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**NEW FINDINGS ON HITLER AND
GERMANY: A SYMPOSIUM**

**CHILD ABANDONMENT IN
RENAISSANCE FLORENCE**

**CHILDHOOD AND REBELLION OF
13TH CENTURY SAINTS**

CHILDHOOD BEREAVEMENT

REVIEWS OF PSYCHOHISTORY

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2315 Broadway • New York, New York 10024 • 212-873-3331

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HITLER'S CONCEPT OF *LEBENSRAUM*: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS

RUDOLPH
BINION

What was the source of Adolf Hitler's psychological power over Germany? Rudolph Binion's findings in this question, his present subject of research, have far-reaching implications for the study of leaders and followers. He sees two thrusts to Hitler's politics, one (anti-Semitism) deriving from a trauma of Hitler's young manhood, the other ("Lebensraum") from a German national trauma—from a shock suffered by the German people collectively. The former fell in with the Germans' abreactive need, which the latter then supplied. Hitler's relationship to Germany threw back to his infancy, but the trauma behind his politics dominated the infantile material that connected with it.

Binion is working toward a book on Hitler and Germany. Meanwhile, through unpublished lectures, he has been exciting lively controversy among Hitler scholars as well as psychohistorians over his reading of the Nazi record. He would publish none of these lectures before because, he said, they were at once too "sweeping" and too "tight" for proper footnoting. He gave this one to History of Childhood Quarterly when we invited him to append documentation in whatever form and amount he chose. It was originally delivered on December 28, 1972, at the American Historical Association meeting in New Orleans.

"*Lebensraum*"—"living space"—is one of several borrowed terms that Adolf Hitler used more or less interchangeably to express the same borrowed idea. This idea was that history is basically a life-and-death struggle among peoples for feeding ground. Already in the early 1920's Hitler complained a couple of times in passing that the Versailles Treaty had deprived Germany of the land needed to feed her growing population. But this was a mere token

grievance over Germany's lost colonies. Only in 1924—beginning at his Putsch trial and continuing in a magazine article and then in the fourth chapter of *Mein Kampf*—did Hitler develop this theme of territorial needs in a big way and to the effect that the additional territory the Germans needed lay in eastern Europe. Once before 1924, in December 1922, he had remarked in private that the future German dictator “must go over to a purely continental policy, avoiding any damage to British interests” and aiming at “the dismemberment of Russia,” which would provide “enough land for German settlers and a broad field of activity for German industry.”¹ But this was an isolated anticipation of the territorial theme that Hitler first sounded publicly sixteen months later and that then became the monotonous refrain of his writings and speeches until he ceased publicizing his drastic purposes when the elections of 1930 brought the Nazis to the forefront of German politics.

Germany's eastward expansion was the second of Hitler's two political objectives which all his other political objectives merely subserved. The first one was, in his words of September 1919, “the total removal of the Jews.”² A deadly rage against the Jews was the central thrust of his agitation until the Putsch of 1923. Then came the case for “living space,” to which the case against the Jews was soon subordinated within a composite doctrine according to which the Jews were spoiling history because they did not compete with other peoples for territory, but lived amidst other peoples as parasites. Moreover, Bolshevism was Judaism triumphant, so that the conquest of Bolshevik Russia was a double historic imperative devolving upon Germany: a supreme land-grab and supreme Jew-kill. This conjunction of the case for “living space” with the case against the Jews was faintly foreshadowed in 1922 or 1923 in an outline of Hitler's for a book about the Jews that would have dealt with their nonterritoriality as one theme among several. Conversely, the final joining of his views on race and space, in his unpublished book of 1928, relegated the Jews to a subtopic. Still he did specify regarding this subtopic that Jews on land won by Germany were to be eradicated *as it was won*. After he took power he pursued his two aims—the land-grab and the Jew-kill—in unison until December 1941, when he recognized that his war against Russia was lost. Then the eradication of Jews was extended from Russia to all Europe under cover of the losing war. At the bitter end (on April 29, 1945) he concluded his Political Testament with the injunction: “Above all, I bind the national leadership and following . . . to merciless resistance against the world poisoner of all peoples . . .”³ Later that same day he added as an afterthought: “The goal must still be to win living space in the east for the German people.”⁴ Therewith the original precedence as between the two controlling purposes of Hitler's career was restored *in extremis*.

