
The Subject of Art in Process

Undressing the Emperor's Nude Close

Stanley Horner



Towards a MetaModern Art and ArtEducation

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
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Stanley Horner



Analogos ReTouchStone Press
In cooperation with
Trafford Press
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada

ART RESOURCE CENTRE

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"The bronze replica of the original Romulus and Remus sculpture at the Pallazio Del Conservatori in Rome, Italy, was presented to Rome, Georgia on July 30, 1929. Placed on a base of white marble from Tate, Ga., the replica was accompanied by a brass plaque that says: "This statue of the Capitolene Wolf, as a forecast of prosperity and glory, has been sent from Ancient Rome to New Rome during the consulship of Benito Mussolini in the year 1929. The story of why Rome was given the replica began in 1928, when the American Cotillion Company decided to build a rayon plant in Rome."

"Because the company was a joint American-Italian undertaking, Italian premier Benito Mussolini sent a block of marble from the ancient Roman Forum inscribed with "From Old Rome to New Rome" to be used as the cornerstone of the new rayon plant. Rome's American Cotillion facility opened in April 1929. Three months later, the Romulus and Remus replica statue was presented to the city, which erected it in front of the city hall. In 1940, reacting to Mussolini's alliance with Hitler, the Rome city commission removed the statue and replaced it with an American flag. In 1952, the statue was restored to its former location."

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Acknowledgements

This text is dedicated to
all those who so generously nurtured its underground ideas
over the years
and to those who sustain their continuity in days yet to come.

<ufi*...I am indet'd too oll thoze stu.dents hoo pickd up th mo.mentum uv theze ideeaz and ran along with' me; too thoze colleag'z hoo sustaind with' me a poi'ny'nt di.alog, espesh'lee my teach'rz, <Douglas Burns Clarke, Ghitta Caiserman Roth, Leah Sherman, Alfred Pinsky, Josef Albers, Stanley Hayter, Robert Marx, Arthur Kroker>; too th valuez passd on by my payrents and passed on again in new formaysh'n too my children; too thoze hoo in th past lent an int'm't ear and voisse, <Kathy, Alanna, Sylvie>; too thoze hoo off'rd import'nt s'pport, <Norman Watanabe, Ron Firek>, my bruthrz and thayr famleez; too the infin'tee uv awth'rzs hooz ideeaz hav informd mine, sum uv hoom ar list'd in th bibleeogr'fee; too my children Kyle and MaraDora, the best of teachers, and too Colleen Woods, my wife and compaytree't in th levelz and lay'rz uv life and luv (not th least uv which lyz in disco.rse). Too oll theze and a mult'tued uv uthrz cot in th stray passingz uv a lifetime uv wond'ringz wund'ringz, I wish too express my unlim't'd grat'tude!>

*ufi, <Uze'r Frendlee Inglish>, a text form that notates speech sounds, is outlined in the Appendix.


Stanley Horner
at Souliterra
the earth-sheltered, solar, studio house near Ottawa
May, 1999

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The Subject of Art in Process: bottom-up layered schema (AnalogosMacroParadigm: I-II-III-IIII)		

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The *Analogos* paradigm and syntagm are used throughout this text. The syntagm presents a *visual mapping* of the 'spatial' interactions between different basicSubjects (A-B-C-D), between different microSubSubjects (1 to 8) or different macroSuperSubjects (I-II-III-IIII) and/or between any of these. The paradigm presents variable *concepts* that can be input into these stable, constant syntagms, that is, either into the interactive triangles (above) or into the interactive, layers (on the opposite page); of the two, the bottom-up layerings are considered throughout this text as more *paradigmatic* (they accept more *content*/conceptual information than the triangles can) and the triangles are considered as more *syntagmatic* (they can show the interactive *structure* better than the layered schema can).

On some future morning the sun will rise and there may be no human eyes to bear witness to it. Rising there on the horizon as it has always done, but now lighting a barren and burnt landscape of broken, twisted forms, the sun in that day will have changed. Rising on a void, it will have lost its splendor and in time it will die. And this death will slowly spread over the face of everything on earth, including earth itself. Perhaps this death will even reach the heavens. The silence then will be most complete and perhaps forever, and when night comes the stars themselves may cease to shine when there are no longer any inquisitive eyes to look at them and to praise their glory. (Romanyshyn, p. 3, 1989)

Inner Worlds
What lies behind you and what lies before you are tiny matters
compared to what lies within....
Ralph Waldo Emmerson

Outer Worlds
Everyone has the power for greatness, not for fame, but greatness,
because greatness is determined by service.
Martin Luther King

Transitional Worlds
When people show you who they are,
believe them.
Maya Angelou

Autonomous Worlds
The key is to keep company with people who uplift you,
whose presence calls forth your best.
Epictetus

Discontinuity
Every image of the past that is not recognized by the present
as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.
Walter Benjamin

Continuity
A storm is blowing from Paradise;
it has got caught in the angels wings with such violence
that he can no longer close them.
The storm irresistibly propels him into the future
to which his back is turned,
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward.
This storm is what we call progress.
Walter Benjamin

disContinuity
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying
and the new connot be born;
in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears.
Antonio Gramsci

DeContinuity
There are at least two kinds of games.
One could be called finite,the other infinite.
A fininte game is played for the purpose of winning,
an infinite game for the purpose of continuing the play
James P. Carse

Preface

The Subject of Art in Process not only sets out to construct a new visual-based paradigm, one that attempts to address the vast array of complexities facing today's artists, but perhaps, more importantly, it opens the door to a possible Renewed Art Education. Territorial specialists of Modernism are more and more being joined by Border-crossing multi-practitioners of MetaModernism. Whereas DBAE (Discipline Based Art Education) endorsed the Modernist preoccupation with discrete domains of knowledge and a top-down hierarchy that focused more on the 'subject matter' than on the 'subject agent', the Analogos proposes an intra/interactive, interdisciplinary option for the opening of the new Millennium. IIAE (InterActive InterDisciplinary Art Education) is grounded in the practice of inner image/outer image fluency of individual subjects engaged as members in a community of voices and as activators, inter-activators and retro-activators, and, in particular, selfTeachers (intra-activators), in a community of voices that share interDisciplinary knowledge.

The Subject of Art in Process introduces the *Analogos paradigm* and *syntagm* into the public domain for the first time. It is a construct designed to assist (especially sensory–based) multi-practitioners in the process of lucid and layered thinking; hopefully, it can facilitate users to better understanding the complexities of event-processes. While semiotics generally ignores the 'subject', the Analogos foregrounds it as basic to all intra-active and interactive dialogue. While structuralism generally ignores the diachronic (temporal process), the Analogos foregrounds it and integrates it into the problematic of the synchronic, the domain of timeless stasis, still images.

The text also introduces into the public domain, if ever so slightly, the use of UFI (Uze'r Frendlee Inglish), a new notation system that is capable of carrying aspects of the vocal sounds of the speaker along with the meanings already possible when writing standard English. UFI introduces only two rules that are completely new: a dot after a vowel identifies it as a long vowel sound (a-e-i-o-u as spoken when saying the alphabet); a slur or short-short vowel (written as an apostrophe, inside a word) is pronounce like the 'oo' in the word 'good' (in Canada). All the other basic 'roolz' are 'natural' to readers and writers of English; these are included in the Appendix—written in UFI.

Both inventions carry the seeds of innovation, and, as such, will no doubt face resistance. The Analogos is offered as an open proposal and interested readers are invited to join in a dialogue to further explore its potential; UFI is used herein only in a few more or less poetic, metaphoric instances—where it can add a read-aloud sound aura; the new look of words can also add multi-layers of meaning. Advocates of UFI and/or the Analogos will find both fully developed in my *Sincro.Nis'tee:Reaching <I Ching>* (2000), a presentation of 64 original verses and works of art set in parallel status with the 64 sites of the I Ching. A manuel for UFI is in preparation. The second edition is updated to Adobe PageMaker and includes minor clarifications.

Stanley Horner,
Victoria, British Columbia

Professor Emeritus
Faculty of Fine Arts
Concordia University
Canada
2000

"Once art began its relentless advance into traditionalessness, every new style served as a new beginning, a new plunge ahead. Beliefs had to be continualy changed, always in favor of newer and better ones, which would only be rejected in return...The impulse to experiment continuously is profoundly different from the goal of tradition, which implies a conservative attitude and considers the past as a model, or guiding example. But what the early modernists failed to forsee, in their dedication to the new, was that such a concept of history could only be built on sand...Maximizing the variable of change, stimulating it artificially and making it the most important thing on the stage, destroyed stability...modernist 'progress'...is radically at odds with systemic wisdom and equilibrium...."

"But the paradox of freedom...is that it is very difficult for the individual to preserve his identity in a society where traditional institutions and values offer no support. Liberation and alientation turn out to be inextricibly connected....Our art seems, in the last few years, to be leaving its experimental period behind. There has been so much varied activity over the past half-century that most prejudiced have now been destroyed. The old and the new intermingle; and it has become clear that imitation and invention are not, in themselves, either good or bad.In our present state of freedom, there is no recognized means of prescribing or forbidding anything to anyone.We can now see, however, that rebellion and freedom are not enough: modernism has moved us too far in the directiion of radical subjectivity and destructive relativitism.

Suzi Gablik, *Has Modernism Failed?,* Thames and Hudson, 1984

" (A)...widespread crisis of artistic authorship (has) swept the cultural institutions of the West in the mid-1960s—a crisis that thook the its name from the title of Roland Barthes's famous 1967 postmortem 'Death of the Author.' If, as Barthes argued, the author could not—or could not any longer—claim to be the unique source of the meaning and/or the value of the work of art, then who—or what—could make such a claim? It is my contention that, despite its diversity, the art of the last twenty years, the art frequently referred to as 'Postmodernist,' can perhaps best be understood as a response or a series of responses to this question—even when artists simply attempt to reclaim the privelelges that have traditionally accrued to the author in our society....Much of the art produced during the last two decades has been concerned simply to register the disappearance of the figue of the author."

Craig Owens, *Beyond Recognition: Representation, Power, Culture*, University of California Press, 1992

Because power is inherently patriotic, it is characteristic of finite players to seek growth of power in a society as a way of increasing the power of a society. It is in the interest of a society therefore to encourage competition within itself, to establish the largest number of possible prizes, for holders of prizes will be those most likely to defend the society as a whole against competitors...Culture on the other hand, is an infinite game. Culture has no boundaries. Anyone can participate in a culture—anywhere and at any time.

Because a society maintains careful temporal limits, it understands its past as destiny; that is, its course of history lies between a definitive beginning (the founders of a society are always memorialized) and a definitive ending. (The nature of its victory is repeatedly anticipated in official declarations; "to each according to their need, from each according to their ability," for example.)

Because culture as such can have no temporal limits, a culture understands its past not as destiny, but as history, that is, as a narrative that has begun but points always toward the endless open. Culture is an enterprise of mortals, disdaining to protect themselves against surprise. Living in the strength of their vision, they eschew power and make joyous play of boundaries.

James P Carse, F*inite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility*, The Free Press, 1986

To sumarize any spec of the reality of the world in a list of four equal items, numbered from one to four, is to undercut the amazingly intricate inter-/intra-relationships that they co-inhabit, each with each other. To invite them into the four rooms of the AnalogosHouse is to give them each a space, a room of their own, where they can each bring a unique aspiration to the whole estate. To list the ten commandments is to forget their bearing on each other; to think of them as ten fingers is to give each one a place to hold in the dexterity of what the mind can grasp of its ten fingers as set out on two hands. There is a right and left: thumb, index finger, middle finger, fourth finger and little finger. They each carry a role, the thumb being set against the fingers to support a grip. Each embodies a place in constituting the meaning of body ex-tension.

Preamble: Responding to This Book

Warning: This text may tax your mind! This is not a typical book that reads from beginning to end, it is rather more like a painting where the whole image is set out and available from the outset. For that reason different readers will want to enter it through different doors; that is, individuals will want to start at a place that is appropriate to their needs. Different entry places will yield different versions of what lies herein. For that reason an overview roadmap is offered below.

Readers who want to dive into basic practical approaches to the 'undressing' of artEvent processes may want to begin with Part II. Starting with Part I immerses a reader into the world of human intra-/inter-actions, the world as seen from the perspective of the subject. To start with Part III is to enter into the dynamics of the world of objects, extensions, as central to artEvent processes. To enter via Part IIII would be to insist on a panoramic overview, a sort of top-down approach, before engaging in any close-up details. The Prologues and Epilogues serve as brackets and can easily be be left until the end—although Prologue 1 can be read at any point just as a sign on a door can be read again and again as a right of passage. But all of these approaches will need to have some basic insight into the Analogos schema, outlined in the Introduction (page 21). A more cursory summary of this schema is offered below. The mappings/diagrams are included to articulate precise sortings to enable the studious to delve deeper.

The Analogos schema is, in simplified terms, a four-part construct. Why four? Because it is based on the archetype of 'dialogue', that is, two subject agents, each sustaining an inner and an outer version of the 'self' as well as of the 'other'; together these constitute *four* sources of inter-relation. A parallel premise can be stated: the Analogos posits that there are four *archetypal* aspects to any artEvent, two inner ones (A and B) and two outer ones (C and D). In an artwork these can be termed as follows:

- a latent (inner) *pre-content* or conception, for example, the pre-image an artist sees in a block of stone or on a canvas; the inner image expectations that a viewer brings with them before they start to respond to an artwork; this constitutes the *ground* (background, underground, pre-text) of artEvents (A);

- a latent (inner) *context* or structure, for example, the pre-formation that is embedded in a block of stone or in the shape of a picture plane on canvas; a block of stone or wood or a rectangular canvas already have built-in complexes, pushes and pulls; an artist has to work with these in relation to their body orientation in space—with up and down, left and right and front and back; a canvas has a center, corners, diagonals, all of which have pre-set powers to grab whatever content arrives; an artist has to deal with eye-level and human scale; these pattern-types constitute the *conFiguration* of artEvents (B);

- a manifest (outer) *content/text*, the meaning inside the extension/artwork that exists inside the technic/ linguistic mediation containers that give it external existence; this constitutes the *figuration/subject* of artEvents (C);

- A manifest (outer) *metacontent*, the retroactivation, the hindsight, the evaluation, the post-review of the figuration, the critique; the recommendations for the next encounter, typically formulated in words; this constitutes the *metaFiguration* of artEvents (D).

These four archetypal complexes co-exist in a syntactical or constant inter-relation to each other; it is this reliable construct, this *analog*, this grammar that enables the ordering of unlimited conceptual variables. The *Analogos* structure/syntagm is represented in two ways (basic map examples are on page 21-23):

- a paradigm-map of four horizontal rows or layers, to be read from the bottom-up (like the layers of rock in an outcrop, layers that were deposited in that order, historically, geologically);

- a syntagm-map of four triangles, to be read from the bottom-up (A-B) and then from left to right (C-D, when it is a narrative, with the letters and/or numbers indicating the sequential order) and from the center triangle-out (if it is like an icon or an image with the numbers removed to hide the sequential order)

Prologue 1: <The Emp'r'rz' New/Nake'd/No/Newd Cloze>*

<UFI...az th storee goze...th tayl'r haz doopd the emp'r'r
hoo th'ot he had *new clo.thz*
as a muthr makes an inf'nt grand and grate
so illooj'n stocks th hart and marks th fate whare a fewch'r goze

th rich may doop th poor az iz th norm
and tiz a sacr'lidj too bottum up the antee in re.v'rs
for when a chi.ld brakes up ilooj'nz in th rich
a top-down blame may bottum-up a broke'n hitch

it takes a chi.ld...no less... too spot a man with'out hiz clo.thz
paradeing at th hed whare oll th gloree goze
it takes adults too join th doop and see whare nuthing iz
when wake'nd by a child hoo nuthing nohz

and so a story goze...a chi.ld haz doopd an emp'r'r
hoo nohz by now he-z wareing *nake'd clo.thz*
as an inf'nt must illooj'nz brake
so a nake'd man must ware hiz skin with' a dub'le take

it takes a chi.ld...no less...too spot a porno man
paradeing az a hed-z p'lld forw'rd by its noze
it takes adults too join th sneer that seez whare nuthing iz
or whot it seemz too be or whare it goze

and so a storee goze...a top dog-z cot with' hiz tale be.tween hiz laygz
he nohz he-z out…up frunt and dressd in th best uv...yes..*no cloze*
an inf'nts' fing'r points whare oll ize blaze
a show time stopp'r cannot stop a show that so well floze

and so a storee goze…az critic spinn'rz join paradez uv disr'pute
paradeing out ill newz…a f't iz hidd'n by its boot
the emp'r'r-z out uv town...he-z gone
but he left be.hind hiz o.ld *newd cloze* so all c'd hav a plase too spit and shoot >

a pre-text	b contnet	c content	d de-context	*basicParadigm*
a <new clo.thz>	b <nake'd clo.thz>	c <no cloze>	d <newd cloze>	*<ba.sicParadym>*

*The verse is written in UFI (Uze'r Frendlee Inglish), the details of which are outlined in the Appendix.

Prologue 2: <Kansel and Sett'l>

Part a: The Setting is a Place to Stay

There is first of all the house, where the tensions of a ruptured family reside; then there is the forest where danger lurks; there is also the candy cottage, that, set up as a decoy, entices sitting ducks to forget the world of guns; finally, there is the family home where, in the end, the collective resolve mends its ways. The story opens with the ground of kinship under threat: a newcomer, a step mother, wants to belong but the children are inclined to show their loyalty to their 'other-mother'.

a-4 ▲	*(back) home/surviving the danger*	metaFiguration/de-context
a-3 |	*cottage of candy*	figuration/content
a-2 |	*split father/forest of fear*	configuration/containment/context
a-1 |	*family home/bonds/bondage/kinship*	ground/conception/pre-content

Part b: The Pebbles Track the Way

The father, a woodchopper, remarries and the stepmother is not overly inclined towards his two children, Hansel and Gretel. The two children overhear the parents talking about leaving them in the woods to fend for themselves. Hansel prepares for the occasion by collecting pebbles, which he can drop along the way to enable them to find their way back home. It works: the parents leave the children while they go off to chop wood, but when they return home, the children are already there. The children succeed; the parents fail.

b-8 ▲	*father: the dilemma of split loyalties*	metaFiguration/de-context
b-7 |	*Hansel: the strategic side of childhood*	figuration/content
b-6 |	*step mother: the infusion of outside momentum*	configuration/containment/context
b-5 |	*Gretel: the vulnerable side of childhood*	ground/conception/pre-content

Part c: The Candy Cottage Fills the Bill

For the second attempt, Hansel upgrades his strategy from the use of pebbles to that of pieces of bread, perhaps because the story needs to reveal the naivety and inexperience of childhood decision-making. Why did it not work? Because the birds ate the crumbs and the trail back home was deleted. The parents succeed in ridding themselves of the children, giving them a time to be alone without the split-family interference and responsibility. In their wanderings the children come upon a candy cottage and begin to appease their hunger. But it is a decoy and the owner-witch captures them and tries to fatten one of them up for a rather cannibalistic meal. But the other child uses a childhood schoolyard strategy and succeeds in pushing the witch from behind so that she falls into the oven and is nicely removed as an antagonist-obstacle. The children are able to return to their home; the shock of near catastrophe, of disillusionment, perhaps, awakens everyone to learn from the experience.

c-4 ▲	*parents: the joys of escaping tragedy*	metaFiguration/de-context
c-3 |	*Hansel: the naive side of childhood*	figuration/content/text
c-2 |	*the witch: the dangers of strangers*	configuration/containment/context
c-1 |	*Gretel: the vulnerable side of childhood*	ground/conception/pre-content/pre-text

Part d: The MetaStory Rounds the Hill

Kans'l and Sett'l are inseparable if seen as the two sides of an individual's survival wish: the security to stay within the status quo and/or the desire to break loose from a past that carries too much protocol, too well learned. Since they worked hand in hand, they survived to carry forward and integrate the lessons learned. In surviving as a unit, the two-children-as-one-child brings him/her recognition as being independent and less of a burden for parents, and it offers a worthwhile reason for the parents to also act in consort and to embrace the children's future with pride and support. How is a family bonded? How does an outsider gain membership? kinship? Having succumbed to desire (the sugar candies of life) and the dangers it masks, how does one regain stature and a position that is reliable and stable? How does one resolve split loyalties? How can one take sides in a conflict when it is set up as a catch-22, a double bind? Illusion's dream, when challenged, can only survive if the disillusioning process is faced and overcome. Every loss is a gain; to be deprived of disillusionment is to lose the loss that lifts the gain.

b-8 ▲	*father: the dilemma of split loyalties*	metaFiguration/de-context
b-7 |	*Hansel: the strategic side of childhood*	figuration/content/text
b-6 |	*step mother: the infusion of outside momentum*	configuration/containment/context
b-5 |	*Gretel: the vulnerable side of childhood*	ground/conception/pre-content/pre-text

Prologue 3: Robinson Crusoe

In Northrop Frye's little book, *The Educated Imagination*, it is the different uses of language that take center stage; he sees these different tracks coming about as a result of the attempt by humans to find an identity in a non-human, perhaps even hostile, context—and that non-human context is nature. Frye's sophisticated structural sense seems tailor-made to enliven and be enlivened by the complexity that is the AnalogosParadigm, the underlying schema that informs this text. While he only identifies three types of language usage ("three reasons for using language", mapped on page 11as b-5, b-6, b-7), the fourth one (b-8), as insisted on by the Analogos (which by default must include a fourth one) is the critical use of language or *literary criticism*; while outside the frame of reference of Fry's publication, it is included in the present text. As a radio broadcast, *The Educated Imagination* was addressed to a general public; accordingly, the role of literary critic, a role which Frye himself exemplifies, was not directly referred to here. (It is only implied in Epilogue 3 but given a distinct place in Epilogue 4.)

Frye sets the stage for his readers/listeners (The text was written to be broadcast on CBC Ideas in the early nineteen sixties) by asking them to imagine being shipwrecked on an "uninhabited island in the South Seas." He implies that in such a situation, one would see nature as "objective, as something set over against you and not yourself or related to you in any way. It doesn't have any conversation." It doesn't have a "human shape or a human meaning." He sees this as causing a split in one's perception: an intellect that wants to study it and feelings that regard it as "beautiful or austere or terrible." He defines this type of *objective* or *technical* language (b-6, below) (mostly populated with nouns and adjectives) as

> "the language of...awareness... the speculative or contemplative position of the mind, the position in which the arts and sciences begin, although they don't stay there very long. The sciences begin by accepting the facts and the evidence about an outside world without trying to alter them...The emotions are unreasonable: for them it's what they like and don't like that comes first...Your habitual state of mind is the feeling of separation which goes with being conscious, and the feeling 'this is not a part of me' soon becomes 'this is not what I want'. (Frye, pp. 3-4)

It is this difference between the world as given and the world as desired or 'wanted', between an 'objective' one and a 'human' one, between an 'environment' and a 'home' that pushes one to start building something human out of nature-in-the-raw and then "separating it from the rest of the world..."(from all that is not human-made). It is this construction mode, according to Frye, that initiates another, second type of language usage:

> As soon as you plant a garden or a crop you develop the conception of a 'weed', the plant you don't want in there. But you can't say that 'weed' is either an intellectual or an emotional conception, because it's both at once. Further, you go to work because you feel you have to, and because you want something at the end of the work. That means that the important categories are no longer the subject and the object, the watcher and the thing being watched: the important categories are what you have to do and what you want to do—in other words, necessity and freedom. (Frye, P. 4)

This second type of language, here termed *practical* (b-7) and populated with verbs, is also characterized by its position: it shifts *away* from the alienation of nature, as described with objective language above, towards a dialogue *with* nature. There is a new dilemma, however: that of necessity and freedom. It addresses the question: what can I *not* change and therefore must accept as given? And what can I change and therefore focus on so that I can construct a human place to physically survive in? (A third type of language usage, *literary* (b-5) language, as outlined below, will ask the next level (the meta-level, but parallel) question, one that addresses the next dilemma unveiled: how does one secure a 'place' to *psychically* survive in?) Frye elaborates on the second type (b-7) of language usage.

> These things, these rudiments of city, highway garden and farm, are the human form of nature, or the form of human nature, whichever you like. This is the area of the applied arts and sciences, and it appears in our society as engineering and agriculture and medicine and architecture. In this area we can never say clearly where the art stops and the science begins, or vice versa. (Frye, p. 5)

In the beginning, then, there is an illusion of hope or a dreamwish (a-1, below); the sort of awareness that Frye is identifying above. This becomes challenged by an objective language that alienates us from nature, one that comes with a loss of the illusion, the dreamwish, the hope. This, the disillusion process (a-2, b-6), comes with the realization that a technic/linguistic wall stands between inner imagination (the primary and emotional-based use of language [a-1 feeding into b-5]) and the real world that demands survival skills (a-3, b-7). The awareness of one's awareness comes with the acquisition of a repertoire of values (a-4) and the ability to analyze them (b-8). This makes outer-identity expression (c) possible; finally, this latter can lead to metaformforms (d); the one under focus in this text (and the one that is uppermost in Fry's overall output) is literature (d-5).

THE EDUCATED IMAGINATION			
4 super-conscious/self	8 critical language	4 environment	8 criticism
3 conscious	7 practical language	3 garden/buffer zone	7 pedagogy
2 conscience	6 objective language	2 forest/nature	6 research
1 unconscious	5 literary language	1 home/shelter	5 literature/art
b inner identity after Freud	*b inner formation after Frye*	*c outer identity after Frye*	*d outer formation after Frye*
Types of language usage (b) (after Northrop Frye) (basicMicroParadigm)			

What is immediately instructive in the above scenario, as the Analogos version of what is set out by Fry, is the sense of nature as 'other', of nature as alien, non-human. This Robinson Crusoe dilemma is presented as a prototype of the most basic human ground, that which is needed to sustain human survival. Accordingly, our existence is predicated on the support of nature (forest, c-2) as the resource or 'other' out of which we must construct, through technics and language, a home/garden (c-1, c-3) that is at the same time both natural and humane; it both protects us from and conjoins us to raw nature as a way of offering us a place inside human nature. The garden (c-3) is a transitional time/place; it represents a resolution in a terrain mid-way between the raw and the cooked, between the home/nest (c-1) and the forest/wilds (c-2). Frye refers to the language of practical sense (b-7)

> as one of adapting to the environment or rather of transforming it...the animals have a good many of our practical skills: some insects make pretty fair architects...(we'd) have about the ranking of a second-rate animal. What makes our practical life really human is a third level of the mind, a level where consciousness and practical skill come together. This third level is a vision or model in your mind of what you want to construct. (Frye, p. 5)

What humans end up building is "prompted by desire" such as sex or needs such as food, warmth, shelter.

> But there's also the desire to bring a social human form into existence: the form of cities and gardens and farms that we call civilization. Many animals and insects have this social form too, but man knows that he has it: he can compare what he does with what he can imagine being done. So we begin to see where imagination belongs in the scheme of human affairs. (Frye, p. 5)

What distinguishes the imaginative (b-5), inner image world of language from all others is that it is unlimited. There are no physical technic/linguistic demands to restrict its free range. This is possible because none of it happens in the outer world, the world where technic/linguistic support systems rule supreme.

To summarize, there are three "levels of mind" and a "language for each of them": In Fry's first one, the level of *awareness* (b-6), where the English (if that is the language under consideration) is objective it is that of "ordinary conversation"; here the important difference is between "me and everything else". In Frye's second level (b-7), the level of dialogue with nature, where the English used is that of *practical sense*, of social participation, of "teachers and preachers and politicians and advertisers and lawyers and journalists and scientists", the important difference is between what can physically be changed in nature and what cannot. In Frye's third level (b-5), that of the *imagination*, which produces the literary language of "poems and plays and novels", the important difference is between the medium and the message. (Although Frye introduces the three levels of language in a different order than that set out in the Analogos, the paradigm seems completely faithful to his structure.)

Fry's focus is on the education of the imagination, the last of Frye's three uses of language as outlined above, and the most primary or intrinsic use of language according to the Analogos. One way to articulate the use of the imagination is to describe its different use in science as opposed to art.

> Science begins with the world we have to live in, accepting its data and trying to explain its laws. From there, it moves towards the imagination: it becomes a mental construct, a model of a possible way of interpreting experience. The further it goes in that direction, the more it tends to speak the language of mathematics, which is really one of the languages of the imagination, along with literature and music. Art, on the other hand, begins with the world we construct, not with the world we see. It starts with the imagination, and then works toward ordinary experience: that is, it tries to make itself as convincing and recognizable as it can. You can see why we tend to think of the sciences as intellectual and the arts as emotional: one starts with the world, as it is, the other with the world we want to have. (Frye, p. 6)

Of course, Frye is quick to counter argue that "You can't distinguish the arts from the sciences by the mental processes the people in them use: they both operate on a mixture of hunch and common sense." And he concludes with a value-based comment: "...a highly developed science and a highly developed art are very close together, psychologically and otherwise." That they start "from opposite ends, even if they do meet in the middle" does, however, render an important difference between them. "Science learns more and more about the world as it goes on...Literature doesn't evolve or improve or progress.... Writers don't seem to benefit much by the advance in science, although they thrive on superstitions of all kinds." The same myths and narratives keep recurring today after thousands of years ("sculptures of winged bulls...people who flew so high on artificial wings that the sun melted them off"). Frye asks the enduring question about the human use of imagination: "Do we need such stories now that we have private aeroplanes?"

In response, Frye answers that literature is a human shape where "the primary realities are not atoms or electrons but bodies, and the primary forces not energy or gravity but love and death and passion and joy." Literature belongs to the "world man constructs, not the world he sees; to his home, not his environment." Literature offers humans a sense of identity in relation to nature, one that is unique and grounded in the need for psychological survival.

> At the level of *ordinary* consciousness (b-6) the individual man is the centre of everything, surrounded on all sides by what he isn't. At the level of *practical* sense (b-7), or civilization, there's a human circumference, a little cultivated world with a human shape, fenced off from the jungle and inside the sea and the sky. But in the *imagination* (b-5) anything goes that can be imagined, and the limit of the imagination is a totally human world. Here we recapture, in full consciousness, that original lost sense of identity with our surroundings, where there is nothing outside the mind of man, or something identical with the mind of man (italics and brackets added). (Frye, p. 9)

The imagination dreams up visions that range from the horrors of hell to the dreams of heaven "completely separated from the state of frustration and misery that bulks so large in ordinary life...What's produced the aeroplane is not so much a desire to fly as a rebellion against the tyranny of time and space. And that's a process that can never stop..." Literature emerges out of a specific way of using language. "Outside literature, the main motive for writing is to describe..." the world we live in. "But literature itself uses language in a way which associates our minds with it. As soon as you use associative language, you begin to use figures of speech."

Frye uses the example of his talk to illustrate the concept of associative language." If you say this talk is dry and dull, you're using figures associating it with bread and breadknives." Frye indicates the two common linguistic choices available, the metaphor (for example, 'the bird knives the air') and the simile (for example, 'the bird cuts the air like a knife'). Included is a caution to be careful when using associative language: "You'll find that analogy, or likeness to something else, is very tricky to handle in description, because the differences are as important as the resemblances...by saying 'this is that' (b-5), you're turning your back on logic and reason (b-6) completely, because logically two things can never be the same thing and remain two things." That the poet uses analogical means (b-5) is an indication that he is not intending "to describe nature" but rather to "...show a world that is completely absorbed and possessed by the human mind."

> The motive for metaphor...is a desire to associate, and finally to identify, the human mind with what goes on outside it, because the only joy you can have is in those rare moments when you feel that although we may know in part...we are also part of what we know. (Frye, p. 10)

Prologue 4:The Garden of Eden

Northrop Frye's little book, *The Educated Imagination*, also contains a summary of his pedagogical aspirations for the *teaching of literature*, and presumably any of the arts (Chapter 5).

> I'm ready to put this theory to a practical test. If it's any good, it should give us some guidance on the question of how to teach literature, especially to children. It should tell us what the simple and fundamental conceptions are that we should start with, and what more advanced studies can later be built onto them. (Frye, p. 45)

Frye's (after Blake) taxonomy of the development of human imagination is grounded in mythology. Literature comes to light only after there is a highly developed unconscious preoccupation with myth making, one that takes centuries to emerge. "A myth is a simple and primitive effort of the imagination to identify the human with the non-human world, and its most typical result is a story about a god. Later on mythology begins to merge into literature...(and) becomes a structural principle of story- telling." Why? Frye answers with his well established conception of the origins of literature: "...myths stick together to form a mythology, and...the containing framework of the mythology takes the shape of a feeling of lost identity which we had once and may have again." In short, a myth is a people's reconstruction of their sense of loss.

What Frye is describing for the human race, Winnicott describes for each new member of that race: that the mother provides her infant with an illusion of omnipotence, of magical power before she proceeds gradually with the disillusioning process. The equivalent literary version of the illusionment for the human race is contained in the story of the Garden of Eden. It is this loss, which incites humanity to regain what was envisioned and then lost. With the loss there is a gain: for the child it's the intrinsic need to acquire technics and language. This is the means whereby each new infant is offered the promise of uniqueness and autonomy in the world; for Adam and Eve the loss of innocence was compensated for by the gain of "knowledge".

> The most complete form of this myth is given in the Christian Bible, and so the Bible forms the lowest stratum in the teaching of literature. It should be taught so early and so thoroughly that it sinks straight to the bottom of the mind, where everything that comes along later can settle on it. (Frye, p. 46)

It should be noted that the metaphors used by Frye in the above passage are (in complete harmony with the Analogos paradigm) bottom-up formations: "the lowest stratum" references geological formations of sediment that are deposited one layer over the top of another, the oldest one being at the bottom; the reading of geological time, accordingly, starts at the bottom and proceeds upwards to the top surface. This is entirely in keeping with the structure of the Analogos. It is also consistent with the emergence of plant life: it grows upwards from seed to blossom. The Analogos also encompasses the possibility of a top-down movement; however, this is regarded as a reversal or retrogression, be it positive or negative, and not as an initial or archetypal development. Frye's "lowest stratum...of the mind", occupies a parallel position as the lowest layer in the framework of the AnalogosParadigm, that of the 'ground' of experience.

Frye justifies his proposal to ground the imagination in the stories contained in the Bible (ib-d-5, opposite), not on religious grounds, not because it is quoted endlessly, not because the King James version cadences are "built into our minds and way of thought", not that "it's full of the greatest and best known stories", but rather, he advocates it because of its "shape and structure", because of "the fact that it's a continuous narrative beginning with creation and ending with the Last Judgment, and surveying the whole history of mankind..." Frye sees this as the enduring *myth* that could best ground literary training: "its imaginative survey of the human situation...is so broad and comprehensive that everything else finds its place in it." From the above it follows that "the Bible could only be taught in school by someone with a well-developed sense of *literary* structure (ib:d-8. opposite)."

The next 'substance' layer up (see dynamic Y, page 28), in a program of literary education, according to Frye, is that of Classical mythology (ib-d-7), which, if more fragmentary than the Bible, provides the same sense of imaginative structure that was available in the testaments. It offers, more clearly than the Bible, "the main episodes of the central myth of the hero whose mysterious birth, triumph and marriage, death and betrayal and eventual rebirth follow the rhythm of the sun and the seasons". Frye has a larger aim here as well. He stresses the importance of discovering how the same patterns turn up in the Bible and in Classical mythology, "within different cultures and religions".

> The Greeks and Romans, like the authors of the New Testament, arranged their myths in a sequence, starting with stories of creation and fall and flood and gradually moving into historical reminiscences, and finally into actual history. And as they move into history they also move into more recognizable and fully developed forms of literature. The Classical myths produced Homer and the Greek dramatists; the ancient traditions developed into the Psalms and the Book of Job. (Frye, p. 47)

THE EDUCATED IMAGINATION			
4 metallusion	8 super-conscious	4 environment	*8 irony*
3 resolution	7 conscious	3 garden/buffer	*7 comedy*
2 disillusion	6 conscience	2 forest/raw nature	*6 tragedy*
1 illusion	5 unconscious	1 home/nest	*5 romance*
a inner identity after Winnicott	*b inner formation after Freud*	*c outer identity after Frye*	*d outer formation after Frye*
i-a: Literary genres (d): after Northrop Frye (basicMicroParadigm)			

The second layer up (the first structure-based layer [according to dynamic Y, page 28], ib-d-6, below), in Fry's taxonomy, constitutes, at last, a concentration inside "the structure of the great literary forms" in their own right. Here Frye recognizes four genres: romance, tragedy, comedy and irony (outlined in this order in the paradigm above, ia-d: 5-6-7-8 and ib-d-6, below), the basic forms developed in his *The Anatomy of Criticism* (1957). "Of these forms, comedy and romance are the primary ones (in the Analogos, the content or substance-based ones); they can be taught to the youngest students." Adults return to these forms when they want entertainment. His definition of romance explains why: it represents "a simplified and idealized world, of brave heroes, pure and beautiful heroines, and very bad villains." The story of the hero's adventures is a continuation of the earlier myths"; comedy develops "out of the episode of the hero's triumph or marriage." Tragedy and irony are more complex (more structural, secondary, in the framework of the Analogos) than comedy and romance: "all forms of irony, including satire, stress the complexity of human life…"

THE EDUCATED IMAGINATION			
4 metallusion	8 super-conscious	4 environment	*8 literary structures*
3 resolution	7 conscious	3 garden/buffer	*7 Classical mythology*
2 disillusion	6 conscience	2 forest/raw nature	*6 literary genres (i-a)*
1 illusion	5 unconscious	1 home/nest	*5 Bible*
a inner identity after Winnicott	*b inner formation after Freud*	*c outer identity after Frye*	*d outer formation after Frye*
i-b: Literary structures (d) after Northrop Frye (basicMicro)Paradigm			

The fourth layer up (ib-d-8, above), according to Frye, involves the training of students in the habit and skill of "standing back and looking at the total structure of every literary work studied." This enables them to see, for example, the same general structure in a comedy by Shakespeare as there is in a "battered old movie". The purpose of this is not to teach that Shakespeare is superior; "…value-judgments in literature should not be hurried. It does a student little good to be told that A is better then B, especially if he prefers B at the time. He has to feel values for himself, and should follow his individual rhythm in doing so." This allegiance to intrinsic motivation on the part of a reader allows for "his undeveloped taste and still doesn't turn him into a gourmet or a dyspeptic before his time."

Frye is careful to differentiate "imaginative and discursive writing" and to stress the importance of the former, of reading or listening to "everything that has a story, such as a myth…the art of listening to stories is a basic training for the imagination." This is in opposition to the discursive approach that assumes the author to be disguising a hidden "message or moral or Great Thought" behind the story, one that "you can snatch out of it and run away with."

> You don't start arguing with the writer: you accept his postulates, even if he tells you that the cow jumped over the moon, and you don't react until you've taken in all of what he has to say. (Frye, p. 49)

Frye underlines the importance of the second side of a response process, that of giving outer image form to fulfill the needs of the first side of a response process, that of inner image activation. While this, typically, initially, takes the form of *speaking* about what has been read, it is the *follow-up*-as-*writing* that Frye emphasis. "No matter how little of this he does, he's bound to have the experience sooner or latter of feeling he's said something that he can't explain except in exactly the same way that he's said it." It is a struggle, the practice of which, makes one more tolerant of authors whose works are being read; in addition, practice builds a repertoire of textual experiences to facilitate future fluency in writing and in speaking.

Two literary contexts are addressed by Frye: the first involves that of languages other than English (ii-d-5, below), the need to read stories in the language of their origin whenever possible and, more specifically, how this intersects with the fact that the cultural heritage of English speaking peoples is Latin, Greek and Hebrew. The second involves the context of the arts (ii-d-7, below) other than literature: "...just as it's easy to confuse thinking with the habitual associations of language, so it's easy to confuse thinking with thinking in words." How, for example, does a musician think about a passage of music when it has no words? Frye includes this seemingly irrelevant aspect because he sees it as having values that feed back into the domain of literature. It is in keeping with the numerous critical reviews that he wrote in response to art forms other than literature.

THE EDUCATED IMAGINATION			
4 metallusion	8 super-conscious	4 environment	*8 contextual pedagogies (iii)*
3 resolution	7 conscious	3 garden/buffer	*7 contextual arts*
2 disillusion	6 conscience	2 forest/raw nature	*6 contextual disciplines*
1 illusion	5 unconscious	1 home/nest	*5 contextual languages*
a inner identity after Winnicott	*b inner formation after Freud*	*c outer identity after Frye*	*d outer formation after Frye*
ii: Literary contexts (d) after Northrop Frye (basicMicroParadigm)			

> Everything that man does is some kind of construction, and the imagination is the constructive power of the mind set free to work on pure construction, construction for its own sake. The units don't have to be words; they can be numbers or tones or colored bricks or pieces of marble. It's hardly possible to understand what imagination is doing with words without seeing how it operates with some of these other units. (Frye, p. 50)

A third context of literature involves an understanding of its place in relation to other subject domains (ii-d-6, opposite), subjects such as history, philosophy, psychology and sociology, that are word-based. This takes on more importance as students get older and search out more complex literature, a literature that mines human situations, conflict and resolution.

A fourth context of literature involves pedagogy (ii-d-8, above and iii-d: 5-6-7-8, below), and Frye here critiques an approach that he finds "futile". While he advocates the general structural approach of starting at the center and working outwards (in the AnalogosParadigm, starting with the ground at the bottom and working upwards as onwards), he finds fault with the notion of "starting with the applied use of words, that is, with 'effective communication', as it's often called, then gradually work(ing) into literature through the more documentary forms of prose and finally end(ing) with poetry." He considers the center to be poetry (iii-d-5, below and iiii-d: 5-6-7-8, on page 18); then, moving outwards, this is followed by literary prose and finally by the applied use of languages—in business and the professions and in ordinary life. His rationale: "poetry is the most direct and simple means of expressing oneself in words…prose is a much less natural way of speaking than poetry is. If you listen to small children, and to the amount of chanting and singsong in their speech, you'll see what I mean."

THE EDUCATED IMAGINATION			
4 metallusion	8 super-conscious	4 environment	*8 literary criticism*
3 resolution	7 conscious	3 garden/buffer	*7 applied language*
2 disillusion	6 conscience	2 forest/raw nature	*6 prose literature*
1 illusion	5 unconscious	1 home/nest	*5 poetic literature (iiii)*
a inner identity after Winnicott	*b inner formation after Freud*	*c outer identity after Frye*	*d outer formation after Frye*
iii: Pedagogical Development (d) (after Northrop Frye) (basicMicroParadigm)			

How does Frye come to the concept of poetry as the ground of a pedagogical approach to the study of literature, that is, poetry as the ground for the development of an *educated imagination*?

> What poetry can give the student is, first of all, the sense of physical movement. Poetry is not irregular lines in a book, but something very close to dance and song, something to walk down the street keeping time to. Even if the rhythm is free it's still something to be declaimed. (Frye, p. 51)

Prose follows poetry in the order of advancement, and the continuity that Frye demands is that prose have the rhythm that was experienced in poetry (iiii-d-5, below). "We're often told that to write we must have something to say, but that in turn means having a certain potential of verbal energy." In short, Frye stresses the importance of acquiring a technic/linguistic repertoire (and not just experience) as a means of training the imagination. Other aspects of poetry that need to be carried forward into prose are: the use of imagery and diction (iiii-d-5), of concrete and simple words (iiii-d-7), of figures of speech (the metaphor and simile, iiii-d-6) and their ability to "contain great reserves of meaning in the simple forms that we call myths and read as stories…"(iiii-d-8).

THE EDUCATED IMAGINATION			
4 metallusion	8 super-conscious	4 environment	*8 encompassing form*
3 resolution	7 conscious	3 garden/buffer	*7 concrete/simple words*
2 disillusion	6 conscience	2 forest/raw nature	*6 figures of association*
1 illusion	5 unconscious	1 home/nest	*5 rhythm/image/diction*
a inner identity after Winnicott	*b inner formation after Freud*	*c outer identity after Frye*	*d outer formation after Frye*
iiii: Poetic form (d) (after Northrop Frye) (basicMicroParadigm)			

As students grow secure in their reading, their study of literature centers more and more around certain works that are considered "classics or models". A work becomes a classic, not only if it satisfies certain literary requirements, but also because "a great work of literature is also a place in which the whole history of the nation that produced it comes into focus." He exemplifies this in the case of Robinson Crusoe as one who offers a "detached vision of the British Empire, imposing its own pattern wherever it goes, catching its man Friday and trying to turn him into an eighteenth-century Nonconformist, never dreaming of 'going native'..." This is a vision "that history alone could never give." (ii-d-7, above).

The study of literature also offers feedback in the use of ordinary practical speech (Prologue 3). That literature is the means whereby humans describe the nature around them in a "kind of associative language that relates it to human concerns" makes it uniquely situated to affect everyday thought, the everyday use of the imagination. Accordingly, everyday language is saturated with metaphors and similes: "getting 'down to the facts'...lining up arguments facing each other like football teams: on the one hand there's this and on the other there's that". Frye sees this relationship between the imaginative use of language (as expressed in literature) and its everyday use as prototypic: mathematics gives life and form to the physical sciences; "myths and images of literature ...give form to all the structures we build out of words."

Frye, finally, alludes to the theoretical dimension of literature, as opposed to the practice by authors, be they geniuses or hacks. By theory, he means "criticism, the activity of uniting literature with society, and with the different contexts that literature has..." (iii-d-8, above). While this activity consists of both "reviewing, or introducing current literature to the public" and of pursuing "scholarship and research", the bulk of it, according to Frye, involves teaching. Hence, the importance of the pedagogical focus in this, the last of the four Analogos Prologues. By insisting on the inclusion of the pedagogical dimension in this essay on literature he is professing that the discipline, the study of literature, needs a pedagogical dynamic or theorization that is unique to the domain of literature.


Frye concludes by reiterating the importance of the world of imagination as a means whereby students can acquire a "vision of possibilities", one that can be carried into society. "It's clear that the end of literary teaching is not simply the administration of literature; it's something more like the transfer of imaginative energy from literature to the student"

Prologue i: MetaProglogue

The Four Prologues

In summary, the four Prologues-as-a-whole can be seen as initiating a headlong dive into the cool waters of the AnalogosParadigm and AnalogosSyntagm; they are mapped both ways below to try to make possible such a potential; all four-seen-as-one constitutes a meta-level meaning that is both a backward-facing metaphoric repeat-echo and a forward-facing revision-extension of their individual structures.

THE FOUR PROLOGUES-AS-A-WHOLE	
d rebirth	*The Garden of Eden*: the meta-level transcendence ahead to an imaginary Garden of Eden
c life	*Robinson Crusoe*: the figuration of individuals as they constitute a made-up society
b death	*<Kans'l and Sett'l>:* the split family as configuration to challenge the threat of the 'lack'/loss
a birth	*<The Emp'r'rz' Newd Cloze>:* the body/mind as (under/back)ground and cover up
BasicAnalogosParadigm (after Spengler's *The Decline of the West: birth, death, life, re-birth)*	



Coda: Dragstrip Drive

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we zip along in the lazy stream of high tech cars on a white lined road
where billboard sighs of life sign off...slur on...and on across the windshield screen
zooming up and piercing near...then smashing through the tender edge of our mere here
and now
they slip away in the lazy stream of high tech poles and twigs and bars
engulfed...devoured and swallowed up in the thoughts that shield the wind and slide
along the sideward flow where all things side swipe a car before they go...are gone

our drive-by movie purrs and sings of endless things and swings to the beat of jazz
as the littered loads of homemade signs show off their tin and wood and rust
and words flip in and out and come and go as a speech might flow
odd pictures laugh at freaks of this and that...facades shout out and then fade in
to keep all eyes off backs and sides where buildings face the backward glance
and the upper class looks up and away...askance
each building faces up to its highway view and hates its neighbor's silly stew

fragments fly within and up and float along the window screen
the wood is paint and the bricks are tar and the plastic's wired to catch the wind
the tiles are glued and the stones are stuck and the stucco's lost in the bric-a-braid
of memories caught on the windshield screen of a dragstrip trip
where long lost fields of trees and farmers' ploughs bring rings of things to inward ears
as the rain falls into tears

<ufi...we zip along in th lazee stream uv hi teck carz on a white lined road
whare billboard syze uv life sine off...sl'r on...and on across th windsheeld screen
zooming up and peersing near...then smashing threw the tend'r edge of our mere here
and now
thay slip away in th lazee stream of hi teck polez and twigs and barz
engulfd...devourd and swollo.d up in th thots that sheeld th wind and slide
along th sidew'rd flo whare oll thingz side swipe a car be.fore thay go...ar gon

our drive-by moovee p'rrrz and sings uv endless thingz and swingz too th beat uv jazz
az th litt'rd loadz uv homemade sines sho off thayr tin and w'd and rust
and w'rds flip in and out and cum and go az a speech mite flo
odd pickch'rz laf at freaks uv this and that...fasadz shout out and then fade in
too keep oll ize off backs and sides whare bildingz fase th backw'rd glanse
and the upp'r class l'ks up and away...askanse
each bilding fase's up too its hiway vue and hates its nayb'rz' sillee styew


fragm'nts fly with'in and up and float along th windo screen
th w'd iz paint and th bricks ar tar and th plastic-s wired too cach th wind
th tilez ar glood and th stonez ar stuck and th stucco-z lost in th bric-a-braid brine
uv mem'reez cot on th windsheeld screen uv a dragstrip trip
whare long lost feeldz uv treez and farm'rz' plowz bring ringz uv thingz too inw'd earz
az th rain follz intoo tearz>

Introduction


Part A: Analogos Orientation

<If tiz trew that 'tiz th clo.thz that makez th man', then whot makes th man that warez no clo.thz?> And what constitutes the no-clothes that such a man is not wearing? If a man is defined as the not-clothes and the clothes as the not-man, then what makes the not-clothes of the not-man? Or the not-man of the not-clothes? Is there something lacking (in the Lacanian sense of 'lack') that lurks as a living loss here? Or is language itself undressing the subject of man even as it pretends to dress it up? If an idea exists inside words, what remains when the words are pulled out from under it? And where can the words be hidden so that the idea doesn't seek them out, rejoin them and maybe even elope with them after dark when no one is knowing or even not-knowing?

INTRODUCTION	
d rebirth (de-context)	*Analogos dynamics X, Y, Z*: double dialogue maps (de-context)
c life (content)	*Analogos time/space*: synchronic and diachronic maps (content)
b death (context)	*Analogos interactions*: quadrant relationship maps (context)
a birth (pre-text)	*Analogos orientations*: quadrant content maps (pre-text)
The AnalogosParadigm, after Spengler's birth, death, life, re-birth sequence (substanceBasicParadigm)	




The Analogos is an integrative paradigm/syntagm designed to assist one in the mapping of complex ideas; more specifically, to take several strands of knowledge and orchestrate and layer them interactively so that their individual meanings can be amplified, and so that their inter-relationships can become 'visible', focused and thereby enriched. It is based on a four-part construct; the most basic unit is two subjects in dialogue, each with an inner and an outer version of reality; these are mapped in a four-part layered schema (as above), which is used to tease out the *paradigmatic content*, and a four-part triangular schema (as above and below), which is used to tease out the interactive *syntagmatic structure*.




D ▲	*de-context*	metaFigurations: hindsight, generalization, theorization, retroactivation
C	*content*	figuration (foreground): subject matter, meaning, materialized reality
B	*context (container)*	configurations (formation): structures of media: technics, linguistics
A	*pre-text*	(back)grounds: expectations, motivations, drives, desires. latent reality
Archetypal AnalogosBasicParadigm: *pre-text, context, content, de-context*		

Four examples of the basic (A-B-C-D) paradigmSyntagm become visible if one zooms *out*: the result is a four-part *macro ParadigmSyntagm* labeled: I, II, III, IIII (each part containing the four-part *basic-Paradigm:* A-B-C-D); the dynamic inter-relation between the four layers or the four triangles remains constant whether one is mapping at the basic level or at the macro level. However, there is also a difference because the macro-level always acts as a container for the basic-level content.



