Understanding The Musical Experience



Edited by
F. JOSEPH SMITH

GORDON AND BREACH



UNDERSTANDING THE MUSICAL EXPERIENCE

MUSICOLOGY: A BOOK SERIES
Edited by F. Joseph Smith

Volume 1 *THE EXPERIENCING OF MUSICAL SOUND*
Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music
F. Joseph Smith

Volume 2 *MUSIC AND ITS SOCIAL MEANINGS*
Christopher Ballantine

Volume 3 *MUSIC, FILM, AND ART*
Haig Khatchadourian

Volume 4 *LATE RENAISSANCE MUSIC AT THE HABSBURG COURT*
Polyphonic Settings of the Mass Ordinary at the Court of Rudolf II (1576–1612)
Carmelo Peter Comberiati

Volume 5 *WITNESSES AND SCHOLARS*
Studies in Musical Biography
Hans Lenneberg

Volume 6 *THE TROMBONE*
Its History and Music, 1697–1811
David M. Guion

Volume 7 *MUSIC FROM THE MIDDLE AGES THROUGH THE TWENTIETH CENTURY*
Essays in Honor of Gwynn S. McPeek
Edited by Carmelo P. Comberiati and Matthew C. Steel

Volume 8 *UNDERSTANDING THE MUSICAL EXPERIENCE*
Edited by F. Joseph Smith

Additional volumes in preparation

Volume 9 *STRAVINSKY*
The Music Box and the Nightingale
Daniel Albright

Volume 10 *MUSICAL LIFE IN CONTEMPORARY POLAND 1945–1977*
Lidia Rappoport-Gelfand

UNDERSTANDING THE MUSICAL EXPERIENCE

Edited by

F. Joseph Smith

Gordon and Breach
New York London Paris Montreux Tokyo Melbourne

Gordon and Breach Science Publishers

Post Office Box 786
Cooper Station
New York, New York 10276
United States of America

Post Office Box 197
London WC2E 9PX
United Kingdom

58, rue Lhomond
75005 Paris
France

3-14-9, Okubo
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo
Japan

Private Bag 8
Camberwell, Victoria 3124
Australia

Chapters 1–4, 6 and 7 of this work are reprinted from the *Journal of Musicological Research* Vol 3 (1–2); Vol 4 (1–2/3–4); Vol 5 (4); and Vol 6 (1–2/3).

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Understanding the musical experience.
(Musicology, ISSN 0275–5866; v. 8)
Includes index.
1. music—Philosophy and aesthetics. 2. Phenomenology.
3. Music—20th century—History and criticism.
4. Musicology. I. Smith, F. Ioseph. II. Series:
Musicology (New York, N.Y.); v. 8.
ML3800.U5 1989 781 88–24369
ISBN 2–88124–204–9

Cover : From the finale of Beethoven's F major Sonata op. 54.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

The Gordon and Breach *Musicology* series, a companion to the *Journal of Musicological Research*, covers a creative range of musical topics, from historical and theoretical subjects to social and philosophical studies. Volumes thus far published show the extent of this broad spectrum, from *Music and Its Social Meanings* through *The Trombone: Its History and Music 1697–1811* and *Music from the Middle Ages through the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor of Gwynn S. McPeek* to the present volume, *Understanding the Musical Experience* and to forthcoming works on the music of Mendelssohn and Stravinsky. The editors also welcome interdisciplinary studies, ethnomusicological works, and performance analyses. With this series, it is our aim to expand the field and definition of musical exploration and research.

PREFACE

These essays, written by scholars working within the framework of twentieth century philosophy and music, discuss current topics of interest and concern to thinking musicians, music theorists and music educators, as well as to musicologists coping with overcoming musical positivism and factualism. Musicologists have become aware of the need to re-examine the values, limits, and goals of historical musicology, and, in fact, a lively discussion of the proper intent of musicology has been going on for some time now within the ranks.

In a well-reasoned essay dealing also with historical musicology, Douglas Bartholomew introduces the reader to phenomenology as such and to its methodology and possible applications to musical thought and analysis. It is one of the most lucid, thorough-going, and yet practical and readable introductions to phenomenology the present editor knows. Christine Skarda presents a thorough and systematic account of Alfred Schutz's phenomenology of music, broadening the scope of musical and philosophical methodology. Antonio Serravezza, in a profoundly thoughtful essay, helps liberate us from scholasticizers of Arnold Schoenberg, while Judy Lochhead addresses herself to contemporary music in detailed samplings of current repertory. Joan Stambaugh examines Hanslick's and Langer's positions on feeling and musical expression, and Arthur Motycka brings us, in literary manner, to the musical experience itself. Manfred Frings introduces the ontological perspective of the musical composition as a work of art. Finally, the editor deals with musical positivism and factualism from the examination of what transpires in musical variation, as an essential part of compositional technique and philosophical method.

Increasing numbers of musicians and philosophers are dealing with musical phenomena from the basis of phenomenology. This philosophical method, of course, is far from homogeneous, ranging as it does from fundamental studies of Husserl, through Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, et al. This book of essays hopes to serve the musical and philosophical worlds by bringing together members of both in a common effort to bridge disciplines and work more convincingly together. The publisher is to be thanked for encouraging our various musical and philosophical authors and thus building up our musicology studies, and in the process providing a significant service to that scholarly world that looks to the future of our fields both in critique and hopeful expectation.

Preamble to a phenomenology of music

DOUGLAS BARTHOLOMEW

Case Western Reserve University

1. INTRODUCTION

THERE IS need for proper preparation for a phenomenological treatment of music. Although work in the phenomenology of music has been done, it needs a larger audience. Phenomenology as a philosophy is itself little represented in the literature of music education, history and theory. It is one goal of this paper to further the understanding in the music community of this approach to philosophy, an approach which stands as one of the main currents of 20th Century thought. To this end it will be necessary to lay out the phenomenological perspective, in particular its methodology. Key concepts and terms will have to be defined and developed. On the other hand, a full historical discussion, or an in depth study of the philosophical assumptions and problems pertaining to phenomenology, or a critique of the various phenomenologists lies far beyond the scope of the present study.[1] The point, however, is to introduce phenomenology as a method, to describe its central themes, and to clarify the steps of the method by going through a preparatory description.

The point of departure, however, must be historical; something appealing to musicologists. The term phenomenology, as used in the present study, refers to the philosophical work of Edmund Husserl. Husserl, born in 1859, began his academic work in mathematics and published his first major work in the philosophy of arithmetic in 1891.[2] In this work Husserl attempted to show a connection between the fundamental concepts of mathematics and

psychological acts. His next major work, *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901), took up this issue focusing on logic now instead of mathematics. In the *Logical Investigations*, however, Husserl held that logic must be distinguished from the psychological and that psychology did not stand as the foundation for logic. This was a reversal of his position stated in his earlier *Philosophy of Arithmetic.* In the *Investigations* Husserl began using the term "phenomenology" as the subjective correlate of logic. In other words, though he was intent on distinguishing the subjective from the objective, he did not mean to remove all contact between them. The study of this correlation between the subjective and the objective pervades all of Husserl's work. Spiegelberg describes Husserl's interest in this parallelism in this way:

> To study one without the other would be an artificial abstraction which may have its uses, but which ultimately requires reintegration into the context of the concrete experience from which they have been isolated.[3]

In *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913) Husserl first elaborates and defends phenomenology as a philosophy that includes within its purview the study of both the subjective and objective aspects of experience.

Phenomenology is a philosophy, or even a science, of experience. It is applicable to any realm of human experience.[4] Because of this, many phenomenologies are possible, and it must be determined to which experience to turn. While it is the intent here to develop a phenomenology of music, the introductory purpose of this study might better be served by beginning with a somewhat different range of experience, namely sound. To begin a description of music with a study of sound seems right and proper. Sound is implicated so strongly in musical experience that such a beginning goes beyond the preparatory into the necessary. Phenomenologically, however, the beginning is not with sound by itself but with the experience of sound. This point needs elaboration for it is a cornerstone of the phenomenological method.

This elaboration is the task of this study. We will begin by explicating the phenomenological method along the lines of chapters 1 and 2 of Husserl's *Ideas.* This calls for a discussion of the intuition of

both particular things and essential relationships. This will be followed by a section that raises certain questions and cautions having to do with description. These problems highlight the need for a new perspective, a new orientation. Husserl proposes the phenomenological reduction as a means of gaining this new perspective necessary for adequate and certain description. The reduction opens up a realm of pure experience for study. In the last section the methodological considerations will focus on the phenomenological reduction.

The focus will then shift to a description of phenomenologically attained data that will be important for a discussion of the experience of music. The first theme to be considered in this context will be that of intentionality. Briefly put, the notion of intentionality refers to the directedness of experience towards objects (whether real, dreamt, imagined, seen, or heard), and includes both act and object components. This discussion will lead to a consideration of temporality, the experience of time, and Husserl's concept of constitution.

2. METHOD

Ideas begins with a chapter in which Husserl develops the notions of intuition and essence, including the intuition of essences. Husserl's project, in part, here is to make possible a return to pre-theoretic knowledge which can serve as an unquestionable foundation for philosophic and scientific enterprise.

A. Intuition

The phenomenologist wants to begin with direct, intuitive knowledge of experience, not a constructed or deduced knowledge. This is a primary concern for the phenomenological method, for by this means Husserl seeks to establish a foundation for presuppositionless knowledge, knowledge that is absolutely certain. One needs first to experience things directly, prior to any theory or analysis before this experience, the purely presented phenomenon, can be analyzed according to how it gives itself. Then, and only

then, can one begin to describe this experience with the conviction that this description is not biased by prior assumptions concerning "how things are." Intuition, in Husserl's writing, refers to an immediate form of knowing, not to anything hidden or mystical.[5] Husserl makes explicit what he considers the fundamental importance of 'presentive intuition' in his "principle of principles":

> *Every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition,* that *everything originarily* (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) *offered* to us *in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being,* but also *only within the limits in which it is presented there.* We see indeed that each [theory] can only again draw its truth itself from originary data. Every statement which does no more than confer expression on such data by simple explication and by means of significations precisely conforming to them is, as we said at the beginning of this chapter, actually an *absolute beginning* called upon to serve as a foundation, a *principium* in the genuine sense of the word.[6]

Presentive intuition, for Husserl, is that which grounds and validates the legitimacy of knowledge. It is a "regress to what is ultimate in cognition."[7] "To have something real given originarily ... and 'experience' it in an intuiting simpliciter are one and the same thing."[8] In external perception we have originary experience, for example, of fans, ringing telephones, and musical works. In memory these objects are no longer presented as external originarily, but our memories-of-them are presented originarily.

Spiegelberg, in his description of the phenomenological method, counts the first step of this method to be the investigating of particular phenomena, and he divides this step into three substeps: intuiting, analyzing, and describing. He considers the intuiting to be the most demanding, but admits that there is little help in the form of directions that can be given to help carry out this phase of the project.[9] Once the particular phenomena are located in originary experience (and this is more difficult for some phenomena than for others), they can be analyzed and described. The point, which becomes more important later, is that analysis and description does not exhaust the theme of phenomenology. Rather, it is "to the things themselves" that the phenomenologist directs his attention. The analysis consists in making clear the constituents and the structure of what was intuited. Then comes the description.

It can be seen that the three substages (intuition, analysis, description) are very closely related: their differences reflect the extreme care and rigor demanded of Husserl in this method.

B. Intuition of essences (principles)

If phenomenological intuition and description remains at the level of the particular there arise problems, as the following example will make clear.

> I hear the phone: it is a familiar sound. I can describe its cycle: a ring followed by a pause. The ring itself consists of a bell-like sound reiterated quickly many times. I could count these reiterations, or I could measure and compare the duration of sound and silence. I hear a pitch: I could sing it, place it in a register. I notice that the pitch rises slightly during the reverberations following each ring. I could describe the timbre.[10]

This example remains at a surface level, a level of facts. Such a description could go on indefinitely, but this detail would serve no purpose. The ring of another phone could be lower in pitch, slower in reiterations, or shorter in duration. Or, it could be another sound, a buzz, the sound of breaking glass, or even an excerpt from a Beethoven string quartet. Nothing of the description in the above example need hold in any of these instances. Rather than focus solely on the individual, Husserl, in Part One of the *Ideas*, argues for the possibility of a focus on essences.[11]

An essence is an invariance, an identity within a manifold of actual or imaginable experiences.[12] Husserl distinguishes between an "eidos," which is a pure essence, and the empirical universal. What distinguishes them is the type of experience in which the identity obtains. The empirical universal, the goal of the natural sciences (and of psychology to the extent that it considers itself a natural science), is found only within actual experiences. An eidos, however, is grasped primarily (but not exclusively) in "free phantasy."[13] The eidos is what remains invariant in all possible variations of a thing, imaginative or otherwise. "In this process of free variation we become aware of an identity that persists in all the cases we can imagine."[14] The eidos and eidetic relationships are at the heart of Husserlian phenomenology.

The individual thing, Husserl argues, is contingent: it has *this* location, *this* physical shape, and *this* duration, but it could just as easily have been someplace else, with a different shape, and with a different temporal locus. "Individual existence of every sort is, quite universally speaking, 'contingent'. It is thus; in respect to its essence it could have been otherwise."[15] The matter of factness of the individual thing, however, is connected to a necessity. "It belongs to the sense of anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended purely."[16] Each individual thing has, as well as its own factuality, "a stock of essential predictables" which another individual thing can have, too. Every experience is not only a particular fact but is also an instance of a principle of experience.

An eidos is not a mysterious, hidden, and evanescent quality. It is simply a "characteristic way of being", how a thing is "in principle."[17] (The term Husserl uses, which is translated as "essence", is *Wesen*: being) The ringing of the phone has essential characteristics as a sound that it shares with all other sounds; a typical way of being present in experience. As a sound it has these characteristics *in principle*. One could not imagine a sound without these characteristics.

A first step in the investigation of essences and essential relationships is to locate the particulars of experience as a species of a region, that is, to find its place in a graded series of essences, from greater generality to greater specificity. The relation of a region to a species is a relation parallel to that of a whole to its parts. The highest region is that which cannot be subsumed under any other category. Phenomenological inquiry seeks out these relationships, locating the essential connections, the whole-part relations, obtaining among and between the particulars under investigation.[18]

Husserl distinguishes two types of parts depending on whether they can be presented separately from the whole or not. Pieces, independent parts, can be presented apart from their whole. Moments, however, are dependent parts. They cannot be presented separately from their whole.

These distinctions will gain more meaning as we turn now to a study of the whole-part-relationships involved in the experience of

sound. Because these distinctions are fine and perhaps unfamiliar, it will be valuable to compare how they operate with respect to sound to another field.

An example of the piece-moment distinction can be found in a flower. The petal is a piece of the whole flower. The petal can be presented apart from the flower. The color of the petal, on the other hand, is a moment, an abstractum. It can be separated from the petal in thought only. Color is a moment to the region, material thing. It can be abstracted from the material thing but can never be presented, or intuited, apart from a material thing. Further, color itself consists of several moments — hue, brightness, saturation — each of which depends upon, is supported by, and can be abstracted from the others.

A melody can be presented independently of a piece of music. For example, the theme of a variation movement can be heard all by itself. A melody is thus a piece of the music. A sound by itself contains several mutually dependent moments, pitch, loudness, and timbre, for example. It is clear that without a sound there can be no actually heard pitch or loudness. If there is no pitch there is no sound and no loudness. These are essential necessities. Pitch can be abstracted from a sound but requires loudness to be presented.

Timbre, however, has a more complicated relationship to pitch and loudness than pitch and loudness have to each other. Timbre is the combination of pitch (taken broadly to mean the total frequency-spectrum of a sound all fundamental frequencies present, as well as all their partials, and all of the interferences and other acoustical facts, such as combination tones and subjective pitch, resulting from the combination of frequencies) and loudness (also taken broadly to mean the complete description of the sound's envelope — attack, decay, sustain, and release — combined with the amplitudes of the various partials constituting the sound). Each timbre consists of the moments, pitch and loudness and is itself dependent upon them as they are both dependent on timbre and each other. Pitch and loudness are further abstractions from sound and are supported by timbre. Pitch, timbre, and loudness all depend upon the more general category, sound.

A sound-complex might be the combination of several timbres.

The timbres would be pieces of the total sound-complex, being themselves separably presentable from the whole complex. The interferences and combination tones would not be pieces, however, for they depend on the interaction of the members.

The individual, thus, is never known only as an individual, but can be known as an instance of a principle. This principle, this eidos, can be the object of an intuitive regarding. Just as we have intuitive experience of sounding things, an experience that grounds other knowledge of sound, so we can have eidetic intuition of a pure essence. The sound of this phone is of such and such a pitch and loudness, but any and all sound essentially has some pitch and some loudness. Though the ring of this phone is of such and such a duration, every sound, in principle, has some duration. Husserl holds that we have "originary presentive" (intuitive) experience of these principles (essences).[19] His point is that an eidos is not simply a mental construction, but that it is given directly in our experience of things. It is simply the manner in which an object, a sound in this case, presents itself in our experience. We confront an eidos when we confront an essential impossibility, when even in imagination we cannot conceive of such and such a thing.[20] The eidos of an individual sound refers to the essential impossibility of a sound not having pitch, loudness, or duration. We cannot even imagine the possibility of holding a sound in our hands, or walking around a shout. These impossibilities reflect the essential (eidetic) structure of sound.

What a phenomenology of sound has as its goal, then, is the essential structure of sound experience, the lived experience of sound. Therefore, though it is necessary to begin with particular sounds, the phenomenological focus should also include what remains the same in an essential manner through all experiences of sound.

C. The describing

To begin to describe without first opening oneself to experience, without the intuiting, weakens the truth of description for several reasons. First, such a description can easily be infected with

habitual patterns of thought, with a common-sense metaphysics already at work.

Connected with this, if we begin our description too soon, even the language we use can adversely affect the project. Consider the influence of a visually-orientated world view might have on our thought. Beginning with the pre-Socratics, the tradition of Western thought draws heavily on visual metaphors.[21] Expressions such as "insight," "clear thinking," "speculation," "theory," "throwing light on the subject," "mind's eye," "seeing what is meant" all point to this influence. (In fact the Greek verb "oida" — to know — is actually a past form of "eidenai" — to see; thus to know something was to have seen it!) It could be argued that these are just surface terms and do not point (is this another visualism?) to an underlying metaphysics.

Other examples suggest a deeper influence. Aristotle, in the opening paragraph of his *Metaphysics* held that "sight is the principal source of knowledge." In Plato's myth of the cave, the various levels of knowledge are symbolized by images of light: shadows, firelight, and sunlight. The myth is built on a comparison of knowing with seeing.

The point is to be wary of this "visualist" influence in attempting a description of the sound field. The traditional forms of thought that have "visual" tendencies may prejudice an investigation into auditory things.

Husserl's interests, in part at least, lay in a rigorous description of experience. This description can be skewed by previous assumptions concerning the nature of things. These assumptions, in fact, can hinder, if not block completely, the ability to see, hear, or know just what is given in experience. The experience of silence may serve as an example of this. In a classroom, the assumption that 'when no one is talking there is silence' can prevent one from hearing the buzz of the flourescent lights, or the hum of the air conditioner. When attention is directed to these sounds, the 'silence' disappears.

Or, if one assumes the veracity of Schenker's theory of levels, in particular the *Ursatz*, then one seeks this out in musical structure. By this assumption one is led to hear music in a particular way. For

a more obvious example important to musicology, consider people trained in the style of the common practice period of Western music who (1) have attempted "functional harmonic analyses of music of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, music written prior to the consolidation of the common practice tonal and rhythmic system, or (2) in ethnomusicological studies, have imposed structures taken from the common practice period on music from other cultures. These are examples of cultural biases (assumptions which may have never been critically examined) which infect the nature of their respective perceptions.

From another perspective, the assumptions on the theoretical level as well as for common sense (what Husserl calls the natural attitude) that sensation, in the form of discrete sonorous stimulations, is the foundation of auditory perception, and that the perceptual systems themselves are discrete and independent make it difficult to begin a description of music with anything other than scientifically defined sound. In other words, for this position, the basic materials of music are sounds, each defined by a certain frequency, amplitude, envelope, and harmonic content, and of a specific duration. Music reduces to a sequence and combination of such sounds, and the scientific data adducible to these sounds constitute its description. This data is not found in direct experience, however. No matter how fine one's auditory acuity, the frequency cannot be "calculated" by ear; no more can the decible level, the harmonic content, or even the precise duration be figured by ear. One can discriminate minute differences in sound and still not be able, only from hearing, to answer for the objective, scientific data.

It is clear then, that if the project is to describe what is known directly (intuited) in experience, and to be able to justify this experience, some way of getting clear of the assumptions of common sense, the natural/scientific attitude is needed. But what characterizes this "natural attitude"? In the natural attitude there is present "a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world."[22] In the natural attitude this world is simply there, existing. Sounds are made by things and heard. Sounds themselves, in this attitude, are not "things", but are results. The hum of the heater is taken as the result of the fan motor — turn the heater/fan off and

the sound disappears. Things remain. Husserl's description of the natural attitude — "continually 'there for us' and 'on hand', and which will always remain there according to the consciousness as an actuality ..."[23] — does not seem helpful in connection with sound because sounds are not always there for me and do not remain. On the other hand, even though the life of a sound, its sounding duration, can be very short, it still has an objective, acoustic reality for the duration of its life. The existence of the casual greeting when heard is not doubted, it is not taken as an illusion or hallucination. It is there for us, and we respond to it. This greeting shows our belief in its natural objectivity, its actuality, when we choose not to return it and later regret this choice. Though the sound is no longer heard, neither the sound nor the greeting are taken to be ephemeral or non-real. The sound is now merely past. It was, though it is not now. It is this belief in the world's actuality posited in the natural attitude that characterizes this attitude.

The turn towards experience is a turn away from science, common sense, and what Husserl calls the "natural attitude" in which the scientific and the common sensical perspectives are developed and supported. For the acoustician, the description of sound includes such information about wave forms, vibrations, harmonics, envelopes, energy, molecules, etc. None of this is present to immediate experience. The scientific account is an *explanation* of the physical nature of sound rather than its description as experienced. This turn away from science and the natural attitude is, for Husserl, a turn away from a tendency to "reduce" things to just their objective, measurable properties. It is an attempt to uncover the basis for the possibility of this objective, scientific concern with things, in particular with things that are "out there," or transcendent. The object as it appears to a consciousness, in other words, as it is presented in lived experience, both "transcends" consciousness and is also "in" consciousness. This is possible because of the special character of consciousness, namely that it is directed towards its object. (To clarify the meaning of this will be the task of the following sections.) The phenomenological description of an object is concerned with the object as it appears, and thus as immanent in

consciousness. It is important to note that this concern with the immanent includes both the subject's experiencing, which Husserl calls the noesis, but also with the object of that experience *as it is experienced.* It is not a question of what is inside and what is outside consciousness, but of how what is outside consciousness gets its sense from how it appears in experience when the object is normally experienced. Husserl called this turn towards the contents of immediate experience the phenomenological reduction.[24]

D. Phenomenological reduction

Husserl refers to the procedure of the reduction alternately as a parenthesizing, excluding, bracketing, putting out of play, and refraining from belief. What he intends to be put out of play, and so to be parenthesized, is our conviction in the actuality of the natural world.[25] Zaner describes the bracketing as a disengagement from the taken-for-granted.[26] In the natural attitude we "posit an Objective spatio-temporal actuality as *our factually existent surrounding world to which we nonetheless belong.*"[27] It is this position, this belief in the actuality of the natural world, that needs to be put out of play before the phenomenological attitude can be effected. Along with this position, however, goes the bracketing of all the natural and social sciences connected with this position (physics, biology, sociology, empirical psychology, musicology as scientific and historical, and so forth).[28]

This may seem to be a very startling if not absurd and off-putting move, especially to any of the behaviorist or positivist-factual strain of thought. This may be true even for the musicologist, for whom a solid foundation in research, science and history is hereby hardly dispensed with. The Behaviorists argue that there *is no* consciousness that transcends the objective world.[29] To attempt to 'reduce' the field of endeavor to 'lived experience', to the ways in which objects are presented to consciousness, and to the life of the mind, is sheer folly to this view. There would be nothing left to talk about. But in fact, as Husserl makes clear, everything remains following the reduction, but everything also undergoes a change in sign, a revaluation.[30] However, this remains to be shown.

In the phenomenological attitude the belief in the actuality of the sound is suspended, thus, putting the objective world in brackets. When one listens phenomenologically to a telephone actually ringing, or a flute actually being played, though the belief in the actuality of these sounds is put out of play, still the relation between the sound heard and the hearing remains. The phenomenological reduction does not completely obliterate or disparage the achievements of the natural world, instead it opens up a new field of study, one in which, instead of just living *in* it with all the commitments this entails, acts of reflection can be directed to this 'living in' including its commitments.[31] Thus, the reduction does not make for a new reality, it does not destroy the transcendent, rather it exposes a new way of being for the one reality. The reduction establishes a distance from the natural attitude and its objects. It makes possible a study of objects as given to consciousness and of the giving of consciousness.

An obvious, though perhaps trivial, example may help clarify the concept of the phenomenological reduction. In daily life we often hear the phrase "The world is getting smaller." On the one hand, science tells us that the world is not getting smaller or larger in any sense relevant to that expression. The common sense of the natural attitude takes this scientific position for granted: 'Of course the *actual* world isn't getting smaller, there are still the same number of miles between Cleveland and Spokane." But it also senses the truth of the statement and attempts to reconcile the contradiction by reference to metaphor or 'mere' appearance: (1) "Oh, that's just a figure of speech", or (2) "Well, the world isn't actually getting smaller, it just *seems* like it is."

On the other hand, phenomenology does not take as its field of study the actual world — which is the domain of the natural sciences. Rather it is interested in our experience of this world. Phenomenology "turns away from the object to the ways in which the object is presented [to a consciousness or in lived experience]."[32] In other words, phenomenology focuses on how the object (whether material thing, piece of music, judgment, or any other possible object of experience) is present to us in our stream of lived/living experience. Thus, for phenomenology, it is not that the world *seems*

smaller (which would tend toward phenomenalism — that reality, the way things really are, is only appearance) but that, given what life is these days, with modern transportation systems, modern communication systems, and an increased knowledge base concerning geography and sociology, the world really is smaller for us as we live our lives. Phenomenology does not deny the validity of the measurements that science makes. It looks to other data, other evidence, for its considerations. Phenomenology examines both the world as lived and the objective, measured world. "Phenomenology wishes to describe what is *engendered* when thing and mind come together."[33] From this point of view, then, the expression "the world is getting smaller" is no mere metaphor, no mere appearance, nor is it a contradiction of the given body of scientific knowledge. In concrete lived experience the world simply *is* getting smaller.

The reduction is, fundamentally, a challenge to clear, open experiencing, to careful, critical analysis of the two poles of experience, and to its rigorous description. It opens up the field of lived experience, its contents and its modes of experiencing. The reduction is not a disbelief, or even a doubt, but an understanding, or an attempt to understand.[34] It leads to a new kind of analysis: a description of the essential structures at work in *what* we experience (or live) and also in the *way* in which the what is experienced (or lived). This experience serves as the subject matter of the phenomenological method.

We can now move on to an examination of the structures of experience, in particular the experience of sound, that are uncovered by the phenomenological approach.

3. INTENTIONALITY

We noted above that it was possible to describe both the "what" and the "way" of experience. The following takes a look at the correlation of these two aspects in our experience of sound.

A. The eidetic structure of experience.

I focus on the ring of the telephone again. I notice the sound of course, but also my act of listening. Not only am I aware and able to describe the ringing as heard, but also the way in which it is heard. When the phone is actually ringing I perceive it, I hear it as actually ringing. But it can be present in other ways. In memory, dreaming, or imagination, I 'hear the phone ringing'. I can remember that the phone rang, but I can also remember its ringing, the sounding. This is also true in dreaming. Perhaps I even awaken in order to answer the ring of a phone that was only dreamt.

In this example the ring of the phone (whether remembered, dreamt, or actually perceived) is correlated with a hearing. This is an essential feature of listening (and experience): every sound heard is correlated with a listening, with a hearing. Hearing is always *of* or *to* something. It is a presentation of something besides itself. It is never *just* a hearing. Indeed, this is a characteristic of all mental acts, of all experience as lived. Whether in perception, imagination, memory, or in dreaming, there is always a something that we perceive, imagine, remember, or dream. Likewise all objects of perception, memory, imagination, and so forth are the objects of acts of consciousness. In other words, in the case of dreaming, we do not simply dream, we dream something. Dreaming is "having dreams", perceiving is "having perceptions", and so on. Husserl termed this feature of experience "intentionality."[35] A central concern for a phenomenology of sound is the description of the intentional structure of listening.

Every listening has two parts: 1) the 'what' of that which experienced and 2) the 'experiencing' of this what. Husserl termed these as "noema" and "noesis" respectively. (Both terms derive from the Greek verb "noein" — to think, suppose, perceive, intend.) The noema is roughly that which consciousness is of and the noesis is the act, the mode of experiencing. But the noema is not just the object, it is precisely the object as given in the phenomenological reduction. Intentionality is this noetic-noematic structure. We noted that it was possible to describe both the experience of the sound of the phone ringing (the noema) as well as how it was experienced (the noesis). This two-part structure is a necessary

aspect of experience and both parts have to described. Everything heard is essentially correlated with a hearing.

In fact, Sokolowski argues that the phenomenologist does not describe the contents of experience so much as the structures of the experienced and experiencing. The focus is not so much on a thing but on the thing's presence and absence in experience. He states that the novelty of phenomenological analysis is the claim "that presences and absences are forms belonging to the object in its presentational possibility, in its being, and that the mind is with the object and not only with representations of it."[36] In the experience of sound the phenomenologist asks what is present, how does it present itself, what is absent, and how is one aware of its absence. The phenomenological focus is on experienced things, the way things are in experience, not on the way they are from an "objective, scientific" view. Phenomenology also examines the way our experience is different with different kinds of things.

But if we are not going to describe "actual" things but only experiencing and things as experienced, then what are we describing? It is to the noesis and noema, the intentional experiencing and the intentional object, that we now turn.

B. Noesis and Noema

Husserl distinguishes between inherent, or integral, parts of pure experience and intentional correlates. If experience is treated like an "object" and subjected to analysis, it can be seen that it is composed of at least two inherent parts: the material and the noetic components of experience. Husserl often calls the material component the hyletic data. One is able to analyze any lived experience into its hyletic data. With respect to the telephone these data might consist of a tone quality, a pitch, a loudness, and if I see the phone, then also its color, shape and size would be included in the list. These should not be considered as simple, discrete sensations, for they are not the stuff out of which we built perceptions but are rather what we analyze perceptions into. Still the hyletic data are given to experience and are an inseparable part of all lived experience. They are the means by which moments of physical things,

reverberant sound or coloredness for example, present themselves to consciousness.[37]

What is first in perceptual experience is not hyletic data but perceptual intentions — hyletic data already infused with meaning. It is the noetic component which animates, or bestows meaning, on the hyletic. The noesis constitutes a meaning, and this meaning is the noema. The noema, then, is not an inherent part of lived experience, no more than is the actual object. Rather, the noema is a *product* of this experience, it is an *intentional object*, an object by means of which the experiencing acts are directed towards actual objects.

As the intentional correlate of experience the noema is not simply the actual physical object either. The actual tree "can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements," but the noema, the perceptual sense, "cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties."[38] But just because it is not actual, the noema does not lack reality. Rather, the noemata are the multiplicity of forms of presentation of real, actual objects, gathered up and unified by consciousness. Husserl warns explicitly against setting up two realities, one actual and one immanental. The intentional object, though correlated with and constituted by really inherent components of experience, the noetic and hyletic, is itself not an inherent component of experience. "There is no second immanental tree, nor even an 'internal image' of the actual tree standing out there before me."[39] If this intentionality is to account for how consciousness is directed towards the actual world, an internal image or picture would only make it necessary to posit a second level of intentionality by which the internal image of the first intentionality is directed towards the actual object, precisely the problem which the first level of intentionality was supposed to solve. In order to avoid an infinite regress, and thus losing the notion of intuition by which the world is known in direct presence, at some level the distinction between the inherent parts of intentional experience and its correlative objects must be made.

In the example of the shrinking world, there is an actual distance between Spokane and Cleveland. This actual distance is only one part, though perhaps a core part, of the noematic sense which is

that of lived experience and despite this core sense the journey from Spokane to Cleveland is getting shorter.

C. The Noemata of Sound Experience

Intentionality refers to the directedness of mental processes and experiencing. Consciousness "intends" an object. When analyzed by the phenomenologist this intentional object is called the noema. Asking what is intended, or meant, in our listening to sounds is to ask about the noema of sound experience. What might this noema consist of in the experience of sound?

When I hear the phone ring, the sound is present but also a posture — I find myself inclined physically to go answer it, or I know that I can turn away from it. In fact, at the first ring I can hardly keep myself from getting up. At a minimum I turn my head, or look up. It is as if someone is calling me and I attend to the call. I hear the presence of the sound, the feeling of my posture is present, but the phone and the person calling are absent.

In these cases there is more in the heard-ring than just acoustic phenomena, whether perceived, remembered, imagined, or dreamt. Not every aspect was experienced as present or as fully present as other aspects in all modes. In perception the acoustic phenomena is present, but so is the posture, though it is there often only as a background. In memory the experience of the sound, and perhaps the posture as well, is present but not the acoustic sound itself.

As I watch out the living room window and enjoy a vigorous Cleveland summer rain storm I am struck by the fullness of the experience. I see, hear, smell, and feel the cooling down-pour. I hear thunder, in the distance to begin with, but coming closer. All at once there is a sudden crack of thunder. Not only did I hear it but I could feel its sound in my legs, belly and chest. In a very real sense this sound was not only "out there" but also "inside me." Composers have imitated this, musically.

Not only does our experience of sound go beyond acoustic phenomena, but it goes beyond our ears. Though our ears are our focal organs for sound, our experience of sound goes beyond the division of our senses into discrete mechanisms. We use all of the ways in

which our bodies open up to the world to assist us in our interaction with the world. We strain our eyes to see who it is that we hear. We feel with our hands to find out which car is still running. Our sense experience begins as a continuum and remains so in lived experience. The separation of sense experience into discrete organs and areas of activity certainly has justification and facilitates the study of the psychophysical dimensions of experience. Phenomenology returns to the global nature of experience to discover how it is that these discrete sensations have meaning for us.

As I sit at my desk and ponder what to write next, I hear many sounds: typing, piano practicing, people conversing, electronically manipulated sound composing, and traffic. This initial catalogue could, of course, be much longer. Although I am dimly aware that all of these sounds fill my auditory field they do not do so equally. As I focus on the piano playing, listening attentively to the pitch organization of the music, the other sounds recede: I cannot at the same time keep track of the content of the conversation. As I turn my attention to the composing and try to guess what compositional problems are being currently addressed by the composer, I lose the syntax of the piano playing. Throughout, the traffic provides a more-or-less continuous background.

What can we conclude from these examples? The thing to be noted first is the polyphonic aspect of the auditory field. There can be many simultaneously occurring strands of sound filling this field. Within this field one can distinguish a central, or focal aspect and corresponding fringe surrounding this focus. In listening (and in lived experience generally) there is always a focus — a figure — set inside a fringe — or against a background. Within this polyphony one can focus on a single strand, in which case the other strands recede and become fringe-like. As one refocuses and attends to a different strand the previously focal strand now becomes part of the background. The proportion between the focus and the fringe, however, is not stable. One can widen the focus (which correlatively reduces the fringe) and vice versa. As the focus is widened, though one is still aware that there are parts to the field, it becomes more difficult to distinguish them. This focus cannot be widened indefinitely, however. There is a horizon, a limit, that cannot be exceeded — it recedes with every approach. For sound experience this limit is silence.[40]

I again turn to the piano playing, composing, conversing, and traffic. As it happens, none of the objects making these sounds are visible to me, though some have been, but others I may never have seen before. Further, I may never see some of the objects I hear. Of course, there is always the possibility of seeing them, if not by me then by someone else (as in the case of the trucks passing by two blocks away).

This possibility emphasizes the fact that we do hear things even when we can't see them. As intentional, I perceive more than disembodied acoustical signals: I hear the sounds *of* the typewriter, *of* the piano, *of* the traffic. I cannot, *in my experience*, disentangle the sound from the things that make the sounds. Furthermore, I hear these sounds coming from someplace.

Since sound is rarely taken as giving or presenting spatiality, it will be valuable to look more closely at these matters. The most obvious way that sound implicates space is by means of location. When we hear a sound clearly, we hear it coming from someplace, and we can look to this place or describe where the sound seems to be coming from. This "echo location" can be fooled as sound reverberates through, in, and around enclosed and open spaces. That we can be fooled and can correct ourselves implies that in fact we do expect sound to be able to present this information. Of course sonar is based on this principle, namely that sound yields a spatial-coordinate-type knowledge about the world. We do not always focus on this aspect of sound; in fact the concert hall situation may reduce it, attempting to create a more "omnipresent" sound environment. But the eyes have no monopoly in this area.

Ihde, in his phenomenological description of sound, describes ways in which sound can present shapes, surfaces, and interiors.[41] He describes a game in which an object, such as a die, a marble, a golf ball, a pen, or a feather, is placed in a covered box, and someone has to guess what the object is. It is easy to see that, because we can hear shapes to some extent, it is possible to determine, by listening alone, if not what the object is, at least something about what size and shape it has: whether it is round or flat, large or small, heavy or light. It is also clear that we can hear whether a surface is smooth or rough, soft or hard. By tapping the water tank we can hear inside to tell if it is full or not. Ihde's example of hearing

interiors uses a set of lacquered balls. When tapped, each reveals is own inside, whether rubber, wood, metal with a hollow core, in each's respective "voice", whether a dull thud, a sharp click, or a bell-like ringing tone.

On closer inspection, some of the things I hear are present more fully defined than others, I know I hear the traffic of gasoline-powered internal combustion vehicles, and I can distinguish cars from trucks, but I cannot make any more subtle distinctions as to the age, make, model, or engine dimensions of these vehicles. I assume some people could, but maybe not at this distance. The traffic is thus somewhat indistinct to me. Other sounds make present "things" more fully to me. When I hear a certain birdsong, I hear the call of that species. I hear a cardinal, for example. And if I am in a position to look for the source of the sound, I look for a red bird with a crest, not a bird in general. An even more telling example of this is the sound of my children's voices. When I hear one of their voices, I do not hear just words, or just a general child speaking, I hear Douglas, this particular boy, speaking, whether he is present to my visual field or not.

Sound can make the invisible present with surprizingly rich definition. Just as "things" are concretely there, present to my visual field — though some are only there in the background and vaguely given, some are clearly there but unnameable, and others are distinct, nameable individuals — so likewise can a bird, or any other material thing, be made present to me in my auditory field.

It is clear from these examples that sound is dependent on and presents things to us, but not in the same way that color does. As noted earlier, color is dependent upon the material thing. Color is essentially of things, it is presented by things. It can be abstracted in thought from things — we can think of a color, but yet the color can only be present, we can only know it intuitively, as an inseparable part of a material thing.

At first glance things seem different with sound. We noted in our first example of naive listening that we heard things, and so we might expect a parallel relationship between color and sound to the regional essence, material thing. This does not go far enough. Though things are always presented *as* colored, they are not always sounding (though they always have the *potential* for sounding). We might say that we heard the scratch of a pencil, but in fact we would

have heard the sound of a pencil scratching across a pad of paper or a piece of roughly textured wood. The pencil, left to its own devices, makes no sound. As color is to material thing, sound is to material things. Sound is not dependent on a material thing but on more than one material thing. We can listen to either the pencil or the writing surface, but in fact we hear the two things making only one sound. Even this is not complete. Sound is dependent upon two other factors: There must be motion and collision. One of the material things must move and must come in contact with the other thing. The Zen koan of the sound of one hand clapping well illustrates that sound is dependent upon (1) more than one thing, (2) motion, and (3) collision. Sound is less a moment, an inseparable part, of the material thing than of the temporal and spatial relationship of material things.

There are other interesting comparisons to draw concerning these two aspects. The thing "shows", or "presents" a color, while it "sends" a sound. While the color of a thing remains with, or inhers in, the thing, the sound leaves, it separates itself spatially from the thing. The source of the sound can be determined, but this manner of speaking is telling! We trace the sound back to its source, while the color never left. Sound is aggressive, it penetrates and fills other things, while color, keeping its distance, remains fixed in its own thing, protecting it.

The differences between sound and color with respect to their dependencies on things are due to the way things are intended in hearing and seeing, the different ways the noemata are constituted in their respective regions. Different aspects of the object are made present depending upon whether we hear or see the object. Correlatively, different aspects are absent. These differences between how sound and color make present the material thing are important because they reveal different aspects of our experience of things.

Sound depends on time as well as on things. It is not only subsumed by the region of the material thing, but also by the region of the temporal thing, temporality. This issue is fundamental to a discussion of musical experience. Its introduction here, with the relatively more simple cases of single sounds, will make it possible to consider and digest more fully Husserl's conception of tem-

porality and time-consciousness prior to applying it to the more complicated cases of musical situations. But first some other aspects of intentionality and identity will have to be developed, in order to set up the discussion of temporality.

D. Presence and Absence: Filled and Empty Intentions

In vision we see, or we are presented with things. But yet no physical thing is presented fully — all at once and immediately — in one sighting. Only one side of the object is given as present, or in Husserl's terms, only one side is fulfilled intentionally. In other words, we can only ever see a thing from one perspective at a time. The other sides, not visible from "this" perspective, are intended emptily, but they co-function in presenting the object.[42] The intentional object consists of both filled and empty intentions. When something is seen, one side is present while other sides are emptily intended. Its color is present, is filled intentionally, while its sound is absent. All aspects emptily intended can be brought to presence, that is, they are essentially fulfillable. (Intuition, then, refers to this concept of filled intention. What is intuited is precisely that which is intentionally fulfilled or brought to presence.) We can change our perspective and see other sides. As we do, however, the side previously present withdraws and becomes intended emptily. This is *not* to say that we confront only a "face", or an appearance, but that seeing an object is based on our lived experience of that object, namely that we confront the whole object intentionally.

On the other hand, when we hear a thing and do not see it, its color is absent, emptily intended. What about the thing itself? It is easy to consider that the source of the sound is intended emptily. As was noted previously, sound separates itself spatially from its source. But this analysis reduces the thing to (the presence of) its *visual* aspects; it reduces the reality of the world to its visual reality. Sound is a moment of the regional essence, material thing, just as color is. It is not a disembodied quality. A thing is brought to presence by sounding every bit as much as it is in illumination. Different aspects are intentionally fulfilled in each type of experience. Visually the object is determined in certain ways; its shape, color,

size and location relative to the viewer, are easily fulfilled. Around these determinations is a horizon of indeterminacy, aspects that are emptily intended though potentially fulfillable. Some aspects, such as shape are experienced as partially determined but with a horizon of indeterminacy (what is the shape of its hidden side?). Lest there be confusion here, it should be emphasized that it is not that we can't report the shape of the other side, clearly in many cases we would be able to do this, but that this shape is not *present* to this sighting. Other aspects, such as its interior, are experienced visually *only* indeterminately (though we can't see it we still assume that it has an interior; the interior is intended emptily).