Those two purposes (killing Jews and conquering Russia) cannot be grasped separately in Hitler's psychology any more than in his politics. But just as their coordination in his thought and action appears contrived, or forced, so the connections between them in his psychology look remote and tenuous on first analysis.

The first of his two aims, that of killing the Jews, derived from a trauma in two stages dated 1907 and 1918 respectively. In January 1907 his mother

consulted a Jewish doctor named Bloch about a pain in her chest. Bloch diagnosed cancer and promptly had one breast removed. The cancer recurred nonetheless, and the following fall Bloch—with young Hitler's agreement and apparently even his encouragement—undertook an intensive, expensive local treatment with iodoform that ended with the patient's death some seven weeks later. Hitler was then nearly nineteen, and intellectually and emotionally retarded after having lived idly with his widowed mother for some years past at suffocatingly close quarters. Consciously, he loved Bloch like a kind father; unconsciously, he blamed Bloch for his mother's cancer, for the toxic treatment, for the huge terminal bill paid on Christmas Eve. This blame surfaced after 1918 as a burning rage against the Jewish cancer, the Jewish poison, the Jewish profiteer. On balance, the evidence that he was not an anti-Semite until after World War One, despite his own account in *Mein Kampf*, is compelling. At all odds, his deadly hate for "the Jew" along with his political vocation itself can be dated quite precisely from his hospitalization of October-November 1918 for a gas poisoning that blinded him temporarily. The gas—mustard gas—was actually a liquid spray that burned through the skin just like iodoform. Hitler associated his gas poisoning with his mother's iodoform poisoning as he felt himself succumbing. By the time he was hospitalized at Pasewalk (north of Berlin) he must have been raving, as he was assigned to psychiatric care. The chief psychiatrist took his blindness to be hysterical—wrongly. But just when he was recovering his vision in the normal course, he relapsed at the news of the Revolution and Armistice. This relapse was hysterical. It may have been prompted by the false diagnosis of hysteria that governed his treatment. In fact, I am now following up a strong indication that the chief psychiatrist deliberately induced the ecstatic hallucination through which Hitler emerged from his two-day relapse and fit of desolation. In that hallucination Hitler was summoned from on high to undo, and reverse, Germany's defeat. The Germany that he was to restore and avenge was transparently his mother: this is graphic in one of the accounts of the hallucination that Hitler himself gave in the early 1920's and especially in an official Party version of it that he must have approved. In his trance he was not expressly called upon to kill the Jews; nonetheless he emerged from his trance resolved on entering politics in order to kill the Jews by way of discharging his mission to undo, and reverse, Germany's defeat. This resolve led eventually to those gas chambers that he himself ordered for the Euthanasia program and then transferred to the Final Solution. The Final Solution actualized his deepest reaction to his gas poisoning of 1918 associated with his mother's death at Bloch's hands in 1907. His Euthanasia program of 1939-1941 was like a last defense against that deepest reaction in that Jews (meaning Bloch) were exempted from it along with the mental casualties of World War One (meaning himself); it was designed to deliver incurable sufferers and to save expenses in the bargain, but was applied to mental patients—which all refers to his mother's last illness, since the iodoform she absorbed necessarily affected her mind. The Euthanasia program was itself preceded by a program of expelling Jews from areas in Hitler's control. Hitler's rationale for these expulsions was that he was exporting anti-Semitism, and this the more since the

Jews expelled were despoiled beforehand. But from the beginning Hitler had envisaged expelling Jews as an alternative to exterminating them, and not just out of prudence: the language he used about removing, extirpating, excising the Jewish cancer from the national flesh was the very language of his mother's operation of January 1907. Thus these three successive programs formed a psychological continuum for Hitler, with the futile surgery performed on his mother's cancer (the expulsion program) yielding to the representation of her death as a mercy killing (the Euthanasia program) and this in turn to his retaliation against Bloch (the Final Solution).

