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IN SEARCH OF MUSICAL METHOD

F. J. SMITH

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IN SEARCH OF MUSICAL METHOD

Edited by

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To the Memory of

ERWIN W. STRAUS

*PHYSICIAN, MUSICIAN,
EDUCATOR, PHILOSOPHER,*

1892-1975

Introduction

In Search of Musical Method

IN THIS DAY and age everyone seems faced with the problem of how to come to grips with the world in which we live. Though often preoccupied with economics, we cannot understate the crucial place of a proper understanding of musical phenomena in our troubled culture. The problem with music is that it has too often been regarded as a mere embellishment to civilization, as entertainment, as something not belonging in essential manner to man's spirit. This is partly the fault of musicians and musicologists themselves. But it is not all their fault. The problem has been intensified by our society's lack of ease with the artist as opposed to the worker. The latter is regarded as essential to the building up of our society; the former is regarded as dispensable. The fact is that music is crucial to the building up of civilization, as all history proclaims. Our present difficulties seem traceable to an unsuccessful search for the proper method, i.e., the theoretical and practical manner in which to come to grips with the question. The essays chosen for the present work begin to indicate in what direction a proper method or approach might lie. They represent mostly but not exclusively the phenomenological method, a way of psyching out problems and questions that meets with considerable success in certain areas, despite its obvious drawbacks. Presented in undogmatic manner as a way of going at musical questions within a societal and cultural framework, these essays may well abet our effort eventually to discover a method that will satisfy us, at least temporarily, in our search.

It is a great privilege to be able to present for the first time anywhere the "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music" by Alfred Schutz, as edited and annotated by Prof. Fred Kersten. A

man universally known for his sharp insight into social philosophy rightfully leads the discussion of any phenomenology of music, even though a musicologist can easily point out certain technical flaws and naïvetés with regard to music as such, when treated by a philosopher even of such stature. Such slips as identifying a faux bourdon technique with open consonant fifths instead of with the intervals of the third and sixth in no way detracts from the overall breadth and depth of Schutz' insights. A good musicologist will realize he is reading the essay of a philosopher genuinely interested in music as part of society and philosophy and rejoice at that. He will eschew the pedant's tendency to chortle at every mistake, whether it appears in some undergraduate's history examination or in an essay on Mozart by Kierkegaard, a chapter on music by Santayana, or a treatise on the musical phenomenon in society by Alfred Schutz. One need not be overly upset by Schutz' insistence on musical theme, as a unique configuration, apperceived as a unit (Gestalt) in consciousness. The formal theme has been with us, of course, mostly since the classical era, though it has its roots in eras before Mozart and Haydn. If we emphasize the word, configuration, we are better off, since it then takes us back farther to include Bach, the Renaissance, and, of course, the Middle Ages. In other words, a musician or musicologist can make any and all adjustments and comments for Schutz, whose importance for music theory need not be undermined by lapses in technical knowledge. As to the social import of this particular essay, it is mostly implicit. But it is surely a strong undercurrent even in these "fragments", given that the thrust of Schutz' written corpus is so socially oriented. Surely Schutz would have agreed with one of the central purposes of the journal, *Music and Man*, which is "an attempt to reach a valid philosophy of music and the arts and to promote the realization in the musician of the importance of the world that exists off-stage". The phenomenological method is not only a study of the musical subject; rather, intersubjectivity, i.e., the relationship between human subjects, is sounded out and thematized. The method is thus crucial to a genuine social philosophy of musical (and other) phenomena.

And yet while this may be all well and good, actual works of music cannot be ignored in favor of philosophizing. And thus in an

essay which deals with music as a “constituted object” Thomas Clifton brings competence in philosophical conceptuality to a useful and necessary exemplification of Webern’s *Bagatelle No. 1 for String Quartet*, Op. 9. He stresses and analyzes its meaning, as it emerges in the world of the perceiver’s experience, underscoring the “network of intentionalities” after Merleau-Ponty.

In a further essay, written as a kind of report concerning his ongoing workshop studies of conducting, José Arcaya essays an inquiry into musical imagination based on experience and interviewing of orchestral conductors. Here the phenomenological method is seen directly at work, and the practical results that ensue make our effort that much more concrete and down to earth. Arcaya thematizes the relationship between the conductor and the orchestra in terms of the imaginative process going on and attempts to embody it in the musical sound produced in this cooperative effort of musicians at work.

In another essay that gets directly at the music itself, Rita La Plante Raffman, a concert pianist and theorist, analyzes a composition by John Cage, stressing Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblances. A formal philosopher might not go at it in precisely such a practical manner, but a musician is at his or her best in so doing. A philosopher can easily fill in for the musician, if this is indeed called for, just as a musician can perform this function for a philosopher. What is called for is a pooling of interests and skills, and this essay seems to begin to do precisely that.

Wittgenstein, of course, may be more important for music than musicians or phenomenologists might realize. Contrary to Schutz, Wittgenstein expressly states that a sentence and a given musical theme are related. The word, related (*verwandt*), implies a family resemblance between musical statement, especially as a theme, and a language proposition. It is a question not merely of an abstract relationship but of the concreteness obtaining between relatives in the family, if we consult *Philosophical Investigations* (nos. 527 and 65). But the concept of family resemblance is not merely a philosophical notion. It is one common to musical education. LaRue, analyst par excellence of symphonies, has written on “significant resemblances” between classical themes, with no reference, of course, to any

philosopher. In *A Young Person's Guide to Orchestra* Benjamin Britten spoke of the "family likeness" between musical instruments; and in his history of musical instruments the renowned Curt Sachs wrote of families of instruments. Symphonies are more convincingly linked to one another in terms of family resemblances than in terms of some latter day abstract symphonic form. Wittgenstein has contributed crucial notions to any theory of music that has philosophical pretensions.

Finally, in the closing essay the present writer attempts to wed music theory with the mainstream of the history of ideas and philosophy by giving a musical interpretation to Descartes' "I think and thus I am". Here we, as it were, plug directly into human consciousness and the experiential substrate that must underlie any convincing musical theory. The close link between Descartes and such musical greats as Mersenne and Rameau is emphasized, showing the Cartesian problem to be at the heart of classic music theory. From here to a Husserlian and Heideggerian critique of the Cartesian dualism—which badly affected also music theory—is but a small but vital step. The essay, though written with careful clarity, is not an easy one, but it does begin to bring music theory back into the mainstream of theory as such.

In this work then we have been in search of a method which will hopefully begin to open us to the musical experience that must underlie any theorizations. While the phenomenological method has been featured, the analytical and the socialist views must not be completely neglected. Perhaps we need a dialectic of what is essential to these methods so as to promote an integral methodology operative at various levels of musical thought and analysis. The present work is preparatory to such a task. May it be received in the spirit in which it is proffered.

F. J. SMITH
Chicago

Fragments on the phenomenology of music

ALFRED SCHUTZ (ed. F. Kersten)

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Preface

ALFRED SCHUTZ'S "Fragments on the phenomenology of music" has been edited from a manuscript written in Lake Placid during the week of July 16th to July 23rd, 1944. The manuscript consists of 65 hand-written pages, in English. Written as a first draft, it was clearly not intended for publication in the form in which Schutz left it. Unfinished in the elaboration of its content, the manuscript contains but few revisions which seem to have been made at the time of writing. Some sections, announced in the text, such as those on rhythm, are missing altogether; other, and very short sections, seem incomplete.

The title of the manuscript, and its division into sections, are those of Schutz. The editor has added section titles, and has made a few minor changes in terminology. In addition, some changes in punctuation, grammar, and style have been made for the sake of a more readable text. Where it was necessary to add words and phrases, they have been enclosed in brackets. Unless otherwise noted, the footnotes are by the editor; they refer principally to further development of similar ideas in Schutz's published writings. With the exception of footnote 9, clearly marked as such by Schutz, footnotes attributed to him are parentheses or paragraphs which do not seem to be appropriate parts of the text as it exists; they may very well have been integral parts of the text had it been completed.

In addition to a copy of the hand-written text, the editor has also used a typescript of the manuscript prepared by Mr. Lester Embree, and which was carefully corrected by Mrs. Alfred Schutz. The editor wishes to thank Mr. Embree both for the use of his typescript and for his encouragement in editing the text. A sincere debt of gratitude is owing to Mrs. Schutz for granting permission to publish this very important manuscript. The editor also wishes to thank Mrs. I. W. Kersten for her patient help in understanding some of the technical problems in music discussed in the manuscript.

During his lifetime, Alfred Schutz published two essays on music: "Making music together. A study in social relationship," *Social*

Research, Vol. 18, No. 1, March, 1951; and "Mozart and the philosophers," *Social Research*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Summer, 1956. Both essays are reprinted in Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers*, Vol. II: *Studies in Social Theory*, edited and introduced by Arvid Brodersen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). Some passages in these two essays, especially in "Making music together," are very similar to the present essay, which could very well have been basic to both published essays. It would also suggest that Schutz eventually located the present essay in the larger framework to which the published essays belong. There is some confirmation of this by Schutz himself who, shortly before his death, organized his work into the three volumes of *Collected Papers*. More specifically, the two published essays on music were listed under the heading of "applied theory."¹ However, as Brodersen observes, "applied theory" had a unique meaning for Schutz:

One lesson which Schutz learned early in life and continued teaching to the end was the necessity for basing any social theory upon a foundation of philosophy. . . . Against this background the term "applied theory" describes the character of the present *Studies* in yet another sense—as exercises in the application of philosophic thought to the interpretation of society.²

This unique meaning of the studies on music is further confirmed by Schutz when he states in "Making music together" that the essay aims at the analysis of "all social interactions connected with the musical process"³—social interactions which are meaningful and founded on "communication" not in the sense of a semantic system but, instead, on "communication" in the sense of the "sharing of the other's flux of experiences in inner time, this living through a vivid present in common," which "constitutes . . . the experience of the 'We,' which is at the foundation of all possible communication."⁴

This signifies for Schutz that, so far as music is concerned, we must distinguish, on the one hand, the "inner time in which the flux of musical events unfold," and, on the other, a social relationship such as making music together, which occurs in "outer time" and which presupposes a face-to-face relationship, a "community of space, and it is this dimension which unifies the fluxes of inner time and warrants their synchronization into a vivid present."⁵ The "Fragments on the

phenomenology of music” examines in detail the nature and structure of inner time and the unification (“synthesis”) of fluxes into a vivid present. To that end, the essay deals with the unfolding of the musical theme in inner time under three categories: continuance, sameness, and movement. With respect to the third category, the foundation is laid for the constituting of the community of space. To be sure, this community of space is not the space studied by the physicist; it is the social-cultural space of making music together, of the musical process itself. This idea also allows us to see the extent to which Schutz’s thinking, in what is but a first sketch for a phenomenology of music, goes beyond the framework of “applied theory.”

The composer, for example, uses specific means in order to bring about, on the part of the listener, a course of consciousness whereby what he actually hears, in the musical experience of listening, is referred by him to what is anticipated as well as to what has just been heard and what he has been hearing since the piece of music began. Some of these means, Schutz notes, are essential to any kind of music, still others are peculiar to a particular musical culture:⁶

Rhythm, melody, tonal harmony, technique of diminution, and the so-called forms based on what Tovey calls the larger harmony, such as Sonata, Rondo, Variations, and so on, are certainly characteristic of the musical culture of the nineteenth century. *It may be hoped that intensified research in the phenomenology of musical experience will shed some light upon the difficult problem as to which of these means of meaningful arrangement of tones is essential to music in general, regardless of what its particular historical setting may be.*⁷

The “Fragments on the phenomenology of music” examines the “meaningful arrangement of tones” in terms of the musical theme, hence the essay forms the central core of analysis of the essential nature of music in general. The essay is, then, basic to, and, indeed, presupposed by, “Making music together” and “Mozart and the philosophers”—essays whose chief emphasis is, if not the “sociology of music,” then at least the characteristics of musical culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (some of which, to be sure, turn out to be essential to music in general).

We may say, accordingly, that “Fragments on the phenomenology of music” is both part of “applied theory” in Schutz’s unique sense, as well as, at the same time, part of what we might call “foundational

theory.” As part of the latter, the essay is not only a sketch of the philosophic thought applied to the interpretation of society, but it is more fundamental in the sense that it contributes to philosophic thought itself. The essay not only criticizes but also revises and further develops the phenomenological theory of consciousness of Edmund Husserl.

There are three doctrines of the phenomenological theory of consciousness that Schutz deals with which are of central importance for elaborating a phenomenology of music. The first is the distinction between “monothetic” and “polythetic” constitution; the second is the concept of “passive synthesis”; and the third is the ideal status of a work of music. All three are familiar topics in Schutz’s writings; “monothetic” and “polythetic” constitution has been considered by Schutz not only in connection with music, but also, more generally, in connection with the structurization of the social world, with language, and with the theory of relevance;⁸ Schutz has dealt with Husserl’s idea of “passive synthesis” both in connection with a critique of Husserl’s account of the constituting of “other minds,” and with a far-reaching account of the constituting of types;⁹ and although there is a wealth of discussion of Husserl’s doctrine of ideal objects, of “essences,” there is very little on the unique characteristics of the “essence” of a work of music.

Ad. 1 The importance of Schutz’s discussion of “monothetic” and “polythetic” constitution is two-fold. In the first place, he suggests that the distinction holds only for the constituting of conceptual and theoretical states of affairs, and that, consequently, the distinction does not have the universality ascribed to it by Husserl. Precisely the musical experience proves to be a case in point. To seize upon the musical experience “monothetically” signifies to step outside the experience, so to speak, indeed, to step outside the very meaning-context of music itself. But, in the second place, Schutz also holds that the musical experience is a basic example of the face-to-face relationship, that is, of the fundamental social interaction in which the flux of one’s own inner time is shared with those of others.

Two conclusions may be drawn from Schutz’s discussion. The first

is that our most basic experience of sociality likewise lies outside of a conceptual frame of reference, that our most immediate communication is non- or subconceptual.¹⁰ In Schutz's words:

The peculiarity of the musical process of communication consists in the essentially polythetic character of the communicated content, that is to say, in the fact that both the flux of the musical events and the activities by which they are communicated, belong to the dimension of time. . . . In all these circumstances performer and listener are "tuned-in" to one another, are living together through the same flux . . . the copformance in simultaneity of the polythetic steps by which the musical content articulates itself in inner time.¹¹

This peculiarity of the musical process of communication holds equally for all other kinds of communication, "the essentially polythetic ones as well as those conveying meaning in conceptual terms—that is, those in which the result of the communicative process can be grasped monothetically."¹² There are, thus, cases of constitution which cannot, in essence, be grasped monothetically. If it is the case that only those polythetic constitutings which can be grasped monothetically are those which can be conceptualized, it would seem to follow that certain dimensions of consciousness cannot be directly examined within a conceptual framework. The very foundation for their conceptualization—a stratum of monothetic constitution—is lacking.

I am uncertain if this is Schutz's final conclusion. It is, rather, a possible conclusion to be drawn from his analysis carried as far as its radicality allows. But it would further signify that "rationality" has definite limits. This is of importance to the social scientist, for example, because it would also signify that there is a whole domain of constituting which cannot be subjected to construction into ideal types. One example would be the experience of each other in the first person plural, the *We*. Yet this experience is at the root of all social theory. There is also a second conclusion to be drawn here. At the outset, the "theorist" is faced with a paradox: precisely what he wants to seize upon monothetically to produce social theory does not allow of being seized upon that way without being altered.¹³ More broadly stated, the social world has a substructure which is not only non- or subconceptual, but which is also, in principle, unconceptualizable. This paradox, which has various forms even in

Husserl,¹⁴ may have been one of the motivations for Schutz's suggestion at the end of "The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity in Husserl" that the paradox is peculiar to phenomenological analysis which seeks to go beyond clarification of meaning-structures to the foundation of the structure of being, and for the further suggestion that to get at the foundation of the social world it is necessary to establish an "ontology" of the social world—something which phenomenology is incapable of doing.

There is further evidence, although of a different kind, that Schutz recognized the radical consequences of his revision of Husserl's doctrine of monothetic and polythetic constitution. In making this evidence explicit, we can see from still another angle the significance of the analysis of music for Schutz and the central place that analysis holds in his philosophy. In "Mozart and the philosophers," Schutz cites Leibniz's definition of music as a "hidden arithmetical activity of a mind that does not know it is counting," that is, of a mind that does not grasp itself monothetically. In that connection, Schutz approvingly refers to Schopenhauer's revision of Leibniz's definition: "music is a hidden metaphysical activity of a mind that does not know it is philosophizing."¹⁵ If this is the case, then, at the very least, the conceptual frame of reference of philosophy is no longer the primary one for understanding consciousness, which turns out to be essentially polythetic. The theme of phenomenological analysis is now the pluridimensionality of inner time which *we* simultaneously live through, mutually coperforming polythetically not just the unfolding musical content but, more importantly, the unfolding musical content of which the whole world is the text.¹⁶

Clearly this view takes us far beyond "applied theory" and the bringing of philosophy to bear upon the interpretation of the social world.

Ad. 2 The paradox of the subconceptual within a conceptual frame of reference involves another important concept in Husserl's philosophy. This is the concept of "passive synthesis," and Schutz's analysis of the musical experience has equally radical consequences for this concept.

Husserl held, especially in his later writings, that not only was

consciousness “synthetic,” unifying, but that it is possible, upon analysis, to discriminate and explicate those synthesizings, or unifyingings, peculiar to experiences of things in which the ego was engaged and those in which, in principle, he was not engaged. According to Husserl, in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*,¹⁷ the former experiences are mental processes which have the capacity to bestow significations on locutions; examples are judgments, wishings, askings, commandings, and doubtings. From these are distinguished those mental processes which do not have the capacity to bestow signification, whose objective senses cannot be significations of expressions or expressed by locutions; examples are perceptions, retentions, protentions, and “associating” mental processes.

To say that consciousness is “synthetic” signifies that the most basic kind of synthesis is the union of a multiplicity of mental processes, as a result of which something is meant and “intended to” as self-identical and numerically distinct from something else.¹⁸ These syntheses of identification and numerical difference can be either active or passive, and are fundamental to another kind: “associative” synthesis. It is precisely that fundamentality which Schutz challenges in his analysis of the musical experience. Consequently, a few words are in order to clarify what is at stake.

Consider the case where we see two or more things, meant and seen as self-identical and distinct from one another. Also suppose that they are seen as more or less similar to one another in one respect, more or less dissimilar to each other in another respect. This is a case of what Husserl calls “association” or “associative synthesis.” A “primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate as ‘association,’ in contrast to passive synthesis of ‘identification,’” is *pairing*. An example of the most primitive case is the following:

Two data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis—essentially, already in pure passivity (regardless therefore of whether they are noticed or unnoticed)—, as data appearing with mutual distinctness, they *found phenomenologically a unity of similarity* and thus are always constituted precisely as a pair. If there are more than two such data, then a phenomenally unitary group, a plurality, becomes constituted. On more precise analysis we find essentially present here an intentional overreaching, coming about genetically (and by essential necessity) as soon as the data that undergo pairing have become prominent and simultaneously intended; we find, more particularly, a living mutual awakening and an overlaying of each with

the objective sense of the other. This overlaying can bring a total or a partial coincidence, which in any particular instance has its degree, the limiting case being that of complete "likeness." As the result of this overlaying, there takes place in the paired data a mutual transfer of sense—that is to say: an apperception of each according to the sense of the other, so far as moments of sense actualized in what is experienced do not annul this transfer, with the consciousness of "different."¹⁹

In the foregoing passage Husserl indicates the fundamental features of constituting things of the perceptual world in and through experiences which can go on regardless of whether *I* am engaged in them—indeed, experiences which are the foundation of further experience of the world not only as populated by this or that unique, individual thing, but also by more or less familiar-unfamiliar kinds of things. "Passivity" does not signify "receptivity"; it signifies, instead, the ongoing course of mental processes in which the ego is not engaged, with whose objects the ego is not busied. Without that "passivity" there would be no world at all. Besides certain perceptual syntheses of identification and association, prime examples of such "passivity" are retentions and protentions making up the flux of inner time, examined in detail by Schutz (Sections 14, 19ff., 24). With this in mind, we can clarify further our example of "passive synthesis."

Suppose that two things are visually presented in simultaneity—a pair of dice. One die is presented as itself here in the seeing of it, and the other as there in the seeing of it. Two things, not one, are meant and seen, and there is, accordingly, an identifying and numerically differentiating synthesis. The dice are also presented as having certain determinations, size, shape, color, texture, and which are likewise numerically differentiated. On the basis of each die being meant as self-identical and as distinct from one another, there is a mutual overlying of sense, a transfer of sense. This transfer of sense, *in turn*, is the necessary basis for an associative synthesis. For example, the transferred cubical shape and the presented cubical shape found a synthesis of perfect likeness in shape. The presented determinations of each die are transferred to the other, likewise founding a synthesis. And, as in the case of the synthesis of identification, "association" can go on purely "passively," that is, without the engagement of the ego in the mental processes in question.

Precisely this "passive" synthesis is Schutz's concern in analyzing the musical experience; the examples we have mentioned are taken from the domain of sight; Schutz is concerned, however, with the domain of audition. And it is also precisely there that he discovers that what holds for sight does not hold for audition, for listening: in the case of listening to a piece of music, *there is no founding synthesis of identification*, hence there is no mutual transfer or overlaying of sense founded on it which, in turn, founds associative syntheses (e.g., the musical theme). In the case of sight, the *sameness* of the die is constituted in the synthesis of identification and numerical difference; in the case of listening, "sameness is not that of a numerical unity but of recurrent likeness."²⁰ The building up of a series of events in inner time, step by step, as in the listening experience, is not *ipso facto* to constitute them as identical and numerically distinct from each other, on which is founded a transfer of sense and, finally, an associative synthesis of similarity or likeness. Rather, what gives the "illusion" of the passive synthesis of identification is the "superfluousness of starting over again the polythetic activities of our mind in which the monothetic experience of the field has been built up."

If this is true, then, at least for listening, the constitutive structure of passive synthesis described by Husserl is a *prejudice* of the monothetic-polythetic distinction in its universality, hence of the conceptual frame of reference:²¹

This illusion of a passive synthesis <scilicet of sameness> disappears if I do not look monothetically at the spatial field from my regained home-position. I may start again to run through the polythetic steps in which the visual field constitutes itself and these steps are the "same" as those which I had to perform when I first experienced this particular sector of the visual field with its particular objects. Then, if any step actually performed corresponds to *like* steps previously performed and not recollected, and if the actually performed step had a sedimentation *like* the recollected ones, I say that the field re-perceived, on the objects re-experienced, are the *same* or the same, although modified.

The first way—that of monothetic recognition—is restricted to the spatial field because it presupposes the freedom to return to the home-position, and the undoing of the changing aspects arises while I was absent from the home-position. The second way—that of polythetic recognition—may be performed if what was anticipated to be familiar turns out to be strange. Objects existing merely within the dimension of inner time, merely audible objects and, especially, musical objects, can only be recognized polythetically.

“Sameness” as recurrent likeness, i.e., a passively constituted associative synthesis, is the *only* meaning of “sameness” for the auditory field; “sameness” as numerical identity is peculiar to the visual field where, however, we can also discover a further and *founded* meaning of “sameness” as recurrent likeness. But in the auditory field, recurrent likeness is a *founding*, never a founded, meaning.

The extension of the monothetic-polythetic distinction to the lowest levels of constitution, with the monothetic “sameness” as the ultimate founding stratum of constitution of the real, objective world, allows for the extension of the conceptual frame of reference, of “rationality,” to even the lowest levels of constitution, hence resolves the phenomenological paradox mentioned earlier.

However, it is the result of Schutz’s analysis that there are cases where there is no founding monothetic constituting, where, instead, the lowest stratum is polythetic. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl states that “If we consider the *fundamental form of synthesis*, namely *identification*, we encounter it first of all as an all-ruling, *passively* flowing synthesis, in the form of the *continuous consciousness of internal time*” (Section 18). Precisely this is an “illusion” according to Schutz. The extent to which this effects the Husserlian account of the constitutive origins of the world in which we live is extensive, since it is owing to that fundamental form of passively flowing synthesis, *identification*, that we continuously have a world at all, that the “Ego always has an environment of ‘objects.’”²² In short, by challenging the universality of the synthesis of identification in pure passivity, Schutz has challenged Husserl’s conception of the nature of the “passive Doxa” by virtue of which there is a world for us in the first place.²³

To critically evaluate Schutz’s results would require a much longer study than we can provide here; certainly Schutz’s own analyses would have to be carried much further than in “Fragments on the phenomenology of music.” Yet his work remains a profound challenge of Husserl’s philosophy, that is to say, a challenge which provides *sight* into the most complex workings of the multiple ways in which the world is continuously constituted.

Ad. 3 A few words are necessary, finally, about the ideal status of

a piece of music. Neither "Fragments on the phenomenology of music," nor Schutz's other published essays on music, explore this status of works of music in particular or of works of art in general. Schutz's chief contribution to the "phenomenology of essence" is made in his essay, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's late philosophy" (1959). But already in *Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt* (1932) Schutz had begun the task of developing a typology of the social world, of social action and of interlocking social roles. There, to be sure, he drew upon the work of Husserl, but, at the same time, also upon the work of Max Weber and the notion of ideal types. Eventually, Schutz precised this amalgamation of Husserl and Weber into a method of "ideation" appropriate for the social sciences, especially as regards the construction of ideal types for the sociologist.²⁵

This is not the place to rehearse Schutz's development of the phenomenological theory of type and *Eidos*.²⁴ But a few words can be said about his view of the ideal nature of a piece of music. And even though we treat this topic last, it is first in Schutz's thinking because it is in the light of considering the ideal nature of music that he introduces the distinction between monothetic and polythetic constitution, and, ultimately, the concept of passive synthesis.

In Section 8 of "Fragments on the phenomenology of music," Schutz asserts the ideal status of a work of music, and in Section 9 he examines the mode of existence of such ideal objects. A work of music, he suggests, is similar to a mathematical theorem in its ideal nature:

The ideal object, "Pythagorean Theorem," has . . . been built up in our minds in a series of interconnected mental operations, or, to use a technical phenomenological term, it has been built up *polythetically*. After having performed this procedure, in one single glance I may look back at the whole process of polythetic steps and, by doing so, I can grasp the meaning of the resulting proposition. . . .

But this last step is not possible in the case of a work of music:

In other words, the specific existence of the ideal object, "work of music," is its extension in time; its specific way of constitution is a polythetic one.

Here, again, to appreciate this brief suggestion by Schutz it is

necessary to formulate in outline Husserl's view of the constituting of ideal objects.

According to Husserl, ideal objects such as generic and specific universals, formal-mathematical universals, verbal expressions, etc., can be grasped in a manner generically alike but specifically different from the manner in which individuals, such as real perceptual things, are grasped. In other words, ideal objects are likewise presented, given, and, indeed, presented in original modes of awareness of them. And even though the apprehending of ideal objects, "essences," is founded upon actual or imagined perceivings of exemplifications or embodiments of them, there is no analogue in perception for the structure revealed in the presentation of ideal objects:

from the point of view of the composer a musical thought may be conceived without any intention of communication. This thought may be a perfect piece of music, having its specific meaning structure; it may be remembered at will without being translated into actual sounds or into the visible form of notation. This is, of course, not a particularity of the musical process. It has been said that Raphael would have been one of the greatest painters even if he had been born without arms.²⁶

In addition to showing Schutz's basic agreement with Husserl, this passage further indicates that, as for Husserl, while space and time are important for perceiving, ultimately communicating,²⁷ something real, they are unimportant for grasping ideal objects such as a musical thought. To be sure, the apprehending of such an ideal object can be founded as much on actual as on imagined perceiving of individual exemplifications or embodiments.²⁸ But so far as grasping the ideal object, e.g., Brahms's Fourth Symphony, is concerned, it makes no difference if I fictively or actually listen to a performance. (To be sure, there is a significant difference between fictively and actually listening—universally, there is a significant difference between actually perceiving and feigning to perceive.)

So far we have mentioned determinations belonging to ideal objects at large. Ideal objects, such as works of music, are not, however, material (generic or specific) universals, nor are they formal-mathematical universals; nor can they be construed as classes or even types of things. Like universals and other ideal

objects, they are repeatedly identifiable,²⁹ and, also like universals and other ideal objects, we can make intersubjectively verifiable judgments about them. But a work of music is *individual* rather than universal. In this respect, the ideal object, work of music, is more like verbal expressions, significations of words or sentences. To use Husserl's term, it is an "eidetic singularity."³⁰ But unlike many cases of verbal expressions, the ideal, individual object, work of music, does not have a conceptual content. If we compare works of music to verbal expressions at all, they must be compared to poetry. In listening to a piece of music, Schutz says, the meaning

can be grasped merely by reimmersing oneself in the ongoing flux, by reproducing thus the articulated musical occurrence as it unfolds in polythetic steps in inner time, a process itself belonging to the dimension of inner time. And it will "take as much time" to reconstitute the work in recollection as to experience it for the first time. In both cases I have to re-establish the quasi simultaneity of my stream of consciousness with that of the composer. . . .³¹

Because there is no conceptual content, the music can only be grasped polythetically:

A poem, for instance, may *also* have a conceptual content, and this, of course, may be grasped monothetically. I can tell in one or two sentences the story of the ancient mariner, and in fact this is done in the author's gloss. But insofar as the poetical meaning of Coleridge's poem surpasses the conceptual meaning—that is, insofar as it *is* poetry—I can only bring it before my mind by reciting or reading it from beginning to end.³²

This comparison of a piece of music with the non-conceptual content of a poem is important because it indicates a profound difference among ideal objects in general, and ideal individuals in particular.

There is a clear difference between (1) apprehending an individual performance as embodying an ideal object such as a work of music, and (2) apprehending an ideal object embodied in a given actual or imagined performance. With regard to the first apprehension, it must be noted that in our daily life we do not experience a world of unique, real individuals; instead, according to Schutz, we experience those individuals under a horizon of pre-acquaintanceship, however vague and undetermined that might be. In other words, real individuals are always confronted as of this or that sort, of this or that kind; and the same holds true of social behavior—no matter how

unique: we always expect some kind of behavior or other even though the person we meet at the present moment may not display the behavior or act out the role expected. As a rule, in daily life we are not theoreticians or disinterested observers; we gear into the world straightforwardly pursuing aims and goals according to more or less defined rules and recipes. And in one way or another, we build up, polythetically, a more or less coherent and structured field of action.

