
VOLUME 3 NUMBER 1

SEPTEMBER 1974

ART-LANGUAGE

DRAFT FOR AN ANTI- TEXTBOOK

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Price £1.00 UK, \$4.00 USA

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ART-LANGUAGE

Published by Art & Language Press
13 Milverton Crescent
Leamington Spa
Warwickshire
England

All enquiries in North America to
250 Bowery
New York City
New York 10012
USA

All other retail enquiries to 13 Milverton Crescent,
Leamington Spa, Warwickshire, England.

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1. CAUTION

We made transcripts of conversations we had in New York during May, June and July 1974. Transformations from 'talk' to 'prose' are, to some extent, dialogically cosmetic.

If you think that we are 'searching the world' for methodology and 'mirrors of our minds' at arm's length, you're wrong: explicit subject-focus is marginal to the problematicness of our situation. The lacuna separating a 'searching...etc.' and a possibility of radical theory...this shows the power of grammatical expedient to enforce the persistence of subject-specificity. If you consider the de re modalities of our situation, such persistence is at best accidental, at worst illusory.

For this and other accidents and illusions, read on.

2. SOMEWHERE TO BEGIN

Can I speak of two people having the same points of reference? —Not the same, but shared, and not necessarily in the same way. The show we had in Florence is a shared reference, but we share it in different ways. But it's nothing at all unless it is constituted in (as) a relationship by an individual. —'Sharing' is perhaps a pointless dubbing... implying some half-lit world of 'public objects', however...

This might be logical claptrap, but you call the Florence show a 'point of reference', not a 'presupposition'...but the relationships I construct to the show I would say are some of my presuppositions... I mean presupposition in a pragmatic sense...and we get into a real wiring diagram here. A context of a blurt is a 'sum' of relevant points of reference, as well as presuppositions, of that blurt...or discourse...obviously you have presuppositions which are not relevant at a given time. A point of reference, pace Montague, Scott and a lot of others, for this conversation might be 'the Bowery', which could very well index into the conversation, but an assumption of mine would be that, as a point of reference, it isn't relevant to this particular conversation...that's a judgement on interpretation...if an alien being had to deal with this particular surface of our language, would 'the Bowery' help him understand? I don't think it would.

If, reading these transcripts, someone tried to (re)construct our references, they would be involved in the same fictions we are, and they would be off-base if they came up with a static, compartmentalized subject-matter; nor do we depend on a rigid a priori subject-matter. It seems to me that you either accept some sort of social compartmentalization, or you resist by living in the kind of uproar that we have... We're not part of the knowledge production industry because there is a certain sort of rationale in having such an enterprise which doesn't match with living in the corpse of Official Culture (New York) in 1974. And, anyway, that enterprise presupposes market requirements we have difficulty meeting... Consistency, exhaustiveness and simplicity have been called the canons of empirical enquiry... must I be in a madhouse then, since I have none of these?

—Talking to each other has to do with the relationships it's possible for you to set up between people...and to do with being frustrated by present concepts of exchanges between people. This is important because what's contingent on such relationships is the way 'knowledge' is produced —and especially the way learning takes place; part of what we are trying to do here is break up the regimentation of structures which makes some people 'experts', some 'learners', and subject-syllabuses can be protected.

Part of the internalized pandemonium of the work articulated since

around mid-1972 has to do with how we map and map onto each other... hence blurting.... One of our problems... it may turn out to be an advantage... is that we can't separate the 'knowledge' from the 'noise' ... the knowledge industry tries to exclude noise, but I'm interested in the noise, it's just about all I've got. I get to a point where I start imagining it's all noise...

You've got to watch making too much of a 'knowledge/noise' dichotomy, it sounds as if we're trapped in the dichotomy and we're not... the academic is involved in refining and administrating the knowledge to the exclusion of the noise —but isn't he making an 'arbitrary' decision in the first place? What I'm dealing with is something like my noise, your noise, his noise, which relates respectively to points of reference ... it's the difference between noises, not the difference between message and noise. It's a problem of contexts... of messages expressed in one context and (over)heard in another... if I talk to you, the noise in the first place might be psychological —but, in the broadest sense of contexts, noise relates (somehow) to culture and society. What is noise in contrast to message except some sort of interference from context? —the noise is context, and I'm interested here in getting at that context since then I might be able to construct a passage from surface (blurting) to a depth, and that way get some sort of... however frail... inroads into our languaging/culture.

Aspects of what I'm doing seem to be getting at some of my socio-cultural presuppositions, of a particular group of people (us) at a particular time and circumstance. Obviously this sort of search is embedded in a lot of things, in our language, languagedness... which is why I have to talk about presuppositions. —You mustn't give the impression that, whatever we do, we're always in a position to 'have a look at' our presuppositions... because we're not. There is nothing special about our reflexivity, it's just part of talking to each other ... analysis is no use, the activity is (simply) part of conversational habit, it's a feature of 'normal' conversation that I ask questions.

There's no way you can 'surface' presuppositions, what you get is just another surface. Presuppositions in themselves are not context ... nor points of reference; together they constitute a kind of pragmatic context... everything that's in your head when you walk into the room which is possibly recallable... Getting at context is controversial when you try for it by listening to a person's reports on his context —but that's the only way of getting at context isn't it? —perhaps it's got to do with a person's notion of interpretation... something to do with intending something.

A context is not separable from a person nor from what the person intends —it's not something you can just abstract and analyse, it's not something abstracted from a person making his points of reference accessible to you. You don't want to talk about 'sets of presuppositions'

and persons as if they are separate things, as if they have nothing to do with each other...this is all to say that context is more to do with what you are than what you are in.

3. LANGUAGE HAS A HOLD ON US

When I talk about my language... idiology seems to be interesting since it suggests a relation between idiolect and ideology... idiolect being an individual's languaging at a particular time (... 'language within language'). These might be as arbitrary for me as anything else, but are what I've got... all I've got for tackling my 'culture'.

Something as blik-like as 'an A&L ideology' shouldn't be seen as independent of our effect on 'the culture' —to get a purchase on it you have to encounter it, there's no way of standing off and getting, anthropologically, an overview. It is pragmatized. You encounter it under these particular circumstances and it may be thought of as such-and-such... although you form a picture from your encounter, it's not a 'true' picture because there is no such thing. You can't overlook the actual process of encounter... a point of praxis... it is providing me with existential possibilities, it's not abstract, not a grand argument. 'In the culture' has something to do with personal choosing and deciding amongst competing possibilities —which is one reason for stressing these contexts... and one of our points seems to have been to disrupt habit —how advanced!—even our own, or particularly our own, and so in fact create more conditions for choice and deliberation.

Obviously this kind of view... an indeterminacy of pragmatics... has drastic consequences for our thinking. It's opposed to the model where you can get an overview, the anthropological purchase on the whole situation... it's relativized and a lot of what follows keeps coming back to pragmatics.

There are no 'results' or 'conclusions', at least as they occur in the positivist tradition... this expectation is closely related to that of overview, the gamut of after-the-event pictures or facts. Any halting place can be seen as arbitrary, you end up not with 'results' but more starting points.

This might exist anomalously within our habitual conceptual schemes ('art'... etc.) —that's obviously why it might be telling —it's not trying to be primitive or presystematic or crap like that, better to say we are at a collapsed stage... trying to start someplace... though 'collapsed' might lead you to think that prior to this time we really did have it all sorted out.

Mapping all this might be important, critical to our chatter... mapping the difference between someone saying to me 'Is this art?' and, on the other hand, saying 'I have this concept of art, how does my concept map onto yours?'

There are habitual socio-cultural canons, 'bodies of knowledge', static subject-matter, how the cultural world (natural world?) is

compartmentalized in (not only) Capitalist Society. There is also ideology in the sense of your unique individual praxis, what you do; there's also maybe your idiology, what you can constitute when you take your own languaging as focus. OK, now what I want to bring out are the mappings, abrasions, impingements, to all of these...the abrasions (etc.) may be the only 'real' aspects of our language we can deal with...it's an area where advantage is blunted by confusion —turn it to advantage— I want to take advantage of the shifting, the confusedness, the pandemonium...which seems as good a place as any to begin.

We won't get far by looking 'within': you've got to get away from saying 'I don't have anything objective or rational, so, gee-whiz, I must have something subjective and personal'...a philosophical dead horse. I'm saying, I don't have a lot which is objective and rational, but I do have something pragmatic, underdetermined, and it's 'individual' in this sense...what I've got are my own experiences, my language, my culture and these are my points of reference, what I've got to go on, build on, etc. My points of reference coincide with some of yours...hence you shouldn't simply see ideology and this thing about pragmatics as competing but more to do with ways of sorting out references...I don't have an ideology separate from particular circumstances, I don't have anything which always says 'the world would be better if everybody did this' —But I think there are fragments, splinters of metaphysical systems, like Marxism say, which get in...and some of this is mappable onto a given situation, so there are circumstances where I can suggest that if we do this here and now, it will improve things for some people. This just points to the defeasibility of some of this stuff.

Is the way we want to go on conversational, dialogical, argumentational, in the Perelman sense? —It is opposed to analytic/descriptive nullities. One of my a priori's seems to be this sociality, that I'm starting with a dialogical situation and staying with it...this kind of starting point escapes most people.

Are we trying to be external observers on ourselves? —Shit no! this isn't just talking about talking...it's very complicated, I have something to say right here and now...yes, which is defeasible, and that's part of it too.

Perelman's stuff might be accountable as descriptive...from 'inside' language (?)...but models, the sorts of things we have looked at over the past year, are different —they are about leaving aspects out in order to concentrate on the selected aspects...and obviously 'true' models are beside the point. But it does come up in some queer ways. What I understand of Montague is not that he is offering a world-view of language, all he came up with was a way of describing a fragment, a tiny fragment, of the English language —and for which it required

such unbelievable machinery that there's no way you can simply say, OK, we have it for a fragment, we can now build it for the whole language. To build it for the 'whole language' you would end up with a piece of machinery as big as or bigger than the language...like Lewis Carroll's map being the same size as the country. From a practical view, the machinery rejected the notion of completeness —all it could do was be relativized to this piece of language, or that piece, and so on. It denies completeness, and it might be useful.

Idiology and language? —Language is elusive and God knows with idiology? If I accept the idea of idiology, then it's about how I get through tomorrow, ideology, in the Metaphysics sense, is about the rest of your life conceived as a formality. So idiology shouldn't be taken merely as a given, something you supposedly have no choice over, you do have some choice in the sense that you can say you won't read any more Capitalist 'running-dog' philosophy, and that is going to affect markedly your outlook, your idiology, your idiolect ...your cosmology.

4. MARKET RELATIONS?

We've claimed the work doesn't comfortably admit overviews...but are we ignoring the sorts of overviews tacitly accepted in various institutional solicitations...galleries and museums, collectors, grants, trendy journals, and so on. How do others handle it? Various linguists have been dickering around in a self-defeating effort to produce natural-language 'speaking' automata —or Kasher receives research money under a Rome (Texas) Air Development Center Contract to help develop formal pragmatics...is it clear they are being selective about when, where, and how they will call themselves to account for their commitments? —scientists, like Ziman for example, play up just how socially embedded the scientific enterprise is, but they still hold out for the 'core' of it being somehow 'above' ideological problems...automata theory and Defence Department money are no mere coincidence. —But these are the easy examples, the CIA knows that dissent is necessary so it pays for just enough to prevent confrontation...this goes under the heading of intellectual freedom of course...these are the insidious examples.

The sorts of projects that get financed reflect the special interests of a government —and there's the International Program of the MOMA and how the U.S. Government's interest in special 'spheres of influence' are indicative of where the travelling exhibitions go.

Technology has 'changed the world'...how can they claim that it's neutral? —What about philosophy? —There was something in the New Left Review a couple of years ago about trying to sort out Wittgenstein's political views by looking through all his writings and letters, talking to his friends, and so on...but they couldn't discover any political attitude...philosophy leaving the world as it is...and that frightens me a bit. —OK, so it frightens you, but can we say more than what's almost trivial. Can we say that the West has driven a tyrannical wedge between theory and practice...

The point of Kasher's research being underwritten by the Airforce... at least with the Pentagon's interest in artificial languages they have their theory and practice sorted out. What's the difference between that situation and us accepting money from the government? —Not much...but the point is that Kasher, like us, is accountable in the end. It's not simply a question of, as Chomsky suggested in For Reasons of State, what you ultimately do with it...that's standard liberal self-justification. —It's the riddle of whether you can get the Tzar to pay for his own downfall...the State's a monolith and we're all swept along with it including Leftist 'revolutionaries'...

Maybe all you can do is try to get as much self-consciousness into what kind of scheme or program you are being fitted into...and which views you as financeable. You're not innocent (simply-doing-your-

job) or neutral...the foundation of the bourgeois ethic...you have to realize you're in a morally loaded situation all the time, with your language etc. etc., and coming to this realization is half the struggle. And let's not kid about with our class situation either, we are part of the bourgeoisie too.

I have some idea of my commitments in the economic web...it's a constant state of near-paralysis, not knowing what's going on, of there being no possibility of abstract, idealist 'morality' but knowing you've got to play the game the best you can. I get back to the suggestion that, simply because we offer sets of (ideological) postulates, it doesn't necessarily follow that we're offering ourselves as a well formed set...quantifying over ourselves...it's trying to conduct a dialogue on the possibility of ideology, to break through official language —language devised so as to prevent us from really saying anything. —It's also a matter of realizing the dilemmas are not just resolvable...rationalizable...that the answer has to be to work with them...working with them might dissolve them, not resolve them, or defuse them, not refute them; I don't know...I know something of the blindness enculturation brings on, —but obviously not everything is clear —I know enough not to accept a grant from a White House Plumbers Fund, some things are that clear.

The point made here seems to be that, faced with these existential conditions, we don't compromise we improvise —this is Leninism—we can't afford and we can't not afford to play by the rules of the game...repression functions on us by its voracity to subsume...

5. APODICTIC TABLEAUX

One account of context is provided by current pragmatics (e.g. Helmut Schnelle 'Language Communication with Children' in Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Reidel, 1971.

Whenever a speaker x produces a noise of shape p at some time t , then —given the context type i — he may be taken to utter thereby a well-formed expression q (of language L), and —depending on the properties of well-formedness $SD(q)$ and the given context type j — he may be taken thereby to express a speech act complex s , comprising

- (a) a propositional content (including reference, predication, quantifying, modalizing, causally connecting, etc.),
 - (b) the implicates of the propositional content,
 - (c) the communicative force he intends to establish over a communicative relation between him, the addressee(s), the audience, etc.,
 - (d) the signalization of his choice of communicative effectivity ($ugh!$) r (including indication of topic, focus, presupposition, and other more typically rhetoric factors) appropriate to the given communicative situation and context j ,
- where j = what the speaker sees, knows, etc., what he assumes his audience knows, etc.

The implication is that from descriptions such as this you could generate models of communicative acts such that phonetic, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features would be clearly displayed, allowing theories about the relations between levels (here p , q , r , s , and t in i , j), etc. Models of many communicative acts: speaking, writing, 'body language', ritual performance, making art (sic).

Notice the language used here...it's bureaucratic. People don't talk, people execute 'communicative acts', an abstract process, separated from particular persons...The point is there is a conventional academic way of presenting arguments which makes them much more positivistic than they really are (part of the general strategy of keeping power in a given domain)...that's the whole problem with academics...you put your ideas across in a way where, if you're not certain, you ought to pretend you're certain...and here you get into a funny kind of Weltanschauung: that Lockean 'to know and be certain is the same thing' and this leads, in an inexorable way, to the reduction of the field of knowledge and an increase of 'certainty'. In other words, you get the Cartesian rejection of uncertainty, there's no epistemology that allows for uncertainty, defeasibility, and so you retreat into narrower but less refutable areas of activity... now what A&L has done is start by going into a wider and more refutable position...and here we get the origin of the whole 'wilful pandemonium' talk...and so the 'logical' connection between meaning and certainty is rejected, i.e., foundationism is defeated because it depends on maintaining this connection between your ground and

what you say...like when Carnap pointed out that any concrete statement may serve as a protocol or basic statement...that started the rot.

Anyway, our descriptions are not meant to stand as 'what the case actually is'...you can only get a so-called 'take' on the situation from a particular view and there are multiple 'takes'...the models used here are abrasive, that is, they are cast against 'our world' to see how they fit, but the aim isn't to get a perfect fit, not-fitting is just as revealing.

The notion behind a program like Schnelle's is basically to do with making a model language, a very simple one, one which answers certain needs and only those needs and can't deal with anything else. Contrast this to Montague's tendency to suspend his machinery somewhere 'in the middle' and not know how it's suspended and not worry too much about it...a bit like that notion of the 'now' where, if you think of time as a series of points, then you really worry about where the start is, and where the finish is but, on the other hand, if you take the 'now' and realize that's the point of reference, then you don't particularly worry that you might have an infinite number of points that you are suspended from and also into the future...the point is that you don't worry about it, you don't try and get a whole picture or overview of 'time'.

What's worrying too about Schnelle is he said it's impossible to give an account of a fully developed language because the person who gave that account would have to be the complete encyclopedist, to get to know about every possible aspect of the language...so a full account could be given by the complete encyclopedist...but the point is this is crap because language is dynamic, not static...you can get a synchronic picture but not a diachronic one and here we have the overview thing again you see.

The problem is dealing with any restricted language like the one Schnelle says adults use when they talk to children —Well, his argument is that people use a reduced version of their normal language when speaking to kids and that works...the question is how does this relate to the fully developed language? —It's a bit like falling over yourself to talk to people in the art world...how does that 'restricted' or reduced language related to the natural language...but what's this OED concept of language —yeah, again it's apart from people, considered in the bureaucratic sense.

We are not restricted in the sense that the way we go on is a sub-species...full blooded natural language minus its limbs. And anyway, what OED fucker gets to say what natural language is. Then there are some idiotic questions...pace Searle...can you choose, in speaking, not to perform a speech act (ugh, ugh!) of the institution

bound sort? What is happening when you utter a sentence which you intend to stand as refuting the necessitous quality of (what might be) its own description? Is that an impossibility? I've just uttered one and my dictionary didn't self-destruct.

If Searle says you can't choose not to perform a speech act of an institution bound sort, then it tells you a hell of a lot about him. He has the argument that language is based on rules, proceeds according to these rules...all these rules are given in the institutions of language, and every speech act you can perform relates to the previous ones...every speech act is an institutional performance. His sense of institutional is, in other words, reformist...you can extend the institutions, but that's all.

I can't help feeling that this all has to do with some of us worrying too much about silly books, and some of us worrying too much about exorcising silly books...

Anyway, given that Searle was an exact time and place contemporary of the 'free speech movement' at Berkeley, Speech Acts looks even more silly. We know something of his overt political views from his The Campus War...there's an instinctive conservatism, you know, the kind that sees Left opinions as 'political' in contrast to their own just plain opinions — even worse than Harold Wilson labelling some strikes 'political'. Searle exemplifies the ideology of academic philosophy...he devotes page after page to arguing the 'logical' necessity of students being 'seen but not heard' during lectures. In his 'theory of the university' argumentation and dialogue occurs primarily between 'teachers' who may extend it to 'students' if they feel like it, and on their own terms. This makes a joke of learning...education becomes a matter of his priestly strutting.

6. IDEAL SPEAKERS...

The concept of an 'ideal speaker' is basic to most theories of language, but I have a hard time in even imagining what one would be like. If you were an ideal speaker and I was an ideal hearer — sounds like a track from a musical— would you even need illocution and perlocution, or would your locution be enough? —You would still need them probably. I find it hilarious to picture a world full of ideal speakers and hearers... Jesus... Rescher probably relies most on the notion with his 'every assertor is a rational assertor' and, 'if an assertor asserts x, and x entails y, then he is also asserting y'. That's not just an ideal speaker, it's also an ideal assertion: not just a rational world, but everyone in it is rational.

The trouble with a lot of this stuff isn't just that it's wrong —right or wrong, who knows— but that much of it is relentlessly square, middle-class, and sometimes downright silly.

But assumptions like ideal speakers have tremendous force for everything you might do. It's like the 'commitment' to, say, a strict Roman Catholic 'form of life': if you accept the Credo, then certain problems will arise but they can't be fundamental, and a machinery for sorting them out is given a priori. Something like an absolutist credo would seem to give you the psychological credo to doubt dramatically —precisely because you have guaranteed yourself release from the problematicity of doubting radically. Refusing such a credo might make it seem you are in the situation of 'having an opportunity' for radical doubt (?)...but it's stronger than that: you are in such doubt necessarily. It becomes a life or death matter, it has to do with how you live your life —you refuse to live it in a deadly way.

I don't know, this all sounds like waffle to me...you're giving the impression that we're somehow better off because we don't belong to any clubs, which to me sounds like a perfect prescription for bourgeois 'intellectuals'.

Yeah...the problem is that the idea of the ideal obviously assumes a neutral position; so, what we're left with is something being 'ideal' from this vantage point, or that vantage point, but never just simply 'ideal'. —If you say there is such and such an event and we can create 'ideal conditions' for looking at that event, much like a laboratory-controlled environment, what then are we idealizing? —We would assume that implicit in such a program is the hope that its designers can get a simple ideal model to 'work', they can then work toward making it less ideal and more real. That's roughly how Searle approaches utterances. And also Apostel, with that illocutionary stuff...he started off with Rescher's ideal assertor (or rational assertor), added some irrational aspects, and then modalized it from various needs. It's an odd approach, that somehow we are all

'ideal beneath the surface' —It's probably even more pernicious than that... while it's possible to use that methodology under some conditions, it seems questionable to use it to sort out aspects of how people use language.

One of our presuppositions which has collapsed is the one underwriting the scientific method... can you imagine, an A&L controlled environment! —Well, we don't even have a graspable dividing line between what we think our 'environment' is, and the rest of (what we think) our world is. Again, it's not that we are at the other end of the spectrum, but it's a different spectrum —a different conceptual frame. That's the issue with 'it fits where it touches' —more often it misfits even where it touches...

Pragmatics isn't an approach where you start from an ideal set-up and then put it out in the world —willy-nilly— in order to 'pragmatize' it. —Montague probably went as far as anyone in respect to formalizing pragmatics, but, you can still say all Montague did was give a slightly pragmatized semantic framework... which might say a lot about semantics. It's the hope about being consistently pragmatic that's lunatic... it's like the hope of being consistently irrational... it's fine to deal with, say, a fragment of English, but if you do that then you also have to deal with a fragment of English speakers/hearers, in other words with a particular group of people. That's how pragmatics screws-up grand semantic systems.

There is no way of providing a practical non-intuitive procedure for deciding, irrespective of context, any semantic matters, e.g., whether a given statement is analytic or synthetic. This is the problem with a dictionary —it can't handle extra-linguistic context —meaning must be completely determined by reading a sentence. Wouldn't any theory of natural language which claims to disambiguate sentences using extra-linguistic pragmatic setting be obliged to represent every item of information about the world?

You can't have an A&L 'uncontrolled' environment any more than you can have a controlled one. Here again we are coming up against the grammatical expedient enforcing division of knowledge that we really want to resist.

7. ANNOTATIONS...SELECTIVE MEMORY (HISTRIONICS?)...

Some of the more recent notions about languaged environments come partly from the Annotations (February, May 1973) — which was in a way a mechanism set up to generate some 'shared' environment... to language a social problem...and socialize a languaging situation. Any thought about the viability of a 'controlled' environment was explicitly exposed in the Annotations...there was no laboratory controlled experiment, all there was was some sense of social (group) obligation. Again it was a problem of not being able to distinguish 'message' from 'noise' — the 'languaged environment' really being more an 'arena for noise'...we found ourselves in a position of realizing points of view where anomalies are no longer anomalies...the potentials of confusion...living with the difficulties...and how seemingly contradictory notions were no longer excludable.

What you consider to be 'anomalous' has to do with how you choose to produce your knowledge. If you choose the model of the possessive individual you are faced with more 'consistency' problems... which is what we are trying to get away from here...

There was the possibility of continuing the work as a kind of 'classroom activity'...as soon as you put forward your certainty into a social context, you have to admit the possibility of contradictory arguments coming up...

We seemed to grant that we shared with each other at least a substantial part of the languages we used...the machinery of exchanging commentaries was built on that assumption...it probably was an over-estimation...the stylized, formal 'public' aspects of it exposed its fragility...

