statements crucial (and some statement of formal properties) is the difficulty of being able to identify the logical form of a fact (or a putative fact) independently of the grammatical form of the sentence which states it. The identity questions aren't answered by the assertion that tensed existence is a genuine predicate of individuals (Cf. p. 16): there is a distinction inhering in such an assertion though, which is relevant, or at least clarifying, and that is the one between tensed existence and non-tensed – the latter is represented by the existential quantifier. Modelling on the problems of referential tautology and referential contradiction, answering identity statements remains a possibility: that the subject of a sentence implies present existence is no bar on its denial in the same statement by a tensed verb.

In Burn
 Roger Cutforth
 Neil Ramsden

PROCEEDINGS

claims that it is possible to frame effective propositions about 'art' through the manipulation of material constituents are problematic. The quasi-empirical connotations of such cases imply that the introduction of 'art' must be as a second context, i.e., 'something' to which a second status is ascribed. Objects, metonymically as 'art', represent a manipulation of material constituents depicted by a proposition without essentially inquiring into the special syntax of that proposition. An overtly syntactical approach to a state of affairs normally considered well within the bounds of material constituents might well be repudiated on the grounds of a seeming indifference to the significance of these constituents; some argument might however be advanced that certain of the constituents do not count (subsistently or otherwise), excepting that their function within the state of affairs is merely syntactical.

If an analogy is drawn to the customary rejection of 'the ontological argument', then such statements as 'art is' or 'art exists' can be held as misleading. While they may be grammatically or syntactically misleading, they may (or may not) necessarily be so in the terms of any possible 'facts' they are employed to record. That is, they may be 'formally improper to the facts of the logical form they are employed to record and proper to facts of quite another logical form'. So, grammatical appearances to the contrary, within such remarks the term 'art' is not introduced as a subject, nor does it function as a subject about which something is being predicated or asserted. It follows that the verb 'is' or 'exists' is not signifying any character predicated and that the term 'art' is introduced *predicatively*. (This predicative status is not contradicted by the argument that, in use of the term, the implication is 'condition of art' or 'covering concept of art'.) Therefore the term 'art' is introduced into the statement as an assertion which is employed to signify the character or status by which the subject is being characterized. So, while the tendency has been to direct at the term 'art' all attributes of a true subject, it is still functioning as a covert predicate.

In an expression such as 'object of art' (i.e. art-object), the terms 'object' and 'art' are introduced in different ways; 'object' is introduced as a particular and functions in the statement substantively and as a *subject*, whereas 'of art' is assertive and predicates the subject. It can be posited that, aside from any material constituents, 'object of art' is primarily a *propositional* format in which a substantive term is introduced and predicated by 'as art'.

There is a distinction within the proposition between a *substantive* and an *assertive* introduction of terms; 'objects' and 'art' are terms which are mutually exclusive and are linked only as a proposition. Although both of the terms can join as a proposition they can in no way be regarded as *being* the proposition. The 'object' in no way contains the assertion 'of art' as an ingredient and this holds for every and any subject as 'art'. In statements like '. . . of art', the exemplary term is the assertive introduction of 'of art' rather than something which, because of the propositional format, is somehow locatable 'in' the subject. This provides the basis for the erroneous belief that exemplary substantives must exist, that all other substantives exhibiting similar features are indeed 'art' and are classified as such. (Such instances simply disregard the assertion.) However the designating feature is not that e.g. the Bottle Rack and painted form each possess an intrinsic element known to be 'art', but that they both belong to a class of subjects *asserted* 'as art'.

Grammatical distinctions such as prepositional difference: e.g. '. . . as . . .', '. . . in . . .', '. . . for . . .' are only *prima facie* evidence of distinction in application. This can be qualified, though imprecisely, by stating that distinction cannot be evident from any knowledge of applications but can be considered to be merely grammatical. Of course this may appear particularly contradictory, as it is posited, the context of applications originates from an essentially linguistic format. However, as has been stated previously, the component terms and the propositional format itself are somewhat distinct. If 'as' or 'in' do not count, it is in *application*;

although they may be formally-proper grammatically they are insignificant in terms of applications. In these terms then, *any* link-up will serve since ostensibly first context subjects cannot become intrinsic constituents of 'of art'. Within the propositional format the terms remain exclusive, the component term 'art' designating distinct subjects.

From the propositional linking of 'art' and 'object', a proposition of synthetic status is recognized. This suggests that 'object' does not and cannot belong to or be a property of 'of art', which is so regardless of the subject predicated. In this format there are no restrictions on elaboration, *ad infinitum*. As long as the proposition is 'about' or 'ascribing to' it will remain synthetic. The supposition here is that 'object', 'art' and 'proposition' are distinct and are only syntactically grouped because of contextual rules forming 'applications'. It is through this that 'object' and 'art' come to be regarded as propositional as well as component terms.

The stratification of almost all 'art' terminologies in order that they deal exclusively with propositional formats (of which 'art' is considered to be a component term), results in excessive confusions between 'art' and particular properties and substantives. Grammatical distinctions are valid, not in so far as they mirror 'real and true applications', but rather because the initial proposition is intrinsically linguistic. Clarification of this kind is not intended to develop any alternate temporal or spatial properties as 'art', but rather is to establish explicit grammatical groundwork for a state of affairs that has predominantly depended on certain semantic applications. (If most of the art-community had not been afflicted with an advanced logophobia, this would be readily apparent.)

If *any* 'subject' can replace 'object', then within the propositional format one can postulate that this subject is merely syntactical. Then the exclusive function of the subject may only be that it occupies a syntactical role as component of the proposition.

However, the question as to whether 'art' and 'object' are open to operability apart from syntactical component terms really depends on whether the propositional format itself is dispensable. It is evident that one term is a mere matter of filling a grammatical 'hole' while the other serves as a conglomeration of vague genealogical justifications; there is not much one can do to escape the quasi-nominative role that 'art' performs while holding such a status.

The contention is being held that, despite the appearance of certain substantive objects as constituents of the propositional format no empirical import should be accorded them; i.e. in the proposition '. . . as art' constituents rely on syntax rather than on application for their signification. They therefore appear as syntactic component terms apart from 'facts' but within 'propositions' and, despite an adeptness in surrounding the linguistic format with mystic penumbras, the component terms retain a fixed operation within a context of rules. The subject term is employed in a syntactical role of '. . . as art', while the predicate term is paradigmatic and nominative, both as fixed terms of the propositional format. It is particularly within this synthetic format that 'art' is able to designate 'subjects' and it then accumulates an aura of a whole genealogy of applications. (This does not help if the aim is to maintain procedures outside of any application.) The predicate term acts as the paradigmatic feature (the only one) for a number of undeniably dissimilar subjects and as components the terms are fixed into this mode, i.e. the designating and the merely grammatical.

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Ian Burn

READ PREMISS

Within a propositional form, it can be asserted that there is a direct relationship of identity between two ideas. This work (as an idea) is affirming the character of a prior work (as an idea). The prior work, which is titled 'Six Negatives', was conceived by Mel

Ramsden in late 1968. For convenience, the present work is referred to throughout as the 'predicate' work since in many ways it is making an assertion about 'Six Negatives' as a subject. However, it seems probable that this work extends beyond the normal designation of a 'predicate' since in necessary description it tends to presume and assimilate its 'subject', while in other considerations it seems to be making assertions which have little concern to the original 'subject'.

In this 'predicate' work 'Six Negatives' has been accepted as a particular subject-matter and considered for certain implications of the work. The considerations involved are not necessarily the considerations involved in forming 'Six Negatives': the work evolved to a final form only as a consequence of a number of considerations; whereas, in this 'predicate' work, 'Six Negatives' was used as a departure for further considerations, that is, they were directed from a specific idea already existing. (This is converse to Ramsden's preoccupation since his working was from a general area of ideas toward the forming of a specific idea; by inversion, I have used this as a focus from which to project again into a general area of ideas. Though this 'area' will not necessarily contain the same ideas as the previous 'area', it obviously has been necessary to describe some of the original ideas. To work from general ideas to a specific form is the normal procedure for 'making art' and traditionally this has been the only procedure; however, could this be reversed so from a form one proceeds to general ideas, does this mean one is not 'making art' or that a condition of art depends on a procedure which can operate only in a particular way?) It could be inferred that the two works have the same subject-matter and, as a statement, this would have to be true that 'Six Negatives' (as a name of something) is the name of the subject-matter of each work. However it might also be stated that though Ramsden and myself are both aware of the same material we also have differing conceptions of what it is that 'Six Negatives' is naming, i.e. 'what the work is' is relative to each person though each uses the same name for the same form.

'Six Negatives' was conceived in the following way: The tabular synopsis of categories was appropriated per se from Roget's Thesaurus. There are six classifications stated for dealing with ideas (I. ABSTRACT RELATIONS, II. SPACE, III. MATTER, IV. INTELLECT, V. VOLITION, VI. AFFECTIONS), of which two (class IV and V) each have two divisions. Each class or division or class formed a separate page in the work. Within each class are listed a number of sections and within each of these are listed a number of categories or heads, being arranged in two columns, the left listing the positive words denoting categories and the right listing the negative or contrasting. Having accepted the synopsis of categories as a basis for working, a process of negation was imposed; this was formed by four distinct attitudes: (i) the imposing of the process negating the possible role which the synopsis categories could assume in the work, (ii) the physical striking-out or negating of each word in the column of positive words, (iii) as a result a vocabulary of negative or contrasting words remains, (iv) finally the entire work made into a photographic negative in its completed state.

The synopsis of categories was used in 'Six Negatives' partly in the sense of a ready-made. The synopsis acts not specifically as an object (in the current usage) but rather an indication or 'picture' of a totality of our language and ideas, a 'world view'. The intention of this was to be able to indicate the presence of this totality as a system within the work, the idea of the Thesaurus partially forming the idea of the work. After the synopsis has been altered through the 'negations', this 'picture of a world view' is no longer viable, while still acting as a reference it misrepresents. As such, the synopsis indicates the system from which it derives, but only as a *representation* since it must exclude the system 'as a whole'. The identification of the whole system with the art context would imply the inclusion of the meaning and the sense of the system (and thus its functioning as part of the Thesaurus), then the art condition would be the actual synopsis in every sense so it could no longer logically be an art condition.

The ready-made proposes the 'not-making' of an object in a serious and almost definitive way. (A distinction is being drawn here between 'made' and 'not-made' states of work within an art context: the 'not-made' classification includes the ready-made since the artist cannot have been instrumental in its making, but also includes work which is not made at all and need not even be objects (it merely identifies states or conditions for art.) Not-making forces into issue the decisions involved and the work seems to maintain itself entirely by these decisions; by contrast, the decisions used in making an object cannot but take into some consideration a particular material result and are not exposed to the same kind of appraisal. In this latter case, the decisions are always dependent on an object and any object must offer visual (but not necessarily art) concerns which act as a distraction between the artist's decisions and an audience: the object itself tends to become the focus of critical interest and the decisions become

relatively (sometimes conveniently) obscured. A ready-made offers visual interest as a utilitarian entity but this does not become an art consideration. Encountering a ready-made, the experience is prescribed by habitual attitudes of perception; we have one prescribed pattern for perceiving art and another for perceiving ordinary objects; but, when an ordinary object is presented as art, we do not seem to have any attitude for viewing it since neither of the previous patterns seems appropriate any longer.

The next aspect of 'Six Negatives' is the process which was imposed on the synopsis and this process obviously has an adverse effect on the status of the ready-made. Having no visual art-interest in itself, a ready-made is still apparent and conspicuous, that is, it is a positive object; however, by using it as a situation or context for another system, the ready-made (as an object) is reduced to ready-made *material*, i.e. something to be used, a site or location.

The Thesaurus represents a system for dealing with language (through ideas) and the process being superimposed is one which derives from an idea (existing in language). This process is based on an *idea* of negation and consists of aspects of meaning and possible applications of this idea. That is, given the general idea of negation, one looks for and states the particular applications which might exist in this situation: this is iterating the principle of the Thesaurus, or again, utilising the principle as a process to deal with the Thesaurus (i.e. the synopsis) as material. The negations were as follows: (i) the imposing of another process onto the synopsis, which reduces its status within the work from that of an object to that of material. This was a negation of the role of the synopsis in the work; (ii) the physical act, that of striking out each word in the column of positive or absolute words. This was an observational action which left a permanent visual record of itself: not only has it negated each word visually but, by making it impossible to decipher, it has negated the sense and meaning of each word; (iii) as a consequence of the positive words being struck out, there remains only a negative vocabulary. This column usually provides contrasts with the words in the positive column, but since this has been negated there is no contrast, so that in a sense the negative column becomes positive. If one had to deal with the world and objects with this vocabulary only, then one could not deal with many things directly, but would be faced with an indirect or negative approach to the world; (iv) finally the turning of the work (considered as a black and white surface) into its photograph negative state through a commercial process. This negation is the only application of the idea which may be seen as a traditionally visual decision. There could have been other applications within the work, but the artist's interest in the system was in formulating it and not in exhausting it.

The manner in which the words denoting categories of the Thesaurus are treated in this process varies considerably, sometimes considered merely as marks on a surface, sometimes as objects but with no meaning, and sometimes as having a common condition. At no time are they allowed the potential meaning of words. As they exist in 'Six Negatives' they do not have individual meanings because they do not have particular uses as ideas in the work, so they are not functioning normally as words. (A comparison might be drawn with this 'predicate' work in which every word has a meaning since it also has a function.) This process is deriving from and existing in language only and to be confronted with the physical form of the work does not mean that one visually recognizes the links in the process since the relationship of the parts is not visual and only exists when the applications are recognized and named (translated into the words representing them). The recognition of the name of the process (i.e. 'negation') provides the connection which creates the relationship. Using what is a semantic principle infers that the process exists in one level when considered in language only, but that in its physical application it infers picturing the synopsis as many states, as an idea, as a representation, as material, and so on. The perceiving of these various 'negations' is not simultaneous, since one needs to specify a differing conception (of what the work is) for each case — it is simultaneous only when considered as a verbal relationship: this means that it can be discussed verbally in a manner in which it is impossible for it to be perceived.

A consequence of working within this kind of framework is that the work is not concerned with its own appearance in any way. Work like this requires an almost pre-defined attitude for perceiving it; it cannot be viewed as one would a painting since the necessary visual relationships do not exist for this type of viewing. Since the work consists of language it would seem a reasoned approach that the meaning would be derived through the reading of every word, but this effort may be merely confusing. The only attitude for viewing seems to be through recognition — recognition of the Thesaurus (i.e. the synopsis) and of what it represents, and the recognition and naming of the alterations made by the applications of the process. One must recognize the systems for dealing with language before one can 'see' the work.

in a chance encounter (that is, devoid of context), it is highly unlikely that one could empirically identify the work with art, some prior knowledge of the conditions and context would seem necessary. In fact it must be agreed that the physical part of the work has no meaning or value as an aesthetic object and that it is only representing the art condition, that is, it is a *record* rather than a picture of the art process. This seems to imply that the making of an object in such work is not very necessary to the idea and that whether it is in a 'made' state or a 'not-made' state seems reasonably equated in the terms set by the artist. However, in terms of response of a viewer, it is far from this equation of states: the made state far outweighs the not-made state. It could be an example that, even though an adequate description (which might also be called a not-made state) of 'Six Negatives' has been proffered in parts of this 'predicate' work, there still remains the wish within the response of the viewer/reader to actually see the physical work. It could be argued that, merely by any work existing physically, this must give qualities which could not be transmitted in any other form. However the physical experience of this work seems in no way to expand it — no new information is gained. This possibly is due to the work being about something which is unable to be 'pictured', that although one can imagine and in the mind follow the process, one cannot form a 'picture' of it. If the idea cannot be 'pictured', then its experience through the physical object would seem to be derived 'second-hand', and to approach the idea requires the translation from any physical response through recognition into a propositional form (in language). To say the experience of an object is the same as that of a statement of information is of course absurd, they obviously are different kinds of experience. But the point at which the viewer contacts the idea and its form is each the same and beyond any initial perceiving of the work. The work exists simply within a conceptual basis rather than a usual framework, and the conceptual basis requires that the language form be arrived at in one way or another.

