

Architecture Art
Media Politics

Grey Room
07

Special Issue: On 9/11

Andreas Huyssen
Twin Memories

Samuel Weber
"War," "Terrorism," and "Spectacle"

Karen Beckman
Terrorism, Feminism, Sisters, and Twins

Arindam Dutta
Infinite Justice

Judith Butler
Explanation and Exoneration

Andrew Herscher
The Language of Damage

Nick B. King
Dangerous Fragments

Anthony Vidler
A City Transformed

David Salomon
Divided Responsibilities

Laura Kurgan
Around Ground Zero

Guy Nordenson
City Square

Keller Easterling
Enduring Innocence

Reinhold Martin
One or More

Gwendolyn Wright
Building Global Modernisms

Grey Matter

Daniel Bertrand Monk
"Welcome to Crisis!"

$18.00

Architecture Art
Media Politics

Grey Room
07

Published by The MIT Press

Grey Room 07, Spring 2002

Grey Room (ISSN 1526-3819, E-ISSN 1536-0105) is published quarterly (Fall, Winter, Spring, Summer) by The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142. Subscriptions and address changes should be addressed to *Grey Room*, MIT Press Journals, Five Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA 02142-1407; phone: (617) 253-2889; fax: (617) 577-1545; e-mail: journals-orders@mit.edu.

An electronic full-text version of *Grey Room* is available with all print subscriptions. Subscription rates are $65.00 for individuals, $40.00 for students and retired, $170.00 for institutions. Outside the United States and Canada add $20.00 for postage and handling. Canadian subscribers add 7% GST. Current issues are $18.00. Back issues are individuals $22.00, institutions $44.00. Outside the United States and Canada add $5.00 per issue for postage and handling. Canadian subscribers add 7% GST. Claims for missing issues will be honored free of charge if made within three months of the publication date of the issue. Claims may be e-mailed to: journals-claims@mit.edu. Prices subject to change without notice.

Grey Room is distributed in the U.S.A. by Ubiquity; 607 Degraw Street, Brooklyn, NY 11217; phone: (718) 875-5491.

Postmaster: Application to mail Periodicals Postage Rate pending at Boston, MA and at additional offices. Send address changes to *Grey Room,* MIT Press Journals, Five Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA 02142-1407.

For advertising and mailing list information, contact the Marketing Department, MIT Press Journals, Five Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA 02142-1407; phone: (617) 253-2866; fax: (617) 258-5028; e-mail: journals-info@mit.edu.

Grey Room is indexed in *Avery Index to Architectural Periodicals* and *The Bibliography of the History of Art.*

All editorial correspondence should be sent to *Grey Room*, P.O. Box 250834, New York, NY 10025; e-mail: editors@greyroom.org. Manuscripts for review should be no more than 8,500 words, submitted in duplicate, double-spaced, and in accordance with *The Chicago Manual of Style. Grey Room* cannot be responsible for returning submissions to authors.

http://mitpress.mit.edu/grey

ISSN 1526-3819
E-ISSN 1536-0105
ISBN 0-262-75496-7

Cover, top to bottom: Details of images appearing on pp. 14, 34, 56, 72, 86, 100, 104, 123, 136.

Contents

Contributors

Karen Beckman is currently a Whiting postdoctoral fellow in the Department of English at Princeton University, and will begin a position as Assistant Professor in English and Film Studies at the University of Rochester this year. Her book, *Vanishing Women* is forthcoming from Duke University Press. She is currently working on a study of the relationship between feminism and terrorism.

Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the author of numerous books and articles including *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (Routledge, 1990), *Excitable Speech* (Routledge, 1997), and *Antigone's Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death* (Columbia University Press, 2000).

Arindam Dutta is the Richard H. Blackall Chair in Architectural History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is currently completing a book on imperial bureaucracies and aesthetic pedagogy in nineteenth century England and India.

Keller Easterling is an architect, author and associate professor at Yale. She is the author of *Organization Space: Landscapes, Highways and Houses in America* (MIT 1999) and *Call it Home,* a laserdisc history of American suburbia from 1934-1960 and is currently working on a book titled *Terra Incognita* about spatial products in pivotal political locations around the world.

Andrew Herscher served in 2001 as Co-Head of the Department of Culture of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. In 2002 he is a fellow at the Dartmouth Humanities Center's Institute on Ethnic Conflict and Culture.

Andreas Huyssen is the Villard Professor of German and Comparative Literature at Columbia where he directs the Center for Comparative Literature and Society. He is an editor of *New German Critique*, the author of several books in German, and of *After the Great Divide* (Indiana University Press 1986), *Twilight Memories* (Routledge 1995) and *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

Nick B. King is the J. Elliot Royer Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Department of Anthropology, History, and Social Medicine at the University of California, San Francisco. He is currently completing a book on emerging infectious diseases, biological terrorism, and American public health in a globalizing era.

Laura Kurgan is an Assistant Professor of Architecture at Princeton University. In addition to a design practice in New York City her work includes projects and installations which have been exhibited internationally, most recently at the ZKM in Karlsruhe as part of *Control_Space* (October 2001) and at Swiss National Exposition 2002 as part of *Money and Value* (Biel, May 2002).

Reinhold Martin is an Assistant Professor of Architecture at Columbia University, a partner in the firm of Martin/Baxi Architects, and an editor of *Grey Room*. His book, *The Organizational Complex: Architecture, Media, and Corporate Space* is forthcoming in 2003 from the MIT Press.

Daniel Bertrand Monk is Associate Professor of Architecture at the State University of New York, Stony Brook. A recipient of the SSRC's MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in International Peace and Security, he is the author of numerous articles concerning the role accorded to architecture in political culture, and of *An Aesthetic Occupation: The Immediacy of Architecture and the Palestine Conflict* (Duke University Press: 2002).

Guy Nordenson is a structural engineer in New York and an associate professor at the Princeton University School of Architecture. Current projects include The Museum of Modern Art expansion with Yoshio Taniguchi and the Simmons Hall dormitory at MIT with Steven Holl.

David L. Salomon is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Architecture and Urban Design at UCLA. He is currently completing a dissertation on the design of the World Trade Center.

Anthony Vidler is the Acting Dean of the Irwin S. Chanin School of Architecture of the Cooper Union. The author of numerous articles and books, his writings include *The Architectural Uncanny* (MIT Press, 1992) and *Warped Space* (MIT Press, 2000).

Samuel Weber teaches critical and media theory, German and Comparative Literature at Northwestern University. His book, *Theatricality as Medium* is forthcoming from Stanford University Press.

Gwendolyn Wright is a Professor of Architecture at Columbia University. She has written extensively on both American architecture and colonial/postcolonial issues, including *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (University of Chicago Press, 1991).

On 9/11

THE EDITORS

On September 11, 2001, for many of us in New York and around the world, time momentarily stood still. Since that date, which has already become an entry in next year's dictionaries as "9/11," many other events have occurred. For months historical time, measured by the tickers running continuously below 24/7 news broadcasts, seemed to accelerate, if only in the media imaginary, an imaginary that has had very real effects on the prosecution of an ongoing war. While as of this writing a disquieting "normalcy" seems to have returned to the flow of events, in which a unilateral bravado, convinced in its pursuit of "history," seems poised to render permanent the state of emergency that followed in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Under such conditions a critical understanding of these events and their context even as they unfold has acquired a particular urgency. We have therefore attempted, in this special issue of *Grey Room,* to assemble a range of contributions spanning the intersection of disciplines and discourses toward which the journal is oriented, in an effort to reflect on certain specifics. In doing so, we have been acutely aware of the particular temporality of a quarterly publication, which, while precluding an immediate response to the events, has nevertheless allowed a space to form in which broader questions may be asked. Thus, if time remains somewhat out of joint here, it is our hope that the discrepancy between the event(s) and the appearance of these texts—all of which were written shortly thereafter—may enable rather than impede the formulation of counter-discourses, critical alternatives to the dominant narratives that have already taken hold.

For example, in New York and elsewhere, including in the mass media, there has been much discussion of the future of what has come to be called "ground zero," a question that may seem particularly suited to a journal that positions itself at the intersection of architecture, art, media, and politics. This discussion, and the various proposals that have ensued, has focused attention on the role of architecture, urbanism, and aesthetic practice in the process of urban reconstruction and memorialization. But again we have sought to defer the question here, in an effort to interrogate the assumption that the primary role of those disciplinary practices (architecture in particular) toward which *Grey Room* is oriented, is to fill the void left behind by history with new and innovative aesthetic and technical production. It has

 Grey Room 07, Spring 2002, pp. 6–7.

seemed necessary instead to offer the outlines of an intellectual and historical context in which the political implications and overdeterminations of such assumptions might be recognized, when a certain triumphalism, technological and otherwise, is confronted with the complex violence of globalization.

We therefore hope that this issue might represent both a continuation of the discourse to which *Grey Room* has been dedicated, and a beginning, a potential opening up of the conversation toward those issues with which we are now faced. And so we are grateful to all those who have contributed here, that they too have felt the urgent need for untimely meditations at a moment when time itself has been in short supply.

Twin Memories: Afterimages of Nine/Eleven

ANDREAS HUYSSEN

In a culture as obsessed with memory as ours, it is not surprising that the debate about how to commemorate the attack on the Twin Towers began to stir soon after the traumatic shock of their collapse. Spontaneous memorials and "missing" notices replete with vital data and photographs sprang up everywhere in downtown Manhattan—in subway stations, on storefronts, at bus stops. Flowers at many of these sites indicated that there was not much hope of finding any of the missing. A whole part of Manhattan had been turned into a cemetery, but a cemetery without identifiable bodies and without graves—a death zone in which the work of cleanup and removal went on day and night.

The ruins were still smoldering with underground fires when the architects and developers came forth, emphasizing the need to rebuild fast and big, possibly even bigger than before: No ruins allowed in the American imagination. At the same time, a consensus has emerged that there must be some permanent memorial to the tragic loss of life that traumatized New York. Any memorial will also have to commemorate what may turn out to have been a major turning point in U.S. history, not just in the history of the city. How can one reconcile the desire to rebuild a prime site of real estate with the need to commemorate the dead and with the challenge to memorialize a historical event? Anybody who knows about the frustrating debates and unsatisfactory "solutions" concerning the commemoration of historical trauma and criminal terror elsewhere, even decades after the commemorated events, must fear the worst. The Oklahoma City bombing memorial, with its 168 empty chairs symbolizing the number of the victims, reminds one of the theater of the absurd; and the Eisenman Holocaust memorial in Berlin, once it is built, has the potential of becoming a monumental memory sore rather than the space for historical reflection that was intended. The issue here is not the imaginative ability or disability of artists, architects, and designers, but rather the objective problems of representing and memorializing traumatic events in built space, especially if that space is a death zone still in living memory. The instant permanent memorial—this must end badly. And there is an added problem for the memorians in New York: How does one imagine a monument to what was already a monument in the first place—a monument to corporate modernism? No surprise that some suggested rebuilding an exact replica of the Twin Towers. The idea is as absurd as it is intriguing in its logic: the rebuilt Twin

Bamiyan Valley, Afghanistan.
1963.

Towers as a monument to forgetting, an erasure of history, an emblem of global capital in a different sense from that of the terrorist imaginary. Call it capitalist realism, but even then there would be a conundrum. The simple opposition of memorial vs. office building is flawed since any new office building would itself be affected by the aura of memory and the specters of 9/11.

The real debate about "ground zero," however, has moved on. Discussions about how to memorialize 9/11 are gathering steam, though they are not yet fully public in New York at a time when the media are still so busy with the war front. No doubt the memorial debate will soon grow by leaps and bounds, driven by the narcissism of victimization and accelerated by its convergence with the short-term time frame of developers and city and state politicians. Given such objective pressures, it seems quixotic to suggest that it is not yet the time to produce a permanent memorial. Considering New York's record of urban planning and building, slowing down seems unlikely unless it were forced by the economic downturn. And yet, this is what I would wish for. Neither rampant nationalism nor the raw emotions of injury and anger have ever produced persuasive monuments or memorial sites in urban space. This, then, may be a good moment to reflect on something else. For me, the theme of memory and the Twin Towers conjures up images of events in the past rather than the future of memory—events that in my own imagination have attached themselves closely to the collapse of the Twin Towers.

In the rare moments of reflection not tied to daily news events this past fall, I've been surprised at how persistently the afterimage of the Twin Towers hovers in my mind. Clearly they carry symbolic meaning more forcefully than the partially destroyed Pentagon. But this symbolic meaning is not that of the terror of globalization and hegemonic power, as the blowback theorists argue and as it seems to function in the terrorists' imaginary. No single nor even twin corporate tower could ever represent the nature of global capital, nor could its destruction equal capital's collapse. This is infantile symbolism, even though it must be analyzed rather than dismissed. For a New Yorker by choice, it is a different symbolism that counts. The image of the unloved Twin Towers simply represented home in the metropolis. Often, you first saw them approaching New York from the air. Year after year you first saw them in the distance driving back home from the airports in Queens, Brooklyn, or New Jersey. Unwieldy and ugly as they were, they anchored the island's skyline in the south. Their monumental size crowded out other landmarks. Monumentality itself is at the core of their afterimage and its effects.

Thinking about the buildings as buildings and as symbols, memories of two other images and events crowd in, superimposing themselves on the television sequences of the unfolding disaster. When I saw the Twin Towers collapse on television on the morning of September 11—despite shock over the unfathomable loss of human life and a fleeting fear about a potential

nuclear device on board the planes—I was instantly reminded of images showing the controlled implosion in 1972 of another icon of modern architecture: the Pruitt-Igoe Housing project in St. Louis, designed by the same architect who built the World Trade Center, Minoru Yamasaki—a haunted architect, if ever there was one. Pruitt-Igoe became an icon only through its destruction, images of which have widely circulated both on television and in architecture books. That implosion of thirty years ago has been described time and again as a symbolic marker for the end of urban modernism and the beginning of postmodernism in architecture. The Twin Towers, however, were completed in 1973 and 1976, after that supposed historical break, and they were built in the spirit of the classical modernist skyscraper and its vertical sublime. In 1972 it was supposedly the end of urban modernism. Now we hear talk of the end of the skyscraper, coupled with renewed fears about the end of urban life and public space. Early suggestions after 9/11 to protect New York by closing Times Square to traffic, transforming it into a tourist mall, were joined by such ideas as limiting access to railroad terminals and to public parks—all in the name of creating defensible space. None of that will fly. Sure, some will go live in Celebration, Florida, and New York may have to go through another bad period of economic downturn, rising unemployment, and urban decay—not just as a result of 9/11, but as a consequence of the mega-delusions and speculative frenzy of the 1990s. But New York will not end up lying flat. Neither modernism nor the skyscraper is dead. Rather, the key issue will be how to rethink both in relation to metropolitan public and civic space, in relation to business culture, and in relation to governmental responsibility and civic politics. The implosion of 1972 did not generate much in the vein of urban renaissance. Only time will tell whether the collapse of the Twin Towers will generate imaginative alternatives for an urban restructuring of the southern tip of Manhattan.

The other more recent image that sadly attaches itself to the disappearance of the Twin Towers in clouds of smoke and debris opens up another more international dimension. What I have in mind is the dynamiting of the two Bamiyan Buddha statues near the Hindu Kush mountains in central Afghanistan. In the spring of 2001, after having massacred many of the Shia minority Hazaras living in the Bamiyan valley, the Taliban destroyed these two sublime statues, which had inspired awe and wonder for centuries on the silk road, itself one of the emblems of transcontinental, if not global, trade at another cross-roads of the world in another time. The Islamic Pashtuns and other Islamic Afghan tribes had lived with these millennial statues carved out of a massive sandstone cliff for hundreds of years. The Bamiyan statues stood as an emblem of cultural syncretism and religious tolerance of an earlier age. Suddenly, almost five years into Taliban rule, they were declared blasphemous, and a seemingly disproportionate effort was mounted by the Taliban to destroy them. Why?

Threats to the statues were first articulated by Taliban military leaders in 1998 after the American missile strike against one of bin Laden's training camps. But it was only in late February 2001 that Mullah Muhammad Omar issued a fatwa calling for the destruction of all figurative statues in Afghanistan, in line with his narrow and distorted version of Islamic law. The Buddha statues were dynamited in mid-March. In the weeks between Mullah Omar's fatwa and the destruction of the statues, the international media was flush with appeals to the Taliban and with criticisms of their oppressive political regime. Parallels were drawn with other state-sponsored iconoclams, such as China's cultural revolution, the Nazi destruction of Jewish artifacts in the Third Reich, and the Serbian destruction of Muslim cultural sites in Bosnia. Kofi Annan and UNESCO, governments of many Asian countries with large Buddhist populations, as well as major international museum figures intervened in a futile effort to save the statues. At the time, there was speculation in the press that the Taliban acted out of defiance—defiance of the international community that still refused to recognize the Taliban government as legitimate. The press also linked the illegal antiquities trade to the Taliban, which had been secretly selling off Afghanistan's cultural heritage under the veil of self-righteous religious iconoclasm.

But as we now know more about Mullah Omar's extremely close relationship with, if not dependence on, Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden since the mid-1990s, it is difficult not to think about the relationship between the attack on the two sublime Bamiyan statues and the subsequent attack on the differently sublime Twin Towers. It is as if the dynamiting and collapse of the two statues last spring was a carefully staged prologue to the attack on New York, symbolic actions both, intended to whip up support in the Muslim world for bin Laden's apocalyptic Islamism. The parallels are obvious: in each, two figures, one taller than the other, like brothers, both invested in the aesthetic of the sublime, but not the terrorizing sublime that makes the spectator feel small and overwhelmed, for each allowed a view from the top—from the observation deck in the case of the World Trade Center and from the top of the Buddha's cave at Bamiyan. In both cases, the aesthetics of the sublime represented, in the paranoid aggressive world of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, only the demonic power of the other—the other religion, the other way of life, the infidel. But we can now surmise that the links go beyond symbolism.

The documented influence of Saudi Wahabbism on the Pakistani *madrasas* and on the Taliban makes it entirely plausible to suggest that the Wahabbist presence in Afghanistan that had grown during the Soviet occupation played a key role in the destruction of the Buddhas, invaluable monuments to the art and civilization of Afghanistan and the world. And Wahabbi presence in Kandahar points to Al Qaeda and bin Laden. Whether or not bin Laden took an active part in formulating Mullah Omar's fatwa, it is not difficult to

imagine bin Laden and his coconspirators enjoying the international uproar over the attack on the Buddhas even as they were anticipating the deadly attack on the twins, already then at an advanced stage of planning.

Of course, there are differences. The iconoclasm of the Taliban follows the logic of a local theocracy and the religious policing of its subject population. The iconoclasm of bin Laden and his coconspirators, on the other hand, stages a deadly world-media event in order to deal a blow to that very modernity of which bin Laden himself is a product, both in his own socialization as a construction engineer and in his political trajectory toward building a sophisticated terrorist network. But bin Laden's iconoclasm goes hand in hand with a very modern iconolatry: bin Laden posing as prophet on the tapes broadcast to the Muslim world via Al Jazeera, bin Laden in front of his cave, bin Laden surrounded by his followers aiming a submachine gun, bin Laden's image on posters and T-shirts wherever his message resonates. The iconic visibility of bin Laden contrasts curiously with the invisibility of Mullah Omar, whom we have known only from a grainy, rather unfocused photograph.

Now that we have seen the bin Laden tape from the Kandahar safe-house and now that we have read the utterly vacuous and pompous transcript of his and his companions' allegedly prophetic dreams of flying and fantasies of apocalyptic destruction, devoid of politics and interspersed with sanctimonious incantations, it is easy to see what the dynamiting of the Bamiyan Buddhas has in common with the attack on the Twin Towers. It is not the banality of evil Hannah Arendt once analyzed as key to the bureaucratic mind-set of Adolf Eichmann. It is rather the banality of a religious zealotry that has caused much suffering and destruction over the centuries whenever it has allied itself successfully with state power. What is at stake here is not the moral struggle of good versus evil, a discourse that itself remains deeply embedded in self-righteous religious thinking. Demonizing the terrorists only reiterates what they do themselves in their hatred for the infidel. Politicized religious zealotry, whether of Islam, Christianity, Judaism, or any other religion, is not the other of modernity, but its very product. At stake, therefore, is the political struggle to combat religious zealotry in all its forms, with the goal of preventing it from infiltrating or capturing state power wherever it may threaten to do so. To win that struggle, strategies other than military ones are needed. Questions of political power and economic devastation need to be addressed, as well as deficits of meaning, histories of humiliation, and injustice—the downside of globalization that is mostly forgotten when one looks at the world only from a 1990s Western perspective. In the meantime, the twin memories keep haunting me. And if I look closely at images of the now empty cave that held the larger of the two very human Buddha statues, I take comfort in the fact that in the back of the cave, the human outline of the destroyed statue is still visible, if only barely: another afterimage, supporting another memory that lingers.

War, Terrorism, and Spectacle, or: On Towers and Caves

SAMUEL WEBER

The title of our topic strikes me as distinctly contemporary.[1] *War* and *terrorism* have traditionally been associated with one another. But to link them both to *spectacle* constitutes a relatively new phenomenon. To *link* does not, of course, mean to "identify": it does not suggest that war, terrorism, and spectacle are the same. But it implies that there is a necessary relationship between them. And that is what is new. But it is new in a very specific way. For war has traditionally been associated with pageantry, parades, and demonstrations of all kinds. But perhaps never in the way we are witnessing today, when a certain type of spectacle, or as I would prefer to call it, *theatricalization,* seems to constitute one of the essential components of war rather than merely the celebration of its victorious outcome.[2]

Of course, our topic today was not selected out of a vacuum. The destruction of the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, has resulted in what the American president George W. Bush has declared to be a "War against Terrorism." And the theater of operations in and on which this "War" is being fought encompasses not just Afghanistan, but also the media of the world: in the United States and Europe, but also in Qatar and throughout the world.

It is often said that the attacks of September 11 changed everything. It certainly changed the conviction of those living in the United States that "it can't happen here": namely, that organized, mass destruction was something that was limited to the nightly news. The bombing in Oklahoma City, of course, marked a first breach in this widely held belief. But it could still be regarded as the exception that confirms the rule. That rule, however, collapsed together with the imploding Towers on September 11.

One should be as precise as possible here. U.S. society and its media have long been obsessed with violence: the massacres of students at Columbine High School or of Branch Davidians in Waco are just two recent instances of this. But violence in the United States has generally been portrayed, if not always perpetrated, as a *private affair,* done either *by* desperate or deranged individuals (Columbine), or *against* desperate or deranged individuals (Waco).

Ground Zero Viewing Platform.
March 2002.
Photo: Kathleen Oginski.

Violence tends to be individualized or, better, *privatized,* as with the Mafia and organized crime, understood as an extension of individuals, of the family, or of private groups. This is the violence that is demonstrated from morning to evening on the broadcast media, from the reports of mayhem on the highways that accompany the breakfast traffic reports (at least in Los Angeles!), to the incessant series of murders and killings that make up the not so new "nightly news." "Security" has thus been a long-standing and major preoccupation and concern both of individuals and of the American nation for decades.[3]

But what *is* new is the growing efficacy of an organized violence that is no longer simply private or individual, no longer simply "criminal" but rather "terrorist," which is to say: whose goal is (here at least) to disrupt and destroy the very fabric of society as a whole.

Of course, this is not absolutely new—far from it. But for a public whose collective memory seems to be measured in months rather than in years, much less decades or centuries, and which seems to be shrinking rapidly all the time—to this public, organized violence that attempts to challenge the prevailing social order *as a whole* appears to be an entirely new and unprecedented phenomenon.

This perception fits nicely with the "War against Terrorism" declared by the U.S. government in response to the attacks of September 11. The response follows an established pattern. After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, declared a "War on Poverty," while pursuing the less metaphorical war in Vietnam and South East Asia. Later presidents declared "War on Drugs." And now we have the "War against Terrorism." As commonly understood, *war* implies a conflict between *states.* Notable exceptions, of course, are *civil* and *guerilla wars,* in which the conflict is not *between* states but *within* a single state. But in both cases it is state power—that of an organized polity with a delimited territory—that is at stake. From this point of view, which associates war with a constituted state, *terrorism* can be seen as its excluded other. For what is generally designated as "terrorism" is the more or less organized use of violence by entities *other than established states.* Terrorism is of course never merely a descriptive, constative term; it is an evaluative one. Traditionally, the word is used to designate a violence considered to be illegitimate, evil, morally reprehensible *because* exercised by nonstate organizations, groups, or individuals. The state is thus identified as the guardian of law and order. Where this latter presumption breaks down, however, this conception of "terrorism" reveals itself as too simple. Thus, in the years 1940–1944 the German occupying power in Europe designated all resistance movements, in France and elsewhere, as "terrorist." Almost every state defends its claim

to hold a monopoly of organized violence in the name of peace and security by defining the violence of its adversaries—those who do not equate legality with legitimacy—as terrorist.

In the twentieth century, however, and probably long before, this use of the term became more complicated, as the example of the Nazi occupation suggests. For it became increasingly common to designate states themselves as terrorist: for example, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin. The Israeli government led by Ariel Sharon has designated Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority as terrorist, and Arafat has replied by calling Sharon's Israel a terrorist state. The ETA is a terrorist organization for Spain and France but a movement of national liberation for segments of the Basque population.

If states are constituted in violence (for instance, through a revolution) and maintained through the exercise of force, both external and domestic, then the difference between "terror" and "legitimate force" is never simply a neutral assessment but rather a function of perspective, situation, interpretation, and evaluation. This does not mean that it is entirely arbitrary, of course, but rather that it is always *relational:* a function of its relation to other elements, never simply a judgment that can be self-contained.

Despite such problems, however, "terrorism" continues to be defined as the enemy of the state *as such;* and if, as Carl Schmitt persuasively argues, the concept of the political is based on the identification of the "enemy," then this discursive practice amounts to nothing less than identifying the terrorist as the *enabling other* of the state—its negative justification, so to speak. The more powerful the terrorist organization(s), the more powerful the state in its military-political-security functions must become—and, correspondingly, the weaker its civilian and civil functions must be made. Such a tendency takes on a special signification in a period when the traditional conception, if not function, of the nation-state is more in question than at any time since its inception. In the post–cold war period of globalization and transnational capitalism, a new "enemy" seems to be needed to consolidate the role and to reinforce the legitimacy of nation-states that are ever more openly dependent upon, and agents of, transnational corporate interests.[4] Today it is not just the presidents of universities who are primarily fund-raisers rather than policy makers (at least in the United States): presidents and chief executives of nation-states serve with increasing openness as emissaries and advocates of their countries' respective economic interests.[5] But since these interests are also increasingly difficult to identify as being for the common good of a country's population, enemies are needed in order to justify the "sacrifices" demanded of populations subjected to increasing social and economic insecurity.

"International Terrorism" is at the moment the leading candidate for Public Enemy Number One. But it is also an unusual candidate, at least in the forms it has recently assumed. And its unusual quality has to do with the third term I would like to discuss, and to which I now turn: *spectacle.*

The notion of *spectacle* can, if we take the time to reflect a bit, help us describe just what is distinctive about International Terrorism being declared "Public Enemy Number One." In order for something to be a spectacle, it must, first of all, *take place.* Which is to say, it must be *localizable.* Whether inside, in a theater (of whatever kind), or outside, in the open, a spectacle must be placed in order to be seen (and heard). But the place taken by a spectacle is no ordinary locality, at least not in the way *place* has traditionally been defined: namely, as a stable, self-contained container. For the stage or scene of a spectacle is never fully self-contained. To function as a stage or a scene, a place must itself take place *in relation to other places,* beginning with the place of spectators or audience. The space of a theater is divided into the space of the stage and that of the audience. This makes the place and taking-place of a spectacle singularly difficult to pin down. As Guy Debord puts it, in his book on *The Society of the Spectacle* (1967):

> The world the spectacle holds up to view is at once *here* and *elsewhere;* it is the world of the commodity ruling over all lived experience. The commodity world is thus shown *as it really is,* for its logic is one with men's estrangement from one another and from . . . what they produce.[6]

Debord's notion of *spectacle* elaborates on Marx's chapter on the "fetish-character of the commodity," in which a social *relation* that is invisible *as such* appears in the form of a self-contained material or natural *substance.* But Debord's notion of the spectacle foregrounds what is only implicit in Marx: the relation to the spectator (who is, of course, also a listener—an audience). The spectator of the spectacle—which for Debord is always the spectacle of a society determined by the production of commodities—is both separated and isolated: from others, but also from him- or herself. In this context Debord asserts that "the spectacle is simply the common language that bridges this division. . . . Spectators are linked by a one-way relationship to the very center that maintains their isolation from one another. The spectacle thus unites what is separate, but it unites it only in its separateness."[7]

The spectacle, in being "at once here *and* elsewhere" marks the division of the here and now, or, more precisely, their separation: the here is not just now, and the now is not just here. Here and now coexist, but in a disjunctive relationship: they are separated from one another, but inseparable in their separateness. The spectacle *plays to spectators* who are similarly

neither here nor there, or—what amounts to the same—*here and there at once*. The upshot is that such spectators are not just separated from one another but are separated from themselves, insofar as these "selves" are defined through their position *as spectators*.

Debord's theory of the spectacle and of the spectator gives a certain relief to the powerfully provocative response of Jean Baudrillard to the attacks of September 11. In an article published in *Le Monde* on November 3, 2001, Baudrillard writes:

> All the speeches and commentaries betray a gigantic abreaction to the event itself and to the fascination that it exerts. Moral condemnation and the sacred union against terrorism are equal to the prodigious jubilation engendered by witnessing this global superpower destroyed or better, in some sense destroy itself. . . . That we dreamt of such an event, that everyone without exception dreamt of it, because no one could not not dream of the destruction of any superpower hegemonic to such a degree—this is unacceptable for Western moral conscience, but it remains a fact, and one which is justly measured by the pathetic violence of all the discourses that attempt to erase it.
>
> In the end, it is they who did it but it is we who wanted it.[8]

In the light of Debord's discussion, the voice speaking here—the "we who wanted it"—is the spectator of the society of the spectacle. Some thirty-five years after Debord wrote his book, however, those spectators can be more precisely situated and described: they are the television spectators who are themselves sold as commodities to the advertisers who are the real customers of the national and multinational media. This situation obtains almost totally in the United States and increasingly in Europe.

Baudrillard's assertion makes sense, I would argue, *only* insofar as it is understood to articulate the position of spectators, a position that is not the same in Paris as it is in New York but that nevertheless shares certain general characteristics which Debord was one of the first to discern. Debord emphasized that spectacle perpetrated the separation and isolation of individuals in a commodity society while at the same time concealing that isolation. The televisual view of the world propagated by the nightly news in every country with which I am familiar (a very limited number, to be sure: mainly North America and Western Europe) heightens what Debord described but never explicitly named: *ambivalence,* which results when anxieties related to the limitations of physical (and social) existence, involving frailty, vulnerability, and—ultimately—mortality, are provisionally suppressed through images that position the spectator as an invulnerable and all-seeing survivor—surviving all the catastrophes that constitute the bulk

of the nightly news (at least in the United States; the situation of European television strikes me as different but, unfortunately, moving in the same direction at varying speeds). The situation of this spectator is akin to that of the child, described by Lacan as the Mirror Stage, characterized by an Imaginary identification with an image of wholeness. The internal contradiction of such identification is that it institutes an image of unity only by occupying two places at once: the desired place of wholeness and the feared place of disunity. In the images of catastrophe that dominate broadcast media "news," the disunity is projected into the image itself, while the desired unity is reserved for the spectator off-scene (and for the media itself as global network).[9] To support such identification and the binary opposition upon which its success depends, images must appear to be clearly localizable, self-contained, and meaningful at the same time that they englobe destruction, mutilation, and implosion. They must comprehend and contain the catastrophes that thereby appear to be intelligible in and of themselves, without requiring the spectator to look elsewhere. The spectator thus can sustain the illusion of occupying a position that allows one to "endure" indefinitely. This is the moral of the story, whether it is called "Enduring Freedom" or "Infinite Justice." The War against Terrorism is thus conducted in the name of "enduring freedom," as the freedom to remain the same, to keep one's place indefinitely. This is also the message of "infinite justice": to remain in[de]finitely the same is to pursue the enemy relentlessly, without end, until he is cornered in his innermost redoubts and destroyed. The trajectory that leads from the Twin Towers to the caves of Tora Bora and beyond, marks the will to power as a will to endure. This is the not-so-hidden religious subtext of the ostensibly secular War against Terrorism, a war that is above all a defense and an affirmation of "globalization" as the right to determine the earth as being both all-encompassing and self-contained.

To rule the planet, one must survive. But to survive, one must rule. Western television (and often print) media appeal to their viewers by promising them the continued rule of such survival. "Stay with us: we'll be right back after the break." Stay with us—and survive the break; leave us and perish.

The spectacle of the Twin Towers imploding—a phallic fate if ever there was one—and of a portion of the Pentagon in ruins, broadcast in real time, has had two effects. On the one hand, it heightened the anxiety of the "break" to which consumption appeals. Consumer confidence was shattered, at least temporarily, and after a period of mourning the official discourse had to urge all citizens not, as one might have expected, to "get back to work," but to start spending again. The promise of immortality through

consumption had lost much of its appeal, for the time being at least. But since just such traumatic breaks are at the origin of the compulsion to consume, the basic structure and process was not fundamentally altered. That is, as long as the putative cause of anxiety can be located *in an image,* confined to a site, a stage—or, rather, to multiple sites and stages, but in sequence, one following the other. This is the goal of the military response to "terrorism": it must be named (Al Qaeda), given a face (Osama bin Laden), and then, above all, *located* (Afghanistan, Tora Bora, Sudan, Somalia, and so on) in order then to be depicted, if possible, and destroyed. The names and faces may change. But presumably not the need *that* "terror" be named and given a face.

On the other hand, when *terrorism* is defined as "international," it becomes more difficult to locate, situate, personify, and identify; or, rather, it can only be situated sequentially, one site after the other, not all at once. From this point on the War against Terrorism becomes a scenario that unfolds, step by step and intrinsically without end, in its effort to bring the global enemy to "infinite justice." Almost from the beginning of this war, the Bush administration asserted that the enemy was "international" in character, limited neither to one person, however important, nor to one state, however nefarious. Thus, the War against Terrorism, unlike the cold war, cannot be defined primarily as a war against a single state, the Soviet Union, or against that state's international emanation, "The Communist Conspiracy." It is not even a war against a single terrorist organization, however decentralized, such as Al Qaeda. "International Terrorism" englobes all the "rogue" states that for years have been designated by the U.S. State Department as aiding and abetting terrorism: Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Syria, and so on. What characterizes this policy is its continuing effort to tie terrorist networks to nation-states. It locates cause, condition, *and* ramifications in the pathological behavior of individual "rogue" states, whose roguishness consists in their refusal to follow the norms of international behavior as laid down by the United States government.[10]

To conclude: the spectacle, at least as staged by the mainstream broadcast media, seeks simultaneously to assuage and exacerbate anxieties of all sorts by providing images to which they can be attached, ostensibly comprehended, and, above all, *removed.* Schematically, the fear of death is encouraged to focus upon the vulnerability of the other, which, as enemy, is the other to be liquidated or subjugated. The viewer is encouraged to *"move forward"* and simultaneously to *forget the past;* encouraged to identify with the ostensibly invulnerable perspective of the pilotless airborne camera that registers as blips the earthbound destruction tens of thousand of feet below. Such a position seems to assure the triumph of the spectator

over the mortality of earthbound life. The trails of the B-52s in the stratosphere high above the earth announce the demise of the Caves and the Ressurrection of the Towers.

And with these Good Tidings, the first global spectacle of the twenty-first century appears to approach a Happy Ending, at least on our television screens. But if the spectacle seems to be drawing to a close, for the time being at least, the scenario itself is far from over.

Notes

1. This paper was originally presented at the Forum on War, Terrorism, and Spectacle, University of Lancaster, U.K., December 15, 2001.

2. To be sure, spectacle has always been a part of warfare. But its addressee has changed. It is no longer primarily the enemy that the demonstration of power and control is designed to demoralize, but rather the detached spectator, whether at home or abroad.

3. In his remarkable book *Politics of Security* (New York: Routledge, 1996), Michael Dillon, one of the organizers of the Forum on War, Terrorism, and Spectacle, argues persuasively, following Heidegger, that the concern with security is rooted in Western modernity and the metaphysical tradition from which it emerges.

4. A recent example that has been in the news is that of "Echelon," the worldwide system of surveillance put into place by the United States in collaboration with Great Britain and the other countries of the Commonwealth. Echelon apparently has served as much to gather economic information used to advantage American (or British) corporations as to provide political-military intelligence. For details, consult the Web page of Echelon Watch (www.echelonwatch.org), a discussion forum sponsored by the ACLU.

5. And sometimes even against them. Here a precise analysis would have to bring out the dissymmetry in the respective roles of the hegemonic superpower and the subordinate allied countries. For example, it appears that the Echelon information-gathering system may have been used to help the Boeing Corporation successfully compete against Airbus, in which British interests are largely represented.

6. Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* (1967; New York: Zone Books, 1995), 26.

7. Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, 22.

8. *Le Monde* of November 2, 2001. The English translation of this article by Rachel Bloul is available at http://cryptome.org/baud-terr.htm. Translation modified.

9. Or, one could say that the disunity is "contained," as *content*, within and by the unified *form* of the image. This unity of image sustains the conviction that its beholder must be no less unified. The emotion that results is the jubilation that Lacan associates with the Mirror Stage and that Baudrillard describes as a widespread response, outside of the United States, to the spectacle of September 11.

10. In passing, it should be noted that the political use of the word *rogue* has an interesting history. As far as I can remember, the word first became prominent in relation to the assassination of President Kennedy, when it was used by investigators—and certainly not by the authorities—to describe elements of the government ["intelligence" services, military] that might have acted secretly, outside the official chain of command. Later the term came to descibe states that did not comply with American expectations of proper political behavior, such as Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Iraq. In short, from a term designating the disunity of "official" state organizations, it became a mark of abnormal political-state behavior—a symptomatic development, to say the least.

Terrorism, Feminism, Sisters, and Twins: Building Relations in the Wake of the World Trade Center Attacks

KAREN BECKMAN

Everyone had a good laugh at a recent roundtable discussion of September 11 and its aftermath when postcolonial historian Gyan Prakash, responding to a question from an audience member, mistook the word *feminism* for *terrorism.* Judith Butler swiftly corrected the slip, "Not terrorism, *feminism,*" and the conversation moved on. But if such slips of the ear, or "symptomatic actions," do, as Freud suggests, "have a meaning and can be interpreted," then we need to return to the burst of laughter that occurred in place of a discussion and think about what is going on when we confuse one ism with another.[1] The mistake can be more easily understood when we take into account the question that preceded it. Challenging Butler's oppositional stance toward the U.S. military attack on Afghanistan, the audience member in question stated that he had learned from his reading since September 11 that U.S. foreign policy on Afghanistan had actually been shaped by feminists and their constant pressure on the U.S. government to address the atrocious treatment of women under the Taliban regime. On one level, then, Prakash's failure to hear the word *feminism* can be read as symptomatic of his incredulity at the audience member's formulation of the current military actions of the U.S. military as a laudable attempt on the part of the federal government to keep American feminists happy.

Placing Prakash's slip in the context of the question might explain his confusion, but it does not explain the comedy of the moment. Why did everyone laugh? What is so amusing about the confusion of terrorists with feminists? The moment of mishearing enacted an imaginary substitution, evoking a number of funny images, allowing us momentarily to picture, on the one hand, the spectacle of feminist theorists destroying buildings, taking lives, and causing massive crisis to the machinery of the state, and, on the other hand, "terrorists" struggling to articulate how they define themselves, asking who gets included or excluded by the label *terrorist,* and wrestling endlessly with generational conflicts—how to relate to the terrorists of the 1970s, as well as to the younger generation of "post-terrorists." And so on. But this

Grey Room 07, Spring 2002, pp. 24–39.

Gerhard Richter, *Confrontation 2 (Gegenüberstellung 2)*, 1988. Oil on canvas, 44 x 40.25" (112 x 102 cm). Courtesy Gerhard Richter and Marian Goodman Gallery.



substitution would lose its comic possibilities if the terms involved were totally unrelated. Freud's work on jokes suggests that the pleasure of hearing a joke derives primarily from "the momentary suspension of the expenditure of energy upon maintaining repression."[2] The laughter that erupted in the auditorium did so as a result of the brief emergence of a repressed notion of feminism as a type of terrorism. We might partly attribute the emergence of this repressed relation between the two discourses to the presence of Judith Butler, whose work over the last few years has consistently challenged the usefulness of a feminism that works in tandem with, rather than in opposition to, the institution of the state, and whose recent work focuses on the figure of Antigone, who, at the height of the Baader-Meinhof crisis in the 1970s, was described by a character in the collectively directed *Germany in Autumn* as "a terrorist woman."[3]

The joke was also, of course, a joke about isms, about the difference that lies embedded within the consonance of that appendage, which can, as the dictionary tells us, have several competing meanings, including: "1. Action, process; practice: *terrorism*. 2. Characteristic behavior or quality: *heroism*. 5.a. Doctrine; theory; system of principles: *pacifism*. b. An attitude of prejudice against a given group: *racism*."[4] *Feminism* is noticeably absent from the list of examples, but it would be instructive to think about where it would belong, were it to be included. Is feminism a practice, a form of action (like terrorism), a theory (like pacifism), or an attitude of prejudice against a given group—for example, men—(like racism). The difficulty of resolving the placement of feminism might explain its absence. But are any of the given examples exempt from the difficulties that feminists face when trying to decide which "-ism" they best exemplify? Who decides that racism is only an attitude, rather than a practice; or that pacifism is a theory, not an action? Does terrorism have a system of principles as well as a practice? Might heroism be a doctrine, a practice, or even an attitude of prejudice, as well as a personal quality? In the current political climate such questioning of the ambiguity of terms like *terrorism* and *heroism* is generally regarded as ethically unsound.[5] Lately, however, this type of interrogation of words and ideas has been put on hold. Being "American," or at least a patriotic American, seems to require a suppression of ambiguity, as when George W. Bush issued his ultimatum to the world on September 20, 2001: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."[6] Where does this formulation leave feminism? What kind of space does feminism occupy in relation to both the state and terrorism?

Retrofeminism: Us, Them, and the Return of the 1970s

In striking contrast to the rhetoric of World War II, which compelled us to "tighten our belts" and endure the frugality of rationing at home for the sake

of "the boys" over there, the "war on terrorism" exhorts us to demonstrate our love of country through the purchase of stocks on U.S. exchanges, as well as through a continued commitment to frenzied shopping. And although consumer reports predict that fashion accessories will be the number-one holiday-season purchase, it is clear from displays in bookstores everywhere—where histories of Islam are nonchalantly placed beside World Trade Center photographic souvenirs, sociological studies on terrorism, collections of Arabic poetry, and theories of post-Holocaust trauma, as if the relationship between these various texts were glaringly obvious—that the consumption of "terrorism" now also has an important role to play in the well-being of our ailing national economy.[7] Offering a perfect model of the hypercapitalist psyche, America "works through" its trauma by first commodifying, then consuming it.

Of the many books being ordered or rushed back into print before the current interest in terrorism subsides, it is disappointing but not surprising that only one book by a feminist writer has received any attention: Robin Morgan's *The Demon Lover: On the Sexuality of Terrorism*. Indeed, one of the disturbing shifts in discourse that has taken place since the horrific events of September 11 is the reemergence of a feminist voice—exemplified by Morgan—that had its heyday in the seventies and eighties, one that espouses the essentialist claim that war and violence are almost exclusively male phenomenon. Women, with their nurturing, maternal instincts, their collective care about the world, and their innate peace-loving natures, simply do not respond to conflict in violent, militaristic terms. For Morgan, "the rebel woman in a male-defined-State-that-would-be is merely acting out another version of the party woman running for office in the State-that-is. And the terrorist woman is doing the same thing, writ large in letters of fire."[8] Morgan argues that the men who "call up armies, attach electrodes to living flesh, [and] justify the invention, testing, and stockpiling of world-destroying weapons" share a key trait: a fundamental lack of ambivalence.[9] By contrast, the violent instincts of women, Morgan implies, are held in check by what she calls "the virtues of ambivalence": "However enraged we become—and however much an individual woman may act (classically) in defense of her children or (lately) in defense of herself—*women as a group do not mobilize for our own rights through violent means.*"[10]

The irony of this passage stems precisely from Morgan's own lack of ambivalence about women's relationship to violence, from her stubborn unwillingness to acknowledge the way in which feminist discourse has repeatedly aligned itself with a discourse of terrorist action and armed subversion. Indeed the feminist peace movement that formed in opposition to the Vietnam war coincides both with a surge in female terrorist action (most prominently within the Baader-Meinhof group, the Weather Underground

movement, and the Wimmin's Fire Brigade) and with the eruption of symbolic feminist violence in the publication of texts like Valerie Solanas' *S.C.U.M. Society for Cutting Up Men Manifesto* (1968), Monique Wittig's *Les Guérillères* (1969), Angela Carter's *The Sadeian Woman* (1979), which includes a chapter entitled, "Sexuality as Terrorism," as well as in the production of female terrorist films, such as Margarethe Von Trotta's *Marianne and Juliane* (*Die bleierne Zeit*) (1981), and Lizzie Borden's *Born in Flames* (1983). Although one might argue, as Morgan does, that the female terrorists within organizations like the Baader-Meinhof Group always acted within a patriarchal structure that positioned women as "the Demon Lover's Woman," there is still an urgent need to complicate the relationship between feminism and violence. Of de Sade's Juliette, for example, Carter writes, "She uses her sex as an instrument of terror; death is more frequently the result of it than birth. She lobs her sex at men and women as if it were a hand grenade; it will always blow up in their faces."[11] And in an interview with feminist film theorist Anne Friedberg, filmmaker Lizzie Borden acknowledges that, while her final shot in *Born in Flames* (an image of the transmitter on top of the World Trade Center being blown up by a futuristic women's army) is "not prescriptive," she does know that "there has never been any social transformation without violence."[12]

More surprising than Morgan's views, which were written before many of the essentialist-constructionist debates of the nineties so profoundly shaped our understanding of gender, is Jeanette Winterson's article in the *Guardian*'s "Women" section on October 30, 2001. "When are we going to take responsibility for the way we live?" Winterson asks—and this seems like a promising question. But then she continues,

> I can hardly believe that we are back into those 70s feminist debates about women, nature, the Earth, life, nurturing and continuity, versus men who have no respect for the natural world, and see it as they see the female body, as something imperfect, approximate and in need of a helping hand from science.

> Everywhere I look, men are talking about nuclear capacity, about germ warfare, about dedicating 50 years to wipe out terrorism. . . . This is a war—and the "big trousers" are back in charge. . . .
>
> Women will have to take a stand against this madness. I hate the fact that war is gendered—with men doing the destroying and women picking up the pieces. Yes, I know that women fight in the army, but when [Stephen Hawking] is talking about aggression and how it is the superior principle of survival, I know he's not talking about women.
>
> I had begun to hope that gender was becoming less important. . . . The hard lines of the sex war had softened. But now we're in a different kind of war, and testosterone is back.
>
> Germ warfare or gender warfare? Can somebody tell the guys what planet we're on?[13]

I, too, can "hardly believe" that "we" are back into those 1970s notions of woman as nurturer, especially given the fact that the article adjacent to Winterson's own column focuses on women who kill their husbands.[14] Clearly, the murderous and abused women discussed in this neighboring article represent the exception to Robin Morgan's claim about women and violence. They are women who act "(classically) in defense of [their] children or (lately) in defense of [themselves]"[15]; they are women enmeshed in a system of patriarchal violence, for sure, and their violence can be read as one of the by-products of patriarchy. But given that women have always had to exist under the conditions of patriarchy, where do we find examples of women who are not affected by this violence? I would happily "tell the guys" what planet we are on, if only I knew where that planet was. Winterson seems to be suggesting that we inhabit different worlds, something along the lines of Martian men and Venusian women. And yet the title of her article, "Life on Planet Earth Is Precious," brings us back to the same world we both inhabit, making the debate more complicated than her suggestion of extraterrestrial difference would seem to allow.

There are good reasons for questioning the post–September 11 polarizations of gender that are confined to the sphere of gender politics, as well as the way in which these public constructions of gender norms shape the possible spaces available to men and women in the public sphere. But more generally, I would suggest that any attempt to rigidly separate violence and nonviolence through the idea of gender, as both Winterson and Morgan try to do, would be to fall into the same rhetoric of "us" and "them" that Bush Jr. introduced in his address before Congress, a rhetorical strategy that he and his propaganda machine have been busy mobilizing ever since. If we must return to the debates of 1970s feminism—and current events suggest that we

Feminist terrorist attack on the Twin Towers. Lizzie Borden, *Born in Flames*, 1983.

may have to—we need to consider the intimate relationship between feminism and violence, terrorism and war, that coexists with feminism's articulation of a commitment to the *nonviolent* transformation of society.[16]

Sibling Rivalry

In choosing to call the events of September 11 "The World Trade Center Attacks," the media removes from public discourse the question of relationship that the buildings' other name—the Twin Towers—reveals.[17] In the wake of the Twin Towers' spectacular falls, it was hard to break out of a vertical mode of thinking. The question of the skyscraper and whether or not it would be foolhardy to design a replacement building that would again reach so far up dominated architectural discussions in the immediate aftermath of September 11, at the expense of reflections on the buildings' striking doubleness and their suggestion of lateral relations. Robert A. M. Stern, dean of the Yale School of Architecture, for example, stated in the September 30 issue of the *New York Times*, "We have always expressed our confidence through tall buildings. We are still a brash, new, swaggering country, and we must still explore the imaginative possibilities of height. To bury our heads in the sand or create imaginative voids seems not appropriate."[18] Even when the buildings only existed on paper, they provoked troubled contemplation not only of how each tower related to the other, but how the "twins" in turn related to their environment. In May 1966 Wolf von Eckhardt wrote in *Harper's Magazine*, "These incredible giants just stand there, artless and dumb, without any relationship to anything, not even to each other."[19] For von Eckhardt the Twin Towers represent relationship in crisis, a symbol of sameness as absolute isolation. And although he implies that this crisis constitutes a failure of the buildings themselves, I want to suggest that in the wake of September 11, these now absent buildings, designated as twins, provide us with a vital image for beginning to explore America's own representation of itself and the impact that that symbolic representation has on those both within and outside of its borders.

If, in the wake of September 11, the Twin Towers have become a symbol of American relationships per se, then perhaps we should begin by thinking about the word *twin*. The twin is one of two offspring born at the same birth, one of two ostensibly identical people. The idea of twins takes the sibling relationship to extremes, pushing always beyond the point of similarity to an uncanny sameness or "identity," and belying the difference that marks the twins as separate subjects in spite of their shared birth history. Like Bush Jr.'s declaration to the nations of the world—"you're either with us, or you're with the terrorists"—the symbol of the twin articulates relationship *as* sameness, leaving room only for absolute identity or absolute opposition. But like twins themselves—at once identical and different, the word *twin* is

itself paradoxical. Though the word connotes identity or sameness, it has forgotten roots in the Middle English verb *twinnen,* which means "to put asunder, to separate, disjoin, disunite, sever, part, divide, distinguish."[20] The sameness of the twin, therefore, rests on a repressed memory of severance, disunity, and violent division. By formulating relationship in terms of identity or sameness, "America" becomes a symbol of the refusal of difference. Since September 11 the mainstream media has happily embraced the notion that racial tensions will simply disappear in the spirit of "United We Stand."[21] On October 10, 2001, a *New York Times* article titled "Sept. 11 Attack Narrows the Racial Divide" presents the testimonies of various people who perceive the evaporation of racial conflict. Louis Johnson, 18, described as "the child of Trinidadian immigrants," declares, "I just thought of myself as black. But now I feel like I'm an American." Meanwhile, the Reverend David Dyson, a white pastor in Brooklyn, celebrates the fact that he hasn't "heard the word gentrification uttered since this happened. . . . There's not nearly as much us against them—the old us against them." The recent race baiting by Mark Green supporters in the New York mayoral race, however, suggests that racial prejudices stubbornly live on within the city. As Patricia Williams has so cogently argued in *Seeing a Color-Blind Future,* the invisibility of racial difference is not necessarily a good thing.[22] Indeed the absence of public discussion about race may encourage further entrenchment of racist views and public policies and may in fact be symptomatic of a renewed unwillingness to confront the social and economic inequalities that support racial divisions.

The disappearance of "the twins" from the New York skyline provides architects with a space in which to imagine a new way of articulating a symbol of America's relationship both to its own inhabitants and to those beyond its borders, something more akin to analogy than to identity—analogy being a mode of relations that takes account of the complexity of relations within any given relationship. As Rodolphe Gasché writes,

> Up through Aristotle, analogy had the meaning of mathematical proportion, relation, ratio, correspondence, thus reflecting its origin as a mathematical concept formulated by the Pythagoreans. It did not signify a simple relation or a simple proportion but a system of relations or proportions. Puntel writes, "Analogy is a relation of relations, a proportion of proportions, in short, a correspondence of relations." According to this originary meaning of analogy, the unity or the identity that difference presupposes, and which mediates between what is different, becomes manifest in the similitude of *opposing but back-stretched relations.* As a matter of fact, the whole problematic of analogy is one of determining these relations.[23]

"Back-Stretched Relations": Marianne and Juliane

In order to think further about the possibilities of Gasché's concept of "back-stretched relations," I want to return to my earlier claim that feminism, rather than emerging in opposition to the notion of "terrorism" and violence more generally, has in fact articulated itself through a complicated relationship to both. Margarethe von Trotta's 1981 film *Marianne and Juliane* provides a particularly resonant vehicle for this inquiry, because it not only asks how a feminist relates to a terrorist, but does so through the lens of the sibling relationship. *Marianne and Juliane,* based loosely on the life of Baader-Meinhof leader Gudrun Enßlin and her sister Christiane, depicts the strained relationship between the convicted terrorist Marianne and her feminist activist sister Juliane. Both share a revolutionary vision of a different world that radically challenges state authority, but while Juliane writes for a radical feminist magazine and participates in pro-choice demonstrations, Marianne has adopted a strategy of armed resistance. Marianne thinks Juliane has abandoned the revolution in favor of a bourgeois lifestyle and trivializes the importance of her feminist work, while Juliane accuses Marianne of undoing the achievements of leftist feminism through her terrorist activities.

After its release the film was harshly criticized for its conservative politics, most notably by Charlotte Delorme in *Frauen und Film*.[24] Delorme takes issue with von Trotta's misuse of the historical lives of Gudrun and Christiane Enßlin, but her primary critique of the film targets the Manichaean universe the film establishes through the sibling relationship. According to Delorme, von Trotta's portrayal of Marianne draws heavily on reactionary clichés and psychological theories about terrorist behavior, thereby undermining the radical political stance Gudrun Enßlin took. Further, Delorme claims that the film establishes an opposition between the "healthy" and the "sick" sister, with Marianne emerging as the purely negative, slightly hysterical figure. As if this weren't enough, Delorme goes on to describe the camera as "voyeuristic and spiteful" ("voyeuristisch und hämisch").[25] All that we are left with, this article suggests, is the "sticky 'truth' that blood is thicker than water."[26]

E. Ann Kaplan has defended the film against many of Delorme's charges in, "Discourses of Terrorism, Feminism and the Family in von Trotta's *Marianne and Juliane,*" arguing that it possesses radical moments that Delorme's reading ignores. Although Kaplan acknowledges that von Trotta's cinematic technique fails to convey a radical message, relying on conventional realist strategies that do not challenge the traditional modes of representing women, she suggests that von Trotta tries to establish some distance between the viewer and the film itself by the use of flashbacks. Though a standard feature of classic Hollywood film, the flashback in this case becomes interesting, Kaplan argues, because, rather than narrating a "single, closed,

and finished past event," Juliane's voice-over combined with the flashbacks recalls a series of changes and events that are still in flux.[27] I want to suggest that Kaplan's claims for the radical nature of the flashback do not go far enough and do not begin to identify why these scenes play such an important role in the political work the film enacts. In a 1981 interview von Trotta distinguishes her use of flashbacks from the conventional Hollywood use of this narrative strategy not on the basis of the changing nature of the depicted events, but rather on the grounds of casting: "I didn't want to reach back to the Hollywood method, i.e., making up the older actresses as their younger selves. Therefore I had to find other actors who fit the people in question. I worried that they wouldn't be accepted."[28] Although von Trotta begins to audition young actresses who physically resemble the older actresses they will double and is pressured by others involved in the film to cast on the grounds of resemblance, she ultimately selects Ina Rubinski to play the young Juliane, an actress she describes as "the one who looked most unlike Jutta Lampe [Juliane]" of all those auditioning.[29] Though the older Juliane has light hair, contrasting with the older Marianne's dyed black hair, the young Juliane has dark hair, while the young Marianne has blonde hair. This switch in the visual markers of characters is further complicated by the fact that in her youth Juliane is clearly the more rebellious, active protestor of the two sisters. While Marianne complies willingly with the social norms of 1950s Germany, obeying father and schoolteacher alike, Juliane reads Jean-Paul Sartre, refuses to wear skirts to school, smokes in the corridors, and denounces Rilke as "kitschig." Not only are we not sure which sister is which; von Trotta actively encourages us to mistake one for the other, and, as a result of this confusion, the film's backward reach establishes a complex network of relations between the feminist and the terrorist. Once von Trotta presents the sisters' attempt to identify themselves through their own linked history, the structure of the relationship between them shifts from binary opposition to chiasma. While Marianne's present self resonates with Juliane's former self, Juliane's present self—committed to changing the world through nonviolent political service—echoes Marianne's childhood longing to "be of use" and to help the needy. In order to relate to her former self, each sister must also relate to her "opposite," for it is this other who always most resembles the earlier self. These flashbacks produce disorientation and confusion in spectators and characters alike, fundamentally disrupting the Manichaean universe out of which the film's narrative seems to grow.

This confusion of "good" and "evil" is not a momentary blip in an otherwise politically conservative film, but rather a systematic effort to refuse a discourse of "us" and "them" throughout the entire work, one that begins with the flashbacks, but develops through a series of images of literally

back-stretching efforts to reach for a relationship with the other. At Juliane's first visit to Marianne in prison, the prison guard forces her to lift her sweater over her head as part of a thorough body search, placing Juliane momentarily in the position of the imprisoned criminal with no right to privacy. At the end of a later prison visit, Marianne asks Juliane if they can swap pullovers, which they immediately do, resulting in a rapid scene of upper-body contortions and stretches as the sisters undress and redress in seconds. While Marianne begins the scene in black, with Juliane wearing the opposite, morally virtuous white sweater, by the time Juliane leaves the prison, the color symbolism has been reversed, echoing the earlier confusion of the sisters' hair color. Toward the end of the film, after Marianne has apparently committed suicide in her cell, Juliane, who suspects that her sister was actually murdered, engages in an elaborate and physically exhausting process of reaching back to reconstruct the moment of death. Juliane sews a life-size replica of her sister's body, stuffs the dummy until its weight matches Marianne's weight exactly, then suspends it from the cord with which Marianne apparently hanged herself. The cord snaps, not strong enough to bear the body's weight, proving to Juliane that the whole suicide narrative is itself as much a fabrication as the cloth body lying before her. By the end of this scene Juliane lies crumpled in the corner of her room as a result of the psychic and physical labor required simply to relate to the life and death of the other.



The blurring of feminism and terrorism reaches a climax during Juliane's visit to the modern prison to which Marianne is moved in the latter part of the film, where the two sisters are now divided by a glass screen. In what Kaplan describes as "a remarkable scene recalling Bergman's *Persona,*"[30] Juliane's reflection on the glass momentarily merges with the face of Marianne behind the glass, producing an uncanny composite image of a face in which the two become indistinguishable. Kaplan argues that the image can be read both positively and negatively. "The image," she suggests, "could . . . well imply a kind of demonic

Top: Back stretching I. Margarethe von Trotta, *Marianne and Juliane*, 1981.

Bottom: Back stretching II.

Opposite, top: Juliane's bodily collapse.

Opposite, bottom: Composite image of the sisters' faces.

possession of Juliane by Marianne, something that events in the rest of the film might support."[31] To read this space of merging as subversive, according to Kaplan, "would mean that von Trotta intended to posit a pre-Oedipal, pre-linguistic realm, not unlike Kristeva's 'semiotic,' where female/female bondings, repressed in patriarchy, can be rediscovered; and second, to argue that such a space can dislocate/disrupt traditional familial relationships, structured around the law of the father."[32] The film itself strongly resists Kaplan's interpretation of this moment as an idealized place of "female bonding." As the faces merge, Juliane moves her head aside and complains, "Your face looks blurred to me . . . I can't see it properly anymore" ("Dein Gesicht verschwimmt mir . . . ich kann es nicht mehr richtig sehen"). The sisters try to communicate through the glass, but the microphones only whistle as they frantically press the necessary buttons. The prison warden announces that the session is over and removes Marianne from the room. Rather than representing a moment of joint entry into a place of presymbolic unity, which in itself would be difficult to read as subversive in a story of two women striving to gain a political voice *within* the symbolic, this moment of merging represents a crisis, even a breakdown in the possibility of relationship. In becoming identical, these "twins" experience the repressed meaning of "twin"—they are torn asunder. Indeed the film refutes an equation of Marianne with Juliane as strongly as it refutes the idea of them as polar opposites. Instead, *die bleierne Zeit* seems to advocate a politically radical theory of relationship between feminism and terrorism that founds itself not on the cliché that "blood is thicker than water" (Delorme), but rather on the far more challenging notion that relationship only becomes possible if we begin by acknowledging our own contamination in the very traits of "others" that distinguish "them" from "us," without simply incorporating those "others" into ourselves.



The political utility of this film for the present moment lies in its insistence upon a historical understanding of relations, both to ourselves and to others, as a

prerequisite to the possibility of relationship. Simultaneously refuting the logic of "us"/"them" *and* the model of identity or "twinship" as a viable model of relationship, this feminist film challenges America now to begin its self-definition with a backward glance.[33] As flashbacks of America—including slavery, lynchings, the Vietnam war, the death penalty (sometimes a sidelong glance will do just as well as a backward stretch)—flicker across our own imaginal movie screens, we will have to ask how exactly it is that we are defining *us* in such absolute opposition to *them,* "the terrorists." This question does not collapse one party into another; it does not require us to engage in a form of moral relativism that condones the September 11 attacks on the grounds that "we are terrorists too." Indeed, as I have tried to suggest, this type of simplistic reduction to sameness is as destructive to the possibility of communication and relationship as the alternative model of polar opposition. Until we move beyond a notion of America that depends upon either absolute sameness or absolute difference, the faces on the other side of the window will always be blurry, the microphones will always be whistling, and our visiting sessions with "the other" will always be over before they have even begun.

Notes

1. Sigmund Freud, "An Autobiographical Study," in *The Freud Reader,* ed. Peter Gay (New York and London: Norton, 1989), 29.

2. Freud, 40.

3. The play itself is also called a "Terrorstück" by a television producer who does not want to run a film version of Sophocles' play until "quieter times." *Germany in Autumn (Deutschland im Herbst)* (Alf Brustellin, Hans Peter Cloos, Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Alexander Kluge, Beate Mainka-Jellinghaus, Maximiliane Mainka, Edgar Reitz, Katja Rupe, Volker Schlöndorff, Bernhard Sinkel, Peter Schubert. Screenplay by Heinrich Böll and directors, 1977/1978).

4. *American Heritage Dictionary,* 3rd ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), 955.

5. See, for example, William Safire's contribution to the *New York Times Magazine* on 23 September 2001: "The sternly judgmental word should not be avoided or euphemized. Nobody can accurately call those who plotted, financed and carried out the infamous mass slaughter of Sept. 11 *militants, resistance fighters, gunmen, partisans,* or *guerrillas.* The most precise word to describe a person or group who murders even one innocent civilian to send a political message is *terrorist,*" "Infamy: Words of the War on Terror," 32.

6. "President Bush's Address on Terrorism before a Joint Meeting of Congress," the *New York Times,* 21 September 2001, B4.

7. Other post-September 11 consumer items include flags, mugs, bumper stickers, T-shirts, World Trade Center images, pins, headscarves, and children's firefighter rain jackets with accompanying helmets. We should also not forget the media-driven consumption of both the event itself and the trauma that followed in its wake. These spectacles included news shows and talk shows. The event will soon also be available as a full-length feature film. See Marc Cooper, "Lights! Cameras! Attack! Hollywood Enlists," *The Nation,* 10 December 2001, 14, in which Cooper outlines the guidelines provided to almost four dozen of "Hollywood's power elite" by Bush Jr.'s top adviser and strategist, Karl Rove. Bryce Zabel, screenwriter and CEO of the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, states, "What we are excited about is neither propaganda nor censorship. The word I like is advocacy. We are willing to volunteer to become advocates for the American message."

8. Robin Morgan, *The Demon Lover: On the Sexuality of Terrorism* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1987), 214. The other primary feminist text on terrorism is Luisa de Cataldo Neuberger and Tiziana Valentini, *Women and Terrorism,* trans. Leo Mitchell Hughes (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1996). This work is as problematic as Morgan's. Rather than denying the existence of women's relationship to violence, as Morgan does, Neuberger and Valentini found their inquiry on the myth of the femme fatale: "In sum, femininity as carrier of life and death, oracular voices, divine medium, ruthless instrument of vengeance, depository of 'strong' and immanent values, the point of intersection of pleasure and death, of sensuality and assassination. . . . The woman who brandishes an automatic weapon incarnates the definitive and irrevocable power of her mysterious myth, of her life and death rites, just as the Gorgon turns men into stone when she shows her nocturnal face" (vii–viii).

9. Morgan, 170.

10. Morgan, 170.

11. Angela Carter, *The Sadeian Woman and the Ideology of Pornography* (New York: Penguin, 1979), 105.

12. Anne Friedberg, "An Interview with Filmmaker Lizzie Borden," *Women and Performance*

1, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 37–45. It is interesting to note that the interview begins with an epigraph from Wittig's *Les Guerillères,* "Their armies grow hourly." Though much has changed since 1983, feminist Web sites such as http://www.burningairlines.com still tout bumper stickers declaring the violence of feminist women: "Ladies Sewing Circle and Terrorist Society," "Please Don't Make Me Kill You," and "I'm Out of Estrogen . . . I have a Gun." And although the sixty women legislators in Olympia, Seattle (birthplace of the riot-grrl feminist movement)—the largest group of women legislators in the nation—no longer belong to the Women's Sewing Club and Terrorist Committee, they do wear small gold pins with the letters M.O.B., "Mean Old Bitches." See Dionne Searcey, "Women Are Changing Style, Substance in State Legislature," *Seattle Times,* 31 January 1999, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/local/html98/womn_013199.html.

13. Jeanette Winterson, "Life on Planet Earth Is Precious—Can Somebody Please Tell the Lunatics Running the Asylum," *The Guardian,* 30 October 2001, G2, G9. Winterson here refers to Stephen Hawkings's recent recommendation that we genetically engineer human bodies so they are better able to live in space, something that becomes important when we consider that "there are too many accidents that can befall life on a single planet" (quoted in Winterson, 9).

14. Rachel Cooke, "Snap Decisions: A Man Kills His Unfaithful Wife and Gets Two Years. A Woman Kills Her Violent Partner and Gets Life. Not Fair, Says Justice for Women, 10 Years Old Tomorrow," *The Guardian,* 30 October 2001, G2, G8.

15. Morgan, 170.

16. For a broad overview of the feminist writing of the 1970s produced within the tradition of nonviolent resistance, see Pam McAllister, *Reweaving the Web of Life: Feminism and Nonviolence* (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1982).

17. I am grateful to Beatriz Colomina for drawing my attention to the difference this act of naming makes.

18. Deborah Solomon, "From the Rubble, Ideas for Rebirth," *New York Times,* 30 September 2001, Arts and Leisure section, 37.

19. Quoted in the *New York Times,* 30 September 2001, CY7.

20. See, for example, *Ancrene Wisse: Parts Six and Seven,* ed. Geoffrey Shepherd (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1985), 24, lines 29–31.

21. "For Now, Sept. 11 Terrorist Attack Narrows the Racial Divide in the U.S.," the *New York Times,* 10 October 2001, B1, B13.

22. Patricia J. Williams, *Seeing a Color-Blind Future: The Paradox of Race* (New York: Noonday, 1998). For further discussion of the relationship between the current formulation of antiterrorist policies and the racialized civil-rights issues that existed prior to the September 11 attacks, see Williams's recent discussion of terrorism in the context of the O.J. Simpson case, "More Juice?" *The Nation,* 24 December 2001, 11.

23. Rodolphe Gasché, *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Reflection of Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 297, emphasis added. Barbara Maria Stafford's recent work, *Visual Analogy: Consciousness as the Art of Connecting* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), is useful for thinking further about the possibility of analogical relations, particularly in the visual realm. However, it is problematic in its insistence that the recent postmodern embrace of "difference" has foreclosed more complex notions of relationship. Her critique fails to take account of the important work done on analogy by the primary philosopher of difference, Jacques Derrida (see, for example, *The Archeology of the*

Frivolous: Reading Condillac, trans. John P. Leavey Jr. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1980), 53–87.

24. Charlotte Delorme, "Zum Film 'Die bleierne Zeit' von Margarethe von Trotta," *Frauen und Film* 31 (February 1982): 52–55.

25. Delorme, 54.

26. Delorme, 54.

27. E. Ann Kaplan, "Discourses of Terrorism, Feminism, and the Family in von Trotta's *Marianne and Juliane,*" in *Women and Film,* ed. Janet Todd (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), 262.

28. Reiner Frey and Christian Göldenboog, "Rebellinen wider eine bleierne Zeit," *Filmfaust* 24 (1981): 34. My translation.

29. Frey and Göldenboog, 34.

30. Kaplan, 266.

31. Kaplan, 266.

32. Kaplan, 266.

33. It is crucial to remember the extent to which the story of the Baader-Meinhof group is a story about America's intervention in Vietnam and the German resistance to that intervention.

Infinite Justice: An Architectural Coda

ARINDAM DUTTA

We begin with Lyotard's opening paragraph on the "differend":

> As distinguished from a litigation, a differend *[différend]* would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. One side's legitimacy does not imply the other's lack of legitimacy. However, by applying a single rule of judgement to both in order to settle their differend as though it were merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both of them if neither side admits this rule). Damages result from an injury which is inflicted upon the rules of a genre of discourse but which is reparable according to those rules. A wrong results from the fact that the rules of the genre of discourse by which one judges are not those of the judged genre or genres of discourse.[1]

There are the standard questions that need repeating: Whose justice? Whose history? Whose memory? Whose architecture? Whose modernity? Lyotard's dazzling passage introduces the concept of the differend as the residual or excess element in the scene of the encounter, any encounter, between heterogeneous modes of discourse. To be attentive to the differend is to bear witness to the irreducible alterity of the other, at the very point where either party seems to resist the very terms of the encounter. Lyotard opens the framing of the differend with a European example—the problem at hand is juridical, posed as a problem of evidence. Those who witnessed the gas chambers in action, those who could testify to their existence and use, died in them. In their absence, how are others to persuade the tribunals that the gas chambers did indeed exist, or more important, to whom do they owe justice when the victims themselves no longer live to phrase their testimony? Since the rest of the world did not die in the gas chambers, what world would be a beneficiary of this justice? The questions asked earlier can be reframed, not only as whose justice, but also as justice for whom? In its ultimate unwillingness to address these questions within its own territories, Europe exports the "Jewish" differend to Asia.

Let us reframe the differend through an Asian example.

The place: Hopetown, part of the penal colony founded by the British in



"Map of India showing the Principal Buddhist Localities," in James Fergusson: *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*. (1876; Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1998).

the Andaman and Nicobar islands, in the middle of the Bay of Bengal.

The time: the evening of February 8, 1872. A visiting dignitary, an Irishman named Richard Southwell Bourke steps off the boat along with his official retinue. They are here to inspect the programs set underway to "reform" the convicts. As they head back to the ship after having toured the island, a man creeps up behind Bourke, stabs him in the back, and kills him. The murderer's name, as far as we are able to determine, is Sher Ali. He is a Pashtun native of Jamrud, near Peshawar, at the foot of the Khyber Pass. After 1901, having miserably failed to conquer the entirety of the Pashtun homelands, the British will call this area the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), a name that remains to the present day. Its strategic geopolitical importance as the frontier toward the vast Tsarist empire to the north takes precedence over local place names. To its immediate west is Afghanistan, much of whose population is composed of the same ethnic background as Sher Ali's. Over the period between 1838 and 1919, Britain and Russia will fight three major wars and many small battles in this region, using several local warlords as proxies and dupes.

Sher Ali, a subaltern in the Peshawar police, had been arrested for avenging the murder of a kinsman by killing the assailant, a practice justified in tribal custom under certain conditions. British jurisprudence, which forbade the individual from taking the law into his own hands, deemed Ali's act a criminal infraction. The trial was carried out on what was at best questionable jurisdiction—had Ali incidentally carried out the murder outside of the porous borders of British-held territory, he would not have come under the purview of British law. Taking these circumstances into consideration, the magistrate handed out what he considered a lenient sentence—transportation to the Andamans. It is precisely because of the importance given to custom in British jurisprudence and political thought that the incarcerated subject has to be distanced from its "traditional" surroundings. Edmund Burke's traditionalism is as much the progenitor of the penal colony as the utilitarianism of Bentham. Considering this symbolic ignominy rather than legitimate punishment, Sher Ali asked to be put to death, rather than be incarcerated in a foreign land. This voluntary offer was, of course, ignored. At the Andamans, Ali now set about planning his own death, but this time he would factor in British imperial justice in an entirely new equation.