In the second case of apprehension, we make the kind or sort thematic; if, for instance, I am confused as to what course of action to take, I may grasp in an original way the *type* itself as exemplified by actual or imagined deeds. Or, if I am uncertain as to the interpretation of a piece of music I may make the music itself thematic as embodied in this or that actual or imagined performance. As a rule, this second case of apprehension is *monothetic*. In other words, I grasp the ideal object exemplified or as embodied without having to recur to the polythetic steps of, e.g., the first case of apprehension. But the work of music is unusual in this respect because *I grasp an ideal individual as standing out over against but always with reference to actual or imaginary performances embodying it*. It is an ideal individual repeatedly identifiable, embodied in an indefinite number of performances. But the grasping is never monothetic; in a single ray I can grasp

the content which the work of music conveys, the particular mood or emotion it evokes in us, or its inner form, as when we say: "These were variations with a finale in the form of a passacaglia."³³

In contradistinction I can only grasp the ideal object, the ideal individual, the work of music, step by step in an original way. The act of ideation, if we can apply Husserl's term here, must be a coperformance—indeed, more: a cocomposing of the ideal individual. Thus the ideal object, work of music, is unusual to say the least. It "behaves," so to speak, as neither universal nor class, but as an individual which is multiple in its unfolding. In this respect, the work of music as an ideal object differs from all other ideal individuals. Part of Schutz's originality is seeing that there is a genuine case of polythetic thematization. We cannot enter further into this

intriguing suggestion here. Instead, it is necessary to mention one other feature of certain ideal individuals.

It has been noted that verbal expressions differ from other ideal objects insofar as they have a history, hence undergo change, are mutable but without losing in any way their repeatable identity.³⁴ This is perhaps true of all ideal objects which are cultural objects. And the work of music is no exception. Schutz gives a variety of examples of this—the classical forms of Viennese music, the general style of a whole musical culture, primitive music, Gregorian antiphons, and so on.³⁵ Most of this would probably be dealt with in his theory of relevance which would have the further task of determining which are essential to music as such.

In the foregoing comments we have attempted to indicate some of the extensive implications of Schutz's analysis of the musical experience. In "Fragments on the phenomenology of music" he deals primarily with the musical theme, but at the same time spells out an almost exhaustive range of problems and tasks of the phenomenology of music. Here we cannot mention, let alone do justice to the rich array of ideas Schutz offers. If the task which Schutz set himself, the full elaboration of a phenomenology of music, was not completed in his lifetime, it is not because he did not live long enough. It is rather because this task is a perennial one for a community not only of thinkers *but also of listeners*: the wiseman, Heraclitus says, is the one who *listens* to the Logos. It is in this spirit that "Fragments on the phenomenology of music" is published. Taking matters into our own hands, we might further revise Schopenhauer's definition of music mentioned earlier, and say that music is the hidden philosophical activity of a mind that does not know it is listening.

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Footnotes to preface

1. See Brodersen's Introduction to Vol. II of the *Collected Papers*, p. viii.
2. *Ibid.*, p. ix.

3. "Making music together," p. 159. (All references to Schutz's writings are to the volumes of the *Collected Papers* unless otherwise noted.)
4. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 170, and p. 170, note 15.
7. *Ibid.* (Emphasis added).
8. See below, pp. 64ff., and note 34.
9. In this connection, see F. Kersten, "Phenomenology, history, myth," in *Phenomenology and Social Reality, Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz*, edited by Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 238ff., 242f., 261 ff.
10. See "Making music together," pp. 177f.; and below, Sections 10, 11, 14, 19.
11. "Making music together," pp. 173, 175.
12. *Ibid.*, p.178.
13. Although Schutz does not develop the problem in these terms, the methodology he develops for the social sciences does allow, it seems to me, of circumventing the problem. The methodology allows, more specifically, for a shift in the level of research "to that of individual human activity" by means of a series of "postulates" or "transformation laws" obtaining between levels of understanding—e.g., conceptual and non-conceptual levels. For a discussion of this methodology, see F. Kersten, "The constancy hypothesis in the social sciences," in *Lifeworld and Consciousness*, edited by Lester Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), Section 10.
14. See, for instance, Husserl's formulation in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, translated by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), Section 54.
15. "Mozart and the philosophers," p. 199.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 180. See "Making music together," p. 175.
17. Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), Sections 3ff.
18. See Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), Sections 17f.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 112f.
20. See below, Section 23, p. 52
21. See below, Section 24, p. 54
22. *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 79.
23. For Husserl's idea of "passive Doxa" as the primal ground for our belief in the world, see *Erfahrung und Urteil*, edited by Ludwig Landgrebe (Hamburg: Classen Verlag, 1954), Sections 7, 12, 13, 19.
24. See, for example, "The social world and the theory of social action" (1940), "The problem of rationality in the social world" (1942)—both reprinted in *Collected Papers*, Vol. II; "Common sense and scientific interpretation of human action" (1953), "Choosing among projects of action" (1951), and "Concept and theory formation in the social sciences" (1954)—all reprinted in *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, edited and introduced by Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962). There is very little in phenomenological literature on the ideal status of the musical work. In his *Fondements de la*

Musique dans la Conscience Humaine (Neuchatel: Baconnière, 1961), Ernst Ansermet reports the last conversation he had with Ortega y Gasset; upon explaining to Ortega the work on music he had projected, Ansermet reports Ortega's statement "Que la phénoménologie de la musique ne soit pas encore faite est un scandale philosophique!" (I, p. 473). This is especially true with respect to the analysis of the ideality of musical works. Other than Alfred Schutz, Roman Ingarden is perhaps the only phenomenologist who has considered the problem; see Ingarden's *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1962), Chapter I: "Das Musikwerk." (The chapter dates from around 1933.)

25. For Schutz's theory of types, see the excellent summary by Aron Gurwitsch, Introduction to *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, edited by I. Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. xvff.
26. "Making music together," p. 164.
27. See above, p. 7.
28. For this and other aspects of the account of ideal objects, see "Type and Eidos in Husserl's late philosophy," *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, pp. 94ff.
29. See below, Section 18, pp. 46ff.
30. See Dorion Cairns, "The ideality of verbal expressions," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, I (1940), pp. 453-462. In addition, see Fritz Kaufmann, "The phenomenological approach to history," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2 (1940/41), pp. 161ff., 167ff., for a very lucid account of ideal individuals in contradistinction to ideal universals.
31. "Making music together," p. 173.
32. *Ibid.*, note 22.
33. Below, Section 9, p. 29.
34. See Cairns, *op. cit.*, pp. 459f.; Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 169f.
35. See below, pp. 43ff.

Section 1 Music and language

A PIECE of music is a meaningful context. It is meaningful to the composer; it can be understood as meaningful by the listener; and it is the task of the interpreter to bring about the correct meaning. Applied to music, the terms “meaning” and “context,” “understanding” and “interpretation” are used, however, in a specific way which is different from other meaningful systems such as languages.¹ To be sure, language is also a meaningful context. Each term within the system of a particular language has its specific semantic functions. Each term is a symbol of the concept which it conveys, and the concept itself refers to the real or ideal objects of our thoughts, to the qualities of these objects, to what happens to them with or without our interference. Thus, the three main elements of any language—nouns, adjectives, verbs—refer to a conceptual scheme by which we interpret the world in which we live, including ourselves, men among fellowmen who live in the world with our minds and bodies, our thoughts and emotions. These three classes of terms are completed by the important groups of relational or operational terms and by a set of rules—called grammar or syntax—indicating the operational functions of each of the meaningful terms within the meaningful unit of a sentence or a proposition. The propositions themselves are either true or false, compatible or incompatible with other propositions; as a unity, propositions either have or have not a specific meaning which can be verified or falsified. An additional meaning supervenes from the context in which a proposition stands and from the occasion on which a proposition is used. Thus, a universe of discourse has been organized, each unit of which refers, if it is meaningful, to the conceptual scheme of references by which we interpret the world. The structures described here very roughly and imprecisely, have been studied by modern logic, especially symbolic logic. However, the science of logic, even when applied to meaningful systems, has always been merely a science of concepts; meaning became the object of the science of logic only when it dealt with the representative function of the symbol.

Music is an instance of a meaningful context without reference to a

conceptual scheme and, strictly speaking, without immediate reference to the objects of the world in which we live, without reference to the properties and functions of those objects. Music does not have a representative function. (Musical notation, of course, does have a representative function.)² Neither a piece of music, nor a single theme, has a semantic character. There is no analogue in music to propositions which are either true or false; and there is no analogue in the meaning of music to verification or falsification. But there is, nevertheless, an analogue in music to the syntax of language, namely, the set of rules governing the musical form. However, this syntax of the musical form does not have the character of operational rules.

Section 2 Art and language

But is it not true that any work of art is a meaningful context of the same kind as that of music? All works of art based upon language—poetry, the novel, drama—use a semantic system as their basic material; it is a semantic system which shares with all other languages the character of relating to a conceptual scheme and to grammar. To be sure, the language of the poet confers upon each unit of language, even upon each term, a meaning in addition to that which a unit or term would have if it were used in colloquial conversation or in scientific discourse. There are even additional syntactical functions in the language of poetry which are super-venient to the syntactical functions of ordinary language. Yet the reference to a conceptual scheme and the reference to the objects of the world subsist; this conceptual scheme and these objects merely receive a particular interpretation, a particular symbolic character or, as we may say, a specific representational value.

For example, the paradox—meaningless or false in terms of a logic of propositions—may become a means of conveying the highest truth in poetical language. To be sure, the elements of the paradox itself are conceptualized, the words which are used are defined in the dictionary, and the reference to the world of objects subsists. Only the meaning of these words, concepts, or objects has changed insofar as they are interpreted as merely indicating something else

rather than as standing for themselves. This, however, is instead a definition of what is called "representation." Since language itself is representational in character, language receives additional representational values in the arts as means of expression. The representational functions of poetry are functions of a higher degree.

Section 3 Abstract painting and music

The art of the painter, the art of the sculptor and, to a certain degree, the art of the architect, do not have, of necessity, a reference to a conceptual scheme. Nevertheless, those arts do refer immediately to objects of the outer world, bestowing on the objects representative values which they would not have in their natural settings. For instance, it is not the physical aspect alone of the model or the landscape which is reproduced upon the canvas; the canvas stands for many other things of which it is merely a symbol. But what that which is reproduced on the canvas stands for is brought out by the significative functions of a sector of the world, a sector chosen in such a way that it suggests its hidden relationship to what is represented and, in the last resort, to the universe. This does not hold good for so-called "abstract" paintings. But abstract painting admittedly tries to transplant the technique of music to the dimension of spatial expression. The counterpart of abstract painting is so-called "program music" which tries to transplant the technique of painting into the dimension of inner time.

Section 4 Music and the ornament

Perhaps the closest analogy to the meaning-context of music is offered by the ornament, the pattern, for instance, of a Persian carpet. But the ornament suggests either geometric forms or the shape of plants or animals, or religious or cultic symbols. As a rule, the ornament is not entirely free of conceptual schemes. However, in the repetitions and interlacements of the pattern the ornament does offer a structure similar to that of music—a structure which is meaningful and, nevertheless, without representative value.³

Section 5 Music and dance

The art of the dance and of the mime certainly have to be considered separately. Insofar as they are abstract, that is, without any relation to a religious or social ritual, or represent occurrences in daily life, they constitute meaningful patterns without reference to a conceptual scheme. This partially explains the close connection between music and dance. The rhythm is the connecting link.

Section 6 The phenomenological approach to music

A phenomenological approach⁴ to music may safely disregard the physical qualities of the sound as well as the rationalization of these sounds which leads to the musical scale. As Scheler had already correctly pointed out, in listening to music we do not perceive sound waves emanating from the oscillation of the sound producing matter. Two different schemes of reference may be confused. The physicist may say that sound waves emanate from the oscillating matter; the sound waves affect the tympanum of the human ear. The physiologist, as far as his abilities go and as far as his science permits, may explain what parts of the inner ear, what nerves and brain cells, respond to the stimulus which the tympanum receives. All this is immaterial to the experience of the listener. He responds neither to sound waves, nor does he perceive sounds; he just listens to music.

It is customary that nearly all books on the theory of music go back to the mathematical foundation of music, back to the simple proportions in which the scale is built up, back to the sequel of harmonic tones,⁵ and so on. Interesting and even miraculous as this relationship is when compared to other points of view, it has little to do with the experiencing of music, just as the frequency of amplitudes of colors and their place in the spectrum has little to do with the experience of the beholder of a painting, or just as the anatomic structure of the human pelvis has little to do with what the art of the dancer conveys. The relations between sounds and mathematical proportions cannot even contribute anything to the questionable problem of consonance or dissonance, which are historical categories of the aesthetics of music prevailing during certain periods in

certain cultures. The ideal of musical beauty prevailing in ancient Greece considered the musical interval of the third as a dissonance, while the culture of the “faux-bourdon” period recognized sequences of empty fifths as consonant. The solution of the so-called “Pythagorean comma” employed to build up the scale of medieval music brought about a rationalization and middle-of-the-road solution incompatible with the simple mathematical proportions of the interval. And our system of “temperament”⁶ is just a further step in this direction. Scales in use in other cultures (China, Arabia, primitive tribes) are incommensurable with ours and with the simple proportions of the mathematically pure intervals. And even the development of modern Western music shows that what is considered to be dissonant or consonant changes with the generation and education of the listener’s ear. There has not been a composer from Bach to Schönberg who has not been criticized by his contemporaries because of his cacophonies. What one generation blames as dissonant is accepted by the following one as aesthetically consonant and becomes an element of the prevailing ideal of perfection.

Section 7 The phenomenological approach, continued

The many vehicles and means of performing music and of preserving and reproducing it may equally be disregarded. Musical instruments in the broad sense, including the human voice, the technical possibilities and limits of musical instruments, the way to use them, musical notation, mechanical devices such as records, ensemble playing of all kinds—from accompaniment of a song to the modern orchestra—all of these are merely means for the production, the reproduction and conservation of the work of music, and they have only a mediate impact on the experience of the listener as well as of the composer. As will presently be shown, they do not even have a direct connection to the form of existence peculiar to the work of music.

Section 8 Music as an ideal object

It is erroneous to think that a symphony exists only in the score or

in its performance by an orchestra. Both the score and the performance have the same relation to the work of music as the printed book or lecture has to the existence of a philosophical thought or a mathematical theory. To be sure, the score, the performance, the book, the lecture, are indispensable means for communicating the musical or scientific thought. They are not, however, this thought itself. A work of music or a mathematical theorem has the character of an ideal object. The communicability of a work of music or a mathematical theorem is bound to real objects—visible or audible objects—but the musical or scientific thought itself exists independently of all these means of communication. The overture to *Don Giovanni* which, according to legend, Mozart wrote down the night before the first performance, existed in his mind long before, although it was inaccessible to anyone else. If Beethoven filled his notebooks with sketches for his compositions, he did so for his own convenience. The themes noted down did not enter into existence by his writing them down; they existed in his mind long before. On the other hand, he who knows a piece of music “by heart” does not need any reference to print, to any musical instrument or to performances heard or previously made, in order to reproduce the piece of music from beginning to end for his inner ear.⁷

Section 9 The ideality and mode of existence of a musical work

There is, however, a peculiarity of the way in which the ideal object, “work of music,” constitutes itself. For instance, if I am studying the Pythagorean Theorem, I learn how to derive it step by step from certain assumed premises, each of the steps following the rules of arriving at a correct conclusion. The ideal object, “Pythagorean Theorem,” has, therefore, been built up in our mind in a series of interconnected mental operations, or, to use a technical phenomenological term, it has been built up *polythetically*.⁸ After having performed this procedure, in one single glance I may look back at the whole process of polythetic steps and, by doing so, I can grasp the meaning of the resulting proposition, “ $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$.” And I can do this without recurring to, or starting over again, the performance of the single mental operations whose outcome is the proposition and

its meaning. I can, thus, grasp the meaning of the ideal object, "Pythagorean Theorem," once constituted, "monothetically"—that is, in a single ray without any recourse to the polythetic steps in which it was built up.

It is not possible—at least not possible for the ordinary human mind—monothetically to look at the ideal object, "work of music."⁹ In one single ray we cannot grasp the constituted meaning of a work of music. At best, we can grasp in one single ray the content which the work of music conveys, the particular mood or emotion it evokes in us, or its inner form, as when we say: "These were variations with a finale in the form of a passacaglia." The work of music itself, however, can only be recollected and grasped by reconstituting the polythetic steps in which it has been built up, by reproducing mentally or actually its development from the first to the last bar as it goes on in time. By necessity, this process will be a process in time (the nature of which will have to be studied carefully). And it will take "as much time" to reconstitute the work of music in recollection as it will to experience it originally in its unfolding, polythetic constitution while listening to it for the first time. In other words, the specific existence of the ideal object, "work of music," is its extension in time; its specific way of constitution is a polythetic one.

Section 10 Monothetic and polythetic constitution

The specific mode of constitution of the work of music requires, however, further analysis. First, it is not the ideal object, "work of music," which alone has the peculiar form of existence described so far. A poem, for instance, can equally be reconstituted only in polythetic steps, and exists merely in such a reconstitution. The poem may have a conceptual content, and this conceptual content, of course, may be looked at in one single ray. In one or two sentences, I may tell the story of Enoch Arden, but I can bring Tennyson's poem before my mind only by reciting or reading it from beginning to end. Therefore, it can be stated that the dichotomy between polythetic and monothetic constitution refers to an underlying conceptual scheme of reference, and the statement that music cannot

be caught monothetically is merely a corollary of the thesis that the meaning-context of music is not related to a conceptual scheme.

Section 11 The existence of ideal objects and time

We may even find an analogue to the existence of ideal objects, such as a work of music, in the dimension of time in a phenomenon of the outer world, namely, in movement as an ongoing occurrence. Bergson's philosophy has taught us, in full clarity, the double aspect of movement: On the one hand, movement means the ongoing motion, the perceptual change of place of an object, an event which happens in time and which can only be grasped as a unit by our sense of inner time—the *durée*. On the other hand, for the movement as an ongoing occurrence our mind substitutes the spatial trace traversed by the moving object. This is a conceptual scheme, incompatible with the pure *durée*. It requires the exteriorization of *durée* into space, the transformation of the inner sense of time into spatial time, into the time of our clocks, of our life with others—the time in which the earth turns around its axis and completes its course around the sun.

Consider the flying arrow of Zeno. Regard its flight as an ongoing movement. It is a unit from the instant it was shot from the bow until it reaches its goal. Following this movement with your eyes, you experienced one single event in inner time. Afterwards, in hindsight, when this movement will have been completed, when the arrow has traversed its path, you may consider the movement—once performed and accomplished—as identical with the trajectory traversed by the arrow. Then you may break down into pieces the unity of the ongoing motion. In this dimension of spatial time, you may even designate the spot occupied by the arrow at any chosen instant during the flight. But then you have dropped entirely the idea of an ongoing motion. It is no longer a question of the motion of the flying arrow held still or passed at any instant, at a point of the parabolic trajectory: only the arrow which you imagine as having been arrested at such a point remained for an instant at the spot designated. But, then, the arrow does not fly any longer. By intermingling these two aspects of the same event—ongoing movement

as a unity, accomplished movement as divisible into parts—the Eleatic paradox arises that the flying arrow does not move at all. As an ongoing motion it is a unit and participates in the stream of your consciousness in inner time.

Section 12 The problems of a phenomenology of music

Returning to our problem, namely the problem of the existence of the ideal object, “work of music,” in the extension of time, we find that the way in which we described its constitution as a polythetic one requires a certain restriction. There is no doubt that the dimension of time in which the work of music exists is the inner time of our stream of consciousness—in Bergson’s terminology, the *durée*. This statement will be corroborated by the analyses which follow.

But are we entitled to speak of a polythetic constitution in inner time? Did not our analysis of motion prove that as a development, as an ongoing motion, the whole event shows all the criteria of an indivisible unit? Did we not come to the conclusion that it is only the movement once accomplished which seemingly breaks down into pieces? Do we not have exactly the same situation in the work of music itself? Is not what we call a polythetic constitution in reality only a polythetic reconstitution of the music once accomplished? As long as a piece of music lasts, and as long as we are listening, we participate in its flux; or, more precisely: the flux of music and the flux of the stream of our consciousness are interrelated, are simultaneous; there is a unity between them; we swim, so to speak, in this stream. And music goes on as a unit which is indivisible. Only if we stop this ongoing development, only if we bring the flux to a standstill, only if, so to speak, we step out of the stream and look back: then it seems that what we experienced as a unit while it lasted, has been constituted in polythetic steps.

But how? Was not the ongoing flux of music structurized? Did we not have the feeling that a certain configuration, which afterwards we will call a musical theme, started, developed, ended, recurred? And while listening to this theme: did the theme not have a special structurization too? Was it not articulated in several ways, first showing what we usually call a rhythm, then a specific relation

to its starting point—a relation which music theory will teach us to interpret as its melodic or harmonic structures? And, in a more complicated composition, could we not distinguish, when first listening, the theme, its accompaniment, subordinate voices, counterpoints, and so on? Again, do we not run into an Eleatic paradox? Does music move at all? Is it not a sequel of static situations? Where is the unit? What dimension of time is there in question? Or is the whole analogy not misplaced, and are we not merely victims of a fallacy? Is, perhaps, the antithesis, “polythetic-monothetic,” only applicable to operational processes of the mind within a conceptual scheme of reference? And is the antithesis, “flying-arrow”—“trajectory,” applicable only to movements in space or in the spatial-temporal dimension in which the outer world exists? Is there a spatial element in music? If there is, how does it enter into the flux of inner time? And, again, in either case: What gives us the right to speak of music as a meaningful context? How is this meaning constituted?

All of these questions have to be investigated. But this tentative approach shows that we cannot use a current philosophical doctrine without careful investigation if we want to describe the musical experience in a phenomenologically correct way. Even the phenomenological method itself, as far as it has been developed up to now, may prove to be insufficient. On the contrary, it may be hoped that a careful analysis of the musical experience may contribute one or another detail to phenomenological theory.

Section 13 The spatial element in art in general and in music in particular

As a convenient first approach to the problems outlined in Section 12, let us analyze the spatial element in music. There is no difficulty in constituting the experience of space by visual or tactile elements, especially if, with Husserl, the movements of the entire body in walking are reduced to experiences of the haptic sphere.¹⁰ Starting from oculomotoric and haptic kinaesthesias, we may build up isolated optic and haptic spatial fields, each of them centered around a kernel of optimal accessibility. This kernel of optimal accessibility

is the sphere of nearness with my own body in the center, constituted as the origin of the whole coordinate system which I apply to the spatial field. The remote things are, then, either those which I may approach by performing certain kinaesthesias, especially the kinaesthesias of walking, or they are the things which may, if they are self-moving, approach my sphere of nearness, or they are the things which, by resemblance to things within my sphere of nearness, are interpreted as having structures, shapes, qualities, and so on, analogous to things within my sphere of nearness. The whole spatial field, thus constituted, is structurized in perspectives; it has its distances, its horizons and its observational optimum. The latter, in the optical sphere, is the optimal standpoint, permitting us to choose a focus which brings the selected sector of the field into optimal *sharpness*; in the haptic sphere the observational optimum is the possibility of touching the thing, of following its surface with the tactile organs of my body, my hands, my limbs, etc. These experiences may be corroborated if they reappear after an interruption. I close my eyes and reopen them again, I withdraw my hands from the surface of the thing and, then, touch it again. The previous experiences recur, the thing is still there, and so are its experienced parts and portions. There is, furthermore, the synthesis between these different fields, the mutual control of visual by tactile impressions and vice versa, the anticipation of approaching the remote thing, the reference back to previous experiences of successful approaches, and so on. In this way, although it would seem insufficiently, G. H. Mead has studied this structurization under the title of the "manipulatory sphere,"¹¹ a term which suggests, roughly, what Husserl calls, much more precisely, the optimal sphere. Thus, the constitution of space refers back to our kinaesthetic experiences of our bodily organs of sight and touch and our actual or virtual ability to perform the kinaesthesia of locomotion.

The arts using spatial elements as a medium take into account these ways of constituting the dimension of space. The frame of the picture delimits the sector of the visual field selected. There is one standpoint assigned to the beholder, from which the painted space appears optimally centered and from which all the painted perspectives gain their correct proportions. Within this field the art of

the painter, by specific devices, guides the oculomotoric kinaesthesias of the beholder required to appropriately organize this field. The eye has to follow certain contour lines; it is guided by the distribution of colors, lights and shadows, etc. Although the painting represents a set of coexistent and immovable images, these images are not perceived by the beholder in simultaneity but in succession. His eye is incited to wander around within the limits of the frame. He is invited to shift the center of his visual field from one of the painted objects to the other, pushing to the horizon what formerly was in the center, and so on. If his oculomotoric movements return to the starting point, he will find the same aspect as before. Thus, the art of the painter frequently creates in the beholder the impression of rhythmic recurrences, and suggests in some cases even the experience of a movement as an element of inner time. It is the reversal of the Eleatic problem mentioned before: the flying arrow depicted in its place of rest on the trajectory produces in the beholder the experience of its flight by provoking oculomotoric kinaesthesias which refer to previous experiences of motion in inner time. Thus, it is the special problem of the painter to refer the beholder to experience of his inner time by using as means elements exclusively pertaining to the dimension of space. By the specific way in which he distributes coexistent, unchangeable elements in space, the painter incites the beholder to transform the coexistence into succession, to modify the unchangeable by recurrent experience, to translate spatial experiences into those belonging to the flux of his stream of consciousness. All this is possible only because the beholding of the painting requires the performance of oculomotoric kinaesthesias which are, as such, experienced exclusively in inner time, but which, in succession, permit the building up of a coexistent spatial field of vision.

The works of architecture require the beholder to perform locomotion and the adherent kinaesthesias. A work of architecture is based upon the idea that there is not one single optimal sphere of looking at it, but that any of its aspects can be brought into nearness by walking around it, the successive images of the same structure organizing themselves in a planned way regardless of whether the object appears as a remote one in the horizon of the visual field, or as a near one—whether I walk around it or enter it. The architect

takes into account that the shape of the exterior suggests its interior, the frontside the back, the roof the structurization of its foundation. The plan of the architect anticipates all possible perspectives in which his work may appear to a beholder who is not only free to choose his standpoint, but to change his standpoint at random. However, it is not only the kinaesthesia of walking around which is required for an appropriate approach to the work of architecture. The devices applied by the artist suggest that each of these aspects and perspectives be structurized in itself in a particular way. The planned arrangements of pillars or windows lead the eye to follow a certain pattern. The eye has to accept the features selected by the architect as the elements relevant for such a structurization. The roving eye has to start from them and return to them. This again leads to oculomotoric movements, to departures and returns, experienced in inner time, and thus the impression of a recurrent rhythm is created again in the beholder. Architecture, therefore, refers to both: the visual and the locomotive kinaesthesias and their mutual control and verification.

As to the work of sculpture, it seems that we have to distinguish between large statues which in gross outline require the same attitude of the beholder as do works of architecture with the important difference, however, that they do not have an inside which can be entered and that their outer shape does not suggest a corresponding structurization of the interior. But they, too, leave open to the observer the standpoint from which the perspectives offered structurize themselves, and prescribe certain relevant aspects as guidance for the beholder's oculomotoric kinaesthesias. Like a painting, they may provoke rhythmic recurrence of such kinaesthesias and even create the impression of motion in inner time. As to smaller objects of the plastic arts, which can be held in the hand, the dimension of haptic kinaesthesia supervenes, experiences in one field always checking, verifying, amending or annihilating those originating in the others.

In all the cases considered so far, we found that the experiences of the observer referred to his possible kinaesthesias, the visual, the tactile, the locomotive ones. Yet, the organ by which we experience music, the ear, does not have any kinaesthesia. There is no center of

nearness and no horizon in the acoustical field, nor is there a structurization analogous to that of perspective. Of course, I hear approaching steps, I hear the distant thunder. But in analyzing these cases we find that the experiences meant by the terms "approaching" or "distant" are not those of the mere acoustic field. They are based upon preconstituted spatial experiences which were not purely auditive ones. There are, for instance, in the case of the approaching steps, recurrent acoustic impressions—starting low and becoming louder and louder; and we know from other experiences, such as visual ones, that the steps of the approaching walker sound the louder the nearer he comes. Thus, the ear is not able to build up the dimension of space. The only reference to it is the capacity of the ear to give a certain orientation as to the directions where the sound comes from. In order to listen better to the sound, I have to turn my head or my body; however, this is not a kinaesthetic movement peculiar to the auditive sphere. At any rate, the art of music does not make any use of the ear's capacity to localize the origin of the sound. Music does not require any kinaesthesia on the part of the listener.

Another peculiarity of the sense of hearing is that the impressions transmitted by the ear cannot be interrupted voluntarily. I may withdraw from the visual field by closing my eyes, from the haptic field by removing my hands. If I open my eyes again, or touch the object again, I find that my previous experiences still subsist, or I find that they have changed. The ear is always open to acoustic impressions. I cannot interrupt my hearing of them, I may only stop to listen to them. I apperceive permanently all the events in the acoustical world even if I discontinue perceiving them. Analyzing the peculiar devices that the arts of the spatial dimension use in order to induce the beholder to bring forth a rhythmical pattern, we find the importance of the departure and the return of the same experience originating in the recurrence of the same visual, tactile, and locomotive kinaesthesias. The ear is not capable of creating such a recurrence, and therewith it is incapable of creating a rhythmical pattern and an anamnesis of pre-experienced impressions. The art of music knows, of course, rhythm and pattern, but they do not originate in our experience of space. In this sense we may say that

the art of music and the means it uses are independent of our spatial experience. Or, as we put it in the beginning, music is without a specific reference to the objects of the world in which we live. Further investigations will modify this statement to a certain extent. It will be shown that the time dimension in music refers back to our spatial experience. But this can only be done after examination of the nature of this time dimension itself.

Section 14 The temporal element in music¹²

I have here a box of different kinds of 78 rpm records. If you look at your watch, you will find that it takes about three minutes to play one side of a twelve-inch record. This is an important fact for the person in charge of making up a radio program. It is entirely immaterial to the listener. To the listener, it is not true that the time he lived through while listening to the slow movement of a symphony was of equal length to the time he lived through while listening to its finale, although each movement needed the playing of two sides of a twelve-inch record. The listener lived, while listening, in another dimension of time which cannot be measured by our clocks or other mechanical devices. In the measurable time there are pieces of equal length, there are minutes and hours. There is no such yardstick for the dimension of time the listener lives through; there is no equality between its pieces, if there are pieces at all.