Roger Cutforth

from *ELEMENTS IN REFERENCE TO*

the ESB* replaces the role of the art object it would become apparent that the object/context relationship, as art, would be redundant in favour of the language references through which it becomes known. It can be noted that it has always been a condition of art that sets of references have functioned 'as art' and not any identifiable substance possessed by the object or material classified as art. Whether or not the ESB (or its context) is an art object (or context) is not brought into question here, since obviously the ESB as the ESB is neither The ESB can serve as the centre for a propositional system. It could be argued that, being central to the system itself, the ESB comes up for consideration 'as art' beyond the terms by which it comes into use originally, i.e. as a non-art object. Such an argument however serves only to underline the fact that the status of any object as 'art', or 'as an art object', is propositional and not factual. It is to avoid such confusion that the ESB is given only a hypothetical role in the system, the assertion being that the function, or status, of anything 'as art' can only be a hypothesis It is possible for two separate systems to be formulated, one dealing with all aspects of the building as an object, the other considering the ESB as a series of language classifications. The second system would embrace all statements about the (particular) building and could equally be considered in relation to any building (e.g. statements concerning size, age, construction, particular and general relations to other buildings, function and use etc.) The first system accepts the subject (ESB) empirically, as an object to which any reference necessarily derives from experience of the building (the role of ESB here being exclusively visual/perceptual). The role played by ESB, as the subject of the system, is relative to interpretation. If it is considered as the object, i.e. ESB, then, being immovable, experience necessarily involves travelling to it. If it is interpreted as the subject of a system of referential connections, it provides a conceptual schema for which all information is available in classificatory form The second system could exist only as language references; in which case it would seem that the system of reference would supersede the 'subject' as well as its 'as art' consideration.

Empire State Building.

INQUIRY # 5

There is apparently no greater need to regard the syntactical conditions for prescribing art-work as constant than there is for regarding the substance of it as such. For certain objects to be prescribed requires acknowledgment of the covering conditions of a specific language and, within this language, one would have to include the 'operating' of the language, e.g. its 'internal' operation and its 'external' function, conventions of use, application, context, and so on. The operating of these sustainers remains constant and disjunct from any internal maneuvers that take place within the language (internal is not used here in the sense of intrinsic). So there may be numerous strata of languages internal to the covering language which do not deal with either operation or application. If there were some way of removing these categorically dissimilar languages until the prescribing was reduced to an operationally basic set of connections, then this operation might become evident. This still would not uncover that which, in the operation, is contingent to a language from which the operation itself is prescribed. We are faced here with a familiar regress, what is the possible context of this, and could it all eventually be traced to some 'ultimate' set of conditions that in other words would ostensibly form the foundation of a genealogy of art.

A laying-down of some long term foundations for art-work ought to be initiated (and this inquiry forms a continuing part of that foundation).

The covering conditions from which an object is prescribed can be known as A. These conditions must be met and, in so doing, prescription can be formulated of the object (known now as B) in the 'correct' way. This could be postulated as the language (A to B) proper which retains a constant operation, disjunct from the types of maneuvers that take place *within* B or *within* A to B. These internal languages can be altered without their having any influence on the operation or context of B. Once B is prescribed from A, the it is going to be held in the syntax (A to B). We can begin here by dealing with what is sayable, i.e. a language of sorts. The stratum under consideration must be decided upon and this ought to be restricted to the operating of the language and not its 'ultimate' constituents. Thus internal languages held within B (i.e. 'content') are regarded as irrelevant to the *operation* of the 'language proper', (i.e. A to B).¹

Prescribing B entails not only the acknowledgment but as well the *use* of A. This procedure is unavoidable despite its presentation of obscure syntactical demands; so we can prescribe from a framework of which we have only an incomplete understanding (and this is where we can, and do, promote the auras of superstition). Clarification of the syntax (A to B) depends on inquiry along the stratum of the language proper. Since it is impossible to isolate B from the syntax provided for it by A, so it is difficult to make a factual inquiry by the framing of B. It is ineffectual in actually dealing with the demands of A which enables this to function as a constant. So, unless the usually prescribed B (from A) immediately identifies with art, then there is no sense in regarding it as preponderant or indisputable as a framework for art-work (unless to uphold B as substance or to preserve some vocational survival-kit).

We can posit B as operating as an *internal definition* of A. In other words, B can neither examine nor reveal the application or function of A because it is already within A. This is important in the sense that it allows criteria to be formed which would imply a departure from the set of conditions by *degree*. However, the connections that B reveals are covertly prescribed through A which establishes the criteria as a consistent set of conditions. Genealogy here is obscure, but essentially it is difficult to make the transitions (B from A) in such a way as to entail a prescription which is 'analytically apparent'.² Furthermore, the promotion of B through A does not make more than an internal definition which is contingent on, but cannot examine, the operating or function of its holding language A. There is some chance however that this function could be elucidated by making the transition from internal 'abstracting' (i.e. that of B) toward external 'theorizing'. After positing the syntax of B within A, application of A could be considered; although, in order to avoid the regress, we would have to remain within this stratum (i.e. that of the language proper).

If a line of 'external' inquiry is initiated, then some consideration of the application of A could be attempted from the 'outside'.³ In contrast, the investigatory potential of the internal definition is ineffectual in the determination of this 'constant'. This acceptance of framework A as a constant prompts B into the kind of definition that goes (given the necessity of framing B): 'what is the most

table definition B can frame?' or, 'what is the way B can best maneuver?'⁴ This undoubtedly provides refinement of the potential transitions (B from A). However, whether these are or are not analytically apparent, they are still firmly placed within the constant; differences from other similarly framed internal definitions are therefore a matter of degree. It follows that, in manipulating aspects of the internal (though non-operative) languages whilst maintaining the identical framework apparatus, one promotes an essential device in forming criteria: identifiable resemblances. There is no possibility here of genuine theory but rather manipulation of some institute. With 'external theorizing' we may be nearing, for instance, 'how and why B operates?' This kind of ploy could lead off as a line of external consideration.

The objective of B is, we have posited, to make apparent or to make analytically apparent certain of the connections it may make with A. Supposition would be necessary to consider what the association is between the nature of A and whatever is its application in context. Either B, regardless of the type of definition it frames of A, links up because of the nature of A, or, it could link up regardless of the framework A but solely *because* it is an internal definition. Here A serves as an example that there has to be a *pro* a language operating in order to frame a definition. Then, whether this language apparatus actually entails the internal definition is irrelevant at present to the introduction of the long-term foundations. This definition may or may not be needed after a revision of the holding language. The introduction, as a ploy, of a 'substitute framework' (read A1) can now be considered. In this case the prior definition B cannot be overlooked because any revision of A will, it follows, entail the notice of B. However B certainly cannot be upheld along any of the more familiar morphological grounds. Therefore, in postulating the A1, the syntax of both A and B proper will have to be taken into some account. (This does not deny that the obligation of framing a definition of B could be irrelevant.)

With A, the class heading could be applied to the A1 from the start. There is a similarity between this kind of application and an external function: both appear to be disjunct from the manipulating of any internal languages. Since, for example, the 'contents' of art-objects are ineffectual in determining the operation of the object proper as art, so the postulation of some alternate language schema cannot extend so far as to actually determine a new function for art itself (?). If we could systemize A, and then sort this into a connectible stratum of languages (the A1), it would be essential that this sorting-out be done whilst realizing there will be no change in the function of the class heading. Evidently we are unable to influence this stratum of the determining language. In sorting-out the A1, some equation will need to be derived from the syntax A to B. None of the equating will have any immediate correspondence to the facts of the world; all determining is traceable to propositions which lie in relation to each other, to connections within a schema. Perhaps this is where we get the 'language proper' confused with ostensibly proper though usually peripheral and internal languages which, though strongly evident, actually belong to a distinct stratum. If the function were to operate in the world, it might be possible to isolate it from any internal or supporting language (since that function would then be evident). Function that deals with the world should appear constant. However, it can be assumed that if the function is not related to the world but is a matter of syntax, then there should not be any 'correct' form, nor anything constant about that function.

The reduction and eventual systemization of A by some method of linguistic classification would be particularly helpful. It would mean that A could be reduced to a (verbal) condition, the structure of which is relatively evident. Once this is formulated (and one of the primary reasons for listing it linguistically is for the schematization), consideration of the A1 could begin as an *analogous* framework (read as the substitute framework). The analogous condition would prevent the loss of contact with A. A1 could be assumed to differ from A in a number of important ways; primarily, instead of possessing a covert schema as in A, A1 will be the subject for liberate formulation, making a stratum of concepts which are syntactically distinct. So, if we were to attempt to prescribe or to name a definition B1 in relation to A1, this could be done in a way to make the connectibles more precise and analytically apparent than they had been with B from A. As significant could be the possibility of open identification of the language apparatus from which B1 is really determined.

Whilst altering the conditions of the framework we might still be forced into stating some form of internal definition. There would be a little problem in getting A1 party to the usual class headings and conventions of use. This is fairly basic in our language 'hierarchy' and would probably look after itself.

NOTES

¹All that is required for a strict operationalism in this sense is a 'mute' object. As has been observed elsewhere, with the profusion of simple box-like work by certain of the 'minimal' artists (although there was evidence of it earlier) a fundamental concept of the art-object language was altered. Concern moved from problems **in** the object to problems **of** the object. From here it is a short step to the concerns moving into an examination of the syntactical position **for** this object.

²For an examination of 'art as analogous to an analytical proposition' and its existence as a 'tautology' see Joseph Kosuth's 'Art After Philosophy' part 1, in **Studio International**, October 1969.

³See in relation to this the concept of 'the alien' introduced by the Art-Language group. This acts as a particularly useful device for 'leaving' our customary set of conditions; see **Art-Language**, vol. 1, no. 1.

⁴With the introduction of 'best', a potential equivalency of 'internal defining' and 'statement of value' is raised. This is not a confusion of language strata, but the recognition of B as being possible only as a composite object. So, whilst there is no actual equivalency, these are combined when B is framed. Since it is framed by the set of conditions, and since it is within these conditions, it is not an actual form of inquiry but a 'command' within the conditions and has to come within the range of criteria.

INFORMATION 2

Art should raise questions.

Bruce Nauman

In ecological terms what has transpired in recent art is a shift from "primary" homesite to the alternate or "secondary" homesite. With the fall of galleries, artists have sensed a similar sensation as do organisms when curtailed by disturbances of environmental conditions. This results in extension or abandonment of homesite. The loft organism stifled by the rigidity of his habitat works on not recognizing his out-put waning to the contemplation of new ways to work within old bounds.

The more successful work from the minimal syndrome rejected itself, allowing the viewer a one-to-one confrontation with pure limit o bounds. This displacement of sensory pressures from object to place will prove to be the major contribution of minimalist art. However when one's energy can be absorbed so wantonly by the "place you put your thing" . . . it's time to consider a more deserving location.

Dennis Oppenheim

Every art expression has an effect.

Stephen Kaltenbach

I start by thinking I'm going to make use of all possibilities without troubling any longer about problems when something starts to be art. I don't make the ETERNAL work of ART, I only give visual information. I'm more involved with the process than the finished work of art. The part of my object is untranslated. I think objects are the most usual part of my work. I'm not really interested any longer to make an object.

Jan Dibbets

The essential quality of existence concerns where one is at any instant in time: that locates everything else. Location, as a phenomenon of space and time, has been transposed by most art forms into manifestations of visual equivalence: that is, as an experience located at the ends of the eyeballs. I am interested in transposing location directly into "present" time by eliminating things, the appearance of things, and appearance itself. The documents carry out that role using language, photographs and systems in time and location.

Douglas Huebler

Magazine reproductions are part of today's landscape.

Iain Baxter

I'm not only questioning the limits of our perception, but the actual nature of perception. These forms certainly do exist, they are controlled and have their own characteristic. They are made of various kinds of energy which exist outside the narrow arbitrary limits of our own senses. I use various devices to produce the energy, detect it, measure it, and define its form.

Robert Barry

The working premise is to think in terms of systems; the production of systems, the interference with and the exposure of existing systems.

Such an approach is concerned with the operational structure of organizations, in which transfer of information, energy and/ or material occurs. Systems can be physical, biological or social, they can be man-made, naturally existing or a combination of any of the above. In all cases verifiable processes are referred to.

Hans Haacke

Every effect is a causative force producing another effect.

The chain of influence can diminish in power.

The power of the chain can increase.

Stephen Kaltenbach

The perspective we are beginning to have, thanks to these past four years, allows a few considerations on the direct and indirect implications for the very conception of art. This apparent break (no research, nor any formal evolution for four years) offers a platform that we shall situate at zero level, when the observations both internal (conceptual transformation as regards the action/praxis of a similar form) and external (work/production presented by others) are numerous and rendered all the easier as they are not invested in the various surrounding movements, but are rather derived from their absence.

Daniel Buren

My work is a manifesto against sensibility, against the expression of the personality of the individual. In my work, the final manifestation of my personality, my last choice will have been to opt for OBJECTIVITY.

Bernar Venet

present oral communication as an object, . . . all art is information and communication. I've chosen to speak rather than sculpt. I've freed art from a specific place. It's now possible for everyone. I'm diametrically opposed to the precious object. My art is not visual, but visualized.

Ian Wilson

I suppose some work has to do in part with some of the things the Dadaists and Surrealists did. I like to give the pieces elaborate titles the way they did, although I've only been titling them recently. That all came from not trying to figure out why I make those things. I got so I just couldn't do anything. So like making the impressions of knees in a wax block [A Wax Mold of the Knees of Five Famous Artists] was a way of having a large rectangular solid with marks in it. I didn't want just to make marks in it so I had to make this other kind of reasoning. It also had to do with trying to make a less important thing to look at.

Bruce Nauman

The documents prove nothing. They make the piece exist and I am interested in having that existence occur in as simple a way as possible. Where a thing is located involves everything else and I like that idea much more than how I "feel" about it or what it looks like.

Douglas Huebler

A work of art by its existence is a fabricated reality. As an object which is man made (or chosen), and also part of the inanimate world but not natural and also not utilitarian, it has an ambiguous existence. Phenomena are impenetrable by thought and exist non-ambiguously as they exist preceding definition. But a work of art is the product of thought which precedes the actual work. Now that art has freed itself from both referential and abstract burdens artists face a new paradox. Is ambiguity inherent in the thing or is it created by ambiguous elements?

Mel Bochner

I do not owe anything to the Dadaist tradition.

Saul Ostrow

. the new series of my works are traces of what an artist does. Somehow the shit residue of art history made me make paintings and sculptures. But now I feel no contact with or relevance or need of a place in art history.

Lawrence Weiner

Twenty-six gasoline stations, various small fires, some Los Angeles apartments, every building on the Sunset Strip, thirty-four parking lots, Royal road test, business cards, nine swimming pools, crackers.

Ed Ruscha

The techniques of recording are appropriate to the kind of information presented and include visual, verbal, and mathematical data.

Donald Burgy

What's the difference between asking and telling?

James Lee Byars

Sensory consciousness is of essentially undifferentiated sensory information. The primary ordering of sensory information is into space and time continuums. The secondary ordering further differentiates it into segments along the continuums: specific space and time conditions The resulting consciousness is of an indeterminate number of points or instants at which the space and time continuums intersect. Any combination of space and time conditions on the continuums may intersect to form one or a series of points or instants.

Adrian Piper

The true artist helps the world by revealing mystic truths.

Bruce Nauman

Painting and the selling have become cliches of fine arts. I search consciously for a form of art which is not tied by tradition and in which an oeuvre is less important than the research. There are so many different situations in which to look at something, that standing right before the painting or walking around a sculpture could well be the most simple kind.

Jan Dibbets

The existence of each sculpture is documented by its documentation.

Douglas Huebler

Altitude lines on contour maps serve to translate measurement of existing topography to a two dimensional surface. With my piece, I create contours which oppose the reality of the existing land, and impose their measurements onto the actual site, thus creating a kind of conceptual mountainous structure on a swamp grid.

Dennis Oppenheim

Canvas, which should be left for the tent and awning makers, is returning in my work in the form of tents and awnings.

Iain Baxter

There are many other possibilities which I intend to explore – and I'm sure there are a lot of things we don't yet know about which exist in the space around us, and although we don't see them or feel them, we somehow know they are out there.

Robert Barry

is the form which it takes. The form must unceasingly renew itself to ensure the development of what we call new art. A change of form has so often led us to speak of a new art that one might think that inner meaning and form are linked together in the mind of the majority – artists and critics. Now, if we start from the assumption that new, i.e. "other," art is in fact never more than the same thing in a new guise, the heart of the problem is exposed. To abandon the search for a new form at any price means trying to abandon the history of art as we know it: It means passing from the Mythical to the Historical, from the Illusion to the Real.