When Sher Ali killed Bourke in 1872, he had waited four years for the opportunity, four years of planning and waiting not only for a significant victim to arrive but for his own death as well. And the murdered victim was the ideal one, indeed it was an assassination and not just a murder, since Bourke was none other than the Earl of Mayo, Benjamin Disraeli's appointee as the Viceroy of India, the *Laat Saaheb*[2] of Britain's eastern empire. The

incident triggered shock waves across the world, including a corresponding burst of nationalism in Britain itself. Many commented on how mourning had "united" the country from its usual fractious internal rivalries. Newspapers opined and discussed, editorialized and investigated the possible geopolitical implications of the event. The British-run *Friend of India* suggested that the government "[s]end the scoundrel to perdition in a pig skin to break his caste."[3] When asked to divulge his accomplices, Sher Ali refuted any larger plot, *"Merá sharík koí ádmí nahín; merá sharík khudá hai"* (No mortal is my companion, my companion is God himself).[4] His statement notwithstanding, almost everybody was intent on wrenching global meaning out of this isolated act. Liberals, nervous not to sound antipatriotic, made ineffective noises attributing the act to disaffection over Britain's economic and taxation policies. Some pointed out Mayo's oppressive treatment of Wahhabism, an insurgent and millenarian movement that had recently emerged in India. *The Times* in London darkly hinted at the existence of a secret "fraternity of hatred," of a secret Wahhabi plot to undermine the British empire. Originally founded in the eighteenth century in the Nadj area where the Saud tribe had established a kingdom on its literalist emphasis on the reading of Islamic scriptures, the Wahhabi movement in India had no direct connections to the Arab context. Its beginnings stemmed from conversions to the cause in the eastern city of Patna. Its early campaigns had been directed against the Sikh kingdom, under which Muslims were badly off. Since the British were fighting the Sikhs at this time, they found it convenient to encourage them in the early stage.

However, with the annexure of the Punjab in 1848, the Wahhabis increasingly became a thorn in the side of the colonial administration as well. After a spate of police crack-downs on the insurgent sect, tensions came to a head when J.P. Norman, the officiating Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, was assassinated on September 20, 1871 by a man affecting Wahhabi sympathies, barely three months before Mayo's own assassination. The specter of international insurgency with sectarian adherents as far distant as Mecca and Calcutta unnerved many who saw all manner of conspiracies being hatched to destabilize the British empire. It hardly helped that the Duke of Edinburgh, Victoria's second son, had been shot at by an Irish Fenian on the way from India to Australia in 1868.[5] After Mayo's murder, officials searched for letters that Sher Ali might have received from the "Patna malcontents," hoping to establish links with the larger Wahhabi movement. No such "proof" was forthcoming.

The British administration commemorated Mayo's short-lived career in India with a spate of institution building that would bring home the message of the intended persistence and tenacity of the Empire. Consequently,



Left: Mayo School of Arts, now Pakistan's National College of Arts, Lahore. Photo: Arindam Dutta.

Opposite, left: Lahore Museum, exterior. Although the museum was moved into this building after John Lockwood Kipling's departure from Lahore, it is a testimony to his legacy. Photo: Arindam Dutta.

Opposite, right: Lahore Museum, interior. Photo: Arindam Dutta.

even as the administration was unwilling to publicly state that Mayo was assassinated for political reasons, every official action they took thereafter reflected precisely those apprehensions. This memorializing impetus realized its apogee in Lahore, capital of the erstwhile Sikh kingdom, the latter a traditional enemy of the Afghan rulers, with the construction of the Lahore museum and the Mayo School of Art. Both the program and the form of these coupled institutions reflected the transformed attitude of the administration toward accommodating "native agency" in the policies of governance, especially after the 1857 Mutiny. The spate of localized insurgencies that continued throughout the nineteenth century was to keep the question of tradition alive in debates over colonial policy.

In any case, the creation of the Punjab as a "nonregulatory" province in 1849 had already signaled the turn toward the institutionalization of native customary agency.[6] This turn derived as much from economic considerations as political ones. A minimalist administration that left the terrain of domestic and personal law for native adjudication also absolved itself of the infrastructural costs of a full-fledged state apparatus at the periphery. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, colonialism seeks not so much to transform native subjecthood as to manage it. Punjab's administrative status thus contrasted sharply with the early "Regulatory" provinces (such as Bengal) where personal and domestic laws were brought directly under the purview of colonial jurisprudence. Recurrent insurgency from below owing to colonial interference in domestic and personal laws thus only appeared to justify a general tendency toward minimalism in colonial governance from above. This dual rationale was instrumental in shaping a decentralized and two-tiered policy where customary jurisprudence devolved to native authorities and the colonial administration retained control over political, criminal, and economic policy. Both feminist and other scholars of colonialism have noted that this two-tiered structure effectively exacerbated the patriarchal and despotic dimensions of this seemingly decentralized equation. In this system of "indirect" rule, traditional informal transactions acquired formal sanction from above, thus creating the conditions for increased native despotism at the ground level within the rubrics of "household," "caste," and "tribe." *Imperialism resolves the problem of the differend by situating it within relativism.*

The architecture of colonialism reflected the above concerns of governance at almost every level. The Mayo School and Museum were designed

on the lines of what was now shaping up to be the official architectural style of the British administration in India, the so-called Indo-Saracenic style. This representational motif was consistent with the general thrust of colonial policy in economic, political, and cultural fields. India would have her antiquity resurrected and restored to her through the recuperative stability of the Empire. To that effect, the manifestoes underlining the school and museum envisaged them as headquarters to document, incorporate and reinvigorate the traditional artisanal trades of the region in order to instill industriousness within native life. The sphere of "employment," realized through the alibi of traditional artisanry, could now be activated as a ruse to cover over the general economic depradation in the colonial landscape. In the imperial periphery, the monument is not so much a mute testimonial as a machine for subject formation.[7]

Let us cut to a scene within the Lahore Museum, which the British have renamed Jadoo-Ghar or Wonder House, appropriating native "irrationalist" colloquial language as official terminology.[8] The time: indeterminate. We cannot be quite sure. The North-West is restive again. Beyond Afghanistan looms the vision of an all-pervasive Russian empire that threatens to infiltrate the core of Britain's territories in Asia. Soon there will be a war. At this time, a Tibetan lama arrives at the gates of the Museum. A boy playing outside takes him in to meet the elderly curator, a white-bearded, gentle, learned Briton empathetically expert in the ways of the East. A peculiar encounter then unfolds—peculiar because it signals a shift in sign systems. The lama has come to the Museum because he has heard of the renowned Buddhist statuary kept there. At the sight of an image of Sakya Muni Buddha, the lama breaks down. The secularized ruins and fragmented museum display of a lost Buddhist civilization in South Asia suddenly becomes activated into a palpable and living idiom. Sculpture once again becomes idol. Curatorial

canon becomes religious pantheon. Seeming to acknowledge the East's greater profundity in these matters, the European curator defers his sense of rationalist historiography to the lama's transcendentalist understanding. Both the curator and the lama, through their respective powers of knowledge and faith, appear to share a stupendous secret that both must realize in their separate ways. "We be craftsmen together, thou and I," the lama tells the curator, in their respective quest for a redemptive destiny. The history of the past encapsulated in these lifeless images augurs a future British India where knowledge and religion will impeccably coincide in a time of peace to come. As proxy agent for the curator's epistemological project, Kim, the little brown-skinned boy loitering outside the museum will accompany the lama on his sacred search in order to realize this convergent prophecy.

The scene is, of course, from Rudyard Kipling's *Kim*.[9] It is well known that Kipling based the character of the curator on his father, John Lockwood Kipling, professor of architectural ornament, founding principal and curator of the Mayo School and the Lahore Museum. Part of an emergent generation of liberal colonial administrators, Kipling Sr. derived his creed from the ongoing scholarly effort by the British to unravel the native's frame of action and ethics through the extraordinary interdisciplinary collaboration between quite distinct professional endeavors. Colonial scholars such as James Fergusson (in significant ways the doyen of a global architectural history) and, in his wake, Alexander Cunningham, first head of the Archaeological Survey of India, equated formal typologies with different ethnic and racial groupings.[10] Thus Indian architectural history came to be periodized into successive stages such as "Buddhist," "Jain," "Brahmanical," "Indo-Scythian," "Pathan," or "Moghul," respectively.[11] The institution of the Archaeological Survey underlined a series of parallel initiatives in museology and preservation. At least part of the concern over colonial archaeology and preservation stemmed from the fact that Indians themselves seemed to be least interested in either recovering or preserving their own past. Under a recuperative imperial epistemology, the contemporary Indian (or for that matter, Greek or Egyptian) unable to gauge his sense of historical agency, would gain a sense of his ethical present through the colonialist excavation of the past. Memory must be instituted *as if* intuited. We are in *Blade Runner* territory here—historical memory is always already an implant. This is the secret, the fabulous normalization of complicity between colonizer and colonized, that is shared by the curator and the lama—the curator desires to *institute* what the lama *intuits*.

The lama's character is also significant for another reason. As is well known, the overwhelming and minuscule minority of Europeans as compared with the native population necessitated the creation of a native gentry and

bourgeoisie who would act as imperialism's agents at the periphery. It is the native bourgeoisie's political consciousness, ever susceptible to European notions of political action and opposition, that must be circumscribed by this form of history. In *Kim,* the Bengali Hindu spy for the British and aspirant to membership of the Royal Geographical Society, Hurree [Hari] Babu, the figure held most in contempt by Kipling—approximates the subjective outlines of this emergent figure.[12] In the affairs of British India, Buddhism, more or less a political nonentity, could therefore also be invoked as a major alibi in the establishment of Pax Britannica, precisely to counter this politically emergent subject (both Hindu and Muslim) militantly recuperating its religious identity as instrument for sedition.

With the transition of mercantilism to industrial capitalism in Europe, transcoded in philosophy and culture as the "Enlightenment," European states could dissemble their identity as triumph of the political state over religion. However, the basic identification of every European state with one particular religion remains to this day a dirty little secret that could be made visible, or covered over at will. In this sense, there is nothing "spontaneous" about singing "God Bless America" on the Capitol steps in Washington. Triumphal religion can write this history quite differently: the massacre of Jews in Europe could be written off as a crime of the German nation rather than a crime of Christianity. This is not restricted to the First World. At the height of the first wave of secular nationalisms in the Third World, to the astonishment of many, "religion" was introduced as one of the two fundamental principles to be discussed at the famed Bandung conference in 1955.[13] In a classic instance of derivative postcoloniality, Third World leaders pledged to build solidarity in the shared fight against underdevelopment and European colonialism on the principles of Buddhism.[14]

In the nineteenth century it is because of this fear of an insurgent nationalism driven by religion that imperialist politics acquires its secular face in the global arena. The secularism of European polity would be used not to battle religion in Europe, but to circumscribe it in the colony. Religion would therefore both be undone in its insurgent potentials, even as some of its elements would be transcendentalized into proxy ideologies for the imperial agenda of keeping the peace. The political script of empire could now be read as *our* Benjamin Disraeli, *your* Gautama Buddha. Through this political reframing of the economic theater of imperialism as a cultural conundrum, as a conflict between religion and customs, the colonized native bourgeoisie would be pried away from attending to the most depredatory effects of the British imperial system. The skeletons of the 30 million Indian dead from starvation in the period between 1870 to 1947 would be covered over by the bourgeois staging of a conflict between cultures and civilizations.[15]

In the context of colonial archaeology, the contending claims of a culturalist ethnography invoking an identification between native agency and the romantic evocation of place found itself at odds with the demands of scientific epistemology and research. The claims of the museum, repository of the latter strategy and of the Enlightenment principles of disinterested study of objects removed from their context, began to be squared off in the 1860s against the countervailing principle of preserving artifacts and buildings in situ. Even as the introduction of reproductive techniques such as photography, casts, and drawings appeared to satisfy museumatic demands, colonial archaeologists and architectural historians now saw India itself as an open-air museum. The categories created in the museum were now extended to the geographical map itself. Henry Hardy Cole, first Curator of the Department of the Conservation of Ancient Monuments, founded in 1880, therefore reclassified the Indian map, marking different sites as B (Buddhist), H (Hindu), J (Jain), or M (Muhammadan). Imperialism places the differend within relativism—*but this relativism is limned precisely by figuring a transcendentalist identity larger than the peoples that encompass it.* In the context of the Indian North-West the largely neofeudal character of the colonial administration, born out of political expediency, is supplemented by parallel claims to the transcendant history of Islam and Buddhism in the region. Thus, the many "open-air" sites of the Gandhara region and the Bamiyan Buddhas complement the limited institutional locus of the Lahore and the nearby Kabul museum—thus explicitly encoding them within a larger regional identity that appears to figure its importance in global civilization.

It is important to note here that this dyad of regional trans-signification and global particularity is the principal thematic invoked in the first wave of anticolonial nationalist imaginaries. It is because of the noncoincidence of transcendentalist imagination and geographical map that the nationalist project can be said to be a kind of longing for an origin that is inevitably located "elsewhere." Nothing epitomizes this better than the case of the two states carved out of British India. The Indus Valley civilization, perceived fount of Indian history, has most of its archaeological remains located inside Pakistan, while the principal imperial remains of Pakistan's presumed cultural forbearers, the Islamic emperors, are located inside India. In the aftermath of so-called political decolonization, the complicity between this flawed transregional imaginary and a derivative Eurocentrism can be said to be underpinned by the creation of the United Nations, the old cosmopolitan specter of a global community of nation-states. Correspondingly, institutions such as UNESCO and the World Heritage project can be considered to be the direct legatees of the Fergussons and the Cunninghams in that their principal aim is more to secure a global *pax* than to sanctify local imaginaries.

In contemporary South Asia this has had some interesting ramifications. On December 6, 1992, gangs of the Hindu religious right destroyed an abandoned mosque, the Babri Masjid, named after the first Mughal emperor Babar, in the northern Indian town of Ayodhya. Even as this symbolic affront created ripples across Asia and the Islamic world, the mavens of Eurocentric global "cosmopolitanism" and agencies such as UNESCO kept quiet. The destruction of a mundane mosque was an affair *too regional* to be of import to the concept of World Heritage. In the subsequent national election, the political party responsible for the destruction was voted into power in India's federal government. It remains there today. In the beginning of 2001 the Taliban government, enraged at what it perceived as the global community's apathy toward its economic desperation, blew up the ancient Buddhist sculptures in the province of Bamiyan. B becomes M on the map. The spark appears to have been ignited by UNESCO's offer to come in with teams and millions of dollars to preserve the sculptures when the Taliban was desperately seeking international funding to stabilize its government. Militia leaders also pointed to the destruction of the Babri Masjid as precedent. The "international community's" reaction was distinctly different from the Babri Masjid incident.

In the context of the history that I have narrated above, how are we to read these apparently corresponding acts of iconoclasm? Identitarian fundamentalism against capitalist cosmopolitanism? As comeuppance for a historiographic strategy set in place by imperialism? As the revenge of the local and particular against the global and the universal?

Not quite. First of all, under the dispensations of modernity realized by imperialism and neocolonialism, the global can hardly be equated with the universal. Conversely, the local is hardly the particular. I would like to return us to the concept of the differend, and with it the singular case, both juridical and historiographic, of Sher Ali. I have noted above that he had requested to be executed by the British administration rather than be transported to a distant place. In the following section I will attempt to suggest that Ali's request can be said to be unraveling the project of European humanism. There are a few more determinants that one would have to consider along the way.

One question cannot be ignored, especially after close to two hundred years of a repetitive history—Why Afghanistan? Peter Hopkirk's extraordinary series of books on Central Asia have highlighted the incredible history of the contestations over the region by the great imperial powers. Of these books, written from an Anglophone romantic perspective, *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia* is remarkable. In addition, five of his other books also narrate the complicity between imperial geopolitics and humanist knowledge gathering in this region. These are: *Trespassers on the Roof of the*

World, Setting the East Ablaze, Foreign Devils on the Silk Road, Quest for Kim, and *Like Hidden Fire.*[16]

Reading these books not entirely against their grain, I would like to explicate the question "Why Afghanistan?" through Louis Althusser's invocation of the Leninist theme of "the weakest link": "A chain is as strong as its weakest link."[17] In the aftermath of the October revolution, Lenin attempted to theorize its inexplicable early triumph by asking the question "Why Russia?" Lenin calculated that the overwhelming contradictions articulated in Russian society, the overlap of advanced industrialism in the cities and exacerbated feudalism in the rural areas, the crepuscular "ignorance" of the peasantry, and the enlightened cosmopolitanism of its exiled political elites derived as much from internal determinants as from its external relationship with regard to the other imperialist states. Given the particular stage of global history in the aftermath of the war, "Russia was the weakest link in the chain of the imperialist states."[18] While it is these contradictions that fuel the revolution, in its aftermath it became clear that the bourgeois revolution could not be coincided with the peasant revolution. It goes without saying therefore that Stalin sought to sew up these maximized contradictions through the vision of a bourgeois "Communist Party that was a chain without weak links."[19] The contradictions were erased rather than worked through.

With this frame in mind, I would like to suggest Afghanistan's status as a "weak link" *in the chain of colonized states.* Its locus is defined by *maximum overdetermination* in the context of Eurocentric imperialist geopolitics and *maximum undermining* of the project of Eurocentric modernity. Suspended in the cusp, the no-man's-land and buffer state between two superpowers, it was therefore the global nonplace that not only was not colonized, but *could not be* colonized.[20] The global "balance of powers" figures the *national* territory of Afghanistan as absence—the Taliban's effort to secure national integrity is therefore as much a Stalinist eradication of weak links as an instance of theocratic oligarchy.

In September 1996 one of the first acts of retribution by the Taliban after the conquest of Kabul was the execution of Najibullah, former head of the genocidal secret service agency Khad, and Communist president during the Soviet era. Before he was dragged out from the U.N. compound, where he had sought refuge after the defeat of his government by U.S.-backed Islamist rebels in 1992, Najibullah had told U.N. officials that he was translating Peter Hopkirk's *The Great Game* into Pashto.[21] This last ditch, and failed, attempt to institute for Afghans the narrative of the overdetermination of Afghanistan's modern history exemplifies its failed nationalism.

I have tangentially indicated earlier that it became the lot of the great anticolonialist nationalisms to undo the imperialist legacy of neofeudalism

and transcendentalist religion in the colony. In Western Europe, the vaunted "democratic" revolutions of the modern era—the nominal accession of the representative population of the nation-state into political rights—could only proceed as a stage-bound maneuver. At each stage a newly emergent class gaining access to political representation prepared the ground for the next, so that the classes below the current dispensation could only enter this ambit to the extent that they acceded to the key ideological motifs of the ruling class. It must be pointed out that the great decolonization struggles—in the Third World, in their embrace of the nation-state as liberative instrument—set out to achieve this historical transformation at the single stroke of an hour. This caprice presaged their failure—both from within and without. In today's neocolonial context, Afghanistan is not the only place in the world where this project can be said to be failing.[22]

If the bourgeois-communist Najibullah waited for his death by unsuccessfully attempting to forge a nationalist, therefore modern, historiography, Sher Ali's wait for death marks the failed relationship to modernity in a slightly different way. As a Pashtun, Sher Ali's linguistic-ethnic matrix is split between imperial extraterritoriality (Afghanistan) and the terra firma of British justice (NWFP). It is here that his case can be seen to approximate the differend between neofeudalism and the enlightenment subject. In his dying confession, Sher Ali stated that the slaying of a hereditary foe was no crime in his eyes. In spite of this disavowal of culpability, however, he preferred to be executed rather than be transported and kept alive. Operative in this is a robust sense of submission to justice, even when justice is delivered through the law of the other. On the other hand, the British magistrate's decision to transport him cannot be seen as anything less than a humane act. Embedded in this act is the exemplary tolerance of British liberal humanism toward the nuances of customary and common law. And yet, for Sher Ali, the core of the injustice lies in the decision to keep him alive rather than kill him. On the level of singular acts of justice, this asymptote epitomizes the differend—the honorability of either side cannot be doubted at the level of singular intention. Two systems of justice seek to compete not by undoing but by outdoing the other.

However, in his next crime, the murder of the Viceroy, Sher Ali puts this very singularity, and therefore this presumed honorability of intent, into question. European liberal humanism could unfold as a global ethic only under the cocked rifle hammer of British imperialism. Sher Ali's lunge with the knife undoes this coerced complicity—it is here that his revolt becomes systemic, the unraveling of a protocol of power, rather than merely an intuitive opposition. It is important to note here that Islam acts as customary *constraint* rather than messianic injunction.

This reading is further intensified by his response to a telegram sent by Mayo's children on the eve of his execution. On hearing their message, "May God forgive you," Ali became enraged, saying that if they had sent a message ordering him to be cut to pieces he would have been glad, but a prayer for God's forgiveness he could not accept from them.[23] I grant you the right to punish, but not the right to forgive. I accept your law, but not your justice.

It is because the origins of modernity in the colony are inexplicably tied up with the ends of imperialism that its outlines operate as a historical teleology in reverse: *first* the institution of the neofeudal-capitalist/disciplinary apparatus (even within the postcolonial "independent" state), while the "enlightenment" of the native is a project that can be deferred endlessly. But the assassin or the insurgent are more functions of discursive difference—the activators of the differend—than they are representations of a "non-modern" native will or symptoms of some "other" manner of being. It is the teleology of imperial discourse itself that is unraveled by the assassin.

Sher Ali's action produces a crisis at the geopolitical level. At the same time his narrative singularity can neither be embraced by statist historiography (whether imperialist or Third World nationalist) nor can it be approximated to modes of collective "political" insurgency. Sher Ali's ethical trajectory is *in* the great apocalyptic master narratives of modernity, but not *of* them. Within the province of law, Lyotard points out that the "humanist" assumption of innocence on the part of the accused primarily benefited hegemonic power, since its victims could never formulate their testimony into a cognizable "phrase."[24] Sher Ali's singular narrative cannot therefore be recognized by colonial power as full-fledged "political" consciousness. This is why in the first historiographic account we encounter of his story, Mayo's biography, his name is willfully written out: "Neither his name, nor that of his village or tribe, will find record in this book."[25] The early Subaltern Studies collective in India read the colonial archive to tease out precisely such irruptions in its textual protocols. In the colonial records of anticolonial insurgency, subalternist historians saw these insurgencies as necessarily failing (since colonial power could always muster enough force to stamp them out physically) and yet leaving their trace as a crisis in the textuality of colonial historiography.[26]

Sher Ali's plea inviting his own execution reveals death itself as the keeper of the differend. If I cannot live according to my norms in your (triumphalist) juridical frame, then let me die so that the norm can be preserved. Bury the differend so that it can be mourned "properly." Do not rationalize it away and leave it to fester as the province of the irrational. Humanistic justice, willfully noncognizant of its complicity with imperialism, cannot honor this plea as a desire for modernity, a plea for *accession* to a universal justice, a

justice that could also be the name for a modernity yet to come—a modernity and a justice that the Christianized *pax imperialis* can never bear. Unlike Western Europe, *internal* revolutions—the necessary "working through" that leads the ancestors to their proper burial—continue to be interdicted across the (neo)colonial world. The differend must invoke other forms to win recognition.

Notes

This paper has benefited immensely from my conversations with Kryzstof Wodiczko. I am grateful for his input.

1. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Différend: Phrases in Dispute* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), xi.

2. Colloquial expression for "Lord Sahib," the administration's own vernacularist term for the viceregal position.

3. The politics of religion in British colonial sociology was yet to unfurl in its formal dimensions.

4. William Wilson Hunter, *Rulers of India: The Earl of Mayo* (London: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1891), 198.

5. Mayo himself had served as Chief Secretary for Ireland back in Britain, the experience from which was considered a positive attribute in being appointed Viceroy of India.

6. See John Stuart Mill's comments on the subject in Mill, *Writings on India,* Vol. XXX of the *Collected Works* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 116.

7. See Arindam Dutta, *Designing the Present: The Cole Circle and the Architecture of (an) Imperial Bureaucracy* (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2001).

8. See Dutta, ch. 5, "Peasants in the Architecture: Event and the Politics of Representation."

9. Rudyard Kipling, *Kim* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997).

10. See Tapati Guha-Thakurta, "The Museumised Relic: Archaeology and the First Museum of Colonial India," *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 34, no. 1: 21–51. My account of the politics of the Archaeological Survey of India derives substantially from her analysis.

11. Developing from its own roots in a monarchical system, British colonialist historiography (as opposed to French, for example) developed an account of India's past as riven by internecine conflict between feudal and kingly states, alternating with periods of stability and prosperity realized only at periods of comprehensive imperial consolidation. Two such sanctified periods, the widespread empires of the Hindu (and later Buddhist) king Ashoka and the Mughal emperor Akbar, thus reflected not only what the British saw as the two principal religious constituencies in their Indian empire, but also seemed to presage the institution of Victoria as Empress of India in 1877.

12. I thought of Hurree Babu as we saw the recent televised images of the Northern Alliance, ridiculously costumed in *jungle warfare* fatigues in a patently *arid* and *desert* landscape. After the fall of Kabul, news reports reach us of these mimic soldiers dragging women out of their houses and ripping off their *burqas* in front of Western cameramen and journalists, thus claiming to have "liberated" them.

13. Albert Memmi notes this with not little consternation in the aftermath of the Algerian revolution. Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), 133.

14. Mike Mason, *Development and Disorder: A History of the Third World since 1945* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997), 31.

15. That starvation-based genocide across the world under British imperialism was an unintended effect of its economic policies made it no less a *planned* event. See Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (London: Verso, 2001).

16. Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); *Foreign Devils on the Silk Road: The Search for the Lost Treasures*

of Central Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); *Trespassers on the Roof of the World: The Race for Lhasa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); *Setting the East Ablaze: On Secret Service in Bolshevik Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); *Quest for Kim: In Search of Kipling's Great Game* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and *Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire* (New York: Kodansha International, 1997).

17. Louis Althusser, "Contradiction and Overdetermination," in *For Marx,* trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1969).

18. Althusser, 97.

19. Althusser, 98.

20. The Balkan states play out a comparable thematic on the European side—except that their proximities to the countries of the Enlightenment locate them *within* the crisis of "Europe" as cosmopolitan superstate.

21. *New York Times,* 6 October 1996. "Afghanistan Reels Back into View," cited in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Foucault and Najibullah," in *Other Asias* (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming).

22. The Indian economist Prabhat Patnaik's work on the fiscal legacies of the older territorial imperialism in today's decentralized neocolonialism, and their relationship to the resurgence of antidemocratic authoritarianism in the South, is illuminating here, especially in the context of macroeconomic "conditionalities" imposed by the World Bank/International Monetary Fund/WTO triad. Prabhat Patnaik, "Whatever Happened to Imperialism?" in *Whatever Happened to Imperialism and Other Essays* (New Delhi: Tulika Press, 1995), 209–210.

23. George Pottinger, *Mayo: Disraeli's Viceroy* (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1990), 188.

24. When sufficiently challenged, hegemonic power can transform itself into despotic power and suspend this assumption of innocence—vengeance can overrule other principles of justice.

25. W.W. Hunter: *A Life of the Earl of Mayo,* Vol. II (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1876), 366.

26. See Ranajit Guha, "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency," in *Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South Asian History and Society* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), 1–42.

Explanation and Exoneration, or What We Can Hear

JUDITH BUTLER

The left response to the war currently waged against Afghanistan has run into serious problems in part because the *explanations* that the left has provided to the question, "why do they hate us so much?" have been dismissed as so many *exonerations* of the acts of terror themselves. This does not need to be the case. I think we can see, however, how moralistic anti-intellectual trends coupled with a distrust of the left as so many self-flagellating first world elites has produced a situation in which our very capacity to think about the grounds and causes of the current global conflict is considered impermissible. The cry that "there is no excuse for September 11" has become a means by which to stifle any serious public discussion of how U.S. foreign policy has helped to create a world in which such acts of terror are possible. We see this most dramatically in the suspension of any attempt to offer balanced reporting on the international conflict, the refusal to include important critiques of the United States military effort by Arundhati Roy (writing in *The Guardian* of September 29, 2001) and others within the mainstream U.S. press, the unprecedented suspension of civil liberties for illegal immigrants and suspected terrorists, the use of the flag as an ambiguous sign of solidarity with those lost on September 11 and with the current war, as if the sympathy with the one translates, in a single symbolic stroke, into support for the latter. The raw public mockery of the peace movement, the characterization of antiwar demonstrations as anachronistic or nostalgic, work to produce a consensus of public opinion that profoundly marginalizes antiwar sentiment and analysis, putting into question in a very strong way the very value of dissent as part of contemporary U.S. democratic culture.

The articulation of this hegemony takes place in part through producing a consensus on what certain terms will mean, how they can be used, and what lines of solidarity are implicitly drawn through this use. We reserve "acts of terror" for events such as the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S., distinguishing these acts of violence from those that might be justified through foreign policy decisions or public declarations of war. On the other hand, these terrorist acts are construed as "declarations of war" by the Bush administration, which then positions the military response as a justified act of self-defense. In the meantime, there is ambiguity introduced by the very

Ammended newspaper headline.
14 September 2001.
Photo: David Hanks. Courtesy:
David Hanks/Global Exchange.

use of the term "terrorist," which is then exploited by various powers at war with independence movements of various kinds. The term "terrorist" is used, for instance, by the Israeli state to describe any and all Palestinian acts of violence, but none of its own. The term is also used by Vladimir Putin to describe the Chechen struggle for independence, which then casts its own acts of violence against this province as justified acts of national self-defense. The U.S., by using the term, positions itself exclusively as the sudden and indisputable victim of violence, and there is no doubt that it has suffered violence, terrible violence.

The point I would like to underscore here is that a frame for understanding violence emerges in tandem with the experience, and that the frame works both to preclude certain kinds of questions, certain kinds of historical inquiries, and to function as a moral justification for retaliation. It seems crucial to attend to this frame, since it decides, in a forceful way, what we can hear, whether a view will be taken as explanation or as exoneration, whether we can hear the difference, and abide by it.

There is as well a narrative dimension to this explanatory framework. In the U.S., we start the story by invoking a first-person narrative point of view, and tell what happened on September 11. And it is that date, and the unexpected and fully terrible experience of violence that propels the narrative. If someone tries to start the story earlier, there are only a few narrative options. We can narrate, for instance, what Mohammed Atta's family life was like, whether he was teased for looking like a girl, where he congregated in Hamburg, and what led, psychologically, to the moment in which he piloted the plane into the World Trade Center. Or what was bin Laden's break from his family, and why is he so mad? That kind of story is interesting to a degree, because it suggests that there is a personal pathology at work. It works as a plausible and engaging narrative in part because it resituates agency in terms of a subject, something we can understand, something which accords with our idea of personal responsibility, or with the theory of charismatic leadership that was popularized with Mussolini and Hitler in World War II. And this is easier to hear than that a network of individuals dispersed across the globe conjured and implemented this action in various ways. If there is a network, there must be a leader, a subject who is finally responsible for what others do. Perhaps we can hear, in a limited way, about the way in which the Al Qaeda group makes use of Islamic doctrine, and we want to know, to shore up our liberal framework, that they do not represent the religion of Islam, and that the vast majority of Muslims do not condone them. Al Qaeda can be "the subject," but do we ask where this comes from? Isolating the individuals involved absolves us of the necessity of coming up with a broader explanation for events. On the one hand, we are perhaps perplexed by why

there is not a greater public repudiation by Muslim leaders (though many organizations have done that), and on the other, we cannot quite understand why it might be difficult for Muslim leaders to join publicly with the U.S. on this issue even as they condemn quite clearly the acts of violence.

Our own acts of violence do not receive graphic coverage in the press, and so they remain acts that are justified in the name of self-defense, but also justified by a noble cause, namely, the rooting out of terrorism. Recently, it is reported that the Northern Alliance may have slaughtered a village: will this be investigated and, if confirmed, prosecuted as a war crime? When a bleeding child or dead body on Afghani soil emerges in the press coverage, it is not framed as part of the horror of war, but only as a critique of the military's capacity to aim its bombs right. We castigate ourselves for not aiming better, but we do not take the sign of destroyed life and decimated peoples as something for which we are responsible, or indeed understand how that decimation works to confirm the U.S. as performing atrocities. Our own acts are not considered terrorist. And there is no history of acts that is relevant to the self-understanding we form in the light of these terrible events. There is no relevant prehistory to the events of September 11, since to begin to tell the story a different way, to ask how things came to this, is already to complicate the question of agency which, no doubt, leads to the fear of moral equivocation. In order to condemn these acts as inexcusable, absolutely wrong, in order to sustain the affective structure in which we are, on the one hand, victimized and, on the other, engaged in a righteous cause of rooting out terror, we have to start the story with the experience of violence we suffered. We have to shore up the first-person point of view, and preclude from the telling accounts that might involve a decentering of the narrative "I" within the international political domain. This decentering is experienced as part of the wound that we have suffered, though, so we cannot inhabit that position. This decentering is precisely what we seek to rectify through a recentering. A narrative form emerges to compensate for the enormous narcissistic wound opened up by the public display of our physical vulnerability. Our response, accordingly, is not to enter into international coalition where we understand ourselves to be working with institutionally established routes of consensus-building. We relegate the United Nations to a second-order deliberative body, and insist instead on American unilateralism. And subsequently we ask, Who is with us? Who is against us? As a result, we respond to the exposure of vulnerability with an assertion of U.S. "leadership," showing once again the contempt we have for international coalitions that are not built and led by us. Such coalitions do not conflict with U.S. supremacy, but confirm it, stoke it, insist upon it, with long-term implications for the future shape and possibility of global cooperation.

Perhaps the question cannot be heard at all, but I would still like to ask: Can we find another meaning, and another possibility, for the decentering of the first person narrative within the global framework? I do not mean that the story of being attacked should not be told. I do not mean that the story that begins with September 11 should not be told. These stories have to be told, and they are being told, despite the enormous trauma that undermines narrative capacity in these instances. But if we are to come to understand ourselves as global actors, and acting within an historically established field, and one that has other actions in play, we will need to emerge from the narrative perspective of U.S. unilateralism and, as it were, its defensive structures, to consider the ways in which our lives are profoundly implicated in the lives of others. My friends on the left joke about having lost their first world complacency. Yes, this is true. But do we now seek to *restore* it as a way of healing from this wound? Or do we allow the challenge to first world complacency to stand and begin to build a different politics on its basis?

My sense is that being open to the explanations, poorly circulated as they are in the U.S., that might help us take stock of how the world has come to take this form, will involve us in a different order of responsibility. The ability to narrate ourselves not from the first person alone, but from, say, the position of the third, or to receive an account delivered in the second, can actually work to expand our understanding of the forms that global power has taken. But instead of remaining open to a consequential decentering of first-worldism, we tend to dismiss any effort at explanation, as if to explain these events would accord them rationality, as if to explain these events would involve us in a sympathetic identification with the oppressor, as if to understand these events would involve building a justificatory framework for them. Our fear of understanding a point of view belies a deeper fear that we will be taken up by it, find it is contagious, become infected in a morally perilous way by the thinking of the presumed enemy. But why do we assume this? We claim to have gone to war in order to "root out" the sources of terror, according to Bush, but do we think that finding the individuals responsible for the attacks on the U.S. will constitute having gotten to the root? Do we not imagine that the invasion of a sovereign country with a substantial Muslim population, supporting the military regime in Pakistan that actively and violently suppresses free speech, obliterating lives and villages and homes and hospitals, will not foster more adamant and widely disseminated anti-American sentiment and political organizing? Are we not, strategically speaking, interested in ameliorating this violence? Are we not, ethically speaking, obligated to stop its further dissemination, to consider our role in instigating it, and to foment and cultivate another sense of a culturally and religiously diverse global political culture?

Part of the problem the U.S. is up against is that liberals have quietly lined up behind the war effort, and supplied in part the rationale that keeps our own violence from being labeled as terrorist. It is not just the conservative Republicans who do not want to hear about "causes." The "Just war" liberal-left has also made plain that it does not want to hear from "excuseniks." This coinage, rehabilitating the cold war rhetoric about Soviet Russia, suggests that those who seek to understand how the global map arrived at this juncture through asking how, in part, the U.S. has contributed to the making of this map, are themselves, through the style of their inquiry, and the shape of their questions, complicitous with an assumed enemy. But to ask how certain political and social actions come into being, such as the recent terrorist attacks on the U.S., and even to identify a set of causes, is not the same as locating the source of responsibility for these actions or, indeed, paralyzing our capacity to make ethical judgments on what is right or wrong.

No doubt there are forms of left analysis which say simply that the U.S. has reaped what it has sown. Or they say that the U.S. has brought this state of events on itself. These are, as closed explanations, simply other ways of asserting U.S. priority, and encoding U.S. omnipotence. These are also explanations that assume that these actions originate in a single subject, that the subject is not what it appears to be, that it is the U.S. who occupies the site of that subject, and that no other subjects exist or, if they exist, their agency is subordinated to our own. In other words, political paranoia of this kind is just another articulation of U.S. supremacy. Paranoia is fed by the fantasy of omnipotence, and we see this evidenced in some of the more extreme explanations of this kind, i.e., the attacks on September 11 were masterminded by the CIA or Mossad, the Israeli secret police. It is clear, though, that bin Laden did apprentice to the CIA and that the Taliban has been strongly supported by the U.S. in the 1990s when it was deemed strategically useful. These links are not precisely causal explanations, but they are part of an explanatory framework. They do not translate into the notion that the U.S. did these acts, but one can see how the connection becomes the occasion for the causal reduction, and a certain paranoia amplifies itself by seizing upon part of a broader explanatory picture.