We need not have the specific experience of listening to music in order to learn the incommensurability of the time we are living through by the dials of our clocks. The hand of our watch runs equally through half the circle of the dial, whether we waited before the door of the surgeon who operated on a person dear to us, or whether we had a conversation with a friend on a topic in which we are vitally interested. But we will be astonished in the first case that the waiting period which seemed without end lasted only half an hour, and, in the second case, that we spent so much time, although we had intended to see our friend only for five minutes. The time of our waiting, the time within which we grow old, the inner time of our stream of consciousness, is entirely free from elements of

space. It is the same dimension of time in which we experience movement as an unbroken ongoing occurrence, first of all as the movement of our own body. Considered as an event in space, as a trajectory or trace run through by the moved thing, movement (and, first of all, our bodily movement) becomes spatial in character. Inner time projected into space becomes the dimension in which our actions take place, the dimension which we share with our fellow-men, and which, by a supervening idealization, may be conceived as the cosmic time or the time of the physicists. This spatialized time may be measured and divided into equal parts. But all measurement of time is done by measurement of spatial distances, be it the way traversed by the earth when revolving around its axis or circling around the sun, be it the way made by the hands of our clocks around the dial. In a last formalization, this concept of outer time leads to Riemann's Continuum of four dimensions, in which time takes on the mathematical function of a fourth dimension which is super-venient to the three dimensions of space.

Philosophers from Augustine to Husserl, James, and Bergson, have studied the nature of immanent time, or *durée*, as Bergson calls it, and of our stream of consciousness (under which title James deals with the problem).¹³ Without entering into a thorough discussion of the teachings of these philosophers, we have to point out certain other basic concepts relevant to our problem in order to show that music is experienced as an occurrence in inner time.¹⁴

Our mental life has been described by the metaphor of an ongoing stream of our thoughts. Experience follows experience in an unbroken and interconnected way. Every Now emergent within this stream turns into a Just-Now if I try to catch it, and becomes a more and more remote past, whereas other experiences emerge, forming other Nows which, in their turn, can only be caught when having become a past. We may take a double attitude toward this ongoing stream of consciousness. Sticking to the metaphor of a stream, we may say that we can swim with the stream. Then we are living in our thoughts, in our acts, and we are directed toward the objects of our thoughts or acts; or, we may stop swimming with the stream, we may step out of its current, bring it to a standstill, and look back in what is called an attitude of reflection, toward the past

phrases of the stream of our thought. Then we are no longer living in our acts directed toward their objects; we make our acts themselves objects of our reflective thinking. This attitude of reflecting is made possible by that peculiar feature of our mind which is generally called the faculty of memory.¹⁵ The Now which turned into a past does not entirely disappear; it may be recollected; it is then no longer an actual vivid experience, but it subsists as remembrance of things past. It is this faculty of memory which makes the stream of our consciousness an unbroken and interrelated sequel of our thoughts in inner time. At any moment of our stream of thought the actually experienced Now sinks down into a recollection of this Now, which thus became a past Now, and which can be recollected as such by a reflective attitude which we are assuming in another Now, the actual Now of our reflection. But it belongs to our state of mind in this second Now that we are turning back to a past Now, the past, which we are, reflectingly, bringing before our mind as a past, which formerly was a Now. Thus, the past elements of our inner life continue in our actual Now in the form of recollections. It is clear that the images of our recollected past experiences will change because they depend upon the Now in which we assume the reflective attitude. The same object of our thoughts has another aspect (1) if actually experienced; (2) if looked at as an object actually experienced in a past, but now recollected; (3) if looked at later on in a third Now—as an object, actually experienced in a past and previously already recollected; the remembrance of the past actuality must also include in this case a reference to the past Now in which it was recollected, a reference to a past Now which was such a Now only because it included this recollection: such is the third Now, which is only such a peculiar Now because it includes both the recollection of the object and the recollection of having previously recollected it. In all three cases, it is the same object, but the same object as modified, as having changed, as offering new aspects, new features, new structures of relevance. Thus a specific style, a type of object of recollection and of its peculiar modifications is built up which, too, becomes an element of our stock of experiences at hand.

We now have to distinguish two different types of remembrance

within what we called recollection. First, there are reflective attitudes towards an experience which was actual in a Now *just* past. The remembrance, then, attaches itself immediately and without interruption to the actual experience. Although it sinks into the past, the actual experience is still retained, and, therefore, the term *retention* has been used for this special type of remembrance. A border line case of such a retention—very important for the experience of music—is the experience of a lasting object which, therefore, participates in several Nows of our stream of thought; for example, a sound which lasts for a certain period of time. We have, then, in any Now in which we perceive this lasting sound both the actual experience of this sound and the retention of its initial phases, which belong to past Nows. The second type of remembrance—called *reproduction*—does not attach itself immediately to actual experiences. It refers to more remote Pasts which are reproduced in these recollections of other experiences having emerged between the past Now, in which the recollected object of our thought was actually experienced, and the actual Now, in which it is recollected. Retention and reproduction are, thus, the two outstanding types of memory. Both are equally important for the constitution of musical experience.

But our analysis of the stream of thought has so far dealt only with the actual Now and the past, and with the phenomenon of remembrance. We now have to examine the dimension of time which is called the future. By living in our experiences, by being directed towards the objects of our acts and thoughts we are always oriented towards the future, we are always expecting certain occurrences and events. What we are foreseeing is suggested by the general style or type of our past experiences or by the assumption that things will continue to be what they have been so far, and that what has proved to be typical in the past will also be typical in the future. These expectations, of course, are uncertain, they are empty, they may or may not be fulfilled by the anticipated event when it materializes in actuality. Remembered objects of facts are no longer empty. They were what they were; my memory might deceive me, but the remembered objects are definite and definitive. Future objects, however, may turn out to be quite otherwise than we anticipated,

and there is no warranty whatsoever that they will even be of that general type or style which we ascribed to them in foresight. Closer analysis shows that we may distinguish between two types of expectations in a manner analogous to the way in which we distinguished two types of recollection: on the one hand, there are those which immediately attach themselves to the actual experience; they may be compared to retentions, and, therefore, the term *protention* has been used for them; and, on the other hand, there are those which refer to events and experiences of the more distant future; they correspond to the reproductions, and are called *anticipations* in the strict sense. It is quite clear that although both protentions and anticipations are empty, the former are more likely to be fulfilled by actuality than the latter, especially if a protention attaches itself to an actual experience which itself contains a retention of the same object. To come back to the example just used: if I have been perceiving an enduring sound of a specific, unchanged pitch, I may assume that this sound will have the same pitch in the following fraction of time. Retentions and reproductions, protentions and anticipations are constitutive for the interconnectedness of the stream of consciousness. They are equally constitutive for the experience of music.

But, by necessity, this analysis gives a wrong impression because the terms used like "now," "just now," "past" experiences, have an atomistic connotation. The reason for this is that language, designed to establish a universe of discourse with our fellow-man and to describe acts and events pertaining to the spatiotemporal world, is itself atomistic. It dissects the continuity into pieces; it creates the impression of parts and pieces, where a single indivisible unit should be depicted. The thought expressed may be a unit but it is expressed by, reconstructed from, the fragments of words which compose the sentence rendering the thought. When Bergson tries to convey the image of the onrolling *durée*, he gives the example of a melody, a melody, however, not structurized as to rhythm, harmony or difference in pitch or loudness.¹⁶ The insight that the inner time cannot be broken down into units (in contrast to the spatialized time within which the spatial elements of points and distance can be assumed and even measured) shows that the notion of the present

deserves further consideration. The present of our vivid experiences is never a mathematical point, a mere instant, an ideal limit between past and future. The assumption of such a mere instant would be an abstraction borrowed from the geometry of space or its analogue, the spatialized time. The vivid present encompasses everything that is actually lived through, it includes elements of the past retained or recollected in the Now and elements of the future entering the Now by way of protention or anticipation. The present we are living in is always a specious present, as James calls it, having in itself its structurization, having a before and an after. It may include very unequal elements of the past and the future. Its shape will depend upon what Bergson calls the tension of our consciousness, and this tension itself is merely a function of our attention toward life. Life requires acting within the outer world, dealing with its objects, mastering the outer world, and performing all these activities in collaboration with others, making fellow-men objects of our acts and being motivated by theirs. This everyday life is life within the outer world, amidst its objects and fellow-men; it is life in space and the spatio-temporal dimension. To master this everyday life requires a degree of high tension in our consciousness, called full awakeness. Living in such a state means being directed towards the objects of the outer world, including our fellow-men, and to live in the activities which these acts have as object. The spatialized time of our daily life corresponds to the attitude of full attention to it, to the state of full awakeness. This tension hides our experiences of our inner life which become visible only if we return from full attention to life, only if we diminish the tension correlated to full awakeness necessary for our dealing with the outer world. Thus, a gradual withdrawal from the spatio-temporal dimension is performed together with the transgression to other levels of our conscious life, that is, to levels which are more intimate and nearer to the experience of the stream of our *durée* but unfit for performing in them our activities gearing into the outer world.¹⁷

Section 15 The experience of music

If we abstract from the special use of music to accompany certain

events in the outer world—music for dancing, music for marching, music in combination with the drama (a use which will have to be analyzed separately)—we find that the decision to listen to pure music involves a peculiar attitude on the part of the listener. He stops living in his acts of daily life, stops being directed towards their objects. His attention toward life has been diverted from its original realm; in Bergson's terminology, his tension of consciousness has changed. He lives now on another plane of consciousness. This, of course, has nothing to do with the intensity of his listening. He may be engaged and, for the most part, he will be engaged, with greater intensity in listening to music than in the performance of his daily routine work. But when the conductor raises his baton, the audience has performed a leap (in the sense of Kierkegaard) from one level of consciousness to another. They are no longer engaged in the dimension of space and spatial time, they are no longer involved in the maze of activities necessary to deal with men and things. They accept the guidance of music in order to relax their tension and to surrender to its flux, a flux which is that of their stream of consciousness in inner time.

Section 16 Elements common to music at large

In order to attempt a truly phenomenological analysis of the listener's experience of music, we must try to bring about those elements which are common to all kinds of music and we must disregard—temporarily at least—all the features characteristic of a particular musical culture only.¹⁸ The way in which the listener educated in the Western civilization of our times looks at music is determined by a certain education, by habits of listening, by habits of interpretation, by general concepts of the function of music, by certain assumptions as to the typical style prevailing in the musical works of past periods, and by a peculiar attitude towards contemporary music. On the average, he knows only a very small sector of music, the Western music of the last 250 years, from Bach and Handel up to our times. This kind of music has formed an ideal of his education which involves, among other things, rhythmicality, tonality, a peculiar concept of harmony, a peculiar kind of counter-

point, a peculiar kind of possible modifications of a theme, and of a standard of musical forms, and so on. Furthermore, he has a specific idea of the faculty of music to express certain feelings or moods, to depict occurrences in the outer world; he cannot forget the standard set up by the Viennese classics for symphonic forms, and by Richard Wagner or Verdi for the opera; he not only looks at contemporary music as a derivation from, or a modification of, these standards; he even reads the works of Bach or Mozart with other eyes than did his fathers and grandfathers. The reason for this is merely that for the latter the standard of music set up by Wagner and his school had an importance which differs from its importance for us. But all the Gregorian antiphons, the Gothic music, the music of the Masters of the Flemish school, the Arabian, Chinese and primitive music must show certain features which are essential for the experience of music as a *phenomenon of our conscious life*, and it is exactly these elements which have to be investigated by a phenomenological description. Having secured a few results by this endeavor we may investigate some features peculiar to the kind of music regarded as a valid ideal within our musical culture.

Section 17 The frame of reference of the experience of music

That does not mean that such a phenomenological analysis would disregard the existence of specific standards for music prevailing in certain periods. Of course, we have to take into account that the listener—any listener—has a certain set of experiences as to the general style or type of music he is listening to. Unless he has such a previous knowledge, the music he hears does not make any sense to him. He may understand that the sounds he perceives are meant as a meaningful context, but he cannot grasp them as such. If I, who have no knowledge of the Hungarian language, am hearing somebody recite a poem in this language, I understand that this man is reciting a poem; it has rhythm, rimes, and a certain arrangement of vowels and consonants which are similar to the general idea of a poem I have experienced within the frame of reference of languages which I understand. And by the expressional values, which he who recites this poem bestows upon what he recites, I become convinced that he

understands what this poem means. Even more, I may receive a vague impression of the meaning, the general mood, for instance, which the poem wants to confer—that it is sad or gay, and so on.

On the other hand, I may even understand that the language of the poem is the Hungarian language because I have formed by previous experiences a certain typical idea of how the Hungarian language sounds, of the inflection and the treatment of vowels and consonants in such a language. Briefly, I may refer what I am hearing to a series of frames of reference which are derived from previous experiences and which are now at hand as typical features of the unknown. But I am lacking that peculiar frame of reference—called the Hungarian language—which would enable me to grasp the recited poem as a meaningful context. The average musician of our times and civilization will have a similar experience if confronted for the first time with Gothic music or a modern composition written in the twelve-tone system.

Our analysis will, therefore, have to take into account the fact that, while listening, the listener uses previous experiences of the kind of music he is listening to. He has a certain knowledge of its general type and style. This knowledge functions as a frame of reference to which he refers his actual experiences. The knowledge of this type or style enables him to follow the flux of the music he is listening to, to be directed at any Now toward the experience which the next Now will actualize: By this general knowledge of the typical, he foresees what will follow, he anticipates it; it is clear that these anticipations (or protentions) are empty and will or will not be fulfilled by the actual event when it materializes itself in another Now. But in order to perform such anticipatory functions it is sufficient *that* the listener *has* knowledge of *some* type or style which he uses as a frame of reference, whether it is a type or style derived from a general knowledge of the musical culture to which the work of art he listens to belongs, or whether it is of the style of the individual composer, or even of the peculiar work itself. And, consequently, a phenomenological analysis of the experience of music has to take into account only the existence of *some* frame of reference at the disposal of the listener. *What* the *peculiar* features of this frame of reference are is immaterial for a general theory of musical ex-

perience. It is the task of a history of music, a history surpassing the biographies of musicians and their adherent anecdotal materials, to describe the peculiar styles and types or frames of references used at different times in different musical cultures. On the other hand, it is quite possible for theoretical analysis to apply its results at the level of concrete analysis of a given musical culture, its typical forms, structurizations, etc.

Section 18 Summary of the elements common to the musical experience

There are relatively few elements common to any kind of musical experience. They can be summed up in the following propositions:

1) All musical experience originates in the flux of inner time, in the stream of consciousness. It does not necessarily refer to objects of the outer world. If musical experience does refer to objects of the outer world, it uses specific devices for coordinating the events within the spatio-temporal dimension with those within the inner time. These specific devices originate in the suggestions of movements, and, first of all, in the movements of the human body, which occur simultaneously in both dimensions—the inner *durée* as well as the spatialized time.

2) Musical experience is based upon the faculty of the mind to recollect the past by retentions and reproductions and to foretaste the future by protentions and anticipations. The musical experience takes place in a specious present which, by means of recollection and expectation, includes elements of the past and the future. As an ongoing flux it shares the flux of the stream of consciousness in simultaneity. The listener may partake in the flux or “bring it to a standstill.” He may assume a “Dionysian” or “Apollonian” attitude towards it (Nietzsche).

3) The basic element of all music is a unique configuration called the theme. It is itself extended in inner time. It is apperceived as a unit (*Gestalt*), or as a combination of those units. It may be itself structurized, it may have parts and “moments,” these parts or “moments” may be dissected afterwards. But it is experienced as a whole.

4) A theme may recur. It may be repeated immediately or recur after other themes have intervened.

5) A theme may be modified and then, nevertheless, recognized as the same but modified—it may be inverted, reversed, enlarged, diminished, transposed, varied, embellished, and so on. It is, then, experienced as the same theme, but inverted, etc.

6) A theme may be combined with other themes or with itself or its parts or moments or its modifications. This combination may take place either in succession or in simultaneity.

As will be seen, rhythmical structurization is not included in this list; the problem of rhythm will have to be handled later on. It is not at all certain that rhythm is essential to musical experience itself. Rhythm is only peculiar to certain musical cultures. The Ambrosian or Gregorian music, even Palestrina's music, is not rhythmical in the same sense as our modern music. Add to this that the concept of rhythm is an equivocal one, referring, on the one hand, to physiological occurrences (beating of the heart, breathing), on the other to occurrences in the outer world (marching, walking, dancing), and, finally, to specific structuralizations of our modern musical idea (rhythm as a function of harmony). That is the reason why rhythm is not included in the catalogue of elements of our musical experiences. The aforementioned aspects of rhythm will be handled at the appropriate places.¹⁹

Section 19 Phenomenological analysis of a sequence of tones

A piece of music starts. We are perceiving the first tone \bar{c} in the actual vivid experience of a Now.²⁰ The tone lasts, it has a certain extension in time. We have the actual perceiving of this tone and, at the same time, a retention of its initial phrases. Both coincide. It is the same tone \bar{c} that we are perceiving now as before; it is an enduring tone. A second tone \bar{d} follows, experienced in the vivid present. When perceiving it we have a vivid retention of the first one (\bar{c}), although it has now ceased to be actually perceived. We are hearing the interval ($\bar{c}-\bar{d}$) between both, we are referring the second one to the first and say: That is an interval of the second upwards.

The second note (\bar{d}) is followed by a third one (\bar{e}): we perceive it actually, retaining the second one (\bar{d}), and in this retention we retain the interval ($\bar{c}-\bar{d}$) between the first (\bar{c}) and the second (\bar{d}), and retain, therefore indirectly, the first one (\bar{c}). We have then: (1) the third tone (\bar{e}) in actual experience; (2) the second one (\bar{d}) retained; (3) the interval ($\bar{d}-\bar{e}$) between the second and the third; (4) the first one (\bar{c}) as a retentional element of (2) (\bar{d}); the interval ($\bar{c}-\bar{e}$) between the actually experienced third (\bar{e}) and the first one (\bar{c}). The fourth (\bar{c}) will be acknowledged by a synthesis of passive recognition as having identical pitch with the first (\bar{c}), the fifth (\bar{d}) as having identical pitch with the second (\bar{d}), all of them retained directly or indirectly by retentions of retentions, etc. Since we recognized the fourth (\bar{c}) and the fifth (\bar{d}) as being identical with the first (\bar{c}), and the second (\bar{d}), we may expect by way of protention that the sixth one will be of the same pitch as the third (\bar{e}). We consider, then, the sequence of the first three tones $\bar{c}-\bar{d}-\bar{e}$ as a "theme," as a unit which is expected to recur by way of immediate repetition. But this expectation—if we have it at all—would be deceived by the actual experience of the sixth tone which is not, as the (assumed) protention might have indicated, an \bar{e} , but a \bar{d} . The non-fulfillment of the (assumed) protention makes us understand that what has to be considered a unit or a theme is not the thematic sequel $\bar{c}-\bar{d}-\bar{e}$, which repeats itself, but the whole sequel of six notes: $\bar{c}-\bar{d}-\bar{e}-\bar{c}-\bar{d}-\bar{d}$.

Section 20 Three basic categories of musical experience

Let us open a parenthesis and consider the relationship between the fifth and the sixth tone (both \bar{d}), and compare it with the mechanism of retention studied in the light of the example of the first tone while it lasted. When the first note was experienced as an enduring one, there was a coincidence between the actual experience of the actually perceived note \bar{c} and the retention of its initial phases—also \bar{c} —and there was no intermittence between the two. We not only experienced the pitch of the retained sound as identical with the pitch of the actually perceived one. But we also experienced the same sound as enduring. The case is different in the relationship between the fifth and the sixth note. While listening to the sixth note, we know

by way of retaining the fifth note that both have identical pitch and timbre. It is the same sound; but, nevertheless, we are convinced that the fifth note did not last; it ceased to be perceived actually and started again; in intermittence of the actual experiencing, there was this \bar{d} , although the retention of it was not discontinued. When listening to the sixth note we do not say: "This is the fifth one which still lasts." We say: "The sixth tone is a repetition of the fifth one; it is a tone, having the same pitch as the previous one, but it is not the same one which still lasts; the fifth one came to an end, it had its final phase, it disappeared, and the sixth one started with its own initial phase, which is not identical with the initial phase of the fifth, but followed the end-phase of the fifth. There is no continuance, but repetition of the 'same'."

This observation is important in a twofold respect for the phenomenology of musical experience. (a) It shows three basic categories of all musical experience, namely continuance and intermittence (repetition) in the equivocal use of this term; (b) it gives an interesting aspect of the difficulties involved in the ascertainment of sameness; (c) it shows the differences of the style of experiences related to space (by kinaesthetic movements) and those related to inner time.²¹

Section 21 The category of continuance and repetition

Ad (a). I. The terms *continuance* and *repetition* are opposites merely if applied to the experience of one single tone which either lasts or finds its final phrase succeeded by an initial phase of the same tone. But even this statement is not precise enough. As an example, take a repeated bass tone in a composition. It will have the same function as a continuous bass tone. In both cases, we speak of a "pedal point." The reason is that by way of retention the intermittent repetitions of the same tone are brought to coincidence and apperceived as a specious continuance, although actually repetition of the same occurs. This phenomenon is of great importance for the theory of music. It is not merely restricted to the repetition of the same tone. *Repetition*—as used here—is merely a special case of the intermittence of a continuance. It is intermittence of a sameness. (This statement will be qualified by the following paragraph.) However, by way of

retention a virtual unity may be established even between intermittent notes of different pitch. This unity should be better called a *coherence*, the term "continuance" being reserved for the same enduring tone. Terminologically we have, then, the antithesis, coherence-intermittence, of which continuance-repetition, as used above, are merely special cases. Now, we said that a virtual coherence may be established by retention even between intermittent sounds. Within the flux of a composition a specious coherence might be established by the listener, for instance, between the top notes of an inverted melody. Actually, only this one melody—the real voice—materializes. But by retaining the intermittent notes a second and, eventually, a third and fourth specious voice are experienced as present. A monodic composition may, therefore, be experienced as a polyphonic one, consisting of one real voice in counterpoint to one or more specious voices. Ernst Kurth has seen this problem and dealt with it in his book, *The Linear Counterpoint*.²²

II. Continuance and repetition have, however, another meaning if referred to functional units themselves, to themes or groups of themes, or, finally, to independent parts of the musical forms. Then they do not originate in pure retention. They are based upon the other forms of memory; the repetition originates in a synthesis of recognition between the reproduced past experience of the theme with its actually experienced recurrence, and the continuance originates in a fulfilment of the previously anticipated development by the actual experience.²³ These relations can, however, only be studied after further investigations as to the constitutions of the units of musical experience, such as the theme. We must mention this problem here in order to show its origin.

Section 22 The category of sameness

Ad (b). The question of "sameness" is one of the most difficult problems of phenomenology. According to Husserl, there is a passive synthesis of recognition or identification which brings the recollection of a past experience of the same object of thought by "superposition" into congruence with a renewed originary experience of the same (or, at a secondary level, produces such a congruence

between recollections or even recollections of recollections of the same).²⁴ But, on the other hand, Husserl has shown that we may recognize an object as the same, but modified, and that we have, furthermore, to distinguish between sameness and likeness. We may find likeness between two different and distinguishable objects; we may find sameness of the object, although the object has changed meanwhile. Here, again, we will have to distinguish sameness and likeness of a single tone, and we will have to make that distinction if a functional unit, such as a theme, is in question. For the time being, we restrict our investigation to the first problem.

In our example in Section 20, the tone \bar{d} is repeated as the "same." Certainly it is the "same"—only interrupted—if we merely consider the pitch of both; it is—in our example—furthermore of the same length as its predecessor; it may be assumed that it has the same timbre. However, it is different from it in several respects. First of all, it is a repeated tone. Its initial phase started after the end-phase of the "same" preceding tone ended. The retention of the actual experience of the first tone in its complete development—initial phase, enduring phases, end-phase—has been retained when the second tone was actually experienced. Secondly, the entry of the second tone certainly adds something new to our previous experience. But it is not entirely new, there is no contrast between this experience and the previous one, as it was the case when the first \bar{d} followed a \bar{c} . The mere interplay of retentions, described earlier, gives a \bar{d} which follows a \bar{d} a character different from a \bar{d} which follows a \bar{c} . The singer and the player of an instrument know this difference very well. They will give the second (repeated) \bar{d} a slightly different accent, dynamically and even agogically. Imagine that the six notes used as an example had to be sung to the word "Amen" or "Kyrie eleison," and it will be clear that the last note in our example will have quite another character than the note before last—no difference having been made as to pitch, timbre, or length. It could be argued that this difference results from the deception that the anticipated reduplication of the first three notes \bar{c} – \bar{d} – \bar{e} by the last three notes did not materialize; or that an anticipation occurred, that the last note will be a \bar{c} instead of a \bar{d} , thus returning to the beginning of the melody. But such an argument would be void. If we

had played only the first five notes and had stopped inviting the listener to continue, we would have had a certain knowledge of his anticipations. In our example, these anticipations would be different for different individuals; it is not at all excluded that a repeated \bar{d}^\sharp was anticipated. This is especially true in our case where nothing has been stated as to the closing character of the sixth tone, nothing as to the "tonality" of the composition, and the principle of the leading tone has not been established by previous knowledge of the type of musical culture to which the composition in question belongs. The previously mentioned difference merely originates in the structure of the *durée* as a permanent flux or stream. The same occurrence, if repeated, is not experienced as strictly the same, it is not even experienced as being a like experience. Our mind has changed, infinitesimally, but, nevertheless, changed—by already having once pre-experienced the tone \bar{d} in the same context. This is important because, as we will presently see, this is one of the several origins of musical rhythm.

Section 23 The category of movement

Ad (c). So far phenomenological investigations have dealt mainly with experiences of the outer world. Since the world of rigid objects is of the greatest importance for dominating our environment, all philosophical speculation has considered the rigid visible and tangible object as the paradigm of the notion of "thing." This thing endures, it has its own dimension of time, it lasts, and even if moved or deformed, it remains the same lasting thing—the same, although deformed or changed. The synthesis of recognition—based upon passive identification—can be verified by congruent kinaesthetic experiences. I see an object. I close my eyes and reopen them. The object is still here, and it is the same object as seen before. The same holds true if by some kinaesthetic performance I change my field of vision, turning away from the object and then turning back to it. It still is the same and recognized as such. It is clear that for the object of my haptic experiences a similar situation prevails if I release the object from my touching fingers and grasp it again. In the case of visible or tangible objects, the synthesis of identification can be veri-

fied by releasing it from my field of experiencing through the performance of an appropriate kinaesthesia and by re-establishing the previous field through the performance of an opposite kinaesthesia which undoes the first one. These kinaesthesias interrupted my experience of the enduring sameness of the object. But this holds good only for the spatial dimension. The ear does not know kinaesthesias of this kind.

Of course, approaching the cascade I may perceive its distant murmur. If I withdraw, the murmur is no longer audible; it reappears when I approach it again. But in this case my knowledge that this is the same murmur is based on my knowledge that the object "cascade" exists and that it has lasted while my experiencing of it was interrupted. It is the knowledge of a lasting quality of an external object which is in question. If the wind blows intermittently through the trees before my window, it is the same tree which is pushed by different and successive waves of the storm.

In the purely auditive field, however, in the realm of music, intermittence can never be ascribed to a kinaesthetic change, which re-establishes or even verifies sameness. Intermittence has not a subjective, but an objective character. The sound, the tone itself, has ceased to exist, and another one has started to appear. This other one may be one like the first but it is, strictly speaking, never the same one. In the dimension of inner time, sameness has to be understood in another way than when tangible or visible objects are in question. The synthesis of identification works differently in the former dimension than it does in the latter dimension. Sameness does not mean that the same object survived while my experiences of this object were interrupted. It means that the identification is experienced in the form of a recurrence of a like object. Likeness, however, presupposes comparison, the possibility of "superimposing" one object upon the other, the possibility of bringing both to congruence. This, in its turn, presupposes the coexistence of both objects and, therewith, the categories of space within which alone two objects may coexist as distinct and separate unities. In the sphere of inner time, in the sphere of purely auditory experiences, there is no coexistence. Likeness or sameness refers to succeeding objects, there is not the possibility of looking from one object to the other in order

to perform the synthesis of identification or of recognition. And, nevertheless, we identify the recurrent tone as a tone like the first, or we even say that the same tone has been repeated. If I define sameness as numerical uniqueness, it is, of course, not the same tone but just a like tone, following the first one, which has now disappeared. But I experience it in a way which identifies it with the first one as to pitch, timbre, length and still as another one, by the mere reason that a like tone preceded it.

We conclude, therefore, that in the dimension of inner time, or in the purely auditory sphere of music, the form of sameness is not that of a numerical unity but of recurrent likeness; and after this explanation we will use the term "sameness" exclusively for conveying recurrent likeness, keeping in mind what has been stated in this and the preceding paragraph.

Section 24 Passive synthesis and the experience of music

But another problem still remains unsettled. According to the teachings of phenomenology, the synthesis of recognition or of identification is a passive synthesis which does not require any activity of our mind. There has always been something mysterious about this passive synthesis, even if experiences of visible or tangible objects are exclusively under scrutiny. But if we try to explain such an identification or recognition within the purely audible sphere, in which there is no coexistence of objects but merely succession of our experiences of them, we have to examine more closely the mechanism of the so-called passive synthesis.²⁵

For this purpose we have to consider the irreversibility of the stream of consciousness. Within the spatial field I have the possibility of changing my standpoint freely and, therewith, of changing my perspectives: I may walk away and I may return: there is the same aspect in the same perspective, the same object in the center, the same field of vision and the same horizon. If so, I say, nothing has changed. Or, if something has changed, it stands out as a strange thing over against the unchanged, which remains in its familiarity. On investigation it may prove to be the pre-experienced Same, but changed. At any rate, I have the possibility of undoing all the

changes originating in my different kinaesthesias—kinaesthesias belonging to the optic or haptic field, kinaesthesias of walking, and so on—by re-establishing the former position through opposite kinaesthesias. I am skipping them, so to speak; I am skipping the interval of my non-perceiving of the same, I am disregarding my absence from my “home-position,” in which everything had its character of familiarity, and I always have it in my power to return to this home-position and to reassume the contact with the familiar surroundings. This creates the impression as though a passive synthesis of “superimposition” had been performed, but such an impression prevails only in hindsight. It prevails because in space nothing hinders me from returning to where I started. But—and that is the decisive point—in such a case I am looking in a single glance, in a single ray of thought, at the field and its objects as ready-made, as having been constituted in a process of successive experience now sedimented. I do not necessarily have to run through the process of constitution again. What I am comparing is the recollection of the outcome of this previous process, once performed, the recollection of the ready-made picture I had in mind when leaving my home-position, with the actual ready-made experience I have when returning to it. What we called “familiarity” is the striking experience of the familiar things, that they were somewhat pre-experienced in successive activities of our mind.²⁶ In looking at them again I do not start again to re-perform all of the polythetic steps by which I built them up at the first time; I grasp the field monothetically by one single ray, and I find that there is a coincidence between the actual monothetic experience and the recollection—and the monothetically recollected, previous one. What gives the illusion of a “passive” synthesis is merely the superfluousness of starting over again the polythetic activities of our mind in which the monothetic experience of the field has been built up.