Daniel Buren

The chain can branch at every link.

The chain and its branches can develop in any direction.

The direction and strength of the chain may be determined at every link by an artist who has the desire to do so.

Stephen Kaltenbach

I'm not a poet and I'm considering oral communication as a sculpture. Because, as I said, if you take a cube, someone has said you can imagine the other side because it's so simple. And you can take the idea further by saying you can imagine the whole thing without its physical presence. So now immediately you've transcended the idea of an object that was a cube into a word, without a physical presence. And you still have the essential features of the object at your disposal. So now, if you just advance a little, you end up where you can take up a word like time and you have the specific features of the word "time." You're just moving this idea of taking a primary structure and focusing attention on it.

Ian Wilson

. . . this is Genet's existentialism, not Sartre's or Camus's.

Lawrence Weiner

. . . and since I am not interested in problems of forms, color and material, it goes without saying that my evolution could not be esthetic. It may be that simply making a work signed 1970 will be more interesting than another signed 1967 (treating the same subject) because of new informations and additional precisions that will have enlarged the subject.

Bernar Venet

The recent shift to terrain has evaporated the importance of discrete objects and rejects what could be called "media distance," a force of indirect energy, compounded by allowing mobility, and permanence a major position in scribing aesthetic boundaries. The artist, relieved of dogmas which covet this indirect energy distribution, now responds directly to the terrestrial eco-system. Rather than the objectification of aesthetic impetus through physical media, the actual exterior framework which delivers stimulus will house and project the art. This allows the sculptor to work within the media. There is no deliberate transporting of materials for pre-arranged viewing or the isolation of individual components for contemplation. The aesthetic transaction is a constant force operating between polarities that affect major or minor change — the sculptor is now occupied by his material.

Dennis Oppenheim

I use the unknown because it's the occasion for possibilities, and because it's more real than anything else. Some of my works consist of forgotten thoughts, or things in my unconscious. I also use things which are not communicable, are unknowable or are not yet known. The pieces are actual but not concrete

Robert Barry

A reproduction in a top art magazine is worth two one-man shows.

Iain Baxter

Vertically striped sheets of paper, the bands of which are 8-7 cms wide, alternate white and coloured, are stuck over internal and external surfaces: walls, fences, display windows, etc.; and/or cloth/canvas support, vertical stripes, white and coloured bands each 8-7 cms, the two ends covered with dull white paint.

Daniel Buren

Desire often results from an understanding of the process.

Understanding may be gained through observation of existing chains.

The critical opinion expressed as a result of this show provides opportunity for observation of a secondary link.

Stephen Kaltenbach

I use the camera as a "dumb" copying device that only serves to document whatever phenomena appear before it through the condition set by a system. No "esthetic" choices are possible. Other people often make the photographs. It makes no difference. What may be documented that has appearance in the world actually is returned to itself as only that and as nothing that has to do with the piece.

Douglas Huebler

N.E. Thing Co. is anything.

Iain Baxter

Condensation – forcing out space between a series of steps – is like eradicating time intervals between notes. The result is a single sound unbroken by silence. The museum walls echo the solidified vibrations of exterior distance.

Dennis Oppenheim

Materialist implies a primary involvement in materials, but I am primarily concerned with art. One could say the subject matter is materials, but its reason to be goes way beyond materials to something else, that something else being art.

Lawrence Weiner

Every impossible thing I can think of is possible, everything I think already exists. Everything exists in any possibility.

James Lee Byars

You can fly over something, you can walk along something, drive (by car or train), sail, etc.

You can "disorientate" the spectator in space, integrate him, you can make him smaller and bigger, you can force upon him space and again deprive him of it.

Jan Dibbets

Every act is political and, whether one is conscious of it or not, the presentation of one's work is no exception. Any production, any work of art is social, has a political significance. We are obliged to pass over the sociological aspect of the proposition before us due to lack of space and considerations of priority among the questions to be analysed.

Daniel Buren

I feel I am the New Hudson River School traditionalist, using water, air, sky, land, clouds, and boats. My friend, Friel, uses fire. We could be called the fire and water boys.

Iain Baxter

The proposed projects do not differ from the other pieces as idea, but do differ to the extent of their material substance.

Douglas Huebler

*As with any art, an interested person reacts in a personal way based on his own experience and imagination.
Obviously, I can't control that.*

Robert Barry

*The terrestrial studio cannot accept the stringencies of a minimalistic influence. Reductionist's needs no longer have their source —
this art should not pay heed to vibrations returning from the mimicry of compositional superstitions. The vestiges of a loft
micro-environment will not find rapport with the new sensibility.*

Dennis Oppenheim

The forms of art are always preformed and premeditated. The creative process is always an academic routine and sacred procedure. Everything is prescribed and proscribed. Only in this way is there no grasping or clinging to anything. Only a standard form can be imageless, only a stereotyped image can be formless, only a formularized art can be formulaless.

Ad Reinhardt

In France there is an old saying, "stupid like a painter." The painter was considered stupid, but the poet and writer very intelligent. I wanted to be intelligent. I had to have the idea of inventing. It is nothing to do what your father did. It is nothing to be another Cezanne. In my visual period there is a little of that stupidity of the painter. All my work in the period before the *Nude* was visual painting. Then I came to the idea. I thought the ideatic formulation a way to get away from influences.

Marcel Duchamp

The basis of an aesthetic act is the pure idea. But the pure idea is, of necessity, an aesthetic act. Here then is the epistemological paradox that is the artist's problem. Not space cutting nor space building, not construction nor fauvist destruction, not the pure line, straight and narrow, nor the tortured line, distorted and humiliating; not the accurate eye, all fingers, nor the wild eye of dream, winking but the idea-complex that makes contact with mystery – of life, of men, of nature, of the hard, black chaos that is death, or the gray softer chaos that is tragedy. Everything else has everything else.

Barnett Newman

I will refer to the kind of art in which I am involved as conceptual art. In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the art. This kind of art is not theoretical or illustrative of theories; it is intuitive, it is involved with all types of mental processes and it is purposeless. It is usually free from the dependence on the skill of the artist as a craftsman. It is the objective of the artist who is concerned with conceptual art to make his work mentally interesting to the spectator, and therefore usually he would want it to become emotionally dry. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the conceptual artist is out to bore the viewer. It is only the expectation of an emotional kick, to which one conditioned to expressionist art is accustomed, that would deter the viewer from perceiving this art.

Sol Lewitt

"Non-art," "anti-art," "non-art art" and "anti-art art" are useless. If someone says his work is art, it's art.

Don Judd

In a broad sense art has always been an object, static and final, even though structurally it may have been a depiction or existed as a fragment. What is being attacked, however, is something more than art as icon. Under attack is the rationalistic notion that art is a form of work that results in a finished product. Duchamp, of course, attacked the Marxist notion that labor was an index of value, but Readymades are traditionally iconic art objects. What art now has in its hand is mutable stuff which need not arrive at the point of being finalized with respect to either time or space. The notion that work is an irreversible process ending in a static icon-object no longer has much relevance.

Robert Morris

In time the whole electrical system will pass into inactive history. My lamps will no longer be operative; but it must be remembered that they once gave light.

Dan Flavin

Focus. Include one's looking. Include one's seeing. Include one's using. It and its use and its action. As it is, was, might be (each as a single tense, all as one). A = B. A is B. A represents B (do what I do, do what I say).

Jasper Johns

. . . The thing that I find in commercial art — in the new world outside largely formed by industrialism or by advertising — is the energy and the impact that it has and the directness and a kind of aggression and hostility that come through it . . . It has a lot to do with the conceptualization of art rather than the visual. Conceptualization in a way means oversimplification and I'm very much concerned with apparent oversimplification . . . It doesn't mean that the art is oversimplified; but it's a kind of stylistic development . . .

Roy Lichtenstein

The disinterest in painting and sculpture is a disinterest in doing it again, not in it as it is being done by those who developed the last advanced versions. New work always involves objections to the old, but these objections are really relevant only to the new. They are part of it. If the earlier work is first-rate it is complete

Don Judd

I think both art and life are a matter of life and death.

Walter De Maria

But having gotten used to its absence, one notices the new presence derived from and created by its physical sojourn; a kind of presence — presence, autonomous and different from all other phenomenal states in this work from which the painting is absent.

It's a question, really, of a creation of art, pure, true art. And no longer of suggestion, of picturesque this and that, crystallisation of desires, or of a psychological state, etc. etc. . . .

Yves Klein

It is not surprising that some of the new sculpture which avoids varying parts, polychrome, etc., has been called negative, boring, nihilistic. These judgments arise from confronting the work with expectations structured by a Cubist esthetic in which what is to be had from the work is located strictly within the specific object. The situation is now more complex and expanded.

Robert Morris

For too long the artist has been estranged from his own "time." Critics, by focusing on the "art object," deprive the artist of any existence in the world of both mind and matter. The mental process of the artist which takes *place* in time is disowned, so that a commodity value can be maintained by a system independent of the artist. Art, in this sense, is considered "timeless" or a product of "no time at all"; this becomes a convenient way to exploit the artist out of his rightful claim to his temporal processes. The argument for the contention that time is unreal is a fiction of language, and not of the material of time or art. Criticism, dependent on rational illusions, appeals to a society that values only commodity type art separated from the artist's mind.

Robert Smithson

Every possible buyer of an immaterial pictorial sensitivity zone must realize that the fact that he accepts a receipt for the price which has paid takes away all authentic immaterial value from the work, although it is in his possession.

Yves Klein

I'm just making the last paintings which anyone can make.

Ad Reinhardt

One of the important things in any art is its degree of generality and specificity and another is how each of these occurs. The extent and the occurrence have to be credible. I'd like my work to be somewhat more specific than art has been and also specific and general in a different way. This is also the intention of a few other artists. Although I admire the work of some of the older artists, I can't altogether believe its generality. Earlier art is less credible. Of course, finally, I only believe in my own work. It is necessary to make general statements, but it is impossible and not even desirable to believe most generalizations. No one has the knowledge to form a comprehensive group of reliable generalizations. It is silly to have opinions about many things that you're supposed to have opinions on. About others, where it seems necessary, the necessity and the opinion are mostly guess. Some of my generalizations, like these verbal ones, are about this situation. Other generalizations and much of the specificity are assertions of my own interests and those that have settled in the public domain.

Don Judd

A diagram is not a painting; it is as simple as that. I can make a painting from a diagram, but can you; Can the public; It can just remain a diagram if that is all I do, or if it is a verbalization it can just remain a verbalization. Clement Greenberg talked about the ideas or possibilities of painting in, I think, the "After Abstract Expressionism" article, and he allows a blank canvas to be an idea for a painting. It might not be a *good* idea, but it is certainly valid. Yves Klein did the empty gallery. He sold air, and that was conceptualized art, I guess.

Frank Stella

Abstract art or non-pictorial art is as old as this century, and though more specialized than previous art, is clearer and more complete, and like all modern thought and knowledge, more demanding in its grasp of relations.

Ad Reinhardt

The detachment of art's energy from the craft of tedious object production has further implications. This reclamation of process refocuses art as an energy driving to change perception. (From such a point of view the concern with "quality" in art can only be another form of consumer research — a conservative concern involved with comparisons between static, similar objects within closed sets.) The attention given to both matter and its inseparableness from the process of change is not an emphasis on the phenomenon of means. What is revealed is that art itself is an activity of change, of disorientation and shift, of violent discontinuity and mutability, of the willingness for confusion even in the service of discovering new perceptual modes.

Robert Morris

Somewhat new work is usually described with the words that have been used to describe old work. These words have to be discarded if too particular to the earlier work or they have to be given new definitions. Occasionally new terms have to be invented.

Don Judd

If the artist carries through his idea and makes it into visible form, then all the steps in the process are of importance. The idea itself, even if not made visual is as much a work of art as any finished product. All intervening steps – scribbles, sketches, drawings, model work, models, studies, thoughts, conversations – are of interest. Those that show the thought process of the artist are sometimes more interesting than the final product.

Sol Lewitt

The difference between the new, non-objective (“useless”) art and the art of the past lies in the fact that the full artistic value of the latter comes to light (becomes recognized) only after life, in search of some new expedient, has forsaken it, whereas the unapplied artistic element of the new art outstrips life and shuts the door on “practical utility.”

Kasimir Malevich

It can be argued that we are not really dealing with alternatives. If almost all modern art is developmental, consciously or not, with a family tree of commentaries, quotations and extensions, then the very notions of experimentation and brinkmanship are themselves heritage of the last hundred years. Admittedly so, but the crucial difference here involves a separation of cultural *attitudes* from cultural *acts*: attitudes which are to be applied to a zone, still unmarked, between what has been called art and ordinary life. Metaphorically, the displacement is almost a manufactured schizophrenia, and in the shift, a unique mentality may take over.

Alan Kaprow

I wanted work that didn't involve incredible assumptions about everything. I couldn't begin to think about the order of the universe, or the nature of American society. I didn't want work that was general or universal in the usual sense. I didn't want it to claim too much

Don Judd

An Eskimo lady who couldn't speak or understand a word of English was once offered free transportation to the United States plus \$500 providing she would accompany a corpse that was being sent back to America for burial. She accepted. On her arrival she looked about and noticed that people who went into the railroad station left the city and she never saw them again. Apparently they traveled some place else. She also noticed that before leaving they went to the ticket window, said something to the salesman, and got a ticket. She stood in line, listened carefully to what the person in front of her said to the ticket salesman, repeated what that person said, and then traveled wherever he traveled. In this way she moved about the country from one city to another. After some time, her money was running out and she decided to settle down in the next city she came to, to find employment, and to live there the rest of her life. But when she came to this decision she was in a small town in Wisconsin from which no one that day was traveling. However, in the course of moving about she had picked up a bit of English. So finally she went to the ticket window and said to the man there, "Where would you go if you were going?" He named a small town in Ohio where she lives to this day.

John Cage

Fine art can only be defined as exclusive, negative, absolute, and timeless.

Ad Reinhardt

At first, he didn't like the notion much, but he understood, and after a while he agreed. He took out a portfolio of his drawings and began thumbing through it. He pulled out one drawing, looked at it, and said, "No, I'm not going to make it easy for you. It has to be something I'd miss." Then he took out another portfolio and looked through that, and finally he gave me a drawing, and I took it home. It wasn't easy, by any means. The drawing was done with a hard line, and it was greasy too, so I had to work very hard on it, using every sort of eraser. But in the end it really worked. I *liked* the result. I felt it was a legitimate work of art, created by the technique of erasing. So the problem was solved, and I didn't have to do it again.

Robert Rauschenberg

order that art may be really abstract, in other words, that it should not represent relations with the natural aspect of things, the law of the *denaturalization of matter* is of fundamental importance.

Piet Mondrian

that the work of art looks like isn't too important. It has to look like something if it has physical form. No matter what form it may finally have it must begin with an idea. It is the process of conception and realization with which the artist is concerned. Once given physical reality by the artist the work is open to the perception of all, including the artist. (I use the word "perception" to mean the apprehension of the sense data, the objective understanding of the idea and simultaneously a subjective interpretation of both.) The work of art can only be perceived after it is completed.

Sol Lewitt

Art no longer cares to serve the state and religion, it no longer wishes to illustrate the history of manners, it wants to have nothing further to do with the object, as such, and believes that it can exist, in and for itself, without things.

Kasimir Malevich

Art is what we do. Culture is what is done to us.

Carl Andre

We saw that pictures these days are only imitations and substitutes of real things and therefore not "high" art. If you think that a picture of a sunset or a nude is real, then you don't have much fun, do you; . . . We saw that both light and time is space, that you yourself are space, that a painting is a flat space. We saw that an abstract painting is not a window-frame-peep-show-hole-in-the-wall but a new object or image hung on the wall and an organization of real space relations A modern painter's worst enemy is the picture maker who somehow creates in people the illusion that one need not know anything about art or art history to understand it. But looking isn't as simple as it looks.

Ad Reinhardt

. . in 1922 I ordered by telephone from a sign factory five paintings in porcelain enamel. I had the factory's colour chart before me and I sketched my paintings on graph-paper. At the other end of the telephone the factory superintendent had the same kind of paper divided into squares. He took down the dictated shapes in the correct position.