What is generally heard when these opinions are expressed is that the U.S. is the culpable agent, that it is, effectively, the author of these events, and that the U.S. is solely responsible for this global outcome. This kind of reasoning is unacceptable to the press, and to the public in general, because it seems to blame the victim in this instance. But is this the only way to hear this point of view? And is this the only form this point of view takes? It seems that being most precise about this point, and publicizing it where one can, will be crucial for any effort by the left to offer an antiwar viewpoint within

contemporary public discourse.

If we believe that to think radically about the formation of the current situation is to exculpate those who committed acts of violence, we will freeze our thinking in the name of a questionable morality. But if we paralyze our thinking in this way, we will fail morality in a different way. We will fail to take collective responsibility for a thorough understanding of the history which brings us to this juncture. We will, as a result, deprive ourselves of the very critical and historical resources we need to imagine and practice another future, one which will move beyond the current cycle of revenge.

When President Gloria Arroyo of the Philippines remarked on October 29, 2001, that "the best breeding ground [for terrorism] is poverty" or Arundhati Roy claims that bin Laden has been "sculpted from the spare rib of a world laid waste by America's foreign policy," something less than a strictly causal explanation is being offered. A "breeding ground" does not necessarily breed, but it can. And the "spare rib" that is said to emerge from a world laid waste by U.S. foreign policy has, by definition, emerged in a strange and alchemical fashion. It is from waste that this rib is formed, as if the bone belongs to the dead, or is itself the animation of a skeletal remain. This is not God creating Eve from the rib of Adam, life generating life, but death generating death, and through a means that is figural, not precisely causal. Indeed, both of them make use of figures—grounds and bones—to bespeak a kind of generation that precedes and exceeds a strictly causal frame. Both of them are pointing to conditions, not causes. A condition of terrorism can be necessary or sufficient. If it is necessary, it is a state of affairs without which terrorism cannot take hold, one which terrorism absolutely requires. If it is sufficient, its presence is enough for terrorism to take place. Conditions do not "act" in the way that individual agents do, but no agent acts without them. They are presupposed in what we do, but it would be a mistake to personify them as if they acted in the place of us. Thus, we can say, and ought to, that U.S. imperialism is a necessary condition for the attacks on the U.S., that these attacks would be impossible without the horizon of imperialism within which they occur. But to understand how U.S. imperialism figures here, we have to understand not only how it is experienced by those who understand themselves as its victims, but how it enters into their own formation as acting and deliberating subjects. This is the beginning of another kind of account. And this seems to be, for instance, what Mary Kaldor writing in *The Nation* on November 5, 2001, points to when she claims that "in many of the areas where war takes place and where extreme networks pick up new recruits, becoming a criminal or joining a paramilitary group is literally the only opportunity for unemployed young men lacking formal education." What effect did the killing of an estimated 200,000 Iraqi citizens,

including tens of thousands of children, and the subsequent starvation of Muslim populations, predicted by Concern, a hunger relief organization, to reach the number six million by year's end, have on Muslim views of the U.S.? Is Muslim life as valuable as legibly first-world lives? Are the Palestinians accorded the status of "human" in U.S. policy and press coverage? Will those hundreds of thousands of Muslim lives lost in the last decades of strife ever receive the equivalent to the paragraph-long obituaries in the *New York Times* that seek to humanize—often through nationalist and familial framing devices—those who have been violently killed? Is our global capacity to mourn not foreclosed precisely through the failure to conceive of Muslim and Arab lives as lives?

Rudolph Giuliani's response to Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal's remarks on October 11, 2001, in New York raises this question of the acceptability of critical discourse emphatically. The Prince came with a ten million dollar check in hand for the World Trade Center relief effort and expressed at the same time horror and moral condemnation of the attacks on the World Trade Center and asked that "the U.S. take a more balanced stand toward the Palestinian cause." Later that day, the website *Forbes.com* reported Giuliani's refusal of the check this way:

> While in New York, Alwaleed said, "Our Palestinian brethren continue to be slaughtered at the hands of Israelis while the world turns the other cheek." At a news conference, Giuliani said, "Not only are those statements wrong, they are part of the problem. There is no moral equivalent to this attack. There is no justification for it," the mayor said. "The people who did it lost any right to ask for justification for it when they slaughtered four or five thousand innocent people, and to suggest that there is any justification for it only invites this happening in the future." The Saudi prince, the sixth richest man in the world, did say he condemned terrorism, and he expressed his condolences for the more than 5,000 people killed when hijacked jets slammed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

In a television report that same day, Giuliani announced that Alwaleed's views were "absolutely wrong." I would suggest that it was not possible to hear both of these views at the same time because the framework for hearing presumes that the one view nullifies the other, so either the claim of grief or the offer of help are considered disingenuous. Or what is heard is that the failure of the U.S. to offer a balanced approach to the Palestinian cause provides a justification for the attacks. Alwaleed is clear, and was subsequently clear in a *New York Times* editorial, that he did not think that the U.S. policy failure, which he deems true, to honor the Palestinian cause *justifies* the

attacks. But he did think that long-term U.S.-Arab relations would be improved were the U.S. to develop a more balanced approach. It makes sense to assume that bettering those relations might well lead to less conducive grounds for Islamic extremism. The Bush administration itself, in its own way, attests to this belief by pursuing the possibility of a Palestinian state. But here the two views could not be heard together, and it has to do with the word "slaughter," the utterability of the word "slaughter," in the context of saying that Israelis have *slaughtered* and do *slaughter* Palestinians, and in large numbers.

Like "terrorist," "slaughter" is a word that, within the hegemonic grammar, should be reserved for unjustified acts of violence against first-world nations, if I understand the grammar correctly. Giuliani hears this as a discourse of justification, since he believes that slaughter justifies military self-defense. He calls the statements "absolutely untrue," I presume, not because he disputes that there have been deaths on the Palestinian side, and that the Israelis are responsible for them, but because "slaughter" as the name for those deaths implies an equivalence with the deaths of the World Trade Center victims. It seems, though, that we are not supposed to say that both groups of people have been "slaughtered," since that implies a "moral equivalence," meaning, I suppose, that the slaughtering of one group is as bad as the slaughtering of the next, and that both, according to his framework, would be entitled to self-defense as a result.

Although the Prince subsequently undermined his credibility when he betrayed anti-Semitic beliefs, claiming that "Jewish pressure" was behind Giuliani's refusal of the check, he nevertheless initiated an utterance and a formulation that has value on its own. Why is it that these two sets of deaths are not viewed as equally horrible? And to what extent has the very refusal to apprehend Palestinian deaths as "slaughter" produced an immeasurable rage on the part of Arabs who seek some legitimate recognition and resolution for this continuing state of violence? One does not need to enter into the dreary business of quantifying and comparing oppressions to understand what the Prince meant to say, and subsequently said, namely, that the U.S. needs to think about how its own political investments and practices help to create a world of enormous rage and violence. This is not to say that the acts of violence perpetrated on September 11 were the "fault" of the U.S., and it does not exonerate those who committed them. One way to read what the Prince had to say was that the acts of terror were unequivocally wrong, and that the U.S. might also be able to intervene more productively in global politics to produce conditions in which this response to U.S. imperialism becomes less likely. This is not the same as holding the U.S. exclusively responsible for the violence done within its borders, but it does ask the U.S. to assume a different kind of responsibility for producing more egalitarian

global conditions for equality, sovereignty, and the egalitarian redistribution of resources.

Similarly, on November 2, 2001, the *New York Times* described Arundhati Roy's critique of U.S. imperialism as "anti-U.S.," implying that any position that seeks to reevaluate critically U.S. foreign policy in light of September 11 and the ensuing war is anti-U.S. or, indeed, complicitous with the presumed enemy. This is tantamount to the suppression of dissent, and the nationalist refusal to consider the merits of criticisms developed from other parts of the globe. The treatment is unfair. Her condemnation of bin Laden is clear, but she is willing to ask how he was formed. To condemn the violence and to ask how it came about are surely two separate questions, but they need to be posed in tandem, held in juxtaposition, reconciled within a broader analysis. Under contemporary strictures on public discourse, however, this kind of dual thinking cannot be heard: it is dismissed as contradictory or disingenuous, and Roy herself is treated as a diva or a cult figure, rather than listened to as a political critic with a wide moral compass.

So is there a way, in Roy's terms, to understand bin Laden as "born" from the rib of U.S. imperialism (allowing that he is born from several possible historical sources, one of which is, crucially, U.S. imperialism), without claiming that U.S. imperialism is solely responsible for his actions, or those of his ostensible network? To answer this question, we need to distinguish, provisionally, between individual and collective responsibility. But then we need to situate individual responsibility in light of its collective conditions. Those who commit acts of violence are surely responsible for them; they are not dupes or mechanisms of an impersonal social force, but agents with responsibility. On the other hand, these individuals are formed, and we would be making a mistake if we reduced their actions to purely self-generated acts of will or symptoms of individual pathology or "evil." Both the discourses of individualism and of moralism (understood as the moment in which morality exhausts itself in public acts of denunciation) assume that the individual is the first link in a causal chain that forms the meaning of accountability. But to take the self-generated acts of the individual as our point of departure in moral reasoning is precisely to foreclose the possibility of questioning what kind of world gives rise to such individuals. And what is this process of "giving rise"? What social conditions help to form the very ways that choice and deliberation proceed? Where and how can such subject formations be contravened? How is it that radical violence becomes an option, comes to appear as the only viable option for some, under some global conditions? And against what conditions of violation do they respond? And with what resources?

To ask these questions is not to say that *the conditions* are at fault rather than the individual. But it is to rethink the relation between conditions and

acts. Our acts are not self-generated, but conditioned. But we are acted upon and acting, and our "responsibility" lies in the juncture between the two. What can I do with the conditions that form me? What do they constrain me to do? What can I do to transform them? Being acted upon is not fully continuous with acting, and in this way the forces that act upon us are not finally responsible for what we do. In a certain way, and paradoxically, our responsibility is heightened once we have been subjected to the violence of others. We are acted upon, violently, and it appears that our capacity to set our own course at such instances is fully undermined. But only once we have suffered that violence are we compelled, ethically, to ask how we will respond to violent injury. What role we will assume in the historical relay of violence, who will we become in the response, and will we be furthering or impeding violence by virtue of the response that we make? To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution? Similarly, moralistic denunciation provides immediate gratification, and even has the effect of temporarily cleansing the speaker of all proximity to guilt through the act of self-righteous denunciation itself. But is this the same as responsibility, understood as taking stock of our world, and participating in its social transformation in such a way that non-violent, cooperative, egalitarian international relations remain the guiding ideal?

We ask these latter questions not to exonerate the individuals who commit violence, but to take a different sort of responsibility for the global conditions of justice. As a result, it makes sense to follow two courses of action at once: it is surely important to find those who planned and implemented the violence, and to hold them accountable according to international war crimes standards and in international courts of law, regardless of our skepticism about such institutions (skepticism can furnish grounds for reform). In pursuing a wayward military solution, the U.S. now perpetrates and displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of young Muslims to join terrorist organizations. This is poor thinking, strategically and morally. Ignoring its image as the hated enemy for many in the region, the U.S. has effectively responded to the violence done against it by consolidating its reputation as a militaristic power with no respect for lives outside of the first world. That we now respond with more violence is taken as "further proof" that the U.S. has violent and anti-sovereign designs on the region. To remember the lessons of Aeschylus and refuse this cycle of revenge in the name of justice means not only to seek legal redress for wrongs done, but to take stock of how the world has become formed in this way precisely in order to form it anew, and in the direction of non-violence.

Our collective responsibility not merely as a nation, but as part of an international community based on a commitment to equality and non-violent

cooperation, requires that we ask how these conditions came about, and to endeavor to recreate social and political conditions on more sustaining grounds. This means, in part, hearing beyond what we are able to hear. And it means as well being open to narration that decenters us from our supremacy, in both its right and left wing forms. Can we hear at once that there were precedents for these events, and to know that it is urgent that we know them, learn from them, alter them, and that the events are not justified by virtue of this history and that the events are not understandable without this history? Only then do we reach the disposition to get to the "root" of violence, and begin to offer another vision of the future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying it, offering instead names for things that restrain us from thinking and acting radically and well about global options.

This article first appeared in Theory & Event, Issue 5:4, 2002.

The Language of Damage

ANDREW HERSCHER

"What are you guarding?" I asked the guard.
"Nothing. Ruins."
—Vlado Mrkić, *Nikad više zajedno*

Architecture fulfills a representational function not only through its construction, but also through its destruction. Damage is a form of design, and the traces of damage inflicted by political violence—a facade stippled by the spray of bullets, a penumbra of smoke around the hole where a door or window once was, or a pile of rubble no longer identifiable as architecture at all—are at least as significant as any of the elements from which buildings are constructed for living, for the living. Architecture's representational status is, in fact, often more vivid, intense, and insistent when it is damaged than when it is intact, and this effect of heightened representationality can take hold even when architecture is destroyed and ceases to exist. A devastated ground zero is materially empty but also a zero signifier, an absence that can evoke the former presence of a site, the presences of those who formerly inhabited it, and a proliferating array of other significations, some of which are capable of motivating the infliction of further damage as well. Damage, then, is both a violence inflicted on architecture and an architecture inflicted on violence; it is not simply a misuse or abuse of architecture, but a manifestation of architecture's potential for producing meaning, effected as and through violence.

The language of damage is based on damage's double status as a direct and unmediated trace of violence and as a signifier whose meaning is wholly determined by the chain of signification it is inserted into. Thus, though the physical remains of damage appear to be "evidence," precisely what these remains are evidence of is a result of the often fantasmic social meanings that damage is endowed with. Consider, for example, the compellingly real damage of the attacks of September 11, 2001, understood by some as the work of Islamic terrorists and by others as the work of the Israeli secret service, by some as a result of a sophisticated co-option of technology and by others as a result of a pretechnological worldview, by some as a response to an overly militaristic America too willing to wreak violence on its adversaries and by others as a response to an overly tolerant America too welcoming to its adversaries to secure the safety of its own citizens. These readings correspond not only to more or less informed interpretations of the violence of September 11, but also, in a precise and specific manner, to the very antagonisms from which that



Financial District, Manhattan.
September 12, 2001.
Photo: Michael Shepherd

violence erupted. Damage, then, is both a nonideological record of violence and a manifestation of violence's ideological structure, both the means by which violence is inflicted and the means by which violence is socially constituted and sustained.

As representation, the infliction of damage not only partially or totally destroys its target; it also marks its target in a certain way. What damage attempts to represent, according to what may be regarded as the discourse of the attack, is the relation of its target to the trauma that the attack responds to. This relation is established reflexively: a target is associated with one site or situation of violence by making it another site of violence. A bombed discotheque may be represented as a gathering of actual, potential, or virtual soldiers and thus be associated with military occupation; a bombed pharmaceutical plant may be represented as a chemical-weapons factory and thus associated with terrorism; a bombed village may be represented as a sanctuary for terrorists and thus associated with a war on terrorism. Despite the actual and horrible injuries that political violence inflicts, it is an activity that is grounded on a symbolic level: victims become representatives of a targeted institution, nation, or phenomenon; injuries become responses to injuries inflicted on other victims; and the perpetrators of injury become representatives of these other victims. The terror of the attacks of September 11 may therefore be related not only to the attacks' physical characteristics but also to the difficulty of understanding these characteristics on a symbolic level: no political program, scripture, or narrative of any kind seems to render the attacks interpretable, and thus, manageable.

The conflicts that damage erupts within revolve around the representation of damage, then, as well as its infliction. In the context of political violence, the key distinction is that between "terrorism" and "war." To describe damage as a result of "terrorism" is to cast damage itself as a purpose. The function of terrorism is to produce terror, so that an act of terrorist violence represents, more than anything else, other possible acts of violence. There can be no collateral damage in an act of terrorism because damaging is the act's defining function. Terrorism, by definition, cannot be authorized or legitimated; to accept political violence as authorized or legitimate is to describe it as "war." In war, damage is only a means to achieve an end, an end that putatively has nothing to do with damaging. Violence is disowned in war and its properties are sublimated in political or social agendas; damage inflicted in war is either strategic, in the service of the war's end, or collateral, an accidental by-product of the intent to achieve that end. The distinction between terrorism and war, therefore, corresponds to the distinction between damage that is regarded as unacceptable, beyond any political justification, and damage that is conditionally acceptable, according to pragmatically assessed conditions. The application of these distinctions, however, depends very little on the material

form of damage and very much on the meanings that damage is endowed with; victory in violent conflict rests not only on damaging an adversary but also on the representation of this damage as just.

Thus, the events of September 11 and their aftermath have taken place in cultural spaces that allow little or no room between justice and injustice: between the mourning of damage and the infliction of damage, between the condemnation of violence and the instrumentalization of violence, between formal and awful symmetries between "us and them" constituted, it seems, by almost every formation of the social field in which damage is threatened, inflicted, experienced, and responded to. In no case do the modes of damaging represented as "jihad," "terrorism," and "war" permit acknowledgement of the differences and alterities that traverse the binary oppositions that these modes presuppose and then wreak damage within. So from one side, the death of civilians in warfare in Afghanistan is "collateral damage" that may be either "played up or played down" while the death of civilians in terrorist attacks in the United States is "evil itself." Or from another side, a mosque destroyed in the bombing of Afghanistan is evidence of a satanic war waged against Islam while the destruction of the World Trade Center is evidence of a holy war waged against the United States. Or the sides switch properties, so that it was the terrorism of September 11 that performed the "surgical strike" that is supposed to characterize warfare, targeting and toppling the twin towers amidst the dense and crowded cityscape of Lower Manhattan, while the war on terrorism has transformed the entire nation of Afghanistan, if not much of the Middle East as well, into an enormous theater of battle, a topography of terrorist training camps, safe houses, and supply sites; the neighborhoods that surround them; and the networks—physical, virtual, and alleged—that link them. In each of these cases damage furthers conflict and, in so doing, renders that conflict comprehensible and justified.

Architecture is both the setting for these *mises en scène* and one of their key components: damage transforms a building from an object with precise uses and meanings into a treasure trove of materiality, into heaps of stuff and clouds of smoke that easily, even necessarily serve as substantiation for violence, whether it is the violence that inspired damage or the violence that damage inspires as a response. Despite the compelling form of this substantiation, however, the primary significance of damage is not determined by the hurt that it causes or the injuries that it wreaks, but rather by ideological structures that preexist and provoke its infliction. These structures are far more difficult to damage than any of the objects that they stage as targets of violence; they are responsible for separating what is accepted as injury from what is annihilated without recognition. The assessment of damage, then, remains incomplete if it is limited to counting the dead and injured and surveying the scope of ruination.

Dangerous Fragments

NICK B. KING

Richard Preston's *The Cobra Event* (1997) was by most accounts a commercial failure. The "fact-based novel," which chronicled a bioterrorist's release of the genetically engineered "Cobra virus" in New York City and Washington, D.C., reportedly earned him a $3 million advance, and the first printing ran at least 250,000 copies. Yet total sales of this hugely anticipated follow-up to his best-seller *The Hot Zone* (1994) proved disappointing, and the hardcover was quickly consigned to the remainder pile.[1]

The book nevertheless had a considerable impact at the highest levels of government. One of its readers, President William Jefferson Clinton, was impressed enough by its warning of impending catastrophe to pass it along to intelligence analysts, Defense Secretary William Cohen, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich.[2] Clinton subsequently announced the development of a series of antibioterrorism initiatives, for which he requested an additional $294 million in his fiscal year 1999 budget request. In April 1998 Preston provided testimony for Senate hearings regarding "Threats to America: Are We Prepared?"[3] And in a 1999 special issue of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) journal *Emerging Infectious Diseases,* Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna E. Shalala began her article "Bioterrorism: How Prepared Are We?" by outlining the plot of Preston's novel.[4]

Preston's novel crystallized an American discourse on biological terrorism that had been developing for a number of years. During the late 1980s and 1990s, American national security and public-health experts became increasingly concerned that the United States was vulnerable to attacks using biological weapons. Like Preston himself, these bioterrorism experts treaded a fine line between speculation and analysis, constructing fictional scenarios in order to develop medical and political responses to future events. Like his novel, the American discourse on bioterrorism is both a legitimate response to a nascent threat and a subterranean dialogue shaped by peculiarly American ambitions and anxieties about social change in a globalizing era. This discourse shapes discussions of, and responses to, the recent cases of anthrax in the eastern United States.

At a pivotal moment in *The Cobra Event,* bioweapons inspector Mark Littleberry and FBI agent Frank Masaccio try to piece together the identity of their bioterrorist quarry. Upon learning that the Cobra virus contains elements of smallpox, the common cold, and a nuclear polyhedrosis virus found in

Grey Room 07, Spring 2002, pp. 72–81.

Irradiated copy of the *New Yorker* delivered December 2001.



moths, they speculate that it might have been produced in a Russian biological weapons facility:

> "Biopreparat [the Soviet biological weapons program] was a Humpty Dumpty," Littleberry told Masaccio. "It fell into pieces when the Soviet Union broke. . . . The Biopreparat that's visible is the part that makes face cream and vodka. Another chunk was pulled into the Russian military. There may be other invisible pieces of Biopreparat floating around. Dangerous fragments. Maybe Biopreparat has an Evil Child. Maybe the Evil Child has no connection to Russia anymore."
>
> "So you think an Evil Child has put together the Cobra virus?" Masaccio said, incredulously, "You think it's the *Russians?*"
>
> Littleberry smiled. "Not exactly. The Cobra virus is so beautiful and so new that it has to be American engineering, Frank. Has to be. Looking at that virus is like looking at a starship. But the smallpox in it—that's ancient and old and smells like Russia. . . . Here's what I think. I think Cobra has two makers. One is American and one is Russian. They've gotten together somehow, and there's money involved. There has to be. I think there's a company in this. Cobra does come from an Evil Child. And I think the Evil Child is an American company operating somewhere near New York City."[5]

Dr. Littleberry, first introduced to readers as he oversees a U.S. navy biological-weapons test conducted in 1969, is the archetypal American disease detective of the post– cold war world. To him, bioterrorism is the product and the symbol of a new world disorder in which the dangerous fragments of a fractured Cold War order recombine in frighteningly novel and unfamiliar ways. This Evil Child of globalization is a monstrous hybrid, fusing East and West, ancient natural pathogens and space-age technology, military research and private science, in a process lubricated by capital's universal solvent, money.

Space

The bioterrorist is both the symbol and the material offspring of geopolitical and technological remappings of *space* in the late twentieth century. Discussions of the threat that he (for the bioterrorist is invariably characterized as male) presents attempt to make sense of that remapping. It is no accident that Littleberry seizes on the end of the cold war as a turning point. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, nation-states sought to contain biological weapons through the political institutions and binary logic of cold war politics. The scientific expertise, technology, and institutions necessary to weaponize biological agents were located exclusively in the major

nation-states. Limiting the development and deployment of biological weapons could be accomplished, however imperfectly, through time-tested channels of state-to-state diplomacy and international conventions. The threat presented by biological weapons was thus easily mapped onto cold war space: they were produced within the borders of enemy states; they might be deployed against civilians or armed forces in the event of a conflict between the superpowers; they could be monitored through open and covert surveillance of enemy states; and they could be contained through agreements between nations.

The end of the cold war and the acceleration of political-economic globalization rendered this mapping untenable. In its place the New World Order of the 1990s featured a proliferation of threats dispersed through a fragmented and reconfigured geopolitical space. "Rogue nations" such as North Korea, Libya, and Iraq, with erratic and unpredictable leaders at their helm, were uncontainable by conventional diplomacy and openly hostile to the United States. Several were suspected of developing biological weapons on their own or of sponsoring their development by "nonstate actors," individuals and organizations that Walter Laqueur identified in 1996 as harbingers of "postmodern terrorism." This "bewildering multiplicity of terrorist and potentially terrorist groups and sects . . . espousing varieties of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, fascism, and apocalyptic millenarianism" could not be easily located and isolated within geopolitical space.[6]

When Masaccio wonders whether "the Russians" developed the Cobra virus, Littleberry smiles, then gently reminds him that their quarry is the product of a changed world. The bioterrorist's national affiliations are unclear or multiple, his identity heterogeneous, his motivations and goals unrecognizable or obscure. Diplomacy, weapons conventions, and—as the failure of international surveillance efforts after the 1991 Persian Gulf War proved—even warfare are apparently useless in preventing him from developing biological weapons. The boundaries of the nation-state, and the presumption that global political life is governed by the relationship between states, no longer lends security in a borderless world. Dangerous states and ideologies have given way to dangerous fragments, circulating globally and freely transgressing the boundaries of the modern world.

Networks

These transgressions are facilitated by the bioterrorist's ability to navigate and manipulate *networks*. Global networks of transportation, trade, and information allow him to secretly acquire or construct, and rapidly and efficiently disseminate, his weapons of mass destruction to American cities. Unrestricted global trade gives him access to the tools and materials necessary

for the production of his weapons.[7] The acceleration of international travel and commerce facilitates the delivery of biological weapons from almost any source to almost any target. The networks that Americans depend upon to deliver their intellectual and industrial products could be turned against them by the bioterrorist: in his hands, even the U.S. mail is a weapons delivery system.

The bioterrorist takes advantage of virtual as well as physical networks that allow him access to scientific information. Initially, informational exchange necessitated geographic movement. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, former members of its biological-weapons program with the technical skill to weaponize biological materials were dispersed across the planet. Ironically, these invisible pieces of Littleberry's Humpty Dumpty could prove more dangerous in the absence of an Evil Empire than inside it. Cast adrift in the frighteningly unstable world of global capitalism, and with few economic resources at home, Russian biologists and chemists might resort to offering their services to terrorist organizations as mercenary scientists-for-hire.

With the proliferation of global informational networks, the potential bioterrorist need not rely on Russian expertise. Complex biotechnological knowledge is no longer contained within the confines of a few expert individuals or institutions. Research takes place in an increasing number of unsupervised locations, including heretofore technologically unsophisticated sovereign states, academic institutions with little or no administrative oversight, and commercial locations, from small biotechnology startups to multinational pharmaceutical corporations. The information that they produce seems to be readily and anonymously available to anyone. In 1998 one group of national security experts noted with alarm that

> the ability to acquire information of all kinds, quickly and with ease, is increasing. The Internet contains a vast amount of information relevant to the planning and execution of complex violent acts. . . . Much of this information has been present in libraries for years, but access to it has never been easier. Today's violent non-state actors are able to start substantially higher on the terrorist learning curve.[8]

The proliferation and circulation of this information has also changed the language of biological weapons. Cold war weapons conventions (and Soviet/American disputes) relied on a distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" research, prohibiting the former. Never easy to demonstrate in practice, this distinction became increasingly untenable as biological science grew more sophisticated. By the late 1980s, as both the Soviet Union and the United States funded research into biological weapons, it had collapsed

entirely. In its place commentators argued that biological research and technology were inherently "dual use."[9] From this perspective, *all* research into the manipulation and control of bare life, be it military, industrial, or academic, has the potential to spawn Evil Children.

After tracking the Cobra Virus to Bio-Vek, a small New Jersey biotechnology company, one of Littleberry's colleagues speculates on its links to a multinational that employs Russian scientists: "'Bio-Vek may be connected to BioArk, the company that Vestof said she works for,' Hopkins said. 'Maybe the two companies are swapping strains and technology.'" Littleberry tersely responds, "Welcome to the global village."[10] Operating at the junction between commercial, informational, and scientific economies, the bioterrorist represents the darkest potential of globalization.

Infection

It is unsurprising that bioterrorism inspires exceptional anxiety and repugnance. After all, Americans have repeatedly viewed the expansion of international migration and commerce through the lens of infectious disease, associating it with alterity and the transgression of political and corporeal borders. During the successive waves of immigration to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Americans blamed epidemics of smallpox in San Francisco on Chinese immigrants and held Italians responsible for increases in polio in New York City. In the most famous instance of nativist anxieties determining public health policy, the Irish immigrant Mary Mallon—popularly known as "Typhoid Mary"—was incarcerated for twenty-five years on a small island near New York City. More recently, Americans identified first Haiti and then Africa as the origin of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.[11] In the last decade of the twentieth century, they wondered whether the globalization of international travel and commerce might bring exotic new "emerging" infections such as the Ebola and West Nile viruses to American shores.[12]

Like his predecessors in the American imaginary, the bioterrorist—that disconcerting hybrid—transforms global networks into conduits of infection and symbolizes American fears of racial, ethnic, and national contamination. Yet the bioterrorist threatens not just transgression but fragmentation and recombination of national and corporeal boundaries. Whereas Typhoid Mary was a passive carrier of germs within her body, the bioterrorist is an active agent, blending science and nature into political weapons. At his most sinister he utilizes recombinant molecular technology to fashion a literal viral hybrid, merging elements of disparate viruses and bacteria into a chimerical, pathogenic monster.[13] This "sophisticated" bioterrorist—a twenty-first-century "dressed native"—captures American speculative

biotechnology and uses it for his putatively atavistic, ideological, or religious purposes. He thus transforms science, symbol of American economic and political modernity, into a technology of contamination.

Infectious disease has long been a powerful symbol of sociospatial and corporeal transgression; this potency remains undiminished. Yet infection also refracts contemporary social change in historically peculiar ways, marking the nonplaces and networks of modern life, heretofore benign conduits of travel and commerce, as locations of risk and uncertainty. Bioterrorism should force us to rethink the utility of the network as a signifier and an object of analysis. Networks are dangerous: they establish proximity between places and provide conduits for infection. The "network society" is not only an abstracted space of flows in which trade and commerce are accelerated.[14] It is also a fearsome new world in which dangerous fragments circulate and recombine in ways that threaten bodies, identities, and even places in novel ways.

Conclusion

Long before October of last year, American scientific and security experts argued that bioterrorism "preparedness" should become a fundamental part of routine public health.[15] Their recommendations—better management and control of national borders, more efficient collection and management of intelligence and epidemiological information, acceleration of biotechnological research, and development of vaccines and therapeutic agents—have become conventional wisdom during the past several months. These solutions have a familiar ring to them. What is represented as a fragmented postmodern threat is countered by a resolutely modern faith in the reconstitution of national boundaries and a reliance upon progress in information science



and biotechnology.[16] Thus, public-health officials respond to the dispersive and heterogeneous logic of bioterrorism by resorting to a nostalgia for impermeable boundaries and a naive faith in technological fixes.

Alternative responses to dangerous fragments are possible. To begin with, we would do well to take note of David Harvey's observation that "globalization" is ultimately about the sociospatial relations between billions of embodied individuals.[17] It should come as no surprise that global economic networks, which benefit the few under the guise of benefiting the many, might be transformed into political networks and turned against those few beneficiaries. Perhaps the specter of bioterrorism will inspire Americans to recognize that they are subject to the terrifying vicissitudes of global pathways and hybridizations. Non-Americans, their bodies suffering the ill effects of political and economic decisions made thousands of miles away, have long recognized this.

**Screenshot from ebay.com,
March 20, 2002.
CIPRO for sale from India.**

Notes

The author would like to thank Warwick Anderson, Jennifer Fishman, and Felicity Scott for helpful comments on this essay.

1. Richard Preston, *The Cobra Event* (New York: Random House, 1997); Preston, *The Hot Zone* (New York: Random House, 1994); Paul Nathan, "Big Deal," *Publishers Weekly* 244, no. 40 (29 September 1997): 23; Judy Quinn, "Cobra's Eye," *Publishers Weekly* 244, no. 25 (23 June 1997): 22–24; and Judy Quinn, "A 'Big Book' Correction," *Publishers Weekly* 245, no. 12 (23 March 1998): 41–49.

2. Lawrence Kaplan, "A Bridge Too Far," *The National Interest* (Fall 1999): 135–139; Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," *Foreign Policy* 112 (Fall 1998): 110–123; and Stephen S. Hall, "Science-Fiction Policy," *Technology Review* (November–December 1998): 92. In a 1999 interview with the *New York Times*' William Broad and Judith Miller, Clinton cited *The Cobra Event* as a "futuristic novel" that he found "interesting, especially when he said what his sources were, which seemed fairly credible to me." This interview is available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/01/1999-01-21-interview-of-the-president-by-the-new-york-times.html.

3. Preston's prepared statement before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons is available from: http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/preston.htm.

4. Donna E. Shalala, "Bioterrorism: How Prepared Are We?" *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 5, no. 4 (July–August 1999): 492–493.

5. Preston, *Cobra Event,* 284.

6. Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996): 28, 33. For an extensive list of international terrorist organizations circa 1990, see Raymond Allan Zilinskas, "Terrorism and Biological Weapons: Inevitable Alliance?" *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 34, no. 1 (Autumn 1990): 65–70. See also Jonathan B. Tucker ed., *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).

7. During the 1990s the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, the Iraqi weapons programs, and Christian Patriot Larry Wayne Harris were able to purchase weaponization materials, including production equipment, agents, culture media, and seed stocks, from American companies.

8. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, eds. *America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 174–176.

9. In 2000 Laurie Garrett observed that every putatively benign biomedical discovery contained a hidden Faustian bargain: "Today every aspect of biology research and development is far cheaper, easier to hide and simpler to execute than the weapons technology of the cold war. Basic biomedical research under way in top private and public laboratories could prove useful for insidious weapons development. . . . The bottom line is the so-called 'dual-use' dilemma: Every breakthrough in biomedical research also has the potential of destroying significant segments of humanity." Laurie Garrett, "Experts: It's Time to 'Be Paranoid,'" *Newsday* (29 November 2000), A8.

10. Preston, *Cobra Event,* 311.

11. Roy Porter, *The Greatest Benefit to Mankind* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997),

166; Alan M. Kraut, *Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the "Immigrant Menace"* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Judith Walzer Leavitt, *Typhoid Mary: Captive to the Public's Health* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); Paul Farmer, *AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); and Warwick Anderson, "Excremental Colonialism: Public Health and the Poetics of Pollution," *Critical Inquiry* 21 (Spring 1995): 640–669.

12. These topics are covered in detail in Nicholas Benjamin King, "Infectious Disease in a World of Goods" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2001).

13. The recurring use of the word *chimera* is instructive. The lethal agent featured in *Mission Impossible 2,* product of Biocyte Pharmaceuticals' Russian molecular biologist, is a genetically engineered pathogen called "Chimera." The virologist heroes of Preston's novel discover that their quarry had fashioned his "Cobra" virus with elements from a moth virus called nuclear polyhedrosis, smallpox, and (in a chapter entitled "Chimera") the common cold. Russian defector Ken Alibek quotes a colleague as saying that, inspired by Western genetics research, "we believe we can create a chimera virus." See Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, *Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It* (New York: Random House, 1999), 259.

14. Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (London: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996).

15. See, for example, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response. Recommendations of the CDC Strategic Planning Workgroup," *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 49, no. RR-4 (April 21, 2000): 1–14.

16. Similar themes can be seen in American responses to the informational terror of the Y2K bug. Jennifer Ruth Fosket and Jennifer Fishman, "Constructing the Millennium Bug: Trust, Risk, and Technological Uncertainty," *CTheory* (13 October 1999), available online at http://www.ctheory.net/text_file.asp?pick=216.

17. "The body cannot be understood, theoretically or empirically, outside of an understanding of globalization. But conversely, boiled down to its simplest determinations, globalization is about the socio-spatial relations between billions of individuals." David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 16.

A City Transformed: Designing 'Defensible Space'

ANTHONY VIDLER

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center is propelling a civic debate over whether to change the way Americans experience and ultimately build urban spaces. Are a city's assets—density, concentration, monumental structures—still alluring? Will a desire for "defensible space" radically transform the city as Americans know it?

For more than a century, architects and urban planners have tried to design better forms for the modern metropolis. Some, like Le Corbusier, reimagined the city in glass and steel, its transparent towers majestically spaced amid greenery—prismatic objects in a huge urban park. Others, like Frank Lloyd Wright, envisioned it dispersed in "broadacres," spread across the fertile prairie, each citizen given a plot of land.

All these plans grew out of a desire to counteract what were seen as the central threats against life and happiness in the late nineteenth century: lack of light and air, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions and congested circulation that demanded the opening up of narrow streets and the restitution of "nature" in the form of green space, if not the dispersal of the entire city.

Such dispersal has, in fact, been taking place since the 1920s, as the "metropolis" grew into the "megalopolis." The result was an uneasy compromise between clusters of skyscrapers in downtown redevelopments and urban sprawl.

But the central city, for all its economic woes, has retained its strong attraction as a focus of public interaction, a center of trade, finance, and consumerism. In recent years, cities like New York have seen a return to livability and a reconstruction of social and cultural services and neighborhood.