This illusion of a passive synthesis disappears if I do not look monothetically at the spatial field from my regained home-position. I may start again to run through the polythetic steps in which the visual field constitutes itself and these steps are the “same” as those which I had to perform when I first experienced this particular sector of the visual field with its particular objects. Then, if any step actually

performed corresponds to *like* steps previously performed and not recollected, and if the actually performed step had a sedimentation *like* the recollected ones, I say that the field re-perceived, or the objects re-experienced, are the *same* or the same, although modified.

The first way—that of monothetic recognition—is restricted to the spatial field because it presupposes the freedom to return to the home-position, and the undoing of the changing aspects arises while I was absent from the home-position. The second way—that of polythetic recognition—may be performed within the spatial dimension, and will be performed if what was anticipated to be familiar turns out to be strange. Objects existing merely within the dimension of inner time, merely audible objects and, especially, musical objects, can only be recognized polythetically.

The irreversibility of the stream of consciousness does not permit another attitude towards the object existing merely within the dimension of inner time *as long as* we follow the stream, *as long as* we have not stepped out of the flux and established, thus, so to speak, a kind of home-position. Having heard many times the First Symphony by Brahms I may look forward to hearing the theme of the French horns in the introduction to the finale. I may not only recognize this theme if somebody whistles its initial four notes—it is the fourth note only which makes it that specific, unique theme, and makes it recognizable (the first three notes alone may and do occur in an indefinite number of other compositions)—I may even immediately know how the fifth, sixth, and seventh note continues. I may not only identify this theme and the work of music to which it belongs. I may immediately present the role of this theme within the finale, the modifications in which it will appear later on, the reference involved back to other themes of previous movements of the same symphony, the similarity of this theme to others typical for Brahms. To me personally—and probably to many others—this peculiar theme is the key to the understanding of Brahms' First Symphony. That is what I know by previous experiences. If the first notes of the beginning of the first movement start, I am directed by my anticipations toward the French horn theme which will appear later on at the end of the introduction of the fourth movement. All the preceding occurrences in the symphony receive—to me—their

peculiar meaning and significance because I know that they will lead to this theme, all the events that follow derive their meaning from it.²⁷ Thus, to me, this peculiar theme functions as a kind of “home-position” which may be reassumed any time if I am listening to this symphony or reproducing it before my inner ear. But it is, nevertheless, necessary in order to think of this theme to reproduce in my mind the succession of the seven—or, at least, the first four notes—by which it is built up; and, furthermore, its functional importance for the symphony refers to my acquaintance with the whole work—from previous listenings, from playing it on the piano, from studying the score with all kinds of concomitant recollections not immediately related to the work of music itself supervening. But in such a case, I am no longer surrendering myself to the flux of the symphony, I am no longer guided by the experiences of the ongoing musical events as when I listen to the work in question for the first time, recollecting by retention or reproduction what the onrolling music itself suggests that I recollect, anticipating to what the past Now of the actually experienced part of the work points. If I remain within the flux, I recognize emergent themes as recurrences of themes previously experienced. But I do not perform, then, a mere passive synthesis. It is identification—step by step—of the building up of the theme in actual experience with *like* steps, previously experienced in actuality, and now retained or recollected and leading to the same configuration of a unit. But, this again is done within the flux of the ongoing stream of consciousness, living in the direction from the first note to the last one; but so living we are—by retention and recollection—mindful of the past phases. Presently, this will be investigated further.

Here we have only to draw the following conclusions from what has preceded:

a) Sameness and likeness have meanings in the spatial world of visible and touchable objects different from those in the world of pure music which has its existence merely in the dimension of inner time.

b) Within the experience of pure music the synthesis of recognition

is another one if referred merely to recurrent times or to recurrent thematical units.

c) It is quite another kind of synthesis at work if I recognize musical recurrences when listening to a work of music for the first time living within the ongoing flux (or if I re-establish such a situation), or if I recognize a piece of music or its thematical elements, not being immersed in the ongoing flux but reproducing in my mind music with which I am familiar.

It is to be hoped that this will become clearer if we close now the all too long parenthesis and resume the investigations where we interrupted them at the end of section 19.

Section 25 Reflection and the experience of music

In section 19 we studied the mechanism of retention which enables us to apperceive the six-tone sequence $\bar{c}-\bar{d}-\bar{e}-\bar{c}-\bar{d}-\bar{d}$ as a theme. But what we really described was the experience of a person *having* listened to this sequence of tones, *having* apperceived it as a unit (called a theme), having stopped to listen to what follows, or even to expect that anything will follow, but having turned back to what he experienced and having asked himself what happened in his consciousness while he was listening. That means that the analysis offered is an analysis in hindsight. The mechanism of interlaced retentions only becomes visible for an attitude of reflection. In performing such an analysis, we are no longer dedicated to the listening to music as an ongoing flux. We are, as it is frequently said, no longer living *in* our acts of listening directed toward the object of such listening, namely the music as it goes on to build itself up within the stream of our consciousness. We have brought this flux to a seeming standstill. We turned back, living now in our acts of reflection, and made objects of these reflective acts not the music itself, but rather the acts of listening we have just perceived. We make objects of the acts of listening guided by a theoretical interest in that phenomenon of consciousness which is called "listening to music." We are not induced to do so because we hope to improve our understanding of music, and it is by no means contended that any

listener or even some listeners are aware of the interplay of retentions described. It is very important to make it perfectly clear that the experience of listening itself has quite another structure. The listener lives in his acts of listening, he is directed toward the ongoing flux of music as it flows. The stream of his inner time (of his consciousness) and the stream of music are simultaneous within the precise meaning given by Bergson to this term. He calls two fluxes simultaneous if I am able to look, at my discretion, at both of them as a unit or at either of them distinctly.

Within this attitude, however, I am experiencing the sequence of the six tones under scrutiny as a unit which does not have any pieces and which cannot be broken down into its elements. It is an attitude similar to that in which we experience movement not as an event in space, but as an occurrence within our inner time. While I write the word "time" on this sheet of paper, I am performing a movement of my fingers and of my hand which is an indivisible unit from the inception of writing the letter *t* until the end of the letter *e*. If I am reaching for this box of cigarettes, I have performed one single impulse of grasping this object. If I am following the arrow shot from the string of the bow it is one single kinaesthetic motion which accompanied its flight up to the bull's eye, and I grasp this movement as an indivisible unit. It is the Eleatic problem mentioned before applied to the realm of music. To give another example: A trained pianist playing a piece of music at sight grasps in one single glance the passage his left hand has to perform in the E-major scale and, being trained to play such a scale, he performs the required movements of his fingers and hand in one single impetus without hesitation. Now, ask a physiologist to explain to you what happens in the human body if you move merely the fifth finger of the left hand. You will be surprised to learn from him how many muscles, nerves, etc., have to be put in action for this single movement. And, then, remember the difficulties for the learning child in grasping the correct fingering of the E-major scale. There is no doubt that the pianist in our example performs in one single indivisible impulse a movement which is enormously complicated in itself. It is not sufficient explanation to reduce this capacity to the categories of acquired skill and training. If this were an explanation at all, it

would refer merely to the skill acquired by the practising child in learning the correct fingering. It would not explain the physiological occurrences enabling the player to innervate the many muscles and joints involved. I may be an excellent piano player and musician, even an excellent piano teacher, without being interested in the physiology of piano playing. But there is no doubt that all the events the physiologists explain are by necessity involved in what the player performs in one single impulse of his conscious life and in what he experiences as such.

Thus, there is no incompatibility between both of our propositions: (1) The listener experiences the theme as an indivisible unit, as a single impulse, as long as he lives within the flux of the ongoing music; (2) What enables him to experience the theme as a unit is the interplay of retentional and protentional mechanism of his conscious life, described before, but this mechanism only becomes visible to him if he ceases to participate in the ongoing flux, and turns back to his past experiences in an attitude of reflection—making the acts of his listening the object of his reflection.²⁸

For our problem, that of the musical theme, it is important to study certain constitutional elements which render a sequence of tones a theme. When talking parenthetically of the French horn theme of the final movement of Brahms's First Symphony (section 24), we observed that this theme, consisting of seven notes, can only be identified by at least its first four notes. As a matter of fact, it is articulated in such a way that the first four notes form a sub-unit of the theme, as do the last three notes. Indeed, in the subsequent development of this theme, Brahms makes separate use of these sub-units. Any other combination does not give the impression of a unit. Neither do the first three notes represent the theme, nor are, for instance, combinations of the second-third-fourth notes or even the second-third-fourth-fifth notes felt as a unit, a *Gestalt*. Or, take the well-known four-note theme with which Beethoven's Fifth Symphony starts. Leave out the fourth or any of the preceding notes and you do not have another unit, but, instead, no unit at all.²⁹ We have, therefore, to ask again: Why is it that we experience some sequences of notes as a thematical unit, other sequences of notes, however, not as such a unit? We just used the term "articulation"

in order to refer to units and sub-units. We have to find out what this term implies.

It implies, certainly, a feeling of virtual finality. If the musical flux stopped here and nothing would happen thereafter, the original impulse would have had to come to an end. What was conveyed by this impulse has its peculiar meaning, a meaning which might be incomplete, which makes us expect by protention or anticipation an additive which would complete this meaning but which, as a fragment of the whole, has its clear, fragmentary meaning. What we called "virtual" initially corresponds to what James called the "resting places" of thought. According to him, the movements of our stream of consciousness may be compared with the movements of a flying bird.³⁰ There are phases of flight changing with phases of rest. There is a continuous change between these two types of movement of our thought. The resting places articulate the totality of the bird's movement, they bring the initial phases to an end and a new phase starts thereafter. Compare this Jamesian image with the outcome of Husserl's Fifth Logical Investigation on the theory of pure grammar.³¹ We have, to distinguish, Husserl says, between a collection of words which does not give any meaning (although each of these words means something), and fragments of sentences which convey meaning—although incomplete ones which require a supplement for full precision. The kind of meaning Husserl has in mind refers, of course, to the standardized intersubjective meaning of language as a universe of discourse. But his statements are also applicable to subjective meaning constituted within the stream of the insulated consciousness, such as the meaning of a theme. What does meaning in this latter use signify? Meaning is certainly nothing else but the aspect in which past experiences are conceived by the mind which performs in the actual or virtual reflective attitude towards its own experiences. An experience while occurring, that is, while we are living in it, does not have any meaning; only the past experiences toward which we may turn back, are meaningful. However, a certain caution is necessary here. The use of expressions like "an experience *has* meaning," or "an experience *is* meaningful," suggests that meaning is a predicate or a quality of something called "experience." This is not the case; by internal reason of its grammar, the nature of

language suggests a relationship which does not exist. "Meaning" is nothing else but the attitude of the experiencing mind towards its past experiences. Only the past, therefore, is meaningful; the future is only then conceived as meaningful if it is conceived in terms of that which will have happened—so to speak, in the past-future tense.³² All purposes or projects preceeding our actions are events fancied to have happened in the future. The past experiences are meaningful for the reflective attitude means that they are felt as belonging to the Now in which this attitude is assumed; it is the insight that these past experiences lead to the Now which would be quite another one if these and those peculiar experiences had not preceeded them, and preceeded them in this peculiar sequel—each of them having this and that peculiar extension in time and having affected our mind with this peculiar intensity. We now have to ask two questions: (1) What are these experiences which are selected by the reflective glance, and what is the principle of selection then prevailing? (2) How is the reflective attitude possible? What are its prerequisites and conditions?

1) The past experiences grasped by a reflective attitude among all other experiences are, of course, either retained or reproduced experiences. But not all experiences which may be retained or reproduced are really retained or reproduced. In other words, it is not our whole past which is made an element of our specious present by the act of reflection. Not all of the past experiences seem to stay in a context with our present, not all of our past experiences seem to have led to this present and have made it what it is. We say that some of the recollected or recollectable experiences may be brought into a unit-context with the actual Now, others may not. Or, to put it otherwise: some are relevant, others are not. The first consequence is that what is relevant depends on the Now in which the reflective turning back is to be performed and that it will change from Now to Now. Therefore, the aspect of the past experiences for the reflective glance, in other words, their meaning, will also change from Now to Now if for no other reason than because other experiences of the past are always brought into the unifying glance of the reflective attitude. Not only the sector of the past selected by this reflective

ray changes, but within this sector other configurations or contour lines stand out as relevant, others are in the center, others are brought into the horizon, others enter the field, others disappear from it. Let us compare this reflective attitude with the cone of a moving searchlight which continuously changes the perimeter of its cone as well as the intensity of the source of light. This searchlight moves on, changing the direction, the reach, the intensity of its rays, while other objects and always other objects become visible or fall back into darkness.

But is the comparison correct? Is there any steering in the selecting mechanism of the reflection? Or is the appearance or disappearance of the past quite independent of such a mechanism? Are recollection and that which is recollected imposed upon us, or are they searched for, looked for? And, in either case: Is this process of a random [pressing]³³ up haphazardly once this, once that, or is relevance itself organized, and if the latter is the case, according to what principles does all this happen?

Only a complete theory of relevance could answer all these questions. Tentatively the following answer could be given: In selecting what is relevant both principles cooperate. On the one hand, there are recollections imposed upon us; there are the phenomena called "association" by older psychologists, the same phenomena which have to be analyzed under the captions of Sameness, Likeness, Similarity, Types, and phenomena of that kind of contiguity which makes an event simultaneous in time, or coexistent in space with the recollected experience, which come into our mind quite involuntarily if we try to grasp by reflection this single experience with respect to which the others are quite accidental. It may be that these accidental experiences themselves prove to be relevant either with respect to the Now in which the reflection is performed, or secondary to the experience at which the reflective ray is directed. If so, they enter into the relevance unit, established or to be established, by the reflective ray. Or, they prove entirely irrelevant for the purpose at hand, they cannot, as in the first case, give the context of meaning another fringe. Then they are rejected as entirely immaterial, and we may even become angry that such

unimportant things come to our mind which tries to concentrate upon vital problems.

On the other hand, there is definitely a kind of steering mechanism at work in building up the relevant meaning context of the past experiences grasped by the reflective ray. These phenomena have to be considered under the captions of attention and interest. Attention is a function of the interest dominating the Now in which the reflective attitude is performed. This interest itself is constituted by the stock of my previous experiences, my knowledge at hand, by the protentions and anticipations prevailing at this time—not only those related immediately to our activities, such as plans for work, for leisure, for life, and not only those related to our prevailing attention for life (the tension of our consciousness if we are dealing with the outer world in full awakeness, or in day-dreaming, or in theoretical or religious contemplation), but also those related to our emotional sphere, such as hopes, fears, remorse. Furthermore, most of the unconscious and subconscious experiences with which psychoanalysis deals legitimately enter here: they are integral determinants for our interest and, therefore, indirectly for our attentional selection of the relevant elements of the past. All this would have to be handled by a complete theory of relevance.³⁴

2) As to the prerequisites of the reflective attitude, we mentioned before that recollection (and, therefore, retention or reproduction) is essential for performing the reflection. For terminological reasons, we shall distinguish this kind of re-production, which requires us to stop the flux of consciousness and to turn back to our past experiences, and which we called “recollection,” from remembrance; remembrance shall include the stock of our past experiences, itself organized, which we have permanently at hand in the form of knowledge. I know, that is, I remember, that $2 \times 2 = 4$, that forty-eight states form the United States, that the sun rises in the East. Of course, I once had to learn all this; now I know it by having kept in mind what I learned. I remember it, but it is not necessary for me to turn back to the process of my learning by a special act of reflection. I just have my stock of experienced, remembered knowledge at hand. This remembered knowledge is important to the

extent that it determines my interest, that it, therefore, determines the selection of the relevant in my past. (To give an example from music, my knowledge of the typical style of a certain musical culture (Viennese classics), and within it of an individual composer (Haydn), governs my anticipation of the further occurrences. If I am listening, say, to a minuet in a Haydn symphony, I am sure that there will be two parts, in some manner affiliated one with the other, that each of these parts will be repeated, that a Trio will follow, that, then, the two parts of the Minuet will be played again, and so on.) Remembrances of this kind function like a manual of reference which I can open and close at my discretion; they have, as such, nothing to do with what we called recollections.

We have frequently said that the reflective attitude can only be performed if we stop the flux of our consciousness, and turn to our past. It is now the question whether we can do so at any time, at random, at our discretion, and, nevertheless, still bring the relevant sector of our past into a meaningful context by virtue of the unifying power of our reflective ray. It seems that the answer is in the negative. If we conceive the stream of our consciousness as a series of impulses, as a continuous change between flight and resting places, we can perform such a turning back only at a resting place, at the end of the phase of such an impulse in order to bestow meaning upon our past experiences. If we look at the events of our inner life, we find that we do not at any time "stop and think." We are doing so only if we feel ourselves stopping before the beginning of a new phase, whereas the previous one has ended. By a considerable effort we may, of course, interrupt this natural flux and, so to speak, turn back in the mind to the onrolling wave. But, then, we will try in vain to look at the past experience which led to the Now, as a unit of which this Now is an element. I shall not find a unit, but just pieces, not a *Gestalt* but incompatible parts. It seems that the reason for this is the following: We have no power to define the limits of our specious present, to draw its border lines over against the past or the future. Our stream of consciousness is itself articulated. Impulses and resting places, periods of tensions and relaxation alternate. Wave follows wave, each wave having its crest and valley. Each of these impulses is experienced as a unit, a movement in

inner time which tends to fulfill its final phase as soon as it starts. If we interrupt this development before the impulse comes to an end, if we make this impulse abortive, we cannot grasp our specious present and the relevant sector of our past adherent to it.

All of this will have to be worked out in elaborate analyses which are not immediately connected with the problem of musical experience. However, we had to make these preliminary remarks in order to clear up the problem of the musical theme. Let us now draw some conclusions from what has preceded.

First of all, we have to consider what we called the articulation of the musical flux into units and sub-units. Any musician knows this problem very well. It has for him the name of musical phrasing. The art of musical phrasing consists in making each unit and sub-unit discernible by bringing together into one single phase what belongs together, and to separate it from the next phase by a very short interruption of the flux of music—so short, sometimes, that even no sign of notation is required in order to mark the short pause between the end of the first and the beginning of the next phrase. It is these small fractions of time, incommensurable in our current notation, which the singer or wind instrument player needs for breathing, or the string instrument player for changing the stroke of his bow. The composer of our times orders the player by the use of ties or [rubato],³⁵ or even in special cases by the use of rests, to observe these thematical units and sub-units. These very short intermittences are the resting places during which the flux of music comes to a standstill. The listener is invited and incited by them to look from this end-phase back to the initial phase, to return to the beginning still accessible to him by reason of the interplay of retentions analyzed before. Looking back to the initial phase, the listener becomes aware that there was a single impulse going on, that each element of the unit was connected with its predecessors and attracted or, better, brought about its successor; he will conceive, then, the unit or sub-unit as a meaningful context, meaningful within the precise definition given before. The meaning may be incomplete and require a supplementary fulfillment: this will, then, especially be the case if the musical culture of the period to which the listener belongs, or his knowledge of the period to which the composition in question

belongs, induces him to make certain anticipations in order to obtain typical completeness not granted by what he actually hears. In such a case, the listener will be in the same situation as the reader of a fragment of a sentence: the words he read make a meaning, but an incomplete one; they may be followed by a comma but not by a period. That is exactly what we understand under a sub-unit. The six-note theme used in section 19 as an example is, for our modern ears, at least, such an incomplete sub-unit requiring a conclusion in order to be complete.

This is the way in which a theme constitutes itself. Once constituted, it becomes a *Gestalt* within the meaning of the Gestaltists. As a unit, it can now be recollected as an entity with particular meaning. But this recollection will no longer take place in the form of a retention or a retention of a second degree. It can be, however, recollected by "reproduction" and recognized when it recurs by immediate or not immediate repetition. It will be recognized as the same, or as the same but modified (inverted, enlarged, in another key, etc.). It has become a *Gestalt* with a specific configuration. As such its sequel will be anticipated as soon as the initial phases have been suggested. Finally, it may become entirely familiar, it will be known in such a way that no recollection will be necessary. It has been remembered and is now at hand.

Just one word in concluding as to the mechanism of this special kind of reflection. The attitude of the listener, his decision to follow the flux of music, involved his preparedness to perform the reflective attitude as soon as the flux of music itself invites him to do so. He has, therefore, not to change permanently the state of tension of his consciousness. He starts his listening in the expectation that the music he listens to will turn out to be a meaningful context. He, therefore, has an interest only in understanding this context, and this interest determines his attention toward the ongoing music and steers the selective activity of his scheme of relevancies. However; what is relevant is also indicated by the musical structure itself, by the devices applied by the composer in order to evoke the appropriate reactions of the beholder.

One of the most important of these devices, rhythm, we can study later on.³⁶

References


1. Schutz's theory of language can be found in its most succinct form in "Symbol, reality and society," *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, edited and introduced by Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 287–356. A longer and more detailed account is in *Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, 2nd edition (Vienna: Springer, 1960), section 24ff. (Translated as *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, with an Introduction by George Walsh [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967]. The section numbers of the German edition correspond to those of the translation.)
 In addition, a shorter discussion very similar to the one found in the present text is in *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, edited, annotated, with an introduction by Richard M. Zaner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 86ff., especially 93ff.
2. For further discussion of this idea, with critical reference to the contrary theory of Halbwachs, see "Making music together," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 163, 165f.
3. In this connection, see Schutz's discussion of Rousseau's ideas on music in "Mozart and the philosophers," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 182f.
4. For a general statement of Schutz's understanding and development of the phenomenological approach, see "Some leading concepts of phenomenology," *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 102ff., and "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences," *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 120ff.
5. The manuscript has the German term, "Obertonreihe."
6. The manuscript has the word "temperature," undoubtedly translating the German term, "Temperatur." The term is perhaps better translated as "temperament."
7. See the similar discussion in "Making music together," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 164.
8. For a similar, but more detailed, critique of monothetic and polythetic "constituting," see *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, pp. 78ff., especially 81ff.; "Making music together," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 172ff. The chief ramifications of Husserl's doctrine are discussed by Schutz in *Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, Section 11f., 14, 15. The basic source in Husserl is found in *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913), Vol. I, section 137.
9. To this passage Schutz has appended the following note: "To the best of my knowledge, there is one single instance to the contrary. In a letter to his father, Mozart describes his experience, while composing, of hearing the whole composition from beginning to end simultaneously, and he describes this experience as curious as well as wonderful. It would seem that Mozart's genius had the capacity to grasp monothetically the whole composition. But it must be admitted that the passage just referred to is not quite clear and that, at any rate, experiences such as described by Mozart are only accessible to a genius of his kind."

I have been unable to find such an account in any of Mozart's letters to his father—either in the recent re-edition of Mozart's letters by Emily

Anderson (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966) or in *Mozart. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen (Gesamtausgabe)*, edited by W. A. Bauer and O. E. Deutsch (Basil: Bärenreiter, 1963). There is, however, such an account in a letter supposedly written in Prague in 1790; it is not in Anderson, and Bauer and Deutsch print it in an appendix of Vol. IV of letters of doubtful authenticity. In part, the passage expressing the experience referred to by Schutz reads as follows: "Das erhitzt mir nun die Seele, wenn ich nämlich nicht gestört werde; da wird es immer grösser; und ich breite es immer weiter und heller aus; und das Ding wird im Kopfe wahrlich fast fertig, wenn es auch lang ist, so dass ichs hernach mit Einem Blick, gleichsam wie ein schönes Bild oder einen hübschen Menschen, im Geiste übersehe, und es auch gar nicht nach einander, wie es hernach kommen muss, in der Einbildung höre, sondern wie gleich alles zusammen. Das ist nun ein Schmauss. Alles das Finden und Machen gehet in mir nur, wie in einem schönstarken Traume vor: aber das Ueberhören, so alles zusammen, ist doch das Beste." (Bauer and Deutsch, Vol. IV, pp. 529f.)

10. See Schutz's review of Husserl's *Ideen*, Vol. II, and *Ideen*, Vol. III, in *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, pp. 15ff., and 40ff.
11. Schutz refers to G. H. Meade, *The Philosophy of the Present* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), pp. 124ff., and *The Philosophy of the Act* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 103–106, 121ff. Schutz's discussion of this idea is in "On multiple realities," *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 223f.; and in *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, pp. 176ff.
12. For a very similar discussion and development of the idea of music as a "meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time," see "Making music together," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 170ff.
13. For Schutz's published accounts of the stream of consciousness, see *Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, section 7ff.; "On multiple realities," *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 212ff., and "William James's concept of the stream of consciousness," *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, pp. 8ff. For the application of the concept of the stream of consciousness to specific cases in music, also see "Mozart and the philosophers," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 198ff.
14. This passage is marked for deletion in the manuscript.
15. Schutz's concept of reflection sketched here is crucial both for his theory of subjectivity at large and for clarification of the theoretical attitude of the scientist, viz., the social scientist. See *Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, section 33.
16. The manuscript has the German term, "Tonstärke."
17. See "On multiple realities," *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 229ff., where Schutz develops Bergson's notion of the "tensions of consciousness" in terms of what Schutz calls the "epoché of the natural attitude." The following section, section 15, details examples. For discussion of Bergson's notion itself, see *ibid.*, pp. 212ff.
18. For a very similar account to what is given in section 16 and 17, see "Making music together," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 167ff. All of this may be regarded as concrete application of the concepts of socially derived and socially approved knowledge; see, e.g., "The well-informed citizen," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 131ff.

19. The discussion of rhythm, referred to at various places, is lacking in the present manuscript. In addition to the brief comments on rhythm here, see "Making music together," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 164.
20. The following diagram was written on the reverse side of the preceding manuscript page, and may be presumed to have been used as a guide by Schutz as he wrote this section:



21. This paragraph is somewhat garbled, but it is left essentially as in the manuscript since Schutz constructs the following sections around it. From what follows it is clear that there is a three-fold respect, namely, the three categories of continuance and intermittence, sameness, and movement.
22. Ernst Kurth, *Grundlagen des linearen Kontrapunkts: Bachs melodische polyphonie* (Berlin, 1922, 3rd ed.)

The immediately following paragraph is appended here as a footnote by Schutz: "It is the task of the arranger who transcribes such a composition for orchestra to make these specious counterpoints real. This problem is very difficult because it seems that the capacity to retain the specious coherence depends, to a certain degree, upon the homogeneousness of the timbre of the real voices. If this homogeneousness is interrupted by the "coloring" process of instrumentation, the specious coherence disappears owing to the failure of establishing retentional relations between the disparate material. Therefore, the instrumentation has to transform the specious voices into real ones; but that is a business which only a sympathetic composer of high genius is able to perform. The difference between an arrangement of a Bach organ composition for orchestra as performed by Stokowsky or Schoenberg lies exactly here."

23. This sentence is marked "unclear" in the manuscript.
24. For further discussion of this idea, see *Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, section 8.
25. For a published account of Schutz's views on Husserl's notion of passive synthesis, see "Type and Eidos in Husserl's late philosophy," *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, pp. 96ff.; "The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity in Husserl," *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, pp. 62ff.
26. The problem of accounting for the phenomenon of familiarity and the pre-acquaintedness with our world and its meaning, is a persistent and important one in Schutz's works; see, for example, "Phenomenology and the social sciences," *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 134f.; "The problem of rationality in the social world," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 74, 80; and "The Stranger," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 94ff.; "Type and Eidos in Husserl's late philos-

- ophy," *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, pp. 95f.; and *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, pp. 56ff., 141ff.
27. A parenthesis follows in the manuscript which reads as follows: "This is, of course, an account of my personal experience and even, as it cannot be otherwise, of an experience which does not always prevail in my listening to this Symphony. Neither is it pretended that this peculiar theme has or has not a key position to any [other] listener, nor that [the theme] has [such a position] from the point of view of objective analysis of musical form, nor that such a functional rôle was intended by the composer."
 28. The paragraph immediately following in the manuscript is perhaps better placed as a footnote: "If we said that the listener experiences the theme as a unit we tried to circumscribe the term "Gestalt" as used by modern psychologists. As a matter of fact, it would be the most adequate way for describing the units of musical experiences in terms of Gestalt-psychology if the latter would not operate with unclarified concepts of the whole and parts."
 29. The following parenthesis follows in the manuscript: "This clearly shows why the terms of Gestalt-psychology cannot be applied uncritically to musical experiences. Each of the themes of our examples, modified as suggested, would still represent an individual "Gestalt," but it would not be considered as a musical theme."
 30. A marginal note to this passage in the manuscript reads in part, and in translation, "All of this has to be made (formulated), of course, much more precise, and [more] thoroughly elaborated in the places indicated."
 31. I am uncertain as to the reference in the Fifth Investigation; the problem is treated in the *Fourth* Investigation, section 9ff. See also *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, pp. 94ff.
 32. For this idea, basic to Schutz's phenomenological epistemology, see *Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, section 9; "Tiresias, Or Our Knowledge of future events," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 278ff.; cf. *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, pp. 110ff.
 33. The bracket-enclosed gloss is a guess at the word in the manuscript, which is badly blurred.
 34. This task of developing a complete theory of relevance is laid out in detail in *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*; see Zaner's Introduction, pp. xiiiif.
 35. In the manuscript, Schutz has the German word, "Akzentzeichen." However, it seems to me that accent makes little sense here because what Schutz is talking about would seem rather to be a matter of stress than of "time." Hence rubato might be closer to what he has in mind here. For the problems involved, see "Making music together," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 166f.
 36. The manuscript breaks off at this point. See also note 19, above.

Music as constituted object

THOMAS CLIFTON

"I have compiled this discourse, which asks for your consideration and pardon not only because the matter itself is by no means easy to be handled, but also because the doctrines herein contained are somewhat contrary to those held by most of the Platonic philosophers."

Plutarch

HOWEVER we may care to define music, we should agree that one of its important aspects is its non-empirical status. It is sustained, no doubt, by a collection of empirically verifiable acoustical data, but music is to acoustics what a person is to his body. Music *has* empirical data, but it is not defined in terms of these data, just as we say that my body *has* muscles and tissue, but that I can neither necessarily nor sufficiently be defined by them. If we choose, we can enter a frame of mind which uses music as a source for the observation of acoustical data, such as frequencies, timbres, intensities, absolute durations, etc. But if we try to position music within the same field occupied by these empirical objects, we are led to some erroneous conclusions. We start thinking of music as "organized sound," and it becomes very easy to slip into an attitude expressible in statements like, "The tonality (or set structure, or rhythmic scheme) of the piece provides the means whereby structural cohesiveness is maintained." We then begin to regard tonality, etc., as an empirical object, something which the piece *has* (along with its acoustical data), and definable in terms of elements, relations, and operations allegedly contained in the tonal composition. The terminal point of this *cul de sac* is the designation of tonality as an "in-itself." The only way to further progress consists in re-tracing

our steps and taking up a position diametrically opposed to the one we left.