Lazlo Moholy-Nagy

I'm believing painting to be language.

Jasper Johns

I know of no occupation in American life so meaningless and unproductive as that of art critic.

Dan Flavin

The artist who wants to develop art beyond its painting possibilities is forced to theory and logic.

Kasimir Malevich

Conceptual art doesn't really have much to do with mathematics, philosophy or any other mental discipline. The mathematics used by most artists is simple arithmetic or simple number systems. The philosophy of the work is implicit in the work and is not an illustration of any system of philosophy.

Sol LeWitt

Whatever happened to the art object?

Carl Andre

One's proposal challenges what one thinks art might become (even its existence).

Dan Flavin

The main virtue of geometric shapes is that they aren't organic as all art otherwise is. A form that's neither geometric or organic would be a great discovery.

Don Judd

One standard in art is oneness and fineness, rightness and purity, abstractness and evanescence. The one thing to say about art is its breathlessness, lifelessness, deathlessness, contentlessness, formlessness, spacelessness and timelessness. This is always the end of art.

Ad Reinhardt

INFORMATION 3

TERRY ATKINSON

Studied Slade School, University College, London. 1960-64

Lecturer, Birmingham College of Art. 1964-66

Lecturer, Coventry College of Art. 1966-

DAVID BAINBRIDGE

Studied St. Martins School of Art, London. 1963-66

Lecturer, Birmingham College of Art. 1966-69

Lecturer, Coventry College of Art. 1967-

MICHAEL BALDWIN

Studied Coventry College of Art. 1964-67

Lecturer, Coventry College of Art. 1969-

Lecturer, Leamington Spa School of Art. 1969-

HAROLD HURRELL

Studied Sheffield College of Art. 1961-64

Studied Institute of Education, London. 1964-65

Lecturer, St. Martins School of Art. 1966-67

Lecturer, Hull College of Art, Yorkshire. 1967-

EXHIBITIONS ETC.

ATKINSON

1962 Young Contemporaries Exhibition, London.

1963 Young Contemporaries Exhibition, British Arts Council Prize for Painting.

1963 November. Founder-member of Fine-Artz Group.

1964 Young Contemporaries Exhibition, London. Fine-Artz Group Exhibit 'Action-Chair'.

1966 May. Fine-Artz Group 'Miss Misty' Show, University of Aston, Birmingham.

66 July. 'Drift' away from Fine-Artz policy complete. No longer associated with Group.
65-66 Bainbridge works out 'Crane' piece – Atkinson-Bainbridge dialogue on rudimentary 'Declaration-Series'.
66 October. Takes up lecturing post at Coventry. Meets Michael Baldwin, then a student at Coventry.
67 February. Bainbridge-Hurrell 'Hardware' show at Architectural Association, London. (Contrast this show offers to 'Miss Misty' show more or less indicates the recent direction of Atkinson-Bainbridge-Hurrell 'ideas-area', Bainbridge-Hurrell exhibit 'Radio-Loop' pieces – 'nothing-to-see-at-all'.)
67 March. With Michael Baldwin completes formative constructs for maps, acid boxes, temperature piece, time drawings, air-conditioning show.
67 July-September. Visits New York City, meets LeWitt, Graham, Andre, Smithson; also visits Los Angeles.
67 October, 'Frameworks' and 'Hot-cold' books, 'Air-show' piece with Michael Baldwin.
67 December. Bainbridge starts M1 model.
68 January. 'French Army' book, with Michael Baldwin.
68 May. With Bainbridge, Baldwin and Hurrell, founds Art & Language Press.
69 January. Ikon Gallery show, Birmingham. Hurrell exhibits fluidic device.
69 July-September. Visits New York City. Meets Kosuth, Weiner, Kawara, Koslov, Barry. Joseph Kosuth invited to become American editor of *Art-Language*, and to participate in Art & Language Press.
69 September. Seattle show.
70 February. *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 2.
70 February. 'Status & Priority', *Studio International*.

BAINBRIDGE

64 Works upon 'Action-Chair' with Fine-Artz Group. Thereafter fairly critical of Fine-Artz position.
65-66 'Crane' piece. Atkinson-Bainbridge dialogue, etc.
66 Sculpture exhibition. St. Martins School of Art, London.
67 February. Bainbridge-Hurrell 'Hardware' show. Architectural Association, London, etc. etc.
67 December. Starts M1 model.
68 May. With Atkinson, Baldwin and Hurrell, founds Art & Language Press.
69 January. Ikon Gallery Show, etc. etc.
69 *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 1.
69 September. Seattle show.
70 *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 2.
70 'Status & Priority', *Studio International*.

BALDWIN

66 Young Contemporaries Exhibition, Manchester. Prize for painting.
66 March. Visits New York City.
66 October-November. Meets Atkinson, Bainbridge and Hurrell.
67 March. With Terry Atkinson completes formative constructs for 'Air Conditioning Show' etc. etc.
67 October. 'Frameworks', 'Hot-Cold' book, etc. with Terry Atkinson.
67 December. Bainbridge starts M1.
68 January. 'French Army' book, with Terry Atkinson.
68 May. With Atkinson, Bainbridge and Hurrell founds Art-Language Press.
69 January. Ikon Gallery Show, etc. etc.
69 *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 1.
69 May-September. 'Sunnybank', 'The Art of Terry Atkinson', Documents.
69 Seattle show.

- 1970 February. *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 2.
 1970 February. 'Status & Priority', *Studio International*.

HURRELL

- 1967 February. Bainbridge-Hurrell 'Hardware' show, Architectural Association, London.
 1967 March. 'Function' seminar, St. Martins School of Art, London.
 1967 December. Bainbridge starts M1 model.
 1968 May. With Atkinson, Bainbridge and Baldwin founds Art-Language Press.
 1968 October. Starts 'Fluidic Device' model.
 1969 January. Ikon Gallery show, etc. etc.
 1969 May. *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 1.
 1969 September. Seattle Show
 1970 February. *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 2.
 1970 February. 'Status & Priority', *Studio International*.
 1970 February. Enlist aid of Computer Dept., University of Hull, to carry out formation of 'Fluidic Device', Truth-Tables.

ART & LANGUAGE PRESS ROOM

1. *(Art) Object Specification I (1966-67)*
2. *Early Work (1966-67)*
3. *Frameworks; Air Show; Air Conditioning Show (1967)*
4. *Acid Boxes (1967)*
5. *Loop (1967)*
6. *Notes on Substance Concepts (Art Objects) (1967)*
7. *Concerning the Early Work (1968)*
8. *368 Year Old Spectator (1968)*
9. *Sunnybank (1969)*
10. *Aphorisms: Perorations and Imperatives (1969)*
11. *Notes: Harold Hurrell (1969)*
12. *The Art of Terry Atkinson (1969-70)*
13. *Agents and Spectators (1969-70)*
14. *Status and Priority (1970)*

FREDERICK BARTHELME

born: 1943 in Houston, Texas.

lives in New York.

education: Tulane University, New Orleans, La.; University of Houston, Houston, Texas.

EXHIBITIONS

Group:

1965 Louisiana Gallery, Houston: Nine Situations (with Joel McGlasson).

1967 Museum of Normal Art, New York: Normal Art.

1967 1000 Post Cards (World Show: 1)

1969 Seth Siegelau, New York: March 1969.

1969 Paula Cooper Gallery (organized by L. Lippard)

1969 Dwan Gallery: Language III.

1969 Seattle Art Museum: 557,087.

1969 Sub Art Gallery, Vancouver: Photo.

1970 Vancouver Art Gallery: 995,000.

1970 *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 2.

1970 New York Cultural Center: Briefcase.

1970 Allen Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio.

1970 Wharton, Texas: World Show: 3.

1967 'The Parable of Arable Land' (long-playing record), IALP 2, International Artists Producing Corp. (with Mayo Thompson and Steven Cunningham).

1970 (forthcoming) *Rangoon*, 206 pp., illustrated by Mayo Thompson, Winter House Ltd., New York (September)

1970 *Everyday Aphasia*, ca. 200 pp., illustrated, Doubleday & Co., New York (September)

Being, 12 parts (sequence), February 2, 1970, presentation: four 8½" x 11" sheets of paper.

Being, 12 parts (location in relation to a chosen object), February 12, 1970, presentation: three 8½" x 11" sheets of paper.

Substitution 20-26 (filled out form),

February 17, 1970, February 18, 1970,

February 19, 1970, February 20, 1970,

February 21, 1970, February 22, 1970,

February 23, 1970, presentation: seven 8½" x 11" sheets of paper.

Miscellaneous, April 9, 1970-August 25, 1970.

ROBERT BARRY

Born. March 9, 1936, New York.

Lives in New York City.

EXHIBITIONS

- 1964 American Federation of Arts, purchase and traveling exhibition.
- 1964 Westerly Gallery, New York City (one-man exhibition)
- 1964 Hudson River Museum, New York State, "8 Young Artists" (organized by E. C. Goossen).; traveled to Bennington College, Bennington, Vermont.
- 1965 Westerly Gallery, New York City, "The New Edge"
- 1966 Tibor de Nagy and Stable galleries, New York City, "Distillation" (organized by E. C. Goossen)
- 1966 Radich Gallery, New York City
- 1966 Guggenheim Museum, New York City, "Systemic Painting"
- 1967 Muller Gallery, Stuttgart, Germany
- 1968 Bradford Junior College, Massachusetts, with Carl Andre and Lawrence Weiner
- 1968 Windham College, Putney, Vermont (outdoors)
- 1968 American Federation of Arts, traveling exhibition, "The Square in Painting"
- 1968 Paula Cooper Gallery, New York City, "The Peace Show"
- 1968 The "Xerox" Book, New York City, with Andre, Huebler, Kosuth, Lewitt, Morris, and Weiner
- 1969 Seth Siegelaub, New York City, "January 5-31, 1969," with Kosuth, Huebler and Weiner
- 1969 Seth Siegelaub, New York City, "March"
- 1969 Kunsthalle, Bern, Switzerland, "When Attitudes Become Form . . ."; traveled to Krefeld, Germany, and the Institute Contemporary Art, London.
- 1969 Seth Siegelaub, Los Angeles, California, "Inert Gas Series" (one-man exhibition)
- 1969 Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, Holland, "Op Losse Schroeven"; traveled to Folkwang Museum, Essen, Germany
- 1969 San Francisco Art Institute, San Francisco, California
- 1969 Paula Cooper Gallery, New York City (organized by Lucy Lippard)
- 1969 Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada
- 1969 Eugenia Butler Gallery, Los Angeles, California, "Conception-Perception"
- 1969 "0-9," Number Six, July 1969, Vito Acconci and Bernadette Mayer, editors
- 1969 "Summer Exhibition" (organized by Seth Siegelaub)
- 1969 Seattle Art Museum, Seattle, Washington, "557,087" (organized by Lucy Lippard)
- 1969 Kunsthalle, Dusseldorf, "Prospect 69"
- 1969 Städtisches Museum, Leverkusen, Germany, "Konzeptkunst"
- 1969 Art and Project, Amsterdam, Holland (one-man exhibition)
- 1969 School of Visual Arts Gallery, New York City, "Groups" (organized by Lucy Lippard)
- 1970 Sidney Janis Gallery, New York City, "String and Rope"
- 1970 Jewish Museum, New York City, "Software" (organized by Jack Burnham)
- 1970 Galleria Sperone, Turin, Italy (one-man exhibition)
- 1970 Exhibition organized by Michel Claura, Paris
- 1970 Eugenia Butler, Los Angeles

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- 964 E. Stevens, *Art News*, Nov., p. 53.
- 964 *Arts Magazine*, Nov.
- 964 E. C. Goossen, "8 Young Artists," catalogue Hudson River Museum (photo).
- 966 Lawrence Alloway, "Systemic Painting," catalogue Guggenheim Museum (photo p. 43).
- 966 Lawrence Alloway, "Background to Systemic," *Art News*, Oct. (photo).
- 966 Robert Pincus-Witten, "Systemic Painting," *Artforum*, Nov.
- 966 E. C. Goossen, "Distillation: A Joint Showing," *Artforum*, Nov. (photo).
- 966 *Village Voice*, Sept. 15 (photo).
- 968 Gordon Brown, "The De-Materialization of the Object," *Arts Magazine*, Sept.-Oct., p. 56 (photo).
- 969 Gregory Battcock, "Painting Is Obsolete," *New York Free Press*, Jan. 23, p. 7 (2 photos).
- 969 John Perreault, "Art Disturbances," *Village Voice*, Jan. 23, pp. 14,18.
- 969 Arthur Rose, "Four Interviews," *Arts Magazine*, Feb., pp. 21-22 (photo).
- 969 Dore Ashton, "New York Commentary," *Studio International*, Mar., p. 35.
- 969 John Perreault, "Off The Wall," *Village Voice*, Mar. 13.
- 969 Grace Glueck, "Art Notes," *New York Times*, Sunday, Mar. 16.
- 969 Barbara Rose, "Problems of Criticism, Politics of Art, Part 3," *Artforum*, May, p. 46.
- 969 David Shirey, "Impossible Art," *Art in America*, May-June, pp. 39, 41.
- 969 James R. Mellow, "Art Beyond Art," *New Leader*, June 23, p. 29.
- 969 Scott Burton, "Time on Their Hands," *Art News*, Summer, 1969.
- 969 Howard Junker, "Idea As Art," *Newsweek*, Aug. 11, p. 81.
- 969 Lucy Lippard, Rohbo, Paris.
- 969 Germano Celant, "Arte Povera."
- 969 "When Attitudes Become Form," catalogue Kunsthalle Bern, Switzerland.
- 969 Art Workers Coalition Publication of Hearings.
- 969 Jack Burnham, "Real Time Systems," *Artforum*, Sept., pp. 52-54 (photo).
- 969 Norbert Lynton, "Impossible Art - Is It Possible," *New York Times*, Sept. 21.
- 969 Michel Claura, "Extremisme and Rupture I," *Lettres Francaise*, Sept., pp. 26-27.
- 969 Michel Claura, "Extremisme and Rupture II," *Lettres Francaise*, Oct., pp. 26-27.
- 969 Thomas Marion, "Invisible Painting and Sculpture," introduction for catalogue, April 24-June 1, Richmond Art Center, Richmond, California.
- 969 Tommaso Trini, "The Prodigal Maker's Trilogy," *Domus*, Sept.
- 969 Joseph Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy: Part 2," *Studio International*, Nov.
- 969 Joseph Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy: Part 3," *Studio International*, Dec. (photo p. 213).
- 970 Michel Claura, Correspondence: "Conceptual Misconceptions," *Studio International*, Jan., p. 6.
- 970 Jack Burnham, "Alice's Head: Reflections on Conceptual Art," *Artforum*, February (photo).

(for work see following page)

1. *Inert Gas Series. Xenon: ¼ liter to indefinite expansion. March 4, 1969.*

2. *It is wholly indeterminate. It has no specific traits. It is entirely ineffable. It is never seen. It is not accessible.*

AIN BAXTER

President): N. E. Thing Company Limited (Netco)

Departments: Thing, Research, Movie, Project, ACT & ART, Service, Cop, Printing, Photography, Communications, Consulting.

Business: Producers and Consultant Specialists in – Ideas, Planning, Sensitivity Information (specialty Visual – V.S.I.), Name Development, Design, Ecology, Communications, Architecture, Aesthetics, Things, Photo-V.S.I., Work, Anything.