Sound, too, exposes the material thing, but not the same facets: location, resonance, its construction with respect to the regularity of its harmonic structure can be fulfilled intentionally in listening to greater or lesser degrees. Some aspects, such as resonance, are experienced partially determined with a horizon of indeterminacy. For example, to distinguish by listening between a wooden and a metal flute is a task easy to accomplish. The size can be so determined, but not perhaps with the same precision (Is it an A or B-flat clarinet that one hears?). On the other hand, other aspects, such as location, are more or less ambiguously determined: it is not always possible to fix definitively the location of a thing by its sound. Still others, such as color, are experienced audially only indeterminately: we can rarely if ever determine the color of the sounding object. (Note that in synaesthesia, where the experience of sound produces the experience of color, it is that hearing "X" makes the subject see "y", not *hear* "y", where "X" is a sound and "y" is a color).

The full noema, then, consists of all the intended aspects, both present and absent. When we intend the "same" object in various perspectives and at various times, we are conscious of an identity. The empty and filled intentions are inseparable parts of this consciousness. "Only when we are able to experience the object in its presence and in its absence do we encounter its identity."[43] In like manner are the present and absent aspects, whether visually or auditorially, inseparable parts to the identity of the material thing.

E. Identity: Unity in a Manifold

The visual object is never fully present in perception but has aspects of presence and absence. A book is present necessarily from one perspective at a time. If what is present from any one given perspective is called a side, then the visual object is an identity within a manifold of sides. Though the book is rectangular, it has a rectangular aspect from only one optimal perspective. From other perspectives the aspect presented may be trapezoidal or rhomboid, and these vary in shape and size depending on the specific perspective. The color of the book is also presented in different perspectives. Depending on the direction, intensity, and color of the illumination of the color of the book appears to change. Yet we intend a unity within these manifolds. We take the book to be the same size, shape, and color no matter from what perspective or under what kind of lighting we see it.

It is immediately apparent that in our visual experience of the telephone we intend a unity over manifolds of changing perspective and illumination. In the ordinary experience of the natural attitude we tend to *assume* that each visual object has its own more or less invariant shape and color because we know "know" about the invariance of the physical object. Piaget has shown that the knowledge of this invariance is an accomplishment and not just an obvious feature of the world. Yet, we are so accustumed to exersizing our belief in the actuality of the objective world, so accustumed to seeing beyond visual appearances and finding a unity or invariance, that we have difficulty in focusing only on the appearances, the visual presentations of things. We encounter an identity when we are able to fuse these presently filled intentions with corresponding previously filled but now empty ones.[44]

The situation is not so clear with auditory experience. When we hear the sound of the telephone, each sound being composed of several bursts of ringing, it is difficult to say whether each burst is either the same or different. If we focus on the more objective description of the burst, by recording its duration, pitch, loudness, the timing of the particular sounds in each burst, there is a strong

tendency to regard each burst as the same, at least to the extent that these measurements are the same for each burst. But there is an equally simple analysis which regards each burst as different, each as a new production. It does not seem that either analysis has a general ascendency over the other in auditory experience, while in visual experience there are few who would "innocently" assert after a new viewing of a given phone, even if from a widely different perspective, that the phone has a "different shape" in the new viewing. Even if we can easily see in the new viewing a different aspect of the "same shape" of the phone, it would still be the "same shape" in a different manner than the repeated burst is the "same" as the first burst.

The manifold of sides and shapes visually presented are unified by an identity intention. How is a particular sound an identity within a manifold? What filled intentions are fused with empty ones? Depending on from what place a sound is heard changes in loudness and apparent location take place. Do these changes affect our judgement as to the identity of the sound? Does the vibrato, as a change of pitch, destroy the identity of the sound within these changes? Don't changes in the register involve changes in the identity of the sound? In other words, don't instruments and voices really have different sounds in their different registers? In short, can we speak of the "identity" of a sound?

One difficulty in clarifying the notion of the identity intention with respect to sound lies in what seems to be the enduring nature of the visual aspects of the object versus the corresponding passing of the auditory aspects. With respect to a seeing of a phone we can always check our intuition by returning for another viewing something we cannot do with sound for the sound must be reproduced. But the color perceived, the color aspect of the noema, must be renewed in each new viewing even though the physical aspects of the color of the material object endure. Once we look away we must look again to have this color again present. The perception of sound needs a similar renewal but is correlated not with an enduring aspect of an object but with a reproduction of this aspect.

The material object that presents the perceived color, shape and size is always filled intentionally in the perception of these aspects,

whereas the material object can be intended emptily in the perception of its auditory aspects. But, as we have seen, sound can present a material object, though not its visual presences. And we certainly intend the identity of a material object over changes in the sounds it can be made to produce. No matter what sounds a given flute makes, these sounds are always "of this flute." In this respect we identify the sounds made by an object as "of this object."

On the one hand, though the potentially continual and evenly sustained presence of the visual aspects of a material object contrasts with the becoming and decaying and only intermittent aspects of its auditory aspects, both are identified in part by their presentation by the same object. On the other hand, though we count all of the possible perspectives of an object and all of the sounds it can produce as "of this object" and intend an identity in our perception of this object, we do not identify all its colors, shapes and sounds. Just as we keep separate the black of the handle from the silver of the pot, so the sound made by striking the wooden handle versus the metal pot are different, though each contributes to the total identity of "this aluminum cooking pot."

Thus the visual aspects of a material object seem more enduring than its auditory aspects because (1) the almost overwhelming tendency that the material object be intentionally filled in our visual perception, and (2) of the usually intermittent presentation of its sound. Both visual and auditory aspects are capable of making present a material object, and both contribute to the manifolds through which a unified object is intended. All the shapes made possible by various perspectival viewings of one machine are part of the unity of the machine, but all these shapes cannot be identified as one unified shape without losing their character as presentations of the object. Likewise, all the sounds that a single machine makes are part of the unity that is that machine, but all these sounds need not themselves be identified as a unified sound. Such identifications of these presentations as one shape or sound are accomplishments of our pre-occupation with the things of the natural attitude. We take this unification for granted when we speak of "the shape of that block" or "the sound of that flute." Phenomenologically, we want to expose this pre-occupation and explore how these identities are

possible. Thus, as aspects of noemata, the individual sounds and shapes of an object can remain distinct. Each aspect can be distinguished by its character as either present or absent and whether from this view or that, with this timbre or that. Aspects so distinguished can and do remain connected to other aspects. Identity occurs when the present aspects, filled intentionally, are fused with absent aspects, intended emptily. We note that we can know material objects only through and because of the mixture of presence and absence that objects have in our experience of them.

When we make auditory aspects the object of our attention, we note that there are situations in which we identify various changes in this aspect as "one sound." Changes in distance from the sound source will involve changes in loudness. Yet, through these changes we can, and often do identify "one sound." There are other examples of the unification of certain aspects of the auditory field to form an auditory object. A person's voice is a unity both with respect to pitch, loudness, and timbre, among other things. The sound of William Bennett playing the flute can also be such a unity. In fact, the individual timbres associated with all musical instruments and with voices are all unities within manifolds. The flute timbre is a unity with the manifold of changes (1) in intensity, (2) in pitch, (3) in wave-form structure with respect to the flute's several registers, and (4) in many different modes of sound production such that we can recognize a beginner from a professional but also recognize both as flute sounds. Likewise the perception of pitch is the unification of a manifold of pitch presentations either (1) in the multiple frequencies present in a complex tone, (2) in various timbres, (3) in the simultaneous presence of several pitches, and (4) in various intensities. Thus, a pitch vibrato destroys the unity of the pitch only when one becomes incapable of, or at least is hindered in fusing one absent pitch with another one that is present. We are not simply taught that this is so, we must listen more closely and discover it. We must pay attention to the way these sounds come to be, how they are constituted in our experience.

The changes in color, shape, loudness, pitch, and timbre are thus parallel in this respect: all result from changed aspects of the total act of perception and are experienceable changes, but they

emphasize different parts within the whole perceptual act. As we objectify the visual appearances of things we tend not to see what new viewings bring. Because the auditorial presentation must be reproduced, either actually or in memory (though in the case of memory, it should be noted, it is the memory of a "very same experience of sound" and not the production of a brand new sound), we tend to be more aware of what new hearings bring. Identities of material things or of visual or auditory objects result from the binding together of present and absent parts, and memories are absent parts. Memories are a prime way in which the identity intention functions in the perception of auditory objects.

In phenomenological reflection, we focus on the appearances as presentations, or modes of being, of objects. We can also see the identity intention at work unifying the manifolds of visually and auditorially presented objects. From this vantage point we can also see the identity intention function differently for auditory and visual presentations because of their different modes of being and different capacities for presentation. The differences are due only to the different ways in which color and sound make the material thing present to us and in which visual and auditory aspects can be objectified, not to fundamental differences in the reality of color and sound.

As we focus on the visual and auditory presentations of things, that is, with their particular mixture of presence and absence, we must remember that these presentations are the only way objects are given to us in perceptual experience. The more we objectify things, that is, the more we abstract the things from their presentations, the more possible it is to measure them: the telephone is so many inches wide, deep, and tall, and has a ring of such and such a pitch. The identity we intend, however, is not simply these measurements.

If we look to measurements, to wavelengths and decibels, to help us think about and solve the problems of appearances, we have begun to abstract the object from our experience of that object. But a science of measurements does not explain the identity we experience in these cases, or even the conflict of appearance versus identity. Science assumes this identity. The identity is not simply the

scientific description of the object. An avalanche, considered from the scientific attitude, is only a combination of mass, temperature, and energy. The interaction of these elements can be expressed in the form of measurements and equations. We think of more than this, however, when we think of an avalanche. We add to this account a subject world: sheltering homes and forests, challenging elements, human life and comfort. Husserl's intent is to show that the scientific account is possible only as a part abstracted from the whole, a whole which includes in the surrounding "life-world" both the actual objective and the psychological subjective aspects of this world.

The "scientific object" is an inseparable part of our experience of sound, but it is supported by and abstracted from this experience. We *intend* an identity within the series of changes, and this is true whether the changes are of loudness, location, context, vibrato, or register. The identity of a sound is intended: we recognize it as the same (or different) as a previously experienced sound. This recognition is not simply a subject's construction, though the subject is certainly involved. Husserl terms it a constitution by the subject. We look closer, we listen harder, and we see or hear the identity. We recognize it as the same, but we do not create or make up the identity. The "sameness" is there and we constitute it as "the same" by synthesizing filled and empty intentions. We let the object build itself, we let it take shape for us.[45] Constitution, a critical notion in Husserlian phenomenology, consists, in part at least, of an integration of the mixture of presence and absence that things have in our experience of them. It is not a re-making of the data given in perception. Rather, it means letting things manifest themselves to consciousness. It is developing a sensibility to what is given. With this sensibility we can hear and see past variations in context and production to the identities present in the appearances. As we become more able to "objectify" sound, as we become more able to focus on and describe its objective aspects, we become more able to "hold" this sound in our minds, to experience it in its absence, and thus to encounter its identity. This cannot happen without developing the sensibility. Sensibility "feels otherness and sameness, and it senses the difference of parts, but it does not mark

them off ... Without this sensing of parts there would be no thinking; but without thinking we would not appreciate that we are sensing parts."[46]

Every actual object is given only from one perspective at a time: it is never present completely. Because of this essentially incomplete presence, we need to be able to move, to explore, and to interact with the object in order to get a new perspective and to realize more fully the identity within the various manifolds. At the theater, stage sets gain their sense of reality by having the viewers fixed in one location. The needed new perspective can be gained by moving (around, closer, farther away) and by repeated or steady viewing. But is a "new" perspective even possible with non-enduring objects such as telephone rings, spoken sentences, sounding symphonies and such? One cannot walk around a melody to see it from different sides. The visual object offers an infinite number of sides with no preferred viewing order. The auditory object seems to offer one principle perspective, from beginning to end, and its order is a necessary order. (Though it is possible to walk around the producer of the melody and hear the melody from different angles.) Temporal constitution, already of concern in the context of sound as a mode of appearing of a material thing, becomes of paramount importance as we turn our attention to sound as an auditory object. It is to this temporal perspective and its corresponding intentions that we now turn.

4. TEMPORALITY

A. Inner time-consciousness

Husserl's analysis of inner time-consciousness is one of his most important and well known contributions. His thought on this issue did go through some development and was tied closely to the emergence in his work of the notion of an "absolute consciousness."[47] It is to his position elaborated in his book on time-consciousness that we now turn. Husserl's analyses of the structure the experience of time is very relevant to the present project for he uses musical sound as a model.[48]

Husserl distinguishes between the transcendent object in objective time and immanent unities of pre-empirical time.[49] This distinction is important. Material objects endure in objective time. An actually sounding melody, another kind of transcendent object, has a specific duration and temporal location. It is a sequence of tones. Having begun, parts of it are past, parts of it yet to come, and one part is current in a Now. With respect to a single tone, we see that it, too, has these phases. But what makes it possible to recognize the past phase as distinct from the Now phase? If a past phase must be remembered in order to distinguish it from a Now, that is, if the past phase is no longer present in consciousness, then once remembered this phase will be present (as remembered) and instead of succession we get a simultaneity. Miller points out that "no succession of awareness — no matter how close together in time they come — can, by itself, account for the awareness of succession."[50] The same holds true for the duration of a tone. In order to account for the awareness of a duration we need more than a continuity of awareness. In a melody one tone succeeds another. To understand how we are aware of this succession as a succession Husserl shifts the focus to the immanent object. By bracketing transcendent time, Husserl is able to describe how the immanent object appears, what its forms of absence and presence are, and how it is given.

> The sound is given; that is, I am conscious of it as now, and I am so conscious of it 'as long as' I am conscious of any of its phases as now. But if any temporal phase (corresponding to a temporal point of the duration of sound) is an actual now (with the exception of the beginning point), then I am conscious of a continuity of phases as 'before', and I am conscious of the whole interval of the temporal duration from the beginning-point to the now-point as an expired duration. I am not yet conscious, however, of the remaining interval of the duration. At the end-point, I am conscious of this point itself as a now-point and of the whole duration as expired (in other words, the end-point is the beginning point of a new interval of time which is no longer an interval of sound). 'During' this whole flux of consciousness, I am conscious of one and the same sound as enduring, as enduring now.[51]

The parts belonging to the consciousness of the immanent object Husserl calls the primal impression, retention, and protention. He distinguishes, then, the parts of the temporal object from the parts

of the consciousness of that object. In the now-phase (a part of the temporal object) we experience the primal impression connected to retentions (of elapsed phases) and protentions pointing, with a certain indeterminacy, towards phases yet to come. All of these parts, both the phases of the temporal object and the parts of our consciousness of the flow of time, are moments, inseparable from each other in any given awareness. Retention is the comet's tail of the primary impression. Though we are able to think about these parts separately, there can be no retention without a preceding primary impression, and no past phase that is not succeeded by a new Now, preceding a phase about to be. A sound perceived begins in consciousness as a primal impression but passes over immediately into a retentional modification which is an "actual existent." "The retentional sound is not actually present but 'primarily remembered' precisely in the now."[52]

The retention itself cannot be an actual sound, not even an echo. Nor can it be a symbolization or a representation. The retentional modification must be an "originary consciousness." "It pertains to the essence of the intuition of time that in every point of its duration (which, reflectively, we are able to make into an object) it is consciousness of *what has just been* and not mere consciousness of the now-point of the objective thing appearing as having duration."[53] Thus, we are able to have an awareness of succession and not just a succession of awarenesses. Retention is therefore other than recollection. Recollection is, for Husserl, an act which does not place before us an object itself but is rather a re-presentation of it.[54] The retention, on the other hand, is *joined* to a primal impression in the perception of a Now.

Through the structure of primary impression, retention, and protention a unity is constituted. "The constituted act, constructed from now-consciousness [primary impression] and retentional consciousness is *adequate perception of the temporal object*"[55] It is by means of this constitutive act that we are able to know a temporal object as a unity. This act involves a third level of the consciousness of time, the "absolute, temporally constitutive flux of consciousness" or absolute consciousness. Absolute consciousness has two inseparable intentionalities associated with it, one directed towards the

immanent temporal object and the other directed towards the flow itself.[55]

A continuous sound has its own past, present, and future which are distinct and separable parts. This is in contrast to a color which does not have past, present, and future parts that are distinct and separable. A color, by itself, does not have temporal parts. The presentation of a sound takes time. We can measure its duration and say that the sound lasted so many seconds. Throughout its duration we can identify the phases of the sound's presentation, its past, present, and future parts, as a single, unified sound. This identification is the result of the fusion of the retentions, primal impressions, and protentions of the experience of the sound. At any moment in the experience of a sound there are retentive and protentive features that are inseparable parts of that moment's primal impression. The experiencing involved in these cases also has this three-part temporal structure. Experiences of both tone and color have retained and protended features intended in the present Now. Indeed, experience generally has this structure and has it necessarily. The intentionalities associated with (1) the temporal structure of experienced objects, and (2) the experiencing itself are the two inseparable intentionalities associated with absolute consciousness.

It should be noted that though we unify in intention the phases of a sound, it is the case that in experience the phases of a sound come together on their own: we simply grasp this manner of presenting itself. We do not construct a unity out of separate elements. (What would the element be that we would use to construct a single sustained tone?) Rather, and it is even more true with a melody, we let the sound or sounds come together. We are able to do this because of the structure of time-consciousness. "Time-consciousness is, thus, the primordial place for the constitution of musical identity and unity, as well as the source of the connective forms of co-existence and succession."[57]

B. The temporal perspectives of melody

According to Husserl, when we intend a single sustained tone we

identify a series of phases as a unified object, and we will perceive the duration of this tone even though some phases will be emptily intended. If we intend a motive or a short phrase within a melody we will not perceive a whole unbroken, unparsed melody. We will have perception of a thing only as long as the thing intended is present. So long as our intentional act is directed towards the whole melody we perceive the whole melody even when part of this melody is past. Husserl puts it this way, "The whole melody, however, appears as present so long as it still sounds, so long as the notes *belonging to it*, intended in *one* nexus of apprehensions, still sound. The melody is past only after the last note is gone."[58] Perhaps reference to a diagram may help clarify this point.

When I intend the notated musical phrase, the structure of my intention might be diagrammed as in Figure 1. The horizontal line (AH) represents the series of primal impressions of this temporal object, A is of the first note, B is of the second note and so forth. (This analysis could be carried out in similar fashion for the single



FIGURE 1 Time diagram.[59]

tone.) The vertical lines represent Nows, in which the primal impression is joined to the retentions. The diagonals represent what Husserl calls the "running off phenomena" of each impression. The Now in which I hear the second tone is represented by the line BA_b, where A_b stands for the retention of the previous primal impression A. When I hear the c-sharp, at E, I hear it with respect to the profiles D_e, C_e, B_e, and A_e. Furthermore, A_e is not simply the retention of A. As each impression is retained it is modified continuously (it "runs off"). Thus, A_e, as a part of the Now represented by EA_e, is a modification of A_d which is in turn a modification of A_c and so on.

This is a description of the temporal structure of a musical object, a melody. If focally attended to this melody has this structure, and this structure is one aspect of its objectification. A melody can become an object for us to the extent that as we are in the presence (either actually or in an "inner hearing") of any of its parts we intend retentionally and protentionally the remainder of its parts.

In the perception of a book, though some of its aspects are intended emptily, we still perceive a full-fledged object. The book's presentation in our experience, how it gives itself, may be incomplete, but the book itself is not incomplete. Likewise, though some of its parts are past and some yet to come, we confront a full-fledged object when we intend a melody, and we confront it at each moment of its presentation.

The melody, then, does have temporal "sides" that are somewhat similar to the sides of a material thing. Just as the material thing can only be present in one perspective or another, so the temporal object presents itself as a series of perspectives. A crucial difference in the perception of a book versus a melody is the manner in which the empty intentions can be filled. In the case of a book, or other visually appearing material object, there is a dispositional aspect connected to making the various perspectival variations that would make present previously absent sides of the object. (Though, as was mentioned earlier, the previously present sides become absent in this process.) One can pick the book up, turn it over and around at one's leisure. One can repeat any of these actions in any order. And one *need not* do any of these things. One

can look at the book from this perspective alone, then look away, and still the book will be experienced as a whole and not a single side. A melody, or other sound, however, though it has "temporal perspectives," these perspectives are set up in a series the order and pacing of which are fixed. One cannot re-order or reverse this series without changing the object. (A retrograde is such a reversal, but it is a change. The retrograde of the melody of Figure 1 is simply not the same, identical melody.) Nor can one hear these perspectives at one's leisure, if one is to hear the melody. These perspectives and their order are given, and if one attends to the melody throughout, one cannot escape hearing "this" series. One cannot, without changing the melody, have it only from one perspective in this sense. Further, an actual hearing of a melody presents the melody in a complete though not exhaustive set of its temporal perspectives (even though not all of its parts need be presented in a primal impression). To have heard the melody is to have had all of its parts made present in a specific order. The perception of a melody, and sound generally, requires attention to the presentation of a specific ordered set of temporal perspectives. It is as if my viewing a book was always and necessarily guided by a specific series of perspectives, a series that the viewer has no control over but can only watch. Such is the temporal organization of sound.

This, of course, is not all that can be said about the temporal structure of musical objects. For example, though the order of perspectives of a melody is given, we can enlarge or narrow the size of frame of the perspectives. In other words, we can intend notes, motives, phrases, periods, movements, and perhaps even multi-movement pieces. (Though this last is theoretically possibly, it is an achievement of no small proportion to be able, at a glance so to speak, to hear a whole movement such that all moments of this movement are intentionally represented in this glance, and the bulk of these intentions are more than just a general sense of a series of events but specify what these events might possible be. That is to say that in a single momentary hearing, all of the tonal, harmonic, rhythmic and structural relationships of the movement have specific auditory intentions that are present in either retained or protended form in this given Now.)

A phenomenology of music would describe the mixture of presence and absence that would correlate with these various sizes of frame. Also the re-hearing of musical objects suggest other perspectival possibilities. All of this needs to be worked out, but these analyses would take us far from the present task of explicating phenomenological themes through a phenomenological analysis of sound.

5. CONCLUSION

The explication of phenomenological themes by means of analyses and descriptions of the experience of sound has brought us to the doorstep of a phenomenology of music. The point of a phenomenology of music would not be to uncover new modes of musical analysis or to make better analyses of musical works, though either of these might result. The point of such a study would be to "become aware of what already possess and what we take for granted."[60]

Becoming aware of what we possess and what we take for granted in the experience of music can be understood as a study of a part-whole relationship, a study of presence and absence. In this endeavor, other part-whole relationships are uncovered that bear, if not on musical practice directly, then on the general theory of music.

A phenomenology of music would address issues such as the relationship of feeling and affect with musical experience. Are feelings and affects parts of the musical noesis or noema, of the musical listening or of the music heard? In other words, are the feelings and affects that are reported in musical experiences parts of the experiencing, of the musical object, or are they parts of the total experience and inseparable from it? Can we *have* the feeling we get from hearing Mahler's *Kindentotenlieder* without having the music?

Another central consideration in applying the phenomenological method to music would be the description and analysis of the musical object *as perceived.* It would seek to trace the interconnecting relationships of sound, silence, music, time, space, and movement.

How can the "objectivity" of an event such as a melody be specified? Is there a musical object apart from its perception? How can music be anything but an event? What presences and absences are merged in the unity that is a piece of music? Goodman, as a result of an examination of the logic of notational systems, is able to entertain the seemingly counter-intuitive notion that a miserable performance which is in complete compliance with the notations of the written score can count as a genuine instance of a musical work, while a brillant performance of this same work — but with a single wrong note — cannot count as such an instance.[61] An analysis of the identity intentions involved in the experience of musical objects can help settle the differences between Goodman's "technical language" and ordinary usage.

The phenomenological method applied to music has important implications for the teaching of music. The phenomenological approach begins with actual musical experience, with how music presents itself in experience. If music perception begins in presence, we cannot begin by teaching concepts. Rather than applying analytical procedures by which music can be categorized, the phenomenological approach lets music suggest the categories of analysis. We can be taught to hear with a given theoretical perspective, but such a perspective may not be the only way in which music can present itself. As Smith points out, mental constructions may, in fact, act as depressants or even suppressants with respect to the full presence of musical sound.[62] A phenomenological approach would focus on rigorous description of shared musical experience. Theoretical analysis is founded upon such description and rings hollow without it. Phenomenology attempts to expose theoretical perspectives as assumptions at work in the act of listening.

Phenomenology seeks foundations. Musical objects have their foundation in musical experience. Music theory has its foundation in musical experience. Music learning and musical development have their foundation in musical experience. What do we know about musical experience? The snares of a too narrow realism catch only the physical aspects of musical experience, while a too relative subjectivism seduces the actual world and blurs its distinctions. When our focus is on performance techniques, historical veracity,

structural analyses, music literacy, or cognitive strategies, is our focus on music or just an aspect of it? The pre-occupation of the musician with the production and scientific description of sound (a pre-occupation which is, of course, healthy) is not necessarily a pre-occupation with musical experience. Phenomenology provides a way to approach the question of musical experience.

Notes

1. For a thorough account of these aspects see Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 3rd ed., rev. and enl. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).
2. For a full historical treatment of phenomenology see Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, from which much of the historical dimension of this discussion is drawn.
3. *The Phenomenological Movement*, p. 93.
4. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 67-68.
5. Husserl, *Ideas*, pp. 8-11.
6. Ibid., p. 44.
7. Ibid., p. 188.
8. Ibid., p. 6.
. *The Phenomenological Movement*, p. 682.
10. In order to illustrate certain points pertaining to the experience of things, first-person examples will be used. These examples are actual cases that can, in principle, be experienced by anyone. All such examples have been indented to separate them from the main text.
11. Husserl, *Ideas*, pp. 7-11.
12. Robert Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 100.
13. Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 158-161.
14. Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, p. 63.
15. Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 7.
16. Ibid., p. 7.
17. Erazim Kohak, *Idea and Experience: Edmund Husserl's Project of Phenomenology in Ideas I* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 9.
18. Husserl, *Ideas*, pp. 18-30.
19. Ibid., p. 10.
20. Ibid., p. 25.
21. Don Ihde, *Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1976), pp. 6-15 and F. Joseph Smith, *The Experiencing of Musical Sound: Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1979), pp. 27-64 have developed the history of visualism in Western thought.
22. Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 53.

23. Ibid., p. 61.
24. Ibid., pp. 57-62.
25. Ibid., pp. 57-60.
26. Richard Zaner, *The Way of Phenomenology: Criticism as a Philosophical Discipline* (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 48.
27. Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 56.
28. Ibid., pp. 131-132.
29. Morton Hunt, *The Universe Within: A New Science Explores the Human Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 48-62.
30. Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 171.
31. Ibid., p. 113.
32. Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, p. 107.
33. Ibid., p. 107. Emphasis added.
34. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 189.
35. Husserl, *Ideas*, pp. 73-78.
36. Robert Sokolowski, "The Theory of Phenomenological Description," *Man and World* 16 (1983), p. 225.
37. Husserl, *Ideas*, pp. 203-205.
38. Ibid., p. 216.
39. Ibid., p. 219.
40. For an in depth treatment of the phenomenon of silence see Bernard P. Dauenhauer, *Silence: The Phenomenon and its Ontological Significance* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980).
41. Ihde, *Listening and Voice*, pp. 60ff.
42. Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, pp. 18-21.
43. Ibid., p. 22.
44. Ibid., pp. 21-23.
45. Smith, *Experiencing Musical Sound*, pp. 230-244.
46. Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, p. 107.
47. John Brough, "The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl's Early Writings on Time-Consciousness," *Man and World* 5 (1972), pp. 298-326.
48. Smith, *Experiencing Musical Sound*, pp. 91-118.
49. Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, ed. Martin Heidegger, trans. James S. Chuchill (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 98.
50. Izchak Miller, "Husserl's Account of Our Temporal Awareness," in *Husserl, Intentionality, ad Cognitive Science*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), p. 133.
51. Husserl, *Time*, pp. 44-45.
52. Ibid., p. 53.
53. Ibid., pp. 53-54.
54. Ibid., pp. 63-64.
55. Ibid., p. 60.
56. For a discussion of this new level and its philosophical implications, see Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, pp. 138-168, and Brough, "The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness."

57. Smith, *Experiencing Musical Sound*, p. 112.
58. Husserl, *Time*, p. 61.
59. Adapted from the diagram given in Husserl, *Time*, pp. 49 and 121.
60. Robert Sokolowski, "Timing," *The Review of Metaphysics* 35 (1982), p. 688.
61. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), p. 186.
62. *Experiencing Musical Sound*, p. 107.

This article is a revised version of material found in the author's doctoral dissertation, *A Phenomenology of Music: Themes and Implications*, Case Western Reserve University, 1985. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of F.J. Smith and Robert Sokolowski.

Alfred Schutz's phenomenology of music

CHRISTINE A. SKARDA

Alfred Schutz's phenomenological investigations of musical phenomena are contained in four essays, written over a period of approximately sixteen years. The earliest essay, which remains unpublished, is a rough draft of an investigation of drama and opera written sometime before the Second World War. The second entitled "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music," dates from 1944 and was originally written in English.[1] Both of these essays were utilized in part in Schutz's two well-known essays dealing with music published in *Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory*.[2] Ideas developed in the earliest essay dealing with drama and opera find expression in the essay "Mozart and the Philosophers" (1956), and "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music" contains elements both presupposed and directly paraphrased by Schutz in "Making Music Together" (1951).

I. SCHUTZ'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO MUSICAL EXPERIENCE

It is probably most helpful to begin with a presentation of Schutz's understanding of the phenomenological approach to musical experience, since it determines his entire investigation in a particular manner. Only in "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music," however, does Schutz deal specifically with the problem of the phenomenological approach to musical experience, although some remarks concerning the characteristic features of this approach are made in passing in "Making Music Together."[3]

Schutz's characterization is negative: he approaches that which is

essential to the musical experience phenomenologically considered through a characterization of what is *not* essential. This negative approach, characteristic of the phenomenological method itself, has the function of clearing away the unnecessary and confusing presuppositions which obscure the phenomena to be investigated.[4] With the elimination of theories and presuppositions, which have themselves become the habitual topic of inquiry into musical phenomena of all kinds, the phenomena proper to the phenomenological approach to musical experience emerge.

Schutz lists three phenomena which, although not essential to the phenomenology of musical experience, generally play a determining role in musical investigations. Two of these, mentioned in the following quotation, predominate in music theory and appreciation texts.

> A phenomenological approach to music may safely disregard the physical qualities of the sound as well as the rationalization of these sounds which leads to the musical scale (FPM § 6).

It is not uncommon to find discussions of the physical properties of sound in texts dealing with musical experience. The experience of music is "explained" in terms of sound waves that have as their origin a vibrating material and that ultimately affect the ear of the listener. Thus the experience is explained in terms of a stimulus-response relationship between the sound waves and their physiological effects on the human ear. When we consider the actual experience of music, however, we must agree with Schutz that this explanation is inadequate, that the listener "responds neither to sound waves, nor does he perceive sounds; he just listens to music" (FPM §6). Such an explanation substitutes for an account faithful to the actual experience of listening to music a scheme of interpretation proper to physics and in this way either loses or obscures the original phenomena. Indeed, with the introduction of this scheme of interpretation problems arise which would otherwise not have to be raised. For example, we find ourselves faced with the task of bringing into agreement our experience of music and the scheme of interpretation from the field of physics. Questions arise as to why certain sound waves in combination are perceived as dissonant or consonant, etc.[5]

Similarly, works on music theory usually devote a good deal of space to discussing what Schutz terms the "mathematical foundation of music." The experience of the listener, however, is not an experience of the mathematical proportions which hold between notes of different pitch.

> Interesting and even miraculous as this relationship is when compared to other points of view, it has little to do with the experiencing of music . . . (FPM §6).

This mathematical relationship, as Schutz indicates, does not even help to solve the problem of consonance and dissonance. A theory of pure intervals and simple proportions does not explain the phenomenon of dissonance for the Western musical tradition, let alone musical scales and "tastes" of other cultures. Schutz suggests that the meaning of these "historical categories of the aesthetics of music" should rather be sought in the context of the relevant "prevailing ideal of perfection" which would necessarily be an element in the listener's stock of knowledge.

Finally, Schutz claims that the phenomenologist may disregard the various means and methods used in the actual performance, or reproduction of a performance, of a musical work. This claim is a direct consequence of Schutz's understanding of the mode of existence peculiar to a musical work—a topic which we shall deal with shortly. As a result of this third claim Schutz has further characterized the phenomenological approach to musical experience as one which does not have to concern itself with musical instruments (including the human voice) or the various forms of reproducing or recording music. Of course, Schutz does not claim that the various means used in transmitting music are wholly irrelevant to musical experience.[6] It makes a great deal of difference, for example, as to whether a musical work is played well, sung badly, simply imagined or remembered, etc. Schutz's claim is that,

> . . . all of these are merely means for the production, the reproduction and conservation of the work of music, and they have only a mediate impact on the experience of the listener as well as of the composer (FPM §6).

As a *means* of communicating a work of music, they are to be distinguished from the work of music itself, i.e., the communicated

musical content. This distinction underlies Schutz's third assertion about the phenomenological approach to musical experience.

Schutz plainly disregards those elements of the total experience of a musical work which vary from performance to performance, from one kind of instrument or recording technique to another. In other words, he disregards variable or accidental elements, focusing on what is invariant and essential in musical experience. What Schutz calls his "eidetic method" is an approach which goes beyond mere description although, in principle, it remains faithful to the phenomena of immediate musical experience. Thus, in the present context the phenomena with which the phenomenological approach concerns itself are

1) the essential structure of the experience of the listener *reflectively* grasped and

2) the "content" of the musical work considered as the intentional correlate of musical consciousness with its peculiar mode of existence.

Indeed, this peculiar mode of existence is central for Schutz's account of the experience of music.[7]

II. THE WORK OF MUSIC AS AN IDEAL OBJECT

Central to Schutz's phenomenology of the musical experience is his conception of the ideal nature of the work of art in general and the musical work in particular. However, this key concept remains a merely implicit element in his published essay "Making Music Together," and the ideal status of the musical work is merely asserted, not examined, in the earlier "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music." We must nonetheless attempt to define the ideal nature of the work of music since it is crucial for all of Schutz's further distinctions with respect to the experience of the work of music, e.g., the distinction between polythetic and monothetic constitution.

In Section 8 of "Fragments" Schutz asserts that a work of music has the "character of an ideal object," and in Section 9 he investi-

gates the peculiar nature of this ideal status. He begins by making a sharp distinction between

1) the work of music as an ideal object, i.e., the musical meaning, and

2) the score or performance, etc., which as "real objects" are the means of communication to which the ideal object or meaning is bound.

> To be sure, the score, the performance, the book, the lecture, are indispensible means for communicating the musical or scientific thought. They are not, however, this thought itself. A work of music or a mathematical theorem has the character of an ideal object. The communicability of a work of music of a mathematical theorem is bound to real objects—visible or audible objects—but the musical or scientific thought itself exists independently of all these means of communication (FPM §8; also MMT 164f.).[8]

When Schutz refers to the "ideal" nature of a work of music he is not speaking about its ontological status as anything like a Platonic Idea (CP I 110). Among ideal objects he includes "the concept of number . . . or the content of the Pythagorean theorem as a meaningful entity; or the meaning of a sentence or a book . . ." (CP I 110). An ideal object for Schutz is an intentional object or constituted meaning of the intended objects of our experience.

Furthermore,

> It is the peculiarity of intentional objects that they are *founded* upon so-called "real" objects of the outer world, and that they can be communicated only by signs and symbols which are in turn perceptible things, such as sound waves of the spoken word, or printed letters (CP I 110).[9]

Schutz, following Husserl, here emphasizes the essential difference between the enduring and self-same *constituted meaning* of the musical work and the plurality of more or less contingent *means* of communicating it. Schutz's phenomenological analyses are concerned with the constituted meaning and not the means by which it is communicated.

Also, ideal objects are "founded" upon the various means by which they are communicated (whether merely imagined or actual), but are not to be identified with them. For example, with respect to

the act of grasping the ideal object as a constituted meaning, space and time as we ordinarily think of them are unimportant (MMT 164).

If Beethoven filled his notebooks with sketches for his compositions, he did so for his own convenience. The themes noted down did not enter into existence by his writing them down; they existed in his mind long before (FPM §8).

On the other hand, space and time are important for the *communication* of ideal objects and thus for the real objects upon which they are founded.

Schutz makes two further distinctions concerning ideal objects:

1) A work of music is characterized by a form of constitution peculiar to itself, which serves to distinguish it from other—e.g., mathematical—ideal objects. The Pythagorean theorem as an ideal object is constituted in a series of related acts of deductive inference, in a process which Husserl termed "polythetic constitution."[10] Once constituted, its meaning is available to be grasped immediately, as a whole, as the "proposition and its meaning," without reference to the multitude of single steps in which the meaning was first constituted. Thus, the meaning of ideal objects with a conceptual content of which "originally we can be aware . . . only synthetically,"[11] becomes available to a "monothetic" grasping, i.e., immediately and without rehearsing the "polythetic" acts in which the ideal object (meaning) was first constituted.

The work of music as an ideal object, however, cannot be grasped monothetically. "In one single ray we cannot grasp the constituted meaning of a work of music" (FPM §9). Of course, we can grasp the mood evoked or suggested by the program notes, or the content in terms of a definition of the musical form, e.g., sonata form, passacaglia, theme and variations.[12] But this "content" should not be confused with the polythetically constituted meaning, i.e., the work of music itself, which

. . . can only be recollected and grasped by reconstituting the polythetic steps in which it has been built up, by reproducing mentally or actually its development from the first to the last bar as it goes on in time (FPM §9).

Unlike the constitution of the Pythagorean theorem, the original

polythetic constitution of the work of music does not result in the constitution of a conceptual meaning content which is available to be grasped monothetically. The meaning of the work of music is intimately connected to the very process of its polythetic constitution from which it cannot be abstracted.[13]

2) Schutz makes a final distinction among those ideal objects which are properly speaking "ideal singularities" (*eidetische Singularitäten*).[14] This distinction is made in Section 10 of "Fragments," and is briefly suggested in a footnote to "Making Music Together" (MMT 173n). Both a poem and a musical work must be reconstituted in a polythetic manner, and in both instances the meaning properly exists in such an act of reconstitution. The difference is that as an ideal object the poem may have a conceptual content, i.e., a content which admits of being grasped monothetically. This conceptual content, however, must not be confused with the poetical "meaning" of the ideal object. I can discuss and theorize about the content of a poem by Hölderlin, but insofar as I respect the poem as a poem, I can never substitute any conceptual content for the essentially polythetically constituted meaning of the poem.[15] The work of music as an ideal object, however, is "not related to a conceptual scheme" (MMT 173) and cannot be grasped monothetically. It must always be grasped as a unique individual, as *this* work of music, with reference to its (actual or imagined) re-creation in the series of polythetic acts which constituted its unique meaning.

III. MUSICAL EXPERIENCE AS A FINITE PROVINCE OF MEANING

In order to be able to study the experience of music we must first examine and bring to light those features which characterize this experience and thus distinguish it from other experiences. We must first ask what it is that makes the experience of music different? What is the source of the difference?

With these questions the scope of investigation must broaden to include Schutz's philosophical inquiry beyond the narrower confines of the experience of music. To be sure, Schutz's investiga-

tions of the experience of music were subordinate to his primary philosophical interest in the structure and constitution of the world which is taken for granted by all of us in our daily life together in the world. Within this larger framework, some of the insights into features of musical experience merely indicated in the essays on music are more fully elaborated.[16]

In Sections 15 and 16 of "Fragments" Schutz presents an extremely condensed summary of some of those features characteristic of the musical experience—a presentation which presumably would have been considerably expanded had Schutz completed the essay. For our purposes, I would like to develop Schutz's suggestions by placing this essay on music (1944) in the larger context of Schutz's thought as formulated in the essay "On Multiple Realities" (1945).[17] We should thus be able to answer our questions concerning the features which characterize the experience of music.

According to Schutz, the experience of music assumes a peculiar and characteristic attitude. He says:

> . . . we find that the decision to listen to pure music involves a peculiar attitude on the part of the listener. He stops living in his acts of daily life, stops being directed towards their objects. His attention toward life has been diverted from its original realm; in Bergson's terminology, his tension of consciousness has changed. He lives now on another plane of consciousness (FPM §15).

This passage, which points to the fact that the experience of music is made possible through the adoption of a particular attitude, brings to our attention several important questions, whose answers will enable us to determine what it is that makes the experience of music unique. We must ask how our attention to the original realm to which Schutz refers differs from our attention to the work of music? What is the nature of the transition to the attitude peculiar to the experience of music? How is the transition achieved?

The adoption of the attitude peculiar to the experience of music is first made possible by a suspension of those eminently practical concerns and interests which characterize the "paramount reality" of daily life. Schutz here utilizes the Husserlian concept of "epoché" although admittedly in a manner different from Husserl. Schutz, unlike Husserl, here understands the epoché not as a device or *methodological procedure* to be consciously and systematically employed

in order to give access to the field of investigation proper to phenomenological analysis, i.e., consciousness and its correlates, although for Schutz too it serves to de-limit what is and is not thematic.[18] It is, rather, the experience of turning our attention away from the everyday world and its practical concerns; of changing the focus of attention by overlooking elements that were previously thematic and the center of our concern. Following Kierkegaard, Schutz applies the term "leap" or "shock" to the transitional experience which leads to the experience of music. We will find that what is thematic in the new experience differs radically from what was previously thematic and that the transition is achieved by means of an experience of reorientation.

How is such a subjective experience of reorientation achieved? The transition is accomplished by means of a suspension of concerns not pertinent to musical experience, but which may have predominated beforehand, e.g., theoretical concerns may have dominated for the scientist at work as practical concerns may have dominated for the person engaged in earning a living. From the examples which Schutz offers it seems that the transition can occur either passively and quite unintentionally, or actively as the result of a decision. To elucidate the two possible ways in which this transformation can be achieved we may compare the "shock of falling asleep as the leap into the world of dreams" with the "radical change in our attitude if [standing] before a painting, we permit our visual field to be limited by what is within the frame" (CP I 231). The experience of falling asleep and the corresponding transition to the world of dreams is an instance of what I have termed a "passive" transition. Of course we can certainly make a resolve to go to sleep, but it is always possible (except in the case of insomnia) for us to quite simply fall into the state of sleep with no previous intention of doing so, e.g., while reading. We quite naturally make the transition to the world of dreams without any special effort or awareness of transition. Quite different, however, is our experience in a gallery in which we have come to see works of visual art. Here we have an example of a transition which is actively effected. We radically change the focus of our attention and we do so voluntarily and actively. Schutz mentions the function which the picture's frame plays in this transition; how-

ever, it is also true that the museum or gallery is itself a sort of "frame" which functions to change the focus of our attention. Upon entering the gallery the "tension" of our consciousness changes. We voluntarily lay aside the concerns and attitudes which are operative within the everyday world. The gallery itself, announces the fact that here something different is required of us. Within what may be a quite ordinary building, we find ourselves adopting an out-of-the-ordinary attitude. We no longer concern ourselves with problems which might ordinarily be the focus of our attention, e.g., the housewife does not worry as to whether the gallery is dusted and cleaned, we do not think of the building as we think of the building where we live or work. What is now thematic is the visual experience of the paintings which are displayed in the gallery. We do things which indicate the shifted focus of our attention. We speak in hushed voices and stand before the pictures concentrating upon that which is visually offered. The focus of our attention is circumscribed by the frame of the painting (when there is a frame), which quite literally separates what is pertinent from what is not, and focuses our attention upon the visual forms within its boundaries.