D ▲	*de-context*	metaFigurations: hindsight, generalization, theorization, retroactivation
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Archetypal AnalogosBasicParadigm: *pre-text, context, content, de-context*		




The basicParadigm (A-B-C-D) can also be zoomed *in* to reveal the 64 *microParadigms*: (I: A-B-C-D and II: A-B-C-D and III: A-B-C-D and IIII: A-B-C-D, each of these 16 parts containing 4 sub parts, numbered 1 to 4 or 5 to 8); half of these are primary (each A: 1-2-3-4 and each C: 1-2-3-4), the other half are secondary (each B: 5-6-7-8 and each D: 5-6-7-8). (See Dynamic Y, page 28, for a map of this split: A-C verses B-D.) The inter-relationship between layers remains *analogically* constant, whether zooming in or out. (This constitutes the metaphoric sub-text of the Analogos paradigm: it visualizes and embraces *analogical* potential rather than the more typical theoretical approach that relegates the analogical to poetics in favor of a purely logical construct.)

The full 64-part Analogos syntagm with all the layers indicated is mapped below.

Introduction

Part B: Analogos Interactions

Whether zooming out or in, each layer of the paradigm carries the same inter-relationship between parts; only the scale changes: a primary one (1-2-3-4, A/C, I/III) is always substance-based, that is, relatively more bottom-up/inner/grounded while a secondary one (5-6-7-8, B/D, II/III) is always structure-based, that is, relatively more top-down/outer/configured. Primary ones are content-based; secondary ones are context-based (as in Dynamic Y, page 28).



IIII/iiii	D/d	4	8	de-context	secondary	metaFiguration	trans-disciplines ▲
III/iii	C/c	3	7	content	primary	figuration	extensions
II/ii	B/b	2	6	context	secondary	configuration	practices
I/i	A/a	1	5	pre-text	primary	(back)ground	subjects
Archetypal Analogical layerings of the Macro- Basic- Micro- Paradigms							


In the making of a painting, to exemplify the Analogos schema, there is, in the beginning, a given (back)*ground* (A) implied on the picture plane (or in a block of wood or stone if it is to be carved); by means of technic and linguistic means, in space and through time, this latent image takes on a coherent, underlying structural shape, a *conFiguration* (B); this implied structure supports a *figure* (C) or foreground, which, in turn, becomes visible as it is differentiated from and emerges out of the background (A); the outcome (the content formed or the formed content, (C) can then be retroactively reflected upon to see what principles or evaluations or *metaFigurations* (D) can be surmised to offer feedback; these are directives for future use (for A-B-C-D the next time around); the cycle goes on. The Analogos paradigm, then, is not a one-dimensional, linear schema, but rather a layered one (as mapped above), layered in such a way that each basic site in the paradigm is sustained by all the other layers under it as it in turn sustains all the layers above it. Most interaction, however, occurs between immediate layers. In short, the layers are intended to be seen as interactive, both upwards and downwards in the paradigm or back and forth between and among the triangles in the syntagm.

In a similar way, there exists in the beginning a *pre-text*, a text that is latent but in a state of readiness (A); the *content/text* (C) comes to light by means of a technic/linguistic process of mediation (B), or *context.* The *de-context* becomes available after the fact, after the inner time and inner space are left behind and hindsight opens doors to the future (D). This latter, the meta- message, in being de-contextualized from its source specifics, is free to be used to frame new situations different from the context in which it took shape; used with caution, this has an expansive potential, allowing for extrapolation, opening a space for interdisciplinary ideas. After the outcomes have been lifted from their specifics, then, they can be somewhat applicable inside new situations. Even the old context (at last visible and manageable) can be left behind, but not without holding on to vestigaes of its past; all the same it can send forth the structure of the over-arching discoveries that it brought to light as it emerged out of the process of A to B to C to D.


Introduction

Part C: Analogos Time/Space

The Analogos maps time and space inside both its parallel/layered paradigmatic structure and its triangular/syntagmatic structure: A *diachronic* (time-based) sequence is indicated when the letters and/or numbers are included in a syntagm or a paradigm as a way to chart the *archetypal* passage of time. A *synchronic* (outside-of-space/time-based) stasis moment (as in a still image) is indicated when the letters and/or numbers are excluded and all the paradigm layers and all the syntagm triangles co-exist simultaneously as if in a state of arrested animation.




To envision a synchronic syntagm, imagine the four triangles with the numbers or letters removed; this suppresses the desire to read a sequential, diachronic order into the syntagm; it's momentarily 'minimized' but not forgotten.



Diachronically, a bottom layer is in place before a second one arrives (above); the second one is in place before a third one arrives; and the third one is in place before a forth one arrives. Normally, in a typical linear progression, each layer displaces the previous layer, eradicates it. In the case of the AnalogosParadigmSyntagm, however, each layer remains in the repertoire for future use and as the foundation for subsequent occurrences to emerge in the next paradigmatic layers above it or in the next syntagmatic triangles after it. The Analogos structure cannot, therefore, be represented by one, continuous series of events along a single line, each event eliminating the previous one in a domino-effect sequence; rather, it is a layered concept in which all aspects remain at all times fully present on stage (or off stage, as in *Waiting for Godot*) even when dialogue bypasses them or when they are momentarily invisible, rendered spoken.

Synchronically, it's possible to make a vertical cross-section profile at any point in the paradigm map of layers above, and read the profile of all 4 layers as if arrested inside a given moment, as if outside of time. As always, however, the synchronic profile leads to a diachronic extrapolation because it takes time (the diachronic order) to read it. The result is inevitably a narrative, a *process*, an *event*, that tracks the journey of the response process—leaving the synchronic 'non-process' behind. (An archetypal response process is outlined in Part II.)

A diachronic (time-based) order is narrative and, in contrast to a synchronic order, is unstoppable. When numbers or letters are installed in the paradigm/syntagm, they map a sequence, a passage of time. Even though an individual narrative rarely follows a simple developmental sequence (such as A-B-C-D) it can, in any case, always be seen in relation to this sequence, and can be mapped to indicate any on-going zigzag back and forth. A particular narrative of an individual event, with its numerous twists and turns can, then, become 'visible' if it is mapped onto the AnalogosParadigmSyntagm. Because the Analogos proposes to represent an invariable structure, a constant, it can stand as a higher order framework, offering expanded layers of meaning to ordinary events. Because diachronic art works (such as film, performance, video, multi-media) cannot be stopped for someone to behold them (they must be accessed as ongoing events inside their duration time), they can only be mapped after they are finished and/or disrupted; the response *process*, as outlined in Part II, can then start to take place.



The Synchronic Orientation of the AnalogosSyntagm
(with the letters and the numbers removed)

In the syntagm above, imagine that there are no inner alpha-numerals to indicate a narrative sequence; this would make it a synchronic representation and as such it could be read more like a painting than a film or performance work. The *center triangle* now becomes a sort of "ground" because it is the site through which all of the others must relate. While the left/right directions remain, the order in which these are "unloaded" in any given narrative event (that is the order in which they are rendered diachronic) is in no way pre-cast in the archetypal 1–2-3-4 sequence. The interface between diachronic time events and synchronic spaces-made-into-time events are both conFigured within the same Analogos schema, a layering that is filled with a rich potential.

What sort of sequence does a beholder experience? Initially, a beholding inner image 'trip' takes place (as elaborated in Part II-A-1, 'forgetting'); it can then be reconstructed as an inner image memory (II-A-2, *inner imaging*, 'remembering'); then, among other possibilities, the experience as remembered can be mapped (II-A-2, *outer imaging*, 'remembering') and then possibly re-mapped onto the AnalogosSyntagm (a process that is itself diachronic—even if the beholding took place with a synchronic still image). The map is itself a synchronic or stored residue of the event and can remain in absentia until a new beholder awakens it again into a new diachronic 'artEvent'. To read a map that has been made is to re-enter into another diachronic event (another version of II-A-1, *inner imaging*); to remember the event itself, or to remember the mapping of the event, or the reading of the map, or the remembering of the remembering of the event—to do any of these is to enter into a diachronic event; they are all examples of re-entering a forgetting process (II-A-1) and/or following through with any of the other layers in the process.


A synchronic (space-based) order is indicated by disregarding the sequential order of the letters and numbers in the AnalogosSyntagm. This perspective, as inherently timeless as is a still image, shifts the paradigm away from any possibility of being a narrative, of marking out a process through time; rather, it becomes a way to regard everything as being inside a simultaneous moment in space. In this case the profile of the 4 layers that co-exist outside of time (as if time were stopped), must be held in stasis (outside of time) as a concept—even as the concept can only be brought to light by re-entering time—as a diachronic journey or event. Casting the I Ching, according to Jung, enables one to tap into a synchronic cosmos; it proposes to read the totality of space during a given moment of time (or timelessness).

Introduction

Part D: Analogos dynamics X, Y, Z


Since the AnalogosParadym is a four-part syntagm, there are three possible two-way splits:

- Dynamic X: A-B verses C-D
- Dynamic Y: A-C verses B-D
- Dynamic Z: A-D verses B-C




Dynamic X: A-B verses C-D

Dynamic X: The *inner world* (A-B) is differentiated from the *outer world* (C-D). A and B both face forward and are thus in harmony; but they also are in competition because one is above (secondary) and the other is below (primary). C and D face in opposite directions and are thus complementary to each other, one feeding back and the other feeding forward. Synchronically C occupies the central, contiguous position, sharing a border and consequent communication rights with all of the other three. As such, C is the mediator that both separates the other three from each other and at the same time acts as the agency for their potential interaction.



Dynamic Y: A-C verses B-D

Dynamic Y: The *substance-world* (A-C) is differentiated from the *structure-world* (B-D). B and D are both secondary and both face forward and are thus in harmony; but they also are in competition because one is inner and the other is outer. A and C face in opposite directions and are thus complementary to each other, one feeding back and the other feeding forward. Synchronically C occupies the central contiguous position, sharing a border and consequent communication rights with all of the other three. C is the mediator that both separates the other three from each other and at the same time acts as the agency for their potential interaction.



Dynamic Z: A-D verses B-C

Dynamic Z: The *infinite-world* (A-D) is differentiated from the *finite-world* (B-C). A and D both face forward and are thus in harmony; but they also are in competition because A is inner and primary and C is secondary and outer. B and C face in opposite directions and are thus complementary to each other, one feeding back and the other feeding forward. Synchronically C occupies the central contiguous position, sharing a border and consequent communication rights with all of the other three. As such, C is the mediator that both separates the other three from each other and at the same time acts as the agency for their potential interaction. The C-sites in all the examples encountered in this text can be seen as the central ground supporting and/or de-limiting any interactions that occur between or among the four agencies.

"But he has nothing on!" at last cried all the people.


The Emperor writhed for he knew it was true. But he thought, "The procession must go on now." So he held himself stiffer than ever, and the chamberlains held up his invisible train. (Hans Christian Anderson, translation by E. Lucas). (Perhaps only an emperor could continue to hold himself stiff on such an occasion!)

Part I

Subjects

When does the messenger *carry* the message and when does the messenger *become* (more or less) the message itself? If the messenger under question is one of the Analogos mediation carriers (technics or linguistics), then, when is it more transparent, a carrier of the message, and when is it more opaque, a medium with 'no' message other that itself? When is it ambivalent, not discernibly the one or the other? Subjects A and C (below) promote substance over structure, message over medium; subjects B and D promote structure over subject, medium as message.

<UFI...That nite she stared at herself in th glass; and eve'n az she did so she hate'd her boddee with' its musc.y'l'r shoald'rz, its smoll compact brests, and its slend'r flanks uv an ath'lete. Oll her life she must drag this boddee uv herz like a monstr's fett'r imposd on her speer't...O, poor and most des'late boddee!> (E.T.Hall, *The Dance of Life*, p. 187



D: *Socio-audio/visual: outer mediation*, mind/language as subject (medium as the message/content)
C: *Socio-dialogical*: outer objective information, content as subject (subject content over medium)
B: *Psychical-somatic*: inner mediation, muscular body/technics as subject (medium as the message/content)
A: *Psychodynamic*: inner subjective feeling, conception as subject (subject content over medium)
PART I: Subjects (basicParadigm)

C-D: social remote/exterior	D: audio/visual outer mediation linguistic subject	D-7/8 visual D-5/6 audio	8: text 7: image 6: speech 5: musical voice
	C: dialogical outer reality content subject	C-4/3 manifestation C-1/2 agency	4: meta subject spoken 3: subject spoken 2: spoken subject 1: speaking subject
A-B: psychical immediate/interior	B: haptic/conceptual inner mediation technic subject	B-7/8 inner image B-5/6 somatic	8: imagination 7: memory 6: emotion (feeling) 5: sensation (feeling)
	A: psychodynamic inner reality conception subject	A-3/4 motive A-1/2 motivation	4: meta conscious (self) 3: conscious (ego) 2: conscience (super ego) 1: unconscious (id)
Part I: Subjects (BasicMicroParadigms)			

The Analogos posits four types of subjects. Of these four, the *psychodynamic* subject (A) is the most internally oriented, the most immediate, the most individual-based of the four subjects. It is also the most absolute since it is unique for each individual, making it impossible for others to gain access to it, to confirm it or deny it. Accordingly, it is the most un-absolute (relative) subject for everyone else because these others can only hope that the mediation systems of technics and linguistics that are used to externalize it can do it justice. There is no way to verify the measure of correspondence between the inner images of one speaking subject with that of an other. Accordingly, a most perplexing pivitol quest/question remains: "What is the correspondence (presumably there is some) between my inner version of an other's inner image and their version of it when the latter can only be revealed to me inside whatever containers of technics and language they have chosen and/or have available to house it, carry it, contain it, make it visible/audible somatic?"

The second type of subject, like the first, also very immediate, is that of *technics* as subject (B). Technics, based in the body's motor control system, becomes a subject when it over-rides the content that it carries and draws attention instead to itself. It is, of course, impossible to make extensions without the use of technics; whether it involves the vocal chords used to speak, or the muscles used to dig a ditch, or the muscles used to push a button to explode a bomb on the other side of the planet, technics will inevitably come to be engaged as a mediation system. In its purist form it becomes a full-fledged subject, its own message; a messenger can try to have little or no message other than that of being a messenger. The dictum 'art for art's sake' was an orientation that hailed the production of works that had no purpose, no message. Abstract Expressionist painting, which embraced this ideology, glorified the body as gesture and the sensuous quality (linguistics) of paint (technics) as the perfect extension of it; The idea that paint could portray a subject other than itself, outside of its own gestural life (a normative realistic image of the human figure gesturing, for example) was rejected as subverting the medium to do the job of carrying an other's outside message (in this case, that of the look of the human body).

> One spring day I walked in the meadow behind the barn and felt rising around me the exhalations of the field, the moist sweetness of the grasses, and I imagined the earth's soul lifting to a warmth of the sun and mingled me in some divine embrace. There was such a brilliant conviction in the colors of the golden hay meadow, the blue sky, that I could not help laughing. I threw myself down in the grass and spread my arms. I fell at once into a trance and yet remained incredibly aware, so that whatever I opened my eyes to look at I did not merely see but felt at its existence. Such states come naturally to children. I was resonant with the hum of the universe, I was indistinguishable from the world in a great bonding of natural revelation. (E.L.Doctorow, p. 27)

The third type of subject (C), remote in comparison to the first two types, is that of external or *objective reality* (such as a realist painting of a gestural figure) posing as subject. This sort of representation posits the existence of the empirically objective, of factual information, of data that everyone more or less agrees is reality. This perceived content can only be accessed if the mediation systems (B and D, above) are willing to convey it with a minimum of interference. A television screen that has snow interfering with the image has lost some of its objective content to the interference of technics. A clear image or a clean sound has been transmitted with the technics as slave; content gains clarity when technics reduces its own desire for being seen or heard or felt and it is able to render the content that it carries with as little reference to itself-as-subject as possible. Since technology evolves over time, realism evolves hand in hand with it; the ability of technics to bypass itself is becoming ever more and more sophisticated.

The fourth type of subject, that of the symbolic, of *language* as subject (D), of codes or images or sounds as signs, is here posited as the most remote, the most abstract; this may appear to be in contradiction to the notion that language is an internal construction of the mind. However, the linguistic/semiotic is, like technics, a mediation system; every utterance depends on it for its sense of structure, for its conveyance of meaning. If technics is rooted in the body's interface with the material world, linguistics is rooted in the mind's interface with the symbolic world. And this latter is the more abstract of the two; it articulates the structure of the mind. Just as computer programming secretly underlies computer software, so language underlies human ideation.


Body language becomes visible/audible through the technics of motor/muscular activity, that is, through gestures, facial expressions, vocalizations. *Body language* acquires a concrete system of codes. *Symbolic language*, on the other hand, must acquire an abstract system of codes before it can articulate a message. When the two are in conflict, the immediate one, body language typically speaks the louder of the two: when someone yells to someone else to be quiet, the body language (yelling) cannot be easily ignored and it may even erase the more abstract or linguistic one (to be quiet) by drowning it out (the silent partner speaks the 'loudest'). The body language is in this case asking for the opposite to that of the over-all intended outcome: the former calls for noise, the latter calls for quietness. If the statement were to be typed in text, then the body language would be screened out and the message would be without conflict. Like technics, when language becomes a subject (D), it tries to speak of and for itself rather than to deliver a message. Poetry is a form of message-making that loves to play up the linguistic as part of the 'massage'; Dada poets went to the extreme of composing rhythmic sequences of pure sounds—as far as that is possible in the notation of text. Abstract painters, for example those working in the Modernist tradition of color-field compositions, pursued the hope of eliminating identifiable content (C) so that they could concentrate on visual language of and for itself (D).

The Analogos postulates four human "languages" or mediation systems (subjects B-5/6, B-7/8, D-5/6, D-7/8, above). The first two (the somatic and the virtual) are grounded in pre-verbal experience, are inner somatic-linguistic-based, while the latter two (the visual and the auditory) are outer-anchored, socio-linguistic-based. But all four, being structure/language-based, in contrast to the other substance-based four (within A and C), have a natural proclivity for insisting that the medium itself can become its own message.

It is in the nature of acting that we are not to see this woman as Ophelia, but Ophelia as this woman (G.B.Shaw). The difference between 'Olivier is Hamlet.' and 'Hamlet is Olivier.' is vast; in the former the actor takes on a role; in the latter, the actor is no more than the role. In the former the actor is a mediator who cannot stand inside the role without also standing for himself; in the latter, the actor becomes transparent for he is 'nothing' but Hamlet. In the latter, it is this absence of a representative from the non-theatrical world that reverberates. In the former, the person Olivier overlayers Hamlet with dimensions of his other acting roles and lived lives. The transparent and the opaque, acting as shades, ranging from more to less, of opposing options, are forever lingering in our interface with everything that we are not, with everything that is other..

> Of course, not for a second will this woman in her acting be unaware that she is acting. She never forgets that she has veiled herself sufficiently to play this role, that she has chosen to forget for the moment that she is this woman and not Ophelia. But then, neither do we as audience forget we are audience. Even though we see this woman as Ophelia, we are never in doubt that she is not. We are in complicity with her veil. We allow her performed emotions to affect us, perhaps powerfully. But we never forget that we *allow* them to do so. (Carse, p. 14)

D:7\8	visual language, the register of (outer) *light on the eye*
D:5\6	auditory language, the register of (outer) *sound on the ear*
B:7\8	virtual/emotional or inner image language, the register of (inner) *memory and imagination in the mind*
B:5\6	haptic or body language, the register of (inner) *sensory feelings in the body, including taste and smell*
The four human languages (microParadigms)	



The layered paradigm and the triangular syntagm at the beginning of Part II both outline the differentiation between substance (A, C) and structure (B, D). According to the Analogos, then, the four languages are structural (B, D); language is the container that carries messages (A,C); language is the messenger that delivers the message. In terms of semiotics, there are two aspects involved in communication: firstly, the syntagmatic, or *structure* of language which holds the syntax, the rules, that aspect that remains consistent and reliable as a container, and secondly, the paradigmatic or *substance,* the complex of variables, the content, that aspect which consists of the many options available and ready to be inserted into any appropriate vacancy into the container/ syntagm.

A syntagm has rigorous structural rules that determine when and where a specific paradigmatic unit can be inserted. For example, a noun, such as the word 'dog' (a paradigmatic unit), must stand in the same category as other nouns and it must relate to the other figures of speech, such as a verb, in the prescribed word order that is practiced in English (a syntagmatic sequence). In a verbal language, such as English, the sentence order is a syntagmatic construct that remains constant (with strict variations permissible); this typically consists of the following basic, set sequence: an article ('the' or 'a') followed by an adjective, a noun, a verb, an adverb, an article, an adjective and a noun, in that order. For each of these positions a vast range of words will fit but only one can be chosen, leaving the absence of all the others, the ones not selected, clearly implicated as rejects. As such, parts of speech, adjectives, for example, can only be inserted in their designated place in the sequence. The invariability of the syntagmatic structure and the flexibility of the paradigmatic structure make it possible for an infinite number of meanings (I-C-3) to be expressed inside an agreed upon linguistic structure that is shared and uttered by one or more in a group of speaking subjects (I-C-1). They always take into account their 'other', their expected or intended receiver, their spoken subject (I-C-2). What is spoken is the subject spoken (I-C-3), and what is said about what is said is the meta subject spoken (I-C-4). In the Analogos schema the lowest layer (A, a, I, 1, or i) and the lower-left triangle (also A, a, I, 1, or i) can only accept the ground aspect of any complex; all other aspects must be steered elsewhere; as well, once one version of the ground is inserted, all other acceptable ways of representing the specific ground are also fully present, but in absentia.

The Analogos syntagm consists of a four-part triangular structure with a specific diachronic order (pre-text, context, content, de-context, in that sequential order) and synchronic order (the same structure as that of the diachronic, but with the time, as indicated by letters/numbers, removed, i.e., with simultaneity foregrounded). The Analogos paradigm can fully accept diachronically any event or sequence, small or large, and it can accept any removed-from-time, non-event, synchronically. The fact that both time and space enter the same syntagmatic structure helps the user to resist the usual conceptual problem of not being able to hold them both at the same time, a practice that tends to leave them, theoretically, isolated from each other, and incapable of revealing the rich interrelation that struggles survive and even to thrive in the Analogos.

Relative to French, the English language has a much more relaxed syntagmatic structure; English tends to favor substance whereas French tends to favor structure, relatively speaking. As a small example, English can differentiate between the following two sentences, which is not possible in French because the syntax wants to keep the upper hand and will not allow it: "They have her book" and "They have his book". In both cases the French syntax over-rules, requiring that the pronoun (his/her) agree with the gender of book (masculine) so that it cannot refer to the actual gender of the person whose book it is. In this case, relatively speaking, English favors the substance or subject matter, the message; French favors the structure or language, the messenger.

The difference between the two expressions, a 'company on the internet' and an 'internet company', is an indication of the way that English differentiates between meaning that is transparent (the mediation is 'just a tool', the former) and meaning that is opaque ("the medium is the message", the latter). But an 'internet company' can also become partially transformed into a 'company on the internet' when it proceeds to set up affiliates to market itself, even as it's 'real' purpose is to act as a marketer for other companies.

Part I: A

Subjects: Psychodynamics (the inner self-dialogue)

An infant may have no sense of other, no differentiation from the mother; but this is certainly not the case for those of us who as adults are socialized and enculturated. Every word or utterance that adults, as speaking subjects, make, is constructed with an *other*, very-present *spoken subject* in mind; they imagine what to say and then they imagine their other receiving it. The fact that we are unaware of this spoken 'other' most of the time does not mean that it is absent. It arrives with the process of *socialization* and follows us everywhere. Even when adults talk to themselves, their other is present; in this case it is their own 'other self'. In short, in the process of growing up, humans construct an inner duality, an 'inner one' and an 'inner other'. Every time we conjure up a scenario of what we expect to happen in the future, we engage this pair of characters and run them through the proposed sequence to see how they (or rather, 'we') make out (or rather, *might* make out, since it is all in the virtual language of the inner image).

How, then, does this inner dialectic take place? And by what process is the conflict resolved between two inner subjects who (like the relationship between two people, two subjects) often have differing motivations and expectations? Freud tried to propose an answer in his "Interpretation of Dreams" His theorization is instructive in helping to delineate the structural dynamics of the two most internal/basic sites of the Analogos, Part I-A-1 and I-A-2, above).

Freud, in 1899, postulated the existence of two inner domains, an *unconscious* (Part I-A-1) and a preconscious (Part I-A-2). Since the two operate on the basis of an entirely different set of processes and with entirely different motivations, their disperate characters and their modes of interaction is instructive in the present context. What they both share is their responsiveness to external stimulation, imprinted as memory traces. Accordingly, they are first and foremost reservoirs of cultural norms and values, of prohibitions and models, of pleasure to seek and pain to avoid. However, in the unconscious these take on sensorial forms (images, sounds, smells, tastes, sensations); they are emotionally charged and are not subject to conscious recall. In the preconscious (or conscience, the term used more often here), on the other hand, they take on a structural or linguistic form making it possible for them to be willfully recalled.

The *preconscious* is accordingly a storehouse of culturally learned values; the unconscious on the other hand only becomes aware of these through its dealing with the preconscious. To accept the existence of this inner socio-cultural reservoir (the preconscious) runs counter to the often popular myth of the 'natural child', after Rousseau and others; this is the notion that socio-cultural acquisition is detrimental to a child's development. If, however, as Freud noted, cultural values are already introjected in infancy, it seems to make little sense to advocate protection against them later on. More recent research indicates that without socialization a child cannot even survive.

Freud postulated that the motivation behind the psychic economy is the avoidance of *unpleasure*, that is, the release of tension build-up; this he referred to as the pleasure principle. The unconscious responds to unpleasure by attempting to repeat the solutions that worked successfully on previous occasions; these take on a sensory form, privileging images and sounds. The preconscious comes into play through disillusionment; it regards the desires of the unconscious as rather juvenile and irresponsible and in need of editorial clean up before being allowed expression. This is th task that it takes on as its reason for being.

Since the preconscious has fluency with outside reality, it rejects the hallucinatory solutions or primary gratification proposed by the unconscious in favor of actions that it considers more likely to be accepted. For the unconscious a vivid fusion with memory is uppermost; however, for the preconscious a more appropriate response involves the use of language with its clear differentiation of the syntactical structure from the paradigmatic content. (The Analogos is itself a linguistic system, and is, accordingly, like the preconscious; however, since it is premised on the use of *analogical* rather than strictly *logical* relationships, it is also akin to the unconscious. This mid-position will be seen to recur in subsequent discussions involving the use of metaphor and metonymy as two linguistic means indispensable to artists.)

As an infant gains experience from the gradual introduction of disillusion experiences, it acquires a repertoire of strategies for coping with the particular mother/other; the two states of mind (I-A-1, I-A-2) will more and more take on specific roles. The preconscious will learn to act as censor, blocking wishes that it considers as bound to fail in the real outer world. Meanwhile the unconscious goes on wishing, and, according to Freud, infantile impulses that were repressed will continue to seek fulfillment. They will keep trying different solutions until they can find one acceptable to the preconscious. Accordingly, when they do break through, they will be wearing masks, camouflages and end up as slips-of-the-tongue, dreams, jokes, neuroses. Freud seems to posit that the triangle that every child encounters in its inevitable identity conflict occurs when it discovers that there are two genders, as present in the mother and the father; this occasion, that he called the Oedipus complex, marks, for Freud, a major site of human desire. It may be said metaphorically that the unconscious signifies desire/identity while the preconscious (that is, conscience) signifies need/complementation, the former searching for *self-reflection* (Who am I?), the latter searching for *self-revelation* (Who am I not? or who do I need to become to complete 'myself'?)

The unconscious works more or less on what Freud terms *primary process*. It seeks immediate gratification, and when blocked, it zips with great fluidity from one pleasurable image (visual, auditory and/or haptic) to another until it finds one that will bypass the censorship of the preconscious. It searches out stereotypical responses; it favors ritual, the repetition of past successes, pleasures.

Secondary process, on the hand, must reduce the tension level of primary responses so that inner image relations can be worked out in accordance with ones that were socially and/or culturally rewarding in the past. If primary process tries to fuse differences, secondary process, must try to construct and sustain the clear separation of the syntagmatic from the paradigmatic that is basic to any language system. If primary process looses itself in sensory activity, secondary process tries to deal lucidly in verbal memories. Secondary process, as the second level in the Analogos (I-A-2), is, unlike primary process (I-A-1), aware of the potential power inherent in being able to differentiate terms and uses language precisely for this reason. The value of memories in verbal form is that they can be recalled at will. Unconscious memories are only accessible via this preconscious or secondary process.

Although both primary and secondary process are socially constituted, the former one is the source of pre-verbal, sensorial enrichment while the latter one keeps in touch with the culture whose language it 'speaks'. There is an indication here of the importance of verbal therapy to help subjects who have been traumatized or over-charged at the primary process level and need to acquire a sense of differentiation; and of sensorial therapy to re-activate a primary process that has been the victim of a dictatorial preconscious. Motivation has its source in primary process; communal acceptance has its continuity in secondary process. While their interaction, each one with each other, is one of opposition, each one having a complementary job description, they have in common the need to co-exist because either one alone is dysfunctional. This dynamic elaborated by Freud characterizes the relation between Part I-A-1 and Part I-A-2 in the Analogos paradigm/syntagm at all parallel levels, from micro to macro. Part I-A-1 and Part I-A-2 constitute the inner dynamic, the dynamic of any two initial/inner triangles (1-2, 5-6, A-B, I-II) in any series of four. The above description provides a way to understand something of the dynamic through which a speaking subject becomes constituted within a socio-cultural fabric.

Freud later modified his terminology so that the 'unconscious' can for our purposes be updated to the term, 'id', and the preconscious to the term 'super ego'. Bern popularized these terms in his "Games People Play" as the 'child' and the 'parent', the former evoking primary process and the latter, secondary process. (Bern's other term, 'adult' corresponds more or less to Freud's 'ego' in the Analogos, while the term 'self', as coined by Jung, the fourth term in the Analogos, while not mentioned by Bern, refers to his own discourse, his text, which he might have termed, 'meta-adult' to describe one who not only is mature but sees the deep structure behind maturity.) The chart below summarizes these as reconstituted by the Analogos.

To understand the structure of all four parts of Part I-A, that is, how the ego and self emerge from the id and the super ego, the developmental process proposed by Winnicott is, I would argue, among the most articulate. He theorized, to encapsulate his work in much too brief a framework, that at first a mother illusions her infant into believing that it is omnipotent by initially satisfying its every expressed cry. The infant develops an illusion, an inner image, a belief that it is actually functioning with great facility in the world; after all, it merely has to cry and it achieves instant results. The inner image desire and the outer image construct are fused into a single event. As adults we have come to know that this normally requires a sophisticated skill (with technics and linguistics) to achieve results; and rarely are they either instant or easy to achieve. Without this skill the infant needs 'mothering' (by an adult) to set the conditions for it to gain the illusion that it is activating the real world by itself.

Sooner or later, however, the infant will need to face the reality behind the illusion, the reality that they will need to develop technic/linguistic skills to survive on their own. How does the mother undo the illusion that she has created? Winnicott noted that the 'good enough' mother typically disillusions the infant by gradually extending the time and space expectations of the infant. When it cries for food, for example, she more and more sets up delays and when it needs holding she more and more sets up distance. Winnicott noticed that at the same time as the infant was being disillusioned it was developing a close relationship with an object such as a blanket

Freud (1899)	process	Bern	Bradshaw	Freud/Jung	*Analogos (I: A)*	
		meta-adult		self (Jung)	*(meta) self*	4
		adult		ego	*conscious*	3
preconscious	secondary	parent	inner parent	super ego	*conscience*	2
unconscious	primary	child	inner child	id	*unconscious*	1
Part I-A: Psychodynamics (after Freud. Jung, Bern, Bradshaw) (microParadigms)						


A blanket holds its infant inside a 'surround', it is an object that can be easily manipulated and, unlike the mother, it stays put. In this investment in an object, the infant is supposedly beginning to develop a sense of autonomy, a sense of power-over-other—even, an awakening to the idea that there is such a thing as an other. The fusion with the mother is fading away as the differentiation emerges. The mother makes/gives a blanket that she has invested with her technic/linguistic skill; in doing so she enables the infant to experience its world as if it were in full possession of these very skills which in reality it is so fully lacking.

In providing a readymade object for the infant at the same time as she is distancing herself in terms of time and space, the mother has set in motion a process of disillusionment that the infant is able to cope with, one that at the same time, enables it to gain a sense of self, of autonomy, of separation from its mother/other. This process of socialization in which the infant is first led to believe in the illusion of power and then to ever so gradually break through that illusion, spells out a way to understand how an infant, a beginner, can move from the absence of any skills at all to a gradual mastery of many during a lifetime. This diachronic sequence is not reversible; it is not possible to disillusion someone until they have illusions. And it is this initial illusion of creative power, Winnicott would argue, that enables individuals from that time forth to believe in their ability to activate their world, to be *creative*.

The outcome of this primary/secondary (I-A-1/I-A-2) intra-action could be termed a 'resolution', to give Winnicott's construct a term of continuity. The *resolution* of the inner dialogue between illusion and disillusion is the construction of an 'inner parent', an inner holding/surround object, but this parent is a constructed, or inner parent (I-A-2), one over which the infant has control. The resolution is validated and anchored in the form of a real blanket, an object that is outside and as such strengthens the infant's sense of differentiation from the mother; this is the developmental beginning of Jungian individuation. To coin a term for the fourth site of the Analogos, a '*metallusion*' can be said to be in place when the infant knows that it knows, when it has an inner image that precedes the outer one, when it can predict action and then proceed to carry it out. The chart below configures Winnicott's concept of transitional space in the Analogos paradigm.

If Winnicott proposes a way to understand transitional or interdependent interaction between subjects, then Greenberg proposes a way to conceptualize the reverse position, the other side of the coin. This is perhaps best exemplified by a term that is central to Modernism, that of the *autonomous object*. If Winnicott elaborates the object that exists in a co-ownership between two subjects (such as a mother and child), then Greenberg defined the sort of object that is designed to stand on its own, detached from any specific speaking or spoken subject.

Freud (1899)	process	*Winnicott*	Part	Freud (later)	Analogos (I:A)	
		*'metallusion'**	Part I-A-4	self (Jung)	(meta) self	4
		*'resolution'**	Part I-A-3	ego	conscious	3
preconscious	secondary	*disillusion*	Part I-A-2	super ego	conscience	2
unconscious	primary	*illusion*	Part I-A-1	id	unconscious	1
Part I-A: **Psychodynamics** (Winnicott, etc.) (microParadigms)					*Analogos terms	



Once the easel painting lost its mural-position on the wall, it became a commodity that needed to carry with it the full instructions for someone (anyone, supposedly) anywhere, to be able to read it. Greenberg's 'Art for art's sake' was born. An object can supposedly be invested with autonomy, with a capacity to carry a stored message beyond the time and place of the subject agent that created it. The messenger is free to act on its own. The maker and the viewer are freed from each other's immediate terrain and time—and the artwork becomes an object, an object that has all the prerequisites to become a commodity.

The infant's first object (and supposedly the first object for all of us since all of us, with the possible exception of characters like Adam, were at one time infants) is significant because it is through the specifics of this object-event as it unfolds that an infant comes to form a basis for subsequent relations with objects. Winnicott terms this first extension of an infant as a *transitional object* because it is situated between the mother and the infant; they both can claim a form of ownership, the mother having 'made' it, acting as a skillful adult and the infant having 'made' it, acting as a beginner without skills. The lack of skills is not a handicap since the infant does not need them to accept a completed *readymade* object and invest in it, a process that initiates and facilitates the development of a life-long process of skill acquisition.

To summarize the above sequence: the mother sets the conditions for the infant to construct an illusion that enables it to come to believe in itself as powerful (A-1, the illusion); the mother then gradually disillusions the infant while at the same time providing a transitional, readymade object (A-2, the disillusion); the infant finds the found object and remakes it as its own (A-3, the resolution); the infant gains enough security to believe in its fluency to (pre-) inner-image new extensions and then outer-image them inside the transitional space that is its home terrain (A-4, the metallusion).

The above schematic delineates how an infant is set up to invest in an external object, to re-make it on its own terms, to come to secure a sense of dependence on an object, how it is then propelled along a course of illusionment-breaking experiences in order to attain a motivated relation to the world. The mother sees through the illusion; the infant only gradually comes to see through it; the mature mother starts the process of the transfer of power so that the vast discrepancy between the two at the beginning decreases as time passes until it becomes one of a shared dialogue between two 'equals'. In the first two phases (A-1, A-2), the mother initiates; in the latter two (A-3, A-4), the infant initiates. In the beginning the infant is 'tricked' into acting as a *speaking subject* while the mother plays at being the *spoken subject*; the dialogue in the end is between two speaking subjects who can alternatively take turns as a spoken subject or listener when their other speaks.

Part I-B

Subjects: Psychical-somatic (inner mediation, body/technics as subject)

Part I-A (above) focused on the quaternity of inner dynamics as the source of content (as latent content); Part I-B focuses on the other (upper, but still inner triangle) side of this dialogue, that is, the body/mind that exists as the mediator, that component that is designed to make the virtual dreams of the imagination (I-B) manifest, visible, audible, haptic, in the real world. This focus on the inner quaternity of Part I:B should not be allowed, however, to distract us from the larger interaction between I-A and I-B. The inner latent content (I-A) has no voice until the technics (I-B) can be called upon to express it in concrete terms, to speak it, to materialize it, to manifest it, to offer the means whereby it can be uttered, that is, given form as an extension in the outer world (this outer world, I-C, is the central triangle and focus of Part III). Part I-B that follows, then, is, in the first instance, an attempt to articulate the complexities of the body's ability to gain muscular control (skill) over the technics that can be used to fashion outer image ex-tensions of a subject's inner image in-tensions.


Since the body's technical skill involves the feedback loop of sensorial experience (such as eye-hand co-ordination) there is a full-fledged participation of the psychical in this evolving process. This psychical feedback, in sync with physical technics, could be termed a grammar of the body/mind; materials have intrinsic demands that the motor/muscular abilities of the body will need to adapt to and structure if it is to find ex-pression through them and sensorial feedback from them. Accordingly, Part I-B begins with an outline of the emergence developmentally of a sensory-motor repertoire (or memory) in a typical human infant. All adult literate humans will presumably have been through this sequence in one way or another.

> Centering: is the act which precedes all others on the potters' wheel. The bringing of the clay into a spinning, unwobbling pivot, which will then be free to take innumerable shapes as potter and clay press against each other. The firm, tender, sensitive pressure...yields as much as it asserts. It is like a handclasp between two living hands, receiving the greeting at the very moment that they give it. It is this speech between the hand and the clay that makes me think of dialogue. And it is a language far more interesting than the spoken vocabulary that tries to describe it, for it is spoken not by the tongue and lips but by the whole body, by the whole person speaking and listening. And with listening too, it seems to me, it is not the ear that hears; it is not the physical organ that performs the act of inner receptivity. It is the total person who hears. Sometimes the skin seems to be the best listener, as it prickles and thrills, say to a sound or a silence, or a fantasy... (Richards, 1964, p.9)

According to Piaget, mental development begins with *sensory-motor memory* or association (B-5); he describes this as a phase, one that evolves during the first two years of life. During this time the '*circular reaction'* of exploration and remembering enables the toddler to acquire a *repertoire* of likes and dislikes; it is this formation that initiates the emotional memory (B-6) and grounds it and sets the character of the emotional personality of the individual. In the beginning, then, (in the first month), there emerge the 'primary circular' reactions, or motor-based memories, the most common one being that of thumb sucking. The action is within itself; it produces pleasure and is held in the memory repertoire as such. There is not yet a sense of differentiation between the inside self and the outside other/mother.

By age four months the senses are more and more coordinated and the infant can respond to actions that are outside the '*primary circle'*; an example of this type of '*secondary circle'* reaction is that of the child shaking a rattle. In this case it is the sound feedback loop that is experienced as pleasure and becomes held in the memory repertoire as such. At the approximate age of four months the infant can respond to external stimulus in the form of a smile. Early experiences retained in sensory-motor memory become embodied. They are faithfully retained: learn to drive a bicycle and decades later the skill remains intact. That Bolles, in *Remembering and Forgetting,* does not include this layer in his steps of repertoire development is not an indication of its lack of importance, but rather merely that it is so early on in development that he does not single it out.

<table>
<tr><th>Part I-B
Analogos layer</th><th>memory layer
(after Bolles)</th><th>brain (McLean)
Analogos</th><th>age of emergence in infants (with examples) (after Piaget)</th></tr>
<tr><td>B-8 imagination</td><td>interpretive</td><td rowspan="2">upper brain
B-7-8 symbolic</td><td>24 months (speech 'chunking')</td></tr>
<tr><td>B-7 memory</td><td>factual</td><td>10 months (absent objects retained)</td></tr>
<tr><td>B-6 emotion-feeling</td><td>emotional</td><td rowspan="2">lower brain
B-5-6 somatic</td><td>4 months (rattle sounds, smile)</td></tr>
<tr><td>B-5 sensation-feeling</td><td>sensory-motor</td><td>1 month (thumb sucking)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Part I-B: PsychicalSomatics (after Bolles/McLean/Piaget) (microParadigms)</td></tr>
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In the present (Analogos) structure, the sensory motor memory is the most essential layer because it remains the foundation for all that follows. It is not a stage that passes but rather continues to act as the ground of all of life's experiences. It is always there (as a double check) to help validate input from the more remote (visual and auditory) forms of *perception*. For example, human technics is initially (in an infant) a motor action that operates as an interior or primary circle (there is no awareness of an external object to perceive); but with the development of the senses it continues to engage increasingly larger feedback loops; these circles eventually not only extend to the length of the arm but with the evolution of technics can include an act such as pushing a button to trigger a nuclear bomb or a nuclear reactor continents away in years to come.

Bolles argues that, in contradiction to most early metaphors or theorizations of the nature of memory, there is no storage process involved, as in computers, but rather there is an accumulation of a repertoire of *emotional associations*. The recognition of external objects engages the infant in a feedback loop or circle that invites an emotional reaction to things that are 'other'. Pleasure and/or pain, as experienced, constitute the groundwork of what Bolles calls emotional memory. As soon as an infant engages in a secondary circle, recognizing an 'other' beyond its self, emotions are triggered and the formation of an individual repertoire of interrelational feeling associations is set in motion.

According to Piaget, infants can respond to incoming sensory stimulation (from objects, for example) when they are younger than three months. But it is not until the age of about 10 months that they can retain an interest in the object after it is no longer present. At twelve months, a child is able to speak in single words and by eighteen months they are able to lump words together. This is an indication of the increasing complexity of the child's factual memory (I-B-7), as defined by Bolles.

By two years of age, children often begin to form sentences; while these are an indication of increasing sophistication, they are what Bolles calls clichés, or undigested chunks, somewhat like bitmaps in computerese. Interpretative memory (I-B-8) is present, Bolles suggests, when a child gains insight into these clichés. At this stage a child can substitute individual words correctly into a sentence. In short, there is enough grasp of sentence structure to fit words into their proper places; to be able to engage the process of substituting adjectives to replace other adjectives, for example, is an indication that there is an understanding of the paradigmatic (the available words) in relation to the syntagmatic (the available syntax that determines where and how to correctly place the words in sequence).

Sensory-motor memory (I-B-5) is the ground of all experience; no information seems as reliable as that derived through the body itself (the somatic or haptic sensibility), through direct contact, be it the sense of touch on the skin, of taste on the tongue or of smell in the nostrils. Further, skills are grounded in sensory-motor memory, especially those depending on the eyes and ears to receive feedback from actions. Sound can be received from a distance if there is a medium such as air or water to carry it. Light can even penetrate a vacuum and as such can bring information from remote galaxies. Auditory and visual perception, the two most remote, abstract, but articulate of sensorial pipelines, are also the most subject to distortion and deception. The somatic sensibility, unlike the visual and the auditory, insists on reading only by contact, making it more difficult to trick. All over-layered experience continues to depend deeply on the ground provided by sensory-motor memory just as a tree depends on its root system.

> "...(The) corpus callosum...which becomes complete between ages four and five...not only bridges the hemispheres, it may control the traffic on that bridge, sending information either way, making decisions, closing traffic when the left hemisphere needs privacy to do its work, and so on. Through its possibility for isolation, the left hemisphere...doesn't have to make the organic intelligence governing life as a whole, as the lower structures do....Using abstract ideas coming not from matter as it is, but from the mind's ideas of what might be done with matter, we modulate, mutate, or change concrete information. (Pearce, 1992, p.176)

Emotional memory (I-B-6), Bolles argues, begins and continues to operate via emotional associations, not as stored experience, as was theorized historically. With each new encounter an infant retains a sense of wanting either more of the same or a sense of never again wanting to approach anything even remotely similar. Most of the humdrum experiences in between these two extremes are probably not given much importance among the memory associations retained. To assign emotional memory as an *acquired* repertoire of experience, does not mean that it is randomly attained without any genetic predispositions; rather Bolles theorizes that it is built on instinctive, inborn taste. In the end, however, individuals acquire a distinct and unique repertoire of emotional memory that guides them in the push and pull of everyday choices.

In differentiating sensory-motor associational memory (B-6) from purely motor memory (B-5), Bolles notes that mammals and birds are capable of both, whereas animals lower down on the evolutionary scale can form only motor associations. The awareness of pleasure and pain associated with sensation is required for emotional memory, not to replace reflexive/motor memory, but to extend it.

Factual memory (I-B-7), according to Bolles, is the next step on the developmental stairs (after emotional memory). Again, he argues, current thought is in contradiction to the historical theorization that focused on the dictum, "Pay attention!" The problem is that attention comes, not from an order to do it, but rather from a repertoire of emotional memory associations. Accordingly, as sensory memory rides on the back of motor memory, so factual memory rides on the back of emotional memory (or to be more precise, factual memory functions if it is supported by emotional memory which functions if it is supported by motor memory.)

The difficulty with factual memory is that it is external to our embodiment of associations; things have names, things remind us of other things. When one thing is present we expect to find the other aspects that were originally associated with it. The chain extends: we hear music, it brings back the place which brings back the person which brings back the time. This triggers the emotions that were associated with the original cluster event. Emotions bring us to attention; ordering ("Pay attention!") has none of this potency and staying power. It follows that emotions drive expectations; and these may be rewarding, but they may also be disappointing—when reality doesn't measure up. Bolles makes the point that, although factual memory is not creative, it is 'marvelously adaptive'. Because it can trigger memories of aspects that are absent in the present but were present in the past, it can warn of a possible repetition of danger or provide a sense of anticipation; it enables a sense of readiness for events yet to come.

The above paragraph refers to factual memories that are specific, the ones that come with the full context of the already-in-place ensemble of associations that were together when they were first encountered. But there are also more abstract, general, factual memories: for example, a word refers to a thing which refers back to the word: a rose (the thing) is a rose (the word) is a rose (the thing)...This closed loop does not send the memory back to the past, for example, back to associations of specific smells and scenes that led to the name of the event. Rather, it holds the memory in the present tense in the present context (a context that may have no particular interest in offering support). The chain of specific events is one of repeats of *recognition* followed by *recall*: Something triggers a recognition of a smell which enables a recall of past details which in turn enables one to recognize the context which in turn enables one to recall the name of the event.

Bolles outlines the complementary roles of recognition and recall: "the former one understands, the latter is productive". In terms of psychodynamics (I-A), recognition can be seen as the primary process or under-side of the coin (it thrives on context because that facilitates the making of displacement chains); recall is the secondary process or upper-side of the coin (it needs to differentiate content from context because that facilitates the use of language to articulate the general or abstract). Memory works best when the two function in mutual support; primary-process recognition providing substance and secondary-process recall providing the structure.

If, as Bolles suggests, factual memory is dependent upon emotional memory, then what emotion serves memory best? He indicates that *fear* promotes avoidance of memory; action and anger arrest learning; 'coolness' focuses inward and is not helpful in arousing interest in what is outside or other. *Arousal* is the emotion that initially promotes good memory and therefore better learning. This is important information for those who parent, teach or for those who are involved in the advertising industry because memory that provokes no emotion is easily forgotten. When arousal is merely based on surprise it may fade away unless it trigger a personal connection; and arousal may not even be triggered if it has become habituated, as happens, for example, when city sounds are 'unheard' by those who live there, or when zoo animals ignore the tourists. Bolles identifies the *fixed gaze* as an indication of arousal, and the *double take* as an indication of a delayed reaction. Further, the *recency effect* explains why it is typically easier to recall the latest occurrences in a sequence than it is to recall those that came earlier.

Over-arching events that reach us via the media, such as the announcement of Kennedy's murder, provoke what Bolles calls *flashbulb memory*. Everyone remembers vividly the specifics of their situation upon hearing the news. However, since most news arrives in words and comes from remote places, it is perceived as highly abstract (the absence of embodied, pre-verbal languages is fully present). Indeed, the lack of contact, of sounds and smells should suggest that this is not going to cause much arousal or interest. But the gravity of the event commands full attention and the more primary levels of arousal are quickly filled in. In short, since the event is virtual; its physicality is fully present as an *absence*; and this type of metaphoric 'lack' as tension cannot do other than cause deep arousal. This use of absence is a common practice with artists and pedagogically competent leaders because they are aware of the profound significance of loss, of lack, as being emotionally charged—which in turn can form the motivation or basis for supporting factual memory. If emotional memory re-cycles information about ourselves back to us, factual memory does not. The later, on the other hand, is vital because it serves practical needs about our relation to our external world.

Interpretive memory (I-B-8), although dependent upon factual memory, differs in at least one important way from the latter. Interpretative associations combine experiences in order to form insights, meaningful patterns, whereas factual associations combine experiences in whatever random way they occur. Bolles differentiates them qualitatively thus: "The associations of factual memory are sensory, evoking images (visual and sound). The associations of interpretive memory are *symbolic*, evoking meaning (brackets added)." While factual memory organizes recognition and recall in a string of cause and effect sequences, interpretive memory overlays the two terms so that it is impossible to tell which one came first. The shift from factual memory to interpretive memory parallels the shift from paradigm to syntagm aspects of signification.


The pioneer who first bypassed the concept of the *storage* metaphor for memory was Bartlett. Unlike Ebbinghaus before him, who limited his research to factual memory (nonsense lists, for example), Bartlett was trying to understand interpretive memory, or at least make sense of the distortions and inventions that seemed to be integral to the way the mind works. He theorized that an organizing principle was at work, that individuals were adjusting new input to fit a pre-existing *schema*. Miller furthered this idea, noting that the grammar part of language is just such an organizing principle, that meaningful order facilitates recall.

By the 1970s Piaget had joined in this research; he noted that 10-year-old children were able to remember a cause-effect experiment because they understood the principle behind it, whereas younger children remembered very little, not having grasped the organizing principle. Individuals construct experience and then remember the construction or how the details are organized into schemata. The Analogos is such a schema, enabling the organization of experiences not only across a cluster of close-up details or random events but also at the macro level, across disciplines, and between micro and macro versions of reality. Each time an event is recalled it needs to be constructed again; this helps to explain how it is possible to remember things that never happened (false memory). Accordingly, it is not so far fetched to realize interpretive memory's ability to form associations that never existed. The inner image can leap from 'factual' memory to imagination, the source of creativity and invention. Bolles notes that being able to envision diverse and separate associations as a unified chunk "permits creative action...*chunking* permits something new".

On the basis of his experiments with children drawing the uneven levels of water in a U-shaped tube, Piaget concluded that memory shifts when there is a conflict between recall and recognition, between perception and cognition/construction. The latter insists that the former adjust to fit some unifying principle or schema. The children who drew without understanding why there were different levels felt this tension, but without an explanation their drawings six months later revealed that the discrepancy had been forgotten. When they understood, the drawing retained the information. They had to either record what they saw and feel that it was wrong or correct the grammar of the information to make it 'right' (in this case, equalizing the water levels in the drawing). The process extends to the principle of *plausibility*: if a new 'fact' fits into an already exiting schema, it is quickly 'recognized' and has a familiarity. Bolles utilizes his own interpretive memory in the invention of his *schema* of a staircase to describe memory, one step for each type. The Analogos offers this possibility of organizing unrelated parts.