1. *10 Acre Survey.*

2. *Telex Triangle over North America.*

3. *Radio Wave Transmission (inside the Arctic to inside the Antarctic).*

4. *Citations: N. E. Thing Co. ACT & N. E. Thing Co. ART.*

MEL BOCHNER

EXHIBITIONS

(one man)

- 1966 Visual Arts Gallery, New York City: "Working drawings and other visible things on paper," (a book exhibition)
- 1969 Galerie Heiner Friedrich, Munich, West Germany: "Measurements"
- 1969 Ace Gallery, Los Angeles: "Orientation: Compass"

(group)

- 1967 Dwan Gallery: "Scale models and drawings"
- 1967 Museum of Contemporary Crafts: "Monuments"
- 1967 Finch College Museum: "Serial Art"
- 1968 American Federation of Art: "Rejective Art"
- 1968 Dwan Gallery: "Language 2"
- 1969 Kunsthalle, Berne, Switzerland: "When Attitude Becomes Form"
- 1969 Eugenia Butler, Los Angeles: "Conception/perception"
- 1969 Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago: "Art by Telephone"
- 1969 Seattle Museum, Washington: "557,087"
- 1969 Museum Leverkusen, West Germany: "Conception"
- 1969 Kunsthalle, Berne, Switzerland: "Plans and Projects"
- 1969 Finch College Museum: "Art in Process, 4"
- 1970 Multiples Gallery: "Artists and Photographs"
- 1970 Galerie Yvon Lambert, Paris: "American Drawings"
- 1970 Allen Memorial Museum, Oberlin, Ohio: "Art in the Mind"

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(by the artist)

- 1966 "Working drawings and other visible things on paper," four Xerox books, published by School of Visual Arts.
- 1966 "Primary Structures," *Arts Magazine*, June.
- 1966 "Less Is Less (for Dan Flavin)," *Art and Artists Magazine*, London, December.
- 1967 "The Beach Boys – 100%," *Arts Magazine*, March.
- 1967 "The Serial Attitude," *Artforum*, December.
- 1968 "Alphaville, Godard's Apocalypse," *Arts Magazine*, May.
- 1968 "Serial Art; Systems; Solipsism," *Minimal Art Anthology*, published by Dutton, New York.
- 1968 "Seven Discrete Tiers," *Aspen Magazine*, June.
- 1968 "The Singer Notes," four Xerox books, published by the artist.
- 1968 "Eight times eight times eight," a book of Ozalid drawings, published by the artist.
- 1969 "Background is not the Margin . . .", catalogue statement, Finch College Museum.
- 1970 "Ten Misunderstandings" (a theory of photography), published by Multiples.

FILMS

- 1965 "A Straight Line Through Grand Central Station" (with Robert Moskowitz), seventy-two seconds.
- 1966 "New York Windows (with Robert Moskowitz), ten minutes.
- 1969 "Ten Slides/One Film, Ten Minutes" (now destroyed).

1. *15' Between Tapes 1968/70*
Measurement Series: (Available Areas).

DANIEL BUREN

Born March 3, 1938, at Boulogne/Seine, France.

Lives in Paris, France.

1. *'Beware!' (Text).*

DONALD BURGY

born August 3, 1937, New York City.

Lives in Bradford, Massachusetts.

1943-55 Chicopee Public Schools, Chicopee, Massachusetts.

1955-59 Massachusetts College of Art, Boston.

1959 U.S. Army – Infantry.

1964 Travels in Peru, Bolivia, Argentina.

1966 Travels in Spain, Italy.

EXHIBITIONS

- 1944 Grace Congregational Church, Holyoke, Massachusetts (one-man show)
- 1963 Douglas College Art Gallery, New Brunswick, New Jersey (one-man show)
- 1964 Ruth Sherman Gallery, New York City, new talent show.
- 1967 Addison Gallery of American Art, Andover, Massachusetts, 'Feely Show'
- 1967 Massachusetts Council of the Arts, Boston, government centre show.
- 1968 Douglas College Art Gallery, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 'Bradford Show'
- 1968 Bradford Junior College, Bradford, Massachusetts, 'Bradford Show'
- 1968 Moore College of Art, Philadelphia, 'American Drawing 1968'
- 1968 Tufts University, Boston, 'Sculpture out of doors'
- 1969 Raytheon, Bedford, Massachusetts, 'Experiments in Art and Technology Show'
- 1969 Bennett College, Millbrook, New York (one-man show)
- 1969 Abbot Academy, Andover, Massachusetts, 'Bradford Show'
- 1969 Paula Cooper Gallery, New York City, 'Number 7'
- 1969 Dwan Gallery, New York City, 'Language 111'
- 1969 Städtisches Museum, Leverkusen, West Germany, 'Concept Art'
- 1969 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 'Moon Show'
- 1969 Seattle Art Museum Pavilion, Seattle, Washington, '557,087'
- 1969 Vancouver Art Gallery, Vancouver, B.C., '995,000'
- 1969 Student Union Art Gallery, University of British Columbia, 'Photo Show'
- 1969 Kunsthalle Bern, Bern, Switzerland, 'Art After Plans'
- 1969 Munich, West Germany, 'Art After Plans'
- 1969 Hamburg, West Germany, 'Art After Plans'

Public Collections: Addison Gallery of American Art, Andover, Massachusetts
Rutgers – The State University, New Brunswick, New Jersey

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(by the artist)

- 1970 *Art In America*, March.

(on the artist)

- 1967 *Sunday Home News* (New Brunswick, N. J.), Oct. 15 (photo).
- 1968 Caron Le Brun, *Boston Sunday Herald Traveler Magazine*, June 2 (photo).
- 1968 "Symposium on the Occasion of the Joint Dedication of the Center for Advanced Visual Studies and the Center for Theoretical Physics," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., Mar. 21, panel discussion (Mr. Anonym).
- 1968 "American Drawing – 1968," catalogue Moore College of Art, Philadelphia (photo).
- 1968 Douglas Smith, "The Feelies," WGBH-TV (Boston), videotape.
- 1969 Jack Burnham, "Real Time Systems," *Artforum*, Sept., photo and statement.
- 1969 Dan Graham, "End Moments," New York.
- 1969 Joseph Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy, Part II," *Studio International*, Nov.
- 1969 "Concept Art," panel discussion, Institute on Contemporary Art, Boston. Art and Technology, Inc.
- 1969 Lucy Lippard, "557,087," Seattle Art Museum catalogue.
- 1969 Lucy Lippard, "955,000," Vancouver Art Gallery catalogue.
- 1969 Städtisches Museum, Leverkusen.
- 1970 Donald Burgoyne, "Checkup," *Art In America*, Mar.-Apr., photos and statement.
- 1970 "Concept Art # 2," panel discussion, College Art Association of America Conference, Washington D.C.

1. *Space Completion Ideas.*

IAN BURN

Born 1939, Geelong, Australia.

Worked as carpenter five years. Pastimes: tennis, cricket, surfing.

Lived London, England, 1965-67.

Invited as official War Artist to the Australian Forces in Vietnam, 1967 (invitation rejected).

Lives New York City.

Founded:

- 1969 Art Press (with Cutforth and Ramsden)
- 1969 The Society for Theoretical Art and Analyses (with Cutforth and Ramsden)

EXHIBITIONS

- 1961-65 Various exhibitions in Australia
1966 Rudy Komon Gallery, Sydney, Australia
1966 "Soft Tape (for Australia)," London (with Mel Ramsden) – gallery display rejected.
1968 "The Field," National Gallery of Victoria, Australia
1968 "The Field," New South Wales Gallery, Australia
1969 Three-man show (with Cutforth and Ramsden), Pinacotheca, Melbourne, Australia
1970 "Art in the Mind," Allen Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio

Collections: Museum of Modern Art, New York; Mr. Fred Williams, Melbourne, Australia.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

by the artist)

- 1966 "Situation-Identity" (for Australia), London – publication rejected (in Australia).
1969 Untitled Magazine, Art Press, New York, July.
1969 Statement, Pinacotheca catalogue.
1970 *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 2.
1970 Proceedings of the Society.

on the artist)

- 1961-68 Various reviews, Australia.
1968 "The Field," catalogue, Melbourne, Australia.
1969 G. Lansell, "Pseudo-Science," *Nation* (Australia), August.
1969 *Art International*, November, p. 46.
1969 Joseph Kosuth, "Aft After Philosophy," *Studio International*, November.

Abstracts of Perception, no. 2, 1969.

Read Premiss (the holding system for 'The Six Negatives'). Text. 1968-69.

Proceedings. Text. Feb. 1970.

JAMES LEE BYARS

1. If you ask for something that doesn't exist you deserve it on the intelligence of the request?
2. Change the title of this show to *Mathematics HaHa?*
3. Call this Bldg. *The Emergency Room?*
4. To present the opportunity of potential response is the exhibition?
5. My tongue is insured for \$50,000?
6. My first show was in M.O.M.A.'s fire escape in '58.
7. I was the Extraordinary Student of Philosophy at Oxford for a week.
8. I got my Fictitious Doctorate Degree from the University of California by asking for all hypotheses (in simple English) from all disciplines.
9. $E = MC^2$, next?
10. I'm the Unofficial Poet Laureate of the United States?

1. $E = MC^2$, next?

ROGER CUTFORTH

- 1944 Born Lincolnshire, England.
1962-63 Studied Nottingham College of Art, Nottingham.
1963-66 Studied Ravensbourne College of Art, Kent.
1968 Moved to New York.

Founded:

- 1969 Art Press (with Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden)
1969 The Society for Theoretical Art & Analyses (with Burn and Ramsden)

EXHIBITIONS

- 1966 Ravensbourne College of Art, Kent
1969 "Language 111," Dwan Gallery, New York City
1969 Pinacotheca, Melbourne (3-man show with Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden)
1970 "Art in the Mind," Allen Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio

BIBLIOGRAPHY

by the artist)

- 1969 Untitled Magazine, Art Press, July.
1969 "The ESB," a reference book, Art Press.
1970 Proceedings of the Society.

on the artist)

- 1969 "Language III," *Time*, June.
1969 G. Lansell, "Pseudo-Science," *Nation* (Australia), August.
1969 *Art International*, November, p. 46.
1969 J. Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy," *Studio International*, November.

Time/Place/Recordings (one work in three parts). Photographs. Calendar. Location. 1969

"The Empire State Building." A Book of References. 1969

Proceedings (text). February 1970

AN DIBBETS

born 1941, Netherlands.
lives in Amsterdam.

- 1967 Royal Scholarship for Painters
1967 British Council Scholarship
1967 With Lucassen and van Elk, Founder of the International Institute for Reeducation of Artists, Amsterdam

EXHIBITIONS

(one man)

- 1965 Galerie 845, Amsterdam
- 1966 Galerie Swart, Amsterdam
- 1967 Galerie Swart, Amsterdam
- 1967 Stedelijk Museum, Schiedam
- 1968 Konrad Fischer, Dusseldorf
- 1969 Seth Siegelau (Exhibition by Mail), New York
- 1969 Art & Project, Amsterdam
- 1969 Museum Haus Lange Krefeld, audio-visuelle Dokumentationen – al Documentation
- 1970 Galerie Yvon Lambert, Paris
- 1970 Galerie Françoise Lambert, Milano

(group)

- 1967 "Serielle Formationen," Universitat Frankfurt/M.
- 1967 "Dies alles Herzchen," Galerie Loehr, Frankfurt/M.
- 1967 "Liga Nieuw Beelden," Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam
- 1968 "le Biennale d'Art Graphique," Musee d'Art Moderne de la Ville de Paris
- 1968 "Public Eye," Kunsthaus Hamburg
- 1968 "RA 3/Arte + Azione Povera," Amalfi
- 1968 "Junge Kunst aus Holland," Kunsthalle Bern
- 1968 "Projekt Katshoek," Rotterdam
- 1968 Galerie Swart, Amsterdam (with Boezem and van Elk)
- 1969 "Earth Art," White Museum, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
- 1969 "Op Losse Schroeven (Cryptostructuren) / Square Tags in Round Holes," Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam
- 1969 Folkwang Museum Essen
- 1969 Akademie voor Kunst en Vormgeving, Den Bosch (with Boezem and van Elk)
- 1969 "When Attitudes Become Form," Kunsthalle Bern, Haus Lange Krefeld, I.C.A., London
- 1969 "Art and Language III," Dwan Gallery, New York
- 1969 John Gibson: Ecologic Art, New York
- 1969 "Number 7," Paula Cooper Gallery, New York
- 1969 Simon Fraser University, Vancouver
- 1969 Summershow (organized Seth Siegelau), New York
- 1969 "557087" (organized Lucy Lippard), Seattle Art Museum
- 1969 "Art by Telephone," Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago
- 1969 "Prospect 69," Kunsthalle Dusseldorf
- 1969 "Konzeption/Conception" (organized Konrad Fischer), Schloss Morsbroich, Leverkusen
- 1969 "Kunst nach Planen," Kunsthalle Bern
- 1969 Artists and Photography (organized Multiples, New York)
- 1969 "Tabernakel," Louisiana Museum (Denmark) (with Beuys, Long and Panamarenko)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1966-67 M. Vos, "Jan Dibbets," catalogue Galerie Swart
- 1967 M. Vos, Jaarboek Overijssel
- 1967 R. H. F. Hartzema, "Dutch Treats," *Art and Artists*, 6.
- 1968 J. Clay, Robho 4, Paris.
- 1968 R. H. F. Hartzema, "Dibbets (27): voor beeldende kunst moet je kunnen kijken," *Museumjournaal* 13/4, Amsterdam, Sept.
- 1969 Germano Celant, "Arte + Azione povera," Mazzotta Editore, Milano.
- 1969 R. Patteeuw, "Jan Dibbets," *Kreatief*.
- 1969 G. Schum, Katalog Land Art.
- 1969 H. Junker, "Down to Earth," *Newsweek*, March.
- 1969 J. Perreault, *Village Voice*, March.
- 1969 D. Bourdon, "What on Earth," *Life*, April.
- 1969 J. C. Ammann, Schweizer Brief in *Art International*, February-May 1969.
- 1969 D. Ashton, *Art News*, May.
- 1969 F. W. Heubach, Notizen zur Land Art Interfunktionen 03, May.
- 1969 J. C. Amman, "When Attitudes Become Form," *Art International*, June.
- 1969 J. R. Mellow, "Art Beyond Art," *New Leader*, June.
- 1969 M. Claura, "Extremisme et Rupture," *Les Lettres francaises*, 24 September.
- 1969 T. Trini, *Domus*, 478, September.
- 1969 R. Demizot, "Arriere et Avantgarde d'aujourd'hui," *Les Lettres francaises*, 29 October.
- 1969 G. Celant, *Casa Bella*, Winter.

FILMS

- 1968 "Fire — Feu — Feuer — Vawr"
- 1969 "18 Hours Ebb and Flood-Tide Object at the Dutch Beach," 1968/69, Fernsehgalerie Gerry Schum, Berlin, March (land art)
- 1969 "T.V. as a Fireplace" (1968), executed German T.V. 1969.

1. *Work / Photographs of Shadow Piece.*

2. *3 times 1 location (post card piece).*

3. *Perspective Correction.*

HANS HAACKE

- 1936 Born in Cologne, Germany.
1956-60 Studies at Staatl. Hochschule fur bildende Kunste, Kassel.
1960-61 Paris, Atelier 17.
1961-62 Fulbright Grant, Philadelphia, Temple University.
Teaches at Cooper Union, New York.
Lives in New York.