The last decades, however, have seen a major increase in terrorist attacks on the public centers in Europe, the Middle East, and now the United States. Dispersal rather than concentration is being talked about as the viable pattern of life and work, where monumental buildings will give way to camouflaged sheds, or entirely scattered to home offices.

Urban planners are ill-prepared to respond to this new reality. Fear of aerial attack has preoccupied planners and architects since the First World War and its Zeppelin bombardments. At that time, decentralization was the watchword—a strategy that fit the polemics of the Garden City movement.

Grey Room 07, Spring 2002, pp. 82–85.

the *corcoran* group real estate

October, 2001

Dear Neighbor,

At this very difficult time in the life of our beloved city, may Bonnie & I as residents of Hudson Heights express our care and concern to our neighbors, as we have all been impacted by this tragedy.

The following is an update on the market. Statistics for Mid Year 2001 illustrate that while the market has calmed down, prices are still being pushed up in many neighborhoods, including ours. The buyers are coming back to the marketplace and they are still buying apartments. Due to our location we feel that our neighborhood may actually become even more desirable.

We are including one of our newest exclusives located at **350 CABRINI BOULEVARD, APARTMENT #5N**. Should you or someone you know be interested in this very desirable property, please give us a call.

The Corcoran Group is proud to be New York City's leading residential real estate agency, bringing buyers and sellers together with world class marketing services. For more information, please feel free to contact us directly, visit our website at www.corcoran.com/bob or for a free market evaluation return the enclosed card to discuss how you can utilize our dynamic approach for the marketing of your apartment.

Sincerely,

Robert Manzari
Senior Vice President
(212) 941-2560
the *corcoran* group real estate

Bonnie McCartney
Sales Associate
(212) 941-2558
the *corcoran* group real estate

Tel: (212)941 2500 Fax: (212)941 6626
490 Broadway New York, New York 10012 www.corcoran.com

Manhattan real estate marketing correspondence, October 2001.

Regional planning groups in Britain and America stressed the security advantages of "spread" cities. Le Corbusier, in consultation with former military officers, drew diagrams showing his project for a "Ville Verte" or "Green City" was less susceptible to damage from above. Its wide parks and narrow bands of apartment-buildings offered smaller targets.

But all such plans were drawn up to counter the threat of external attack, rather than to protect against terrorism from within. Indeed, for many critics, security has been seen as a threat to liberty—the surveillance of society as a dystopia of secret cameras, invasion of privacy and the abuse of state power. If planners considered security, it has been in the service of crime prevention in the inner city or the retreat into gated "safe" communities of the suburbs.

Certainly the superficial result of the latest terror will be to confirm the dark images of metropolis drawn by the Expressionists in the 1920s, and popularized by Fritz Lang's silent masterwork, *Metropolis*—the city as an untamed monster, a vision updated in the cyberpunk stories of William Gibson, movies like *Blade Runner* and the Japanese comic books, *Atari* and *Metropolis*, whose ruined streets bear a disturbing resemblance to the devastation in downtown Manhatten.

There will be an understandable impulse to flee. The "new urbanism" movement, with its low-density developments like Seaside or Celebration in Florida, designed to replicate small-town life in premodern America, will no doubt take the opportunity to denounce tall buildings as inherently mistaken. Certainly a number of firms will relocate outside New York in the search for space and security; maybe a number of New Yorkers will move to the suburbs.

The experience of the rest of the world indicates, however, that terrorism alone will not decrease the importance of city centers for the public life of societies. London, subject to terrorist bombings since the late Victorian age, subject to the ferocious bombardments of World War II and to the spillover of the violence in Northern Ireland, has always rebounded with strength. Paris has been on the alert for terrorism since the Algerian War. Yet its museums, monuments, and public spaces are continually filled. New York will be no exception.

For real community, as evident over the last week, is bred in cities more strongly than suburbs. The street as a site of interaction, encounter, and the support of strangers for each other; the square as a place of gathering and vigil; the corner store as a communicator of information and interchange. These spaces, without romanticism or nostalgia, still define an urban culture.

Proposals have already been made that would change the nature of public space: closing off Times Square to traffic; limiting access to railroad terminals; reducing access to parks; adding more cameras and security personnel in

buildings. Such a world would hardly be worth living in and would inhabit the very contact through density that cities encourage.

Yet it is true that urban public life has suffered major onslaughts in the last twenty years, from the increasing privatization encouraged by reliance on Internet to expansion of the mall-effect—whereby only the largest consumer outlets survive. In the current crisis, it is all the more important that the idea of public space, and its relations to urban community, be sustained.

This is why it is urgent that planners explore new designs that learn from the difficulties of past utopias as well as avoid the nostalgia of anti-city programs. We should search for design alternatives that retain the dense and vital mix of uses critical to urban life, rethinking the exclusions stemming from outdated zoning, real estate values, and private ownership, to provide vital incentives for building public spaces equal to our present needs for community.

This article first appeared in the New York Times *on September 23, 2001, WK 6.*

Divided Responsibilities: Minoru Yamasaki, Architectural Authorship, and the World Trade Center

DAVID L. SALOMON

Who is responsible for the World Trade Center? Before September 11, 2001, this question seemed noteworthy if only for its potential to illuminate the increasingly ambiguous and fragmented role of architects and architecture in the 1960s. After "the eleventh" the very same question produced military and political responses that were not only dismissive of ambiguity, but seemingly unlimited in their reach. However, what remained the same, both before and after that horrific day, was the consistent and often obfuscating practice of assigning authorship and/or responsibility to a single person, a practice that in the case of the World Trade Center has always been difficult to do.

Few things are as central to modernism's mythology as the image of the heroic architect creating revolutionary designs that overturn both aesthetic and technical norms. Yet, in his prescient text of 1947, "The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius," Henry Russell Hitchcock noticed that the days of the architect as master builder had already past. Instead, he accurately predicted that architectural labor would be divided along pragmatic and symbolic lines. The ever pressing practical programs that made up the majority of architectural work would be left in the efficient hands of larger multidivisional offices, while projects that carried important social and cultural weight would be entrusted only to the mind of an individual "genius."[1]

However, in the early 1960s, when faced with the task of hiring an architect to design the World Trade Center, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey encountered a dilemma that Hitchcock's logic did not account for. On the one hand, its enormous scale—which originally called for over 10 million square feet of office, retail, and other commercial space, to be distributed over an irregular and watery sixteen-acre, fourteen-block site—required the organizational and technical skills of a large bureaucratic firm. On the other hand, the lofty symbolic and operational goals of the project—which were nothing less than to solidify the United States's global position in international trade, reinvigorate the local real estate market in lower

Grey Room 07, Spring 2002, pp. 86–95.

Top: Minoru Yamasaki.

Bottom: Julian and Richard Roth, Emery Roth & Sons.

Manhattan by establishing a new physical and economic center, and produce an icon that would represent the increasing interdependence of international commerce and world peace—needed a one-of-a-kind design.[2] In other words, it required the skill sets on either side of Hitchcock's divided profession.

At first glance it would appear that the Port Authority's decision, in October of 1962, to hire the iconoclastic and controversial architect Minoru Yamasaki revealed that their architectural needs were primarily symbolic. However, this only tells half the story, for Yamasaki wasn't the only architect who would be retained by the Port Authority. After selecting Yamasaki's Detroit-based firm, the Port Authority hired the New York firm of Emery Roth & Sons. In addition to these two outside sources, the Port Authority also had at its disposal its own internal architectural and engineering staffs. Finally, the Port Authority would also engage the services of a number of construction and real estate experts to pretest the logic and feasibility of the advice given to them by their architectural experts.[3]

In part, the size of the design team assembled by the Port Authority was a function of the Center's scale and unique function. Neither a cultural nor governmental institution, it was established as a unique, speculative real estate development. Like the agency entrusted to bring it to fruition, it was to be a quasi-public entity, whose goal was to consolidate in one place any and all public and private companies and agencies that participated in New York City's role in the acceleration of international trade.[4]

The Port Authority had been asked to develop, own, and operate the Center by the project's original sponsor—the David Rockefeller-led Downtown-Lower Manhattan Association—for a number of reasons. A bistate, semiautonomous, semipublic, and highly controversial agency founded in 1921, the Port Authority was, and still is, an entrepreneurial institution responsible for maximizing the revenue-generating flow of goods, vehicles, and people that pass within and through New York's harbor, bridges, tunnels, and airports. Its experience in designing, building, and operating these various pieces of urban infrastructure, along with its power of eminent domain, made it the only existing agency qualified to take on, and to pay for, a project that advertised itself as being both profit driven and in the public interest.[5]

After testing and fleshing out the program it had inherited from the Downtown-Lower Manhattan Association, the Port Authority negotiated for and assembled the site,[6] and, with the aid of New York's governor (and David Rockefeller's brother) Nelson Rockefeller, politically pushed the project to the point of no return, and then set about finding an architect who could manage the enormous technical and organizational difficulties and, in turn, produce an image New York could literally sell to the world.[7]

Just which architect, or even what kind of architect was best able to handle

such a complex task was not immediately clear.[8] Within a self-described chaotic architectural culture, there were no obvious choices. To begin, the Port Authority dismissed the so-called "genius committee" of Gordon Bunshaft, Wallace Harrison, and Edward Durrell Stone, who along with the lesser known Richard Adler had been working with the Port Authority between 1960 and 1962 on a number of feasibility studies. Then, from an initial pool of over forty architectural firms, the Port's selection committee narrowed the field to a list of seven finalists. This group included an array of architectural practices, from the large multidivisional organization at Welton Becket and Associates, the team-oriented approach of Walter Gropius and The Architects Collaborative (TAC), the individualism of Philip Johnson, and the relatively balanced approach of Minoru Yamasaki, as well as a few local firms with big-building experience.

In a two-hundred-plus page document, the committee responsible for recommending an architect to the Port Authority's directors evaluated the pluses and minus of each firm. Although Johnson was perhaps the most famous and the most radical of the finalists, and his form-making abilities the most daring, his lack of experience on large projects and his failure to make fiscal responsibility a priority disqualified him. On the opposite end of the spectrum was Becket's office. Although highly efficient and attentive to the client's administrative concerns, the architecture they had previously produced did not suggest that they could create an inspired or significant work.

The committee was apparently intrigued by Gropius, who clearly recognized the symbolic importance of the project. His international reputation and name recognition was highly valued by the Port Authority as well. Further, his firm had completed a number of large projects, including the Pan Am building in New York a few years before. However, the committee was less enamored with Gropius's emphasis on TAC's team approach. While the Port Authority understood that such a large project would require a diverse team, they did not share Gropius's belief that the team should be internalized within one firm, let alone an architectural one. Even more disturbing was Gropius's failure to reassure the Port Authority that he personally would be responsible for the design. This shared design responsibility was most disturbing for the Port Authority, and they concluded that the multiheaded design methods employed by TAC could not produce the singular object they wanted.

Thus, Yamasaki emerged as the clear, if not surprising, choice. Although his and modernism's reputation was badly, if not irrevocably, damaged by the infamous 1972 implosion of his Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis, in the years following its completion, Yamasaki emerged as one of the more successful architects who openly questioned modernism's dogmatic formal

and ideological restrictions.[9] This questioning began after a 1954 trip through the Far East, India, and Europe. Inspired by this exposure to both historical and vernacular traditions, upon returning to the United States he began to actively incorporate historical and ornamental forms into his work in an attempt to produce what he called more "serene" and "humanist" spaces.[10] The buildings that earned him a reputation large enough to be considered for the World Trade Center job were a series of relatively small, simple, box-like buildings that were often placed adjacent to, if not surrounded by, shallow pools of water and were augmented with an individual interpretation of Gothic ornament made from aluminum and/or precast concrete.[11]

Against the prevailing architectural norms that emphasized hyperrationality and efficient performance, the appearance of an architecture that attempted to express "enjoyment" and "delight," was greeted by many as a welcome relief.[12] Although many disdained his personalized, pseudo-Gothic forms, committed modernists had to admire his commitment to and experimentation with technologically advanced methods and materials to produce these forms. He was particularly interested in the use of prefabricated building components and precast concrete. As a result, with this combination of formal audacity and technological rigor he positioned himself as a slightly reformed version of the modernist master—a singular figure who challenged the aesthetic and technical status quo in an attempt to produce a new architectural idiom.

Minoru Yamasaki and Emery Roth & Sons. World Trade Center, model, 1964. Photo: Balthazar Korab.

As Eric Darton notes in his penetrating "biography" of the World Trade Center, a different aspect of Yamasaki's credentials would have appealed to the Port Authority's own ethic of efficiency and service. According to Darton, Yamasaki's commission is attributable in large measure to the fact that he was a kindred spirit of the Port Authority's director Austin Tobin, who, with Yamasaki, are described as an "ambitious climbers with the souls of engineers." Likewise, Tobin also would have appreciated the fact that Yamasaki was not, in Darton's words, "a modernist prima donna. His track record showed that he was capable of putting his client's needs ahead of his ego."[13]

However, it is more likely that other members of the building team reassured Tobin that the Center would not be an exercise in aesthetics but would perform as a piece of physical and economic infrastructure, just like any other work of "diligently planned and effectively engineered" Port Authority project.[14] Chief among Yamasaki's short-term partners was Emery Roth & Sons. The Roths' qualifications were well established and included the design and construction of numerous, if not indistinguishable, curtain-wall-clad office towers in New York after World War II. Their role would be to produce the working drawings, to check and tweak the feasibility and economic viability of Yamasaki's designs against the stringent standards they had established over the previous fifteen years, and to work through the day-to-day problems and details that would crop up as design and construction progressed.[15] In addition, the Port Authority's own sophisticated engineering and "construction management" staff would be able to troubleshoot any logistical or construction problems encountered during the design and construction of the project.

In contrast to the apparent runner-up, Walter Gropius, Yamasaki's control over his relatively small firm convinced the Port Authority that he could not only cultivate creativity but that he alone would be responsible for it.[16] This responsibility, however, was a limited one, his contractual role having been defined as "designer."[17] Thus, while he certainly participated and contributed to some of the engineering solutions on the project, he did not have any real technical or operational responsibilities, the handling of which the Port Authority had more than adequately planned for.

Despite the breadth of this team, within architectural discourse the authorship of the World Trade Center has been consistently embodied in the figure of Yamasaki. While there is no doubt that Yamasaki was responsible for the overall image of the project, it is unsettling to observe how, in almost every pre-September 11 account of the project, any contributions made by the Roths or any other architect or engineer is repressed, and it is Yamasaki alone who is initially given credit and then later, blame. Even in his own account of the project, revealed in his 1979 memoir, *A Life in Architecture,*

Yamasaki fails to mention the contributions of the Roths or his hand-picked structural engineer, John Skilling (of the Seattle based firm of Worthington, Skilling, Helle & Jackson). In fact, in his summary of the project, he intones that he, either through his direct intervention or through his initial urging, was responsible for many of the aesthetic and technical innovations.

These claims are perplexing, especially considering that Malcolm Levy, their Port Authority client, noticed that the two architectural firms "complemented each other so well that it is hard to pull apart who did what."[18] Even more bewildering is Yamasaki's failure to mention Skilling's contribution. Before receiving the World Trade Center commission, Yamasaki and Skilling had worked on a number of projects together, including a nineteen-story tower for IBM in Seattle. For that design, completed just before the design of the Twin Towers, instead of following the by then eighty-year-old tradition of enclosing a steel frame within an independent enclosure system, their structural/enclosure solution was a self-supporting exterior-bearing wall. This solution, which Yamasaki noted "could not have been done without John Skilling," would be revisited and updated by them at the World Trade Center.[19]

The exterior-bearing walls designed by Yamasaki and Skilling to support the Twin Towers were enormous Vierendeel trusses made up of hundreds of prefabricated sections. As in their IBM tower, the absence of a structural frame allowed the interior spaces to be column-free, providing the maximum flexibility and efficiency for tenants and landlords alike. The extreme height of the Twin Towers required that each exterior column be a fourteen-inch, square steel box column spaced at only three feet four inches on center, a structural design that resulted in twenty-two-inch windows between the columns. Clad in aluminum, the façade differed from the standard and ubiquitous metal-and-glass curtain wall in that it completely integrated the previously separate functions of structural, enclosure, and fenestration systems.

While these restrictions were structurally necessary—and their effects much criticized[20]—they also point to how closely Yamasaki and Skilling worked to create architectural and engineering solutions that reinforced one another. For example, the monolithic façade made up of 1,350-foot-tall, uninterrupted columns reinforced Yamasaki's long-standing preference that tall buildings emphasize their verticality. Similarly, he argued that the close spacing of the large columns provided visual and physical protection for its inhabitants by serving as a physical and psychological barrier between them and the outside. This security was particularly important to Yamasaki because he himself suffered from acrophobia.

Despite the close relationship between the architectural and engineering goals and techniques, when Yamasaki wrote about the relationship, he didn't

emphasize the collaborative effort but instead echoed his modernist forefathers, proclaiming that it is the architect, and the architect alone, who can and ought to give "basic form and concept to the structure," while the engineer is left only to "carry out these ideas."[21] By stressing the architect's dominant role, he again repositioned himself in the mold of the modernist master builder, the true and only author of his buildings.

Yet, to make this claim, especially in 1979, was not enough to rebuild his reputation; nor could it reestablish this vision of the architect within architectural discourse, or stop the increased fragmentation of the profession. By 1979 architecture had, to a great degree, abandoned the goals established by the heroic first generation and then repositioned by Hitchcock and Yamasaki, among others, after World War II. Regardless of how Yamasaki or anyone else framed it, the severe distribution of architectural responsibility evident at the World Trade Center, and the alienating objects it produced, represented to many the epitome of an architectural ideology without merit and a profession without power, direction, or authority.

Notes

This essay is part of a larger study of the World Trade Center begun before September 11 for my doctoral dissertation in the Department of Architecture and Urban Design at UCLA.

1. Henry Russell Hitchcock, "The Architecture of Bureaucracy, the Architecture of Genius," *Architectural Review* (January 1947): 3–6.

2. For the original plans and goals of the project, see Downtown-Lower Manhattan Association, *World Trade Center: A Proposal for the Port of New York* (New York: Downtown-Lower Manhattan Association, 1960). Yamasaki was clearly aware of and agreed with these goals, recognizing early on that his task was to create a "living monument to World Peace." Minoru Yamasaki, "New World Trade Center for Manhattan," *Architectural Forum* (February 1964): 5–7.

3. See Angus Gillespie, *Twin Towers: The Life of New York City's World Trade Center* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 60; and Leonard I. Ruchelman, *The World Trade Center: Politics and Policies of Skyscraper Development* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1977).

4. The idea to create a World Trade Center in New York was first raised in 1946. It was picked up in 1958 by David Rockefeller and his Downtown-Lower Manhattan Alliance. Other cities around the country had already established such centers or were planning them, most notably New Orleans and San Francisco.

5. In order to convince the legislators in New York and New Jersey that its mandate should allow for the construction of what was essentially an office-building complex, the Port Authority, in part, maintained that the future of the Port would depend on increasing the flow of more abstract and pure forms of capitalism, i.e., information and money itself.

6. Part of this negotiation included convincing New Jersey that it had something to gain from the Port Authority's involvement in the project. The negotiation ultimately hinged on shifting the World Trade Center site from the east to the west side of Manhattan, a move secured by the Port Authority's agreement to take over the Hudson and Manhattan (now PATH) rail lines, terminal, and buildings, thus making the project directly accessible to New Jersey commuters.

7. See Gillespie, 16–52; Ruchelman; and Abraham Stein, The *Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the 1962 PATH–World Trade Center Project* (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1980).

8. For a detailed summary of the process, see Anthony Robins, *The World Trade Center* (Englewood, FL: Pineapple Press, 1987), 19–27.

9. Born, raised, and receiving his architectural education in Seattle, Yamasaki spent the years of World War II in New York. There he worked in a number of large architectural and industrial design firms, including Harrison, Fouilhoux, and Abromowitz and Raymond Loewy; he also formed a brief partnership with George Nelson. His first real notoriety came from his design for the main terminal of the St. Louis airport, and, in the same year, the ill-fated Pruitt-Igoe housing project, both of which he designed while in partnership with Hellmuth and Leinweber.

10. Yamasaki directly addresses this experience and their effects in "Toward an Architecture for Enjoyment," *Architectural Record* (August 1955): 142–149.

11. See Ada Louise Huxtable, "Minoru Yamasaki's Recent Buildings," *Art in America*, No. 4 (1962): 48–55, for a synopsis of his work leading up to the World Trade Center commission,

as well as its critical reception and his own editorial interpretation.

12. See "Conversation with Yamasaki," *Architectural Forum* (July 1959): 110–118; and "Individual Theories of Design," *AIA Journal* (August 1958): 49–59.

13. Eric Darton, *Divided We Stand: A Biography of New York's World Trade Center* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 116.

14. Darton, 116.

15. Robins, 33; and "Yamasaki and Roths: At Two Ends of the Same Drafting Table," *Engineering News-Record* (9 July 1964): 46–50.

16. Robins, 27.

17. Robins, 33; and "Yamasaki and Roths."

18. Malcolm Levy, quoted in "Yamasaki and the Roths."

19. "Unusual Structural Wall for IBM," *Architectural Record* (December 1963): 104–107.

20. The small module was alternatively described as being either too "dainty" or "repetitive and dull." The tall, thin windows were criticized for obscuring the sweeping views possible in such a tall building. See, Ada Louise Huxtable, "Big but Not So Bold," *New York Times,* 5 April 1973: 34.

21. Yamasaki, *A Life in Architecture,* 33.

Around Ground Zero

LAURA KURGAN

The map distributed with this issue of *Grey Room* and reproduced on the following pages was produced during the month of December 2001 as a part of the Temporary Memorials Committee of New York New Visions. It is designed as a pocket-sized fold-out map for viewers to the site of the former World Trade Center to provide basic information about the area and recent events, in the interest of facilitating reflection and the work of remembrance. The map serves at once as a practical guide to the site as well as a memorial document. As such, it is dated and updated along with the changes that it defines. It is a temporal map.

This map is the second printing, dated March. Many changes to the site and are reflected in the map itself and by the images and text accompanying it. By the time this journal is printed, a third version of the map will have been produced. For further information, an archive, and the most current map, please refer to http://www.aroundgroundzero.net.

"It is a burial ground. It is a cemetery, where the men and women we loved are buried. Where they rest is now hallowed ground."
—Family Member, the *New York Times*, October 25, 2001.

Since September 11, 2001, the area around Ground Zero in Lower Manhattan has provided the site for a multitude of private and public acts of remembrance, respect, and understanding. Like the remnants of the buildings, these memorials change, are disassembled and remade, often disappearing forever.

Looking and listening, a walk around the site inspires imagination, mourning, and recollection, allows us to participate in charting a future course, and to measure our disorientation in the face of the unimaginable.

Above: Aerial photograph of Ground Zero, 23 September 2001. Photo: NOAA.

Opposite: Ground Zero Memorial. Photo: Margaret Morton.

Wall of the missing, St. Vincent's Hospital, September 2001. Photo: Margaret Morton.

Ground Zero (also referred to as the inner zone, the pile, the pit, the site, the zone) is where the twin towers and the neighboring buildings of the World Trade Center collapsed, leaving a 16-story pile of debris and fragments of the exterior structural walls. The pile consists primarily of dust made up of the pulverized contents of the towers, extending deep into the underground base of the complex. The site is accessible to construction and rescue workers, firefighters, and police involved in these efforts, as well as to public officials and the press, and others with special authorization. Coordinated by four construction companies, workers are engaged in removal and recovery operations 24 hours a day.

As of mid-December, some 3,000 people are thought to have died at Ground Zero, including the 147 passengers aboard the two planes that struck the towers. The debris is removed carefully to allow for the identification of the missing. Ambulances, bearing the remains of the victims still being unearthed, depart the site with some regularity; a police escort may indicate that they are carrying the body of a firefighter, police officer, or emergency worker. The

cranes on the site have become a new landmark for downtown Manhattan. Typically used in mining operations, they are much larger than ordinary construction cranes.

Trucks carrying debris from the site leave it frequently.

Debris hauled from the site is taken to Piers 6 and 25 and loaded onto

barges for shipment across New York Harbor to the Fresh Kills landfill on Staten Island, where it is reexamined by investigators and engineers. What remains of the steel structure is transported to Brooklyn for examination and then to scrapyards in New Jersey for recycling. The debris is estimated to weigh 1.2 million tons, about half of which had been removed by mid-December.

There is no **public access** to Ground Zero beyond the "red line." Although it runs through buildings and other obstacles, it is visible as a chain-link fence covered in green fabric. Several construction access gates at major streets are guarded by police or National Guard troops. Between the fence and the inner zone are areas used for staging, construction, and emergency vehicles.

This **green fence** prevents visitors from interfering with recovery and demolition work and ensures the safety of the public. The temporary barriers can be moved to allow for different conditions on a daily basis. Though segments of the fence obstruct the view, visitors have appropriated them as sites of memory and witness.

The openings afforded by cross streets and avenues often allow **views** of the site. As the demolition progresses, these locations change. There are two official **viewing platforms**. Just inside the site at the south west corner, the Port Authority platform has been used by dignitaries,

celebrities, officials, and by the victims' families, many of whom have written messages on the handrails. A public viewing platform has been built on Fulton Street.

Within and around the site, many spontaneous **memorials** to the dead and missing have been constructed, disassembled, lost, removed, moved, or rebuilt since September 11. At Ground Zero, large pieces of the building, notably the remnants of the walls and fragments of its steel structure, served as markers of the catastrophe. Most of these have disappeared. Around the site, at the fence, the viewing platforms and elsewhere, memorials have included candles, photographs, flowers, flags, messages, and teddy bears, which have become the most prominent symbols of mourning and memory. Two memorials were created along the Battery Park Esplanade, one for uniformed officers and the other (a wall of hundreds of teddy bears, now largely removed) for civilian victims.

Tens of thousands of flyers with the photographs of the missing victims of the disaster, their names and descriptions, were posted near hospitals, rescue centers, bus stops, and phone booths around New York City. These flyers first appeared as signs of hope, and later became markers of loss and memory.

Elsewhere, memorials have also been created at many firehouses and police stations, Washington Square Park, Union Square Park, the Lexington Ave. Armory, Bellevue and St. Vincent's Hospitals, Grand Central and Pennsylvania Stations, and the Family Assistance Center on Pier 94.

Notes

Concept and design: Laura Kurgan. Project team: Laura Kurgan, Janette Kim, Bethia Liu, with participation by Rivka Mazar and Donald Shillingburg. Photography: Margaret Morton. Web Design: Courtesy Razorfish. Web hosting: Courtesy Logic Works.

We would like to acknowledge the following organizations and corporations for their support of this project: American Institute of Architects (New York Chapter), Con Edison, The New York Community Trust, The New York Foundation for the Arts, The Open Society Institute, Princeton University, TBWA CHIAT DAY, The Van Alen Institute and two anonymous donors.


PARK PLACE
Bank of New York
US Immigration & Naturalization Bldg
WEST STREET
Red Cross staging area
BARCLAY STREET
140 West St Verizon Bldg
7 WTC
struck by portion of north tower, and collapsed, 6:00pm. Debris collapsed into1/9 subway tunnel below. former site of Mayoral Emergency Command Center
WORLD FINANCIAL CENTER
3 WFC
6 WTC: Custom House
struck by facade of north tower, debris partially removed due to government offices in building
North Bridge
1 WTC north tower
8:46 a.m. impact
10:28 a.m. collapse
debris partially removed
World Trade Center Plaza
Winter Garden
temporarily closed to the public
2 WFC
PATH Trains to New Jersey (not in service)
Cortlandt (not in service)
3 WTC Marriott Hotel
struck by portion of south tower, collapsed
2 WTC south tower
9:03 a.m. impact
9:50 a.m. collapse
debris partially removed
Port Authority Viewing Platform
(restricted access)
NY City Police Memorial
Gateway Plaza
South Bridge
St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church
Banker's Trust
Struck by portion of south tower, 09.11.01, 9:59am
SOUTH END AVENUE
1 WFC
Green Exchange Bldg
ALBANY STREET
Marriott Hotel
ALBANY STREET
CARLISLE



GROUND ZERO
RESTRICTED ACCESS
SUGGESTED PATH

OPEN VIEW
VIEWING PLATFORM
FENCE
TEMPORARY MEMORIAL
CURTAINED GLASS
POLICE
POLICE STATION
FIREHOUSE

CRANE
TRUCK
BARGE
HIGH VOLTAGE LINE

COLLAPSE
PARTIAL COLLAPSE
MAJOR DAMAGE
MODERATE DAMAGE

M 22 MTA BUS
5 MTA SUBWAY
FERRY/CRUISE

Wall of the missing, St. Vincent's Hospital, September 2001. Photograph by Margaret Morton

Around Ground Zero

14TH STREET
POLICE LINE -
SEPT 11-14, 2001

Ground Zero (also referred to as the inner zone, the pile, the pit, the site, the zone) is where the twin towers and the neighboring buildings of the World Trade Center collapsed, leaving a 16-story pile of debris and fragments of the exterior structural walls. The pile now removed, consisted primarily of dust made up of the pulverized contents of the towers, extending deep into the underground base of the complex. As this foundation is excavated, "the bathtub," a 70 foot-deep slurry wall holding back the Hudson River and dating from the construction of the towers, has been exposed at the western side of the site.

The site is accessible to construction and rescue workers, firefighters and police involved in these efforts, public officials and the press, and others with special authorization. Recovery and removal operations go on 24 hours a day.

As of early March 2002, some 3,000 people are thought to have died at Ground Zero, including the 147 passengers aboard the two planes that struck the towers. The debris is removed carefully to allow for the identification of the missing. Ambulances, bearing the remains of the victims are increasingly rare; a police escort may indicate that they are carrying the body of a firefighter, police officer, or emergency worker.


Sal Pepe
MISSING
David Pruim
JOSEPH PLUMITALLO
Firefighter
Kevin Prior
F.D.N.Y. Squad 252
HELP US LOOK FOR
ANTHONY PEREZ
MISSING
MISSING



A project of the Temporary Memorials Committee of
New York New Visions Coalition for Rebuilding New York

Concept and Design: Laura Kurgan
Project team: Janette Kim and Bethia Liu with Rivka Mazar and Donald Shillingburg. Photography: Margaret Morton. Printing: AGW Lithographers, Inc. This map is printed on Sappi Porcelain 80 text.

Support from the following organizations and corporations is gratefully acknowledged: American Institute of Architects, New York Chapter; Con Edison; The New York Community Trust; The New York Foundation for the Arts; The Open Society Institute; Princeton University; TBWA\Chiat\Day; The Van Alen Institute; and two anonymous donors.

For information: http://www.aroundgroundzero.net
Web design: Razorfish
Web hosting: Logicworks

The site is accessible to construction and rescue workers, firefighters and police involved in these efforts, public officials and the press, and others with special authorization. Recovery and removal operations go on 24 hours a day.

As of early March 2002, some 3,000 people are thought to have died at Ground Zero, including the 147 passengers aboard the two planes that struck the towers. The debris is removed carefully to allow for the identification of the missing. Ambulances, bearing the remains of the victims are increasingly rare; a police escort may indicate that they are carrying the body of a firefighter, police officer, or emergency worker.

Very large **cranes,** typically used in mining operations, were used to remove most of the debris, and in the process became a new landmark for downtown Manhattan.

Trucks carrying debris from the site leave it frequently. The rubble is taken to Piers 6 and 25 and loaded onto **barges** for shipment across New York Harbor to the Fresh Kills landfill on Staten Island, where it is reexamined by investigators and engineers. What remains of the steel structure is transported to Brooklyn for examination and then to scrapyards in New Jersey for recycling. The debris is estimated to weigh 1.35 million tons, about two thirds of which had been removed by March.



There is no **public access** to Ground Zero beyond the "red line." Although it runs through buildings and other obstacles, it is visible as a chain-link fence covered in green fabric. Several construction access gates at major streets are guarded by police or National Guard troops. Between the fence and the inner zone are areas used for staging, storage, construction and emergency vehicles. The **green fence** prevents visitors from interfering with recovery and demolition work and ensures the safety of the public. The temporary barriers can be moved to allow for different conditions on a daily basis. Though segments of the fence obstruct the view, visitors have appropriated them as sites of memory and witness.



The openings afforded by cross



COURTESY FEMA/MITRE

In addition to the collapsed WTC buildings there were some 45 seriously damaged buildings around the site. Many of these have been repaired and reopened. Some of these structures have been temporarily covered by con-

and m
ated a
one fo
(a wal
largely
fence

ed WTC build-
45 seriously
und the site.
repaired and
se structures
vered by con-

and memory. Two memorials were cre-
ated along the Battery Park Esplanade,
one for uniformed officers and the other
(a wall of hundreds of teddy bears, now
largely removed) for civilian victims. The
fence along St. Paul's Chapel on Broad-

other temporary memorial, composed
of the remnants of a destroyed sculp-
ture from the WTC plaza, is planned for
Battery Park.



, composed
oyed sculp-
planned for

a chain-link fence covered in green fabric. Several construction access gates at major streets are guarded by police or National Guard troops. Between the fence and the inner zone are areas used for staging, storage, construction and emergency vehicles. The **green fence** prevents visitors from interfering with recovery and demolition work and ensures the safety of the public. The temporary barriers can be moved to allow for different conditions on a daily basis. Though segments of the fence obstruct the view, visitors have appropriated them as sites of memory and witness.

The openings afforded by cross streets and avenues often allow **views** of the site. As the demolition progresses, these locations change. There are two official **viewing platforms**. Just inside the site at the southwest corner, the Port Authority platform has been used by dignitaries, celebrities, officials, and by the victims' families, many of whom have written messages on the handrails. A public viewing platform has been built on Fulton Street, near Broadway. It too has become a repository of messages left by visitors. Tickets to the viewing platform are distributed daily at the South Street Seaport Museum's ticket booth at Fulton and South Street on Pier 16.



COURTESY FEMA/MITRE

In addition to the collapsed WTC buildings there were some 45 seriously damaged buildings around the site. Many of these have been repaired and reopened. Some of these structures have been temporarily covered by construction **curtains** to prevent injury and damage from falling debris.

Within and around the site, many spontaneous **memorials** to the dead and missing have been constructed, disassembled, lost, removed, moved, or rebuilt since September 11. At Ground Zero, large pieces of the building, notably the remnants of the walls and fragments of its steel structure, served as markers of the catastrophe until mid-December. At the fence, the viewing platforms and elsewhere, memorials have included candles, photographs, flowers, flags, messages, and teddy bears, which have become the most prominent symbols of mourning

and m
ated a
one fo
(a wal
largely
fence
way at
if char
bicyc
serves
numb
worker
sands
the m
tions,
cente
aroun
signs
of loss

The "T
beam
Batter
from

Where they rest is now hallowed ground."

(Family Member, *The New York Times*, October 25, 2001)

Since September 11, 2001, the area around Ground Zero in Lower Manhattan has provided the site for a multitude of private and public acts of remembrance, respect, and understanding. Like the remnants of the buildings, the traces of these acts change, are disassembled and remade, often disappearing forever.

Looking and listening, a walk around the site inspires imagination, mourning, and recollection, allows us to participate in charting a future course, and to measure our disorientation in the face of the unimaginable.

http://www.aroundgroundzero.net.

NewYork NewVisions | Coalition for the Rebuilding of Lower Manhattan

ed WTC build-
45 seriously
und the site.
repaired and
se structures
vered by con-
to prevent
alling debris.

, many spont-
dead
con-
ost, removed,
eptember 11.
s of the build-
s of the walls
eel structure,
catastrophe
he fence, the
ewhere, mem-
ndles, photo-
essages, and
become the
of mourning

and memory. Two memorials were created along the Battery Park Esplanade, one for uniformed officers and the other (a wall of hundreds of teddy bears, now largely removed) for civilian victims. The fence along St. Paul's Chapel on Broadway at Fulton Street has been a constant, if changing, memorial site. An unclaimed bicycle on Broadway at Cedar Street serves as a memorial to the unknown number of undocumented immigrant workers who died on September 11. Thousands of flyers with the photographs of the missing, their names and descriptions, were posted at hospitals, rescue centers, bus stops, and phone booths around the City. They first appeared as signs of hope, and later became markers of loss and memory.

The "Tribute in Light," a projection of two beams of light into the night sky over Battery Park City, is scheduled to run from March 11 through April 13. Another temporary memorial, composed of the remnants of a destroyed sculpture from the WTC plaza, is planned for Battery Park.

AROUND GROUND ZERO

Mar 2002

"It is a burial ground. It is a cemetery, where the men and women we loved are buried. Where they rest is now hallowed ground."