We could also show the distinction between the passively and actively accomplished transitions or experiences of "shock" within the realm of musical experience. As Schutz points out, "when the conductor raises his baton, the audience has performed a leap, in the sense of Kierkegaard, from one level of consciousness to another" (FPM §15). Here the transition is actively and voluntarily carried out. However, the transition can also be involuntarily achieved as when music suddenly "catches" my attention. I might, for example, be sitting at my writing table working on an essay, when I suddenly become aware of, and am absorbed by, the music playing on the radio. The focus of my attention is no longer directed upon my essay and the problems with which it dealt. I am now completely absorbed by the music; this fact indicates that the transition has been effected.

In all of these examples, we have spoken of a transition from one realm of experience to another. It is now time to investigate their nature and the ways in which they differ from one another. Schutz, reinterpreting William James's concept of "sub-universes" of reality in phenomenological terms, designates these realms as "finite pro-

vinces of meaning" (CP I 229ff.).[19] Each finite province of meaning depends upon and is characterized by a peculiar "cognitive style" with respect to which it is internally consistent. To the cognitive style characteristic of each province of meaning belongs

> . . . a specific tensions of consciousness and, consequently, also a specific *epoché*, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective (CP I 232).

Schutz investigates the nature of several finite provinces of meaning, the modification of the meaning in passing from one province to another, and their corresponding cognitive styles in his essay "On Multiple Realities."

Once the transition to the new level of consciousness, with its peculiar tension characteristic of the musical experience, has been accomplished an entirely new experiential complex is brought into operation. At this level of consciousness

> [the members of the audience] are no longer engaged in the dimension of space and spatial time, they are no longer involved in the maze of activities necessary to deal with men and things. They accept the guidance of music in order to relax their tension and to surrender to its flux, a flux which is that of their stream of consciousness in inner time (FPM §15).

According to Schutz, the province of musical meaning is constituted, like every other, by the change in our tension of consciousness, which in turn results from directing our attention away from the world of everyday life which is the archetype for all of our experience (CP I 233). The field of consciousness is no longer geared for action, i.e., we do not feel compelled or called upon actively to change the world by our working actions. For example, when we attend a performance of *Hamlet,* we have come to see and hear what takes place on the stage. We must leave behind our everyday concerns and with the dimming of the houselights (a further indication of the fact that the "accent of reality" has been transferred to the now lighted stage and the action taking place there) and the beginning of the dramatic work, we make the "leap" to a new tension of consciousness appropriate to the finite province of meaning of the drama. It should be noticed that we experience time and space quite differently within this new province of meaning. We witness action unfolding on

the stage within a space and time which, although representing the space and time in which our actions in the everyday world take place, is distinctly different.[20] The time and space of the action of the actors on the stage is an "imaginary" (Bergson) time and space, i.e., one in which we do not actively participate, but rather live imaginatively. Furthermore, as I become progressively involved as a spectator in the unfolding of the course of events of the drama, the actors "are" Hamlet, his mother, etc. I watch as the drama of their lives unfolds upon the stage. As a member of the audience, I am called upon to observe simply what *appears* before me, i.e., to be a "spectator."

It would be completely out of keeping with the dramatic province of meaning to suddenly transgress its boundaries and attempt to actively intercede on Hamlet's behalf. Within the province of meaning of the experience of the dramatic work we are called upon as members of the audience to be spectators, who as such, bestow upon the dramatic work its "accent of reality." Within this province of meaning our working actions (active intercession) are inconsistent with the set of experiences characteristic of this province. The disruption of the dramatic reality which would occur if a member of the audience ran onto the stage to warn Hamlet of a plot against his life brings to our attention the fundamental *inconsistency* of the world of everyday life, in which such an action would be interpreted as a laudable deed, and the imaginary world of drama, in which such an action is out of place and totally inconsistent with the province of meaning of the dramatic work. Active involvement would be interpreted as absurd by the other members of the audience who live within the finite province of the drama, in which such active participation is foreign.[21]

Returning, however, to the musical province of meaning, we further observe that the music itself directs us to accomplish the transition from the province of meaning of everyday life to that of music. The listener makes the transition by giving himself over to the musical flux with its corresponding temporal experience. It is the nature of this experience of temporality and the relation of this temporal experience to the musical theme and communication which occupies Schutz's attention to the remaining sections of

"Fragments" and in "Making Music Together." We shall consider these topics after one final observation concerning the province of musical meaning.

Schutz declares that the phenomenological analysis of the work of music must disregard, for the moment, the peculiarities of a given musical culture in its attempt to discover

> . . . certain features which are essential for the experience of music as a phenomenon of our conscious life (FPM §16).

This, however, does not mean that a phenomenological analysis is to disregard the *role* which the musical culture plays as a "frame of reference" for the actual experience of a musical work. A phenomenological analysis would deal with musical culture with respect to its essential function (FPM §17).

The existence of this frame of reference provides us with another aspect of the musical experience which differs from that of everyday experiences, thereby serving to further distinguish this experience as unique. Although Schutz only hints at this distinction, we may elaborate somewhat in the direction he indicated with the aid of related material contained in the book *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, the manuscript of which was begun three years after that on the phenomenology of music.[22] What Schutz terms the "stock of knowledge at hand" in the manuscript on relevance is what he is referring to as the "frame of reference" and "previous knowledge" in "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music."

In both instances, the sedimentation of previous experiences constitutes what Schutz calls our "habitual knowledge" (RPR 66), i.e., knowledge which remains unactivated and on the margins or "horizon" of our field of consciousness until needed in the course of further experiences. The activation or bringing into play of particular elements of this frame of reference is to be understood in terms of "systems of relevances." The elaboration of the specifics of these systems is beyond the scope of this investigation; however, the direction of Schutz's thought is important for our purposes. Schutz summarizes as follows:

> . . . we have found that what we call our stock of knowledge at hand is the

sedimentation of various previous activities of our mind, and these are guided by systems of prevailing actually operative relevances of different kinds. These activities lead to the acquisition of habitual knowledge which is dormant, neutralized, but ready at any time to be reactivated. Motivational relevances lead to the constitution of the "interest" situation, which in turn determines the system of topical relevances. The latter bring material which was horizonal or marginal into the thematic field, thus determining the problems for thought and action for further investigation, selected from the background which is, ultimately, the world which is beyond question and taken for granted. These topical relevances also determine the level or limits for such investigation required for producing knowledge and familiarity sufficient for the problem at hand. Thus, the system of interpretational relevances becomes established, and this leads to the determination of the typicality structure of our knowledge (RPR 66).

Taking this into account, we can begin to see the extent to which Schutz's ideas concerning the function of the musical culture in his essays on music exceeded the scope of a straightforward history of music. By shifting the focus of investigation, by ignoring certain traditionally standard problems of music theory, Schutz was able to expand and deepen our understanding of music and musical experience. Schutz suggests that we disregard the peculiarities of particular instances of frames of reference which have been operative at various times and in various musical cultures, although the importance of such an historical investigation for an adequate understanding of particular works of music is not denied. What Schutz rightly emphasizes is the importance of recognizing, first, that there necessarily exists such a frame of reference within the context of *any* meaningful experience of music, and second, that this frame of reference must be investigated with respect to its structure, constitution, and function within our experience of music. In the absence of this sort of prior recognition, the history of music can become a formless and trivial collection of biographies and anecdotes, in which, although the presence of these frames of reference may be discerned, their function and structure remains unrecognized or obscure.

We have already discussed some of the ways in which music as a province of meaning is differentiated from other provinces of meaning as well as from that of daily life. A further difference can be discovered in the systems of relevance peculiar to each province of meaning. When we make the transition from one finite province of

meaning to another, there is a corresponding shift in the prevailing systems of relevance.

> While living in any of these worlds (on which we then bestow the "accent of reality"), we live in the various systems of relevances peculiar to it. There are, that is, topical, motivational and interpretational relevances pertaining to the world of dreams, of play, of theory, and so on. If we "leap" from one to another, we leave behind all the systems of relevances operative merely within its limits (RPR 105).

Schutz gives an indication of the function played by such shifting systems of relevances in Section 17 of "Fragments." As the music begins and the listener's attention is shifted to the province of meaning peculiar to the musical process, a system of relevances is activated in which that which is typically relevant to the musical topic at hand is brought into play. The listener refers what he is now experiencing to a stock of previously acquired knowledge which is relevant for giving meaning to the present experiences. As he listens to the music unfold he brings pertinent material from the horizons of his conscious life into the now thematic musical kernel.[23] He is thus led to refer the present experience to his knowledge of a relevant type or style which will give meaning to this particular experience. These "interpretational relevances" enable the listener to make sense of the sounds that he hears.[24] But what Schutz calls "typicality" also refers to the ability to anticipate that which will follow (RPR 58). The listener anticipates that the next movement of the sonata to which he is listening will be a slow movement on the basis of his acquaintance with the sonata form of this period, with the composer's typical arrangement of his sonatas, or, perhaps, even from his previous experience of listening to this sonata itself. In each of these instances the anticipations are to a greater or lesser degree empty.

Although we cannot describe in greater detail the interplay of the three systems of relevances, the establishment of the topically relevant theme and the various ways in which the motivational relevances (both the "in-order-to" and the "because" motives) are brought into play, we have at least indicated that each province of meaning has its own system of relevances. In the province of musical meaning the thematic musical kernel determines what will be relevant to its interpretation. The experience of this particular piece of music prompts the bringing into play of relevant material in previous

experience and this is determined by our "actual interest" which in turn is a function of our present situation (RPR 44). We do not refer our present experience of a work of music to our knowledge of finances or of grammatical rules. In fact, according to Schutz, none of our spatial experiences is relevant for the interpretation of music. Thus, with his concept of systems of relevances and the relevant stock of knowledge at hand, Schutz distinguishes the musical experience from other experiences and brings to our attention another feature of musical experience.

IV. ELEMENTS OF THE MUSICAL EXPERIENCE

In Section 18 of "Fragments" Schutz lists three elements essential to musical experience.

1) Musical experience, according to Schutz, "originates in the flux of inner time" and does not, of necessity, refer to the spatiotemporal dimension. Musical meaning emerges from our experiencing of the unfolding of the musical events in the inner time of our conscious life. Musical experience, however, can refer—as in the case of dance music—to actions in the outer world, and this is possible, according to Schutz, because the composer utilizes his musical elements in such a way as to suggest movement and thus to coordinate the "events within the spatiotemporal dimension with those within the inner time" (FPM §18; also CP I 218).[25]

2) Because the musical experience "shares the flux of the stream of consciousness in simultaneity," the meaning of this experience is based upon the way in which meaning is constituted—through "retention" and "reproduction," "protention" and "anticipation"— in our stream of consciousness. If "only experiences which can be recollected beyond their actuality and which can be questioned about their constitution are . . . subjectively meaningful" (CP I 210), then musical meaning emerges from the flux of its unfolding in the stream of consciousness by means of a structure which utilizes our ability to recall and anticipate our experiences.

3) Finally, within the flux of inner time, the musical theme emerges as what Schutz calls "a unique configuration." The theme, which is the "basic element of all music," is "experienced as a whole."

The term "theme" as used here should not be understood in a narrow or technical sense. Although Schutz employs a melodic example, characteristic of Western musical culture, when discussing the musical theme as a sequence of tones in Section 19 of "Fragments," it must be realized that this is only *one* example. It can be gathered from Schutz's characterization that the term "theme" refers to a structure or configuration which recurs and is identifiable, admits of being combined with other themes, and can undergo modification and be recognized "as the same but modified" by the listener. Thus understood, i.e., as structure, a theme can be formed by a series of rhythmic beats on a drum as well as by a sequence of tones.

A theme in this broad sense is a structure through which the experience of music in inner time is articulated, in a particular manner, as is evidenced by the fact that Schutz does not include rhythmical structuralization among the elements common to all musical experience. If our interpretation of the theme as structure is correct, then Schutz is correct in rejecting rhythmic structuring as an additional element common to all musical experience. Rhythmic structure would represent merely a particular instance of structure in general, which is a necessary element of all musical experience.[26]

V. MUSIC AND SPACE

In Section 13 of "Fragments" Schutz explores a characteristic peculiarity of musical experience not explored in either of the two essays which appeared in *Collected Papers II*, viz., the relationship between musical experience and the experience of space. The peculiar nature of this relationship serves to further characterize the musical experience and to distinguish it from experiences of other art forms.

Our experience of space is determined by the interplay of our various kinaesthetic functions, by means of which the spatial field is built up as a continuum of perspectives, all of which refer to the "kernel of optimal accessibility . . . the sphere of nearness with my own body in the center" (FPM §13). Within this sphere of optimal accessibility I am free to manipulate and tactually experience objects with respect to haptic kinaesthesias, and I can visually observe this field with "optimal *sharpness*" with respect to optic kinaesthesias. It is also possible within this sphere to re-experience and thus corroborate previous experiences. For example, upon re-opening my eyes I perceive the same desk and writing materials that I had perceived before I closed my eyes.

The remote spatial field, on the other hand, is experienced as a possible field of action whose objects I may approach, or one whose objects may enter my manipulatory sphere through movements of their own. It is the spatial realm interpreted on the basis of previous experience within the immediate manipulatory sphere as being the same or similar.

Thus, the constitution of space refers back to our kinaesthetic experiences of our bodily organs of sight and touch and our actual or virtual ability to perform the kinaesthesia of locomotion (FPM §13).

The art of painting, an art employing as a medium spatial elements, must take these ways in which space is experienced into account. The eye of the beholder is first focused upon a specific visual field by means of an experience of encounter with the edges or margins of the painted field (whether or not these boundaries are accentuated by an actual frame).[27] With this narrowing of the visual field to the painted surface, the painted objects and their arrangement become thematic and the eye is incited to investigate the painted space, thereby organizing it in a manner determined to a large degree by the artist's arrangement of it, e.g., by means of perspective, color, line. An illustrative example of the manner in which a painter can organize the painted space, utilizing only coexistent and immovable images, and yet, guide the oculomotoric movement of the beholder to organize this field for himself in a predetermined manner is found in the portraits of Velásquez.

Normally, of course, the arrangement of the perceptual field is not made thematic. Velásquez, however, made this straightforward visual experience thematic by capturing it and presenting it in his paintings. When we look at a given object before us, we focus upon it in such a way that it is optimally clear and distinct. However, the horizons of this focal area includes many other objects which together form the visual field. These objects are included but are only indistinctly presented, since they are literally not the focus of attention. The margins of the visual field and their corresponding objects blur into one another, are "fuzzy" and only indistinctly perceivable. Velásquez' paintings dictate that a single perspective be assumed by the beholder, by utilizing the very manner in which our visual field is organized to make us adopt a particular perspective.[28] In his portraits, whether of one person or of a group of people, Velásquez painted everything with reference to a single focal point. Everything lying outside of this focal point is presented in varying degrees of indistinctness. In a full-length portrait in which the focal point is the facial area, for example, the rest of the body as well as other objects in the visual field are also present. But if we turn our attention from the focal point to some other area of the painted space we discover a degree of indistinctness which is not characteristic of our experience of the visual field of optimal sharpness. Despite all efforts, the beholder is not able to bring this painted space into focus, and this incompleteness (this "not quite") incites his gaze to move within the painted space in search of visual completion. The art of Velásquez lay in capturing on canvas a single act of perception with its focal point and horizons of indistinctness. He was both able to present the way in which we normally see things and to make use of the way in which we see things to make us see what he intended us to see.

Painting is not the only art form employing spatial elements. Architecture and sculpture are also discussed by Schutz as art forms which necessarily refer back to those kinaesthetic activities in which our experience of space is first constituted. Two features of the experience of the arts using spatial elements should be mentioned. First, in each of these arts, by performing certain kinaesthetic acts, we are able to re-experience a given spatial element as the "same"

element previously experienced. To be sure, although each art form utilizes spatial elements in a different manner to induce the beholder to perform and re-perform various visual, tactile and locomotive kinaesthesias, the experienced effect is the same. The coexistent spatial elements are experienced in a succession of departures and returns to the same elements, thereby creating the impression of a rhythmic recurrence and even of movement. This is possible, according to Schutz, because the kinaesthesias which constitute the spatial field are experienced in the flux of inner time (FPM §13). The impression of movement results from the fact that the polythetic acts in which the spatial field is first constituted are experienced successively in inner time. Secondly, Schutz notes that the spatial field allows of being monothetically grasped, and that this mode of recognition is fundamental for the spatial experience of sameness. The experience of the arts employing coexistent spatial elements is characterized by the possibility of monothetic recognition of sameness. Although the elements may be experienced successively, thereby creating the impression of movement, in fact spatial elements endure and are always available through the re-performance of various kinaesthesias, in which no new process of constitution is required. The coexistent spatial elements remain available to be grasped as a whole in subsequent phases of experience.

Upon examining musical experience, however, Schutz finds a completely different set of experiential features.

> In all the cases considered so far, we found that the experiences of the observer referred to his possible kinaesthesias, the visual, the tactile, the locomotive ones. Yet, the organ by which we experience music, the ear, does not have any kinaesthesia. There is no center of nearness and no horizon in the acoustical field, nor is there a structurization analogous to that of perspective. . . . Thus, the ear is not able to build up the dimension of space (FPM §13).

The apparent absence of spatial structure[29] in the acoustical field is not mitigated, according to Schutz, by the fact that the ear does provide a certain orientation as to the source of a perceived sound or by the fact that the increase and decrease in the volume of a given sound can indicate spatial distance. These acoustical properties do not alone give rise to the experience of "distance," by rely upon "preconstituted spatial experiences which were not purely auditive

ones" (FPM §13). Furthermore, the ear has no means for withdrawing temporarily from the acoustical field, in order to return at a later point in time. The ear is always available to acoustic impressions. Thus recurrence, by means of the re-performance of kinaesthetic activities, fundamental for the experience of sameness in the arts utilizing spatial elements, plays no role in purely acoustical experiences. Schutz concludes, therefore, that the experience of rhythm and pattern in music is independent of spatial experience and that music must necessarily employ a different means to achieve the experience of rhythm, sameness, and pattern.

VI. MUSICAL EXPERIENCE AND THE TEMPORAL ELEMENT

The difficult question of the temporal element in musical experience must now be considered, a discussion central to both "Fragments" and "Making Music Together." In the latter essay Schutz defines music as "a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time" (MMT 170), and goes on to contrast the "inner time" of the work of music with the "outer time" characteristic of the means of communicating music in an attempt to clarify his claim that the work of music—the ideal object—pertains exclusively to the realm of inner time. The contrast between the work of music as an ideal object and the means of its communication, between the ideal object and the "real" object upon which it is "founded," is continued in the present context in terms of a contrast between inner and outer time.

I would suggest that Schutz's entire discussion of temporality is understandable only if we understand what Schutz means when he speaks about music, i.e., when we recall once again what the phenomenological approach deals with. In Section I we concluded that the phenomenology of music deals with music *as it appears* to musical consciousness, i.e., as an intentional correlate. In Section II, when the ideal nature of musical meaning was discussed, it was said that space and time as ordinarily thought of are not involved when it comes to grasping an ideal object. Schutz's use of the term "music" must be understood within this framework.

Furthermore, it should be recalled that aesthetic consciousness

has as its correlate an entire province of meaning, i.e., the world of art, within which the province (sub-province) of musical meaning finds its place. The world of art contains many different art forms, and Schutz, as we have seen in the last section, has attempted to describe some of the peculiarities of music, which he maintains is essentially temporal, over against those arts utilizing spatial elements. In the present context the important point is that each province of meaning, including that of music, has "a specific time perspective" (CP I 232) and it is the time peculiar to the musical province of meaning and musical experience that Schutz proposes to study in his essays on music.

The time of music, considered as it appears to musical consciousness, is "inner time." Schutz characterizes inner time in agreement with the distinction drawn by Husserl between the unchanging and divisible outer experience and the indivisible, permanent flux of inner experience.[30] Inner time, the time of lived experience, is completely free from spatial elements.

> The time of our waiting, the time within which we grow old, the inner time of our stream of consciousness, is entirely free from elements of space (FPM §14).

Inner time is "lived through," and thus cannot be either divided or measured. Thus, the listener lives "while listening, in another dimension of time which cannot be measured by our clocks or other mechanical devices" (FPM §14; also MMT 171).

For example, although the clock upon the wall may measure the passage of a similar amount of time in the case in which we wait anxiously to receive the outcome of major surgery upon someone we love and in the case where we eagerly discuss an issue of vital interest with a friend, we do not *experience* these time intervals as equivalent. In the first example, we say that the time "dragged on" and in the second that the time "flew by." There is no way in which the time which we experience can be measured: it is simply lived through.

In order to be shared or communicated, however, our experience of time must find some expression in the outer world, i.e., it must be founded. This occurs when we "project into space" (FPM §14) our experience in inner time. Inner experience thus comes to be coordinated with events in the world. Through such coordination inner

time becomes available for measurement in terms of motion which traverses spatial intervals. This "projected" time is the "outer time" which Schutz speaks of as the "dimension in which our actions take place, the dimension which we share with our fellowmen" (FPM §14). This outer time is available for further abstraction and can be transformed into the "time of the physicists." The apparent continuity of the process of abstraction, however, should not be allowed to obscure the fundamental difference between inner time and its "projected" counterparts.

Thus far inner time has only been negatively characterized in terms of how it differs from outer time. Schutz's positive characterization of inner time is heavily dependent upon the accounts of Husserl and Bergson as well as upon that of William James. He alternately refers to inner time as "immanent time," as the "durée," and as the "stream of consciousness." From James, Schutz takes an emphasis upon the flow of conscious life and the concept of the "spacious present" in James's interpretation. From Bergson, he adopts the concepts of

1) a durée free from spatial elements and
2) the "tensions" of conscious life.

From Husserl, Schutz takes the detailed and careful structural analyses of the stream of conscious life in order to show how this flux is integrated into an unbroken stream of experience.

According to Schutz, we experience our inner life as unbroken, a flow of interrelated experiences. The "Now" or present is characterized as the time of our immediate experiences. The past, however, is also available to us in the form of completed experiences, in which we no longer immediately "live" but which can become the objects of the reflective mode of experience which we call "memory." "It is this faculty of memory which makes the stream of our consciousness an unbroken and interrelated sequel of our thoughts in inner time" (FPM §14).

Past, completed experiences do not disappear entirely, they are included in present experience through the performance of acts of recollection. The recollection of a past Now, however, does not restore the past to its former state of being present. The recollected past is modified by the perspective of each succeeding Now in which

it is incorporated as the object of the present act of recollection. No further activity is possible with respect to the past, i.e., we cannot "live in" the past as we do in our present experiences or acts. Thus, the past cannot be altered. It is now only a possible object to which present experience can reflectively direct itself in different ways.

The changing flux of conscious life and the difference between the past and the present are also evidence that there is a definite structure to consciousness. Because of this structure it makes a difference whether the object of our thoughts is presently experienced, experienced as recollected or experienced as previously recollected. In each act the same object, "but the same object as modified" (FPM §14), is either immediately experienced or re-experienced. Modifications also originate in continually different relevances operative within each actual Now. New structures of relevance, bring to the foreground new features of the past.[31]

Schutz distinguishes between two types of memory. First, there is the interrelation of present experience with the experience which immediately proceeded it. "Although it sinks into the past, the actual experience is still retained, and, therefore, the term *retention* has been used for this special type of remembrance" (FPM §14). Retention is especially important for music because it helps to explain how a sustained note can be experienced without interruption as an object included in successive Nows. In each succeeding Now there is both the present experience of the sustained tone and the co-present retention of the immediately past experience of this same tone. A second form of recollection, called "*reproduction*" refers to pasts not immediately contiguous with present experience, i.e., it refers to the more remote past. Both retention and reproduction are crucial for the experience of a musical work as a meaningful sequence of tones as we shall see.

Inner experience reveals another dimension of inner time equally important for musical experience; namely, its future-orientation. The future is the ever-present element of expectation that accompanies all of our present experience.

> By living in our experience, by being directed towards the objects of our acts and thoughts we are always oriented towards the future, we are always expecting certain occurrences and events (FPM §14).

Thus, the future is to be understood as an element of expectation and open-endedness which accompanies all on-going experiences. It is an empty field of expectation, but it, too, has a structure. That which we expect, is dependent upon the "types" of relevant occurrences from our past and upon the assumption that such types will continue to prevail in the future. That we have no guarantee for this assumption indicates that the future is indeed the empty (merely possible) field of expectations. Past objects of present experience, on the other hand, are not "empty"—"they were what they were" (FPM §14). The past is characterized by its definiteness; and, although I may inadequately or wrongly recall the past, these completed experiences are as past "definite and definitive."

Corresponding to the two forms of memory are two forms of expectation: *protention* and *anticipation*. Protentions are expectations of the immediate future, and are contrasted with what Schutz calls "anticipations," which are of the more distant future. As Schutz indicates, the expected course of those events which are objects of protentions are more likely to be fulfilled than those which are objects of our anticipations. A higher degree of indeterminateness is associated with the remoter future.

The forms of memory and expectation, thus play a decisive role in interrelating the various forms of our experiences into the unbroken flux of conscious life.

Schutz concludes his discussion of the temporal element in music with a consideration of the present. The continuity of the flow of our inner experience of time, as opposed to spatialized time, whose passage is measured as distance traversed between certain points in space, shows that the notion of the durationless present is unacceptable. Such a "knife-edge" instant is an abstraction which does not accord with our experience of the succession of experiencings in inner time. We experience a continuity in our conscious life and this continuity can only be accomplished within the present as the field of those experiences that we live in.

> The vivid present encompasses everything that is actually lived through, it includes elements of the past retained or recollected in the Now and elements of the Future entering the Now by way of protention and anticipation (FPM §14).

The structure of the present, the degree to which the past is

remembered and the future anticipated, does not remain invariable. According to Schutz, its structure is determined by what Schutz calls, following Bergson, the "tension of our consciousness." Depending upon our activities at the present moment, a greater or lesser role will be played by our recollections and expectations. Our activities in the world of daily life engaged with other people and with things requires a very high degree of this "tension," which Schutz terms "wide-awakeness."[32]

In this high degree of conscious tension we are oriented toward affairs in the world which we share with others, and this full attention to life demands that attention be paid primarily to the spatialized (shared) time of our life together with others. Our life with others demands that we live in accordance with a time which is not our own—a spatialized time which passes steadily whether we are happy or sad, frightened or overjoyed, expectant or nostalgic. Only with lower tensions of consciousness do we begin to catch sight of the flow of our own *durée* which may have been completely ignored before we withdrew our full attention from the spatio–temporal world of our life with others in the working world.

Schutz's theory of time, here only sketchily presented, attempts to explain the interconnection of one experience with another in inner time, which is, as such, without reference to spatial elements. Such an explanation is crucial for an understanding of the musical experience—an experience which has been defined as an experience without reference to spatial elements. Schutz's concept of the changing structure of the present is especially interesting, but it can only be fully appreciated in the light of his theory of relevance. It may be added that realistic accounts of time fail to consider as a rule this changing structure of the present, and Schutz's theory is greatly enhanced by his account of this phenomenon.

VII. SCHUTZ'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ACT OF LISTENING

Before extending our investigations into the constitution of the musical theme—the central investigation of the essay "Fragments on the

Phenomenology of Music"—and ultimately to a consideration of the social interactions involved in musical experience and performance as presented in "Making Music Together," we must recall, this time in a slightly different light, the strict limitations of the phenomenological investigation. Ultimately the positive results of this approach must be sought within these limits.

What has been presented represents Schutz's attempt to investigate the acts of listening which together constitute our experience of music. The phenomenological approach is a *reflective* consideration of musical experience, i.e., it requires that the investigator reflectively grasp musical experience in such a way that he can examine the activities and structures essential to all musical consciousness. The reflective attitude determines the field of phenomenological investigation in a decisive manner.

> We make objects of the acts of listening guided by a theoretical interest in that phenomenon of consciousness which is called "listening to music." We are not induced to do so because we hope to improve our understanding of music, and it is by no means contended that any listener or even some listeners are aware of the interplay of retentions described. It is very important to make it perfectly clear that the experience of listening itself has quite another structure (FPM §25).

To examine reflectively acts of listening and to listen, Schutz here emphasizes, are two very different activities. Or to put it another way, a phenomenological account *of* musical experience is not equivalent to the *experience* of listening itself. This reflective method should not be confused with that which it reflects upon. Furthermore, the phenomenological approach does not prescribe the methods to be used while listening to music, i.e., it is not a form of music appreciation or of music theory. These other ways of viewing musical experience are, to be sure, important for a complete understanding of the experience of music, but they are not the same as a phenomenological investigation. Schutz stresses this.

Keeping in mind, then, that the following analyses are reflectively concerned with the act of listening to a work of music and utilizing the results from the previous section, we discover the following with respect to the perception of the sequence of tones c, d, e, c, d, d. No information is provided concerning the duration of any of the tones, the tonality of the musical composition, or the particular musical

culture which would provide a basic frame of reference for the piece. As the music begins, we perceive in the vivid experience of our actual Now the tone c. This tone is of a certain duration and is experienced as persisting. This means that combined with the actual experience of the tone c, is the retention of the initial phases of the experience of the same, enduring tone. Tone d follows and is experienced in the vivid present. Combined with this vivid, immediate experience of the tone d is the retention of the now just completed experience of the tone c. Included as an element of this retention is the interval c–d with its corresponding upward impulse. Tone e follows and this tone is also experienced in a vivid present. The complex of retentions becomes more complicated by virtue of the introduction of this latest tonal element. There is

1) the present actual experience of the tone e;

2) the vivid retention of the just past experience of the tone d, with the accompanying interval d–e;

3) as an element in the retention of the tone d is the tone c as a previous retentional element, and thus the interval c–d;

4) through the process of the retention of a retention the interval c–e enters into the experience.

With the introduction of the fourth tone, c, a process of recognition is brought into play in which this tone is identified as being the same pitch as the first tone. A similar process occurs identifying the fifth tone (d) with the second (d), and once again the upward impulse is created by means of the retention of c. At this point, i.e., before the introduction of the final tone, the identification of the fourth c with the first and the fifth tone with the second may lead the listener to expect, by way of protention, that the sixth tone will be an e, i.e., the expectation is that the tone sequence c–d–e will be repeated. This expectation is based upon the recognition of this tone sequence as a unit, a "theme," which will immediately be repeated. However, the introduction of the sixth tone as a d does not fulfill this expectation. We are led, Schutz says, to identify the entire tone sequence c, d, e, c, d, d as a unit.

The remaining investigations in Sections 21 through 25 of "Frag-

ments" are based upon the results of this analysis; in particular, upon a comparison of the relationship between the fifth and sixth tones in the sequence, both experienced as the tone d, and the experience of the enduring first tone c. When the experience of the enduring first tone was examined, a coincidence was discovered between the actual experience of the tone and the retention of earlier phases of the experience of the same tone. In other words, an enduring tone is experienced. There was no gap between the actual experience of the tone c and the retention of earlier phases of our experience of it. The perception of the fifth and sixth tones in the example, however, is different. Although both tones are experienced as the same, one enduring tone d has not been experienced. Rather, the fifth tone with its corresponding beginning and end-phase is first experienced, and then this experience is followed by the experience of the initiation of a second d. This last example, is not an experience of the endurance of the same tone through successive phases of our experience, but the experience of the repetition of the "same." Comparing these two experiences, Schutz identifies three sets of problems important for the phenomenology of the musical experience, which he groups into three categories: the category of continuance and repetition; the category of sameness; the category of movement.

A The category of continuance and repetition

Schutz merely outlined the wide range of problems included within this category, which we shall summarize very briefly. Schutz deals with the phenomena of continuance and repetition as applied to three distinct musical situations. First, in the case of the repetition of the same tone, i.e., a repeated bass tone, he discovers that a repeated bass note serves the same function in a composition as a continuous or sustained bass tone (each is called a "pedalpoint"). The reason for this experienced similarity is that distinct repetitions of the same tone are perceived as a "specious continuance." Retention functions as a mechanism whereby the intermittent tones are experienced as coinciding. "*Repetition*—as used here—is merely a special case of the intermittence of a continuance" (FPM §21). Second, musical

experience also provides instances in which a "virtual unity" is established, by way of retention, between notes of different pitches. To distinguish this experience of unity from that of continuance, Schutz uses the term "coherence." Finally, the terms "continuance" and "repetition" take on yet another meaning if applied to the musical theme or to groups of themes. Retention alone is no longer solely responsible for these experiences. Reproduction of the completed experiences is required for the "synthesis of recognition" and thus for the experience of repetition. Continuance, on the other hand, originates in the fulfilment of previous anticipations in actual experience.

B The category of sameness

Schutz's comparison of the experience of an enduring tone with that of the repetition of the same tone uncovered the difficulties involved in the recognition of "sameness." Husserl accounted for the experience of sameness upon the basis of a passive synthesis of identification.[33] Such a synthesis

> . . . brings the recollection of a past experience of the same object of thought by "superposition" [*Deckung*] into congruence with a renewed originary experience of the same (or, at a secondary level, produces such a congruence between recollections or even recollections of recollections of the same) (FPM §22).

The complexity of the problem is further indicated when Husserl insists that there is a need to distinguish between sameness and likeness. Likeness refers to the perception of similarity between two objects or parts of the same object, which are nonetheless experienced as different. Also, an object may be experienced as the same despite the fact that it has undergone modification, i.e., as the same but modified. An examination of musical experience would have to consider the phenomena of sameness and likeness in connection with both single tone and the theme as a sequence of tones.

Schutz's investigation is confined to a consideration of the repetition of the tone d as the "same." Without a doubt the repeated tone is the "same," however, it is not *strictly* the same, i.e., as in the experience of the enduring tone c. The repeated tone d differs from the

enduring tone c in several respects. First, it is a repeated tone with its own initial phase and development, the experience of which includes the retention of the previous d in its competed development. Second, the introduction of the second d alters or adds something to the previous experience. Musical experience offers many examples of this phenomenon, all of which share a common origin in the structure of consciousness.

> The same occurrence, if repeated, is not experienced as strictly the same; it is not even experienced as being a like experience. Our mind has changed, infinitesimally, but, nevertheless changed—by already having once pre-experienced the tone d in the same context (FPM §22).

This change is indicated by the fact that the interplay of retentions and protentions necessarily change with the introduction of each new experience. Thus, in the peformance of a musical work this small but significant change is reflected in the different articulation given to the second d by the performer. The difference between a poor performance and an excellent one can lie in the performer's sensitivity to such seemingly small but significant differences.

C The category of movement

It is not clear that "movement" should be considered in the same way that continuance, repetition, and sameness, i.e., as a basic category of musical experience, as seems to be indicated in Section 20 of "Fragments." Movement belongs to that sphere of experience which has been called "outer" and would thus appear to be an element foreign to the experience of music—an experience in inner time. To be sure, Schutz maintains that movement is foreign to musical experience. His account of movement is, rather, a continuation of his discussion of sameness, which includes his critical evaluation of Husserl's investigation of this phenomenon.

According to Schutz, phenomenological investigations, particularly Husserl's, have remained confined to perceptual experience of individual objects in the external world. Perception has been taken as the paradigm experience and the "rigid visible and tangible object as the paradigm of the notion of 'thing' " (FPM §23). Schutz main-

tains that it was on the basis of this assumption that Husserl formulated his concept of the experience of sameness. In the case of visible or tangible objects the recognition of one object as the same or similar to another can be verified by various kinaesthetic experiences, thereby achieving the "synthesis of identification." For example, I see the lamp on my desk, and then close my eyes or turn my head. Performing certain kinaesthetic acts has removed this desk and lamp from my field of vision. By performing an opposite kinaesthetic act, however, I can bring the lamp back into my field of vision and re-experience it is the "same" as seen before. The lamp persists and remains available as an enduring object.

However, we recall that auditory experiences belong essentially to our inner experience of reality and that the ear alone constructs no experience of space in which are found the rigid objects of outer or spatial experience. What Schutz indicates is that an essentially different kind of experience is involved in music, and that what holds for sight and touch does not necessarily hold for hearing.

For example, there is a difference between our experience of the phenomenon of intermittence in visual and auditory experience. In the example above, intermittence is the result of the performance of various kinaesthetic acts which interrupt or re-establish the experiencing of the lamp as the same. Our examination of the repetition of the tone d, however, revealed a different way in which intermittence could be understood.

> In the purely auditive field, however, in the realm of music, intermittence can never be ascribed to a kinaesthetic change, which re-establishes or even verifies sameness. Intermittence has not a subjective, but an objective character. The sound, the tone itself, has ceased to exist, and another one has started to appear (FPM §23).

This suggests that the mechanism, whereby one object is identified with another, operates differently in the dimension of inner time than it does in the spatial dimension. "Sameness" has a different meaning for each of these experiences, i.e., it refers to a different kind of phenomenon. When an object in the spatial dimension is designated as the same this usually refers to the fact that, although our experience of this object was interrupted, the object itself persisted

unchanged. "Likeness," on the other hand, with respect to spatial experience refers to the possibility of comparing one object with another and thus to the dimension of space "within which alone two objects may coexist as distinct and separate unities" (FPM §23). In the dimension of inner time, proper to purely auditory experiences, the phenomena of sameness and likeness do not refer to coexistent objects, but to successive ones. Schutz concludes that,

> . . . in the dimension of inner time, or in the purely auditory sphere of music, the form of sameness is not that of a numerical unity but of recurrent likeness; and after this explanation we will use the term "sameness" exclusively for conveying recurrent likeness . . . (FPM §23).

Schutz's claim that the synthesis of identification operates differently in the spatial and auditory realms of experience raises questions as to the general validity of Husserl's notion of "passive synthesis." It appears that this notion also originates in the unquestioned acceptance of the paradigmatic nature of perceptual experience. In perceptual experience intermittence resulted from the performance of various kinaesthetic acts by means of which we return to the same spatial field of experience. We are always, in principle, free to reverse the order of kinaesthetic acts once performed and to return to a former position. It is this ability which "creates the impression as though a passive synthesis of 'superimposition' had been performed, but such an impression prevails only in hindsight" (FPM §24). The freedom to perform the opposite kinaesthetic act and to return to a former spatial field tends to obscure the difference between the original experience and the recollection of it at a later time. The spatial field, too, is first constituted in a series of polythetic steps, but the experience of recollection is different because I am no longer compelled to run through the various polythetic steps which taken together first effected the constitution of this field.

> What I am comparing is the recollection of the outcome of this previous process, once performed, the recollection of the ready-made picture I had in mind when leaving my home-position, with the actual ready-made experience I have when returning to it (FPM §24).

The impression of a passive synthesis is created by the possibility in

the spatial dimension of grasping monothetically a field of experience first built up in the polythetic activities of consciousness. Upon the successful completion of the necessary kinaesthetic acts I grasp the field monothetically and compare it in recollection with the outcome of the original experience. However, if the spatial field returned to by means of appropriate kinaesthetic acts is not grasped monothetically, the illusion of the passive synthesis ought to disappear. If we once again perform the polythetic acts which originally constituted the spatial field the impression of a simple "over-laying" will disappear.[34]

Inner experience, on the other hand, has been characterized as a continual flux, as the irreversible stream of consciousness. Monothetic grasping of this flux itself and of objects which exist purely in this dimension is precluded by the very irreversibility of the flux. There is no possibility, while living this flux, of changing perspectives or of regaining a former position. Whereas the spatial dimension allows for both monothetic and polythetic recognition, the dimension of inner time allows only for polythetic recognition.

The work of music exists as an audible object within the dimension of inner time. As long as we are immersed in the unfolding of the musical events, the acts of recognition of successive experiences as the same or different must be performed polythetically. Before listening to a particular work of music which I have already heard and know well, I may think of a particular theme and anticipate its development. I may view the entire work of music from the point of view of this theme and its recurrence and development. The rest of the work may be interpreted as a development of this one theme. But when I adopt such a "point of view" I am no longer immersed in the ongoing musical process. While immersed in the musical process itself the recognition of a recurrent theme as the same or different occurs not through a passive synthesis of recognition, but through a *step by step*, polythetic re-experiencing of steps once experienced and now re-experienced. These steps lead to the constitution of a unit: the theme. Only by performing or re-performing the polythetic steps of this constitutive process can we experience sameness or similarity in musical experience.[35]

VIII. CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE MUSICAL THEME

We have as yet to consider the manner in which a theme is constituted as a unit in experience. Consider, for example, the four note theme which introduces Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. These four notes are clearly experienced as a musical theme. The omission of one or more of the notes does not lead to the experience of another unit; it only destroys the impression of a unit experienced when all four notes are played consecutively. Furthermore, when performed this tonal sequence is articulated in a way that emphasizes the fact that these four notes belong together

Schutz says that articulation "implies, certainly, a feeling of virtual finality." This means, that upon hearing the fourth note the listener experiences a sense of completion in which the interplay of retentions and protentions do not call for the addition of further elements. The original impulse has come to an end and that which was conveyed, i.e., the meaning, is now offered as a fragment of the whole. Articulation points back to that specific structure of experience which enables the meaning of the musical events to emerge as they unfold simultaneously with the flux of inner experience. What Schutz calls "virtual," "initially corresponds to what James called the 'resting places' of thought" (FPM §25). James's concept of the peculiar structure of the stream of consciousness, is used here as an important element in Schutz's investigation of musical experience. James maintained that there are periods of activity separated by phases of rest in conscious life. The periods of rest represent a significant aspect of conscious life in that they articulate the periods of activity bringing the activity of one phase to an end and thereby allowing for the emergence of a new phase of activity. James compared this structure to the flight of a bird which is intermittently interrupted when the bird alights. It is this articulation of the stream of consciousness which causes meaning to emerge. Schutz recognized that the musical work also has phases of movement or activity alternating with phases of rest. Existing within the realm of inner time, the musical work makes use of the very means which produce meaning within the stream of consciousness. Through "phrasing,"

the musical means of articulation, the musical units or themes arise which are experienced as meaningful.

By means of the art of phrasing, the musical work is articulated in such a way that distinct units, some complete and others not, all with their own impulse and resting points, emerge from the flux of the musical experience. Although no special notation may indicate these phrases, the musical work is structured in such a way that in its performance it indicates to the listener what belongs together as a unit or sub-unit.