I'm not talking about the prospect of substantial agreement because of 'shared' language. Rather, the stylistic parameters tended to dictate at least the appearance of substantial disagreement, or grudging agreement — there was an effort to work against the unificatory tendency of 'group exchange'...

The notion here of an ideal annotator would be rather comical. He would not only know his own language perfectly, but also be committed to the belief that all the other annotators knew their own languages perfectly and that they shared at least appropriate parts of them with him and each other...he would mean exactly what he writes (says) ...he wouldn't lie or arse about, ask rhetorical questions, fake an answer, pretend to knowledge he didn't have...when reading an annotation (hearing) he would understand perfectly what is written — he wouldn't misunderstand, misinterpret, miss the point or mistrust the writer...as both speaker and hearer he knows the rules of the exchange thoroughly, grasps fully the contexts of each utterance, etc.

Moreover, he knows that he is ideal and that the other annotators are too... finally, he knows that he knows he is ideal etc.

Practically, we constructed a finite (?) multivocal 'stream of languaging' in which 'confusion' was not only apparent but wilful. A way of (partially) formalizing the advantages, the sociality, of informal conversations. The Annotation 'experiment' was constructed around this rule: A set of blurts or fragments of written discourse were produced and an extended series of commentaries or annotations were written (blurted) deriving from these —this resulted in a variety of possible pairings or concatenations of these blurts, the same blurt often existing in different sequences or pathway strings —and generally the surface exhibiting various branchings, intuited implicative relations, ambiguous/contradictory/incompatible sequences and so on. The edifice was a sort of topological picture, for that time, of the eight individuals participating and some realization of the role of context(s)...pragmatics —Each week we were faced with new annotations from everyone else. Swapping bits of paper like this counted against having much level of intensionality you could deal with...there wasn't even any biographical stuff...you didn't have someone talking, you only had a scrap of paper to look at, make what you can of it. This was funny, and it's probably closer to 'stimulus-response' than we would now care to admit. Could we say that the clusterings or sequences or strings represent some sort of epistemic preoccupation? Could we topicalize these? —we would need something like sets of topics, given the difficulties of cross-identifying a topic or list?

The Annotations were a mess...in many different ways...especially some of the social problems which came up and have come up since. Moreover, we didn't have many resources for catching/mapping the indexicality of these operations...any of the idiolect stuff, it was only a surface...

Harold wondered why we used such a mechanistic specification...did we have any more than that; did we have any more overtly teleological motivations —some of us did —the context of the Annotations, the learning/encounter 'experience' was a lot more interesting than the pile of paper we ended up with...we needed ways of indexing...

The endeavor was partly a consequence of needing to include, as part of the activity, more references to context...since the activity was idiolectic you needed to be able to index that. We projected a conversational model: there's that remark you made about conversation being relational (thesauric...surface relational or thematic relational) more often than definitional (lexicographical)...and that's where the maligned notion of doing a thesaurus came up...

One way of looking at the Annotations was that it was a way of 'organizing' people. And once you had that you could permit and encourage

types of 'disorder' —sorting out the relationships between people was basic...but you needed some social frame to begin with.

There were some attempts to work against the unificatory 'code' of socializing —vestiges of the hit-parade and our careers. What interested me about the Annotations was the 'uproar'...but it was difficult to make that public —we still haven't sorted that problem out very well. Then there was the business of trying to suppress some of the uproar, of one of us saying 'no, you can't write down just anything' —it wasn't a dynamic liberal environment, but anyway this just increased the uproar.

Much of what we've done since has presupposed that potential, starting at points where goals, methods, are already (arbitrarily) decided upon, about...if you make a decision, what it commits you to, rather than about the context of trying to make that decision...so the Annotations were basic —in a funny sort of way.

8. CACOPHONOUS...

Our actual competence preconditions contrast sharply with 'the ideal'. An ideal speaker would be fully aware of the meaning relations between sentences in his well-formed language and so on — e.g., when assertion p entails assertion q he knows this is the case and is able to draw the appropriate conclusion from his being committed to grant assertion p is true, viz. that he is also committed to granting assertion q is true. On the other hand, anyone can find sequences of assertions in every annotation and daily chatter which reveal behaviour contrary to this rule and are still acceptable...

But for Christ's sake, who cares... why don't you just accept the ideological stance as bizarre, and put up with it...

You have a logically-ideal world versus the pragmatic circumstances of my life-dimensions... how can we make this remark seem less than trivial, how can we make it seem that we're not just opposing formalism to our 'freedom' — can we look more closely at the models of individuals that both these things presuppose?

We're looking it seems for an example: take 'contrary behaviour'... there was an instance in the Annotations where Michael advanced simultaneously two incompatible 'part theories' of translation, and you said they were mutually incompatible. What circumstances do you need to say contradiction is OK? — The point is we do contradict ourselves, you can say something now and in five minutes contradict it and I probably wouldn't worry about it... and why? — because the circumstances are changed. Now that would be acceptable but there are other circumstances where it would not be acceptable. If you want to more or less simultaneously contradict yourself, what sort of pragmatically-accessible conditions would you have to set up in order for it to be publically acceptable? Obviously you would have to give some linguistic or extra-linguistic clues to the effect that you were going to contradict yourself deliberately — saying 'Here are two contradictory but equally persuasive theories of translation which will underscore the indeterminacy of translation' You've got to embed your remark, give us some clues...

Yeah... but the point is we do have contradictions because of our pandemoniac situation in the world... 'ideally', of course, contradiction is not allowed. If you admit contradiction you have to admit everything in the world which might seem daft but I don't think so... talking about life-dimensions isn't trivial... because if you admit contradiction then you have to find other parameters to make 'sense' of your situation — maybe look at indexing 'time' — but here you have a good example of being dependent on pragmatics...

But that still doesn't tell me much about why it's OK to contradict

yourself sometimes and not others —well, we don't have any clear ideas here about entailment...we know about the logics industry's problems with a strictly logical sense of entailment, and entailment in a pragmatic sense is beyond all hope of formalizing. —But, we do have some notion of what happens if we simply overlook a contradiction, it's brought to our notice because it affects our argument —and there is a model of individuals acting in the world implicit in this too...a second possibility is when we wilfully refuse to obey the law of no-contradiction...but how does that jibe with pragmatic entailment? —If I say 'I'm now going home but I'm not going home', with typical conversational or social 'good faith' anyone who knew me would probably interpret that I intend different references for each use of 'home'...the first to imply 250 Bowery, the second to imply Geelong. But we're getting fucked up here, the point is that generally the concepts of 'contrariness' and of 'incompatibility' are logical concepts —and what you've called 'contrary behaviour' is likely to derive from one of two things: one, that in this particular instance you refuse to accept what the contradiction logically commits you to; or, two, you refuse to accept the whole logical framework...the first is still within the logical framework, the second rejects the framework per se. —Clearly, the second questions the use of a logically-ordered world...

You don't just reject logical frameworks off-hand...there are reasons...contrary behaviour can be seen to have a lot to do with sociality, that we do exist in a dialogical situation, where different things keep coming up all the time —so that what you say is always coming up in a constantly shifting context. We're faced with our life-conditions in a Kierkegaardian sense, so that we do talk to each other, we do mean...and that's what we start from, not from 'the individual'.

That sort of lets us lose the logicality...you can have contrary behaviour in the same 'world' or occurring in different worlds...the difference between being illogical in a logical world and being illogical in an illogical world —the iteration dissolving itself into action?

I don't know, but obviously it's not so easy. There are huge abysses between our intentions and achievements...I am rapaciously conditioned all the time, I often find myself trapped in ideological stances which I know to be bizarre, but can't struggle out from under. Writing-off rationalism doesn't easily give me any alternative ways of going-on. Painstaking resistance may give me glimpses of options, but there is a danger of fiddling with the intractable, of ending up pursuing a policy of nicely calculated dithering...if I weren't so ratshit about it, so frustrated, so anxious, if you like. —Come on, your ulcer isn't much of a criterion of your 'authenticity'. Surely the point is that your (our) ontological geography is peculiar: these 'worlds' start to sound like entities, and externally observable ones at that. —Is this what Michael called 'criticistic', i. e., projecting a 'world' through a dubbing ('logical', 'illogical')?

9. BUREAUCRACY...

Do I look at my language as deviant? Does trying to learn from our 'deviances', our 'peculiarity' imply trying to learn how our deviances are deviances —do we have to know what we are deviating from?

Deviation is simply the way we differ from a bureaucracy. It's a problem of what is accepted as a 'standard'. Now John Searle might know, but I for sure don't —though we're tediously familiar with what Searle might think is 'standard'. So it becomes a question of our commitment, do we accept their status quo or do we look at it and see how we map onto it?

But isn't it just a ground against which we deviate, a sounding board for intuitions? It's not a ground but it's a surface...the problem with talking about deviances is that it isn't very dialectical...it's value-laden and hierarchically weighted, it implies authority...

Isn't that basically what pragmatics means to us? I'm complaining about the bureaucratic implications inherent in the concept of deviance...or, if you like, the world model that we have. Is there a relativised sense of deviance? —So that a deviates from b just as b deviates from a? —Doesn't that sound queer...it shouldn't.

That's interesting...but it might be taking it too strongly; it might be denuding our language to a point where we can't say anything. —Culturally, deviance might make a lot of sense. Any art being made in Kuala Lumpur which has been directly influenced by New York art we would call a deviant art form...and that's a way of getting at the provincialism question —the provincialism question, it is really just a question of bureaucracy...'internationalism' being the most deadly bureaucracy of them all...

But language —that's another question; the characterization of English is what the Queen speaks! All standard English is then a socially privileged idiolect (of one person)...and that's about as arbitrary as you can get.

Even...or first of all, language is made into a bureaucracy...to presuppose my language is a deviant form of official language is to degrade my language, make it unreal, separate it from me...

If we are stuck with pragmatics, then we have a kind of anarchistic device to bust up 'standards' since we ourselves are our strongest points of reference —but they are not our only point of reference, there are others...standards do exist, and this is a mapping problem...that's the point in looking at indexicality in a broad cultural sense...

10. POINTS OF ORDER?

The government and economists use the statistical fiction 'the average American' in the course of sorting their data so as to provide grounds for determining policy... a consequence being the general self-assertion of the 'average man'; and philosophers use, actually seriously use, the notion of a consistently rational assertor (or, in moments of vagueness, 'a reasonable man') in addressing problems about how things are... there's a funny merging of the 'ideal' with the 'average' in the quantified... statistical world of megalomania...

Chomsky's 'ideal speaker-listener in a completely homogenous speech-community' whose 'performance is a direct reflection of his competence' is clearly self-serving — it enables him to give an account of a community precisely without the problems which he sets out to account for.

Any notion of rationality which doesn't take account of specific human abilities and limitations of attention, memory and conceptualization has nothing to say about rationality. There's a trick here, the idealization sneaks back in, the implication that all of 'us humans' (at least the rational among us) have similar abilities, limitations of attention, etc.

Well, can the notion of rationality possibly be pragmatized? Or has it to remain general? — Unless you want to have it specific to each and every 'communicative situation' (Perelman's idea that all concrete audiences have their own presumption about a universal audience — this precisely doesn't give you a universal audience in any sense separable from the projections of a particular group)... rationality then becomes the internal rationale of a conversation. You can say that it's rational to walk down the stairs and not jump out of the window — but I can imagine circumstances where it's more rational to jump out the window... so then look at a remark like it's more rational to do paintings than do this sort of work and then look at the century we are living in.

'Rational' is the ideology of the status quo... we feel uncomfortable with things that 'don't fit', that's the way things are set up and this is astonishing — What I'm talking about is that a shift to doing things that (wilfully) don't fit is not a prelude to getting better fits, but a kind of heuristic for being self-conscious. So there is that stuff about encouraging anomalies because they are learning-points... it's where we take seriously the notion of failures — A&L as a 'history of failures' — I think we are confronted with... unbelievably... having to re-invent ways of failing, having lost our conceivability to genuinely fail — which is presumably different than just faring poorly — And I don't need a theory of failure, only a few rules of thumb, ad hoc suggestions... if professionalism is knowing how to succeed, then forget about it...

Finally, you have particular circumstances and particular persons' 'interests' —only here you have a dangling notion of 'interest'... things aren't naturally interesting, there's a sense in which I construct my own interests and a sense in which you (etc.) construct them for me —this goes without saying really...

So I'm comfortable with the notion of blurting... 'throwing things out into a social/cultural context', or, not truth, cry Ruth...

It's a question of whether I can even use the notion of rationality... that's also the trouble with irrationality, it assumes you have a concept of what it is to be rational...this also comes up with uncertainty, excepting that you might be able to make it clear that any notion of certainty is also uncertain...you don't start from certainty and uncover what is uncertain, you start with uncertainty (and probably stay with it)...it's a linguistic and existential problem, and outside of any simple dichotomy —at best, certainty could be a subset or special case of uncertainty...

11. NO REFUGE IN 'AUDIENCE' ...

Presumably we are involved in constructing something which may have certain (fragmentary) generalizable potential. It's a bit like what Ian said: 'sometimes I feel like an artist' ... well, sometimes some of this stuff might map onto what certain people think art is.

There's a problem with talking about the blik 'art' without saying 'I have this notion of art, how does mine map or impinge onto yours?'. Then you seem to be moving the question onto a dialogical level...

If you suddenly start talking about the possibility of an art language/ideology (whatever that is), then you are contradicting to a degree the development of a pragmatics. That is, you have an institutional ideology conflicting with an ideology/ideology interface ... which is interesting. All an art language/ideology could possibly mean is that my problems, if they are at all interesting, are (may be) generalizable. But then what's generalizable is not always the same, a relation between me and somebody else depends on who that somebody is ... if he is part of my references. This is where all the concepts of abstract 'audiences' fall apart.

I haven't come through all this to suddenly say 'OK, how does all this relate to art?'. There's a less daft perspective: we have certain problems because of our histories etc. — when we generalize, in other words look at the projectability of our chat, then part of that generalization... an art language would come into... but that's only part of (or a restriction on) the generalization. It's not a matter of a total correspondence being, naively, to something called 'art' ... it's a matter of finding these various correspondences to be problematic (and interesting), it's a matter of realizing this and seeing the way it maps onto the 'history of art' as being problematic and wilfully so. Most of what has gone on in art recently seems importantly to do with job preservation ... artists, critics, dealers, historians, et al...

What happens if I assume that everyone has membership in a set of audiences ranging from very general to very specific communities? If I assume that how I act as a speaker/hearer will, in some significant sense, be a function of the values, beliefs, rules, habits, etc. of my membership set(s) ... presumably you could then go on and talk about 'an artworld' because you're putting yourself in a descriptive position, you're trying for a sociological overview and there's a lot of doubt whether that will help us at all. If you go on about 'members of the art-world', you're talking sociologically... you assume that you can get a purchase on things by describing people in roles. Of course roles exist, — they are part of, generally speaking, our ideology, our customs. — But I'm interested in the abrasion... how does the notion of roles relate to ideology, to ideology? — roles are, at this time, a fundamental part of our socio-cultural organization; talking

about 'members of the art-world' is talking about people in roles... or rather, it's talking about roles independent of people... when I talk about the revisability of our language/culture, I'm talking about using (maybe?) our ideologies to get at the language/culture. We have (I think) a little more than just social organization...

A reason this 'membership' stuff comes up is that one of the ways somebody like Apostel tries to get a clearer picture of context — pragmatic context — of any speaker (given particular situations) is by trying to construct a speaker's membership sets ... which might be one way to start. Membership notions (role projecting) at least get us away from the idea that the art-world (say) is defined by one product, usually art-works ... that's saying awfully little...

But then — how does the somewhat happy institutional sorting out of people into various membership sets match with Sartre's mauvaise foi or 'insincerity' ... role-playing being a form of insincerity. Apostel is confirming our social structure which (of course) relies on people being in (and staying in) roles ... bourgeois ethic again... it's good when I can get someone to fix the air conditioner, bad for the 'enemy' we drop bombs on. Now we're trying to screw out from being merely role categorized... good Germans. Role culture exists of course and part of going on pandemoniacally is to try to foul it up, in a sense provoke revisability... it's possible... but then isn't it a funny way of doing philosophy of language?

Can we talk our way out of it? We tried for a long time to make some sense of Apostel's stuff about audience... Philip and Dave used it in their Studio article, but I couldn't make any sense of it there either ... constructing audience in this way is constructing it in abstraction. My notion of audience is, crudely, when I'm talking, you guys are listening — and that's the place to start, it seems to me. So you write differently for the Journal of Philosophy than for Artforum... is that really saying anything about 'the audiences' or is it saying something about your presuppositions about those audiences? — and the organization of academic bureaucracies? Now I read the Journal of Philosophy... sometimes... as much as I read Artforum and what does this do to the membership-set picture?

If we take the Perelman notion of audience, it doesn't seem to me to imply an abstract sense of audience at all... we get back again to that notion of encounter... you have to encounter your audience and proceed from there; you can generalize from this encounter but not from some 'whole picture' of what your audience is. Anything else seems to be a conservative and institutional notion of audience, membership sets seem to be confirmations of the status quo.

OK, you've got the encounter situation... but it doesn't follow you no longer have encultured roles... it means rather that both contexts

are working (on you), — usually against each other. — But you've got to take encounter as the basis of dialogue...it speaks of...inter-subjectivity, not of audiences — encounter with the personal, not the impersonal. If I have a concept (presupposition) of audience, then I must have some notion of excluding people...but I don't...you can't foreclose on the possibility of generalizability.

What happens if I go over to John Weber's and spend all the time in there thinking about Barry McKenzie? — how would Apostel characterize me? — what happens if I'm thinking about him (Apostel)? It's just the daft notion that now you're part of this audience, then that audience, and so on...it's mechanistic. It's got to do with getting tickets — they should hand out tickets, then we could say 'Ah, so we have this many audience'. I'm reminded of things like Haacke's sociology questionnaires...so many of the audience comes from New Jersey; some are under twenty-one...how interesting.

These notions of audience are a consequence of having a (presupposed) notion of speaker (etc.)...why not start with a speaker, me, and then ask how do I conceive of (my) audience? — what comes up are the kinds of presuppositions I have about who I think I'm talking to...and that comes up in a concrete sense. — But Apostel's saying that, in all cases, if you communicate you're following the formal characteristics to do with membership sets...some stunning set theory. He seems to be comfortable in 'objectifying' or impersonalizing the problem, but you've got to see this against the notion of encounter...and what are the consequences?

I doubt how objectifiable a notion of encounter is...it's lived and personal...so how do I go on about generalizations? But it seems more a case of how encounter (the actual) is set against the membership notions.... We're mapping up against the institutions and we're saying how does ideology rub with this. Having a pragmatized notion of encounter doesn't imply that roles no longer exist...that would be plainly unreal...

Sure there are some rigid role compartmentalizations... 'it's not my job, man'...this is why the organization, the messing about with the organization of people, is so important to us...I think.... You can mess up the expected roles, because your life-dimensions have a personal focus, and Apostel's notions of audience leave out any focus: you've got a set of sets but you don't have you in it — it's a theoretical audience. — And this doesn't mean we don't have any concepts of role-playing audiences, we do; we are trying to say it's highly problematic... and that includes the idea that, if what I say interests me, then it will interest somebody else (though I mightn't know...).

Assume all this chatter is published. People will probably read it and different things will interest different people for different reasons

(maybe). Publishing this assumes a potential of generalizing, bits may interest people who might be called 'members of the art-world' but the same and/or other bits may interest other people... that's all I want (and that's a lot)... it's not constructible set-theoretically, or it's misleading if it is, but it's encounterable.

Can't we get away from naive notions (presuppositions) about audiences; what would it tell me to know that 437 people will read this stuff?

Formalized notions of audience reflect the way this society is organized and bureaucratized... it has to do with assumptions like there is a 'philosophy audience', and an 'art audience', etc., and these can be further broken down into subsets — I think that's pretty funny — but it's how we're encultured to think and act. But we can't live with stuff like that... so I don't have a concrete picture to replace the one I dislike, so what, — we have plenty of 'negative heuristics'.

If I want deal with it, then I want to find out about what some of (say) Mel's presuppositions about audience would be, for his 'public blurting', perhaps (a bit simple-mindedly) trying to project an index of those presuppositions... this would tell me more about his notion of audience in a given circumstance than the above constructions. It seems you do that... or forget about it altogether... you don't fantasize in sociological 'insights'.

12. 'SOMETIMES I FEEL LIKE AN ARTIST...'

To bring up an analogy between a speaker's blurting and his audience and an artist's artworks and his audience is to labour a point we've been making for several years: the relation between language 'in general' and 'languages of art'. —But I feel as though we've said, to put it mildly, plenty about this, even though what we've had to say hasn't been particularly brilliant...

The stress on the languagedness of things isn't reductivist, that is, there is no attempt to reduce 'art' to language (whatever that means) —you mean it has nothing to do with a naive correspondence theory— yeah... just the necessity of having some tool (language) which enabled us to deal explicitly with context —it's that point about language being interesting because of the 'noise' it makes rather than the 'messages' it conveys...

Now, in the early work, when we did a lot of talking about nonsense like 'theoretical art', or the possibility of such an art, there was a dialectical relation with other art... art history. That's to say, faced with all the going possibilities of extending art morphologically, we tried to extend it in a way which was dialectical... it involved a 'higher order' comment on the position previously achieved. This is Hegelian... in modern Syntactics and Semantics higher-order comment would be called a meta-language...

Bochner, in that PR thing on Malevich in Artforum, has the notion of a correspondence theory, that what he calls the 'ideal conceptual work' narrows the gap from experience to linguistic transference (?)... the notion that you can translate the art object, without remainder, into an art-language. Arguing against this he seems to suggest that when faced with a painting, what's interesting is what's unsayable. We've all read the Tractatus, but the trouble with this point is if you use it as a unique individuating feature of art. That is, it seems to me to be equally a characteristic of all things you may want to contemplate, including language, daily discourse, etc. So it's not as if what Bochner says is wrong, but that here it is trivially true... and even more than that, it continues the myth that art alone is supposed to be the only place that Western Man can tolerate being face-to face with mystery as meaningful...

A number of things come up now: the relationship between what you do 'out there' in the world to 'yourself'... the relation this has to the Marxist notion 'you are what you do'... can I conceive of verbal language having a different relationship to myself than non-verbal 'language'?

The person who sees himself as an artist and only an artist... is he a different sort of 'communicator' than the person who thinks he is an artist some of the time... what does this mean, is it bullshit?

Is the primary interest still dialogical? Is it still concerned with talk? —Don't we suddenly get into this tacky area where there are questions like 'are we artists?', 'why are we using language?'... Suddenly I'm doing art-criticism, suddenly I'm not stumbling along with my own problems and reference points anymore, suddenly I'm 'above it' all and going on about membership crap like artists and artworks...

The earlier work was an attempt to explicitly articulate an interpretive framework rather than work along with the interpretive framework already given. Now it follows that all sorts of things then became subject to articulation. It became newly problematic that things were put in galleries and, in my mind, it still is...and this shouldn't be seen as a puristic or merely a 'moral' move...

A note on the genesis of the work: the 'negative' function of a lot of the old work can't be seen as in any way able to account for the complexity of some of the stuff now. Now also, language was seen, or so it seems in retrospect, to have a higher effectiveness, ideological power, in the culture 'in general' than non-verbal 'language'. It is about not being coerced...about, simply, efficacy. Now you've then got, if I keep historicizing like this, questions like, why was one more efficacious than the other? Well, one answer would be that if you made objects then they went 'in' the going conventions... you didn't have any choice...it's a bit like the people in the old Art Worker's Coalition, painting ten foot square canvases, yet moaning about the galleries. They didn't see that the canvases were radically contingent on that gallery structure —they had no real choice...

What we do becomes a question of people familiarizing themselves with a context of enquiry; an historical, ethical, ideological problematic (in the Althusserian sense of 'framework')...people have got to stop seeing art as capable of simple-minded ontological reduction...there is a problem, therefore, with talking of A&L 'works'...they can't be understood—Or, not understanding is understanding...if understanding is any sort of inquisitive as opposed to appreciative condition?

I'm not too sure about the 'problematic' notion. Can everybody understand real problems in the real world...are we a privileged set?

The notion of an ideal speaker is ridiculous in the philosophy of language. There are certain models of art, articulated most often by Greenberg, but in fact generally held, that are based on an odd notion of an 'ideal' artist. Such idealizations can proceed classically: the 'best' parts are pieced together. Thus Greenberg. Or, in less confident moments, it proceeds desperately: any parts are pieced together...so long as they seem to keep the artist/critic ahead of the game...even just for a while. Thus Pincus-Witten et al.