We will, then, no longer speak of tonality, set-structure, etc., as existing "in-themselves" but rather, "for-me." We will methodologically deny that the "in-itself" plays a role in the intuitive experience of music, and methodologically suspend all beliefs and assumptions about the reality of music which cannot be found on this level of experience. In short, we will "claim nothing that we cannot make evident by direct reference to consciousness, viewed immanently" (Farber, 1966, 56). The reality of music is no longer assumed as a fixed and stable reference point; it will, in fact, have to be constituted by a human act. Such is the proposed task of this article. However, since the process of constitution is infinite in principle, I can only hope to present the outline of its movement, and duly note the loose ends which will appear. It should also be understood that I am not about literally to constitute the particular composition to be studied here (Webern's *Bagatelle No. 1 for String Quartet*, Op. 9), but rather, its *meaning* as it emerges from the world of my *Erlebnis*. In this space, I cannot directly confront and dispel understandable fears that the point of view suggested here is subjective or solipsistic, and hence counter-productive. At best, I can divert them by referring the fearful reader to the treatment of these issues at the hands of the seminal phenomenologists.

The procedure to be used here sounds deceptively simple. I will treat as "meanings" those objects of my consciousness of Webern's *Bagatelle* which can be experienced as immediately and predicatively given. I will reflect on both these objects and the experiential acts connected with them. In this way, I intend to relate general essences to their specific configurations as manifested in the *Bagatelle*. This is in keeping with the purpose of the essence, namely, to elucidate the objectivity of a meaning-object by demonstrating the variability of the universal and the necessary (cf. Dufrenne, 1966, 60). In this manner, we save the essence from being reduced to a tautology from which we can learn nothing.

What, then, are the essential acts of experience by which this *Bagatelle* becomes constituted? What are the meaningful objects of these acts? To the former belong those actions of the body by which

feeling, understanding, time, motion, and play are all directed *toward* something. That something is the object of the act: a possession, a concern, a project, a relation, a form, or a problem. There is no rigid one-to-one correspondence between object and act: a single object, e.g. a form, may be the correlate of all experiential acts; conversely, the activity of time can involve the collaboration of many objects. The remainder of this article can be regarded as a journey across this complex “network of intentionalities” (after Merleau-Ponty).

If we listen in such a way that we take nothing for granted, we find ourselves confronted by a major problem: how do we know that these strange events all belong to a single work? How do we know that, from instant to instant, we are experiencing the same Bagatelle? The answer is implicit in the question. It is not simply a matter of knowing; “knowing that” the piece has unity can only be preceded by an awareness *of* its unity, and if I care enough about the experience of the Bagatelle to raise a question concerning its self-identity, then I am already affirming such identity. I am already aware, in a non-thematic manner, of being present at a single, unified experience which underlies the very possibility of contrast. We must, then, recognize that “unity” cannot precede experience, cannot be demonstrated apart from experience, and cannot be sustained apart from a certain attitude which the experiencing person adopts toward the object of experience. When we say that a composition has unity, we are really saying that it is our experience of the composition which is unified. This experience is not preceded by epistemic awareness of the historical conditions surrounding the work, or by the apodictic certainty that it was indeed composed by Webern and is not a counterfeit, or by Webern’s own attitude toward the work (he may have wanted to play a joke on us), or, finally, by any purely “factual” existence of unity. In other words, its unity is not presupposed, but constituted by a conscious but pre-predicative act. Such an act is not possible without its accompaniment of feeling. This suggestion calls for a consideration of feeling as an essential and irreducible aspect of the musical experience.

1. FEELING AS AN IRREDUCIBLE STRATUM

Two fundamental feelings underpin a complex of more conscious feelings: those of concern and possession. The Bagatelle can only become meaningful to me if I am concerned for its well-being. It becomes a pro-ject, something in which to “throw” oneself, the location of *Dasein*, the disclosure of Being, and an object that matters (cf. Heidegger, 1962, 172–179). Concern is occasioned by the recognition that the Bagatelle, as a meaning, is inherently labile. At any moment its meaning-structure can be destroyed by an assertion of my freedom: I can choose, within its brief duration, to literally or figuratively walk out on it. But, in a more concerned mood, I can also choose to become the Bagatelle’s accomplice. In any case, my feeling implies an object of feeling, accessible, in principle, to other people. The meaning of the Bagatelle is not “in” me in the manner of a purely private hallucination, but “in” a *there* which the feeling of concern urges me to grasp. Or, more precisely, the meaning is not “in” the music either. The “there,” then, refers to the music-as-perceived. The direction of feeling is more circular than linear: my consciousness is directed toward the music-as-perceived, which in turn completes the circle by affecting me. It is this circularity of feeling which invokes the experience of possession. I intend, or tend-toward, the object of feeling, but at the same time, submit to it by allowing it to “touch” me. Possession itself is thus two-directional: I possess the music, and it possesses me. It is this quality of “ownness” which enables us to say that a composition is phenomenal because it is ours. If I find meaning in the musical world of Mozart, Webern, or acid rock, it is because, first of all, I experience this music as relating to my own present; it is, literally, mine. To argue the other way around—that is, to argue that it is mine because it has meaning—is to suggest that meaning is a changeless property, completely independent of me. But it is precisely because meaning is cumulative and open-ended and in need of sustenance that it is an object of concern. Meaning, then, is not something to be assumed to be already there, along with empirical data. Meaning is an achievement, a performance (*Leistung*) of the listener, a goal to be aimed at by the performance (*Aufführung*)

of the musical score. "Being in possession of, and possessed by," describes the experience of a composition as a meaning-object for me which provides the foundation for thinking of a composition as an empirical object, with a history and a tradition. It is because of this fundamental bond between myself and the composition that feeling, as a positive value, can be said to reside more in the act of participating than in manipulating. Manipulation is done by those who are either masters of the situation or who are confronted with an object from a totally alien world, as would be a monkey manipulating a typewriter. The participant, on the other hand, voluntarily gives up a bit of his freedom as the price for owning the composition

There is much more to be said about this stratum of feeling. What about the relation between such experience and language, for example? Can one develop Heidegger's association of *hören*, *hорchen*, and *gehорchen* (to hear, to harken, to obey)? What can one make of the association of such Latin words as *perceptio* (taking, gathering), *per-cipere* (to seize, hold) with the German word *fassen* (to grasp, understand)? What can be said about the thorny problem of possession and so-called cultural conditioning? Can we distinguish "music" from physical tone sequences by the way we live through these events? These and other problems must be left, as the saying goes, as "exercises for the inquisitive student," because it is time to become a bit more explicit.

At the moment, the Bagatelle is nothing but a localization of one's Being, a general meaning about which we show some concern, and a possession which implicates one while in the very act of possessing it. This meaning is still very much on the non-thematic, implicit level of givenness, corresponding to a "background" of first order (as opposed to first-hand) experience. From this background of feeling, we can either work forward to the uncovering of more explicit feelings, or proceed linearly to other types of experiential background. I have opted for the first choice merely for the sake of convenience.

To aid in understanding our feelings about this Bagatelle, we can ask ourselves what it would be like to dance to it. What sort of bodily gestures would help to render this Bagatelle visible? Does

it make some sense to say, “I feel graceful?” (This is the more correct way of saying that “the music sounds graceful.”) More specifically, do not the first $2\frac{1}{2}$ measures require expansive (convex, curving outward) motions but conducted in a smooth, uninterrupted, unexaggerated, *graceful* manner? To be graceful implies, at least, a “seemingly effortless beauty or charm of movement, form or proportion” (*American Heritage Dictionary*). Would one not choose to express gracefulness and expansiveness by slow or moderate (*mässig*) gestures rather than violent jumping or pacing? Would one not differentiate between the first $2\frac{1}{2}$ measures and the next $1\frac{1}{2}$ (through measure 4) by maintaining the graceful motions but somewhat reducing the size of the gesture?

Handwritten musical score for Example 1, measures 1-4. The score is in 3/4 time with a tempo marking "Mässig (♩ = ca 60)". It features four staves: Violin I, Violin II, Viola, and Cello/Double Bass. The score includes dynamic markings (pp, p), performance instructions (mit Dämpfer, am Steg), and articulation (arco v). Measure 1 starts with a half rest in the upper strings and a half note in the lower strings. Measure 2 features a half note in the upper strings and a half note in the lower strings. Measure 3 shows a half note in the upper strings and a half note in the lower strings. Measure 4 includes a half note in the upper strings and a half note in the lower strings, with a "rit." marking at the end.

Example 1.

Several events in measures 3 and 4 suggest the feeling of tending-toward-compression: the narrower space of the cello and viola melody (as compared to the opening melody), the isolated tones of the upper strings in measure 4, and the first occurrence of a relatively “thick” vertical sonority on beat 3 of measure 4. But there is only a tendency, which has to wait for measures 7 through 9 to fulfill itself. As one moves through measures 5 and 6, this tendency toward compression is interrupted (that is, one experiences the

feeling of interruption) by events of a different sort. A primary condition for the experience of interruption lies in the more spastic, disconnected events of these measures. But reflection on this experience suggests a more “hidden” condition, namely, that figure-ground relationships seem to be reversed. In the first four measures, the foreground was primarily melodic, with the viola’s 16th-notes in measure 2, and the isolated tones in measure 4, functioning as background. However, in measures 5 and 6, it is melody which recedes into the background, while a texture of isolated tones comes forward. This reversal of relationships, together with the overall increase in dynamics and acceleration of tempo, seems to encourage the feeling described above as “spastic.” Is it possible, though, to be more specific about why this word was chosen? Let us examine a single event: f^3 in measure 5:

The musical score for Example 2 shows measures 5 and 6. The top staff (Violin I) has a treble clef and a key signature of one flat. Measure 5 is marked 'tempo' and 'pp', and measure 6 is marked 'accel.' and 'f'. The second staff (Violin II) is marked 'am Steg' and 'pp'. The third staff (Viola) has a treble clef and a key signature of one flat. The bottom staff (Cello/Double Bass) has a bass clef and a key signature of one flat. The score includes various dynamics (pp, f, p, sf) and articulations (pizz., accents).

Example 2.

We must never be deceived by the notation. This tone doesn't appear out of nowhere, nor can we always safely assume that it is merely prolonging itself briefly but uni-directionally in time. Simultaneously with the instant of audition, one can detect, in the silence of the upper registers, the sharply ascending path cut by its own coming-to-be. It is this “audible silence” which precedes f^3 , or rather, which throws f^3 up to its register, that requires a sharp, jerky movement known as “spastic.”

From “spastic” one moves to “violent” in measures 7 through 9.2. In terms of tempo, dynamics and register (observe the absence of low cello tones), measure 7 presents the climax to the movement. It so happens that it is the only measure in which one experiences “intersection”: not the intersection of set theory but the collision of tones fighting for the same small space:

heftig (♩ = ca 96) rit... wieder mäßig (♩ = ca 60)

Handwritten musical score for Example 3, measures 7-10. The score is written on four staves. Measure 7 is marked "heftig" and "rit...". Measure 8 is marked "wieder mäßig". Measure 9 is marked "rit..." and measure 10 is marked "♩ = ca 44". The score includes various dynamics (ff, f, p, pp, ppp), articulations (pizz, arco), and performance instructions like "d-Saite" and "b2".

Example 3.

It is here where the previous “tendency-toward-compression” is consummated. The hardness of the texture reduces the previous

transparency of this piece: it becomes more solid, more heavy, a condition which is dispelled only with the last $1\frac{1}{2}$ measures. The form of the feeling, then, is delineated with classical clarity: one moves from gracefulness, quietude, moderation, and smoothness to more spiky and violent gestures, squabbling tones, rapid tempi, and back again—back to a condition of serenity even more pronounced than the opening measures. The allusion to classical clarity is not altogether appropriate, however, since the description of yet another feeling—ambiguity—must be postponed. The feelings described here provide only the roughest outline to an experience which is essentially incomplete, since it lacks the contributions of other (trained) listeners, and essentially ineffable, since what is understood by the hearing of this Bagatelle will always outrun what can be told of this experience. This is one reason why constitution is an infinite task, and why knowledge of the object will always be less than perfectly explicit.

2. THE PRE-REFLECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF TIME

The question again comes up, “How do I know that event y in a certain piece follows from event x in the same piece?” For this section, the question becomes, “How can I affirm the identity *and* the temporality of the piece?” To answer this, we must be clear about the nature of the object of the listening act. It must be understood that the Bagatelle is not presented to us as a bundle of sensations of fleeting duration. The identity of the Bagatelle would then be seriously questioned—along with our own. But the “now” of my perception of that first d^1 is not a knife edge; each successive instant is not created out of nothing only to be again cast into nothingness. Such a situation could never lead to the experience of succession. The method employed here grounds succession on a background of unity, but abstains from any judgment about the notion of unity as an absolute quality of the empirical world. In other words, unity itself is the object of the act of what Husserl calls “passive synthesis”: an act which breaks the dichotomy of identity and temporality by making each a requirement of the

other. Neither identity nor temporality is assumed in advance: each is the result of an activity of pre-reflective consciousness. In other words, synthesis applies not so much to the tone-in-itself (since I am abstaining from any judgments about the factuality of this tone) but to its meaning for me. It is this meaning which is synthesized, and part of its meaning is that it is one with itself. The process of meaning-synthesis can be described more precisely by referring to a "field of presence."

This field precedes the tripartite division of time into past, present, and future, and in fact makes this division possible. In addition, the field of presence precedes memory and expectation. Memory, for example, can be invoked only "after" an event has been perceived. In other words, memory presupposes some cut-off point which separates the percept from the image. But in experiencing the Bagatelle, I do not experience an instantaneous percept in one part of consciousness and a non-temporal collection of images in another part. If, in saying that I experience the Bagatelle, my language makes any sense at all, it is because I experience the *whole* Bagatelle as present. Thus Husserl writes:

The whole melody . . . appears as present so long as it still sounds, so long as the notes *belonging to it*, intended in the *one* nexus of apprehensions, still sound. The melody is past only after the last note has gone. (Husserl, 1969, 61.)

Husserl is describing a form of consciousness prior to memory, which he calls *retention*. This term describes the perception of a tone as "just-having-been," which is distinct from "having-gone-by." I can, with memory, recollect the whole Bagatelle, but I perceive it, in actual or imaginary performance, as pass-ing. As measure 1 passes away, it does not cease to be. Were this to be the case, I would be forced constantly to refer back to measure 1 to prove that it once was. On the contrary, it is still there, but in the mode of "has-been." Merleau-Ponty speaks of retention as the act of maintaining a direct contact with a living past, a past which reaches into, and influences, the experience of the present. Similarly, Husserl's word, *protention*, is to be distinguished from mere expectation. Protention influences the "now" from the side of the future, which is, in Chapman's phrase, "abouting to be" (Chapman, 1966,

86). The meaning-vectors of protention surge toward the present, making it not merely “now” but a “now” which will soon be past. About the “now,” Merleau-Ponty writes that

We must feel the pressure upon it of a future intent on dispossessing it; in short the course of time must be primarily not only the passing of present to past, but also that of the future to the present (Merleau-Ponty, (1967), 414).

Protention is more like anticipation than expectation (a distinction well-known to readers of Heidegger). Anticipation implies a more active involvement in events by implicating the present beyond itself: the present can go forward to meet the future, which makes available the possibility of choice. Thus Merleau-Ponty writes:

Our future is not made up exclusively of guesswork and dreams. Ahead of what I can see and perceive, there is, it is true, nothing more actually visible, but my world is carried forward by lines of intentionality which trace out in advance at least the style of what is to come (although we always wait, perhaps to the day of our death, for the appearance of *something else*) (*ibid.*, 416).

The field of presence, then, is a complex of significant “nows” interacting with retentions and protentions. These can influence the “now,” and, in its turn, the “now” can project forward and backward to other “nows” which have-been or which may-soon-be. It is this complex which must be evoked in any account of such experiences as “unity,” “identity,” or “continuity,” since we know now that it is not only in the nature of musical events to be in flux, but that allegedly more stable objects (paintings, tablecloths) are also in motion, or rather, our relationships to these objects are inherently in flux. In short, the identity of the Bagatelle is a constituted identity, brought about by the recognition that one awareness of it is “one with another awareness, that is to say, these are one because they are awareness of the same thing” (Husserl, 1967, 17). It can be concluded (for now) that the process of change does not destroy identity, but, on the contrary, contributes toward its definition. Change is possible only within a *situation* which either does not change or which changes at a different (slower) rate than the objects so changed. This situation is what I have been describing as the field of presence.

From all this, the attentive reader might conclude that words like "change" and "occur" refer, respectively, to objects and events, but not to time itself. Past, present, and future do not "occur," nor is time some kind of object which "flies." It could only do this with respect to a meta-time, the consideration of which would lead to an infinite regress. This demands that we reverse traditional psychological interpretations of time as a "datum" of consciousness, and say, with Merleau-Ponty, that "consciousness unfolds or constitutes time" (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, 414). In short, time is not a thing which flows at all, but, rather, is a measure of our implication with the events of the world-as-lived-in. The breadth and depth of time have more to do with our relations to events than to any absolute measurement, which is why it is meaningless to think of Wagner's music as "absolutely long" and Webern's as "absolutely brief." The experience of time is rather a matter of the amount of work required of consciousness to constitute a meaning. Regarded in this light, the field of presence for Webern's music is very broad indeed.

But these last few sentences point up the impossibility of describing time-relations purely in terms of the temporal. We cannot describe time in terms of time, as Aristotle discovered, but only in terms of our consciousness of things changing. Where this statement differs from empiricist doctrine is in the notion of "thing," interpreted here to be purely an object of consciousness. Hence, the discussion of movement and gesture in the Bagatelle was placed under the heading of feeling, since one is conscious of the flux of feeling in relation to kinds of motion. Similarly, the brief reference to the form of the feeling implies that musical space as well as musical time contributes to the definition of form. Accordingly, in turning to the next kind of constitutive act, we should bear in mind that time-consciousness permeates all such acts, or, more generally, that all constitutive acts permeate each other.

3. THE SYNAESTHETIC ACT

The time of the Bagatelle includes definite beginning and end

points. The first tone does not come after I have taken my seat in the correct hall, nor does the last tone of the program precede my exit from the hall. The Bagatelle, as a plastic, pulsating form, is not "in" the time of the world; its sounds are not connected to those of my neighbor rattling a program or of the fire engines rushing past the concert hall. Its time creates a line, a boundary, perhaps with world time as its ultimate background, but the Bagatelle has form because it stands out from such a background. The difficult question is, what *is* the form? Can one talk about a temporal form apart from considerations of how that form is deployed in space?

The Greeks thought of time as circular, with the "now" representing a point at which the past ended and the future began. But this gets us into talk of the "flow" of time, of the past receding from the "now," etc. It seems more accurate to talk about the past in terms of a sedimentation of meaning, and to say that as the piece moves, the accumulation of meaning fills out the incompleteness of the moment. We can then talk about the form as cyclic because of the experience of similar meanings at the beginning and end of the Bagatelle. The piece begins and ends with a single line: d^1 in measure 1, c^2 in measure 10; from the line in measure 1, it grows into a more complex texture of several lines moving across a two-dimensional space. Not until measure 4 does a planar structure present itself, in the form of the vertical sonorities on the third beat. Purely linear movement reasserts itself in measure 5, but with the increase in dynamics, this movement becomes more three-dimensional. That is, certain lines stand out more from the context, such as the accented, isolated tones of measures 5—6, as well as the 1st violin gesture between measures 6 and 7. This three-dimensional linear form lasts through the first half of measure 9; further complexity is added by the return of planar surfaces (the vertical sonorities cutting across measures 8 and 9). Finally, one returns to the two-dimensional lines of the opening measures, and thence to the single line of the final c^2 . So if we say that the piece is cyclic, this does not mean that we have returned to the beginning, or that we have experienced a reversal of direction. To describe the form as cyclic signifies that *part* of the meaning of measures 9.3–10 is similar to the meaning of the opening measures: similar, but not

equivalent. We have returned to smooth, quiet motions, but these are not the *same* motions as previously felt; in addition, they appear slightly more disconnected than those of the opening measures. Thus, the circle may have been completed from one perspectival view, but, when viewed from another perspective, the return seems to be located at a different level than occupied by the beginning. In short, the ending is not a complete closure, but already looks forward to another Bagatelle.

What have I been talking about, if not a visual experiencing of the sound-structures of this Bagatelle? Let me be quite clear in saying that the first three pitches (for example) do not “represent” or “symbolize” a sharply rising line; there *is* such a line, as an object of my consciousness. The problem here is not so much the validity of synaesthetic perception; it is, says Merleau-Ponty, the rule rather than the exception (1967, 229). But philosophers aside, one need only recall the interest in synaesthesia shown by the Expressionists: think of such paintings as Kandinsky’s *Green Sound* (1924), or his *Three Sounds* (1926). The problem for synaesthesia lies in the nature of the status which the synaesthetic object is accorded. One might initially think that terms like “rising lines” or “planar surfaces” are too personal to be helpful. But consider that I could not even begin to describe a meaning in this way if these terms did not also transcend the particular object being experienced. But this doesn’t imply that I am abstracting the meaning of “rising line.” It is not a matter of surveying a collection of objects to see what they have in common; it is the other way around, meaning that an essence, like “rising line,” is something discovered as belonging to many objects. We then arrive at a proposition significant for musical analysis, namely, that it is the essence which defines a collection, not a collection which defines an essence. This can be re-stated in many ways: (1) unity is not determined by set-structure, unity *determines* set-structure; (2) rhythmic elements do not define time and space, time and space are experiences which define rhythmic elements; if I had no direct experience of time and space I would not know what a rhythmic element was. We could go on like this for several pages, but the point to be made here is that essences like “rising lines” are accorded the status of

nothing less than an *a priori*, for the following reasons: (1) This experience is not a mere subjectivism, since it does not depend on a mood for its existence; rather, as I have tried to indicate, mood and motion-in-space are parallel and connected *a priori* structures. (2) "Rising line" is descriptive of an irreducible experience, not of a definition presumed in advance of the experience. (3) It arises spontaneously from the evidence of experience rather than systematically from the evidence of empirical observation. (4) It designates a structure of the object as an essential aspect of it, if the object itself is to appear at all. I recognize "rising line" in *this* texture because "rising line" is already an acquisition of my body. I can communicate with the synaesthetic meaning of music because my body is in communication with itself.

So far, I have only described the synaesthetic experience of motion and form (the form of the motion, the motion of the form) in terms of feeling, time, and space. Another type of synaesthesia, however, involves the experience of tactile qualities. The admission of such qualities might even be recognized in the German terms for major and minor: *dur* and *moll*. These words have as much to do with texture as with tone color. In the absence of pre-defined conditions for consonance and dissonance, a great deal of the tension of a composition can come from the experience of "hard," "rough," or "gritty" sounds. This might be one reason why measures 7 and 8 sound "closer" than measures 1 and 2. There is a metallic hardness and opacity in the gestures of the former, especially in the plucked sounds. These seem to "rebound" from the overall sonority, whereas the plucked B⁶ in measure 4, for example, is more "harmonious" in its capacity to be absorbed by its context. But these remarks should not be used for purposes of inductive generalization. Nowhere in this article is there any attempt made to stipulate cause-effect relations, or laws of perception which make "softness" a requirement of certain textures. It should be understood that I am not predicating "softness" of the texture of the opening measures, but rather, of the texture-as-perceived. I have been speaking throughout of the Bagatelle as such a meaning-object, and indeed I have no choice, since I have not the slightest idea of what could be meant by the Bagatelle-in-itself—nor does anyone else.

We can arrive at some interesting conclusions regarding synaesthetic perception. If we want to distinguish "movement" or "hardness" as a phenomenon from their empirical interpretation, we shall have to speak of "movement as interpreted by my conduct," and not "conduct as interpreted by movement." There are two reasons why the former expression is preferable:

1) The latter expression confuses the perceiving subject, "I," with the subject's physical properties: his nerves, muscles, etc., with the result that the "movement" becomes a stimulus impinging on the subject's body. But we can regard the matter in a different way, if we consider that a description of a composition's "movement" is really a description of our bodily behavior. In the presence of a composition, *we* move; if it "changes tempo" it is because *we* do so. In short, if it begins to make sense, it is because we are there, attuned to the world of that composition, and because it is I who give sense to the composition. Thus, to talk of its "inner logic" or "inner necessity" is to engage in non-illuminative metaphors. Without a person to constitute the sense of a composition, its meaning is non-existent. This point of view is different from cause-effect theories, but also from conditioned response theories. I think it is unwise to equate meaning with conditioned response as long as we are confronted with the problem of how a person (e.g. Heisenberg) can demonstrate the unpredictability of nature while he himself allegedly constitutes an "operant" whose behavior can be invariably predicted.

2) The expression, "conduct as interpreted by movement" implies that the movement of the piece remains invariant. But this confuses not only object with event, but empirical object with phenomenal object. While it is self-evident that "I perceive movement," it is not at all self-evident that "there is movement" or even that "the movement is always the same." If it were the same, there would seem to be no reason why my "responses" to it should be any different now than they were ten years ago. On the contrary, the movement of the perceived Bagatelle has since changed because the meaning of the Bagatelle has changed, just as it is likely to continue changing. Again, this is why constitution is an endless task, and why the "reality" of the Bagatelle can never be completely disclosed. It is

also why the identity of the Bagatelle can never be a proven identity, but is always a believed identity. Thus Merleau-Ponty writes that “perception is pinning one’s faith, at a stroke, in a whole future of experiences, and doing so in a present which never strictly guarantees the future . . .” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, 297).

4. THE PLAY ACT

The final experiential act to be considered in this article is the element of play. The first question to be answered, of course, is, “Why is play an essence of the musical experience?” The second follows: “What is playful about this Bagatelle?”

The first question can be answered only by a consideration of the essential aspects of play itself. In this space I can discuss only two such aspects: ritualistic and heuristic behavior. Ritualistic behavior involves all forms of controlled play. Aside from music, this form is to be observed in such diverse areas as religion, politics, and sex, as well as sport. An important aspect of ritualistic behavior is the experience of being absorbed in an activity whose continuation is desired. We can ask ourselves if such an experience does not accompany the audition of the Bagatelle. If it does, we can conclude that the experience of continuity is as much a matter of will as it is of cognition and feeling: continuity becomes necessary *for us*. The aim of ritual is to permit an experience of achievement or accomplishment (*Leistung*, again). To this extent, it is far from being purposeless: a composition is experienced as a personal acquisition to the extent that one is personally involved in it. Again we can ask if this is true of the experience of the Bagatelle. It is precisely this experience of acquisition which synthesizes the frivolous with the serious into a single experiential act whose function it is to constitute the non-empirical object of that act. Thus we “play” a composition which is a “work” of art—even if it is a Bagatelle.

A few connections between music and ritual can now be drawn. Both involve directed action rather than mere movement. An action, or activity, is goal directed, if “goal” is taken to be the constituted meaning. Even if the goal is “non-directedness,” still this is the

meaning toward which an activity may be tending. Words like "directed" or "activity" imply that there is someone who directs or acts, and therefore, the goal comprises the meaning *for* that someone. In other words, directedness and activity are intentional words, whereas movement need not be exclusively intentional (as in the movement of stars or non-sentient organisms). The upshot of all this is that the actual movements in a ritual (people walking or gesturing) are not what constitute the meaning of the action. Rather, the meaning of the action suggests which kind of movement shall be appropriate *to* the meaning.

To ask if the Bagatelle is a form of controlled play seems to place too much emphasis on the composer's intentions and thought processes while in the creative act. We should rather ask if the experience of the Bagatelle is ordered or chaotic, or, to make things a bit more complex, an ordered picture of disorder. This is not a question for a census taker but for a philosopher concentrating purely on the *a priori* character of these experiences. Weighing all the possible alternatives, I can describe the Bagatelle best (at this writing) by saying that it presents an order of a highly complex sort, which is probably why it has maintained its composure all these years, in the face of so many well-intentioned analyses (such as this one) and evil-intentioned criticism. But there is a more profound reason for regarding it as a play-form. Let us go back to ritual for a moment.

In addition to the characteristics of ritualistic behavior described above, it also involves a re-combination of previously discrete experiences. Ritual selects from the world in order to express the same world, but in a more concentrated and economical manner. A great deal of evidence exists which suggests that play, far from being an escape from the drudgery of reality, is constitutive of reality. It is this constitutive function of play which draws the Bagatelle toward it, so that we begin to regard the Bagatelle not as a ludicrous and irrelevant spasm but as an insight into reality (always meaning, of course, reality-for-me). Its "Bagatelle-ness" doesn't imply that its experiences are of no, or little, consequence. On the contrary, it is through such "abstract" compositions that we really learn to see and hear. In general, it seems incorrect to think of play as "an intermezzo, an interlude, in our daily lives"

(Huizinga, 1970, 9). This point of view presupposes a mode of thought which creates a dialectic between play and reality, which makes play a symbol of reality, and reality the basis of play. We simply cannot make any pronouncements about whether music, as play, constitutes a rise or a fall from reality since, it is not clear what aspect of reality should provide the norm against which the rise or fall is measured. The question of whether the Bagatelle or, say, political expediency presents the world of "reality" is beautifully raised by Dylan Thomas:

How light the sleeping on this soily star,
How deep the waking in the worlded clouds.
[from "I Followed Sleep" (Thomas, 1957)]

Finally, we may consider heuristic behavior as a play form. The word "heuristics" is used to describe an experience which is essentially non-algorithmic. However we may engage in current jargon about the "rigorous specification of register," etc., it remains true that the next event is simply unknown—but not unknowable. To a greater or lesser degree, then, the listening experience is involved with the perception of problems, and as we know from games like chess, an important aspect of play involves the very process of working toward a solution to a problem. This implies a kind of foreknowledge of the general outline of the solution (or else we would not know where and how to begin the solution), simultaneously with the hiddenness of the solution (otherwise there would be no problem). For example, Husserl writes that

In every action we know the goal in advance in the form of an anticipation that is "empty," in the sense of vague, and lacking its proper "filling-in," which will come with fulfillment. Nevertheless we strive toward such a goal and seek by our action to bring it step by step to concrete realization (Husserl, 1969a, 149).

Let us take as a listening problem a question raised before, concerning the self-identity of the Bagatelle. This question was briefly considered from the point of view of the retention and protention of time-consciousness, but it can also be approached from the side of its sound qualities in a way not previously discussed under synaesthetic perception. The problem is whether the overall form

is heard as a movement of pitches and intervals or as a more general movement of "sonority." The same question can be raised with such compositions as Beethoven's *Grosse Fuge*, Chopin's *Prelude No. 14*, or Boulez's *Le Marteau sans Maître*. In fact, once the twin idols of pitch and interval are overthrown, this problem of sonority becomes more pervasive than is generally acknowledged. It seems that here, Webern takes great pains to minimize the importance of pitch and interval (as meaning-objects), so that what is perceived contributes to the "field of presence" mentioned above, in the form of a sonority which, for any given moment of the *Bagatelle*, provides us with, as it were, the same cross-section in a more or less concealed manner. The elements of this sonority are carefully built up by the tentative opening measures:

The image shows the first four measures of Webern's *Bagatelle*. The tempo is marked 'Mäßig' with a quarter note equal to approximately 60 beats per minute. The score is in 3/4 time and consists of four staves: Violin I, Violin II, Viola, and Cello/Double Bass. Performance instructions include 'mit Dämpfer' (with damper) and 'am Steg' (at the bridge). Dynamic markings range from *pp* (pianissimo) to *p* (piano). The notes in measure 4 are circled in the diagram below to illustrate the sonority.