(Family Member, *The New York Times*, October 25, 2001)

, composed
oyed sculp-
planned for

Around Ground Zero, February 2002. Photographs by Margaret Morton


Port Authority police operations
temporary Verizon public phones
Borough of Manhattan Community College
debris removal barges
WEST STREET
Washington Market Park
Stuyvesant High School
Hudson River Park
IS/PS 89
PS 2
WARREN ST
PARK PLACE WEST
BATTERY PARK CITY
College of Insurance
MURRAY ST
Battery Park City Waterfront Esplanade
WEST STREET
Red Cross staging area
M 20
M 22
X 25
Embassy Suites Hotel
Tribute in Light (Open March 11)
Irish Hunger Memorial under construction
Commodities & Mercantile Exchange (temporarily closed to the public)
NORTH END
WORLD
3 WFC


Duane Park
emporary Verizon
ublic phones
TRIBECA
HUDSON ST
Washington Market Park
1
A
2
DUANE STREET
C
READE STREET
M 20
M 22
X 25
Chambers Street 1-2
CHAMBERS STREET
PS 234
GREENWICH STREET
WEST BROADWAY
CHURCH ST
WARREN STREET
Verizon staging area
College of Insurance
MURRAY STREET
US Dept. of Internal Revenue
PARK PLACE
Bank of New York
US Immi-gration & Naturaliza-tion Bldg
WEST STREET
BARCLAY STREET
7 WTC
struck by portion of north tower, and collapsed, 6:00pm, Debris collapsed into 1/9 subway tunnel below. former site of Mayoral Emergency Command Center
140 West St Verizon Bldg
Federal Office Building (Post Office)
6 WTC: Custom House
struck by facade of north tower, debris partially removed due to
5 WTC
struck by collapse of towers,


A
C
DUANE STREET
READE STREET
X 17A
X 12
reet 1-2
CHAMBERS STREET
Chambers Street A·C
X 19
X 11
X 16
CHURCH ST
WARREN STREET
MURRAY STREET
US Dept. of Internal Revenue
Federal Office Building (Post Office)
N
R
African Burial Ground
Disaster Assistance Service Center
CHAMBERS ST
City Hall N·R
M 1
M 6
Tweed Court House
City Hall
City Hall Park
BROADWAY
X 25
M 22
Park Place 1·2
Woolworth Building
M 15
M 103
M 51
PARK ROW
St. Peter's Church
THEATER AL
VESEY ST
(open to rescue workers only)
St. Paul's Chapel
ANN ST
World Trade Center Station
Reopened January, 2002)
ollapse of towers,


Red Cross staging area
Embassy Suites Hotel
Tribute in Light (Open March 11)
Irish Hunger Memorial under construction
Commodities & Mercantile Exchange
(temporarily closed to the public)
NORTH END AVE
Battery Park City Authority free shuttle bus
4 WFC
WORLD FINANCIAL CENTER
3 WFC
Winter Garden
temporarily closed to the public
2 WFC
North Bridge
Circle Line Tours depart from Pier 83 (42nd St) and South Street Seaport
Ferries to/from:
-Hoboken
-Jersey City
North Cove Yacht Harbor
NY City Police Memorial
Gateway Plaza
SOUTH END AVENUE
ALBANY STREET
GROUND ZERO
RESTRICTED ACCESS
SUGGESTED PATH
OPEN VIEW
VIEWING PLATFORM
FENCE


US Immigration & Naturalization Bldg
BARCLAY STREET
7 WTC
struck by portion of north tower, and collapsed, 6:00pm. Debris collapsed into 1/9 subway tunnel below. former site of Mayoral Emergency Command Center
140 West St Verizon Bldg
Federal Office Building (Post Office)
6 WTC: Custom House
struck by facade of north tower, debris partially removed due to government offices in building
5 WTC
struck by collapse of towers, has since been demolished former site of Port Authority Police Station
North Bridge
1 WTC north tower
8:46 a.m. impact
10:28 a.m. collapse
World Trade Center Plaza
PATH Trains to New Jersey (not in service)
Cortlandt St (not in service)
Memorial to the 1993 WTC Bombing Victims
3 WTC Marriott Hotel
struck by portion of south tower, collapsed
2 WTC south tower
9:03 a.m. impact
9:50 a.m. collapse
4 WTC
struck by collapse of towers,has since been demolished
slurry wall
Port Authority Viewing Platform
(restricted access)
South Bridge
St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church
Banker's Trust
Struck by portion of south tower, 09.11.01, 9:59am
CEDAR STREET
THAMES STREET
Green Exchange Bldg
ALBANY STREET
Marriott Financial Center Hotel (open)
CARLISLE STREET
Gateway Plaza
SOUTH END AVENUE
1 WFC
2 WFC
WFC


Woolworth Building
M 103
M 51
PARK ROW
St. Peter's Church
Federal Office Building (Post Office)
THEATER AL
VESEY ST
(open to rescue workers only)
St. Paul's Chapel
World Trade Center Station (reopened January, 2002)
ANN ST
Fulton St A,C
FULTON ST
7 BLOCKS TO SOUTH STREET SEAPORT
Public Viewing Platform
Millen-nium Hotel
Fulton St 4·5
Broadway/ Nassau St J·M·Z
DEY ST
NASSAU ST
JOHN ST
4
5
J
M
Z
Century 21 (open)
Cortlandt St (not in service)
CORTLANDT ST
MAIDEN LN
4 WTC
struck by collapse of towers, has since been demolished
One Liberty Plaza
Federal Reserve Bank (temporarily closed to the public)
LIBERTY ST
Liberty Plaza
Un-claimed Bicycle
CEDAR STREET
HS for Economics & Finance
US Realty Building
CEDAR ST
THAMES ST
THAMES STREET
HS for Leadership & Public Service
PINE ST
American Stock Exchange
TRINITY PL
BROADWAY
Trinity Church


GROUND ZERO
RESTRICTED ACCESS
SUGGESTED PATH
OPEN VIEW
VIEWING PLATFORM
FENCE
TEMPORARY MEMORIAL
CURTAINED GLASS
POLICE
POLICE STATION
FIREHOUSE
CRANE
TRUCK
BARGE
HIGH VOLTAGE LINE
COLLAPSE
PARTIAL COLLAPSE
MAJOR DAMAGE
MODERATE DAMAGE
M 22
MTA BUS
5
MTA SUBWAY
FERRY/CRUISE
NY City Police Memorial
Gateway Plaza
SOUTH END AVENUE
ALBANY STREET
South Esplanade
RECTOR PLACE
M 9
BATTERY PARK CITY
South Cove
AROUND
Mar 2002
GROUND ZERO


Viewing Platform
(restricted access)
Gateway Plaza
South Bridge
St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church
Banker's Trust
Struck by portion of south tower, 09.11.01, 9:59am
CEDAR STREET
HS for Economics & Finance
THAMES STREE
HS fo Leadership & Public Servic
Americ Stoc Exchang
SOUTH END AVENUE
1 WFC
Green Exchange Bldg
ALBANY STREET
Marriott Financial Center Hotel (open)
CARLISLE STREET
ALBANY STREET
RECTOR PLACE
M 9
NYPD
Rec (not ser
GREEN
WASHINGTON ST
WEST STREET
ATTERY PARK CITY
WEST THAMES ST
3RD PL
BATTERY PLACE
BROOKLYN BATTERY TUNNEL
South Cove
2ND PL
1ST PL
1 BLOCK TO BATTERY PARK & PIER A FERRIES
TUNNEL TO FDR DRIVE
Ritz-Carlton Hotel (open)


LIBERTY ST
(temporarily closed to the public)
Liberty Plaza
CEDAR STREET
Un-claimed Bicycle
NASSAU ST
CEDAR ST
HS for Economics & Finance
US Realty Building
THAMES STREET
THAMES ST
HS for Leadership & Public Service
PINE ST
American Stock Exchange
TRINITY PLACE
BROADWAY
Trinity Church
Wall St 4·5
WALL ST
Federal Hall
New York Stock Exchange
(temporarily closed to the public)
Rector St N·R
Rector St (not in service)
FINANCIAL DISTRICT
GREENWICH ST
EXCHANGE PL
Broad St J·M·Z
NEW ST
BROAD ST
BROOKLYN BATTERY TUNNEL
MORRIS ST
BEAVER ST
MARKETFIELD ST
Police Musem
0
200 feet
400 feet
0
.05 mile
.10 mile
Bowling Green
4 BLOCKS TO STATEN ISLAND FERRY
TO STATE ST
TO WHITEHALL ST
STONE ST
Copyright © 2002 Laura Kurgan

City Square: Structural Engineering, Democracy and Architecture

GUY NORDENSON

I watched the attacks on the World Trade Center towers at home in New York, on television. My office is on Broadway a block away from the site, but I was leaving home late that morning. Like most others I did not realize till the second plane hit at 9.03 a.m. that this was an attack. And it took me another half hour watching the fire in the north tower to understand that it would collapse. I know these structures well, from study, the work of a design studio conducted at Princeton in 1999, and discussions with their structural engineer, Leslie Robertson. I knew, as I think the terrorists did, that they were especially robust.

I began calling my colleagues—engineers, emergency response specialists, and others in the earthquake engineering community. It was very hard to reach anyone. The city's emergency response headquarters, which I had visited in June, was destroyed with the WTC7 tower. I was able to reach my colleagues Ramon Gilsanz and Aine Brazil, and we discussed how we might mobilize volunteer engineers through the Structural Engineers Association of New York (SEAoNY), a group we had founded together in the early 1990s. Aine's firm, LZA/Thornton Tomasetti (LZA/TT), had already been hired by the city to help on the site, to advise the contractors on safety as they assisted with the search and recovery efforts. George Tamaro and his firm Mueser Rutledge were hired to consult on the below-grade structures.

The Mayor's Office of Emergency Management (OEM) had assigned to the NYC Department of Design and Construction (DDC) the supervision of construction-related work on site. The DDC agreed to give SEAoNY a role, with LZA/TT, in providing teams of engineers, organized by the individual firms, to be on site with the four contractors (Amec, Bovis, Tully, and Turner/Plaza), around the clock on twelve-hour shifts. Each shift would begin with a briefing by the departing group and a detailed discussion of all the engineering issues of concern. These included the safety of existing structures, the design of crane platforms and access ways, and the demolition strategies.

A second task was to inspect the surrounding buildings and determine which were safe for re-occupancy. On September 13 and 14 I proposed to

Grey Room 07, Spring 2002, pp. 102–105.

WTC Emergency
SEAoNY/DoB/DDC
Buildings Inspection Ratings–
Second Round.



my colleagues at SEAoNY and the DDC a methodology for inspections based on the approach taken after the last major earthquakes in California and using a database of NYC building information assembled at Princeton for a research project for FEMA. Details of this can be found at nycem.org/default.asp and www.princeton.edu/pr/pwb/01/1008/1b.shtml. Through SEAoNY we organized a number of inspection rounds: (1) of 400 or so buildings in the surrounding area (see map) during September 17–18, (2) of the 31 most damaged buildings ("dark grey" and "grey" on the map), in joint teams with the NYC Department of Buildings, on September 21, (3) again of the 400 buildings during October 4–10, and (4) close inspections of several of the "dark-grey" buildings. (1) and (3) were "rapid" visual inspections from the sidewalk and with aerial photographs, (2) were more detailed walk-throughs, and (4) involved mapping and categorizing the specific damages. (1), (2), and (3) used a standard procedure (www.atcouncil.org/wtcarticle.htm) with individual building checklists preprinted for each team.

On September 11 a colleague of mine at Princeton, Josiah Ober, presented a paper, "The Politics of Knowledge in Democratic Athens," at the University of Wisconsin. He referred to Heroditus' use of the concept of *isegoria*, and translated it as an "equal opportunity to speak in public: the equal right to rhetoric." He points to Pericles' Funeral Oration regarding "democratic Athens, [where] open deliberations and bold collective action are mutually entailing

rather than mutually exclusive." Ober writes "the Athenians attend quite promiscuously to anyone whether he be a smith, a shoemaker, a merchant, a sea-captain, a rich man, a poor man, of good family or of none." Against Plato (in *Protagoras*) he is critical of the idea of "political expertise" (*politike techné*). Instead, with Aristotle he suggests that "because they are many, each can have a part (*orion*) of virtue and practical reason, and on their joining, together, the mass of people, with its many feet and hands and having many senses, become like a single human being, and [it does] so also with respect to character and mind."

In retrospect, the great benefit of the SEAoNY activities at the WTC site was this "promiscuous" deliberative aspect. Engineers, construction workers, firemen, and rescue workers argued, suggested strategies and designs, acknowledged good ideas, and criticized dumb ones. Within an overall "command" structure managed by OEM and the DDC thrived a powerful, at times very emotional, and extraordinarily effective democracy. Thanks to this the work proceeded safely, effectively, and in fact quickly. This went beyond the "public" and "private" sectors. It was in every respect a renaissance of democracy.

Of course capitalism abhorred this momentary "New York Commune" and swiftly sought to impose its structure on the site. The developer barons met with the state and city officials, and their architects, and mobilized. Still, in the void there had been created an experience of real democracy. What is built must remember this.

Like so many others, I was compelled to go work on the site and fortunate that there was something I could do. My experience with earthquake engineering, my own and my colleagues' research work for FEMA, and the existence of SEAoNY proved useful to the inspection program we were asked to organize. With my colleagues I spent hours, day and night, observing the damage, the chaos, the courage, and democracy. In mid-November I left for a long-planned trek in the Himalayas and took along *War and Peace*. Reading Tolstoy's descriptions and meditations on the great battles of Napoleon's wars, I understood that I had witnessed a battle, the awful and amazing reality of which history would never capture.



Opposite: World Trade Center Aerial Photograph. 13 September 2001.

Right: Alberto Giacometti, *La Place* (1948). © Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York/ADAGP, Paris.

Enduring Innocence

KELLER EASTERLING

On September 11, 2001, architecture—as building and as urbanism—became a primary adversary or competitor, an apparatus or provocation of war. The battle was fought in a terrorist network resembling our own well-worn pathways of global exchange. Terrorists, politicians, businessmen, diplomats, and hackers inhabit and manipulate the same transnational networks, slipping between legal jurisdictions, leveraging advantages in the differential values of labor and currency, brandishing national identity one moment and laundering it the next, translating information between nations and beyond patriotic posturing, often using lies and disguises to neutralize difference. Joining these characters, buildings and cities become not only national and international icons, but active players in global markets and political conflicts, to be assessed for their weakness and resilience, violence and aggression, collusion and resistance. By translating the static envelopes of buildings and the conventions of urbanism into an architecture of conflict and warfare, the attacks identify a latent political agency for architecture, a global urbanism that extends the territory of the discipline.

The work of ethnologist/anthropologist Gregory Bateson facilitates the translation between architecture and warfare. By assigning intent or behavior to organization, he provokes a short contemplation of this political agency in architecture. As in all of Bateson's "cybernetic" analyses, and consistent with his polymathic project, he liberally circulated ideas between contexts and disciplinary logics in a search for shared organizational principles in networks, mechanisms, animal behavior, or global politics as a means to extend the territory of his own discipline. The spirit and methodology of his inquiry, one that both garnered and lent intelligence in kind, may also contribute to the contemplation of an extended territory for architecture.

Specifically, Bateson's discussions of what he calls symmetrical, complementary, and reciprocal relationships are useful. For Bateson, a symmetrical relationship describes an escalating rivalry and mimicry between two parties, whereas a complementary relationship describes submission and recognition of hierarchies between parties. Both relationships can generate a fragile stability, but both can also lead to rivalry, insurgency, or violence. A reciprocal relationship, on the other hand, neutralizes an escalating symmetry or a hierarchical submission by surrendering interest in the fight, multiplying both enemies and friends and entering into a more complex web of cooperative

Grey Room 07, Spring 2002, pp. 106–113.

Debris; Financial District, Manhattan. September 12, 2001. Photo: Michael Shepherd.

engagements.[1] Since information theory informed Bateson's entire project, these three concepts are most valuable to a general discussion of organizational protocols in the sense that they describe constructions that permit or exclude varying degrees of information. Symmetrical and complementary relationships must exclude some information to maintain their order, while mixtures of symmetrical and complementary relationships or reciprocal relationships are not only the most stable but the most information rich. By identifying, in organization, agency related to conflict, submission, or aggression, the terms amplify our common cultural assumptions about organizational complexity. From robotics to networks to genetics we understand that an abundance of information, redundancy, and error creates more robust organizations and that the weakest, the least resilient constitutions, tending toward violence and destruction, are marked by the exclusion of information. Reciprocal relations may counter symmetrical entrenchment or the withholding of information with cooperative structures, avoiding warfare that would arrest a vital flow exchange. Mimicry and righteous innocence, dependent on exemption or exclusion of information, reduce the resilience of an organization and often precede violence and destruction. This same intelligence informs architecture and urbanism when these are understood not merely as building envelope and master plan but as entities with a specific organizational constitution that is responsive to and responsible for a broader political context.

Bush and bin Laden, the two sons of midcentury oil privilege, engage in a dumb and deadly symmetrical organization in which they cast buildings as major players. With what seems like almost too much satisfaction, President Bush repeats, "They live in caves. They live in caves." The wheels, slowly turning, contemplate his boosted rank in intelligence relative to a condition signaling primitive man. The Al Qaeda network, the other, the nomad, will be brought to justice. Caves are stone age and the World Trade Center is a gleaming specimen of technological superiority. Bin Laden also seizes this construct of the righteous civilization forced to dominate the other. Both must fight their war on the other's turf, displaying their military apparatus as superior and enlightened. Bush must fight his war on an exotic battlefield with the sentiments that accompanied World War II. Bin Laden must fight his war under the fluorescent lights of Walmarts and, aided by the media production values, in the brilliant sunshine of New York City. Caves are complex organizations and the World Trade Center is a vulnerable primitive.

This competition is staged as a tragic riddle of conflicts and fatal flaws, a riddle within which one must become one's enemy, a riddle the answer to which one must already know. The characters move about in circular struc-

tures of kinship, a family drama, with comforting, almost involuntarily programmed retaliations and self-protective consolidations, an organization that permits no new information. Yet, consistent with this denial of information, from within this perfect circle of self-reflexivity, emerge the most resolute cries of innocence, the innocence and pain at the hand of an alien enemy, an outsider. Claiming that we did not ask for this mission, Bush must send snowy lambs to fight the evil doers. While just completing the kick that tumbled the blocks in the nursery, with the fires still burning and the air thick with dust, bin Laden, victimized by accusation, must produce the poker-faced "I did not do this" and subsequently, affecting some involvement with larger juridical global compacts, the equally comic "Prove that I did it."

The United States constructs its sovereignty by constantly switching between symmetrical and reciprocal stances. The symmetrical construction of a great war, while dominant, is a veneer for the more complex reciprocal organization of the global coalition. The coalition fights additional campaigns on the information front, with both allies and potential enemies and with other agendas including commercial relationships and oil interests in the Arab world or the Caspian basin. The Al Qaeda also switches between the symmetrical and reciprocal, organizing young men's lives in the thick of America's most banal cultural offerings, deciding when to schedule their enrollment in school and when to schedule their suicide. A reciprocal stance coaxes new intelligence from enemy culture, but it eventually fuels the clanking apparatus of the military. This oscillation between the reciprocal and symmetrical, between cooperation and direct warfare perhaps marks the most dangerous or formidable waters in the sea of globalization, and righteous declarations of innocence amplify its violence with an extra exemption or exclusion of information. Maintaining a healthy open network of associations while also withholding information in the form of a secret agenda employs the power of a reciprocal architecture as an accessory to a symmetrical order, making more robust the episodes of innocence and violence that the rest of the world must endure.

In these treacherous oscillations between symmetrical and reciprocal architectures, between the expansions that admit new information and the contractions of righteous war, the World Trade Center both provoked and succumbed to warfare. Terrorism is arguably only a prompt for the enemy's own self-destruction, and in this symmetrical relationship the World Trade Center was both combatant and instrument of suicide. The attacks tested the building's powers to resist, cooperate, or surrender, not only in relation to their structural engineering but their network resilience and powers of evasion. Perhaps more importantly, the attacks revealed a network of global urbanism controlled by remote forces not typically considered within

the conventions of localized urban planning.

As a building, the World Trade Center was a spectacularly vulnerable adversary when in symmetrical alignment with its attackers. Yamasaki's design for the World Trade Center was born into a complex urbanism of weak building codes, municipal incentives, real estate schemes, and urban master plans, a weblike, reciprocal organization, filled with productive lies, scams, and disguises. The project deflected and strengthened an entire subway system, as well as a network of urban associations locally and globally. The contemporary journalism often focused on the building's timed and redundant elevator network as just one of its intelligent building systems. Yet, though the building appeared to be a giant blank computing unit, filled with an efflorescent network, unlike the elevator technologies within, or the global urbanity of a city like New York, the simple volumes contained in its spatial envelope had a much less intelligent organizational repertoire. To maximize rentable area, the floors were almost completely segregated, connected only by thin strands of exit stairways. Finally, the buildings rose from their urban context with a symmetrical competitive assertion to be the largest volume of commercial real estate and the tallest towers in the world.

If evaluated as network architecture, the World Trade Center would thus be considered a serial rather than a parallel arrangement. Like serial computing systems, in evacuation, the World Trade Center required slow sequential routes of circulation rather than the simultaneous and reciprocal points of contact and communication associated with parallel computing. The Pentagon, of near equal capacity and only surpassed in size by the World Trade Center at the time of its completion, was a much more resilient organization because it contained multiple redundant pathways of entry and exit more immediately contacting the ground. Evacuating the building took minutes rather than hours. The World Trade Center also approached the limits of spatial efficiency in the super-tall tower. A thickening core designed to quickly deliver a population of people to the upper floors reduces the rentable floor area that funds the entire enterprise. Some super-tall towers designed today, working with very similar limits, would propose to make the elevator core the means of fire-safety egress and to dedicate a separate bank of elevators for fire fighting, thus extending the intelligent redundancies of the infrastructure to life-safety issues and to a better communication between spatial volumes divided by floors.

The destruction of the World Trade Center was caused by both explosion and implosion, detonation and self-destruction. Yamasaki's own Pruitt-Igoe towers, demolished in 1972, just a year before the completion of the World Trade Center, marked the beginning of a number of implosions of high-rise housing all across the country, housing that had almost self-destructed in

the face of adversaries like crack and crime. Any user, dealer, criminal, or maintenance problem affected the entire tower through the core, the unavoidable space of circulation. The towers were exactly the kinds of structures that an epidemiologist would describe as highly susceptible to contagions. Like these towers, the World Trade Center organization was so singular, so impossible to partition, that any negative influence potentially initiated an epidemic or an avalanche. Like any symmetrical organization, with no means to dissipate disturbance, the reductive organization only escalated the power of these negative influences. Whether by association with housing towers or explosion movies, the strange familiarity of the World Trade Center implosion, looping over and over in the media, was not banal.

The collapse also materialized a network of global geopolitical forces affecting building and urbanism. The spreading extent of this network identifies remote sites for leveraging advantage or change, sites that avoid a direct symmetrical fight but suggest a potential for rich reciprocal relationships. For example, in both economic and military theaters around the world, oil, the stone-age currency, still dominates. The wreckage of the towers continues to outgas information about old deals with toxins and petroleum products. The oil fight is one of America's ways of squabbling symmetrically over a limited resource, and we pay dearly just to be in that fight, selling off our limited reserves much more quickly than those countries in the Middle East with much larger reserves.[2] The stupidity of this policy makes it inviting territory for the inventions of architecture, of building and urbanism, territory that is particularly interesting at this moment as a broader substrate of the global economy rather than a declared incentive for war.

While architects busy themselves with new urban plans for rebuilding lower Manhattan, the most profound effect on global urbanism and global political alignments resides in the ingenious adjustments of the fuels, vehicles, materials, and systems that overturn those habits and desires associated with our dominant forms of energy. The righteous fight and the pallid aesthetics of some sustainability efforts that directly address the evils of energy wastefulness with a symmetrical construction exclude opportunities for leveraging a more complex outcome within the lies and disguises that generate urbanism and usually do not demand to be identified as an ethical project. Avoiding these issues on aesthetic grounds because they might be associated with do-gooders is only another, equally unimaginative exclusion of information. Similarly, those certain they can outline the logics of capital caution against collusion, against "riding the waves" on the giant seas of globalization. Yet, the means to change may be lateral or reliant on indirect persuasion, collusion, or conspiracy, as well as invention.

While architecture inserts the most obdurate or static objects in the flows

of world trade, it commands and modulates vast networks of materials and labor in those flows. The discipline rarely researches the political instrumentality of these networks, perhaps even granting exemptions from responsibility in inverse relation to the scale of the work. We still primarily build in response to instructions from a hierarchy of clients who, to protect themselves, oscillate between symmetrical and reciprocal responses to culture. The architect is only following orders. Assignments can only be received. Architecture does not believe this to be a dangerous stance, but one that produces innocence. These claims of exemption or innocence ignore the real power of the networks materialized on September 11, missing the opportunity to deploy the cagey effectiveness of an architectural hacker.

In collapse, in surrender, overwhelmed by a sea more abundant with information than before, the World Trade Center leaves behind a reciprocal architecture. The avalanche, as a kind of suicide, was not agonizing or torturous, belligerent or bloody, but terrifying, vicious, and instant. The buildings' self-destruction was the cruelest way to release information, in crisis and helplessness. The incineration, the rapid transformation to ash, and the simple release of surrender produces some ineffable and frightening comfort. That arresting condition might trigger the elegiac, a symmetrical fight for the righteousness of our tallest building. Or it might construct a more durable network to leverage and recondition a global urbanism with political stakes, one that replaces innocence with ingenuity.

Notes

1. Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1972). Bateson uses the terms *symmetrical* and *complementary* throughout his writings. Two chapters in particular are useful references: "The Cybernetics of Self: A Theory of Alcoholism" and "Moral and National Character."

2. Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 45.

One or More

REINHOLD MARTIN

At the center of the lawsuit filed by the Swiss Reinsurance Company against a group led by Larry Silverstein, the developer who holds the lease on the World Trade Center, a question has been raised regarding the spatiotemporal definition of an "event." Since Silverstein had only recently taken over the ninety-nine-year lease on the Trade Center from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the insurance policy was still under negotiation at the time the towers fell. All that existed were drafts of proposed coverage, called "binders." Somewhere in the binders, according to news articles, was a provision for $3.6 billion in compensation per catastrophic event. Silverstein, in a symbolically charged effort to fund the symbolically charged reconstruction or "rebuilding" project, has argued that there were not one but two attacks—that is, two events—that morning, and that since he is entitled to $3.6 billion in coverage *per event,* he is due to receive a total of $7.2 billion in compensation.[1]

While the resolution of this question may have direct architectural and urbanistic consequences for New York, what matters more is that its very asking answers all too prematurely the implicitly prior question of whether—at the level of representation—there is anything to rebuild. *This* question is attended by still another that underlies the nervous public interest in the future of the World Trade Center site: the question of whether, on September 11, 2001, there occurred anything like a singular, world-historical "event" worthy of the kind of symbolic energies of both commemoration and erasure—"rebuilding," again—that are (as of this writing) being expended by real estate developers, architects, incoming mayors, and political commentators alike, a representational expenditure that has already extended its scope well beyond the imperative of memorializing the lives lost. Indeed, in public discourse the drive to rebuild has already conflicted with the memorializing imperative, since some see what is now called "ground zero" as a burial ground, the sanctity of which would be violated by new construction. Such debates aside, at a broader level the "world-historical" question has been hastily answered in the affirmative, with the declaration oft repeated in the American media that everything has changed as of September 11, a declaration that has had the effect of authorizing, without sustained political debate, sweeping initiatives in U.S. foreign and domestic policy. The rhetoric of "rebuilding" thus reproduces and reinforces this media consensus in its

The Pentagon building,
Arlington, Virginia, 1943.
Site plan.

symbolic urgency, by supplying a complementary logic that seeks to remove the traces of the event itself: everything has changed, but don't worry, nothing has changed.

An alternative response to the question of whether the events of September 11 might constitute a world-historical rupture might be "no," since unfortunately the only thing that visibly distinguishes this atrocity from others of comparable scale and horror that have preceded it is that it took place on American soil and involved American lives. To that extent, it may have altered the situation locally but not globally. On the other hand, an equally, if not more, compelling response to the same question would still have to be "yes," since it irreversibly shattered the post–cold war bubble that separated a safe and secure domestic realm from its geopolitical outside in the American—and to some extent the global—imaginary. The political rhetoric and actions that have followed, formulated around "good" versus "evil," "us" versus "them," and so on, have been largely directed toward restoring the "security" of this bubble, which is to say, to rebuilding it in both a literal and a figurative sense. In the form of military action, domestic policy, and geopolitical realignment, this alone has already had significant human and historical consequences. But such consequences might have been (and could still be) redistributed if it is observed that on September 11 a historically emergent spatial and territorial order of an entirely different sort was made visible, which has since been actively repressed by so-called "rebuilding" and by the violent restoration of "security."

Thus the question in the lawsuit—one or more events—not only leads back to architecture, in that it reflects on the towers' doubling, mirrored by that of the two planes. It also suggests that architectural analysis, carried out at the level of the "event" and its extrarepresentational residue, may contribute something to the larger cultural and political debates that have commenced. Regardless of the actual outcome of the litigation, both potential answers to that question also undo the symbolic overdetermination of the attack's known targets, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Taken at a purely numerical level, one that refuses the presumed coherence of the Trade Center as symbol and merely inventories its components as urban elements, we might say that in New York there were in fact two distinct events that morning. Indeed, the quantitative calculus that the towers appear to announce in their iterative architecture would seem to support such a response. Seen this way, each impact would be one in an ongoing series of violent acts in the global arena, nothing new, a repetition simply to be added to the long list of atrocities worldwide, distinguished only by the blinding glare of eternal media exposure. But I think that we can also glimpse here something like a difference in kind, immanent to that calculus, a difference

that marks the singularity of September 11 while still calling into question the consequences of the symbol-laden declaration that everything has changed. This difference did not appear when the first plane, American Airlines Flight 11, hit the north tower—No. 1 World Trade Center—at 8:46 that morning. It appeared when the second plane, United Airlines Flight 175, impacted the south tower—or No. 2 World Trade Center—at 9:03 that morning. In other words, the events of September 11 became a qualitatively singular *event* only in their quantitative multiplicity.

In suggesting this I do not only mean that with the impact of the second plane did it become clear that this was an attack and not an accident. More significantly, we can observe that the appearance of a second plane (and a third, and a fourth) confirmed to all on the ground, in the buildings, and in front of their television screens that the attack was something systematic and indeed *systemic*—designed not to "shock" in the modern sense of a single, destabilizing irruption, but to "terrorize" in the sense of a network of apparently linked events and agents with no evident terminus. In other words, what became clear at 9:03 a.m. and thereafter was that this carefully coordinated exercise in spatiotemporal logistics was both organized and decentralized, and therefore potentially limitless. As such, it revealed, despite the presumably deliberate symbolism in its choice of targets, the significantly more diffuse, delocalized, and horizontal networks already embedded within and indeed sustaining what to all appearances was the ultimate, vertical monument to authoritarian state and corporate power. All of this was specifically made visible as *event*—that is, as an ongoing, ever ramifying constellation of spatial and temporal singularities—and, therefore, as a fragment of a historical constellation. It was at this point that "September 11" could be understood as the shocking intrusion of a memory that, as Walter Benjamin put it, "flashes up at a moment of danger." In that sense, the pseudohistorical declaration "everything has changed" construes the "event" of September 11 with an immediacy that both reveals *and* obscures its thoroughly mediated historicity. And to the extent that both the structure and the symbolism of this event involve actual architectures, its historicity intersects with that of the buildings themselves. Seen from this perspective, the history of the World Trade Center begins with that of the Pentagon.

Completed in 1943 and designed in-house by the construction division of the U.S. Army Engineers, the Pentagon building consolidated a U.S. military command-and-control apparatus that had previously been scattered throughout Washington, D.C. It is really five buildings (or pentagonal rings) one within the other, connected by corridors at the inner apexes. The geometrical figure from which the building acquired its name is said to be residual, deriving from the geometry of a site for which the complex was originally

planned prior to being redesigned for its current location, directly across the Potomac River from downtown Washington. Although it also recalls the defensive geometries of Renaissance fortresses, its center harbors only an empty, ceremonial courtyard, surrounded by sixteen-and-one-half miles of corridor in the five concentric rings, linked in a redundant, robust network that absorbed the shock of an airplane's impact with comparatively little damage. At the time it was built, the Pentagon, at six million square feet, was also the largest office building in the world. Inscribed within its defensive shell was a managerial architecture of cellular offices strung along the corridors, in which the institutional and departmental divisions and hierarchies of the U.S. military were submitted to the techniques of prewar office planning.

If the Pentagon can also be seen to harbor (like a fortress) a self-contained city, the architecture of this city becomes most visible in the access routes that connect the building to an enormous highway interchange. At the time it was built, the editors of *Architectural Forum* were correct in seeing these inside-out entrances as the building's most revealing aspect when they wrote that "Here is the picture of a future architecture in which buildings will be linked to their users by smooth-flowing traffic networks."[2] This system—a continuous interior—was designed to accommodate up to thirty thousand visitors a day arriving by car and by bus from both the city and the outlying suburbs. Thus, the building's location, as well as its horizontality, can be seen as a military response to its constituents' fears of perceived urban overcrowding and their desire for suburban living. The Pentagon thus monumentalizes American military authority while covertly integrating itself and its constituents into the "smooth flowing" networks of an automobile-centered suburban landscape, in which the lifestyles of consumer-subjects are constructed along the normative lines of what became known in the postwar, postindustrial lexicon as "individual choice."

Despite its later date of completion, the World Trade Center was also conceived during this period. In 1946 New York State set up a "World Trade Corporation" to promote international commerce and thus move more goods through the industrial Port of New York and into the new markets opened up by the war. Although no architectural plans were made, studies were undertaken for the construction of about one million square feet of office space (one-sixth the size of the Pentagon) scattered in twenty-one buildings throughout the city. However, the idea lay dormant until 1956 when, during the design and construction of the Chase Manhattan Bank headquarters by Gordon Bunshaft of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM) near Wall Street, Chase president David Rockefeller founded the Downtown-Lower Manhattan Association (DLMA) in order to encourage further development downtown and thus shore up his investment. SOM were hired to develop a one-hundred-

block plan for the revival of the entire financial district, which now consolidated the earlier idea of a World Trade Center in a single complex of large buildings. By 1960 the future World Trade Center as specified by the DLMA contained five to six million square feet of office space (i.e., as large as the Pentagon) to be located on a site on the east side of lower Manhattan south of the Brooklyn Bridge. A schematic version of this project was designed by SOM in a form that essentially amalgamated the example of the United Nations Headquarters with that of Lever House and included a "world trade mart" and a relocated stock exchange, as well as numerous banks and offices.

Later that same year (1960), the Port Authority inherited the project from the DLMA and hired architect Richard Adler to study it further. Adler, advised by Bunshaft, Wallace Harrison, and Edward Durrell Stone, produced a more detailed scheme that was presented in a report to New York governor Nelson Rockefeller and other officials in 1961, a year that also saw a proposal for the Port Authority to take over the Hudson and Manhattan transit tubes (now the PATH trains) that connected the city to New Jersey. However, a piece of legislation that linked this proposal with the World Trade Center project failed, largely because the east-side location of the Center promised little direct economic benefit for New Jersey. By late 1961, however, the World Trade Center project had been revived but was connected much more directly with the train tunnels on a new, west-side site directly over their termini—a shift that ultimately explains why so many of the post-September 11 funerals were in the suburbs. New legislation was approved and Adler prepared studies of the new site, during which time a number of the basic urban planning decisions were made. It was also at this time that the idea of a one-hundred-plus-story skyscraper was apparently first entertained, an idea that originated in the Port Authority's public relations department.

Indeed, by mid-1962 the question of public relations for the project had gained a sufficiently high priority within the Port Authority that Adler, a relative unknown, was relieved of his duties and a national search was launched to find an aesthetically more ambitious architect to repackage the project in a distinct and recognizable image. Minoru Yamasaki, who had recently completed a number of important commercial and institutional commissions, was chosen. His office began immediately to work closely with the various technical departments within the Port Authority, as well as with the New York firm of Emery Roth & Sons, who acted as associate architects responsible for overseeing detailing and construction. The design eventually to be built, distinguished by the doubling of its towers, each to be the tallest in the world, was publicly unveiled in 1964. The proposed buildings would now overtake the Pentagon as the world's largest office complex, providing ten million square feet of largely speculative office space. Construction of a

slightly modified version began in 1966. In 1970 with the lower ring of buildings (Nos. 4, 5, and 6) complete, the World Trade Center concourse opened. The first tower, No. 1 World Trade Center, the first to be hit on September 11, opened in 1973, and building No. 2, the second to be hit but the first to fall, opened in 1976, completing the first phase of the project.

Though the two couldn't seem more different, the embryonic spatial ambiguity of the Pentagon and many of the large suburban office buildings that followed it, in which state and/or corporate authority was networked into consumerist individuality, was in fact exacerbated in the "twin towers" of the World Trade Center. This exacerbation was most visible in the towers' structural system, which consisted of a dense ring or "tube" of steel columns at their outer perimeters that maximized structural efficiency and enabled them to rise as high as they did. All other interior structure was concentrated in a central service core, which left the surrounding office space column-free and completely flexible, as in SOM's Chase Manhattan Bank, a building that was buried in the Trade Center's historical unconscious. Thus the rigid cells still lining the infinite, Kafkaesque corridors of earlier office buildings like the Pentagon were literally flattened out here into a thin exterior shell, releasing the individuals and institutions they housed into the supposedly "free" space of the open office, which is to say the very literal space of the capitalist marketplace, a flexibly modulated, horizontally networked space that we now recognize as the space of world trade. In that sense, the "smooth flowing" space of consumerist mobility that remained outside the Pentagon was brought inside at the World Trade Center through the medium of its shell.