Here I get involved in logical impossibilities and pragmatic absurdities...as a kind of way of making an abstraction. What's the stuff of these idealizations, for example? You can't lie, cheat, fudge, obfuscate anymore. People begin to take themselves seriously and start believing their own PR. The idealizations are made up from little bits of trivia —allowing, generously, that to be the Husserlian sense of 'trivia'...facts of the Lebenswelt... Yeah, but the idealizations are made up from a hotch-podge of rules of thumb, private fantasies, professional cunning, slogans from Artforum etc. etc. and this turned into an image of (capital A) Art!

People are actually caught up in this mind-controlling bureaucracy...that's what the idealization does, it makes art into a bureaucracy.

But this idealization is something that can also function as a negative heuristic for us. Criticism is based on the 'overhearing' model — one of the ways most art is happily conventional is that it has an unproblematic notion of audience...i.e., it presupposes an audience. There's a problem, if you go on about membership, dealing with any problematic audience and then you get down to the ludicrous point of having millions of sets with only one member in each —that's the absurdum audience...but the point seems to get home...

When the Weber show was on here some guy wandered up and said to me 'This derives from Bar-Hillel's notions of indexicality, doesn't it?' — In Apostel's membership sets, there wouldn't be too many people in this guy's set...

Apostel makes a distinction between being a member of an audience you are actually part of and being a member of an audience you think you are part of —can you believe it! Presumably I would be in the latter category for art...but it's amazing how it's all articulated in an institutional sense...as if it isn't legitimate to have problems that 'a philosopher' has, unless of course you are a philosopher. But this is the status quo's watchdog...middle-class, respectability...James Collins and people like that —boring fuckers.

Goodman talks a bit about 'a community of problems': the Duck-Rabbit picture can be found in Wittgenstein, in Psychology...none of our problems are confined to 'art'...but —Christ, that gets us into the tacky area of what the administrators of 'our' knowledge call 'interdisciplinary problems'...gasp...and most of the people who go on about this are appalling...Koestler might be one of the more interesting? After saying it's wrong to divide the world up into specializations, they simply sketch out a holistic, seamless garment picture...

It isn't just reification in terms of artworks that's the problem, it's the whole blik with 'art', 'artwork', 'artist', 'critic' and so on...

though the clearest case is that privileged object of goggle-eyed contemplation, the art-object. This culture is founded on role-reification...and the point is we're not above it, we're in it as well, it being a matter of not reducing our self-consciousness about it.

What does the reification look like? 'The artworld' is a highly stressed rhetorical situation in which roles are contingently related to constantly shifting sets of audience values, procedures etc. The artist is the prime-mover, the artwork the life blood, the critic the catalyst, the dealer the distributor, the audience the lapping-it-up fodder of glorious 'art'...

I mean this model of the closed image of the artworld as a natural order where everybody has a role which fits together as in an interconnected organism is half our problem...it's what we're up against. It's easy to create another, more sinister picture: where the dealer is related to the stockbroker and the artist is related to the peddler...

I find stuff like 'constantly shifting sets of audience values' absolutely hair-raising. A relationship like 'interlocking' seems to imply that there are natural relationships here. Starting from pragmatics, which is yourself and which is also 'subjective' you've got to watch 'criticism'...you can't take these relationships as natural...there I get to reification again...like the notion of a deviant...you're presupposing some sort of ground from what you deviate...there isn't any neutral mapping.

The notion of impingement, I'm not sure about it. What I say now I can say impinges on what you said just before, whereas you might not think it does at all. So what use is impingement as a mapping —It gives us some idea how complex the mapping's got to be...from my reference point it impinges, from your's it may not, there's no 'natural' impingement...it's according to a particular projection system. So what we're doing here might impinge...ironically... on New York Modern Art adventurism? It's difficult to get descriptive about impingement since it is obviously something that is defined operationally, experienced, learnt from but that doesn't merely 'exist' in a natural way...

So you can't start from bliks like 'artist', 'artwork' and so on. I hope it isn't reductivist to say that we ought to start from interchange, or, people acting as rhetors in roles...

I don't think there's anywhere where you 'start'...you start in the middle, anywhere, not from 'foundations', not from a tabula rasa, but in a mess.

Waffling on like this is, if made public, going to have a kind of institutional force...whether we want it or not...whether I like it

or not, is going to be 'fit' into certain a priori notions of art and this is where a notion of mapping comes into it...I can have a relationship to the institution, it can be talked about as an impingement...this is our problem just like it's everyone else's, — and it depends on just how problematic we can make that mapping. And I'll continue to worry about it. You can deal with this in a couple of ways...in England they've said 'we don't care' but you can also take some responsibility...if it's possible to, it may not be...and this is also where notions of opportunism get hard to swallow. Perhaps we can try to deal with, at least for a start, why things are different, and even that things are different, not why they are similar (family resemblances, etc.) ...saying why we think we may not be institutionalized.

13. INSTITUTIONAL SERENITY

A popular approach (Searle) to a theory of speech acts is this:

'In performing a speech-act a speaker characteristically performs at least three interrelated acts:

- (i) utters words (morphemes, sentences), i. e. performs utterance acts,
- (ii) refers and predicates, i. e. performs propositional acts. (These first two divide Austin's category 'locutionary acts'.)
- (iii) states, asserts, questions, commands, promises, describes, requests, etc., i. e. performs illocutionary acts,

Somewhat differently, from an audience viewpoint, a fourth:

- (iv) has a certain effect on his audience, i. e. performs perlocutionary acts.

Each of these has appropriate kinds of indicators of force and of (intended) effect, with the exception of propositional acts which have indicators of content.

As well, there are various rules governing the relations between speaker, speech act, hearer, and their relations to pre-conditions, to contexts, to the given (institutional) meanings of the language elements and structures used, etc.'

So what can I say in a general vein about why I don't like this approach, why it bugs me? It's the sort of structure being opted for... you start with little bits and try to work out to the context; but in doing that context is pretty much left dangling everywhere. The abstracting methodology you use means that pragmatics is not where you start but what you try to add as an after-thought... like trying to explain existence by talking about the necessity of breathing at least every so often.

How, in remarks like this, do I mean pragmatics? Taking the above 'theory' to task amounts to criticizing it for basically (deliberately) omitting the difficulties arising out of context. Talking about communication, where else can you start but with (actual) context(s)? — Moreover, communication suggesting, not that I just want to get together with people and talk, ourselves, whoever — but that I might have something to say which sustains priority over just talking for the sake of talking. I'm faced with a situation where there are no a priori significances, I'm faced with everything and the problem of improvising some significances for myself, from what are my references (my history, life, etc.). — But it still does have something to do with getting together with people, with a social 'surface', doesn't it? — But that's not likely an end... socializing serves a purpose but isn't the purpose. Not in my experiences, anyway. — To me, pragmatics has something to do with that sort of viewpoint. It isn't (can't be) a matter of merely 'there is communication, let's look at it' but rather I communicate. You read the above 'theory' and you don't get much

impression of people talking/communicating, but a lot about cogs, gears, and bits of machines. — You also don't get any sense of people learning (no matter what you think that is), that there are such purposes to people talking sometimes.

But also, if Searle really thinks that the first three things listed above are actually separate acts, he's got to be crazy...if you refer to something, then your uttering is a separate act to the referring?

Take context...the 'theory of speech acts' gets at contexts through a notion of rules: a set of constitutive rules establish the possibility of an activity as well as the ways of changing it, other rules regulate it. Together these rules specify not only the activity itself but its appropriate contexts. Thus '...speaking a language is performing acts according to rules... the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a conventionalized realization of a series of sets of underlying rules, and speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules'. You are then able to express such rules in the form (e.g.) 'X counts as Y in context C'. Context then amounts to the circumstances under which X counts as Y — or, you might have expected, the preconditions which need to be satisfied before X may count as Y. But no, appropriate context is merely the absolutely minimal amount of appropriate 'institutional facts' — pseudo-Occamite 'adequacy' disgraces any prospect of a broader sense of context.

The picture of the world that this implies is, crudely, something like this: speech-acts are entirely rule-governed forms of behavior; motor-body acts are likewise; as are desires, etc.; all thinking is rule-governed; natural processes are law-regulated; interaction between these is similarly rule-based; and everything else in this or any other possible world will eventually be able to be shown to be behaving according to rules of the kind already given. Of course, it's not stimulus-response behaviorism. And of course, much liberal chatter may be heard about the enormous 'freedoms' which these rules 'sanction' and 'encourage'. The monomaniac scientism is obvious enough.

You wonder what you are dealing with ... there can't be any 'natural' a priori significant features which can be taken for granted... significance is a matter of a life-situation or something as banal as 'point of view'. Context isn't something 'out there', distinguishable from the utterance...you can't hang your hat on it...it's how the utterance occurred, how it exists. And taking a notion like 'art context', it's even hairier...

In other words, to separate art and culture, art and ideology, one needs a particular theory of society...like the one which sees art as a depository of 'civilized' platitudes, which teaches the artist to see

'other people's business' as irrelevant...and this is the way most of us have been educated since age ten: the frozen syllabus.

It's not enough to say that our 'linguistic institutions' are enough to interpret our utterances...yes, they are important, they may be what we share in a 'language sense'...but take the conversation we are having now, a precondition for it is a conversation we had yesterday...that's not institutionalized, nor can it be...nor will it have the same force tomorrow. This is why knowing about the institutions of our language(s) doesn't say much about our actual talking. Our talking is constitutive, and our presuppositions are unpredictable.

The relationship between context and audience...if this conversation presupposes the one we had yesterday, how does that come out in this conversation? — Whatever stance you have will suggest which indices or points of reference you encounter or need to encounter, won't it? I can't give every possible reference for every possible hearer/reader, so I end up singling out on the basis, I suppose, of my presuppositions about the sorts of people likely to read this...and although I might be embarrassed to defend those presuppositions...but the important thing is that I don't or can't assume there is a specifiable minimum amount of such a frame of reference. Even redundancy isn't a given, but it also is a matter of a point of view. I suppose the idea that you can have a minimum is tied in with some idea about an ideal minimum. In respect to what we are trying to do here, we aren't just providing a surface but (read this metaphorically) we are trying to build into that surface particular sets (points) of reference which may provide 'perspectives' on that surface.

Before you can set up rules, I've got to assume that you must have principles of some sort...these, if you like, would derive from certain rather strong beliefs or presuppositions. To say that a particular program was successful implies that it satisfies the rules, not the principles. Now what would be regarded as methodologically 'radical' is someone who challenges the rules, but not especially the principles...since someone doing that would find themselves in an indeterminate world and essentially out of a job: they would find themselves sympathetic to the sort of situation we've found ourselves in recently. — So far there has been very little epistemology which allows for indeterminacy. The classical notion of knowledge is equated with certainty...if you're not certain it isn't knowledge...Cartesian dualism...and basically we are still coming out of the arse-end of all that. So when I carry on about indeterminism, uncertainty, pandemonium, and so on, stuff which is meant to bring the questions closer to sociality, then you can see how frail is the whole shibboleth of certainty (knowledge). This is why our 'butting up' against Searle and others brings out more incompatibilities and incommensurabilities than straight forward contradictions.

Indeterminacy isn't something which can just be shelved — and there is something sinister about any specious incorporation of it as a special rule. I have to reject Quine's remark about a system as a man-made fabric, which impinges on experience only along the edges... it seems harmless enough, but I really want to say that it impinges on indeterminacy along the edges, — and that's the rub, the absurdity of the remark. From a rationalist stance, it would likely be said that I end up with nothing — whereas I want to say that I definitely end up with something, perhaps a world intact (?).

Would not a completely (?) formalized pragmatics of natural language be a vacuous ambition? — what would a completely formalized pragmatics be? — There are several ways of looking at it: firstly, the notion of 'completely formalized' and the notion of 'pragmatics' are incompatible and therefore you have a vacuous expression; or secondly, assuming a concept of pragmatics, then what you could mean by 'completely formalized' would be a formalized fragment or aspect. The second interpretation allows a lot of good faith, particularly around the word 'completely'. Obviously such a fragment would be interesting. — What people like Apostel, Montague et al. generally say is that they want to present an account of 'a formal pragmatics', what does that mean? — it suggests they want their abstractions to count for concrete acts of formalizing bits of a pragmatics, that's the basis of 'points of reference' which we tend to be using a lot... it has to be called a pragmatic concept. — Stalnaker makes a claim that although his paper gives informal presentation, the subject pragmatics can be developed in a relatively straight forward way as a formal pragmatics no less rigorous than present-day logical syntax and semantics...huh! — That's pretty ambiguous, we all know the abject failure of present-day semantics and the tentativeness of logical syntax...it's a bit hard to say what he means, though you might have strong suspicions that there's some 'grand scheme' lurking behind a remark like that — but philosophy, logic and linguistics have had a long tradition of 'grand schemers' and habits die hard.

14. A 'LOGIC' OF GOING-ON?

Can any sense be made out of a 'logic of pandemonium', a 'logic of non-consistency', even a 'logic of dada' in articulating a 'logic (or grammar) of going-on?' Is the expression 'a logic of pandemonium' a contradiction?

If you can have an aleatoric logic you can have a logic of pandemonium...logics aren't just what logicians do, but as much about things like...walking down the street...

The only logic or grammar which is real to me is a 'local grammar'...or, you can call it a 'contextual grammar'...

Are we talking about a formalization of pandemonium? —it wouldn't be ontological, but it would be a linguistic formalization...almost like a set of (incompatible?) articulations...a rhetorical stage-setting...

But reflecting on the pandemonium —would we be reflecting pandemoniacally or rationally on the pandemonium? —it's not a 'criticistic' reflective situation...if you step back it's lost...

Going-on has Markovian elements...a nightmare of induction... when each event is exclusively determined by the preceding event... and a structure is determinable only in each pair or concatenation? —That's too linear, as if we do one thing at a time. But also, at any given time there are uncountable possibilities for what to do next, one of which looks, retrospectively, as if it were completely determined by and the only possible determination of what preceded it —Like looking at a baby: you can't picture how it will grow, but looking back at the baby pictures, it looks unquestionably like the adult...

Think of how historicism reconstructs a sequence of 'revolutionary' events. You commit an error in assuming the preconditions of a revolution could only have one 'inevitable' result...the one we know. This prediction after the event is unjustified —the revolutionary situation will be found to be fraught with many conflicting possibilities and the one which finally unfolds is often the one least anticipated. Only the historicistic fanatic will insist that it was inevitable. In the pre-revolutionary stage, you wouldn't be too certain that the status quo had broken down...except for yourself...this bears on Kuhn's paradigm-shift stuff...with the qualification of moving from an old paradigm without moving to a new one. There are advantages in retaining this state rather than 'completing' the revolution...thus 'wilful pandemonium'...you are in that position by choice, and you stay there by choice...

15. DO WE HAVE ANYTHING LIKE 'ASSERTION'?

Can the concept of assertion inform the stuff about blurting? What do we mean by blurting? —Is it just a dubbing? It seems to be the most inclusive notion, including grunts to 'profundity', to include everything...but in particular not to give preference to nice neat 'rational' remarks...it shouldn't be seen as emphasizing unreflexive remarks either...these are no more or less interesting than anything else. You can't say they are 'better' because they are unreflected upon...or that they capture 'intuitions' better...in a sense it's 'getting it all out' to form the social situation...

Assertion...how isolable is it? It's obviously embedded and confused with so many other activities. One thing I'm interested in is the sorts of commitment that might hold between persons and what they say/do...

This is allied, not with 'argumentation' or 'communication', but with a sense of sociality...

If Mel asserts something, then he appears to be accepting some sort of obligation toward what he has said; on the other hand, if there is no commitment on Mel's part I would say he didn't assert, he uttered...

Assertion isn't a necessary condition of each step in a dialogical exchange. I am taking 'communication' to be dialogical. There are particular social connotations to 'dialogical' which are more easily swallowed than 'communication'.

Assertion is usually thought of as an overt act, a biographical transaction, it occurs at a certain time and place, under particular circumstances...one major element of which is that a hearer or audience is presupposed. Nonsensical assertions can be admitted but not vacuous ones —mere utterances (I assume) may be vacuous...though I'm not clear how...but every assertion is type-cast with a meaning of some sort and an effect of some kind.

Could you have a vacuous assertion? If I said 'Pass the Zeppelin please Terry' ... is this vacuous? It's easy to imagine circumstances where it's meaningful...if Terry was looking at some old photographs and one of them was a Zeppelin...

If I came along to one of our talks and all I did was continually grunt and not say anything, you wouldn't say that was vacuous; you would have enough 'context' in respect to me to know it wasn't just laryngitis but that I was really trying to say something. —'Would you kindly mind asserting vacuously?'...can any sort of utterance be vacuous? I don't know...it seems that aspects of the 'good faith' that underpin social situations would rule out vacuity...even

if it seemed vacuous wouldn't you still give it the benefit of the doubt? If I came along and just went 'Huh! Huh! Huh!...' the whole time, it would still be indexible —just as someone who said nothing... though there are many ways of 'saying' nothing.

Researching again and again...

An axiomatized argumentation logic (Apostel-Rescher) could begin like this: (1) For every assertor x there is at least one statement p , i. e., $[(x) (\exists p) Axp]$; (2) Every assertor denies at least one proposition, i. e., $[(x) (\exists p) Ax(-p)]$; (3) Every assertor argues, i. e., every assertor asserts, for at least one pair of statements, p and q , that every assertor who asserts p ought to assert q ...and so on —through axioms of contradiction and excluded middles. —Postulates like these seem more concerned to set the lowest limits, rather than the parameters of assertion or argumentation... they also seem to have a lot to do with us being haunted by silly books...

Take 'every assertor denies at least one proposition' —we might toss out the 'every' as unrealistic. Inevitably, if you assert for long enough you will eventually assert the denial of a proposition. —What would you do about someone who decided on the strategy of scrupulously avoiding argument with anyone for the duration of a particular conversation? —Introduce 'tacit denial'?...for every assertion there must be something denied by asserting it...or, silence suggests acquiescence and acquiescence suggests not agreeing with something else...oh, Jesus...

In conversation you do not have a strict logical mode of negation, but some weaker or conditional mode. The way we produce stuff is conversational...the way 'knowledge' is produced...if I avoid 'absolute' assertions, I can't have absolute negations...in a dialogical situation, do I logically negate at all...you see we keep coming back to how this logic stuff presupposes a particular, possessive model of an individual! —OK, but do I logically negate? Don't I withdraw my commitment to an assertion, rather than contradict my commitment to it? Don't I have disputation in a dialectical sense and not negation? And all in a setting of particular circumstances...are you trying to generalize from that sort of situation?

'Mel, have a chair'...has a tacit assertion that there is a chair... —a tacit assertion or a presupposition? I would be presupposing that there are such things as chairs and tacitly asserting that there was at least one such chair available for Mel to sit on...

But when I contest a remark of yours, and you fail to repeat it, do I assume you have denied it or merely withdrawn it? If I let something ride and re-assert it later, am I making the same assertion?

It might be the same sentence which is being asserted but it's occurring in a different order of circumstances and likely some of my initial assumptions have changed... where does this leave me...

The point is that logical negation and other shibboleths just don't fit... what we're doing is scratching around to see why... a lot of this has to do with us doing our homework.

The trouble is how to know what commitments hold between what someone says and the person who says it... it doesn't seem to matter too much whether they are openly asserted or tacitly asserted, though the tacit ones are a bit more troublesome. This can be dull... if you are realistic, then you forget about 'if you assert p and p implies q, then you're also asserting q'. —But if you can't have that then you can't have anything which is intensional... you can only have an extensional world without people who think in it.

OK, so you dialogize it. In conversation it might come up like this: 'if you assert p and p implies q, and you accept that p implies q, then it's likely that you are committed to asserting q as well'... but why bother about bending over backwards to save the machinery!

What about the overlooked circumstance which changes everything, and so on and so on. If I think you are asserting q as well, but I'm not sure, and it is to the point, then I'll fucking-well ask you...

One of the points in talking to other people is to clarify things, not necessarily to make them explicit. The point is though, we do talk to other people. It's not as if some condition existed where we don't ever talk... which is the impression a lot of these logics give me...

Talking makes commitments, insofar as they might be relevant, more apparent... 'if you say that, do you also say this' which is just normal conversation.

Is there any circumstantial way of knowing whether a person who raised a point is committed to (accepting) other things? A point raised may entail a number of consequences, regardless of what the pragmatic circumstances are —i. e., there are logical entailments. Saying 'Mel, have a chair' entails my tacit assertion that there is a chair available and so on... it's pretty trivial on that level... it only leaves this level when you say it entails a number of presuppositions about 'good manners', sorts of socialization processes, or whatever... but you can't say it logically entails those.

There's a lot of positivism about 'logical' language —the big assumption is, when I've said something, I've said something I wanted to say exactly as I wanted to say it and it perfectly reflects my intent-

ions... if I accepted that sort of positivism, then it's feasible to accept strict rules of commitment, otherwise it's all waffle about ideal assertors.

If I make assertion p, then assertion p commits me to every possible assertion in a logically possible world — again you're into a remarkable positivism, a model of perfect language and perfect language-users... and it's all unbelievable.

An entirely extensional logic of conversation would be a joke... psychology and behaviourism... but the way you're talking is almost in behavioural terms and would seem to admit to a virtual extensional logic... putting it all as a 'surface' or empirical data...

What this points to is the failure of strict rules... at most you've got a few ad hoc procedural pointers or guidelines — there's a lot of good faith involved.

'You mean you don't accept a commitment to q after you've asserted p — Good Heavens!' It's a normal tactic because it respects the indeterminacy between the surfaces of the language we are institutionally provided with and the fragment of actual language you used to mean something... that's a beginning, a space to work in, to see why what you said wasn't interpreted as what you meant... you can start to get a purchase on a few cultural and institutional things... that's the clarification you get in conversation.

The weakest sort of commitment which might hold would be a part-whole relation... if you assert a whole, then you are committed to asserting the parts of that whole — this is treating a conversation as a sequence of assertions (!) — That's sure weak but even it has problems... you're not committed to asserting everything you've said equally are you? Moreover it implies that there is a shared sense of things like coherent 'wholes'. — Would it be like me saying I was committed to all of what I had argued, and that entailing I was prepared to defend every little bit of what I said? — Yes...

But it doesn't fit for us... take making those Lisson Gallery transcripts public. There were six of us involved in the transcripts and in a general sense we would each accept a commitment to what was there — but none of us would accept a commitment to every part of it... and this came out at the Florence show where we had a list of 77 blurts, which we each embedded by an explicit convention; but for each of us there were a number of blurts we didn't touch, and these different for each of us... to all appearances we were publicly asserting the whole 77 blurts, but individually that fell apart... There were some we 'asserted' ironically, some metaphorically, and so on... what about that? So much for part-whole crap.

Do we have any use for logical types of assertors and assertions? A 'veridical assertor' is meant to be one who asserts only what is true, i.e., $\text{Axp} \rightarrow p$...I can rule that out obviously. An 'omniscient assertor' who asserts everything that is true, i.e., $p \rightarrow \text{Axp}$...I can do without. Two assertors mutually agreeing, who assert exactly the same propositions, i.e., $(p)(\text{Axp} \equiv \text{Ayp})$, might be feasible in some partial sense, but the allegiencies would need to be very strong. A similar problem with mutually contradictory assertors, it can be made feasible by confining it to 'contingent' assertions (those neither asserted nor denied by everyone). An axiom of universal disagreement seems harmless enough: for every pair of assertors, it's the case that there is at least one proposition such that Axp and $\text{Ay}(-p)$. A logical characterization of skepticism would be that, in a group, every proposition not asserted by everyone is denied by someone. The notion of complete assertor, one who takes a definite stance of either asserting or denying in respect to every proposition, rules out silence, indifference, and non-committal (etc.) reactions.

Suspended assertion —putting forward something while suspending its truth-functionality (its so-called 'assertive' condition)...is this any approximation of blurting? This suggests that the expected commitment of truth-values doesn't obtain —this is nonsense...mostly we don't know and can't know the status of our remarks. I blurt something out, see how it 'looks' and that as often as not suggests a degree of commitment...

This is queer...we are trying to unscramble some dialogical sets, but we end up making trite metaphysical propositions about what might be asserted...surely a funny way of providing conditions of radical theory/praxis...