> These irregularities can elaborate on and perhaps ultimately overthrow earlier insights. They have filled the world with tools, art, and meaning. When formalized, this testing between particular experience and general expectation is the scientific method. Artistic tension is less rigorously defined, but more open to surprising and telling situations. The tensions of interpretive memory lie at the center of the artful world we have made for ourselves. (Bolles, p.91)

The correspondence between the brain and memory layers in humans becomes especially visible in the Analogos paradigmSyntagm. McLean, Koestler and others have researched and theorized about the conflict-complementation between the lower old brain and the upper neocortex; Sperry and others have researched and theorized about the conflict-complementation between left and right brains. These differentiations have evolved within the limitations inherent in the situation: it is a case of the brain speculating about itself. The fact that humans can use their brain to think about their brain, a case of the beholder's focusing being also the focus beheld, may be in itself, amazing; but it also forecasts unthinkable limitations, perhaps even a 'conflict of interest'!



The oldest, or reptilian brain, at the top of the spinal cord, is a slave to precedent, to ancestral lore. The limbic system, wrapped around the reptilian brain, registers rewards and punishments as well as emotions in general, and it controls the autonomic nervous system. The neocortex, human brain or 'thinking cap', consists of two lateral brains joined by a corpus callosum. If surgically separated, the left and right brains operate independently. The left brain thinks analytically and reductively, registers linearity, diachronical or temporal sequence, language and mathematics.

Part I-B brain layers (after McLean...Sperry...)	*memory layer (after Bolles)*	*verticality Analogos*	*brain layer functions (after McLean., Sperry...)*
B-8: right neocortex brain	interpretive	upper brain B-7/B-8 symbolic	holistic, synchronic, patterns, faces...
B-7: left neocortex brain	factual		analytical, reductive, linear, language.
B-6: limbic system	emotional	lower brain B-5/B-6 somatic	pleasure, pain, autonomic system...
B-5: reptilian brain	sensory-motor		ritual: sex, hierarchies, bonding...
Part I:B PsychicalSomatics (after Bolles, McLean, Sperry...) (microParadigms)			



The right hemisphere thinks holistically, synthetically and synchronically, registers spatiality and patterns, especially faces. The left schema is supported by behaviorism, the right by Gestalt psychology. The left schema may dominate in a highly literate, hi-tech, scientific culture. These layers are outlined in the mapping above.

Part I: C

Subjects: Socio-dialogical (outer objective information, content as subject)


<ufi...I sumtimes find myself wund'ring how I expe.re.ensd th w'rld when I wuz an inf'nt. I suppoze wun uv th reaz'nz I am int'rest'd iz that thare seemz too be no way for me too find out. Evreething I noh s'jests that I must hav been inside my own expe.re.ens; yet my mem'ry uv it iz so blank that I am inclined too wund'r if I wuz ev'r thare. I wus not eve'n aware uv my lim't'd awareness, it seemz. And now, in spite uv my marv'lus adult awareness, my be.ginningz uv yest'ryear seem more re.mote and inacsess'b'l than ev'r. I am left with' th rea'lizeaysh'n that part uv me must be lost and that th close'st I can c'm too it may be too take up my pen and invent it.>

<ufi...And yet, on the uthr hand, it duz not make ennee sens too invent sumthing that has olreddee exist'd, and more espesh'lee sumthing that haz olreddee exist'd in my own expe.re.ens—and pre.zoom'blee still duz! Stepping back frum th situ.aysh'n, I find myself asking why this iz so. Why ar hu.man inf'nts kept frum a self-re.'lyzaysh'n uv themselvz? Why iz the infant hu.man not born with' instant s'rvive'l skillz and a mem'ree too go with' it, like most an'm'lz, eve'n th piglet, for examp'l.>

<ufi...I am aware that I can wotch uthr inf'nts so I can try too re-vizit my o.n past. But this off'rz no real so.lush'n too my d'lemma ; it leavz me with' a 'long dist'ns' feeling ; I am pri.mare'ly aware uv th feeling uv be.ing lockd out uv the inf'nts' inn'r expe.re.ens. Th chi.ld haz the expe.re.ens with'out the awareness and I hav the awareness but am outside uv the expe.re.ens.>

<ufi...When I re.coil the enormus fas'naysh'n that I had in wotching my o.n infant children (yearz ago), I suspect I wuz rea'llee in s'rch uv my o.n lost chi.ldh'd — in partic.y'l'r, the 'rle.est part uv it that escapes th reach's uv my mem'ree. I hav long sinse rea'lized that it wuz th f'rst time 'my' infant expe.re.ens and my adult awareness w'r faseing each uthr. While it iz trew that the infant expe.re.ens wuz not my o.n, th displaysm'ent wuz az min'm'l az it can poss'blee be.c'm, at least jennet'c'lee. Az well, th daylee involvm'nt in infant de.tails enab'l'd, eve'n n'sess'tayt'd, a re.viz'taysh'n uv a lost time, a new bond with' the o.ld wuz abe'l too take plase. I be.gan, for th f'rst time, 'too be.hold' sum sens uv the inn'r de.tailz uv my o.n invis'b'l, inawd'b'l. blank't'd be.ginningz, and too invest them with' a meaningf'lness that wuz poss'b'l o.nlee aft'r I had acwired a <repertoire> uv the expe.re.ensd awareness that c'mz with' be.ing adult.>

	Subjects	Inner image	Outer image
C-4	*meta subject spoken (meta speech)*	my revision of C-3	my meta parenting
C-3	*subject spoken (speech)*	my remembered upbringing	my parenting
C-2	*spoken subject (other)*	my remembered childhood	my children
C-1	*speaking subject (one)*	my parents as remembered	me as parent
Part I-**C: Subject Agency and Subject Manifestation** (microParadigms)			



In all dialogue (whether it be silently in the inner image or an outward utterance) there is at any given moment one who is the speaker (the speaking subject), an other who is spoken (the spoken subject, an inner image audience or listener that one supposes will be the other one hearing the utterance and responding); when the speaker does speak, the result is the subject spoken (an imaginary in-the-head scenario of what might be said usually precedes the actual utterance), and further speech about the speech results in a meta speech (an imaginary in-the-head scenario of a potential meta speech often precedes the actual utterance); it offers feedback as valuable information for future encounters.

As I became more and more engaged in parenting, an additional awareness soon emerged. I began to realize the layered complexity of this unprecedented adventure; I began, for example, to 'see' the involvement that my parents must have experienced on my behalf years ago. I began to recognize some of their strategies emerging in my actions. Unbeknownst to me previously, I had seemingly assimilated their parenting politics, and my awareness of them was slowly surfacing after years of silence. In retrospect, I realize that these patterns are probably deeply embedded in all of us and are merely waiting for a situation that will call them into action. All this was new to me. For the first time in my life I was able to imagine the fullness of the first times of my life.

In 'my childhood' of the present I was able to imagine my childhood of the past. I was inhabiting a mid-world between two generations, a time/place that I have long since realized stimulates the imagination. It is not so paradoxical, after all, that I was able to enter into the child world as an outsider; it is only the outsider who has no choice but to imagine and invent the other's inside experience. While it is clear that I was, in fact, neither my own infants nor my own parents, I 'was', in effect, both of them, and it was inside this mid-world that I was able to 'inhabit' a present reality and within it re-create the long ago lost one.

Stepping back from inside this inside experience again, I am wondering about the beginnings of child art. Why has the study of child art left void the early years, preferring to start the story only in the second year? What mystery lies here? It is no wonder, then, that I should find myself in this land of infancy and infinity, so inaccessible and yet so close to all of us, in search of the beginnings of child art.

> Within developmental psychology there has been a recognition that the opening two years of life are relatively devoid of symbolic use. And it is in the period between the ages of two and five that the child acquires an incipient mastery of the symbol systems of his culture. (Gardner, 1982, p. 113)

Winnicott (1971) has been helpful in offering insight into the object relations that we all experience in our earliest years but cannot remember. Implicit in his theoretical work, which he elaborated as the relationship between the 'mother' (whoever does the mothering) and the child, is the underlying conclusion that the infant must, for successful survival, experience a satisfactory 'holding environment'. He has written that "there is no such thing as a baby" alone. There is always a "nursing couple". The unit is never in the individual infant but rather in the infant-environment. This is somewhat in contrast to Freud and Kline who rooted their psychology more in a theory of instincts. Winnicott's concept is especially relevant for educators because it focuses on the central territory of learning: the relationship between the individual potential and the "good enough" environment.

How, then, does the child come to first engage in and then separate itself out from the initial mother-environment? Winnicott came to the conclusion that this originates for the infant through "moments of illusion" provided by the mother. If, for example, the mother offers the infant the breast at the same time as it is crying of hunger, the infant's hallucination (*inner image*) and the environment's presenting (outer image) can be seen as identical, as one and the same. As adults we call this an illusion because (unlike the child) we know that we cannot imagine (cannot inner image) something and expect it to be instantly manifested (an outer image) in the real environment. Educators can see that the relationship between a student's inner image and the realizability of it in the real world (the outer image world) speaks about grounding learning in the process of inner image/outer image fluency. Significantly, then, Winnicott saw the 'illusion' as the way an infant first experiences the capacity to be creative.

Providing an infant with this illusionment was for Winnicott the mother's first essential role: before all subsequent learning the infant must experience *omnipotence*. The infant must come to experience the power to manifest, as if by magic, to make outer images without the struggle that technics and linguistics will later on extract (when there is no longer a 'mother' to fill in the space between inner and outer imaging). Winnicott surmised that the second task, developmentally, of the mother was to provide the necessary disillusioning experience, a withdrawing and weaning process, so that the child could be slowly and carefully initiated into a state of separateness from her, feel the loss and be motivated to sustain the illusion.

What the mother previously so carefully nurtured she must then gradually reveal as the necessary untruth that it was. This process of challenging (disillusioning) the infant to construct its own inner/outer image world is the *figuration* that can succeed only if the infant is well *grounded* in a strong illusion. One cannot be disillusioned if they are not first illusioned; and the readiness of an infant to face disillusionment depends on the depth of the illusionment readiness or preparation. If the disillusionment process is too rapid for the particular infant, the result can be traumatic; in such a case the infant's illusion is not strong enough to support it's belief in its own power to survive the struggle, to achieve inner image/outer image fluency—autonomy.

Winnicott noted that, as the disillusionment takes place in time and space, the infant becomes attached to its first object (usually a rag or a blanket); he identified it as a "transitional object", that is, an object that inhabits an intermediate area between the "subjective" and that which is "objectively perceived". In short, the infant has created an outer image by proxy: the mother has provided the technic/linguistic skill that the infant has not yet acquired; the mother has offered a *readymade* for the infant to claim and possess by investing in it. It belongs to the infant (as it sees it); but it also belongs to the mother who is its author. It is transitional, belonging to both but owned exclusively by neither. The mother has not only set up the infant's need for it through a disillusioning process but she has also provided a means whereby the infant can experience and learn about the process of overcoming a loss. This experience of being '*creative*' out of a need (although illusionary in infancy) is the touchstone that sets a life pattern.

The *transitional object* can never come under the same omnipotent control as did the first object (the first 'mother') because even though it stays where it is left, it does not mirror the way the mother does; it does not offer instant illusion. At the same time it is a readymade object (an outer image fabricated by an other) and therefore brings with it a measure of predetermination (as invested in it by the mother). The reverse side of this is that the infant invests energy in the transitional object and builds up a sense of comfort that it is always reliable; it stays where it is put; it keeps the same texture and smell. The infant has 'invented' an object (an outer image) that is neither completely out of control nor completely under control, and yet it provides both of these experiences. It can comfort in the absence of the mother (thereby providing her with some freedom from the demands of the illusioning process); at the same time it harbors the threat of discomfort for when it is missing it cannot come back on its own (as a mother can).

Winnicott provides a way of understanding and articulating the incidence of the infant's first 'art work', the first art work for all of us. Further, he provides a way of understanding the recurring need for illusionment and/or disillusionment throughout life, and the individual differences that are experienced in the ability to sustain a sense of hope, to believe in success. It also provides an understanding of the *readymade object* as a primary one: a first step when experiencing difficulty in outer imaging. One way to overcome the fear of the white canvas is to revisit the original primary process, the most receptive form of disillusionment: start with a readymade (rather than with a *readymeans*); it is an outer image already in progress, one that merely needs help to find its resolution. The 'blanket' can be seen as the prototype of a primary object, a *transitional object*, a readymade object; a 'found' object, one that inhabits a space/time between two subjects, both of whom are invested in it, facilited by it and co-speak through it.

In the beginning, an object inhabits a transitional space between a mother and an infant; as adults we can still create objects that are transitional between a maker and a reader. This is in contrast to an *autonomous object*, one that must be made to stand as a free agent, one that the artist must abandon so that it can fend for itself, on its own—one for which the viewer needs no other sources than the work itself to process/possess its meaning.

The transitional object was, accordingly, for each of us, our first outer image, our first encounter with the demands of technic/linguistic mediation, our first statement in the form of an extension that stands outside the boundaries of the self and stands available for us to read—in this case to read something of our own 'making'. It was our first externalization of what necessarily becomes, through time, an established need to become human, to become socialized, to become enculturated, in short, to construct symbolic mid-worlds for psychological survival.

The infant does not have the technic/linguistic skill to construct an object from scratch (it is not in command of the necessary '*readymeans*', yet), but it is born with the capacity to 'invent' what in the history of modern art is called the *found object*. When we realize that the adult world, the one we live in, is grounded in the child world, the one that lives in us, there can be little doubt that the transitional time/space experience is one that we can return to again and again for primary insight and revelation. Artists such as Duchamp opened up the terrain of what I have come to call *'transitional art'*; it was an affront to the autonomous ground of modernism where artists had come to require of themselves that they create from scratch, from the position of a *readymeans* as source, where the art work stood alone, severed from its making subject and its reader. To a *metaModernist,* and as endemic to the Analogos, both options (the readymade remake and the readymeans innovation) must be allowed to co-exist.


<UFI...I sumtimez find myself wund'ring how uthrz perseve me. Whot do I l'k like? Sound like? Jesch'r like? How do the 'uthrz' be.hold me? I s'poze that wun uv th reaz'nz that this paradox uv an absent pres'ns ocaj'n'lee fludz ove'r me iz that thare seems too be no way for me too find out. I cannot get outside uv myself too hav a prop'r look at th p'erson that iz me, or too hear my vois frum afar (rathr than frum inside th same hed that speaks), or too be.hold me frum a distans in unbe.noh'nst mosh'n, jech'r, in fig.y'r-ground <Gestalt>>

<ufi...Trew, I have an inn'r imaje uv myself az I imajin uthrz must re.gard me; yet, it is informd by informaysh'n that is so second hand and so outside my ohn experee.ens that I am sumtimez inclind too wund'r if it iz not just a fant'see or p'rhaps an invensh'n uv my ohn makeing — maybe eve'n held in a white-out fog for reaz'nz uv s'rvive'l. How can I be sh'r uv the solid'tee uv th ground that sustainz my inn'r self imaje az th ground uv my out'r imaje uv my self?>

<one> (myself) speaking in, speaking out			<other> (herself) speaking in, speaking out	
4 ▲		my imaje uv uthr (out'r speak)	her imaje uv uthr: uv me (out'r speak)	8 ▲
3		my imaje uv my self (out'r speak)	her imaje uv herself (out'r speak)	7
2		my uthr imaje (inn'r speak)	her uthr-imaje: uv me (inn'r speak)	6
1		my self imaje (inn'r speak)	her self imaje (inn'r speak)	5

MicroParadigm: Inn'r imaje/out'r imaje int'racsh'n be.tween a < one> and an <other>

Although all these forces are at work when individuals speak, one way or another, it would be misleading to imply that everything that happens to us is a reaction to something we said or did. Much as (it) goes against our beliefs in how the world should be; sometimes others treat us in ways that have far less to do with who we are as individuals than with their assumptions about who we are, based on the group we seem to belong to....We would all like to believe that we judge others and are judged by competence, performance, and hard-and-fast results, not stereotypes. But there is overwhelming evidence from studies in many different fields that people's judgment of others are influenced by appearance and other characteristics that cause us to see them as members of groups about which we have pre-existing assumptions...women and men can get very different reactions even if they speak the same way. (Tannen, p. 194 -195, 1994)



<ufi... I hav sumwun in mind (that iz, in my inne'r imaje). If I ask him too speak with' hiz own vois, in ord'r too bring him more clearlee intoo y'r inn'r imaje, whot mite he say? Whot follo.z, then, in th f'rst p'rson, iz him speaking by himself for himself. "I have sumewun in mind (that is, in my inn'r imaje), sumone vayree diff'r'nt frum me, diff'r'nt in upbringing, edjewcaysh'n, jend'r, muth'r t'ng and, no dout, asp'raysh'nz. And so I sumtimes find myself wundring whot p'rvades her inn'r w'rld when I be.hold her frum the outside. Whot inn'r imajes duz she (with')hold? what inn'r vois? whot inn'r jesch'rz? I s'poze wun uv th reaz'nz that this paradox uv an absent prez'ns fludz ove'r me iz be.cuz thare seemz too be no way for me too find out. I cannot get inside her <repertoire> uv experee.ens's too hav a prop'r look threw h'r <eyes>, too hear frum inside her earz or too feel frum inside her boddee.>

<ufi... I noh that she must hav an inn'r imaje just az I do, but, for me, herz iz so inacses'b'l that I feel p'shd on th wun hand too acsept its non-exist'ns in my inn'r imaje, or, on the uthr hand, too invent an e.lab'r't pro.jecsh'n uv whot it w'd be if I c'd be she. (And maybe that-s whot I'v olreddee dun.) But no matter which way I see it, I am still merelee hite'ning my awareness uv the absens uv her inn'r imaje in mine.>

<ufi...I hav an inn'r imaje uv myself and an inn'r imaje uv her; theze can both' be out'r imajed (az medeeayt'd by technic/lingwistic struckch'rz) and then adjust'd on the bas's uv feedback frum myself and'or frum her. She can doo th same. Updating with' feedback iz keeping in tuch.>

"Who am I?" is the question that pervades those seeking identity; part of the answer lies in addressing the questions, "To what group(s) do I belong?" and "Do I want to belong to the group(s) where I find myself embedded?" And if the answer is "No", then what can or cannot be done about it? What becomes of identities that are closeted? erased? outed? denied? suppressed? Does an absence create a lack that shines both inwardly and outwardly? Does a visible presence have to cast the shadow of the group? Does a visible group have to cast the shadow of the individual?


In a *transitional dialogue*, the *speaking subject*, the mother, for example, needs to find a way to teach the infant how to also become a speaking subject. Winnicott has offered insight into how this can be approached. An infant cannot be a speaking subject in the sense that adults think of this dynamic; but it can be made to believe in this possibility. And it is through the vividness of this fantasy, this illusion, that it can experience and believe, unforgettably, that it has the power to construct its own world as a speaking subject—in a community of voices.

Part I-D


Socio-audio/visual (outer mediation, mind/language as subject)

Part I as a whole consists of a discourse on the *Subject* as posited by the Analogos. The fourth and last section of Part I (I-D) focuses in on the linguistic/semiotic aspect as a subject. The chart on page 52 surveys Part I-D in relation to the other three sections outlined above (I-A, I-B, I-C). Since the Analogos is itself a semiotic formation, an understanding of its inner structure depends upon an understanding of the most basic dynamics of 'language' at both its primary and secondary process levels. Psychoanalysis proposes an entry to the former and linguistics/semiotics to the latter. What the two have in common is the need to cope with the way parts relate to the whole.

mediation as subject *Analogos layer*	*neocortex* *hemisphere*	*sensory-motor* *Analogos layer*	*signifier/signified* *relationship*
D-8: text	left brain	eye/hand *D-7/D-8 visual*	secondary process language
D-7: image	right brain		primary process language
D-6: speech	left brain	ear/vocal chords *D-5/D-6 auditory*	secondary process language
D-5: acoustic sound (song)	right brain		primary process language
Part I-D: SocioAudioVisual (microParadigms)			



D	*audio/visual*	*outer mediation*	*linguistic subject*	*D:7/8 visual* *D:5/6 audio*
C	dialogical	outer reality	content subject	C:4/3 manifestation C:1/2 agency
B	haptic/psychical	inner mediation	technic subject	B:7/8 inner image B:5/6 somatic
A	psychodynamic	inner reality	conception subject	A:3/4 motive A:1/2 motivation
Part I-D: Subjects (basicMicroParadigm)				



In the present context of sound or sight, two types of relationships are implicated: congruency (similarity) and contiguity (juxtaposition). The term *congruency* implies that two parts in a work can relate to each other through similarity even when they are far apart; if they are close together they fuse into continuity and cease to exist as separate parts. The term *contiguity* implies that two parts can relate to each other if they share the same boundary, even if they are totally different. If they are different from each other as well as separated from each other, then they cease to form an association (other than that of a non-relationship relationship).

Examples of congruency are two words that set up a connection when separated in a text (such as a synonym for a word recurring later in a sequence, or two rhyming lines of poetry, or two separated words related by alliteration, or, in film, a flash-back-repeat scene or in space, two buildings in the same style in different cities. Examples of contiguity are any two words used together, or two film frames in sequence, or two buildings that are joined or juxtaposed..

Freud identified two types of *primary process* that are commonly present in the language of dreaming: condensation and displacement. Both of these characterize a response of complete identity when an impulse is blocked. *Condensation*, for example, is the clustering of previous content, such as the combining of a known face with an other's clothes or body with an other's name with an other's voice. *Displacement* refers to the slippage of one content to another. In both cases, according to Freud, there is an attempt in primary process to find a representation that is acceptable to the censor who resides in the land of secondary process and acts as a sort of parent to primary process as a child. Condensation is a form of congruency or similarity; displacement is a form of contiguity. In the former, similar parts join; in the latter 'slippage' involves whatever subject matter is at hand, whatever subject is close enough to slip into.

Secondary process, unlike primary process (but in consort with it) is designed to uphold linguistic differences. The terms of secondary process, the *syntagmatic* and the *paradigmatic*, are, unlike displacement and condensation (which operate on the basis of blurring boundaries), designed to uphold differences in order to articulate clear meanings.

If, as Freud suggests, dreams represent a prototypical understanding of psychodynamic process, how then are dreams manifest? How do condensation and displacement perform the *dreamwork*?

According to Freud, dream-thoughts, or stray memories from recent events, as well as unrepressed memories (both *preconscious*) come together to supply the dream with its signifying materials. These serve as containers for the unconscious materials, be they the result of *condensation*, the compression of numerous needs/desires into one focus, or of *displacement*, the slippage of needs/desires to find the acceptable outlet. These take the form of dream-thoughts, that, in their final version, must trick the preconscious into letting them be expressed. The latest version in any slippage series is for the unconscious wrapped in the same cloth as was the original; differentiation is unknown in this underworld. The dreamwork uses a sort of Trojan horse strategy: unconscious wishes are able to penetrate a barrier only by fabricating a brilliant and highly condensed/displaced deception; and as a reward they are able to gain symbolic existence in the comprehensive world of secondary process where language gives it signifying potential. Whether the language is visual or auditory, it is this structural-substance differentiation that enables communication with more or less articulate meanings. These layerings are mapped as a *metaParadigm* (Part i) below.

Part i: MetaSubjects*

**A MetaParadigm is included at the end of each Part; the main body or archetypalParadigms as outlined in Parts I, II, III and IIII are mapped with capital letters; the metaParadigm examples at the end of each Part and in the Prologues and Epilogues are mapped with lower case letters.*

<ufi...Aft'r riteing the text (page 53), I went too sleep and awoke with' the mem'ree uv th folo.ing dream: I be.hold an imaje uv a pair uv tri.ang.y'l'r boardz., hinjd on wun side. I seem too be outside uv it and at th same time fuzed with'in it. It iz a tense experee.ens in which I am struggling too ope'n doorz; it seemz impos'b'l; yet I cannot giv up th hope be.cuz thay ar olredee ope'n e.nuf too teaz me intoo continueing th strugg'l.>

<ufi...This re.lates too th way I am lying when I awak'n: on my side and hinjd in th midd'l; it iz olso like a book, op'n e.nuf too reveal too me that it contains se.crets, but not e.nuf too re.veal too me whot thoze se.crets ar. This olso alludes too the ideeah that I wuz w'rking on in a painting be.fore go.ing too sleep (oltho not with much awareness uv it until I awaken'd). It olso re.lates too anothr sereez, in this case uv 3-d'mensh'n'l peas's, that I was wo'rking on ov'r a long peree'd. Theze olso have hinj'd dorez that call for th vue'rz' partis'paysh'n in op'ning them (but part uv the intensh'n iz too prod ishewz that in the end cannot yeald thayr se.crets). Th dream olso colls up the Analogos syntagm with' its zooming lay'rz. And finally, I wuz sleeping with a door just a few feet away frum my hed, one that, be.cus it wuz tri.ang.y'l'r at th top, made me strugg'l too find a way too hang it. Aft't th dream I new the ans'r.>

The following mapped account (by no means complete) is included to suggest the complexity of the signifying economy that takes place between the unconscious and the preconscious, between the sleep state and the awake state, each one securing its other by its complementary position. If primary process acts as if it is without any sense of language, choosing to gratify its drive towards pleasure as easily and quickly as possible, refusing to recognize differences between terms, then secondary process will have no choice but to stand up for what its other lacks. It does this through language; by guaranteeing the shift from primary-process to secondary process, from *"thing presentations"* to *"word-presentations"* (to use Freud's terms); the sensorial and emotional tonalities of the unconscious are reduced in intensity. Accordingly, the *differences* between terms are rigorously upheld in order to guarantee the priority of meaning and understanding over feelings of emotion (I-B-2) and feelings of sensation (I-B-1).

> The sets condensation and displacement, metaphor and metonymy, and paradigm and syntagm are central to any investigation of discourse since they orchestrate the interactions of signifiers and signifieds. These sets are so closely related as to have been frequently conflated....The basis for a frequent association of the terms "condensation," "metaphor," and "paradigm" would seem to be that all three derive from the perception of similarity. In much the same way, displacement, metonymy, and syntagm are all seen as involving the principle of contiguity...the desired clarification can be found in the pages of (Freud's) *The Interpretation of Dreams*. (Silverman, p. 87, 1983)

Mediation **Processes** and Related **Contents**			
d secondary (outer) process/content	contiguity/juxtaposition (sub-secondary)	*AnalogosSyntagmatic* *(human order)*	d-8 process ▲
			d-7 content
	congruency/similarity (sub-primary)	*AnalogosParadigmatic* *(human epics)*	d-6 process
			d-5 content
c primary (outer) process/content	contiguity/juxtaposition (sub-secondary)	*syntagmatic*	c-4 process
		information	c-3 content
	congruency/similarity (sub-primary)	*paradigmatic*	c-2 process
		information	c-1 content
b secondary (inner) process/content	contiguity/juxtaposition (sub-secondary)	*metonymic*	b-8 process
		artifaction/poetics	b-7 content
	congruency/similarity (sub-primary)	*metaphoric*	b-6 process
		artifaction/poetics	b-5 content
a primary (inner) process/content	contiguity/juxtaposition (sub-secondary)	*displacement*	a-4 process
		dreamwishes	a-3 content
	congruency/similarity (sub-primary)	*condensation*	a-2 process
		dreamwishes	a-1 content
PART i: MetaSubjects (PsychodynamicSemiotic) (metaBasicMicroParadigm)			

<ufi...I am t'rning on th hot wot'r tap, th wun that iz on th left, az I hav c'm too noh it in th habits uv my lirn'td but d'rect boddee langwaje. Too my s'rprize it t'rnz out too hav a 'c' on it: oh! it must be cold! So I ov'r-ride my boddee langwaje expectaysh'nz and try th wun on th rite. Be.leave it or not, th rite side t'nz out too be cold so that my boddee langwaje wus rite in th f'rst plase. But now a lingwistic kwesch'n teaz's me: Why iz th 'c' on th left when th cold iz on th rite? Iz sumwun trying too teach me sumthing or iz it just a mistake? Iz it p'rhaps de.zined for a left-hand'd p'rsun? The ans'r t'nz out too be vayree simp'l: th 'c' may stand for cold in Inglish, but in French it stands for warm or <chaud>! Wun is ab'l at last too say that if 'c' standz for both' **c**old and <**c**haud>, then 'c' = hot = cold. > Once again, what is denied or absent is what is most fully 'present'.>

Before the above event I was hardly aware of the body-language grammar of water taps or of the possible conflict between body-gestural language and visual-textual language. The syntax becomes visible only as one discovers the binary opposite term: if it is 'c' and 'h', then it is in English and if it is 'f' and 'c', then it is in French. Or, more simply, ignore both and follow the body language which was my first gesture and the correct one. The syntax for <boddee langwaje> is that the left is always hot and the right is always cold (in English or French). The syntagmatic is, by definition, the one that is always stable and consistent; it is the paradigmatic that can be free to try different options (but only if the syntagmatic is anchored and the provider of stability for the two to function together in consort).The liberty of one is contingent on the constancy and the reliability/stability, that is, the predictability of the other.

If, for example, both taps were to be marked with a 'c', a bilingual version, it would tax the reliability of the syntax. Shifting between two verbal linguistic systems, French and English, undermines the stability of either one. Only the paradigmatic can be allowed such freedom if language is intended to carry meaning with clarity and efficiency. Language, as secondary process, requires this *difference* to be upheld.

While both primary and secondary process must work in dialogue with each other, either one is prone to dominate the other in specific cases. Primary process can take day thoughts (secondary) and fuse them into dreams (primary); secondary process can take sensorial/emotive 'thing-presentations' (primary) and differentiate them as structured (syntactical) sound or text images (secondary). But is there a way that the two can interact without either one in domination? Silverman proposes that *metaphor* (similarity/congruency) and *metonymy* (contiguity) perform in precisely this way.

> ...metaphor and metonymy respond to similarity and contiguity as the basis for the *temporary replacement* of one signifying element by another...Within metaphor and metonymy the primary and secondary process find a kind of equilibrium, one which permits profound affinities and adjacencies to be discovered without differences being lost. (Silverman, 1983, p.109)

According to Silverman, *metaphor* and *metonymy* are, while both subject to either a stronger primary or secondary influence, inextricably bound together. Under the sway of the former (metaphor), when two terms are involved, one term is repressed or rendered absent, leaving the other to remain and represent it. Interestingly, this absence increases the tension, or creates what Lacan would call 'desire' as constituted by a 'lack'; this lack is regarded as a loss or absence of the pre-verbal life that a child experiences due to the acquisition or over-layering of language and self-consciousness. For example, in 'Waiting for Godot", Godot becomes the main character in his absence; thus, although there is a balance, even a fusion (a metaphor), between the two terms (the name and the character), one is present and one is absent. This absence or repression of one term is the norm for primary metaphor or primary metonymy (the paradigm of both primary and secondary forms of both metaphor and metonymy is mapped on page 59).

In the expression, 'the bird knifes the air', the knife is absent and taken over by the bird that is present; this is a primary metaphor. However, if we shift this to 'the bird cut the air like a knife', then it becomes a secondary metaphor, that is, a simile, because both terms are retained. In the Schubert art song, *The Trout Stream*, the piano accompaniment tries to bring to mind the sound of rushing water (similarity). The absence of real water makes this a primary metaphor. Wagner, however, was fond of using a 'lied motif', securing a liaison between one term, such as water (a theme in the libretto), with another, a particular musical theme (contiguity). Every time the theme returns the water is associated with it. Wagner is using a secondary metonymy (the juxtaposed presence of both terms in the beginning) to enrich the meaning. During recurrences of the musical theme, the absence of its other in the text shifts it back to being a primary metaphor. The vacated space can hold a new text, a new over-layer of secondary metonymy.

The interest in retaining two related terms, balancing and layering both terms as present and in contiguity, is a basic characteristic in secondary versions of metaphor and metonymy. Cézanne developed a painting style that was a remarkable expression of primary/secondary process integration. By working within a restricted range of over-all colors he was able to fuse together objects and areas as different as earth and sky (secondary metonymy or juxtaposition of areas of difference, in the real world, that is shifted to secondary metaphor or similie, that is, separated areas with similarities, in the painted world); it presents a world where the syntax of visual language becomes a container, bathing all parts of the surface in the same unity of chroma. He carried this fusion further by means of a syntactic device: using what he called '*passages*', areas where the boundaries dissolve, an approach that leaves the edges of objects ambiguous and mystical (a primary metaphor, juxtaposed objects can live in oneness, leaving any possibility of a secondary aspect as fully absent). To compensate for this absence, or Lacanian 'lack', he clearly articulated edges at other key places to allow the syntax to affirm its solidity in the face of passage-dissolution (secondary metonymy, harking back to the given juxtaposed difference that is evident in nature). This interface of structure in dialogue with dissolution reflects the primary/secondary dialogue of the inner image (for example, I-A-1/I-A-2), that is, the psychodynamic, as well as the paradigmatic/syntagmatic dialogue intrinsic to all language.

As elaborated in the above examples, the presence/absence of 'passages', that is, the momentary presence/absence of *boundaries* between discrete objects, heightens the tension. Cézanne was able to interweave primary process (congruency/similarity in the form of a *fusion* between discrete objects and between figure and ground) and secondary process (difference/contiguity in the form of selected articulation of *boundaries, the location of the juxtaposition,* between objects and between figure and ground). This resulted in a sort of democracy of the picture plane, a style in which community or over-all structure reigns supreme over individuality, over local subject matter; it is a unifying structure wherein the syntagmatic over-rules the idiosyncrasies of substance or the paradigmatic. His use of technics reinforced this by means of an up-front exposure of the painting process; his revelation of the geometry of planes (*linguistics*) is fused (primary process) with the use of brush strokes (*technics*) to represent these planes; the paint surface joins the over-all sense of unity, of community. It is a style in which the inner world of primary process 'content' can feel at home and fully embraced by and in dialogue with its secondary process that is its 'containment'.

A somewhat different signification is enacted in the use of *photomontage*. When a part of an image is cut away, it carries with it the memory of its former continuity or lost context. When it takes its new position in a new photograph, it covers an area or disrupts the former continuity (inserting contiguity) in the new photograph. In an overlay photomontage, then, there are two absences, the one that haunts the inset piece (the context that it has lost but still carries in absentia) and the one that haunts the photo that has been partially covered. A new continuity (contiguity) is constructed but the slippage or paradigmatic substitute (similarity/congruency) of one fragment when displaced by an other fragment typically continues to remember what is lost or lacking; what is absent continues to assert its presence. This absence creates a (primary) metaphoric tension while over-layering it with (primary) metonymy at the edges. Surrealism capitalized on this collision of worlds, this build-up of multiple layers of *linguistic loss* all concentrated in precisely the same boundary. And this *linguistic* shock cannot but be amplified by the presence of the *technics* of the cut or torn edge that also resides within the compressed zone of precisely the same boundary.

When overlay *transparency* is used, on the other hand, the two terms involved remain present and the result engages secondary process, that is, it becomes metonymic; and with the non-absence of either term there is a corresponding absence of tension. It is typically replaced by a more mystical quality as each image relaxes its strength to make way for its other. A shift from photo images to moving images is a shift from the synchronic (timeless space) to the diachronic (space inside time). But the same semiotic dynamics apply. A fade out sequence of one image as another one fades in is akin to transparency or double exposure in photography; a sudden cut from one image to another is akin to photomontage. Both primary and secondary process, then, are common in film and deliver very different meanings. The former, as in a collage, gathers the tension of the absent term; the latter, as in the fade-out/fade-in, spreads relaxation as the old is given time to withdraw while the new arrives. A film maker orchestrates this displacement of one term by an other inside time to render a specific narrative meaning; a photographer has to leave the temporal factor up to the viewer who needs time to unravel the meaning.

A *shot/reverse-shot* sequence in film (or in photo-installation) is an attempt to reconcile the flat screen, always seen from only one side, with that of the real world, which holds 360 degrees. In the latter there is a sense of being able to turn the head to see what is behind. The shot/reverse-shot attempt to render 360 degrees on a flat screen thrusts the viewer into an illusion of being thrown through 180 degrees each time the camera reverses (in the real world of stage theater this would require a high speed crane that could sweep the spectators back and forth between the two positions, or alternatively, a high speed screen that could flip back and forth). Because the spectator is glued to the position 'behind the lens', this shot/reverse-shot action of the camera causes the spectator to be always absent from one of the two positions. In this case the tension being created by means of absence (primary process) seems no longer to be located within the artwork but rather in the viewer's complex sense of embodiment/disembodiment in space. That it is virtual space adds another layer of lack, a double sense of disembodiment.

The Analogos posits four types of subject matter (the subject spoken, content, I-C-3)

1. *conception content as subject* (i-a, opposite page): the ground is *invisible, inaudible, non-somatic and non psychical* to others because it remains within the inner image of the subject until a (technic/linguistic) mediator renders it readable (but only in a concealed form: metaphors, slips of the tongue, dreams) (*desires, wishes*); the mediators (especially the technics at this level) must be rendered as transparent as possible. (This is the homeland of *surrealism.*)


2. *artifaction content as subject* (i-b): the subjective rendition of inner reality as mediated by technic/linguistic interplay (especially the technics which dominate the linguistics at this level) (*expressions of emotion*); the mediators (especially the technics) must be rendered opaquely; the means must enhance the meaning. (This is the homeland of *expressionism.*)

3. *information content as subject* (i-c): the objective rendition of outer reality, seemingly solely factual, because the mediation vehicles are highly sophisticated in order to conceal their critical role in carrying the meaning forward (*technical, scientific, documentary, descriptive, factual info*); the mediator (especially the linguistic because it dominates the technic at this level) must be rendered as transparent as possible. (This is the homeland of *realism*)

4. *abstraction content as subject* (i-d): the linguistic/structural rendition of outer reality, seemingly solely structual because the mediation vehicles (*abstraction, philosophy, theoretical research*); the mediator (especially the linguistic as it dominates the technic at this level) must be rendered as opaque as possible. (This is the homeland of *formalism.*)

Part	*subject formation*	*mediation/content interaction**	*style of subject*
i-d	abstraction content as subject	mediation opacity (+ linguistics)	*Formalist*
i-c	information content as subject	mediation transparency (— linguistics)	*Realist*
i-b	artifaction content as subject	mediation opacity (+ technics)	*Expressionist*
i-a	conception content as subject	mediation transparency (— technics)	*Surrealist*
PART i: Types of SubjectMatter (metabasicParadigm)			

* + = the presence of technics or linguistics as the subject; if the media can seduce the content the media can enhance content
— = the absence of technics or linguistics as the subject; if content can seduce the media the content will be clear.



	Type of figure of speech	*Semiotic style*	*Type of Process*
d	*secondary metonymy*: both terms present, juxtaposition, contiguity	Metonymic (contiguity)	secondary process
c	*primary metonymy*: one term absent, , juxtaposition, contiguity		primary process
b	*simile*: both terms present; similarity, congruency	Metaphoric (similarity)	secondary process
a	*metaphor*: one term absent; similarity, congruency		primary process
Part i: Primary and Secondary Metaphor and Metonymy (basicParadigm)			

Coda: The Body as Subject

> Of all the objects in the world, the human body has a peculiar status: the person who has it does not only possess it; it also possesses and constitutes him. Our body is quite different from all the other things that we claim as our own. We can lose money, books and even houses and still remain recognizably ourselves, but it is hard to give any intellectual sense to the idea of a disembodied person. Although we speak of our bodies as premises that we live in, it is a special form of tenancy: our body is where we can always be contacted, but our continued presence in it is more than a radical form of being a stick-in-the-mud....it is only by being able to move in and act upon the world that we can distinguish it from ourselves.
>
> We can...perceive our body as if it were one object among others. We can gaze at it, ouch it, grope many of its contours, as if it were another of the many items in the world's furniture. Each of us, then, has two images of the bodily self: one which is immediately felt as a source of sensation and the spring of action, and one which we see and sometimes touch. In growing up, in emerging from the 'blooming, buzzing chaos' of infancy, these two images blend with each other so that the body which we see becomes the visible manifestation of the one which we immediately feel. Nevertheless, a moment's introspection will show how different these two images actually are. (Miller, J., pp 14-15)

It is rare that one encounters any one of the four types of subjects in its purist form; most of the time there are shades of all four at work. In a typical situation, all the sensorial channels are open simultaneously, available to surge between strong and weak, between inner expectations and outer stimulation, if it is an inner imaging response process. Similarly, all the acquired technic/linguistic skills are surging between strong and weak as needed in the process of constructing an outer image and reading the on going feedback. That individuals build a repertoire of a selected band of these possibilities is not surprising; and the more one uses one of these channels, the more adept one becomes at fine tuning it—and accordingly the more apt one is to continue selecting it over other options. One way to re-balance this is to block off one or more of these in order to give the neglected ones a chance to flourish. Spending a half hour blind-folded, in the presence of a trusted companion, for example, opens up an entirely new 'mix' of the sensory channels. Similarly, drawing with the left hand, opens up a new ratio of left-right relations. The haptic is the *ground* of all the senses.

> The term "subject" designates a quite different semantic and ideological space from that indicated by the more familiar term "individual." The second of these terms dates from the Renaissance, and it still bears the traces of the dominant philosophical systems of that time—systems which afforded to consciousness the very highest premium. The concept of subjectivity...marks a radical departure...by giving a more central place to the unconscious and to cultural overdetermination than it does to consciousness....Together the terms "individual and "man" posit an entity that is both autonomous and stable...untouched by historical or cultural circumstances—what the Renaissance was fond of calling "reason," but which in the twentieth century generally goes by the name of "consciousness." ...a man...is understood to be a free intellectual agent, except insofar as a greater mind—like God's impinges upon him....Descartes (works) are generally cited as the most classic demonstration of private consciousness, of a cognitive operation which believes itself to be both independent and authentic for all time. (Silverman, pp. 126-127, 1983)

The first important disillusion for all human beings is presumably that of the shock of birth. After the initial illusionment of the aquatic pre-natal period, the passage towards independence in an environment of air and light must carry a certain challenge to overcome. If it is a Cesarean birth, the disllusionment must be of a different kind than that of the passage through the birth canal. And as always, some humans need more illusioning than others and some can only cope with less disillusioning than others.

The Analogos is not satisfied with noting that there are four types of this or that; it insists that there is an underground relationship between the four parts—that there is a ground aspect, a structural aspect, an unveiled-content aspect and a meta-content-hindsight aspect—none of which can exist independently; indeed, it is the relationship between them that enables the construction of meaning.

Part II

PRACTICES (Response and Reflective Practices)

<ufi...I t'rned on th TV in s'rch uv sumthing too woch. I had no pre.consepsh'n in mind (that I wuz aware uv) az too whot I wont'd too see or eve'n uv whot wuz pro.gramd for that time uv day. Whot flashd on th cul'rd screen wuz an o.ld time black and white moovvee. Instantly I found myself completelee de.tachd frum th caract'rz. I had no intrest in thayr acsh'nz, thayr speech, or eve'n th staje set or th sin'matic approach. I be.came vayree consh'z uv my disengajement. I wuz asking myself why I wuz re.sponding this way and I wuz eve'n asking myself why I wuz asking myself this kwesch'n.>

<ufi...I soon came too th rea'lizeaysh'n that it wuz th constraneing e.fect uv th black and white that wuz affecting me. With'in sec'ndz, howev'r, I found myself re.vizeing this and conclooding that it wuz the absens uv th rich and joosee cul'r that wus frustrateing my expectaysh'nz. It seemz that, unbe.noh'nst too me, th need for cul'r wus hi on my list uv re.kwirem'nts. And in this case, az it t'rnd out, I wuz abe'l too ove'ride my wish. I had olredee t'rnd it off and wuz re.flecting on my disappointm'nt. And so I am left asking how it c'd be that absens can dominate prezens so completelee.>

nonEvent response sequence (from above)	*event response sequence (after Analogos II-A)*
4. I reflect on my reflection. ▲	4. I engage in a revision practice (revealing: II-A-4) ▲
3. I reflect on the nonEvent event.	3. I engage in reflection role playing (reflecting: II-A-3)
2. I experience a nonEvent event.	2. I recall the narrative of no.1 (remembering: II-A-2)
1. my expectations are blocked.	1. I enter the dream space/time (forgetting: II-A-1)
A nonEvent is an event; but it remains an *inner event* in the absence of extended input.	

<ufi...I found myself re.flecting on a parallel situ.aysh'n that o.c'rd yearz ago—o.nlee it wus an inv'rs experee.ens. Eve'n tho I had gon f'll uv exsite'd antis'paysh'n too woch <Ingmar Bergman's> f'rst cul'r film, I soon found myself fiteing agenst a feeling uv disengajement. It took sevr'l min'ts for me too re.'lize that I had arrived with' strong expectaysh'nz uv be.ing imm'rsd in th rich use uv blacks and whites that I had grown accust'md too in his pre.v.y's w'rk. For me theze had be.cum e.ssensh'l too his way uv rend'ring meaning. And I wuz suddenlee feeling a deep sens uv loss. Th caract'rz, now parading around in f'll cul'r, c'd no long'r liv inside th blackout and whiteout mistreez uv yest'ryear, az I re.memb'rd it. Th flesh cul'rz uf the cast seemd so i.soleate'd frum thayr w'rld and th deep'r meaningz wuns attachd too blacks and whites w'r no long'r part uv the experee.ens. I wuz go.ing threw with'draw'l simptumz. Sev'rl min'ts passd be.fore I wuz abe'l too bypass my expectaysh'nz and acsept whot I clearlee felt wuz a let-down. And eve'n then thare wuz a res'due uv my disappointment that re.maned too constrain and discul'r my hole re.spons too th film (Luv Storee); and too this day that toneal'tee has not been e.rased.>

I peer into the many human creations (made by myself and/or others, and/or those made by "nature") that surround me; I add to the accumulating streams of human ex-tensions by making something in response. For all outward responses there is an inner antecedent; for all inner responses there is an outward antecedent. Inner imaging calls forth outer imaging which calls forth inner imaging, and so the cycle goes

(The term inner image *in the Analogos includes anything imaginable, so that it is not limited to the picture-image, but rather includes the entire sensorial band width. The term* outer image *in the Analogos includes anything 'outed', uttered, made, fabricated, materialized (that is, mediated by technic/linguistic vehicles.)*

From the above account of an experience, it can be surmised that dialogue flows between inner image and outer image worlds; in this can be found the basic dynamics of human interaction. *Response practice* consists of this, then: that we engage in the process of inner imaging in order to find meaning in our environment; we construct inner meaning; we use our senses to make sense of what we encounter in our surroundings. But making sense is cut short if the process of outer imaging is not also fulfilled; our inner imaging needs to work at fabricating an outer version response before we can feel grounded in the real world again. An inner image is virtual; it is without physical materialization and constructs inner reality by screening out the technic/linguistic containers so important in outer images. And an outer image is nothing if not concrete, existing only by virtue of its technic/linguistic embodiment as born in the manifestation process. In short, inner image and outer image versions of reality can only co-exist; each offers what their other lacks.

For a *viewer*, an outer image object feeds an inner image (imagination) that in turn feeds an outer image; or conversely, a *producer/artist* starts with their inner image (imagination) as the basis for making an outer image object. These two process sequences may appear to be more or less the same; however, starting with a process of inner imaging sets up a different orientation than is the case when staring with a process of outer imaging. Subjects who are acting as *viewers* need most of all to feed the inner imaging process and to pay less attention to the outer imaging follow-up; on the other hand *artists/authors* need mostly to feed their outer imaging process and accordingly must focus their attention on the technic/linguistic demands that need to be reckoned with in the process of giving birth to outer images. Both subject agents, then, engage in the same process even if each focuses more attention on an opposite outcome: both viewers and producers (or any newcomer such as a child or an immigrant) are, however, viewers *first*, before they are producers, and both always follow-up by producing something, be it minimal, epic or whatever.

An artist/author must struggle to master specific technic/linguistic mediation demands; conversely an ordiary viewer may outer image by talking to a friend, walking more slowly or quickly or by engaging impromptu in an off beat task during the course of a regular day. However, artists are also viewers, they are also proverbial inner imagers; and the quality of their inner imaging process must bear some direct relation to their skill in outer imaging—in using technics/ linguistics. In the end it is the outer image or extension as technically and linguistically rendered that stands between all subjects as their only source of insight into each other. And extensions do not exist for either an artist or a beholder other than inside the framework that is an *artEvent*. This is because it takes time not only to make an extension but also to read one; and that which takes time, is, by definition, an event.

When a *response practice*, an inner/outer dialogue, comes to a stop, it can continue greatly transformed as a second level, more objective, inner/outer dialogue—herein referred to as a *reflective practice*. An artEvent can even continue as a response practice in the inner image long after the art object/event is out of view. If, however, one is to engage in a reflective practice, one begins to look back on the outcomes of the response practice as source rather than to refer to the work itself. If there is a need to go back to the primary work, then it constitutes a return to a response practice—however, temporary that may be. A response practice asks questions like: what does this outer image mean to me? and how can I give the inner meaning that I have constructed an external form (outer imaging)? A reflective practice asks more abstract, outside, theoretical questions such as: what does this meaning mean (a process of meta-innerImaging)? and how can I articulate the meaning of this meaning (meta-outerImaging)?. A *response practice*, in the outer imaging phase, usually takes a concrete form such as a spoken narrative, a verbal dialogue with a friend, a change in attitude, another extension in the same medium (for example, a painting inspired by a painting or a film or a dance inspired by a film or a dance). A *reflective practice*, on the other hand, usually takes the form of a text or a verbal discourse that uses top-down theoretical frameworks to articulate bottom-up underpinnings. It is designed to provide an infrastructure for the underground discoveries of the response practice that preceded it. This type of reflection re-vitalizes both the inner and the outer image repertoire of a subject's response practice just as their reflective practice is vitalized by their response practice.

All response or reflective practices necessarily take place within the framework of an event. Inner/outer imaging is an ongoing process that can only take place inside time. While this may seem evident in the case of watching a film, it may seem less so in the case of looking at still images. However, in both cases it takes time for meaning to unfold (the inner imaging process)—even if the entire image is present in the first instance, as is the case with still images. In all cases it takes additional time to articulate the meaning (the outer imaging process). A viewer gathers meaning by attending to different aspects of the still image, one after an other, in a sequence; this constitutes an event, a temporal processing. BasicParadigm II tries to map this process as a series of layers; the order is *developmental* in that each layer is designed to provide an inner image repertoire of experience that should empower rather than undercut both previous and subsequent layers. The mapping of layers is not intended as the track of any one specific event/experience but rather as an archetypal or world map upon which individual events can be tracked, these latter moving up/down the layers or back/forth between triangles—as determined by the specifics of the event, by the intrinsic dialogue between the subject and their object..

Inner imaging is itself a dialogue; the viewer comes with expectations, as does the 'thing' viewed. This latter, the extension/outer image, is designed by its maker to ask for certain kinds of responses; the reader also comes in search of certain kinds of response rewards. A viewer's constructed inner-image meaning emerges out of the dialogue between these two voices; the object stands in for its maker so that only one of the two subjects, the viewer, is actively engaged. One might think that this is a special case because it is not a dialogue between two active subjects. However a closer look reveals that this latter is never possible in any case; there is always an *extension* between speaking subjects. Each one can make an utterance that is an outer image for the other to behold; there is as yet no way to bypass this in-between outer image extension that separates subjects—even as it makes their communication possible. Even body language, as close as it is to its speaker, is really also an outer image, 'uttered' by its speaker and made available for the other to read—visually or even through touch. In short, there is always an extension between speaking subjects, and it is their only means of dialogue, of inter-relation.

How does the above inform our modes of teaching ourselves? of teaching others? How is it possible to foster fluency in inner/outer imaging dialogue? In general, it seems appropriate to initially strive for a workshop environment where a practice is ongoing: outer imaging (as a process of gaining fluency with technic/linguistic constructs) needs to be integrated with inner imaging (as a process of not only reading what one or an other thinks they have outer imaged but also hearing the feedback/readings and 'feedforward'/ recommendations from others, from peers and experts/teachers as well as from non-experts—input that a receiver can 'take and/or leave').

Eventually, after a formation (of technic/linguistic skills) is up and running with a measure of autonomy, it seems fully possible to keep the inner/outer image fluency on track within the framework of a community of voices. An outer image practice can be sustained by individuals working in their own studio settings while also arranging to interchange feedback; what seems most valuable is a reflective practice where inner-image feedback/readings are on going in an inner-group, *transitional community* environment. It enables makers (those who focus on outer imaging) to receive feedback from the outside, from others who focus on inner/outer imaging, from those who are within the community and have a vested interest in it, but who at the same time are outside the inner world of the other dedicated makers. As well, focused feedback from outsiders, from those not engaged in the innermost outer imaging process, is often of great significance to those so involved in their own outer imaging that they are not able to see it from afar. Different ideologies, in dialogue, can, with care, co-contribute.