> The art of musical phrasing consists in making each unit and sub-unit discernible by bringing together into one single phrase what belongs together, and to separate it from the next phrase by a very short interruption of the flux of music . . . (FPM §25).

It is this very short interruption in the musical flux that is crucial for the emergence of the experience of meaning, for it is precisely in these brief moments of interruption that the listener immersed in the musical experience is invited by the composer to reflect upon the now completed experiences which have led to this phrase's completion in such a way that meaning arises.[36]

Naturally, the composer of the musical work does not intend that all of the listener's past experiences, retained or reproduced, to be recollected. These short pauses in musical experience have a much more limited function. Reflection in these brief interludes is guided by a principle of relevancy. Depending upon the particular Now in which the reflective stance is assumed, different experiences are seen as relevant, as contributing to the present experience and making it what it is. Thus, depending upon the Now in which the reflective attitude is assumed different past experiences become important. When the four note theme from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is articulated by means of phrasing in such a way that a short interruption in the musical flux is created, the listener is invited to reflect from the end of the phrase to the beginning. Through the interplay of retention he becomes aware of the peculiar structure of this unit and of the fact that it continues a single impulse from beginning to end. He may also become aware of the characteristic rhythmic articulation which distinguishes this unit giving it its specific character, etc.

Schutz indicates that the process of selecting what is relevant is

guided by recollections which are imposed upon the listener as well as those which are freely selected. Under the category of imposed recollections, Schutz includes the various phenomena traditionally grouped under "association." When we try to recall a particular past experience of music, we often find ourselves confronted with a whole group of past experiences merely incidental to the one directly under consideration, e.g., those experiences which are like, the same as, or similar to the experience considered in the present. On the other hand, upon hearing this particular theme we may recall all sorts of facts about the musical culture to which this piece belongs. We might recall, for example, that this composition can be placed in the context of a musical tradition generally familiar to the Western ear and extending from the time of Bach to the present; or, that this work is considered an example of music from the Romantic period in Western music. Some of these recollections will be important for our present experience while others may be disregarded as irrelevant. The reflective selection of experiences can also be guided voluntarily by the phenomena of attention and interest.

> Attention is a function of the interest dominating the Now in which the reflective attitude is performed. This interest itself is constituted by the stock of my previous experiences, my knowledge at hand, by the protentions and anticipations prevailing at this time . . . (FPM §25).

Within the context of musical experience, attention is directed by our interest in, and decision to listen to, music. The listener is interested in understanding the music in its unfolding; and, by means of this guiding interest, with its corresponding anticipations of emergent musical meaning, which themselves are based upon past experiences sedimented in the form of the stock of knowledge at hand, his attention is focused upon the musical events. Once immersed in these musical events the listener will also be guided by the musical structure itself, which has been arranged in such a way that he is led to react in an appropriate manner. Thus, there would seem to be an interplay here between the listener's anticipations, which emerge from his stock of musical knowledge at hand, and his actual musical experience. His knowledge of other compositions by Beethoven and of the characteristics peculiar to music composed

during the Romantic period may lead to the anticipation of a certain development of the four note theme of the Fifth Symphony. The listener's present musical experiences may confirm these anticipations based upon his stock of musical knowledge which operates like a point of reference for his present experience; or, the present experience may frustrate these anticipations.

Through this dynamic interplay of expectations and recollections the musical theme is constituted and emerges as the fundamental unit of meaning for musical experience. Once constituted, it, too, can become an element of our stock of musical knowledge. According to Schutz, it becomes a *Gestalt* which can be recognized "as an entity with particular meaning." For example, having heard a particular Bach fugue many times or having performed it, the listener will recognize the theme immediately, the last phases will be anticipated as the initial phases are suggested, it will be continually recognized throughout the piece as the same theme, or as the same but modified if it is extended in time, invested, combined with other elements, transposed into a different key, etc. "Finally, it may become entirely familiar, it will be known in such a way that no recollection will be necessary. It has been remembered and is now at hand" (FPM §25).

IX. THE PROCESS OF MUSICAL COMMUNICATION

The focus of our investigation changes as we begin to consider the essay "Making Music Together" (1951), as an essay which explores the phenomenon of musical communication—the shared participation of the ongoing flow of the musical content. But "Making Music Together" also represents more than a presentation of the phenomenology of musical experience in just another context. As an essay in "applied theory," it represents an attempt by Schutz, to utilize "theory for a more adequate interpretation of social reality" (CP II ix).

In "Making Music Together" Schutz investigates the complex of social interactions in their varying degrees of intensity, which are involved in the process of musical communication among the composer, conductor, performers and listeners. Utilizing the results of

his investigations in "Fragments," Schutz recognizes the process of the communication of musical meaning as an outstanding example of those "pre-communicative," non-conceptual social interactions which are presupposed by communication understood as a semantic system.[37] Investigations into social phenomena are combined with investigations into the phenomenology of musical experience to produce this essay in "applied theory."

Schutz says that there is

> . . . a strong tendency in contemporary thought to identify meaning with its semantic expression and to consider language, speech, symbols, significant gestures, as the fundamental condition of social intercourse as such (MMT 161).

It is Schutz's thesis, on the other hand, that all communication, including language, a semantic system, symbols, etc., is founded upon a type of social interaction which he terms the "mutual tuning-in relationship." This social interaction is pre-communicative and non-conceptual, and although it forms the ground of possibility for communication itself, it can neither be grasped by, nor does it enter into the process of communication (MMT 161). It forms the substratum of human interactions, so to speak, and the possibility for the emergence of language as the "paramount vehicle of communication" (MMT 160). It is not surprising that Schutz chose the process of the communication of musical meaning as his example. As we have seen, as early as 1944 in the essay "Fragments" Schutz had come to understand music as a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time, and the musical experience as a polythetic grasping of this step-by-step occurrence in inner time. The unavailability of musical meaning for a conceptual grasping makes it an ideal example for investigating the manner in which meaning is communicated pre-linguistically.

Any investigation of the manner in which musical meaning is communicated is immediately confronted with the system of musical notation and its function as a technical means for the communication of musical meaning. However, with respect to the system of musical notation, it must be remembered that we are not to identify the musical meaning with the particular means of its communication. The specific meaning of a work will maintain its self-identity

despite the form of communication utilized and regardless of the fact that this same meaning may be communicated in many distinct performances at different times. Schutz contrasts the self-identical nature of the meaning of the musical work with the multiplicity of means through which this meaning can be communicated. We must also resist the temptation to identify musical communication with the system of musical notation and to further interpret this means of communication as a "musical language." "Musical notation is," according to Schutz, "just one among several vehicles of communicating musical thought" (MMT 165).

This is easy to demonstrate, e.g., I may be unable to read musical notation and yet be able to understand the musical meaning which is communicated by purely auditory means. In fact, the transmitted musical meaning need never have been communicated through notation. Also, musical notation should not be interpreted as the language system of music. The function of musical notation is a different one. A written word refers to a certain spoken sound. Such referring may suggest an identification of the written word with musical notation, which also is a set of instructions for producing a certain sound. But Schutz is quick to point out that the written word in a language system refers primarily to the *concept* conveyed by the spoken word (MMT 166). Musical notation, on the other hand, has no such possibility since, as we have seen, "the meaning of a musical process cannot be related to a conceptual scheme" (MMT 166). Furthermore, musical notation admits of various interpretations and can only approximate the intentions of the composer as to how the musical meaning is to be communicated. It is left more or less to the performer to interpret the prescriptions offered through the musical notation so as to achieve the most effective communication of the musical work. Finally, musical notation should not be identified with the "musical culture" of the musical work, which serves as a point of reference for the interpretation of the musical meaning as well as the musical notation. Musical notation requires for its interpretation the preacquired stock of musical experiences which are socially conditioned. Musical notation itself refers back to a necessary fundamental social stratum of the musical experience. According to Schutz,

> . . . the player approaching a so-called unknown piece of music does so from a historically—in one's own case, autobiographically—determined situation, determined by his stock of musical experiences at hand in so far as they are typically relevant to the anticipated novel experience before him. This stock of experiences refers indirectly to all his past and present fellow-men whose acts or thoughts have contributed to the building up of his knowledge (MMT 168).

Thus, the communication of musical meaning is accomplished against the background of a socially conditioned stock of musical experiences which, so to speak, sets the stage for the actual performance of a work of music. However, Schutz's investigations do not end with the discovery of this historical determination of the musical experience. The stock of musical experiences at hand "constitutes merely the setting" for the primary social relationship which makes possible the communication of musical meaning (MMT 169). We must now examine the nature of the various social relationships which exist between the composer, performer, and listener.

We begin with a consideration of that situation in which a listener or single performer enters into a social relationship with the composer of a work of music. We assume that the transition has been accomplished, in the presence of that "tension of consciousness" characteristic of the musical experience, to a new attitude which prepares the listener to follow the flux of the music in such a way that his expectation that this musical work is a meaningful context will be fulfilled. He is prepared to follow the invitation and suggestions contained in the musical flux itself. The focus of attention, i.e., that which constitutes the "thematic kernel" of conscious life, is the intention to seize upon the musical meaning of the composer, and, in the case of the performer, to achieve "its interpretation by re-creation" (MMT 169).

> This thematic kernel stands out against the horizon of pre-acquired knowledge, which knowledge functions as a scheme of reference and interpretation for the grasping of the composer's thought (MMT 169).

The flux of musical events begins, and as the listener or performer participates in this flux, he becomes immersed in the process of emergence of the musical meaning through a series of irreversible events occurring in the flux of inner time. Meaning emerges because the composer has arranged the musical elements in such a way that

those activities of conscious life that interrelate all experiences, i.e., retention, recollection, protention and anticipation, are used to interrelate the successive elements of the musical flux in inner time. The manner in which the successive elements of the musical process are interrelated was the focus of interest in "Fragments." Of interest in the present essay is the social relationship which exists between the composer and the listener or lone performer of the musical work.

To inquire into the nature of the social relationship prevailing between the composer and the listener may at first appear to be a rather dubious undertaking. It is quite likely that the composer and the listener may be temporally separated by a span of hundreds of years. How can the listener enter into a social relationship with a composer whom he has never known and may never have the opportunity to know? An answer to this question must be sought for in the nature of the musical experience itself.

The social relationship between the listener and composer is explained in the following manner. Upon hearing the first notes of the musical work, the listener immerses himself in the ongoing flux of musical events as they occur. He grasps the musical meaning by "living in" and "re-producing" the step by step flux of the articulated musical events in inner time. This polythetically constituted musical work, itself existing in inner time, however, is none other than the musical meaning originally intended by the composer and communicated by means of a series of events in the world.

> We have therefore the following situation: two series of events in inner time, one belonging to the stream of consciousness of the composer, the other to the stream of consciousness of the beholder, are lived through in simultaneity, which simultaneity is created by the ongoing flux of the musical process (MMT 173).

It is Schutz's thesis that the process whereby a quasi-simultaneous sharing of experiences in inner time and the "reconstruction of a vivid present" occurs, represents a derived form of "the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience of the 'We,' which is at the foundation of all possible communication" (MMT 173). The listener polythetically grasps the musical meaning intended by the composer, which is communicated by means of activities in the dimension of outer time, e.g., the performance, but which them-

selves belong to the dimension of inner time. Thus, the listener and composer are united by the ongoing flux of musical events, they share in quasi-simultaneity that "derived form of the vivid present shared by the partners in a genuine face-to-face relation" (MMT 171f.).

This "mutual tuning-in relationship" admits of various degrees of intensity as becomes evident from an investigation of the role of the performer in the musical process of communication. The performer acts as an intermediary in this process. With the introduction of the performer in the process of musical communication, however, the web of social relationships becomes more complex, since his experiences refer to both the composer and the audience.

> It is the eminent social function of the performer—the singer or player of an instrument—to be the intermediary between composer and listener. By his re-creation of the musical process the performer partakes in the stream of consciousness of the composer as well as of the listener. He thereby enables the latter to become immersed in the particular articulation of the flux of inner time which is the specific meaning of the piece of music in question (MMT 174).

It is the performer's responsibility correctly to re-create the specific musical meaning first intended by the composer. For those listeners unable to share in the ongoing flux of the musical process without the aid of audible sounds, the performer's performance offers them the sole opportunity to become acquainted with the work. This function of the performer becomes clear when several distinct performances of the same work are compared. What we discover is that in one or more of these performances, the performer executed his role more perfectly and was able to transmit more of the musical meaning than in other performances. We say in such a case that the piece was better executed, more meaningful, etc. In these performances the listener becomes aware of more of the interconnections which lead to the formation of the specific meaning and themes of the work. To be sure, we notice that a particular performer may be able to penetrate deeply into one composer's musical works and yet fail to understand another composer's, i.e., the performer is sensitive to the particular musical meanings and their arrangements peculiar to one particular composer and can share his musical experiences to a greater degree that those of another composer. The effectiveness of the performance

depends upon the degree to which the performer can become immersed in the flux of musical events which together form the musical meaning of the work, and upon the performer's ability to communicate this musical meaning in the performance.

Although it is of "no great importance" whether the performer enters into a relationship with the listener in a mediated or immediate way, Schutz does say that those cases in which the performance is mediated by a mechanical device always refer back to the situation in which the performer and the listener "share together a vivid present in face-to-face relation" (MMT 174). This latter situation is the "paramount situation" according to Schutz. Here the listener is able to experience the immediate presence of the performer. The performer is recognized as such by the members of the audience, and together they experience one another spatially and temporally in the mode of immediacy.[38] Take the example of a solo pianist and his audience. As a member of the audience I am attentive to the ongoing flux of the musical process. The intention to seize upon the particular meaning of this work forms the thematic focus of my conscious life. The question arises, then, as to why I become so absorbed with the visual aspects of the performance. Why don't I simply settle back in my seat, close my eyes and listen to the music? Why is it that as the musical performance begins the members of the audience position themselves in such a way that they have optimal visual contact with the performer? From these and other phenomena we must conclude that this particular situation, in which the musical meaning is communicated in person, is particularly vivid for both the audience and the performer. A process of mutual orientation, of taking one another into account, takes place between the performer and his audience, e.g., the phenomena of applause and bowing reflect this mutual orientation. The audience watches the performer and interprets his motions, facial expression, etc., as indications of the nature or the intensity of the feeling and involvement. As the performer becomes more immersed in the ongoing flux of the musical events, the audience takes notice of this and with growing enthusiasm participates more fully in the meaning of the work. The performer in this immediate situation has more opportunities to create an understanding audience as he offers to share with them the possibility for a

greater appreciation of the work. Furthermore, the audience's reactions may help the performer enhance his performance and thereby communicate more of the musical meaning. The process is reciprocal.

> In all these circumstances performer and listener are "tuned-in" to one another, are living together through the same flux, are growing older together while the musical process lasts. The statement applies . . . primarily to the co-performance in simultaneity of the polythetic steps by which the musical content articulates itself in inner time. Since, however, all performance as an act of communication is based upon a series of events in the outer world . . . it can be said that the social relationship between performer and listener is founded upon the common experience of living together simultaneously in several dimensions of time (MMT 174f.).

As the title "Making Music Together" indicates, the investigations are carried one step further to include a consideration of the relationship among two or more performers of a musical work. Once again we find that the social relationships are founded upon the simultaneous sharing of all those involved in different dimensions of time. The difference in this situation lies in the fact that whereas the listener's acts of co-performance were merely internal, the co-performers must execute activities occurring in the spatial dimension simultaneously with activities in inner time; and furthermore, be so oriented to their fellow performers as to reciprocally take into account their experiences in both the dimension of inner time and that of the outer, spatial dimension.

Consequently, each performer's action is oriented not only to the composer's intended meanings, but also to his audience and to his fellow performers (MMT 175). We can test Schutz's claims concerning this situation of making music together, by investigating the limiting situation in which only two performers are involved.

Each of these performers, say a pianist and a violinist, has a prescribed part to play in the performance (we thus ignore the important musical activity of improvisation for the moment). The composer has so arranged the musical work that the fragmentary activities of each of the performers, when performed simultaneously, will form a harmonious and meaningful process unfolding step-by-step in inner and outer experience. To achieve this harmonious integration of activities, however, it is required that each of the

performers take into account the other's activities. Through a series of protentions and retentions, each must be able to anticipate the activities of the other. But the anticipations in this situation extend beyond the purely auditory sphere and the unfolding of the musical events in inner time, because the co-performers here enjoy spatial immediacy as well. Each of their actions is available to the other. The gestures and expressions of the Other are available for interpretation as indications of what he may do next. The two performers do not perform the work in total disregard of one another. They look at one another, gesture and signal to one another, accommodate their activities to those performed by the other, etc. In other words, they live together through the flux of the musical events following the suggestions that the composer has incorporated in the work itself, as well as the suggestions of the fellow performer.

In the more complicated situation in which many individuals are involved in the performance, the immediacy of the limiting situation is lost. As Schutz indicates, it is the role of the conductor to "establish with each of the performers the contact which they are unable to find with one another in immediacy" (MMT 176). The members of a symphony orchestra are unable to share in an immediate face-to-face relationship with one another. They look to the conductor for an indication of the activities of all the others. The very arrangement of the symphony orchestra reflects the importance of the role played by the conductor. All of the performers are arranged so as to make possible direct visual contact with the conductor. Through visual contact with the expressive activities of the conductor the performers are once again brought into contact with one another, although in a mediated manner, in both the dimension of inner and outer experience. The conductor is the means by which a real "community of space" is maintained between many performers, thus unifying their experiences into a "vivid present."

We might add, that, although Schutz does not mention the relationship of the conductor and performers to the audience, this relationship could be analyzed in a similar way. For the members of the audience attending the performance given by a symphony orchestra, the conductor also plays a key role in establishing the "vivid present" of which Schutz speaks. In the case in which one performer or a

small group of performers face an audience, there exists for the members of the audience at least the possibility of watching each of the performers. The various expressive activities involved in the musical process of communication are available as indications and suggestions as to what course the musical experience will take, etc. Confronted with an entire symphony orchestra the situation changes drastically. The members of the audience can no longer grasp in such immediacy the activities in which the performers express their involvement in the musical process. The conductor's activities replace, for the audience as well as for the many performers in such a situation, "the immediate grasping of the expressive activities" (MMT 176f.). The conductor's gestures, which evoke in the spatial dimension those musical events belonging properly to the dimension of inner time, are also a point of reference for the audience, establishing a "community of space" which unifies the fluxes of inner time of the audience and performers in such a way that they are synchronized "into a vivid present" (MMT 177). The performers, the conductor, and the members of the audience emerge from the completed musical experience with the feeling that they have *together* shared the musical meaning intended by the composer and communicated in the performance.

X. CONCLUSIONS

To provide a definitive statement concerning the phenomenological approach to musical experience upon the basis of the preceding investigation of Alfred Schutz's work would be difficult if not impossible. It would be difficult both because only Schutz's work in this field has been presented,[39] and because of the fact that Schutz's work itself was left uncompleted and thus merely indicates the direction for further phenomenologically oriented studies. Thus, all that will be offered by way of conclusion are some suggestions concerning the importance of Schutz's work in establishing a foundation for a phenomenology of musical experience.

In the first two sections we attempted to discover what it means to investigate music phenomenologically. It was concluded, upon the

basis of Schutz's work, that the phenomenological approach to musical experience is a reflective approach which concerns itself with the essential features of musical consciousness and the musical work understood as an ideal object. Thus, Schutz proceeds by reflectively considering music as it appears to consciousness and in this way discovers an important structural feature of musical experience. Schutz discovers that, upon the adoption of the peculiar attitude necessary for listening to music, the meaning of all of our experiences undergoes a peculiar alteration (FPM §15), he discovers the finite province of musical meaning.

I would like to suggest that the importance of Schutz's work for establishing a phenomenology of music is to be understood in terms of this concept of the finite province of musical meaning. I find it to be crucial for two reasons:

1) It is an important methodological device which allows Schutz to distinguish the musical experience from other kinds of experiences.

2) The use of this concept of finite provinces of meaning, which is understood by Schutz as possessing certain necessary features which constitute its cognitive or experiential style (CP I 232), allows Schutz to point out essential features of the musical experience.

In this way, the concept of the musical province of meaning becomes an important tool for establishing a general phenomenology of the musical experience. We shall conclude this essay with a short discussion of these two points.

1) In the third section above, we examined the way in which the concept of a finite province of meaning could be applied to musical experience. Primarily we considered the way in which this idea is helpful in differentiating between experience in the everyday working world and that of the world of art. We found that the meaning of our experiences changes when we make the leap from one finite province of meaning to another, e.g., in the finite province of dramatic meaning the spectator is not called upon to "act" but only to observe the action taking place on the stage and thus to bestow upon the dramatic world the "accent of reality." In a similar manner the

arts of music and painting we discussed and this led to the distinction between the world of art and other provinces of meaning, such as that of philosophy, dreams, etc.[40]

What remained implicit for the most part, however, in the discussion in Section III was the fact that this concept can also be used to distinguish between the experiences of various art forms within the world of art itself. To be sure, in "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music" Schutz prepared the way for a characterization of that which is unique to the finite province of musical meaning by comparing it with the finite provinces of meaning peculiar to other art forms, e.g., literature, painting, dance, ornament, architecture. Schutz's work in "Fragments" can be understood as an attempt to illustrate the fact that not every art form "is a meaningful context of the same kind as that of music" (FPM §2). Schutz's discovery, for example, that musical experience is a form of experience that does not necessarily refer to the listener's spatial experiences, serves to distinguish the musical province of meaning from those of art forms which rely upon the beholder's ability to spatially experience their elements. Also, in Section 2 of "Fragments" Schutz says that music can be distinguished from those art forms which employ language in that it does not have a representative function. Naturally, Schutz's work remains merely programmatic, but his concept of finite provinces of meaning provides the basis for elaborating upon the suggestions already present in his work in order to distinguish between the experiences of various art forms.

2) The musical province of meaning, like every other, has its peculiar cognitive or experiential style which is characterized by

> . . . a specific *epoché*, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective (CP I 232).

With these defining features of every finite province of meaning in mind, Schutz was able to discover several important features of the musical province of meaning. Four of these features will be mentioned in conclusion:

a) the system of relevances peculiar to the musical province of meaning;

b) the role played by musical culture in musical experience;

c) the nature of musical communication;

d) the temporal perspective of the musical experience.

a) According to Schutz, each province of meaning has its own peculiar systems of relevances (RPR 105). In Section III, we tried to illustrate this within the musical province of meaning, by elaborating upon Schutz's own work in "Fragments" (Sections 15–17, 25), "Making Music Together" (169), and in *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*. What should be emphasized is the importance of Schutz's recognition of this phenomenon—of the way in which these systems of relevances operate within musical experience and of the part they play in distinguishing the musical province of meaning as unique. Again, Schutz's work is incomplete, but it is clear that the musical province of meaning is distinguished from other provinces of meaning by a unique system of relevances. Once the experiential or cognitive style peculiar to musical experience with its appropriate tension of consciousness has been adopted, a unique system of relevances comes into play. There are for example, particular kinds of motivational relevances which contribute to the constitution of the musical "interest" situation, i.e., the interest in listening to music, to this particular work, etc. This, in turn, leads to the formation of a thematic field within musical experience, with respect to which certain activities, experiences, recollections, etc., are relevant while others are not. In musical experience this interaction of motivational and topical relevances is determined to a large extent by the decision to listen to music and the desire to understand the musical meaning which is thereby communicated. The world becomes one which is interpreted as it appears acoustically, and that which is brought into the thematic focus of conscious life pertains to this world of acoustic meaning.

b) However, Schutz's theory of relevance not only serves to distinguish the musical province of meaning from other provinces of meaning in terms of the systems of relevances peculiar to each, it also offers a basis for a more adequate understanding of musical phenomena, such as musical culture. Not mentioned above in connection with the systems of relevances, musical culture can be prop-

erly understood as an essential element for the interpretation, and therefore meaning, of musical experience. Musical culture, according to Schutz, forms a scheme of interpretation, which along with other interpretationally relevant material, makes it possible for the listener, etc., to correctly understand and make sense of his musical experiences. It is musical culture, as we have seen, which influences the composer as he works, provides the performer with a basis for interpreting the musical work, and which is even, in part, responsible for the fact that the listener finds himself unable to listen to "new" music. Thus, musical culture has an *essential* function within musical experience, a function which must be examined phenomenologically with regard to its structure, etc.

It might be added, that Schutz's recognition of the essential role played by musical culture has importance beyond the scope of a strictly phenomenological investigation as well. For if it is true that musical experience necessarily includes musical culture as its frame of reference, then this recognition also brings to light the tremendous influence which musical culture can have upon musical experience. Consequently it can be seen, for example, that the role played by critics, music theorists and historians, etc., is a crucial one. A responsible form of music theory and appreciation is required, in which the historian or theorist does not merely compile a list of biographical information or technical terms. Realizing the role which his work plays (or can play) within musical experience, the theorist should approach his work accordingly. The aim of responsible musical scholarship ultimately, is to enable the listener, performer, composer or conductor to better understand the musical meaning communicated in musical experience.

c) We must not fail to include in this summary the insights yielded by Schutz's investigations of the shared experience of the musical work, i.e., his investigations of the specific form of sociality peculiar to the musical province of meaning. There is little doubt that this constitutes Schutz's best known and most impressive contribution to the understanding of the musical experience as a whole. Although the musical work can, in principle, remain uncommunicated, it is also true that the composer creates the musical work with

"communicative intent" (MMT 170) and that only insofar as the work is communicated in some manner does it become intersubjectively available and of interest to a community of appreciators. For the most part, discussions of musical phenomena presuppose that the work of music is intersubjectively available. A music historian discusses the historical development of Western music, the careers of individual composers and distinct musical forms and styles without considering the manner in which the work of music can be shared and understood by others. A music theorist studies the particular structure of the work of music without asking how it is that he can share in the musical meaning of the work. For the listener who is actually listening to a work of music, of course, the problem doesn't arise as to *how* the musical meaning can be shared. As a member of the audience, he simply listens. But when we attempt to understand the musical experience itself, we must ask how an audience can share a musical work with the composer, the performers and the conductor. Schutz's investigations of the peculiar form of sociality within the musical province of meaning in "Making Music Together" make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the problem of the web of social relationships involved in the musical experience.

d) Finally, the musical province of meaning is distinguished from other provinces of meaning by its particular temporal perspective. As we have seen, Schutz maintains that the temporality peculiar to the musical province of meaning is not the objective time proper to the world of everyday life, but the inner time of the stream of consciousness. It is in inner time that the musical meaning is constituted, and since musical meaning is such that it can only be polythetically grasped, inner time must be understood as the very form of existence of music, i.e., music is "a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time" (MMT 170).

We do not wish to restate here in its entirety Schutz's investigation of this point, but only to indicate the importance of his recognition and investigation of this structural feature of the province of musical meaning. Musical consciousness, Schutz has demonstrated, concerned as it is with musical meaning, is limited to musical meaning *as* it appears, i.e., how it appears. Since musical meaning necessarily

emerges polythetically and always remains only polythetically available, musical consciousness itself is only capable of grasping this meaning polythetically in inner time. Musical meaning does not make its appearance in outer or cosmic time, and thus musical consciousness, which is concerned with the musical meaning as it appears, is confined to that time perspective peculiar to its very own constitution—inner time. This insight constitutes an important contribution to the understanding of the musical experience. Using this insight as a foundation Schutz then continues his reflective consideration of musical experience with an examination of the manner in which the musical elements become integrated within musical experience leading to the emergence of musical meaning.

In the foregoing sections we have attempted to indicate some of Schutz's insights and contributions toward a foundation of a phenomenology of music, as well as carefully developing some of Schutz's work along the lines suggested by him. In this way, we have uncovered a rich and fertile field of ideas and suggestions which would require a fully developed phenomenology of music to complete. Such a development is beyond the scope of the present investigation, however, which only set itself the task of examining Schutz's phenomenological approach to music with an eye towards its concrete contributions. A multiplicity of insights have surfaced in the course of these investigations, and we find ourselves challenged to begin again—this time where Schutz left off.

References and Footnotes

1. Alfred Schutz, "Fragments on the phenomenology of music," ed. Frederick Kersten, in *Music and Man*, v. 2, nos. 1/2 (1976), pp. 5–72. Hereafter cited as FPM.
2. Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory*. ed. Arvid Brodersen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). The essay "Making music together," pp. 159–178, is hereafter cited as MMT.
3. Schutz's discussion of this in "Making music together" seems, in fact, to have been drawn from the earlier investigations in "Fragments."
4. Spiegelberg has referred to this "negative aspect" of the phenomenological method, i.e., "the identification and deliberate elimination of theoretical con-

structs and symbolisms in favor of the unadulterated phenomena . . ." in *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 656.

5. Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Dusquesne University Press, 1964), Part I, §1 dealing with the "constancy-hypothesis." It might be parenthetically noted at this point that musical experience has little to do with notes, chords, etc.
6. See Section 9 of this chapter for further discussion of this topic.
7. Schutz writes: "It may be hoped that intensified research into the phenomenology of musical experience will shed some light upon the difficult problem as to which of these means of meaningful arrangement of tones is *essential to music in general*, regardless of what its particular historical setting may be" (MMT 170n: my italics). Also see Husserl's characterization of the phenomenological method as one in search of essentials in *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Erstes Buch* (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), §75. Hereafter cited as *Ideen I*.
8. Schutz's use of the term "musical meaning," as well as the, in my opinion, rather unfortunate use of "musical thought," must be correctly understood, especially in this context where they are used alongside of "scientific thought." Schutz does not mean to equate musical and scientific meaning: this will become clear when Schutz's objection to Husserl's doctrine of "monothetic constitution" is discussed below. Musical meaning differs from scientific or conceptual meaning in that it does not point beyond itself to something else, and in this connection it is important to note that musical meaning is not to be found in the notes or score. Still, as in the scientific experience, musical experience is "meaningful," i.e., there is some kind of understanding going on that is denoted by the very term "music." Thus, in a very fundamental sense, we must say that music, itself, is the "meaning."

   But beyond this most fundamental statement concerning musical meaning, is the purely phenomenological import that this term has for Schutz, who is dealing with music "as a phenomenon of our conscious life" (FPM §16). That is, through his reflective analysis of the musical experience, attention is focussed upon the field of investigation proper to the phenomenological investigation, i.e., musical consciousness, its essential structure *and its correlate*, or intentional object ("phenomenon"). This correlate of musical consciousness is the "meaning" of which Schutz speaks. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)* ed. R. Boehm (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; English trans. J. S. Churchill, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964]), §43, "The perceived is also what is meant; the act of meaning 'lives' in the act of perception." Also *Ideen I*, §90, "Ähnlich wie die Wahrnehmung hat *jedes* intentionale Erlebnis—eben das macht das Grundstück der Intentionalität aus—sein, 'intentionales Objekt,' d.i. seinen gegenständlichen Sinn."
9. For Husserl's explanation of the concept of "foundation" see *Logische Untersuchungen* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), v. 2, Part I, Chapter 2, pp. 261ff. The passage here referred to was paraphrased by Marvin Farber, in *The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1943), pp. 297–99.

"If in accordance with essential law an a can only exist in a comprehensive unity which connects with a μ, then we say, an a as such needs foundation through a μ, or also, an a as such is in need of completion by means of a μ. If accordingly, a_o, μ_o are definite particular cases of the pure genera a, or μ, which stand in the cited relationship, and if they are members of one whole, then we say that a_o is founded by μ_o . . . The indefinite expressions: a_0 is in need of a supplement, or it is based upon a certain factor, are synonymous with the expression: a_0 is *dependent*."

10. See Husserl, *Ideen* I, §119.
11. ". . . die ihrem Wesen nach 'ursprünglich' nur synthetisch bewusst werden können . . ." (*Ideen I*, §119, p. 294).
12. Also see MMT 172f.
13. Schutz's claim that musical experience offers an example of a polythetic process of constitution which cannot be grasped monothetically, i.e., conceptualized, represents a criticism of Husserl's doctrine of constitution. Husserl maintained that for every polythetic constitution there existed as an "essential" possibility its transformation into a monothetically available objectivity. See *Ideen I*, §119; *Logische Untersuchungen*, Inv. V, §36. Husserl's position insured that all dimensions of consciousness were available for conceptualization. Also cf. MMT 178 for further implications.
14. "Eidetische Singularitäten sind Wesen, die zwar notwendig über sich 'allgemeine' Wesen haben als ihre Gattungen, aber nicht mehr unter sich Besonderungen, in Beziehung auf welche sie selbst Arten (nächste Arten oder mittelbare, höhere Gattungen) wären" (*Ideen I*, §12; also §§15, 75).
15. Insofar as literary criticism and analysis fail to recognize the fundamentally polythetic character of the poetic meaning they obstruct honest attempts to come to an understanding of the original intentions of the poet. Even the best theory or interpretation, can do no more than aid the reader or listener to a more adequate recreation of the polythetically constituted poetical meaning. Similarly, an account of the life of Beethoven etc., can never replace the actual experience of reproducing in some manner the musical development and unfolding of that musical work.
16. It is only within this larger context that Schutz's motives for assigning the essay on music in (Collected Papers) II to "applied theory" make sense. MMT is *first* an investigation of "the social interaction which, though it is an indispensible condition of all possible communication, does not enter the communicative process and is not capable of being grasped by it" (MMT 161). The occasion of making music together is itself only one example of a process fundamental to all forms of communication and thus must be understood in this larger framework.
17. In CP I 208–259. Although published in 1945, on the basis of a manuscript made available to me by Prof. Frederick Kersten, it seems that this essay was written between 1940 and 1943 and thus precedes the "Fragments" essay of 1944. With this in mind I have concluded that the later essay on music can be seen as an attempt by Schutz to study one particular province of meaning in some detail.
18. Schutz considerably broadened Husserl's concept of epoché. For example, even the natural attitude has its peculiar epoché, which itself contributes to the nature of this province of meaning. The epoché of the natural attitude involves

the suspension of all doubts about the existence of the world (CP I 229). The epoché characteristic of the musical experience, according to Schutz, simply involves the suspension of "more layers of the reality of daily life" (CP I 233).

19. The meaning of "finite provinces of *meaning*" is indicated by Schutz's reference in a footnote to "On multiple realities" (CP I 230) to Husserl's *Ideen I*, 55: "Absolute Realität und Welt sind hier eben Titel für gewisse gültige Sinneseinheiten (nämlich Einheiten des 'Sinnes"), bezogen auf gewisse ihrem *Wesen* nach gerade so und nicht anders sinngebende und Sinnesgültigkeit ausweisende Zusammenhänge des absoluten, reinen Bewusstseins." It is in terms of these "unities of meaning" and the "meaning-giving consciousness" that Schutz reinterprets James's "psychologistic" concept. See CP I 229f.
20. See CP I 239, 234f.
21. See "Don Quixote and the problem of reality," CP II 149ff. Here Schutz discusses the problem of the reality of the work of art in connection with Don Quixote's attendance at the puppet show of Master Pedro: "We, the audience, the beholders, are powerless with respect to the reality of the work of art or the theater; as beholders we have to suffer or to enjoy it, but we are not in the position to interfere with it, to change it by our actions. Here is perhaps one of the roots of the particular phenomenological structure of the aesthetic experience. But to follow this idea up would lead too far afield" (150).
22. Alfred Schutz, *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*. ed. Richard M. Zaner (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970). Schutz worked on the unfinished manuscript of this book, according to the editor, from August 1947 to August 1951. Hereafter cited as RPR. See also CP I 227.
23. With respect to that which is thematic for musical consciousness Schutz says, "it is the grasping of the composer's musical thought and its interpretation by re-creation which . . . become 'thematic' for his ongoing activity. This thematic kernel stands out against the horizon of preacquainted knowledge, which knowledge functions as a scheme of reference and interpretation for the grasping of the composer's thought" (MMT 169).
24. Schutz's theory of relevances provides a basis for a more adequate interpretation of the phenomenon of musical "taste." With reference to the stock of knowledge at hand as the sedimentation of relevant previous experiences we can better understand the difficulty encountered in listening to contemporary music, e.g., modern jazz, where previous experience may be unable to offer "types" relevant to such a novel experience.
25. Schutz doesn't explain how this coordination is achieved. It is probable that had Schutz completed the manuscript that he would have included an account of this coordination in section 5 which deals with music and dance.
26. Schutz remains consistent, continually searching for those elements which are essential to the musical experience. One may only question his preference of the term "theme" rather than "rhythm," which he declares is too equivocal (FPM §18). We can agree with Schutz on this point naturally, although the term "theme" is beset by similar difficulties.
27. Schutz's brief discussion of the art of painting is confined to an understanding of a painting as framed and having only one perspective point. This is, however, not the only possibility, since paintings are not always framed and a single perspective can be shattered, for example, by the introduction of other perspectives.

28. See José Ortega y Gasset, *The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on Art, Culture and Literature*. tr. Helene Weyl (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 121.
29. Emphasis should be placed on the word "spatial" here. Although Schutz does not, in this quotation, specify that he is speaking of the absence of spatial structure, I believe that this is what he intended. To be sure, there is structure in the acoustic field, but it is temporal not spatial. For example, if there is depth in acoustic experience then it is the experience of temporal depth, i.e., the past, that is meant.
30. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution* (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), §32; see also §§49b, 49c. For Schutz's comments on *Ideen II* see "Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Volume II," in *Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*. ed. I. Schutz (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 15–39.
31. See RPR for a detailed study of the systems of relevances operative in the present and the role which these relevances play in the selection of aspects of the past important for present experience.
32. See "On multiple realities," CP I 212ff.
33. See E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge* (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), §§18, 59. Hereafter cited as CM.
34. Cf. CM §38.
35. Schutz's claim that the "passive synthesis" is an "illusion" has radical consequences. Husserl maintained that this synthesis is responsible for the fact that the Ego has a world of objects in the first place (CM §38). This investigation, however, extends beyond the scope of the present investigations.
36. Our earlier clarification of the term "meaning" should be recalled here (see p. 6 above). For Schutz, meaning, "is not a quality inherent in certain experiences emerging within our stream of consciousness, but the result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present Now with a reflective attitude" (CP I 210).
37. There is some confusion in this essay about the use of the term "communication." Schutz says "The chief interest of our analysis consists in the particular character of all social interactions connected with the musical process . . . founded upon communication, but not primarily upon a semantic system . . ." (MMT 159). Schutz also says that "all communication presupposes the existence of some kind of social interaction" (MMT 161). Clearly, Schutz refers to communication in two different senses in these quotations. In the first, communication is understood as the "pre-communicative social relationship," and in the second it is a semantic system. There is no real contradiction between these statements, but the reader must be careful as to which of these senses is given to the term when it is used.
38. See "The dimensions of the social world," CP II 24ff.
39. Work has also been done in this field by others. See Ernest Ansermet, *Les Fondements de la Musique dans la Conscience Humaine* (Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1961); Roman Ingarden, *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst: Musikwerk, Bild, Architektur, Film* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1962). [Editor's note: See also the extensive work done by J. Arcaya, T. Clifton, and F.J. Smith,

In Search of Musical Method (1976), *The Experiencing of Musical Sound* (1978), and *Understanding the Musical Experience*, 1989.

40. See "On multiple realities" (CP I 207–259) for Schutz's discussion of various provinces of meaning and their relationship to one another.

A phenomenological interpretation of the works of Arnold Schoenberg

ANTONIO SERRAVEZZA [trans. F.J. Smith]
University of Bologna

ARNOLD SCHOENBERG always denied that his "method of composition with twelve notes posited only in relation with each other" could ever qualify as some sort of "system." The word, system, suggests the notion of a binding prescription of a normative order. And it was precisely this that the composer held to be quite alien to his way of doing things musically.† In an unpublished writing entitled *Wgr* (apparently *Wiesengrund*) Schoenberg recalls to mind, that the twelve tone method "does not represent the only way to the solution of new problems but is only one of such possibilities."[1] It is not legitimate to impose on compositional practice an external legality; and thus it is not possible to indicate in any codified system the path of artistic production.

In his *Harmonielehre* (1911), written before the new method took shape, one finds an analogous achievement in regard to the relationship between compositional procedures and theory. Musical theory "observes a series of phenomena, classifies them according to certain common features and from these deduces laws. This is entirely appropriate and could hardly be otherwise, since there is no other realistic road open. But at this very point there is likewise the beginning of error, because the false conclusion is drawn that these laws – from the moment they seem to be

† Accordingly, Schoenberg's disagreement with Hauer had its origin in the purely methodological character of his new compositional model. In this context we have to understand his polemics with the author of *Dr. Faustus*, as also with the "secret *consigliere*" of Mann. This is so also with Adorno, with whom he disputed the interpretation of the serial principle as a binding order.

true for the phenomena actually being observed – should be valid from then on also for all future phenomena. Thus the nefarious result, that one believes oneself to have found a *norm* to determine the value of art likewise in any future works."[2]

His polemics against any aesthetic, often occurring in the pages of the *Harmonielehre*, may be interpreted in the same insightful way. By "aesthetic" Schoenberg does not intend getting into the problems of art but rather indicates a normative model, that has to do with setting definitive terms for the *conditions* of a work of art. And to any "*bad* aesthetic" is opposed "*good* craftsmanship,"[3] i.e., compositional practice free of prejudices and entirely cognizant of its operations. In other words, the flowing evolution of art is not susceptible to codification. Musical practices precede theoretical systematizing in the sense that compositional problems from time to time require from musical logic the finding of valid solutions. This validity on the other hand cannot extend itself beyond the specific situation that justifies it. Theoretical achievements are not to be rejected *for themselves*, and they obey legitimate cognitive needs. But theory becomes a source of bias when, ceasing to be "honest research,"[4] it pretends "to have found *eternal* laws."[5]

In the sixties certain sectors of Italian culture proposed a phenomenological interpretation of these theses of Schoenberg, and we may recall that an analogous task had been done by the French composer, René Leibowitz. This was the period in which the work of Edmund Husserl exercized a notable influence on Italian intellectual life, becoming a potent factor for renewal and contributing to the overcoming of a stagnant neo-idealistic tradition. Such an influence as this, that does not remain circumscribed within the restricted ambit of philosophy, has a much more expanded cultural significance. In the same years an updating of the forces of Italian musical culture took place, emphasizing the experiences of the historic avantgarde (despite a time gap) and the more recent evolution of musical language. Because of this interest has grown with regard to a phenomenological "reading" of the writings of Schoenberg, in which claims are made as to "surprising"[6] and even "stupefying"[7] discoveries concerning Husserl's work.