A thought may have the same content whether you assent to its truth or not, and a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition —this was Frege's point. I can use this to say I can put forward a proposition p without asserting p as true (and thus I can put forward the negation of p without rejecting p as false)...for example in a simple conditional...which is not too objectionable if you further assume that assertion is a special commitment between a speaker and what the speaker says; 'unasserted propositions' then, are those raised independently of considerations as to their truth-functionality —All this has a funny sound to it too.

OK, so the point about assertion is commitment, but in a general sense, it doesn't seem to necessarily imply a truth condition, does it? —In a formal sense only, only if you rule out psychological states, sociality...when it comes to what we're doing, there's a commitment to what we say but not much idea whether it's true or not...because the things that are interesting don't come up like that. Again, you can't reduce the personal to language...

16. WHAT ARE WE DOING IN LANGUAGE?

What about the late unlamented 'artwork as proposition' stuff? It's been around in the art-language analogy for a long time...if Joseph had wanted to make more sense, he would have needed a less promotional notion like 'sentence'...consider the difference between, one, the relation between a person and a proposition, and two, the relation between a person and a sentence —the latter is pragmatical while the former tries to characterize the state of a person not necessarily involving language. Analytically, propositions become essentialist abstractions which ignore the pragmatics of social situations...so Joseph was able to keep formalist 'tautologies' going along in tandem with 'propositions'...it all seems a bit old-hat now anyway...

There is also the point that if something is 'propositional', then there must be something that stands against it, but what stands against an artwork-as-proposition?...it's silly to imagine you are contesting one artwork by doing another...people do though...Fried's modernism is predicated on a naivete about art's 'radical self-criticism'...the most you can wring out of it is something like (Carnapian) pseudo-propositions...

We're not talking about language because we think, like a lot of artists and estheticians do, that artworks are like propositions or are like utterances in a language, or that art is analogous to language. It's not Wollheim stuff about 'art language' or like Goodman rejecting any strong disparity between verbal and non-verbal symbols as a basis for talking about the 'languages of art'...nor does it come down to any prejudiced appeal to ordinary language bases. We might be sympathetic to some of these views at times...but it's nothing to do with any picture theory of language...or Goodman's 'I began by dropping the picture theory of language and ended by adopting the language theory of pictures'...

We have some assumptions —Aren't we 'embedded in language'? —language being our existential (and ontological) problematic, not one of a simple logical or constructible relationship to 'us' or to 'the world', or to anything else...you can't tritely ask 'what are we doing in language?' —we simply are in language, language is one of our presuppositions, it's one of my/your 'experiences'...

As far as 'making lucid' the so-called 'relationship' to language, in any structural sense, I can't..it's something which can't be tackled directly, it's a matter of reflection...because we are already 'in' our language...

Is this the point about the languagedness of our culture(s)? It's more than the Structuralist view of people like Whorf...that's only part of the problematic, part of the dialectic, if you like...between the languagedness of our lives/culture(s) and each person's languag-

ing...an individual's languaging being his/her personal praxis. The problem with a structuralist approach is that it overlooks the role of the person...and the personal...how else can you introduce the possibility of potential surprise and change...doing other than the most expected?

But isn't a languaging/languagedness dialectic just another way of putting the langue/parole bit? —A dialectic implies one process, it's not something with distinct entities...anyway, it differs from the langue/parole distinction in that the role of us, people, that is me, is implied more strongly in it; it doesn't suggest that language usurps the place of me, or is in any sense independent of me, it's like realizing that language doesn't mean, we mean...the awareness of using, as distinct from the use of language.

Most of our shows...deal with possible cultural/social transformations in language...but they're not about language, but about making language 'noise'...

This seems to bear on the mistaken view of the situation of —it's built into my language, I was about to say 'the situation of us as individuals within our society'...of having 'individuals' on the one hand and 'society' on the other...then you can have fun with issues of 'free-will', 'determinism', and so on, bearing on the relation between the two. But that's fiction, the two terms aren't up...it depends on how you sort your theory/praxis distinctions out. There is the complaint against 'bourgeois' sociology talking about the culture...what is silly is that they hang 'keep off' signs all over it and then worry about 'theory'...

I can only see my languaging in a dialectic with the languagedness of things...it's then more a matter of praxis. Languaging isn't languishing...it's the limits of my languaging that's the limit of my world —but without giving up on the ineffable, the words that aren't there.

17. 'CONSISTENCY' IS AN IDEOLOGICAL POSTULATE.

There's a logical view of 'incompatibility'...two statements are incompatible if the following situation obtains: it's not possible, or it's not permitted, to assert p and to assert q for the same assertor. There are some suggestions made by Perelman for overcoming this logical impasse...he suggests overcoming incompatibility by (i) making it obligatory to assert only one of the statements, (ii) weakening them so that their common assertion is possible, or (iii) diplomatically proving it's not obligatory to assert either statement.

Contradiction is a special case of incompatibility where q is equivalent to not-p...the logical way of subverting the 'principle of contradiction' is by many-valued logic...there the principle is best looked on as a restrictive principle governing the mode of negation at issue...

Why is incompatibility a worry at all? —You have someone blurting one thing and someone else blurting something else. In a way this seems taken care of by the development of the ongoing conversation. —Not always, and here is the problem. In those notes of Andrew's there were some things which seemed incompatible to me, and which were not taken care of by the ongoing conversation. There was a problem with Andrew's reliance on sociological terms...I just find it hard dealing with their embeddedness...using a term like 'shifter', something which might to me approximate 'indexical term'. Incompatibility in this is a function of the language we choose or are given...I have trouble mapping onto the language of writers like Wilden, Larcan, O'Malley.

We spoke of the 'tyranny of language' with Michael Corris: he was going on about 'the domain of discourse A&L', 'the class of statements A&L', 'items which are members of the class...' and so on. Michael said he wasn't talking about 'membership' in any strict or logical sense...but you've got to watch your language. Take for example (i) 'A&L is not restricted to a membership of 16' and (ii) 'anyone who talks to one of us becomes a member of A&L'. Now in (ii) by still using your 'old' language you're using 'member' in a somewhat meaningless sense.

OK, so one of the points in using that expression in the first place would be to point out the meaninglessness of 'membership'...using an 'official' language for its rhetorical force...but if the rhetorical aspect is missed, then you have to watch out for dragging a corrupted language around with you. You then start worrying about whether my early morning remarks to Paula are part of the 'class of statements A&L'...and we are then right back in silly-land...some things have just dissolved.

What worries me about Perelman's first suggestion is who is making it obligatory? In what sense is it obligatory? Logically? Deontically? —No, I suppose it needs cooperation...I would say, OK, so we have incompatible views, then let's assume your (or my) point of view and both start from there...

It's one thing to deal with incompatibility in baby-talk or short remarks...or sentences and another to deal with long 'actual' sections of discourse. In the former you have grammars which can handle it to some extent. If you take gross fragments of language, then the way Perelman lays it out, incompatibility isn't going to come up —Here incompatibility means they are in different worlds, not just different expressions in the same world...but 'worlds' is a semantics notion...if you have too strong a conflict then you don't really have any conversation or dialogue...conversation depends on a certain amount of cooperation, even disagreements depend on cooperation. This is where the 'logical incompatibility between two isolated statements' looks more than a bit funny —in discourse, where you really are dependent on good faith...

Looking at two large fragments of 'incompatible' discourse, it's hard to imagine all of their arguments being incompatible...bits will map on, there will be places where talk is possible...

But there's no absolute or fixed 'incompatibility', it's relative to given circumstances. It's like Goodman's remark that 'with suitable principles of correlation a Constable painting can be made to provide an enormous amount of information about pink elephants'... set up the right sort of correspondence rules and you can 'explain' what you like about anything —which sounds a lot like the rules of art-criticism to me. It means 'choose' your reality, and we only know the world in relation to how we can describe it...etc.

Logically 'p and not-p' is regarded as a false (contradictory) proposition. A better formulation may be: p and not-p is inadmissible as an assertion from one and the same point of view. Hence an interpretation of a contradiction is better seen as implying different reference points. We could interpret it as $Ax(p/q)$ and $Ax(-p/r)$...read as 'given q, x asserts p' and 'given r, x asserts not-p'. The statements are regarded as conditional, not absolute.

On the other logical hand, with a three or more valued functionality, you have (degrees of) indifference, neutrality, and so on...however you can be neutral within the same framework or you can be neutral by being outside the framework. Formal logic might be described in terms of the former...functioning on the 'law of the excluded framework', it can't admit its own framework...

What about questions of consistency if we forget about propositions

and bring up sociality? It seems to me that this stuff about propositional consistency is based on the assumption that you can only deal with formal propositional models or self-contained 'private' individual persons. That is, I'm an individual, I can reflect, I can be consistent because I can keep 'the crowd' away. But what about putting consistency into sociality...the uproar...no static conception of the ontological (?) perimeters of 'me'...if you start talking about consistency, all you are talking about is either petrified safe-deposit boxes of knowledge, absolutist epistemologies, or a particular model of the possessive individual person...

Sociality means you live with the inconsistencies...dissolving static self-conceptions, in other words, the kind of model of what it's like to 'be' that blokes like Rescher have is a model something like an automaton —or, if not that, a square, boring and middle-class individual. Hence the possibility of 'consistency'...

Consistency is sometimes said to mean 'logically conceivable'... Is that meant to say that everything fits into an a priori perfectly logical 'world'. One of the things I like about my life is that I get surprised and I learn; but, you might ask, how does epistemology fit in with this? Are you going to say, on top of the surprises, that the whole world is really consistent, but you just don't see it all the time? How does learning take place when all conditions are 'logically conceivable'?

Can you subvert the criterion of consistency by insisting that it holds if and only if you are solely concerned with deriving conclusions? —i.e., 'not (p and not-p)' holds only if proposed as premisses in a valid argument? Does that lay you open to charges of not being able to separate sense from nonsense, and so we might as well be talking nonsense since it doesn't matter..?

Relate this to Kierkegaard's interest in Plato's dialogues...the ones that end 'not with a result, but a sting'...you can be consistent if you want results, but if you try for a sting...try to get a situation which makes others reflect...to choose and decide...where choosing and deciding become points of learning...then 'inconsistency' becomes essential(?)...this is where we move miles away from sense/nonsense stuff since the fields of decision lie, not in a logical world, but in a social...actual encounter conditions.

What happens if you take a blurter to be an arbitrary (but consistent) axiom system? —defining an assertor rather than an assertion in terms of consistency? Hence an assertor is a consistent finite set of propositions... $x = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n\}$, and then let $X = (p_1 \& p_2 \& \dots \& p_n)$ i.e., be a conjunction of all x-elements. That gives you a model of a person as a consistent finite set of propositions...x asserts p if p is plausibly implied or entailed by X.

This would seem on the surface of it to be adequate as a definition of (say) the assertor 'PH' operating in the annotations. But what about the person Preston Heller who contributes towards the proceedings of A&L? In the Annotations we did to some extent function on the assumption that we were consistent assertors...at least in the beginning...but it was shown operationally to be daft..the point is that 'PH' as a consistent assertor has nothing to tell us about Preston Heller who wrote some of the annotations...it's the confusion of 'responding' to a fragment of language independent of a particular user...

Scratching about...there's a final point in relation to consistency...Wartofsky made some programmatic suggestions...the notion that a 'conservative' incorporates inconsistencies into his framework; a 'radical' changes his framework to account for the anomalies; and the 'opportunist' lives with the difficulties...Here's a set of reactions toward inconsistencies...there are also Lakatos' suggestions that the 'conservative' position is where you halt your program until inconsistency is repaired; the 'rational' position is where you exploit the heuristic power of inconsistency but you don't resign yourself to possible chaos; and finally the 'anarchist' position where inconsistency is extolled as a basic property of nature...

What's limited about these is that they are devices for safekeeping a rationalist underpinning for notions of a program...which these guys are more comfortable with. Anomalies in specific sub-programs get absorbed —and finally, the 'opportunist' and 'anarchist' ideas are pseudo-options. This doesn't help us at all.

18. DEAD HORSE...

Pragmatics isn't the remaining bits in the jigsaw puzzle after you've got your syntax and semantics into place. Montague's conditions for interpreting a pragmatic language L are: determine the set of all relevant aspects of possible contexts of use (indices, points of reference); determine the set of objects existing or present with respect to each point of reference; determine the intension of each predicate and individual constant of L; interpret the operators of L, i. e., let each operator be a relation between points of reference and sets of points of reference...this implies establishing criteria for truth and satisfaction...

If you tie pragmatics to truth-functionality, what happens to your pragmatics? —Generally, pragmatics deals with the 'here and now', which includes whatever you want...my presuppositions, yours... You said that something like Montague's conditions reduce pragmatics to a set of truth-values, but isn't it the other way about, truth-value is reducible to a set of pragmatic points of reference? Now, what sort of priorities you read into that are pretty important. If all you regard of a pragmatic situation are those reference points relevant to truth-functionality, then you are in effect reducing pragmatic elements to (into) a semantic system...yes, you will get a richer semantic system, but it's not a rich pragmatic outlook...semantics being the sole criterion for singling out pragmatic references.

You also have to consider the type of concept of truth involved here —it's a logical one, functioning in terms of baby-talk like 'it is raining now'...and it can't handle, say, broader cultural points of reference, which are equally the grounds from which you make your remarks. But, in terms of the latter, you are faced with what possibilities of clarification (or formalization) there are and you realize there aren't many...you can't reduce it to a clear picture...whereas the former starts from an a priori reduction, and hence the possibility of clarification, formalization, and axiomatization. The point of admitting more pragmatic references than those relevant to truth-functionality is simply the point that truth-functionality isn't always pertinent.

We seem to have everything, profundities to grunts and groans, indexed into the conversation equally —just because they are voiced(?). Or are there criteria? I constantly use 'ideological filters' when I listen to you, not consistently, but somewhat ad hoc-ly — we do all have different filtering systems...what would an ad hoc filter look like...?

What's the strongest sense you could give to asserted commitment? If you assert p, then it ought to be the case that you believe p, and it ought to be the case that you act in accordance with p? —But all that is irrelevant, we don't blurt sentences of that order...

Some of our 'strongest' assertions are made with varying degrees of irony...perhaps because they are psychologically forceful for us ...but they are often exposed to doubt, skepticism is built into the remark...is that the same? Also, remarks which reflect a fair amount of certainty are often subjected to an ironicalized 'distance' soon afterwards...as if to make them conditional or something like that...to fuck-up the overdetermining aspects, but I'm not sure...

Yeah...I don't think this is true at all...in fact it's very wrong...being ironical, and we are a lot, is being in an existential state...it's just how the world appears, it is ironical, you have no choice, irony isn't a higher level of reflexivity than certainty...

Is asserting with a low degree of conviction (a high degree of uncertainty) somewhat isomorphic with asking a question? —But there you go again...I am in uncertainty or indeterminacy...—OK, the more certain you are of something the less interested you are in any response to its assertion —look at this from the point of social divisions...a model of knowledge being the wedge driven between people...and this is the thing we're up against, we're all up against. Yeah...social conditions...the less certain you are, the more you expect and invite reinforcement, challenge, etc. If you make a question-like assertion would you be inviting an answer-like assertion? —And we proceed by hints, clues, matchings etc...

19. ITERATION.

Meta-assertion can be odd: you can be honest about your honesty (e.g., $Ax(Axp) \rightarrow Axp$), but can you, for instance, be candid about your candor (e.g., $Axp \rightarrow Ax(Axp)$)? —From temporality you can't... iteration in meta-candor can't occur at the same moment as the assertion, strictly speaking...

A more useful illustration might be meta-irony...being ironical about your irony. Isn't this queer? If you say 'James Collins is a great artist', I understand very clearly that the only possible interpretation is that you must be speaking ironically. But if you say 'It is ironical that James Collins is a great artist', I would understand you to be saying James Collins is a great artist but that you find that state of affairs ironical...I would also assume you were going bananas.

Ironical statements are ironical precisely because they are contextualized...existential remarks...once you try to stand back to nest such statements you have to take them seriously (literally) and here you have a kind of tyranny of the standard...

What we do seems to exist ironically in contexts like galleries, now this is terribly complex, it's paradoxical...like Epimenides the Cretan saying Cretans always lie. In strict logical form, lying is similar to irony...amounting to saying p and meaning not- p ... which misses the point of irony completely...

But on the problem of being ironical about my irony...Kierkegaard's point was that he knew irony was a question of praxis, and one anxiety in his writing is that he knew he was seriously theorizing about his irony —he was in an existential paradox. He didn't iterate his ironical situation, he ironically embedded his theorizing about his irony. Irony isn't reflexive, but it may be a heuristic...obviously, you can't be unreserved about your unreservedness...just as you can't be artless about your artlessness...

20. MORE EXHORTATIONS?

Something queer which is persisting is the idea that we are in a dialogical situation of a prima facie kind... implicit in the talk reflecting a sort of behavioural 'access' to 'assent' conditions...

The point of us looking at assertion is to see what kind of surface it can give us as a reference... and the conclusion is that it doesn't give us much of a surface at all... in terms of 'experience' it just doesn't fit very well...

Presupposing an audience... an assertor may not have even a general notion of the class of audience appropriate to the content of his assertion or his style of asserting... so, what about 'if it's interesting to me then I just assume it's going to be interesting to some other people'... that's what I think of audience, and that rolls over your previous remark, doesn't it?

'Constructing' an audience ought to be thought about — except what do you do to construct an audience? It implies you do some work 'in the world' to at least inform yourself of some structures and 'construction' contradicts, flatly, that previous remark that if it's interesting to me it will be interesting to somebody else... it's sort of naturalistic: the audience is the audience that acts as the audience to whatever I say...

It isn't contradictory at all because I construct the audience on my assumptions not on the audience's assumptions... reversing Perelman's rhetoric stuff, because for me audience is problematic, therefore I've got to start from my assumptions...

Perelman's point that you always take into account other people's presuppositions... look at Copernicus... the point about argumentation that you always have to take account of the assumptions of others could be a not-so-tacit restriction on the production of knowledge? — But the point in 'taking account of the presuppositions of others' is not to restrict your knowledge but to prevent the divisive individualistic model... shit, that's a mess — But if you look at his book De Revolutionibus, it's layed out in argument form, the point is that he explicitly takes into account the assumptions of his audience, the Church... and argues against them... so there is perhaps a distinction between doing the work and persuading people about what you've done... the latter is part of theatre and the artworld... but the funny thing is to counter suppression Copernicus made his book unreadable except to the most erudite astronomers of the day... exactly like Lenin's tactical or Aesopian language.

Are you saying there is a distinction between 'doing' the work and persuading people as to the results of your work? This gives us some very funny, undialectical, distinctions. — It's perhaps OK in

the case of work which is separate from the public realm...scientific 'observations', etc...and we have an added confusion, we work hard at persuading each other, our sociality, and do I assume this is generalizable?

The individuals we may 'reach' have such a diversity I could only trivially construct them as our audience...I mean, I'd like to be surprised by my audience...there's a certain difference between communicating a body of authenticated truths in propositions and doing what Kierkegaard calls 'existing in the truth'. This thing about 'work' coming up only in the public presentation/display context has got a lot to do with us working with discrete propositions and I don't think we do work that way. Also, if we worked with a set of clear propositions then I think we could say, or it would then make sense to say, we have such and such an audience. But I don't think it makes any sense at all to argue about audience in the institutional sense...we don't suppose that all 'knowledge' has got to do with communication of authenticated truths, which means you can resolve everything by 'mature reason', 'the neutral progression of ideas' and that there's no such thing as paradigm differences, histories, social structure.

You're in trouble if you think all you have to do is communicate authenticated truths and the other person simply has to agree or disagree. What a lot of the formal logic we've had a look at depends on is an incredible simplification such that, whenever you get a possible difference of opinion, you only get it on the grounds of propositions being true or not-true...it's not so much the excluded middle that's worrying about this as there's no accounting for total indifference to p or not- p being ruled out...which isn't the excluded middle, it's outside the context altogether —truth functionality doesn't really fit anything, the least you could have would be a crowd... 'mob psychology'...what about incompatible, indifferent...etc...

A slippery bugger this...there's the difficulty of it (the opinion, assertion and other formulae) existing outside a context...a candidate for inclusion in a context is a pre-interpreted string...the 'excluded item' will not be treated because you just won't have access to it.

One of the points of the blurting is that what is indexed to our conversations are grunts and groans, as well as profundities; just in terms of your remarks about audience where you said you would like to think of our audience as the guy who came up to you at Weber's and said 'This derives from Bar-Hillel's notions of indexicality, doesn't it?' rather than the one who said 'What the fuck is this elitist nonsense?'. Well, I'm not sure, because the person who says 'What the fuck is this elitist nonsense?' has the potential to realize what an important remark this is, as well as the person who simply

'agrees' with us...because in both cases you're dealing with a 'mapping onto' and thus with the possibility of learning, or getting at ideology, in both cases. Also, if we're going to say of our blurring, the crap and the nonsense are indexed, then presumably, that would work for an external person —an acceptable part of our problematic being the people who can't stand us, and how useful their reasons are for not standing us.

If our 'first audience' is ourselves, in what sense do we presuppose our commitments to talking to each other? —I would assume we don't...I talk to you because it's better than sitting down and talking to myself...but there are times when I don't feel like talking to Mel for a few weeks, where the return doesn't seem to me to match the inputs. —It doesn't seem as if you are dealing with a commitment then, it's almost like a straight trading, a social question...some people are more interesting than others...commitment has the connotations of a club...and you're going to say 'ah-ah, but it is a club!'...a social thing, and this gets us into sociality...

21. JOSEPH KOSUTH SAYS THAT THE GROUP IS A CULTURAL GHETTO...

Maybe the most we can presuppose about each other as an audience is a sociality such that we believe we can learn more in a talking-to-each-other context than we would without it...

I would question a 'belief' modality: it doesn't seem to be something you explicitly believe or don't believe, it's a bit closer to home... desperation seems closer to it. Would you mean by 'believe' that we might have a choice or that we don't have a choice? —I'm not sitting here talking to you blokes because I 'believe' in it and think it's probably a terribly exciting and advanced thing to do, one of the most advanced art-forms of our advanced times; I'm talking to you blokes because I don't know what else to do, it's really on that level, about not having choice...

This sociality thing... can we clarify it? —It has a big effect on 'audience', and large consequences for 'membership'. First of all, by 'sociality', we don't mean 'collaboration', do we?

This is where Joseph is wrong I think... the idea of 'collaboration', if it ever worked with us, has certainly collapsed during the past couple of years into (vague) sociality. The problem with collaboration was the 'we speak with one voice' implication; sociality might be more like 'I speak with many voices'... sociality would then be the inverse of collaboration.

The question of 'my' experience and 'our' experience is often very hard to distinguish... I wonder what I think I am, in respect to what I and we are doing, in respect to the whole dialogue/uproar, and in respect to experience of all that... I'm just not too sure what are 'my' experiences and what are not. I probably often operate on terms of, say, your experiences... now, in terms of me constructing some notion of myself, in terms of the work, some of my points of reference I know patently are my experiences, but some of my points of reference are, probably, your experiences and not mine. They are things I haven't experienced, yet the 'experience' (i.e., your report of your experience) becomes part of my set of references —Though I find it pretty glib and misleading to separate 'report' from 'experience' in this way... back as part of the undialectical stone-age.

This is where the sociality stuff comes out a bit stronger... it's not a matter of knowing they are your experiences and not mine, it's a situation of not knowing. It runs pretty deep and on a theoretical level we don't have that strong a notion of individuals, which is odd... and this has to do with the way we learn and the way we learn from each other. But this isn't an explanation, it's a context... that we have talked to each other so much is a context rather than

an explanation that sometimes you don't know where things come from. If you bring in that remark 'If it interests me, it will interest somebody else', then that's a strongly solipsistic view...or it seems like it...

Perhaps not, there is an aspect of ideological hope in that, and it also assumes that 'interest' is asymptotic with some condition(s) of 'authenticity'...

But suppose you transfer that into the sociality context where sometimes it seems you know what your references are composed of and sometimes it seems, maybe, to come from some other person — Is that a worry to you? — No, it isn't, the sociality stuff reflects back on the individual and makes it not quite so 18th Century. — You are getting some queer combinations here, like a mad marriage between solipsism and materialism...if sociality does make sense, then we've used the word in the wrong way: rather than talk about our sociality, we ought to be talking about my sociality and your sociality; it sort of gets focussed on individuals still...though we ought to say 'localized'...the description is how sociality is constituted by the individual self rather than the reverse (which you had seemed to be saying earlier).