Now, what has the psychological basis of Hitler's territorial imperialism to do with this complex underlying his deadly anti-Semitism? At first blush, nothing whatever—and nothing with any other identifiable personal determinants either. Rather, the immediate latent referents for Hitler's doctrine of "*Lebensraum*" are to be found where he himself pointed in insisting that his movement was born of the 1918 defeat and that he was talking out of the "inner will of the nation."⁵ The political and military operation against Bolshevik Russia that Hitler proposed, planned, and launched had a glaring precedent—never mentioned at the time—in Germany's vast eastern conquest of 1917-1918, which was still continuing into the Caucasus when Ludendorff panicked over the mounting pressure on Germany's western front. It was just because of that colossal eastward extension of German power that in 1918 the defeat in the west came as such a shock—and this also went unmentioned in the postwar period (except once by Stresemann on his sick bed in 1927⁶). That 1918 shock of defeat was traumatic for the German people, and a traumatic shock generates an impulsion to repeat the experience behind it. It was this impulsion on Germany's part that Hitler expressed when he proposed to renew Germany's hapless play for world power. Thus his program for Germany's succeeding the second time round was the very program that had failed the first time: alliance with Italy, British and hence American neutrality, and *Blitzkrieg* against France, all preparatory for a life-and-death struggle with Russia. And his aim of Germanization eastward towards the Urals emerged just as he was supplanting Ludendorff in the public eye after their Putsch fiasco—Ludendorff, who symbolized Germany's earlier play for world power in its final phase of Germanization eastward towards the Urals.

Hitler's message about "living space" was, then, a German traumatic message that Hitler voiced for Germany and conjoined with his own traumatic message about the Jews beginning in 1924, when he turned from Bavarian agitation to national politics. But, looking back from 1924, we find that Hitler's message of 1919-1923 about the Jews already spoke to Germany's traumatic needs as well as his own; indeed, it harmonized his pathology with Germany's more neatly than did his later combined doctrine of race and space. His original political affirmation ran: Germany was defeated in 1918 because Germany was infected by the Jews; remove the Jewish infection and the defeat will be undone. Hitler never said *how* the defeat would be undone in the face of the Allies' opposition—the purified, revitalized nation would just irresistibly assert its will. Like Hitler, all Germany denied the 1918 defeat in one way or another and refused to live with its consequences: that

was a normal first adjustment, or nonadjustment, to a traumatic event. But Hitler's myth of the Jew and prescription for undoing the defeat were cogent where the other legends about the defeat and other revisionist policies were not. The legend of the army stabbed in the back said Germany was self-destructive, and the legend of Wilson's trickery said Germans were fools; neither permitted much hope for a national comeback, or pointed a way out of the Versailles bind. Hitler's myth of the toxic Jew pointed a simple way out—an inhumane and quasimagical way, but one no less enticing for that reason at the psychic level he struck, the primitive level at which a group trauma operates. He communicated with the German public at this level only: his message about the Jews did not penetrate the consciousness of his individual listeners or readers any more than did his later message about eastward expansion, for all his singlemindedness and plainspokenness in delivering both.

How did Hitler come to his second message? He came to it after Germany's refusal to acknowledge the 1918 defeat or live with its consequences had climaxed in a ruinous effort at passive resistance to the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, and after his own bid to undo the defeat instead through an internal purgation of Germany had climaxed in the Putsch fiasco. Thereupon he alone among Weimar politicians was responsive to the unconscious national need to pass from rejecting an unacceptable fate to re-experiencing it—or, on the political surface, from losing efforts to lift the penalty of defeat to losing efforts to reverse the defeat itself. He began articulating his second message at his Putsch trial following four months' incarceration—that is, four months' isolation from his mass public after more than four years' continual, intensive interchange with it. Such an interlude of isolation may have been necessary for him to register the new national need. But beyond this, it is striking that his incarceration before he voiced his second message virtually reduplicated his confinement before he voiced the first. He was disabled and evacuated, then hospitalized, on the occasion of the Putsch just as he had been when the poison gas hit him in October 1918. And he was again thrown into a state of shock: the prison psychiatrist diagnosed a "very severe traumatic neurosis."⁷ Further, his superseding Ludendorff in the eyes of their common following may have been a precondition for his new political line that led to a resumption of Ludendorff's exploits of 1917-1918. At the same time, a return to Ludendorff's land-based power constellation of 1917-1918 was already implicit in Hitler's first political prescription, his pre-Putsch prescription for undoing the defeat, since this undoing would leave eastern Europe as it was in the summer of 1918: in Germany's control or at Germany's mercy. Indeed, this was the clearest edge that Hitler's prescription had on simple revisionism with Germany's old boundaries as its outer limits.