Thus for the musicologist, Luigi Rognoni, the *Harmonielehre* represents a "true and proper phemomenology of musical technique."[8] The philosopher, Carlo Sini, attributes to this work "the effective character of the phenomenology of musical technique *ante litteram*."[9] In effect such attestations can be persuasive, and one cannot deny certain thematic convergences between Schoenberg's method and that of phenomenology. For example, the composer's intent on a system of dismantling, as a process capable of discovering the original sense of phenomena and overcoming the "obvious" elements in reified theorizations, becomes apparent. Theoreticians, who sustain the unconditioned validity of the laws of harmony, in reality "have not understood the wherefore, how and when of these laws (or they may have forgotten them at least), and thus they retain them as eternal."[10] Moreover, "obviousness is their hallmark. No one has ever told them that in art there is nothing obvious or that anything is well founded."[11] Theory "is only *one way to look at and deal with* things and cannot be construed as a self-contained system."[12] "Truth value" is similarly dealt with in *Harmonielehre* and in *Probleme des Kunstunterrichts*, being counterposed to the absolute and definitive value of "truth." Any ultimate solution to such problems even in the arena of musical art would amount to an end of research as well as lead to immobilization in a non-productive situation, in which every aspiration has been exhausted. Vice versa, artistic research has an infinite nature and even in its developed stage is interlaced with errors, indispensably present in order to maintain live tension.[13] Again, Schoenberg polemicizes against those theorizations that proceed from "considering the forms found (by human intelligence) as given forms,"[14] and he insists on a concept of theory in which "there do not exist for us eternal laws but only indications that have value, provided they do not get overladen or eliminated – *in toto* or in part – by new conditions."[15]

But do these citations actually constitute a phenomenological interpretation? The composer certainly put into his work "a technique of discovery for laying bare the origins and sense of every operation that, historically transmitted, have taken the form

of absolute aesthetic laws";[16] and he is resolute in asserting that "tonality is not a natural law or an eternal musical norm."[17] Noteworthy is also his recognition that consolidated systems can acquire the aspect of "second nature"[18] i.e., the characteristic of obviousness that can be removed only with great critical effort. Frequent are passages, where it is denied that art and music are tied to a clutch of "givens" and obey a natural law. "Attempts to reduce the phenomena of art unconditionally to those of nature will continue to be effectively frustrated," he writes, "because the two regions are not homogeneous."[19] Rather they are reciprocally external to one another, and "the laws of nature do not know exceptions, whereas the theories of art consist substantially of exceptions."[20] Moreover, "art is not a given element, as is nature, but a matter of becoming."[21] The musical idea, consequently, "does not exist in us as something immutable, as a natural datum not susceptible to modification, but as an element capable of being modified in accord with the dictates of taste or, particularly, the tenor and spirit of the times."[22]

The theses, however, do not find a clear and coherent systematization and coexist with propositions of considerably different meaning. In the problematical context of *Harmonielehre* they do not represent the center or foundation of theoretical discourse but rather are only *one* perspective, *one* aspect of a complex meshing, often confused. In fact, notwithstanding the views first expounded, Schoenberg does not hesitate to resort to the old concept of art as *imitation of nature* and limits himself to proposing only a partial correction, in the sense that at higher levels art reproduces an "interior nature"[23] and not natural external reality. In the attempt to focus this conceptualizing more closely he makes reference to "the impression made on the contemporary subject"[24] by sound material, understood not merely as external data but as coinvolved element in the very process of perception and in the corresponding physiological phenomena.[25] Between sound and sound perception on the one hand is artistic result, and on the other there exists the strictest tie between them. "The material of music is sound, and this with all its characteristics and effects is considered capable of producing artistic phenomena. All the

sensations that it evokes with and after such characteristic effects influence in some manner the form of which sound as such is the constitutive element, in other words an influence on the entire musical composition."[26]

Obviously, Schoenberg does not limit himself to expounding the thesis that material sound and its acoustical properties represent the natural foundation, the material presupposition inseparable from musical reality – a thesis that is quite obvious. In reality he intends to assert something more, namely that the nature of the material is not merely a *condition* but is also a *guide and model* of artistic activity. More precisely, sound material contains in itself a complex of possibilities, of which the history of music is the progressive actualization. Music is imitation of a natural model in the sense that it puts at our disposal resources that serve in an ever more adequate manner. The evolution of musical language is thus nothing else than a process of the actualization of "the will of nature,"[27] and, if in the arena of art no achievement is definitive and further progress is always possible, this happens because it comes closer and closer to the *naturgegebenes Vorbild* without, however, attaining it at any time. As to the bimodal system, for example, "an approach has been made to the will of nature, yet it is still far from it,"[28] and future stages of the language will represent further progress in this direction.

The distinction between consonance and dissonance will now be shown ever more clearly as quite inadequate, because the natural phenomenon of harmony does not justify such a simplistic antithesis. There simply exist harmonies that may be more or less far from the fundamental sound; and musical systems evolve in the direction of an ever greater integration of distant harmonies. "What today is distant tomorrow may be close, and all that is really necessary is the capacity for approximation. In the course music has run this has meant the introduction within its ambit of expression of an ever greater number of possibilities and relationships already innate in the very self-constitution of sound as such."[29]

All this will allow a phenomenological "reading" but only with considerable difficulty, for here we are faced with naturalistic

residues that make the value of distinctions between art and nature moot; moreover, an essentialist view of art is reintroduced. The basic naturalism of musical systems and theories is overcome in the sense that every kind of universal or eternal legality is refuted; but it remains in the sense that their fundamental legitimacy is recognized in progressive approximation toward a mythical "natural model." In reality Schoenberg has been conditioned by an equivocal achievement in the face of natural reality, negated as permanent order but accepted as arising inexhaustibly from musical creation.

The conception of history that emerges from Schoenberg's writings results as perfectly functional regarding this achievement.[30] In substance one is dealing with a linear-progressive conception; thus the development of music follows a unitary course without interruption. The accomplishments of great composers, i.e., of the innovators, coordinate themselves in a contemporary and evolving line, on which the works of minor composers are also placed, and the latter have the function of "connective tissue." As one reads the essay, *Unterstütz den Kleinmeister*, we are assured that minor composers guarantee the continuity of evolution, filling in eventual voids between diverse stages of musical technique. Such a development represents progress; for, in the history of music there emerge "ever more authentic models"[31] for the nature of sound materials, and "every new step attained allows a more profound penetration"[32] of this nature and of its inexhaustible potentialities. For Schoenberg, the history of the art of music thus has a teleological structure. His fundamental hallmark, as Christian Martin Schmidt has shown,[33] is finalistic orientation. If the ultimate purpose is the penetration of all the richest lode of musical material — a decisive step, as one reads in *Style and Idea* — it is represented by the construction of a unitary sonorous space, in which the complete integration of the horizontal dimension is actualized. And it is this evolving phase that Schoenberg tries to embody in his work.

On the basis of this conception of history imbued with finalistic elements it is not hard to see a kind of belief in predestination. The composer is the bearer of historic destinies, and his role is that

required by the history of music. Open problems *must* find a solution; and there is no doubt that sooner or later some composer will be called to fulfill this task. Between this conception of history and that of the musical profession there thus exists a close bond. "Nature as the originator of music, history as development, genius as executor of the duties already traced by nature and the chef d'oeuvre as result," Carl Dahlhaus writes, "constitute in the thought of Schoenberg a complex whose partial elements appear indissolubly linked with one another."[34]

One hardly needs recall how tenaciously Schoenberg was bound to the idea of the musical profession as *duty* and as vocation, a *topos* that recurs especially in anecdotes relating to his person. In a brief passage from 1911, the same year that the *Harmonielehre* appeared, this idea finds radical expression: "I believe that art does not come from technical capacity but from an imperative (*Dovere*). The creator of objects of art knows the technique," he continues, "and he has developed innate abilities, so that if he wants to, he can do whatever he desires, good or not, superficial or profound, contemporary or outmoded. But the artist experiences an inner compulsion. He cannot remain inactive, since it does not depend on his will; rather, because he must act, he derives his capacities from this very impulse."[35] The true moving force of the composer is thus inner necessity. Yet this does not imply complete grasp of his potential range; rather, he can impose on himself what goes beyond conscious intents.

In the immediacy of his work, the composer does not always perceive the historic value of his work. The significance his solutions to compositional problems will have in relation to the future orientation of musical language may remain obscure to him. "He is destined not to guess the future – only to realize it."[36] And at times in the midst of his compositional work a "concealed will"[37] prevails over that of the musician himself. "Only the true masters cannot permit themselves to write at all, because they must do what is necessary, must fulfill their destiny. Only to those who have the courage and the fervor to accept the consequences and the grave responsibility that has been superimposed on their very will, only to these is given to prepare for such a task with all

assiduity amidst thousands of doubts about not succeeding, amidst thousands of scruples about not having grasped what a higher force has expected of them. It is not by accident that in the first scene of act one of *Moses und Aron* the protagonist alludes to a will superior in struggle to his own desires.

The history of music – so it seems – is a necessary development, a continual evolution toward a teleological goal, a *telos*. It is implied that this *telos* (the actuation of potentialities contained in the nature of sound) is an ultimate end, an orientation of every compositional task, not a realizable objective in definitive form. That would compromise the open character of evolution, which instead Schoenberg intends as an infinite process of perfection. The "natural model" (*naturgegebenes Vorbild*) cannot be completely attained, but has to remain a goal of successive approximation. "There do not exist points of arrival that are insuperable . . . nothing is definitive in human civilization, but everything is only preparation for a higher degree of development. . . . Evolution is not finished but has just begun, and the peak has not yet been attained; it is yet to come, or perhaps will never arrive, since it is always being surpassed."[39] For this reason Schoenberg does not share the thesis of Spengler on the decline of the West, as he declares non-belief in the inevitable decadence in the life of peoples.[40]

It is characteristic that, to underline the open nature of evolution, he loves to launch out on philosophizing adventures regarding the dominance of life over death, expressed in vitalistic metaphors. Thus the progress of music is compared to the flowering of a tree in spring.[41] Or he indulges in biological images, in accord with which the history of music is described as an "organism" with a specific "instinct for development."[42] In this prospective vision the principal value of the musical world is the *new*, and only innovative productions work together to "conserve life" and "to protect it from mechanical repetition, from decadence and decay."[43] More precisely, only innovations ensure the overcoming of sclerosis and the exhausting of the expressive possibilities that derive from frequent and repetitive use. And this is the destiny that attends any linguistic means on which survival devolves, as

can be noted from the *Harmonielehre* and comes up for mention again in the *Probleme der Harmonie*. Fundamentally, it is a matter of dealing with a conception sufficiently close to the observations on language contained in *Beilage* III of Husserl's *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften*, where he describes the sedimentation of original evidence in the sense of linguistic signs, whose use and experience become passive and repetitive. And, in general, we are dealing with a conception not far removed from the grand phenomenological theme of the decay of "evidence" into the "obvious." On this terrain there can be discerned other significant thematic convergences. The innovative task of the composer does not exclude, in the mind of the author of the *Harmonielehre*, a link with tradition.

If the history of music consists in progress, and if there is a teleological orientation, then at every moment there has to be not only a genetic link with what went before, but it is intimately connected with it in the same teleological structure. The past does not represent only a prior moment, a *prius*, in chronological order; and when Schoenberg observes that the new is rooted in tradition, he does not intend to simply repeat a commonplace. Rather, he wants to underscore that there exists a profound homogeneity in the obedience to common imperatives, a fact in need of study. Recognizing his debt to all the eminent figures of the history of music from Bach to Mahler,[44] he establishes the worth of his own work as placed squarely on the "royal road" of history as such. At this point it is not out of place to refer to the *Krisis* and precisely to the pages entitled, *Reflexions on our way of viewing history*, where Husserl assigns philosophers the role of "functionaries of modern philosophical humanity, heirs and bearers of that orientation of the will which transverses it."[45] In both cases we are confronted with traditions to which there is attributed a teleological sense. In this framework the interpretations proposed by Leibowitz in *Schoenberg et son école* begin to make sense, a passage where using tools of obvious phenomenological derivation serial technique is regarded as the result of a process of transformation of musical language, ever guided by the same intentional current and coinciding with the entire polyphonic tradition.

Furthermore, in harking back to tradition and in recalling the evolution of musical techniques and theory, Schoenberg is not interested in a philological reconstruction. His facing of the past is an attempt to get at the sense of tradition and the meaning of cultural formations in view of the contours of the future. One of the most notable tasks of theory is to reveal love of the past and at the same time to open up the perspective into the future. In such a way theory can be historical, tying together what has been, what is, and what presumably will be. History can become fertile ground, when it does not present merely data but a conception of history, and when it does not limit itself to enumerating but tries to read the future from out of the pages of the past."[46] Here also Schoenberg's ideas can find resonance in the writings of Husserl, in the new and "unusual"[47] model for historical research proposed in the *Krisis* and in *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*. Such cues refute the impositions of historicism, whose thematic direction is oriented toward "the facts of the empirical life of the spirit."[48] One turns instead to "a critical comprehension of the *sense* of historical formations and of their connection in a global teleological structure." Such comprehension demands the capacity to collect original evidence obfuscated beneath traditional sedimentation and to "revive for ourselves the concealed historical sense."[50] And basically the style of work evidenced in the practical aspects of the *Harmonielehre* demonstrate how the author's efforts look towards the recovery of the significance of the motivations of such musical prescriptions and harmonic procedures, as e.g., the prohibition of octaves and of parallel fifths. This is also the style of Leibowitz's interpretation, as it takes off from this premise: ". . . if we want to arrive at a real comprehension of problems imposed by 'authentic' and more radical modern musical expression, such as that embodied in Arnold Schoenberg's work and that of his school, we must not only rehearse the various stages of the history of music, but rather force ourselves to reactivate the sense of that continuity, on which we place so much emphasis."[51]

Schoenberg never had hidden his diffidence with regard to science or scientific values and underlined with conviction the

difference between scientific images and artistic imagination, as an important fragment quoted by Rufer demonstrates.[52] Yet his conception of musical history possesses typical characteristics of a certain model of the history of science. In the first place, it has within it the seeds of progress and perfection. Secondly, it does not admit of revisions or inversions of innate tendencies. Thirdly, it grows through progressive achievement, since particular moments do not negate but rather summate one another. New horizons of harmony do not imply abandonment of the old. "In the harmony of us moderns there will come the day when we shall see the same laws that governed the harmony of the ancients, but, of course, in an enhanced and more generalized form."[53] As did older methods, so also the new ones assure coherence and the articulation of musical discourse. They guarantee in progressive form the same results.[54] In this way a rebuttal of any formulated "atonal music" is clear, and one is made to think of negation and revision, whenever the most advanced musical experiences are engaged in a broadening of the limits of tonality. "It is easy to imagine that the concept of tonality could be extended to include every kind of sonorous combination,"[55] as we read in the *Harmonielehre*.

Progress, understood as progressive broadening preserves the bond with tradition in exactly the same way as Husserl conceived the evolution and structuring of science and philosophy, as a continuous achievement that preserved knowledge already acquired, if not in their contingent formulations, certainly in their objective validity. "Geometry," writes Husserl, "resting on a traditional base, is for us the comprehensive result of a series of mental operations, a result that in the course of its ulterior elaboration, broadens itself across other results produced by new acts of the spirit . . . a continuous synthesis within which all preceeding results retain value, so that in every single phase the total result constitutes, so to say, a total premise for the acts productive of the successive phase."[56]

It is useful to stress the fact that for Schoenberg musical progress is at the same time technical and artistic. The acquisition of new techniques always implies the production of new aesthetic

results. Yet we are far removed from the thesis of Max Weber, that he proposes in a page of his essay on *Weltfreiheit*, interpreting musical "progress" in a purely technical sense, excluding every consideration about the value of works. Rather, for Schoenberg the category, "progress," is in certain aspects the foundation of evaluative activity. The value of a musical work does not reside in a single quality of the work in question but is measured in terms of the progress of the language, thus in the final instance on the capacity to bring about a more profound penetration, with respect to the past, of the natural model. In this perspective the value of the music is at the same time historical and atemporal. This means attaining – across a series of historical stages – a metaphysical model. Historical is the journey itself (*iter*), the itinerary transversed by music; and above time is the validity of the *telos* that guides it. In the same manner Husserl conceives authentic historical consciousness as not destroying faith in the universal validity of knowledge (*epistéme*), but as rediscovering the objective value of consciousness in historical formations of scientific knowledge. Of course, this does not touch historicism, which has an ascetic vocation. Analogous considerations can be extended also into the aesthetic sphere. If the distinction "between science as a cultural phenomenon and science as a system of valid theories" is legitimate[57] the distinction "between art as a cultural form and valid art"[58] is similarly legitimate.

The analogies between the two camps, however, cannot be extended further. Husserl is resolute in declaring that artistic objects have a particular status and structure in no way comparable to that of the products of science. "A work of art is one that . . . contains the category within itself. There is not, nor ought there to be material for the construction of new works of art. Each work begins and finishes of itself. Works of art are not constructed by means of art works. Multiple works of art of every conceivable kind can "signify" much for the nation in its present; and in this there can be presaged the unity of the "spirit of the people." But in their sense of being they are and always remain particular formations not constituting a totality of meaning or purpose . . . Things are different when it comes to science. Every

scientific proposition is a conclusion and a result; but likewise it is material for that further scientific work to which every scientist is called."[59] The distinction could hardly be clearer. Art is a cultural region with a particular structure. It does not constitute a cumulative tradition and is not developed on the basis of open cooperation. Its significance and validity have certain intersubjective characteristics; and yet, for Husserl, every work is "an end in itself and for itself,"[60] an individual production definitively completed. This excludes one's being able to talk of progress in this area and of the necessary increment of a patrimony transmitted across "spiritual heredity,"[61] of a connection between the projective activity of the artist and the "will of his spiritual forebears."[62] Also, art is developed on the terrain of history, as are all cultural formations, but it does not possess that "second" and more pregnant historicity, which is characteristic of the theoretical horizon, and that consists in the necessary link of every conclusion with the preceding results from within the framework of a particular spiritual community.

The divergence registered here between Husserlian and Schoenbergian positions is evidently not just a question of details. Yet there are divergences even more notable. Husserl is interested in a history of the formations of meaning, of intentional separations in which these are constituted, and in the *Krisis* even proffer us an example. And, as has been said, Schoenberg also did not set a goal for himself of reconstructing a history of givens, but rather researches the significance of traditions. At the same time, however, he conceives music history as the deployment of natural potentialities. This implies important consequences; for, human operations are not always the conscious vehicle of historical necessity, and the activity of composing is not always guided as *intentio* corresponding to the results. In Husserl the historical *telos* is a human achievement of even a universal humanity. In Schoenberg it is a heteronomous end not only with regard to the individuality of the musician but also the artistic community.

Thus is explained the insistence on the idea of *duty* and *obedience*, on execution of a command even beyond one's own comprehension. Here we do not find the commonness of diverse

wills in a communal design but submission of the individual will. The root of this divergent attainment is in the diversity of the various teleological designs. Perhaps these are equivalent from the formal viewpoint but opposed in their meaning – an infinite objective to which generations come close in continuity, universal value that cuts across history. On the one hand, there is the idea of *epistéme* and of reason, i.e., the idea of constitutive elements of *Menschentum*; on the other hand, that of the "nature of material sound."

The fact that Schoenberg sometimes intends to correct the more more grossly naturalistic aspects of this idea, arriving, as he is said to have, at an "internal nature," does not attenuate the opposition between the two models. Even as "interior," the nature that guides the history of music is tied to a horizon of necessity and of heteronomy; and it is not a case that can be tentatively defined in psychophysiological terms. If in Husserl "true nature is an idea disposed toward the infinite . . . an *infinity of theory*,"[63] in Schoenberg nature is ever yet conceived in essentialistic terms. Writing in *Harmonielehre* that his program could be condensed in the motto *Vor zur Natur*, he definitely intends to anchor his studies in a permanent given, in an element of solid objectivity. In his way of thinking subjectivity and objectivity encounter one another in a complex pattern. As over against collective myths and collective prejudices as well as the preponderance of the "mass" – typical polemic sore spots for the composer – the value of the single person is salvaged. As against musical conformism and bad traditionalism the originality and innovative capacity of the true artist is vindicated. Vice versa, countering a disengaged use of musical language and the practice of the arts as play, as against artistic choices motivated only by personal predilections and aversions, there is vindicated an "objective reason for decision."[64] And the latter cannot consist in obeying the "imperative of the material."[65]

The Schoenbergian image of the history of music derives from an accentuated selection that only goes along certain tendential lines and thus excludes us from many other factors. On the one hand, the myth of continuity without rupture, on the other, the idea of finalized progress lead to the construction of a historical

trajectory utilizing only certain segments and certain levels of tradition. Everything that does not appear as coherent within the lines thus traced is relegated to a periphery of irrelevance. Thus, transformations of style are retained as non-essentials in regard to any progress of musical "ideas," and the recouping of ethnic traditions is considered regressive when it comes to a "capacity to express superior ideas."[66] Accordingly neo-classicism is judged to be but a marginal phenomenon and even a deplorable deviation with regard to the vital tendencies of "new music." And so it goes.

Evidently we are confronting not only a historical reconstruction, but a construction as such. It is peculiar that Schoenberg tries to characterize the "master path" of music as a necessary course of history, guided by objective reasons, and at the same time offers us a design so clearly personal, even arbitrary! In other words, the idea of a "superior will" that inspires every artistic choice, the recognizing of a complex historical link and of a unitary tradition, all originate in an act of personal faith. The imperatives and goals, the duties out of which the evolution of musical language is believed to be constellated, derive from an individualistic vision, from the initiative of the theoretical subject. From this viewpoint, tradition and history, whose essential meaning is to be "revitalized" are only projections of an ideology and of poetry, and their supposed objectivity is but a pretext. This could be valid not only for the creator of the twelve-tone method, but also for all those sectors of the avant-garde that have individualized in serial technique the logical and necessary sequence of a linear evolution of language.[67]

Luigi Rognoni, author of numerous articles on the "Second Viennese School," has observed that the thematic content of *Moses und Aron* is not far removed from Husserlian positions, and especially from denunciations of the decline of rational culture in "naturalism" and "objectivism."[68] In reality, not only in this biblical work, but also in the global effectiveness of the entire Schoenbergian opus, there does not always emerge a coherent anti-objectivist and anti-fetishist aim. Along with this task, ever present but not exclusive of other aims, there emerge elements of

meaning in quite different manner — "naturalistic" residues, dogmatic positions, articles of faith presented as objective necessities. In the Schoenbergian conception of music and its history one can glean a comprehensive critical tonality; but there are also registered moments of reduced critical tension, and perhaps of authoritarian excrescences. Not only is this conception magmatic material that acquires numerous and diverse cultural ferment from antipositivistic reactions to the poetics of expressionism, from the cult of classicism to the exaltation of the new for its own sake, from the critique of basic musical naturalism to the myth of the uninterrupted progress of history; it touches as well on faith in the predestination of musical life ranging toward certain conventionalistic theses from authoritarian ideology of Duty to antidogmatic aims. On the basis of such factors phenomenological interpretations of his work teem with perplexities, particularly when we deal with phenomenology properly understood, not just with the tools of the philosophical trade, but with phenomenological thematics emergent from the writings of the composer himself.

The fact that occasional and even noteworthy thematic convergences with the work of Edmund Husserl emerge cannot allow us to postulate a predominantly phenomenological "style" in Schoenberg! Furthermore, one cannot forget that these interpretations proceed on the fragile thread of thematic analogies, and that for want of precise documentary evidence they should be limited to a "common cultural atmosphere." And this is surely enough for a convincing hypothesis, though too little for a very persuasive foundation to such an argument.

Endnotes

1. Cf. J. Maegaard, "Schönberg hat Adorno nie leiden können" in *Melos*, XLI, 1974, p. 263. In Maegaard's article the unedited *Wgr* (no. 135 of the section, *Artikel und Essays* of the Rufer catalogue) is given in its entirety.
2. A. Schönberg, *Harmonielehre*, Wien, 1949 (IV ed.), p. 3. The Italian translation is *Manuale di armonia*, Milan, 1973, p. 9.
3. Ref. 2, p. 7; Italian text, p. 13.
4. Ref. 2, p. 3; Italian text, p. 9.

5. Ref. 2, p. 3; Italian text, p. 9.
6. C. Sini, "Prospettive fenomenologiche nel 'Manuale' di Schönberg," in *Aut aut*, 1964, no. 79-80, p. 69.
7. Ref. 6, p. 73. See also L. Rognoni, "Dalla tonalità alla atonalità. Introduzione alla 'Harmonielehre' di Schönberg" in *Fenomenologia della musica radicale*, Milan, 1974 (II ed.), p. 116.
8. L. Rognoni, Ref. 7, p. 113.
9. C. Sini, Ref. 6, p. 79. On the possibility of a phenomenological interpretation of the work of Schönberg see also F. Cagianelli, *Tra fenomenologia e strutturalismo: l'opera teorica di Schönberg*, Perugia, 1971.
10. Ref. 2, p. 323; Italian text, pp. 339-340.
11. Ref. 2, p. 199; Italian text, p. 201.
12. Ref. 2, p. 114; Italian text, p. 115.
13. See also Ref. 2, pp. 393-395; Italian text, pp. 410-412.
14. Ref. 2, p. 324; Italian text, p. 341.
15. Ref. 2, p. 60; Italian text, p. 63.
16. C. Sini, Ref. 6, p. 73.
17. Ref. 2, p. 4; see also pp. 28-29; Italian text, p. 9 and p. 35.
18. Ref. 2, p. 56; Italian text, p. 59.
19. Ref. 2, p. 6; Italian text, p. 11.
20. Ref. 2, p. 6; Italian text, p. 12.
21. Ref. 2, p. 115; Italian text, p. 116.
22. Ref. 2, p. 155; Italian text, p. 158.
23. Ref. 2, p. 14; Italian text, p. 20.
24. Ref. 2.
25. See also Ref. 2, pp. 14-15; Italian text, pp. 20-21.
26. Ref. 2, p. 17; Italian text, p. 23.
27. Ref. 2, p. 117; Italian text, p. 119.
28. Ref. 2.
29. Ref. 2, p. 18; Italian text, p. 24.
30. In this regard see Ch. M. Schmidt, "Uber Schönberg's Geschichtsbewusstsein" in R. Stephan, ed., *Zwischen Tradition und Fortschritt. Uber das musikalische Geschichtsbewusstsein*, Mainz, 1973, p. 86.
31. Ref. 2, p. 378; Italian text, p. 396.
32. Ref. 2.
33. See Ch. M. Schmidt, Ref. 30, pp. 87-95.
34. C. Dahlhaus, "Schönberg's musikalische Poetik" in *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, XXXIII, 1976, p. 81.
35. Schönberg, "Probleme des Kunstunterrichts" in *Stil und Gedanke. Aufsätze zur Musik*, Frankfurt a.M., 1976 (*Gesammelte Schriften*, I), p. 165; Italian translation: "Problemi dell'insegnamento dell'arte" in *Analisi e pratica musicale*, Torino, 1974, p. 13.
36. A. Schönberg, "Gewissheit" in *Stil und Gedanke*, p. 189; Italian, "Certezza," p. 42.
37. Ref. 2, p. 500; Italian text, p. 521.
38. Ref. 2, p. 488a; Italian text, p. 510n.
39. Ref. 2, pp. 117-119; Italian text, pp. 120-121.

40. See also the unedited *Wgr* as in J. Maegaard, "Schönberg hat Adorno nie leiden können," p. 263. In addition see *Harmonielehre*, p. 118; Italian text, p. 120.
41. Ref. 2, p. 481; Italian text, p. 502.
42. Ref. 2, p. 63; Italian text, p. 66.
43. A. Schönberg, "Einige objektive Gründe" in *Stil und Gedanke*, p. 312; Italian trans. "Per quali ragioni oggettive le nuove generazioni vanno educate alla musica contemporanea," p. 178.
44. Also cf. A. Schönberg, 'Nationale Musik" in *Stil und Gedanke*, p. 253; Italian, "Musica nazionale," pp. 107-108.
45. E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, den Haag, 1954 (Husserliana, Bd. VI), p. 72; Italian transl., *La crisi delle scienze europee e la fenomenologia transcendentale*, Milan, 1961, p. 99.
46. Ref. 2, p. 31; Italian text, p. 37.
47. Ref. 43, p. 365; Italian text, p. 380.
48. E. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, Frankfurt a.M., 1965, p. 49; Italian transl., *La filosofia come scienza rigorosa*, Torino, 1975, p. 59.
49. Ref. 45, p. 72; Italian text, p. 99.
50. Ref. 45, p. 73; Italian text, p. 100.
51. R. Leibowitz, *Schoenberg et son école*, Paris, 1947, p. 23.
52. Cf. A. Schönberg, "Zu 'Darstellung des Gedankens'" in J. Rufer, *Das Werk Arnold Schönbergs*, Kassel, 1959, p. 129.
53. Ref. 2, p. 86; Italian text, p. 87.
54. Cf. A. Schönberg, "Probleme der Harmonie" in *Stil und Gedanke*, pp. 226-227; Italian translation, pp. 76-78.
55. Ref. 54, p. 229; Italian text, p. 78.
56. Ref. 45, pp. 336-367; Italian text, p. 382.
57. Ref. 48, p. 52; Italian text, p. 62.
58. Ref. 48, p. 52; Italian text, p. 63.
59. Ref. 45, p. 506; Italian text, pp. 533-534.
60. Ref. 45, p. 505; Italian text, p. 532.
61. Ref. 45, p. 72; Italian text, p. 99.
62. Ref. 45, p. 73; Italian text, p. 100.
63. Ref. 45, pp. 41-42; Italian transl., p. 71.
64. A. Schönberg, "Gesinnung oder Erkenntnis?" in *Stil und Gedanke*, p. 209; Italian transl., "Partito preso o convinzione?", p. 54.
65. Ref. 2, p. 379; Italian text, p. 396.
66. A. Schönberg, "Einige objektive Gründe," in *Stil und Gedanke*, p. 311; Italian text, p. 396.
67. On these themes cf. H.H. Eggebrecht, "Musikalisches Denken" in *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, XXXII, 1975, pp. 228-240.
68. Cf. L. Rognoni, *La scuola musicale di Vienna*, Torino, 1974 (III ed.), pp. 212-214.

Editor/translator's note. Some necessary editorial liberties had to be taken with the original Italian text of this essay, to render it in more easily comprehensible English idiom.† As translator, the editor also had to break up longer sentences for similar reasons. The author's content, however, is left untouched. Serravezza both here and in his recent book, *Sulla nozione di "esperienza musicale"* (Università degli studi di Bari, II serie, 1, Adriatica editrice, Bari, 1971), seems to think and write in similar vein to the editor/translator's own work, *The Experiencing of Musical Sound* (Gordon and Breach, 1979). *FJS*

---

† "Sulla possibilita' di un' interpretazione fenomenologica dell' opera teorica di Schönberg."

Temporal structure in recent music

JUDY LOCHHEAD

State University, N.Y., Stony Brook

RECENT MUSIC poses an analytical problem. The analytical difficulties are greater if the focus of the inquiry is temporal structure. These difficulties have a conceptual and methodological source: current analytical concepts and methods are of limited value for an investigation and elucidation of temporal structures presented by recent music.

Current concepts of temporal structure include such notions as rhythm, motive, meter, phrase, form, and upbeat/downbeat (or weak/strong). These concepts were developed in the context of eighteenth and nineteenth century music and are the basis of most analyses of that literature. They have little explanatory power for recent music and further, the structural connotations of these concepts hinder an assessment of the temporal structures presented by recent music.

The methodological aspect of the problem is blatantly demonstrated with Joel Chadabe's "From the 14th On." See Example I. Traditional analytic methods depend primarily on information from the score — the score being a record of the piece. However, in many recent pieces either there is no score or it is a sort of recipe for the piece. Since the score either does not exist or is not a record of the piece, an analysis cannot use it as the primary source of structural information.

The reliance on the score for information about temporal structures reflects a more profound analytical difficulty. Structural information gleaned from the score is visually apprehended and as such is predisposed to visualist models of structure. These models are

Example I Chadabe: "From the 14th On" (excerpt).

PERFORMANCE DIRECTIONS FOR FROM THE 14TH ON, FOR SOLO CELLO

JOEL CHADABE

ALBANY, APRIL 1973

The score consists of 18 lines of music. The pacing should be varied and comfortable and the general style of the performance should be virtuoso and graceful, almost mercurial.

The player should perform with a great variety of sound from note to note and phrase to phrase, varying dynamics, expressive "envelopes", vibrato, bowing, etc.

indicates a repetitive event featuring the written note, which could be strummed, a bowed tremolo, repeated single pizzicati (inwhich case all the pizzicati should be of the same type), slow vibrato on a bowed note, repeated bowed attacks, etc.

indicates legato, played expressively.

indicates a short note, which could be pizzicato (tastiera, normal, slapped against the fingerboard, fingernail, left hand, etc.), staccato with bow, col legno battuto, etc., or any combination of pizzicato and bowing. When several short notes appear in succession, no two successive notes should be played the same way.

indicates glissando, more or less as indicated.

indicates that that note should be considered an independent entity which may be played in any manner, for example: expressively, as a harmonic, col legno tratto, tastiera, ponticello, etc.

Reprinted with the permission of the composer

Example I (continued)



premised on symmetry and balance and on a timeless notion of "objective" structure. Most current concepts of temporal structure do not take into account the passage of time, before/after relations, and the role of the future and past. They do not account for temporal structure as something occuring through time, and they are not concerned with structure as an "apprehend*ing*."

The problem surrounding analyses of temporal structure presented by recent music is both conceptual and methodological: current concepts do not illuminate temporal organization and current methods of gathering structural information are directed at a non-temporal and visually apprehended score. Phenomenological philosophy provides a way of opening up both aspects of the problem. It defines a method for freeing analysis from the restraints of current concepts, for discovering temporal structures presented by recent music, and for conceiving the essentially temporal nature of musical structures. Phenomenology provides a basis for the notion of musical structure as an apprehend*ing* — as something heard —

and it defines a method for investigating such heard structures — a method which does not rely on the score as the primary source of information.

Current analytical concepts and methods reflect the premises of the Western philosophic tradition. Temporal and aurally-apprehended structures are denied reality because they cannot be said to "exist" in the way that spatial and visually apprehended structures do. In this tradition, there is nothing substantial and permanent about a heard musical phrase. Musical investigations exhibit the Western prejudice toward visualism in the dependence on visual information from the score and on visual models of structure such as symmetry and balance. Information about structure from listening experience is suspect because it is considered "subjective" and is opposed to "objective" information from the score. In musical investigations, aural information is considered inferior to visual information.[1]

Phenomenology challenges the premises of the Western philosophic tradition and provides a conceptual basis for the epistemological adequacy of aural information about structure and for a notion of heard structure. Phenomenologists deny the distinction between subject and object; instead, subject and object are correlated in an inclusive notion of experience.

Any experience involves both something experienc*ed* and an act of experienc*ing*. These two poles of experience are called noema and noesis.

Phenomenology posits a correlation between the two poles: what is experienced reflects the circumstances of the experiencing including mode — perceiving, imagining, dreaming, etc. — and the conceptual framework of the one who experiences including presuppositions, concepts, expectations, etc. The notion of intentionality formalizes the correlation between noema and noesis.



The correlation of the two poles of experience grounds the epistemological adequacy of experience and, for us, of listening experience. Since what is heard reflects an act of hearing, knowledge of musical structure through listening is adequate. There is no independently existing structure which is to be discovered, but rather structure results from a correlation between our presuppositions, concepts, and expectations about the world and that which we encounter in the world.

Experienc*ed* musical structures reflect the presuppositions, concepts, and expectations of a listener, and more generally, they reflect the training of a community of musicians. This means that not only analyses but perceptions of temporal structure in recent music are shaped by current musical concepts. To avoid the negative epistemological effect of many current concepts, there must be an attempt to wipe away the layers of sedimented knowledge. Procedures for investigating experience defined by phenomenology provide a means for uncovering structural possibilities.

These procedures are succinctly given as hermeneutic rules by Don Ihde in *Experimental Phenomenology*[2]:

1. Attend to phenomena as and how they show themselves
2. Describe (don't explain) phenomena
3. Horizontalize all phenomena initially[3]

These rules will be elaborated in the context of specific musical applications; they define investigative procedures that later will be applied to excerpts from three recent pieces: Fourth String Quartet by Seymour Shifrin; "Music for Violin Solo" by Daria Semegen; and Brass Quintet by Elliot Carter.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES

1. Attend to the phenomena as and how they show themselves

The phenomena of specific visual experiences are such things as rocks, trees, birds, etc. They are objects with shape, color, size and location. In other words, we experience "a red vase in the corner" not a "formless" patch of red. Visual perception is the apprehension of structure. In auditory experience, the phenomena are not simpy sounds but the sounds *of* things — the sound of a barking dog, of someone sawing wood or of a ticking clock.

In musical experience, the phenomena are the sounds *of* musical structure. It is important to remember that the noematic focus of a musical experience is a temporal focus — or a focusing — which is both a retentional and protentional act, i.e., it involves primary remembrance and anticipation.[4] The noematic focus of a musical listening act is a temporally given whole — a temporal object. Musical perception then is the apprehension of temporally given structures.

Such terms as melody, counterpoint, phrase, motive and rhythm refer to possible noematic structures. However, it is a mistake to think that any one of these is the focus and the others are the field of a particular musical experience. A melody might be the focus of a monophonic song, but the noema of a melody and accompaniment texture is "melody and accompaniment."

The noema of musical experience are the structures of music, and they are essentially temporal. What we count as a musical experience needs qualification. The following investigation of temporal structure is concerned with the phenomena presented in any straightforward listening act.[5] The qualification includes all direct involvements with a musical presentation — involvements during which we apprehend musical structure — and excludes those involvements during which we attend to the listening act itself.

Ihde's first rule suggests that we attend to phenomena as and how they show themselves. Musical phenomena present themselves temporally and in sound. They aso present themselves to a listener. The investigation here is particularly concerned with these three

aspects of phenomena. It explores sounding structures as they are heard by a listener. The investigation is not explicitly concerned with the activities of either composer or performers.[6]

2. Describe (don't explain) phenomena

This rule calls for the suspension of all presuppositions and explanations. Any account of a phenomenon which "goes behind" the heard is automatically excluded. All theorectical presuppositions about musical structure are "put out of play." Thus, the descriptions of temporal structure are not "musical analyses" in the customary sense. The investigation is not concerned with such things as strong and weak beats, hierarchical patterns of beat, symmetrical phrase structures, musical forms, musical levels, and so forth. In other words, all explanatory musical concepts are excluded from the investigation.

For instance, the following quote from Charles Rosen's *The Classical Style* might be considered descriptive:

> The syncopated accents of the finale of Beethoven's F major Sonata op. 54 are ... surprising: they occur alternately on the second and third sixteenth notes of groups of four as follows:

Example II



> This provides two contradictory forces that challenge the weight of the downbeat. The *sforzando* on the tonic in the bass reinforces the second sixteenth note, which is the weakest in the measure, making the accent most destructive to a sense of unvaried flow.[7]

The analysis is explanatory and makes several presuppositions about musical structure.[8] Rosen assumes a hierarchical patterning of beats when he writes that "two contradictory forces challenge the weight of the downbeat." And, in the statement that "syncopated accents occur on the second and third sixteenth notes of groups of four," he implies that there is a regularly recurring beat which comprises four sixteenth notes and that accents off the beat differ from those on the beat. Further, he implies that even though the note which is accented by a *sfp* has a long duration, we hear the accent with respect to the regular beat and the four sixteenths.

The presuppositions and concepts excluded from the following investigations of recent music are those which belong to a specific group of people: musicians trained in the Western classical tradition. Phenomenology holds that what we experience will reflect our noetic anticipations, i.e., the circumstances of experiencing. For musicians, musical experience will reflect training; this means simply that a trained individual "hears" music differently from an untrained individual. If I, as a trained musician, suspend my traditional expectations of musical structure, I will not hear as an untrained individual; however, if I approach my musical experience without those expectations, other structural possibilities may be discovered.

3. Horizontalize all phenomena initially

This rule calls for the suspension of reality beliefs. It warns us not to overlook certain phenomena which may be accepted as "less real" because of an assumed "hierarchy of realities."

For instance, I have just heard a performance of the following passage.

Example III Lassus: "Sicut rosa" from *Cantiones duarum vocum.*



I then describe my experience in accordance with the two preceding hermeneutical rules. At first, I hear two vocal parts which sound independent of one another but co-ordinated. Then, sometime around measure 34, the parts work together — one has a long note while the other has short notes. Finally, at measure 35/1[9] both parts initiate a long note which concludes the passage.

There is another feature which I have overlooked, however. Sometime around measure 34, I begin to anticipate what will happen next, and when the lower voice presents its half-note F# in that measure, I can hear ahead to what might happen. In other words, anticipation is a feature of my experience which I initially overlooked, perhaps because of a belief that anticipation is a subjective response. Such a belief means that the experience of anticipation is not as "real" as other features of experience. All such reality beliefs are to be excluded from a phenomenological description.

The investigative procedures call for descriptions of musical structure. The descriptions attempt to transcend theoretical explanations in an effort to dis-cover temporal structures of recent music which are covered-over by traditional concepts. Since information about structure is obtained from a reflection on musical experience, descriptions will reflect the temporal nature of structure.

Before commencing with the descriptions of structure in the three excerpts, further controls must be placed on the investigative procedures. First, the investigation here is restricted to a consideration of temporal structures only. Second, the descriptions will be guided by an observational context. This context imposes some restrictions on the descriptions[10]. It defines a conceptual framework which is flexible and does not imply explanations, and it allows for the investigation of temporal phenomena not allowed by traditional concepts. The descriptions reflect the structural categories established in the observational context.

OBSERVATIONAL CONTEXT

The observational context is based on two central ideas about tem-

poral experience: one is Edmund Husserl's and the other is Martin Heidegger's.

Husserl begins his investigation of internal time-consciousness by describing how we temporally experience melodies.[11] He notes that we perceive a melody as a successive whole, and that the possibility of such a whole depends not on the perception of duration but on the duration of perception. He calls such successive wholes *temporal objects.* Athough Husserl considers only a melody in the description of time-consciousness, his notion of a temporal object can be applied to other sorts of musical structures.

Example IV



From: Piano Music of Robert Schumann, Series I, ed. Clara Schumann (New York:Dover Publications, 1972).

For instance, the temporal objects we hear during a performance of the excerpt shown above in Example IV differ, in some respects, from the temporal object Husserl considered. We hear not simply a melody but a prominent top part and other parts which complement it. We also hear musical units which may be described as temporal wholes. As we are listening to the excerpt, the first time we hear a musical unit which sounds like some sort of whole is at the

end of m. 2. This unit — a temporal object — is followed by another just like it. We hear these two temporal objects as separate units, but when each one stops, we are aware that more will follow. In other words, they do not give a conclusion. In measures 5-8, we hear another temporal object; it lasts longer than either of the two preceding units and does seem to end.

Example V



The temporal objects indicated in Example V above are the noematic structures we hear during the Schumann excerpt. The temporal objects, then, are not simply the melody or the accompaniment but successive wholes.