Example 4.

In measure 4, this sonority is presented as a background to the melody in the cello and viola:

Handwritten musical score for Example 5, consisting of five staves. The notation includes various musical symbols and performance instructions:

- Staff 1:** Treble clef, 4/4 time signature. Measure 4 contains a chord with a '4' above it. Measure 5 contains a chord with a '3' above it. Dynamics include *p* and *pp*. A double-headed arrow \leftrightarrow is present. The instruction *rit ...* is written above the staff.
- Staff 2:** Treble clef. Measure 4 is marked *pizz*. Measure 5 is marked *arco*. Dynamics include *pp* and *p*. A double-headed arrow \leftrightarrow is present.
- Staff 3:** Bass clef. Measure 4 contains a chord with a '4' above it. Measure 5 contains a chord with a '3' above it. Dynamics include *p* and *pp*. A double-headed arrow \leftrightarrow is present.
- Staff 4:** Treble clef. Measure 4 contains a chord with a '4' above it. Measure 5 contains a chord with a '3' above it. Dynamics include *p* and *pp*. A double-headed arrow \leftrightarrow is present.
- Staff 5:** Bass clef. Measure 4 contains a chord with a '4' above it. Measure 5 contains a chord with a '3' above it. Dynamics include *p* and *pp*. A double-headed arrow \leftrightarrow is present.

Example 5.

Not until measure 5 does the sonority reveal itself with any distinctness:

Handwritten musical score for Example 6, consisting of four staves. The notation includes various musical symbols and performance instructions:

- Staff 1:** Treble clef, 2/4 time signature. Measure 5 is marked *tempo*. Measure 6 contains a chord with a '4' above it. Dynamics include *pp* and *p*. A double-headed arrow \leftrightarrow is present.
- Staff 2:** Treble clef, 2/4 time signature. Measure 6 contains a chord with a '4' above it. Dynamics include *pp*. The instruction *am Steg ...* is written above the staff.
- Staff 3:** Bass clef, 2/4 time signature. Measure 6 contains a chord with a '4' above it. Dynamics include *p* and *pp*. A double-headed arrow \leftrightarrow is present.
- Staff 4:** Bass clef, 2/4 time signature. Measure 6 contains a chord with a '4' above it. Dynamics include *p* and *pp*. A double-headed arrow \leftrightarrow is present.

Example 6.

But from measure 6 to 9.2, the sonority recedes behind wisps of melody and pizzicato explosions, while still adhering to these:


The image displays three systems of handwritten musical notation. Each system consists of a treble clef staff and a bass clef staff. The notation includes various notes, rests, and dynamic markings such as *pp*, *p*, *sf*, *f*, *ff*, *stacc*, *arco*, and *pizz*. There are also performance instructions like *am* and *stacc*. The first system includes measure numbers 5, 6, and 7. The second system features large hand-drawn ovals grouping notes across both staves. The third system includes measure numbers 9 and 10. The notation is dense and expressive, with many slurs and accents.

Example 7.

Finally, in the last $1\frac{1}{2}$ measures, the “empty anticipations” felt in the opening measures are “fulfilled” in a highly concentrated manner, with a presentation of two versions of the same sonority:

Example 8.

What shall we think of this? We know, with immediate certainty, that the sheer sound of the Bagatelle is quite different from the sound of Webern’s musical ancestors, even different from Berg’s and Schoenberg’s music, but not so different from other works by Webern. In fact, one can hear the self-quotation, in measures 9 and 10, of the opening to the second movement of his Op. 5, *5 Sätze für Streichquartett*:



Example 9.

But can we also say, with immediate certainty, that we hear this sonority throughout the Bagatelle? It would be more accurate to say, paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty, that we hear *with* it, or *according to* it. Certainly, with the exception of measures 5 and 9.3–10, the essence “sonority” is meant to serve as a sonic background to the flutterings of surface events. Conceivably, it could contribute, on a more explicit level of interpretation, to the problem of self-identity. What has to be further considered is that this type of background, unlike the *Ursatz* of tonal music, is itself highly mobile. In moving in and out of the texture, in creating holes in itself, and in distributing itself throughout the range of any given pitch activity, it brings up the question of distortion and, possibly, self-destruction. But this question was answered long ago by Kandinsky, whose words will form a fitting close to this venture:

Every form is as sensitive as a cloud of smoke. The slightest obvious change in each of its component parts alters it completely; in fact, it is perhaps easier to obtain the same note or harmony by means of various forms than by repetition of the same form. A truly exact repetition cannot be produced. As long as we are susceptible to the composition as a whole, this fact is mainly of theoretical importance. When we perceive a finer and stronger feeling through the use of the abstract forms, which will accept no material interpretation, this fact will gain more in practical significance. On one hand, the problems of art will increase. Yet, at the same time, the abundance of forms will grow, as the quantity and quality of form-expression increase. At the same time, the question of distortion in drawing will automatically be abandoned and replaced by another one of much higher artistic import. How far is the inner appeal of a particular form concealed and how far does it give full expression? This changed viewpoint will lead to further greater possibilities of expression because concealing or veiling plays an enormous part in art. The combination of the veiled and fully expressed will suggest a new possibility of “leit-motifs” in form composition (Kandinsky, 1946, 53).

5. CONCLUSIONS

By no means does the process of constitution end here. Obviously,

the experience of the Bagatelle also includes the remaining Bagatelles of Op. 9, as well as Webern's total output, and ultimately the sedimentations of all music ever heard, all pictures and films ever seen, all books ever read, all people ever met, in short, the infinite web of relationships formed by, and constitutive of, the "I" who has perceived the Bagatelle.

If there is one common element hovering over the constitutive acts of feeling, temporality, synaesthesia, and play, it is the implicit involvement of understanding. In moving from general to particular considerations of essences, the assertions made here already represented an interpretation of, revealed a point of view toward, and a complicity with, the constituted object. But these assertions did not spring up from nowhere. They were grounded in what Heidegger calls a fore-having, a having-in-advance, which means that as analysis moves from the implicitly given to the explicitly expressed it already reveals something "taken together" as well as "taken apart" (cf. Heidegger, 1962, 201). Interpretation does not necessarily impose new structures on the given structure, or replace the latter with some other structure, but simply brings to light the original structure as given by experience in a non-thematic manner. What does this do to the meaning of "truth": in other words, where is the "true" Bagatelle? Let us answer this by reversing the relationship between "truth" and "Bagatelle," by asking not whether, and how, true statements can be asserted of the Bagatelle, but how the Bagatelle reveals the idea of truth. If we do this, we form a picture of truth which is not a matter of propositional tautologies but of a revelation of possibilities. In this way, truth, and philosophy with it, becomes a relevant issue.

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A phenomenological inquiry into the musical imagination: the experience of orchestra conducting

JOSE ARCAYA

INTRODUCTION

TO ANYONE familiar with symphonic orchestras, it is a well-known fact that the conductor is the single most important member of such an ensemble. Over the past several years his publicized image has occasionally been exaggerated to unwarranted extremes. Sometimes his notoriety has even eclipsed the contributions of the instrumentalists themselves. Nevertheless, in spite of all that, orchestra conducting justifiably remains the most challenging artistic task that can be demanded of any musician. A conductor is required to fulfill a great many diverse functions that are not expected of an instrumentalist. He must select and edit music appropriate to the ensemble which he directs and to the audience which hears it, he must be thoroughly knowledgeable about all the music which he conducts, he must properly prepare the orchestra through group and individual rehearsals, and, finally, he must organize and lead his ensemble authoritatively.

At the heart of the conductor's craft, however, lies the most important requirement of his profession—he must be able to imagine how a piece of music would sound before it is played and communicate this inspiration to others. Without this ability of conceptualization and communication, scholarly authoritativeness, personal charisma, or musical versatility will not result in a good musical performance. A defined intent prior to rehearsing the orchestra is absolutely necessary for any significant musical leadership to occur.

To conduct implies to lead, counsel, advise, or otherwise direct. A

well-articulated notion of the music before it is played provides the conductor with a reference and standard of judgment from which to effect this responsibility: critically to shape the real sound along lines that satisfy his musical ideal. Devoid of a personal idea of how the music should be rendered, the conductor is like an object adrift at sea. His leadership is unsteady and his communication unclear. The waxing and waning currents of the immediate sound can easily distract and disorganize the conductor's leadership if he has no conceptual anchor to provide him with a stable musical direction.

In this essay we report on the development of the conductor's musical conception as determined from empirical research based on personal interviews with three conductors. It is a condensed version of a larger study which is still underway. We aim to uncover through this investigation the process by which a conductor goes about realizing a musical idea and then how he communicates this notion to the large number of people under his command. This study is not intended to improve orchestra conductors' techniques or otherwise add to the professional knowledge related to that field. Instead, we investigate conducting in the hope of learning more about the imagination and its relationship to non-verbal language as a general, extra-musical phenomenon. It is our belief that conducting exemplifies much about how perception, language, and consciousness ordinarily operate. Because it requires such a total integration of an individual's faculties and abilities, to understand conducting as it is experienced by the practitioner means to more deeply appreciate the structure of human awareness in general.

We follow the phenomenological approach in our investigation. Basically this requires that our data be descriptive in nature and be understood from the experiencer's perspective. We seek to discover how a conductor experiences his imaginative and perceptual world as he practices his skill.

We organize our paper into four major sections. In the first we review and critique a few representative works on the relation between the musical imagination and conducting. There we also present pertinent philosophical and psychological theories of the imagination. Secondly, we describe our research approach and procedures. A summary of the results is then presented in the form of

a structural description of how a musical idea is conceived and communicated to an ensemble. Finally, we reflect on the implications of our study for the general fields of psychology and musicology.

I. LITERATURE

a) Conducting and the Imagination

There is no dearth of testimony in the conducting literature attesting to the importance of the musical imagination. Erwin Stein, for instance, states the following in his book, *Form and Performance*:

The performer must have a crystal-clear conception of the music he is going to play, a conception which is necessarily in terms of sound. The better he understands the form, the clearer will be his conception. Form and sound must become identical in his mind. He ought to hear distinctly and vividly with his inner ear the exact shape of every passage, the extent of every crescendo, the accentuation of every phrase (Stein, p. 19).

Karl Krueger, in his book about conducting, asserts:

Because the conductor himself determines the essential nature of his tonal image even before it reaches his hands as raw material, he is actually creating his instrument at virtually the same time he is playing on it. Having called forth this tonal image, he proceeds to weave the musical tapestry from it, imparting pulse, direction, and form. This is the true function of the conductor, the end toward which his technique is directed (Krueger, p. 31).

Finally, Benjamin Grosbayne, in his recent textbook for student conductors, states:

As he prepares to rehearse a score, the conductor must achieve a unified and individual concept of the music as a whole and hear in his mind's ear how it will sound eventually under the direction of his baton. If, in the performance, he does not reach his ideal, he can console himself with the knowledge that this difference between projected and actual performance has plagued the greatest conductors (Grosbayne, p. 231).

This kind of commentary is quite common whenever the role of the conductor's imagination and his realization of the music are discussed by musicians. Normally such terms as "inner ear", "tonal image", "mind's ear", or "inner-sound image" are employed to

describe this imaginative process. If we examine the musical literature extensively, we find not only are these terms uncritically used, however, but there are outright contradictions about the role of imagery in a conductor's music-making. No clear understanding seems to be operating when musicians and conductors describe the manner in which the mental conception of the music interacts with the actual performing event. One school of thinking, for instance, claims that the conductor actually hears the music in his "inner ear" prior to it being played by the orchestra. Goldbeck represents this view:

Yet the conductor never dances the 'whole dance'. Or at least he should not. As soon as undergone, the dancing impulse is controlled, taken over by the will, canalized and stylized. He makes only his hands and arms dance—the rest of him being kept on the brink of dancing without yielding to the impulse. The hand's and arm's dance has to fit in with the beating signals, with pointing to a player for a lead-in, or with molding the shape of a double-bass accompaniment. The indispensable element of rapture has to coincide with unwavering attention; the conductor's presence reacting on the spot not only to every detail, foreseen or unforeseen, of the first horn's actual playing, but to every detail of the horn theme's image *heard beforehand by the inner ear* . . . (my emphasis, Goldbeck, p. 174–175).

Others, however, claim that score preparation, rather than providing one with an idealized musical image, endows the conductor with a keener ear. This heightened awareness makes the leader more attentive to the present sound rather than to an imagined one. Henry Wood reflects this position:

I have so often noticed that conductors do not *listen* to the orchestra when directing; they are so absorbed in the act of conducting, score-reading, memorizing, that they forget to listen with a critical ear. Here again I do insist that the preparation and study of the work on hand is the factor that will give you the much-to-be-desired faculty for critical listening (Wood, p. 27).

In this study we desire to unravel this problem—does a conductor first listen to his mental "image" of the piece being performed and then compare this to the real sound which he hears? How do the imagination and perception interact so that he knowledgeably conducts the orchestra? We turn now to theories in psychology and philosophy which address themselves to this issue.

b) Psychology and the imagination

For a long time, especially since the pre-eminence of the Behavioral and neo-Behavioral schools, a problem has existed in psychology regarding the status of mental concepts, private events, and their relationship to empirical research. Since the downfall of Introspectionism as an investigatory methodology, most contemporary experimental psychologists have experienced difficulties in operationalizing the concepts of imagination and imagery. The prevailing positivistic research paradigm has required that any problem-area studied be measurable and subject to public verification. The imagination by its very character, of course, is not accessible to external observation. Therefore, practically no effort has been made by modern psychology to account for and describe its function.

Psychological Abstracts, for instance, the main index of psychology's research literature, gave no separate listing for the imagination prior to 1972. The reader was referred to such areas as "cognition", "intuition", and "thinking" instead. Recently, however, more materials have become available dealing exclusively with this topic. All can be seen to be interesting intellectual exercises attempting to reconcile behavioristic methodologies with what had formerly been a topic inaccessible to investigation.

Segal (1971), to cite a major example, distinguishes between the imagination and perception using a classic experimental design originally devised by Perky (1910). This consisted in seating subjects under a hood, having the appearance of a deep-sea diver's helmet, and asking them to imagine six items successively. Unbeknown to them four of the items were, in fact, projected inside the hood on a small screen. Since the threshold in which these projections occurred were quite minimal, they could not be seen distinctly. The subjects were informed of the trickery and then asked to identify the four objects projected. In another variation of the experiment, the subjects were informed beforehand that four of the six images would be accompanied by actual projections. Again they were asked to identify which ones.

Segal discovered that in the former condition there were only 38% correct "hits" while in the latter 66% were right. Based on this difference as well as other experiments of this type Segal concludes:

The percept is simply the picture we build up of the world about us, but the image, while it depends more on needs, expectancies, and wishes, also is in close interrelationship to the external world. When we have been able to ascertain that a given impression shows adequate correlation with external events to satisfy our current needs, it is conventional to call it a 'perception'. When there is a disturbing lack of correspondence, the impression may be called an illusion, an image, a hallucination, or a dream. So remarkably effective is this decision process that it is commonly regarded as being nearly perfect. In fact, it is only in certain ambiguous situations that the decision is at all difficult to make (Segal, p. 97).

This decision-making theory of perception assumes that no innate difference exists between the structure of the percept and that of an image. Instead, it asserts that all judgments and distinctions regarding the difference between reality and illusion are based upon a subtle, educated-guessing process.

We may wonder, however, about the following: if this guessing procedure is correct, how do people ever determine that a given perception is in fact real (i.e., conforming to an expected state of affairs) unless they use another act of perception to make that determination? If this is the case, then it seems that perception could never be distinguished from illusion since every determination would have to be arbitrated by perception itself. Since it is perception which is in question, this would result in a circular argument wherein the contention is used as its own proof. In fact, Segal himself could never make the bald assertions which he makes in his study without first having the implicit conviction that he knew what was true from what was illusory.

While it is true that perception is highly colored by attitudes, expectations, and assumptions, this is not to say that this is *all* of perception. We know the difference between perceptions, images, and illusions because of how they are experienced spontaneously. Within the conscious act itself is given their difference. We may confuse a tree stump for a squatting man, for instance. Yet this mistake is not the result of a wrong "guess" but of an incomplete perception which is later rectified by another perception. Perception is never experienced as a guessing game even when the perception is mistaken. Segal's theory, in other words, inevitably leads to a solipsistic view of human communication and perception. The philosophical

absurdities associated with such a position are too numerous to detail here.

Haber (1971), on the other hand, maintains that imagery ("icons" in his terminology) constructs the visual field of perception:

Perceivers do not, and cannot, see an entire visual field in a single glance. It takes many glances and we never make enough of them. Much of the visual field is never looked at directly and is never seen in clear vision. Hence, an integrated view of a continuous world that we perceive must be *constructed* out of many glances, and all that we know about the visual world around us is constructed out of the information contained in icons (Harber, p. 47).

His view, not unlike Segal's, is that perception and the imagination are really one and the same phenomenon. They differ only to the degree that one is immediate and is more "true" (perception) than the other. What appears real is merely the synthesis of many iconic units that integrate into a consistent world-view.

Again our objections here are the same as those invoked in Segal's case. This theory would maintain that perception is actually the by-product of an invisible construction process resulting from a mosaic of representational units. However, such a view never explains how this construction, synthesis, integration, or unification is itself achieved without there being *another* act of perception to verify the former's consistency, validity, integration, etc. This theory, like Segal's, presupposes what it asserts. Ultimately perception itself is used as its own validation.

Richards (1969) rejects any investigation dealing with the imagination which does not examine that faculty in terms of explicit imagery:

Mental imagery refers to (1) all those quasisensory or quasi-perceptual experiences of which (2) we are self-consciously aware, and which (3) exist for us in the absence of those stimulus conditions that are known to produce their genuine sensory or perceptual counterparts, and which (4) may be expected to have different consequences from their sensory or perceptual counterparts (Richards, p. 2-3).

He considers the first two criteria to be subjective and the last two objective. This, he believes, allows the latter two to be measured operationally and validated empirically. Based on a thorough review of all the major findings related to imagery and perception, Richards concludes:

Now consciousness of some aspect of the outside world may dawn gradually or it may simply present itself as immediately there. In this latter instance we most frequently employ the term *perception*. In the former the process is closer to that of *problem solving* in which we implicitly or explicitly set up hypotheses and check them (Richards, p. 142).

We find Richards ideas incomplete. While some problem-solving no doubt occurs in the imagination, it is questionable whether the whole process can be reduced to that function alone. In this formulation we believe that Richards misses the most important function of the imagination—its constitutive aspect. We will say more about this later.

Pylyshyn (1973) completely reviews all of the major theories dealing with mental imagery. He rejects each but eclectically selects favorable parts of several to advance his own theory. While his discussion is too involved and technical to be included in this paper, it may be said that it conforms to a computer, information-processing model of the brain. What is of importance for us is that this sophisticated treatment of the imagination dismisses the phenomenon of imagery as being meaningful in its own right. The image and the experience associated with it have “no causal role . . . they remain, at most, a source of ideas suggesting what processes might be required in the model” (Pylyshyn, p. 22). Instead he explains imaginative activity in terms of processes that are “functional” (*ibid*) and invisible to the actor’s consciousness. In short, he gives no importance to the experiential reality of the imagination.

The imagination is certainly an involved activity of consciousness and this Pylyshyn appreciates. However, no matter how technically convoluted its biological workings may be, there is still an undeniable experiential, taken-for-granted, everyday quality about it. This aspect cannot be causally explained away as Pylyshyn would have it. People imagine, symbolize their ideas in emotional images, and conceive of possibilities through them. To dismiss this reality as trivial because imagery plays no “causal” role in the function of the imagination is to overlook an experiential truth because it does not conform to a logical theory. The fact remains that imagery *does* exist and reflects some meaningful activity of consciousness. Although we are in agreement with Pylyshyn that there is more to imagination

than mere images, we nevertheless question whether the image phenomenon can be so easily ignored. Perhaps an examination of philosophy might clarify some of these issues further.

c) Philosophy and the imagination

Probably the most renowned account distinguishing imagination and perception is that of David Hume in his *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739). In this work he described ideas (images) in terms of faintness and impressions (perception) in terms of intense vividness. He regarded images as exact copies of perceptions which could be recombined to construct new schemas of understanding.

Yet, as has often been observed (c.f. Sartre, 1962), if Hume were correct then low threshold perceptions could be confused with images. While Segal (1971) showed that this was possible, it occurred only under artificial laboratory conditions. If imagination and perception in everyday experience were distinguishable only along a quantitative dimension, no certain distinction could ever be made between reality and illusion.

More recent philosophers like psychologists, have despaired of even attempting to make any valid statements about the imagination because of its private nature. Ryle (1964), for instance, discounts the possibility of any worthwhile investigation into this topic by claiming that "mental images do not exist" (Ryle, p. 129) since they are not subject to public confirmation. R. G. Collingwood (1925), in a similar vein, states that the imagination is "indifferent to identity of the Real and its opposite" (Collingwood, p. 13-14). Like Ryle, Collingwood deems inquiry into the imagination meaningless because no way exists to validate the truth of statements made about it.

J. P. Sartre (1962, 1966) more positively conceives of the imagination and its associated imagery in terms of the *relationship* of consciousness with the world:

The word image can therefore only indicate the relationship of consciousness to the object; in other words, it means a certain manner in which the object makes its appearance to consciousness, or, if one prefers, a certain way in which consciousness presents an object to itself (Sartre, 1966, p. 7).

Expressed differently, the image is not an entity in consciousness. Rather it is a certain "type of consciousness . . . an act . . . a consciousness of some thing" (Sartre, 1962, p. 146).

This formulation of the imagination we believe is more adequate than the notions previously presented. Sartre recognizes that the imaginative experience involves not merely a portion of consciousness which imagines. Rather it is the whole of consciousness acting in the mode of an image. Unfortunately, Sartre distorts this insight to suit his own ontology. Since an image is spontaneously produced, it is not subject to the restraints of reality. We can imagine non-existent objects, absent ones, or impossible situations. In each case, according to Sartre, we "nihilate" (Sartre, 1966, p. 236) reality through the imaginative act. That is, we can create the opposite of what is true. This being the case, Sartre adds that through the imagination men "realize their freedom" (Sartre, 1966, p. 243). In this manner he bifurcates consciousness into the spheres of the real and unreal—perceptual consciousness and imaginative consciousness—without making it clear as to how both are part of the same awareness.

Heidegger (1962) presents a fuller conception of the imagination following Kant's insights in the first edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason*. There Kant was led to the startling conclusion that the imagination is the founding root of understanding (i.e., the categories of reason) and sensibility (i.e., perception). As such Kant's Transcendental Imagination was the source of temporality and, ultimately, truth itself. According to Heidegger, this insight filled Kant "with alarm" (Heidegger, p. 127). He could not find a stable ground upon which to build his ontology. His fear that a rampant relativism would destroy all metaphysical philosophy forced him to alter his initial formulations in the second edition of the *Critique*. Kant replaced the imagination with pure reason as the agent of temporal and experiential synthesis. Between the publication of the first and the second editions of the *Critique*, asserts Heidegger, Kant "came more and more under the influence of pure reason as such" (Heidegger, p. 173).

Heidegger extends Kant's findings by postulating that it is the Transcendental Imagination which "is capable of forming and

sustaining the unity and primordial totality of the specific finitude of the human subject" (Heidegger, p. 192). Stated more simply, it is Heidegger's contention that the imagination is consciousness in the act of constituting reality. This act of constitution, of course, is not the same type as discussed by Harber (1971). Heidegger is not saying that we build reality from blocks of cognitive images. Rather, he is pointing to the fact that the imagination synthesizes the perceptual stream of experience as a meaningful whole. We do not have scattered, isolated perceptions, we have an integrated *gestalt* of the world. This integration, however, it is not the "glueing" of bits of perception together. Nor is it even "problem-solving" behavior (Richards, 1969) or a "decision process" (Segal, 1971). Instead, the imagination functions in advance of any particular perception creating the framework and horizon in which any meaning is apprehended. According to Heidegger, it is the origin of *time* itself. Obviously the implications of such an assertion are quite profound. Rather than extending this discussion of Heidegger's ideas further, however, let us simply note that his ontological assumptions are entirely different than any of the previous theorists. He situates imaginative activity at the center of human existence itself.

While the preceding views of the imagination discuss its functioning in diverse ways, they all fail to describe its operation *vis a vis* the embodied state. Each tends to speak of the imagination as a purely mental faculty rather than a total operation which includes the functioning of the perceiving body.

In considering the musical imagination of the conductor, this view is clearly inadequate. As the orchestra's leader, his imaginative conception interplays with his perception, gestures, and memory. When considered holistically, more than the simple lying-side-by-side of mental and physical faculties is at work in conducting. In some sense, we might depict the conductor's imagination as not dwelling inside his mind, but as living actively in his body. For this reason we have investigated the imagination as an embodied phenomenon; as it is lived by conductors.

II. METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

Three conductors were interviewed at length about their preparation of a musical score. Conductor A was assistant to one of the country's major orchestras. Conductor B directed three community ensembles and was himself the principal teacher of student conductors at a large university. Conductor C, although younger and less experienced, was assistant conductor for several years to a well-established community orchestra and was the principal conductor of his own, recently-formed orchestra.

All of the interviews were spontaneously obtained but in each questions relating to the phenomenon under investigation were asked: how does a conductor realize a musical score so that he has a concept of what he wants from his ensemble and how does this conception appear in fact during the actual rehearsal-performance process? Inquiries pertaining to this central question were formulated in various ways throughout the course of the interviews. All of these conversations were taped and then transcribed to serve as a permanent record. This data was then analyzed in the following way: (1) the transcripts were repeatedly read over and over to get a general sense of the conductor's experience in regard to our phenomenon; (2) following the phenomenological approach, we then laid aside our presuppositions regarding the meaning of the data (i.e., we "bracketed" our prejudices) and from this naive attitude abstracted any quotations which pertained to our phenomenon; (3) these ideas were condensed into general themes which directly revealed information regarding our question; (4) we further condensed all of the themes into an overall structure which contained all of the principal insights gleaned in steps 2 and 3; (5) we repeatedly read over the structure in dialogue with the original transcripts, quotations, themes, and the phenomenon to see if it captured the essential points common to all. Throughout this last step we attempted to discern any horizontal, virtual, or implied meanings that might have been present in the data but not directly stated. Satisfied that both the actual and implied significances of the data were captured by the structure, we presented it as our finding.

III. FINDINGS

a) Themes

1) Conductors typify the music they are to conduct in terms of styles, compositional devices, and the historical context of the music.

2) Typifications aid the conductor in memorizing or otherwise becoming thoroughly familiar with the composition. This involves knowing the principal melodies and instruments which play them.

3) A conductor makes implicit sense of the piece in terms of how it relates with his own emotional life and feelings.

4) The experienced conductor is unlikely to memorize his gestures prior to conducting the piece. While he may rehearse certain of his movements and tempos in order that a smooth transition may occur from one musical moment to the next, in the actual conducting he takes his gestures for granted, knowing that they will be available to him when they are needed.

5) A conductor gauges his expectations of the imagined sound in dialogue with either the instrumentalists who are to actually play for him or ensembles who he has heard before.

6) When conducting, the conductor is not listening simultaneously to an imagined version of the music and to the actually-heard sound at the same time. Instead his attention is focused on the real, presently-heard sound. It is from within that context that he decides whether it is satisfactory or not.

7) In the act of conducting the conductor is horizontally aware of what is about to come from the *now* sound which he hears. Each note implies an array of succeeding and preceding notes. The *now* sound is a virtual summary of the music as it has unfolded to that point. Moreover, it is also an indication of where the sound is going, given its past context.

8) The conductor intends the whole of the composition while he conducts. He is constantly situating what he presently hears in terms of that background. Therefore it is possible that his rhythm, dynamics, and pauses will be inconsistent. His concern is how these fit into the architectonic structure of the composition rather than how

they sound in themselves. The whole is always horizontally present in the *now* sound.

9) While he conducts, the conductor normally does not deliberately order his body to respond, gesture, or express itself in any particular way. Instead he finds that this occurs automatically and without conscious control. His body responds to the *now* sound in a way that is both appropriate and mysterious to his reflective awareness.

10) The conductor's gestures are in part a specialized language acquired through training, in part everyday mannerisms that are pre-reflectively employed to serve the spontaneous need-situation.

11) A conductor's gestures are always serving the future needs of the music. They function to prepare the instrumentalists for what is about to come.

12) A conductor's musical concept changes over the rehearsals as he interacts with the personalities, capabilities, and overall make-up of his ensemble. While he conducts, he has learned to expect particular levels of performance from his players. This alters spontaneously his initial, unrehearsed conception of the music.

b) Structure

When a conductor approaches a composition he is to conduct, he involves himself in a prolonged study of its formal structure. He obtains an understanding of the piece through a process of musical typification. Here he draws from extensive musical training to conceptualize the sound in terms of its style, compositional structure, and historical context of the music. He makes sense of the music through traditional modes of conceptualization that give him an initial, global comprehension of the sound and situate his duties in terms of more or less stable guidelines. However, the conductor modifies the sedimented approaches to the music in light of his own temperament and feeling-states. He implicitly subjects his global understanding to a dialogue with his own personality style and personal history. It is the integration of these two demands, the typified expectations of how the music should sound and the conductor's own personal history, which create the beginnings of the conductor's musical conception. This is further modified in accord

with the actual playing situation in which he is to perform (e.g., the concert hall, the other repertoire, the concert data, etc.) and the temperaments and capacities of his players.

From his extensive study of the score, the conductor minimally learns the major sections of the music and which instruments are to play these. While he is able to reproduce these sections spontaneously, in the actual conducting situation he does not focus on any independently-conceived musical sound. Instead he is aware of the *now*-sound, the immediately-heard music. The horizontal quality of these notes, which contextualize the present sound in terms of what has preceded and what will come, automatically call forth preparatory gestures from his body. These gestures are not generally self-consciously chosen. Rather they flow spontaneously from an embodied repertoire of technical and everyday mannerisms which the conductor has mastered in the course of his life and training. Confident of his musical abilities, the conductor attends to the immediately-heard sound rather than to the motions of his body as he conducts. If he is sincere in his intent to guide and be of service to the musicians while they perform the music, the conductor attends to the just-about-to-be-heard aspects of the piece. His gestures follow from this perception in order to warn the musicians of how the coming sections should be played. Since he is interested in the overall shape and impact of the music, he may spontaneously alter and modify his non-verbal instructions to the orchestra so that the immediate sound conforms to the larger architectonic musical conception. The kind of gestures with which he communicates, with its particular insistency, size, and nuance will depend of the particular individuals to which it is addressed. It will reflect his history with them as personalities and musicians.

IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Several interesting implications for psychology and musicology exist in the study. First, the manner in which the imagination operates in this profession is as a *selective hearing*. Contrary to some reports (Goldbeck, op. cit.) the conductor does not imagine the sound which he conducts prior to actually hearing it with his ears.

Rather, his prolonged study has sensitized his perception to listen for particular musical features in the context of the notes themselves. This, of course, is not a bald act of hearing as implied by some (Wood, *op. cit.*) but an enriched or educated apprehension that seeks to uncover and encourage certain portentialities inherent in the musical sound immediately heard. All this suggests that the image is not thematic in the imagination. Rather than appearing as figural to awareness, the imaginative process remains in the background of perception, integrating, organizing, and sensitizing awareness to particular possibilities.

Secondly, the conductor's gestures and his imaginative concept are intimately associated to the point that the former cannot be described as emanating from the latter's directives. The body, again due to extensive training and familiarity with certain technical movements, acts to maintain, alter, or emphasize the immediate sound spontaneously. The conductor's gestures, like a speaker's words, are not deliberately chosen to produce a certain effect. Rather, because the conductor is at the level of the musical idea, his gestures respond to the call of the musical situation. A conductor is musical in that his body responds in harmony and rhythm of the sound, in that the music has been typified in his movements and postures. He possesses a system of specialized bodily powers (*c.f.*, Merleau-Ponty, 1962) which sympathetically reflect the music's character through his movements in space. He communicates *welt* to his ensemble when his movements comfortably convey the music in an automatic, non-reflective manner.

Thirdly, the conductor depends very heavily on already-constituted understandings of the music. A "pre-knowledge" (Schutz, p. 168) of the music is present in all the conductor's interaction with the composition. Around the socially-approved, taken-for-granted schemas of understanding (e.g., classical compositions are conducted lightly, Romantic music is treated with deep feelings, Modern music is rendered precisely with efficient aloofness, etc.), fashions his concept of the music according to his unique personal history and emotional temperament. Rather than constraining him to produce impersonal renditions of the music, typifications allow the conductor to realize his own uniqueness in the music through the shared

meanings which they universally communicate to all musically-knowledgeable audiences. He uses the sedimented approaches to musical interpretation to assert his own personality by the way in which he imaginatively alters and arranges these components. Hence a Beethoven symphony may express the temperaments of a reserved scholar, an impassioned romantic, or a rebellious iconoclast without ever once having its formal structure deformed (i.e., having its universally accepted ranges of tempos, dynamics, length of pauses preserved). The compatible integration of the music's formal structure with the personal life of the conductor is the feat of a creative imagination.

Finally, the conductor's imagination cannot be appreciated as merely a personal construction of reality. His private concept of the music is always in dialogue with the social world. It is his searching of possibilities within the actually-rendered sound by a community of people. Contrary to Segal's (1971) and Harber's (1971) view that the imagination is merely a *re*-presentation of absent reality, we have found that nothing is represented by the imagination. Rather it is an opening-up of possibilities within an actual perception. Since this perceiving situation always involves the larger domain of the social world explicitly or implicitly, to imagine is not to be absent from the world but to be with it virtually, invisibly, or in possibility. Imagination, in other words, does not remove us from other people but makes us present to them through another perspective.

No conductor, for instance, has simply a free-floating musical conception swimming in his head. Rather, he has music ideas in relationship to a group that he is about to conduct, could possibly conduct, or may never conduct but which, nevertheless, possesses select attributes of ensembles which he has heard in the past. His image of that music occurs in the context of the physiognomy, character, make-up, or emotional atmosphere of the present situation in which he finds himself while he images. The imagination, in other words, is always grounded in the real world.

This brief sketch dealing with the experience of orchestra conductors is undoubtedly incomplete. The next stage of our investigation will examine the obverse perspective of this phenomenon: the instrumentalists' views of the conductor's behavior. We have

presented these preliminary findings in the hope that our investigation may intrigue and stimulate future thinking with regard to the imagination and that others may be moved to apply a qualitative method of research to human phenomena as they are experienced. It is time that experience be accorded respect by science. It is time that our awareness of it be awakened.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances and contemporary music

RITA LAPLANTE RAFFMAN

THE PRESENT disorganized state of musical culture is the result of that view of things which holds that if a thing is called by a name, in this case, music, it must have something in common with all the other things called by that name. Listeners and critics, hearing a new work, search for that something and, when they don't find it, conclude that what they are listening to is not music.

Ludwig Wittgenstein offers a different point of view:

Is am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which make us use the same word for all but that they are related to one another in many different ways¹. . . I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances'.²

Reminding us that, in a family, one member will have brown hair like one brother or sister, blue eyes like another, and be left-handed like yet another, Wittgenstein points out that a series of relationships of height, health, hair color, left-handedness or what-have-you relates each member of the family to all the others without there being any one thing which all the members of the family share.

What would happen if, upon exposure to a new musical work, we adopted a family-resemblance outlook and searched for over-lapping threads of similarities rather than for a common element shared by all music?

To dramatize the possibilities inherent in the adoption of a Wittgensteinian attitude, I plan to follow the critical process as it would operate in the presence of a work which has been refused the name music by most critics and listeners. We have all met people who did not, at first or even second glance, look like their brothers

or sisters and whose family-resemblances became apparent only upon further examination. So, too, similarities between our orphan and more traditional musical works will manifest themselves as we compare them, all within the context of the categories usually encountered in an analysis of music.

SOUND

The work I have chosen to examine, *4'33"* by John Cage, consists of 4 minutes and 33 seconds of silence observed by a pianist or string quartet who are poised to play but do not. The musicians produce absolutely no musical sounds, but Cage expects, and counts on, the occurrence of accidental sounds from either, or both, the audience and the musicians.

Most people would claim sound as the *sine qua non* of music; is it any wonder, then, that the man-in-the-street, and just about everyone else, insists that this so-called Silent Sonata is not music? It certainly doesn't resemble, in terms of sound, any of the thousands of works we know as music.

If, however, we examine the work more closely, certain similarities become apparent, certain correspondences come to mind. Sounds and silences are components of the Beethoven Fifth Symphony and they are components of the Cage. The emphasis is different, obviously; the silences stop the flow of sounds in the Beethoven while the accidental sounds stop the flow of silence in the Cage. It is true that there are no so-called musical sounds and that those sounds that do occur are accidental, chance, the very opposite of the meticulously planned and scored harmonies of the Beethoven; nevertheless, those fortuitous pristine sounds rivet our attention and force us to attend to them. It shouldn't be surprising that the composers of today, having at their disposal the almost limitless possibilities of sound available through electronic devices, should refuse to be bound by the traditional acoustical system of pitch-relationships found in music like the Beethoven Fifth or that they should delight, out of ennui with systems of any kind, in the unplanned, uncertain, and unforeseen.

RHYTHM

Rhythm described as measured movement is not pertinent to the Cage. Accidental sounds *do* come at different times, but there is no plan or regularity involved in it; we must look for other kinds of temporal similarities to the Beethoven and other works.

Although it might seem that under these aleatory conditions there would be no experience of movement, no sense of duration, such is not the case; change and motion are terms that are pertinent to both the Cage and the Beethoven, although admittedly in a different way. In the Beethoven, the flow of time is experienced through the harmonic, melodic, and rhythmic elements of a formal progression towards the recapitulation and beyond; in the Cage, by the anticipation we experience as we wait for something to occur, for the silence to be interrupted. In fact, the experience of the passage of time, of duration, is more intense in the Cage because, although we focus on the momentary experience of sound or silence without making any connections between one occurrence and another, the very concreteness of each atomic fact dramatizes the alteration and, therefore, the movement, of sounds and silences.

Both Beethoven and Cage encapsulated a period of time. The development of his idea is all-important to Beethoven, not the amount of time it takes to play the work. His time-frame is all-important to Cage, along with the contingent and always-different sounds which might, or might not, occur during 4 minutes and 33 seconds. Beethoven carefully specified the contents of his time-capsule, Cage left much of his to chance. *Vive la différence!*

MEMORY-EXPECTATION

The role of memory is central in the hearing of traditional music. What is its role, if any, in the Cage *Silent Sonata*?

When we listen to the Beethoven Fifth Symphony, the work unfolds for us as expectations are built up and fulfilled, or not fulfilled, in a progression where memory is the shaper and catalyst. In the Cage, memory in this sense is not involved, since there are no

sounds to be remembered and gathered together, no musical expectations to be fulfilled or not. However, expectation in the sense of waiting for something to happen is definitely active, especially since the musicians are poised as if to play and we know only at the end (at least on first hearing) whether or not this expectation will have been fulfilled. However, this expectation does not come as the result of musical evolution but is the psychological concomitant of the situational context prepared by the composer.

The other side of the coin of expectation, the surprise element, is omnipresent since every occurrence is unexpected although some, like coughing, chairs scraping, or strings breaking (if being undertaken by a string quartet), would be more likely to occur than others. Sounds from the musical instruments, which would seem to be the most likely, are the very sounds that are not heard. Our expectations would therefore be frustrated on all sides and all occurrences would be surprises in a topsy-turvy world.

Certain it is that in terms of memory and expectation any resemblance between the Cage and more traditional works would be those of a third cousin, if any.

FORM

The form of the Cage is definitely not that of the Beethoven but we should not say that it has no form because of that. Historically, the relationship of one occurrence to another over time, both over the short and the long haul, was thought to lie at the heart of music; we have only to listen to the Beethoven to realize that. But why should we expect that the form of a piece which removes the individual sound from any musical context resemble that of a piece where every sound grows out of, and is dependent on, other sounds?

Whenever a composer separates off a segment of time with a beginning and an end, squaring it off, delimiting, he is forming, structuring, organizing. Cage says: "The principle of form will be our only constant connection with the past."³

RULES

To hear some people talk, Cage's music is anarchy. How, they say, can you claim of a stretch of silence, or accidental sounds, that it has any remote connection with rules?

I think we would all admit that Cage doesn't follow the same rules Beethoven did, but that doesn't mean he doesn't follow any rules. Cage works as composers have always worked, but, unlike traditional composers who are satisfied to operate within the framework of rules handed down to them, he uses these rules as a structure *against* which he plays, in turn building a new set of presuppositions.

The Greeks inferred *their* rules from the physical nature of sound; Beethoven wrote within the context of the tonal system; the 12-tone system was a reaction against the rules of the diatonic system. When Schoenberg taught the rules of his new system to his students, they accepted them and worked with them. Cage's followers accept *his* presuppositions in the same way Schoenberg's disciples followed their master. Why is it that when Cage states that "any sound may occur in any combination and in any continuity"⁴ he's supposed to be advocating chaos? He's being creative! Just as much as any other composer, Cage is helping to define music.

ORDER

Rules produce order. The people who maintain that Cage's Silent Sonata is not music would laugh if you suggested that it manifests order. They would also undoubtedly allege that any haphazard 4 minutes and 33 seconds of silence is as much a piece of music as Cage's work.

Anything haphazard is not a work of art—that is a contradiction in terms. An art-work implies a certain way of thinking on the part of the creator and a certain way of attending on the part of the auditor or viewer. Cage has ordered every parameter of his creation strictly; the piece last 4 minutes and 33 seconds, no more, no less. Although the musicians do not play, they must be ready and poised to do so. Although there are no planned sounds, they are planned

for; it is not a contradiction to say that a very specific intention can include indeterminacy. The very fact that the composer set this slice of time apart, thoughtfully arranged it, specifying some of its constituents and leaving others indeterminate, manifests that search for order which is part of what Wittgenstein calls the human form of life. Whether it consists of Cage's isolated sounds and silences or the large complex interrelations of tone and chords of a Beethoven Symphony, music is, as Stravinsky puts it, "putting into order certain relationships."⁵

COMPOSER'S INTENTION

Putting things in order necessarily implies an intention; yet some people claim that Cage abdicates the role of composer when he refuses to choose pitches, chords, rhythms, timbres, etc., when he leaves so many aspects of his work to chance. Although it may not seem that way at first glance, Cage made many choices; he chose not to write in a traditional system (that took a lot of courage); he specified the length of his work (that's his form-equivalent); he selected the instruments to be used (or, rather, not to be used); he decided on the number of performers; he assumed that accidental sounds would occur at some time during the 4 minutes and 33 seconds of silence.

Admittedly this manner of proceeding is not that of a Beethoven who, in selecting the form in which he would couch his musical ideas, the tonalities, chords and rhythms he would use in developing those ideas, his melodies and the transformations they would undergo, the size and make-up of his orchestra, and so forth, followed the procedures which were the accepted criteria of his day.

But what of it? If a composer decides to include no planned sounds, isn't he making a choice? If he elects not to clothe his ideas in traditional garb, isn't he just replacing one method of organization with another? Isn't he giving the lie to those who would deny him the name composer?

REPRISE

John Cage took silence, which is an important part of traditional

music, and made it the foundation for his piece, the aspect of the world that he wants us to attend to, in order that we might be all the more sensitive to the unexpected, non-musical sounds contributed by the environment. He wants us to focus on this charged silence in the midst of which sounds fall like pearls. Isn't that a proper attitude for a composer?

John Cage is defining music just as much as Beethoven ever did. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, music is the totality of all musics of the past, the present, and those musics that will be written in the future. As listeners to music, we are partners in the process of establishing the viability of one after another of these musics. Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances can help us assume a positive rather than a negative attitude in this important venture. He shows us the way when he says:

What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression. I show that it has kinds of uses of which you had not dreamed. In philosophy one feels *forced* to look at a concept in a certain way. What I do is suggest, or even invent, other ways of looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought. You thought that there was one possibility, or only two at most. But I made you think of others. Furthermore, I made you see that it was absurd to expect the concept to conform to those narrow possibilities. Thus your mental cramp is relieved, and you are free to look around the field of use of an expression and to describe the different kinds of uses of it."⁶

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1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953, No. 65.
2. *Ibid.*, No. 67.
3. Quoted by K. L. Roy in *The Strange and Sonic World of John Cage*: HiFi/Stereo, Nov. 1960, p. 64.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Igor Stravinsky, *Poetics of Music*, New York: Vintage Books, 1947, p. 52.
6. Quoted by Norman Malcolm in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1972, p. 50.

Music theory and the history of ideas

F. J. SMITH

AN ANALYSIS of “thinking” when applied to theory, including musical theory, must include a philosophico-musical examination of the classic Cartesian *cogito* (“I think, and thus I am”). Descartes, of course, is important for music history and theory as well as for philosophy as such. It is not sufficiently well realized that his *Les Passions de l'Âme* (1649) as well as the *Compendium Musicae* (1650) are significant for the theory-of-affects in the Baroque era—and certain modern concepts. His influence on M. Mersenne was particularly crucial. (The present writer will be forgiven for recalling that Mersenne seems to have been the first one to mention the *Speculum Musicae* in modern times in his work, *Des Consonances* [1635].) Perhaps even more noteworthy is the fact that J. P. Rameau followed Descartes in attempting to give music a rational base, in fact, a mathematical one. It is for this reason that the restoration of Rameau in the last century is such an anomaly; for, in philosophy Descartes had already long since been superseded by Kant, who in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* had given the now classic criticism of Descartes’ “problematic idealism”. Kant himself has been dealt with in depth in our century by both Husserl and Heidegger. The problem of the Cartesian *cogito* is thus at the very heart of philosophico-musical theory. It is in this mainstream of western thought and the history of ideas that music theory needs to be re-examined and restored to relevance. Accordingly, this essay will delineate the break with the classic interpretation of the *cogito*, outline the “bodily logos” underlying the phenomenological interpretation, underscore its relevance to musical thought, especially in regard to the difficult problem of mind vs. thing, and, finally, point to a purely musical

rendition of the *cogito* as an “Audiendo cogito ergo sum” (“In hearing I think, and thus I am”). This phenomenological “inhearing” will be seen as a crucial part of any *cogito*. Since musical “thought” is not abstract, as in classic philosophical theory, it is viewed phenomenologically as central to bodily awareness in bridging the traditional dichotomy of mind and body.

It is a truism that Edmund Husserl emphasized the *cogito* of the “Cogito ergo sum”, “I think and thus I am”, while Martin Heidegger was preoccupied with the *sum*. In other words, Husserl concentrated on the flux of consciousness in the human subject, thus overcoming the Cartesian mathematicizing of musical consciousness, while Heidegger contented himself to address the subject from his entrenched position in the question of being, thus from ontology, without truly developing a theory of subjective awareness, so important for any theory of musical experience. And yet this does not connote that Heidegger’s interpretation of the *cogito* ignores the subjective moment in favor of the ontological. Indeed, despite the risks entailed in any ontology within phenomenology—thus the risk of being preoccupied with “being” to the detriment of experiential awareness—Heidegger’s involvement with the question of being, and by implication with musical being, is not as prejudicial to the theme of the subject’s consciousness as loyal Husserlians often state.

Granted that being can be made thematic even within Husserlian phenomenology—and in fact Husserl has apparently developed a more varied and subtle range of ontologies than Heidegger—Heidegger’s existential interpretations of the *cogito* are something new and original. That there were misunderstandings between master and student is in a sense beside the point. A full phenomenology of musical consciousness and thought would have to take in all major figures in the history of phenomenology. What needs to be stressed here is that the implications of phenomenological thinking go beyond in-house relevance and that both Husserl and Heidegger had an essential interest in music. As pointed out elsewhere, musical sound was in fact a model for Husserl in his development of time consciousness. His thought is thus directly relevant to an analysis of the musical experience. But though his interest in music is more peripheral, Heidegger, too, can be useful in abetting a phenomenol-

ogy of the musical experience, in this case of an analysis of the musical *cogito*, as this essay will try to demonstrate.

For the musicologist all theory must perforce be viewed in its concrete historical setting. Lack of such historical critique led last century's theorists into the uncritical resurrection of pre-Kantian rationalism in focusing on Rameau *redux*. Similarly, an insistence on the major figures of this century's philosophy, viz., Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, again underscores the fact that the philosophical and musical *cogito* cannot be considered outside its historical context, even though this is done at the risk of a kind of "objectification" of the *subject*, as thinking.

I. THE BREAK-THROUGH OUT OF THE TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE COGITO

While making use of Heideggerian insights in this interpretation, we present by no means only a doxographical or expository study of the subject. Instead we will attempt to describe the ontology of *cogito* in creative manner, but relying on a good many of especially Heidegger's insights into the matter. But this is not done to the exclusion of others. In accord with Heidegger and a number of other contemporary thinkers the usual picture of the *cogito* is at best a bad philosophical novel. For the *cogito* has very little to do with a theory of knowledge, with skepticism or a merely subjective thinking. Rather, the *cogito* emerges in a discussion on first philosophy in Descartes' *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*. It is thus a metaphysical rather than an epistemological situation, based on a *mathesis universalis* rather than on any universal "doubt" in a skeptical sense. Thus "mathematical" clarity not universal skepticism was the goal. Descartes' "doubting" was in effect a re-examining of the metaphysical foundations of thinking. It is therefore not a question of establishing one's existence because one cannot deny thought itself.

Since the entire thrust of Descartes' "doubting" was to establish a universal clarity, his *mathesis universalis* becomes the basis for a wholly new approach to metaphysics. (We leave in abeyance the Husserlian critique of the failure of the initial epoché in Descartes' philosophy

and the resultant wreckage which emerges in the history of philosophy as the Cartesian “dualism”, so treated even by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*.) This “mathematics” was to have been the standard and grounding of all thought, and thus Descartes set up rules for thinking in his *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*. It is for this reason that method became all important. Method is no longer simply an abstract process but rather a procedure in which the subject “makes” objects. Method is not mere procedure but the very ground from out of which and upon which we begin to know what can become an object for us, and how it becomes an object. The entire method “consists in order and disposition” and the reduction of the obscure to the simple by means of clear intuition. *Scientia universalis* is not attained in any other way than by deducing from this basis whatever can be clearly intuited.

This is therefore not a psychological situation but rather the attempt to re-ground metaphysics in “mathematics”, i.e. on a new philosophy of number. Such attempts are to be found, of course, before Descartes. In the hitherto unanalysed *Speculum Musicae* (1330–40), for example, Jacques de Liège wrote that the object of traditional metaphysics was not just being as being (*ens qua ens*), as it is usually presented in our manuals of history, but numbered being (*ens numeratum*). Number is thus recognized as the basis of the question of being, a number which in turn is based on *mundus*, understood in pre-Copernican context as a *world* centered upon man and universally intelligible by man’s reason. Now Descartes tried again to found metaphysics, i.e. to rediscover its ground in *mathesis*, in order to give knowledge a more solid foundation. This is not being “subjective” but is the “objective” grounding of the *subject thinking*, even as the “objective” world depends on the subject as ground. The mistake Descartes made was to put this grounded subject in what Merleau Ponty calls the *monde-en-idee*, i.e., an ideational world. The Cartesian *cogito* is thus truly metaphysical in a traditional pre-Kantian sense, for it is but a *cogito pensé*, a thought-*cogito*, rather than one grounded in-the-world and on-the-earth.

Since for Descartes the grounding of things is the task of the *res cogitans* or “thinking-thing”, i.e., the human subject, axioms and assertions are important. Things are regarded not in their bodily

situation for themselves but only in the light of clear and distinct concepts and assertions about them. The assertion rests on mathesis. The assertive statement is grounded in the subject, *as* thinking, and the subject grounds itself upon an “objective” philosophy of number. The subject-thinking is the fundamental or the “ground-statement” itself. But this does not mean that the subject is “subjective”. When I make a statement, “I think”, it is not meant as a premise leading to the conclusion that “*therefore*, I am”. Rather, the *cogito* has little to do with existence or nonexistence. Instead it seems to mean that I posit or “set” myself intellectually. And this “primary and most certain of all statements” is a self-stating statement, a self-positing, a “proposition” that results from such a metaphysical positing. I state myself: I set or posit myself before myself and thus I come to “be”. Hence being is not the conclusion to a logical argument; it is the intellectual ground and not the result of thought. Being, conceived intellectually (rather than phenomenologically) by Descartes, is therefore the sub-ject or ground-of-thinking. In accordance with this, the translation of *cogito ergo sum* is not “I think, and *therefore* I am”, but rather, “I *am*, as thinking”, i.e., I am when I state or posit myself as the ground or subject of my own being.

The ground-statement, “I posit myself”, is a rational ingathering of self and thus a *res cogitans*, or “thinking-thing,” is a “reason-thing,” thinking. *Cogito* means: I think rationally and thus ground my own being, securing myself inwardly. In order to ground my being on clear and distinct thought-concepts I must not find myself in contradiction. The predicate must not say anything against the subject, since the subject is ground; and an assertion based on the grounding subject cannot go against itself. Thus the axiomatic principle of contradiction, which is not logical but metaphysical or onto-logical.

While the attempt to re-ground metaphysics was necessary, our modern objection to Descartes, and thus by direct implication to Rameau and his latter day followers, is not that he was simply a skeptic or a subjectivist, but rather that he founded subjectivity—the basis for general and particularly musical experience—on abstract reason, rather than in an experience-based matrix. Traditional reason, even though made possible by an experiential *logos*,

is a departure from the primordially of the structure of experience, i.e., the bodily logos. And thus, though the Cartesian *cogito* is ontological rather than either logical or psychological, it is not yet founded on a fully human logos, i.e., an experiential structure. For, the Cartesian *res cogitans* is quite separate from the *res corporea*, i.e., the body, thus perpetuating the classic dichotomy between mind/soul and body, departing to that extent from the unitary experiential structure of the human logos. And this, despite Descartes' assurances that the "soul" is not merely a pilot in a ship but is somehow confusedly one with body.

The Cartesian *cogito* is at best an "embodied" thought, and in this sense the *res*-philosophy of Descartes is not wholly unlike traditional metaphysical realism. Any being in-the-world is indirect in such thinking. For though Descartes speaks of *res*, as thing, it is the mind or soul which is the "true me", as thinking thing. Body, as corporeal thing, is what situates me in a world of objects, for it is body as extended and as capable of locomotion that places me in the *res extensa*, the external world. Thus the "true me" is only indirectly in-the-world and is in a real sense quite worldless. The ego is self-incapsulated. It is solipsistic (*solus ipse*), surrounded by a world of objects with which it has real contact only through despised body. It is for this very reason that it must reach out intellectually in order to make the metaphysical escape from solipsism, which is at the heart of this "first philosophy". Instead of emerging out of world, our natural self posits itself from out a worldless *monde-en-ideé*. And from here it reaches out to the extended outside world via "corporality." But such being *in* the world-of-idea means being *out* of phenomenological world, as such, since "idea" is a metaphysical abstraction, something speculative reason abstracts from the concreteness of reality. And thus it is necessary for me to reach out *into* world, to perceive it intellectually, to force the dark and the obscure into the metaphysical forms of distinctness and clarity.

In addition, the whole structure rests on a theological basis, though it is possible to dispute this. It is possible that in grounding his thought in a metaphysical mathesis Descartes "brackets" the theological presuppositions. Yet whatever subtleties lie between the lines, it seems clear that—overtly at least—Descartes postulates the

deity to hold together soul and body, thus guaranteeing my being also in the outside extended world by means of corporality (*res corporea*). The foundation of such *res*-philosophizing is *substance*—which God is only analogously. Now substance is a thing “which so exists that it needs no other thing to exist”. Yet substance as such is inaccessible. Substantial being cannot really affect us; it is unknown and not a real predicate of the subject. Here we see how Cartesian philosophy is wholly abstract. Existential being lies hidden and covered over beneath this system of Descartes, even as it purports to be a “first philosophy”. And once more we can see, with Heidegger, that a theologian cannot ask the fundamental question concerning ontological being.

Descartes' *cogito* means “I perceive or have an idea”. To perceive thus means to *set* something *before* me, i.e. to re-present something to myself. I make it secure and thus “found” my own certitude; I must do this, if I start from such a metaphysical solipsism as that of Descartes. I have consciousness of the object in the act of perceiving or grasping it. This grasping is really my securing of the object. The thinking thing secures its place in the external world, as extended thing. This conceiving, as a perception or grasping, includes will, affects, actions and passions, in short as Descartes himself writes, “all those things which happen consciously within us and to us. . .” A thing is perceived, i.e., it *is*, as secured and ordered (in Leibniz, as perfected). A thing “exists” only when I have secured or grounded it in my rational subjectivity, even as the latter relies on the “objectivity” of a metaphysical mathesis. Man is therefore no longer the measure of things in the sense that he measures up to things in dialogue with them; rather man *is* the measure or standard of all things, as he finds himself in “mathematical” subjectivity. Things now become the object of this self-grounding subject. The *res extensa* is made the object of the *res cogitans*—and thus any “dualism”.

“I am” means “I ground and secure myself”, and thus I also secure things: I subject things to myself as grounding subject, because *I* am rational subject, i.e. *I* am that which under-lies any perception. I am the subject or ground of perception. “I perceive” means that I order, arrange, dispose, organize. Such a “hominized” rather than “subjective” metaphysics is possible, of course, only with

Christianity in the background. Certitude and the need for it is characteristic of traditional Christian philosophies, as is a very definite solipsism. For everything must indeed be "secured" in a world in which the Christian man is or would be the undisputed center. Perception means taking possession of a thing; for, Descartes tells us, we are to be "possessors of nature". To take possession means to "object" the world, i.e. to re-present or make a thing present to myself *as an object*: to ground and secure it in my own solipsistic subjectivity. Thus I give things their rationale for existing. In Leibniz, I find a *sufficient* reason and erect this into the *grande principium*. I make a thing objectively present to myself as subject: I put it into my rational presence; and I do this, of course, in accord with *my* categories, since I alone am rational substrate, i.e. the ground of judgment and certitude concerning all things that can be objectified. What we call "subjective thinking" is born: not out of the subjectivity of the thinking thing so much as out of the objectivity of the thing thought. Re-presenting a thing means making it present or visible; this visible re-presentation is an "idea", especially as "made by me". But ideas are also innate or "adventitious".

Thus *cogito* means to *bring* things to mind, i.e. to the rational ego, thinking and grounding itself. This bringing entails an examining of the thing, a calculating according to the correct rules of thought, as based on mathesis. And it is this that leads us to the precise meaning of "doubting". To doubt does not mean to destroy by means of a skeptical denial of things; it means to re-examine: to re-ground. (The *cogito* and the *dubito* are interchangeable, Sartre writes in *Situations*, II, in his essay on Cartesian freedom.) All thought is a "doubting": a re-examining and securing of things. There is therefore no universal doubting in Descartes, as though he were a philosophically doubting Thomas; instead there is a universal re-grounding of things—just the opposite of what easy introductions to philosophy tell us. Instead of a universal doubt we must speak of a universal assurance given by the re-grounding of the thinking subject in a *mathesis universalis*. This universal *scientia*, of course, implies the *con-scientia sui*, i.e. a self-assuring or self-securing. To stretch a point, it is a kind of *présence-à-soi*, i.e. making self distant from self, so that it can be presented-to-self. This is a kind of re-assuring or re-securing

of presence. We see then that the *cogito* is not primarily psychological but rather metaphysical in the first philosophy of Descartes. I think on what *is*, even when this is my own subjectivity.

According to Heidegger it was Nietzsche who interpreted Descartes' statement as "psychological", since he himself takes up the "physiological" position, as the anti-pole of traditional metaphysics. But even here "psychological" means metaphysical. It can be thus understood best in the wake of Kant, who called Descartes' idealism empirical and gave a critique of the empirical ego as such in terms of a transcendental metaphysics rather than of theory of knowledge or of "psychology". The "physiological" in Nietzsche's writing was still enmeshed in the ontic i.e., classic metaphysical order, Heidegger states. But in reality it may well have been the first step out of the metaphysical or ontic order of things, even though it never attains the level of a Heideggerian ontology, as "eksistential", nor the dimension of Merleau-Ponty's body-subject (*corps propre*). Nietzsche objected to Descartes' presuppositions on existence, thought, and certitude. But his more cogent objection is felt in the identification of *cogito* with *volo*, as the will-to-truth: knowing or thinking means a conscious attempt to *control* reality. Knowledge as a *con-scientia* is a self-willing, a self-justification. This is more evident in the thought of Leibniz, where perception is appetitive: an active force that goes out of itself to possess the world. It must be admitted that this has obvious roots in a Christian voluntarism that no serious student would call into question. Nietzsche claimed that Descartes' *cogito* was a hypothesis that gave the feeling of power. Will was of prime importance for Nietzsche, influenced as he was by Schopenhauer. And thus also the will to power, even though "power" is meant as the will to *fullness-of-life* rather than to control. In Nietzsche feeling is in and of the "body"; but Descartes' *cogito* is only in the *res animata* as "soul-thing." It is the life of the soul, not the fullness of bodily life, that makes us truly human and thinkers.