<ufi...I note'sd a vayree odd-shaped, creach'r near a fens and de.side'd too approach it too see whot it wus. I had no fear be.c'z it wuz vayree smoll. I conclood'd that it wus sum rare type uv rabbit. I tuchd it jentlee with' my boot. It turnd around too fase me, expozeing suddenlee its f't long spiked-noze. Th shock-ing s'rprize wus be.ginning too arouz a mezj'r uv fear in me, a fear that wus gro.ing sumwhot out uv controle. I dont noh if it wus my increasing tay'r'r that wus cozing th creach'r too olso gro larj'r and larj'r, perhaps in self-defens, or if my mind wus merelee concocting theze looming pro.poresh'nz too al'rt me too th danej'r. Hoo nohz how I got thare but in an inst'nt I found myself lying on my back kicking f.y'ryuslee too keep th creach'r away frum me. O.nlee when wun uv my feet hit th bed with' a thump did I awak'n too escape frum this nite-mare hor'r. Haf awake I be.came aware uv myself trying too kech up on lost breth'; uv myself wund'ring what this weerdness wuz oll about, and trying too fig.y' r out why on this o.cayj'n my musc.y'l'r sist'm kickd in and starte'd acting out whot wus aft'r oll o.nlee a mind pic\ch'r. (Perhaps it wus al'rting me too wak'n up and get out uv th dred.) I had been kicking at thin air, at a monst'r that had no emboddeem'ent; it wus entirelee a construcksh'n uv and with'in in my inner imaje. Riteing about it here iz my outer imaje respons>

inner imaging	*outer imaging*	*PartI*	*outer mediation forms (between one and self/other)*	
seeing	writing	I-D-6	text	D-6/D-7: visual ex-tensions D5/D-6: auditory ex-tensions
seeing	drawing	I-D-7	image	
hearing	speaking	I-D-6	speech	
hearing	singing	I-D-5	acoustic sound	
imagining	pretending	I-B-8	imagination	B-7/B-8: virtual in-tensions B-5/B-6: somatic in-tensions
remembering	intending	I-B-7	memory	
feeling	expressing	I-B-6	emotion	
feeling	touching	I-B-5	sensation	
Part II: the inner/outer process layers: primary in-tensions (B) and secondary ex-tensions (D)				

The above chart of in-tensions (B) and ex-tensions (D) makes explicit that primary process (B) is at home with slippage (the boundaries are tenuous) and secondary process (D) is at home with difference (image, text, speech and music cannot easily be mixed; while they lend themselves to being overlayered, each one demands for itself a distinctive technic/linguistic skill.) While the two structural types of ex-tension (speech and text) are similar in their use of linguistic units (letters) and linear/diachronic syntax, they differ because one is channeled through the ear and the other through the eye. While the two substance types of ex-tension (music and image) are similar in their use of patterned relations, they both differ because, again, one is channeled through the ear and the other through the eye (see page 30).

Outer imaging is sustained by the inner image source (the imagination) that feeds it (as well as the technic/linguistic skill that potentially has to be engaged). This inner source is greatly extended when it receives feedback during and after attempts to find the "right" medium (technics/linguistics). In addition, for the imagination to continue to keep alert and to grow, it also needs to be continuously nourished by inner imaging in the presence of works that are *transitional* (Winnicott) as well as with others that are more *autonomous* (Greenberg). Outer image feedback from others provides inner image enrichment; it can grow and deepen if it is a full two-way exchange, an outer image/inner image process between the makers and the readers, each one continually updating and clarifying previous experiences, gaining new insights.

Let's not underestimate the power and grandeur of our inner image world as source. Feedback from others may help us to vivify this vast expanse of memory and imagination that we all possess; however, the most difficult problems usually revolve around the other struggle: how to find the best way to manifest an outer image; how do we master the technic/linguistic mediation formations without which no utterance, no outer image making, is ever possible.



Part II (A-B-C-D) details the process of inner image construction without developing the outer imaging side of the cycle because this latter aspect is the focus of Part ii and Part III. As well, it is essential to realize that it is possible to engage in all 16 layers of basicParadigm II as an inner imaging process (A-B-C-D) before making any outer image (A-B-C-D) utterances. In short, it is possible to go to an art exhibition and engage in the full range of possibilities, as outlined here, in complete silence; however this is not very typical and it is probably more insightful to keep some sort of interactive (inner image/outer image) dialogue on-going, each one alternately speaking and listening; otherwise the long series of events is difficult both to remember and to develop into an involved and enriched repertoire for future reference. The inner image build-up is bound to overflow into some sort of outer imaging—even when it is given a gag order. Even though a response practice, by definition, starts out by inner imaging, it is always possible to introduce outer imaging activities immediately (after the inner imaging activity has run its course) at any stage (layer) in the process that is outlined in Part II: A-B, (page 70).

Once I actually directed a class of student teachers through the 8 layers of the microParadigm of a response practice (Part II: A-B); they were responding to an artwork. I instructed them not to tell anyone what they were thinking, not to make notes or reveal any body language (in short they were asked to stay entirely within the boundaries of an inner imaging process). As I had predicted, even though it took only about 15 minutes, everyone was ready to explode with outer image responses long before the inner imaging side of the artEvent was finished. Their engagement was nothing if not intense; it was my hope that they would experience first hand the intrinsic importance that we ascribe in everyday experience to keeping the inner and outer imaging processes interacting with each other. I also wanted them to never forget how rich and re-sourcefull inner imaging can be, how important it is as a source for the outer images that pervade our daily lives (especially when we know how to fabricate a response that gives it an outer form). An outer image gives one enough distance to behold it as an outer-other, an outside version; when it is left as an inner image we are still beheld by it. In this seemingly simple process lies the entire infrastrucure of what is known as education.

The most common form of outer imaging is verbal; after seeing a film, for example, most of us want to share our encounter by talking on and on: we try to clear up for ourselves and share with others who we identified with, what motivated characters to act the way they did, or even the use of the cinematic technics and/or linguistics, the visual and/or auditory language, as set forth by the director. It will become more evident in the mapping of the basicParadigm dealing with extensions (Part III) that inner/outer imaging is born inside the guiding light of a great variety of sensorial orientations: different individuals find ways to prioritize/privilege different ratios of their potential *haptic* and/or *emotional* and/or *auditory* and/or *visual* bandwidths .

When one looks at an outer image (an object/extension), one is in the process of constructing an artEvent; as such one gains some sense of the subject who made it. And this is as close as it is possible to come to that 'other'. One can have the illusion of being directly in touch with other humans; however, one is only able to behold what others present as their outer image, be it in body- /emotional- /auditory- or visual-/language. An other's inner image is forever beyond one's reach; there is always an utterance, an extension between the inner images of two subjects. This is both a manifestation of the distance that separates humans from each other and of the intimacy that enables them to feel inseparable. Further, extensions cannot exist unless they are inside an event; that is, they can exist only if there is a subject to behold them inside time, to give them event status. A film is intrinsically an event when it is screened; however, as is also true of a still image, it can fall out of 'existence' if no one takes time to behold it, to restore it inside event status again, that is, inside time. When the screening is over, the film goes back into storage, more or less as an outside-of-time, nonEvent—with, however, full *potential event* status.

We do not see objects or persons; we see the light that bounces off of them and that reaches our eyes. We do not hear objects or persons; we hear the sounds that reverberate off of them and that reach out ears. We do not feel objects or persons directly; we register the sense of touch through nerve threads that are spread along the boundary of the skin—that which is stretched as a differentiating membrane between our physical being and all that is other.

We do not communicate directly with each other but rather through extensions that both conceal aspects of our inner image world and reveal aspects of our inner image world. We manifest extensions through the two mediation systems: technics, which extends the body's muscular system, and linguistics, which extend the mind's symbolic system. As mediation media they are never completely transparent (without any interference in conveying the message) or completely opaque (becoming intrinsic to the meaning of the message).

<ufi...Imajin a commune'tee uv peap'l sitting around a rathr larje tabe'l; in th cent'r uv th tab'l iz a larj ves'l f 'll uv smoll'r ves'lz. Each p'rs'n iz repre.zent'd by wun uv the inn'r ves'lz: each p'rs'n can inp't and outp't o.nlee intoo thayr o.n ves'l; howev'r thay hav acsess throo thayr o.n ves'l too th contents uv ennee uv the uthr inn'r ves'lz.This meanz that no.buddee can feel or hear or see ennee uthr p'rs'n d'rectlee; each memb'r can o.nlee off'r and be.hold th repre.zentaysh'nz that rezide in the inn'r ves'lz. No wun exists too ennee uv the uthrz be.yond thayr repre.zentayash'n in th ves'lz that contain them.>

Subjects are connected by means of the extensions or *representations* that reside between them. If seeing communication this way seems more disconnected than connected it is probably because we fall in love with the illusion that supports the notion that the representation is the thing itself. Further, subjects are only connected to their extensions by means of sensorial pipelines: the haptic/somatic sense of touch, taste and smell, the emotional feelings of pleasure/pain, the auditory sense of hearing and the visual sense of sight. Each pipeline is assigned a certain range or technic/linguistic bandwidth: touch requires direct contact; sound requires a medium such as air or water to sustain its passage from sender through to receiver; light can pass through a vacuum, even from the remote stars. In short, between subjects there lies a minefield of extensions, representations, outer images 'designed' to build and uphold a sense of connection—to help them ward off the dangers of disconnection and loss.

But between subjects and their extensions there also lies a minefield of technic/linguistic challenges, often perceived as obstacles: the *structural demands* of materials and symbols. Communication links, in summary, are nothing if not fragile and nothing if not breathtaking when they flower up with fluency and carry the illusion that they do not exist; or in the case of poetics (artifactions) insist that the medium is not transparent but joins in to 'massage' the message (McLuhan). Whether fabricating or reading, side effects can fulfill or de-rail intensions.

The inner image/outer image dialogue that occurs between an extension such as a work of art and a responding subject starts off with pre-expectations from both. What happens, when they both intersect, not only involves the complex passageways between them, but also the complex aspirations that each one brings to the exchange. A work of art carries the latent desires of the artist: for example, it may be programmed to seduce a viewer through its color or through an expression on a dramatized face; or it may offer up signals constraining responders to play a role such as that of a voyeur, pulling them into the work while not allowing them to 'enter' it. Viewers may also arrive in search of a particular find; they may wish for an engaging experience, to be entertained (illusioned) or to be challenged (disillusioned); they might find themselves oblivious to a particular subject matter. Who would dare to predict the outcome when two such complex sets of desire face each other? The fact that both makers and readers sometimes enter into a dialogue at very different stages of experience and/or training only adds to the complexity of the process.

Responding as a metaModernist practice can be characterized as an inner imaging/outer imaging dialogue, initially fulfilling the needs of the former, which in turn motivates the need for the latter. It is a process that is set in motion by reaction, which in turn leads to action. It is, first and foremost, a dialogue (an artEvent) between the desires of an inner imaging subject and the desires of an extension object (which has already been imbued with desires or, as in the case of performance, is in the process of being outer imaged by the same subject agent who is activating the performance).

The MetaModernist Orientation

Since the Analogos Paradigm proposes a metaModernist orientation, it is important to understand how it differs from a prototypical Modernist approach. Probably the most illustrious account of a way to respond to art as a Modernist is that formulated by Feldman (pp.348-383, 1970). In marked contrast to what I am proposing, Feldman sees the art work as carrying a message irrespective of who the viewer is. He does not see the viewer as a presence interacting with art so much as someone, anyone, who goes to art to find what is already "in art", anyone involved in "praise, comparison, description, and explanation as well as disapproval" (p 348) of the outer image, but not of their own inner image. He does not see the responder dialoguing with art, but rather someone receiving a message from it. The artwork is the giver, the viewer is the receiver; the viewer comes to art to see what is already "in it" so as to extract it and possess it. The responder must come to understand it; there is no mention of a two-way reflective dialogue between the viewer as a subject and the artwork as a subject.

Feldman does concede that "...we want to know how it affects our lives and our world outlook..." (p. 394); he seems to be interested in the viewer. However, even here, it is evident that he is describing a one-way communication street; the viewer seems to be a passive recipient whose life will be affected if they get the message. He makes no reference to the significance of the context that a viewer brings with them to the work. As viewers, not only is our gender or our class background insignificant, but also beyond this, he sees no value in our recent or even long-term experiences, no matter how vivid or profound, that come with us to propel us forward into our particular selection of what to see or how to go about seeing it. Our 'history' as viewers seems irrelevant; it is "the historical function of a work of art (that) is useful to us as critics...when it points to significant features of life..." (p. 349). When it comes to pointing, he attributes that privilege to the artwork; as viewers we have no pointing power. Feldman has, in short, proposed a method that is intended to keep the viewer from skewing the meaning of an artwork away from the expert, established version.


MetaModernist responding is a process of first inner imaging and then outer imaging; this latter can be seen as an attempt to construct an individual external version, one that can be held outside at a distance and assist the maker in gaining a better sense of their perspective. The interaction between the inner self image and the outer image of the self constitutes the ground for a dialogue of self-revelation, a dialogue that, once fluent, is the lifeblood of learning.

The first four layers (A: 1-2-3-4, page 70) of basicParadigm II are designed to assist the beholder in engaging subjectively with an extension; the subsequent four layers (B: 5-6-7-8) should assist the viewer in establishing a more objective, studied and somewhat critical distance. (A more extensive discussion of an after-the-event critical process is developed in the subsequent eight parallel layers, called the *reflective practice*, C and D) This developmental order proposes that a responding process advisedly begin with direct, first-hand experience, that it is imperative to discover one's own inner responses before seeking out the readings of others. Underlying this process is the assumption that one brings to any engagement rich layers of memory that can and need to be given a voice if one is to gain fluency in trusting one's responses. It assumes that one needs to be sufficiently grounded in first-hand experience before attempting to join and contribute to a community of voices, at first with peers and later with the more scholarly.

> The audience creates the author as much as the author creates the taste by which he is to be enjoyed....The teen-age market was invented by the Beatles. In politics, as in war, youth is now a major factor. The TV set introduced the viewer as screen, the public as participant. It puts us on....the producer and the consumer make each other. (Mcluhan, 1970)

D: *Autonomous Reflective Practices*: received insights (5-6), readymeans insights (7-8)
C: *Transitional Reflective Practices*: projective insights (1-2), readymade insights (3-4)
B: *Autonomous Response Practices*: received experiences (5-6), readymeans experiences (7-8)
A: *Transitional Response Practices*: projective experiences (1-2); readmade experiences (3-4)
Part II: Response and Reflective Practices (basicParadigm)

C-D: reflective practices	D: autonomous reflective practices	D-7/8:readymeans insights D-5/6: received insights	8: retro-activating 7:. interpreting 6: structuring 5: describing
	C: transitional reflective practices	C-3/4: readymade insights C-1/2: projective insight	4:. revealing 3: reflecting 2: remembering 1: forgetting
A-B: response practices	B: autonomous response practices	B-7/8: readymeans experiences B-5/6: received experiences	8: retro-activating 7: interpreting 6: structuring 5: describing
	A: transitional response practices	A-3/4: readymade experiences A-1/2: projective experiences	4: revealing 3: reflecting 2: remembering 1: forgetting
PART II: Practices (macroParadigm)			




Part II-A: (1-4)

Transitional Response Practices (Inner/Outer Imaging)

	orientation	*inner imaging*	*outer imaging*
A-4	*revealing*	imagining revisions	making revisions
A-3	*reflecting*	imagining oneself as an other	role playing
A-2	*remembering*	inner recalling	linguistic/speaking, writing, etc.
A-1	*forgetting*	space/time 'dreaming'	technic/emotional gesturing, etc.
Part II-A ResponsePractice (microParadigms)			

Part II-A

Layer 1: Forgetting



Forgetting for a metaModernist is an initial trance-like engagement with an extension object/event; it is a process that invites beholders to bring their own expectations, their own memories and associations, their own values, in short, their own context, to both their inner imaging and their outer imaging follow-up of the responding process. This requires for most people a protected period of time without distractions; in classes it calls for a group understanding that individuals need to refrain from speaking out until each person has had unencumbered time to commune individually with the work under study. Without this common communal agreement individual responses are unable to deepen from the inside out; they are caught in a push and pull series of reactions for and against what others say rather than what they might arrive at on their own.

Beginning moves or entry strategies to an event tend to set a pattern that subsequent dialogue seems destined to follow. Planning the initial orientation of an event is, accordingly, of critical import. "Getting off to a good start" may set a momentum that fulfills itself without much further effort; however, a start in the wrong direction calls for extra energy, not only to arrest the backward momentum, but to reverse it, re-start it and then re-gain momentum. We can, of course, learn from our mistakes, that is, allow ourselves to make mistakes in order to learn; but usually we keep trying to find ways to better guarantee our chances of getting off to a good start. It is in this light that forgetting stands as the entry or ground mode for a responding practice in Part II of the Analogos.

One way to assist ourselves (or others) to become fully engaged as beholders, fully responsive to our inner sensations and feelings, is to regard the process as a journey, an adventure. We can ask, "If it were possible to enter into this space (illusionary space if it is an image, real space if it is three-dimensional) or surface (if it is abstract), what journey would I make?" Drawing attention to the temporal nature of responding underscores the fact that it takes time to experience a work of art. Drawing attention to the need for a quiet period, free from distractions, free from responses by others, underscores the importance of being allowed to become engaged, to constructed meaning first hand in a one-to-one dialogue with a work. What one is *forgetting,* then, is the fear of not finding the correct or the best answer, that is, the fear of failure. Everyday rules of protocol are suspended; one can take a dream journey inwardly in full-blown incognito, daring to partake in the most beautiful or depraved of personal narratives and tell no one; and no one can ever be accused of being wrong by others; they cannot claim to know where you have 'been' or what you have 'seen'.

The experience of forgetting has its analogue in the omnipotence of early infancy (Winnicott), that initial period when each of us was able to drift along inside the illusion that anything we wished for was available at our fingertips. Our every wish was fulfilled more or less instantly, and on command, even though we had not the slightest grasp of technics or linguistics to realize the outcome by ourselves. Experience with art enables an adult as a beholder to re-live that long lost sense of empowerment, to inhabit an imaginary world that is exempt from the emphasis on survival that surrounds everyday life. For the new infant, omnipotence (if good enough "mothering" provides for it) is the ideal illusioning experience; for us as adults, however, *forgetfulness*, the re-kindling of illusions, is usually forbidden, and in any case the closest we can come to it is to enter into a sort of dream time/space that is here being termed *forgetting*. This return to a place where survival demands are suspended and the *imagination* is let loose to play out the impossible, may be, after all, the best way to rehearse the dangers and/or hopes that populate the survival world, so that later, upon return to that real world, they can be more knowingly avoided and/or attempted.

In the stillness of this first phase of a metaModernist responding practice (whether it be with a still image in synchronic space or with moving images in diachronic time), there can be no pressure on a beholder to attempt to formulate externalizations, not even speech; the imagination needs no external haptic language, no sounds in auditory language, no images or text in visual language. To struggle with the complexities of a technic/linguistic construction (that is, with outer imaging) at the same time as one is beholding (inner imaging) is to de-rail both experiences; the grounding process of *forgetting* is inner imaging, and to *displace* it with an outer image description that pretends to honor it, is to sacrifice both of them.

The *remembering*-of-the event, the next phase, is itself a new event, a version that can, like forgetting, be constructed entirely in an inner image world. When this scenario is developed in the inner image, the complexities of the outer image manifestation can be faced. The technic and linguistic demands that must be met when we try to make external *ex-tensions* (outer images) to share with others (or to behold something to re-see for ourselves at a distance, outside of our imagination) require extensive mediation, for they are entirely virtual as long as they remain in the *in-tensions* of our inner imaging experience.

When we gaze into extensions, we enter analogically into what Lacan calls the *imaginaire* order, the state that an infant must experience when it is still fused with the mother. During this first phase of life, a child still has no awareness of the period that is to follow, that of Lacan's *symbolic order*, when language is encountered, as associated with the father. This latter phase only emerges when the child comes to differentiate the inner self image from the outer image of the self; the former comes into awareness with the birth of the latter, with the discovery of the outer image of the self in a mirror (Lacan) or the outer image of the mother's mirroring in the form of baby talk and facial mimicry (Winnicott).

Just as an 'outer imager' (an artist or an author, for example) initially faces what appears to be a blank canvas or a white page, a beholder appears to face a blank inner emptiness. There is, of course, no such thing as a blank, zero-degree clean slate in a response practice, either in- or out- side. The inner 'canvas' already has over a life time introjected a propensity, a desire for certain schemata that it has favored out of past experience; Lacan refers to this desire as a *lack* needing to be fulfilled. Similarly, the exterior canvas carries the history of a particular socio-cultural ideology that is silently written in invisible ink, a good example of which is the proverbial rectangle (the one that lurks everywhere in human culture), replete with diagonals that mark out triangles, a center point, not to mention all of the pushes and pulls that horizontals and verticals are heir to.

There is no way an adult beholder can enter into Lacan's *imaginaire* order. We are already in possession of symbolic language (and technical skills to speak and perhaps write it); we know that there is such a thing as death, that we can, ourselves, die; in short, we know that the world's existence does not depend on us. Kristeva (1980), elaborating on Lacan's thesis, has described an adult version of the *imaginary*, or that part of it that is retained, as *semiotic*. As a feminist she has tried to reconstitute this pre-Oedipal imaginary phase over and against the patriarchal, symbolic post-Oedipal phase. She theorizes that the suppression of the first phase with its undifferentiated, heterogeneous flow of body rhythms is not totally effective; rather there remains a residue of it in our language. Because the infant in this first period knows no gender, and is not yet differentiated from the mother's body, it is closely connected with femininity (for both boys and girls). In that sense the bisexual, semiotic early state can be seen to undermine the fixed binary ideologies (good/bad, true/false, beautiful/ugly) of the later adult, male-dominated (God, father, state) class-society.

There can be no doubt that when we enter into a *forgetting experience*; we are in a very vulnerable position. It is for this reason that it needs to be stressed that this first phase cannot be detached from subsequent phases, especially, *remembering* (phase two). Forgetting is proposed herein as a means of deepening our experiences; by entering into the fusion that is inner imaging; a beholder experiences not just the work's aspirations and not just their own, but rather the interaction between the two; one is able to construct a transitional zone that is at once both and neither. We cannot forget, however, that in forgetting, we are still in the grips of a fusion rather than separated out from the object with the presence of mind to critically question it. This is not to suggest that this latter, a critical positioning, be displaced but rather merely delayed until a later phase when the individual voice has become sufficiently grounded to withstand the sweep of other meanings and be able to dialogue with them rather than be overwhelmed by them.

Meaning does not pre-exist in an artwork; nor does it exist in a viewer. Rather it emerges in the *journey* along a road-under-construction—in the inner imaging dialogue. (Later this can be further extended as an outer imaging dialogue with a new 'canvas'.) Usually one enters into an engaging experience when all the conditions are in sync; however, sometimes there is a resistance, a dislike, a refusal to 'enter' a work, even if the metaphor of a journey is embraced. In such a case a non-journey can be seen as a journey, one of conflict and resistance rather than of fusion. Since even a non-journey (see page 61) takes time to take shape it is in and of itself still a type of journey and can be seen as a narrative no less than a voyage that finds receptivity.


Each viewer brings to a response practice a unique complex of expectations just as each artwork has a different set of aspirations built into it by its author. Some works, for example, seem to exude resistance, seem to exist to provoke or raise negative issues. They go out of their way to make the responder ambivalent, or even to experience pain. Parallel to this, some viewers may practice within the framework of an ideology that insists on a course of resistance or even to use art to illustrate their theory. These are all examples of responses; hence a "non-journey" is a journey, and this remains so even when the viewer feels that the artist wanted to provoke but failed in the attempt. Unraveling the process whereby a failure is given form may provide a journey of insight about what not to do, or even about how to re-make the event in a new way.

Sample questions one might ask to initiate a "forgetting" journey: *If I could enter this work what journey might I make? Where might I start? What pulls me in and/or pushes me away? Can I enter into this dream time/space, take a fully engaged journey and sustain the trance experience until the journey itself decides that it is ready to let me "awaken"? Will I be able to recount the event to myself? to others? How could I outer image a sense of this for others?*

(These sample questions are presented in the first person; one learns, or teaches oneself, by alternating between the roles of (self)teacher and (self)student. However, they can easily be shifted to the third person if the aim is to teach or assist others. It is also possible for a small group of individuals to get together and work collaboratively; however, this is an entirely different type of dynamic and the success or failure for each individual may rest to a large extent with their sense of being included, that is, on the ability of everyone to work out an inclusive interactive process.)

Part II-A

Layer 2: Remembering



Having taken a journey, having not only experienced it "first-hand" (metaphorically), but also having been its co-author (in collaboration with the contribution put forth by the artist/author of the work experienced), a viewer emerges 'back home' in the real world with the one and only available memory record of the event. It is this memory of the inner journey as experienced, and only this memory, that becomes the ground out of which the event can acquire a new life through language, first in the inner image 'pre-language' language and later, as an outer image text (often in words but in any technic/linguistic form that the viewer has some facility with: dance, drawing, film, video, song, to mention only a few of the ones outlined in Part III). This process of bringing to light, herein called *remembering* (layer 2), is itself also a dialogue, a transitional experience: on one side the memory of the dream, the ground event, calls for an authentic account of itself; on the other, standardized use of language calls for a careful use of syntax so that the words (or whatever form is being used) make sense as 'sentences'. Each side has its unique demands; only together do they constitute remembering.

Beholders, by first *forgetting* about their everyday survival demands, can open a door to free association, to emotional fusion with an outer image; they can bring their expectations with them. To a metaModernist a 'correct' message cannot pre-exist in a work of art; rather, meaning is born at the intersection between expectation schemata of a viewer's desire and those of an artist/author's desire (as embedded in the work). Since both of these form *stories* and bandwidths that are entirely unique for each new viewer, no one can forecast a response ahead of time; and the only 'correct' response has to be the one *remembered* by the viewer. No one else could have been present inside the experience to witness the details.

When a journey is taken over by a remembering process the result is not just a translation. Rather it is a new work born out of the dialogue that takes place between the demands of the inner image *pre-language* memories and the inner image demands of language syntax as a fluid system of social communication. All of this takes place first as an inner image. Later, this invariably further develops into some sort of outer image ex-tension—one that emerges out of a dialogue between the inner image language version already in place and the demands of real materials (outer imaging technics) and real symbols (outer imaging language)

Remembering can be characterized as a practice that gives inner virtual, technic/linguistic order to the processing of time and the shaping of space of a forgetting experience; then, when already embedded in the pre-verbal memory bank of the inner body/inner ear/inner eye, it supposedly has enough substance and momentum to give birth to an outer image manifestation, one that is materialized in 'real' tecnic/linguistic containers..


Remembering has its analogue in Winnicott's concept of disillusionment; the undifferentiated illusion/fusion of the forgetting phase becomes 'broken', structured, in order for the viewer to gain some sense of one and 'other'. The object of desire, the work of art in this case, stays behind in the museum; what we can take with us is the inner image fusion experience and our reconstruction of it in language (both as the inner language of the imagination and as a potential external ex-tension of it as an outer image, the varieties of which are elaborated in Part III). A forgetting experience becomes unforgettable if it is transformed into inner image language (*remembering*), and more so again if it is given an external construct that then has the potential to become embedded in the social dialogue of a community of voices.

Whether we think of *remembering* in terms of disillusionment (Winnicott) or of symbolic order (Lacan), we identify a difficult but necessary thrust forward. The gain is made possible at the expense of the loss of innocence, of illusionment (Winnicott), of the imaginaire (Lacan). The prototype here may be the experience of trying to remember a dream: the more we surround it with language the more its pearly pureness seems lost. And yet if we do not try *remembering* it, it fades away and is lost in ever more remote depths of the ineffable. Accordingly, there may be occasions when it is appropriate for a beholder to remember right away and others when it is best to forego remembering until later—if they are not yet ready to accept the loss or if they find that the thrust forward into symbolic language is too much of a shift too soon.

Sample questions: *When I return "home", that is, when I re-surface after a forgetting engagement 'within' a work, can I rethink (in my imagination) the journey as an inner image story, narrative, or text, as a series of imaginary gestures (mime), or an imaginary drawing? (For extended possibilities, that is subsequent outer imaging, see Part III where the range of examples in the outer image world is outlined.) Can I also manifest these externally? If I were unable to enter into the work, can I describe in a sequence my resistance, my series of struggles? Can I include both the experiences that seem to be about the work and those that seem to be about what was happening inside myself (in my inner image of emotional feelings and physical sensations; in my inner music and speech; in my inner images and texts; as alluded to in Part I)? How could I outer image a sense of this for others?*

Part II-A

Layer 3: Reflecting



As viewers enter into a third layer, they emerge upward and outward from their deep *sleep* of layer 1 and their more conscious reconstruction of it in layer 2 into an even more aware state of being, that of *reflecting*. The undifferentiated, unreflective but essential, initial two layers still stand as the ground out of which all subsequent layers can take form. A *reflecting* process (the central, pivitol triangle) enables viewers to carry forward the rich memories of the preceding experiences. Stepping aside, or outside, insures a sense of separation; the fusion that was 'one' has split to become the 'one' and the 'other'. The fusion-identity that was encountered in the first phase of the Analogos responding practice and the coming-to-light of the second phase, must now in layer 3, enable a beholder to undergo a first radical transformation. At this stage, a viewer can reflect on their experience, no longer only as an insider but now from an external vantage point, that is, after the fact (the dream time) and outside of the place (the dream space) of the *forgetting and remembering* experiences. As one beholds their 'other' image in a mirror, their quest becomes one of their 'self image' (inner image) facing their 'image of self' (the reflection in the outer image), and vice versa (both of them having just returned from their extended forgetting/remembering "journey").

One can update their inner self-image by *reflecting* on their outer/other image of the self in a mirror. To enter a *reflecting* practice the viewer can return to the original work of art and start to imagine what it would be like to inhabit one of the characters, one of the color-configurations or constructs set forth by the author/artist in the work. To role play in this way is to invent another version of the self, one that is outside (in the work) and therefore one that a beholder can get a good look at, gaze at, in order to gain another dimension of the continuous self, the one inside that can only ever look out. To go one step further in this play-acting/role-playing, one can imagine the experience of that other self in the image looking back at the one out here and surmising what they behold.

What is the bond between an inner self image and an outer image of the self when they reflect upon each other? Which one is the ground of its other? And which one is the figure of its other? In asking these questions one taps into the notion that transitional phenomena is not just any presence in any mid-world. A figure can only emerge if there is a ground from which it can procure existence; the artist envisions a potential image or figuration awating release from the (back)ground of the canvas plane; the sculptor envisions a 'figuration' in the ground or block of rock. The reverse is also possible. In our present context it is the inner image, the memory, now under the weight of many layers, that is the ground for the reflective inside/outside intra-active experience. A viewer is never able to view a full schema of their own body the way others can; hence the importance of a *reflecting* response (II-A-3), and subsequently of a *reflecting* practice (II-C and II-D).


Reflecting, like forgetting and remembering, is first grounded in the inner image world; it is an inner solo performance without any outward utterance. It is still first and foremost a dialogue between a viewer and their *object of desire*. As before, then, it is imperative that this practice of *reflecting* be safeguarded against distraction, that individuals be guaranteed a time/space of silence to fully engage in this complex act of the *active imagination* (Jung). This does not discount the greatly increased value of subsequent dialogue among individual viewers who want to share their respective versions of their communal *forgetting*, *remembering* and *reflecting* experiences. This latter, the externalization or 'figuration' of the internalized ground, further enriches all the previous layerings; the internal version of a *reflecting* process sets a ground, the external version gives it a figuration to behold; an external version can then become a communal ground, adding a further layer of metafiguration complexity for a viewer to behold.

As diverse responses, from different viewers peering into the same work of art, come to co-exist in the outer image world of a community of voices, individual speakers cannot help but come to notice (to behold, to inner image) how distinct their own figuration is. In this context each speaker can discover not only the reflections that they themselves figured but also some that never occurred to them. They can become what they did not imagine; their ground (the original forgetting layer) is enriched retroactively as their figure (the new enrichment) takes on new possibilities.

Sample questions: *As I imagine that I am a character, a brush stroke, a cinematic camera pan, a passage of words, or some other node in an outer image, what is my state of affairs in the work and what does it feel like (including both emotions and physical sensations) to be in the midst of the art work? What is my relationship to my continuous self that remains looking at the art work from the outside? Can I imagine a dialogue between the two of us? If I recount my reflecting experience to others, then, as it comes to reside among the other beholders what can I discover about my sense of self? about my communal context? How could I outer image a sense of this for others?*

Part II-A

Layer 4: Revealing



To enter the fourth of these beginning, subjective engagements within an artEvent is to set in motion a sense of closure; it enables the viewer to step back even further than was the case in layer 3 and gain a new perspective on the over all experience. Having devoted the first three phases to enriching our inner imaging of the work, the viewer is ready to *imagine* the outer imaging process without actually doing it externally. (Externalizations can be delayed until the inner image is sufficiently fulfilled to sustain them.)

One way to do this is to enter an 'un-construction' process: one can un-paint if it is a painting, un-carve if it is a carving or un-perform if it is a performance. In short one can subtract it back to the white canvas, the block of stone or the 'empty' performer in the empty performance space. On the way back, however, one can leave all the bits and pieces or constructs that one feels are too important to erase. Then one can proceed to re-make the work in complete concordance with one's desires—as a scenario in the inner image, that is. This scenario for a new work, although still entirely an inner imaging process, shifts the direction towards a preparation for the possibility of outer imaging, of fabricating a new work; the *outer imaging* side of the response process is now more fully on the agenda than it was during any of the previous layers of experience. This has the effect of propelling a viewer forward, motivating them to let the new response *input* have an affect on subsequent response *output*. The outcome may range anywhere from a subtle reworking of mood to a new work of art paying homage or offering a revision, a critique, a deconstruction; it could even lead to a new work that seems to have no antecedent in the parent one that was its 'source'.

The extent to which someone is willing to imagine themselves changing a work of art will probably, at least in part, be influenced by the orientation of their response to it: if one has been moved deeply, or considers the work to be already fully successful, there may well be a resistance to imagining any change. Conversely, one may find the work un-fulfilling, that is, not meeting inner expectations, and as a result be highly motivated to make a new work designed to fulfill the lack. This may well be a common scenario among artists: an unsatisfactory response to a previous artwork spurs them on to fulfill their vision (inner image) of a better work, the one that it could have, should have, been. There is here an echo of the difference between a *readymade* and a *readymeans* situation, the former calling for an outer image response of only some measure of change and the latter calling for a transformation so radical that the new work may seem to bear no relation to its antecedent. In either case, however, irrespective of whether the transformation is small or enormous, the act of imagining an extension into one's own time and place and then re-constructing it as an artist/author completes the cycle of four layers, a process that starts with the potential for inner imaging and ends with the potential for outer imaging.

Sample questions: *Could I imagine undoing this work? How much of it would I keep and how much erase, and how much completely re-invent? If I imagine making a new work after beholding this one, what will it be like? Will it have any obvious influence on my work? If so what aspects will I keep? any? some? all? Would I change the topic? the technic and/or linguistic means used? Would I actually do it or would I prefer just to imagine it and let the effects be more incidental? Would my work change my understanding of the parent work? How could I outer image a sense of this for others?*

The next four layers of our Part II (B:5/6/7/8) are co-equivalent to the four-stage method outlined by Feldman (1970). The similarity ends there, however. The four layers presented here exist inside the Analogos; each layer is sustained inside a structural inter-relation with each of the others that informs their individual inner meanings. As well, a viewer entering these next four phases of the practice is already situated inside the dynamics of this process in the first four layers (e.g., reflecting [A-3] and interpreting [B7] occupy central triangles); the next four layers carry the same structural interplay that was implicit in the first four layers; however, this must be seen as a more extrinsic orientation than what has preceeded it in the first four layers of experience.

A viewer entering phase 5 of the Analogos response practice is already immersed in the transitional (Winnicott) time/space experience of the first four layers (as described above); they are already positioned inside a subjective fusion, a solid ground that is designed to sustain them as they progress through the more objective layers of experiences to come. A metaModernist orientation then is radically different from the Modernist one proposed by Feldman: it insists that a viewer be situated initially *inside* the response practice, rather than (as Feldman implies) be held throughout the response process as an observer on the outside looking in (see also pages 68-69).

Feldman proposed a high modernist pedagogy for a high modernist era. It was a perfect fit for its time, making it all the more out of sync as the only option for today's metaModernist view of the world. Feldman's contribution; his proposal that art can be seen as a subject, observed objectively, was an important modernist aspiration that he articulated for his time. A metaModernist paradigm has no interest in negating modernism, but rather aspires to extend it and in the process reaffirm its ground. It is in this context that the next four phases are presented as the objective continuity of an Analogos response practice.


Part II-B

Autonomous Response Practices: Inner/Outer Imaging

	orientation	*inner image language*	*outer image language*
B-8	retroactivating	inner imaging future prospects	setting out future prospects
B-7	interpreting	inner imaging meanings	articulating meanings
B-6	structuring	inner imaging unity patterns	constructing sructural patterns
B-5	describing	inner imaging unit details	constructing an inventory
Part II:B ResponsePractice (basicParadigm)			

Part II-B

Layer 5: Describing



The act of *describing* an extension/artwork (after having completed the first four phases, II-A: 1-2-3-4) in all its observable details, and as an outside reality, opens up a completely new orientation for a viewer who has been involved in the previous series of experiences described above. If the first four phases were designed to assist a beholder in developing and sustaining a subjective dialogue, then phase 5 represents a radical shift into the potential of extending the dialogue between a viewer's inner image, already in full flight, and their outer image (what they are looking at as a subject in its own right). At this turning point a viewer may try to 'enter' a work, but in so doing, they may feel like strangers in a foreign land and in an other time. As an outside observer, one gains a new, disinterested perspective, somewhat like a voyeur, a tourist, someone without the concerns of a vested interest or an emotional or subjective engagement.

To describe, as understood in our present sequence of events, is to focus on the object as if one were a discretely differentiated and disinterested outsider; with such an orientation one proceeds to observe its digital moments and scan across the parts that constitute the whole. By focusing on the details it becomes possible to build up a description that stands in as an inventory of the parts as beheld. By simply identifying these and attaching an inner image name to each one in turn it is possible to track the order of their occurrence, the order in which they called for the viewer's attention and/or the order in which the viewer decided to discover them. As was the case in previous layers it is important for a viewer to carry out this process in the inner image before outer imaging it (in this case often verbalizing it or writing it); and although sharing it with others helps individuals to identify their commonalities and differences, this value can only be attained if the inner imaging is allowed to find its own 'voice' *first* before either outer imaging it or joining in a community of voices.


If the work being described is a temporal work (such as is the case with film, video, music, performance or theater) then the process of attending to the individual parts that populate the work to make the whole is already ordered in sequence. Unlike the process of viewing a synchronic work, such as a still image, a diachronic or time-based work unfolds according to the order set by the author. As a result the order in which aspects are recalled after an event has stopped may be more significant than the order in which the parts were presented.

Entering this fifth phase after having been involved with the first four, is a totally different experience from that of *commencing* a viewing experience with this activity (as Feldman has advocated). To start with phase 5, to start by objective describing, is to guarantee an experience that is grounded in an external, disinterested world and in one that is fragmented. While it is possible to make a developmental shift from an inside-oriented response experience (layers 1-4) as a ground to an outside disinterested one (layers 5-8), the reverse seems all but impossible. Once an objective cast is set down it is hardly possible for a viewer to ignore this sufficiently to engage in a full-fledged *forgetting experience*; they can react with their objective findings or against them but it will be difficult to ignore them.

Sample questions: *Can I name the parts of the extension, thinking of them as isolated, as if each one were an entity onto itself? Can I give them fanciful names? descriptive names? character names? How does it feel to touch them or imagine touching them? picking them up? smelling them? How do they supposedly think about the names that I gave to them? What parts did I name first? second? What parts did I leave un-named? How did others do this? How does my description relate to the descriptions of others? How could I outer image a sense of this for others?*

Part II-B

Layer 6: Structuring



The process of *structuring* is inextricably bound up with its predecessor, *describing*; each one represents the other's absence. They need each other. Describing proceeds with the hope of building up a sense of a whole (or more properly, a non-whole whole) by accumulating more and more molecular units; the relation of parts can only claim to be a non-relation. Structuring, on the other hand, is all about relation; it aims to reveal the underlying patterns of space and the rhythms of time; it aims to make explicit the context that lies hidden beneath and behind any proliferation of surface details. To structure is, then, first of all, an attempt to see beyond the mere units that, like leaves, conceal their forest. A view from an airplane can show a configuration of green fields, but not the blades of grass or the bugs between them; conversely, a close-up or inside view of the latter has little to say about the former.

Analogos is itself a substance/structure entity. In addition, it has a built-in zoom that enables a user to zip between macro over-all views (I-II-III-IIII) and/or basic views (A-B-C-D) and/or micro detailed views (1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8). Because it consistently keeps the same syntagmatic pattern (the four equilateral triangles that together constitute a single equilateral triangle) and the same paradigmatic content (two sets of two subjects in intersecting dialogue, charted in a four tiered system of layers, for example), it carries the same (archetypal) analogical imprint whether zooming in or out. (For example, in accordance with dynamic Y, the two triangles A and C are always substance-based; B and D are always structure-based; similarly 1-3-5-7 or I-III are always substance-based and 2-4-6-8 and II-IIII are always structure-based).


The basis of language is such that it consists of two terms: a grammatical or syntagmatic framework, the structure, that is solidly fixed for no other reason than to give freedom to its other, to the vast range of words and their associated meanings, the substance or paradigmatic; this interposition between two terms, between solid framework and variable freedom, is precisely how it makes possible the communication of an infinite variety of meanings. Similarly, the structure of the body carries a grammar of technics (which can be extended beyond the body into tools and instruments) that provide a consistent structure to support the endless variety of gestural, symbolic meanings. Inner image language survives in a similar way, but in a virtual world that is without concrete technics or concrete materials, without concrete forms, without concrete (spoken or written) language. It is only by means of technic/linguistic mediation systems (and there is no other way to make outer imaging possible) that the private and virtual inner image world of individuals can enter into the community of voices; and these outer image manifestations of our others re-present the only version of their inner language that is available to us. There is no way to fully access the accuracy or discrepancy between the inner and outer images of others; indeed, it is difficult enough to understand this complexity in our own inner/outer experience!

In spite of the objectivity inherent in the *structuring process* as outlined herein, viewers are not yet looking for an answer that is known by an expert before hand. They will necessarily come upon their own constructed structural insights out of the layering of experience that is gained in the first five phases. Emotional residue and memory associations as well as the accumulation of details (the substance) all point in the direction of patterns; but it is, more specifically, the orchestration of technics and language (body language, auditory language and visual language) that mediate between inner and outer image construction and that thereby ground the formulation of structural insight.

Sample questions: *Can I discover any logic that reveals the way the extension is put together? Is there a main structure that is sustained throughout? Is there a counter resistance operating against the main thrust of the work? Am I part of the order of the work? Does the work position me? Can I map the structural patterning of the work? Can I map it according to the Analogos paradigm? Does the structure propose a meaning? How could I outer image a sense of this for others?*

Part II-B

Layer 7: Interpreting



The search for meaning in a "...painting is embedded in social discourse which formalism is hardly able to see, let alone explain in its own terms." (Bryson, 1983, p. 85). The formal analysis outlined in Feldman's second stage (the sixth layer in the AnalogosParadigm, II-B-6) can assist one to find a Modernist message in a work, but (as Bryson asserts) it mitigates against the search for a metaModernist meaning. Bryson goes on to state "...that it is in the interaction of painting with social formation that the semantics of painting be found." (p. 85). In contrast to this Feldman locates the meaning entirely inside the work; viewers are instructed to avoid paying attention to what they might bring to the engagement. "It is an important rule of art criticism that your interpretation and judgment be based on what you have seen and felt *in a work* (my italics)." (p. 363)

Interpreting, whether we like it or not, is a form of social discourse in the sense that we bring with us to the responding process a vast repertoire of past interchanges with others. The wide open passageways between images and words in today's metaModernist world is so prevalent that it is difficult to remember how deeply Modernist artists scorned any use of words about images. Interpreting, in the present Analogos context, is regarded as enriched if a beholder finds that their dialogue with a work unveils glimpses of the particular social infrastructure that informed their childhood and subsequent years of growing up. Interpreting, while initially an inner imaging process, as is true of all the other layers/phases, does not fulfill its potential until it is it outer imaged—and it gains further again when a community of diverse placeholders share their different approaches and interpretations of a shared experience with the same work of art. In a community of voices meaning is not frozen in an object or in a beholder, but rather hovers in the transitional time/space between their diverse findings, that is, between the many juxtaposed viewpoints, as remembered and/or recorded by the individuals. Feldman did not see the artwork as an engagement between two nodes of energy:

> A critical interpretation is a statement *about* (my italics) a work of art...an interpretation might also be regarded as an *explanation of* (my italics) a work of art. (p.363)

Although the above quotation was in tune with the times, a metaModernist can no longer regard meaning as situated exclusively in an outer image extension, such as a work of art, any more that it can be regarded as situated exclusively in an egocentric subject viewer.

When a beholder 'exits' from an inner imaging response experience it is the memory of their response that they take with them; they do not take the work itself. The work's existence is validated only through narrative and discourse, at least between the viewer and the work, if not always between viewers. This is not in any way to under-rate the significance of the material practice, but to embrace it within the inner image/outer image response dialogue that keeps it alive. A viewer's response is *grounded* in the rich layers of inner image memory; but it is *figured* in the rich layers of meaning that can emerge from the material/symbolic potential that is the contribution of the outer image. Materializations are relatively stable in space/time; it is a viewer's inner image that hovers in an eternal state of interactive flux. This difference enables each new encounter with the same extension to yield a new response (even as the work is more or less unchanged), and the new inner image construction in turn serves to motivate a viewer to follow through with a renewed outer image response.


What emerges out of an interpretation is: first, an inner image insight into meaning, and secondly, an outer image practice that further reckons with the struggle to construct meaning. Everyone encountering stimulation activates their inner/outer image response practice as their way to dialogue with these outer images that they encounter, however minimal or complex; artists, however, are technic/linguistic focused practitioners and are inclined to respond with sophistication, and even in kind—making a painting after seeing one, for example. In the end, however, artists, like everyone else, respond with inner imaging that is commensurate with their capabilities and desires and outer imaging that reflects their fluency in whatever particular technic/linguistic skills they have available and/or choose to use.

Sample questions: *What question is this outer image/extension asking me? Is the work a response to a question that I already seemed to be asking? Is the question raised by the technic or linguistic means? by the content? Is it coming more from my past frames of references and/or associations or more from the outer image itself? How can I best reveal the meaning to myself? Are these issues of concern to me? Is there some way I could rephrase them as my own? How could I outer image a sense of this for others?*

> The real object is the thing in the outside world—the piece of marble, the canvas with pigment dried on it, the air waves vibrating at certain frequencies, the pile of printed pages sewn together in a binding. The aesthetic object, on the other hand, is that which comes into existence when the observer experiences the real object aesthetically. Thus it is a construction (or reconstruction) in the observers mind. Aesthetic objects may exist in the absence of a real object. One can have an aesthetic experience through thoroughly fictitious objects; for example…when we are repeating a poem from memory." Thus the material book (or whatever) is not a literary work, but only a means to 'fix' the work, or rather to make it accessible to the reader." (Chatman, p.26, 27)

Part II-B

Layer 8: Retroactivating



How does one arrive at closure in this developmental sequence? In a metaModernist paradigm a response process is bathed in continuity; however, there are turning points, breathing pauses, coffee breaks, stock-takings, moments when the flurry of fluency that has been in high gear needs to yield to a time of reflection; one needs to address questions arising out of what has taken place, all the better to understand what conclusions might be valuable to be aware of for future encounters. These turning points are not so much controlled by a beholder as determined by the inner necessity of the process—a process that resides between a beholder and their beheld. And once responders are clear about their own assessment of their experience; having an idea of *what* they have found and *what* its worth is to them, they are in a position to research (to inner image) the findings of others who previously addressed these same issues. Having engaged in this response process-of-many-layers, having constructed their own reality, a responder is ready to *dialogue with* parallel interpretations of others, even with experts—without being submerged by them.

For beholders to evaluate their experience in the light of expectations and in the context of other viewers' evaluations stands in marked contrast to Feldman's modernist dictum: that viewer's finalize a project with a "judgment". He advocates that viewers be "...good judges or critics (who) decide whether a work is poor or excellent" (p. 372). It becomes clearer at this point why Feldman has avoided any mention of the orientation that was outlined here in the first four layers of experience. For him art is an illustration of a philosophy, not a direct experience for a beholder. "The reasons for judging a work excellent or poor have to be based on a philosophy of art, not on a man's personal authority." (p. 372).

Judges may judge and announce their verdict, but responding subjects come laden with all sorts of value systems upholding a vast range of ideologies; they are often unaware that they carry these heavy loads of 'baggage'. What is "poor" in one context and to one responder may be "excellent" in another context and to another responder. Individuals representing different genders, sub-groups, socioeconomic classes and ages, will all, more than likely, have different ideologies—not to mention the vast array of individual differences possible within these groups. While Feldman is careful to delineate different contexts within the work of art itself (formalism, expressionism, instrumentalism, p. 370-371), he disregards the context of the viewer. To a meta-Modernist, however, an evaluation resides in the dialogue between the work and the viewer and then between one viewer and their other viewers—other viewers who may offer feedback that ranges all the way from the naïve to the 'expert'.

In the present context, one is first and foremost not judging in the abstract sense, not merely attributing a quality of "poor" or "excellent" to a work of art, but rather one is assessing the *experience*, the outer image/inner image dialogue. By starting from an engaged, silent fusion with the work one learns to trust basic responses, which, through on-going practice, and within a community of voices, become more and more 'educated', socialized. Indeed, the quality of a response can become on occasion 'excellent' even when the outer image extension being viewed may be considered less than great. For example, seeing a way to improve what one perceives as a weak work (weak experience) can be highly motivating. These questions, focusing on the complexities of *valuing,* bring the discussion to a second level of responding, one that takes place retroactively. What follows in the second half of Part II (Part C-D), then, is an outline of a metaModernist *reflective practice*; it follows the same pattern of the 8 layers outlined above and is structurally parallel to them.

Sample questions: *Does this extension invite me to forget my everyday world or does it interrogate me, questioning who I am? How do I respond to this orientation? Does this work challenge me? Does this work make me think about issues in the everyday world? Do I really think about them or do I dismiss the work as ineffective? What, as I see it, does this work seem to want to represent? Is it successful in doing so for me? Does this work have a purpose? Does it fulfill it, as I see it? How and how much, qualitatively, do I value the responding experience? What is my assessment of the work's ability to elicit a response in others? In what context(s) do I consider it likely to be effective?*

The paradigm case presented here as a developmental sequence is not being proposed as a prescriptive model to be followed. Rather the intention is to convey a sense of the inner necessity of the paradigm, an archetypal grid work that allows different map makers to track their individual pathway through the different triangles, in whatever order they were experienced. While it is probably instructive to follow the given archetypal order (1-2-3-4) as a beginner, an experienced viewer will more than likely find out retrospectively that their journey was anything but straightforward. An outer image has its built-in expectations just as a viewer does. This opens the way to a journey that can be played out in sympathy with on-going pushes and pulls. The paradigmSyntagm has its built-in (syntactic) form as well but the sequential order that any individual follows or fills-in will probably have a more specific (paradigmatic) and intrinsic order. If the Analogos provides a stable ground, then the responding subject is the free agent that moves back and forth within that framework constructing meaning and value as the specific occasion demands.