The second basic idea for the observational context is Heidegger's. In *Being and Time*,[12] he distinguishes between temporality and time. The primordial temporal experience is a spread of past-present-future; it is characterized by features of "spannedness, datability, and significance." Heidegger calls this primordial experience temporality. He contrasts it with time which is not primordial but objectified. Time is what we use to regulate our activities and is characterized by the use of clocks. As Heidegger says, time "is that which is *counted.*"[13]

The idea that we may have different sorts of temporal experience can be applied to music: we may perceive time or temporality in any particular musical experience. For instance, the excerpt shown in Example IV above gives a sense of *time.* We perceive the musical succession as "regulated" — as if the music has its own clock.

The excerpt in Example VI gives a sense of *temporality.* We hear durational "spans" not units of time. We "date" or temporally orient musical occurrences to one another not a "time-reckoning"

beat. We perceive the temporal "significance" of musical occurrences as a "past-ness, present-ness, of future-ness" not as a relation to some unit of time.

Building upon the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger, I have constructed an observational context which will guide the phenomenological descriptions of temporal structure. I have used concepts from the various present and past philosophies of time to devise this context.[14] It defines flexible structural categories which allow for a range of possible temporal structures. For instance, Husserl's temporal object has a beginning which is preceded by silence and an end which is followed by silence: it has clearly demarcated temporal boundaries. However, it is possible to conceive of temporal wholes which either have overlapping boundaries or perhaps hazy boundaries. Heidegger's idea of distinguishing temporality from time can be similarly expanded; for instance, musical succession might give a static sense or a dynamic sense. The observational context includes other such possibilities.

The following is a compendium of possible temporal structures. The terms listed here are used in the following descriptions of temporal structure.

OBSERVATIONAL CONTEXT

I) Temporal Phenomena

This investigation is directed at temporal phenomena which are or might be the noematic focus of a straightforward musical experience. Three sorts of noematic structures are possible.

1) *Temporal Objects — henceforth, TO's* A TO is any structure which we apprehend as a successive whole. TO's are characterized by temporal extension.

TO's may have:

i) Clear or distinct boundaries
Successive TO's with clear boundaries may be contiguous, overlapping, or separated by silence.

Example VI "Three Pieces for Clarinet and Piano" by Daria Semegen. Excerpt of third piece.



ii) Hazy boundaries
Successive TO's with hazy boundaries may be overlapping.

iii) No boundaries
Successive TO's with no boundaries are continuous.

2) *Temporal Place or Places* A temporal place is a locus of temporal awareness which does not have temporal extension. Places may be marked by such occurrences as a change in some musical dimension (i.e., pitch, dynamics, texture, etc.). A temporal place is not necessarily an "extraordinary musical event." Temporal place or places may be the noematic focus of musical experience, or they may be used in conjunction with other temporal structures, e.g., in conjunction with the boundaries of TO's.

3) *Temporal Modes* A musical presentation may draw our attention

to a temporal mode: to simultaneity, to duration, or to succession. For instance, duration may be the noematic focus instead of temporal place, or succession may be the focus rather than a successive whole.

TO's, Temporal Places, or Temporal Modes are possible noematic structures. The investigation is directed at other structural features which shall be called Temporal Attributes.

II) Temporal Attributes

1) *Order and Mensural Properties* Following the practice in philosophical writings about time, I have distinguished metrical and order properties of temporal phenomena. Since "metrical" has a musical meaning I specifically want to avoid, the term *mensural* is used. Musical presentations project both order and mensural relations.

Order properties may be characterized by:

i) Dynamic and irreversible succession. A musical presentation may project dynamic relations which are characterized by a sense of "becoming" and by "tensed" attributes of past, present, and future. We perceive such order relations as an irreversible or unidirectional succession. A visual analogy will clarify our temporal experience of such a succession. Imagine that you have just watched a sugar cube dissolve in a glass of water. The irreversibility of this process is a feature of your experience.

ii) Static and reversible succession. A musical presentation may project static relations which are characterized by "non-tensed" attributes of before/after or earlier/later. We perceive such order relations as a reversible succession. Again, a visual analogy will help. Imagine watching a film strip during which each frame presents a color in the order: brown, red, blue, purple, yellow, green, grey. This sequence is characterized by "non-tensed" and reversible characteristics.

Mensural properties may be characterized by:

i) Time
A musical presentation may project an absolute temporal background which has a "container" function. Musical structures occur "in time." The background generally involves a recurring mensural unit which regulates the musical presentation. We perceive TO's and temporal places in relation to this background.

ii) Temporality
A musical presentation may be characterized by mensural features of spannedness and datability: we perceive TO's as spans and we hear TO's and temporal places in relation to one another (i.e., not in relation to a temporal background).

2) *Change and Continuity* A musical presentation may draw attention to features of temporal continuity or change. Such features may be used in conjunction with the three sorts of temporal phenomena. For instance, a change in pitch, dynamics, texture, etc., may mark a temporal place or define a TO. Successive events of a musical presentation may suggest a continuum, i.e., musical succession is continuous. We still hear successive musical things but the relation between those things suggests a continuum. Successive TO's may also define a continuum.

3) *Temporal Orientation* Temporal orientation is associated with a sense of before and after; as Aristotle noted in his *Physics*, a before and an after are given with respect to a "now."[15] In musical presentations, temporal orientation may be given with respect to: TO's or the boundaries of TO's, a regularly recurring mensural unit of an absolute background, a temporal place, or a silence.

4) *Gestural Functions* A musical presentation may gesture beginning and ending functions. For example, a TO may open with music that sounds like a beginning and close with music that sounds like an end. We recognize such gestures directly.

5) *Protentional and Retentional Involvements* Some musical presentations involve us in the futural realm of the temporal spread[16] —

involvements with temporal structure are protentional. For instance, a TO may have an anticipation feature which either 1) projects a place of arrival, i.e., an anticipated place of ending, 2) suggests a continuation, i.e., we expect more will follow, or 3) makes us wait for the future to happen. Some musical presentations involve us in the past realm of the temporal spread — our involvements with temporal structure are retentional. For instance, during some presentations, TO's are given in retention. We apprehend such TO's when some occurrence "now" defines what we have just heard as a temporal whole.

6) *Manifest and Latent Aspects of Temporal Phenomena.* The investigation is directed at both manifest and latent aspects of temporal phenomena. A manifest aspect is that which appears directly in experience, a latent aspect that which implicitly appears. For instance, TO's are manifest structures and the absolute background is, most often, a latent aspect.

Finally, in order to avoid any explanatory connotations, many standard musical terms are not used in the descriptions. Some of the terms I do use, whose meaning may not be immediately apparent, are defined below:

elements: any constituent of a musical succession — notes, rests, drum beats, etc.

prominent and complementary: these terms describe a relation between musical parts or voices which are presented simultaneously, i.e., the way an oboe part and a violin part interact: we may perceive one part as conspicuous and the other as ancillary.

independent: this term also describes a relation between parts presented simultaneously: we perceive the presentations of each part as autonomous.

DESCRIPTIONS

The following descriptions employ the investigative procedures and

the observational context discussed above. Descriptions of the 3 pieces under consideration will reflect my "hearing" and the structural possibilities delimited by the observational context. In any one description, my task is not to describe the range of possibilities but a possible structure within the devised framework. Thus, the reader may hear other structures; all such possible structures should reflect the observational context.

Readers are strongly encouraged to acquaint themselves with the excerpts considered here by listening to live and/or recorded performances. A score may be used to determine the fidelity of the performance. Also, references to the score will be used as a convenience for the discussion about the sounding musical phenomena. A score of the pertinent excerpt accompanies each description.

1. Fourth String Quartet, Seymour Shifrin

The first movement of Seymour Shifrin's *Fourth String Quartet* focuses our attention on TO's and on the succession of TO's. Some have clear boundaries and project a sense of ending and beginning. Others have hazy boundaries so that the succession of TO's defines a continuum. Temporal places are sometimes used in conjunction with TO's either to mark boundaries or recurrent mensural units. Order relations between TO's and between the elements of TO's project an irreversible and dynamic succession.

Two TO's are presented in measures 1-6/2 (See Example VII below). They have clear boundaries which are not associated with temporal places. TO 1, measures 1-3, is apprehended as a temporal whole at the juncture between it and TO 2. Violin I begins the movement with a long element during which the other strings present a single, short element. Then, Violin I presents a falling figure of two short elements and a longer one. The 'Cello, Viola, and Violin II successively join in, and the rate at which elements are presented speeds up (measure 2): we perceive an increase of activity. At measure 2/4, the activity begins to slow down, until in measure 3, Violin I and Violin II present long elements. During these long elements, the Viola presents a single short element. The decrease of activity and the long elements suggest an end. Not only

1) Fourth String Quartet by Seymour Shifrin
First movement, measures 1-28
Recording: Composer's Recording Inc. (CRI) #SD 358, Fine Arts Quartet
Score: Peters Edition, New York (#66478)

For the members of the Fine Arts Quartet
Leonard Sorkin, Abram Loft, Bernard Zaslav, George Sopkin

String Quartet No. IV

I

SEYMOUR SHIFRIN
1966 / 67



* the signs ⌜ ⌝ and ⌜ ⌝ indicate phrases and sub-phrases
⊤ ⊤ indicate overlap of groupings

Fourth String Quartet (continued)



* the sign ⌋ denotes the end of the preceding performance indication.

Fourth String Quartet (continued)



Fourth String Quartet (continued)



(N.B. Shifrin indicates "phrases" in his score. My hearing of TO's does not always correspond in his "phrases". TO's are indicated below.)

TO's presented in measures 1-28



these features but also the resumption of activity in measure 4 delineate measures 1-3 as a TO. The long element (D^{b} in Violin I) which continues during the end and beginning of TO 1 and TO 2 respectively, does not blur the boundary between TO's but rather links the two separate wholes.

Example VII



TO 2 presents a stronger ending; it is suggested by a decrease of activity in measures 5/5-6/2 and by the repetition of a falling pitch contour stated by Violin I in measure 5.

Example VIII



The stronger ending in measure 6, the long element which links TO's and general similarities of texture and figures give the sense that TO 1 and TO 2 are paired.

The following passage, measures 6/3-12/2, presents a succession of TO's which are shorter than the two just heard. TO 3 is characterized by long elements and TO 4 by a quick succession of short elements: by slower and faster activity. TO's 5 and 6 are similarly characterized. Thus, in TO's 3-6 slower activity alternates with faster activity. TO 6, however, lasts for a longer time than TO's 3, 4, or 5. Beginning at measure 10/2, Violin I presents a succession of short elements, and musical activity increases. In measures 11-12/2, when longer elements are presented in all parts, activity again decreases. The long elements and the decrease of activity suggest an end. TO's 3, 4, and 5 all have distinct boundaries but do not have elements which suggest an end. We perceive the succession of TO's as a continuum which is articulated by the ending features of TO 6.

The TO's presented in measures 1-12 do not employ temporal places to mark boundaries or to provide temporal orientation. The music of measures 12/3-15/1 does employ temporal places. We perceive a regularity in the succession of elements presented by TO's 7 and 9. The elements project an orienting mensural unit and regularly recurring temporal places at the beginning of units (see Example IX). TO's 8 and 10 do not employ temporal places or project an orienting mensural unit. In measures 12/3-15/1, TO's which mark temporal places alternate with those which present long elements. The boundaries between TO's are distinct in this passage, and like the succession of TO's in measures 6/3-12/2, the succession of TO's defines a continuum. However, the fourth TO — TO 10 — does not have features which suggest an end. On the contrary, TO 10 has a hazy ending. We hear its long elements as part of the alternation which characterizes measures 12/3-15/1. When new music occurs in measure 15/2, we focus on its beginning, not on the end of TO 10.

A solo Viola presents the new music which begins at measure 15/2. Its succession of short elements is followed by a long element; then the other strings enter, also with long elements. The change to long elements here delineates a TO — TO 11 — which has a hazy

Example IX


TO 7
TO 8
TO 9
TO 10
Measure:
12/3
13/2
14/1
15/1
(4/4)
Temporal Places:
Orienting Mensural Unit:

ending. The long elements continue until measure 17, when the Violin I presents a succession of short elements. Again, the change delineates a TO with hazy boundaries. (See Example X below.)

The presentation by Violin I in measure 17 concludes on a long element. During it, the other strings present music which gradually slows down. At the end of measure 17, all instruments present long elements which are followed by a short silence; the silence delineates TO 13 and provides a clear end boundary.

Another TO — TO 14 — begins at measure 18 when the 'Cello enters. This TO also has a hazy ending. After a succession of short elements, the 'Cello and then the Viola present long elements. During these long elements, Violin I enters with new music which draws our attention to a beginning.

We perceive the succession of TO's in measures 15/2-19/3 as a continuum. The TO which begins at measure 19/3 — TO 15 — focuses our attention on such a continuous succession. It lasts for the longest time of any TO heard so far in the excerpt. The texture begins to get thicker in measure 20 until at measure 21 and following, all parts present a quick succession of short elements. We perceive the interaction of elements as a continuum; our attention is drawn not to successive elements of one or more of the instruments but rather to the duration of the continuum. In measures 27-28, long elements presented by all parts *decrescendo* and finally bring a halt to the increased activity of TO 15. The long elements suggest an end and delineate measures 19/3-28 as a TO. This end is the strongest heard in the piece so far.

The strong end of TO 15 is linked to mensural properties. At the beginning of the movement, we hear two TO's which span similar durations, then, several more which span shorter durations. Finally, we hear a TO which spans a long duration. The succession of these spans has a tempo: at first, it is constant, then increases and finally slows down. The slowing tempo of succession suggests an end and corresponds to the strong end of TO 15. (See Example XI.)

Finally, order relations in Shifrin's Quartet define an irreversible and dynamic succession. The pairing of TO's and the alternation of different types of TO's project a sense of becoming. Temporality characterizes mensural relations. TO's span durations and the suc-

Example X

Continuum of TO's

Example XI



cession of elements is oriented by the boundaries of TO's. Some TO's, however, do present an orienting mensural unit and briefly suggest properties of time.

2. "Music for Violin Solo," Daria Semegen

Daria Semegen's "Music for Violin Solo" (henceforth *MVS*) presents TO's with hazy boundaries. The music focuses on change and continuity between successive elements and successive TO's. Often a continuous succession of elements cuts across the boundaries of TO's; there is a sense of change but also a sense of continuity through that change.

The temporal concepts of Henri Bergson can be applied to our perception of temporal structure in *MVS*.[17] Bergson conceives of time as "ceaseless emergence of psychological events."[18] He characterizes becoming — the primary temporal attribute — as heterogeneous, qualitative succession and as multiplicity without divisibility. In *MVS*, the succession of elements and of TO's may be characterized as a heterogeneous yet indivisible emergence.

At the beginning of *MVS*, the presentation of elements defines a continuous succession during which change is slowly introduced. The Violin first presents a two-part figure — a short and a long element on the same pitch. At A a change occurs: a short element on the same pitch but *pizzicato*. This is followed by a two-part figure like that which opens the piece. Another change occurs at B : a short *pizzicato* element on a new pitch. The rate of change begins to increase when we hear two more new pitches in succession at C ; however, the mode of production — *pizzicato* — stays the same. At

2) "Music for Violin Solo" by Daria Semegen
Opening lines, 1-7
Recording: Opus One #59, Carol Sadowski, violin
Score: Columbia University Music Press, New York



"Music for Violin Solo" (continued)



D, the mode of production changes to *arco* and two new pitches occur, but the "short-long" succession reminds us of the two-part figure heard at A and B. In the next presentation, the mode of production stays the same, but the pitches and the "short-short" succession are different. The following septuplets present new music which, however, seems to grow out of the previous "short-short" succession at E; the pitches are those we have just heard at D and E. Finally, at F, there is a change which breaks the continuity. The long element, high pitch, and *decrescendo* suggest an end and delineate TO 1. The following silence defines a clear end boundary.

The succession of elements in TO 1 may be characterized as heterogeneous yet indivisible; there is often some feature of continuity between successive elements. In Bergsonian terms, elements bear the traces of their past.

The sense of a distinct end boundary of TO 1 is sustained by the presentation that follows — it sounds like a beginning. Howver, as we listen further, the register and chromatic pitch succession recall the music of TO 1. The descending succession of this passage (G — H) reverses itself at H. The long element here suggests an end and delineates TO 2.

The silence which follows the long element at H defines a clear boundary for TO 2. However, the following element blurs that boundary; the Violin presents the same pitch heard at H and reminds us of the preceding TO. We do, however, perceive this element as the beginning of a TO — TO 3.

Like TO 1, TO 3 introduces changes very slowly. It presents short elements which are separated by silences and which alternate between two pitches — sometimes a pitch is repeated. The succession of elements is variously slow and fast.

This presentation continues until I when a change occurs: the two pitches are stated simultaneously. Another change occurs at I when three new pitches are presented; all other features of the presentation stay the same. The gradual introduction of change continues until TO 3 is delineated at K. The long element and the gradual merging of two simultaneous pitches into one suggest an end. The silence which follows defines a clear end boundary.

The next presentation blurs that boundary. The music at [L] states, in succession, the two pitches which were stated simultaneously and then merged into one at [K]. The repetition of these pitches recalls the end of TO 3, and the short elements separated by silences recall the beginning of it. These recollections give a sense of continuity and blur the end boundary of TO 3.

Bergson's idea that the present bears the traces of its past nicely characterizes the relations between successive elements in *MVS*. The sense of continuity between successive elements often cuts across the boundaries of TO's: there is multiplicity without divisibility. These features of *MVS* project irreversible and dynamic order relations. Mensural relations are characterized by temporality. We hear TO's as spans, and temporal orientation is provided by the boundaries of TO's.

3. Brass Quintet, Elliott Carter

Elliot Carter's Brass Quintet (henceforth *BQ*) presents TO's which have no boundaries. The TO's are characterized by musical types; such features as pitch contour, intervallic content, dynamics, mode of production (*glissando, staccato*), and duration define the types. These types will be referred to by the affective adjectives which are given in the score: "calm," "menacing," "dramatic," etc.

We hear four TO's and part of a fifth in the excerpt considered here. At the beginning of *BQ*, Trombone II, Trombone I and Trumpet I enter successively and present long elements at a *pp* dynamic level; these features define the "calm" type. In measure 5, the Horn enters with a different type — "menacing" — which is defined by a *mf* dynamic and shorter, accented elements. At the end of the fifth measure, Trumpet II enters with the "calm" idea. The Horn, stating more of the "menacing" type, then presents a succession of short elements which are followed by silence in measure 7/4-9/2. The silence abruptly interrupts both the "calm" and "menacing" music.

Following the silence, some new musical types are presented. The Horn resumes its "menacing" type as if no time had elapsed during the silence. Shortly after the Horn entrance, Trombone I and Trumpet II each present a new type: "dramatic" and "humorous" respec-

3) Brass Quintet by Elliot Carter
Measures 1-73
Recording: Odyssey Y34137, American Brass Quintet
Score: Associated Music Publishers, New York (7521)



Brass Quintet (continued)



Brass Quintet (continued)



Brass Quintet (continued)



Brass Quintet (continued)



Brass Quintet (continued)



* For measures 72-95 and 194-210, the horn player should use a mute that matches as nearly as possible the nasal quality of that of the second trumpet.

tively. The three types here quickly give way to the "calm" music. Two additional types presented by Trombone II ("angry") and Trumpet I ("flowing") in measure 10 also merge into the *pp* dynamic level and long elements of the "calm" type (measure 11).

At the beginning of *BQ*, we hear the "calm" music as a sort of steady state. As the "calm" type gradually resumes, in measures 9-11, we hear the other types in measures 9-10 as a disruption of the steady state. By contrast, we hear the Horn in measures 5-7 not as a disruption but as a disturbance: it disturbs the already present "calm" music. The resumed steady state in measure 11 does not last long; it is again disrupted in measures 11/3-12 by "dramatic" music which is presented by all instruments.

Trombone II reasserts the "calm" type in measure 13, but the other parts do not. They present a new "lightly" type which is defined by short, staccato elements and a *p* dynamic level. At the end of measure 15, the Horn enters with "calm" music. We do not hear the "lightly" idea here as a disturbance or as a disruption of the steady state; rather, we hear the two musical types co-existing. In measure 27, the "calm" idea ceases. After it stops, we recognize the TO's which are characterized by the "calm" and "lightly" types. We hear the "calm" music go out of focus and the "lightly" music come into focus. The focusing and unfocusing of types delineates TO's.

TO's 3 and 4 similarly come into and go out of focus. In measure 30, the Horn and Trombone II present a "vigorous" type which is defined by accents and by "hairpin" dynamics. The "lightly" and "vigorous" types co-exist until measure 38 when the "vigorous" music comes into focus. We recognize it as a TO when this focusing occurs.

Trumpet I enters in measure 41 with the "calm" type and draws

Example XII



some of our attention away from the "vigorous" music. The "calm" type gradually begins to assert itself with the successive entrances of Trombone I in measure 42 and Trumpet II in measure 44. Finally, in measure 48, the "vigorous" type in Trombone II gives way to the "calm" music. Immediately afterward, two new types are presented: first, the "angry" type in Trombone I and then the "flowing" type in Trumpet I. These two types and the "calm" music co-exist in the following passage. In measure 62, the "flowing" type ceases and five measures later, the "angry" music also gives way to a dynamic level of *pp* and long elements: our attention is again focused on the "calm" type.

Another new type — "humorous" — deflects our attention in measure 72; later, this new type comes into focus as the fifth TO. Example XIII indicates the TO's presented in this excerpt. The coming into and going out of focus of TO's is suggested by the overlapping curves. Athough these curves have end points, it should be recalled that aurally we do not perceive such boundaries. Instead of places of beginning or ending, we hear co-existing types.

Order relations define an irreversible and dynamic succession with respect to the TO's that are characterized by musical types. We perceive the coming into and going out of focus as a unidirectional becoming. Order relations between successive elements, however, define a static and reversible succession. The elements present a continuous succession which is not articulated by the ends or beginnings of musical types. For instance, in measure 30, the entrance of the "vigorous" type does not draw our attention to a place of beginning. The new type intrudes on the "lightly" type which is the focus of attention in measure 26-29. (See Example XIV.) The elements define a continuous succession, and the process of focusing and unfocusing of musical types during this succession delineates TO's.

Temporality characterizes the mensural properties of TO's. However, the continuous succession of elements often projects an orienting mensural unit. For instance, we perceive a regularity in the "lightly" music of measure 13-15. Example XV shows the succession of elements presented by Trumpet I, Trumpet II, and Trombone I and also the orienting mensural unit. Such a mensural unit is not manifest but is a latent feature of temporal structure.

Example XIII



Example XIV



BQ does not employ a single orienting unit. Changes from one unit to another are frequent but the shift between them is continuous; the changes do not mark temporal places. For instance, in measures 30-37 (see Example XVI), a longer duration has the orienting function (in noation, a half note at ♩ = 48), and in measure 38 a shorter duration takes over that function (dotted quarter at ♩. = 60). The change between them is such that we are not aware of an exact place at which the change occurs but rather of a general "speeding up" in the latter part of measure 38.

In the excerpt of *BQ* considered here, TO's are given retentionally and do not involve anticipation. Temporal structure draws our attention not to a place of change but to continuous change. TO's do not have boundaries and are delineated by a process of focusing and unfocusing.

CONCLUSIONS

The investigative procedures and observational context introduced here respond to the analytical problem of recent music generally and to the conceptual problem of temporal structure specifically. The investigations are not analytic but empirical. They are an attempt to dis-cover temporal structures presented by recent music, structures that may be covered-over by traditional analytic concepts and methods.

In keeping with their empirical thrust, the investigations do not presume the value of a work by setting out to demonstrate the source or sources of coherence and cohesiveness. The investigations explore

Example XV


Measure:
13/2
14/1
15/1
Trumpet I:
Trumpet II:
Horn:
Orienting
Mensural Unit:

Example XVI


35
to the fore
Tenor-Bass Trombone
Orienting Mensural Unit
mf
f
mf
più f
(♩. = 60)
f
mf
mf
f

the possibilities of heard temporal structures presented by recent music. The results of these investigations, the descriptions, are attempts to conceptualize.[19]

Along with the purpose of dis-covering temporal structures in recent music, this study attempts to approach and conceptualize temporal structues in ways that capture and preserve their temporal nature. This requires not only a de-visualizing of structural models but of apprehension as well.

The investigative procedures and observational context introduced here respond to a problem and pose a challenge. They demand an assessment of the fit between theoretical models and musical behaviour, and further, they demand a critique of the theoretical enterprise in music. Most importantly, however, the study here is a challenge for more work exploring phenomenological approaches to music study.

Notes

1. There is a problem of performance in an investigation of listening experience (there is no such problem, of course, for tape or computer pieces). A performance may inaccurately produce all or parts of a piece as determined by the score or by performance practice. This is only a superficial problem so long as the "piece" is not identified with the score. Quite different performances can be faithful to a score and be instances of the piece indicated by the score. An investigation of structure should check the fidelity of performance to score and should, if possible, consider more than one performance.
2. Don Ihde, *Experimental Phenomenology* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1977), p. 38.
3. Ihde gives a fourth rule: Seek out structural invariants. This rule will not figure in musical investigations later in the paper because the stage of inquiry invoked by it would take us too far into the realm of philosophy.
4. Husserl distinguished primary from secondary remembrance. Primary remembrance is an integral part of temporal awareness while secondary remembrance requires an act of recollection. Primary and secondary anticipation may be similarly distinguished. See Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), pp. 50-59.
5. Ihde gives the following account of straightforward experience in another context: "In most of my straightforward experience, I am certainly not primarily, or even self-consciously, attentive to what is going on in that experience. Instead, I am busy attending to the matter at hand. Thus, if I am chopping wood for the evening fire at Vermont, I am so involved with splitting the wood, that I do not notice most of what goes on around me, nor do I think self-consciously about how it is that I am splitting the wood. In fact, if I do turn critical and self-conscious,

while my ax is raised to swing, I may miss the log entirely." *Experimental Phenomenology*, p. 45.

6. It implicitly concerns them since both composers and performers "make" music and their activities reflect the noetic intentions of the general musical community.
7 Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1972), p. 61.
8. By pointing this out I mean not that there is necessarily anything wrong with an explanation but only that what we sometimes take for description is most often explanatory.
9. Henceforth, any score reference such as "measure 35/1" indicates measure and beat of that measure. The reference means that a note, silence, *crescendo*, etc. start either on or sometime during the beat.
10. These restrictions are not totally in keeping with a pure phenomenological investigation. Such an investigation seeks our structural invariants in an effort to explore the intentionality structure of experience and to dis-cover the essential structures of phenomena.
11. Husserl, *Time Consciousness*, p. 41.
12. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 456-480.
13. Ibid., p. 473.
14. These philosophies are briefly discussed in Chapter One of my dissertation. "The Temporal Structure of Recent Music: A Phenomenological Investigation" (State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1982)
15. Aristotle, *Physics*, Book IV, trans. P.P. Hardie and R.K. Gay, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 219b-220a.
16. As discussed above, the temporal spread is Heidegger's concept of primordial temporal awareness. It encompasses past-now-future in experiential awareness.
17. See Bergson's temporal theories in *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur E. Mitchell (New York: The Modern Student Library, 1944); *Matter and Memory*, trans. Paul and W.S. Palmer (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1919; and *Time and Free Will, an Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. F.L. Pogson (New York: Macmillan Co., 1910).
18. Milič Čapek, *Bergson and Modern Physics*, VII, *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 90-91.
19. Later stages of a study of temporal structures presented by recent music would involve postulation of a theory to explain structural behaviour. No such theory can be advanced before structural behaviour is fully investigated and described.

Expressive autonomy in music

JOAN STAMBAUGH

Hunter College

IN THIS PAPER I should like to explore the question of what it is that music expresses. This involves the related questions of what the content of music is, whether music has a content at all, and, if it does, whether that content is feelings and emotions.

Art in general can transcend the limitations of conceptual language and present us with realities that lie beyond the sphere of our ordinary, everyday existence. Music in particular takes us into an even more rarified sphere, beyond concepts, representation and objectivity. For this reason there may have been more divergence of opinion, confusion and misunderstanding about what music is and is supposed to do than about any of the other arts. The situation is complicated by the fact that there are highly intelligent people who simply have little or no access to music; there are others whose enthusiasm for music borders on *Schwärmerei*, on fanatic devotion and commitment. On the whole, the philosophers have tended to view music as lacking in intellectual content, hence as residing on the lowest rung of the hierarchical ladder of the arts. As examples of this patronizing tendency toward music, I should like to cite two of the greatest modern German philosophers, Kant and Hegel.

> Besides, there attaches to music a certain want of urbanity from the fact that, chiefly from the character of its instruments, it extends its influence further than is desired (in the neighborhood), and so as it were obtrudes itself and does violence to the freedom of others who are not of the musical company. The arts which appeal to the eyes do not do this, for we need only turn our eyes away if we wish to avoid being impressed. The case of music is almost like that of the delight derived from a smell that diffuses itself widely. The man who pulls his perfumed handkerchief out

of his pocket attracts the attention of all around him, even against their will, and he forces them, if they are to breathe at all, to enjoy the scent; hence this habit has gone out of fashion.[1]

Music, for example, which has to deal exclusively with the entirely undefined notion of the soul within, with the musical tones of that which is, relatively, feeling denuded of positive thought, has little or no need to bring home to consciousness the substance of intellectual conception. For this very reason musical talent declares itself as a rule in very early youth, when the head is still empty and the emotions have barely had a flutter; it has, in fact, attained real distinction at a time in the artist's life when both intelligence and life are practically without experience. And for that matter we often enough see very great accomplishment in musical composition and execution hung together with considerable indigence of mind and character.[2]

Needless to say, I am not going to try to follow this direction. I should like to begin with the question of the relation of emotion and feeling to music. At one end of the scale of possibilities, there is the fairly widespread claim that music expresses emotions. At the other end of the scale stands the gifted nineteenth century critic Eduard Hanslick who stated that the content of music is comprised of tonally moving forms (*tönend bewegte Formen*).[3] Although Hanslick's definition of the content of music is not a very stirring one, I shall try to show that it is fundamentally correct. Music does not refer to or express anything outside of itself; it is expressively autonomous.

I

One of the most intelligent and sound proponents of the theory that music expresses emotions is Susanne Langer. In her book *Feeling and Form* she states that "music is a symbolic presentation of the highest organic response, the emotional life of human beings."[4] She is careful to state that music *presents* and *expresses* emotions; its function is not to *stimulate* them.

Our interest in music arises from its intimate relation to the all-important life of feeling, whatever that relation may be. After much debate on current theories, the conclusion reached in *Philosophy in a New Key* is that the function of music is not stimulation of feeling, but expression of it; and furthermore, not the symptomatic

expression of feelings that beset the composer but a symbolic expression of the forms of sentience as he understands them. It bespeaks his imagination of feelings rather than his own emotional state, and expresses what he *knows about* the so-called 'inner life'; and this may exceed his personal case, because music is a symbolic form to him through which he may learn as well as utter ideas of human sensibility.[5]

For Langer, the relation of music to feeling is not a simple, direct one. The composer is not expressing his emotional state at the moment; he is not expressing his own personal *symptoms*, but what he knows about feelings in general. And he does this *artistically.*

Sheer self-expression requires no artistic form. A lynching-party howling round the gallows, a woman wringing her hands over a sick child, a lover who has just rescued his sweetheart in an accident and stands trembling, sweating, and perhaps laughing or crying with emotion, is giving vent to intense feelings; but such scenes are not occasions for music, least of all for composing.[5]

All of this seems plausible and correct. But for Langer what is not simple and direct thereby acquires the status of a *symbol.* This seems to me to be at least questionable. Starting from Clive Bell's conception of art as significant form, Langer states that "the concept of significant form as an articulate expression of feeling, reflecting the verbally ineffable and therefore unknown forms of sentience, offers at least a starting point for such inquiries."[7] But then she goes on to take what seems to me an unjustifiable step and asserts that "art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling."[8] The phrase "significant form" is philosophically neutral and flexible enough to be useful in discussing any art, including music. No one, I believe, would contest the fact that music has or is form and that this form is significant or makes some sort of sense. But to go from there and say that art and music are forms symbolic of human feeling has left the region of philosophic neutrality and committed itself to a whole metaphysics. I am no specialist in symbols and symbolic forms, but it seems to me that, generally speaking, a symbol is something concrete standing for or representing something abstract. A lion symbolizes strength; the American flag symbolizes and stands for our country. A symbol in this sense is a metaphysical concept with separation of the concrete and the abstract. It is my contention that music is utterly lacking such a metaphysical structure; it does not

stand for or represent anything outside itself.

Langer is aware of some difficulties in her theory as is evident in the following quotations.

> For music has all the earmarks of a true symbolism, except one: the existence of an *assigned connotation. . . . For music at its highest, though clearly a symbolic form, is an unconsummated symbol.*[9]

> If music is a symbolism, it is essentially of this untranslatable form.[10]

If a symbol does not have a definite connotation, if it is unconsummated and untranslatable, it seems to me that it does not stand for or represent anything outside of itself and therefore cannot be called a symbol. *Symballein* literally means "to throw together"; you cannot throw *one thing* together!

Langer also characterizes music as "a total analogue of emotive life."[11] Although the word "analogue" is perhaps less explicit than the term "symbol", both terms are strongly reminiscent of the Platonic (metaphysical) theory of art as a kind of imitation or copy. In this case, the original element is human emotion and music then comes to imitate and stand for that emotion in the medium of rhythm and tonality. Emotions are part and parcel of human life and music then imitates, stands for or "expresses" these emotions in an artistic medium separate from life. Although Langer's theory is more sophisticated than Plato's, it remains fundamentally Platonic.

In her attempt to grapple with the philosophical question "What is music?", Langer, starting from Hanslick's point of view, states that the elements of music are *moving forms of sound.*

> The realm in which tonal entities move is a realm of pure *duration*. Like its elements, however, this duration is not an actual phenomenon. It is not a period — ten minutes or a half hour, some fraction of a day — but it is radically different from the time in which our public and practical life proceeds. It is completely incommensurable with the progress of common affairs. Musical duration is an image of what might be termed 'lived' or 'experienced' time — the passage of life that we feel as expectations become 'now', and 'now' turns into unalterable fact. Such passage is measurable only in terms of sensibilities, tensions, and emotions; and it has not merely a different measure, but an altogether different structure from practical or scientific time. The semblance of this vital, experiential time is the primary illusion of music. All music creates an order of virtual time, in which its sonorous forms

move in relation to each other — always and only to each other, for nothing else exists there[12]

Virtual time differs from actual time. By actual time Langer means time measurement, what Heidegger calls "clock time." By virtual time she appears to mean the artistic transformation of "subjective" time, *the experience of temporal passage.*

The direct experience of passage, as it occurs in each individual life is, of course, something actual, just as actual as the progress of the clock or the speedometer; and like all actuality it is only in part perceived, and its fragmentary data are supplemented by practical knowledge and ideas from other realms of thought altogether. Yet it is the model for the virtual time created in music. There we have its image, completely articulated and pure; every kind of tension transformed into musical tension, every qualitative content into musical quality, every extraneous factor replaced by musical elements. The primary illusion of music is the sonorous image of passage, abstracted from actuality to become free and plastic and entirely perceptible.[13]

Much of this analysis is based on Bergson's *la durée réelle*, subjective or lived time, "duration". But Bergson's horror of anything smacking of spatialization led him to treat subjective time as a completely formless flow, lacking any structure whatever. Basically, Langer accepts Bergson's conception of duration or lived time with the reservation that it is not formless. As she says, "in apprehending a melody we are not vaguely billowing along with it".[14]

As soon as we regard music as a thoroughgoing symbol, an image of subjective time, the appeal of Bergson's ideas to the artistic mind becomes quite comprehensible; for music presents reality no more directly than philosophical discourse, but it presents a sentient and emotional reality more adequately in a non-discursive image — *globalement*, as the French would say."[15]

II

I turn now to the other end of the scale of possible interpretations of feelings and emotion in music as represented by Eduard Hanslick. While I am much more inclined to agree with Hanslick than with Langer, I shall finally want to add some brief thoughts of my own on the subject.

As stated before, for Hanslick the "content" of music is tonally moving forms. His is commonly called a "formalistic" theory in contrast to Wagner's (and Langer's) "expressivistic" theory; that is, music expresses human emotions. To learn what music really is, says Hanslick, we must get out from under the dubious authority of feeling.

> According to this doctrine, music cannot entertain the intellect by means of concepts the way literature does, any more than it can the eye, as do the visual arts. Hence music must have as its vocation to act upon the feelings. 'Music has to do with the feelings', we are told. This expression 'has to do' is a characteristically vague utterance of previous music aesthetics. In what the connection between music and the feelings (specific feelings connected with specific pieces of music) might consist, according to what natural laws music might work, and according to what laws of art it may be shaped — about all this the very people who 'have to do' with it leave us entirely in the dark. However, when we allow our eyes to adjust a little, we arrive at the discovery that in the prevailing view of music the feelings play a double rôle. Of music in the first of these two rôles, it is claimed that to arouse the delicate feelings is the defining purpose of music. In the second, the feelings are designated as the content of music, that which musical art presents in its works. The two are similar in that both are false.[16]

In contrast to the theory that music expresses human emotions, Hanslick states soberly and emphatically that what music expresses is *musical ideas.* He describes what music *does*, not what its *purpose* is. In good Kantian fashion he simply says that beauty has no purpose. In discussing the four moments of the beautiful, the four factors required in order to judge an object to be beautiful, Kant had stated that beauty is the form of the *purposiveness* of an object, so far as this is perceived in it *without any representation of a purpose.*[17]

The only factor that music has in common with the feelings is their dynamic properties, their motion.

> Motion is the ingredient which music has in common with emotional states and which it is able to shape creatively in a thousand shades and contrasts. The concept of motion has up to now been conspicuously neglected in investigations of the nature and effects of music. It seems to us the most important and fruitful concept.[18]

But motion, and musical motion at that, is a far cry from being able to represent specific feelings. With considerable humor Hanslick points out that everyone will be "moved" by a certain

piece of music, but in the most disparate ways imaginable.

He may play a theme from any symphony by Mozart or Haydn, an adagio of Beethoven, a scherzo by Mendelssohn, or a piano piece by Schumann or Chopin. . . . Who will come forward and venture to declare that some specific feeling is the content of one of these themes? One person will say 'love'. Possibly. Another thinks 'yearning'. Perhaps. A third feels 'piety'. Nobody can refute any of them. And so it goes.[19]

Appealing to the general underestimation of the sensuous by the philosophers, Hanslick states that the proper medium of every art is the *sensuous.* In music this sensuous element is, of course, sound and it is perceived by the sense of hearing. The feeling theory ignores hearing entirely and goes directly to feeling. But normally when I experience an emotion, I do not necessarily "hear" anything at all. There is no intrinsic connection between moving sounds and specific feelings.

It is extraordinarily difficult to describe this specifically musical, autonomous beauty. Since music has no prototype in nature and expresses no conceptual content, it can be talked about only in dry technical definitions or with poetical fictions. Its realm is truly not of this world. All the fanciful portrayals, characterizations, circumscriptions of a musical work are either figurative or perverse. What in every other art is still description is in music already metaphor. Music demands once and for all to be grasped as music and can be only from itself understood and in itself enjoyed.[20]

Distancing himself from the *positivistic theories* of some of his contemporaries, Hanslick is careful not to restrict the musically beautiful to a merely ear-pleasing play of tones lacking all intellectual and spiritual content. Musical forms are "spirit giving shape to itself from within".[21]

As the creation of a thinking and feeling spirit, a musical composition has in high degree the capability to be itself full of spirituality and feeling. This spiritual content we demand of every musical artwork. It is to be found only in the tone-structure itself, however, and not in any other aspect of the work. Concerning the place of spirituality and feeling in a musical composition, our view is to the prevailing view as the notion of immanence is to that of transcendence.[22]

Whereas the view prevailing at his time imputed a "transcending" function to music, a function pointing beyond itself, Hanslick

speaks of the "immanence" of music. It does not point beyond itself to something representable or conceptualizable at all.

Not only is music self-contained, referring to nothing outside of itself, "transcendent" to itself; its "content" is absolutely inseparable from its form. Its content is nothing represented or conceptual.

> People used to consider that a feeling wafting through a piece of music was the subject, the Idea, the intellectual content, and, on the other hand, the artistically created, well-defined tonal sequences were considered the mere form, the image, the sensuous garb of that supersensuous conception. However, precisely the 'specifically musical' part is the creation of the artistic spirit, with which the contemplating spirit unites in complete understanding. The spiritual content of the composition is in these concrete tonal structures, not in the vague general impression of an abstract feeling. The form (as tonal structure) as opposed to the feeling (as would-be content) is precisely the real content of the music, is the music itself, while the feeling produced can be called neither content nor form, but actual effect.[23]

Form and content, to some extent separable in most of the other arts and one of the chief rubrics of aesthetic analysis, are here collapsed into one. Strictly speaking, they are not even collapsed into one since they are not at all separable in the first place. The arts of architecture and dance, says Hanslick, are closest to music in this respect that they bring us beautiful relationships without content. The confusion as to the question of content in music arises from mixing up the concepts of content (*Inhalt*), subject matter (*Gegenstand*) and material (*Stoff*). Content means what a thing contains or holds and in the case of music that is the tones themselves. This is a very neutral sense of the word "content". What one usually looks for as content is much closer to specific, conceptually specifiable *subject matter* (*Gegenstand, Stoff, Sujet*), and Hanslick flatly states that in this sense of content, content as subject matter, music has no content. Its content is nothing but audible tonal forms. "Music speaks not merely by means of tones, it speaks only tones."[24]

Finally, Hanslick states that just because music has no content (*Inhalt*), it does not follow that it has no "substance" (*Gehalt*).

> Thoughts and feelings run like blood in the arteries of the harmonious body of

beautiful sounds. They are not that body; they are not perceivable, but they animate it.[25]

This, I believe, is about as clear a formulation of the question as we are going to get. Thoughts and feeling, the *substance (Gehalt)* of music, are themselves not perceivable, for thoughts and feelings cannot be *heard.* But they *animate,* besoul the body of beautiful sounds. As Hanslick states, "the tones themselves are the untranslatable, ultimate language."[26]

But Hanslick does not deny the expressive effect of music. Basically what he is saying is that *an inner singing, not a mere inner feeling,* induces the musically gifted person to compose. The performance of his composition then can and does have the power to produce effects on the listeners' feelings. Hanslick is keenly aware of the power and intensity of music. He states that "music works more rapidly and intensely upon the mind than any other art. . . . The other arts persuade, but music invades us."[27]

III

In conclusion, let us pose the question why music has the most immediate and intense effect and what the nature of its "spiritual" substance (*geistiger Gehalt*) is. This question is, of course, in no way to be answered in any satisfactory fashion; I can at best provide a few suggestions.