Each of our 'socialities' then, plausibly, has its own effect of 'socialization' relativized to this context and these persons...does that get us away from, maybe, methodological solipsism? The individual self being the only legitimate starting point...maybe, we would seem to be out of this from the standpoint that we are not systematically constructing anything, which all sounds, I admit, a bit odd.

We generalize from our social relations, not from morbid solipsism. I might be (trivially) my own audience, but I don't address myself publicly, I address you publicly. The only value of 'The world is my world' is if it makes sense to you and if I can make sense of it to you...

This has a familiar ring, doesn't it? Every Phenomenologist, Marxist and who knows who, has a bit to say about this. I don't think we really have to say, once and for all, knowledge comes from here, or there, from material reality or individual reality, but rather that 'light dawns gradually over the whole'...it's indeterminate, and the only reason that there's a rush to place 'the origin of knowledge' is that it's to do with foundationism and constructing stable pyramids of knowledge.

You could view sociality as 'the gaining of access to' (a projection of) a 'we' or to an 'our'...provided this becomes a matter of intimacy (possibility), not constraint. It takes on the character of including others — I might say then that a condition of sociality is

that it's an 'inclusive' notion of individual (or self), in contrast to any 'exclusive' notion of individual — one that defines itself negatively, in respect to what it won't admit.

You realize, of course, this is taking the individual self at face-value, and not as the convenient social fiction it generally is...as historically it has been of the bourgeoisie over the past two hundred years. There are inherent problems with the use of 'individuality'...look at it in the situation of, say, the executive working his/her way up through the company: everyone in that company, while they are going through motions that are conformist and obviously conventionalized, totally a matter of reflecting the hierarchical structure of how to proceed through that company in terms of their career, use rhetoric of the strongest individualism about what they themselves are doing, how the company as a whole relates to society...they define themselves in opposition to other co-workers, the company in opposition to other companies, while at the same time being in cartels with other companies, sharing monopolies, and so on. Galbraith pointed out that, like Puritanism, it's a convenient social fiction for middle-class industrialism. — That's the idea of competitiveness, that this society brings people together...for example, a normal school brings people together to learn and at the same time upholds the most fierce individual competitiveness which is designed to keep people apart. That is what this society is built on, it's what the NY modern art-world is built on...the secrecy...the competition. — This is just to emphasize I don't intend this use of 'sociality' as a lip-service individuality, nor as any sort of group-conformism, nor even a tension between those points...

22. ...OVERBOARD ABOUT KIERKEGAARD

In Kierkegaardian terminology... what can I construct in it, do I understand? — I can look at 'communication' from the position of the so-called 'problem of existential communication' (Concluding Unscientific Postscript) ... it has a methodological point. It has to do with the relation of speaker/hearer, of teacher/learner... that is, it has to do with social relations. These relations are the conditions under which knowledge is produced (even recognized), hence the possibility of changing these conditions... and so on. — Teacher/learner (etc.), that is, are somewhat arbitrary ways of dividing up learning ... which may be the beginnings of revision...

The first requirement is that 'communication' be expressed in such a way as to not induce an immediate intellectual assent, it's goal isn't the coercion of hearers to a point of view, but their emancipation so that they may come to understand it inwardly — the inwardness of understanding consists in each individual coming to understand it, to appropriate it, for themselves. Anything else of course violates 'existential' reflection and turns it into a result. This is similar to the point about the effectiveness of 'heuristics' over any pedagogic methods... that lecturing or telling people doesn't work as well as trying to get people to 'experience' what is being taught.

But you seem to be making that point more strongly... implying something like: what you communicate should be displayed in such a way that it invites the recipient to appropriate the truths of what you are saying. There is an idea that you have the truth in the first place... 'truth is inwardness'.... As I recall it, a certain quality of passion is said to be evident in whatever an existentially authentic being does, and the most you can do is display that quality of passion ... what you communicate is your own truth. In a way you are claiming everything for one viewpoint on the grounds of what it feels like to have that viewpoint... and the only person who can test whether your viewpoint is true or profound is a person who also has it, and if they have it they don't need to test it... which is circular, viciously perhaps.... But isn't that the point of faith? — it's not logically verifiable, but it's testable 'in the world'...

Communicating between ourselves... the good faith is taken for granted; communicating with others than ourselves, we can't take the 'good faith' for granted (?) — can I get others to 'experience' my experiences? — Isn't that our problem of (not very well understanding the implications of our/my) sociality, which we already talked about? Sociality is an integral feature of personal existence... not just being-in-a-world, but at the same time being-in-that-world-with-others... and that world is not a natural world, it's a cultural world. — Even Kierkegaard is queer on that point since the terms of his argument are the 'individual' and 'the crowd'... and the crowd is

untruth while truth is inwardness, '...the crowd is, in fact, composed of individuals; it must therefore be in every man's power to become what he is, an individual. From becoming an individual, no-one, no one at all, is excluded, except he who excludes himself by becoming a crowd.' (Concerning my Work as an Author).

If some of my 'experiences' aren't my experiences at all (or, I don't know if they are), then I certainly can't have any static conception of the ontological perimeters of 'me' (as an existing/thinking being) ...this obviously ought to have some very strong repercussions for notions I have about communication, — in particular for the impossibility of a concept of audience (?)...audience can't be independent of 'me'. If my being is dependent on my being-in-a-world-with-others, then 'me' and 'others' are parts of the same concept (process) ...an implication of 'my' sociality. My experience here means my social experience, which is not reducible to my individual experience.

Part of the current problem for us is the confusion of a static body of authenticated truths in a series of propositions (which we don't have) with the 'uproar' — or our 'existing in the truth' — which more closely approximates the present goings-on. — But can you 'communicate' uproar?—or is that a contradiction? — You exist in uproar, you experience uproar...or, in a Sartrean sense, you 'exist' uproar ...it's a contextual condition. — Does pandemonium have any 'external' sense whatsoever?— is it something that I 'experience' in my reflectivity, or something I merely experience? ...are you suggesting that uproar (etc.) is independent of a reflective situation? I would probably have to say that uproar as an idea or whatever it is, in general usage, isn't a reflective idea; however the way I tend to use it is in a reflective sense...we can only talk about it since we have admitted it as a reflective possibility...

But I'm still left with the problem of status of the residue of the uproar, if you like: the 'propositions' (?) which exist in the uproar, what happens to them when they are 'left out' in the world? — this is the old problem of trying to design something which doesn't look like a static body of truths...residual propositions, not constitutive propositions...quantifiably restricted...'the truth' is in the uproar, not in the propositions.

It's probably in relation to communication (the difficulties in ...) that we have become aware of the bedlam aspects...the condition of the uproar is that it is encounterable, it can't be directly communicated since that would make it into a result — which it isn't— and, it follows, would contradict its existential/pragmatic character.

You might illuminate this with what we've said about reading...if you think you are reading a rationally argued thesis, you feel under some obligation that, in order to understand it, you have to read

every word, give every part equal amount of attention. Another way to approach reading is with a more cursory attention, reading closely only what interests you, what 'catches your eye'. You encounter the material in the way you encounter a newspaper or poster ...no-one asks, did you understand the newspaper?

The uproar is not to do with (so much) the content of what I have to say, but more to do with the points of reference I have in respect to what I say, and hence they are (sort of) points of reference for what we publish. — If we publish stuff, there's a sense in which we can cram as much as we like into it...on an assumption that a reader will do his own sorting, that he will intuitively fix on the references he wants for some encountered sort of understanding; on the assumption that he will realize it's not necessary to read it all. A gallery is a somewhat different logico-temporal issue and what we tend to do is that we do some singling out for the spectator...our presuppositions...perhaps that's mistaken, maybe we should cram everything into a gallery so anyone encounters what they want, not what we think they want... though that's also naive since it's always a case of degrees of sorting out...and also optimistic about the kinds of encounter expectancies of people going into galleries...

What about the fact that 'work' only comes up in a public context? I can sit and talk about work being sitting here and talking, reading, and so on — but as soon as it comes up in a public context everybody knows where the 'work' is at...'What sort of work do you do?' — 'Oh, I talk a lot, write things down, read a bit...' for chrissake... But how do you 'communicate' this, what the work is? — One way is overhearing...it's not very good; overhearing is not participating, it's a different or surrogate experience. The other way is that you set up some sort of encounter situation, so people encounter bits of it in their experience...that's the problem with something like the show at Weber's, there weren't enough chances provided for encounter to function.

23. FUR TEACUPS.

It's not just what the work is, you have to take into consideration my attitude towards it... basically strangely inconsistent attitudes... I do the work 'seriously' —if you like—but at the same time have a somewhat ironical attitude toward it. On that level, it comes down to not what we do, but simply what we are. It's a bit like Kierkegaard's notes on himself as an author, where he tells of how he presented himself publicly in Copenhagen while writing his books... he was worried that by writing books, no matter how desperately absurd their content, he would be accepted as a famous 'serious' writer or philosopher; so he spent an inordinate amount of time depicting himself as a layabout, a profligate, a scoundrel... he would work all day and then for an hour, as the main theatre in Copenhagen was coming out, hang about making silly social chit-chat and uttering inanities... that was in the middle of proof-reading Either/Or. He was trying to tackle the problem of his mode of existence and of his authorship —he wanted to fuck-up the impression he would make by publishing his book, messing up the reception of his work, annihilating his public self... distancing himself from the public work... the more interference he can get between himself-in-the-world and his-work-in-the-world, the more 'authentic' that is; something akin to acting in absurdity, about making evident the absurdity of writing a 'serious philosophical book'... and this isn't anything like hanging around SoHo, it's like fouling-up (the possibility of) any conventional subsuming of the work... the failure of failure... saying that the work must remain always problematic...

And part of that problematic... this is where it becomes methodologically difficult, is not only what you write, but how you write and behind that how you act... so you are presenting a kind of moral position and to do that the work has to 'fail'...

Unless you see the irony the work might not exist at all. New York, home of adventuristic Modern Art isn't renowned for its irony, and this might have to do with the recent cultural domination by the United States...

Can you see art today as the ultimate in ironical activities? Most art carefully preserves middle-class contemplation, also the market-system. I don't see this as ironical, just reactionary, silly and sad. Irony has some moral tone —some social ramifications, it isn't Oscar Wilde-ish... the irony isn't the residue, or what's reified, nor in how we proceed... I do have a strong sense that this work has an ironical relationship with (say) John Weber's... the mode of existence of the work is ironical, but you have to see that ironical relation as valid and at the same time see that validity as ironical... irony, here in ontological terms, is a recognition of alienation within a commitment to disalienation...

Where it's interesting is that irony is a possible relation between the occurrence of something (an utterance, a thing,) and the context/index of occurrence...that's where it's interesting for us. —Can you have 'ironical objects'?...would you say that the Fur Teacup was ironical? —That's falling over itself to be ironical...it's being serious about being ironical rather than being ironical about being serious...I don't know?...but there's a kind of tremendous contextualization in irony, like in lying and in metaphor...

Often what starts off as a somewhat ironical gesture, something done 'authentically', is then bureaucratized, taken seriously...not just by the odd critic, but by the artist too. Duchamp notoriously for one...was the readymade once a paradigm of irony? — who knows, anyway it's French art —but it's sure been taken seriously since ...Duchamp is responsible for the most un-ironical 'movements' ever.

There's a similar problem with the logical analyses of irony..that never works because it can't deal with context and irony exists contextually.. saying 'it's certainly bright and sunny' when it's really dull and overcast: saying p and meaning not-p... doesn't tell you much about the socio-psychological states involved, the hollowness of absurdity between what something is and how it exists...something about what you are...existence...and it is a problem of 'art' too!

24. STRAIGHT TALK?

Kierkegaard's 'indirect theory of communication' opens up maybe some examination of writing style. I mean an academic writing style is one way of maintaining orthodoxies in relations between people and I think writing style is methodologically and ideologically important and it has been neglected. There's a declamatory style of writing which prohibits exchange, it maintains the writer as the 'expert' in a static teacher-learner role... it's the academic writing style. Maybe our discourse here, the kind of surface, is an attempt to screw about with the present institutionalized relations between speakers and hearers... you and me.

There are some good crotchety points about 'style' made by Feyerabend... style and its relation to 'experts', people who achieve excellence in narrow fields at the expense of a broader development... the point is they subject themselves to standards that are very restrictive, including style of writing and patterns of speech. This builds a wall between a writer and the reader not because of some lack of knowledge, or because the writer doesn't know the reader, but in order to hide the frailty of personal existence behind some warped professional ideal of objectivity...

It's not a question of simply having stylistic idiosyncracies, it's conscientiously choosing methods of presentation in full awareness that each alternative commits you to different sorts of knowledge, experience, different possibilities of information, etc. Standard lecturing supports the closed, bureaucratized, reified conception of knowledge that makes 'spectator culture' so unreal. That is, you get a kind of 'spectator education', where knowledge becomes separated from the student's knowing... from the possibility of knowing... praxis is cut off. But method is a priori, at least in the sense that a methodological system is presupposed; whereas style may be emergent, it would include your non-systematic presuppositions. — Even here there is a problem since these terms are, of course, bankrupt... 'style', for example, is virtually unsalvable (!)... if someone points to Durrell's style they are talking about literary style; yet if you look at Kierkegaard's style, you're dealing with a methodological direction, an effort to establish relations with his readers on the terms of what he had to say about human relationships philosophically. They are both 'writing styles'... if you like... but Durrell is a matter of contemplation, while Kierkegaard's thrusts responsibility for action on the reader.

For instance, in Michael Baldwin's case... his writing style is suitably terroristic... but the force of what he says has much to do with your sense that he has to say it this way. — That's the point, he's not choosing amongst this or that way of saying, there's no distinction between what and how, the 'content' can't be isolated out... it only exists because of the texture it has...

This doesn't contradict the earlier points, the difficulty with Michael's style is not its abstractness or specialization or quasi-professionalism, but his idiosyncratic, possibly reckless, 'grammar' of expression. I don't think it's just a matter of finding it interesting (or not) either. —There is no 'literal' translation, you can't put his point in 'standard' English... which connects up to what we were saying about irony...

But this writing style, partly because some others... mainly Philip... have picked it up, picked up its texture, determines something of the ideological relation between a considerable segment of A&L and other people. The question is, does this matter? It might be important because there's some pressure on the rest of us to present material in the same way. Anyhow, you can't separate 'meaning' from the presentation/delivery... one thing about A & L recently is the alarming tendency toward group conformity... people either conform or go off and 'do their own work' —I'm not saying we should be a liberal group... perhaps that excessive participation in the Euro-market?

But there's no point in being silly, labeling these proceedings the 'dialogical transcript method' (slightly doctored) as if it had some intrinsic methodological value and wasn't just an intuited ad hoc response to a particular situation... having the three of us available for talks... theorizing...

25. EQUIVOCATING...

Back to mechanics — what's curious about the question-like aspects of my blurting? Is it to do with expecting some sort of response or acknowledgement and so I 'frame' my blurts in such ways that I reflect that expectation? — It might be all to do with tone-of-voice. — At least it seems to catch something of blurting, more than the propositional stuff. Do you see the 'question-like' issue as reducible to full-blooded question forms, or as importantly not reducible to that? — The way you are talking about it, it has to be the latter... that 'question-like' doesn't imply 'question'. That's the trouble with, say, Apostel's analysis of questions... he sees it as not covering any form not reducible to direct questioning... as well as not covering irony or pedagogy. He also approaches the concept of partial answer only from the basis that a complete answer is in some way possible... so that a partial answer is a statement implied by a complete answer to the question.

The 'question-like aspect' is probably more sympathetic to making a particular sort of assertion than it is to full-blooded questions. Is the notion of weak assertion any use here? — where p is weakly asserted if x doesn't assert not- p ? That has some vague fit... if I blurt p , then I certainly wouldn't hold that that entails my not-blurting not- p . This is appropriate to many settings... particularly cases of explicit uncertainty or doubt where I want to allow all other alternatives some weight, even a direct denial of what I blurted.

What's the point of anticipated response of some sort... is there a difference between a social/psychological obligation-to-reply and an elicited response to an epistemic request? — I don't think you can separate them out like that... there has to be a sociological underpinning to epistemic requests... though perhaps not necessarily an epistemic basis for the social obligation-to-reply... I don't know... it's then like the problem of what to do with a person who is silent. Not-replying is clearly indexable into a conversation, but how much silence is indexable... like, how much silence can you have and still call it music? — four minutes and thirty-three seconds? There's a principle of cooperation in conversing where too much silence suggests non-cooperation... a ritualism is involved, even with epistemic conditions, and we constantly re-affirm the ritual in order to go on.

On that basis the rituals we follow are no different, not any more unique than anyone else's... perhaps there's some idiosyncratic icing on the cake, aspects of personalities, crutches we use when we try to externalize anything, — but that doesn't render the process unique. If I make a very positive sounding remark (perhaps depending on what it is), it would be given the benefit of doubt and regarded as implying an uncertain or conditional state. And that gets fucked up when someone fails to give us the benefit of doubt and takes what we

say very positively. It's like Trini (?) reporting that Terry had definitely admitted he didn't know what he was doing... Trini was blind to the paradox involved in saying that; if Terry said that, then his remark itself has to fall within its own asserted framework... you can't make a positive statement out of it. It also brings out other factors about contexts of remarks: me saying to Mel 'I don't know what I am doing' is a different remark altogether to me saying to John Weber 'I don't know what I am doing'... even though I might mean the same thing both times (?). If you realize certain existential states, then this sort of remark is probably an adequate way of reflecting those... on the other hand, if you assume I really would like to be certain of things, then the sentence reflects something else altogether.

That also comments something about taping, why this stuff is all over the place. If you transcribe a conversation by strict propositional sentences, you are blind to the aspects of sociality... you've lost the challengeability taken-for-granted in a social setting — and you don't regain it by asking a lot of rhetorical questions. You have to ad lib tone-of-voice... this is where notions like iteration are interesting and illuminate the embeddedness of most of the remarks...

I don't particularly see that the uncertainty/uproar is reflected in the surface of conversation, but more in respect to points of reference that I accept, the sorts of contingencies I see operating between those points, and those points and me. The relativism of my epistemology is reflected in that configuration... you grasp the 'uncertain' condition of what I say because you 'share' some of my points of reference, but a reader or overhearer has no access to these points, to the index of what I say. That's the point in 'unstructuring'... it's in order to include more than 'just surface', it's to embed what we say, and give access to that embedding, to build into it various points of reference of that embedding...

This isn't a single surface, it's many surfaces, or many levels of many surfaces — hence one surface may appear deterministic in isolation, but in its configuration of other levels and surfaces you come to see its indeterminacy, and the general issue with that of the problematic. It's an attempt to deal with presuppositions (here, as points of reference), make them an unavoidable part of going-on, and not just tacitly or implicitly included.

There is the point about blurting... if you say uncertainty is in the surface of our language, are you then going to rule out 'certain' remarks, or people who make certain remarks? — But that's obviously daft... because you don't have that sort of dichotomy; uncertainty doesn't rule out certainty, they are different. Uncertainty is being in some kind of existential state. Certainty is some kind of limited or restricted class constructed in respect to a particular pre-select-

ed concept of possibility which functions as a denial of the existence of what isn't taken into account by that selection.

I have a lot of misgivings about making much of the surface/depth distinction...you shouldn't take surface as epistemic...as surface is anything you want. It's simply a pragmatically relativized use, what is immediately accessible at a particular time. Depth, if you want to use that contrast as an expedient, is then anything not surface and which, from a particular viewpoint, is seen as relevant...'depth' is anything in any direction from the surface, but 'in perspective' from the surface.

It's probably wrong to confuse presuppositions with 'depth'. These act as keys to dealing with context...if you wanted to establish points of reference for this conversation, the only way you can do that is by trying to expose some of the presuppositions of what you're saying...

In the blurting-versus-assertion case...weak assertion is a special case of your regular rational assertion...to me, the so-called weak assertion seems a normal state. It's like the problem of certainty, I see certainty as a restricted special case of uncertainty. The logical constructions of these seem upsidedown. If I only asserted rationally (and strongly) or only asserted what I was certain of I would be a boring fucker...

We don't ask questions like 'How many cubic feet of water are there in the Boulder Dam?'...we ask questions like 'What do you think we are doing?' for which there plainly can't be a complete answer, but you would give me an answer. That's where it's misleading to talk of 'partial' questions and answers. —The 'question-like' metaphor comes up again...but I should be able to recognize a response when it occurs...if I say 'What is art?' and you say 'that is a salami', then it's difficult to see how that's an answer. I wouldn't say it was an insufficient answer and demand 'more' answer, instead I would want you to show me how it's an answer, to construct it into the conversation, or embed it. I don't question your answer, I question your assumptions in responding the way you did...

I can't generalize about what a 'permissible' reply is...though in allowing certain latitudes I do admit a kind of permissibility, 'letting things ride'...clutching for straws here...but there is a sense in which 'good form' has priority over 'good content'...in the social framework. —But it's meaningless, I know what you mean, you're saying that the priority is the preservation of the framework rather than the pursuit of knowledge...but Avril just walked into the room and we paused in the conversation, that's about all good form amounts to —But Terry, what happens if you're on the verge of one-of-the-world's-most-devastating-discoveries-that-would-help-mankind-and-relieve-all-suffering, would you still have paused? Then it

would be good form to ignore Avril, wouldn't it? But this links with our Education... it ties in with some earlier remarks about role-playing... not transgressing your role is part of the 'good form'. — I don't know what you're talking about.

Are you saying there is something unique about our conversations, about the forms, tactics etc... because I don't think there is. I don't think there is any formal difference with how I'm talking now and how I talk to our landlord. If there wasn't a conventional grammar, we couldn't talk at all... but you can't escape the contradiction... you need to bust up these conventions... the issue we have with it is the priority it's given, in every academic 'profession', art included, where you learn, rather you presuppose, the 'good form' before you can approach epistemic enquiry. Look at Modern Art: people get so involved in the formal structures, in manipulating them, they forget it's meant to be only a social expediency. Content fades away and nobody can deal with it even if they want to... it retards any real inquisitiveness.

This seems like a rephrasing of 'authenticity' worries...

It's not a matter of good form or content, they don't belong on the same level... content needs good form; what would happen if we gave an epistemically sufficient response, but in bad form... it does happen sometimes that we are faced with a response and we're undecided about whether it is a response or not, i.e., if I reply to you in Swahili, then no matter how epistemically adequate my reply is, it doesn't count because it's outside of the common social conventions expected in conversation... you're going to say to me 'How is that a response?'

You have the idea here of 'epistemic adequacy' as private property, and it is... it's outside of common dialogue, encounter...

26. ROUTINE...

The politics of formalism... what of the notion that abstraction is the ideology of formalism, something I'm running up against? John Searle makes as many abstractions as Kenneth Noland. The plug's been pulled a long time ago on Modern Art as the history of increasing abstraction... Formalism's so-called 'rigour' is achieved at the expense of specificity, of intensionality, of pragmatics...

You might see 'history' as another formalism... a way of making something which is complex, chaotic, and at times novel and unexpected, into something which is simpler, more uniform, more predictable, more dull...

Intensionality is fraught... the semantics/pragmatics shift can give you two notions of meaning, one an institution based sort, with meaning already constituted, a given, or the other constitutive, you build meanings in pragmatic 'encounterings'...

You have to watch the systematization of pragmatics. You 'de-institute' given meanings and shape new meanings as you go on. The problem with the institutionalized conception of language is it doesn't account for the complexities of my actual languaging (not much of it anyway). The 'competence rules' of language don't account for my performance. The very idea that there are competence rules is controversial, to say nothing of what they might be like, how they might operate. — Put it this way: we all use grammars, or competence rules are contained in our dictionaries... these are the institutional parts of language, but there's also my personal (read idiosyncratic) languaging. — No, your picture implies that a Chomskian, Katz/Fodor theory somehow naturally gives the institutional aspects of language... but nothing's given, 'institutional' is only a convenient descriptor for some language behaviour which we observe sometimes.

The picture that you have a deep structure of syntax from which you head towards surface pragmatics, picking up semantics on the way is, to me, a joke, a game — the point is our semantics is just another abstraction, a reduction on aspects of pragmatics... if you like.