Part II: C-D

Transitional and Autonomous Reflective Practices: inner imaging frameworks


Reflective practice: outer imaging orientations				
D	8	post structuralism	(canonic art) trans-ideology cultural content (O/L)	de-context
	7	constructivism	(conceptual art) socio-cultural/ ideation content (Tr/L)	low-context (after E.T. Hall)
	6	structuralism	(Formalist practice) secondary/structural content (O/L)	
	5	empiricism	(Realist practice) secondary/objective content (Tr/L)	
C	4	psychoanalytic theory	(iconic art) psychical/social populus content (O/T)	high-context (after E.T. Hall)
	3	reception/suture theory	(communal art) psychical/somatic kinship content (Tr/T)	
	2	existential phenomenology	(Expressionist practice) primary/emotional content (O/T)	
	1	hermeneutic phenomenology	(Surrealist practice) primary/dream content (Tr/T)	pre-text
Part II-C/II-D: ReflectivePractice (basicMicroParadigms)				

(Tr) Transparent: *mediation systems (technics/linguistics) seduced and rendered as invisible, inaudible, unemotional and un-somatic as possible; regarded as excluded from the message or meaning (content over mediation)*

(O) Opaque*: mediation systems (technics/linguistics) visible, audible, emotional and somatic; regarded as part of the message or meaning (mediation over content)*

(T) = Technics*: empowering body/motor skills and their extensions beyond to tools and instruments (technics over linguistics)*

(L) = Linguistics*: empowering cognitive language skills and their extensions beyond into cybernetics (linguistics over technics)*



The 8 layers of a reflective practice (I-C-D), as mapped above, is a parallel archetypal follow-up to the 8 layers of a response practice (I-A-B). A response practice is presented as an initial and bottom-up process; accordingly, individual responders are expected to practice the use of their own voice before having to deal with the influence from others, be they experts or novices. After a response practice is intrinsically complete (that is, after a beholder arrives at a point of closure on their own, from inside their own experience), these remembered/outer imaged experiences of the response practice become the ground for the initiation of a reflective practice, here outlined as a more top-down process. Seeing the world through theoretical frames opens the door to potential insights that cannot be realized if one never goes beyond an inside (bottom-up) experience; neither are they optimum if one comes uninitiated to a situation as a top-down observer from the outside. With no inside (bottom-up, response) experience, a viewer attempting a reflective practice is trying to walk before they have constructed a firm ground (to walk on). Clearly, there is 'no' substance to reflect upon until a subject has engaged in an inner image/outer image response practice prelude. Accordingly, the developmental order outlined here proposes a practice that is initially, an inside, bottom-up grounding (response practice, A-B) experience before one engages in an outside, top-down reflective practice (C-D). Further, while the micro layers within the Reflective Practice outlined here are developmentally ordered from the bottom to the top, pratctitioners are free to move up and down as appropriate within any individual sequential experience. It will become apparent that the top-down (that is, theory informing meaning) orientation as presented here is minimal in the first four or lower layers and maximal in the last four or uppermost ones.


Part II-C: (1-4)


Transitional Reflective Practices

The approach presented here to exemplify a reflective practice offers a personal account of my experience in looking at a reproduction of the famous sculpture of Romulus and Remus. I have already fulfilled my need for a response practice, that is, that prior to the journey narrated here, I have already looked into the work as a response practice (II-A-B), that is, without any guiding frames of reference. Some of that is retained herein. What follows, then, while it insists on top-down frameworks, also insists on the open-ended dialogue that I as a viewer tried freely to construct within these given contexts.

Part II-C-1

Hermeneutic Phenomenology (surrealistic practice) (primary/dream content)





I imagine that I am in the middle of a country field in the middle of a black night. There is no moon; there are no stars. There is not even a lamp light glowing from a distant house. The absence of light is so persuasive that I cannot even see my hands or the patch of earth upon which I assume myself to be standing. Now add to this, not an equivalent silence but rather: the chilling, haunting sound of wolves howling ominously from an unknown source in the distance. As I conjure up this awesome state, shivers begin to run wild through my body and I feel helpless in trying to gain control over some unearthly, instinctual fear that threatens to overwhelm me.

When I look at the accompanying image (a digital reproduction of a photograph of the original bronze) of Romulus and Remus (the children) with the she-wolf, it instantly begins to interrogate me. I am invariably thrown back to my childhood days when, growing up in the remote countryside, the sound of a chorus of wolves howling through the void of night could hold me in a profound fear, even if I were supposedly securely walled within the homestead house. However, upon looking at the image for a longer time, I come to sense that behind the mask of animal ferocity there is a hint of animal compassion; and when my eyes settle on the two infants, this seems to be confirmed for me. How else could I understand the ease and sense of trust that they hold in the she-wolf? And yet, to waver again, I cannot but wonder what will become of these two innocent children. What if they are never touched by human ways? by human language? by human gestures or dreams? Is there even such a thing as animal culture? And if so, could human children adapt to it? All this seems somehow to be a mistake, and I want almost instinctively to rescue all of them from this perceived tragedy of which they seemingly know nothing.


Like *forgetting* (A-1), a *hermeneutical phenomenological* (C-1) approach expects that the beholder re-maker take on a fusion of 'being-in-a-world`, a fusion that promotes a sense of being inside the beheld world with the attitude that it is impossible to ever be outside of it or to ever again stand over against it (Heidegger). One is expected to fuse with the outer image, to fuse one's own 'horizon' of historical meanings with those in which the outer image is placed (Gadamer). Such a theoretical frame is premised on the notion that there is a singular continuous tradition that flows like an underground river beneath the events that constitute human history.

A *surrealist* practice (C-1) is one in which speaking subjects engage their active imaginations to free-float in an inner dream world. It is a stream-of-conscious approach that embraces the unexpected results of free-association, insisting that they over-ride, as a sort of primary process, the structural (syntactical) demands of language. Premised on the belief that there is a synchronic relation between all events in the universe and that these can be tapped into at any given moment, a surrealist orientation exploits the possibilities of random flux, of chance, and all that lies outside the frames of conscious control. It requires an engagement that listens to the inner, unconscious structuring process where connections and fusions are bizarre and outrageous. They are, of course, only bizarre if viewed from a conscious point of view. From the vantage point of the unconscious they could hardly be regarded as anything but utterly realistic, based, as they are, on an inner dream 'reality'. Although seemingly opposite to each other, surrealist inner 'subjectivity' and realist outer, 'objectivity' are really one-of-a-kind in that they both profess to reveal an unmediated truth—as if the technic/linguistic containers that hold them and reveal them did not exist.

Sample questions: *What associational images/events emerge from a reflection that calls up my past? What epics or dilemmas are triggered by these feelings? What cross-generational stories come to mind? What sequence of images or words flood up and how are they connected, fused? How does the theoretical framework support my entry and journey? In what way does a surrealist orientation offer guidance? How can I manifest outer images that would render these inner experiences somatic, auditory and/or visible for others to read?*

Part II-C-2

Existential Phenomenology (expressionistic practice) (primary/emotional content)



In looking at the image of the she-wolf, in particular, I am first of all held in a sustained awareness of her exposed teeth. I seem to know that she intends to ward me off, to protect her two innocents from my encroachment. And clearly I have no intentions of by-passing her fixed boundaries. At the same time I am arrested in my body by the contorted gestures of the two babies trying to drink from above their heads. But as I by-pass this I begin to identify with their alertness and sense of freedom. And so in spite of her splendid, graceful form, the mother fills me with a sense of fear as much as she is supposedly able to fill the infants with a sense of security and warmth.

I gradually come to see the wolf as a paradox. She is a straight jacket in the same wolf's clothing that renders her a security blanket. She offers the infants freedom in the same gesture that she prevents them from becoming human. She is the shelter that protects them from frightening forces and in the same gesture she is the shield that enables them to gain enough confidence to be ready to confront the enemy. (It may become apparent that the upper-inner triangle in the AnalogosSyntagm, in this case II-C-2, invariably represents a challenge, a struggle, a 'negative' impulse relative to the positive impulse that is represented by the lower-inner triangle, in this case II-C-1; here it is the gestural fire of the muscles/emotions [2] that have been let loose to threaten the otherwise untamed inner world that surrealism [1] endorses.)


Like *remembering* (A-2), an *existential hermeneutic* practice (C-2), requires the reflective practitioner (in the Analogos sequence) to make a major leap in the direction of differentiation, distancing. One has to become a separate subject outside of a work in order to open up a passage way wherein feelings can pass between the two. And then, to delve deeper, it also becomes possible to engage emotionally with the artist/author. This is still, however, at this early stage (C-2), an inner sort of non-framework framework for it demands that one ward off any urges to search out contextual references such as autobiographical or historical influences to guide one's reflective practice (Husserl); this must until more differentiation is established (layers 5-8).

An *expressionist* practice (C-2) is one in which the inner *emotions* become the ground for an inner and/or outer image/text. For this reason the transparent realism of the inner imagination that was basic to surrealism (C-1) is of no interest to an expressionist. If the emotions are to be given form, then the liason between emotional impulses and gestural manifestation needs to be supported. For this reason body language (and any imagined technics that can help to extend it) must be allowed to find its fullest (opaque) expression to fulfill the richness of gesture inside manifest meanings. Pre-verbal, linguistic syntax is grounded in the somatics of gesture; the expressive subject survives, indeed is amplified, within the presence of a technic/linguistic energy.

Sample Questions: *What deeper feelings emerge when I engage in a journey within the world of the work? What rhythms and gestures come to mind? Where in the work do I find my self being pulled emotionally? What are these feelings and how can I inner image them expressively? How does the theoretical framework support my entry and journey? In what way does an expressionist orientation offer guidance? How can I manifest outer images that would render these inner experiences somatic, auditory and/or visible for others to read?*

II-C-3

Reception/Suture theory (communal art) (psychical somatic content)



I find myself in the presence of the human children. They are human like myself; I am able to identify with them, but not without finding myself scrambling to cope with the discrepancies. In the absence of any facial expressions, I soon become involved in the extra-ordinary agility and flexibility of their bodies. Only animals could be so co-ordinated at such an early age! And I wonder why they have not listened to their genetic coding and remained helplessly confined to the earth like any ordinary baby. Or if they are more attuned to their environment than to their heredity, why have they not imitated their mother wolf and learned to walk on all four feet? Or has all this professed verticality resulted from the need to access food from above their head? Suddenly I find myself noting an unusually complex expression in the face of the wolf. It is more devastating than the Mona Lisa; it can smile and snarl in the same countenance, whichever I wish to project unto it. Perhaps it is the wolf, after all, who holds the human psyche; perhaps it is the babies who have turned into animals! The mystery of the sculptor's motivation and workings pervade my experience.


Like *reflecting* (A-3), *reception* theory (C-3) survives to the extent that intner dialog is possible; it thrives on intra-action. I had come to the image with a readymade schema of expectations (Ingarden). Intra-active dynamics encouraged me to try out my preset schemas in relation to those preset in the work by the artist (Tompkins). In terms of suture theory it seems that it was the lack of a human presence in the potential narrative of the sculpture that was pulling me to suture over the lack. In addition, the subordination of the male component, that is, not the typical subordination of infant male to mother female, but rather the absence of any *human* female, must have also played into my inner image response. Animal over human is already inversion.

Communal art (C-3), such as folk art, survives as a *transitional* art-based orientation where the inner imaging viewer and the outer imaging maker are known to each other. The transitional world is one in which mediation is rendered as invisible as possible because the subject of the speaking (the text, the art-work) is more important than any poetics of expression; mediation visibility is seen as noise, interference, and as an obstruction to be eradicated. This makes it possible for viewers to feel as if they were in immediate contact with the speaking subject, in this case, the artist who fabricated the outer image; this illusion of a fusion between the maker of the outer image and the outer image itself (the signifier) enables the viewer to feel close to the speaking subject (as if they *were* the signified). The signifier-signified difference is not visible; the two are conflated; the two speaking subjects (alternatively as speaker and spoken) seem to be communicating without any intermediary signifier. The art work is perceived as including the *other* rather than being their manifestation. For this reason transitional artworks are, by definition, tailor-made by one speaking subject for another speaking subject; and a mass audience, for example, is conceived of as one immediate (market researched) speaking subject.

Sample Questions? *What dialogue emerges if I try to set up a conversation between what I speak about and what the other seems to answer? between what it speaks about and what I answer? How can this interactive sequence become an inner image? How does the theoretical framework support my entry and journey? In what way does a transitional orientation offer guidance? How can I manifest outer images that would render these inner experiences somatic, auditory and/or visible for others to read?*

II-C-4

Psychoanalytic theory (iconic art) (psychical/social belief content)



It seems to me that the two babies under the wolf are clearly endorsing the pleasure principle. Wonderful as this seems to be in itself, I am still worried about their sense of self-identity. How can this mother possibly mirror back to the children a human face when all she has to offer is a wolf face? Will the children grow up to see themselves as wolves? Perhaps they already do! After a few moments entertaining these thoughts, I find the absence of the human mother rushing back into my sense of what matters in the scene. Without a human model what will be their mother tongue? Will they never be able to have the experience of a human blanket or a human teddy bear? or even a stuffed wolf? In short, their human potential seems utterly constrained! And yet how can I ignore the sense portrayed that they are totally oblivious to any such problem?

Could it be that they hold some sort of key to a life style that precludes the angst of modern civilization? Perhaps I could trade places with them! On second thought, maybe the price of innocence is too great; their future seems to have been issued without any guarantee, without any life insurance. Are they then headed for a stormy period when they go to pass through the treacherous waters of the Oedipus complex? What father will be their model—wolf or man? And what tragedy will be played out if and when they discover that they are human on the outside and wolf on the inside?


Like *revelation* (A-4) *psychodynamic* theory (C-4) asks a viewer to search inside the psyche of the subjects who live inside the 'fiction' of the work as well as inside the role of the artist/author's up-front use of (technic/linguistic) mediation systems. This pushes one into a search for what lies behind the origins and construction of subjectivity inherent in the work, in particular those posited by Freud (1898) and re-inscribed by Lacan. The revelations that come from an awareness of previously invisible structures increases understanding, and the possibility, due to hindsight, of better relations in the future.

An *iconic* practice (C-4) is one in which the signifier, the artwork, the subject of the speaking, carries within itself an archetypal meaning; the speaking subject, its author/artist has more or less disappeared as the work purports to stand on its own. The technic/linguistic mediation systems are seduced and used to facilitate the subject's meaning and render it more present, more autonomous, more poetic on its own terms. The meaning is supposedly elevated as it transcends the more mundane everyday communal practices described in the previous section. The meaning becomes fused, to the extent possible, with the conventional symbols that are used to render it accessible to and imbedded in the collective expectations of any beholder in a populus.

Sample Question: *What dynamics lie behind the interactive relations as set out in the work being viewed? How are differences in subjectivity and power played out? How can the findings be inner imaged to make these relations explicit without a loss of the implicit dimensions that lie beneath visibility? How does the theoretical framework support my entry and journey? In what way does an iconic orientation offer guidance? How can I manifest outer images that would render these inner experiences somatic, auditory and/or visible for others to read?*

Part II-D: (5-8)


Autonomous ReflectivePractices




The last four Analogos types of reflective practice are iontrinsically autonomous; they can be seen as setting up the most objective orientation possible. Each domain has a body of knowledge, a stylistic strategy and a methodology that expects a speaking subject to read disinterested, that is, observe external reality as if it were evience in support of a theoretical principle or principle..

II-D-5

Empiricism (realistic practice) (secondary/objective content)



According to legend, the twins, Romulus and Remus, were thrown into the Tiber River in Italy by King Amulius; they were decedents of his brother and therefore were in direct competition for the throne. They were miraculously washed up on a beach and suckled by a wolf until a herdsman and his wife rescued them.



The image I am looking at is a greyscale version of an internet, downloaded, digital copy of a high contrast color photograph of a copy of the original bronze sculpture (this latter dating from the sixteenth century). The original is a little over one foot high. In the image, the wolf appears to stand as solid and calm as a building anchored on four solid, splayed posts. Breaking with the norm of a human mother and child, this image displaces the human aspect with that of an animal. By portraying the animal symbolic order as over and above the human one, the presentation challenges our assumptions about human control, power and privilege.


Like *describing* (A-5), *empiricism* (D-5), with its emphasis on factual detail as the full version of reality, demands that subjectivity (given fuller reign in the first four phases described above) be pushed underground. While the new outward orientation (of the theoretical frames of these last four, secondary layers) is decidedly objective, the subjectivity of the first four, primary layers (D-1-4), remains unforgettably solid as the ground work for all the layers that follow it. A viewer has to suddenly try to stop being involved, to stop feeling responsible for revealing their unique and immediate point of view. An empirical reading should, at least theoretically, be more or less the same for all viewers who state their findings. Concentual agreement engenders reality.

A *realistic* practice (D-5) is premised on the possibility of rendering an objective, disinterested representation of outer reality, supposedly not as it is perceived but as it *is*. It asks artists/authors to forego any urges to listen to their inner reality because this would distort the illusion of the apparent perfect identity between outer reality and its representation. In addition, it asks these makers of outer images to render their use of technics and linguistics as invisible as possible. As such, in looking at a signifier, a beholder sees only a signified, the signified acting as a mere deflector as it renders itself invisible. For example, a reader of text does not 'see' the words but rather only the meanings embedded therein. A transparent use of the technic/linguistic mediation support system reinforces the illusion that the manifestation *is* the truth from the original event. The result is a report or docmentation.

Sample questions: *What description best reveals the facts found in the work (facts that can be agreed upon by a consensus of several readers)? Are there some aspects of the technic/linguistic mediation process that seep into visibility? By what means can the findings be articulated in the inner image? How does the theoretical framework support my entry and journey? In what way does an empirical orientation offer guidance? How can I manifest outer images that would render these inner experiences somatic, auditory and/or visible for others to read?*

II-D-6

Structuralism (formalist practice) (secondary/structural content)



The narrative that describes how Romulus and Remus came to found the city of Rome can be represented as a pendulation between over-valuation and under-valuation of kinship. This is somewhat similar to the Oedipus narrative in which incest (overvaluation of kinship) and murder (undervaluation of kinship) alternate back and forth as events unfold (Lévi-Strauss, 1971). The legend of Romulus and Remus commences with King Numitor being overthrown by his brother (this is kinship undervalued). Numitor's daughter, Rhea, is made into a vestal virgin (this is kinship overvalued) by the new king; this act is designed to prevent the birth of offspring that would be in competition for the throne (this is kinship undervalued). However, in spite of this, she manages to give birth to twins, Romulus and Remus (this is kinship overvalued). The king kills Rhea and throws the boys into the river (this is kinship undervalued). The twins are washed ashore and suckled by a she-wolf until they are rescued by a herdsman and his wife (this is *substitute* kinship overvalued). The twins eventually overthrow the king (this is kinship undervalued) and re-establish their grandfather as king (this is kinship overvalued). The twins try to found a city, but quarrel over the site; Romulus kills Remus (this is kinship undervalued). Romulus founds Rome. The sculptor has chosen to portray the extreme moment when the kinship pattern breaks: the wolf interrupts the human kinship continuity by standing in and displacing the *human* mother.


Like *structuring* (A-6), *structuralism* (D-6) involves a search for conceptual frameworks, those syntactical formations that pre-exist specifics and that can give the details a second-level meaning and a sense of endurance. Accordingly, the logic of the mediation systems becomes intrinsic to the meaning (There may even be an attempt to render it as the entire and only meaning.); in particular, the linguistic syntax becomes integral to the conceptual theorization.

A *formalist* practice (D-6) is one in which linguistic mediation becomes itself the subject of the image. Even technics is seduced to answer to the demands of the linguistic syntax as its own subject, be it somatic, auditory or visual. Unlike an expressionistic practice where the somatic language relies on technics to fulfill its emotional needs, a formalist practice focuses on the form and insists that technics serve it transparently as it strives to fulfill its need to be a self-referential metalanguage.

Sample Question: *What gridworks, frameworks, underlying principles, schemata, structures seem to be at work behind the surface meaning of the work? What theoretical framework best gives the found meaning the support that it seems to need? How can this structural support system be inner imaged? described? diagramed? What are potential verbal explanations? multi-media presentations? How does the theoretical framework support my entry and journey? In what way does an linguistic/formalist orientation offer guidance? How can I manifest outer images that would render these inner experiences somatic, auditory and/or visible for others to read?*

II-D-7

Constructivism (conceptual art) (socio-cultural ideation content)



The she-wolf can be seen as a singular form poised on the fulcrum of two front legs, the head cantilevered to the front while the two back legs provide a counterbalancing anchor to the ground. The low curves of these hind legs reach the ground gracefully and surely; the head is thrust forward and is turned in this representation of the sculpture to draw a viewer into its psychological window, the face. There is a persistent wedge shape underlying all these dynamics. These shapes are always truncated; that is, the point of the triangle is never completed, except in the very special case of the four nipples. These point downward in an interlocking rhythm with the hollow spaces between them that point upwards. The former triangles act as suspensions from the upper mass, while the latter ones act as upward thrusts at the same time as they carve out and extend the under-space that houses the two infants. The architectural stability of a post and lintel tradition renders the subject of the image into a geometric construction, a security ploy that can in the same breath enable the gestural children to be seen as escaping the otherwise fixed forms as well as enjoying a state of gestural freedom, an abandonment that teases us into a possibility of forgetting the crisis that otherwise saturates the image.


Like *interpreting*, (A-7), *constructivism* (D-7) is an orientation that is dedicated to the on going development of complex meanings that are rooted in the intrinsic construction of an event as it unfolds. Mediation processes are expected to let meanings transcend their input; their aim is to enable content while remaining transparent.

Conceptual art (D-7) embraces ideational/ideological cultural sources as the basis of the manifestation processes. Accordingly, technic/linguistic mediations must be able to convey messages as transparently as is possible, that is, as if the ideas were born unmediated. Because of the facility of words to articulate complex ideas, relative to body language or images, text comes to occupy a privileged position in any conceptual practice.

Sample questions: *What authors/theories can offer the most insight into the found meanings? What new meanings are added by the conceptual input? How can the findings find a narrative framework? How does the coneptual framework support my entry and journey? In what way does a conceptual orientation offer guidance? How can I manifest outer images that would render these inner experiences somatic, auditory and/or visible for others to read?*

II-D-8

Rationalism (canonic art) (trans-cultural content)



There seems to be a distinct difference between the way in which the two boys pose inside their timeless sculptural gesture. Remus, on the left (let's suppose), is the calm and reliable one; Romulus, on the right, is caught in a tense ascending position. In order to elucidate their sub-text, I am re-naming the quiet one Sir (after circle) and the dynamic one Spy (after spiral). In doing so I have identified two types of cyclical patterning: a circle comes back unto itself such that the end is also the beginning; a spiral comes back at a new level such that the ending constitutes an entirely new beginning. If the former represents a ritual recurrence, the latter represents a quest or questioning. If the former sings *yes* in chorus, the latter trumpets *no* in full singularity. In general, these two options, when seen as a pair, portray the organic need for alternating rhythms: there is a time to keep circling, to relax and dream in preparation for more active future prospects; this ensures that the confidence acquired while coasting (circling) has run its course, thereby opening the gates that pull one upward and onward (spiraling) into the need for adventure. Accordingly Sir and Spy are both phases of the same continuity; each one enables the other and neither one can be fulfilled alone. It is in this sense that we can say that Romulus did not literally kill Remus, but rather subsumed him so that his force could also be fully present to make possible the founding and subsequent ruling of Rome.

Like *retroactivating* (A-8), *post structuralism* (D-8) offers a practice wherein theoretical/semiotic patterns, gridworks, conceptual frames that are intended to open up a whole range of new insights into underlying trans-historical meanings. Stories, when de-contextualized, are lifted from their site of origin so that they can be rendered transferrable to new sites as agents for transformation.

Canonic art (D-8) aspires to render meanings universal, to make them transcend specific time and place limitations. This calls for the use of 'classical' forms; these linguistic structures become the vehicles that transform ordinary events into epic narratives and grand images so that they can carry meaning across continents and through centuries. The result is more important than the process for these are meant to become in and of themselves, autonomous canons against which all pre- and subsequent- greatness can be measured.

Sample questions: *What authors/ideologies can best lift the found meanings into ideas that are transferrable to new situations? How can the meanings be framed so as to make sense in new domains? How does the theoretical/semiotic framework support my entry and journey? In what way does a canonic orientation offer guidance? How can I manifest outer images that would render these inner experiences somatic, auditory and/or visible for others to read?*

Part ii: metaPractices*

Pedagogical Process

**A MetaParadigm is included at the end of each Part; the main body or archetypalParadigms as outlined in Parts I, II, III and IIII are mapped with capital letters; the metaParadigm examples at the end of each Part and in the Prologues and Epilogues are mapped with lower case letters and numbers.*

Pedagogy addresses the 'how'; in art, it's about *how* to go about making up of an inner image scenario or lesson-plan for an art session, hereafter called an artEvent, and then teaching it, realizing it. The term pedagogy is used in the Analogos in the most open sense: an artist having an exhibition is teaching, orchestrating a pedagogical artEvent—as is a multi-national company spending millions on an advertising campaign; both are examples of social activation, that is, of an activator outing their inner image in an artEvent to affect others socially. A performer performing is both artist and teacher at the same time. Answers to the question 'how?' will vary from situation to situation and reflect the style of the activator; but there are common issues that will surface, even if not addressed, no matter what the context.

To stage an artEvent is to invest in the process of helping others to develop a repertoire of inner image/outer image practices and a repertoire of inner image memories that can be used in future outer imaging situations. Since humans are non-stop practitioners of this two-way processing, both aspects of which are more or less engaged all the time everywhere, it is a repertoire that is fundamental to the fulfillment of human potential. And the search for a basic pedagogical metaPractice to sustain it becomes a top priority, not only for experts, but for humanity. As such, it is not only the bread and butter for those who want to practice as teachers but is equally essential for students who will 'make it or break it' on the basis of the quality of their self-teaching practice; in the long term it is intended to enable graduates to keep on acquiring and enriching their own repertoire of this two-way practice as a way of life—as self acting agents. Before teaching others the intricacies involved in gaining fluency in inner/outer communication in art (in any of its various forms of sensorial mediation: body language, auditory language or visual language), it is not enough that one already have developed a good enough repertoire of specific artifaction basic practices; one must also have a good enough fluency in the process of metaArtification practices, of teaching oneself, of selfTeaching, (even of staging an artEvent for oneself, alone) so that these practices can become intrinsic, continually responsive to, and in sync with, the ongoing specific needs of each new situation.

Teaching others the intricacies of an interactive process is hardly fair to these others if the teacher does not have a 'good enough' fluency with the interactive process itself and, as much as possible, a good enough repertoire of practices specific to the subject domain (such as art) being taught. In short, one is first a student of a teacher (preferably a 'good enough' one), then a student of oneself acting as a teacher of oneself (preferably a 'good enough' one) and then a teacher of others, and then a teacher of others who are learning to teach themselves. Such a sequence is accumulative, each phase/layer standing on the shoulders of previous ones, the arrival of each new one forever causing retroactive revision of all that came before. Accordingly, all subsequent layers are grounded in the first, or bottom, layer, that of being a student to a 'good enough' teacher, or an infant to a 'good enough' mother (Winnicott). This solid ground, this foundation (even if it is firmly set at the outset of an artEvent) is, like the other layers above it (if perhaps less so), forever subject to change as subsequent shifts in direction require it to readjust to new narrative demands in the unfolding of the sequence. (This is in contrast to a typical linear sequence in which each new phase wipes out its predecessor to join all the other previous ones that were already wiped out. Developmental Psychology has had to re-think its early stage-phase theorizations because they too often assumed that a child's entry into each new phase displaced the previous one; it is now clear that any repertoire, once acquired, continues to be available and to inform new learning).

Part ii-a: Staging an ArtEvent

We are first children before becoming parents of ourselves (having introjected a vast array of values we carry a full-fledged parent within—for example, the *yes* and/or *no* that surfaces in every decision-making occurrence). Only after having acquired this experience first hand can one look backwards in order to take on the role of being a good enough parent/guide/teacher/activator for others. The two primary pedagogical roles are parenting and teaching. Parenting is to teaching as individual interaction is to social engagement; and the former is the *ground* that provides for a successful entrance into the latter, the *figuration*. The evolution of a self-learning/self-teching repertoire constitutes the configuration aspect; the on-going process of retroactivation, evaluating and 'feedforward' constitute collectively the metaConfiguration.

. Teaching practices, introjected as a student, if merely carried forward without much awareness, will usually guarantee a repetitive continuity of past systems, even if unrelated to new needs. As socialized humans, we are prone to parent as our parents parented us and teach as our teachers taught us. This becomes a problem, however, when the practices are abusive and need to be arrested or when they are out of step with change, of life as lived, often due to new developments in technics. Not everyone has the same opportunity in this regard. We have little choice in the way our parents went about parenting us and we cannot grasp the teaching mode of our teachers until it has grasped us—and then it is too late in the process to call for prevention, if, after the fact, we conclude that it was not to our liking. Accordingly, we emerge as adolescents with a repertoire of specific experiences; we seem pre-destined to live out the mandate (fulfill the frames, uphold the values) that we acquired out of circumstances that were decided long before we knew of the existence of alternative options. We become the torch-bearers of those who handed the flame down to us—as if our stories of destiny were pre-cast in stone before we came to be.

The question then of becoming a parent/teacher, of our selves, of others, or of others who are teaching themselves (the process of calling upon an inner parent or inner teacher in a practice), or of others who teach others, is multi-layered. And so the question, "How does one stage an artEvent?" cannot be adequately addressed without considering the inherent structure of these layers.

To ask the question, "How does one plan and teach an *art lesson*?" positions the quest inside a very different arena than is the case if we ask, "How does one plan and activate an *artEvent*?" If the latter one bespeaks of the orientation of a artist/teacher then the former one conjures up an art-teacher. In a teacher/artist quest, art is the *ground* which drives the pedagogical *configuration* to yield an artEvent as a *figuration;* in the art-teacher quest, pedagogy is in danger of becoming the *ground*, yielding, theoretically, only 'teacher art' as the *figuration*. In such a scenario the teacher overly pre-casts a student's outcomes, undercutting the student's right to construct their own reality. Accordingly, a student can forget that they are learning to find their own voice; and in such a project the teacher also looses sight of their main purpose: to guarantee a student's rights in this process of self-learning/self-teaching. If the aim is to provide students with the conditions in which to practice as a speaking subject; that is, to give them the ability to self-teach when they will be on their own, a student will be held hostage as a spoken subject if they cannot practice as a speaking subject. If they can only speak as another would have them speak, then their own voice is stuck on mute. 'Teacher art' comes on the scene when a student feels compelled to replicate a teacher's misplaced desire; if a teacher tries to force a student to speak what they do not know or feel, the student can perhaps comply, and the work may look adult. But is the result not merely a false representation, being neither the truth of what a teacher might say as a speaking subject, nor the truth of what a student might say as a speaking subject? The loss seems entirely mutual. In short when someone speaks for an other this other is absented from the scene as a potential speaking subject (even if they are bodily present) and the (false) speaker can only second guess the inner image of this other; in such a case, the outer image content cannot be said to truly represent any inner image. The air may be full of 'talk' but there is no one *speaking*! A student must claim, that is, actively construct, their 'voice' just as an infant must claim its 'blanket'.

How then does one go about staging an artEvent? Typically, I suggest, we go through our repertoire of student-being-taught (and even our child-being-parented) experiences in search of a good example that might fit the current requirements. If we are aware of the complexity of layers that are inherent in any artEvent (as alluded to on page 121), even before we enter, we will run through several variations, complete with substitutions, in search of the optimum sequence that might fit our current situation. In our pre-imaging, a scenario will 'run' our perspective 'students' through all sorts of speeded up maneuvers. Fortunately, for the students, all this takes place in our pedagogue's head so that there are no direct side effects on them. Like a painter pre-imaging a painted image or a film-maker pre-sequencing imaginary events, we keep trying different 'good enough' versions until we arrive at the 'right' one, all of this taking place without the use of overt technics (such as brushes or cameras) or overt linguistics (such as body rhythms or color pigments). Of course, there is no way to predict the discrepancy that will inevitably emerge between the foresight in the inner image (imagination) and the hindsight that becomes available only after the event has been made manifest in overt technics and linguistics. Unforeseen pushes and pulls seem lurking at every door and window in any outer imaging process; the possibility of being able to predict in the inner image where the technics/linguistic demands of the outer imaging process might take one is, at best, never very solid. But it does improve with experience, with the acquisition of a repertoire.

When outer imaging an inner image 'story', the entanglement with technics and linguistics causes it to lose its dreamy luster. This loss is the price we pay to gain, in return, feedback from these culturally privileged outer imaged extensions; after all, these outer images are the only available connections between humans. The power of the imagination rests on its freedom: there is no need to struggle with technic/linguistic hardware, one is free to dream up anything, even those ineffable unrealities that could never be made manifest with even the most sophisticated technic/linguistic paraphernalia. Pre-visioning (inner imaging) can save paint and canvas because one can eliminate numerous dry-runs without touching a brush; it can save students from being used as guinea-pigs because a teacher can rework a scenario for an artEvent until it is fine tuned for the situation. But there is another side to this coin: the imagination needs feedback from previous attempts if it is to predict outer image potential with much accuracy; it needs to sharpen its familiarity with the technic/linguistic mediation demands if it is to inner image possibilities that can be articulated (outer imaged) without too much frustration.

Inner image practices range from the most predictable scenario, replete with details of the specific technical and linguistic mediation requirements, to unbelievable flights that would be utterly impossible in the real world. Predictable scenarios are only possible for those who have a repertoire with the specific mediation materials; the downside to this can be seen in the artist who develops a narrow style and seems only able to attend to that limited part of their world that can be rendered thus: a portraitist, for example, working in ochre colored, curved arcs (visual linguistics) in oils (technics) may seek (or see) only subjects that fit into the particular style. Such an artist can perhaps perfect a specialized grain of sand; however, anything that cannot be encompassed as intrinsic to this singular beam of light must by default be rendered lost.

The beginning student teacher has a large repertoire of staged artEvents; however, these have been acquired from their experiences as students; they are seen from the point of view of a learner, someone who is trying to acquire a basic technic/linguistic mediation repertoire. Their main focus is supposedly not on the 'how' as much as on the 'what'. As such, the newcomer will necessarily have to re-think which scenarios are worth keeping in accordance with their own motivations, their own personal style of operating, their own repertoire, and which ones must never be allowed to happen again. As well, they may want to re-work all the other border line experiences that fall between these two extremes. In order for a student to shift to a teacher-role they will need to become aware of the additional layers of responsibility that emerge when they try to translate their studentArt experiences into orchestrated pedagogically appropriate artEvents. At this stage they will also need to become aware of their particular prejudices and blind spots so that these cannot be allowed to railroad a more balanced approach—one that could embrace all students, and not just those who enjoy an orientation favored by the teacher.

Students focus on building their own repertoire of technic/linguistic solutions to give voice to their innermost longings; teachers focus on building a repertoire of *pedagogical* processes that will help students to find their focus; student/teachers are caught in the mid-terrain between these two. They must be able to hold two sides of a coin 'in view' at the same time. This in-between position is not the exclusive terrain of student/teachers, however, for students are also straddling the roles of self-teacher and self-student. But a student/teacher inhabits a shifting ground: how does one act *student* one moment and *teacher* to others the next? Which one is the ground? Which one is the figuration? How does one survive in a transitional terrain? A student needs to gain fluency in shifting between roles (self-student and self-teacher), alternating between them, within their own studio practice. A student/teacher must also straddle two levels (teacher/student and student/teacher) and do so in two terrains. They have to invent ways to integrate their studio practice with their pedagogical practice, each one, in turn, facing inward to the other's outward; and they have to invent ways to integrate the studio/gallery complex with the classroom/study complex. What are the metaphors that an artist must invent to overlayer these differences (as opposed to merely shifting back and forth from one world to the other without any sense of which one is the specific ground and which one is the specific figuration--to support a mutualkly fulfilling dialogue between them)?


Part ii-b: Developmental sequencing

What might be the developmental sequence that a newcomer goes through in the search to find a place in the socio-cultural construction that precedes them, a place where they can feel a sense of identity and where they can feel at home, a place where they can feel as if they belong, a place where they can feel the need to make a mark that matters? Winnicott's concept of the transitional object, the blanket, the infant's first outer image, suggests that children experience a sequential development in their outer image/object making. The Analogos posits the following layers of possibility in children's graphic invention with drawing tools (mapped on page 106).

Scribbling: (layer 1) At first the child scribbles; this kinesthetic exploration in search of gestural/muscular control, is really closer to performance than to drawing, because there is no interest in a feedback loop (no interest in eye-hand co-ordination) at this stage; the child can draw without attending to the marks being made. As well, there is no sense of boundary; the ambiguous rectangular frame of our culture has not yet found a place in the child's sense of place; scibbleArt is boundless; it is as big as the sand on the beach keeps going, or as small as the energy limitations of the drawing arm. This is the *ground* of future outer image development.


Circling: (layer 2) At some point, in their outer imaging process, a child while scribbling, perhaps accidentally, draws a line that comes back so that its tail meets its head; it clearly forms a loop. If the child is in a state of readiness to 'see' the magic of this act, of this find, to note that a new *configuration* has emerged, to grasp the significance of the revelation of figure and ground, of inside space and outside space, then this marks the eruption of a vast new potential. The idea of configuration has been born within the mind of the child, and drawing can never be the same again. This is not to suggest that scribbling is dead, but rather, to insist that the original performance aesthetic will always be there to inform the act of outer imaging, be it in the rhythms of the arm, or the dance of the body or the filling-in of shapes (in an image) with wild gestural masses of scribbled lines.

Outer Imaging: (layer 3) At some point, in the outer imaging process, a child scribbles inside a configuration in such a way that the marks suggest a face; it may be no more than two dots for eyes, or five strokes for the facial feature to come to life as a figuration. If the child is in a state of readiness to 'see' the magic of this act, of this 'accidental' find, to note that a new *figuration* has emerged, to grasp the significance of the revelation of subject matter potential in any configuration (shape), of inside space as a figure-that-is-a-subject and outside space as background, then this marks the eruption of another vast new potential. The idea of *figuration* has been born within the mind of the child, and drawing can never be the same again. This is not to suggest that scribbling or pure configuration (with no subject matter intended) is dead, but rather that the original performance aesthetic will always be there to inform the act of outer imaging, be it in the rhythms of the arm, or the dance of the body, or the drawing of pure shapes or the filling-in of shapes (in an image) with wild gestural masses of scribbled lines.



Inner Imaging (layer 4) At some point, in the outer imaging process, a child stops and imagines, pre-images, the possibility of a drawing with a set of imaginary attributes. It could be scribbles inside a configuration, in such a way that the marks suggest a face, or perhaps no more than two dots for eyes, or five strokes for all of the features to come to life as a figuration. The important thing is that it is being constructed in the inner image before there is any external exploration with technics and linguistics.. If the child is in a state of readiness to 'see' the magic of this ability to pre-image a drawing before attempting to make it, of this power to predict, then this marks the eruption of a vast new potential. This idea, this *metaFiguration*, of using the imagination, has been born within the mind of the child, and drawing can never be the same again. This is not to suggest that scribbling or pure configuration for its own sake, or that the act of making unpremeditated drawings (without an inner image before hand) is dead, but rather that the original performance aesthetic will always be there to inform the act of outer imaging, be it in the rhythms of the arm, or the dance of the body, or the drawing of pure shapes or the filling-in of shapes in an image with wild gestural masses of scribbled lines.

Mirroring: (layer 5) The *pre-school* (mapped on paage 108) dialogue that takes place between a child and a parent, between the child as one and the parent as other, evolves mostly on a one-on-one basis through mostly immediate or *transitional* (Winnicott) extensions. The growing child gradually gains more and more autonomy—more and more practice-play at being a 'parent', that is, of having an inner parent and therefore of being less and less in need of an external parent. It progresses through a sequence of soft blankets, teddy bears, rag dolls and simulated baby dolls that, when treated as 'children', mirror back to the child what they so recently learned about parenting from their parents. In short, the child learns the specifics about how to parent by being parented. After the early years of parenting soft teddy bears and dolls, they gradually extend this practice to include the *realistic* baby doll as their 'child'. In short, the child has acquired an inner parent with a repertoire of basic values (what is good and what is bad, which situations call for a *yes* and which ones call for a *no*) and a repertoire of specific actions and words (extensions) to pass on to the dolls that they parent. All this serves to validate a child's growing self-awareness that they are at the center of their existence, that they are a "one" dialoguing with an "other", a construct that is of their own making. They have begun to mirror as they were mirrored. In the beginning, in a new situation, one is a spoken subject; accordingly, every beginner in a new context is confronted with the need to activate the age-old quetion: how does one become a speaking subject? Every host of a newcomer needs to ask the reverse question, for every subject in a new terrain is in need of a host just as an infant is in need of a mother.



Monitoring: (layer 6) Monitoring is a form of speaking. There is a specific type of early school dialogue that takes place between a *pupil* (in a peer context) and a teacher, between a collective of students and an adult leader; it is one that evolves essentially on a communal basis and that gradually engages more and more *abstract* extensions—object/toy relations are extended to include reading and writing. The early transitional objects (as mapped above) become over-layered with toys and games as a social layer that builds upon the individual mirroring dialogue of the pre-school years. These extensions include a growing sophistication in the use of verbal language and into the worlds of the abstract letters that form text. Children use these to speak, to learn social skills; they learn to deal with the consequences of their actions. They develop a repertoire of monitoring the types of extensions that bring rewarding results and they more and more take responsibility for whatever they set forth in their social context. In short they start teaching themselves as students, 'teaching' their peers, and acquiring a repertoire of pedagogical strategies that bring desired results. The early child/parent dialogue does not cease when the child goes to school, but rather remains the solid ground that continues to sustain the new over-layer of child/teacher dialogue that marks the on going process of socialization.

Modeling: (layer 7) There is a specific type of *adolescent* dialogue that takes place between an already socialized high-school student and a model (anyone who embodies an ideal to imitate). This dialogue, which evolves essentially between one (not alone but as a dedicated member-in-an-interest-group) and an other (a model, usually someone with charisma) evolves culturally through more and more sophisticated and articulately communicative extensions. The earlier extension experiences are over-layered with new ones that speak of the process of enculturation; the adolescent aspires to become another version of their idol. They inner image details, acting at first as spoken subjects and then, gradually, as speaking subjects; they luxuriate in the imitation of their models. They need to prove that they belong. They choose to speak as if they were using someone else's voice. Their extensions become solidly grounded in their developing brain and body, which, new as they are, have at last stabilized and can look back at a history which opens up a trajectory into their future; there is an urgency to find an ideal, an innermost doorway into the culture that they see as already in place, into a world that is both exciting to enter and full of danger to avoid. To become more and more like the model that one imitates is to learn more and more about how to live up to one's ideal, to one's illusive emerging inner model; to learn from a model is to learn how to self-model and how to be a model for others.


Mentoring: (layer 8) There is a specific type of *young adult* dialogue that takes place between a career-oriented student and a (college/university) teacher; that is, with an other who becomes a guide and who elicits extensions that promote mature entry into a specific socio-cultural role. There is a shift away from the other as an ideal to imitate (to *model* oneself after) and towards the other as possessing the specific means, the structural framework, to facilitate entrance into a life-style/career. Models are to mentors as readymades are to 'readymeans'. To learn from a mentor is to learn how to cope in a career world; to learn from a mentor is to learn how to self-mentor, and how to mentor others, in turn.

Part ii-c


Human (self) parenting/teaching development

There is a consistent pattern in the above four-layered sequence: what one learns from the position of 'one' is gradually transferred so that one is able to imagine taking up the elusive position of whoever was their 'other'. This is the process whereby a spoken subject is able to accept the role of speaking subject. Accordingly, a student/teacher already has a repertoire of being on the student side of this practice long before taking on any contractual position of learning how to subscribe to the teaching side. For students who have had rewarding learning experiences there is a solid ground upon which to reflect and re-constitute a pedagogical practice that is of their own making. For others, without this, a ground work will need to be initiated and secured; in all cases, however, these histories of student practices will need to be re-visited and re-constituted as viewed from the other side, as pedagogical practices. The task of a student/teacher then is to re-evaluate and transform their past repertoire so that they can use it to construct their own, one that is relevant to the new cultural terrain that they are about to enter, one that can be at home within the context of the rich theoretical framework that is the history of teaching.

Part ii-c: Mapping the development of human (self) parenting and (self) teaching (basicParadigm)				
d	*college/young adult student*	de-context	revealing	(self) mentoring
c	*high school/adolescent student*	content	reflecting	(self) modeling
b	*early school child*	containment	remembering	(self) monitoring
a	*home/pre-school child*	conception	forgetting	(self) mirroring



Mapping general human social (self)development				
d	*child (self) parenting*	de-context	revealing	(self) mentoring
c	*outer child play*	content	reflecting	(self) modeling
b	*inner parent work*	containment	remembering	(self) monitoring
a	*inner child play*	conception	forgetting	(self) mirroring




A child/parent arrives one day as a parent does so as a fully developed inner parent; but it is a parent with little or no repertoire of an outer parenting practice with real children. A student-teacher arrives one day as a student with a fully developed inner teacher; but it is a teacher with little or no repertoire of an outer pedagogical practice with real students. In both cases there follows an extended period of trial and error as the inner constructs are re-worked by the new student/teacher in the light of their personality and in the face of the never-before heard of circumstances that carry unpredictable demands. It is an exciting time and a terrifying time; beginners' luck marches along with misconceptions about expectations; the joy of newness marches along with the fear of being the victim of experiments that have no prior validation. It is a time when student-teachers need to work within the safety net of mirrors and monitors, of models and mentors. It is a time when the illusion/disillusion dynamic can lose its stability if there are no established practitioners to offer guidance and provide a safety net

At each developmental stage a human learns how to engage in the demands of a new dimension to the dialogue; they are always engaged in learning how to accept the double-sided role: an 'other' interacting with a 'one'; this is the normative process—by being parented or being taught one becomes solidly grounded in the dynamics of parenting and teaching. It is a process not only of inner imaging a *process* in its on-going narrative but also of being positioned inside that *narrative*. A child or student is a 'one' to someone else's 'other', an other who (supposedly) has inside information that the child or student needs. (This other person, this teacher, can only really see their student as an 'other'; it may never even occur to students that they are only an 'other' to their teacher's 'one'. Both may only see themselves as a 'one' and their someone else as 'other'; but an alert teacher, even an alert student, will awaken to the ability to walk in their other's shoes).

It is my privileged position here, as writer about these conundrums, to be able to view them from afar, from either the one or the other position, one after the other and back again, or perhaps even to hold them up simultaneously. I can work and/or play with the dynamics virtually. While the parent *works* (outer imaging) at parenting within the survival context of real life, the child *plays* (outer imaging) at parenting (with a 'doll') in a fantasy life that is protected from any survival angst (the doll cannot suffer or die no matter how much ill-pretend is cast upon it). It is this *play practice* in a protected context that prepares one for a *work-practice* in an adult world. A student *play-world practice* must be formed in a semi-protected setting, which in turn qualifies the student, if successful, to enter the *work-world practice* where responsibility for survival is no longer under the guidance and protection of a saftey-net, a 'contractual' parent or teacher. Outside the framework of a teaching/learning contract, however, individuals live in a real, survival-based world, in a peer community of interactive responsibilities where each member *gives* an investment that hopefully pays back in times when they need to *receive*.

a: Mapping the inner image/outer image graphic (self)development of the *home/pre-school child*			
a-4: inner image/outer image	de-context	metafiguration	inner imaging
a-3: figure-ground/subject-shape	content	figuration	outer imaging
a-2: figure-ground/eye-hand	containment	configuration	circling
a-1: boundlessness/performance	conception	ground	scribbling



Perhaps the most important occurrence in the one/other dialogue that the child learns is the introjection of the parent as an inner version of the real outer one, one that increasingly, with experience, enables a child to discern when to say 'yes' and when to say 'no'. The child learns how to act without the external parent because there exists an interior one that can do the job. This, then, is the process of constructing a sense of independence, of learning how to self-parent (the configuration work) and how to self-teach (the metaFiguration work). *Outer child play* is here mapped as the resolution/work (b-7, below) that is born out of the opposition between the child's inner sense of play (b-5) and their inner sense of being their own best parent (b-6, as introjected, as seen from the childhood perspective), an inner parent that is responsible to structure and protect that playfulness (b-7). A child's metaWork (b-8) is the formation of inner parenting principles to enable them to self-parent wisely. Mirroring, in particular, assists them in initiating/grounding their own inner self image on the basis of their own outer image of the self.

b: Mapping the development of *the pre-school/early school child* (self) parenting and (self) teaching			
b-8: child (self) parenting/teaching work	de-context	revealing	(self) mentoring
b-7: school child outer 'play'	content	reflecting	(self) modeling
b-6: inner parent/teacher work	containment	remembering	(self) monitoring
b-5: inner child play	conception	forgetting	(self) mirroring

When a child enters school, all the eralier training takes on a new dimension; the inner parenting (b-8) that is already in place is over-layered with the inner teaching (also b-8); that is, the home/parenting experiences remain the anchor from which the child is able to develop all subsequent inner self-disciplinary layers. This is not to suggest that the self-parenting layer is terminated and gives way to the self-teaching layer that follows it, but rather to indicate how absolutely important a role the initial parenting development plays. As new parenting and teaching experiences continue to develop and accumulate, the two layers enrich each other and the child builds an increasingly strong repertoire of self-disciplinary principles for the future—even learning to resolve conflicts between the two. This is a period when monitoring is important as the *inner self-image* and the *outer image of the self* need to be interactive to initiate and build new layers of social fluency.


An adolescent has acquired a richly layered repertoire that more and more focuses on the aspirations of becoming an autonomous person, one that seeks out models to identify with and imitate and/or fall in 'love' with as a desirable other. (see identity/complementation, Epilogue 4). A young adult needs to go beyond a self- modeling process and find out about the cultural means whereby they can become full citizens in the culture; this is the search for mentors who know the inner secret workings, for this knowledge is their key to autonomous survival as an adult in a career world where survival matters over-rule any possibility of real 'play'—except when they can engage in artistic, 'creative' endeavors!. The importance of sustaining a continuity of 'play' into adulthood cannot be over-estimated; the value of contractual 'work' is *grounded* in the quality of inner image/outer image 'play' because this is the world wherein survival-issues can be temporarily set aside.

c: Mapping the development of *the high school adolescent* (self) parenting and (self) teaching			
c-4: adolescent (self) teaching work	de-context	revealing	(self) mentoring
c-3: high school outer 'play'/study	content	reflecting	(self) modeling
c-2: inner parent/teacher work	containment	remembering	(self) monitoring
c-1: inner child/adolescent play	conception	forgetting	(self) mirroring

d: Mapping the development of *the college adult* (self) parenting and (self) teaching			
d-8: adult (self) teaching work	de-context	revealing	(self) mentoring
d-7: college outer 'play/study	content	reflecting	(self) modeling
d-6: inner parent/teacher work	containment	remembering	(self) monitoring
d-5: inner child/adult play	conception	forgetting	(self) mirroring

Adults in a metaModernist world are multi-practitioners; if they are involved in the art world then they will need to acquire some fluency in the four practices (that of artists, researchers, teachers and critics,as posited by the Analogos) that constitute this cultural domain. *Artists* (a, above) form the *ground* of the art world by inner imaging their environmental experiences and outer imaging artEvents subjectively/metaphorically that re-present the culture for others to inner image. Researchers (b, above) *configure*, document, report, the art world by inner imaging artEvents objectively/realistically and outer imaging the frames of reference that underlie these for others to read (to inner image). Researchers build archives and inscribe histories.

Mapping adult multi-practices: continuity throughout life						
↑	d	*critic*	de-context	retroactivating	revealing	(self) mentoring
	c	*parent/teacher*	content	interpreting	reflecting	(self) modeling
	b	*researcher*	containment	structuring	remembering	(self) monitoring
	a	*artist*	conception	describing	forgetting	(self) mirroring




Teachers (c, above, the key position, the central triangle) *figure* artEvents of the art world by inner imaging the pedagogical/social potential of these works and outer imaging ways and means (processes) of *activating* an educational dialogue between any of the practitioners (artists, researchers, critics, and other teachers). In a metaModernist world all these are potenetially layered; for example, artists/teachers may build pedagogical layers into their art works; and teachers/artists may use their student works as a basis for their art production. *Critics* (d, above) *metafigure* the art world by inner imaging artEvents made by artists/researchers/educators/critics and outer imaging evaluations based on personal insight within a tradition of ethical and aesthetical principles. In a metaModernist reality, every artist, every researcher, every teacher and every critic is involved in some measure in all of these practices; however, everyone will have a terrain that they claim as their home-turf, their focus-layer, their ground, within or above the primary ground (a, above) that is, the artist-in-each-of-us.