EXHIBITIONS

- 1962 Wittenborn Gallery, New York
1965 Galerie Schmela, Dusseldorf
1965 Haus am Lutzowplatz, Berlin
1966 Howard Wise Gallery, New York
1967 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge
1968 Howard Wise Gallery, New York
1969 Howard Wise Gallery, New York

Selected Group Exhibitions

- 1959 "junger westen," Recklinghausen
1960 "photokina," Cologne
1962 "NUL," Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam
1962 "New Prints from Germany, Poland, and Russia," Museum of Modern Art, New York
1963 "photokina," Cologne
1963 "New Experiments in Art," De Cordova and Dana Museum, Lincoln
1963 "ZERO," Halfmannshof, Gelsenkirchen
1964 "Deutscher Kunstlerbund," Berlin
1964 "ZERO," New Vision Centre, London
1964 "Pilot Show," Signals, London
1964 "One Hundred Contemporary Prints," Jewish Museum, New York
1964 "Sculptors as Printmakers," Museum of Modern Art, New York
1965 "NUL," Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam
1965 "ZERO," I.C.A., Philadelphia; Gallery of Modern Art, Washington, D.C.
1965 "ZERO," Milan, Venice, Turin, Brescia
1965 "Licht und Bewegung," Kunsthalle, Bern, Brussels; Baden Baden; Dusseldorf
1966 "Directions in Kinetic Sculpture," Berkeley
1966 "Kinetic Currents," San Francisco Museum of Art
1966 "Atmosphere 1966," I.C.A., Philadelphia
1966 "Deutscher Kunstlerbund," Essen
1966 "Realites Nouvelles," Musee d'Art Moderne, Paris
1967 "Kinetic and Programmed Art," Rhode Island School of Design, Providence
1967 "Miscellaneous Motions of Kinetic Sculpture," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge
1967 "Light, Motion, and Sound in the New Art," Newark Museum
1967 "Kinetic Environments I & II," Central Park, New York
1968 "Ars Multiplicata," Wallraf-Richartz-Museum, Cologne

- 968 "Plus by Minus: Today's ½ Century," Albright Knox Gallery, Buffalo
 "Air Art," Philadelphia Arts Council; Cincinnati; Berkeley; Edmonton
 "Art Vivant 1965-68," Fondation Maeght, St. Paul de Vence
 "Options," Milwaukee Art Center; Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago
 "Sammlung Kley " (Documenta), Kassel
 "Junge deutsche Plastik," Wilhelm Lehmbruck Museum, Duisburg
 "Made of Plastic," Flint Institute of Art, Flint
 "Soft Sculpture," American Federation of Arts, assembled by Lucy R. Lippard
 "The Machine as Seen at the End of the Mechanical Age," Museum of Modern Art, New York; Houston; San Francisco
 "Some More Beginnings," E.A.T., Brooklyn Museum
- 969 "Earth," Andrew Dickson White Museum, Cornell University, Ithaca
 "When Attitudes Become Form," Kunsthalle Bern; Krefeld; London
 "The Sky Is the Limit," University of St. Thomas, Houston
 "AWC Benefit," Paula Cooper Gallery, New York, assembled by Lucy R. Lippard
 "Wilhelm Morgner Preis für experimentelle Kunst," Boest
 "Other Ideas," Detroit Institute of Arts, Detroit
 "Place and Process," Edmonton Art Gallery, Alberta
 "557 087," Seattle Art Museum Pavilion, Seattle, Vancouver
 "New Alchemy: Elements, Systems and Forces in Contemporary Art," Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto, Montreal
 "Prospect 69," Kunsthalle, Düsseldorf
 "Art by Telephone," Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago
 "Plans and Projects as Art," Kunsthalle Bern, Munich, Hamburg
- 970 "Konzepte einer neuen Kunst," Kunstverein Göttingen

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 965 Albert Schulze Vellinghausen, "Licht und Bewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Frankfurt, August 16.
- 965-66 George Rickey, "Kinesis Continued," *Art In America*, New York, December-January.
- 966 Philip Leider, "Looking at Kinetic Sculpture," *Artforum*, Los Angeles, May.
- 967 Harriet Janis and Rudi Blesh, "Collage," Philadelphia, Chilton Book Company.
- 967 Udo Kultermann, "Neue Dimensionen der Plastik," Wasmuth Verlag, Tübingen.
- 967 Frank Popper, "Naissance de l'art cinétique," Edition Gauthier-Villars, Paris.
- 967 George Rickey, "Constructivism: Origins and Evolution," G. Braziller, New York.
- 967 George Rickey, "Origins of Kinetic Art," *Studio International*, London, February.
- 967 Jack W. Burnham, "Hans Haacke: Wind and Water Sculpture," *Tri-Quarterly Supplement*, No. 1 (Spring 1967), Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois.
- 967 Jorge Glusberg, "La técnica herramienta del arte nuevo," *Analisis*, No. 318 (April), Buenos Aires.
- 967 Jean Clay, "La Peinture est Finie," *Robho*, No. 1 (June), Paris.
- 967 Jean Clay, "Painting — A Thing of the Past," *Studio International*, London, July/August.
- 967 Jack W. Burnham, "Questions a Hans Haacke," *Robho*, No. 2 (November/December), Paris.
- 967 Jack W. Burnham, "Sculpture's Vanishing Base," *Artforum*, New York, November.
- 967 Jean Clay, "Special Hans Haacke: Art Signe et Art Piegé," *Robho*, No. 2 (November/December), Paris.
- 968 Jack W. Burnham, "Beyond Modern Sculpture," G. Braziller, New York.
- 968 John Perreault, "Now There's Hans Haacke," *Village Voice*, New York, January 25.
- 968 Stanley Klien, "Technology Invades the Arts," *Machine Design*, New York, February 29.
- 968 Lucy Lippard and John Chandler, "The Dematerialization of Art," *Art International*, Lugano, February.

- 1968 Jorge Glusberg, "Los globos artisticos," *Analisis*, No. 368 (April), Buenos Aires.
- 1968 Daniela Palazzoli, "L'aria e le strutture gonfiabili," *Bit*, Milan, April.
- 1968 Jack W. Burnham, "Systems Esthetics," *Artforum*, New York, September.
- 1969 Germano Celant, "Arte & Azione Povera," Mazotta Editore, Milan.
- 1969 Monique Fong, "On Art and Technology," *Studio International*, January.
- 1969 John Perreault, "Earth Show," *Village Voice*, February 27.
- 1969 Howard Junker, "Down to Earth," *Newsweek*, March 24.
- 1969 Dore Ashton, "Exercises in Anti-Style," *Arts Magazine*, New York, April.
- 1969 David Bourdon, "What on Earth," *Life*, New York, April 29.
- 1969 Nilo Lindgren, "Art and Technology," *IEEE Spectrum*, April.
- 1969 Fritz Neugass, "Die Kontinente durchpfluegen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Frankfurt, May 27.
- 1969 Jose Pierre, "Les grandes vacances de l'art moderne," *L'OEIL*, Paris, May.
- 1969 John Chandler, "Hans Haacke: The Continuity of Change," *artscanada*, Toronto, June.
- 1969 Jack W. Burnham, "Real Time Systems," *Artforum*, New York, September.
- 1969 John Anthony Thwaites, "Vom Baum der Kunsterkenntnis," *Saarbrucker Zeitung*, Saarbrucken, 14 October.
- 1969 Wibke von Bonin, "Germany – October 1969," *Arts Magazine*, New York, November.
- 1969 John Perreault, "Systems," *Village Voice*, New York, November 20.
- 1969 Christopher Andrea, "Haacke explains his 'astonishing' show," *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, November 24.
- 1969 Grace Glueck, "'Tis The Month Before Christmas," *Art In America*, New York, November/December.
- 1969 Willoughby Sharp, "Plane & Process," *Artforum*, New York, November.
- 1969 Michael Greenwood, "The Open Alembic," *artscanada*, Toronto, December.
- 1969 Gregoire Muller, "In the Galleries," *Arts Magazine*, New York, December/January.
- 1969 William Johnson, "Reviews and Previews," *Art News*, New York, December.
- 1970 Jean-Louis Bourgeois, "New York," *Artforum*, New York, January.

1. *Recordings of climate in main room of 4th floor of "Conceptual Art and Conceptual Aspects Exhibition" at New York Cultural Center, April 9 to August 25, 1970. Thermohygrograph and Barograph manufacturer: Short & Mason, London. Dimensions of room: height 14', length 70', width at each end 22', curvature of north wall reduces room width at center to 19', two entrances in south wall each 5.7" wide to the ceiling and 18' from end walls. Room volume 19,650 c. ft.*

DOUGLAS HUEBLER

Born: Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1924.

USMC – World War II

Studied: University of Michigan (BSA, MFA); Academie Julien, Paris.

EXHIBITIONS

one man)

- 1953 Phillips Gallery, Detroit, Michigan
- 1967 Obelisk Gallery, Boston, Massachusetts
- 1968 Wyndham College, Putney, Vermont
- 1968 Seth Siegelau, New York
- 1969 Eugenia Butler, Los Angeles
- 1970 Konrad Fischer, Dusseldorf
- 1970 Galerie Sperone, Torino
- 1970 Galerie Yvon Lambert, Paris
- 1970 Art & Project, Amsterdam
- 1970 Addison Gallery of American Art, Andover, Massachusetts

group)

- 1957 Columbia (South Carolina) Museum, First Biennial
- 1957 Corcoran Gallery, Washington, D.C., Biennial
- 1966 "Primary Structures," Jewish Museum, New York City
- 1966 "Sculpture USA," Whitney Museum, New York City
- 1967 "Cool Art," Aldrich Museum, Ridgefield, Connecticut
- 1967 "Six Sculptors," Pennsylvania State University
- 1968 "Outdoor Sculpture," Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts
- 1968 "Xerox" book, Andre, Barry, Huebler, Kosuth, Lewitt, Morris, Weiner
- 1969 "January 5-31," Seth Siegelau, New York City
- 1969 "Electric Art," University of California at Los Angeles
- 1969 "18'6" x 6.9" x 11'2½" ETC," San Francisco Art Institute
- 1969 "March," Seth Siegelau
- 1969 "When Attitudes Become Form," Kunsthalle, Berne, Switzerland
- 1969 "Op Losse Schroeven," Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam
- 1969 "No. 7," Paula Cooper Gallery, New York City
- 1969 Simon Fraser University, B.C.
- 1969 "Language III," Dwan Gallery, New York City
- 1969 "Summer" show, Seth Siegelau, New York City
- 1969 "Conception/Perception," Eugenia Butler, Los Angeles
- 1969 "Wall Show - I," Ace, Los Angeles
- 1969 "557,087," Seattle Art Museum
- 1969 "Prospect," Dusseldorf, Germany
- 1969 "Concept Art - No Objects," Leverkusen Germany, Städtisches Museum Leverkusen, Schloss Morsbroich
- 1969 "The Moon," Hayden Gallery, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- 1970 "Artists and Photography, Multiples, New York City
- 1970 "The Highway," Institute of Contemporary Art, University of Pennsylvania
- 1970 The Sub Gallery, Vancouver, B.C.
- 1970 Michel Claura, Paris
- 1970 "Software," Jewish Museum, New York City

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1966 "Primary Structures," catalogue Jewish Museum, New York (photo).
- 1966 Letter to the editor, *Art News*, September.
- 1967 Christopher Andreae, "Oblongs," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, p. 11 (photo).
- 1967 Michael Benedikt, "The Whitney Sculpture Annual," *Art International*, February 1967 (reprinted in *Minimal Art*, ed. by Gregory Battcock, Dutton, 1968).
- 1967 Arthur Hoener, radio interview WGBH (Boston), March 1967.
- 1967 William Owsley, television interview, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio (now in WNET Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan).
- 1968 Gordon Brown, "The Dematerialization of the Object," *Arts Magazine*, September-October, p. 56 (photo).
- 1968 Robert Smithson, "A Sedimentation of the Mind": Earth Projects, *Artforum*, September.
- 1969 Gregory Battcock, "Painting Is Obsolete," *New York Free Press*, January 23, p. 7 (photo).
- 1969 John Perreault, "Disturbances," *Village Voice*, January 23.
- 1969 Arthur Rose, "Four Interviews," *Arts Magazine*, February, pp. 21-22 (photo).
- 1969 Rosalind Constable, "The New Art: Big Ideas for Sale," *New York Magazine*, March 10, p. 49.
- 1969 Dore Ashton, "New York Commentary," *Studio International*, March, p. 135.
- 1969 C. Blok, "Letter from Holland," *Art International*, May, pp. 52-53.
- 1969 David Shirey, "Impossible Art," *Art In America*, May-June, pp. 39-40 (photo).
- 1969 Fred Martin, "Proposals," Front pub. New York; San Francisco Art Institute, April.
- 1969 "When Attitudes Become Form," catalogue Kunsthalle, Berne, Spring (photo).
- 1969 "Op Losse Schroeven," catalogue Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, Spring (photo).
- 1969 John Perreault, "Para-Visual," *Village Voice*, June 5.
- 1969 Ursula Meyer, "De-Objectification of the Object," *Arts Magazine*, Summer.
- 1969 "Summer Exhibition," organized by Seth Siegelaub, catalogue (11 international locations, 11 artists), Huebler, Los A
- 1969 Howard Junker, "Art As Idea," *Newsweek*, August 11, p. 81.
- 1969 "557,087," catalogue Seattle Art Museum (organized by Lucy Lippard).
- 1969 Germano Celant, "Arte Povera," Praeger (photos).
- 1969 Jack Burnham, "Real Time Systems," *Artforum*, September.
- 1969 "Against Precedents," *Studio International*, September (photo).
- 1969 Michel Claura, "Extremisme et Rupture I," "Extremisme et Rupture II," *Lettres Francaise*, September, October, pp. 26-27 (photo both issues).
- 1969 Jeanne Siegel, "Interview" (with Siegelaub, Kosuth, Barry, Weiner and Huebler), broadcast November 2, WBAI, New
- 1969 Jeanne Siegel, "Interview" (with Lucy Lippard, Dan Graham, Carl Andre, Jan Dibbets, Huebler), broadcast February
- 1969 Peter Plagens, "The Possibilities of Drawing," *Artforum*, October, pp. 50-55 (photo).
- 1969 Joseph Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy" (Parts II and III), *Studio International*, November, December (photo).
- 1969 Douglas Huebler, interview, "Prospect 69," catalogue, p. 26.
- 1969 Lucy Lippard, "Time: A Panel Discussion," *Art International*, November, pp. 20-23.
- 1970 Harold Rosenberg, "The Art World: De-Aestheticization," *The New Yorker*, January 24, pp. 62-67.
- 1970 Jack Burnham, "Alice's Head: Reflections on Conceptual Art," *Artforum*, February (photo).
- 1970 John Russell, "London," *Art News*, October, p. 10.

1. *Location Piece # 5. (Massachusetts – New Hampshire).*

2. *Duration Piece # 8 (Global).*

STEPHEN JAMES KALTENBACH

Born May 5, 1940, Battlecreek, Michigan.

Honorable discharge, U.S.N., 1960.

Traveled Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Philippines, Guam, Hawaii and Alaska, 1960; Philippines 1966.

Analy High School, Sebastopol, California.

1958-63 Santa Rosa Junior College.

1963-66 University of California, Davis, A.B. (Honours)

1966-67 University of California, Davis, M.A.,

1958 Doyle Scholarship Award for highest grade point average of high school senior class (5 semesters)

1963 Regents scholarships, University of California, Davis (4 semesters)

1966 Regents fellowship, University of California, Davis (1 year)

1967 Candidate for Phi Kappa Honour Society

Two years teaching assistant for ceramics extension class – Bob Arneson, Instructor.

1966 1 quarter-slip casting techniques. Techniques experience:

Slip-casting techniques.

Fiberglass-hand lay up.

Pattern making.

Mold making – plaster and fiberglass

Bronze and aluminum casting

Materials experience:

Clay, fiberglass, aluminum and brass tubing stock, plexiglass, rigid vinyl, hardwood, and polyurethane foam (sheet and liquid).

EXHIBITIONS

1963 Oakland Annual Craftsmen's Exhibition

1963 Marin Art Society Annual Show, 2nd prize, ceramics

1964 Walnut Creek Ninth Annual, \$75.00 award

1964 State Fair, 3rd award, painting

1964 Marin Annual, 1st award, ceramics

1964 Richmond Print and Sculpture Annual, 2nd award, sculpture

1964 Delta Art Show, 1st award, sculpture

1964 October Show, 1st prize, sculpture; 1st prize, graphics; 1st prize, pottery

1964 Fiber-Clay-Metal, St. Paul, Minnesota, Peter Voukos juror, 2 purchase awards

1965 Crocker Biennial

1965 Scripps College Invitational

1965 Richmond Craft Show

1965 Stockton Art Annual

1965 Marin Annual, 1st award, painting

1965 "New Ceramic Forms," Museum of Contemporary Crafts, New York

1966 "Ceramics by Six, Boston

1966 Raymond College Polychrome Sculpture

- 1966 "New Modes in California Sculpture," La Jolla Museum of Art
- 1966 "Arneson's Students," Museum West
- 1967 "Four New Artists," Dilexi Gallery
- 1967 San Francisco Museum of Art
- 1968-69 Castelli Warehouse Show
- 1969 Street Works I-IV
- 1969 "When Attitudes Become Form," Kunsthalle, Berne
- 1969 "Plans and Projects," Kunsthalle, Berne
- 1969 "Conceptual Art – No Objects," Stadtishes Museum, Leverkusen
- 1969 Dwan Word Show
- 1969 "March"
- 1969 Finch College Show
- 1969 Whitney Museum

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1964 "Motly" cover, University of California, Davis.
- 1964 *Artforum*, December.
- 1965 *Craft Horizons*, January, p. 16.
- 1965 *Craft Horizons*, May, p. 42.
- 1966 *Craft Horizons*, November.
- 1966 *Art International*, December, p. 52.
- 1965 *Los Angeles Times*, May 21.
- 1966 *Boston Sunday Globe*, January 9.
- 1966 *Christian Science Monitor*, January 14.
- 1966 *Boston Herald*, January 16.
- 1967 *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 30.