Still, the problem of Hitler's own psychology and his new message of "living space" remains, so I suggest taking another tack and seeking the source of his sensitivity to Germany's underlying traumatic needs. Here it cannot be overemphasized that he was not himself a party to Germany's trauma of defeat: he was an outsider privy to it. His hallucinated mission to restore Germany was not a German's reaction against his people's unacceptable fate, but an alien's abreaction of a personal trauma displaced onto the German national

trauma. This displacement was automatic in that in his conscious life Hitler had long since transferred to Germany all his affectivity unconsciously attached to his mother: in his words, "My only bride is my motherland."⁸ His personal trauma was, I repeat, his gas poisoning unconsciously associated with his mother's death. In his conscious mind, the front soldier poisoned became Germany poisoned. In his hallucination, he was saved in order to save, and avenge, Germany. That Germany to be saved and avenged was his mother, and so was the command from on high his mother's. The obvious question is, then, whether Hitler, in responding to the German trauma in his psycho ward at Pasewalk, was not unconsciously responding to a trauma of his mother's.

The answer is a pretty definite yes. Klara Hitler's first three children were born in close succession and then all died of natural causes within weeks after the third birth. No mother could escape the traumatic effect of such a loss. Twenty years later Adolf's boyhood friend Kubizek observed in Klara Hitler "the muted sorrow that . . . spoke out of her features" and that, as Kubizek discovered, was due to the "fearful trials" of her young motherhood. "Whenever I saw her," Kubizek later recollected, "I felt . . . compassion and the need to do something for her."⁹ Adolf Hitler was conceived some six months after Klara's maternal tragedy. His conception had not been delayed, but then nearly five years separated him from Klara's two younger children, who were themselves spaced normally apart ("normally" refers to the demographic norm for that time and place). The time intervals add up to an arresting elucidation of Klara's inordinately long infertility following Adolf's birth: after the normal interval, she relived her traumatic maternal experience (from first conception to third death) by not having—suppressing—the three children involved. Compare Ibsen's traumatized heroine of this same period, Irene in *When We Dead Awaken*. "I have had many children," says Irene. "And where are they now?" she is asked. "I killed them." "Now you are lying to me again." "I killed them, I tell you—murdered them pitilessly. As soon as they entered the world. No, long, long before that. One after the other."¹⁰ That Klara Hitler could control her fertility is independently evidenced by the fact that she joined her future husband's busy household probably nine years before his second wife's death cleared the field for her, and only first bore a child 280 days thereafter. (A gestation lasts 267 days on the average. The chance of its exceeding 280 days is less than one in ten.) I would suppose that Klara Hitler controlled her births mentally. Even so, she may have helped keep herself barren after Adolf's birth by breastfeeding him inordinately long. The longest she can have breastfed any one of her earlier children was a few weeks before she was pregnant again. But she notoriously overprotected and overindulged Adolf as an infant—and afterwards. She later related that "she had lived in continual worry lest she lose him"—or so Kubizek recorded, adding that this worry only "ended with her death."¹¹ Adolf was her compensation for her triple loss; she guarded him as anxiously as she did even while she unconsciously relived her triple loss; thus he sucked in that maternal trauma with his mother's milk. The symbiotic relationship between mother and son after the father's death, and particularly after Adolf quit school,

looks for all the world like that infantile nursing situation revived—even when in the last weeks, with the mother dying, Adolf nursed *her* day and night. It was within this nursing complex that, for Adolf, Klara's breast cancer and breast surgery acquired their special significance.


Hitler's posture toward traumatized Germany alias Klara was oral-aggressive—nursing with a bite. He talked his way to despotic power over Germany. He whipped up one mass public after another into an ecstatic frenzy, and himself into a trance that threw back to his Pasewalk trance, with voices again summoning him to save Germany—just as that Pasewalk trance itself had revived his bliss of being lifted up and clutched to his mother's breast in her futile effort to repair a tragic loss. This symbiosis that was recreated through his hallucination, with Germany in his mother's place, was gradually actualized with Germany thereafter—except when he was abruptly cut off from Germany after the Putsch misfired. Then, upon being imprisoned, he tried to starve himself to death. Next he insisted that the food being offered him was poisoned. He talked himself out of this oral crisis at his trial, whereupon he fed himself fat with sweets as he elaborated his new political message.