The ground repertoire that a child acquires stands as the foundational support for all that follows; it is, accordingly, the layer upon which all other layers must depend. It is forever being both consulted and updated as new layers are added to the repertoire. The development latterly from left to right (step-map, opposite, page 113) represents the diachronic or historical/temporal sequence (as indicated by the numerals along the bottom); the spatial profile at any given moment, as represented by looking at a vertical cross-section above any single number, is the synchronic or slice-of-life view outside of time. This latter presents a detailed stopwatch version of what exists in a single moment; it cuts out everything else that forever moves on and on in the complex diachronic passage of time. A stopped version of the horizontal layers, can then be read synchronically, as long as the layers under focus are all arrested and present at the same time. While the process or narrative/time element is lost in a synchronic view, the gain consists in the possibility of taking as much time as is needed to interpret, not only the moment, but also, by projection, what comes before and after the moment. This is not possible in the forever-passing diachronic view. A study of the two views, then, the diachronic and the synchronic, each one seen as a check-and-balance against the other, represents a more accurate approach in any effort to describe the 'truth' than is the case with either one alone.

Part ii-d:

The diachronc and synchronic layering of learning experience: planning artEvents



The 2 representations of reality each offers a different view: the diachronic refuses to give up the whole as it passes through time; the synchronic isolates a complete slice and enables one to focus on it as long as needed before going back to understand its place in the larger, contextual, diachronic passage of time. The diachronic is to the synchronic as a ground is to a figure. The diachronic is a time-over-space view; the synchronic is a space-over-time view.

Mapping the fields to be orchestrated in staging an artEvent (the art content: what to teach?)

ii-a ↑	a-4: meta-figuration	de-context	*metaMeanings*	revealing	(self) mentoring
	a-3: figuration	content	*artworks*	reflecting	(self) modeling
	a-2: configuration	containment	*media/styles*	remembering	(self) monitoring
	a-1:ground	conception	*desires/issues*	forgetting	(self) mirroring

In the artist/researcher/teacher/critic paradigm (mapped on page 112 and pages 114-116), the staging of an artEvent (activating and/or teaching) occupies the central triangle; it is the field through which the other three must pass if they are to relate to each other. In staging an artEvent there are two intersecting fields of focus that will invariably find their way into the scenario: the art pre-content/content (a/c) and the pedagogical context/de-context (b/d). The former asks: what might be taught? The latter asks: how might it be taught? (Other questions, such as: where? when? to whom? lie outside this focus.)


What is to be taught (the proposed subject matter for an artEvent/outer image event) is mapped as ii-a, above. For any art content to survive and thrive in an artEvent it will need to be grounded in the inner image desires of those who are to make it; and this includes students and/or teachers either in the process of self-teaching or teaching others. In other words, it must tap into the inner image, aspirations/quests (illusions/disillusions) of the participants if they are to become motivated, engaged (ii:a-1, above). This basic need for a deeply rooted, psychodynamic content (I-A), this need to address issues of concern to the community of participants, is the earthspring of all motivated action; beyond this there is a need to orchestrate the technic/linguistic context, that which makes outer imaging possible (ii-a-2). Then, beyond this need for a material/symbolic means of containment, there is the expectation of an external extension (III) that can in turn offer feedback. Indeed, this manifestation of an outer image (the central triangle, ii-a-3) is the only evidence or feedback that speaks out about the workings of the inner imaging (ii-a-1 and ii-a-2) that was its 'origin'. This is the figuration (ii-a-3) of the artEvent. Finally, there is a need to retroactivate, to evaluate the worth of the experience, to estimate what it can offer for future episodes, even searching out what others find in it. This is the artEvent's metafiguration (ii-a-4) layer. It looks back to the outer image (figuration, ii-a-3) and ahead to what is transferable to new situations (the next ii:a-b-c-d in a new cycle).

Mapping fields to be orchestrated in staging an artEvent (the pedagogical containment) (how?)					
ii-b ↑	b-8: meta-figuration	de-context	*evaluation*	revealing	(self) mentoring
	b-7: figuration	content	*materialization*	reflecting	(self) modeling
	b-6: configuration	containment	*plan/design*	remembering	(self) monitoring
	b-5: ground	conception	*motivation*	forgetting	(self) mirroring

How one orchestrates an artEvent is mapped as ii-b, above. For an artEvent to survive and thrive it must be grounded (ii-b-5) in the intitial launching that sets it off in a particular direction and gives it a momentum that is not easily de-railed . Beyond this introduction, this quest that is initiated by a *pivotal question*, one that taps into the *motivation* of the participants, be it overtly stated or merely latent in the teacher's scenario, there is a need to set in motion a particular *sequence*, a configuration or orchestration *plan* (ii-b-6) marking out the passage of time. This is the structure of the artist's or researcher's or teacher's or critic's artEvent or session or *scenario*. It sets out the trajectory that is proposed. Whether it follows some aspects of the archetypal practice outlined in Part II: A-B-C-D or a more tailor-made sequence, it stands as a map does to a traveler. It is well to remember that the roads pre-planned may not end up being the roads traveled; that is, the roads traveled may pre- (or post-) determine the final map. (It should be noted that ii-a and ii-b, mapped above, have their realization in ii-c and ii-d, not mapped here)

The figuration (materialization, ii-b-7, above) of an artEvent can be seen in the outcome of the technic/linguistic inter-actions rendered by a subject in constructing the event. The metaFiguration of an artEvent (ii-b-8) addresses questions about its worthiness in relation to the activator's (artist's/researcher's/teacher's/critic's) aspirations (objectives, aims), its success as seen by all those who participated, including a post-post evaluation by the activator who orchestrated it.

Mapping adult multi-practices: *beholders/artists*					
ii: aa ↑	*ii-aa-4: art reviews*	de-context	retroactivating	revealing	(self) mentoring
	ii-aa-3: artworks	content	interpreting	reflecting	(self) modeling
	ii-aa-2: artists	containment	structuring	remembering	(self) monitoring
	ii-aa-1: beholders	conception	describing	forgetting	(self) mirroring



Artists (ii-aa-2, oposite) are first *beholders* (ii-aa-1) (that is, initially they are involved in an inner imaging process), as are children and newcomers to a new culture; they first must 'grow up' responding to what already exists inside the traditions of those who came before them. A newcomer learns a language by listening first before trying to speak. Gradually they gain more and more fluency with the technic/linguistic containers (the outer imaging processors) that enable them to speak and gain more and more fluency in being able to perceive the subtleties and complexities of what they (and others) utter/make/manifest. In the long run, if they are artists, they will gain more and more fluency at revealing culturally shared meanings, ex-tensions that others will seek out as inner image sources. And the *artworks* that they make (ii-aa-3) can embody a rich repertoire that enables reviewers to gain a renewed *review* (ii-aa-4) of the issues addressed.

> All animals perform actions and most do little else. A great many also make artifacts—constructed or manufactured objects—such as nests, webs, beds and burrows. Among the monkeys and apes there is also some evidence of abstract thinking. But it is only with man that artifaction and abstraction have run riot. This is the essence of his success story. (Morris, p. 10)

A research *report* (ii-bb-3, below) is, first and foremost, grounded as the content (outer image) of an artEvent—a content that is available to the extent that the *subjects* (ii-bb-1) who participated in it are able to reveal it. Even a researcher (ii-bb-2) can become one of the participants. However, if researchers see themselves, rather than their subjects, as the ground, then the results are clearly *qualitative* research. Accordingly, the map (below) places the research subjects as the ground of any research project. It is the research subjects who bring the content information to light. The research *report* (ii-bb-3) is a 'narration' of the event; and it culminates in a series of *recommendations* (ii-bb-4) that the researcher(s) think should be implicatd in future research and/or applied in future developments.

Mapping adult multi-practices: *subjects/researchers*					
ii-bb ↑	*4: recommendations*	de-context	retroactivating	revealing	(self) mentoring
	3: reports	content	interpreting	reflecting	(self) modeling
	2: researchers	containment	structuring	remembering	(self) monitoring
	1: research subjects	conception	describing	forgetting	(self) mirroring

Mapping adult multi-practices: *students/teachers*					
ii-cc ↑	*4: self-development*	de-context	retroactivating	revealing	(self) mentoring
	3: school projects	content	interpreting	reflecting	(self) modeling
	2: teachers	containment	structuring	remembering	(self) monitoring
	1: students	conception	describing	forgetting	(self) mirroring

Teachers (ii-cc-2, above, be they artist/teachers, research/teachers, critic/teachers) learn how to teach by first being *students* (ii-cc-1); this way they learn to become self-teachers even before becoming teachers of others. Accordingly, teaching is grounded in the apprenticeship that one receives by being a student. The pedagogical potential is learned first hand by students because they are the recipients of both the *what* (the content, such as art) and the *how* (the pedagogy, such as art education); however, since the how/methodology is mostly incidental for students who must focus on the *what* (the content) that they are learning, they will need to re-visit their past training from a new perspective before it can become integrated into their own evolving pedagogical *practice* (ii-cc-3), their orchestration of artEvents; and their on going *theoretical framework*, an ideology that gives it continuity (ii-cc-4).

Mapping adult multi-practices: ***readers/critics***					
ii-dd ↑	*4: theories*	de-context	retroactivating	revealing	(self) mentoring
	3: critiques	content	interpreting	reflecting	(self) modeling
	2: critics	containment	structuring	remembering	(self) monitoring
	1: readers	conception	describing	forgetting	(self) mirroring

Critics are first and foremost *readers* (ii-dd-1, above) of the writings of other *critics* (ii-dd-2); it is by this means that they fine-tune their perspective on theoretical frameworks. This order, as mapped above, is the appropriate one if we see critics grounded as readers (in the inner imaging process) and configured as writers (in the outer imaging process); further, critics need to be grounded in their readers' needs; accordingly, it is the reader who is positioned in the primary layer (ii-dd-1) in the paradigm above. The critic writes with a specific population of readers in mind, sometimes even with a specific reader in mind. The result is a *critique* (ii-dd-3), a text that focuses on specific works or bodies of work in order to reveal underground streams, theoretical frames of reference. Overarching and/or under reaching concepts need to be designed to build a bridge-over and/or a tunnel-under a river of the present in order to secure a *passage* way between the past on one side and the future on the other (ii-dd-4).

The success of any dialogue between a student and a teacher depends heavily upon the bedrock of *mutual trust* (ii-aaa, below). No student will want to commit their time and energy to a project if they cannot believe in the validity and viability of what is being proposed by their teacher! The teacher is the one who supposedly has an inner image overview of where the dialogue is coming from and where it is going; students need to trust that this is so; otherwise they will feel that they are being 'used' in an experiment On the other side of the coin, a teacher needs to know that their students need a teacher, that their students are on a quest to find answers, humble enough to be a (re)searcher and committed enough to insist on retaining and extending their own trajectory in the search for an *intrinsic voice* of their own making. How does a teacher orchestrate artEvents that can empower students rather than speak for and/or at them? How can a student work through the tunnel of *models* and *mentors* without losing themselves?

Mapping the adult (self) parenting and (self)teaching strategies for *enriched dialogue*				
ii ↑	*ddd: ritual/quest*	de-context	revealing	(self) mentoring
	ccc: transitional/autonomous	content	reflecting	(self) modeling
	bbb: illusion/disillusion	containment	remembering	(self) monitoring
	aaa: trust/mistrust	conception	forgetting	(self) mirroring

If a student does not own a *quest*, then a teacher needs to help them find one; and a teacher must be able to guide the technic/linguistic basis for them to carry out their search. A student who needs to act as a teacher is not a student, just as is a teacher who needs to act as a student is not a teacher. This is not to deny the frequent forays that either one can make into the other's role, but to make it clear that the ground for each needs to be solidly in their contractual 'camp' if each one is to trust their other. This is true at the level of the collective, the whole group, over long periods of time, and at the individual level, at any given moment.

SelfTeaching, which occurs in that *transitional* space in which a student gradually develops an inner teacher to turn to when in need, is possible only when a student can gradually practice being their *own best teacher* and that that selfTeacher insist that they be allowed to fail, to encompass disillusionment. That selfTeacher must also be able to construct illusions, aspirations beyond the reachable, as well as realistic goals. In the classroom, failure is not serious because the teacher (the contractual teacher and/or the selfTeacher) can stand in as a safety net. However, the selfTeaching process needs to be well developed before graduation so that the student can rely on it in the real world (the world with little or no safety net, were the matter of survival is never a non-question); selfTeaching is the life blood that a graduate (l)earns: it gives them a momentum to continue to evolve thereafter. *SelfTeaching is the ultimate skill to be acquired by any student or to be offered by any teacher.*

A teacher needs to be able to ascertain when each student is in need of *illusionment* and when they are in need of *disillusionment* (ii-bbb, above). As well, they need to know which approach is appropriate for the whole group at any given moment. There are times when a student faces overwhelming challenges (which may not be overwhelming for someone else); such a situation calls for support from a teacher; illusionment is the need.

. A teacher needs to recognize the student's need to find an illusion that will enable them to believe in the possibility of success. A student is in a transitional world where they are partially 'ruled' by an outer teacher and partially 'ruled' by an inner selfTeacher. However, eventually, a student needs to be able to develop a reliable inner teacher so that they can become autonomous, so that they can survive on their own. SelfTeaching in this case is the process of building enough inner courage to go forward, to face the fear of failure, to believe in success. At other times when a student may feel bored because the work is too easy or the routine too stultifying, their inner teacher needs to recognize their need for disillusionment: students need to challenge themselves, to have greater obstacles to overcome, to feel the struggle, to face difficult obstacles and *succeed in the face of them.* To try to illusion such a student would be a futile gesture; and to try to disillusion a student who needs to be illusioned would be to set off another layer of crises and then the need for another layer of damage control.

A teacher needs to know when to set up a *transitional* (ii-ccc) inner imaging/outer imaging frame of mind and when to enter into a more *autonomous* frame of mind, either for the group or for their interchange with individuals. A transitional time/space is one in which the speaking subject and the spoken subject are both present to dialogue *through* the outer images (the extensions) that they set forth in relation to each other. This implies a framework of collaborative learning/teaching; it implies an ongoing dialogue of mutual respect as each subject agent tries to see *through* the outer images (the extensions) and behold their other as interactively as possible. Inter-actions between teacher and student(s), student(s) and student(s) and student(s) and teacher (with both the speaking and spoken roles interchangeable in each case) are all potential routes for a transitional atmosphere. A community of voices (such as a class) is inherently transitional.

An autonomous time/space is one in which the outer images (the extensions, including all interactions) must, as much as is possible, stand alone of and for themselves without reference to the speaking subject who made them. This places a heavy burden on the outer image to contain all the codes and contexts necessary to make it readable—without a reader having to go back to the artist/author to ask what was intended. If transitional time/space is on center stage in the current metaModern period, then autonomous time/space flourished during the high period of Modernist desire. (The shift from the autonomous discourse to transitional discourse implies, for example, a shift from text to speech, from singular styles to multiple struggles.) The possibility of moving freely between the Modernist and metaModernist terrains, back and forth in the course of events, or in whatever density of either, is now fully available in a metaModernist world; and a teacher needs to know when it is beneficial to dress up in the one or the other, or in what shades of both. SelfTeaching as a process in a metaModernist ethos includes the ability to engender a flexibility and fluency of movement between these two terrains.

A teacher needs to know when to coast downhill and when to gear down for the uphill pull. There are times when a whole group or some individuals in a group need to be on an adventure, to quest(ion), to say "no" and never say "yes" until they have re-worked and re-worked their findings (ii-ddd, above); they cannot be stopped until they can claim that their findings are finally, 'fully' their own (to the extent that that is possible). And there are other times when it is necessary to sit back and wait until one is in a state of readiness for such a challenge. If both can be seen as cyclical rhythms, then the latter is a circle that comes back upon itself and the former is a spiral that comes back at a higher level. Teaching and selfTeaching are more fluent when they are in sync with each other and in sync within the larger rhythms, whether they be tuned as *rituals* (being inside a force and wanting to be taken along in trust) or as *quests* (being in charge of a force and wanting to drive forward as an adventure in face of difficulty.)

Knowing that the above series of options are available does not of and in itself guarantee success for the simple reason that one is always (as either a teacher or a student) caught in the greatest of all problematics: *we cannot predict the future with a complete guarantee of accuracy*; even jazz players in a group can stray off course if they misjudge where others seem to be heading. We are always at risk because every decision made has an inner image scenario for the future that may have a great deal or very little to do with what will be seen retoactively to have happened, after the fact, when hindsight at last opens its eyes. Knowing some key theoretical options does put in place a bridge/tunnel between the past and the future; it is a sort of world map, however limited and full of blind spots, that at least offers a helping hand as one attempts, in the fog of the present tense, to make decisions for the futures that lie ahead, be they moments or days or weeks or years. "The map is not the territory!"; yet maps offer what territories cannot!

There are several entrance points to the pre-planning of an artEvent. One way to find an entrance, a doorway, into the *orchestrating* of a scenario (and, perhaps, into the orchestrating of the artEvent itself) is to address one of the following questions as the *center of focus:*

1. Who speaks? If the participants are in the foreground of the planned event, then it may be advisable to start with subjects' needs and/or wishes (Part I: Subjects) and allow the other three parts (Parts II, III, IIII) to form the background.

2. How and when and where will the speaking be made manifest? If the mediation/pedagogical processes (Part II: Practices) are foregrounded, then the other aspects (Parts, I, III, and IIII) can be constructed as the background support.

3. What is spoken? If the actual results (Part III: Extensions) are set out as being more important than the means of getting there (Part II) or than who is engaged in the process (Part I), or the concepts implicated (Part IIII), then the manifest outcomes can be seen as the starting point or foreground and the process of getting there can be constructed by working the process backwards from a hypothetical end to a scenario beginning.

4. What is meta-spoken? If a theoretical/conceptual answer (Part IIII: TransDisciplines) is the desired outcome, then the desired research answer can be posed first and the scenario (Parts I, II, III) can be constructed to provide an appropriate way to find the question that addresses the answer. In the actual artEvent, students can be invited to re-trace the sequence as if for the first time; this is a 're-living of history' approach; only the activator knows the outcome at the start.

The AnalogosParadigm deems it important that anyone orchestrating an artEvent keep in mind that all the four parts above are going to be implicated in every situation imagined, whether carefully considered or 'left to the gods'; accordingly, anyone designing a scenario for an artEvent will need to decide where to focus attention and what to control (both the activator's pedagogical control, as outlined above, and the student's control over their search-process) and where to allow for the unexpected, the unpredictable, the unforeseen. Most designers develop a style of always starting with a focus on the 'Part' wherein they feel most at home; in the end, however, all parts will be activated, even when they are forgotten in the scenario set out by the artEvent designer/activator.


A paradigmatic outline for planning an artEvent or an art session is offered below; the term *activator* refers to anyone who is organizing the event, be it artist, researcher, teacher or critic; the term *student* refers to anyone who is a participant, but not responsible for the umbrella organization of the event. This does not discount the possibility of situations where different types of collaboration occur: role-reversal, role-overlapping etc. Usually, the designated leader is responsible for the larger context because they have a long range vision (b-6, below); this liberates the participants to focus on their own content (a-3) and not worry about the leader's problem of, among other things, the organization of logistics and human resources. Underlying this 8-sided schema is the assumption that there is a double layer (a and b) of planning decisions to be made and that these are the key components to attend to in the planning of an artEvent. (Parts a and b, below, provide spaces to be filled out in the planning scenario stage; Parts c and d, not included here, would be a documentation of what actually happened, a and b being inner, and c and d being external, that is, what transpired. A comparison of the inner plan with the outer description would be instructive as to the realism of the plan and/or the flexibility of the animator in relation to the participants. (Blank paradigm and syntagm maps are also included below.) While the terminology used below is that of teacher/student, any of the other three dialogical terms can be understood as just as valid: artist/beholder, researcher/subject, critic/discourse (page 152).


> Metasignals: how one signal can tell us about the nature of another signal; a metasignal is a signal about signals. It is a signal that changes the meaning of all the others actions being performed. An example will help to clarify this. If two men are fighting we can tell at a glance whether they are serious or playful. We do this by reading two metasignals. First we check to see if they are smiling or laughing. If they are we can be sure that the fight is really a mock-tussle. The amused expressions tell us that all the other—apparently aggressive—actions are to be interpreted as play rather that as hostility. (Morris, p. 272)

8: De-context (metafiguration)	The activator's retroactivation, hindsight, evaluation, revisions	b
7: Content (figuration)	The activator's short term pedagogical instructions for class action	
6: Context (configuration)	The activator's curriculum, long-term plan, ideology	
5: Pre-text (ground)	The activator's motives, aims, objectives, expectations	
ArtEvent: Teacher's/Activator's Pedagogical Scenario		

4: De-context (metafiguration)	The student's achievement, self-efficacy, revisions for the future	a
3: Content (figuration)	The student's immediate, short term instructions for action	
2: Context (configuration)	The student's long term needs, wishes, plans	
1. Pre-text (ground)	The student's motivation, expectations, desires	
ArtEvent: The Student's Performance Scenario		

A blank scenario outline form is provided opposite; a blank fill-in form is provided inside the back cover. Either a scenario (a/b) or the perceived outcomes (c/d), can be set out in the same forms (check a/b or c/d).





A teacher can reveal a world, the existence of which lies beyond a student's wildest imaginings; a student can unveil a world, the existence of which lies beyond a teacher's wildest imaginings; a combination of these may well be considered as constituting the measure of greatness. Only together can they really reach imagination's dream!

Note: use as many of the above schemata/maps as needed; add letters and/or numbers to indicate sequential order and fill in the specific headings in their appropriate areas; add details, as needed, of artEvent instructions, notes, information, specific dialogue planned, etc. in additional space, including as many specifics as deemed appropriate.

The senses are ordered in terms of their reliability: the somatic or physiological body language (touch, taste, smell) requires close-up contact, the auditory requires a medium such as air or water and the visual is able to pass through a vacuum. The order is a reflection of the proximity of the beholder to the source of energy. Close-up contact is very engaging and/or frightening; it can reach out only as far as the tips of the fingers or toes and for the most part can only be felt when the skin is touched (smell needs a medium such as air). Accordingly, sensation is highly reliable relative to the other senses. The other aspect of body language, that of the emotions, the other type of feeling, is especially in tune with inner image processing. Both of these two types of body language are registered in the older brain; they form the ground of all perception and, as such, are implicated in every artEvent, even if the activator ignores their role. Typically, a 'good enough' pedagogical orientation suggests, that, in the designing of a scenario for an artEvent, an activator should take great care not only in planning a quality place for the somatic grounding, but perhaps even consider avoiding any investment in the other (audio-visual) sensory channels until the body language is well grounded in the plan.

Shortcomings of body/haptic languages show up when an activator/teacher needs a more precision instrument. Thus, when more articulation is needed, the auditory and/or visual languages are invited on stage (assuming that the haptic/somatic ground is already in place)

Performance, although usually a highly audio/visual form, is typically activated by a performer's body; even when there is a strict separation of performers and beholders on either side of a proscenium arch (an *audience* hears, *spectators* see)—but what they hear and see is the body. The audio/visual channel seems more inclined to transparently relay the haptic/somatic sensation that to speak of itself; the beholder reconstitutes what it feels like to be a performer inside a body. In this case the precision of the audio/visual makes it possible for the beholder to experience the resonance of the haptic/somatic. A similar process can be activated with formance/sculpture. The mass of the material embodies what is experienced as an essential aspect of what it means to spend a lifetime inside the potentialities and the limitations of a body.

When several dancers move through a series of uniform steps, all together inside the same choreography, they form a meta-body. They can no longer perform in contiguity because the border between the individual dancers has been subdued. However, it has not been completely erased because of the individual differences in height, slight variations in gestures, and other idiosyncrasies that occur on and off as the performance tkes place. At the level of the individual boundaries between bodies, there is a potential slippage as the eye follows the repeated figuration; each dancer displaces each other one as the eye move through the series. At the level of the whole, the individuals have been erased in a different way: the line-up becomes a single configuration that moves in relation to the space on the stage; the individuals no longer relate only to each other as individual 'others' but rather to what is 'other' for the group as a whole, the spectators/audience. In this type of situation the typical dialogue between individual performers on a stage is subsumed by the group.

Part ii: Coda

<Sis'fis rollz hiz boled'r onw'rds and up...he holds it on top for a time
he be.levez that th hill stayz still and tiz the bold'r that rollz up and down...flip flop
lifes' off and on tick'r iz a wun way street…it clicks threw th aje's with'out missing a beat
hoo nohz whare its frum or whare it growz or if it runs on wheelz or feet

U can wok bakw'rds if U fase ahed…U can turn in y'r track and wok strate back
but thare-z o.nlee fast forw'rd on a life long rode…thare-z going ahed…thare-z no track back
we swing too th punch'z…be it upw'rdz or down…
till w'r cot in our last long de.sent as an aje-oled stone
when we tew be.cum wun...with'out flesh with'out bone>

Part III

EXTENSIONS


C-D: diachronic event/ extensions	D: symbolic motion surfaces	D-7/8: virtual images D-5/6: virtual surrounds	8: narrative space/time frames 7: characters/sights/duration 6: screen/duration 5: narrative sources/grounds
	C: performances	C-3/4: space/time agents C-1/2: space/time surrounds	4: narrative space/time frames 3: characters/sets/duration 2: stage-platform/duration 1: narrative sources/grounds
A-B: synchronic event/ extensions	B symbolic stasis surfaces	B-7/8: icons/images B-5/6: grounds/figures	8: metaFiguration narrative (wall) 7: figuration (foreground) 6: configuration (picture plane) 5: (back)ground
	A: 'formances' (sculpture, etc.)	A-3/4: objects A-1/2: surrounds	4: narrative context (earth/floor) 3: figure/mass 2: vessel/building 1: landscape/field/ground
PART III Extensions BasicMicroParadigms			

Because the other three parts (I, II, IIII) have made frequent skirmishes into the world of *extensions* (outer images) Part III focuses mainly an an anatomy of the different types of outer images that have come to exist. It is the propensity of outer images to be able to *store* technic/linguistic energy, an energy that can be tapped into when these outer images become a source for inner imaging, that is, when we become engaged in an inner imaging dialogue with them. There are two types of extensions: those that are time-based, the diachronic extensions, and those that are space-based, the synchronic extensions.

The AnalogosParadigm (as mapped above and on page 124) posits that the two types of extensions can be further subdivided as follows (the first two are space-based; the later two are time-based):

- three-dimensional *stasis* objects (A);
- two-dimensional stasis surfaces (that is, virtual/still-images, B);
- three-dimensional moving objects/subjects (C);
- two-dimensional virtual/moving images (D).

Accordingly, anything outer imaged by humans can be seen as either two- or three-dimensional and as either static or mobile. Outer images that are timeless or synchronic (III: A-B), such as photographs, paintings, prints, non-kinetic sculpture, text works, represent lived experience by encapsulating a wide band of space inside a narrow band of time; outer images that are 'timefull' or diachronic (III: C-D), represent lived experience by encapsulating a wide band of time inside a narrow band of space. The Analogos maps both of these in the same paradigmSyntagm so that they cannot become disassociated from each other; that is, the Analogos makes it possible to keep track of a wide band of both. Even if one is always temporarily backgrounded, it cannot be easily forgotten because in the Analogos structure (syntagm) the two are analogically (paradigmatically) in co-habitation.



Outer images (extensions) do not 'exist' experientially unless there is an event, an activating subject (Part I) engaged in an inner image/outer image practice (Part II). Only a *speaking subject* can make a *subject spoken* (Part I-C-3), that is, an outer image (an extension) visible, audible and/or somatic, and only by turning it into a 'subject' (more precisely, a spoken subject—as if the object were a subject, its own maker) inside an artEvent. Since *experience* is always diachronic, always inside of time, synchronic extensions, even though they offer all their information instantly, can only be understood, decoded, slowly, sequentially, as their meaning can only be unraveled through time, inside time; this can be seen as taking place in two phases: firstly, as a response engaging with the work (*forgetting*, II-A-1) and then as a memory response to that response (*remembering*, II-A-2) after the fact, outside of the forgetting time) when that first phase is finished. (Other phases [Part II: A-B-C-D], including outer imaging, are to some degree, bound to follow.)

	dimensions	*types of human extensions or manifestations*	*time/space ground*
D ▲	2-d surface	*symbolic moving surfaces (virtual motion)*	diachronic life-like time/motion: sequential
C	3-d mass	*performances (moving 3-d subjects/objects)*	
B	2-d surface	*symbolic arrested surfaces (virtual stasis)*	synchronic encapsulated time: motionless
A	3-d mass	*formances (sculptures, stasis 3-d objects)*	
Part III: Extensions (basicParadigm)			

How long does a performance have to stay in a phase of stop-motion before it is read as a formance?
How long does a film freeze need to last to be read as a still/stasis image?


Diachronic extensions, since they are already sequential in and of themselves, have to be experienced inside a more or less controlled time; but, as outlined above with synchronic experiences, it takes time after that engagement is finished to construct narrative-understanding. Thus, diachronic extensions require two engagements, a response practice (*forgetting*—often with short lapses of remembering) as the event unrolls and another phase of *forgetting/ remembering,* after the engagement is ended (when it is possible to re-experience the event, this time entirely retro-actively, within the inner image memory syntax, II-A, I-B). A 'diachronic event', such as the screening of a film, then, usually comes with set times/places for the unveiling of the 'beginning, middle and end'. While the time/duration aspect of a 'synchronic event' is largely within the control of the responder (they can respond when and at whatever speed desired), diachronic events have the time controlled (beginning through to ending, and available only as scheduled, and cut out of everyday lived-experience) largely by the director and sponsors of the work. But responders can, after the forgetting-event is ended, once again take charge of the time it takes to unravel their meanings.


Part III-A

Formances (surrounds and objects)

The term '*formance*', coined specifically for the Analogos, refers to a 3-d per-formance that has been rendered still, arrested; conversely, a performance is a 3-d formance that has been set in motion; both occupy real space, but of the two, only performance is conceived of as a construction with its own internal time. Formances are conceived of as timeless, unchanging, and if there is change, it is at the macroscopic level and goes more or less unnoticed. If such a subtle change is taken into account, as in the case of a rusting sculpture, for example, then it is seen as a performance rather than a formance. Sculpture, ceramics, immobile installations, architecture, building, 3-d stasis design and a great deal of material culture are all examples of formances.

	archetype	*interactive layers of formance outer images*	*dynamic X*
A-4 ▲	de-context	*critical frames: floor, terrain, landscape, setting, literature*	outer applied formation
A-3 |	content	*figures: focus, node, positive mass, enclosure, vessel*	
A-2 |	context	*frameworks: structural grid, composition*	inner implied formation
A-1 |	pre-text	*narrative source: pedestal, foundation, background, theme*	
Part III-A Formances (microParadigms)			





Analogos formances (sculptures) are constituted as four integrated elements:

A-1: the narrative groundwork (linguistic), pedestal/foundation (technic) out of which the figuration (A-3) grows, and sustains a sense of continuity with and separation from the world;
A-2: a framework or structural *composition* that is regarded as the internal organization that supports the mass and/or an external organization that supplants and displaces an absent mass (as in open constructions, linear formances, technic); the narrative structure (linguistic);
A-3: the storied figures (linguisitc); the *mass* or articulated 3-d set of relationships (the central triangle, the center of attention [technic]) that provides substance/meaning and over-all focus;
A-4: the epic critical context (linguistic), embedded in the *floor* (technic) as symbol (which can be a wall, a ceiling or any assigned planar zone), a gallery or landscape that sets the stage in time's trajectory .

In (the image of) the formance/sculpture above,

- the *ground* is a pedestal, a ground/land (technics); a narrative (linguistic) which supports the content (A-3) and separates it from the real world of real wolves and real infants;
- the *configuration* is a four-posted structure with a cantilevered head (technic), a sort of architectural *framework* 'designed' to shelter the two infants (linguistic);
- the mass (technic) and meanings embedded in the wolf-as-mother image (libguistic), together with the two mythological human infants that she is harboring, constitutes the *figuration*;
- the critical space of the gallery setting (technic)—as a terrain to house the mythology (linguistic)—constitutes the *metaFiguration* or de-context of the work.

Part III-B

Symbolic Stasis Surfaces (icons and still images)

Analogos *stasis* images are constituted by four interacting layers:

B-5: a *flattened foreground/background* (technic) suggest an atmospheric or over-all pre-wash layer that seems to pre-exist any figuration but may serve as a source for the figure/fore-ground (the *ground* may suggest a potential image, an embedded narrative [linguistic], just as a block of stone may already suggest a potential figure, waiting to be released);

B-6: an implied or stated *composition* or framework (*configuration*) that comes about as the resolution between the pre-existing demands of an archetypically, pre-configured picture plane (often a rectangle) and the pre-existing demands of a pre-configured, foreground subject matter, (linguistic) as revealed in the use of materials such as ordered brushstrokes (technic);

B-7: a *foreground* or *figuration* (the central Analogos syntagmatic triangle) that provides substance, a rendition in a medium such as ink or charcoal (technic), a manifestation of a theme (linguistic), a focus for the otherwise more peripheral negative space or background (B-5);

B-8: the *wall* plane or *metaFiguration* (technic) that offers a buffer zone, a transitional narrative, between the three-dimensional realities of lived space and the two-dimensional realities of illusionary space, this latter being the one that lies inside the picture frame and/or image edge; the larger semiotic/canonical metaMeanings (linguistic).


If the image of Romulus and Remus on the opposite page is now shifted from the position of being a documentation of a sculpture to that of being an *image* in its own right, what is changed?

In the Romulus and Remus *image*:

- the (*back)ground* or negative space/wolf-home that surrounds the wolf and the infants carries the *illusion* that it continues behind and beyond the wolf—a forest/gallery conflict (linguistic); the metalic solidity anchors the stability of the work (technic);
- this background area provides an illusion of distance in order to give the reverse illusion that the *figure* (the wolf and infants), are projecting forward; the composition, *conFiguration* is evident in the arch form of the wolf and its relation to the rectangle, its left–right oriented horizontal (linguistic)—caught in a struggle with the flatness of the 2-d surface (technic);
- the *figuration* or positive space resides in the illusion of the use of a black-grey-white medium (technics) to embody the mother and child relationships (linguistic);
- the *page* that suports the image (technic), rich in book lore, immerses the mother-child theme into literature, and constitutes a de-context or *metaFiguration*, a buffer zone between the virtual reality of the image (linguistic) and the real world reality from which I look out to see it.

- In the Analogos, *icons* are archetypal; they seem to exude the inner necessity of the picture plane and lack a sophistication that would consciously overly differentiate the figure from its ground;
- *images,* on the other hand, emerge when the figure and the ground either become consciously differentiated from each other—or conversely, when they consciously reverse the process because they have become too differentiated. In other words, images convey a sense of self-consciousness, the figure and the ground being carefully held in a controlled intra-relation to each other—one that is not too flat (like a more primitive icon) or not too deep (like an ultra realistic landscape 'picture').

	archetype	*interactive layers of symbolic stasis surfaces*	*dynamic X*
B-8 ▲	de-context	*critical frames: wall, floor, setting, life/art buffer zone*	outer applied formation
B-7	content	*figuration: focus, foreground, positive space*	
B-6	context	*conFiguration: composition, structural gridwork*	inner implied formation
B-5	pre-text	*narrative (back)ground, picture plane, negative space*	
Part III-B: StasisImages (microParadigms)			



Part III-C

Performances (surrounds and subject agents)

Moving upward to layer III-C, the central basicTriangle in the central macroTriangle, the Analogos arrives at the type of extension that comes closest to merging with the time/space experience of everyday lived life, or 'real time'. *Formances* (III-A) may be three-dimensional but they don't move; Still images (III-B) have illusionary, virtual power but they lack both movement and the third dimension; and, likewise, motion images (III-D) claim their power in their lack of the third dimension, but they cannot be mistaken for material density in real space. *Performance*, then, is the layer, par excellence, of Part III, that endlessly plays with the boundary that it shares with on-going life as lived. It is a boundary where the contiguity between life and art (between off and on stage) shimmers with similarity; this is the semiotic condition that conjures up boundary loss—as in a fog-like white-out or a night-time black-out.


Analogos *performances* (and *motion images*) are constituted by four interacting layers:

C-1: the *stage setting as aura* (technics); the *narrative* (linguistic) field of energy that sustains its continuity as an artEvent; that is, the story that reveals aspects of the socio-cultural continuity (life as lived) that surrounds and gives it momentum to unfold and from which it emerges;
C-2: *frames* of a performance that reside in the characteristics of the site (for example, the type of stage, technic) and the orchestration of the event's passage through the space of the stage and through the sequencing of time (for example, the variations in momentum as the artEvent unfolds [linguistic]);
C-3: (the center of the center of the center) the physical aspects (technic) of an artEvent as revealed in the actual performances of the characters (or objects), their invention of intrinsic time (for example, rhythm [linguistic]) and intrinsic space (for example, crowdedness [linguistic]);
C-4: the enduring aspects of a performance, a literary continuity that resides in the symbolic, invented places and times (linguistic); its production qualities as an outer image among outer images (technic) de-contexted from the specific artEvent, separated out from the continuity of life as lived.


In <The Emp'r'z' Newd Cloze> (Prologue 1) if one imagines it being presented at a poetry reading,

- the *ground* is a *narrative* (linguistic) in which listeners are allowed to occupy an inside position (listening to the narrator [technic]), following the making of an illusion and, accordingly, relishing the subsequent disillusionment by identifying with the child, the innocent one, who triumphs by deflating the inflated emperor (all this is grounded in a time before the encumbrances of hi-techno-life entered human history to plunder the emblematic hope of a utopian dream, [linguistic]);
- the *configuration* or *context* is that of a reader/audience (technic) formation proposing the presence of a very distant, exotic world—a mythic land in a mythic time, a place ovelayered with grandeur and a time filled with the ease that a palace is heir to; the story activates the coming and going of grandiose sites and the push and pull of eternal *time* (linguistic);
- the *figuration* or *content* unfolds through the voice of the reader (technic), that is, through the narrataive of the persons of the emperor himself, the tailors, the emperor's subjects and the child who is a 'seer'; the ground comes to life;
- the *metaFiguration* is framed (*de-contextualized*) in the implications of a readers presentational 'take' (technics), of ethics, subsumed in a fairy tale narrative with an epic message about the scandalous dangers of illusionary power and perverse pretension (linguistic).

	archetype	interactive layers of *performance* outer images	dynamic X
C-4 ▲	de-context	*literary frames, theater site, designated time, focus on linguistics*	outer applied formation
C-3 |	content	*characters, setting, positive space, intrinsic time*	
C-2 |	context	*configuration, stage grid, sequencing, focus on technics*	inner implied formation
C-1 |	pre-text	*ground-story, narratives, libretto, plot sources*	
Part III-C Performance (microParadigm)			



	archetype	interactive layers of symbolic *motion surface* outer images	dynamic X	
D-8 ▲	de-context	*literary frames, cinema site, designated time, linguistics*	outer applied formation	
D-7 |	content	*characters, scenery, positive space, designate time*		
D-6 |	context	*configuration, screen grid, designated time, technics*	inner implied formation	
D-5 |	pre-text	*ground, story, narrative, libretto, plot sources*		
Part III-D MotionImages (microParadigms)				



The shift from performance to screen is major in one way and almost unnoticeable in another. To reduce the world of extensions to a mere two-dimensional representation is to take-on a major project in disembodiment; on the other hand, watching a movie and a stage play of the same story can become very similar if the story line is allowed to shine through the different uses of technics/linguistics, mediation being left to play a role that is mostly one of transparency. A brief look at the two paradigms above suggests that there is great similarity between them.

Film is rendered as a series of fast-passing stills or slides, and some 'movies' seem to be mostly stills; video, television and the computer monitor, on the other hand, are digital; that is, rather than operating at a unit level of each total image, as film does, a monitor-screen image survives by being updated with thousands of small particles of tones and/or colors every second. Does this difference affect the viewer's perception? Since both types of image constancy-updating take place more or less below the threshold of visibility, they should not. Certain technical and historical period differences in the early stages of digital development makes it difficult to formulate a clear empirical comparison. A computer monitor emerged on a small, intimate, high definition screen at a time when film was expanding to cover larger and larger walls. Scale, that dimension that positions the size of the human body, then, is historically a major difference. At the early stages of the co-existence of the two technologies, the two experiences are radically different.

That the emergence of *motion images* arrives late in the history of human cultural evolution speaks to the complexity of the technology. While early forms of motion imagery did exist, in the form of camera obscura images (projected on the wall opposite a pin hole in a darkened room) and shadow puppetry, for example, this complex type of extension only become pervasive in the twentieth century. The contemporary thrust of computer technology, especially since it embraces user interactive response, has thrown virtual reality on to center stage. Since digitized, disembodied realities can be easily compressed and stored with a minimal demand on material resources, computer mediation systems have been exempted from much of the drag effect of hard-copy transportation and have, accordingly, come to pervade every dimension of life. Beyond this, unlike performances, moving images are easily stored in that compressed format; they can be re-experienced over and over again in exactly the same format; they can be edited in excruciating detail, by an editor, working in the absence of all other members of the team and they can survive in the original version across the centuries and across the continents. With computers, the flexibility as to when and where an artEvent will take place has been greatly increased. Disembodiment has its 'perks'; the darker side of the loss of the body has its 'quirks'!

Analogos *moving images* are constituted by four interacting 'moving image' layers:

D-5: the *ground* of a moving image sequence is the persistence of 'screen' (technic); the *narrative* field of energy that sustains its continuity as an artEvent; that is, the story that reveals aspects of the socio-cultural continuity that underlies it and from which it emerges (linguistic);

D-6: the *configuration* that *frames* (*contextualizes*) a virtual moving image world; the sense of sequence that resides in the characteristics of screen space (linguistic, for example, the 'depth', amount of detail, size, proportions) and the over-all orchestration of the passage of time (linguistic, for example, the variation in the momentum as it unfolds inside the artEvent);

D-7: the *figuration* or *content* of a moving image artEvent is revealed in the physical/virtual cinematic experiemce (technic); in the characters' (or objects') performances, their invitation to experience intrinsic time (linguistic, for example, shifting rhythms) and intrinsic space ([linguistic] for example, grandiloquent ballrooms or poverty streets);

D-8: the *metaFiguration* of a moving image sequence resides in the symbolic work (linguistic), its ability to transcend (*de-contextualize*) the place and time of its origins even inside the frame of the designated place and time set aside for its presentation as a screen among the history of screens (technic), separated out from the continuity of life as lived.

Analogos *moving images* are also implicated in the four interacting 'stasis image' layers (page 126):

- a *background* emerges out of a narrative/story source (linguistic), an atmospheric or over-all, on-going pre-wash layer, (technic) that seems to pre-exist any figuration but may serve as a source for the on-going figure/foreground (the ground may suggest a series of potential images just as a block of stone may already suggest a potential figure, waiting to be released);
- a *configuration* is an implied or stated *composition* or framework that comes about as the resolution between the pre-existing demands of the picture plane (often, a rectangle) and the pre-existing demands of the foreground subject matter (linguistic);
- a *foreground* or *figuration* (the central syntagmatic triangle) is born out of the attempt (or lack of it) to seduce materials (technics); it provides the substance (the positive space) and a focus for the otherwise more peripheral background picture plane, motion dynamics (linguistic);
- the critical narrative of the *wall* plane or cinematic hall that surrounds the screen (technics) and offers a buffer zone between the three-dimensional realities of lived space and the two-dimensional realities of illusionary space that lies inside the cinematic picture frame/image edge; the literary surround that is cinematic theory.

Part iii


MetaExtensions

The shift that took place in sculpture in the nineteen-sixties is presented by Rosalind Krauss (1979) as an expanded field, beyond Modernism; it is a structuralist analysis that she terms *Postmodern*. If in traditional formance work technics and linguistics were essentially mediational, more and more these became self-referential in metaModernist work. Reworked here in the Analogos schema, the Krauss schema takes on a metaModernist orientation. Her articulation of the shift is incisive and worthy of exact quotation:

> The logic of sculpture, it would seem, is inseparable from the logic of the monument. By virtue of this logic sculpture is a commemorative representation. It sits in a particular place and speaks in a symbolic tongue about the meaning or the use of this place....pedestals mediate between actual site and representational sign...The logic of the monument entered its negative condition (with Rodin's Gates of Hell and his Balzac, 1890s)—a kind of sitelessness, or homelessness, an absolute loss of place. Which is to say one enters modernism, since it is the modernist period of sculptural production that operates in relation to the loss of site, producing the monument of abstraction, the monument as pure marker or base, functionally placeless, and largely self-referential...nomadic....
>
> Through its fetishization of the base, the sculpture reaches downward to absorb the pedestal into itself, away from actual place, and through the representation of its own materials or the process of construction, the sculpture depicts its own autonomy....(sculpture became) what was in front of a building that was not the building...in the landscape what was not the landscape....Sculpture had entered the full condition of its inverse logic and had become pure negativity: the condition of exclusion...and was now the category that resulted from the addition of the not-landscape to the not-architecture...sculpture had become a kind of ontological absence...these terms express a strict opposition between the built and the not-built, the cultural and the natural...terms of exclusion. (not-architecture = landscape; not-landscape = architecture; exclusion = not-inclusion). (Krause, p.34 - 36)


Krauss' *Kline Group*, structuralist diagram sets out a quaternity of the two terms and their two 'not' versions and then posits a transitional practice between each of the four positions: The two positive terms (upper corners of the square, page 133) are considered complex and the two negative terms (lower corners) are considered neuter. This simplified version indicates the classification names for the three new areas of sculptural expansion and their position relative to the tradition of sculpture. The difficulty of adapting this schema to the Analogos lies in the absence of the diachronic aspect in Krauss' schema. The Analogos schema cannot *not* include time. What follows, in the paradigm and syntagm versions below, is a possible re-interpretation.

type of formance	archetypal layer		problematic	dynamic Y
axiomatic structures	metaFiguration	b-8 ▲	outer conflict between transitional site specific monuments (7) and autonomous structural forms (8)	structure
sculpture	figuration	b-7		substance
not architecture (nature)	conFiguration	b-6	inner conflict between the absence of nature (= culture, 5), and the absence of culture (= nature, 6)	structure
not landscape (culture)	ground	b-5		substance
Part iii-b: Secondary Process FormanceExtensions- (metaMicroParadigm)				



type of formance	archetypal layer		problematic	dynamic Y
site construction	metaFiguration	a-4 ▲	Outer conflict between the found/readymade (3) and the readymeans (4) intervention	structure
marked sites	figuration	a-3		substance
architecture (culture)	configuration	a-2	inner conflict between the built (2) and the pre-built (1), i.e., between the cultural (2) and the natural (1)	structure
landscape (nature)	ground	a-1		substance
Part iii-a: Primary Process Formance Extensions (metaMicroParadigm)				

(Parts c and d, not included here but indicated in the Krauss article, would be a listing of actual *outer* examples of the four types of inner/scenario formances and their metaMeanings (these are: marked sites [a-3], site constructions [a-4], monuments or traditional sculpture [b-7] and axiomatic structures [b-8]; Her article has photographs of different examples of these as well as specifics on the four inner conflicts outlined as a-1/a-2 and b-5/b-6). The central Analogos triangles focus on the least intervention into nature (primary, marked sites, a-3) and on the most intervention (secondary, monuments, b-7). Note the inversion of nature and culture in secondary process (b: 5-6), relative to their position in primary process (a: 1-2). The shift perhaps signals a new world where the pervsaive presence of human intervention, of cultural materialism, stands as a shield between human nature and primal nature; is culture the new ground?





The struggle between primary (a/c) and secondary (b/d) process is an echo of the struggle or conflict that occurs between the *substance* and the *structure* within each sub-layer (a-1 with a-2; a-3 with a-4; b-5 with b-6 and b-7 with b-8); that is, there is a struggle between substance as primary and structure as secondary. Primary process (a) reveals a respect for nature: 'landscape' (as a highly cultural version of nature) is the human form of nature, and as such is situated at the root or bottom layer (a-1), along with marked sites (a-3) which offer a minimalist, or minimum, intervention into nature. On the other hand secondary process (b) reveals a sense of *exclusion* and loss, perhaps as the price paid for being remote or distant from the ground, from nature. As an example, a negative term is offered as its best possible positive one: architecture is termed not-landscape (b-5); and in response to the loss of a sense of place, axiomatic structures are de-contextualized so that they can be set up anywhere (b-8); monuments used to be the only option, that is, the term was synonymous with 'sculpture'; they were typically inserted into specific (mostly architectural) sites; as such, they voiced the triumph of human nature over raw nature.


Why refer to landscape as 'not-architecture'? to nature as 'not-culture'? What is at the root of this focus on exclusion, on lack, on absence? This recurrence of a negative term, relegating it to the position of an 'other', an absence of the 'one', may be significant in the sense that it makes visible the dilemma of the everyday confrontation with duality, that is, with the need to make choices, of having to draw a line between that which is allowed in and that which must be rendered absent. It is not, stricly speaking, an echo of the selection process that is embedded in language itself because language makes it possible to think about making selections; it even demands the making of selections; however, for every word selected in a sentence; many others are rejected because they are not in the right category (adjectives, nouns, etc.) for a given position or they are not quite appropriate. The 'others', the absent, those 'not selected' are the not-speakers, the spoken subjects; it is an echo of the mother in the eyes of an infant; it is the infant in the eyes of a mother. To the extent that an infant is a 'not mother' and a mother, a 'not child'—to that extent are they defined by their other, making possible, for each of them, a more responsive inter-active dialogue. The role of the other as spoken subject is nurtured rather than negated; absence becomes presence, even, perhaps especially, when it is absent.

Having arrived at the center of the center of the center (3 is the center of C is the center if III), it is appropriate to zero in on an example of the synchronic potential of the Analogos syntagm. A comparison with the Kline Group structuralist diagram should help to clarify this since the latter has no inherent diachronic dimension to distract it from its synchronic focus.

A comparison between the *square* (implied by Descartes and utilized by Lévi-Strauss) and the Analogos *triangular* structures reveals the inability of the Analogos to forget completely the nature of process, the diachronic; it is impossible to see triangular arrowheads and totally deny any implication that they might have for directional movement. On the other hand, the Aanalogos does not pretend to make all terms mathematically equivalent as the square does: the central figuration term, for example, (triangle c/3/7/III/iii, in the Analogos) is clearly the synchronic focus and the holder of nodal points that take charge of inter-relations between the other three. This is in keeping with the diversity that is being represented by these schemata; the 'natural' world is not inclined to favor a superficial version of mathematically exact equivalences in inter-relations between the domains. As well, in the square, the left-right and upper-lower dimensions are not coded as they are in the Analogos.







> Practice is not defined in relation to a given medium—ssculpture—but rather in relation to the logical opperations on a set of cultural terms, for which any medium—photography, books, lines on walls, mirrors or sculpture itself—might be used.... postmodern...practice...is organized...through the universe of terms that are felt to be in opposition within a cultural situation. (Krauss, p.37)


A metaModernist practice can be characterized as endorsing *transitional* positioning, that is, of over-riding exclusive stances while trying to understand and engage 'otherness', of refusing to be *exclusively* a one or an other, refusing to be either an exclusive presence with all the stops pulled out or an absence with the same amplitude (that is, in stark silence). What does it mean if a negative space calls itself a not-positive space? To claim marginality is not the same as being marginalized by default. And what positive space would want to term itself a not-negative space?

To zoom in on the syntax of *visual image language*, as mapped in the metaMicroParadigm below, the four elements that can be combined in an infinity of ways in aesthetic situations are, in diachronic order, *tone, shape, color* and *line*.