At least three philosophers, Pythagoras, Leibniz and Schelling bring music into an intimate relation with the soul. Leibniz stated that *musica est exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animae,* i.e. music is the hidden practice of the soul unknowingly numbering itself. In his *Philosophy of Art* Schelling quotes this as *musica est raptus numerare se nescientis animae*: music is the *rapture* of the unknowing soul numbering itself. The association of the numbering soul with time goes back at least as far as Aristotle who said that time was the number of motion in respect of 'before' and 'after'.[28] The numbering of motion was, of course, brought about by the numbering soul. In the section on *chronos*, time, of his *Lexicon of Greek Philosophical Terms,* F.E. Peters tells us that "It is likely that

the inhaling process involved limiting the raw, perdurative aspect of time (perduration is an early feature of the *apeiron* [the unlimited]) by its reduction to number (*arithmos*), an association that continued through all subsequent discussion of time."[29] And Schelling tells us that "Generally speaking, rhythm is the transformation of insignificant succession into a significant one. Pure succession is characterized by chance. Rhythm is the transformation of the arbitrariness of succession into necessity. The totality is thereby no longer subjugated to time, but has time *in itself*."[30]

Thus there seems to be some sort of inscrutable relationship between time, soul and music. None of them has any shape (representation) or direct relation to concepts. One might hazard the suggestion that music expresses the relation between time and the soul in a way that prohibits anything conceptual and metaphysical. The inseparability of form and content, of the metaphysical and the physical in music simply rules out conceptuality and metaphysics. The feelings that music "has to do with" are not necessarily ordinary psychological human feelings, although they may well be that, especially in opera, but music expresses spiritual substance. The music of Sibelius, to name but one example, less evokes human feeling than a grandeur of nature. But, of course, this spiritual substance is not at all "substantial" in the traditional sense of that term since its very *medium* is temporality and transitoriness. One might say that music is capable of *im-mediately* expressing life in a truly spiritual sense, not just a psychological one. To really understand spiritual substance or spiritual life and what the feelings or non-rational faculties can tell us about it is a relatively unexplored field in philosophy in general. And this is all the more true in aesthetics. In speaking of human feeling and self-expression, aesthetics never stops to consider who or what the human being is and what these feelings mean apart from a pathological or psychological state. With the collapse of the dominance of rationalism and metaphysics in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries the field becomes open for a new interpretation of what the human being is, no longer considered as "the rational animal". This interpretation would include a completely different way of viewing the feelings and the emotions as a response to the world, as telling us things

about the world that reason alone cannot. Music could play a significant role in this field. The "ex-pression," embodiment of emotions in music can attain a *purity* to be found in no other way, nowhere else.

Notes

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J.H. Bernard. New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1964 § 53.
2. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Fine Art in Philosophies of Art and Beauty*, New York: The Modern Library, 1964, ed. Hofstadter and Kuhns, p. 398.
3. Eduard Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, Trans. Geoffrey Payzant. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1986, p. 29.
4. Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953, p. 126.
5. ibid, p. 28.
6. Susanne Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 216.
7. *Feeling and Form*, p. 39.
8. ibid, p. 40.
9. *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 240.
10. ibid, p. 235.
11. *Feeling and Form*, p. 27.
12. ibid, p. 109.
13. ibid, p. 113.
14. ibid, p. 116.
15. ibid, p. 118.
16. *On the Musically Beautiful*, p. 3.
17. The other three are: The judgment must be *entirely disinterested*, the beautiful must please *universally* without a concept, and the beautiful must be cognized as an object of *necessary* satisfaction without a concept.
18. ibid, p. 11.
19. ibid, p. 14.
20. ibid, p. 30.
21. ibid, with minor changes.
22. ibid, p. 31 with minor changes.
23. ibid, p. 60 with minor changes.
24. ibid, p. 78.
25. ibid, p. 80.
26. ibid.
27. ibid, p. 50.
28. Aristotle, *Physics* IV 219 b.
29. F.E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms*. New York: New York University press, 1967, p. 31.
30. F.W.J. Schelling, *Werke, Dritter Ergänzungsband*, p. 144.

Experiencing a musical composition

ARTHUR MOTYCKA

University of Rhode Island

The concept of musical experience

Musical and physical events belong to different orders of existence.
Victor Zuckerkandl

Everyone responds in some way to musical sound.

Everyone: The primitive, the connoisseur, the deaf, the dilettante, the bored, the musically literate, the audiophile, the excitable, the catatonic, the musically illiterate.

Responds in some way: by singing, by inducing altered states of consciousness, by listening, by tapping, dancing, performing rhythms, by falling asleep to, by thinking about, by heightening visual awareness, by playing an instrument, by creating a song, by sensing vibrations.

To musical sound: as self-expressive, as a symbol-system, as communication, as emotive stimulant and soporific, as entertaining, as educational, as therapy, as experience.

The list is endless. Who, how and why combinations of all sorts — in different forms at different times — help to confirm our basic thesis that everyone responds in some way to musical sound.

The bus driver taps his foot to the straight-forward rhythm of a popular tune he whistles while waiting for a light change. The lobster-man hums a traditional sea-chantey as he heaves in — with accented pulls — the line of his lobster pot. Grandmother rocks slowly in her favorite chair, dreaming yesterday's dreams to the recorded sounds of "her song." The folk-dance troupe performs

with energy and agility to the music of their land. The clarinetist sways knowingly to the sound undulations of the composition she performs. These are human responses to musical sound at a particular moment in each individual's life. Some are simple responses; others involve more complex stimuli which result in what seem to be simple behaviors. Yet these individuals experience music's force; as obvious and subtle, concrete and abstract, technical and non-technical, socio-recreational and evaluative, and so forth. All of these individuals — representing everyone from our first sentence — are part of a musical experience.

Would it be more preferable to say that these individuals were "Having a musical experience"? Or would " doing a musical experience" seem more appropriate? "Receiving a musical experience" might be legitimate in some circles. What we are trying to pin down is: what constitutes a musical experience?

Musical experience defies a neat notebook description. Yet, one of the better attempts comes from a book review:

> Music ... provides access to another, separate 'layer of existence' or 'order of reality.' Music does not merely suggest external scenes or events, it does not merely evoke or suggest or metaphorically resemble human emotions ... Rather, hearing or performing music is an experience which is more than the sum of hearing tones and contemplating emotive life. It is an experience irreconcilably different from any in which a subject contemplates an object or distinguishes between that which lies within himself and that which lies without. Music opens up a level of experience, accessible only to human beings, in which things are conceived of from within ...[1]

The common musical experience

I know, but when you ask me, I don't.

St. Augustine

The more set in our ways we are, the less able we are to adapt our perceptions to the kaleidoscopic world in which we live. Hence, such limited and limiting information received from our experiencing only affirms and reinforces short-termed, goal-directed behavior: "I know what I like and I like what I know." In music it turns out: "I know what I like to hear and I only listen to what I

like." In stricter terms, how clear our perceptual conduits are of distorting noise, and how well they adapt to changing environments, then, determine the level, quality and significance of experience we have.

Can you recall at least one occasion when, as you listened to a musical composition (popular, classical, any style), you critically analyzed it for specific harmonic and form structure, subtle stylistic implication, or some distinctive performance practices? Perhaps it would be more to the point to ask: as you listen to music, are you attending to the meaning of the words? to the music's tendency to "soothe your soul"? to the extra-musical illusions the sounds seem to provide? to the enjoyment — pure and simple — you derive from listening to music? In general, most people under ordinary circumstances would tend to answer "Yes" to these last four questions. What this means is that many people choose those musical settings most likely to provide instant, goal-directed feedback — a moment's pleasure, an entertaining immediacy. The attention necessary for such occasions is evaluative in personal terms ("How well does the music make me feel?") and not in musical terms ("How well-constituted is the music that it makes me feel this way?") While both are valued parts of the musical experience, the former is mainly subjective and needs little refinement, but the later demands objectivity and sharp analysis. Also, the former is short-lived and not cumulative. Otherwise, why would we have the "Top 100" lists changing constantly through the weeks? Why are we always seeking new kinds (styles) of music — acid-rock, jazz-rock, country-western, and so on? Is it because, as Alvin Toffler has warned us in *Future Shock*, we have reached the ultimate state of nihilism in which everything has become consumable; not only food and printed matter, but music, art and even relationships?

While this position would seem fitting of our times to some, only the most pessimistic of seers would take this position without notice of the number of people experiencing life with a higher selectivity and sensitivity. The quality of their lives derives its substance from the honing of their sensory apparatus for the higher-ordered expressive elements of subtle and abstract musical experiences and not stopping at "How good does it make me feel for the moment."

They welcome the opportunity "to comprehend complex interreactive musical relationships."[2] For the others, a reduction of "the quality of human attention" has set in automatically as habit. The ability to cope with our world, under these latter conditions, becomes as limited as our means for determining what we have learned, how well we have learned it, and what good or bad it will do us having learned it. Our experience may be distorted. Hence, we may be — most likely are — kidding ourselves about what we think we know and feel.[3]

Our musical home

. . . you have to see and feel what you are experiencing as it is, and not as it is named.

Alan Watts

As we listen to a musical composition, we intend the sounds to complement our musical experience, which has been built from previous listenings to other musics. We imagine what we want to hear — we expect. In its most obvious form: as we have heard music of a particular composer in times past, now we expect the new composition to sound much like the previous music of this composer. It may have some differing characteristics but never enough to camouflage the style which has become the musical signature of that specific composer. We carry this aural process even farther by expecting whole styles of music to ring familiar to our attuning ears; e.g., the Classical Era, Jazz, Rock, Folk, Musak, our favorite TV shows' themes, and so forth.

What if our intentions are disturbed by unexpectedly unfamiliar musics however, and what if we possess little or no listening experience upon which to depend for comparison? For instance, we attend grudgingly a local concert at which a friend performs some music of Mozart and Beethoven. Somewhere during our general music education we have heard enough of the music of these two composers to identify the obvious differences in their compositional

styles. But within the friend's program some unfamiliar music is heard. Not only is it unfamiliar music but also it is "discordant and angular." Or at least those were the words we heard someone use to characterize the work after the concert. Had we thought of the composition as discordant and angular? Upon reflection, we find that "confusing and difficult" better describes our reaction.

A significant difference — beyond mere words — appears between "discordant and angular" and "confusing and difficult." An attempt at musical analysis of a preliminary nature can be identified when the person says "discordant and angular." Yet, when we say that a musical composition is "confusing and difficult," we refer generally to our state of acceptance or rejection of that composition, whether we recognize it as such or not at first thought.

Because we cannot seem to match the music even remotely with presently-known material, we have chosen to reject it in the most common of manners by perceiving it as a threat, as "confusing and difficult," and as "cultural noise." This is not, then, a fair and critical assessment of the music's worth but a simpler one of our reaction to what we heard. There is quite a difference to be noted here; a difference not involving right and wrong per se, but one of where we place the emphasis of our valuing; on the inherent qualities of the musical composition or on the behavior provoked by what we hear. (While mixed together generally, they can be seen as two different processes. The common music experience confuses the two, valuing the music from an emotional stance only and reducing the quality of the work of art accordingly.)

Of course there is another seemingly more meaningful way of reacting to unfamiliar music beyond being threatened and scowling curse words at it. We can, given average musical literacy, lean back and give it free rein. That is, we can decide to let it play and "see where it goes from here ." Time — sometimes centuries in length — can, not necessarily will, nurture the maturity of performance practices of musicians and the listening acuteness of audiences so that there is sufficient accumulated knowledge of the composition in question to permit more accurate understanding and truer appreciation of its aesthetic worth as an art object. Some things,

however, are lost to history.

To dramatize the differences noted in the quote by Zuckerkandl at the beginning of this essay, and the material in the last few paragraphs, let us examine the use of the terms house and home. The former term tends to denote bricks, mortar, roof, porch, windows, screens and so on. Home, however, tends to connote warmth, livingness, human interactions, births and deaths, the whole human spectrum of life-experience within an environment. Yet these terms are, with careless thought and use, interchangeable within the more common language of certain individuals. So it is with hearing and experiencing a musical composition.

To experience a musical composition is to come into touch with (perceive) the subtle and abstract musical qualities of the work which we value, using the experiential learning which has occurred. (Hearing = merely and solely a passive gathering-in of sound densities for immediate mood gratification.) You must become what philosophers refer to as "at-one-with" the object to experience it.

> When one isn't dominated by feelings of separateness from what he's working on, then one can be said to 'care' about what he's doing. That is what caring really is, a feeling of identification with what one's doing. When one has this feeling then he also sees the inverse side of caring. Quality itself.[4]

> The difference between a good mechanic and a bad one, like the difference between a good mathematician and a bad one, is precisely this ability to *select* the good facts from the bad ones on the basis of quality. He has to *care*! (Pirsig's emphasis.)[5]

The experiential learning which occurs from caring about a musical composition, and some learning occurs given any environment, may be learning not to be put to immediate use. But sometime in the future you will have the purpose and opportunity (and care enough) to bring it forward for practical choice-making. It seems almost too obvious to repeat here that the more resources — experience, knowledge, understanding — available to you and in your command at the moments of choice-making, the better are your chances of quality selectivity and reasons for doing so. I am

not specifying a "Grand List" or "Great Selections" category as the repertoire for you to adopt uncritically in music study.

The aesthetic attitude

To understand music, you must listen to it. But so long as you are thinking, 'I am listening to this music,' you are not listening.

Alan Watts

Philosophers interested in aesthetics have examined the art object, its audience, and the many things in and around both which contribute to the mating of what the art object offers and what the audience is able to accept. One school of thought on the matter views the art object as seductive, evoking flights of mental verities in the forms of fantasy, hope and mystical and emotional catharses. Another position, much more distant from the pole of the first — perhaps as distant as the opposite pole — finds no reason to go beyond the physical properties of the art object in determining quality and affect. Between and around these positions buzz hundreds of aesthetic possibilities. And this is as it should be, for the arts are important societal anchorages worthy of weighty considerations. But what of the audience? How do we really (not seem to) accommodate ourselves to the art object? Or does the art object become adapted to our perception of it? How can we intentionally structure a mind-set which affords us optimum eyes and ears for the art occasion? What is "the aesthetic attitude"?

We must begin by stating that no one aesthetician has given us a clear process whereby we may look at or listen to an art object — loosely identified as an aesthetic experience — and then apply common aesthetic principles which comply with an "empirical uniformity of taste." And, it is expected, no one ever will.(That we would agree on everything, especially the value of art objects, could lead to cultural suicide.) Additionally, attempts to service our diverse tastes by means of broad principles, e.g., "All perceptual qualities have generality,"[6] never end and at times tend to confuse the real issue: How we establish and regularize a "sensing scope" of

such magnitude and latitude so that we may fully benefit from the qualities of the art object we are perceiving. Or: How do we get the most out of our seeing and hearing?

We get the most from our seeing and hearing by being aware of those visual and aural things in our environment. It seems simple: be aware. But ... how much is being aware? There are numerous authorities who have written about awareness and the position in human functioning they believe it deserves. The range includes those who believe awareness to be:

1) an incipient consciousness ("the learner will merely be conscious of something");[7]

2) a bi-leveled "reconstruction of an upper level of what is already organized in another manner on a lower level" kind-of-cognitive unconsciousness;[8]

3) two kinds; focal and subsidiary, with meaning integrally expressed, since "We can know more than we can tell and we can tell nothing without relying on our awareness of things we may not be able to tell";[9]

4) psychological energy (attention/awareness) which "can be volitionally directed ...";[10]

5) "a view of reality free from ideas and judgments ... clearly impossible to define and write down what it reveals";[11] and,

6) a connective, organismic, dynamic, sensing phenomenon (gestalten), immediately and directly grasping the qualities of the aesthetic experience.[12]

It seems, then, if we choose one of the more intentional states of awareness from the six listed above (the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th seem suitable), we should be able to adopt an appropriate aesthetic attitude for more clear judgments. The major criterion in our selection should be that the awareness process affords us an initial uncluttered opportunity for aesthetic arousal; a pure art experience. In my opinion, the 6th description seems the most appropriate to satisfy this criterion. It focuses upon direct awareness. There should be no attempt to analyze or categorize, in theoretical fashions, the form and content of the art object — as yet.

When we so contemplate a beautiful thing, the powers of perception are activated and stimulated to a more than usually intense and harmonious activity; the object is such as to allow them full scope and to satisfy and sustain them. The signal that this is happening is the pleasure that we feel in this full and unimpeded exercise of our faculties.[13]

There we have it: a "direct but nonconceptual apprehension." We should be in a suitable frame of acceptance and welcome in the art object as pure experience; intellection aside for the moment. This last qualification — for the moment — leaves open the door of perception enough to see that, later on, other factors enter into our experiencing. After our first hearing or viewing, we will have many chances, more than likely, to re-experience the aesthetic qualities of the art object while applying labels and other cognitive data.

LEVELS OF MUSICAL RESPONSE

Casual conversations by interested music listeners over the years, even writings by professionals, have tended to treat several qualifying terms as loosely as the control of thought behind their use. The terms are enjoyment, knowledge, understanding and appreciation.

Surely, at some time in some conversation you have heard someone say that they appreciate Bach. "I know his works well," comes about as often as "I certainly enjoyed the concert." "I understand what he was trying to convey" is heard sparingly. Nevertheless, as with the three other terms, understand may have a multitude of intended meanings as we pass from one conversationalist to the next.

It seems necessary to better gauge what someone is trying to communicate to us about their perception of what they hear than by the careless, name-dropping procedures in the prior paragraph. What we need is a more steady sense about everyone's use of these terms when they are expressive of musical experience; yours and theirs. I propose to establish a semantic ranking for the use of these terms. This should provide a musically sensible addition to your everyday vocabulary. The importance of using a consensus phrase-

ology about music experience is as strong as the need for sharing it intelligently with others who are equally concerned.

The enjoyment of music

No one is indifferent as he listens to a symphony, reads a poem or looks at a painting.

Risieri Frondizi

The "taking of pleasure" fills spaces following enjoy in dictionaries. Pleasure of the basest nature — a raw response — is enjoyment. (Certain dictionaries join enjoyment with sexual pleasure as one factor in its popular sense. Therefore, one may make the safe assumption that the enjoyment of music may sometimes relate strongly to extra-musical factors.)

To enjoy music, then, should mean to respond at the primitive, nativistic, primordial, visceral level; no more, no less. But does it in common usage? The newspaper article claims with a certain snobbery that more people than ever "enjoy recordings of classical music." (They derive this bit of guesstimation from sales records; hardly a reliable source for anyone but the most fuzzyheaded of sociologists.) While the newspaper statement may be correct as far as it goes — certain people respond pleasurably to some recordings of specific classical music — it becomes important more for what it does not say: enjoyment implies no requirement of substantive intellection. It is the first affective response to the pure art experience. For that, it is important and germinative. It leads naturally to thinking about what one hears and sees.

The knowledge of music

Knowing ... is participant and principled action undertaken in response either to problematic situations or to an 'every-day reality' that must be imaginatively reconceived.

Maxine Greene

Established facts and unbiased information about music comprise our knowledge of music; e.g., that Bach was born in 1685, that Webern and Berg were students of Schoenberg, that the key of G Major has one note which requires a sharp (F), and so forth. The bulk of most introductory music courses is structured from such facts and information.

The understanding of music

Understanding comes through awareness. To be aware, then, is to be aware of thought, sensations, desires, and all other forms of experience. Never at any time are you aware of anything which is not experience, not a thought or feeling, but instead an experiencer, thinker, or feeler.

Alan Watts

To understand is more than having knowledge of. As you might review various aspects of musical knowledge, you will become more aware of how many particulars grew from the initial affective experiencing and its consequent consideration. To understand is the result of the balanced mixing of feeling and thinking data. This, then, makes obvious two distinct characteristics of understanding: (1) it requires sufficient time to mature from the divided, direct experiences of sensing and cognizing to the points where they converge and where we make sense of the alchemy; and (2) it requires a grasp of the basic theoretical components of whatever it is we are attempting to understand (in our case, music).

Time to understand. How much time? What is enough time? In most cases, it first depends upon the level of abstraction and subtlety the art object represents. Should you seek to understand the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven, a composition of considerable abstraction and subtlety, you should expect the duration of time before more musical authorities would agree that you understand the work to be of equal worth. Implicit in all of this, of course, is the second factor which determines the time it takes to understand, i.e., your capacities to sense and think. But, and it is important to

remember, everyone can reach and sustain an acceptable level of musical understanding, given time and effort.

As for grasping the basic theoretical components of music, John Dewey's analogy of a flower's beauty might suffice:

> Flowers can be enjoyed without knowing about the interactions of soil, air, moisture, and seeds of which they are a result. But they cannot be *understood* without taking just these interactions into account — and theory is a matter of understanding. Theory is concerned with discovering the nature of the production of works of art and of their enjoyment in perception.[14] (Dewey's emphasis.)

This quote contains several uses of the terms with which we have been dealing. It, however, does not refer to the valuing process — appreciation.

The appreciation of music

Appreciation includes not only correct evaluation, but also complete perception.

Ruth Saw

The etymology of appreciate is "to truly evaluate." This simple statement contains the essence of choice-making; the valuing process. But it presumes intelligent choice-making ("truly"). That is, while you have the unquestioned right to choose between musics heard (rock and classical, two compositions of the same style, two interpretations of the same composition, and so on), you should feel a strong aesthetic obligation to apply to the occasion as much musical literacy as is reasonable to expect; equal to the discernable integrity of the art work.

Bernard Heyl once said that "Mere liking is an insufficient condition for the activity of valuing." His point seemed to be: because you are attracted and charmed by an art work — you enjoy it — that this state in no way gives you the aesthetic right of critical judgment or gives credence to whatever interpretive statement you may make of it. Dewey concurs: "... no amount of ecstatic eulogy of finished works can of itself assist the understanding or the gener-

ation of such works."[15] Since you are now familiar with the four terms I have been presenting, you might interpret and extend the Heyl and Dewey quotes in a more positive manner: You should enjoy music as pure art experience, without restrictive judgments, as a first step in the aesthetic experience (affective). Next, the accumulation, categorization and interpretation of musical knowledge (cognitive), blending with and supportive of the affective state, leads to musical understanding. The application of musical understanding to specific compositions demands that the listener appreciate what is heard (and seen in musical scores) for its inherent values. It should be remembered that each response is of equal importance as the next and that dovetailing of one with at least one other response is inevitable.

It is obvious that repeated exposure — of an active sort — to specific music gives you the opportunity to develop each of your musical responses. Each return to music that you have heard before brings "different ears," i.e., greater aural awareness. It is with these different ears that you are better able to assimilate the sounds of your world — a reality which exists as vividly as that that you see, smell, taste and touch.

Notes

1. Bruce N. Morton, from review of Victor Zukerkandl's *Man the Musician*, in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 33, 3 (Spring 1975).
2. Leonard B. Meyer, *Explaining Music: Essays and Explorations* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), p. 80.
3. See William R. Torbert, *Learning from Experience: Toward Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), especially pp. 5-23.
4. Robert M. Pirsig, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1974), p. 297.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
6. Rudolph Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974), p. 444.
7. See D.R. Krathwohl, B.S. Bloom and B.B. Masia, *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals, Handbook 2, Affective Domain* (New York; John McKay Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 176-185.
8. Jean Piaget, *The Child and Reality: Problems of Genetic Psychology* (New York: Grossman Publishers, The Viking Press, 1973), p. 40.

9. Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), Preface.
10. Charles T. Tart, *States of Consciousness* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1975), p. 16.
11. Alan W. Watts, *The Wisdom of Insecurity* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1951), p. 76.
12. Arthur Motycka, *Musico-Aesthetic Education: A Phenomenological Proposition* (Jamestown, R.I.: GAMT Music Press, 1975), Chapter III. Also, see Motycka, *Awareness: A Process and Some Task Examples* (Jamestown, R.I.: GAMT Music Press, 1975), passim.
13. Harold Osborne, *Aesthetics and Art Theory: An Historical Introduction* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1970), p. 191.
14. *Art as Experience.* (New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1934), p. 12. For an opposing view, see Leonard B. Meyer, *Explaining Music: Essays and Explorations*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), especially pp 14-18.
15. *Ibid.*

Harmony and logos: The origin of the musical work of art

MANFRED S. FRINGS
DePaul University, Chicago

INTRODUCTION

THIS ESSAY will attempt to contribute to the question of the relationship between harmony and structure, i.e. *logos* in both music and philosophy. More precisely, we will construct an analogy between music and philosophy with the purpose of approximating Heidegger's primary question: "What is the meaning of Be-ing?"

It appears to be both unphilosophical and unmusicological to engage in a "construction" of an analogy between music and philosophy. For neither philosophizing nor the act of playing and listening to music is, in itself, "constructive". While it is true that construction can be part both of philosophy (e.g., construction of logical systems) and of music (e.g., construction in composition), I shall argue 1) that the essence of "original" thinking (Heidegger) and of "original" listening are the same acts of specific time-consciousness guided by logos and harmony; 2) that logos and harmony are "concealing-unconcealing"† modes of one and the same in original thinking and listening.

To any musicologist it is an equally strange and obvious fact that among the twenty or so great philosophers who lived since the times of ancient Greece up to our present age there are only a few who showed an appreciation and true understanding of music, whereas

† i.e. they both conceal and reveal at the same time, language peculiar to Heidegger's writings.

all of them were either mathematicians or had at least profound knowledge of mathematics. A detailed study of the role of music in philosophy would reveal it to have been an insignificant role, or even, as in Kant's case, an unbelievably simplistic role — exceptions such as Pythagoras and Nietzsche notwithstanding. Even in Heidegger's case we must say that despite his impressive study "On the Origin of the Work of Art", music fails to be given proper credit, whereas forms of art such as painting, architecture and, of course, poetry, are fully acknowledged.

In his systematic interpretation of Heidegger's above mentioned work F.W. von Herrmann rightly contends it has time and again been regretted that so little attention to music can be found in Heidegger. He also rightly contends that Heidegger's aim is to explain the very origin of "art", and not merely of a form of art, and that this latter task of explicating the origins of a form of art remains to be done.[1] It is the purpose of this study to contribute to this question.

The absence of philosophical explanations of the being of music and of sound is all the more astounding because music and sound are temporal. A sound is not an "object" (as Husserl implies). An object is, strictly speaking, precisely what it says it is: anything that is "thrown against" us (ob-ject), i.e., from a spatial distance. The essence of "sound" is not spatial, much as sound "spreads" around us on waves carried through the air.

Sounds come upon us while already fading away into non-existence. Sounds have the mode of "becoming" and "un-becoming" simultaneously. By contrast, van Gogh's painting of the peasant shoes, which Heidegger speaks of so elaborately, stays there before me and remains even when I am gone. The painting is in space. It is an object. Music is flux and, therefore, possesses an inherent linkage in and to "time-consciousness" much more so than, in its own way, an object does.

One of the lasting discoveries of current phenomenological philosophy is the explication of "time-consciousness". We are told that the "stream" of consciousness is a continuous flux of emerging and fading meaning and content. In this, we are also told, it does not matter whether consciousness is in the mode of feeling, willing,

thinking, imagining, dreaming, remembering, expecting or listening. Consciousness is itself flux of whatever is given in and to it. Thus it resembles a river without a bed and shores. This continuum, we are also told, is beset with "nows". The nows of time-consciousness are not points between past and future (which they are in measurable calendar or musico-metric time); the nows are "stretched" paradoxically, overlapping each others' emergent and fading meanings. In short, time-consciousness is "nowing" consciousness (*das Jetzten*).

Of course, in everyday life we are not aware of this flux. We take it for granted because we are floating in it. It is supposed to be in a phenomenological intuition or "gaze" that we can catch a glimpse of the essence of man's existence. We must add "to a certain extent" because this gazing, too, belongs to the very same flux. Hence, this flux can never be completely caught in one viewing. There are no shores to the river, no place on which we could stand and look at the continuum of time-consciousness.

One major structural factor in this is the emergence and passing away of meanings. Sounds, for instance, that have just been heard are still "retained" in passive memory, while sounds that have not yet been heard are already "anticipated" and already being subsumed into a "now". If anticipated sounds do not occur (e.g., a wrong note has been played), time-consciousness is at once disturbed. When this happens the retaining and anticipating sound flux interrupts the musico-logical meaning of sound progressions.

If a piece of music is played and listened to without such interruption, the sounds — like the continuity of words in discussion or the continuity of the words read in this paper — are held together in progressive and overlapping "nows" of ever recurring emergences and disappearances of sound. In listening to a metronome there is already a "cluster" of ticks being heard, i.e., consciousness grasps not only the ticks that hit the ear-drum, but it already envelops those anticipated as well as those that have just passed away. "Listening" is not a sensory experience. Rather, it is a holistic affair embracing totalities of sounds held together in a harmonious logic of progressive "nows" — of sounds I like to describe as "colors of time".

For this state of affairs phenomenologists use the familiar terms of

"protentions" and "retentions". Retentions retain all meanings in immediate passive remembrance. Protentions already grasp meanings in immediate anticipations. The latter pass into retentional modes while new anticipations are already being "nowed", although they are not yet present. In this protentional-retentional fabric of consciousness there is another fact pertinent in particular to music but hardly ever articulated. Retentions and protentions posit themselves in their own timings. Sounds "time" themselves. They are not packaged in objective, measurable clock-time. Of course, they can be clocked with the metronome. Yet in the free act of playing and listening, the tones "fill" time-phases and rhythms with their "color". They cannot readily be disconnected from them. If they are, one is "practicing" a piece of music, i.e., at times interrupting the flow of the sounds and tones, or, in the flux of speaking, one "stammers".

It is my opinion that the essence of a musical performance is "immersion" in this flow of sounds, i.e., in one's being united with this flux. Performance (as well as conducting) is not a deliberate placing of sounds into a preconceived or constructed rhythmic pattern to be followed. Rhythmic patterns are nuanced and change due to the interpretation of a performer, conductor, or composer. Performance and conducting is re-creating. But in every performance the time-phases and that which fills them, sounds, remain "one". They coincide. Whenever there is the least effort at technical mastery, say on the key board, or, positively, whenever the performer is "immersed" and "lost" in his playing (perhaps he himself is being "played by the playing") there is this oneness of the performer's time-consciousness with sounds.

This point of "filled time" does not only pertain to playing and listening to music, chords, or tones; even in our daily lives we "live" this conjunction of our own being and time. While our minds are so often in a state of "objective" thinking, deliberating, weighing arguments, etc., our everyday lives are characterized by this coincidence of meanings and time phases. The din around me, my manipulations of equipment, my handling of situations, my feelings and volitions etc., are, without exception, connected with the time-phases they fill out. We think that so-called objective, measurable

time is "the" time. We ask, for example, "What time is it?" But we forget that "lived" time is quite different precisely because the protensive and retentive nows of meaning are neither measurable nor "clockable", nor can these meanings be separated from the fluctuations of time. Max Scheler qualified this time as "filled" with content, as "absolute time", in which there are different levels.

Perhaps the greatest masterpieces in music are those whose composers grasped the whole of the composition "at once" even before writing it down, as was often the case with Beethoven, Bach, Mozart,[2] and Chopin, to mention a few. Should this be true it is safe to say that the very absence of measurable and objective time makes the work of art in music a true work of art. For it touches on the meaning of time and being in their inseparable conjunction and intercontainment.

These brief remarks concerning time-consciousness need to be kept in mind, in order to be able to approach the origin of art particularly as the art of sound.

I

In order to clarify my contention that the musical work of art leads extraordinarily well into the origin of Art per se — much better so than painting, sculpture, architecture and, as we shall see, also poetry — I avail myself of a description of the act of listening to a "classical" work of music. In essence, it does not matter which classical work we may choose, for the act of listening to the sounds, tones, chords etc., of any such work's melody and themes remains the same and reveals the same structural contents. Nevertheless, I am thinking in particular of Chopin's *Étude in C-Minor* opus 25, No. 12 which he probably composed in Stuttgart at the same time while he was writing down his better known *Étude* called the "Revolution". The *Étude* opus 25, No. 12 has been called posthumously "the Ocean". Both *Études* are pure examples of sound flow; and an analytical or reflective listening to individual tones and chords can hardly bring this flux to a stop. This flow endures in listening, and it tends to refuse to be analysed while the *Étude* is being played. The

retentional-protentional complex is intercontained to such an extent that it continues to merge with the melody, at times not even distinguishing chords, tones and sounds or even the melodic theme itself.

It can already be seen in a simple song, however, that in listening there are basically two structures. First there is that which is being sung at any moment together with the tones just sung and those anticipated. Secondly, there is the melody upon which one sings, so to speak. The tones sung reveal at any phase parts of the background of the melody, the melody itself coming to the fore during any one sung tone. But a sung tone is not the melody; for, the melody as a whole can never be sung at once. It is during the act of listening that the melody is "heard out" as belonging to any one tone, and vice versa. This "hearing out" of the melody, while being sung, gives the melody a time-character of "duration of presence", whereas the sounds and tones being sung have the time-character of "passing presents", conjoined with each other during any one sung tone. These "passing presents", making it possible for them to be objectified and analyzed by a metronome in measurable "sequences", whereby consciousness takes an objective and observational attitude. Thus the song or any piece of music shows three aspects of time:

1. The *durational* presence of melody or theme,

2. The *passing* (retentional-protentional) "presents" of sounds, revealing the duration of the presence of the melody or theme,

3. The *sequence* of tones as objectified in reflection, e.g., in practicing.

For our purposes we can ignore the third aspect of time. For, while it is possible to clock the oncoming and passing sounds in the mode of observation and reflection, it is not possible to clock the duration of the theme or melody. True, we can clock the length of the melody running off on the turn-table, but the "hearing out" of the melody itself is devoid of any possibility of being measured.

Figuratively speaking, we have thus far described the experience of listening in a "horizontal" fashion, i.e., we have presupposed the

flux of sounds and tones as coming along and passing away as on a line before us, while they themselves are taking shape and forming harmonic wholes from the hidden background of the entirety of the melody. Strictly speaking, the duration of a melody is not something "passing". Duration is continued presence. The "passing of duration" is itself a contradiction, when taken within the imagery of linear flux. For duration is precisely the opposite of the flux: duration is perpendicular to flux, as are wave phases to the flux of visible waves on the ocean. But this image, too, is deceiving in our description of the phenomenon of duration. For perpendicular duration comes from behind the flux "toward us", forming only points in the "linear" flux of tones meeting with it. In listening to the duration the melody of Étude opus 25 is "heard out" anew in each passing tone with its retentional-protentional clusters. In each passing tone the duration reveals itself in the different locations of tones, forming not a "straight" line but a curving one constituted by the ups and downs of the tones. The perduring melody shimmers and oscillates in the flux of tones, while holding within its own continued temporal presence.

For this reason the melody is the same and not the same in each passing tone, in tonal decay, the fortes, pianos, emphases, pitches, lengths and so on. More precisely, it is the durational melody out of which and in which the tones are sounding and resounding. The origin of the work of musical art must be in the durational presence of what is sounding as we listen. On the one hand we "listen to" the durational melody, but on the other we do not, because as a whole it cannot be auditorily grasped all at once, much as it "stays" there for us. The act of listening must therefore be imbued with a sense of anticipation permeating the whole of duration. The act of listening consists, therefore, of a structure representing the horizontal flux of tones and the duration of melodious phases of the melody, i.e., of what is "heard out". The very being of what is thus heard is purely temporal, i.e., in terms of duration. Every phase of the melody is conjoined with the horizontal passage of tones engendered in each phase. It is this perpendicular and horizontal linkage and tension in the time-character of listening that makes up "harmony". As the Greek word *harmos* (link) would indicate, duration is composited by

means of the musical tones of the flux, much as this flux has continuous and intercontained manifolds of its own, revealing the emergent melody's own tension with the dispersed phases of horizontal sounds.

It would be of no avail to make comparisons between the above state of affairs and such aspects of Heideggerian thought as the durational presence of Being, the Identity and Difference of entities and Being, or the "concealing unconcealment" of *Aletheia*, as truth. Comparisons of the kind may have some benefit, but they have little or nothing to do with thinking.

The analogy mentioned at the outset of this paper is, strictly speaking, no analogy at all: for music is par excellence *the* art form of *temporal* character. As a form of art, music may well be for this reason "the" form of art through which the origin of Art can be best approached. True, poetry, too, is listened to and recited in temporal fashion. A poem, too, possesses the durational presence of what the words in passage say. But there remains a fundamental difference between poetry and music. In every one of its words standard poetry must "name" something. Poems also require a "title" of what they are about. Music, in essence, neither requires titles nor does it name anything. Chopin's *Étude* does not name anything at all, though people later on poetized it by naming it "the Ocean". This, of course, functions as a convenient image in our analogizing "reflexive listening". In itself, however, the *Étude* is nothing but the durational presence of what is passing. *Sound needs no words. Words do need sound.* If the temporal character of a work of art has anything at all to do with the origin of Art in music, it appears — for this reason — to be closer to the origin than poetry. In this statement, therefore, we disagree with Heidegger's evaluation of poetry. Indeed, our first step into the sounding out of the origin of the art of sound — through an analysis of the act of listening to pure music — would show us that duration resounds in the tonal flow, as it comes together *of itself*. This linkage, *harmonia*, in Heidegger's and the Pre-Socratics' sense of the word, is itself the manifestation of *logos*. We shall return to this point below.

II

It is because of this line of thinking into the origin of the work of art that we question why Heidegger lays so much stress on the spatial arts, in short, on art and space. Art, therefore, reveals itself as attached to "earth", as what is "at hand", as instrumentality even "gear" (*Zeug*). It is easy for us to see how Heidegger can come to make statements like: "During the first World War Hölderlin's hymns were packed in the soldier's knapsack together with his gear. Beethoven's quartets lie in the store room of the publishing house like potatoes in a cellar."[3]

Although this may hold for the printed and written material of art-works, it does not hold for the audial imagination or grasp, which a poet or composer has of his own work of art. The temporal duration of what is to be en-toned, verbalized, or even of what is to be painted or built allows of no spatial origin. It does so only for subsequent performers, reciters or builders who use instruments, printed pages or tools. Originally, both music and poetry were free auditory activities without printed pages and solely for auditory consumption.

It is through this line of thinking that, historically, the work of art of sound may be typified in Greek mythology. The first musicians were the gods: Athena and Apollo (flute), Hermes (shepherd's pipe), Pan (the reed pipes) and the Muses (voice). Next in order came only a few mortals so excellent, however, in the art that they almost equalled the divine performers. Among them Orpheus, whose power of the sound of both his voice and lyre made animate and inanimate nature move, just as its beauty could bring war to a standstill and overcome the dim and endless dullness of the underworld.

Again, it is by thinking of the origin of art as purely temporal that, historically, the work of the art of naming, as purely auditory, can best be typified in the Bible, in God's first "resounding" word to man. So much for history. To seek the origin of the work of art in time may be an erroneous path to take, from a Heideggerian viewpoint. But "erroneous" paths can be positive. For, if the origin of art is not temporal, it must be spatial, i.e., of earthly character. Reading

Heidegger's aforementioned work, one has little doubt about an earthly origin of art.

This is especially so because the art of painting, of sculpture, and of architecture enjoys a predominant role in what one conceives today to be "art". On closer look one can say, however, that what passes as "art" today is often nothing more than a display of exercises and the dexterity of either handling art material and equipment (e.g., manual acrobatics on the keyboard) in order to produce shock-effects, or of arranging mere things into composites (such as wheels and rods, or even a pile of metal junk displayed in an art-exhibit) calling such mere aggregates "composition". It is this "artification" of *things* that largely determine the nature of art today. Any thing including such an unattractive one as a junk pile, or even a toilet bowl, can and is considered as a subject for "art". The endless "artifiability" of things in the spatial arts has something to do with the ethos of our technical age and its obsession to produce, handle and manipulate equipment and things, as well as with man's present-day self-understanding as a "tool-man" (*homo faber*), implying that the genus, man, can master all things ranging from atoms to things in outer space. What is the nature of a thing? A thing is first something thrown before me, we stated, an "ob-ject". Being before me, it is in space. But the "thingness" of a thing becomes less transparent, when a thing loses its spatial character. A social state of affairs among humans, for instance, is not in space and changes in ways different from spatial things. We say, for instance, this (state of affairs) is a curious "thing", but by this we do not mean an object. Thingness even becomes extinct when sounds or tones are concerned despite Husserl's implication that tones are "things". No musician would ever hold this. The character of a thing varies according to its attachment to space or time. The less something is spatial, the less it is a thing. The more something is spatial, the more it is a thing. If something is purely temporal, like duration or consciousness, it is not a thing at all!

The thing-character of spatial works of art (painting, sculpture, architecture) must not be too readily shifted over to sounds and words (music and poetry). In his Heraclitus Lecture "Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens" (1943/44) Heidegger makes a fitting

remark that today words are used like "things" and language as an instrument for communication.[4] This pertains equally to sounds, which are produced today in all types of gadgets and technical devices, for effect and marketability. Poetry and painting have, however, tried to minimize the thing-character of their objects. Poems that only sound without words that name things (Verlaine), and objectless paintings eliminate the "object", although these poems and paintings are preserved in book-things and on canvas-things. Poetry and painting and also sculpture have this potential for reducing spatiality and increasing temporalization and flux in them. But music is unlike contemporary art. Its very nature is objectless flux, even though the words of a song may fill this flux and try to name things in it. There is no phenomenon of "thingness" in Bach's *Well Tempered Clavier*, as keyboard music. There is no phenomenon of thingness in Beethoven's last piano sonata (opus 111). Chopin's *Étude*, mentioned before, is only one out of many examples of pure and absolute music. Maybe his music as a whole is even a classical model of subjectivity. It may be for this reason that Nietzsche said he would give away all of music except Chopin's (*in Ecce Homo*).

Yet, how is our attempted first step into the origin of art, as temporal, to be understood as a whole? To say, as we did, that music as a form of art has to have a distinct place among other forms of art because of its temporal character may be a comforting statement for a musician, but in itself it does not constitute a first step into the temporality of the origin of art as a whole. For we have all along presupposed that there are "forms" or kinds of art that make up Art, as such. They are comparable to disciplines in philosophy, first laid out by Aristotle in terms of logic, physics and ethics. Today there is a so-called "philosophy of" anything like there are "arts" of anything. Art, like philosophy, has been compartmentalized. Heidegger calls such compartmentalization in philosophy "Einfächerung", which prevents any access to original thought.[5] This compartmentalization serves as a filter through which things have to pass. It is those disciplines and branches which have determined all along the classification of objects. "What is" in original thought (Aletheia, Physis, Logos, Harmonia, Einai) remains hidden. This alienation of philosophy from itself pertains equally to

art. The origin of the work of art lies beneath later forms of art. An exchange between forms of art in favor of one or the other does not lead to this origin. I maintain that to a large degree Heidegger's writings on art are also oriented around *kinds* of art, at times around the spatial arts, at other times around poetry.

The reason why we nevertheless stress the art of sound is that Time and Being, not space and Being, lead to the question of the meaning of Being as a whole.