1. *Brass sidewalk plaques: Blood, Flesh, Skin, Bone, Earth, Air, Fire, Water.*
2. *Time capsule.*

ON KAWARA

Biography of On Kawara: 13,620 days.

1. *13,620 Days. 1964 – 1968.*
2. *Books:*

(a)	<i>I READ</i>	1966 – 1969.
(b)	<i>I GOT UP</i>	1968.
(c)	<i>I MET</i>	1968 – 1969.
(d)	<i>I WENT</i>	1968 – 1969.
3. *CODE. 1969.*
4. *Confirmations. 1970.*

JOSEPH KOSUTH

Lives in New York City.

Faculty member, The School of Visual Arts

American Editor, Art & Language Press, England (publishers of *Art-Language*, a journal).

EXHIBITIONS

(group)

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1967 | "Non-anthropomorphic Art," Lannis Gallery, New York City |
| 1967 | "Normal Art," The Museum of Normal Art, New York City |
| 1968 | "Creact," Goucher College, Maryland |
| 1968 | "New York Art," Rochester University, New York (organized by Ivan Karp) |
| 1968 | "Project for S.M.S." (Letter Edged in Black Press) |
| 1968 | "The Square in Art," American Federation of Arts, traveling show |
| 1968 | "Language II," Dwan Gallery, New York City |
| 1968 | "The Xerox Book" (with Andre, Barry, Huebler, LeWitt, Morris, and Weiner), published by Seth Siegelau and Jack Wendler, New York City. |

- 1969 "January 5-31, 1969" (with Barry, Huebler and Weiner), Seth Siegelau, New York City
- 1969 "Electric Art," University of California, Los Angeles; Phoenix Art Museum
- 1969 "March" (31 artists, a catalogue exhibition), Seth Siegelau, New York City.
- 1969 "When Attitudes Become Form," Kunsthalle Berne, Switzerland
- 1969 "Op Losse Schroeven," Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam
- 1969 San Francisco Art Institute, San Francisco
- 1969 Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
- 1969 Paula Cooper Gallery, New York City (organized by Lucy Lippard)
- 1969 "Language III," Dwan Gallery, New York City
- 1969 "Conception/Perception," Eugenia Butler Gallery, Los Angeles
- 1969 "Summer Exhibition" (catalogue and world exhibition organized by Seth Siegelau; J.K.'s contribution executed in Portales, New Mexico, by Eastern New Mexico University)
- 1969 "955,000," Art Gallery of Vancouver, B.C. (organized by Lucy Lippard)
- 1969 "Prospect 69," Kunsthalle Dusseldorf, Germany
- 1969 "Konzeption/Conception," Städtisches Leverkusen, Germany
- 1969 "When Attitudes Become Form, Institute of Contemporary Art, London
- 1969 The Whitney Museum of American Art Annual Exhibition (catalogue statement)
- 1970 "23 Paris IV 70," Paris (organized by Michel Claura)
- 1970 "Conceptual Art," Protetch-Rivkin Gallery, Washington, D.C.
- 1970 "Art in the Mind," Allen Memorial Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio (catalogue exhibition)
- 1970 "Information" (summer), The Museum of Modern Art, New York City
- 1970 "Art Povera/Conceptual Art" (summer), The Modern Art Museum of Turin, Italy

(one-man)

- 1967 "15 People Present Their Favorite Book," The Museum of Normal Art, New York City
- 1968 "Nothing," Gallery 669, Los Angeles
- 1968 Bradford Junior College, Massachusetts (two-man exhibition with Robert Morris)
- 1969 Douglas Gallery, Vancouver, B.C. (Oct. 4 to Nov. 4)
- 1969 Instituto Torquato di Tella, Buenos Aires (Oct. 28 to Nov. 8)
- 1969 Nova Scotia College of Art, Nova Scotia (Oct. 25 to Nov. 9)
- 1969 St. Martin's School of Art, London (Oct. 30 to Nov. 5)
- 1969 Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago (in association with "Art by Telephone") (November)
- 1969 Art & Project, Amsterdam (November)
- 1969 Coventry College of Art, Coventry, England (Nov. 10 to Nov. 25)
- 1969 Oxford University, Oxford, England (in association with "Oxford Project") (October)
- 1969 Galleria Sperone, Torino, Italy (November)
- 1969 A 37 90 89, Antwerpen, Belgium (Oct. 31 to Nov. 29)
- 1969 Kunsthalle Berne, Switzerland (in association with "Art By Plans") (November)
- 1969 Pinacotheca, St. Kilda, Victoria, Australia (Oct. 31 to Nov. 14)
- 1969 Leo Castelli Gallery, New York City (Nov. 22 to Dec. 20)
- 1969-70 The Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto, Canada (Dec. 29 to Jan. 10)
- 1970 The Pasadena Art Museum, Pasadena, California (Jan. 25 to Mar. 1)
- 1970 Galleria Sperone, Turino, Italy (Summer)

by the artist)

- 967 "Non-anthropomorphic Art," catalogue notes and statement, Lannis Gallery, New York City.
- 969 "January 5-31, 1969," catalogue statement, Seth Siegel, New York City.
- 969 "Interview by Arthur R. Rose," *Arts Magazine*, February 1969 (photo).
- 969 Interview (including Siegel, Barry, Huebler, and Weiner) with Jeanne Siegel, WBAI-FM, broadcast February.
- 969 "Critic on the Air," interview by telephone, Vancouver to New York City, CBC (coast to coast), broadcast December.
- 969 "Art After Philosophy," *Studio International* (Part One, October; Part Two, November; Part Three, December).
- 970 "Introduction by the American Editor," *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (February).
- 970 Jeanne Siegel, "Interview," WBAI-FM, broadcast April 7.
- 969 Interview in "Prospect" catalogue, Kunsthalle Dusseldorf, Germany.
- 970 *Function* (book published by Editions Sperone, series ed. by Germano Celant), Turino, Italy.

on the artist)

- 968 Lucy Lippard and John Chandler, "De-materialization of Art," *Art International*, February (photo).
- 968 Gregory Battcock, *Minimal Art, A Critical Anthology*, a Dutton paperback (photo).
- 968 *Time*, June 29, p. 63.
- 968 Howard Junker, "The New Art: It's Way, Way Out," *Newsweek*, July 29, pp. 56-63 (color photo).
- 968 J. Livingston, "Reviews," *Artforum*, November.
- 968 John Chandler, "The Last Word in Art," *Art International*, November.
- 968 Gordon Brown, "The De-materialization of the Object," *Arts Magazine*, September/October (photo).
- 969 Seth Siegel, "January 5-31, 1969," New York City (photos).
- 969 Gregory Battcock, "Painting Is Obsolete," *New York Free Press*, January 23, p. 7.
- 969 John Perreault, "Art: Disturbances," *Village Voice*, New York City, pp. 14,18.
- 969 Rosalind Constable, "The New Art: Big Ideas for Sale," *New York Magazine*, March 10, p. 49.
- 969 Dore Ashton, "N.Y. Commentary," *Studio International*, March, p. 135.
- 969 David Shirey, "Impossible Art," *Art In America*, May/June, pp. 39,41 (photo).
- 969 Barbara Rose, "Problems of Criticism, the Politics of Art, Part III," *Artforum*, May, p. 46.
- 969 Robert Morris, "Notes on Sculpture, Part IV: Beyond Objects," *Artforum*, April, p. 54.
- 969 C. Blok, "Letter from Holland," *Art International*, May, pp. 51-53.
- 969 Howard Junker, "Idea Art," *Newsweek*, August 11.
- 969 Leo Lerman, "Export-Import," *Mademoiselle*, June, p. 117 (photo).
- 969 Peter Plagens, "The Possibilities of Drawing," *Artforum*, October.
- 969 Michel Claura, "Extremisme et Rupture I," "Extremisme et Rupture II," *Lettres Francaise*, September/October, pp. 26-27.
- 969 Jack Burnham, "Real Time Systems," *Artforum*, September (photo).
- 969 Germano Celant, *Art Povera*, Praeger Books (photos and statement).
- 969 Charles Harrison, "Against Precedents," *Studio International*, September (photo).
- 969 Lucy Lippard, "Time: A Panel Discussion," *Art International*, November.
- 969 Achille Bonito Oliva, "America Anti-form," *Domus*, September.
- 969 Peter Plagens, "557,087: Seattle," *Artforum*, November.
- 970 Jack Burnham, "Alice's Head: Reflections on Conceptual Art," *Artforum*, February (photos).
- 970 Catherine Millet, "Conceptual Art," *Opus Internationale*, February.
- 970 Seth Siegel in conversation with Charles Harrison, "On Exhibitions and the World at Large," *Studio International*, February.
- 970 Charles Harrison, "Notes Toward Art Work," *Studio International*, February.
- 970 "Notebook on Water: 1965/66" in *Artists and Photographs*, a catalogue, Multiples, New York, March.

- 1970 Athena Spear, ed. "Art in the Mind," catalogue exhibition, Allen Memorial Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio.
- 1970 Ursula Meyer and Al Brunelle, *Art = Anti-Art*, a Dutton paperback (photos).
- 1970 Germano Celant, ed. "Art Povera/Conceptual Art," exhibition catalogue, Modern Art Museum of Turin, Italy (photos).
- 1970 Germano Celant, *Art Povera/Conceptual Art Archives* (photos and writings).
- 1970 Klaus Groh, *Concept Art*, International Editions (photos and writings).
- 1970 J. Burnham, "Software," exhibition catalogue Jewish Museum, New York City, September.
- 1970 Atkinson, Baldwin, Bainbridge, and Hurrell, "Status & Priority," *Studio International*, January.

INFORMATION ROOM

1. "The Fifth Investigation" (Proposition One) 1969
2. "The Sixth Investigation" (Proposition Two) 1969
3. "The Sixth Investigation" (Proposition Six) 1970
4. "Special Investigation" 1969
5. "Special Investigation: Isolation and Consideration of Presentation, a Listing and Note" 1970

(All works – since 1966 – subtitled 'art as idea as idea')

C. KOZLOV

Born: December 6, 1945, New York.

EXHIBITIONS

- 1967 "Non-anthropomorphic Art," Lannis Gallery, New York City, February.
- 1967 "Fifteen People Present Their Favorite Book," The Museum of Normal Art, New York City, May.
- 1967 "Normal Art," The Museum of Normal Art, New York City (November)
- 1968 "Creact," Goucher College, Maryland, January.

- 1968 "Language II," Dwan Gallery, New York City, May.
- 1969 "One Month," Seth Siegelaub, March.
- 1969 Paula Cooper Gallery, New York City, June.
- 1969 "Language III," Dwan Gallery, New York City, June.
- 1969 "557,087," Seattle Museum of Art, Seattle, Washington
- 1969 "Konzeptkunst," Leverkusen Museum, Leverkusen, Germany, October.
- 1970 "955,000," Vancouver Gallery of Art, Vancouver, B.C., January-February.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1967 *Arts Magazine*, March.
- 1967 Perreault, *Village Voice*, April.
- 1967 *Arts Magazine*, September.
- 1967 Perreault, *Village Voice*, March.
- 1968 Lippard and Chandler, *Art International*, February.
- 1969 Oliva, *Domus*, September.
- 1969 Kosuth, *Studio International*, November.
- 1969 Kosuth, *Studio International*, December (photo).
- 1970 Harrison, *Studio International*, February.

1. *Tape Recorder (Erasure)*
2. *Rejection Series*
3. *Non-Presentation*

BRUCE NAUMAN

Born: Fort Wayne, Indiana, 1941.

B.S., University of Wisconsin

M.A., University of California, Davis, California

EXHIBITIONS

(one man)

- 1966 Nicholas Wilder Gallery, Los Angeles
- 1968 Leo Castelli Gallery, New York
- 1969 Nicholas Wilder Gallery, Los Angeles
- 1969 Leo Castelli Gallery, New York
- 1969 Galerie Ileana Sonnabend, Paris

(two man)

- 1966 San Francisco Art Institute, San Francisco, California

(group)

- 1966 "Eccentric Abstraction," Fischbach Gallery, New York
- 1966 "New Directions," San Francisco Museum
- 1967 "American Sculpture of the Sixties," Los Angeles County Museum
- 1968 Documenta. Kassel, Germany
- 1968 "Three Young Americans," Allen Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio
- 1968 "Nine At Castelli," Leo Castelli Warehouse, New York
- 1969 "Soft Sculpture," American Federation of the Arts Circulating Exhibition
- 1969 "Here and Now," Steinberg Gallery of Art, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri
- 1969 31st Annual Exhibition, Corcoran Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.
- 1969 "Square Pegs in Round Holes," Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam
- 1969 "When Attitude Becomes Form," Kunsthalle Bern, Switzerland
- 1969 Galerie Heiner Friedrich, Munich (drawings)
- 1969 Wide White Space Gallery, Antwerp (drawings)
- 1969 "The Sky's the Limit," University of St. Thomas, Houston, Texas
- 1969 "Anti-Illusion: Procedures/Materials," Whitney Museum of American Art, New York
- 1969 "Theodoron Foundation: Nine Young Artists," Guggenheim Museum, New York
- 1969 "7 Objects/69," Galerie Ricke, Cologne
- 1969 Galerie Rudolf Zwirner, Cologne
- 1969 "Kompas IV," Stedelijk van Abbemuseum, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
- 1969 "Art by Telephone," Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago
- 1969 "Art in Process IV," Finch College Museum of Art, New York
- 1969 Gallery of the School of Visual Arts, New York
- 1969 Contemporary Drawing Show, Fort Worth Art Center, Fort Worth, Texas

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1966 "William Geis and Bruce Nauman: A Two-Man Exhibition," San Francisco Art Institute (a mimeographed article about the artists at the time of the exhibition, Sept. 26-Oct. 22).
- 1966 Lucy Lippard, "Eccentric Abstraction," Fischbach Gallery, New York (reprinted in *Art International*, November, pp. 28-34-40, ill. p. 37).
- 1966 Knute Stiles, "San Francisco," *Artforum*, December, p. 65 (ill. p. 64).
- 1967 Fidel A. Danieli, "The Art of Bruce Nauman," *Artforum*, December, pp. 15-19 (illustrated).

- 068 Ellen H. Johnson and Athena T. Spear, "Three Young Americans: Krueger, Nauman, Saret," *Bulletin*, Spring, Allen Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio
- 067 "American Sculpture of the Sixties," Los Angeles County Museum of Art.
- 068 Kassel, "Documenta IV."
- 068 "Bruce Nauman," exhibition catalogue, Leo Castelli Gallery, New York, Jan. 27-Feb. 17.
- 068 John Perreault, *Village Voice*, February 8.
- 068 Gregory Battcock, *New York Free Press*, February 8.
- 068 *The Blade*, Toledo, Ohio, February 18 (illustrated).
- 068 *Arts Magazine*, March.
- 068 Robert Pincus-Witten, "Bruce Nauman; Bibiena Family Drawings; De Maria, Di Suvero, Serra; Ronald Grow," *Artforum*, April.
- 069 Max Kozloff, "Nine at Castelli," *Artforum*, February.
- 069 "Here and Now," Washington University Gallery of Art, St. Louis, Missouri.
- 069 "Thirty-first Biennial Exhibition of Contemporary American Painting," Corcoran Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.
- 069 "Square Pegs in Round Holes (Op Losse Schroeven)," Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam.
- 069 "When Attitudes Become Form," catalogue, Kunsthalle Bern, Bern

Violin tuned DEAD. (Sound tape).

Rolling on studio floor. (Sound tape).

Photographs.

DENNIS OPPENHEIM

born 1938, Mason City, Washington.

lives in New York City.