Design books often include texture in this list, but it is not included here because it is not considered one of the units of visual image language but rather the incidence of a full-fledged technic/linguistic construct; as such, texture resides at the crossroads between the tool and the material—or the equivalent, if it is an organic material that grows in nature, forming a texture. The marks of a wood chisel [in formance/sculpture] or of a brush [in painting] are examples of the former; wood grain and tree bark textures are examples of the latter. Textures are really mini-patterns and as such are examples of constructs of any or all of the four elemental, visual image units already identified: tone and color as content/substances and shape and line as container/structures; accordingly texture is already subsumed as an example of the use of the four elements in various combinations. Note, in the following four terms, the validity of the former two compared to the latter two: 'a colored shape' and 'a tonal line' verses 'a shaped color' and 'a lined tone', indicating that shape and line are intrinically container/structure-based and that color and tone are intrinsically content/substance-based.


These four elements constitute the most basic units of visual image syntax and come into play at all levels of the AnalogosParadigm of extensions (Part III: A-B-C-D). This visual-image syntax differs radically from that of a text-based one (Part I-D-8), except when letters (the basic units of visual text syntax) are inserted into an image syntax, where they have to hover in a mid-world between the two systems of representation; however, if pushed, they may become fully immersed in the syntax of image making; when this occurs, the viewer has no interest in reading the letters as constituting words with symbolic meaning, but rather reads them as image-based.

	archetype	interactive *elements of picture plane* syntax	dynamic Y
b-8 ▲	de-context	metafiguration, *line*: shape as boundaries, frontiers	container
b-7 |	content	figuration, *color*: tonality as differentiated light waves	content
b-6 |	context	conFiguration, *shape*: silhouettes, earth and sky, fields	container
b-5 |	pre-text	(back)ground, *tonality*: day and night, lights	content
Part iii-b: StasisImage linguistic units (metaMicroParadigm)			



What are the equivalent basic units in an Analogos syntax for an auditory language, where extensions exist inside a time continuum? As mapped below, the most basic content/substance unit is *rhythm*, the ground of an infant's first sense of the marking of time, both in its inner heart beat and in the outer sound (heard through the ears and felt through the skin) of the heart beat of the mother. The other content/substance unit is *pitch*, the melodic structure wherein sequential wavelength incidences (voice or voices in harmony) give the beat of rhythm a sense of momentum, a sense that drives the beat onward, often towards a feeling of fulfillment, of closure. These two units find their manifestation potential in the two container/structure units: *timbre*, the sound quality (also called tone color) of the instrumentation process that makes it available to the ear; and *tempo*, the over-all framework that structures everything else into a period of time, as set apart from real time, which in turn determines the speed at which it will need to progress in order to be finished when the time runs out—or when it 'runs' the time out.

	archetype	interactive *elements of auditory* syntax	dynamic Y
a-4	de-context	metaFiguration, *tempo*: internal speed, total sequencing	container
a-3	content/text	figuration, *pitch*: melodic markers, sound wave length, harmonies	content
a-2	context	configuration, *timbre/tone* color: media manifestation sounds	container
a-1	pre-text	(back)ground, *rhythm*: inner heart beat, repetitive time makers	content
Part iii-a: Auditory linguistic units (metaMicroParadigm)			



Syntax can never be predicated on the mere identification and random use of basic units; there must be some indication of syntagmatic stability in the way that these are combined if artists and readers are hoping to speak to each other. What design principles provide this in the case of image making? in speech-making? in music-making? in text-making? gesture-making?

The groundwork for designing images or sound sequences in the Analogos (as mapped opposite) enters into the making or reading of an art work as the *unifying* force that is inherent in human identity, the human body, human persona. The core of human existence stems from its need to sustain a sense of continuity, of integrity, that the parts embrace the whole and the whole embrace the parts, and that the inner world be self-contained and at home in its outer world.

No matter what external stimulations are encountered, an individual must be able to experience *unity* (iii-c-1/iii-d-5, opposite). Since an inner image must address this sense of being one, this sense of organic unity, any attempt to render or read an outer image will also have to address this dynamic. Even a non-unified unity must be convincing as having the qualities of a singular subject. The other content/substance principle (iii-c-3/iii-d-7, below) is also strong and contextually wired, that of *body-orientation*. The body's inner version of spatial orientation resides in terms of up and down, front and back; and left and right; the outer co-ordinates that set the context are up and down (for the planet), front and back (for objects, enclosures) or north and south (for the planet) and west and east (for the planet). These latter are culturally defined conventions; the former ones are intrinsic to the experience of being oriented inside the same body in a planetary context as the only form of life available.

Body-orientation in sound image experiences involves one's sense of being inside a work—for example, caught in the linear push/pull (in the different sections from beginning to end) upright, forthright or alternatively, caught and pulled/pushed as an outsider, marginalized, offside, off-balance. Spatially, being inside a body, when upright, one experiences *up* at the top of the head but when lying down (facing upwards) there is a shift of *up* to the face. The inner body-orientation remains grounded in that it follows the body; but the outer contextual one, no matter what orientation the inner sense of the body moves through, is also grounded—except that it is grounded in planetary continuity. It is the discrepancy between the two (the body as ground in a planetary configuration) that is variable.

The two container/structural principles (mapped as the *context* and *de-context* layers, below) that inform making and /or reading either visual or auditory extensions are*: human scale* and *sequential development*, the former of which in auditory works has a long tradition of specific forms, ranging in scale from intimate chamber music to grand symphonic epics. Similarly, in visual images, the relative size and positioning of the viewer and the viewed are implicated in the meaning; they are gauged on normative human dimensions and on normative human eye-level.

In visual stasis images the *developmental sequence* deployed to unraveling meanings is less under the control of the maker than is the case with auditory images: since the whole visual work is exposed in the first instance, it is difficult to pre-determine the order in which a viewer might be expected to read the aspects of the work. One of the strengths of stasis images/formances (synchronic works) is, then, this openness of developmental timing that is offered to the viewer. However, this same quality can almost be claimed for diachronic works in that the response process of articulating meaning may take place to a large extent only after the performance is ended. With synchronic works the performance and the response process are fused into a single artEvent; with diachronic works they are over-layered as well as differentiated in terms of time, this latter occurring after the time/space of the performance is closed.

The syntax of audio/visual works, which engage both of these sensorial pipelines in the same formation, although more complex, are still bound by the same four-pronged, general syntactical demands mapped below. Works which are diachronic-based have evolved a long tradition of forms that offer various types of 'narrative' conflict and resolution, of protagonist and antagonist motivations, from novels to operas, from concertos to poems. Authors of synchronic-based works must attempt to embed any developmental intensions inside clues and codes, which although necessarily presented all-at-once, still carry the potential of forming sequential pathways for viewers.

	archetype	interactive *principles of image and/or auditory* syntax	dynamic Y
c-4/d-8 ▲	de-context	metaFiguration, *development*: sequencing, unfolding,	container
c-3/d-7 |	content	figuration, *body-orientation*: vertical, lateral, onward	content
c-2/d-6 |	context	configuration, *human scale*: holding, being held	container
c-1/d-5 |	pre-text	(back)ground, *intra-relation* **:** coherence, unity, oneness	content
Part iii-c: Visual Syntax and iii-d: Auditory Syntax (metaMicroParadigms)			

One of the most valuable revelations consistently revealed by the Analogos is its emphasis on identifying the ground in any given set of process relations. In situation after situation this turns out to be the foundation that, if understood, can make the difference between a failure or a success—or even an exhilarating outcome. Presumably this is because the ground is the place that one can return to over and over again to regain a sense of direction and energy. This rhythm, alternating between forward push and backward resuscitation, between the outward search for manifest content and the inward retreat back to latent, conceptual origins, seems to underlie the deep structure of human modes of processing. This is significant because it posits the existence of a sub-process, one that is parallel to the outer imaging/inner imaging rhythm, one that underlies the 'strict' numbering of Analogos mapping. Accordingly, each individual in each occurrence of an event can map out a sub-sequence of back and forth movements *within* the framework of the archetypal Analogos sequential order (such as, for example, 1-3-2-1-4-2-1-3-1-4-1-2-1-5, etc., with the likely recurrence of 'touching base' at number one over and over again).


The *symbolic ground* that is embedded in *extensions*, in the objects that humans invest in, is complex—as is implied in all of the mappings of this chapter (Part III). For example, it reaches deeply into the shared *narratives* that are carried from person to person via the extensions that are suspended between them; but it also reaches into the long traditions of the buffer zone that differentiates the artwork from the lifework—for example, in the pedestal of a sculpture piece. Both of these ineffable qualities hover around the overt content of the work without every either entering within or exiting without. They seem intrinsic to the work by *not* appearing on stage. This is the paradox of latent content, of ground, be it the boundlessness of scribbling or of the underground/background world that underlies the 'figure' in the pervasive world of images. To be grounded is to be securely in touch; to be groundless is akin to being stuck in a stuck elevator on the top floor of a high rise building that is swaying back and forth in an unexpected earthquake (and 'unexpected' *is*, in the end, the only kind of earthquake that is fully predictable).

Coda: The following structuralist quotation is from Chatman (pp.24-26) – with Analogos letters added.

narrative	Discourse: Expression (Analogos: *Mediation*)	Content (Analogos term is pre-content/pre-text)
Substance	Media insofar as they can communicate stories (some media are semiotic systems in their own right) *b: manifestation (verbal, cinematic, baletic, pantomimic, etc.)*	Representations of objects and actions in real & imagined worlds that can be imitated in a narrative medium, as filtered through the codes of the author's society *a: people, things, etc. as processed by the author's cultural codes*
Form (Analogos term is: *Structure*)	Narrative discourse (the structure of narrative transmission) consisting of elements shared by narratives in any medium whatever *d: structure of narative transmition*	Narrative story components: events, ecistents, and their connections *c: events (actions, happenings)* *existents (characters, settings)*

Analogos: a) ground, shared myths and stories; b) technics, context; c) content/text; d) literature/linguistic/de-context


Dynamic X: a/b (inner) verses outer; Dynamic Y: a/c (substance) verses b/d (structure); Dynamic Z: b/c (finite) verses a/d (infinite)



PART IIII

TRANSDISCIPLINES (Assertion and Transcendence)

C-D: outer collective	D: enculturation (self transcendence inside culture)	D-7/8: inter-disciplines D-5/6: ideologies	8: cultural studies 7: encyclopedias 6: philosophies 5: epic geo-histories
	C: individuation (self-assertion inside individual)	C-3/4: aesthetics C-1/2: psycho-dynamics	4: critical studies 3: artifactions 2: psychologies 1: geo-biographies
A-B: inner collective	B: socialization (tribal-transcendence inside society)	B-7/8: mediation B-5/6: socialization	8: inter-media studies 7: sciences/technologies 6: sociologies 5: human engineering
	A: tribalization (tribal assertion inside kinship)	A-3/4: archetypes A-1/2: natures	4: cosmology studies 3: mythopoetics 2: human nature 1: primal nature
PART IIII: TransDisciplines (microBasicMacroParadigms)			



The AnalogosParadigm endorses analogical thought; this makes it possible to over-layer disciplines in relation to each other. The natural development of knowledge over the years has led to a world map of epistemology with erratic territories and piece meal boundaries between the different domains of study. As each branch of wisdom staked out its ownership and focused on its specialized agenda in isolation from the others, often in competition for the same monies, a historical map developed. The Analogos posits an alternative approach to this mapping, one that is based on the archetypal structures already presented in the previous parts (see, for example, dynamics X, Y, Z) and outlined more specifically in the paradigm and syntagm above.

According to the Analogos there are two *collectives*, a primary one based on an organization in which the individual is subservient to the group (IIII-A-B), and a secondary one emerging out of a state of transcendence beyond group dominance, that is, one that is constituted as a collective of individuals (IIII-C-D). As mapped above, diachronically, there is a four-part sequence in which self-assertion (at first, it is a clan-like kinship that grounds identity) eventually gives way to a transcendence that brings with it new outlooks and new formations of knowledge, new ways of knowing. In a *tribal* society (IIII-A), it never occurs to individuals to question authority; it is a kinship-based formation, and as such is limited in size. A *communal* society, (IIII-B), on the other hand, is a larger and therefore more complex organization held together by levels of top-down power positions that are locked together in a chain-of-command, pyramidal formation. It transcends the needs of a tribal assertion, and, as such, finds itself grounded in a new formation, that of communal-assertion principles. Enlarged group size induces the layering of survival strategies.

At the secondary level, the collective becomes one that transcends communal collective power in order to assert the rights of *individuation* (IIII-C). In such a society, democracy becomes the ruling principle, and, at its apex, includes a guarantee of some sort of minority rights. Each member is vested with a constitutional voice, as exemplified in the right to vote and as protected by a legal system guaranteeing individual human rights. The fourth type of Analogos collective, termed *enculturation*, opens the door to the possibility of transcending individualism in order to assert the virtues of a cultural environment (IIII-D), one in which there is a practice of the J. F. Kennedy pronouncement, "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." One could argue that the paradigm sequence has spiraled in a full circle: in this fourth stage the collective has merely re-placed the tribe above the individual, as was the case in the first formation. However, in the latter case (IIII-D), it comes in an environment of human consciousness, in the aftermath of individual-group dynamics (IIII-C) and within a tradition of questioning the layers of power. This identifies the evolution of assertion and/or transcendence as a spiral type of cycle: when it returns to the beginning pattern it is at a 'higher' level (as opposed to a circle where the beginning is the end, where the cycle forms a pattern of ritual return, of seasonal recurrence).


The terms self-assertion and self-transcendence, taken from Koestler's "The Act of Creation", are here extended to map out an epic developmental sequence. Assertion comes to the foreground when a collective needs to sustain its identity; transcendence is only possible when there is enough security and collective self-confidence to allow group assertion to be relegated to the background—but still providing the stability of syntax, that which is necessary for any affirmation of freedom. Initially, tribalization supports the need for a tribe to gain identity in the kinship structure, to sustain human nature in the context of primal nature. This structure can be transcended if a group evolves a hierarchical power structure in order to sustain a larger group of sub-groups; the result is a society. Large groups face the danger of the individual becoming lost in the mass-public; this incites a need to transcend the autocratic top-down power structure; such a system re-establishes a counter-balance of power in the people as individuals. When this is secure, indivdualtion can be transcended—collaborative energy can sustain an integrative ethos.

IIII-A

Tribalization (natures and archetypes)

As mapped below, the most primary knowledge for humans (IIII-A-1) addresses the questions of existence, of survival: Who are we? How did we get here? Where are we going? They are 'we' questions because in a tribal context there is no 'I' in the sense that it is understood in modern Western society. There are two main branches to this most grounded of all the layers of human knowledge: the nature of human nature and the nature of primal/animal nature. The two main *human nature* (A-2) questions that have led to the accumulation of vast repertoires of 'source knowledge' seem to center around the *survival* of the physical body (and any aspect of the mental apparatus that supports and is supported by the body) and the *survival* of the species by means of reproduction, sexuality. These questions are always caught in the 'pre-text' of *primal nature* (A-1), the animal/plant world and its range of instincts that are genetically designed/evolved to support survival. Primal nature is the dark and bottomless past out of which humans and their lost civilizations have emerged; as such, the relation of humans to primal nature is symptomatic of their relation to their past, be it one of fear and/or revenge, disregard, or empathy.

	archetype	interactive layers of *a tribal collective*	dynamic X
A-4 ▲	de-context	*cosmology/religion studies*: primary belief systems	outer applied formation
A-3 |	content	*mythopoetics/mystics*: primary artifaction	
A-2 |	context	*human nature*: kinship and human species survival	inner implied formation
A-1 |	pre-text	*primal/animal/plant nature*: ground of human survival	
Part IIII-A: Tribalization (microParadigms)			



While the quest for knowledge about *survival* (A-1, A-2) has led to a vast accumulation of what works, or what is dangerous and/or suicidal, that is, of factual information, it has also given birth to a phenomenal repertoire of *mythopoetic* artifaction (A-3). In tribal societies there is supposedly no 'art' because it is so intrinsic to the rituals of survival that it cannot be separated out from life—a 'concept' that has its echo in a metaModernist society (IIII-D). The idea of art as a commodity set off from everyday life in a gallery has no meaning in a tribal context. Tribal art displayed in a museum is riddled with this problematic of misappropriation; it is given a commodity life in compensation for its loss of a primal/spiritual life. The oral tradition of a tribal society places heavy demands on the remembering and re-telling of stories to keep them alive. The legends and historical roots can often only live on in the minds of their keepers. There are no libraries, as such, to let the members of the tribe enter into a relaxed state of forgetfulness; and while the visual art forms can survive beyond the individual kinship members and therefore can be seen as museum pieces able to extend the sense of cultural continuity, this is of little interest in comparison to their ability to offer immediate, ritual power.

The de-contextual aspect of tribalization takes the form of ideological belief systems, *cosmologies*, religions (A-4). Every tribe develops a transcendent frame of reference to sustain a belief in the continuity of human existence after the death of the body, in the space beyond the tribal locale, in meta-outer space, in meta-outer time. It is the infinity of space and time beyond the here and now that challenges the human mind to fulfill these infinites of lack (as mapped in dynamic Z, page 28).


Part IIII-B

Socialization (socialization and mediation)

The second body of knowledge in the AnalogosParadigm revolves around questions of socialization, the process whereby humans develop communal status and protected membership, and how the period of upbringing leads to apprenticeship and full commitment to the group. As such, it is a terrain wherein the technic/linguistic mediation processes are embedded in the outcomes. Technics as an extension of physical/motor, body skill and linguistics as an extension of psychical/mental, cognitive skill need to be more highly differentiated (conscious), at this level, than is the case in tribal ritual practices. In a communal society there is the need to develop organizational systems that can support a large social construct (such as a nation-state).

The ground knowledge for socialization is *human engineering*, or *education* (B-5, below); large groups need to develop systems to guarantee a continuity of acceptable communal practices from one generation to the next. Education is designed to fulfill this function. The development of the high-speed personal computer has thrown research into the subject of the technologies of education onto center stage. And the on going fine-tuning of pedagogical and instructional design is propelled along hand in hand with the development of tehnics..

	archetype	interactive layers of a *communal collective*	dynamic X
B-8 ▲	de-context	*inter-media studies*: technic/linguistic theorization	outer applied formation
B-7	content	*sciences/technologies*: quantitative, accumulative, objective findings	
B-6	context	*sociologies*: research of communal practices	inner implied formation
B-5	pre-text	*human engineering*: education, socialization through disillusionment	
Part IIII-B: Socialization (microParadigms)			



The second layer of social knowledge, *sociologies* (the context domain), is constituted by all those fields of study that bring frameworks towards an understanding of the survival dynamics of social communities. Sociologists of every imaginable persuasion struggle with the questions of human interaction; the unpredictable variables that pop up at every turn in the road of sociological research place heavy limitations on the use of quantitative methodologies. This is at least partly because the psychological (IIII-C, page 144), those aspects that focus on individual motivations cannot cleanly be eradicated from the equation. The abiding question remains: How can community be sustained in such a way that it supports rather than undercuts individual aspirations—motivates rather than frustrates a community of interactive voices?

The third layer of socialization (the content domain), the area of knowledge that frames all human engineering processes (B-5), is the domain of *science* and *technology* (B-7). Objective research is premised on the hope of a more complete control over nature, over the environment (space) and over the future (time). Statistical information offers the precise *probability* of an event taking place under controlled conditions. Prevention becomes a significant motive on the agenda of prediction. This area of knowledge is vast and is continually being updated as more and more finite variables are put under control. However, the really complex social questions are not easily subjected to controlled conditions that are repeatable; and as a result, questions of this type also need to be addressed by qualitative research methodologies to extend the range of knowledge into terrains where scientific methodology cannot go. Unlike 'workers' in the domain of artifaction (IIII-C, page 144) where artists are openly subjective and often work as individuals, science and technology researchers need to work as a community, new researchers even duplicating studies made by others for verification purposes. Objective research is designed to be valid irrespective of who carries out the pre-designated scientific objectives and methodology.


The fourth layer of social knowledge focuses on the mediation processes that enable members of a community to develop and sustain a sense of identity. *Inter-media studies*, being the uppermost layer of Part IIII-B, brings to the fore a focus on the understanding of *processes*—as mediated by the two processors: *socio/bio-technics* (especially, B-5/6) and *socio/cognitive-linguistics* (especially, B-7/8). This focus on mediation systems is a relatively new field of human knowledge but is growing at an accelerated rate, especially in the light of computer technics, which speeds up the links between agencies and, to a large extent, bypasses the immediacy of somatic/body language. This latter has always been important because it is the anchor that grounds knowledge—but the computer has no patience with it because it slows process down. The fields of study of this layer, and perhaps, especially in conjunction with semiotics (IIII-D, below), have been instrumental in opening the passageways that make interdisciplinary a possibility.

Part III-C

Individuation (psycho-dynamics and aesthetics)

A collective of individuals is grounded in texts, in knowledge as stored in the *biographies* that surround heroes (C-1), in their leadership in activating movements, be they evolutions and/or revolutions, that become the legends, histories and grand narratives. Frameworks in which these are cast can be found in the various *psychologies* (C-2), studies of the forces that 'drive' individuals, and that give motivation and momentum to the trajectories that they follow.

	archetype	interactive layers of an *individuated collective*	dynamic X
C-4	de-context ▲	*critical studies*: humanist theorization	outer applied formation
C-3	content	*artifactions*: individual artist/author mass-works and masterworks	
C-2	context	*psychologies*: research on individuation dynamics	inner implied formation
C-1	pre-text	*geo-biographies*: individual hero time/place narratives	
Part IIII-C: Socialization (microParadigms)			



The aesthetic extensions (outer images) of a collective of individuals is herein termed *artifaction* (IIII-C-3); it is the work produced by artists/authors and is an indicator of the ethos of its times, a barometer charting change. The importance of these cultural icons is represented in the Analogos by virtue of the fact that it occupies the central position of the central position (3 is at the synchronic syntagmatic center of C which is at the synchronic syntagmatic center of IIII) of this taxonomy of knowledge (Part IIII). Since the focus of this book is on the orchestration of artEvents, this layer can be seen as the highlighted one in the levels of paradigm IIII.

The de-contextual aspect of an individuation knowledge finds its expression in a critical outlook. *Criticism* (IIII-C-4) de-constructs and appraises the works produced on the basis of evolving theoretical frameworks. This tends to de-contextualize them; it helps to lift them out of their specific (*transitional*) context and enables them to transcend their short term/local place origins; it helps them become available for long-term/large scale cultural continuity, that is, to become *autonomous*, outlasting their authors and reaching beyond the time and place of their origin. This sets the conditions for a possible transcendence towards enculturation. A MetaModern practitioner in letters and/or the arts is grounded in this III-C layer of knowledge and it is in being solidly grounded that they are able to make forays, skirmishes, into terrains above and below where they can come into contact with others who are grounded in very different understandings about what constitutes a center of 'truth'.

While the body of knowledge surrounding an individuation construct finds its expression in psychodynamics (C: 1/2) and aesthetics (C: 3/4), this central zone of knowledge (IIII-C) can easily inter-relate with all the other Part IIII triangles/layers. Transitional art of today has its echo in tribal societies; avant-garde art has its echo in contemporary individuation-based constructs; political art has its echo in Marxist-based formations and autonomous art has its echo in periods where an aesthetic-based, cultural abstraction is pre-eminent. These examples suggest that all of the four ways of knowing (IIII: A-B-C-D) co-exist simultaneously in a metaModernist world; they are not as discrete and hard edged as once believed. Interdisiplinary dialogue and collaborative ways of knowing become second nature as boundaries open and ideas stand in relation, both in contiguity (juxtaposition) and in congruency (similarity, analogically).

A few years ago I reclassified my entire collection of books in accordance with the eight layers of Part IIII (the third column, page 139); what was surprising was the ease with which this was possible—until I began encountering more and more recent publications that insisted on being in more than one layer. This was for me an indication of the shift from a discipline-based world that I had known to an interdisiplinary one that was emerging at all levels of the paradigm map. (The other surprise was the discovery that there was a more or less equal distribution of my collection of books among the different layers. I had not predicted such an outcome)


Part IIII:-D

Enculturation (ideologies and inter-disciplines)

The de-contextualized body of knowledge, that is, the cluster-of-four that occupies the uppermost of all the layers of all the AnalogosParadigm, is that of *enculturation* (IIII-D). If the socialization layer (IIII-B) subordinated the individual to the society, then this layer of enculturation subordinates the society to the culture. As the final stage in the AnalogosParadigm sequence, ideology cajoles specifics to fit the demands of a theoretically constructed, top-down set of principles; if the loss lies in the potential danger of a top-down oppression, then the gain lies in the potential liberation of a vision beyond what is. When ideology creates a straitjacket environment where everyone and everything is required to fit its lofty proclamations, the ground upon which the ideology first emerged, loses its roots and its stability; it loses its power to support and inspire those under its umbrella. Ideologies can offer a pervasive force, uniting members of a group in a sense of momentum and strength; but if it is based too much on exclusion, outsiders may well feel threatened and retaliate.

Interdisciplinarity has emerged as a somewhat late metaModernist, twentieth century alternative to and/or outgrowth of the specialization ethos that pervaded the modernist period; individualism fostered specialization and supported the push towards expertise in one subject, even if it meant a loss in the arena of connected knowledge. MetaModernism shifts the focus away from a position of centrality to one that survives in in-between spaces, at border crossings and along margins. This orientation perhaps finds its most extreme expression in the relatively new field of cultural studies, a terrain that fosters the freedom of the individual-as-a-member-of-a-team, to move through, between and/or across disciplines. The modern 'either/and', with its dictum to choose either one or the other, has been revised to include 'and/or' with its dictum to practice *layering*, *skirmishing*, *slippage*—observing, even engaging, in dialogue with 'other' terrains. The AnalogosParadigm clearly arrives on the wings of the latter ideology.

	archetype	interactive layers of an *enculturated collective*	dynamic X
D-8 ▲	de-context	*cultural studies*: interdisiplinarity	outer applied formation
D-7 |	content	*encyclopedias*: conglomerate information	
D-6 |	context	*philosophies*: ideological frameworks	inner implied formation
D-5 |	pre-text	*epic geo-histories*: human evolution and revolution	
Part IIII-D: Enculturation (microParadigms)			



Enculturation is grounded in the accumulation of *geo-histories*, the legends and mythologies, the epics, everyday stories and avant-garde speculations that can be stored in compressed code in any audio-visual graphic/textual form that a computer can cope with. This is a multi-world in terms of both the content and the mediation systems used. The de-contextualized frames within which these exist and are sustained are held in *philosophy*; overviews of every persuasion co-exist and intermesh in a multi-cultural body of knowledge, creating a flexibility that, while on the one hand is endorsed by the AnalogosParadigm with its philosophy of free-floating analogical overlayrings, must on the other hand suggest cause for alarm. The need for 'deep structure', as exemplified, as proposed by the Analogos, becomes an imperative to prevent 'slippage' from running away with itself; practitioners in a metaModernist ethos still need to be grounded in a home discipline—not locked or imprisoned in it.

The form that production takes in a metaModernist climate includes the juxtaposition of random items as well as over-layered similarities/congruencies; this endorsement of inter-relation (by contiguity as well as similarity) is in contrast to the strict sense of internal logic inside the strictly defined discipline of specialization that was endemic to modernism. MetaModernism does not easily favor hierarchical, progressive, top-down systems. *Encyclopedias* throw chunks together merely because the items involved all start with the same letters; newspapers do it because all the 'top stories' that must be given a space on the front page; surrealists do it because its non-relation heightens the absurdity of the meaning; bill board signs do it because the companies that could afford this way of advertising at a given time in the history of mankind merely happened to commission their projects at the same time. The Internet is the prototype of these not-thematic classifications, seemingly unrelated bits and pieces, held together, in this case, by the category strategies embedded in search engines. Contiguity is allowed to stand as relation; boundaries melt as juxtaposed solitudes start to inter-act, overlayer.

Interdisciplinarity flourishes in *cultural studies*; the interest in a broad topic like culture leads to a knowledge that cross references different disciplines as much as it settles into any one of them. Insights that are brought to light when diverse cultural samples or fragments are set in juxtaposition, are very different from those derived by specialists who focus on a subject in discrere isolation from the other domains of knowledge. The conflict that arises between these two approaches to knowledge is symptomatic of the transitional nature of our times: it is impossible to know everything about everything (the accelerated growth rate of information is exponential), so some choose to know everything about something (a smaller and smaller 'everything' as time passes) and others choose to know something about everything. The two attitudes can be seen as mutually threatening in that advocates of each one can easily perceive the other as missing the point. A resolution that becomes more and more pervasive in a metaModernist climate asks specialists to work in research groups representing different disciplines; this way the cross-dialogue is intrinsic to the emergence of ideas and 'experts' are put in a position where the way to function is to engage in border *skirmishes* beyond the home ground.

Part iiii

MetaTransDisciplines

The first focused studies of signification stem from the work of Pierce (1931) in the United States and Saussure (1966) in France; however, it really only burst on the scene with the work of Lévi-Strauss (1958). In the present context, the term signifier refers to a meaningful *inner image* formation (such as a virtual/inner word sound, the one in the mind that makes no outer sound); the term 'signified' designates an *inner image* concept (such as the meaning of a word) that is evoked by the signifier—or in reverse, a signifier is the virtual/inner image scenario (for example, an imaginary sound) that represents an inner image concept (an inner image signified) symbolically. An inner image of a sound (an imaginary pronunciation of a word, for example) is an inner signifier; the inner image concept it evokes (what the word means) is the inner signified. Both signifiers and signifieds, as defined herein, are accordingly inner, unspoken unmaterialized. This is to differentiate the terms carefully (in this brief discourse of Part iiii) from a definition that commonly places a signifier externally, as the manifestation of an inner image signified.

The *inner image* process (mapped on page 148) can be extended to a secondary series of *outer image* layers, (mapped on page 149); if an actual sound is uttered it becomes an outer image signifier or an *extension* of its inner image source, its inner signified. The *object* referred to by the inner or outer sound-word is its *referent*. An outer image extension is an inevitable outcome in any response process; at some point in any practice a subject agent needs to engage real technics and real linguistics to manifest a material outer image (somewhat detailed in Parts ii and III). Such an *out-come* can be seen as a new technic/linguistic construction based on its inner image source. And presumably it will potentially contain within its embodiment a measure of the complexity that occupied the inner image that parented it. Then, as an outer image it awaits the arrival of a subject agent to keep the inner/outer cycle going, to engage it in dialogue, to construct new and specific inner image signifiers/signifieds in response to it. The metaBasic-Paradigm below focuses in on a such a hypothetical inner image sequence, one that postulates a signification process that takes place entirely in the world of the inner image. Even the signifier is inner, it being the imaginary scenario that is able to inner image a *potential* outer image extension (object) replete with a full set of imaginary technic/linguistic properties.


Evolving an INNER IMAGE SIGNIFIED				Evolving an INNER IMAGE SIGNIFIER		
b	8	audiovisual connotation *signified*	▲	audio/visual connotation *signifier*	8	d
	7	audio/visual denotation *signified*		audio/visual denotation *signifier*	7	
	6	virtual (inner) *linguistic* mediation		virtual (inner) *linguistic* mediation	6	
	5	Audio/visual narrative *signifier*		audio/visual narrative *signified*	5	
a	4	emotional/somatic connotation *signified*		emotional/somatic connotation *signifier*	4	c
	3	emotional/somatic denotation *signified*		emotional/somatic denotation *signifier*	3	
▲	2	virtual (inner) *technic* mediation		virtual (inner) *technic* mediation	2	
	1	emotional-/somatic *signifier*		emotional/somatic *signified*	1	

Part iii: inner image process Meta/microParadigms

The above paradigm (outlining both an a-b-c-d or basic-level order and the 1-8 micro-level order) proposes to map, theoretically, the complexity of an *inner image* signifying cycle: an inner *signifier* (a-1, a-5) constructs a layered inner image *signified* (a-3, a-4, b-7, b-8). Parts a and b detail an inner image response to an outer image; parts c and d detail an inner image response to that input by trying to construct a *potential* outer image scenario (which may or may not be used as the basis for a subsequent, actual manifested outer image).

Outline: When a subject responds to an external stimulus, the inner image devises an inner signifier version (a-1) of the outer signifier beheld; it constructs its own inner 'object', an inner version that is a unique, personal 'compressed' selection derived from the totality of the outer one. (This process is detailed as *forgetting* and *remembering*, etc., Part II-A.); this consists initially of a pre-verbal, or sensory-motor-emotional response (a-1) that the inner image will typically try to grasp as containing a specific meaning, i.e., what it denotes (a-3), and then the larger significance or meta-meaning of this meaning, i.e., what it connotes (a-4). The parallel audio/visual process (b), may occur almost simultaneously or even leap ahead of the pre-verbal (a), if this latter is slow or not very fluent. The contact senses (a-1) generally rely on body technics (a-2) while the remote senses (b-5) rely more on a mental linguistic mediation process (b-6).

At some point, the inner imaging process shifts into imagining the possibility of outer imaging, that is, of responding to the need to initiate the construction of an outer image (it needs to set its response outside of itself to behold it, to sustain a voice through dialogue; it needs to offer output in order to receive feedback.). In short, the inner image will need to start thinking about constructing an inner version (c-1) of what will eventually become an external signified, one that it deems appropriate for their 'other', their spoken subject; they will need to run it through a virtual scenario (c and d) (or several scenario repeats of c and d) before considering it appropriate for the outer world. The *proposed* outer image could eventually become the parent of a manifestation in some sort of real, specific outer image technic/linguistic materialization. And it will, theoretically, 'try' to represent and then 'store' all the complexity that the inner image imagined. This will invariably lead to some sort of outer image; the inner image needs to construct an outer version before it can 'see' its inner one; it needs to initiate a dialogue between inner and outer worlds before it can come to 'know' either one.



Evolving an Outer Image Signified: Reading the aa-bb Fabrication for Quality Control				Evolving an Outer Image Signifier: Fabricating a Technic/linguistic Outer Image		
dd	8	audiovisual connotation signified	↑	audio/visual connotation signifier	8	bb
	7	audio/visual denotation signified		audio/visual denotation signifier	7	
	6	*virtual (inner) linguistic* mediation		*virtual (outer) linguistic* mediation	6	
	5	Audio/visual narrative signifier		audio/visual narrative signified	5	
cc	4	emotional/somatic connotation signified		emotional/somatic connotation signifier	4	aa
	3	emotional/somatic denotation signified		emotional/somatic denotation signifier	3	↑
	2	*virtual (inner) technic* mediation		*virtual (outer) technic* mediation	2	
	1	emotional-/somatic signifier		emotional/somatic signified	1	

Part iii-b outer imaging Meta/microParadigms

When a new viewer (a new speaking subject) comes along to look at this new outer object (for example, a mere gesture or a complex work of art), what they will derive as a response, as their new inner image construction, (a new version of a and b) is usually anything but predictable. The new viewer constructs a new set of inner signifieds and signifiers (a and b). As always, their response will include both phases: the inner image construction as a response to the outer image (a and b) and a new inner image scenario for a potential new outer image (c and d). This layered process—reading an outer image and then constructing a scenario for a new outer image, constitutes the first phase of a response process; the second phase is the actual outer image construction. It is impossible to totally repress the second aspect; under even the most diligent watchdog conditions, it will find some form of *symptomatic* outlet to express itself.

It's important to remember that all layers of a response process involve dialogue. In the beginning, for example, the built-in or suggested response that an artist (or anyone) 'encloses' in an outer image sets up expectations that a viewer will have to contend with; on the other side, a viewer also arrives with a set of expectations, and this will be true even if they profess to commence with an entirely open-minded attitude. The outer imaging process, mapped on page 149 as an exact mirror image of the inner imaging process, can be read similarly, if in reverse.

The outer image AnalogosParadigmSyntagm (page 149) attempts to map the process whereby an outer image takes shape, as constructed by a speaking subject on the basis of an inner image awaiting expression. It maps the layers of meaning that an outer image takes on as it emerges, over a period of time, to become a full-fledged outer image signifier; the full-fledged version is imbued with all the layers, including the connotative meaning (dd-8). It is by this means that an artObject is invested with expectations, ready to dialogue with its own maker. This same maker, after completing their outer image version, typically proceeds to read it (cc and dd) to see if the desired/intended meanings are embedded; that is, to check to try to guarantee that there is no possibility of a viewer coming up with a mis-reading; if it passes this test it is available for an other (as a new speaking subject) to read it (a, b, c, d). As a new beholder takes on the role of speaking subject, the maker becomes a spoken subject.

The work contains its unique stored expectations; the new responder arrives with their unique expectations. This is the interaction, the dialogue, that feeds the inner imaging process of the new responder. Note that it is the responder who must change; the artwork is typically pre-set. Even though the manifest outer object resides in a concrete or materialized form, it is in the end only a *latent* signified (dd-8). It is this absence of a living, on-going subject that, theoretically, creates a lack, a lack (in the Lacanian sense) that pulls a new speaking to start inner imaging, to become engaged in a response process 'driven' to fulfill the missing reality. This call by the work as it 'searches' for a rebirth or temporary completion, referred to as *appellation*, lies waiting in what is otherwise a merely mute *object*. An extension is always out of circulation when in a storage depot, 'waiting' for someone to come to awaken it, that is, to respond to it by constructing an inner image reality (a-b-c-d) (and, then, subsequently some outer image version [aa-bb-cc-dd] to fulfill their inner response; it is a cycle, that, unlike a straight line, has no definitive beginning or terminal point, but is rather a circular, on going layering of a memory-storing repertoire).

To summarize, at first, a meaning, an inner image signified (b-8) must be constructed; this, then, normally seeks expression in the form of an inner image signifier, a hypothetical proposal with a particular technic/linguistic shape in mind (d-8) which, in turn, leads to the fabricating of an approximation of this technic/linguistic shape in the form of an outer image signifier (bb-8) and persisting in this process until they are able to read it as being imbued with an outer image signified that meets their approval (dd-8). Since an inner response signified (b-8) was constructed from a signifier that had utilized specific technic/linguistic media, it is not far fetched to imagine that the reverse process of constructing an outer image might utilize the same media. At the same time, a highly creative approach might insist on shifting the technic/linguistic mediation radically in search of a revitalized or even revolutionary outcome.

Coda: vessels between the one and the other

<my sykee holdz my imaje bank
and so too y'rz U stand be.held
then how frum U too me or I too U
can imaje's be sent?
wot'r wavez with'in its self
containz and holz whot cant be held
for waves pass unbe.noh'nst too it
holding that same wot'r that be.holz...
can tew be wun? can buns sit still az rollz?

from Horner, *<SincroNis'tee: Reaching I Ching>*, Number 40, Arts Press/Trafford Press. 2000

Epilogue 1

The Closed Door

There comes a loud knocking at the door and a voice utters, "Who goes there?" This fragment from Shakespeare's Macbeth is, I suggest, writ large in symbolic expansion even as it is printed small in words-of-text. For poised in the center of this spec of dialogue there is staged a door—a door most heavily closed. On one side a voice initiates the exchange, not with words but with the body. And therein lies the mystery. It is a loud utterance that reveals no concrete voice and no concrete image, the absence of which is potentially ominous. The haptic may reverberate far and loud, it seems, especially in the absence of any other sensorial language pipeline, in spite of the fact that it lacks precision, or perhaps precisely because it lacks precision. It is a message filled with empty spaces left suspended for the other to elaborate, fulfill, work through. But in this case the message appears to be too open, too overwhelming for the other to pick up and carry forth, too ambiguous and incomplete to call for projection. No wonder the 'other' asks for more, much, much more. To ask, "Who?" is to insert no small question into the dialogue. For if the one who knocked turns out to be a stranger, how does such a one answer so complex a riddle? And how do they convince their other that what they offer and/or what the door conceals is not utter fabrication?

And to ask, "Who goes there?" is to further nail down the door as a two-sided/two-headed obstacle, for the one on the outside comes and goes freely in their outside world, and dares to initiate the dialogue, all the while co-opting the door in their seeming desire to remain incognito. But the 'other', the one who faces the other side of the door, the inner side, is caught inside a space and inside a state of limbo. This inside/other subject cannot initiate dialogue because this role is already taken. Neither can they easily escape; they may be protected but not without also being trapped. This other, this spoken subject, cannot dialogue openly without potentially opening the door to risk, at least not until they know what danger (or delight or insignificance) lies hidden in the knocks that so loudly hammered their secret onto the door.


And what is rendered in this case in the manifest position of the audience? We too are entangled inside this drama, inside this dilemma that inhabits the two-faces of the door, inside this drama that is itself so fully unfilled. Suppose for a moment that it is the film version that we are watching; and that we are always on the other side of the door, that is, opposite to both utterances as they are performed, inside as the knocking announces its presence and outside as the voice answers, "Who goes there?" In this short shot/reverse-shot scenario, we are in each case able to read as much as each of the actors, for our view is their view, always framed by the door's determination to offer up an overdose of absence. (On a theatrical stage this presentation is not possible, because in the absence of being able to maneuver the entire audience with a huge crane, to first view one side of the door and then the other, as the movie camera proposes, it would fall upon the director to flip the door from one side to the other. While this could add new content, it would also undermine the doors professed solidity as an obstacle designed to create layers of tension between the two voices.)

If, as film-makers, we decide to insert another level of absence, we could situate the responding voice ("Who goes there?") mid-way between the upper register of the male tenor and the lower register of the female contralto; thereby opening the door for the audience to project onto it their preferred gender identity. In any case, or so it seems, in order to sustain our relations with others, we are wont to ask, "Who speaks?" ("Who goes there?"), not just calling for labels such as gender, age, size, name, occupation, but for an answer that has sufficient complexity to constitute for us a speaking subject that is fully-dimensional. As such we are in search of an answer that penetrates, at least in some measure, the multitude of layers that lie dormant in the array of doors that stand so firmly between and among us.

If we each offer our utterances to our others inside the mediation vessels that stand as our unique containers of these self same utterances (the propose in each case being to make these utterances visible/audible and/or haptic to our others), then do we not need to be reminded every day that the doors between these vessels/rooms, between the one and the other, have no choice but to conceal the ineffable and inaccessible in the same gesture that they propose to reveal "the whole truth and nothing but the truth". If the truth lies all around, do we leave sleeping dogs lie? Do we lie about sleeping dogs? When liars lie, are they not telling the truth in their lie?

The parallel microLayerings							
4 ▲	metaEvent	8 ▲	meta-info	meta-socioEvent	▲ 4	meta-theory	▲ 8
3	artEvent	7	info	socioEvent	3	theory	7
2	*responder*	6	*reader*	*student*	2	*discourse**	6
1	*maker*	5	*reporter*	*activator*	1	*beholder*	5
a	**ARTIST**	**b**	**RESEARCHER**	**TEACHER**	**c**	**CRITIC**	**d**
Epilogue 1: The two-sided door event (basicParadigm/microParadigms)							

*Note that the critic's other/spoken (d-6) is a text and not an other 'subject agent' as is the case with the other three.



** In a dialogue the 'One' position (the front or bottom row of numbers: a-1, b-5, c-1, d-5) alternates with the 'Other' position (the second row of numbers: a-2, b-6, c-2, d-6). For example, a teacher initiates, as a *speaking subject,* an inner image *speech* with particular students as the collective *spoken subject* in mind, virtually as an inner image; this, then, is outer imaged (as the *subject spoken*) to the real students, the real *spoken subject*. It is now the students' turn to become the collective *speaking subject*; accordingly, a student imagines an inner *speech* in response to the teacher who is now the *spoken subject*, and then outer images it as the *subject spoken* to the real teacher, the real *spoken subject*. This is the basic process in its linear formation; however, in reality it almost always very layered: sensory, emotional, auditory and visual languages can all be sent simultaneously, possibly in mutual support of each other, but more likely carrying the residue of some sort of mutual interference, rivalry or intra-conflict.

The parallel basicLayerings			
d ▲	**CRITIC**	metafiguration	metallusionment: *the retroactivation vision*
c |	**TEACHER**	figuration	resolutionment: *the socioactivation*
b |	**RESEARCHER**	configuration	disillusionment: *the theoretical, contextual challenge*
a |	**ARTIST**	ground	illusionment: *the artification vision*
Epilogue 1: The two-sided door event (basicParadigm)			

Epilogue 2

The Screened Window

What we make is what we make of ourselves; what we make of ourselves is what we make. Epilogue 2 is based on the book, *Technology as Symptom and Dream,* by Romanyshyn. It is a daring look into the relation between what we invent to represent what we are and how we come to understand what we are when we behold what we invent. His text details how specific invented modes of representation carry within them the modes of being; and how this becomes second nature to those who slumber within it; his insights offer an awakening.


> Painting…provides this kind of mirroring through which we can read the image which an age has of itself and the world. As a celebration of the visible world painting reflects, among other things, not only the ideas which a particular age has about the space of the world and its place within that space, but also the space itself of that world…. The invention of linear perspective in fifteenth-century Italy is…(a) moment of change, and the tale to be told…(it) concerns how the invention and development of this artistic technique became the cultural vision which has shaped our contemporary technological world….What linear perspective vision achieves is a kind of geometrization of the space of the world, and within that space we become an object of observation…It is the transformation of the eye into a technology and a redefinition of the world to suit the eye, a world of maps and charts, blueprints and diagrams, the worlds in which we are, among other things, silent readers of the printed word and users of the camera, the world, finally, in which we have all become astronauts. (Romanyshyn, p. 32, 1989)

Romanyshyn makes a case for the shift of vision that took place some 500 years ago. He presents a map of Florence prior to the emergence of linear perspective in which the painter "could render what he saw before his eyes convincingly by representing what it felt like *to walk about*, experiencing structures, almost *tactilely*, from many different sides, rather than from a *single, overall vantage*" (Edgerton, quoted in Romanyshyn, p. 36). This is exemplified as the medieval way of representing reality. It is the map of Florence made after the invention of perspective, however, that carries familiarity for contemporary viewers. "It is a view…which finds a favorable reception in the geometry of our eyes, in the way in which we perceive the world…and anyone who has approached a city in an airplane can affirm this affinity" (Romanyshyn, p. 38).

Romanyshyn contends that the invention of linear perspective erects a window between the viewer and the viewed, and that even this boundary becomes an object of vision between the speaking "subject as *spectator* and the world as *spectacle*". Further, the haptic sensibilities, which include the other senses that ground the visible, become increasingly subordinated to the supreme focus of the eye; the new focus is on that which is "visible, observable, measurable and quantifiable". And these come to exist as a "*matter of light*, and as such, a matter of *information*, a bit of *data*".


The invention of a perspective image, traced out on the window through which the world would henceforth be seen, comes with the invention of the *grid* on that window; "all viewers and all objects" of this new world are subsequently reduced to co-exist in a new homogeneous equalization of space; although Romanyshyn doesn't go this far, one can foresee that this would eventually become the 'screen', the high-tech window. What had previously been perceived as a matter of *layers* (as reinstated in the Analogos) and depth into the distance was now re-conceived as a matter of *levels* on a flat vertical screen. Romanyshyn equates this with the "equalizing vision of modern science and its world of explanations and political democracy...as an erasure of distances so that things, like angles and demons, which belong to other levels of existence, become a subjective matter". The human vision supplanted the God-held one; The Cartesian and Newtonian mechanical/mathematical universe (see page 134) came to stand as the essence of reality, of truth. Whereas size had previously been an index of the importance of things in the real world, size was reduced to being merely an index of the spatial distance between things and their viewer.

> Spectator, spectacle, specimen! These are the images we have encountered. They belong together, and each in its own fashion tells that tale of distance, (on being behind and/or in front of the window), departure (on having seen the whole from above, remotely, with the panorama that only the eye can behold), and disincarnation (on having lost touch with the haptic sensibility, the body) which characterizes the story of technology. (brackets added) (Romanyshyn, p. 57)



Romanyshyn sees the camera as exemplifying the "inherent...incarnation of the linear perspective eye. Through the lens the world is opened up as a landscape which converges on a vanishing point. In the camera the world truly does become a matter of light, a matter which speaks not to the entire range of embodied sensual life but primarily to the eye and the eye alone." He cites the work of Hockney as an example of the contemporary attempt to deliberately 'break' the camera eye by presenting the mosaic or fractured, multiple image, that, like the Medieval map of Florence, presents a series of moments rather than a remote, singular overview.


Alberti originally conceived perspective as a window opening unto the world; Romanyshyn details the shift to a closed window ("the open window", "the window as veil", "the veil as mathematical grid", "from window as metaphor to window as map"), eventually ending up in the camera as the technology that simply "records, reproduces". In Epilogue 1, a closed door frames a dialogue that thrives on impasse; in Epilogue 2 a 'closed' window opens up the impasse only to freeze the dialogue in a one-way history of perception:



Facing a doorway (not a door, but a frame, which, like a proscenium arch, separates the player's world of the stage from the audience's world of ongoing life) one can follow one's eyes into the world. One can walk through a doorway. Facing a window that is closed, one can only look at a world, which is for that reason primarily a spectacle. An open window, on the other hand, offers a vision, "a matter of light...While I cannot walk through the open window..., I can nevertheless still hear, smell, and even feel the world on the other side. With a window that is open the world is still more than a matter of light (Romanyshyn, p. 70-71).

To focus on the 'window-veil' as grid is to imagine seeing the world through a mathematical screen that objectifies that reality as a multiplicity of co-equivalent bits. If we accept Romanyshyn's thesis that the self creates its own vision of the world which in turn creates the world according to that vision, then "(f)ree of out bodily tie to things beyond a window which has already made the world primarily a matter for inspection, we are free to veil the world with our vision of it.... Angels first had to be erased from the heavens by mathematizing the sky before we could launch ourselves into space." (Romanyshyn` pp. 79-80).

EPILOGUE 2		
a: metafiguration	metallusionment	*the ethics of the position of humans within nature*
b: figuration	resolutionment	*the eye as specialized spectator of spectacles*
c: configuration	disillusionment	*the invention of linear perspective*
d: ground	Illusionment	*the body as haptic ground of multi-sensorial reality*
Romanyshyn: The Alberti Revolution basicParadigm		



Linear perspective is inherent in photoography. The camera is the technological incarnation of the linear perspective eye. Through the lens the world is opened up as a landscape which converges on a vanishing point. In the camera the world truly does become a matter of light, a matter which speaks not to the entire range of embodied sensual life but primarily to the eye and the eye alone. With the camera we do become a fixed and focused eye, a spectator observing a world which has become a spectacle, an object of vision. (Romanyshyn, pp. 57-58, 1989)


Epilogue 3

Passageways

What are the archetypal human narratives? Robert A. Johnson, in his book *Transformation*, refers to three masterworks of literature to elucidate the epic processes that humans are subject to: Cervantes' *Don Quixote* (1605), Shakespeare's *Hamlet* (1603 or 1604?), and Goethe's *Faust* (Part I, 1808 and Part II, after his death in 1832). He defines the main characters in each of these as two-dimensional, three-dimensional and four-dimensional, respectively.

If the diachronic (temporal) aspect of the Analogos is regarded as a narrative, (for example, the forward/backward or skipping movements of going through the basic sequence of a-b-c-d), then it is possible to understand Johnson's analysis as different versions of this four part sequence of events. In summary, Cervantes and Goethe (Part I) offer narratives that, among other things, portray the case of the over-illusioned/under-disillusioned psyche; Shakespeare offers the case of the over-disillusioned psyche; and Goethe offers the case of the successful transcendence within and through the challenge of the disillusionment.

Epilogue 3: The Passageway			
d ▲	self/super conscious	metallusionment	4-d: Johnson's *Transformation*
c |	ego/conscious	resolutionment	3-d: Goethe's *Faust (Part II)*
b |	super ego/conscience	disillusionment	2-d: Shakespeare's *Hamlet*
a |	id/unconscious	illusionment	1-d: Cervantes' *Don Quixote*; Goethe's *Faust (Part I)*
The Four Dimensions of Human Struggle (after Johnson) BasicParadigm			



All three literary works engage their readers in the a-b dialogue (between illusionment and disillusionment); however Cervantes' focus is on these and only on these; c and d (the resolution and metallusion) are left out as merely transparent after-effects of the a-b struggle. In short, the c and d aspects remain more or less unselfconscious for Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. As a pair they carry an inner-type dialogue between the Don, the Freudian id (a) and Sancho, the Freudian super ego (b) or Winnicott's illusionment (a) and disillusionment (b). The illusion that seems to motivate their "adventure" is set up as a search for Dulcinea, "the (female) sweetness of life". The disillusionment process, which is never taken seriously, is represented in events such as the battle with windmills and an episode within a sort of fairy tale centered on a castle. "Sancho Panza is short, fat, practical, immediate and ruled largely by his appetite..." (by any definition, a weak super ego, a weak conscience!) "....Don Quixote is free, optimistic, happy and sure of himself.... tall, noble of bearing, idealistic (by any definition, a strong id or strong unconscious)" (brackets added, Johnson, 1991, p.17-18).