Discovering the origin of Art, however, must also involve the activity of the artist himself. Without the artist there is no likelihood of the emergence of any art. In his manuscript-fragment "Metaphysics and Art", 1923, Max Scheler draws our attention to this and he juxtaposes metaphysics to art by saying: "Metaphysics is *cognition*, and it is, like all cognition, *no art.*" And further: "Knowledge is *comprehension of what is there* — this obtains for metaphysical knowledge as well. Art is *building of what is not there* but which would be worth being there and deserve to be there according to aesthetic values."[6] Accordingly, the artist is this "little god" creating a peculiar world in each kind of art. The artist's activity soars far beyond reality by creating a work of art that *addresses* us almost in terms of an eternal ground or origin of reality, articulating it for us across the impenetrable "fiat" of sheer will.† While the metaphysician and the artist share the same point of departure in "setting aside reality", the artist and the philosopher take different directions from then on; the artist creates a world "out of nothing", whereas the thinker returns to the "real world", in order to uncover the Being of beings at various levels of existence and non-existence.

Therefore, there is a fundamental difference between a thinkers' looking at van Gogh's painting of the peasant girl's shoes, which Heidegger takes great pains to illustrate, and the artist's creating them in the painting. The thinker brackets the reality of the shoes, in order to point to the "world" they belong to, and he returns to their earthly functions of instrumentality and of daily labor. World and

---

† Paraphrase of Max Scheler's: "Das scheinst Du mir gerade haben sagen zu wollen, Du ewiger Grund der Dinge — sei es, ohne es ganz zu *vermögen* oder in dem rational undurchdringlichen 'fiat' Deines Wollens zu mögen ..." (*Ges. Werke*, 11, p. 35).

shoes stand there, in that the shoes reveal the concealed truth.

By contrast, the artist's painting of the shoes gives a special aura to shoes as such, not the real ones, to be sure, those merely sitting on the floor in the corner of a room. Indeed, van Gogh's "shoes" do not show what they stand on. They do not show the effects of a day's labor, or any usefulness, as they are painted. The artist's shoes are "shoes" in the intrinsic value, which they do *not* have precisely *as* things in the corner. In themselves the real shoes on the floor invite no aesthetic attention as a work of art. Besides, the shoes in this painting are not exactly beautiful either.

But van Gogh's "shoes" address us with Scheler's "imperative", based on an enunciation of an "eternal ground". It is in this that the artist becomes, as it were, a little god: he creates from the Ground of Being by telling us what this Ground otherwise does *not* tell us, i.e., outside of "Art".

For this reason, that van Gogh's shoes are enhanced by the painting, the shoes lose "thingness" in favor of the aesthetic value, through which the artist experiences the shoes. It does not matter that the shoes themselves are not beautiful. As the painting shows, art can easily realize negative values with equal perfection.

This leads us to a brief characterization of ontological values, so often confused with thing-values in the utilitarian ethos of our time. Heidegger, too, takes values for attributes of things and, consequently, they have no place in the question of Being. But the primary reason why I inject at this point a brief characterization of value-being from Max Scheler's philosophy is that among most value theories today there is hardly any that shows us the relationship values have to time. Since we approached the origin of the work of art in terms of "duration", its value must be referred to. I believe that in Heidegger's essay on the origin of the work of art the question of value-being remained unsatisfactorily asked, if at all. Maybe he did not get around to penetrating into the value-being of art, as he did not get around to handling the question of ethics in the "Dasein" of "Being and Time" (1927).[8]

To make our point I avail myself of an analogy between colors and values, which Scheler himself furnished. But I expand this analogy in its application. The following would hold for the deter-

mination of the being-of-values as Max Scheler saw it:

1. Just as colors are given to us only in seeing (and sounds only in hearing) so also values are given to us first only in "feeling", i.e., prior to willing and understanding.

2. Just as colors are given only on surfaces of things on which they appear, so also values are given in and on any thing in which values present themselves.

3. Just as gradations of colors (e.g., dark to bright) and colors themselves are independent of the things they color (e.g., the darkness of shoes, the darkness of the night) so also gradations, i.e., ranks of values, and the values themselves, are independent of what they value. Conversely, whatever presents itself in a rank of values is independent of the value in which it presents itself. The value, for instance, of physical comfort is independent of a comfortable chair or shoe. The value of holiness is independent of God, the gods, or a fetish in which it presents itself. The value of beauty may present itself in a painting or in music.

4. Just as there are a few spectral colors in all possible color combinations, so also there are a few spectral values (= essence of value-ranks) in all value combinations. The seat of such spectral values is the "logic of the heart" or *ordo amoris*, as different in essence from the logic of reason (Pascal's distinction).

The above analogy between the being-of-colors and the being-of-values could also be extended to sounds and numbers. The tone "C" may sound either on a piano or in a human voice. The number "2" may appear in two shoes or shovels. Scheler clearly showed all this at the beginning of his elaboration on the being-of-values, stating that their order and emotive preferences are independent of logical judgment and the logic of things. A value is an attribute of a thing only when it is made to be so, for instance, the value shown on a price-tag. To manipulate such "thing-values" is characteristic of our age of stock and international money markets, and "speculation". Speculation may determine levels of commodity values, i.e., of the usefulness of marketable things. But these levels change by the second, when they run off in terms of numbered money-values on a

television screen. Capitalism, Scheler held, is not an economic or political system but an attitude of mind permeating an age. Capitalism and one of its subordinate forms, state socialism, sees any and all entities in terms of marketability and controllability, including human beings. The attitude toward entities is beset, globally, by an emotive disposition toward the entire range of utilitarian values, being one of the lowest of these ranks. To cure this malaise in modern man was the primal objective of Scheler's political and social writings. What we are saying in our context, then, is that neither Beethoven's quartets in a warehouse, nor Hölderlin's poems in a knapsack, nor van Gogh's shoes are sellable because of the value they present. No "values of person", e.g., in Art, are sellable. If they are sold in auctions, for example, there must be a deeply felt emotive confusion concerning the spectrum of values.

One of the criteria for the elevated level of a felt value, however, is time. This pertains *a fortiori* to personal values, to which aesthetic values belong. One "value-rank", or a value, is higher than another given one, when it is "of duration", and lower when it is of sequence and measurability. Duration and indivisibility on the one hand, and sequence and divisibility on the other, lie in the *feeling* of a value and value-rank, just as the spectral colors ranking from blue to red, or shades of colors ranging from dark to bright, are visibly differentiated, no matter what object they color.

The value and worth of van Gogh's "shoes" is a durational value, an indivisible value. For if some one would, for example, enter the van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam at night and cut the painting of the shoes to pieces, the indivisible value of the shoes, as enhanced by art, would be destroyed, whereas the divisible value of the canvas they are "on" could be patched up again. It is lower in value. Restoration of paintings always aims at minimizing the discrepancy between the divisible and indivisible values of a destroyed or deteriorating painting.

Aesthetic values belonging to the highest value-ranks of durational quality form the domain within which the artist builds and creates. The artist's "shoes" are different in essence from the mere shoes on the rack. This is why in a painting, as a spatial art, the "thingness of the "shoes" recedes into the background and disappears.

The art-form of music, however, fundamentally devoid of thingness, does not represent a thingness value but, in essence, represents the temporal nature of Being itself.

I do not maintain that Be-ing in Heidegger's sense is "value" but I do maintain that it is through absolute music that Be-ing manifests itself to us in Art. The harmony spoken of above is nothing but a temporal ingathering of what is "heard out". In this sense audible harmony and the thinking of logos as "gathering" (Heidegger) are the same. This shows that, from a musicological standpoint, both logos and harmony must be the same for the thinker. Heidegger attests to this: "Therefore, being, the logos as gathering and harmony, is not easily accessible, and not accessible to all in the same form" ... "Because being is logos, harmony, *alétheia*, physis, phainestai, it does not show itself at will."[9] The act of thinking is listening to "harmonious ingathering."

With this final sentence we come to the conclusion of our venture. We may also say:

The ingathering of sounds (illustrated in Chopin's *Étude*) brings us nearer the origin of Art. The gathering of sounds into ever new harmonious wholes, intercontained in the harmonic duration of presence, makes us understand one step further the question of the Meaning of Be-ing.

Reference Notes

1. See F.-W. von Herrmann: *Heideggers Philosopie der Kunst*, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann Verlag, 1980, p. XXII.
2. M. Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, Neske, 1965, p. 117.
3. M. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language and Thought*, Harper and Row, 1971 (tr. A. Hofstadter) p. 19.
4. Martin Heidegger, *Heraklit*, Gesamtausgabe Vol. 55, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann Verlag, 1979, p. 70.
5. ibid., p. 228.
6. *Max Scheler, Centennial Essays* (ed. M. Frings), The Hague, 1974, p. 105.
7. ibid., p. 108.
8. I have shown at length the possibility of ethical implications (Scheler) in Heidegger's *Dasein*-problematic, as well as furnished an explanation of thing-values in relation to a work of art in music (Bach) in *Person und Dasein, Zur Frage der Ontologie des Wertseins*, (Phaenomenologica 32), The Hague, 1969.
9. M. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, (tr. R. Manheim), New Haven, 1959, p. 133; 2nd ed. Anchor Books, N.Y., 1961, p. 112.

Variation in music and thought: a critique of factualism

F. JOSEPH SMITH

Chicago

ON ONE THING both music and philosophy agree: the significance of variation as method and as technique. According to Husserl variation leads to the very essence of things and to a possible scientific invariant.[1] The musician will be attracted to phenomenology, presented in this light, and will grasp its importance more immediately perhaps than the typical scientist. Variations give us various facets of reality and eventually allow a thing, whatever it may be, to present itself to us in more and more of its essential being. In music we unfold the potential of a theme in many variations, but we might also begin to conceive of variations that lead to a theme, discoverable at the end of the process, rather than stated at the outset. This thought suggests itself from an examination of Husserl's position concerning "the conditions of knowledge *a priori*", a question we have since Kant first formulated it in modern times. What are the roots of our knowledge? Is there an experiential science that *precedes* any particular science, especially sciences as positivistic? To a musician this would mean that an experiential understanding of sound phenomena comes before any science-of-music, any musicology as *Musik-wissenschaft*. This immediately implies a descriptive methodology applicable to *the musical world as experiential*, as based in fact on pure experience. It is also within the urgent context of overcoming factualism — a current task in musicology — and connotes the need to reduce scientific facts to their "exemplarity" rather than regarding a given fact or blocks of facts as some sort

of absolute. Husserl recommends putting this positivistic bias out of action, so that a scientific fact can become a starting point for free and creative imagination and discovery, aiming at a more convincing and liberated science. Phenomenology allows the scientific researcher to engage in the free play of the imagination (something akin to the original mentality of science as such), even approaching the creative fantasy and "fiction" of music and literature. The key to this is variational procedure, close to the mind of the great composers. The whole science-of-music can thus deal creatively with this primordial fund of experience on its way to the reformulation of its scientific goals, methods, and categories, in the renewed and critical rejoining of percept and concept. Out of facts come only more facts; but out of variational method come creative discovery and a closer approach to the very roots of scientific procedure.

We need only read Virginia Woolf on the meaning of fiction to see that it is not mere fantasy or some "metaphysical adventure" but of the very substance of developed and contexted facts, factual patterns that have emerged when the free play of imagination is engaged.

Classic sciences were the product of a particular turn in the history of ideas, starting with the approach to Nature, not as an experience but as an objective idea. The subjective element in nature was carefully excised, and the physical was left as theme: the "material", as residue of human spirit. Hence, Husserl proposed the recovery of *experienced* Nature and the lifting (*aufheben*) of mere material abstraction. This implies immediately going back to and recouping the prescientific experience that is given humans *before* the process of abstracting subjectivity is engaged. The whole world of objective science, we might say, the material ontology of any given science, is thus held in abeyance. We tap into an undercurrent of pretheoretical experience and thus make a new kind of knowledge possible. Not only the musicological world is setting its sights on this today with a critical revaluation of factualism and everything built institutionally thereon, but music theorists, plagued by the ghosts of two centuries of music-theoretical pedantry, are beginning to search for the same, as current writings bear witness. The time is thus ripe for a contribution from a phenomenology of

music. And although Roman Ingarden is best known for this effort, the groundwork has really been laid by Husserl himself.[2]

Relevant here is also the concept of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*). This has to do with our *experiential world*, human awareness of the very wellsprings of experience as such, with our vital capacity to experience the world of the "senses", to perceive, to think and even to conceptualize.[3] (It is not just our daily life in the fanciful form of a "lived world" or as "existential".) And it is all this within an open-ended perspective and horizon, not a narrow purview or even a world-class scientific method, as great an achievement after Galileo's mathematicizing of nature as that was.[4] *Lebenswelt* is not some secretly induced metaphysical speculation but rather *the clearly and simply experienced and experiential world, given* to our perceptivity or perceptual faculties.

The pre-theoretical world *is there* for us to sight or listen to in its naive originality, in its very concreteness as a source of experience as such, as a field of origin for whatever knowledge, but especially for the sciences.

This perceptivity or original capacity to experience and know is, however, threatened by naturalistic attitudes, the uncritical acceptance of *what is*, including scientific theory as positivistic and factual, along with our "practical" opinions and activities. In music we feel this almost immediately when faced with the state of music theory and of historical musicology, the one the product of uncritical and narrow guild mentalities of the nineteenth century, the other the factualist and positivistic domain of historicists. Progressive music theorists and musicologists are now addressing themselves to this urgent situation, to rescue music as an experience and music education as an introduction to musical experience and experiential knowledge as such. It has become obvious in these fields that a number of experts simply do not know where to go beyond accumulation of facts and inchoate musings. Leadership apparently cannot be looked for in that quarter; it will have to come from younger professionals open to the considerable horizons of a truer music theory and musicology and less hobbled by a narrow purview of the fields or careerist preoccupations and pressures. This is not to say that the philosopher will be summoned to consult

about the patient, nor that we have the solutions. But we do have insights to revive facets of these fields, and especially those working in the fields themselves can speak strategically to colleagues. Neither does it say we have special knowledge or powers, or that we do not accept and hold in considerable esteem the achievements of classic music theory and musicology. All it says is that we are open to questions and that we are working on problems from this perspective. Husserl himself was careful to state his admiration for the accomplishments of traditional sciences. And yet he felt the need to show an alternative and to try working it through. Phenomenology itself is hardly above critique, and recently some phenomenologists have become expert textualists but remained there, not moving on in any really creative way related to the sciences or life in terms of the very experiential world the texts talk about. On the other hand some who have "moved on" betray a superficial knowledge of phenomenology and exploit it journalistically in ways feared by Husserl himself. Yet while these are legitimate concerns that can hardly be ignored, the path into phenomenology is not led by mere Cassandras. Perhaps a demonstration in live music can best show what can be done.[5] Words divide but musical experience is unifying and embodies a real rather than rhetorical invitation into this illuminative philosophy.

But what indeed is this "experiential world" we are talking about, and how does science have anything to do with it? This world of original experience is nothing mysterious or mythical, certainly not mystical, unless anything that departs from a narrow mentalistic purview must be so regarded or perceived. In music we just call it what it is: a musical world anyone can tune in on. All you have to do is listen. That's what people did long before the emergence of theory or musicology. The latter resulted from our need to think and talk about this experience; and so they are concerned with words and concepts as well as experience, sometimes to the detriment of the experience. We are just beginning to deal with that distortion and with the overemphasis on visual symbols, codes, and historical frameworks borrowed from factualist and positivist sciences. The talent and sincerity involved bespeak hope for startling results after this long period of being dormant. The musical

phenomenologist would now want to examine any emergent new words or concepts to make sure that they come from experience and stay with it, even as they explain and analyze it. True science is built, verbally and conceptually, on *the original field of experience*, and its basic make-up and structure are shaped by the experience, in this case, of *music itself*. The experiential world is the final substratum of any thinking about music (or anything else); and ideational structures that grow out of this world are bound back on experience as such. Thus theory is built on the pre-theoretical world, and history on the live facts of musical experience, given in whatever shape or manner.

The experiential world becomes a living stream of interconnected experiences in our daily wakened existence (*waches Leben*) — something Joyce captured in his stream-of-consciousness writing, something thus well known to students of English literature — and is complicated by the mixture of illusion and reality along with the struggle for or despair of ever attaining *a harmonizing unity* of experiential conciousness. It is the disjointedness or contrasts of our mixed experiences that distress us and produce stress in daily living and in scientific search. These various facets of conscious experience seem unifiable in fact only in *a viable variation technique*, whether in psychology, philosophy, or music! As musicians we have been able to handle disjunct modalities creatively. We may have the key to eventual unity of consciousness and of science, more convincingly than intellectualizers. Musicians know how to handle not only the continuum of musical experience and its history but also its obvious discontinuities and fragmentation. When musical writers address themselves to theory and musicology within this stance, the essays and books ensuing therefrom contribute to scientific progress.

Husserl aimed at a universally valid science but guaranteed the viability of individual sciences which made thematic the concrete and individual shapes of experiential phenomena and "objects". *Music as such* thus becomes the "theme" of any music theory or musicology, but the concrete thematics of music are ultimately bound back on the original world of experience as such, that is there before any theory or science. The network and flow of

experiential relationships build a horizon best seen in creative works of fantasy that illustrate the possibilities inherent in the original field of experiential phenomona. Experience itself must also yield to the open-endedness of an "empty horizon" (*Leerhorizont*), and present experience of whatever sort leads to a manifold of emerging experiences. I think this is best heard in a good set of variations, whether improvised, or taken from standard literature (Beethoven, Schumann, Rachmaninoff et al.). Whatever the case may be, the point is that *a primary experiential science* precedes any individual sciences, and this science is rooted in the original field of awareness, in the *Lebenswelt*.

As odd as it must sound to factualists, phenomenology calls for liberation from facts, in order that we can be open to the original experiential world. In addition to Husserl's "Out of facts come only more facts" we now have his "Let go of facts".[6] This is not the height of irresponsibility but rather freeing the fact itself from being an absolute to becoming an *exemplar* or instance of the truth it points to. In "pure fantasy" every "hard fact" becomes "a fiction" in the sense that besides the one thing a given fact may represent, it is not limited to that but can be developed further; and other possibilities can now be admitted, other clues followed. One thus plays creatively with facts; one can vary them. And *in these variations* we get at the original experiential phenomena closed to us when a given fact or set of facts are regarded as absolute. I believe any composer understands that immediately. It would take a little more explanation to convince the musicologist that developed and varied facts are what create a pattern leading to discovery in the field of history or theory.

But let us address ourselves to the current musicological question concerning factualism. In any living discipline facts are not inert but alive, one might say pregnant with insightful clues. Facts, when used imaginatively, as in all great fiction, hint at, give clues to, are indices of and lead to larger circumstantial and conceptual patterns of evidence. Evidence is made up of a whole range or spectrum of investigatory intents, from facts through patterns that emerge in the process of research and thought about facts we have unearthed. Evidence is thus a *process* that begins with but is not at all limited to

the first stage of digging up facts or artifacts. Often circumstantial evidence even leads back to further factual finds! It is a matter of discoverable *scientific process and method.* No working scientist stays with first facts — in whatever shape they may be, often fragmentary and disconnected. In a creative science the evidentiary process is in fact everything. To avoid "metaphysical adventures", a process of conceptual reduction is provided in phenomenology. The evidentiary process of this kind of science implies *a strategic trajectory of discovery* and exposure. Curiously, much of classic musicology, to which this writer has also contributed a good deal, remains at the early stages of this process, avoiding a challenge that could potentially lay bare a whole musical world and fundamental experience of it, get at the very essence of music and its purpose in culture, its place in the lives of people, and its role in societal dynamics, including meaningful change. Putting a factualist cap on musical (or any other) research is like trying to plug a volcano!

As to music's role in society, I am impressed by Hans Lenneberg's essay, "Speculating about Sociology and Social History", following leads by the Annalistes. Lenneberg calls for "informed theorizing" and writes that even Adorno recognized empirical studies as "essential to the ideal formation of theories."[7] Thus, social history is not marginal or inferior to criticism but rather "can ask questions of interest to music historians, even if they have no sociological theories." Musicology cannot afford to lose contact with its aesthetical and critical core, Joseph Kerman writes, but must deal with *music itself*.[8] Lenneberg feels that people working with "facts" are already doing that without any formal flights into aesthetics or criticism. This strikes one as not unlike Husserl's "zurück zu den Sachen selbst", back to *things as such*, delivered of any oppressive overlay of theory and opening out onto an imaginative new conceptuality.

Factualism can be oppressive. The first pages of Charles Dickens' *Hard Times* carries what is perhaps the best description of factualism in literature. In the stage play the body language of the actor also indicates the arrogance and oppressiveness of teaching "only the facts . . . no fancies!". The whole intent is to keep the students from thinking, especially about the oppressiveness of their social

situation. In our musical fields, it is oppressive if one school of thought, the positivist or factualist, would dictate publication or promotion. Luckily, the situation has begun to open up, and the times are running against positivism, as witness the articles and books dealing with it in musicology today. The whole point is to build further, not in aesthetic pink clouds or fuzzy wool-gathering but in a scientific evidentiary method that will move our research through further stages of discovery and plausible conclusions.

Margaret Bent has pointed out, however, that the positivist is often no more than a convenient whipping boy and a foil for the critical philosopher. Music critics, for example, often make surreptitious use of the results of careful ("factual") musical research to build their critico-aesthetic edifices, all the while accusing musicology of narrowness![9] And, of course, musical researchers have produced and worked with *critical* texts, scores, editions and historical data, without really having been held hostage to a particular brand of historical positivism.

With regard to the need for musical *concreteness* within the field of musicology, even that concept is already ahead of mere fact-gathering. It connotes a concretion of facts and hypotheses suggested by blocks-of-facts and by the primary stratum of experiential data. From concreteness arise conceptual patterns that are grounded in *developed facts*, usefully elaborated in the evidentiary process generated by tapping into the original experiential field of musical consciousness, and now ready for further imaginative work — with plausible results.

Of course, we usually do not proceed in mere intellectual fashion when dealing imaginatively with fact and "fiction". The process of "building on facts" is itself beset by myths, as though there were indeed a "series of logical steps" from facts to developed hypotheses to "scientific results". Perhaps the model of the photographer developing a film is more apropos and provides some limited help in setting our sights on the process itself. In this model traces and initially unidentifiable fragments or even splotches (*Gestalten*?) appear as the film is being "processed". Most of us already proceed this way in our discovery work, beginning with often fragmentary facts, with incipient parts of emerging patterns, rather than build-

ing logically from one "solid" fact to the next in some sort of "scientific" manner, or in accord with some purported "logic". There is really little formal logic in detective work, especially in music; rather, there are a lot of loose pieces and fragments of facts to work with. Thus to discover anything one has to cast the "net of speculation" farther and at some risk, rather than keep it overcautiously reined in.[10] We work mostly not with solid facts but with pieces of a puzzle. This is often so also in our ordinary perception of "objects", especially in art, where there is conscious use of the play of lights and shadows. This is pre-eminently true of a phenomenon as elusive as musical experience, and as fragmentary as much of music history. To succeed we need to combine perceptivity with inchoate cognition and traces of emerging facts with patterns of facts pressed into the service of their *innate fictiveness*, their potential for creative *variation.* It is in fact through the sustained process of variation that we can arrive at whatever *invariant.*[11]

Getting back to "the things themselves" ("zurück zu den Sachen selbst") connotes freeing facts from their ideological and ideational rigidity, where they are *objects* carved in stone, so that their original essentiality can be glimpsed. "Let colors change into other colors, and rest yield to movement . . .",[12] and we might add: let musical sounds change shape, harmonically, rhythmically, and in terms of content and form in free variation to the point of creative arbitrariness ("in freier Willkur").[13] While this is the attitude of composer rather than historian or theorist, a good deal of it ought to rub off on the musicologist, to say the least, if he/she is going to speak to the musical experience and to those who produce it, comment on it and analyze it in terms of the originative phenomenon as such. Husserl traces the path this "fiction-creating arbitrariness " ("fingierende Willkür") takes in our sighting of the primary basis of the sciences, the experiential grounds and consciousness that yield insight into this essential *a priori.* We are used to this procedure in literature, and in music we do not flinch at fantasy as opposed to some sort of musical "reality". Imaginative fantasy is at the very core of literary and musical achievement. It is unusual, however, to postulate this for something as staid as classic objective science. Yet "objectivity" can be viewed as more fluid and, in fact, as based on

human subjectivity, on a given stance, on a subjective mindset vis-à-vis "reality", especially that of "objects". In art we do not object to imaginative fantasy in any given artistic object; in fact we expect it to be the accomplishment of creative subjectivity, and the term, *objet d'art*, is never understood as object in the ordinary sense used in the "exact sciences". Husserl traces how this mindset originated in Galileo and Descartes, and invites the philosopher and scientist to participate in overcoming the mentalistic dualism between subjectivity and objectivity."[14] A word to the wise musicologist is also in place in this regard!

For Husserl, in fact, *variation* is the decisive step in the liberation of facts that leads further toward *Essence as the Invariant.*[15] Musicians have know this throughout music history, but especially since Beethoven. Without our having theorized that much about it, variation has been musical practice, has been the "basic principle of shaping sounds among all peoples and at all times".[16] It is the source of countless musical formations and of form as such, bespeaking in practice the philosopher's cherished "manifold within unity" (Kant). And among the musical variables, there has ever been a *constant*, whether it be melodic, harmonic, or rhythmic. Music theorists could fruitfully concentrate on a reinterpretation of this essential phenomenon, one that in fact may well reveal the "essence" of music, rather than be so totally involved and even entangled in the heritage of the nineteenth century and its pseudo-Rameauesque rationalistic basis, itself based on Descartes's dualistic philosophy — the whole thing held together by pedagogical and guild codes and symbols.[17] Music theory in particular has to break out of schoolmaster mindsets and learn to think in terms of tapping into musical experience instead of drawing on a system of symbols, mostly visual, that has been put between the experience of and knowledge about music. This underlay (*Unterschiebung*) has to be thematized and reduced to make this possible.

For Husserl variational method denotes the process of free fantasy and fiction that through successive variations introduces a manifold that is nevertheless throughout the process a viable unity because of *the underlying invariable form*, that of the "essence" itself. The various samplings of this primordial essence demonstrate

facets of it, in this case, to the musical listener. This Essence is what Husserl calls throughout his philosophy the *Eidos*. Whether we choose to retain such a word as representative of the process involved, it certainly has to be mentioned as part of Husserl's thinking on this fascinating matter. As a musician, I myself would prefer Aristoxenos' word, *Tonos*, so as to set the discussion in better historical and musical perspective, though the word *Echos* might be as musically appealing. With *Eidos* one is immediately captive of the classic tradition of visualizing everything, here even sound. While Husserl does not intend this, and the process of reduction is meant to circumvent it, the word itself still spells the domination of the visual over sound to a sensitive musician.

In fact Husserl immediately exemplifies the process with reference to musical tonality, specifically to *the varying of musical tones*, thus corroborating the inclination of the musical philosopher and music theorist. In looking at, or rather listening to any given musical tone, whether in reality or in fantasy, or in listening to a second tone in addition to it, we realize that we are hearing musical tonality common to both tones, whether real or imagined. The single tones are examples of *tone as such*, of the *Eidos*: tone. Any "reality" of tonal production is seen and heard as the incarnation of a particular possibility, thus a creation of fantasy, not a "fact". There can be any number of different or varied tonalities or tonal and other systems in the world, as comparative musicology and ethnomusicology clearly have demonstrated. Musical sound is not just that of our particular culture but what obtains "once and for all and for everyone", so that every objective science thus comes to rest in the commonality of human experience and not in a given mindset, thus in the *Lebenswelt* where experience of whatever sort originates.[18] This applies also to language, but in a more complex way, since there is no universal language the way there is a universally experienceable music. Husserl envisions a pure "fantasy" world of variable possibilities, of which factual realities are but materialized instances. This is a world that Mozart could comprehend and in which he lived musically. It is a world that Leonardo da Vinci and Albert Einstein could welcome, but not one that merely positivist sciences since the nineteenth century could even begin to compre-

hend. It ought to be comprehensible to a working musicologist as musician, and to a musicology that is processual and progressive.

There is a distinction to be drawn between *variation and alteration (Veränderung)*. A color or sound can indeed be altered, but this is a phenomenon within the factual world of reality not of the creative fantasy world. By contrast variation is what takes place within the realm of pure possibility and of free choice and pleasure, not what may be dictated by a mindset in a scientific experiment, where factors must be altered to obtain a result. Again, this is easy to comprehend in musical composition, in which variation is "arbitrary" and free, even in terms of "rules". That which remains "constant" in a scientific experiment with variables is not the same as the *Invariant* within a set of musical variations. The former is tied to the mindset of a given mental world; the latter is free to phantasize possibilities far beyond a controlled experiment and does not anticipate "exact" results, since it is not at work within any objective system. It is the work of "pure subjectivity", even as it works within a given cultural world — which in music it constantly seeks to change, rather than produce factual conclusions. One sees immediately what must be done to expand the tasks of current musicology! It is simply not an exact science and should not so comport itself. The musical materials it works with are too fluid for that. Our mindset must be accordingly! The goals are much broader, more colorful and intense, than just producing conclusions built on a system that is narrowed down to posited facts and no more. The origin and intent of music as a human and humane phenomenon and "spiritual" experience leads to such things, it is true; but that is not the be-all and end-all of musical research or of musical thought and fantasy. Through music *consciousness is altered* and we enter a liberated world that, while still a part of our "real" and social milieu, is a realm of the free play of imagination (Kant), not just of facts and blocks of posited facts. Positivism is played out; other games beckon.

Elsewhere I have mentioned that the absolute essence of anything is in itself inaccessible to us through experience, and that it is in fact only a projected ideal, even for Husserl.[19] Within the context of variational process Husserl himself writes that, to

demand that one achieve all possible variations, that one make them all "real", is foolish. Rather, variation as a process unfolds "arbitrarily", and we attain only facets of Essence. I'm not sure that Husserl ever intended to hint that in the process of "eidetic reduction" of whatever phenomenal materials we immediately tap into essence as such. In music the great composers were satisfied with a quite finite number of variations of a musical theme, even as they also expressed movement in infinite manner under the title of "Perpetual Movement". Theoretically, of course, variations on a *raga*, a theme, or a motive, could go on indefinitely. There could be such a thing as a variation marathon, but even that would eventually come to an end without one's having ever exhausted all the possibilities or having achieved ultimate contact with musical essence or being. Similarly, there could be as many theories of music history or of music theory as there are cultures and as there are thinking persons within each culture. Mercifully, we are limited to a number of convincing major theories in the history of music. Musicology — to catch up with other branches of history and philosophies of history — needs to break creatively with what appears to be the one theory of history it has found viable: factualism or positivism. This may well be the task and project of the younger generation of musicologists and music theorists willing to risk a number of things, in order to arrive at a whole new conception of the goals of musicology as such.

Through variational process one can also struggle to achieve a more *originative ideational framework* than that given us in classic categorical and species mindsets. We need to do this to avoid describing experiential data in old mentalistic categories and thus pre-empting them. In other words, our ideas and word usage must also be overhauled. In music we speak freely of "tonality", but this is a general category that presupposes we have methodically parsed out all possible tone complexes in variational manner that yields such generalities. In reality we use such general terms without really having gone through this process except in practical and intuitive manner. Phenomenology envisions a scientific process in which this is done, an ideational variation method that yields not only originative experiential data but a new ideational scheme more closely

tied to experiential phenomena. Music theory should be busy doing this kind of work, not just playing with traditional visual symbols and formulae.

The difference between the traditional scientist and the philosopher who tries to break through the classic scientific mold is that between the specialist and the critic. In musicology it gives a wider significance to music criticism: *musicological critique*. Husserl writes of the worthwhile practical attitudes and intellectual tools of the classic researcher and the goals of the philosopher, in this case the phenomenologist.[20] The specialist develops a technical understanding of his craft or trade without necessarily getting at its inner workings. He develops a technical rationality without philosophical dimensions. This can, of course, produce considerable results, satisfaction and career enhancement, to say the least. The technician's goal is practical mastery of realities. But through this activity the world is not made any more understandable to us, rather it has become more useful. Following Friederich Chrysander, musicology ought to choose to co-opt this critique and become self-critical to its own best advantage. What we need is the thinking specialist capable of getting beyond the bare facts and tools of his trade: beyond the aborted theory of the guildmaster.

What we look for in any variation is the thread of *unity* permeating all the changes taking place. It is *passive synthesis* that guarantees this unity according to Husserl.[21] We deal here with *perception*, not just being, in this case with musical tonality for the listener, not just for the analyst[22] and for an expanded notion of history as such, *history as a stage of (musical) consciousness*.[23] "Passive synthesis" connotes the resolution of the classic paradox created by passivity and activity. Aaron Copland refers to the "creative listener"; and every performer, whether musician or actor, knows that feedback from the audience not only encourages but abets and sustains the performance. But here we deal with the perception of sound on the part of an individual hearer, as part of the human community. There is a dovetailing of receptivity and activity on the part of the hearer, a give-and-take based on structures of perception that defy traditional dualistic terminologies. What is "passive" is in reality "receptive"; and any "active" synthesizing of experience is based

thereon. A thing happens to me, whatever it is, and is constituted in my subjectivity as a unified and structured "happening". Modern languages lack the middle or deponent modes of classic languages which emphasize *the subject acting for itself.* It is this self-constituting process of the (listening) subject that guarantees the unity of consciousness amid the multiplicity of perceived sounds or polythematic intentionality.

Through variation method it is possible to escape the tendency to make facts absolute, and through imaginative and fictive procedure to regard a fact simply as one instance or exemplar of reality, and that in terms of a mindset that needs examination. One is then free to explore further possibilities inherent in facts and to recoup the *a priori* potential as such. Writers and musicians already know this! The theme is but one exemplar or sampling of what could be. Its variant forms and variations show what can be done with it. One's whole world is thus opened us and enormously expanded. But what is the *Invariable* aimed at in phenomenology beyond just showing imaginative differences and demonstrating freedom to play with other possibilities, to imagine other worlds? It is possible to do more than just vary a given theme; one could aim at the emergence of a theme, unknown at the start. It is a matter of the heightened level of *variation consciousness*, and the result could be more than just a set of variations! For Husserl there emerged the possibility of an Invariant, not as a new metaphysical entity but as invariable Essence emerging from the process described. Whether this can actually be attained, and whether Husserl's philosophy is up to the demands he puts on it, is another matter. Moreover, he never really describes the Invariant sufficiently well for us to avoid making it an unwelcome metaphysical absolute. What he intended could never be more than a finite and limited grasp of what is essential in things. A musician tends to be more practical than the philosopher. Thus in Bach's *Passacaglia and Fugue* there is a good deal more than must a series of variations of the bass figure. There is rather an exciting build-up and climax. Bach shows, as it were, one finite but magnificent possibility as a musical actuality, as one exemplar of an "essence" that in itself can never be fully expressed. The world for that matter is mostly variants and variations — whether it be plant

or animal species, or human languages — to the point where this, and not idealized generalities, seems normative.

One does not really need to become a special kind of philosopher to use facts imaginatively and creatively in the manner of a fiction writer. Scientists themselves have amply demonstrated this. The facts themselves hint at further facts and blocks of facts, at horizons these facts point to in their being also indices of further developments. Musical facts should be allowed to lead whither they will. In the process our theories and categories will emerge, if it is a creative and thorough effort; and going theories will be tested and adjusted — or even discarded. This, it seems to me, is the very nature of the liberated human mind, however expressed in a philosophy. Eventually, on the way to where facts as indices of larger phenomena may lead, temporary theoretical frames and sets will suggest themselves and even be borrowed from the other arts and language itself. Larger conceptual frameworks should also emerge as par for the course. This happened with Alfred Schutz's and Roman Ingarden's phenomenology of music.[24]

Our trouble in musicology today is that it has become an overcultivated plot of land. Too frequently minutiae and trivia are all that remain for the traditional scholar. A whole new perspective is called for, that will open up a whole range of major themes to research and write about.

This may be all well and good, and I understand what Husserl was doing in aiming at a more basic knowledge and at a science founded on primordial experience of the life-world. His effort was intended to get us out from under the incrustrations of metaphysical and positivistic overlays that inhibit growth and further development. But there is the risk that we are being led back into a substream of naive and prescientific experience that might *also* be an area of darkness, of myth and magic incantation, of superstitious ignorance and religious mystification, back into all the things philosophy as "liberating knowledge" (Aristotle) brought us out of, however imperfectly. Despite disclaimers and reassurances does Husserl not lead us back into a limbo of dismantlement and a prescientific utopia no less scary for all his idealistic intentions, a pre-technological world from which we emerged to considerable

advantage in major areas of practical life? And all of this under the guise of attaining the "primordial". He makes an enormous claim for the experiential substratum of the life-world as the source and wellspring of pristine experience, like some fountain of youth, some magic elixir now expressed in the confident language of academia, drawing for concepts and words on the greats of history, giving them renewed meaning. But I think he has not really worked it out adequately, in deed rather than just in proclamatory word or idealizing concept. The vital substratum of experience is unduly romanticized. It could be a source of other things, too! It could entail reversion to subcortical elements of primitivity, and, like Hieronymus Bosch, one could conjure up more than primordial phenomena. One could risk regression even to subhuman behavior, something Husserl hardly envisioned or intended. But the proper mix of cortical and subcortical *in man* is not made clear at all, nor are the uneven contributions of classic thought and culture parsed out adequately or at all.

So, we end up with his conceptual postulates and verbal projections, his philosophical program spun out *in infinitum*, but not necessarily with a carefully elaborated theory of the life-world. Nor was he at all aware of the dangers of dismantling thought-structures and human behavior based on them, to say nothing of cultural and other values. One of the things regular science does — for all its flaws — is to work carefully through the many steps of research and analysis. Husserl himself recommended working out (*ausarbeiten*) phenomenological analyses. But he seemed to have restricted himself to the method as such rather than detailed samplings of reduceable "reality". For all its flawed philosophical positions classic science has established a systematic discipline. I really do not see Husserl's having done this convincingly, at least for the working scientist. Maybe this is where the good services of his students weigh in! No one can appeal to the special sciences with postulatory concepts and programmatic verbologies. He badly needed to have worked with scientists in a specific field, as Brentano himself had recommended, in order to wed concept with going sciences and work *with them* out from under discoverably flawed processes and conceptualities.[25]

I understand the tribal vocabularies of phenomenology. But to someone in the act of experiencing anything, here music, it all seems ill adapted to express the very thing it pointed to: experience as such. As we cross into this new "subjective" territory, it seems to me that language itself comes into question, especially in its Husserlian form. Both the philosophy and the vocabulary cannot be but provisional approaches to the realm of "pure experience". This is all verbal baggage that has to be left at customs, as one enters — for all practical purposes — naked and speechless into *experience as such*: into music, art, dance, and poetry. But also into a renewed scientific venture.

Notes

1. Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, Husserliana IX, The Hague 1962, no. 9, p. 72ff, cf, especially a) "Die Variation als der entscheidende Schritt der Loslösung vom Faktischen durch die Phantasie — das Eidos als das Invariable"
2. F.J. Smith, *The Experiencing of Musical Sound*, New York 1979, p. 91 ff., "Musical Sound, a Model for Husserlian Time-Consciousness"
3. Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften*, H VI, 1962, pass.
4. *ibid.*, no. 9, p. 20ff. "Galileis Mathematisierung der Natur"
5. This "demonstration" was given within the framework of a seminar on musical sound at Wilfred Laurier University, Canada, June 7, 1988 with the presentation on keyboard of the writer's "Three Sets of Variations".
6. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen* I, H III, 1950, p. 23 "Lassen wir dieses Faktum fallen."
7. Hans Lenneberg, "Speculating about Sociology and Social History" in *The Journal of Musicology*, vol. 6, 1988, pp. 409–420.
8. Joseph Kerman, *Contemplating Music, Challenges to Musicology*, Cambridge 1985, p.19.
9. Margaret Bent, "Fact and Value in Contemporary Scholarship," in *Musical Times*, 127, 1986, pp. 85–89.
10. I have my colleague, Professor James M. Borders, of the University of Michigan to thank for this phrase, traceable to Wiley Hitchcock, School of Music.
11. Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, p. 323
12. *ibid.*, p. 72
13. *ibid.*
14. Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften*, pass.
15. Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, p. 20ff.
16. Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, "Variation" in *Riemann Musik Lexikon*, II, p. 1015
17. F.J. Smith "Traditional Harmony: a Radical Question," in *The Music Review*, vol. 35, 1974, pp. 63–75.
18. Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaischem Wissenschaften*, pp. 72, 142.
19. Lester Embree, ed., *Essays in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch*, Washington DC, 1983.

Cf. "Sight or Sound: Primacy or Synaesthesis?" pp. 312–313.

20. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen* III, H V, 1952, p. 95
21. Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthese*, H XI, 1952, p. 314; and *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, p. 98
22. Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthese*, pp. 16, 105, 127, 202.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 219
24. Alfred Schutz, ed. F. Kersten, "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music" in F.J. Smith, ed., *In Search of Musical Method*, New York, 1976, pp. 5-72.
    Roman Ingarden, *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst*, Tübingen 1962; *The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity*, transl. A. Czerniawski, ed. J.G. Harrell, Berkeley, 1986; rev. in *The Journal of Musicological Research*, 7/4, 1988, p. 401ff.
25. *Proceedings of the Husserl Circle*, ed. José Huertas-Jourda, Waterloo 1988, F.J. Smith, *Sketchbook 33*/254, p. 39

NB. Musicologists should also bear in mind that already in the '20's Einstein held "facts" to be quite relative; and Heisenberg wrote that facts are but momentary perception of the possible! This has all been common scientific knowledge for decades!

INDEX

Understanding The Musical Experience

F. Joseph Smith, Editor

Volume 8 in the Musicology book series

An increasing number of musicians and philosophers are dealing with musical phenomena from the basis of phenomenology. The essays contained in *Understanding the Musical Experience* are written by scholars, working within the framework of twentieth century philosophy and music. Contributions cover current topics of interest and concern to thinking musicians, musical theorists and educators, and musicologists coping with the overcoming of musical positivism and factualism. Entries include an introduction to phenomenology, its methodology, and its possible application to musical thought and analysis; a discussion of Alfred Schutz's phenomenology of music which broadens the scope of musical and philosophical methodology; an examination of Hanslick and Langer's position on feeling and musical expression; an ontological perspective of the musical composition as a work of art; and, musical positivism and factualism from an examination of what transpires in musical variation, as an essential part of compositional technique and philosophical method. These essays and the others contained in this volume serve the musical and philosophical worlds by bringing together members of both in a common effort to bridge the disciplines in order to better understand the musical experience.

Also of Interest

THE EXPERIENCING OF MUSICAL SOUND
Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music
by F. Joseph Smith

MUSIC, FILM AND ART
by Haig Khatchadourian

MUSIC AND PSYCHOLOGY: A Mutual Regard
Stephen McAdams, Editor

MUSIC FROM THE MIDDLE AGES THROUGH THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Essays in Honor of Gwynn S. McPeek
Carmelo P. Comberiati and *Matthew C. Steel,* Editors

WITNESSES AND SCHOLARS
Studies in Musicological Biography
by Hans Lenneberg

JOURNAL OF MUSICOLOGICAL RESEARCH
F. Joseph Smith, Editor



Gordon and Breach
New York / Philadelphia / London / Paris / Montreux / Tokyo / Melbourne

ISBN: 2-88124-204-9
ISSN: 0275-5866