That this shell, this skin, this image was further addressed to the interior of each building and to the interior of each office worker—to their own unconscious, even—is confirmed by the fact that, to a degree, it owes its specificity to Yamasaki's acrophobia, or fear of heights. The gap between columns on each tower's exterior was set at twenty-two inches, slightly more than the shoulder width of an average human body, which Yamasaki judged would be a dimension sufficient to confirm stable enclosure when confronted with the altitude. He tested this gap in his office, with a full scale model through which he would push unsuspecting colleagues in order to demonstrate its physical as well as psychical capacity to keep them inside, safely housed in the domestic realm that was formed by the serial extrusion of their own individualized bodies: twenty-two inches wide and 103 stories high.[3]

This relentless architectural displacement of the body, like the mirroring of the two buildings, enacts an interruption in the consumerist freedom figured in the open office and in the open plaza below. It is the rupture toward which all networks tend, be they technological or social/institutional: an absolute dispersal of subjectivity beyond the limits of spatial confinement

or containment and thus representation, in which individuals become what Gilles Deleuze has called "dividuals," infinitely divisible *loci* of inscription and exchange. By dovetailing the technical modularity of the postwar office building with the intimate modulus of the human body projected at an extraurban scale, the World Trade Center reproduced the outlines of confinement and thus "individuality," including the public relations-driven individuality embodied in its double image. This took the form of a compensatory architectural frame or gap, an interval between columns and between towers that—however—simultaneously displaced its center and that of its subjects into an open-ended, continuous interior, the interior of a network singularized in the daily ritual of each commuter: from house to car to train to concourse to lobby to elevator to office. The ultimately global nature of this interior lies in infinite internal extensibility, the splittings and branchings that reach across space and time through communications and transportation channels that have been exploited by all sides in the conflict both before and after September 11. There is, effectively, no outside to this interior. In that regard, the cave has long been inside the skyscraper and vice versa.

The towering network, a center of nothing, and the low-lying apex of military command: these doubles and inversions require one another, not as the terms of an opposition require one another but rather, as a balloon requires the air that fills it. The "event" of September 11 began with the bursting of that balloon and the scrambling of inside and outside. Under such conditions the futility of rebuilding phantasmatic bubbles should be evident, as should be the repressive violence of a spatial paranoia that imagines "us" as always already infiltrated by "them" and acts accordingly, panicked with confusion by images of terrorists living in the suburbs. This territoriality cannot be contained by architecture or perhaps even by nation-states, as further evidenced by the state confusedly declaring war on the network that had, in effect—albeit in a limited spatial if not (yet) political sense—attacked itself.

Inside this network of networks were and are "individuals" whose interiority—like ours—has been indefinitely displaced and with whom "we" have thus become identified, as well as others to whom "we" have similarly become opposed, always in the manner of serially differentiated twins. This paradoxical relation was tragically called forth from the depths of the World Trade Center's history by the September 11 images of office workers in the sky clinging each to their own window, their own depthless gap. This was perhaps the moment that we who may not have known them first allowed them to usher us into the string of affective individualizations that later proliferated in photographs and detailed descriptions of the missing that were hung on walls and fences and then, in images of each victim accompanied by

personal anecdotes, running consecutively for months in the pages of the *New York Times*. Such images reconstructed the differential particularity with which these office workers were marked in their own deaths by the very architecture that had housed them, a particularity that has itself been grotesquely mirrored in the proliferation of ever more discriminating profiles of threat fed into a state security apparatus that has attempted its own form of containment.

One or more events, then? This question probes the secret of the towers' doubling, of their multiplicity and that of the singular event itself, written into the vertical extrusion of an individual human body repeated fifty-eight times across each facade. The secret was there in the space between these twins, in the primary division that marked their own supposed individuality. It was also there in the local and regional maneuvers that made them possible and yet tore them from the center of the declining industrial port that spawned them and thus reconnected them, via the tangle of transit and communication lines buried inside and below, to ever spreading networks linking ever more individualized—and thus internally divisible—consumer-subjects. These networks and their effects—and not the weak monumentality of the two large office complexes with their weak symbolic manifestation of state or corporate power—were what the "event" of September 11 made visible on all sides of the conflict. It did so precisely in its open-endedness. And it continues to do so in such instances as the videotaped recording of a traditionally anonymous CIA casualty interviewing his doubly complicated double, the so-called "American Taliban." Whether born out of mourning, of morbid curiosity, of defiant hubris, or of defensive fear, each subsequent ramification, each such individualization, each picture attached to each branch of the network thus represents both a momentary crystallization of the event as well as its prolongation. And so each defiant act of "rebuilding" the bubble is also a violent restoration of the forced subjective unity that networks on all sides will continue to tear apart. To the degree that such rebuilding continues, the catastrophic event goes on.

Notes

A version of this text was first presented to the Comparative Cultures Seminar at Columbia University. I am grateful to Gil Anidjar for his kind invitation.

1. Stephen Labaton and Jonathan D. Glater, "Twin Towers at the Center of Legal Brawl," *The New York Times,* 3 November 2001, C1, C14.

2. "Pentagon Building, War Department, Arlington, VA," *Architectural Forum* 78, no. 1 (January 1943): 40.

3. On the history of the World Trade Center, see Eric Darton, *Divided We Stand: A Biography of New York's World Trade Center* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Angus Kress Gillespie, *Twin Towers: The Life of New York City's World Trade Center* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999); and Anthony Robins, *The World Trade Center* (Englewood, FL, and Fort Lauderdale: Pineapple Press and Omnigraphics, Inc., 1987). On Yamasaki's acrophobia and the World Trade Center module, see Minoru Yamasaki, *A Life in Architecture* (New York: Weatherhill, 1979), 116–117. On the full-scale model, see Robins, 36.

Minoru Yamasaki and Emery Roth & Sons. World Trade Center model, 1964. Photo: Balthazar Korab.

Building Global Modernisms

GWENDOLYN WRIGHT

We usually forget that modernism came into being in a world framed by colonialism, where visions for improvement and innovation overlapped with and often caused brutal destruction. In the colonial world as elsewhere, modernism was, and remains, at once a universal ambition, a transnational operation, and myriad local variations. Likewise, resistance to these forces has long been an integral part of modern life, whether in the form of nostalgia for the past or, as we realized so brutally on September 11, 2001, that of violent opposition. The processes of modernity are not inherently homogeneous; they generate comparisons and differences, some unequal and destructive; others liberatory and creative. These distinctions haunt all aspects of culture, including the domain of architecture.[1]

Place is always a factor, even in a global world, though no place is autonomous. Indeed, the term *modernism (modernismo)* was invented in Latin America in the 1880s by the Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío.[2] Here, as elsewhere, the colonial legacy was formative. New frameworks of knowledge and new aesthetic concepts moved back and forth between colony, former colony, and metropole, linking and blending the domains identified as West and non-West, white and nonwhite, high art and mass culture—even as a panoply of laws, intellectual constructs, and spatial practices sought to enforce these dichotomies.[3]

In diverse and partial, though quite cohesive ways, the physical environment became a strategy for enforcing common values while maintaining difference within a conjoint modern world. It was at the turn of the last century—the moment when the United States and Japan officially entered the overseas colonial fray[4]—that architecture assumed a major role in the worldwide enterprise of modernization. The French general Joseph-Simon Gallieni built markets and hospitals as part of his military campaigns in Vietnam, Sudan, and Madagascar. "A construction site," he often declared, "is worth more to me than a battalion."[5] A century later it is still unclear whether such structures should be considered as the gifts of beneficent social reform or tactics for pacification. To some extent it depends on positionality, but even then a clear, unequivocal judgment is difficult to achieve and defend.

Ambiguities abounded in the colonial world. Architects and engineers built factories and ports to facilitate a transnational economy; others designed modern housing and commercial buildings along spacious boulevards. To

Grey Room 07, Spring 2002, pp. 124–134.

Murals by Duclos de la Haille for the Colonial Museum at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris. Courtesy of the Musée des Arts Africains et Océaniens, Paris.

situate these interventions, thereby luring tourists as well as investors, teams of architects and art historians preserved cultural-heritage sites and established contextual guidelines for new structures. Seldom discussed if always visible was the underside of modernism, the segregation, exploitation, destruction, and callous neglect inscribed onto the spaces, typically left blank on modern maps, where the vast majority of indigenous people lived and worked.[6] The politics of space involved complex, asymmetrical assertions of power: domination, resistance, incorporation, and exclusion.[7] It was an unstable calculus, both morally and practically.

In 1951 the anthropologist George Balandier spoke of "the colonial situation" to evoke the anomalous ways in which hegemony might still be exercised—and contested.[8] Even as national independence evolved in the aftermath of World War II, nonlocal forces continued to affect the fate of cities and countrysides, without completely determining what happened. Global processes and local agency still coexist, sometimes as before in disequilibrium, conflict, or even chaos.[9] Today's "outsiders" include transnational financiers, corporate executives, nongovernmental organizations, dealers in illegal goods such as weapons and drugs, the international tourism industry, and peripatetic professionals, such as architects. (To be sure, "insiders," both official leaders and shadowy bandits, play an equally critical role.)

As a result, many people have experienced "the modern," at least in part, as a brutal, alien imposition, a force that destroyed their livelihoods and social norms, the good with the bad. Of course, others seized opportunities and many benefited from improved conditions. Yet the gap between winners and losers, whether cities or individuals, seems even greater now than in the past. The fears and realities of inequality, instability, and extraneous control, all of which began under colonialism, have grown apace under the pressures of today's global economy. Balandier's model of strains and ambiguities is thus, if anything, more resonant than ever.

The September 11 bombings struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, two incontestable symbols of American neocolonial power—military, economic, and cultural. Americans and the rest of the world have disparate opinions about this power and its relationship to the globalizing forces of modernity.[10] Likewise the vehemence that fueled the attacks and their aftermath have various origins, especially if one allows for the contradictory emotions of respect, distrust, desire, and rage.[11] Open and honest discussion about such tensions is no easier in our neocolonial era than in the earlier classic era of colonialism. To concede possible reasons is not to justify terrorism or the misuse of global power. Understanding is not the same as endorsement or capitulation. But it is the only possible beginning for productive change, rather than ongoing conflict. *All* parties must make an

effort to comprehend opposing, even paradoxical points-of-view and to redress legitimate grievances, especially those related to unplanned consequences of public actions.

The convoluted nature of modernity, as well as so-called tradition, comes into sharper focus if those in the West look outside Europe and the United States—just as the reverse also happens. Like a magnifying glass or an "inverted telescope," in Benedict Anderson's term, these "other" spaces highlight what might too easily be overlooked closer to home.[12] Peripheral terrains are usually dismissed as insular, scorned as derivative, or excluded as strange, yet they help define the center. "Staging the modern has always required the non-modern," contends Timothy Mitchell. "The production of modernity involves the staging of differences . . . [one register] providing the modern with its characteristic indeterminacy and ambivalence and the other with its enormous power of replication."[13] The system is not inherently fixed, nor is it one-directional. New elements infiltrate, some well-established, others neoteric, altering modernity's appearance and its trajectories in unexpected ways. The variety of combinations ensures that cities will never be experienced in exactly the same way, look just alike, or benefit all citizens in the same way.

This viewpoint casts new light on various assumptions, both spatial and intellectual, that are usually taken for granted. Social imaginaries such as the public sphere and a homogeneous, interconnected global world tend to discount the vast differentials that exist. Why, for instance, should we assume that Walter Benjamin's flâneur is the universal essence of urban modernity? After all, the twentieth-century idea of "modern man," while intended to be progressive, unthinkingly ignored gender differences and denied the appeal of seemingly outdated forces such as religion and nationalism. Proclamations about democracy or universal rights to decent shelter, health, and well-being have been used to justify European colonialism and American military action in the world. Can they also confront the growing class and racial inequities in our own cities?

Universal standards are never really placeless.[14] Germany, Britain, and France once vied to be the de facto center for a modern, international vision of architecture and politics disseminated from their capitals. Today the United States asserts the prerogative to define and defend its presumed values as those of all the world—confusing a broad desire for freedoms and material well-being with a particular parochial version by no means universally available to all Americans. In a similar way, professions appeal to the public good in jealously guarding their positions of privilege. Architects, for example, protest any dilution or compromise of their artistic and intellectual authority, whether the issue is innovative aesthetics or the preser-

vation of historic monuments. Can we instead take up the call of Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Provincializing Europe* and consider other narratives about modernity, ones that challenge our premises about universals in the processes of history, invention, and legitimate forms of knowledge, to say nothing of family, community, and progress? To engage "contradictory but profoundly connected" interpretations would be cosmopolitan rather than universalizing, inventive rather than dogmatic.[15] Yet architects of buildings and policy will face a real challenge. To see "the contemporary as plural [and] equal," writes Chakrabarty, "makes it impossible to talk about the 'cutting edge,' the avant-garde, the latest that represents the future."[16]

Time, too, must be refracted differently. The prefix of *premodern* or *preindustrial* homogenizes differences, isolating them outside the horizons of time, as does that of *postmodern* and *postindustrial*.[17] Failing to grasp historical particularity, such terms mystify more than they clarify. The issue goes far beyond precise chronologies. To reify the past as a field of fixed qualities is to disregard its ambiguities, inconsistencies, and repressed continuities. This in turn justifies the prejudice embedded in dismissing a particular client, a group, a district, or a nation as "backward," "not yet" modern, and therefore not worth full consideration. In like manner, definitions of modernity tend to be inflexible, denying the multiple, even conflicting layers of conventions and change that shape any place or person. Ernst Bloch's term "nonsynchronicities" underscores the simultaneous but radically divergent experiences of "Now."[18]

To be sure, Western culture has also embraced conditions found outside its domain, usually in an exoticism of creative and self-serving misreadings about "timeless" values. Travelers and artists still seek inspiration from cultures they deem spiritually and socially harmonious, unaffected by modern fashion, unchanging and "authentic." There is also a subcategory of primitivism that seizes on pure form. Early twentieth-century modernists were drawn to the unadorned white walls of Moroccan and Algerian medinas, as well as to African masks. In the 1950s and 1960s, hoping to reanimate the rigidity of orthodox modernism, groups like Team X extolled the complex geometric patterns of dwellings in the villages of Mali, Yemen, Turkey, and the Greek islands.[19] This universal vernacular focused on the rejuvenation of one's own creative spirit rather than a depth of respect or understanding for quite diverse subjects.

In a similar way, at once respecting and reducing other cultures, what is now loosely and inaccurately called "postmodernism" first emerged in the colonies, overlapping with modernist experiments rather than succeeding them. *Mestizo* façades and grand spectacles characterized governmental buildings in British India and Malaysia from the 1880s, then in colonies as

diverse as Dutch Indonesia, French Senegal, and Italian Ethiopia. The original goal was to suggest mutual respect and inclusion, masking the power relations that in fact pertained. Yet this "hybrid" architecture has taken on unintended meanings.[20] Modern, neotraditional, and creolized buildings alike have served to legitimate quite different regimes and institutions. Put simply, no architectural idiom can be seen as inherently progressive or oppressive, pure or contaminated.[21]

There is, however, a serious problem with architecture that limits diverse cultural and political expression, for the imposition of rigid design guidelines can directly affect social practices. The pervasive replication of Western prototypes for office towers, shopping malls, and residential enclaves in the past several decades evangelizes a global market economy. Hegemony is not limited to the West. As part of their effort to purify Islam, adherents of the orthodox, Saudi-based Wahhabi sect are now imposing their prototype of the mosque as a universal for Islam.[22] The insistence on a single idea—not only dome and minarets, but religious beliefs and quotidian acts—condemns the multifarious local traditions of Southeast Asia, China, Africa, and other locales. Saudi wealth has subsidized the building of new, often quite imposing mosques all over the world, which greatly enhances the power of this group and their preferences.

Architecture that claims to synthesize different cultures or epochs can also be problematic. Consider the well-meaning Western architects in the 1970s and early 1980s who designed grand projects for Baghdad, Tehran, and Riyadh.[23] The rulers who commissioned these schemes wanted to give symbolic precedents to their authoritarian regimes. Newly conscious of history and the limitations of modernization, the architects believed they could decide which traditions were significant and which aspects of modernity were essential. Indeed they professed to distill the very essence of Islam as well as that of the specific local culture. But who can presume to know the essence of a culture, a place, or its people? To identify an essence is to deny history, cultural complexity, and the unpredictability of change. The answer is not to disengage from all cultures outside one's own milieu, for hubris can likewise obscure the oppressive or self-serving effects of projects close to home. Urban renewal made this all too clear, as do New Urbanist housing projects and the megalomaniac proposals for the World Trade Center site.

What then is the place of "non-Western" cultures in today's architecture culture? To ask this question necessarily prompts a critical reexamination of the "Western" canon, including the avant-garde who seek a rupture with its legacy. A well-entrenched saga of twentieth-century modernism, centered on Europe, is still taught all around the world, proclaiming one foundation, one canon of saints, indeed a quasi-religious faith that often reduces

modernism's original aspirations to a catechism. At a discrete distance is the "survey," a broad sweep often tagged "From Caves to Graves" that follows nineteenth-century conventions of art history in its segments on "prehistory," then "classicism" (taking Greco-Roman antiquity as the foundation), medieval, Renaissance, and so forth. Some professors take excursions to describe synchronic developments in Asia or the Islamic world. What about the interconnections, asymmetries, and exclusions that flow and churn between these too neat groupings of space, culture, and temporality?

Recent interest in multiculturalism, as well as a travel-guide taste for the exotic, has fueled Western curiosity about the traditional architecture of the Islamic world, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa—each treated as an autonomous entity. Contemporary architecture from the same regions is by and large ignored. Inequality pervades even our respective ignorance. Some architects have translated New Urbanist principles into purported national vernaculars or broad semblances of a pan-Asian or pan-Arab language; these sites demand critical engagement not shallow classifications. Tokenism may add a few architects' names to the modernist pantheon—Hassan Fathy, Luis Barragán, Fumihiko Maki, Charles Correa, and Balkrishna Doshi, for example—categorizing them under labels such as *alternative modernisms, other modernisms* or *peripheral modernisms*. These terms originally implied a pervasive openness and experimentation, yet all too often they serve to reinscribe Western hierarchies.[24] Can there not be comodernities and respectful dissent about the term that carries modernism ahead into new terrains, incommensurable yet engaged with one another in multiple ways?

A respect for various traditions, great and small, distant and close at hand, by no means precludes the need for change, but it does temper the aggressive pace. Inventions and experiments must reach beyond the limited domain of a monoculture, including that of the avant-garde. Transnational, comparative alternatives have enriched literature, history, and the arts. Mikhail Bakhtin's acclaim for the genius of ordinary people's linguistic crudeness, unruliness, polylingualism, hybridity, and earthiness provides one incentive. So too does Arjun Appadurai's notion of a "disjunctive order" that moves ahead fitfully through unpredictable problems and felicitous surprises, rather than the smooth, all-encompassing "flow" so often evoked in today's discourse.[25] The novelist Rey Chow celebrates "mobility, proximity, [and] approximation" as the hallmarks of a modernity that embraces our individual and cultural diversity.[26]

These authors share another premise: they recognize the colonial dimensions of concepts like modernism, postmodernism, and tradition. Now more than ever, all disciplines, nations, and religions must come to terms with this shared legacy. No one can simply dismiss colonialism or assume that

it only affects "other" places. The memory and effects cannot be contained or pushed aside. There is an uncanny parallel in our present circumstance as the world confronts the horror, pain, and fear of September 11. A dull amnesia attempts to fill the void, to mute the awareness of our collective human vulnerability. Here too memory cannot be circumscribed to one memorial site; it has multiple dimensions, global and local.

Architects today often speak of ambiguous histories and unexpected consequences, past and present. A recognition of this the colonial dimensions of this goal will prompt animosity in some and self-righteousness in others. It can also generate less presumptuous, more syncretic ways of looking at oneself and others, in architecture as in every field. In the wake of collective anguish, it is time to explore how the different logics of globalism, modernism, tradition, and multiculturalism can creatively engage one another. Can we produce histories and visions of the future attuned to local knowledges and universal hopes? The task will constrain and challenge us all.

Notes

1. Harry Harootunian, *History's Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Benedict R. Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World* (New York: Verso, 1998); and the journal *Third Text,* especially Rasheed Araeen, "A New Beginning: Beyond Postcolonial Cultural Theory and Identity Politics," *Third Text* 50 (Spring 2000): 3–20.

2. David Craven, "The Latin American Origins of 'Alternative Modernism,'" *Third Text* 36 (Autumn 1996): 31.

3. Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb explore this two-way experimentation in *Casablanca: Colonial Myths and Architectural Ventures* (1998; New York: Monacelli, 2002), as does my own book, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Early theorists who stressed the interconnections include George Balandier, "La situation coloniale: Approche théorique" (1951), reprinted as "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach," in *Social Change: The Colonial Situation,* ed. Immanuel Wallerstein, 34–61 (New York: John Wiley, 1966); Franz Fanon, *Black Skins, White Masks* (1952; London: Pluto Press, 1986); and Bernard Cohen, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987). More recent is Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper describe the "modular" nature of these strategies in "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World,* ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, 1–56 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 13, drawing on Benedict Anderson's use of the concept in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 4.

4. See Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); *Rethinking American History in a Global World,* ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); "Empires and Intimacies: Lessons from (Post) Colonial Studies," *Journal of American History* 88 (December 2001): 829–897; Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), especially Kaplan's "Left Alone with America: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture," 3–21; Gilbert Joseph, Catherine LeGrand, and Ricardo Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of United States-Latin American Relations* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Fujimori Terunobu and Wan Tan, eds., *A Comprehensive Study of East Asian Architecture and Urban Planning, 1840–1945* (Tokyo: Institute of Industrial Science, University of Tokyo, 1995).

5. See Wright, *Politics of Design,* 76.

6. For an insightful discussion by a Latin American social theorist, see Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy of Liberation* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996).

7. James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). Also see Abidin Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Culture in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2000).

8. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation."

9. AbdouMaliq Simone, "The Place of African Cities," in *The Pragmatist Imagination:*

Thinking about "Things in the Making," ed. Joan Ockman (New York: Rizzolli and Columbia Books on Architecture, 2001), 234–243.

10. The "Global Attitudes Project" of the Pew Research Center, Princeton Survey Research Associates, and the International Herald Tribune surveyed opinions of political, media, and business "elites" in two dozen nations. For example, large majorities elsewhere believe the United States is mostly acting unilaterally in the fight against terrorism, while 70 percent of American opinion makers believe we are acting jointly with friends. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3490-2001Dec.19.html.

11. For an insightful appraisal, see Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, "Occidentalism," *New York Review of Books* (17 January 2002): 4–7.

12. Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons.*

13. Timothy Mitchell, "The Stage of Modernity," in *Questions of Modernity,* ed. Timothy Mitchell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 24, 26.

14. See Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde* (London: Verso, 1995); and Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990).

15. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 254.

16. Chakrabarty, 88.

17. Chakrabarty, 93. Also see Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Is the 'Post'- in 'Postcolonial' the Same as the 'Post'- in 'Postmodern'?" *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1991), 336–357.

18. Bloch first used the concept of *Ungleichzeitigkeit* in the 1930s to probe the relations between modernism and fascism. It has been variously translated as "nonsynchronicity," "nonsimultaneity," and "noncontemporaneity." Ernst Bloch, *Heritage of Our Times,* trans. Neville Plaice and Stephen Plaice (1962; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 97. Also see Frederic J. Schwartz, "Ernest Bloch and Wilhelm Pinder: Out of Sync," *Grey Room* 03 (Spring 2001): 54–89.

19. See Alison Smithson and Peter Smithson, *Ordinariness and Light* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), esp. 66–178; Alison Smithson, ed., *Team X Meetings* (New York: Rizzoli, 1991); Eric Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928–1960* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 222–238; Felicity Scott, "Bernard Rudofsky: Allegories of Nomadism and Dwelling," in *Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture,* ed. Sarah Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault, 215–238 (Montreal and Cambridge: Canadian Centre for Architecture and MIT Press, 2000); and Monique Eleb, "An Alternative to Functionalist Universalism: Écochard, Candilis, and ATBAT-Afrique," in *Anxious Modernisms,* 55–73. Anthony D. King juxtaposes the lyrical descriptions of indigenous housing in books like Bernard Rudofsky's *Architecture without Architects* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1964) with the negative appraisals of colonial officials who routinely demolished "indigenous housing," rural as well as urban, in the name of modern standards (*Urbanism, Colonialism and the World Economy: Cultural and Social Foundations of the World Urban System* [New York: Routledge, 1990], 53).

20. The term *hybrid* was popularized by the postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha. It has become quite popular in recent years, especially in architecture.

21. Michel Foucault insisted that no architecture is innately oppressive or liberatory, not even that of the panopticon or the Nazi death camps. "Space, Knowledge, and Power,"

interview with Paul Rabinow, *Skyline* (March 1982), 16–20; republished in *The Foucault Reader,* ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 245. Also see my essay, "Michel Foucault: Negotiating Colonial Spaces," *Arbejdspapir* 29 (Center for Urbanitet og Aestetik, University of Copenhagen, October 1998).

22. Renata Holod and Hasan-Uddin Khan, *The Contemporary Mosque: Architects, Clients, and Designs since the 1950s* (New York: Rizzolli, 1997); and Barbara Crossette, "A Challenge to Asia's Own Style of Islam," *New York Times,* 30 December 2001, WK4.

23. For example, "Regenerative Approaches to Mosque Design," *Mimar: Architecture in Development* 11 (January 1984): 44–63; Mildred F. Schmertz, "Mosque as Monument: International Design Competition for the State Mosque, Baghdad, Iraq, Venturi, Rauch and Scott Brown," *Architectural Record* 172 (June 1984): 142–151; [Skidmore Owings and Merrill], *Urban Design Middle East* (New York, 1978); Charles K. Hoyt, "SOM's New Tower in Jeddah," *Architectural Record* 165 (February 1979): 102–106; Roger Yee, "Computer-Driven Development," *Corporate Design and Realty* 4 (November 1985): 70–75; Richard L. Meier, "Tehran: A New 'World-City' Emerging," Working Paper no. 249, University of California at Berkeley Institute for Urban Research and Development (December 1974); "Shahestan Pahlavi: A New Center for Tehran," *Royal Institute of British Architects Journal* 84 (April 1977): 136–147; and "Award: Llewelyn-Davies International, [includes Jacquelin Robertson and Franklin Israel]" *Progressive Architecture* 59 (January 1978): 98–99

24. The term *alternative modernism* was first used by Valerie Fraser and Oriana Baddeley in *Drawing the Line: Art and Cultural Identity in Contemporary Latin America* (London: Verso, 1989); it was then developed in Craven, "The Latin American Origins of 'Alternative Modernism,'" 29–44. On *peripheral modernism,* see Beatriz Sarlo, *Scenes from Postmodern Life* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). In architecture the first use seems to have been Colin St. John Wilson, *The Other Tradition of Modern Architecture* (London: Academy, 1995). For an effort to redress the inequality of ignorance, see *World Architecture, 1900–2000: A Critical Mosaic,* 10 vols., ed. Kenneth Frampton (Vienna, Austria: Springer, 2000).

25. Appadurai, *Modernity at Large.*

26. Timothy Brennan, "The Cuts of Language: The East/West of North/South," *Public Culture* 13 (Winter 2001): 52.

Editors' Note

Daniel Bertrand Monk's "'Welcome to Crisis!': Notes for a Pictorial History of the Pictorial History of the Arab Israeli War of June 1967" was originally scheduled to appear in *Grey Room* 06, but was moved to this issue in recognition of its resonance with the subject matter at hand. As a stand-alone contribution to *Grey Room*, however, Monk's text might also serve as an indication of the significance of questions concerning war, media, and representation as treated by engaged scholarship in the context of historical analysis.

"Welcome to Crisis!": Notes for a Pictorial History of the Pictorial Histories of the Arab Israeli War of June 1967

DANIEL BERTRAND MONK

At an Egyptian air base on 22 May, Nasser announced that the straits of Tiran had been closed to ships proceeding to Israel—"and if General Rabin wants war, then 'ahalan wa-sahalan.'"[1]

No Israeli ship will pass; we will also stop the delivery of strategic supplies to Israel by non-Israeli ships; if Israel's leaders and General Rabin want war, "ahalan wa-sahalan."[2]

Grey Room 07, Spring 2002, pp. 136–158.

"If Israel wants War, we are prepared", Nasser tells jet pilots at an Egyptian air base in Sinai

„אם ישראל רוצה מלחמה, אנו מוכנים, אהלן וסהלן", אמר נאצר לטייסי סילון מצריים, אתם נפגש בבסיס חיל־האוויר בסיני.

From S. Simhoni, ed.,
Ha-nitzahon ha-gadol be temunot
[The great victory in pictures]
(Tel Aviv: Esther, 1967).

Frame by Frame

Shortly after Israel and seven Arab states engaged in the brutal war of June 1967, a crucial reckoning began. For both sides the drastically different—and in may respects unrecognizable—image of the Middle East that presented itself to view at the close of the war demanded of the players that they reexamine the snapshot of the region that had existed directly prior to the conflict's eruption.[3] By inspecting the advance to war frame by frame, the players weren't simply advancing a new politics of blame, though this was also undoubtedly true; they were simultaneously attempting to locate the exact moment when their respective political performances turned into a broader dramaturgy within which no one exercised any real control in the decision to fight.[4]

From *Milhemet Israel: Mivhar tatslume ha-nitsahon* [The war of Israel: A selection of victory photographs] (Tel Aviv: Hasbarah La'am, 1967). These photographs of the skirmishes leading up to the war—frame by frame—are taken from the Israeli air force magazine, *Bita'on heil ha-avir* (29 May 1967), which produced a series of "Alert Bulletins" in the days prior to the war. The photos show the downing of Syrian MIGs in April 1967 and hold a last strip in reserve for the coming war (the blank space on the left). The heading reads, "In Anticipation of Further Combat Footage . . . our fighter planes' 16 mm cameras are ready to record further hits on celluloid."

From *Ha-milhamah le-shalom* [Our war for peace], ed. Mahadurat Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv: Dekel, 1967). Frame by frame analyses of this kind extended to Israeli representations of the war proper. The untranslated Hebrew captions read: 'combat camera reveals an additional hit,' leading to the commentary on the bottom, apparently citing a pilot: "They are not engaging in battle . . . they [the Arabs] are fleeing at super sonic speed."

From *Sheshet yeme milhemet ha-nitsahon* [Six days of the war for victory] (Tel Aviv: Hasbarah La'am, 1967). The war was also rehearsed retrospectively, frame by frame. The soldier describing a dogfight is assuming the dramaturgical position of the "pilot," and is designated in the performative frame by the use of quotes around the same term.

Ahalan wa-sahalan

In retrospect, one moment in particular seized the imaginations of Arab and Israeli chroniclers alike, as each side sought to identify the flashpoint of war—its instigation—in the context of the "mutually assessed mutual assessments" that preceded it.[5] On May 22, 1967, the Egyptian president Gamal ᶜAbd al-Nasser, made his way to the United Arab Command's forward airbases at Sharm-el-Sheikh in the Sinai Peninsula and informed his officers that Egypt would be closing the Straits of Tiran on the Red Sea. (He did not announce when this would happen.) Proclaiming "No Israeli ship will pass," the Egyptian leader then added: "if Israel's leaders [and General Rabin] want war, [then] *ahalan wa-sahalan* [they're welcome]."[6]

Opposite, top: From *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), 23 May 1967. Nasser's closing of the Straits of Tiran, and his invitation to war, as reported in the Israeli press. The image of Nasser meeting with his pilots and laughing it up is often closely cropped in many Israeli images of the event. One suspects two important factors may have played a part in this: as Shabtai Teveth records, the Israeli public perceived Nasser to be speaking directly to *them,* effectively personalizing the menace; and second, in the days of mounting tension, Israel's press may not have wanted to highlight the full complement of Egyptian pilots already present in Sinai. The headline reads, "Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran. Announces before his officers in the Sinai: 'no Israeli ship will pass; we will also stop the transport of any strategic materials in non-Israeli ships; if Israel's leaders and General Rabin want war, they should feel free [they're welcome, ahalan wa-sahalan].'"

Opposite, bottom: From *al-Ahram* (Cairo), 23 May 1967, 1. In the Egyptian press Nasser's statements were reproduced in their entirety, and *al-Ahram*'s Muhammad Youssef produced a short photo essay of the event.

26

ידיעות אחרונות

נאצר סגר מיצרי טיראן

מכריז בפני קציניו בסיני: „אף אניה ישראלית לא תעבור: אנו נמנע גם העברת חומרים אסטרטגיים לישראל באניות לא ישראליות: אם מנהיגי ישראל והגנרל רבין רוצים מלחמה יעשו נא זאת"

נאצר ועאמר מבקרים ב„קו הקדמי"

נאצר וסגנו עאמר — בפגישה עם טייסי חיל האוויר המצרי בעת ביקור, אתמול, ב„קו הקדמי" במדבר סיני.

„יש לנו יותר מאיליושינים"

המוקד: מיצרי טיראן

A1

12 صفحة — الأهرام — 15 مليما

23 MAY 1967 — Al-Ahram

عبد الناصر يعلن إغلاق خليج العقبة

الخليج مغلق أمام الملاحة الاسرائيلية والمواد الاستراتيجية لا تستطيع المرور منه إلى إسرائيل ولو على سفن غير إسرائيلية

الجمهورية العربية المتحدة تطبق الآن فى خليج العقبة نفس القواعد التى كانت تطبقها قبل حرب السويس

عبد الناصر يعلن القرار الحاسم أثناء زيارته أمس لمركز القيادة المتقدمة للقوات الجوية

عبد الناصر يقول بوضوح: لن يمر العلم الاسرائيلى أمام قواتنا المرابطة الآن فى شرم الشيخ — وسيادتنا على الخليج لا تنازع

"لماذا لا يحاول فيصل أو حسين اقناع شريكهما فى الحلف الاسلامى فى إيران بوقف شحن البترول إلى ايلات ؟"

عبد الناصر يشرح تفاصيل الأزمة منذ جاءت المعلومات المؤكدة عن خطة اسرائيل لغزو سوريا التى كان محددا لها يوم ١٧ مايو

"يوثانت تصرف بحكمة ووعى ونزاهة باستجابته لطلب الجمهورية العربية المتحدة بسحب قوات الطوارئ"

"كان هناك من يريدون تحويل قوة الطوارئ إلى خدمة الاستعمار ولو حدث ذلك لاعتبرناها قوة معادية وجردناها من السلاح"

"لسنا الآن فى سنة ٥٦ ونحن الآن مع اسرائيل وجها لوجه وإذا كانت تهدد بالحرب فنحن على استعداد"

يوثانت يجتمع بمجرد وصوله اليوم مع محمود رياض

Ahalan bi'lharb

The moment is captured in photographs that were broadly circulated in the Arabic and Israeli press on the next day. Pointing to a chortling Nasser, the caption to the image of the president depicted in the Cairo daily, *al-Ahram,* reads: *"ahal~n bi'lharb: idha ir~datiha Isrāil,"* or "welcome to war: if Israel wants it."[7] Becoming as instantly familiar in this region as Kruschev's "We will bury you" had been to cold war–era Americans, what rendered Nasser's representation momentous to contemporary observers was not just its conditional structure, which permitted it to straddle temporally between potentiality and fate—that is, between the anticipation of war and its ratification as a struggle already won. To those searching for the precise instant when the scales had been tipped in favor of violence, Nasser's passage from a declarative to a vocative form of address—captured at a standstill in an image of that ambiguity—would prove to be far more important, because it rendered him eponymous. Eponymous, more specifically, in the sense that witnesses to this war would conclude that by merely speaking his lines (and being seen to do so with gusto), Nasser *advanced* the very history he was representing.[8]

Above: From *al-Ahram,* 23 May 1967, 4–5. The caption reads: "Welcome to War [*ahalan bi'l harb*]. If that's what Israel wants."

Opposite, top: From Zeev Anner and Yoseph Alkoni, eds., *Ha-milhamah 727, 1967* (Tel Aviv: Otpaz, 1967). A more accurate translation of the Hebrew caption would read, "Egyptian arrogance reached ever greater heights."

Opposite, bottom: From Naftali Arbel, ed., *Milhemet Sheshet ha-Yamim* [The Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: M. Mizrahi, 1967), 23.



השחצנות המצרית הרקיעה שחקים. נאצר ומפקד צבאו, המרשל עאמר, נראים בוטחים בעצמם בחברת טייסיהם בסיני.

Egyptian complacency mounts. Nasser and his army commander, Marshall Amar, seem confident in the company of their pilots in Sinai.