> "Don Quixote's optimism ruins everything around him. But it finally proves to be correct. He loses every time he relies on his sword; it is by means of his poetic imagination that he becomes victorious...Don Quixote is creating poetry, not reality. Heaven, love, idealism, hope, justice, chivalry, eternity—all are inner realities as palpable and real as any outer realities our world holds in such esteem." (Johnson, p.21)

> As they talk, and often debate vigorously, they enlarge the field of each other's thoughts. No thought on either side goes unchecked or uncritized. By mainly courteous disagreement, most courteous when sharply in conflict, they gradually establish an area of free play, where thoughts are set free for us the readers to ponder. (Angus Flecher, *Colors of Mind*, quoted in Bloom, p.131).... Neither the Don nor Sancho is capable of overhearing himself. (Bloom, p. 134)

How does the narrative take shape in layers 'c' and 'd' (where the conflict between roles 'a' and 'b' is normally resolved)? As expected in a situation in which there is an overdeveloped illusionment relative to a weak disillusionment, this is an echo of over protected mothering in an infant so that the latter retains expectations of having their every-desire fulfilled. Such an outlook has little awareness of socialization, of long term (super-ego/conscience) strategies; the basic aim is for immediate and unconditional gratification. Cervantes spells out for every reader the wonders of living in a world where wishes are magically the same as reality. Except that, as in the real world (layer c), Quixote and Panza, the strong id and the weak super ego, respectively, can never be successful. But this unfortunate feedback seems invisible to the pair; they stumble on through adventure after adventure, forever believing that their illusions are commensurate with reality itself. Accordingly layers 'c' and 'd' are passed through without any need for awareness, learning, or socialization (b, above), without confronting the technic/linguistic structures (b) that must be mastered if the challenge of disillusionment is to be faced and transcended. Cervantes exposes the irony that gets played out in the case of an over determined layer 'a' in its relation to a capitulating, weak layer 'b', which results in a routinzed follow-up, one that offers neither much feedback (c) nor much 'feedforward' (d).

Parallel microLayerings					
4 ▲	self	*self unawareness*	*disregarded feedback*	meta-speech	▲ 4
3	ego/conscious	*inflated ego*	*cathartic action*	speech	3
2	super ego	*under-disillusioned*	*windmills/antagonist*	spoken	2
1	id/unconscious	*over-illusioned*	*Quixote-Pancho*	speaker	1
a	**ONE: inner**			**ONE: outer**	**c**

Epilogue 3: Cervantes' Don Quixote and Sandra Pancho together as one (ONE)

The strength of the illusionment, in each of these metaphoric narratives, is always relative to the strength of the disillusionment that presents itself in the specific context. However, it is not merely a question of their relative balance, rather it is a matter of their inability to interact with each other in a win/win dialogue. The relationship between the 'one' and the 'other' is similarly co-relative: any variation of a win/loss combination carries the seeds of future pathology.

Johnson sees Hamlet, the character, as complex, as a "three-dimensional (hu)man...the modern, worrying, anxious (hu)man who was to take the center stage and is still the model for our (contemporary) character.... the prototype of so many modern men (humans) who see a noble world in their imagination but don't have the means to accomplish..." (Johnson, pp. 37, 47). Hamlet is not, strictly speaking, suffering from a typical failed response to an external disillusionment challenge; rather, the challenge is so demanding that he cannot easily work his way through it. Even for a prince, heir to the extra-ordinary, the task of murdering/avenging his uncle/step father cannot be committed without weighing the extra-ordinary consequences. Hamlet, being who he was, "...wavered for all of us." (Emily Dickinson, quoted in Johnson, p. 38)

According to the view which was originated by Goethe and is still the prevailing one today, Hamlet represents the type of man whose power of direct action is paralyzed by an excessive development of his intellect...of the loathing which should drive him to revenge is replaced in him by self-reproaches, by scruples of conscience, which remind him that he himself is literally no better than the sinner whom he is to punish. (Freud, quoted in Bloom, p. 381-2)

Bloom counters Freud, noting that "Hamlet thinks not too much but too well, and at the frontiers of human consciousness, declines to become his uncle in the same circumstances." (Bloom, p. 387). Hamlet reasons, "a thought which is quartered hath one part wisdom and three parts coward" is insufficient. Johnson writes that "He knows too much to be simple (to take physical action), but not enough to be whole (to take the path of spiritual transformation)....A lesser man might have burst his way out of the dilemma by killing the usurper uncle; a greater man might have withdrawn from the struggle and found a solution in fate and faith." (Johnson, p. 38, 40).

Quixote, in ignoring the existence of any future disillusionment teachings (b), is not subject to the vicissitudes of struggling with outer reality's expectations. He just follows his own expectations. But Hamlet, in facing his challenge (b), that set forth by his father's ghost (to kill his uncle) sets him into a state of wrestling with ultimates. Shakespeare writes in a grand style about grand personalities (about kings and queens); it is a magnification of the dilemma that ordinary citizens must grapple with if they are to become citizens of their world.

Parallel microLayerings (basicParadigm [a-b-c-d]/microParadigms [1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8])					
8 ▲	self/super conscious	*temporary realized self*	*tragedy*	meta-speech	8 ▲
7	ego/conscious	*inflated ego*	*murder*	speech	7
6	super ego/conscience	*under-disillusioned*	*Hamlet/antagonist*	spoken	6
5	id/unconscious	*over-illusioned*	*uncle/protagonist*	speaker	5
b	**OTHER: inner**		**OTHER: outer**		**d**
Epilogue 3: Hamlet's uncle/step-father (OTHER)					

Parallel microLayerings (basicParadigm [a-b-c-d]/microParadigms [1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8])					
4	Self/super conscious	*unrealized self*	*tragedy*	meta-speech	4
3	ego/conscious	*deflated ego*	*play within the play*	speech	3
2	super ego/conscience	*over-disillusioned*	*uncle/antagonist*	spoken	2
1	id/unconscious	*under-illusioned*	*Hamlet/protagonist*	speaker	1
a	**ONE: inner**		**ONE: outer**		**c**
Epilogue 3: Shakespeare's Hamlet, the character (ONE)					

How does Hamlet work his way through the Analogos c-d layers, the resolution and the metallusion process? He finally hits upon a clever device to 'convict' his uncle: a play (within the play) to force his uncle to face the crime. But the strategy backfires; the uncle moves to have Hamlet murdered. The mass destruction of all the main players in the end clinches the tragedy. *Faust: Part I*, as structured within the Analogos schema, runs parallel to the Quixote narrative, but there is a difference: Quixote inhabits a sort of child-like world where the reader can happily drift along without worrying about negative feedback; but Faust's rampage (in Part I) leaves him and the reader inside the deepest of tragedies. Faust is required to pay the price for his juvenile exploits, committed without the normal guidance of a mature (inner) adult conscience (in this case represented by Mephistopheles). Together, Quixote and Faust (in Part I) represent the two different versions of an outcome that follows an over-inflated illusionment (id/unconscious); neither of them becomes adequately disillusioned/socialized. Quixote fits the romantic comedy profile where wish fulfillment runs its course; Faust (Part I) fits that of the realist tragedy where the lack of socialization, of super ego guidance, leads to actions that are tragic, disfunctional.


If Faust (in Part I) suffers tragedy from a lack of disillusionment (b), a lack of conscience to guide him, Hamlet is caught in the opposite dilemma: an over-inflated disillusionment (conscience, b), an overwhelming challenge, that prevents him from action.

It is in *Faust: Part II* that Faust's illusion is strong enough to provide energy to send him forward and his disillusionment is successful enough to adequately lead to resolutionment (c) and "metallusionment" (d). The unconscious illusionment (a) with its drive for immediate reward must find ways to interact in a win/win situation with the conscience/super ego (b) if the ego (c), as acting director of the subject, is to benefit from a resolution between these two energies and find fulfillment in a transcendent sense of self (d).

In *Faust: Part II,* Goethe presents a narrative of an older academic (Faust) being guided through a rejuvenation process. He is able to re-experience the innocence of child-hood, not as a child but as an adult. Goethe, according to Johnson, posits this as a way to gain transcendence, a way to go successfully beyond the disillusionment challenges, to reach maturity. What, in brief, then, is the narrative sequence through which Faust must go in order to become rejuvenated and accomplish transcendence?

> Part II (of Faust) is written in the language of the imagination, a kind of alchemical treatise, a fairy tale, a myth. It is only on this level that Faust can find a way out of his imprisonment.... The efforts of planning, reasoning, discipline, and heroic ventures would only further the emotional confusion of a man who has attained the degree of consciousness Faust has at the end of Part I. Again it is only in the realm of symbol and ceremony that the solution can be found.... the figure of the puer aeternis, the eternal youth, is central in this journey.... The puer energy in a (hu)man is that eternal, inner child whose mentality is geared to the fantasy (illusion) and whose eye is on heaven (pleasure) rather than on any practical (or conventional) endeavor. (brackets added, Johnson, p. 76)

Parallel microLayerings (basicParadigm [a-b-c-d]/microParadigms [1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8])					
8 ▲	self/super conscious	*already realized self*	*transformation*	meta-speech	▲ 8
7	ego/conscious	*inflated ego*	*challenges*	speech	7
6	super ego/conscience	*under-disillusioned*	*Faust/Mephistopheles*	spoken	6
5	id/unconscious	*over-illusioned*	*puer aerternis*	speaker	5
b	**OTHER: inner** (dynamic X)		**OTHER: outer** (dynamic X)		**d**
Epilogue 3: Puer aerternis in Faust: Part II (OTHER)					



Parallel microLayerings (basicParadigm [a-b-c-d]/microParadigms [1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8])					
4 ▲	self	*discovery of self*	*rejuvenation*	meta-speech	▲ 4
3	ego/conscious	*inflated ego*	*struggle*	speech	3
2	super ego	*under-disillusioned*	*puer aerternis*	spoken	2
1	id/unconscious	*over-illusioned*	*Faust-Mephistopheles*	speaker	1
a	**ONE: inner** (dynamic X)		**ONE: outer** (dynamic X)		**c**
Epilogue 3: Goethe's Faust and Mephistopheles as one character in Faust: Part II (ONE)					

There are four appearances of the puer figure in *Faust: Part II*. The first one is that of the boy charioteer (mapped, page 162), the symbol of boundless energy (illusionment, a). This energy leads Faust in search of Helen of Troy (a symbol of feminine beauty) and to the place of the Mothers. Mephistopheles remains Faust's guide (his super ego, his disillusioner, b), keeping him on a track that both nurtures his aspirations and challenges them. This is the role of a good parent/teacher: making sure that a learner's dreams (illusions) are strong and then making sure that they come up against the vicissitudes of reality (disillusions). In the protective situation of home or school, students are being prepared for the eventualities that are to confront them in the real world. The aim is to enable the graduate to leave the nest with a repertoire of experiences in which the inner desire (id, a) and the inner parent (super ego, b) know how to dialogue fluently with each other. By the end of Goethe's elongated narrative, Faust (as id, a) and Mephistopheles (as super ego, b) are able to co-exist supportively. It is this quality that Johnson identifies as transformative. It is two characters role-playing the psychodynamic dialogue of one psyche.

But any passage through disillusionment, as the one that occupies the entire story of *Faust: Part II* is no bed of roses. For example, when Faust tries to embrace Helen of Troy, a huge explosion occurs; she vanishes and Faust is thrown back, burned. (This is the normal outcome to be expected from an inflated illusionment, or in Faust's case, from his opportunity to be juvenile, his part in the bargain with Mephistopheles.) Mephistopheles rescues Faust and takes him back to his study for a bit of "order/ordinariness", an appropriate role for the 'good' conscience.

The second puer is a homunculus, a miniature man (boy) produced in the lab by Wagner, Faust's assistant. His role is to guide Faust back to ancient Greece. And he too explodes when confronted by the classical ideal of beauty. Faust awakens and is given another chance to meet Helen of Troy; the outcome of this meeting is a son, Euphorion, the third puer. ("Goethe uses him as an allegory for Lord Byron's career." [quoted in Bloom, Benet, p. 326]) Euphorion lives only for the joy of the moment (an over-illusionment, the archetypal initiation of the eternal youth, the puer); and, like Icarus, he overacts, flings himself too high and falls to his death. But Faust is again able to see Helen of Troy; this time, on the advice of Mephistopheles, he merely holds onto her garment rather than embrace her. This new approach yields creative energy rather than a devastating explosion, as was the case previously.

As Faust and Mephistopheles begin to interact more and more supportively, Faust stops asking for grandiose things; but he has one wish, a less selfish one: to have a "piece of coastline so that he might reclaim land form the sea…the symbol of the unconscious" This work proceeds well until one day Faust complains to Mephistopheles that an older couple occupying his land is blocking his view. Mephistopheles eradicates them; Faust is shocked. Years pass and Faust keeps digging.

> Mephistopheles intervenes with his final insult: ghoulish Lemurs replace the workmen, and the blind Faust, hearing the sound of their shovels, does not know they are at work digging his grave and not his final improvement of nature. Virgilian spirits of the night and the dream, the Lemures are mere skeletons, indeed mummies, and they pirate the gravedigger's song in *Hamlet* as he digs Ophelia's grave. To this ghoulish music, the sound of shovels…Faust utters his final delusion: "I now enjoy my highest moment." With that, he falls backward into the arms of the Lemures, who lay him on the ground and inter him. By Faust's own language, his soul ought to be forfeited, his and God's wager lost. (Bloom, p. 233)

The narrative seems to fall suddenly into a tragic finality; however, at the last moment Faust is rescued by Gretchen (reappearing from *Faust: Part I*), who, at the head of the choir of angels, pleads for him. "Finally, at the gates of heaven, it is grace, not justice, that prevails. The masculine stuff of law and order are superseded by grace and love." (Johnson, p. 95) Mephistopheles feels betrayed, but when he catches sight of a boy angel in the heavenly band, the fourth puer, he falls in love. And so in the end, Faust and Mephistopheles, with their individual entries into 'heaven' assured, are both redeemed. There is "no redemption of one in a pair of opposites without the same redemption for the other." (Johnson, p. 95) Transformation arrives on the wings of an unconscious (a) that learns how to dialogue with a conscience (b). This is posited as the ground for a healthy ego (the conscious) (c) which in turn is the basis for a transformative 'self' (d).

Parallel metaMicroLayerings			
4 ▲	*Boy angel*	metaFiguration	metallusionment: transformation
3 |	*Euphorion 'boy' (son)*	figuration	resolutionment: rejuvenation
2 |	*Homunculus 'boy' (man)*	configuration	over-disillusionment: challenge
1 |	*Boy charioteer*	ground	over illusionment: dream
Epilogue 3: Faust's rejuvenation passageway through the puer aerternis (Faust: Part II)			

Parallel metaMacroLayerings			
iiii ▲	*Johnson/Analogos*	metaFiguration	metallusionment: transformation
iii |	*Faust/Mephistopheles (II)*	figuration	resolutionment: rejuvenation
ii |	*Hamlet/Ghost*	configuration	over-disillusionment: challenge
i |	*Quixote/Panza//Faust/Mephistopheles (I)*	ground	over illusionment: dream
Epilogue 3: Johnson's mythic passageway to 4-dimensional (hu)man experience			

Johnson's three layers of human epic evolution, as he sees them revealed in three masterworks, resonate fluently within the mythic possibilities of the AnalogosParadigm. This narrative contains a mid-stage that he characterizes as a dangerous terrain to traverse; in the first (Quixote) act (i), too much illusionment never faces disillusionment; while this is not tragic in fiction, it would be in real life; in the second (Hamlet) act (ii), a disillusionment overwhelms the strength of the illusionment that preceded it, leading to tragedy. Rejuvenation/transformation (c-d) are only possible with the integration of these two, each one enabling itself by enabling its other to likewise enable itself.

Johnson sees a parallel in the everyday events of ordinary people. Two-dimensional human qualities (as exemplified by Quixote/Sancho and Faust/ Mephistopheles; Part I pairs/units) live on in "Indian/cowboy stories, or in each new adolescent". When the integration of a-b fails, the negative outcome lives on in activities such as "vandalism, gang behavior, drug abuse". Three-dimensional human qualities (as exemplified by the Hamlet/uncle pair/unit) find rejuvenation (at the two-dimensional level) in such activities as jogging, camping, car worship; but otherwise appear in the form of an identity or mid-life crisis. Four-dimensional human qualities (as exemplified by the Faust/ Mephistopheles pair/unit) live on in the "unaccountable touch of joy…of energy, light, and hope…poetry, music, new perspectives when you are jogging, a blossoming of philosophic inquiry, a new religious understanding—something of this world catches you." (Johnson, p. 104) "Enlightenment is never total or permanent in this lifetime. Mythology has to construct personalities who are perfect. This is the evolution from incompleteness to wholeness" (Johnson, p. 104) The Analogos version of Johnson's *Trans-formation* offers an articulation for the praxis of this type of journey.

A larger question remains: What is the role of negativity in the order of things? To respond to this quest it is necessary to differentiate the type of negativity that exists to be transcended, to guide one to a higher form of consciousness, from the type of negativity that is inherently tragic. Disillusionment, as a process of maturation, a process that seems to negate the earlier period of dreamlike illusionism, but in reality builds on it, is of the first type; it aims at a higher level of positivity. On the other hand, the failure of either of the following, if not arrested, leads predictably to some measure of tragedy:

- the failure of the initial *illusioning process*, the one that grounds an individual's belief in a life-long self-worth, that is, failure in the lack of a formulation of creative energy, itself;
- the failure of the *disillusioning process*, either not sufficiently challenging the illusions, assuming they are in place, or overwhelming them with too much challenge too fast or too soon.

Epilogue 4

MetaPassageways

Why is the triangle (the structure of *three*) the basic unit of the AnalogosSyntagm? What is constituted in an economy of three? Why are there *four* triangles? And what is constituted in an economy of *four*, in a quaternity, in a square?

> Jung was fascinated by the evolution of consciousness represented by the number three moving to four…the number three represented a consciousness that was time-dominated (diachronic reality), devoted to acting, doing, processing, accomplishing…The number four, though, denotes being (synchronic reality), eternity, peace, and contemplation. (brackets added, Johnson, pp. 82-83)

Garber, in her extended exposition of bi-sexuality, elaborates this story of the shift from two to three. If two constitutes dialogue, interaction between the one and the other, the female and the male, the yin and the yang, the diachronic and the synchronic, the id and the super ego and all the other dualities that pervade our culture, then how does this relate to the number three?

> Our entire sense of what it means to be "in love" with someone is based upon the assumption of exclusivity, the assumption of what is "natural" for lovers is to pair up…Logic and language would seem to suggest that couples, whether heterosexual, homosexual, or even bi-sexual, make their appearance in narratives of love and desire—like the animals in Noah's ark—two by two. But as many commentators have noticed, the basic unit of the couple is, paradoxically, not two but three. (Garber, p. 423)

Garber provides a list: "Arthur, Guinevere, and Lancelot; Scarlett, Rhett, and Ashley; 'Shakespeare', the dark lady, and the rival poet; Archie, Betty, and Veronica; Helen, Menelaus, and Paris; Tristan, Isolde, and King Mark—these are the models for how we think of great love." (p. 423) The protagonist has to win the lover from the antagonist. "It is as though love can only be born through an obstacle." Disillusionment holds the key to fulfillment. She argues, "This would explain the role of adultery in Western literature…the rival (of a man) might be another man, a woman, a possessive (or incestuous) parent…a career or other vocation that interferes with the…fulfillment of the courtship, (or even) God. " (p. 423)

Girard was among the first to articulate the concept of rivalry in literature, to indicate a shift from the popular idea of the lovers as a couple to that of a threesome: "What my rival desires I may come to desire, *because* he or she desires it" (Quoted in Garber, p. 424). Proust notes that "in love, our successful rival, that is, our enemy, is our benefactor...he adds prestige and value" to what otherwise might excite only a luke warm sense of desire. Sedgwick extends Girard's premise into the male homosexual realm, arguing that the bond between two rival males is stronger than that which exists between either of the males and their (female) beloved. She notes that "such formulations, whether Girard's, or Freud's (the Oedipal triangle, where the young male is caught between love for the mother and rivalry with the father), or those of the folk tales on which both depend for corroborative evidence, are 'transhistorical,' they posit an unchanging human subject relatively unshaped by culture and history." (Garber, p. 425)

Parallel basic/microLayerings (basicParadigm [a-b-c-d]/microParadigms [1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8])					
8 ▲	self/ super conscious	*complementation*	*ideal/real 'female'*	metaSpeech	8 ▲
7	ego/conscious	*identification*	*image of self/male*	speech	7
6	super ego/ conscience	*social constraint*	*male/antagonist*	spoken	6
5	id/unconscious	*desire*	*self image/protagonist*	speaker	5
b	**OTHER: inner**		**OTHER: outer**		**d**
Epilogue 3: male: b/d = secondary process (OTHER)					

b: male/**other** (inner)

c: female/**one** (outer)

d: male/**other** (outer)

Female/male Identity


a: female/**one** (inner)

Parallel basic/microLayerings (basicParadigm [a-b-c-d]/microParadigms [1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8])					
4 ▲	self/ super conscious	*complementation*	*ideal/real 'male'*	metaSpeech	4 ▲
3	ego/conscious	*identification*	*image of self/ female*	speech	3
2	super ego/ conscience	*social constraint*	*female/antagonist*	spoken	2
1	id/unconscious	*desire*	*self image/protagonist*	speaker	1
a	**ONE: inner**		**ONE: outer**		**c**
Epilogue 3: female: a/c = primary process (ONE)					

Sedgwick further notes (following the work of Levi-Strauss) that "marriage is not established between a man and a woman, but between two groups of men..." (quoted in Garber, p. 425). This status difference between male and female, explains how it is that in same-sex relations male homosexuality is more visible and threatening than is that of females; related to this Gerber notes that "(t)o secure male homosocial desire, male homo-*sexual* desire becomes stigmatized and vilified, creating a (comparably) safe place for relations between men." (p.426).

As outlined in the two pairs of AnalogosParadigms, (pages 164 and 166), both the 'one' and the 'other', whether male or female, search for an identity (3, 7), an image of the self, within the gender group that holds them. This is 'reflection' (I-A-3), feedback as mirroring; however, this does not satisfy the need to engage in an exploration of what one is not; such a motivation spawns 'revelation' (I-A-4): to 'feedforward' is to see 'through the looking glass', to 'view' what one might *become*—but only relative to a realization of one's ground, what one already *is*; but what one *is* also reveals what one is not, that which can only be found in one's other.

In the paradigmSyntagm (opposite page) of a female triangle, (consisting of the speaker herself as female protagonist [c-1], her rival female as antagonist [c-2] and her real/ideal 'male' [c-4]) both she (a/c) and her 'other' ('male', b/d) have a similar inner life at the archetypal primary process level (a and b in both cases)—even if the two are gender opposites. Their difference lies in their identification, each with their own gender group, and then each with their search for their complement, someone from the 'opposite' side/sex. If the identification triangle (1-2-3, below) is more *ritually* oriented, then the complementation triangle (1-2-4, below) is more *quest* oriented. It follows that love survives on the need to feel continuity/similarity through both a similar 'other' (a sense that the human process of identification can be group shared) and on the need to feel contiguity/difference through an opposite 'other' (a sense that for each person the absent aspects, the ones specific to the other gender, can be engaged, presumably because they cannot be directly experienced and are not socially acceptable as a source of identity).



Inner Triangles:
1-2-3: Identity triangle
1-2-4: Complementary triangle
(microSyntagm)

The paradigm on page 166 for a parallel male subject follows the same schemata. Accordingly, there are two inter-layered triangles for all individuals, be they male or female: the primary triangle is constituted as the speaker (c-1, page 164 or 166), the spoken (c-2) and their search for (same sex) identity in another same-gender other as an expression of their need for a reflective social construct (c-3 [represented in triangle 1-2-3, above]); the secondary triangle (1-2-4, above) is constituted as the speaker (c-1, page 164 or 166), a spoken (c-2) and the search for (opposite sex) complementarity in another (c-4, page 165 or 166) as an expression of their need for a revelatory social construct . To the extent that this is archetypal, it offers a ground for both hetrosocial or homosocial intra-actions, couplings. Further, the ideal 'male'/'female' hetrosexual or homosexual other subject can theoretically be someone of the opposite or same sex; same-sex couples merely privilege identification over complementation since both gender qualities (identification and complementation) are projected onto the same gender. This type of fusion-of-the-two undervalues the complementation input, thereby, supposedly, exerting a push for members in same-sex couples to invent expressions of difference.

An example of a cultural difference between males and females, as mapped in terms of the identity triangle (1-2-3, page 165), occurs if the 'image of the self' is beauty-based; this quality is so closely associated with femininity that if males focus on it they can easily be regarded as effeminate, that is, less masculine. If aesthetic appearance is the 'property' of females, then the equivalent norm for males in Western culture is their 'image of the self' as agents of action. Accordingly, the identity triangle is differently constructed culturally for males and females in terms of specifics. This lack in each one is, theoretically, the pull that fulfills their mutual need for each other (the complementation triangle, 1-2-4, page 165). Complementation has its challenges; two subjects engaging in 'what you are not' carries the risk of them arriving into a terrain of mutual alienation; this is especially true if the identity triangle ('what you are'), as the ground, is not kept strong enough in each of the two members of the pair; the identity triangle is constituted as the *ground* of inner-self-image/outer-image-of-self inter-relation; the complementary triangle is the relative *figuration*: inner-image-of-other/outer-image-of-other inter-relation.

Parallel basic/microLayerings					
8	self/super conscious	*complementation*	*ideal/real 'male'/other image*	meta-speech	8
7	ego/conscious	*identification*	*female/image of self*	speech	7
6	super ego/conscience	*social constraint*	*female/antagonist*	spoken	6
5	id/unconscious	*desire*	*female/protagonist/self image*	speaker	5
b	**OTHER: inner**		**OTHER: outer**		**d**
Epilogue 3: female (OTHER) Secondary Process (BasicMicroParadigms)					

b: female/**other** (inner)

c: male **one** (outer)


a: male/**one** (inner)

d: female/**other** (outer)

Female/male identity

Parallel basicMicroLayerings					
4	self/super conscious	*complementation*	*ideal/real 'female'/other image*	meta-speech	4
3	ego/conscious	*identification*	*male/image of self*	speech	3
2	super ego	*social constraint*	*male/antagonist*	spoken	2
1	id/unconscious	*desire*	*male/protagonist/self image*	speaker	1
a	**ONE: inner**		**ONE: outer**		**c**
Epilogue 3: male (ONE) Primary Process (BasicMicroParadigms)					

It is important to note that, syntagmatically, the first inner triangle (1-2-3, page 165, privileging identity) occupies the three most primary, unselfconscious, ritual-based spaces of the AnalogosParadigm, whereas the secondary triangle (privileging complementation) includes the one (4) most distanced from the ground (1) and thus offering the most disinterested, external perspective for insight and revision. Since the above two syntagms can represent two 'life styles' (that is, privileging identification, 1-2-3, or privileging complementation, 1-2-4); and since each one offers very different rewards and stresses; and since each one is exclusive of the other, a third option presents itself: how could someone experience both of these worlds? Traditional 'family values' stressed a careful differentiation between the two: identification needs are met through same-sex friendship; complementation needs are met through opposite-sex love and marriage. Alternatives to the norm involve border crossing; and this opens the doorway to include complex inter-relational understandings; dipping into both sexual and social identification and sexual and social complementation worlds simultaneously is even more complex and conflicting: an understanding of the interactions involved would implicate a complicated involvement of all the map pings on pages 164-166.




> Professors rarely speak of the place of eros or the erotic in our classrooms. Trained in the philosophical context of Western metaphysical dualism, many of us have accepted the notion that there is a split between the body and the mind. Believing this, individuals enter the classroom to teach as though only the mind is present, and not the body. (bell hooks, Teaching to Transgress, quoted in Garber, p.340)

> It is precisely because I believe it is not possible to neatly separate the sexual from other sorts of relations that I find the movement to bar the sexual from pedagogy not only dangerous but supremely impractical. (Jane Gallop, "Feminism and Harrassment Policy", quoted in Garber, p.340)

> "*Between* is properly used of two," wrote Samuel Johnson in his dictionary in 1755, "and *among* of more." Ever the realist, he added, "but perhaps this accuracy is not always preserved." Indeed it is not. The American dictionary-maker Noah Webster observed "that *between* is not restricted to two." The editor of the Oxford English Dictionary, Sir James A. H. Murray, surveyed past practice from the vantage point of 1888 and reported, "In all senses *between* has been, from the earliest appearance, extended to more than two." He concluded, as William Safire notes, that "*between* is still the only word available to express the relation of a thing to many surrounding things severally and individually, *among* expressing a relation to them collectively and vaguely. (Garber, p. 525)


The Analogos embraces both the *between* and the *among*. One way to highlight this is to foreground the *synchronic*—to pay attention to the transitional spatial relations between the triangles (as exemplified in the paradigm of Krause's sculpture types mapped on the next page, introduced on pages 131-134). This can be accomplished by labeling the boundary lines and the meeting points as the transitional terms between the triangles. Focusing on the connecting points of the triangles (r, s, t) and the boundary lines between them (T, S, R), as opposed to the areas as terrains, provides an alternative view of both the syntagmatic inter-relations and the paradigmatic content. It becomes immediately apparent that we are still in the terrain of the tri-world, of triangulation, of the dialogue between two subjects, a speaking subject, their spoken subject and the danger of this other (spoken subject) becoming a speaking subject to an other or third subject outside the *di-alogue*. In such a complex, as in trigonometry, there is always one subject acting as anchor between two others. Duality is forever threatened by 'tri-ality'; dialogue is forever threatened by *'tri-olog'*. In the mapping on the next page, these patterns begin to emerge—the pushes and pulls are always held in a three-way tension. The third dimension strengthens the psychological resolve of inter-relations just as it strengthens the engineering resolve of structural mechanical relations. The Analogos sets out to reckon with triangulation paradox.



If homosexuality is the first inner reflection of self-love, then bi-sexuality may open the door to the secondary (inner) realization of human sexual duality; heterosexuality introduces reproductive complementation and pan sexuality introduces the de-contextual. If homosexuality and heterosexuality are *transitional* (the gender of the other subject is more important than, indeed makes possible, the sexual experience between the subjects) then bi-sexuality and pan sexuality are *autonomous* (the quality of the experience is more important than who [which gender...] it is with.)

The Sculptural Field, presented earlier as a quaternity, can also be mapped as a three-way dynamic:

Types of transitional formances (after Krauss)		*between*	*dynamic*
T	*marked sites* (between not-architecture and not- landscape)	a and c	Y - substance
S	• architecture (between not-landscape and architecture)	c and d	X- outer
R	*site construction* (between landscape and not-landscape)	b and c	Z - 'finity'
t	*axiomatic structures* (between not-architecture and architecture)	a and d	Z - in-'finity'
s	*sculpture* (between landscape and architecture)	b and d	Y - structure
r	• landscape (between not-architecture and landscape)	a and b	X - inner
Analogos transitional nodes (r, s, t) and transitional boundaries (R, S, T)			



Epilogue i

The Four Epilogues

The Four Epilogues		
d	rebirth	Epilogue 4: *MetaPassageways:* the substance and the structure (dynamic Y)
c	life	Epilogue 3: *Passageways:* the infinite/finite losses and gains (dynamic Z)
b	death	Epilogue 2: *The Screened Window:* the inner and the outer object (dynamic X)
a	birth	Epilogue 1: *The Closed Door:* the one and the other subject (X-Y-Z Dynamics)
Spengler		**Epilogue themes**
The Dynamics (after Spengler's *The Decline of the West*: birth/death/life/re-birth) (metaBasicParadigm)		

It is often said, after Zen, that, in knowing what can be changed and what cannot, one can decide where to focus: avoid what cannot be changed and focus on what can be changed. But there is a larger question left dangling in this proclamation. It is not always possible to sort out whether something is or is not changeable. Accordingly, should one give it a short try, a dry run, a tentative entry to see if it shows signs of potential revision? Then, and perhaps only then, is one in a better position to decide to back off or to engage in a transformation of the situation. This is a *mini-skirmish* strategy. However, if the timing is off, if it is not yet in sync, then should one focus elsewhere, assuming that 'it' may be in a state of readiness later. Or should one even delay a possible skirmish until the time seems 'right' for even the smallish effort? Or should one risk making a skirmish just to ascertain if the time is 'right'? This is akin to asking, "How do I know if I should spend time and money going to an event until I go to the event to see if it is worth the time and money?" How do I know if I leave before seeing it to the end? Then it's too late to decide to not-go; that option has been effectively eliminated. In life there is no *vitalist* 'undo' to match the *virtual* one free-floating on the computer screen.

If they will not hire me until I acquire some experience and I can't gain some experience until they hire me, then I guess I'll have to volunteer! To *skirmish*, a prototypical metaModernist inter-cultural, inter-active, interdisciplinary practice, is to enter into worlds unknown, to carry the deep structure from back home into a new terrain, and start to dialogue; it initiates a revelation about the back home that is left behind; as well it can stimulate new insights for the others, the indiginous dwellers visited upon, insights of which they had no previously awareness . Border crossing on an epic scale may be no more than a metaphoric ex-tension of that intrinsic border crossing that is proposed throughout this book as the ground of human existence—inner/outer imaging

Post Script

The mapping posited as the normal process in the AnalogosParadigm is that inner imaging is the ground for outer imaging, that inner imaging preceeds manifestation; a less typical process may be that of acting with no pre-conceived inner image, that is, with no particular hypothetical outer image in mind. This orientation of acting without a scenario and hoping that some sort of transcendent guide will be able to keep the journey on track (in the absence of planning), although it often yields unheard of possibilities, is also fraught with the risk of failure. However, more to the point, and to contradict this often misunderstood concept, it must be argued that there is no such thing as a blank mind, a tabla rosa; a pre-conceived set of preferences will emerge even if they are not consciously understood at the outset of any response process. After starting to outer image, supposedly without any inner image in mind, a speaking subject immediately begins to make choices in relation to their inner image desires and values; inner image expectations were, in this case, present after all and, no matter how vague or unconscious, they start to 'click in' when the process gets under way. The inner image predeeded the outer image, even if the former was not formally and consciously set out ahead of time.

There is a long-standing fear of *copying* among art educators; it is based on the notion that a subject's 'creativity' is de-railed if an other's outer image is seen (inner imaged) prior to their act of making their own outer image. The present text outlines the process of inner imaging as a normal initiation to any act of outer imaging, and as such might be seen as advocating copying. This can be countered in three ways: the Analogos outlines *creative imitation* as the norm, not copying; all children, and all new comers to a new culture, all learners, quite normally imitate others (who appear to have mastered the rules) to try-on the new identity. This is the basis of mirroring and modeling. It enlisted Van Gogh to *imitate* the masters in the Louvre; it is the technic/ linguistic life blood of every new infant.

Further, secondly, the inner imaging process as outlined in the Analogos enlists the viewer in an engagement that is of their own construction and even invites them to 'try on' a re-construction of the work to which they are responding. This prepares the way for an outer imaging process that is far from copying. Rather, it sets the stage for a 'creative' performance that comes from a full-fledged engagement, one that necessarily carries the imprint of originality.

Finally, the AnalogosParadigm does not side step this apparent dilemma—this fear that individuals are going to be influenced by what they see or feel or hear. The idea that the avoidance of inner imaging will prevent imitation is suspect. History is saturated with new comers who openly paid homage to their forerunners, their mentors. The concept underlying the readymade and the found object is an endorsement of the same continuity. The obsession with avant-gardism as a modernist driving force may have over-emphasized the demand for originality to the extent that imitation was denied as a legitimate process. Under such a weight, artists can become afraid to admit that their work has antecedents in the work of others.

Technic/Linguistic Mediation

This text leaves somewhat open the transitional world that exists between, on the one hand, an inner image ready to be manifest, and, on the other hand, the completed manifestation of it (or any approximation of it). While the search for an appropriate pedagogy regarding the acquisition of a technic/linguistic repertoire is addressed throughout (and more specifically in Part II as the outer imaging component), it is not spelled out in detail as such. This should not be taken to imply that this process is incidental or that it needs no attention. While a strong inner image desire goes a long way in the process of propelling one forward in the outer imaging process, it does not in and of itself guarantee technic/linguistic 'success'. The Analogos posits that inner image/outer image fluency is the ground; technic/linguistic exercises, while important in training (such as practicing scales on a musical instrument) are nothing if not hollow when the ground is absent. Since there are many sources available detailing technic/linguistic approaches to art-making, Part II herein focuses instead on the *substance (conception/content)* of art making as that which can never be cast aside because it is the ground that makes training worthwhile.

There are many texts describing approaches to assist one in navigating the complex and difficult passageways that lead to a mastery of technic/linguistic skills. Two can be mentioned as encompassing both the basic and extenuated levels of pedagogy. The Analogos endorses Nicolades' approach to drawing in *The Natural way to Draw*; it is a text that encompasses the extremes of art making: by means of *contour* drawing, on the one hand, Nicolades instructs a student to discover the technic/linguistic *through* an intense, slow focus on the referent object; by means of *gesture* drawing, on the other hand, he instructs a student to discover the technic/linguistic *through* a liberated, rapid 'dance' of the body's arm. In both cases the focus is not on the mediation system itself (in isolation from content), but on a way to discover technics/linguistics *as processors, as mediators*. Another text, "the most widely used and highly praised drawing instruction book in the world" (according to the jacket), Edward's *Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain*, offers a collection of similar sound, well-worn mediation approaches. While it *theoretically* ignores what might be termed upper brain/lower brain intra-action (Part I) and focuses exclusively on right brain/left brain incompatibility, the actual basic instructional examples (if not the theory) can be endorsed by the Analogos.

> <soft go thay for hardware…just too see
> too be in tuch with' gainz…too th'rust agenst th grainz
> thay teaze th si.lent tecknics frum a deep and endless sleep
> too feel th sens uv steel upon th flesh
> until th past be.hind th place foregon speaks up foreth'with'
> too make th bann'rz flo
> whare wuns th tuchstone gardens luvd too gro
> and will agen if we stand up for no>
>
> from Horner, <*SincroNis'tee: Reaching I Ching*>, Numb'r 8, ARTS/Trafford Press, 2000

The Analogous renditions set forth in this text are initial interpretations, tentative and open to revision and revitalization. On the other hand, they stand as a ground, diachronically; they represent a terrain, a first case, that can be pruned and nurtured, enriched and elaborated, questioned and critiqued. Readers who have survived all the way to the end, here, and who would like to contribute to a follow-up anthology, offering critiques and/or using the Analogos for further searchings, including curricular developments, are invited to submit potential articles to the author, in care of the publisher. The format is: Word, Times font, size 10; quotes, indented, size 09; single spacing throughout (except between paragraphs); margins, 1 inch on all sides, throughout; footnotes and/or bibliography at the end of each submission; citations in brackets with the page, APA style for the most part, one diskette and one hard copy. (Adobe PageMaker is even better.)

The Analogos is not satisfied with noting that there are four types of this or that; it insists that there is an underground relationship between the four parts—that there is a ground aspect, a structural aspect, an unveiled-content aspect and a meta-content-hindsight aspect—none of which can exist independently; indeed, it is the relationship between them that enables the construction of meaning.

The first important disillusion for all human beings is presumably that of the shock of birth. After the initial illusionment of the aquatic pre-natal period, the passage towards independence in an environment of air and light must carry a certain challenge to overcome. If it is a Cesarean birth, the disllusionment must be of a different kind than that of the passage through the birth canal. And as always, some humans need more illusioning than others and some cannot cope with as much disillusioning as others. There is always the danger of trauma if it is too overwhelming; there is always the danger of the 'spoiled brat syndrome' if it is not provided. Thus there is, from the beginning, illusion tempered by disillusion and the potential for resolution (when a good enough illusion/disillusion dialogue is sustained); and there is also a recurring sense of revelation ('metalluision') as these patterns become learned and accordingly more effectively directed towards that win/win dialectic that was for all of us so necessary for survival in the remote beginnings of infancy.

Appendix A: UFI (Uze'r Frendlee Inglish) Roolz

Th 2 UFI roolz that ar not olredee comm'n practis ar: th use uv th dot (2a) and th sl'r (3)

1. Short Vow'lz

1a. A vow'l iz short when it iz follo.d by a cons'n'nt: *bat, bet, bit, bot, but* (ov'r-roold by 1b, 2g, 2i, 4)
1b. Lett'rz **a**, **e**, **i**, **u** ar short when folo.d by **h**, the **h** being silent: *lamah, bettah, dinnih, ide.uh*;
o iz short when it iz re.plased by **aw**: law (**o** is long when folo.d by **h**; see rool 2g);
th w'rd '*a*' (the indef'n't art'c'l), oltho pro.nounsd **ah,** iz olwayz rit'n az **a**.
1c. A vow'l iz short when folo.d by a dubb'ld cons'n'nt: *baff'l, bett'r, filld, rotting, butt'r*;

2. Long Vow'lz

2a. A vow'l iz long when folo.d by a dot (**.**): *la.tex, be.fore, bi.sexue'l, co.op, cu.tip*;
2b. A vow'l that iz a cap't'lized, sing'l-lett'r w'rd iz a long vow'l: ***A***? (Pard'n?), ***E***! (How scayree!),
I (f'rst pers'n sing.y'l'r). ***O***! (How surpizeing!), ***U*** (th'rd p'rs'n sing.y'l'r or pl'r'l);
2c. A vow'l (aft'r a cons'n'nt) at the end uv a w'rd iz long: *ba (bay), be, bi/by, go, fu (f.yoo)*;
2d. Lett'r **a** folo.d by **y** or **i** iz a long **a**, the **y** or **i** be.ing si.lent: *bay, bail*;
2e. Lett'r **e** when dubb'ld or folo.d by **a** iz a long **e**, the **a** be.ing si.lent: *weed, bead*;
2f. Lett'r **i** re.plased by **y** iz a long **i** (ennee **y** aft'r a cons'n'nt iz a long **i**) *fly* (note rool 5b);
2g. Lett'r **o** folo'd by **h** or **a** iz a long **o**, the **h** or **a** be.ing si.lent: *noh, boat*;
2h. Lett'r **u** folo.d by **e** iz a long **u**, the **e** be.ing si.lent: *fuel*;
2i. A vow'l iz long when folo.d by a cons'n'nt + **e**, the **e** be.ing si.lent: *bate, bete, bite, bote, bute*;

3. Sl'r Vow'lz

3a. A sl'r vow'l, rit'n az a sl'r (**'**), takes th jen'r'l sound uv the **oo** in th w'rd <g**oo**d> (in Canadah), and
iz uzed mainlee too slitelee sep'rate 2 cons'n'nts: *g'd, sh'd; batt'r, bett'r, fidd'l, bott'l, bund'l*;
3b. W'rdz ending with' a cons'n'nt norm'lee culm'nate with' a sl'r sound; this iz nev'r ind'cated (exsept 6e, *with'*), *o.mitt'd, run, bad, net, slab, back, off, gag, baj, oll, on, pop;* (sum cons'n'nts can sumtimez end with'out a sl'r sound: *bar, ol, boss, oz);* spaces be.tween w'rdz folo th same roolz;

4. Vow'l Blendz

4a. Tew vow'lz with' wun sound: **oy, oi**: *boy, boil*;
4b. Tew vow'lz with' wun sound: **ow, ou**: *cow, our*;
4c. Tew lett'rz/vow'lz with' wun sound: **ew, oo**: *chew, boot*;

5. Y az a Vow'l

5a. Lett'r **y** iz sound'd az a vow'l at th be.ginning uv a w'rd: yam, yes, yin, yond'r, yung, y'r;
5b. Lett'r **y** iz sound'd az a vow'l aft'r a dot** or aft'r a vow'l (ov'r roold by 2d and 4a: bay, boy):
sing.y.l'r, be.yond, eey'r (**note rool 2f; a **y** aft'r a cons'n'nt is a long **i** unless a dot sep'rates them; in which case th **y** iz iz sound'd az a vow'l.);

6. Cons'n'nts

Th folo.ing cons'n'nts ar const'nt *(oll uthrz ar const'nt in UFI az thay ar in stand'rd Inglish practis, incllooding **ch**, **sh**, **zj**):*
6a. **c/k/ck**: *cool, kool, kick;*
6b. **j**: *orjee, jeep, Jorj;*
6c. **g**: *go, bag, e.go;*
6d. **th**: (th sl'r vow'l iz slite and iz not ind'cate'd): *th, the/thee, that, this;*
6e. **th'**: (th sl'r vow'l iz strong and iz ind'cate'd): *th'ink, th'ot, with';*
6f. **rrr**: (a roled **r**): *arrround;*
6g. **x**: (blendz with' its pre-vow'l: ex=ecks): *ax, exit, mix, box, lux (faxe, leex, mixe, bloxe, duxe)*;
6h. **q**: (a short form for: c.yoo, ck.yoo, k.yoo, c.yew. ck.yew, k.yew): *qt = ck.yewt = cute = k.yoot;*
6i. **(n)**: (nayz'l **n**) <liason> (French for link) = *leeayzo(n);* (ennee nayz'l/sl'rd cons'n'nt iz brck't'd).

UFI vow'lz roolz	**a**	**e**	**i**	**o**	**u**
1a	bat	bet	bit	bot	but
1b	Lamah, a	betteh	dinnih	law	i.de.ah
1c	baff`l	bett`r	filld	rotting	butt`r
2a	la.tex	be.fore	bi.sexu'l	co.op	cu.tip
2b.	A?	E!	I	O!	U
2c	ba (bay)	be	bi (by)	go	fu (f.yoo)
2d	bay, bail				
2e		weed, bead			
2f			fly		
2g				fohr (4), foal	
2h					fuel
2i	bate	bete	bite	bote	bute

UFI syntax

1. Sum w'rdz can be spelld more than wun way, de.pending on the intensh'n uv th rite'r; too make it ezee'r for read'rz uv Inglish, spell w'rdz as close too stand'rd Inglish practis az poss'b'l; too rite in code or too t'rn away or frustrate read'rz, uze th most unexpect'd spellingz poss'b'l, and/or s'rch out w'rdz that ar not spelld vayree fonnet'clee in stand'rd Inglish: *no = noh, shoot = shewt, bo.t = boht = boat, air = ayr = are, bikes = bixe.*

2. Contracksh'nz (ind'cated by a hyfun) can be uzed for fine tuneing speech soundz: *sheez = she-z (she iz), thay'r = thay'-r (thay ar)*; sum contracksh'nz cannot be hyf'nated: *arnt (ar not), do.nt (do not), wuz'nt (wuz not), shee'd (she w'd).*

3. More than wun rool can be uzed at th same time: *eff'rt = ef'rt, ol = oll, apostr'fee = apostr'fe, sedee = seedee.* Sumtimez 2 roolz ov'rlaap: *nedee* (the f'rst **e** iz rend'rd long by th sec'nd **e** {rool 2i}which iz syl'nt until th th'rd **e** rend'rz it long {rool 2c}), *nedee = needee.*

4. A backslash (\) can be uzed (inside a w'rd) too ind'cate the end uv an acksent'd sil'b'l; a cap't'l lett'r (inside a w'rd) can be uzed to ind'cate th be.ginning uv an acksent'd sil'b'l: *back\slash, disTribute.*

5. An apostr'fee mark aft'r th fine'l **s** or **z** uv a w'rd ind'cates a sing.y'l'r po.zessiv;
   a dubb'l apostr'fee mark ind'cates a pl'r'l po.zessiv:
   a dogz' pawz = th pawz uv a dog;
   2 dogz" paws = th pawz uv 2 dogz.

6. W'rdz or fraze's rit'n in stand'rd Inglish (or anothr langwaje) can be ins'rt'd in a UFI passaje be.tween tyg marks: *I see with' my <eyes> clozed* (th re.v'rs iz olso pos'b'l: *I see with my <ize> closed.)*

7. W'rds can be speld incap't'l lett'rz too express strong e.mohsh'n: *HURRY!*

8. Sing'l-lett'r and sing'l-numb'r shortcut w'rdz inclood: *B (<be, bee>), C (<see, sea>), J (<jay>), P (<pea, pee>), Q (<cue>), R (<are>), T (<tea, tee>); 1 (<won>), 2 (<too, to>), 4 (<for>).*

Appendix B

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4. Activator's view of the student's (s') anticipated/actualized achievement, self-efficacy, self-evaluation...

3. Activator's view of the student's (students') immediate, short term instructions for action...


2. Activator's view of the student's (students') long term needs, wishes, plans...

1. Activator's view of the student's (students') motivation, desires, expectations, issues...

Teacher's/Activator's Version of the Student's

- ☐ (c) Performance Scenario (before)
- ☐ (a) Performance Outcomes (after)

ORCHESTRATING AN ART EVENT (The Student's Perspective)



8. Activator's anticipated/actualized retroactivation, hindsight, evaluation, revisions...

7. Activator's precise short term pedagogical instruction for student/class action...


6. Activator's curriculum, long-term plan...

5. Activator's motivation, desires, expectations, issues...

Teacher's/Activator's

- ☐ (b) Pedagogical Scenario (before)
- ☐ (d) Pedagogical Outcomes (after)

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The Subject of Art in Process

Undressing the Emperor's Nude Close

Stanley Horner


The Subject of Art in Process not only sets out to construct a new visual-based paradigm, one that attempts to address the vast array of complexities facing today's artists, but perhaps, more importantly, it opens the door to a possible Renewed Art Education. Territorial specializists of Modernism are more and more being joined by Border-crossing multi-practitioners of MetaModernism. Whereas DBAE (Discipline Based Art Education) endorsed the Modernist preoccupation with discrete domains of knowledge and a top-down hierarchy that focused more on the 'subject matter' than on the 'subject agent', the Analogos proposes an intra/interactive, interdisciplinary option for the opening of the new Millennium. IIAE (InterActive InterDisciplinary Art Education) is grounded in the practice of inner image/outer image fluency of individual subjects engaged as members in a community of voices, as activators, inter-activators and retro-activators, and, in particular, selfTeachers (intra-activators), in a community of voices that share both disciplinary and interDisciplinary knowledge.

The Subject of Art in Process introduces the *Analogos paradigm* and *syntagm* into the public domain for the first time. It is a construct designed to assist (especially sensory–based) mulit-practitioners in the process of lucid and layered thinking; hopefully, it can facilitate users to better understanding the complexities of event-processes. While semiotics generally ignores the 'subject', the Analogos foregrounds it as basic to all intra-active and inter-active dialogue. While structuralism generally ignores the diachronic (temporal process), the Analogos foregrounds it and integrates it into the problematic of the synchronic, the domain of timeless stasis.

The text also introduces into the public domain, if ever so slightly, the use of UFI (Uze'r Frendlee Inglish), a new notation system that is capable of carrying aspects of the vocal sounds of the speaker along with the meanings already possible when writing standard English. UFI introduces only two rules that are completely new: a dot after a vowel indicates that it carries a long vowel sound (that is, a-e-i-o-u as they are spoken when saying the alphabet); a slur or short-short vowel (written as an apostrophe, mostly inside a word) is pronounce like the 'oo' in the word 'good' (in Canada). All the other basic 'roolz' are already in common usage by readers and writers of English; these are included in the Appendix—written in UFI.

Both inventions carry the seeds of innovation, and, as such, will no doubt face resistance. The Analogos is offered as an open proposal and interested readers are invited to join in a dialogue to further explore its potential; UFI is used herein only in a few more or less poetic, metaphoric instances—where it can add a read-aloud sound aura; the new look of words can also add multi-layers of meaning. Advocates of UFI and/or the Analogos will find both fully developed in my *Sincro.Nis'tee: Reaching <I Ching>*, a presentation of 64 original verses and works of art set in parallel status with the 64 sites of the I Ching. A manuel for UFI is in preparation.

Stanley Horner, formerly a Professor of Studio and Art Education at Concordia University, Canada, grew up in the remote Upper Ottawa Valley; he currently resides with his wife in Victoria, BC, where he works with traditional and high tech visual media, music and text.



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