EXHIBITIONS

(Recent one-man shows)

- 068-69 John Gibson Gallery, New York
- 069 Yvon Lambert, Paris
- 069 Galerie Lambert, Milan, Italy

(recent group exhibitions)

- 1968-69 "Language II-III," Dwan Gallery, New York
1968 "Earthworks," Dwan Gallery, New York
1968 Sculpture Annual, Whitney Museum, New York
1969 "New Media – New Methods," Museum of Modern Art, New York
1969 "Earth," Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
1969 "Land Art," Gerry Schum, Fernsehgalerie, Berlin
1969 "Op Losse Schroeven," Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam
1969 Eugenia Butler Exhibition, San Francisco Art Institute, San Francisco
1969 "Prospect," Stadtische Kunsthalle, Dusseldorf, Germany
1969 "March," Seth Siegelaub, New York
1969 "When Attitude Becomes Form," Kunsthalle, Bern, Switzerland
1969 "Ecologic Art," John Gibson, New York
1969 "A Report – Two Ocean Projects," Museum of Modern Art, New York
1969 "Return to Abstract Expressionism," Richmond Art Center, Richmond, California
1969 "Art by Telephone," Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago
1969 "Place and Process," Edmonton Art Gallery, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
1969 "The Artist's View," Jewish Museum, New York
1969 "Art After Plans," Kunsthalle Bern, Switzerland
1969 "557,087," Seattle Art Museum, Seattle, Washington

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1962 "Independents" (University of Hawaii), *Artforum*, September.
1966 Belmonte Show, *Artforum*, June.
1966 "2D-3D" (Richmond Art Center), *Artforum*, June.
1967 James Monte, *Sculpture of the 60's*.
1967 Pamela French, "Plastics West Coast," *Artforum*, November.
1966 L. R. Lippard, "Eccentric Abstraction," *Art International*, November.
1968 Grace Glueck (John Gibson Show), *New York Times*, May.
1968 Scott Bergson (John Gibson Show), *Art News*, May.
1968 Howard Junker, "The New Art," *Newsweek*, July.
1968 Howard Junker, "Dirt Art," *Saturday Evening Post*, October.
1968 Peter Hutchinson, "Earth in Upheaval," *Arts Magazine*, November.
1968 Sidney Tillim, "Earthwork and the New Picturesque," *Artforum*, November.
1969 Earthworks Show, *Time*, October.
1969 Rosalind Constable, "New Art," *New York Magazine*, February.
1969 David Shirey (Whitney Annual), *Newsweek*.
1968 Leo Lerman, "Most Likely to Succeed," *Mademoiselle*, September.
1968 Robert Smithson, "Sedimentation of the Mind" (Earth Projects), *Artforum*, September
1969 Grace Glueck, "Snow Projects," *New York Times*, January.
1969 *Art Now – New York*, Volume 1, January.
1969 Howard Junker, "Earth" (Cornell University), *Newsweek*, February.
1969 Bill Johnson, *Art News*, February.
1969 Max Kosloff (Earth Project), *Nation*, March.
1969 David Bourdon, "What on Earth," *Life*, April.

- 969 *Studio International* (Earth Show, Cornell University), April.
 969 Dore Ashton, "Exercises in Anti-style," *Arts Magazine*, April.
 969 David Shirey, "Impossible Art," *Art in America*, May.
 969 Bill Johnson, "Visionary Projects," *Art News*, May.
 969 *L'OEIL* (Kunsthall Bern), May.
 969 Otto Hahn, "Lambert Show," *L'Express*, June.
 969 Bernard Burgeaud, *Pariscope*, June.
 969 Jack Burnham, "Real Time Systems," *Artforum*, September.
 969 David Bourdon, "Money You Can Bank On," *Life*, September.
 969 Dennis Oppenheim, *Artforum*, October.
 969 "A Report — Two Ocean Projects," *Art News*, October.

Venus 3557 (Diagram for Solo Dance).

PAUL OSTROW

born August 3, 1947, in Brooklyn.
 lives New York City.

School of Visual Arts.

Co-Founder (along with Frank L. Viner and Rex Lau) and Chairman of the Board of A.I.R. (Artistic Investigations and Research).

EXHIBITIONS

- 968 "The Square in Painting," American Federation of Arts Traveling Show
 969 "Sculpture in the Park," Central Park, New York City
 969 "Language III," Dwan Gallery, New York
 969 "Conception X Perception," Eugenia Butler Gallery, Los Angeles.
 969 "Quintquevalance; Five Situations," Riverside Museum, New York.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1969 William Wilson, "Perception Display at Butler Gallery," *Los Angeles Times*, July 14.
1969 John Perreault, "Quintquevalance: Five Situations," *Village Voice*.
1969 Miriam Brumer, "Quintquevalance," *Arts Magazine*, November.
1969 Joseph Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy," *Studio International*, Vol. 178, No. 916.

1. *Series B (Museum Piece Parts 1 and 2) 1968.*

Materials: letters/photostats/museums/United States Mail.

2. *Series D (Request Piece Parts 1-8) 1969.*

Materials: letters/telegrams/postcards/photographs/books/United States Mail and artist.

ADRIAN PIPER

Born September, 1948, in New York.

Lives in New York.

School of Visual Arts, New York (1966-69), and City College, New York (philosophy major, 1966-present).

EXHIBITIONS

- 1969 "Three Untitled Projects," published by 0 to 9 Press, March (one man)
1969 "Street Works II," New York
1969 "Number 7," Paula Cooper Gallery, New York
1969 "Language III," Dwan Gallery, New York
1969 "557,087," Seattle Art Museum, Seattle, Washington
1969 "Concept Art," Städtisches Museum, Leverkusen, Germany
1969 "Groups," School of Visual Arts Gallery, New York
1969 "Art After Plans," Kunsthalle Bern, Switzerland
1970 "955,000," Vancouver Art Gallery, Vancouver, B.C.
1970 "Art in the Mind," Allen Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(by the artist)

- 1968 *O to 9 Magazine*, No. 5 (December).
1969 *O to 9 Magazine*, No. 6 (July).
1969 "Street Works II," *O to 9 Press*, July.
1969 "Untitled Magazine," *Art-Press*, No. 1 (July).
1970 *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 2.

(on the artist)

- 1969 *Village Voice*, March 27, pp. 15-17.
1969 *Village Voice*, May 1, pp. 14-16.
1969 *Village Voice*, June 5, pp. 16-18.
1969 *Village Voice*, November 20, p. 34.
1969 "557,087," *Artforum*, November, p. 67.
1969 "Art After Philosophy, II," *Studio International*, November, p. 161.

1. *Situation # 18* (January, 1970).

MEL RAMSDEN

Born, Nottingham, England, 1944; has lived in Australia and came to New York in 1967.
Nottingham College of Art, 1961-63 (painting), and National Gallery School, Victoria, 1963-64.

Founded:

- 1969 *Art-Press* (with Ian Burn and Roger Cutforth)
1969 The Society for Theoretical Art & Analyses (with Burn and Cutforth)

EXHIBITIONS

- 1966 "Soft-Tape" (for Australia), London (with Ian Burn) – gallery display rejected
1968 "The Field," National Gallery of Victoria, Australia
1968 "The Field," New South Wales Art Gallery, Australia

- 1969 "Language III," Dwan Gallery, New York
- 1969 Pinacotheca Gallery, Melbourne (with Ian Burn and Roger Cutforth)
- 1970 "Art in the Mind," Allen Memorial Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(by the artist)

- 1969 "Untitled Magazine," Art-Press, July.
- 1969 Catalogue statement, Pinacotheca Gallery.
- 1970 *Art-Language*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (February).
- 1970 "Proceedings of the Society."

(on the artist)

- 1969 G. Lansell, "Pseudo-Science," *Nation* (Australia), August.
- 1969 *Art International*, November, p. 46.
- 1969 J. Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy, Part II," *Studio International*, November.

1. *The Six Negatives* (see text on page 22) 1968-69
2. *Inquiry #5* (text). 1969
3. *Proceedings* (text). February 1970

EDWARD RUSCHA

Born December 16, 1937, Omaha, Nebraska. Moved to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 1942; moved to Los Angeles and attended Chouinard Art Institute 1956-60; travelled in Europe 1961, 1964, 1967; presently resides in Los Angeles, California.

EXHIBITIONS

(one man)

- 1963 Ferus Gallery, Los Angeles
- 1964 Ferus Gallery, Los Angeles

1965 Ferus Gallery, Los Angeles
1967 Alexander Iolas Gallery, New York
1968 Irving Blum Gallery, Los Angeles
1968 Rudolph Zwirner, Cologne, Germany
1969 Irving Blum Gallery, Los Angeles
1970 Alexander Iolas Gallery, New York, Paris, Milan

(group)

1960 "Four Oklahoma Artists" (with Joe Goode, Pat Blackwell and Jerry McMillan), Oklahoma City Art Center
1962 "New Painting of Common Objects," Pasadena Art Museum
1963 "Six More," Los Angeles County Museum
1963 "Pop Art USA," Oakland Art Museum
1964 "American Drawings," Guggenheim Museum, New York
1964 "Collector's Show," Fine Arts Patr., Balboa, California
1965 "Art Across America," sponsored by the Mead Paper Corporation
1965 "Words and Images," Guggenheim Museum, New York
1965 "Five at Pace," Pace Gallery, New York
1966 "Ten from Los Angeles," Seattle Art Museum
1966 "Los Angeles Now," Robert Fraser Gallery, London
1967 "IX Sao Paulo Biennale," Sao Paulo, Brazil
1967 "Fifth Paris Biennale," Museum of Modern Art, Paris
1967 "Annual Exhibition," Whitney Museum, New York
1968 "West Coast Now," Portland Art Museum
1968 "Small Paintings for Museum Collection," American Federation of Arts
1969 "California Drawings, 1969," Ithaca College Museum of Art, New York
1969 "Three Modern Masters: Billy Al Bengston, Edward Ruscha, Frank Lloyd Wright," Gallery Reese-Palle, San Francisco
1969 "Tamarind: Homage to Lithography," Museum of Modern Art, New York
1969 "A Look at Neo Ruralism and Something Else," Multiples, New York
1969 "Contemporary Drawings Show," Fort Worth Art Center Art Museum
1969 "Kompas IV," Stedelijk van Abbemuseum, Amsterdam
1969 "Pop Art," Hayward Gallery, London
1969 "Group Show – Drawings," Galerie Neuendorf, Hamburg
1969 "557,087," Seattle Art Museum
1969 "1969 Annual Exhibition," Whitney Museum, New York

1. *Every Building on the Sunset Strip (1966).*

2. *Selected presentation of grouping of complete book series.*

BERNAR VENET

Born April 20, 1941, France.

Lived New York since 1966.

EXHIBITIONS

- 1964-67 Works presented in Musee d'Art Moderne in Paris; Musee Galiera, Paris; several galleries and Biennale des Jeunes, Paris
- 1968 "New York Art 1968," Rochester
- 1968 "Relativity's Track" (play), Judson Poets Theater, New York
- 1968 "Language II," Dwan Gallery, New York
- 1968 "Prospect with Wide White Space," Kunsthalle, Dusseldorf
- 1968 E.A.T., Brooklyn Museum, New York
- 1968 "Wide White Space," Antwerp
- 1968 "New Acquisitions," Kaiser Wilhelm Museum, Germany
- 1969 "New York 1969," Miami University of Oxford
- 1969 "Street Work II," New York
- 1969 "Language III," Dwan Gallery, New York
- 1969 "Number 7," Paula Cooper Gallery, New York
- 1969 "Play," The Theater, New York
- 1969 "Sygma," Bordeaux, France
- 1969 "Conceptual Art," Leverkusen Museum, Germany
- 1969 "New Acquisitions," Santa Barbara Museum of Art, California
- 1969 "Art by Telephone," Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago
- 1969 "Art selon plans," Kunsthale de Berne and Aktionsraum, Munchen
- 1969 One-man show, Newark College of Engineering, New Jersey
- 1970 One-man show, O.K. Harris Gallery, New York
- 1970 One-man show, Haus Lange Museum, Krefeld, Germany
- 1970 "Kunst Nach Planen," Kunsthaus Hamburg, Germany
- 1970 "Artists and Photography," Multiples Gallery, New York
- 1970 "Art in the Mind," Allen Art Museum, Oberlin, Ohio
- 1970 "Painting and Sculpture Today," Indianapolis Museum of Art and Toledo Museum of Art, Ohio

Collections: Museum of Modern Art (New York); Kaiser Wilhelm Museum (Krefeld, Germany); Akron Art Institute (Ohio); Santa Barbara Museum of Art (California).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1965-67 Articles by Pierre Restany, *Planete*; Jean Jacques Leveque, *Art*; Otto Hahn, *L'Express*; Leveque, *Opus International*, *Lettres Francaises*; Francois Pluchard, *Combat*; Jacques Lepage, *Aujourd'hui*.
- 1968 L. Lippard and J. Chandler, "The Dematerialization of Art," *Art International*, February.
- 1968 "Some More Beginnings," catalogue, Brooklyn Museum
- 1969 John Perreault, "Para Visual Art," *Village Voice*, June 5.
- 1969 Jan Van der Marck, "Art by Telephone," catalogue, Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago
- 1969 P. F. Althaus, "Art and Projects as Art," catalogue.

- 1969 "Konzeption-Conception of a To-day Art Tendency," Museum Leverkusen publication.
- 1970 Catherine Millet, "L'Art Conceptuel," *L'Art Vivant*, January.
- 1970 Laurence Alloway, "Bernar Venet," *Arts Magazine*, March.
- 1970 Catherine Millet, "Conceptual Art," *Opus International*, February.

Documentation and interviews in Archives of American Art, New York City, and Archives of the New York Public Library.

- 1. "New York Stock Exchange Transactions." 1969. Dimensions: 173" x 18". Medium: Photograph.

IAN WILSON

New York City.

- 1. *Oral Communication.*

LAWRENCE WEINER

Born Bronx, New York.

EXHIBITIONS

(one man)

- 1960 "Cratering piece," Mill Valley, California
- 1964 Seth Siegelau, New York City
- 1965 Seth Siegelau, New York City
- 1968 Statements (published by Siegelau/Kellner)
- 1969 Konrad Fischer, Dusseldorf
- 1969 Nova Scotia College of Art, Nova Scotia, Canada
- 1969 "Wide White Space," Antwerpen, Belgium
- 1969 "Art & Project," Amsterdam
- 1969 Galleria Sperone, Torino, Italy
- 1969-70 "Terminal Boundaries" (published by Siegelau, New York City/Konig Koln)

- 1970 Yvon Lambert, Paris
 1970 "Traces" (published by Editions Sperone, Torino)

(group)

- 1963 Atelier 6, Paris
 1966 25, Seth Siegelau, New York City
 1968 Bradford Junior College, Bradford, Massachusetts (with Carl Andre and Robert Barry)
 1968 Wyndham College, Putney, Vermont (outdoors with Carl Andre and Robert Barry)
 1968 "Language II," Dwan Gallery, New York City
 1968 "The Square in Painting" (traveling exhibition), American Federation of Arts
 1968 "SMS" (Letter Edged in Black Press), New York City
 1968 "Xerox Book" (with Andre, Barry, Huebler, Kosuth, LeWitt, and Morris), New York City
 1969 "January 5-31, 1969," Seth Siegelau, New York City (with Barry, Huebler and Kosuth)
 1969 "March," Seth Siegelau, New York City (catalogue)
 1969 "Op Losse Schroeven," Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam
 1969 "Op Losse Schroeven," Folkwang Museum, Essen, Germany
 1969 "When Attitudes Become Form," Kunsthalle Bern, Switzerland; Museum Haus Lange, Krefeld, Germany; ICA, London
 1969 San Francisco Art Institute, San Francisco, California
 1969 "Language III," Dwan Gallery, New York City
 1969 Paula Cooper Gallery, New York City (organized by Lucy Lippard)
 1969 "May 19-June 19," Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada
 1969 "Summer Show," Seth Siegelau (with Andre, Barry, Buren, Dibbets, Huebler, Kosuth, Long, N.E. Thing Co., LeWitt and Smithson)
 1969 "The Wall Show," Ace, Los Angeles, California
 1969 "557,087," Seattle Museum of Art, Seattle, Washington (organized by Lucy Lippard)
 1969 "Place and Process," Edmonton Art Gallery, Alberta, Canada
 1969 "Prospect 69," Dusseldorf, Germany
 1969 "Concept Art," Städtisches Museum, Leverkusen, Germany
 1969 "Art After Plans," Kunsthalle, Bern, Switzerland
 1969-70 "Art in Process IV," Finch College Museum, New York City
 1970 "String Show," Sidney Janis Gallery, New York City
 1970 "955,000," Vancouver, Canada (organized by Lucy Lippard)
 1970 "23 Paris IV 70," Paris (organized by Michel Claura)


- (1. The artist may construct the piece. 2. The piece may be fabricated. 3. The piece need not be built.*

Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist; the decision as to condition rests with the receiver upon the occasion of receivership.)

1. *DISPLACED*
collection of M. and Mme. Roger Mazarguil, Paris.

2. *A GLACIER VANDALISED*
collection – Public Freehold.
dedicated to Mr. and Mrs. John Wendler.

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