And now back to that message. I repeat that the force of it was that Germany should launch her ill-fated venture of 1914–1918 over again. For justification, Hitler advanced a crude theory of "living space." The closest personal influence behind this justification was his nursing and, behind that, his mother's maternal trauma, which had fed into his nursing. That is, even as he spoke to Germany's emergent need to relive a traumatic experience, his message was shaped by his oral-aggressive fixation and by the traumatic experience that his mother was reliving as she fixated him. His major premise was strictly oral-aggressive: that all history was a fight for feeding ground. His minor premise, that Germany could not feed her children adequately, expressed his mother's maternal trauma as it had come through to him in her compensatory overfeeding of him. And his conclusion, the eastern land-grab, pointed beyond itself toward world conquest, which points back to that satiety at the breast when self and world were one. Here, though, in this theme of world conquest, that second message was continuous with the first in *its* final tendency, which emerged progressively, of internationalizing the Jewish peril so that Germany needed world power to destroy the world enemy: thus the orality that swamped his second message had already seeped up into the first. Note that, as Hitlerian discourse goes, an international Jewish peril was as apt a justification for a new bid for world power or new war against the Soviets (the "Judeo-Bolsheviks") as a disparity between population and land. If Hitler nonetheless switched to population and land for his new message, the reason must have been a mounting pressure from the oral libido that had seeped up into the old message and that then swamped the new one. His mother's maternal trauma went with his orality because it had gone into his nursing as she relived her trauma unconsciously—and for this reason too it went into his prescription for Germany's unconscious reliving of the German trauma. Or was it the other way round? That is, was it because he sensed the obscure need arising in Germany to relive the experience of 1914–1918 so as to assimilate its traumatic outcome that his orality was stirred to

its very depths by association with the trauma that his mother had relived while nursing him? For in his mother's case too, as later in Germany's, the reliving was preceded by a period of refusal to register the trauma—a period that included her conception of Adolf after a normal interval and that expired at the normal time for her to conceive next. Two further considerations tend this same way. One is that his formula for undoing the German trauma already implied that the antecedent experience would be relived, that the war would be re-experienced (he left this implication undeveloped, as I have said). The other is that the contrived, controlled repetition of a traumatic experience is an effort at assimilating it, so that this assimilative effort of his mother's as he was nursing must have come through to him as the counterpart that it was to his own oral activity, which was also a losing effort at assimilation—of the mother-breast, the mother, the universe entire.

Now to conclude. The basic libidinal thrust behind Hitler's doctrine of "feeding ground" was entirely oral as far as I can see. But that oral thrust did not produce the doctrine, let alone the policy of eastward expansion that the doctrine subserved. This policy derived, rather, from Germany's irrational needs, which Hitler articulated. He articulated them in terms of his orality, to be sure. But such infantile erotism is infinitely malleable. Thus Heinrich Himmler served this same eastern policy out of anality rather than orality—out of anal sadism rather than, like Hitler, oral sadism. The same point holds for Hitler's policy toward the Jews, only more so. That is, the infantile motives that entered into this policy not only did not shape it, but did not energize it either; this his battlefield trauma of 1918 did in association with his mother's agony of 1907; the infantile material that then fell in with this associative complex was rich indeed, but as I say, it fell in. As for his eastern policy, the unconscious determination came from outside himself, from that "inner will of the nation" to which he responded like a nursling supplying a suffering mother's pressing inner needs and wants while also supplying his independent pressing inner needs and wants. Germany's "inner will" was to cope with the 1918 disaster, and this meant rerunning the disaster course and moreover deserving disaster this time. This deservingness too was supplied by Hitler's rationale of Germany's eastward expansion, which was that an ongoing war of annihilation among peoples is the supreme law of life. In other words, the fact that Hitler was stuck on his mother's breast did not yield his designs on Soviet Russia; the fact that Germany was hung up on 1918 did. But his inner rapport with a Germany overwhelmed by sudden loss came of the precedent that dominated his infancy—that *constituted* his infancy. And his mother's loss that corresponded to Germany's also registered in the doctrine that prefaced his program for renewing Germany's loss—renewing it not, however, as his mother had renewed hers, through symbolic make-believe, but in ghastliest actuality. Here, though, the choice was not Hitler's, but Germany's.