Well, what is it we do share? — It seems that we use the concept of institutionality because we've experienced many instances of people behaving in the world in such a way that what they say seems a function of their institutional position, their role... that commits us to nothing about the formal structure of such language-use, especially that it's institutional, it just states how they appear to us on our various projections... there's a parallel with culture... we might have to think of an individual 'culturing', in dialogue with the encultured aspects of their social context... conceptions of role... Sartre's waiter — if I swallow that, I should get a professorship of nonsense...

27. ...CORPSE OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

How... is the notion of metaphor interesting? I remarked that a lot of what we say is metaphorical...but I also remember that French existentialist when we were up in Nova Scotia last summer— we spent three hours going on about the possibility of applying Kuhn's concept of paradigms to an art situation and, at the end, he said, 'That's all very well, but it's all metaphoric, what have you got to say about art?'. That was just an instance of the question coming up...

Well, then literal...a literal language is one which has developed its own conventions, it is a definitional approach to language, implying a striving for an unambiguous language, — but a metaphor is something like a cutting across those conventions, where you are talking in one set of conventions and you borrow something from another... for psychological force.

If we can't have a systematization or conventionalization of what we are doing, then there's an inappropriateness about talking of what we are doing as metaphor since that presupposes that somewhere, lurking behind our talking, is a literal language. That's if you construct metaphor within the literal-metaphoric dichotomy of Max Black and others; it's then a problem not unlike, if you stick to the Analytic tradition, of saying irony is saying p and meaning not-p... which is trivially true but misses the point, maybe the praxis, of irony...

Metaphor, in the Analytic tradition, is able to be reduced to a literal language, it's always treated as a deviance...a deviance from 'standard' usage. You are presupposing that you do have a literal or conventional language to start with...and that it's unproblematic.... That's to say, there is always some aprioristically privileged language granted (assumed) as natural and to be protected from 'the deviants' ...doesn't that have a familiar ring to it?

The notion of metaphor as a substitute for a literal expression, as reducible to it, is a naive view of language. What are the literal meanings of what I blurt? And, if I have no literal language, does it make any sense to talk about metaphor?

Literal is supposed to have to do with the case, the way things really are...this is daft...an unproblematical representational language ...and there is the same kind of insidiousness to this as to other aspects of the 'myth of the given'..arbitrarily privileged language.

Another view is to divide 'actual' language (Goodman called it) into literal and metaphorical expressions, so that both get in as actual ...then the way language develops literalness absorbs metaphor, metaphors come up as 'fresh expressions' and then they are literal-

ized by use. This has parallels to the idea that reflexive statements may be 'merely' reflexive, but they get absorbed into, if you like, the 'literalness' of the ongoing conversation and this saves you from regress...

Though I think the problem of metaphor can be tied up with that stuff about irony...see it in that context rather than literalness (?). You come to a problematic situation and you can't work through it, to keep going, you metaphorize the problem...you work on an 'as if' level. This fits in with Black's view where a metaphor is a gap-filler, it facilitates going-on...which seems like a poverty-stricken view of metaphor...surely it broadens the problematic in some ways, not just a gap-filler...

It's hard to shake the distinction that your literal language counts in the world whereas your metaphorical one hasn't got that kind of accountability...that's a disastrous distinction. It opposes irony and metaphor to having any teleological reasons for going on; it's as if, if we really knew what we were doing, we could forget about metaphor and irony...it's setting up a situation where both of these things are unreal...where they are somehow 'impractical'...and maybe they are?

A couple of things occur to me out of this; either I don't know why we are talking about metaphor, or, we seem to be heading toward not just making our language out to be very frail, but placing the whole thing on quicksand...and it seems more of the latter...

If I use an expression like 'technicolor yawn', I might think that, given an appropriate social ambiance, it's an amusing characterization of vomiting...if I was in a situation of wanting to be an amusing fellow and I didn't want to say 'oh, he's being sick', since that's boring and no-one would laugh and feel as though we were together in a social situation. Literalizing that would be reducing something which occurs in a particular social setting and time to a literal 'objective' meaning.

Using metaphor like this, isn't it a way of making explicit an index of the particular circumstances? — Mel might say it to me, with a measure of humour, but he wouldn't use it speaking to Abe Beame(?).

28. WE WISH THEY HAD A DICTIONARY

Making a bizarre analogy... you might form a picture of A&L by saying it's an incredibly complex metaphor and that if you ask 'what does it mean?', then you reduce it to some sort of literal index-free body, which it really isn't... but bizarre!

Literal has a very different indexicality than metaphor, but... in talking of A&L as 'metaphoric', you are admitting a kind of broader view.

In a way, metaphor renders context explicit (or at least, a context), literal takes it for granted... but that doesn't at all imply it's context-free, only that it's not admitted — you have to be able to see context-free as a special case, or subset, of a context-dependence.

Levi-Strauss mentions that in most languages there's an association between the words used for fucking and eating. Most of the common words we use to describe fucking seem to be metaphoric... but the association, an example in English seems to be consume and consummate... at some level, it's probably the same root word. But, on the surface of our language, the association is metaphoric, — we have changed it, separated them in different categories. But there are still languages where they actually have the same word to describe both acts... that's how confused it is.

A literal-metaphoric distinction wasn't constructible out of the instrumentality at Weber's... how can you have that distinction when selecting from a list of modalities. But the points of reference for that list of modalities was already (from most people's viewpoint) metaphoric... can you call them that?

Talking about A&L (England)... a problem in relation to constructing a dictionary or lexicon might be its inability to handle metaphor. The most striking metaphors, it's a truism to point out, haven't been used before. How would you have transformational rules for these? A dictionary reflects infinite potential for new sentences, it doesn't show infinite potential for new metaphor, — metaphor relies largely on extra-linguistic context and that seems to be the clue... a dictionary can't handle extra-linguistic contexts, all meaning must be determinable by the reading of a sentence. To incorporate extra-linguistic contexts entails representing practically every item of information about the world.

That doesn't say doing a dictionary wouldn't be worthwhile, all it says is that it isn't a very adequate tool for accounting for what may, in our praxis, come up. It might be an interesting heuristic? Its interest would be its failure to even partially explain what might come up, keeping in mind it would be a fragment too... a question of obsolescence.

The problem of dealing with words in context — what dictionaries do is give the word and then some stage directions for one or two of its possible uses... with the explicit assumption that these are paradigm uses. Which presupposes a literalness, or a reduction to same. Mightn't the idea of the dictionary have shaped this whole problem, the need to be able to enter things in dictionaries, and then a slow building up of a dependence on that situation?

A dictionary is basically to do with semantics. Katz and Fodor's notions about constructing a dictionary on deep grammar 'tree structures' means inserting semantic markers on the various 'branches'. 'State' might be used in many different categories, 'state of mind', 'New York State', etc. You get various contexts of use but these are the literal ones... and given that sort of (a priori) conventional category of use, you assign a semantic marker on the tree structure and you have a definition of use. The idea is that if you keep going, adding more markers, you should end up with a fairly replete semantic description of the English language. What you end up with is something larger and more complex than language itself...

Other questions... does our common stock of (English) words embody all the distinctions and connections worth making? — accumulated through generations, and hence the language that has survived is the fittest? — and similarly, the entrenched 'art language'? — But, in the first place, survival of the fittest presupposes the existence of alternatives and hence can't be used as an argument against admitting alternatives... so it's got to be a basis for encouraging other/different languages. The entrenched art language has a certain ontology, it has a certain structure, and it all seems very clear and not in need of change — but (and this is the rub), despite all that, we still know virtually nothing about the circumstances in which this language will turn out to be misleading... The stream of chatter A&L has produced (inappropriate as it looks) has had the advantage that we are somewhat aware of the circumstances which force us to doubt our language or languaging.

When I use the notion of praxis I'm not using it in a standard Marxist sense, — but that doesn't mean that I'm therefore using it metaphorically. If you are a Marxist it can be clearly seen when you've 'achieved praxis', since that's when, in a particular social circumstance, you perform an action that's politically effective — given your program. Now, the question is, what about our notion of praxis? Isn't the Marxist one general enough to encompass what we do? Praxis is not just aligning yourself with some ideology; it has, so to speak, to do with the idea that the world exists, not apart from me, but because of what I do... there is a contingency between work and our sense of reality. Along with this you get the 'is/ought', 'prescriptive/descriptive' distinctions collapsing... I mean these are not just idle philosophical distinctions, rather they pervade and shape our lives,

and what we are doing here (I think) has to do with the possible revisability of our language, and it's praxis in that sense...revisability of language counts in the world because the world is how you construct it, what you do in it.

29. . . . CONCATENATION . . .

I blurt at particular times . . . time is not isolable from other notions —change, process, contradiction, number, etc. There's no rational assumption that what is blurted at one point in the conversation is held throughout . . . indexing the times in such cases offers some 'escape' from logical contradiction.

We do care about what the other person thinks . . . this is social . . . but I do care about what you guys think rather than simply seeing it as a case of whether or not you have my point of view —it's not about getting others to agree 100% with me. My caring has more to do with you than with my point of view . . . which underscores the dialogical framework and not a logical or formal framework, it makes no sense to isolate it as the latter type of mechanism . . .

What about dialogical teleology? —I don't think our going-on is teleological, I can't see it like this anymore. A notion of 'becoming' (going-on) doesn't entail having an (explicit) idea of what you want to become . . . you don't project anymore than fragmentary 'goals' or 'ends', it's more about projecting your own possibilities . . . that concept of Dasein where it projects itself towards its own possibilities, that it is ahead of itself and consequently 'lives' in the dimension of the future. To make the concept of teleology fit that, it wouldn't be teleology anymore. Future projecting isn't end projecting. A conversationalist is, as it were, a worker for change, not a worker for ends. The point is you are not just an attempted 'changer' since that implies the possibility of being a failed changer, but rather a worker for . . .

Changing the assent conditions, what does that mean? If you fail, does it mean you have failed to change the social conditions required for assent, that is, the sorts of relations that exist between particular people? —One implication of what we said earlier about sociality is that, in many situations, if I raise an issue it doesn't matter whether you make the response that helps deal with it, or whether I make it. We don't always proceed by attempting to persuade each other . . . Perhaps it's at a different state; at one state I'm trying to persuade you something is an issue, and once we share the sense that it is an issue then it doesn't matter where the clue comes from which helps resolve it. This does sound a bit queer . . .

What I am getting at here is that a dialectic in some way transcends the individual inputs . . . the conversation isn't merely the sum of the idiolectic possibilities of each individual at that time . . . this is the sociality of the dialectic. It might be worth looking at the times that the sociality doesn't 'work' as well as when it does. That is, the times when there are incompatible or disputed inputs, rather than 'accumulating' inputs —But I'm surprised you think that is when the sociality doesn't 'work'?

Some remarks are more idiosyncratic...when they are 'socialized' is largely when they are remarks that other persons could have said ...given time...or that they would like to have said. The social, dialogical, state then transcends the individual state and you end up with something that none of us as private individuals could have put together. So you can say...that's not me, you and him talking, it's us talking...sociality does work for us...

You might argue with Terry in order to change his opinion; but underlying that is the assumption, if he changes his opinion, then he will act in some way accordingly...the assumption is of some causal relationship between his opinions and his actions. However, we all have experienced instances of this failing...when the actions I have assumed are entailed by holding some opinion are not the actions assumed entailed by other people.

30. BXAL-ING.

Blurting is a special type of communicating which is a type of action. Can blurting merge with change: change can be represented by a pair of state descriptions: in the first of which a proposition is held true and in the second the proposition is held false. This is the T-relation, which is a temporal connective, '...and next...'. The action of change can then be described by three state descriptions: S_1 : the state when the action began; S_2 : the state when the action is completed; S_3 : the state that would have followed the initial state if the action had not occurred. Thus you get the basic expression: $S_1 T S_2 I S_3$.

Combining this with a formal notion of blurting we get the basic expression $Bxp T Byq I Byr$... which reads as 'x blurts p and then y blurts q whereas y would have blurted r otherwise'. Now, it is a possibility that q is the same as p, or the same as not-p; and it's possible that r is the same as q, or not-q, or p, or not-p. And it's also possible that x and y are the same person.

A list of these possibilities are:

Bxp	T	Byq	I	Byr	(1)
Bxp	T	Byq	I	Byq	(2)
Bxp	T	Byq	I	By(-p)	(3)
Bxp	T	Byq	I	Byq	(4)
Bxp	T	Byq	I	By(-q)	(5)
Bxp	T	Byp	I	Byq	(6)
Bxp	T	Byp	I	Byp	(7)
Bxp	T	Byp	I	By(-p)	(8)
Bxp	T	By(-p)	I	Byq	(9)
Bxp	T	By(-p)	I	Byp	(10)
Bxp	T	By(-p)	I	By(-p)	(11)

— where (1)-(5) describe y blurting something other than what x blurts; (6)-(8) describe y blurting the same as x; (9)-(11) describe y denying what x blurts.

The function of the S_3 description is to interpret what sorts of 'forces' are operating on y. It functions as a sort of index for the first two terms. Notice in each group there is one description where there is no change despite Bx ...and the suggestion gained in (9) and (10) of the possibility of mutually contradictory contributors. In (1) and (5), what x blurts and y blurts is on the surface not explicitly related; However, (1) suggests possible ambivalence or contrariness on the part of y; (3) seems to suggest y being at least partly persuaded by x; whereas (4) suggests y is stubborn or resolute, generally not persuaded by x.

All this is tentative... fanciful interpretations... and a bit behavioral...

What we get with this sort of (simplistic) description is a simple concatenation and an index of sorts for that concatenation.

The T-relation suffices as concatenation... in the New York Handbook for example, concatenation was formalized by characterizing all the possible T-relations under two broad...I'll say...symbols. Now this undermines the notion of change somewhat...to characterize concatenation by change limits it considerably, even trivializes it. The temporality is all that still holds with the same strength.

Change, insofar as it occurs, occurs between the second and third members of the expression, i.e., between S_2 and S_3 ...hence change has to be seen as only one possible (range of) index.

You could illustrate this with the sort of framework we set up for the show at Schema in Florence...we had a list of blurts or points of reference each of which we embedded in terms of the others on the list. Any one of the blurts in isolation I would interpret in one way, however when I used that blurt in embedding one of the other blurts I would hardly agree that I had used it in that original interpretation...I would say under the particular new circumstances, the interpretation had changed. That was the problem with Schema, the changes in interpretations (...the intensionality of the choosing and deciding) were not retrievable in the structure..something like the above Bx-ing list might have given us at least a few indications about that decision making, the whole list acting as an index for a basic concatenation...

In terms of the above remarks about the sociality of our dialogue, I would probably drop the overt formalization of blurts to individuals, merely relativizing the blurts to the social context and, when it seemed appropriate, indexing the blurts to particular individuals of that context. This means dropping the x and y from the above expressions. What is left is asymptotic with the Bxal-ing system they worked out in England and was used at the Weber Gallery and lots of other places. It also points up what we intend in references to 'A&L', that it is a social context in which we all have references, it's not a thing...not a cultural group. Relativizing blurts to that social context, it has to be made quite explicit that the relativizing is social, not epistemic or 'objective'...

It should be said that formalizing Bx-ing expressions lends itself to already formalized (partly) circumstances like the Annotations rather better than our 'informal' conversations. In fact this Bx-ing was sorted out as an attempt to formalize the exchange possibilities in the Annotations...

The Bxal-ing system used at Weber's was interesting in the way it fragmented a language surface and 'constructed' or 'mapped' relationships between those fragments...the way the relationships were

relativized to the individual doing it, to his intuitions ('feelings') about bits of language; it was something like a demonstration of the indeterminacy (even arbitrariness) of our language... if you can live with the indeterminacy then you can to some degree escape the tyranny of the language. If I say I accept language as basic, you have to understand what my concept of language implies... Artforum is drowning in a sea of words, I am not, none of us are, believe it or not.

The Weber show and the Schema show demonstrated the degree to which language is underdetermined by the users of language... you have to be able to see formalism as not just a disease of art but also a disease of language... there really isn't anything to be rigorous about. Using logical expressions isn't a way of demonstrating how terribly rigorous we can be, quite the reverse...

The basic expression in the Horley system was 'Bxal By Cal' which is read 'blurting x (indexed A&L) followed by blurting y and described as "going-on" in A&L'. It was pretty much set up for 'internal' dialogue... however you could shift the first index 'al' onto the second member of the concatenation and get a curious 'inside/outside' mapping expression — 'Bx Byal Cal' where Bx might or might not be uttered in relation to an A&L context... a mapping of appropriations... the first member being a 'floating' candidate, landing anywhere it likes.

Is this a possible way of mapping our discourse onto other people's discourse? Michael did sort out a form of Bxal-ing... the Bj-type which approached this in another way...

The whole point of the Bxal-ing system is, despite its seeming complexity, it's very simple and also very subtle... the mad fear of logic is what puts people off. — But also there's been the fact that no clear enough explanation has been sorted out about it... though it's debatable whether that's even possible, since a large part of its richness is that it relies on personal interpretation... which is itself indexable into the system... a 'lucid' explanation undermines that sort of richness...

The greatest loss, in my mind, with the Bxal-ing has been that while you do end up with a surface of sorts it's basically unreadable unless you did it yourself... it's a surface expressible only in quasi-logical expressions and a token indexicalization of those expressions.

It's a pity a form of it wasn't sorted out so that from the quasi-logical index of the relationship between the fragments of language (the members of the concatenation) you could actually generate another surface or fragment of 'ordinary' English. The problem from our end on doing the Bxal-ing on the Weber show was that in respect

to surface of 'ordinary' language, what we started out with was what we ended up with...at least the Projekt '74 index in Cologne was some improvement in that respect. What I'm saying is that rather than use your guessing-in-the-limit in respect to making selections from a logified set of expressions, use your guessing-in-the-limit to generate another language surface...the operations might be just as recondite, but at least the surface generated would allow the viewer more potential for reconstruction on an experiential basis...

This was being attempted with some of the presently abandoned Workbook notions...generating an index in the first place and then in some way using that index to generate a 'new' surface. It could be done with the Weber forms (indexes)...the forms as they stand are a subtle mechanism for mapping the relationship between two fragments of language, the language fragments being given and the relationship being mappable from the mapper's point of view...but, by taking one of those fragments as given and also the mapped index or relationship as given, then generate a second fragment (i.e., the second member of that concatenation). This would be extremely hard, since you would be generating that 'new' surface by literally guessing-in-the-limit...but it would certainly be as interesting for us and more interesting from the display point of view, ending up with a thousand new 'bits of language', say, ordered according to the order of the first members of the concatenations...you might end up with some wierd syntax and semantics, but maybe some fairly realistic pragmatics...

31. ENDLESS REVISABILITY...

Some of what we've done over the past year has been to try to devise ways of getting 'beyond' the surfaces of our language. That doesn't mean trying to construct a 'deep structure' or 'logical structure' or any of the other formal or grammatical stuff... it's not a matter of contrasting 'depth' with 'surface', if you want a contrast with surface try another surface...

Mel made a comment that all we can do is rearrange bits of language ... which is true, but if you think of it two dimensionally, as all on 'one big surface', then you've got it screwed-up...

So you could rearrange along a temporal dimension or possible modal axes, but I'm not talking of a Chomskian competence/performance distinction or even anything like Hintikka's 'depth information', because with that what you have is a series of reductions until you get something like a logical structure of the information.

Are you talking about intensionality when talking about getting 'beyond' surfaces? —Most chatting about blurting and asserting is extensional ... obviously... but there is no way of dealing 'directly' with intensions... all you do is catch bits 'between' the surfaces and try to give these some 'space', constituting it in some formalized or logified decision-process. Intensions still remain ineffable, just a number of decisions can be indicated... it's not much...

We tried to give access to some intensional processes in the Schema show. We had a list of 77 blurts and embedded each of those blurts using only the other blurts, so forming an 'expression'; a sort of 'dialogical context' for each blurt for each of us... the expression formed represented the (preconditions for) acceptability of a particular blurt, a sort of mapping each of ourselves onto each blurt in respect to the other blurts, and in respect to each other...

In order to represent these mappings there was a recursive rule or convention, which co-ordinated the expression, bracketing various 'layers' of acceptability... the whole thing being treated as a rather gross hybrid.

Clearly most of the blurts are context-dependent (or 'sensitive')... what you are basically doing is defining a personal notion of that contextedness —'to what degree are each of these blurts determined by their contexts for you?'... and vice versa —you have a simple ordering device for representing your 'choosing and deciding'...

The language is relativized and shared points of reference are shared differently by each of us. Things like that are by and large about opening up, as it were, 'intensional spaces'...

What came out was the grossness of Schema...for example:

- (i) The existentialist's 'existence' over and above grammar/concatenation!
- (ii) For the Left-Hegelians running a magazine was enough of a question of practice.
- (iii) Talking to avid Art-Language readers?
- (iv) There is a problem anyway: this won't be the same when it's translated into Italian.
- (v) According to Milton, Pandemonium is the capital of Hell.

There was no 'refined' machinery...and when I see someone try to explain in terms of Hintikka or whoever, my jaw drops...because it's a different kind of texture, it fits only in a very unfitting way!

But this leaves us in an awkward position of almost saying that the machinery didn't exist at all or was strictly intuitive...whereas there was a bracketing system sorted out and decided upon, which operated as a convention, and which you can't overlook. —No, that's not what I meant; there's nothing wrong with saying there's a bit of machinery which you can use to imply a relationship between some things...but if you say 'here are 77 blurts, go ahead and embed them in any order you want', then I think there is machinery, but it's intuitive —But look, don't you see that 'here are 77 blurts, go ahead and embed them' is already a highly unintuitive piece of machinery...I'm never faced with such a list in daily conversation..I don't deliberate about how bits of my languaging are embedded...

I know how it's indeterminate and frail trying to figure out how people use language...it's crazy...all you can do is cast a net and see what it catches...and you can probably take as a rule that what it catches isn't as interesting as what it misses...

You mean embedding in the sense of a particularized contextualization, putting something into an actual situational setting? It comes up as a 'context of use'? —how something exists in relation to a particular situation and person(s)...biography...and it depends on how broad or narrow a sense you want; I might say that an expression has a particular embeddedness for me, and at the same time say each time I use that expression it occurs in a different embedding...

Embedding is a function of context, and a way of opening up context. We might be able to constitute some interesting points of reference, we might be able to get some purchase on 'cultural situations', a sort of configuration determined in respect to a given surface of language and a given set of points of reference in our culture...in other words, some sort of 'cultural readings'.

Can embedding be allied with indexicality? Where you have something that might be dealt with as an explicit case of embedding, you

have a situation which lends itself to indexing, an index of embeddedness... talking about indexicality in a 'rich' sense, not particularly in the sense Bar-Hillel suggested, which was the minimum amount of context required for a 'minimum amount' of truth-value, or semantic interpretation.

In other words, if I say 'The sun is shining', then it needs to be indexed to a time, a date, a place, a person, a fragment of conversation (to tell it's not a line in a joke, or something like that), etc...and from this you can say it's true or not...

But some sort of 'cultural index' might be much more interesting, for instance, why on earth are we sitting here discussing an utterance like 'The sun is shining'...that's far more interesting...people are going to walk into Jaap Rietman's bookstore and buy this, and read us talking about things like 'The sun is shining'...and that fact is just as curious as us talking about it, even more so...but it's all part of what in a broad cultural sense is presupposed in order to get a 'cultural' reading.

The notion of cultural index is close to the Marxist notion of demystification, or de-reification of objects...the possibility of cultural criticism...like the idea of a clock being embedded as 'punctuality as a way of life'...gives a broad cultural context, the pragmatic presuppositions...

32. STRIVING IN THE UPROAR.

Embedding has come up in two ways; one is in the cultural reading sense; and the other in a more praxiological sense...related to some thoughts we had about pathways...the latter being a bit of a mechanistic notion, I think Michael (Corris) even used 'unfolding' in relation to pathways. —There's a lot about pathways in the New York Handbook, where you had about 400 randomized blurts and a number of possibilities for connecting them up, or making 'pathways' through what was a kind of languaged environment...here, pathway was geared towards being a public operation, an explicit public access device...intended to make the reading of a particular body of material more 'real' for someone, much in the Kierkegaardian sense of throwing it back onto the reader's 'subjectivity' ...so they have to decide and deliberate about it...

The Schema show operated in a similar way, using a different notion of pathway or embedding, and it was to do with leaving some traces, the possibility of reconstructing our actions, deliberations, etc...