צוחק מי שצוחק אחרון. נאצר, וסגנו עבד־אל חכים עאמר, בנסיס הפקוד האווירי המצרי, בחברת טייסים. כאן יצא נאצר בהכרזתו המפורסמת על סגירת המיצרים ובחוצפתו השחצנית לרבין. הנאום נחשב כמיסמך חשוב לקצונה המצרית, הודפס והופץ בין הקצונה הבכירה של הצבא המצרי.

He who laughs last... Nasser and his aide, Abed al-Hakim Amer, relax with a group of fliers. It was on this occasion that Nasser announced closing of Straits of Tiran and extended his arrogant invitation to General Rabin. Nasser's speech was an important shot in the arm for Egypt's officers cadre; it was printed and widely circulated.

Rira bien qui rira le dernier. Nasser et son adjoint, le Maréchal Abdel Hakim Amer, en compagnie des aviateurs égyptiens. Encouragé par ses succès, Nasser déclare, au cours d'une visite d'une base aérienne du Sinaï que si Israël veut la guerre... il est le bienvenu ! Et il annonce la fermeture des détroits de Tiran. Le discours, arrogant et provocant, est considéré comme un document dont doivent obligatoirement prendre connaissance tous les officiers égyptiens auxquels il est distribué.

"In Its Own Hands"

Israeli memoirs of the war confirm Nasser's eponymous standing. For example, in his now classic *Hasufim batsariah* ("Exposed in the Turret," but appearing under the English language title "The Tanks of Tammuz") Shabtai Teveth argued that even as Nasser's promise to close the straits of Tiran did not in itself trigger an authentic strategic crisis for the Israeli people—firstly, the straits weren't declared off limits for another twenty-four hours; and, secondly, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol took pains to announce that as a political act the closing of the straits was not in and of itself a *causus belli*—the figure of the Egyptian president proclaiming "*ahalan wa-sahalan*" did:

> The expression *"ahalan we-sahalan"* [*sic*] (a popular form of greeting among Arabs, meaning "welcome") is used by Israelis, and to them it appeared that Abdul Nasser was addressing them in their own language. There could be no doubt about it. The Egyptian president wished to give the impression of being eager for war. . . . [G]one was the power of Zahal [the Israel Defense Forces, or IDF] to deter aggression if Egypt's president and the commander of her armies could so happily proclaim to the Arabs, to Israel and to the world that they would respond to war with *"ahalan we-sahalan" [sic]*.[9]

The journalist privileges this moment for a specific reason. If, according to Teveth, the image of Nasser announcing a welcome to war shattered Israel's "equanimity," the same spectacle was in some measure the unwitting cause of the Jewish state's deliverance, that is, its rescue from what Teveth repeatedly calls a potential second "holocaust."[10] The only real "miracle" of 1967, Teveth suggests, lay in the fact that after May 22–23 (the date of Nasser's invitation and the closing of the straits) the Israeli public was finally capable of distinguishing between concrete and abstract potentialities and between the indices of real intentions and empty political signaling.[11] Confirming the singular status of Nasser's presentation in the advance toward war, for Teveth, Providence [with a capital "P"] intervened at the moment when "the eyes of the nation within Israel were opened to the realization that the danger of extermination threatened it, and it came to the realization that its fate [literally, its life] *lay in its own hands*."[12]

Opposite, top: From Ephraim Kishon, au., and Dosh, ill. *Selihah she-nitsahnu!* [So sorry we won!] (Tel Aviv: sitfriyat Ma'ariv, 1967). In the collaboration between the Israeli satirist Ephraim Kishon and the cartoonist with the pseudonym "Dosh," Egyptian representations of Israeli panic are themselves retroactively mimicked. Here, the image of Israel as a distraught cow (originally published in the Cairo weekly *Rose al-youssef* on June 5, 1967) is lampooned by the figure of "Srulik" (a diminutive signifying "little Israel") who was Dosh's famed eponym for the nation as a whole. Srulik declaims, "That's the way I am. What can I do?"

Opposite, middle left: From *Bita'on heil ha-avir,* 3 June 1967, as reproduced in *Milhemet Israel: Mivhar tatslume ha-nitsahon* (Tel Aviv: Hasbarah La'am, 1967).

Opposite, middle right: From *Ha-milhamah le-shalom* (Tel Aviv: Mahadurot Yediot Aharonot, 1967).

Opposite, bottom left: From Sela, Uri, comp., *Ha-nitsahon bi-rei ha-karikaturah* [The victory in caricatures] (Tel Aviv: Kosigin and Partners, 1967).

Opposite, bottom right: From S. Simhoni, ed., *Ha-nitzahon ha-gadol be temunot* (Tel Aviv: Esther, 1967).

In Egyptian representations of Israel's imminent destruction, the united power of Arabism is often anthropomorphized as a pair of monumental arms, or as an arm holding a weapon aloft, or as the "jackboot" of Islam about to stomp out the Jewish polity (bottom right). In "The War for Peace," for example, the two arms about to squash the quaking Jew like a bug read *"Wahda al-Arabiyya,"* or "Arab Unity" (middle right). Israeli pictorial collections often reproduced these kinds of images, or made their own, privileging them in their account of the buildup to war. In "The Victory in Caricatures" an image (bottom left) from the Egyptian weekly *Rose al-youssef* bearing the caption "this is how the Arabs will use the Star of David" is itself presented as evidence of "Arab boasting." By contrast, in an "alert bulletin" the Israeli air force published only two days before the outbreak of hostilities, Israel appears in a complex, and paradoxical, allegory of victory (middle left). As "Srulik," Israel remains the confident underdog, a David to the Arab Goliath. At the same time, Israel's own power is greater than the sum of Srulik's parts and is figured as the monumental hands of David holding a slingshot with a French Mirage jet rather than a stone. The contiguity between these two allegoremes is maintained by Srulik's hand, which touches the hand that holds the slingshot that is about to kill Egypt, which is figured as a bird rolling up the Straits of Tiran in its talons.

"Theatrical Positions"

Arab sources also privilege Nasser's representation in the advance to war, and, like Teveth, they record its curious status as both a threat and its abrogation. In King Hussein of Jordan's *Harbunah maʿa Israʾil* (My "War" with Israel), the sovereign's chief of protocol, Zeid Rifaʿi, expressed the view that with Nasser's *ahalan wa-sahalan,* "war had to follow."[13] Moreover, the king and his agents expressed the view that even if Nasser himself had no real intention to commence hostilities—but instead wanted to advance his status as the paragon of Arabism—the Egyptian leader had nevertheless been pushed "into adopting measures which in the end led us all to war."[14] To take "theatrical positions makes no sense," argued the King as he laid the blame for the chain of events leading to May 22 on the doorstep of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader, Ahmad Shuqairy.[15] The king believed that the PLO (by provoking Israeli incursions into Syria in response to PLO raids into Israel) had itself exacerbated tensions between Damascus and Cairo to such a degree that they pushed Nasser into his fateful demonstration of unity with the Arab world—that is, by inviting Israel to war. Seen in this light, *ahalan wa-sahalan* was not only a potentially menacing demonstration of cohesion in the abstract, it was simultaneously the anxious portent of a loss of agency in the concrete, one that would be viewed retrospectively as the cause of the demise of Arabism and as the trigger to a second Palestinian *Nakbah*—or disaster.[16]

Top, left: From *Rose al-youssef*, n.d., 1967.

Top, right: From *Bul, albom ha-nitsahon: Tatslume maarekhet Yuni 1967* ["Bull's eye." Victory album: Photographs of the June 1967 operation] (Tel Aviv 1967).

Bottom, left: From *Milhemet Sheshet Ha-Yamim* (Tel Aviv: M. Mizrahi, 1967), 104.

Bottom, right: From Rafi Ilan, ed., *Kol bedihot Sheshet Ha-Yamim* [All the Jokes of the Six Days] (Tel Aviv, 1967).



Popular Israeli representations of the drive to war seized upon, and often parodied, the role accorded to Nasser in the self-representation of the Arab peoples' collective agency; that is, their organic association as something more than a mass ornament (top left). Israeli victory albums frequently depict Israeli Defense Force soldiers posing en masse with official images of Nasser, which they took as booty. In *Bul, albom ha-nitsahon,* for example, a unit that fought in the Sinai campaign poses with "Nasser" as they wave in victory (top right). (The subtitle reads, "We Gave It to Them!"). In another (bottom left), a soldier turns the image of Nasser into a peculiar fetish, by sticking a cigarette in its mouth. (The English language caption doesn't do justice to the pun practiced here, which relies on the fact that in Hebrew, the word *esh,* meaning *fire,* may be used to ask for a light when one wants a smoke or as a command to commence shooting in war. To give a better sense of its meaning, it should read: "*'Esh'?* Be my guest. Nasser asked for *'esh'* and he got it—in spades." The joke also plays upon the fact that it had been broadly reported in Israel that Nasser had boasted that his army would be marching into Tel Aviv before he could even finish smoking a cigarette). However, even after Nasser's disgrace Israel often remains small while he remains large in popular representation. For example, the cover image of a Six Day War joke book shows Moshe Dayan (with the eye patch) and Itzhak Rabin as "Srulik"—like figures and Nasser as a naked Goliath who is their prisoner (bottom right).

"Symbolic Dance to War"

On both sides of the conflict, then, observers concurred that Nasser's expressions had objectively "altered the situation of the participants" and in so doing inaugurated a new level of "strategic interaction."[17] They instituted a realm of "mutual fatefulness" in which players found themselves "taking into consideration their consideration of each others' consideration" so completely that "every expression . . . in one way or another, [became] a performative utterance."[18] However, at the same time as observers began to come to terms with the abyssal properties of a representation of a menacing situation that is at the same time an acting out of the same situation, their own explanations of what a later observer has termed the "symbolic dance to war" simultaneously attempted to arrest the symbol from the dance, communication from expression, and gesture from act.[19] Seeking to recuperate a realist understanding of conflict out of the dramaturgical organization of their own political experience, analysts tried to resolve the expression games of the combatants into two mutually exclusive spheres: a register within which the significance of gestures would be considered contingent upon the motivation of an agent (thereby rendering them transparent *devices* used for instigating political mischief); and another within which the autonomy of gestures from the properly political would mark them as phantasmagoria to which players might capitulate at the cost of coming to terms with objective realpolitik. In short, they arrived at a theory of the performative menace—that is, at a normative understanding of apotropaism—according to which politics either uses or succumbs to representation.[20]



Above: From Ephraim Kishon, au., and Dosh, ill., *Selihah she-nitsahnu!* (Tel Aviv: Sitirigat Ma'ariv, 1967).

Opposite, top: From *Milhemet Sheshet Ha-Yamim* (Tel Aviv: M. Mizrahi, 1967), 98–99.

Opposite, bottom left: From S. Simhoni, ed., *Ha-nitzahon ha gadol be t'munot* (Tel Aviv: Esther, 1967).

Opposite, bottom right: From Mordechai Bar-On, ed., *Shishah yamim: . . . tseva haganah le-Israel* [Israel Defense Forces, the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Matka'l [General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces], 1968), 95–96.



In the victory albums the idea of Arab arms raised to strike in unison (top) was transmogrified into an image of collective defeat by juxtaposing it with photographs of the Egyptian army's surrender in the Sinai (bottom right). (If the original Arabic caption to [top] once read "We are Ready! We are Ready!" in the victory albums it was shown next to pictures of prisoners of war with the following explanation: "This huge drawing in Egyptian papers of 3 June is testimony to Egyptian intentions to strike. The arms [once] raised in menace toward Israel remained up in the air; only their fists were unclenched [to show] their palms extended in surrender.") In Israeli publications, such images of collective readiness for war were consequently presented as object lessons in the perceived propensity of Arab peoples to believe in the image of themselves that they had advanced in their menacing self-presentation (bottom left). (Relying on the sociologist, Hamed Amar's own term for this perceived tendency, Israeli analysts readily accepted the idea of *fahlawism*—that is, of the unrealism of Arab self-assessment—in their own assessments of Arabs.) In *Selihah she-nitsahnu!* Dosh introduces a cartoon of Ahmad Shuqayri, the first head of the PLO, inflating himself with a bicycle pump. Dosh's view is pretty much in accord with the views expressed by King Hussein of Jordan and his prime minister, Wasfi al-Tall (opposite).

"Talk" and "Action"

What was at stake here was nothing less than an attempt to reassert a proper relation between history and representation—essences and appearances—as a relation of discernible causality. For example, even as analysts of the Arab-Israeli conflict, like Yehoshafat Harkabi, acknowledged the dramaturgical facets of the conflict's own perpetuation, they did so with the idea in mind that whether people succumbed to—were used by—images or used them, a relation of instrumentality nevertheless predominated in the relation between politics and figuration. By extension, this meant that the dispassionate observer could, presumably, locate truth either in the *gesture*—that is, in mere signaling—or in the *act* of a performative menace, that is, by reading it as the content of the menace itself. In this way Harkabi hoped to read real intentions/potential out of an abstract politics that admitted no such causality at first glance. An orientalist whose day job as head of Israeli military intelligence was to glean what, if anything, could be deduced about Arab intentions from the way political elites in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan depicted Israel, Harkabi at first concluded that the strategic interaction of the combatants originated in a normative gap between "talk" and "action" in Arab political expression.[21] Reducible neither to "cathartic" expressions of impotence, nor their opposite (the telegraphing of intentions, or "antilocution"), for Harkabi, Arab representations of Israel's imminent destruction seemed to advance an apotropaic principle/logic.[22] As both the "expression of the aim and the cause of the act,"[23] signs like Nasser's *ahalan wa-sahalan* were ideologically "autonomous" (in the sense that they are not the superstructural emanations of a material base), but they nevertheless have real political consequences/effects.[24] Shunning a materialist conception of ideology as "socially necessary appearance,"[25] Harkabi nevertheless finds himself incapable of claiming that "reality is more powerful than ideology" among Arabs in particular without acknowledging that "ideology affects the perception of reality" in general, effectively *making* an abstract history.[26] In this fashion, a paradoxical understanding of apotropaic representation enters into Harkabi's *own* picture of the conflict, though contraband, as a reflexive preoccupation with what he calls "the problem of subjectivity": "The burden of the conflict tends to distort the conceptions of both sides. Because of the limit of the subject, I have dealt with distortions asymmetrically, but I am far from belittling the dangers of pathological social developments which the conflict may produce on the Israeli side."[27]

Top, left: From *Rose al-youssef,* 2 August 1965, as reproduced in Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict from Israel's Perspective," *Sekirah hodshit* [Monthly review], January 1966, 15.

Center: From *Akhbar al-yawm,* 13 July 1964, as reproduced in Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict from Israel's Perspective," *Sekirah hodshit,* January 1966, 21.

Top, right: From *al-Ahram,* 3 February 1964, as reproduced in Harkabi, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict from Israel's Perspective," *Sekirah hodshit,* January 1966, 19.

Bottom: From *al-Massa,* 6 July 1964, as reproduced in Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict from Israel's Perspective," *Sekirah hodshit,* January 1966, 23.

ציור זה התפרסם בעתון המצרי „אל ג'מהוריה" מיום 1-2-1965. הכתובת על הברק: „אחדות העם הערבי". הכתובת שניתנה לציור: „הסופה".

זוהי הצעתו של „אל אהראם" המצרי (3-2-64) ל„כרזה אל יהודי העולם". הכתובות, באנגלית ובערבית: הגרו לישראל — כרטיסי נסיעה חינם, ללא חזור".

הערבים מציגים את ישראל כמרכז לרשת רבת-השפעה שחוטיה נמשכים לכל פינות העולם — ובו בזמן טוענים כי המדינה מעורערת מבפנים ואיננה בר-קיימא. הציור הימני נתפרסם ב„אח-באר אל-יום" המצרי (13-6-64). דברי ההסבר — הנשיא ג'ונסון: „ישראל היתה בכיסי, לאן נעל-מה?" הציור השמאלי הופיע ב„אל ג'מהוריה" (13-1-65). העתון ציטט ידיעות על חילוקי דעות וסכסוכים פוליטיים פנימיים בישראל, והכתירו בכותרת „ועידת השודדים".

העתון המצרי „אל מסא", שפרסם ציור זה ב-7-1964, הכתירו במלים: „נמחץ את העקרב בנעלינו".

Harkabi persistently attempted to advance a realist strategic doctrine by analyzing Arab representations of Israel and, more specifically, of Israel's destruction. In collecting such images, he sought to develop a taxonomy of "attitudes" from which he hoped to filter concrete from abstract potential. In this particular instance, he published his views in the IDF general staff's magazine for officers, *Sekira hodshit*.

Victory Albums

If Harkabi continues to appeal to the concept of a reality beyond abstraction (i.e., beyond the psychopathology of politics and its delusional "logic of images"), he nonetheless repeatedly finds himself describing a condition in which the strategic interaction of the opponents (on both sides of the conflict) will not be arrested at will, or impressed into a relation of discernible causality by them. Instead, even in his own analyses the problem of representation asserts itself as an *objective* demand. After 1967 Harkabi's most persistent strategic concern was that Israel had begun to accept as real the image of itself that it had begun to fashion in the so-called "Victory Albums" of the June war (in effect, yielding to the same kind of fantastic self-conception with which Arab intellectuals had connected their own defeat).[28] Facing the conclusion that representations and norms—principally, the Israeli political Right's swaggering professions of the Jewish state's indestructibility—were consequently objective factors in history, Harkabi pleaded one last time for a mitigated realism, this time as consciousness of the reality of what he calls "unrealism."[29] In his jeremiad to the Israeli people, entitled *The Bar Kokhba Syndrome: Risk and Realism in International Politics,* Harkabi presents the unsuccessful revolt of Jewish zealots against the Emperor Hadrian in 132–135 C.E. (a rebellion valorized by the present-day nationalist Right in Israel, who call it the "War of Beitar") as a disastrous reminder to Jewry that when it flirts with myth it invites disaster. Harkabi laments:

> Until 1967, Israel was, for the most part, a land of *practical, realistic vision,* and our attainments won great admiration in the world. Tendencies toward fantasy were curbed. However, impelled by the 1967 victory, as soon as it was apparent that previously infeasible goals now seemed suddenly attainable, the restraints grew weak. Those tendencies to fantasize possible achievements in public life and even in individual existence were invigorated. The mythical orientation of unrealism gained new ground.[30]

Paradoxically, in its inability to establish the priority of a political reality beyond appearances, Harkabi's realism nevertheless succeeds: it accurately describes the horror of a world in which wars may be happening for the sake of their pictures. (Here, after all, images record nothing except a war's function as a camera for a new image of the Middle East.) Harkabi's failed realism correctly discloses the dominance of an abstract actuality, showing how history effects its own refiguration precisely as interpreters of the performative menace attempt and fail to split a dialectic of essences and appearances into a "useful" pairing of means and ends. Eschewing "a consistent sense of the nonidentical," analysts of the performative menace resurrect—and for that reason advance—the problem of political representation they themselves address at the moment when they assume they have gained a pragmatic understanding of its arrest.[31]



Harkabi presents his fears for Israel's own *fahlawi* turn in his *Bar-Kokhba Syndrome: Risk and Realism in International Politics.* It amounted to a concern that Israel had begun to accept the triumphalist image of itself that began to appear in the victory albums of the June 1967 war. The codification of such a vision of manifest destiny is already immanent in the covers of the albums themselves. For example, the number *6* with the map of "greater Israel" within it that appears in *Milhemet Sheshet Ha-Yamim* (bottom), is included in almost every other publication concerning the war that was published by the IDF's Chief Education Officer, probably making this the first war in history to have its own logo.

Top, left: From Ohad Zamorah, ed., *Ha-nitzahon: Milhemet Sheshet Ha-Yamim* [Victory: The Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Lewin-Epstein, 1967).

Top, right: From Morris Fox, ed., *Six Day Miracle* (Washington: Current Historical Productions, 1967).

Bottom: From Yosef Eshkol, ed., *Milhement Sheshet Ha-Yamim: Mi Pirsume Ha-Mate Ha-Kelali* [The Six Day War: From the Publications of the General Staff of the IDF] (Tel Aviv: Matka'l [General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces], 1967).

Notes

1. S. Simhoni, ed., *Ha-nitzahon ha-gadol be temunot* [The great victory in pictures] (Tel Aviv: Esther, 1967), n.p.

2. *Ha-milhamah le-shalom* [Our war for peace], ed. Mahadurat Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv: Dekel, 1967), n.p.

3. This was the third war fought between Israel and Arab states since 1948. Hostilities commenced on June 5, 1967, and lasted a little over one hundred hours. Battles were fought on three principal fronts: the Sinai peninsula and Gaza, held by Egypt; the Jordan Valley and East Jerusalem, then part of the Royal Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; and the Syrian Golan Heights. Achieving a decisive strategic victory, by the close of the conflict Israel controlled all of the territory from the Suez Canal in the west to the Jordan River in the East and as far as Mt. Hermon and Kuneitra in the north. Following the fight, Egypt's President, Gamal ᶜAbd al-Nasser—who had brokered a coalition of Arab states under his own United Arab military command—resigned his post, only to resume it by popular demand. The significance accorded to the war by strategists, historians, and political figures alike is attested to by the remarkable literary and cultural production that followed it, as players sought to read the immanence of a completely new political picture out of an old one. From classic analyses like Sadiq al-ᶜAzm's *Self-Criticism after the Defeat,* to assessments of the same assessments, like Yehoshafat Harkabi's *Arab Lessons from their Defeat,* critical reflection upon the immanence of a new reality, in itself became a crucial aspect of that same new reality. (See: Sadiq Jalal al-ᶜAzm, *Al-naqd al-dhati bada al-hazimah.* Al-Tabah 1. ed., *Al-mufakkir al-Arab* (Bayrut: Dar al-Taliah, 1968); and Yehoshafat Harkabi, comp., *Lekah ha-Arvim mi-tevusatam: Kovets tirgumim me-Arvit* (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ofakim, Am Oved: 1969). The present essay is my own first effort to analyze the conflict's self-representation after 1967. Structured around photographic histories of the war, the completed work will be the second volume of a broader historical study focusing on the history of the way this conflict has represented itself to itself. The first volume of this larger project is *An Aesthetic Occupation: The Immediacy of Architecture and the Palestine Conflict* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

4. See Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), 24–25. "Every face-saving practice which is allowed to neutralize a particular threat opens up the possibility that the threat will be willfully introduced for what can be safely gained by it." However, "When the participants in an undertaking or encounter fail to prevent the occurrence of an event that is expressively incompatible with the judgments of social worth that are being maintained, and when the event is of the kind that is difficult to overlook, then the participants are likely to give it accredited status as an incident—to ratify it as a threat that deserves direct official attention—and to proceed to try to correct for its effects. At this point one or more participants find themselves in an established state of ritual disequilibrium, or disgrace, and an attempt must be made to re-establish a satisfactory ritual state for them. . . . One's face, then, is a sacred thing, and the expressive order required to sustain it is therefore a ritual one" (19).

5. Erving Goffman, *Strategic Interaction* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), 101.

6. Gamal ᶜAbd al-Nasser, as cited in *Our war for peace* (Tel Aviv: Dekel Publishing, 1967). The statement itself has been transcribed and translated in various ways, just as the photographs of Nasser's visit to his airbase in the Sinai have been cropped with differing results. The text of Nasser's address was printed in the Cairo daily *al-Ahram* on 23 May 1967 to read: "And if it is Israel's desire to threaten a war, then we say to her: *ahalan wa-sahalan*!" *["wa-idhan ir~dat Israʾil an tahdad biʾlharb, naqul laha: "ahalan wa-sahalan!"]* In the Israeli daily *Yediot Aharonot* of the same date, Nasser's statement reads: "The waters of the Tiran Straits are our territorial waters, and if

Israel's leaders and General Rabin want war—'ahalan wa sahalan!' Our forces are waiting for them." *["ha-mayim be meitzarei Tiran hem mayim teritorialim shelanu, ve-im manhigei Israel ve-general Rabin rotzim milhama—'ahalan wa sahalan.' Kohoteinu metzapim lahem."]* (*Yediot Aharonot* [Tel Aviv], 23 May 1967, 1).

7. *Al-Ahram,* 23 May 1967, 5.

8. Like the heroes of Homeric epics, Nasser was perceived to stand in for the Arab *volunté generale* and, thus, to effect it. As improbable as it may sound, I'm suggesting that in this utterly reflexive political framework, the performative utterances of actors like Nasser squared the circle of self-alienated existence, reintroducing something like an eponymous subject. Here, "an individual structure and physiognomy is simply the product of a balance between the part and the whole, mutually determining one another." See Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), 66–67.

9. Shabtai Teveth, *The Tanks of Tammuz* (New York: Viking Press, 1969), 19.

10. Shabtai Teveth, *Hasufim ba-tsariah* (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Shocken Press, 1968), 33.

11. In this instance the terms *index* and *signal* refer to a specific interpretive framework. They are part of a lexicon adopted by deterrence theorists, as they sought to come to terms with the role of norms, representations, and, principally, bluffing, in cold war–era strategies of brinkmanship. Originating in Charles Sanders Peirce's distinction between representations causally imbricated in what they represent (these he termed indexes) and representations that gain meaning solely by convention (these are symbols), this semiotic horizon proved to be indispensable to students of international peace and security, like Robert Jervis, who sought to arrive at pragmatic distinctions between real and phony capabilities/intentions in the behavior of political actors in the international arena. The attractiveness of this differentiation is immediately apparent if one considers the example of a baseball pitcher for the New York Yankees who unwittingly adjusts his belt each time he is about to throw a curve ball. If noticed by his archrivals, the Boston Red Sox, the pitcher's nervous gesture becomes a "capability index" on the basis of which the rivals can adjust their own tactics. But what if the pitcher is feigning the nervous performance, as a bluff of the index? Or, from the other side, what if, having gained knowledge of the pitcher's capability index, the Red Sox give no evidence of that knowledge, preferring to hold this intelligence in reserve for a crucial moment in play? From the standpoint of participants in a strategic contest, seeing through the bluff of the bluff—and even better, bluffing at *not* seeing through the bluff of the bluff—could mean ending, once and for all, the famed "Curse of the Bambino"—that is, gaining crucial advantage. Taken a step further to consider the standpoint of the analyst of the potential bluff of the bluff—that is, the standpoint of Jervis—it would also mean the advancement of an ideal in which interpreters of the interpreters of political performances can arrest significance itself, subsuming all meaning within the horizon of their own instrumental reason. However, the very presence of "actors" engaged in a potentially limitless series of self-representations advanced in consideration of others' self-representations simultaneously problematized the models of "symbolic interaction"—that is, an argument for the *partial* interdependence of outcomes—which is the tacit epistemological horizon of the deterrence theorists. (George Herbert Mead, the source of a theory of "symbolic interaction," defined it as a "conversation of gestures" in which "the attitude of the other is changed through the attitude of the individual to the other's stimulus.") As some students of politics sought to come to terms with the performative dimension of aggression, either by privileging the syntagmatic code for such performances, or by giving priority to the strategic implications of specific gestures *regardless* of their signalling

function, the reciprocal immanence of realism and the syntagmatic code would be advanced by still others in a subsequent theory of "strategic interaction." Here, none of the political actors actually hold the strings of the marionette theater within which they are themselves performing. For Peirce's semiotic registers, see Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Icon, Index and Symbol," in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* vol. 2, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, 156–173 (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 1998); and Charles Sanders Peirce "Propositions" in *Collected Papers,* vol. 4, ed. Hartshorne and Weiss, 359–360. For Mead's theory of symbolic interaction, see George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1934). Robert Jervis's arguments are advanced in *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Jervis's own mentor, Thomas Schelling, advanced the game-theoretical approach in his classic, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1960). Erving Goffman's critique of both the game-theoretical interpretive framework and Mead's symbolic interactionism appears in his *Strategic Interaction.* For a cogent presentation of the various positions in international relations theory, see Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

12. Teveth, *Hasufim ba-tsariah,* 35; translation mine. Emphasis added.

13. King Hussein of Jordan, Vick Vance, and Pierre Lauer, *My "War" with Israel* (New York: Morrow, 1969), 38. Describing a "process of escalation" to war Rifaᶜi notes, "at a radio press conference before 300 journalists, President Nasser said: 'if the Israelis want war, then I say "Ahlan Wa Sahlan" (go to it, we are ready!).' Or, in so many words: 'Sirs, you may be the first to shoot.'" Rifaᶜi records that Nasser spoke these words in Cairo on May 28, and not in the Sinai on the 23rd. (Nasser may have welcomed war several times before combat actually began.) For the Arabic-language version of this book, see King Hussein of Jordan, Vick Vance, and Pierre Lauer, *Harbuna ma'ᶜa Isra'ʾil* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li'l-Nashr, 1968). In the king's narrative the term *war* appears in quotes in order to emphasize his view that what happened in June 1967 was in fact an Israeli land grab only masquerading as warfare. In his view this was an act of aggression perpetrated upon an unsuspecting opponent who did not even have a coordinated plan of defense. This is a style of interpretation of the war that was itself subjected to interpretation. In his "How the Arab Stance against Israel Was Explained within the Egyptian Army," Yeshofat Harkabi stated, "With the defeat of the Arabs in the Six Day war, and with their realization that their aggressive declarations during the two weeks preceding it were received with contempt, [some] Arab sectors are attempting to pretend that they never had hostile intentions towards us." Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Ketsad husberah ha-emdah ha-aravit neged Yisrael ba-tsava ha-mitsri* (Tel Aviv: Matkal, 1967), 7.

14. Wasfi al-Tall, cited in Hussein, Vance, and Lauer, *My "War" with Israel,* 22.

15. Hussein, Vance, and Lauer, *My "War" with Israel,* 23. For Shuqayri's own version of events, see Ahmad Shuqayri, *Al-hazimah al-kubra maa al-muluk wa-al-Ruasa, min bayt ᶜAbd al-Nasir ila ghurfat al-aᶜmaliyat,* Al-Tabah 1 ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Awdah, 1973).

16. The parallels between the terms *Holocaust* and *Nakbah* have been self-consciously developed by both sides in this conflict, and form an important nexus in the history of its self-representation. In his *Lekah ha-Arvim,* Harkabi regularly translates Arab assessments of the "catastrophe," or "Nakbah" of 1948 and 1967 as the Hebrew *Shoah,* meaning *holocaust.* For the way in which Arab and Palestinian intellectuals have developed this correspondence, see ᶜA.L. Tibawi, "Towards Understanding and Overcoming the Catastrophe," *Middle East Forum* 44 (1968): 35–43.

17. These are "Courses of action or moves . . . made in the light of one's thoughts about the others' thoughts about oneself. An exchange of moves

made on the basis of this kind of orientation to self and others can be called strategic interaction" (Goffman, *Strategic Interaction,* 101).

18. Goffman, *Strategic Interaction,* 136–137.

19. Michael Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 153.

20. By invoking the apotropaic gesture in this fashion, I'm actually describing the intrusion of the nonidentical into that which identifies history by way of its dedicated manifestation; and, then, the "practical" accommodation of that intrusion as if it were a menacing gesture already constituted from within the ranks of the political. It is important to note then, that I do not understand the apotropaic gesture in exactly the same way as it was elaborated in psychoanalytic thought. Sigmund Freud deduced the political power of a menacing representation from its consequences, arguing, "what arouses horror in oneself will produce the same effect upon the enemy against whom one is seeking to defend oneself." If, for Freud, the apotropaic image is the *cause* of a certain psychopathology (representing the priority of the subconscious in the domain of the political, its precipitation in history), the process I am trying to analyze suggests instead that apotropaism is the name one would have to give to an inverse *effect.* In other words, the apotropaic does not signal the practical career of a dialectically organized unconscious, as Freud once believed. (Dialectical because, as he would suggest, the menacing meaning of the apotropaic figure transmogrified into its contrary, something quite reassuring.) To the contrary, as it is expressed in these normative explanations of the apotropaic, the putatively "intrusive" unconscious—assembling itself according to a logic of simultaneous displacement and condensation, play, and cogency around an image—actually reveals itself to be the subjective mark of an objective, but thoroughly abstract, condition: it is the trace left on people's practices by a figure's refusal to gain identity with what it is supposed to represent. In practical terms, I'm asking whether the problematic relation between history and its *dedicated* manifestations did not present itself concretely—as an ongoing and menacing crisis—to the actors who participated in the representation of this conflict's representation. See Sigmund Freud, "Medusa's Head," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,* vol. 18, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute for Pschyoanalysis, 1981), 273–275.

21. Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 414. The history of this text is germane to the topic at hand. Harkabi submitted *Arab Attitudes to Israel* to the Hebrew University (Jeru m) as a doctoral dissertation only a few days before the outbreak of the 1967 war. As Harkabi implies, his thesis survived the war intact: "[T]he Arab attitude to Israel is, of course, affected by the vicissitudes of time, and war can certainly change public attitudes and make descriptions of the previous situations out of date. It seems, however, that my description of the attitude is still valid. . . . Even when changes take place in the Arab attitude towards Israel, it will have been worthwhile recording the situation as it was, especially as the influence of some laments of the attitude is liable to persist even after it has been altered" (xv).

22. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel,* 417.

23. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel,* 498, n. 9.

24. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel,* 418. It is this conclusion, in particular, that appears to account for Harkabi's subsequent preoccupation with the relation of subject to object, as elucidated in an appendix to *Arab Attitudes to Israel.* Even as he repeatedly describes the danger of subjectivism as the capitulation to ideal forms, he includes objectivism within the same rubric. Harkabi is equally worried about the distorted image of reality offered by a premature presumption to transcendence, an "ostentatious neutrality" that also does "violence to the facts" (468).

25. This is the definition of ideology most cogently presented by Adorno, who relies on a German philosophical tradition's distinction between *culture* and *society* in order to perform an immanent critique of the same distinction. In this tradition the latter term is, simply put, the realm of necessity, whereas the former is, by its own self-understanding, autonomous. See Theodor Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society," in *Prisms* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 17–34. Harkabi himself cites cold war political analysts and not philosophers to develop his own presentation of ideology. In doing so he unwittingly rehearses the dialectic worked through by Adorno, who suggested that it is not ideology itself that is untrue, only its claim to correspond with reality. Harkabi states, "There is along tradition of contempt for ideology as a variety of falsehood, a tissue of rationalizations, a superstructure of ideas covering a foundation of interests. The attitude may also be expressed in the rejection of programmes and ideals in the name of action and the practical approach. Behind the acts of men, however, there are ideas of some kind, without which we cannot understand the significance of their actions. History is meaningless if we do not complement the so-called historical facts with a conceptual explanation" (*Arab Attitudes to Israel,* 498, n. 9).

26. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel,* 417–418.

27. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel,* 470.

28. I treat the Victory Albums, as a shorthand designator for the Israeli imaginary immediately following June 11, 1967. As Mike Davis has noted in a conversation with the author, these albums presented average Israelis in "codified peril and triumph," in effect advancing a *formulaic experience* of history, a posing of the nation.

29. Yehoshafat Harkabi and David A. Altshuler, *The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome: Risk and Realism in International Politics,* 1st ed. (Chappaqua: Rossel Books, 1983), 122–123.

30. Harkabi and Altshuler, 138.

31. "[T]he nonidentical would be the thing's own identity against its identifications." Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 4–5.



Sponsorship Takes Command

Grey Room is committed to bringing you the most interesting developments in the history and theory of architecture, art, media, and politics. As a nonprofit journal, *Grey Room* relies entirely on donations of support for its editorial production.

Sponsorship is available in the categories of Individual, Contributor, Sponsor, Patron, and Benefactor. Contributions are tax-deductible. All contributors receive a one-year subscription and are featured prominently within the journal.

Help support the future of relevant and challenging aesthetic discourse.

Please address all inquiries and contributions to
Grey Room, Inc. at PO Box 250834, New York, NY 10025.
E-mail: editors@greyroom.org

Sponsors
Grey Room would like to express its gratitude
to the following for their support:

Benefactors
Emilio Ambasz
Columbia University, Graduate School of
Architecture, Planning and Preservation
Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts
Harvard University, Graduate School of Design
Phyllis Lambert
Princeton University, School of Architecture

Patron
Dedalus Foundation

Sponsors
MIT, Department of Architecture
UCLA, Department of Architecture and Urban Design

Contributors
Guy Nordenson and Associates
Lauren Kogod and David Smiley
Robert A. M. Stern Architects

Individual
George Baird

Grey Room would like especially to acknowledge
the generous support of the
Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts

Forthcoming in

Grey Room 08

T.J. Demos
Duchamp's *Boîte-en-valise*:
Between Institutional Acculturation
and Geopolitical Displacement

David Joselit
Yippie Pop: Abbie Hoffman, Andy Warhol,
and Sixties Media Politics

Branden W. Joseph
"My Mind Split Open":
Andy Warhol's Exploding Plastic Inevitable

Mary Lou Lobsinger
That Obscure Object of Desire:
Autobiography and Repetition in
the Work of Aldo Rossi

Martha Rosler
Travel Stories

Published by The MIT Press ISSN 1526-3819 ISBN 0-262-75496-7