Nietzsche's critique thus leads to a better understanding of the beginning of the "bodily" dimension, though his insights remain at the pre-phenomenological level. The *cogito* is not "psychological" but "physiologically" based. Mind is the "little reason", whereas body is "great reason". Humanness is not grounded in a rationalistic

solipsism, as religious and metaphysical, but rather in the body, which is of the earth. The human is that which emerges from "ontological" earth, from that *physis* which gives birth to the "physiological", from that *humus* which is the source of both humanity and humility. Ontological earth, whether conceived in the prephenomenological terms of Nietzsche or in terms of Heidegger's "conflict" between world and earth, is neither fatalistic nor naturalistic. It is that to which we return from out the ideational world for its own sake, from out that half-a-world which begot half-gods and half-men. However, we must be careful to add, that in the *Discours de la Méthode* Descartes asks whether, instead of the speculative approach he pursues, there be not some sort of *pratique*, by which we can know the reality of the body. This is surely an important Cartesian insight and an opening in his otherwise metaphysically conceived thinking. Does it prepare the ground for what we might nowadays style a "bodily praxis"? It is sad that Descartes could not pursue his insight and that it became lost in the actual rational course he did follow. That is one reason why Nietzsche's critique is of great import.

II. THE COGITO IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY; THE PRE-REFLEXIVE AND SELF-ANTICIPATION: THE BODILY LOGOS

Consciousness of self is not that of a subject for an object, phenomenologically speaking. We do not objectify self when we become conscious of self, even as we seek the ontological basis of self. Rather, there is an immediate rapport of self to self and of the "pre-reflexive" *cogito*, which is the condition for any Cartesian *cogito*. Thus, I do not know myself because I reflect, instead *I can reflect because I am conscious*. Hence consciousness of self is not a new consciousness but rather, Sartre writes, "the only mode of existence possible for consciousness of anything." Consciousness is not produced as a singular example of an abstract possibility but arises from within being itself, as the fullness of existence. It is necessary therefore to renounce the primacy of "knowledge" and find the *being* of knowledge: the

“absolute” of existence. The possibility of a parallel between the pre-reflective *cogito* and Heidegger’s “self-anticipation” (*sich-vorweg*), which is the existential meaning of “care”, suggests itself. Both are in a sense attempts to re-ground metaphysics and to overcome the rationality of the Cartesian *cogito*. Care (*Sorge*) is that which *is-there before* and “reflection”. We might add, that the existential-ontological dimension is there prior to reflection upon it, be this the reflective process or the reflecting of self on self. Especially when this self-anticipation is bodily, it is clear that a merely psychological reflection has to do primarily with abstract intellection or knowledge. In this case reflection is an abstraction of that concrete bodily being which makes any reflecting of self-on-self possible at all. Reflection, as rational, roots in the bodily logos as pre-reflective. Heidegger’s “self-anticipation” connotes “standing in one’s own way”. I am thus “before myself” ontologically (rather than only psychologically “for myself”) in that I not only confront myself dialectically at the level of knowledge but “anticipate” myself at the level of conscious being.

Consciousness is therefore not substantive, and Descartes’ error may well have been to make it a substance. Yet Cartesian substance, Heidegger points out, is inaccessible. And thus, even when Descartes defines thought as thing and as substance, it is not “substantive” in the traditional sense, contrary to Sartre (who also makes Husserl pose as a “phenomenalist”). Sartre felt that Husserl remained incapsulated in the phenomenological *cogito* and that the transcendental ego was not an overcoming of ordinary solipsism. Yet it is difficult to state that Husserl remains enclosed in the *cogito*, when he performs a series of difficult reductions, thus overcoming not only Descartes’ *cogito* but also his own egological position. Hence not only the “substantive” ego of Descartes but also the objectionable solipsism is reduced, making the intersubjective dimension possible.

Sartre takes over and adapts the Hegelian distinction between *an sich* and *für sich* in a dialectical explication of phenomenological consciousness. Thus the *en soi* is that which is in itself, as self-contained, a kind of massive density, full positivity and indissolubility. That which is in itself is full of itself; and there is no fissure or opening through which what it is *not* could appear. The *en soi* is not conscious.

And here we must remind ourselves of the difference between self-consciousness, as *wissen* in Hegel, but as phenomenological consciousness, ontologically based, in Sartre. The transition from self-knowledge to a phenomenologically ontological self-consciousness is enormous. But the dialectical process reintroduced by Sartre, and perhaps possible only in a phenomenological ontology of consciousness (rather than in a Husserlian subjectivity of consciousness), recoups the movement of Hegel from self-positing through creative nihilation. Only now the positing is not metaphysical but phenomenologically ontological.

In order to become conscious and attain presence to self it is necessary to gain distance from this compact oneness and in-itselfness. An opening must be found, one covered over by "knowledge" in its systematic self-explication. The opening in being makes it possible to be *for* itself and not just *in* itself. Thus what is in itself must "nihilate" (not annihilate) itself, rather than only reaffirm its oneness with self. It must open out to what it is *not*, in order to recoup the lost negative moment, which it then must take into itself. It must therefore lose itself, absorb itself, sacrifice itself, "decompress" itself, in order to become phenomenologically conscious of self and other and so enter into world. Though Sartre would have us believe so, Heidegger's *Dasein* is not *en soi*, for the ground of its being-there is not self-affirmation but rather no-thingness—even though this negativity is not fully developed in *Sein und Zeit*. Hence *Dasein* is hardly "full positivity". Moreover, it is not monolithic unity but a continual "dialogue" between the ontic and the ontological. Heidegger calls this area the "difference" or the "split" in being. Ontological being is the "open middle" in the ontic beings. To *be*-there means to be caught up in this openness. The influence of Hegel is evident in *Sein und Zeit*, though hardly so overt as in *L'Être et le Néant*. Under such circumstances it would be difficult to maintain with early Sartre that *Dasein* is only *an sich*, and thus also *en soi*.

The *pour-soi* is what guarantees our being in the world; and of its very nature, this means "becoming body." The escape from the *en-soi* world of empty abstractions and closed system effects itself in the form of an involvement with body in the world. Such a world is not a desert, a world of mere concepts without living man,

but is the concrete world of (phenomenologically) bodily reality. Even soul and reason are basically bodily and can be abstracted from body only by a metaphysical withdrawal. The self, which *is* body and of the earth, Nietzsche writes, laughs at the handspings of ego, because self is in reality the very source of "soul" and ego. Here Husserl comes to our aid, when he writes in *Ideen II*, that "body, as the here and now, is the place from which pure ego contemplates the sense world." Soul and body in this case are anti-polar rather than dichotomous.

Heidegger gains knowledge of "body" not so much from such insights as from a dialogue with the pre-Socratics; thus he writes of *logos*. Man is not a "rational animal" or an "ensouled body". He *is* the living *logos*. And *logos* is not conceived rationalistically by the pre-Socratics. It is the task of phenomenology to get back to the primordial *logos*, more fundamental than objective thought, the *logos* that makes the *cogito* itself possible. And Heidegger does this when he restores the Greek sense of the classic definition of man as well as in his attempts to get at the meaning of Parmenidean and Heraclitan fragments. The classical definition underwent a major shift in meaning when it was translated as (*ζῶον λόγον ἔχον*) "animal rationem habens", and thus making man the "rational animal". Heidegger cuts through this rationalistic and metaphysical definition of man, which splits man into soul (mind) and body, and lays bare a more primordial *logos*, which man has/is. *Logos* is a fundamental ingathering or as-sembling, which only in post-medieval fashion can be interpreted metaphysically as "reason". Granted that "reason" is one interpretation of the primordial *logos*, it is not the only one, and is at best a derived and deficient mode of *logos*. Thus rationality must always return to its fundamental *logos*, in order that it not become a form of metaphysical alienation from primordial ground. Thus a Cartesian *cogito* is interpretable as a *co-agitatio*, i.e. as an as-sembling or ingathering by the subject. But in this case it is *ratio* as the *res cogitans* which does the ingathering. A more fundamental as-sembling is the definition of *logos* itself, as that which as-sembles (*ver-sammelt*) or ingathers. Thus the *cogito*, as that which brings together or as-sembles, is in a sense coextensive with *logos* itself, as that which in-gathers (*légein*). *Cogito* is thus the "in-

gathering thought" of the logos itself. Any return out of mere knowledge to consciousness must eventually end up at the primordial level of the logos, as that which makes both consciousness and knowledge possible at all. Thus man is not the "rational animal" divided into body and soul. Rather, man is *bodily* as the "living being which has/is the logos" (*zôon lógon échon*).

Fundamental meaning grounds itself not in reason alone but in the living man as a whole, as ontological body, as logos. The bodily dimension is a phenomenological overcoming of the "dualism" of rational and corporeal, thus of the *res cogitans* and the *res corporea*. In Cartesian philosophy the "true me" is the ego, as mind or soul. But this is in reality but a me-in-idea, which resides in a world-in-idea, rather than in world as such. The ego of Descartes cannot *be* truly in the world except indirectly through speculative reason, newly grounded on a universal mathesis, or in a *pratique* which remains undeveloped and covered over. Yet, phenomenologically speaking, ego is but an abstraction of body, or as Nietzsche puts it, "something of the body". Phenomenological intentionality is in the bodily logos, as primordial, rather than in abstract soul or reason. "It is I who reconstitute the historical *cogito*," Merleau-Ponty writes. This means that I take up the bodily movement of a *cogito*, rather than seeking to embody it in the manner of traditional metaphysical realism. My taking up of the bodily movement of the *cogito* is the return to primordial logos, as such. This bodily movement *is* man moving *as* logos. It is evidently not mere abstract thought but logos-thinking itself. Thus, thought is not mere rational process but a bodily matter.

We might ask how one takes up the bodily *cogito*. Bodily thinking means not just thinking things over abstractly and then judging them in accord with the arbitrary standards of some ideal or ideological system of thought. Bodily *thinking* or logos-thinking is a "weighing" (*pensare*) of matters. This entails not just being "pensive" or "weighing" facts abstractly and "objectively"; it means actually holding them in my hands, getting the "feel" of them, *experiencing in my whole body the weight of a situation* in which I am involved. Abstract thought is a way of escaping involvement in world and earth. But being "bodily" in the world, as logos-thinker, rather than

just speculating about being in the world, means that when I “think” I gather myself together in confrontation and anticipation of self *within* the primordial logos that I have/am.

Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Descartes is somewhat similar to that of Nietzsche. Descartes reduced thinking to metaphysical hypothesis, to system of thought, to “psychology”. The *cogito*, if not grounded in ontological body, is a closing in on one’s own solipsistic world and a retreat from world as such. Thought is not something abstract, absolute, or “eternal” in the traditional sense of “eternal truths”. The *cogito* takes place in time. Eternity is a hypocritical concept, in that it is a derivative of time, which refuses to acknowledge its concrete philosophical and historical source. Phenomenological eternity is but the atmosphere of time, and I partake of this atmosphere.

Cogito as “vision” cannot be but a speculative or theoretically intuited thinking *about* sight. Yet intellectual insight is not just the intellection of abstract ideas and forms, even of a metaphysically conceived mathesis. Vision is an acting out, prepared by my primordial or bodily openness (“ekstasis”) to the field of transcendence. I must “see” the eksistent world appear *before me*, as I “anticipate” myself. This bodily ekstasis or standing-out into world-itself (and away from world-in-idea) is a “vision” that does not merely contemplate things but rather *goes out* to them. Thus *cogito*, as the ingathering of the primordial logos, can come to mean the movement of transcendence which is my own bodily being in contact with, i.e. *one with*, concrete world. I “throw” myself into things. Such “doing” the world rather than merely thinking it begets a “certitude” impossible for the traditional epistemologist to conceive of, for it is a certitude not based on the securing of a world of objects. Instead it is an ontological certitude based on the primordially of an original logos.

In this case certitude does not mean a hard core of convictions, based on anxiety, but the capacity to accept what we are *not* as well as what we *are*. It means not resting content on an imaginary fund of eternal truths but becoming involved in the “nihilation” of being bodily in the world as on the earth. It means the capacity to “doubt”, i.e. to affirm not a world of abstractions but the bodily world in which

we exist. The best way to stop doubting is to "doubt" effectively; to become honestly involved in the experience of doubt. "Doing" the world (Merleau-Ponty) implies grounding oneself bodily in world. This existential grounding begets not an abstract or "moral" certitude; rather it opens out of a mere self-securing into a sharing of world. Doubting demands that I re-examine the foundations of my metaphysical solipsism and stand *before myself* in good faith. But to stand before myself I must return to the primordial logos which makes both the pre-reflective *cogito* and the *sich vorweg* possible. Only then can I "think myself" and thus "know myself".

III. THE PRIMORDIAL LOGOS IN MUSICOLOGY, AS "MUSICAL THINKING"

A musical composition, especially a symphony, does not exist in the dry notes of the musical score, as presented or even restored by the working musicologist, that writer *about* music. We know that a good musicologist does not merely restore the correct scores of past centuries but also, as musician, attempts to recall the concrete milieu and the artistic mind of the composer himself, so that the composition may be safeguarded against often misleading "practical" interpretations. It is especially the musician-musicologist who must "take up the movement" of the musical *cogito*, in order that the musical logos as "composition" may emerge in its concreteness. In restoring old music we do not aim at "objectivity" in a purist sense, as we combat the errant subjectivity of many an unjustifiable private interpretation (as e.g. the romanticizing of Bach). Rather we try to lay bare and return to the musical *subject*, as such, as it is born in the creative activity of the composer, and as it emerges in his concrete "historical" situation. Thus, in order to render the notes of Beethoven, Bach, Hindemith, or Schoenberg, we have to try to enter into their own "bodily" movement, as it were. This is especially true when the composer was also an outstanding interpreter and performer, say, a Rachmaninoff. Thus we recoup a bodily logos.

Musical notes, like the written *cogito*, are never regarded as having value in themselves. They have neither real nor ideal existence *as*

music, Ingarden writes. But it often seems that written words, unlike written notes, have some sort of priority over bodily movement, whence they originated. Words, and then thoughts about words, have been split off from the living, bodily reality of man, as speaker or as singer. The written word has become an abstraction, justifying its priority on the postulation of an ideal world of essence and meaning. This has been a problem in historical musicology from the start. But it is a problem for all the sciences, of which historical musicology would be an honored one. In order to circumvent the tendency of alienation of written word from living logos (as musical or as anything else) perhaps we ought to be aware of the gradual process of alienation that has taken place in the theoretical sciences. A given statement, once the "bodily movement" of the speaker or singer *as* speaking and/or singing, came to be written down. The purpose was laudable: to preserve the proverb or the song for posterity or simply for repetition, when the given word was a part of ritual or ceremony. But this letter, which is a kind of "first abstraction", gradually seemed to become more important than the living word itself, so that finally the living word ended up as just an "instance" of the now "ideal" word, as such. Once written words, as subsumed into an ideal existence, were erected into definitions (such as the rational definition of man) and systems of definitions, and were then regarded as "thought", an important "second abstraction" took place. With the first abstraction our attention was diverted from the living word, as logos, to the *littera*, as written, and thus as "material" or "real" word, a word that could be "preserved", and thus could be regarded as lasting and eventually as "eternal". In the second abstraction (or withdrawal from logos) we depart even farther from living reality and begin to construct systems upon systems of "pure thought", gradually convincing ourselves that this is reality in its purest form. This is the common danger of any idealism. Then to convince ourselves completely, we proceed to "embody" the abstract word. This is most evident in legal word. Yet merely re-embodiment of abstract word is insufficient. It is an ineffectual return to logos, for it keeps up the illusion of the superiority of abstract thought and of the split between the concrete and the abstract.

But rather than essaying "absolute knowledge" in a Hegelian sense, as spirit objectifying itself in nature and subsuming nature into itself in dialectical manner, we try to lay bare the primordial logos, as that which makes "knowledge" possible at all. This is the recovery of living word itself, phenomenologically speaking. For abstract thought, like musical notes or musicological theory, is but a derivative and deficient form of primordial word, as such. Not disembodied verities but rather the truth of bodily logos itself is the norm of thinking, and thus "being and thinking are the same". For any meaningful *cogito* must be based on the primordial logos, of which it is the "conscious expression". Thus abstract philosophical and scientific theories, including musicological research—to say nothing of theological excursions into a "higher life" or an after-life—need to be checked constantly against the bodily logos we *are*, as in the world and on the earth.

It is therefore insufficient just to think or talk the *cogito*. I must throw myself bodily into living world, especially the living world of musical sound. I must *do* this world, *as* logos. Such a bodily logos does not mean merely "certain modulations of my body". Rather it means that "I *am* my body", as Marcel writes both in the *Journal Métaphysique* and *Refus à l'Invocation*. A musician finds this easy to comprehend. Though he may have composed and/or analyzed a given composition, he will not attempt to dictate intellectual forms to his fingers. For he thinks with his fingers, and not just with his head, even as his finger movements are coordinated in his head. They are still finger movements; and his head is, after all, of the body. Fingers in contact and dialogue with the concrete possibilities and limitations of a keyboard (or any instrument) is what gives birth to living music rather than to cerebral effusions or pedantic exercises.

Coming out of abstract world means overcoming an abstract *cogito* with its excessive demands and intellectual chatter. It means breaking down the artificial solipsism that causes the ego to over-demand and chatter at its world of objects, which it seeks to control by means of "thought". The continual chatter of the solipsistic *cogito*, as expressed psychologically or even musicologically (witness the plethora of scientific research on music!), must all fall silent, as when we fall speechless in the "limit-situation." This speechlessness

and "thoughtlessness" is the "silent *cogito*": the silent call of primordial being. At this moment the utter limitation of abstract thought or merely verbal word—in short, the whole world of ontic facts and words—becomes suddenly apparent. At this moment of anxiety we are jarred into wordlessness and into world: into *listening* to the call of ontological being as primordial logos. The "silent *cogito*" is thus the musical logos. When this logos speaks (or sings?) the ontic concepts, categories, and alienated words, no longer mean anything. We are rendered speechless and thoughtless: we fall wordless, as we cease to chatter at our world of controlled objects, as we "lose control", begin to *listen* to the logos, and thus begin to share in the world of others. We thus face the nihilation of all we had relied on heretofore, as we reappraise in silence our entire situation. When ontic words become useless, we must set them aside and face, naked, the living bodily logos of being and being-with. This is the musically ontological moment, when we either exist bodily or face annihilation. There may be no time for "reflexion". Perhaps we begin to see the possibilities of the ontologically pre-reflexive dimension, as *cogito*.

When I think, Merleau-Ponty writes, "I am (one) with myself, as I am in the world". The world is not object but pro-ject; but this is not a subjective projection, born of solipsism. We do not realize selfhood except by becoming effectively body and thus by being bodily in the world. Marcel formulates it somewhat differently: I cannot be truly "spiritual" except under condition of becoming flesh. But this is not mere embodiment. And "flesh" is carnality only to the misguided ascetic. We deal not with corporality but with the bodily dimension as ontological, i.e. with primordial logos. This is not a body conceived in a world-in-idea. Such a "body" is disembodiment: it can be re-embodied with or without success and rather sorrier for the process. Abstract thought or word is but a rationalization of that primordial faith which is involvement with world and earth. Thus "faith" is not merely a rational assent to a disembodied set of religious or scientific doctrines; faith is rather belief, as trust in primordial world and earth, from which bodily logos emerges. Thus a proposition or assertion is valid only insofar as it is an expression of the logos, and to the extent that it is rooted in

life-world as the source of all "objectivity" in the sciences. Statements, whether musical or verbal, which are rooted in concrete world are not rational assertions but phenomenological descriptions of bodily experience of life and primordial belief. This is particularly evident in music, which seems closer to phenomenological subjectivity than the sciences or the visual arts. For the latter seem to make objects; whereas music has no objects at all. It is pure subjectivity.

A musical situation also begets intersubjectivity, for making music means sharing musical logos with the other. It is not a question of my forcing my experience on the other but of unfolding it. Hence mere dialectics are useless, as we conduct an "existential dialogue". In this intersubjective dialogue, which means that one logos unfolds its essence through and in the other logos, it may happen that either the one or the other is more open to the play of being itself. And thus the need for mutual forbearance. If, as two musicians, we play music together, we must share a world and overcome any solipsism. In the creative situation there is no room for either ego or abstractions. The solipsistic ego would destroy the work of art, whereas the sharing of logos is what makes it possible for musicians to "make music" together and thus play a symphony. The essence of a symphony is not first and foremost abstract AABA form in the first movement or the general overriding structures of the symphony, as such. The phenomenological essence of a symphony consists in the intersubjective logos that allows our making music *together*; thus the symphony is a "sounding together". It is the task of the musicologist to lay bare this symphonic logos, for only then can he gain perspective with regard to "form".

IV. RELATIONAL AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRUTH: MIND AND THING

Truth has been described as the "relation between mind and thing". *Cogito* thus means "I relate mind to thing", or "I relate thing to mind". In the framework of truth, as relational, the *relating* of mind and thing is crucial. This re-lating is a carrying-back upon one another of mind and thing. Mind and thing seek to be rejoined to

one another. The *I*, as subject, is the basis of this relation; for the subject, *as* thinking, is that which carries thing back to mind and carries mind forward to thing. The relational definition of truth has obtained since the Middle Ages through Descartes and up to Kant himself. It is first challenged perhaps only by Heidegger, who questions the "dualism" and is dissatisfied with the subject relating. For the relational definition of truth presupposes that mind is a thing somehow apart from world and thing, and indeed in Cartesian thinking mind is indeed a "thing" thinking, *as* apart from the world of objective thing. Because of this apartness (which need not be interpreted exclusively in terms of the classic "dualism") there arises the need to establish some kind of realistic relationship with things. This relationship is in Descartes the "realism" of a *res*-philosophy. But it is precisely here where Descartes may be accused of having erected a hypothesis. For mind is *already* a bodily thing, and the clarity of mind rests ultimately in the "obscurity" of body. This phenomenological *a priori*, i.e. the "already-ness" of mind *as* bodily, is what founds the possibility of "mind", as rational.

Mind is grounded in and is one with body, as the primordial logos. Mind and body are not discontinuous; they are polar. And re-embodied realism of the "relationship between mind and body" is but a pale shadow of the original ontological unity of the fundamental logos. The burden of "proof" lies not with him who experiences himself as a basic unity, but with him who asserts that man is dichotomous. A phenomenological statement, based on the experience of the essential bodily oneness of man, is not an "assertion", but rather an unfolding of what is already *there*. Thus when I *say* "I am bodily, as logos", it is not merely a grammatical or logical statement; instead it is *a manifestation of myself* in concrete situation, as experiencing the basic unity I *am*. Thus Heidegger's "*Sage ist Zeige*": "Saying is a showing". I show myself to be that which I *am* in myself. An ontological "statement", as the manifestation of self-positing is not an assertion, but rather the eksistential ex-positing of man, *as* logos.

It is not a question of "opinion" but of phenomenological "fact". It is not a subjective assertion but is grounded in my bodily subjectivity, as phenomenological, i.e. as the appearing-of-the-logos

that I *am*, as sub-ject. If we live in this body and world rather than in a body-in-idea or world-in-idea, what we "say" is not mere assertion but is an eksistential manifestation of our bodily movement. If we speak from out an abstract world, whether ideological or scientific, what we say is but an assertion. Only the rationalist is capable of assertion, since he alone is alienated from a more primordial logos and thus needs the assertive statement. And thus the problem of musicology as the "science" of music, or as "words *about* music". While it is unnecessary to denigrate the task of the musicologist, it is evident that musicology must always lead us toward the uncovering of the full musical experience rather than lead us away from it into the abstractions of historicism and aesthetics. The purpose of musicology ought to be to lay bare the primordial logos, as musical. The study of form, time, history, and aesthesis, ought all to lead to this subject.

"Mind" is but a further refining of the bodily dimension. It is a "sensing" which is not metaphysically separable from the "senses" but is one with them, even though at a different "level". Mind is grounded in and *is* body, as primordial logos. This is suggested also by a Heideggerian interpretation of Anaxagoras, for whom the *nous* is the "most refined of the senses". ("Senses" is a translation of *chrémata*, as "things-in-hand", thus as the handling of things, as the taking of things *in hand*, thus of feeling and sensing them.) Mind *is* bodily; it does not need to be re-embodied. Its separation from body is at worst a theological artifact or at best an abstraction. When we say that mind *is* body, the word, *is*, is not merely a logical connective particle linking or relating mind to body. The *is* in this case is the unfolding and manifestation of a bodily "fact" of experience. This fact is not an objective entity but rather *the experienced subjectivity of the speaker*, who is alive and speaking from the flesh-and-blood world rather than from out the reaches of some false transcendence. In this case "truth" means not an abstract coherence of subjective mind with objective things, but rather a remaining true to our being in-the-world and on-the-earth. It is in effect a primordial trust in world and earth rather than a relation between mind and things in a world of objects. Thus thinking and thing are at one in primordial faith with bodily world.

All ideologies and ideational abstractions of one sort and another are attempts to create a world apart from the living one. But it is an endeavor doomed at the outset. This holds also for the "practical" attitude which so often turns out to be but vulgar theory. What passes for common sense and practical knowledge is often nothing but a lack of insight and of critique. Hence the need for both theory and practice to be firmly grounded in a fundamental logos, to which any *cogito* must return to find true transcendence and even the "festival of life", in which music plays a central role.

V. INHEARING: "AUDIENDO COGITO ERGO SUM"

As difficult as the above philosophical disquisition might seem, it is no more difficult than Rameau's *Traité de l'Harmonie* (1722) in its intellectual convolutions. To expect all philosophical or musical theory to be journalistically clear and obvious is to expect the impossible. One attempts clarity. But there is no substitute for the serious student, willing to work his way through a treatise by Rameau, an essay by Heidegger, or a fugue by Bach. J. P. Rameau followed Descartes in attempting to give music a mathematical base. This rationalism stood in considerable contrast to the theory of affects, as known and used by J. S. Bach. There is an essential difference between Rameau and Bach. For Bach reason functioned as a substratum to musical affect, whereas for Rameau reason directed musical affects as a control mechanism. For Bach musical affect rooted in reason; for Rameau it is directed by reason. Bach engaged "theological pathos" (Blume), whereas Rameau invoked the cold spirit of rationalism (and is thus an anachronism when resurrected in the Romantic era). For both Bach and Rameau the natural root of musical affects is nature as such; but Rameau, following Descartes, fell into metaphysics. Bach's position is prephenomenological in that he underplays rational control in favor of affect and figuration technique. For Bach the *music itself* emerges as essential. It is not a result of a rational law operative in material tones.

In line with both Descartes and Rameau one could say that *I hear music and thus I am*, a new twist to the classic *cogito*. I am thus

one who hears musical sounds (or the sound of language). I “exist”; for, in sensing and hearing sounds I somehow confusedly think. Thought does not stand isolated from imagination and sensing in the philosophy of Descartes but is aided and embellished by them. The imagination delivers a thought-image or idea of the thing thus sensed, to be clarified and purified by the mind. Sensing is a kind of passive faculty that receives and recognizes ideas of sensible things, according to the *Discours de la Méthode*. The mind attains knowledge of a body, here a sounding one, through an idea to be formed in the imagination (*Regulae ad directionem ingenii*). *I hear and thus I am*. I sense myself either playing an instrument or singing in accord with certain musico-mathematical patterns. I sound with the *ton fondamental* (Rameau’s *Traité*) of my audial subjectivity, not as a real object existing outside myself. But this sound of *the subject hearing* is not simple but complex, and from this complex sound pattern there is educed a fundamental tone which is the root of all real musical tones. This tone, of course, is not itself a real one, as in a “real bass”, i.e., a bass to be “realized” or harmonized in a musical exercise. The tone is for Rameau fictive, purely “subjective”, abstract or virtual, in that it is radical and potential. One sees immediately the obvious mistakes made by last century’s pedagogues. One gets a Kafkaesque vision of dutiful music students carrying out this mistake in hundred of classrooms for scores of years.

Further development of a phenomenological interpretation of the musical *cogito* is possible, but lies beyond the scope of the present essay. But such studies as the above lay the ground for a thorough analysis of what we might call *inhearing*. This is the musical version of phenomenology’s intuition, which is a visually based word. Music theory needs rescuing not merely from the misconceptions of pedagogues, but also from the persistent mathematicizing of the musical experience that has obtained since the Middle Ages in western theory. The port of entry is doubtless Husserl’s treatment of the consciousness of the human subject, and since he used musical tone as a model, the task will be that much easier for us. However, Husserl himself needs updating and considerable critique at the hands of his own students, great and small. Such a systematic study, done by a number of scholars, will help us plumb the depths of

musical perception and experience, as well as accomplish the practical task of putting music theory back in the mainstream of thought where it rightly belongs.

Bibliographical Note

This essay was written with the following works in mind:

R. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Meditationes de prima philosophia, Compendium Musicae, Les passions de l'âme.*

M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit, Holzwege, Die Frage nach dem Ding, Vorträge und Aufsätze, Nietzsche.*

E. Husserl, *Ideen, Cartesische Meditationen, Erst Philosophie, Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften.*

J. P. Sartre, *L'être et le néant, Situations II.*

M. Merleau-Ponty, *La phénoménologie de la perception, Sens et non-sens.*

In addition to the above I have marshalled some of my own materials as well specifically: "Musical sound as a model for Husserlian intuition and time consciousness" in *The Journal of Phenomenological Psychology* 1973; "Traditional harmony? A radical question" in *The Music Review*, 1974; "Une philosophie du nombre: Jacques de Liège et le *Speculum Musicae*" in *Le Moyen Âge, Revue d'Histoire et de Philologie*, 1968. Cf. also dialectical critique of phenomenology in "Music educating for today and tomorrow's schools and society" in A. Motycka, *Music Education for Tomorrow's Schools*, Jamestown, 1976.

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ALFRED SCHUTZ (1889–1959) was long active at the New School for Social Research, where he was among the pioneers in phenomenology and influenced a long list of outstanding students. His chief work (1932) was *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (The meaningful structuring of the social world). Essays on music are included in the *Collected Papers II* (The Hague, 1964), edited by A. Brodersen.

FRED KERSTEN, University of Wisconsin, Green Bay, editor of Schutz' "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music", has published widely in philosophy on Husserl and Heidegger. A recent book of his, co-edited with R. Zaner, memorial essays for Dorion Cairns, is entitled *Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism* (The Hague, 1974).

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