You are involved in some transformations, in a combining or associative sense, also in specifying special conditions for expansion... expansion doesn't just mean adding more sentences, but specifying (... an index of...) context(s). We start from fragments of language...embedding implies some sort of indexable context or expansion in respect to (a set of) points of reference...

I am talking about access to embedding, not just embedding...and a pathway is one way of granting access...it amounts to setting up an a priori piece of scaffolding or formalizing framework which you can't escape. This became very obvious with the Workbooks and the various attempts to get beyond it by introducing 'write-in' conditions: for instance, if you treat a pathway as a sequence of concatenations, (1 & 2) and (2 & 3) and (3 & 4) and so on, then you can designate 'criteria' or satisfaction conditions for the first concatenation and then form a second concatenation on the basis of that criteria, indexing at each step of the pathway and then trying to proceed by satisfying the index...so, the more 'index' you write-in, the more difficult it is to go-on...

To some extent, this got around pathways being over-deterministic ...a pathway existed only by the conditions you can invent for it... but it's still a strain to break away from the aprioriness of the framework...

This work is about having some language which is a priori embedded and then proceeding to do some personal (re-)embedding of bits of that language...the initial embeddedness being about the 'sharedness' of the language and the operations performed being about how each of us shares it differently —what would be amazing

would be if you could sort out a set of transformations between those embeddings — But the initial sharedness, what does it amount to? — You said something about it presupposing 'that some type of (weak... semantic... pragmatic...) entailment holds between the blurts of the set of 77'...but, by saying all you have is a pragmatic entailment, you might be simply proposing that the list was selected on June 2nd, this can count as a sort of entailment...but entailment was brought up in respect to closure, of having arbitrarily 'closed' language environments, the Handbook, the Workbooks...and it depends on how arbitrary you want to regard that closure, e.g., limiting your operations to those possible to perform on this list of 77 blurts, or that surface of language, whatever...it depends on what you are prepared to say is arbitrary...most of us do stop short of saying 'it's all arbitrary' so we could just as well be making paintings or writing poetry; so in some sense you are left with trying to probe at entailment or inductive support holding on some level...

The idea that we proceed inductively might sound a bit crazy, until you realize that counter-inductive forms just an inductive basis... you know, you don't exclude 'negative heuristics'...the problem comes when you start to think that we might proceed, either inductively or counter-inductively, deliberately..and not incidently, as an after-the-facts observation...

If you wanted to get a 'cultural reading' of the 77 Schema blurts, you have the same problem...looking for some sort of inductive support on the basis of relevant variables for each blurt, i.e., a list of all sets of culturally and mutually exclusive circumstances; these variables would have to be like 'interpretation limits' or 'linguistic edges' of the blurts, points at which a shift from one variant to the other of a variable makes trouble for the interpretation of the blurt.

For example, if we took Schema #14 ('Selfishness in A&L'), the obvious relevant variables for this might be: (i) selfishness/unselfishness, (ii) in/not-in, (iii) A&L/other-than-A&L...this seems a fairly simple blurt, but none of us would say that exhausts the possible relevant variables for this blurt...in selecting #14 as a point of reference in an embedding illustration, the above variables don't give adequate definition...of course not, how could you exhaust (say) the metaphoric possibilities, etc...

The dialectic between languaging and languagedness is asymptotic with the 'dialogue' between embedding and embeddedness...hence it's odd in retrospect, especially in the Handbook and Schema, that we never took up the possibility of embedding a blurt in itself...connecting something to itself as a possible concatenation, in the sense of (re) iteration...the Handbook explicitly rules that out; Schema didn't — but no-one used iteration in any of the operations anyway...

Pathways function on a one-to-one basis... what about one-to-many mapping? —like Schema, where you had the 'many' arranged in a hierarchically-ordered (or recursive) configuration... you're not 'getting discourse' in the same way —a pathway is a bit like connecting lines between dots on a surface, it all looks flat, connections between surfaces or between levels aren't accessible... a particular pathway seems to be about how to represent those connections in relation to one surface (... that's really pretty dumb).

In the New York Handbook, 'depth' is suggested only in terms of two connecting functions ('→' and '&') —as a means of expansion, it's a bit facile... you stop when you get tired or bored, not because it becomes too difficult (a condition introduced in some of the Workbooks).

The significance is you have to deliberate about how to go-on, but the question 'Will I go-on?' doesn't open up the Pandora's box of 'Why...?', 'Why ought I...?', etc. Questions like the former are ones asked in the same context, whereas the latter are reflexive and imply a different... dialectical... context of questioning —like Carnap's internal and external questions... though that's a bit misleading, it's not about external views but how much is taken for granted within a context...

You have to give some conditions for embedding —what conditions? The bits of language in a languaged environment (an arbitrarily-closed list of blurts) have to be taken extensionally... we are then approaching language in extensional contexts and trying to indicate (evidence of) 'intensional spaces' (?) Isolated blurts don't represent your intensions, but your deliberating about making a connection between two blurts may... psychology... intensionality is psychological, not logical... even though Montague et al. go on about the logics of intensional languages.

Schema tried to deal with intensions by the bracketing convention, the Handbook by its two functions... neither was all that intensive. Schema did demonstrate that extensional coincidences (different persons selecting the same blurts in the same order) do not entail intensional coincidence... how could it? —Anyway, even taking it as strictly extensional, it has got to be accepted if embedding expressions are coincidental for two persons (say) in the first six members of the expressions, further expansion will necessarily reach a point where there is no more coincidence.

How could embedding be a mapping of extensional sentences/blurts onto an intensional 'space'?

The bracketing intimated various things, but we really needed a rich way of indexing the brackets —the bracketing ended up as being merely another way of representing everything on one surface

—but then you would need another indexing of the index of the brackets, and you see the sort of comical regresses you get.

How do you represent your deliberation.. the Bxal-ing forms are an example, one way of doing it. You try to indicate your decision-processes in relation to a set form... the sort of form you design is unavoidably crucial in influencing the types of decisions you actually make. But this is why it is a map, maps are projection systems, the only way to catch this intensionality is by mapping...

But it is almost impossible for anyone else to interpret the form after you have filled it in...

Some of the Workbooks were explicitly about this problem... indexing choice decisions... transcripts another attempt, a more informal one... trying to 'build-in' as many intensional/biographical working conditions...

We are into indefensible areas... there is a kind of regress. Take one of those hybrid expressions on the Weber forms... and say Ian and Philip both selected line #3, but what does that tell us? —It would be OK if you could say the selections were in some formalizable way defensible... but again, the mappings are complex and intuitive...

33. ART-CAREER COMPONENTS.

It might be possible, speaking generally, to see A&L as having shifted away from the object of contemplation type 'appreciation' to a critical generation of 'contexts of learning'.

I could accept within our context a painting for its capability to teach me something, I could accept propositions I just don't 'believe'... i. e., I could manufacture a show of things directly 'opposing' to A&L and still find them 'acceptable' to our context because of the references we've established.

It's like the absurdity that, while most people see the history of Modern art as one of ever-increasing specialization, they also see A&L as an esoteric specialism within that stream... Modern art can either be accelerated (Koncept Kunst) or decelerated (New Realism etc.)...but just try to get some hooks into references in the real world...

The antedeluvian idea of history in art-retrospectives. Nicholas Logsdail said we should have a 'retrospective'. First there was the idea about articulating a 'history of failures'. But the point in putting the work in a linear progression is that it's too simple, and too insidiously simple. Our recent work may have more to do with Feyerabend and Montague than it does to do with Secret Paintings and Mirror Pieces. A 'retrospective' of our work over the past seven years would have to include a sizable segment of the whole world...

The point is people like Stezaker catch one aspect, the 'art' aspect of the history...in terms of what 'the artworld' project, A&L problems do look very specialized..like when Sol LeWitt says that Vic Burgin does the same kind of thing we do...Jesus...

To paraphrase Wittgenstein talking about Carnap: if you mention Stezaker once more, I'll lose my milkshake.

In terms of acceleration...the choices are working out (exhausting) the details of the present options (i. e., working in the current specialization) or, considering alternatives —the latter may be considered as an alternate specialization or as an alternative to specialization...the 'deconstructing' notion. Now the fact that everyone has seemingly opted for the former choice (or the first option of the latter choice) isn't a case for arguing for its 'innateness'...but more a case that our education is in the hands of people who implicitly subscribe to a doctrine of the necessity of specialization, 'concentration'...simply-doing-your-job.

Pluralism comes up in scientific methodology, as the sociological

equivalent of liberalism, and trendies like Collins, having read people like Sellars at our suggestion, use perhaps useful notions like pluralism as a slogan to push liberalism — Like what David Antin said about Collins' 'Things and Theories', that its world shattering message was everything's still the same in art — which makes half the people happy—but also that everything was different in art — which makes the other half happy.

The thing is that it's not a transformation of ontological dilemmas into the positivism of manageable methodological problems, the latter meaning that it's a choice between various linguistic frameworks...in other words, the metaphysician has overviews, and thus real dilemmas about what exists, etc., then Carnap and Co. come along, reject overviews, and persuade everyone that it's enough to sort things out into linguistic frameworks...this relativism of various linguistic frameworks still omits the very thing we want to stress, i. e., a particular person's pragmatics, the effort to try to establish points of reference yourself, such that you can deal with any framework, make translations between them...you can do far more than you can from within one of these frameworks. — You also show 'external' viewpoints to be fraught...the pernicious fantasy that your view of another person can be 'neutral'.

My view of you is a construction projected pragmatically in terms of my reference points...because these are my references, nothing I use in the construction is external...

But how do you decide between constructions? — You can't, you'd have to project onto a 'neutral' value-system...it comes down to point of view, something like insisting our 'projections' are just more generative.

But we have an advantage: it's not me alone trying to convince the crowd, I don't want to do that; I don't have to because I already have some working social relations, I have already constructed things not privately but intersubjectively...

Artists have always gotten by with making (ludicrously) positivistic claims, and I think A&L in the last two or three years has tried to proceed non-positivistically. — But isn't a recognition of generativeness or effectiveness in the world a measure for distinguishing between constructions — talk about positivism...fuck! — But that's a basis for saying things like anybody who remembers Avalanche in five years will be a nostalgist...

It's not so much that any of us hate overviews...artist as anthropologist stuff, it's more that I find it impossible to have one...they are too rational...the ones I've tried have all had the shape of theatre, of entertainment...the horror of being closed down if you don't please a certain audience, the Broadway runaround of art

stylistics in this city...I can't have an overview because what I do is embedded, it's worrying when you want to know which overview is 'right', which 'wrong'...

I might be saying that a viewpoint can only be articulated internally, not externally...an A&L viewpoint...I don't know what it is but I know what it's like to have one!

Sociology, anthropology, seem to exist in the world in an unproblematic way...moral indignation, righteousness, are tempting, easy, but for us I think unreal options...but that isn't a general law, just something that worries me about some A&L people in New York...it's like talking about problems as if you don't actually have them yourself. And sociology gives you the option of talking about the bourgeois without considering the problematicity of you yourself being bourgeois...and somehow the status of such remark is easy, and worrying...

Lucy Lippard said she 'enjoyed' A&L but still didn't understand it, which might show for her understanding is having an external view or overview, something we can't provide...the best understanding she could have is to not-understand...not-understanding is 'understanding'...the best purchase on us is a confusion about the work .. at least that might be the beginning of 'understanding'. And given typical art-historical expectations, you can't conceive of a learning situation so outrageous, uproarious...you can't shake contemplative 'appreciation'...

It's considering the problems of situations without considering the problematicity of you being part of the problem that we've been going on about all through these talks...and this is what bureaucracy really means.

But on the other hand, we're not really after irrationalism...pandemonium expresses something of our situation...and, in this state, I can get some work done, but pandemonium isn't an overt goal... learning isn't trading for knowledge, knowing that you're learning isn't a matter of accounting chunks of 'acquired knowledge'...in one sense, I know a lot less than I did five years ago, that is, I'm a lot less certain about a lot more. The traditional theory of knowledge would rule me out as knowing nothing...

What we do exists in a context of the possibility of failure...we are all familiar with how ideas (etc.) can be safe-guarded so that failure becomes impossible, this is a factor we've considered...we might be failing in ways that are inconceivable in a 'history of art'...

34. THE UNREALITY OF THIS CULTURE...

(The following two sections were transcribed and doctored up for a specific purpose: some of it will appear early in 1975 in The American Connexion, a collection of essays on U.S. influence in Australia, published by Macmillan & Co.)

The whole point of bourgeois Culture is to promote detachment, the unreality of Culture. One gets a picture of this very clearly in the general notion of art being a part of our leisure, part of our 'time-off'.

A Marxist analysis of culture is useful insofar as it allows you to go beyond reified objects —for example, it's possible to see a clock not simply as a clock but 'punctuality as a way of life' —in the same way, it is possible to see art, not just in an object but in the notion of detachment, of detached 'appreciation' as a way of life. This kind of 'culture' is being rammed down our throats by the MOMA, Artforum etc...they don't acknowledge the ideology of what they are doing because they can't...

At MOMA you find there is no one to accept responsibility, no one in control of 'policy', no one to 'blame'. It's Kafka-esque. Those who organize the MOMA 'travelling shows' send the art around, not because of any intrinsic worth, but because of some model in the sender's mind. Now, what sort of model is that? What causes them to choose one conceptual model of 'the arts' over another? Do they 'choose'? Is there 'another'? It's really got nothing to do with intrinsic worth, ghosts within the objects, it's got to do with the ideological...probably tacit...presuppositions of the senders...and this needs looking at.

The problem seems to lie in the degree that Culture has become bureaucratized. In the West this is bourgeois Culture, the culture of aesthetics, of passivity, of detachment. If, using some magic wand, you rid Australia of U.S. influence, you would still be left with the need, the local need, for Official Culture.

There is a similar institutionalization in Socialist countries, the similar consequence of over-determining the social style of their culture. In Capitalist society, however, it's possible to maintain the myth that artists create 'freely' since the controls are implicit and internalized. To us, Soviet censorship looks dangerously overt; to them, the ways we render our artists impotent by coercing them with 'success' might look like even more invidious censorship.

You talk about U.S. influence through specific policies like the MOMA International Program. Obviously, it's scandalous, but what lessons are in it for us? Well, quite simply, it is a situation which can be studied as a paradigm case of the imposition of an unreal Culture.

What is being transported and internalized in the local context is a set of values which dominates and disrupts any possibility of a non-reified culture emerging locally —in Australia or any place else...

During the MOMA show touring Australia (Some Recent American Art) a number of artists were flown over. While 'the locals' were exposed to a particular artist's culturing, nothing of that artist's enculturation was available. So, in order to respond to that artist's culturing, for it to be a meaningful encounter, the local is forced into tacit reconstruction of the enculturing ideology —that's the insidious level it operates on, you're not directly influenced, it sneaks up from behind. Economic and political power resonates with cultural power —all this power shelters the artist, the locals are faced, not with a line-up of guilty people, but with a parade of fall-guys...a Watergate syndrome.

Official Culture, as paradigmized by the MOMA International Program, results in pushing people into the position of thinking that 'culture' is something separated from what they themselves do; where they feel culture is not acting but being acted upon, where their role is a passive spectator in the pageant of Culture which marches on independently...all you have to do is stand by and 'appreciate' it.

What is the result of sending shows to Australia, S-E Asia, Latin America, etc? —It promotes an unreal sense of culture...that culture is in safe hands, so don't you worry about it...and you can vicariously participate in it, by seeing exhibitions, reading about them, and so on. What I am arguing against here is this whole spectator concept of 'culture'. If a population can tolerate an unreal cultural life, it may tolerate anything.

One of the bourgeois strangle-holds on art which has been incredibly effective in rendering art politically harmless has been the notion that art is merely part of our recreation, leisure, literally part of our time-off... (e.g., the New York Times has the classification 'Arts and Leisure').

This has become one of the more unshakeable postulates of our society, and gets further entrenched all the time. It's reflected in the idea of having a special building for your culture, like the Melbourne 'Cultural Centre'. It's demeaning that the power moguls have their finger on what counts as Culture, and sanction all the new things admitted into that Culture. They allow you to visit this culture at particular times, at a particular place, on weekends, for a small fee. Thus it becomes not something that you as part of society create, but something that you only visit, a spectator culture.

The relation art has to society under governments both Capitalist and Communist is not a natural and unchallengeable relation. That it seems to be unchallengeable is part of the peril in governmental

or officially designated 'recreation'. That is, your 'work' and your 'recreation' both become part of the production system.

Having a special building for your Culture implies that it is somehow 'superior' knowledge...it imposes a static type of teacher-learner relationship on you...it implies that there are 'experts' who have access to this superior knowledge, and who are making it available to 'the masses' who, in turn, must receive it gratefully since they are not in any position to dispute it.

We are not, even remotely, trying to protect Australian 'culture' from the foreign bad guys...because there are ways it is even more disgustingly bourgeois than the U.S. counterpart —partly because it is powerless. And it's no use thinking that you can improve (change) the present bureaucratization with another bureaucracy...

Even if you want to avoid that sort of reformism, you still have to offer some suggestions for ways of working through the problematic. But the thing we can't do is offer a set of rational prescriptions, we don't know what to do, but I think we can say what we have tried to do...and let generalizations take care of themselves. It may come down to remembering something as commonplace as 'criticism and practice are not separate', they are tied together...the potential revisability of this culture is an essential part of praxis.

We had looked at the literal/metaphoric distinction. Now, you could say here is a good example of an 'official' and 'unofficial' language. Institutionally, metaphor is seen as a deviant form of literalness, as reducible to literalness. But the privilegedness of the literal is part of the tyranny of language. Literalness is seen as the 'real' or 'true' language —but actually metaphor is part of praxis, part of what we do...it isn't in any way 'reducible' to literalness. If you demand literalness then you are in fact asserting one so-called 'objective' language model over and above any actual linguaging. It's also part of Official language to be defined as different from what people do —it's a means of control over the language —and that's a key point. A similar point can be made about bureaucratizations like the MOMA...erect a cultural umbrella over people's heads preferably under the guise of 'professionalism', then you don't need to worry about Culture, it's safe in our expert hands.

It's possible to see the notion of detachment as the basis on which people use art as a repository of middle-class platitudes. Look at most art-criticism, it's replete with the jargon of utopia: 'individuality', 'inner-expressiveness', 'quality', 'timelessness', 'universality' —or their fashionable equivalents. These words have a tremendous psychological grip on us because of how, since age three, we have been schooled. These words are hung on selected objects which then become tokens of our 'civilization'.

In the Twenties the function of the MOMA was to bring French art to the U.S. Underlying this is the formalist notion of art's internationalism or universality. Another way of looking at this is that the nouveau riche were trying to define an exclusivist culture for themselves, basing it on French bourgeois values.

There's a similar structure today except it's the U.S. doing the exporting...and there's still the central notion of art being of universal value. Thus such remarks as 'You can make good art anywhere' are always accompanied by the parenthetical rider '...as long as you do it in the right way'. This is always what it gets down to — who gets to say what the 'right' way is? The objects exported aren't neutral carriers of eternal culture; the fact that they are even objects isn't so neutral culturally; the ontology is a function of an ideology — implicit certainly, but an ideology.

If you ask someone working for the International Program whether there was an ideology in it, they would probably say yes, but that it was incidental to the objects, incidental to the shows — and that's fallacious.

The question is, if there weren't heavy U.S. investment in Australia, would there be any 'shows' sent there at all. You can wave flags of righteous indignation about the International Program being the aesthetic wing of the C.I.A. if you want, more to the point is that curators can't see their jobs within a problematic...of course, they would say to us 'OK, we do make compromises, but so do you, like showing in commercial galleries; but we also do some good work transcending our compromises, just as you claim to do'. But the point is I don't think we do claim this, we operate closer to a state of conscientious paralysis which reflects something of the paradoxicality of our modes of existence.

With an Official Culture you are either in it, accept it, or else forget it...it doesn't really have an external view since it admits only itself as the culture. It's this which forces me away from 'constructive' criticism, my critique is more of a scurrilous nature — more of a 'deconstructing' critique. The difficulty of getting a hold on it is that really you have many problems in cacophany, actually, a problematic.

What we are addressing here is the organization, the institutionalization, the bureaucratization, of culture. It doesn't matter whether that is administered from the 'inside' or the 'outside' of a culture. What's most irritating about this structure is that it dictates the sorts of relationships between people. When artists were sent out with the Some Recent American Art show there was a (tacit) a priori institutional set up; the local artists trying to form a relationship with a visiting artist find they have an institutional relationship thrust

upon them, that there is no chance of a 'normal' social relation. The point about institutional (read Cultural) relations is they are not even potentially equal, they are always hierarchical, so that any dialectic (if it does occur) doesn't start off on equal footing and must end up the same way it began. That's the rule of the game...the Prime Minister always ends up as the Prime Minister...

History (or histories) is to some extent the transformation or reification of social relations into cultural ones...the reason I can only have a cultural relation with Jackson Pollock is not only because he's dead...once something is culturally reified or subsumed, it's no longer retrievable socially (or personally)...

What is so maddening about the Australian situation is that the bureaucratized values of a museum like the MOMA are being and largely have been 'internalized' by local museum officials. They may not even realize this...if they do, they might be only too happy to acknowledge it. But this is precisely what sending such shows around the world is meant to encourage...it prods 'key' people in a chosen direction. Right now in Australia this is about the only cultural incentive around —you can't just say it's a deprived culture, it's more a case of it being somewhat jejune insofar as no alternatives are visible.

How should locals deal with these travelling shows? The main point is not to ignore the institutionality. If you do, what happens is that you are institutionally initiated while at the same time being socially alienated —the ideal conditions for imposing 'internationalism'.

In adventurist New York, there may be some match between say Robert Morris's 'social reality' and his 'cultural reality'...how he lives through his life and how he relates to New York...your social reality is your social context, how you relate to other people in that context. Now, for Morris, social reality might be virtually transposable onto his cultural reality, to the extent that it may be recondite making a distinction —and maybe that's OK, as it ought to be. But in far-off Australia, having internalized the 'international' cultural values of New York, social reality probably has little to do with cultural reality...each becomes alienated from the other. This would be even more pronounced in S-E Asia or India, where the results must be positively grotesque...

With this sort of take on the situation, you can't help being amazed that Whitlam's policies, which aim at reducing political and economic dependence on the U.S., at the same time actively encourage increased cultural dependency. This disjunction itself illustrates the somewhat hack ideology that art can be and ought to be independent of the material world. You can only surmise that he has more far-sighted political advisers than cultural ones (?).

It's important to grasp how U.S. museums have changed the common concept and role of the museum. Rather than be mere repositories of past art, they have tenaciously entered the field of contemporary art —and, to a large extent, have assumed power. Moreover, they are accountable, largely, only to themselves. They are mainly private institutions, set up by the moguls of finance and industry on the model of the large business corporation, funded and supported by these people, ruled in the form of self-perpetuating boards of trustees. They determine overall museum policy, hire and fire directors and other staff, influence much of the detailed running...

MOMA is a Rockefeller institution...the Rockefeller's have had close connections with state and federal government for decades...the family has huge foreign investments...government agencies protect and promote these interests. Rockefeller agencies, such as the John D. Rockefeller III fund and MOMA reinforce this hegemony on a cultural level. Personnel shuttle back and forth —notoriously, Thomas W. Braden, MOMA executive secretary then director of the C.I.A.'s 'cultural' activities in the 1950's, and Porter A. McCray, from Office of Inter-American Affairs to director of MOMA's International Council through the 1950's and early 1960's (see Eva Cockcroft, 'Abstract Expressionism, Weapon of the Cold War' Artforum, June, 1974).

The overall policy is transparent: a 'hot' political and economic offensive is buttressed by a 'low-keyed' program of cultural exports designed to flatter and woo the ruling class, including 'intellectuals', of various countries. Such programs corrupt culture, subject it to the exigencies of economic and political interests. The pattern on all levels is the same: go into a country, establish a 'sphere of influence' by supporting the conservative factors in the local power equation, e.g., Diem in Vietnam, render them economically dependent, construct a value structure such that U.S. values dominate —then you've got them by the balls. You've also got yourself too, because you are now obliged to defend your investment. The International Program of the MOMA is a precise picture of the path of U.S. 'interests': Latin America in the 1940's, Europe during the 1950's, Latin America again then Asia, including Australia, during the 1960's and 1970's. The pursuit of 'stability' for the sake of investing, and a fearful anti-communism, is written all over decisions as to which shows go where. There's no coincidence between the sudden swelter of MOMA shows to Australia from the mid-1960's onwards and the expanding U.S. 'interests' and investment in Australia and the commitment to U.S. policy in S-E Asia.

MOMA perpetuates its pain-in-the-arse high Culture throughout the world. This policy has been going on in a consistent pattern since the mid-1940's. And it's effective...Braden once boasted that when the C.I.A. funded the 1952 Paris tour of the Boston Symphony, it won more acclaim for the U.S. than would a hundred speeches by

Dulles or Eisenhower.

MOMA is a private institution...you can buy your way into a trusteeship through massive donations, and then you get to influence directly what counts as 'culture'. Shows sent touring by the International Council are heavily stocked with works from private collections. This way the Museum gets a chance to influence more people to donate their possessions, and both parties benefit from the building up of a 'history' and provenance around the work. Everyone's cultural goodies increase in value and art-historical 'weight'. And a beneficent lender might eventually become a trustee, carrying a whole parcel of vested interests along, which can be now protected, launched into history, made 'culture'.

But, as far as the MOMA is concerned, their ideological blinkers remain resolutely on. Last year the International Council sent some women on the Board to Bogata —where they failed to see a connection between them being American, sending a show there, and the two heavily-armed bodyguards with them night and day.

So, how obvious is the success of these policies? In the late 1950's when a number of Polish artists became influenced by American abstract painting (formalism adapts all too easily to the demands of 'internationalism'), they were 'rewarded' with a show at MOMA (in 1961). This was seen as a victory for U.S. policies —it also underlines that 'thaws' in Communist societies are recognizable only if the values that emerge are official U.S. ones. Another version of this is currently occurring: the upcoming MOMA show Eight Contemporary Artists includes three Americans and five foreign artists, four of the latter being represented commercially by leading New York galleries...but the individuals chosen are those who 'fit' best with MOMA's notion of 'international art' —all of them might just as well live in SoHo.

What better way to promote the uniformity, the one-sidedness, the predictability, and the dullness of art everywhere!

What's depressing about the situation among Australian museum officials is that, given the opportunity, most of them would come up with an almost identical list of 'international artists'. This is the extent to which all of us have been indoctrinated with Official Culture's absurd internationalism —just this sort of enculturation is implied today by a 'good museum official' who knows his or her 'museology'. Courses in museum training, particularly here in the U.S., take their models from the most successful art museums —and, of course, MOMA is right on top of the list...

In any technological society, where 'culture' is overdetermined, virtually programed, you're faced with something resembling a

'productive art society'. Productivity lends itself to organization much more readily than spontaneity. The trick is to prevent anything from really happening. Once you have the bureaucratic machinery set up, it's going to keep running in essentially the same way whatever artworks are produced —the objects become unimportant and the activities of individual artists become basically arbitrary. Your choices are: play the game and be subsumed, or, don't play the game and be banished, literally out of sight.

Even on the brink of Armageddon 'great artists' will be singled-out —the bureaucracy unbelievably continues to insist on fossilized concepts like 'masterpieces' —nothing must interfere with the art world's relentless business-as-usual.

If you wed individual culturing to an avantgardist ideology, then culture becomes happily programed, without the controls being explicit or even apparent. You maintain the illusion of 'creative freedom' even though you've been a priori and constrictively pointed in the 'right' direction. Under these circumstances a society is able, remarkably, to simultaneously posit the importance of Official Culture yet all the while guarantee the harmlessness of art. What a status quo! Nixon never lost any sleep over art, since the bureaucracies have it all sown up. Artists, precisely because they choose art as their 'highest value', and importantly autonomous value, have a priori subscribed to conditions which guarantee their effective neutralization. Hence you can have an analogy between a population of artists and a banana republic in respect to subjugation and exploitation. What needs emphasizing here is the inseparability of these processes: the artist producing 'freely' and the exploitation of what he or she produces is one and the same process.

35. MODISH ABOUT CULTURAL INDETERMINACY.

What might be meant by an 'authentic' culture? We know what counts as 'high' pain-in-the-arse culture, it's the milieu of the MOMA etc. That's a clear enough model by now, but on the other side is no model at all. That is, there is no alternate institution...

We assume here that alternatives like folk-art are no longer possible as serious options for us...though something like teaching, from such a point of view, may be...I don't know...

But what I can do is talk about what we have done in the face of this problematic...what works for us, if it does work, may not be easily generalizable. I can talk about going-on in an existential and pragmatic sense and that's about all —and it's no good if you try and construct a model from that.

I can talk a bit about A&L; about how our working relationships are constructed, not on institutional or cultural relations, but maybe on more 'straightforward' social relations...we do socialize, and there is no clear demarcation when our socializing becomes work. Hence the difficulty in saying, in the institutional sense, what our 'work' is. That's significant. It's not incidental that A&L survives on a social base —there is no 'professional' or organizational base. This sociality was never an explicit goal, more an intuitive reaction to conditions we couldn't stomach —we had the 'sociality' years before it was made explicit...though I think it's been crucial to have made this explicit...

This has also been the problem with art-shows; the relationships between artist and exhibition and gallery-goer have been reified and institutionalized along the lines also of teacher/learner...affirming spectator culture...whereas in the offshoots of the sociality stuff...the 'pandemonium' and the 'uproar', I think we have tried to screw-up that particular relation between people...at least as it bears on us.

Admittedly, we've internalized the problem of culture in a small group. It could be a model except that you can't get an overview on it...

Part of what we publish is simply social proceedings or dialogue. What then about the never ending complaint: access to A&L? The complaints all derive from a misunderstanding of this point: there is no institutional access to A&L, there is only social access, an encounter —if people misunderstand this, tant pis.

This is where Stezaker is just embarrassing, by peddling what is simply another institutional model...a 'prescriptive model for art', you can have a newer and better bureaucracy if you buy (and believe

me he's selling) his model...who, for chrissake, would want that?

It's funny that a lot of people like Stezaker, and Vic Burgin too, see A&L as the paradigm of 'art for art's sake' ..we think it's just the reverse...A&L is more political/ethical than aesthetic/stylistic. People talk about A&L as if it were the 'ultimate' abstraction in a long tradition of abstraction (Modern Art). This tradition must be their only reference point...

But the International art-circus in Germany, Italy, etc., is also a bureaucracy. Artists no longer work for particular persons but for a market and profit making —it's not a community, but a market-system. The 'roots' of the work become totally lost —I just can't understand, in face of the mind-conditioning dishonesty and straight social horror of the world today, how people can make formalist paintings...it doesn't seem to have to do with the real world...and that isn't a cliché...I think one point about us is that some of our reference points are 'real'. —It's not just making paintings because 'authentic' folk-artists make paintings, it's painting's lack of ability to deal with the market they are stuck within...

Authentic social origins...hmm..the real point seems to be that the art-circus institutions are no longer dependent on the artist, the artist is dependent on the institutions...which is what I was trying to say...which is a phenomenally important point. The bureaucracy is enormous...most Marxist and other aesthetics is infuriating because they all assume that art is something people look at, contemplate, rather than do themselves..and that is the real problem of aesthetics...

The crux of passive spectator culture lies in the reification and mystification of artefacts. If, as we have been discussing, artworks are shipped from a far-off culture, it becomes virtually impossible to demythify them, to see their social and ideological meaning, and to understand that such meaning is not incidental, but constitutes the works themselves. No art should be ontologically reduced to a careful selection of objects of contemplation...but this is what 'travelling exhibitions' attempt to do, and this is why they represent the uncontested high point of unreal spectator culture. One must go beyond official art-history, it is not by accident a history of objects. Not by accident because the inclusion of ideological and social factors would ruin the passivity of contemplation. It would also damage the market-system. For someone to, in a heuristic sense, encounter, say, a Don Judd, they need to have access to some of Judd's presuppositions, his references. Awareness of context should overwhelm the objects, and hence you should become more aware of contextual noise. If the object remains inscrutable, art will stay in the context of passive 'appreciation' instead of, as it potentially could be, in the context of creative learning. Australia is very vulnerable to imported culture.

The white population has little culture of its own — what it has has evolved in a lackey relation to more powerful cultures. 'Official Culture' is tyrannical, world-wide, but with Australian museums so eager to import such 'culture', Official Culture in Australia may reach an unreality unique in history...

36. EXPLOITATION... EDUCATION...

We're trying to carve out some reference points without having them handed to us by various cultural and educational institutions or wherever you get points of reference from (?) —There is an ideology of pre-ordained order begotten us of our institutions —hence you get (our) the bourgeois fear of disorder. —Everyone has this fear because it's obviously a condition of the kind of society we live in. I am quite terrified that, when I go to the supermarket, everybody working there will be dressed as large ice-cream cones...you must be able to count on people in roles. —You can't draw a picture of us as, if you suddenly removed all the alienating structures, you would then be left with a whole person. That's not so, the alienated structures have been given inwardness, they now constitute you as a person, the trap is complete.

There is a way of putting this point in existentialist terms: though you still get something to say about sociality...we don't get back to solipsism. Put in terms of 'freedom' and 'unfreedom'...insofar as we are role bound we are in an unfree situation...but there are moments when you can't tolerate your role anymore, so you slip out of it; you either lose your nerve, or you gain a bit of extra space to look at your role, and, from the existentialist point of view, that's a moment of freedom, as much as you can have...perhaps this ties up with the stuff about epoché? —And put in these existentialist terms it becomes for me much more traumatic.

I'm not concerned with acquisition of new knowledge but maybe acquisition of new attitudes toward knowledge. What is our knowledge? —Do we have any a priori topicalization? —I think I have a lot, I'm constantly mapping onto them, they are impinging on me, I'm struggling with them all the time; I'm not in a position to say I don't have any a priori subject-headings...the language that we use is imbued with those sorts of topicalizations, it's a matter of keeping self-conscious about it...

If I say I map onto various categorically prior bodies of knowledge, then I seem to be involved in reformism, to be involved in looking at history and then offering my interpretation of it...you know, all the platitudes...

The culture is set up in a way where you seem to be either pushed into a reformist position or you get reduced to babble...which is maybe a deconstructive position, or a deforming...essentially these are the three positions: join, reform, or babble...I'm a bit afraid of the latter but it's the position we have reached here...

It is possible to see the forms of our knowledge of the world not as naturally a priori but as 'arbitrary' categories of our culture. Are they arbitrary? —Well, they are arbitrary to me at this stage...

if you are after radical theory you've got to ask how far can I go without falling into a priori's like this? —Not very far; you see, it's not just a case of dismantling all these cultural a priori's and then being left with some pure entity called 'yourself', unscathed... because what you are doing is dismantling yourself, and that's where you get yourself into a position in which you are reduced to babble. You have a variety of knowledge monuments and you are left with deconstructing them... which mean fucking them over...

How would you go about making an index for this 'tome' we've produced here... assuming you want no subjects or no topics? How weak a sense of topics can we have? Could you look for key words? Would this give you a topic heading list? —But it is misleading to topicalize... for example: 'Tony Smith is the worst sculptor in the world'; how would you index that... 'sculptors'? —Even topicalization seems too strong for me. The reason why it would be so meaningless to have subject-headings for all this stuff is that it is to do with conversing —and this is where method, mode of display or presentation is important to the mode of knowing... and this is an extremely important methodological a priori... the place to start looking for 'radical theory'...

We're talking about the possibility of radical theory rather than the accumulation of a list of topic headings. Underlying the way knowledge has traditionally been divided up is of course the notion of taking tests and tests are used to bludgeon people into line; these divisions, the notion that knowledge can be learnt through a series of topicalizations, is a way of automating or programming, a way of reducing praxis to process... thus you can automate conversation, you can get a quick agreement on topics and hence never say anything 'superfluous'. Also, the topic becomes totally separate from people, or from any single person's languaging, and therefore it gets held up as an example of 'objectivity'...

I think we have a 'bad fit' with this kind of topicalization not because we have some alternate weltanschauung but, as we just said, we've begun to generate babble, which is the result of seeing the arbitrariness of that topicalization and as well, the difficulty in getting out of it...

These transcripts aren't topicalized, all we have done is localize them —and that's the point, localizability may be the only appropriate 'category'...

When you say something like 'I know more than I did five years ago', it's bullshit that you should be subject to tests of the sort 'What is it that you know more about?'. The knowledge industry is set up in terms of acquiring chunks of subject-matter, parts of a gargantuan monster with a structure like the administrative organization of a university, or a library classification system. Like Phillips

Griffith's example of students sitting a test in five subject-areas, so that one whose twenty right answers are evenly spread is said to know little, whereas one whose twenty right answers are concentrated in a subject-area is said to know a lot about something. He wanted to show that knowledge was a priori, but all he does is point out an instance of enculturation... would he also argue that ignorance was a priori? — Presupposing that knowledge exists apart from individual knowing... that's what's most offensive: the implication that we are all replaceable, that 'knowledge' grinds on regardless... as a description of how it 'is', the status quo, he's right... a system of institutional vigilance. Say you want to teach, well, as soon as you walk through the front door of the school, ninety-percent of this question of knowing is already resolved a priori. You've got to immediately disrupt this situation, open it up to the possibility of everybody's individual 'knowing'...

I'm not talking about subjectivity in terms of everybody 'expressing themselves'... nor that everyone should take themselves as their first and last reference points. In teaching, you've got to set up an encounter situation, but in a way which doesn't predetermine what happens... the students constitute themselves in terms of that encounter. If, say, someone wants to be a painter, it should be a conscious choice won out of a struggle in full awareness of all the options, scope and limitations of painting. You can't stop someone painting, nor encourage them... you direct yourself to setting out as much of the contexts of choice as you can...

It's been well pointed out, present education consists in badly damaging our learning apparatus... a matter of citizenship factories, learning one particular set of views to the exclusion of all others... and so the student does 'fit' and can only conceive of that fit! And, 'if there should still remain a trace of their youthful gifts of imagination, will it not find its proper application in the arts, that is, in a thin domain of dreams that has but little to do with the world we live in'... P.K. Feyerabend.

One way of teaching is to provide as much as possible of everything for people to encounter... another way is to just display your problems, do your own work, show yourself and hope it's useful... and this just depends on whether you are interesting or not. — I mean you just set up a dialogue... it's disastrous to set up a monolithic method of teaching... and there's no prescription to behave consistently... there is everything wrong with the old art-school behaviourist standby of each artist/teacher setting himself up as an ideal model. And, in English art-schools since 1960, you have the other extreme, a laissez-faire which amounts to not teaching at all. All you can do is admit you know nothing, ask where anybody wants to start... and what does anybody want to start...

37. SHOP-FLOORISH?

Because we don't have a specific shop-floor there is some precariousness in us being here at all. We sure don't have The Art Workers News notion of unions. What's bothersome is seeing people who paint abstract paintings lobbying against the MOMA. In our case I think this kind of lobbying is not apart but intrinsic to the work itself. Andre has to leave his bits of metal at home and then go on about 'Marxism'. If you lay bits of metal in a row then you commit yourself to one category...but if you then put on your cloth cap to complain...it's just like the Teamsters meeting at the Hilton to complain about having no money...it's unreal. It's outrageous given the possible options for unions. That's where it gets mad since they have options to behave like unions and they sell out the options and then start waving flags, and everybody knows it's not really serious...you can't just call it paradoxical behaviour, it is, literally, reducing action to behaviour...

And there you have artists also...your identity is limited to an isolated individual existing in your studio...you have been socialized into accepting a bourgeois conception of yourself. The Art Worker's idea seems very much the American idea of a trade union, an organization safe-guarding your well-being and supporting democracy...which fits with the idea of artists as producers for a privileged class...

Typically, people will accept conditions just as they are given, however unsatisfactory, just so long as they can discover 'reasonable' causes for their failure to advance or hold their own within the system. But here I think this has broken down...and realizing we don't want to construct a 'new order' leaves us with trying to sustain something like Kuhn's 'pre-revolutionary' state...this was the point in that earlier chatter about 'wilful pandemonium'. From an institutional vantage point, this might be called 'chaos'... but from a personal vantage, is it really? To have a realization that there are ways in which my culture isn't alienated from we who do it. That's chaos? Surely it's only trading in the rhetorical force of the Official Language...

This is the trouble with Kuhnian paradigm stuff...it represents an incredibly institutionalized view of scientific knowledge...a structure for the continuation of the institutions, an inescapable tradition of bureaucratization, of how to move from one bureaucracy to another...it's all about who gets to say what the 'chaos' is.

Take the notion of 'negativity'...again, it's institutionally defined and 'out of our hands'...bureaucracy controls its reference. In its allowed...common...use, it may refer to an individual playing havoc with sacrosanct institutions, and the bureaucratic legislation is that without institutions the individual doesn't exist...this sort of crap...maybe I could just as well say institutional self-destruction

translates well into (pragmatic) self-consciousness? You can't let bureaucracy define what existence means...and it does, since it controls the language.

Where does this leave me? Do we end up like Goethe's Tasso who, with all his certainties shattered, clings fast to his last possession: language? —Our last possession might be babble, or, the possibility of discourse rather than language?

38. LEFTISH CRITIQUE ?

Is there a view which is not ideological? In the usual sense ideology is some sort of totalizing complex informing attitudes between persons and the world. It appears not as an answer to a specific problematic but rather a closure to that problematic...and that seems true, even when it appears, not as a specific set of already formulated answers, but as a (pre)constituted framework or general context in which partial answers occur...something like a system or sequence of articulations. The ideological weltanschauung, despite its partial and possibly critical insights, prevents us from understanding the social situation and the possibility of changing it —I don't have this notion of ideology in mind at all. And the Hintikka/Quine notion of ideology doesn't move us far away from the above...in terms of what you quantify over, certain things, according to your ideology, you will remain blind to.

OK, so we don't want anything like ideological closure...it's contrary to languaging of ideology, against languagedness. But, if you forget ideological closure, do you have anything left characterizable as ideology? I think it's important to mention 'prospect of ideology' since it doesn't...for me anyway...presuppose reification of ideology, but is closer to something like idiology...it's like ideologizing.

There are certain circumstances when a Marxian critique is useful...obviously I want this to be seen in the light of ideologizing rather than projecting an ideology...the point is that sometimes it offers the strongest critique... 'strongest' here implying the most damaging and anarchistic. But this may contradict...Marx held the social and cultural circumstances must be radically altered if we are to overcome alienation. Existentialism enters here too...with the problem of alienation. There are two ways, traditionally, to go. Toward Marxism and its cultural critique, or toward existentialism and its solipsistic critique? Now we're somehow involved in both, or at least, someone with knowledge of these two modes of thought would view us as involved in both —though I think that may be a mistake...maybe there is an explanation: it gets us back to that stuff about sociality; saying that 'the world is my world' only makes sense if you can say it to somebody else. If we do reach 'complete babble', which may be seen as an existential state, it is also of ideological importance in its 'negative' (remembering our reservations about words like 'negative') relation to 'the culture'. It is culturally important, despite it issuing from, so to speak, an existentialist position, that there are people who might be able to 'make sense' of the babble.

In terms of an art there might be parallels with Althusser's paradox about science: no art if ideology; no art without ideology. There is a pre-constituted acceptance that art 'is'. What it is might be under

continual question, but that it is — is not. So the closure which is implicit in any ideology amounts to the refusal to admit those questions which might actually undermine the category. The point is that this is a paradox, it's not just stuff about gee-whiz-let's-undermine-the-category. Is it possible for an ideology to have the capacity to question its own assumptions? Is this kind of reflexivity, personal dismantling, a priori necessary for everything we do... a cultural critique means chopping off bits of yourself... and then what about Wittgenstein saying you can't be a philosopher and a member of the Communist party at the same time... etc... etc...

This leaves us in a peculiar position...

Can we even talk about ideology? — Can we talk about an 'authentic style of commitment'? Is that non-ideological? Looking past ideology for some kind of... embarrassing though it is... 'authentic praxis'... and does this stand against ideological commitment? Maybe faith stands against ideology... ideology at worst being an evocation of das man... faith means (in a sense) fideologically, transcending the opposing camps of individual and social reality.

This kind of faith comes not from religious faith, which may be ideological, but from 'good faith'...

Faith is the point at which any ideology, even 'rationality', becomes a matter of good faith...

Remarks such as 'we don't know what we are doing' don't sound as if we are preparing to storm the Bastille — that is they are not very ideologically tough... they don't win converts...

But ideology: criticism of 'false consciousness' can be undertaken without holding ourselves up as a well-formed set... lebensphilosophie... anyway, for example, in the posters... one aspect of poster information is that it's 'visual' but avoids the context of contemplation. The poster exists 'in the world', not as part of 'the spiritual dope traffic of art', not as a conclusion, but as a starting-point...

Can we think about slogans... poster language? Compare this to advertising techniques... advertising reaches the 'whole person' because it fucks about with people's intentions. But it's scandalous the way it implants cultural needs... what we want to do is enable people to draw out their own... and one thing to say about A&L is that rather than try to show people 'us' we should enable others to become more aware of their own problems...

Propagandizing isn't indoctrination... it has to do with increasing self-consciousness. Is there a different problem with the 'anti-textbook' or the journal since propaganda must be constructed in

the context of the people likely to read it? —The Salvador Allende poster deals with a specific point of reference...it's not too 'philosophical'.

When you just have a few intuitions and hopes, you have a certain problem with fierce defence of ideology. Having a clear end in mind is too teleological.

But there are fragments of goals...I think for example that reigning notions of 'taste' and 'appreciation' are moulded as class concepts and I really will work towards those things disappearing.

Faith doesn't really 'test' itself...talking about faith which is not blind. Kierkegaard points out that Job and Abraham lost their faith and sold-out because they conformed to a fantastic image of God as an absolutist, that is, they surrendered their freedom...they should have said, no, my faith is larger than my belief in you...

39. SPORADIC ENCOUNTER...

Encountering A&L... it's not a question of 'understanding' in the sense that what we are about can be spelled out according to rational criteria, or, in the tyrannical terms of 'standard English'. You can't set it out in neat layers, as a series of propositions about each of which you could decide whether you believed it or not. It's not like the case of philosophers such as Hume, Hegel, whose thought can be put as systematic theory which you can either understand or not... it's more like an approach to Nietzsche, Pascal, say, whose thought you enter in such a way that systematic sorting seems beside the point.

It doesn't make any sense to conceive of the social/cultural situation except in terms of encounter... the a priori institutions would like us to see everything in terms of 'information', and there has to be a critical/contextual mapping to get rid of 'information' as seen apart from any particular context of encounter — which leaves us, obviously, in an immense mess. People are made to feel, in relation to 'knowledge', as if they are replaceable, and they are not... this is why some of us have been so hysterical about 'objectivity'; it's like Popper's 'Third World', the world of ideas, books, etc... compared with his other two worlds; here is a notion of knowledge I find appalling... but I don't see this related to encounter; I don't understand anything of what you two just said, I'm trying to see if what I'm talking about is the same as what you are talking about...

The dialectic revolves around the concept of (our) possibility. In a sense, you could say that logics are 'is' constructions... 'There is something such that something is...', etc; rather than emergent from a basis in my own existence/possibility... 'I am...'. Coming to terms with a (my) question of existing means starting from the problematicity of the existence of the questioner.

This comes out of the concept of Dasein... not so much Heidegger's 'location of the truth of being', but the indissolubility of the question of my existing and the question of place... i. e., my being is positional, it's not my participation in being. This gets back to authenticity and inauthenticity if you contrast it with das man: role-players who live themselves in terms of others, a self synthesized out of external viewpoints on your self. The language of this is replete with 'one', 'they', 'people', 'it'... but what can you do with a contrast like that? General pictures of 'the nature of man' are useless... you can only map onto aspects of them, use them in your own projections. For instance, if you see Dasein in terms of an existent for which, in its being, this very being is in question... determinable only in self-reflection, there can be no external view... relating yourself to your own possibility.

The 'existence preceding essence', authenticity/inauthenticity stuff bears on the notions we've raised of 'choosing', of disrupting the role demands of your enculturation by your own culturing. The I'm-only-doing-my-job approach implies that your existence is replaceable by someone else, that anyone can say anything but institutions like language, 'art', etc., carry on regardless, there arises a totally unreal conception of a pervasive 'objectivity'...as something apart from what people do...language is worn out...

There's the paradox that we can say anything we like, but because we're really impotent, nothing we say can be effective —but that remark is itself shattering!