Yet this last disjunction won't quite do. Nothing in Hitler's interaction with Germany lay entirely with him alone or Germany alone. For his side of the interaction to be fathomed, the German side must therefore be fathomed as well. I say this in closing only to point up the inadequacy of my presenta-



Dr. Eduard Bloch in his consulting room in Linz, late 1938, as photographed by order of Martin Bormann for the Führer's "personal cassette." An inscription by the Nazi archive specified: "The Führer often sat on the chair beside the desk." From BAK NS26/65/44 and Gertrude Kren.



Dr. Edmund Forster as director of the psychiatric clinic of Greifswald University (1925-1933). From *Festschrift zur 500-Jahrfeier der Universität Greifswald 17.10.1956*, II, 411.

tion in its onesidedness. Unfortunately, the other, national side of my subject exceeds the tight compass of our session today.

ABOUT MY SOURCES

It is not ordinarily possible to evidence single elements of a psychohistorical interpretation adequately. The pieces must *all* fit together, with the facts *all* stacked up behind them: this alone carried final conviction. In the present case, the source material is so voluminous and complex that just taking psychohistorical bearings will necessitate a book-length inquiry. But some of the crucial material facts involved have been overlooked, ignored, or misunderstood. So I shall here take an indispensable first step and attempt to reconstruct the main facts behind Hitler's mental crisis of 1918 on the one side and his responsiveness to the German national crisis of 1918 on the other.

The basic document for Klara Hitler's medical treatment in 1907 is the record kept by Dr. Eduard Bloch (see illustration). The first consultation shown, on January 14, 1907, looks like a yearly check-up, since Bloch noted a previous visit of January 3, 1906, above it. In 1941 he recollected that in January 1907 the patient came complaining of severe pains and that the tumor was already extensive.¹² In 1943 he added that the operation disclosed metastases in the pleura.¹³ The surgeon, Karl Urban, told the Nazi archive only that the "serious operation" lasted "a full hour."¹⁴ The hospital record shows that the patient was discharged eighteen days later.¹⁶ The Linz researcher Franz Jetzinger observed: "Mother Hitler seems to have recovered rather well from her operation, for she was known at all odds to a few women in Urfahr from marketing."¹⁶ She moved twice in midyear and spent most of the summer at her sister's in the country.¹⁷ Her condition cannot have seemed dangerous at the end of September, when Adolf moved to Vienna shortly after a visit to Bloch on the same day as one by her. The entrance test that Adolf failed for the Academy's painting school was held on October 1 and 2.¹⁸ He was back in Linz by October 22 for the first of two consultations with Bloch preceding Klara's iodoform treatment. A neighbor claimed that a word from her had brought him rushing home from his studies to Klara's sick bed.¹⁹ But Kubizek recalled that Klara herself informed Adolf of her worsening state.²⁰ Hazily, Kubizek dated this "late in November already,"²¹ whereas Bloch said Adolf was "home again" from Vienna "within a few weeks,"²² and Paula Hitler in recollecting this period did not even mention Adolf's temporary absence.²³ All three remembered Adolf tenderly nursing his dying mother.²⁴ Apparently he was not away long enough to send Kubizek even a post card,²⁵ though he presumably sent Bloch one reading: "From my Vienna trip the most cordial greetings Your ever grateful patient Adolf Hitler!"²⁶ By rail, Linz was only three hours and twenty minutes from Vienna at 5.30 Crowns, or five hours at 7.40 Crowns.²⁷ Even so, had Hitler been admitted to the Academy's school he would not normally have returned home in the eight days between the entrance test and the start of classes,²⁸ and when he did return home he pretended to Kubizek that he had been admitted.²⁹ So he

Hitler's 1907 case book, from a photostat in the former Hauptarchiv der NSDAP (BAK NS26/65/38). In 1938 Bloch gave an agent of the Hauptarchiv the case book in a sealed envelope for the Führer personally (*ibid.*, 31-33); its fate is unknown. Bloch took a photostat of the record to New York in 1940 (OSS interview of March 1943, "Hitler Source Book," p. 21); it no longer survives (letter from Dr. Frank Kren, September 24, 1971). The record was evidently prepared from daily notations—down to "Kr. 60.—" at a single sitting, then short of the last two entries at another. It served Bloch as a basis for billing. The underlining of a date designated a house visit. The text reads: "Hitler Humboldtstr. 31"; above the line "einen Bs. v. 1906 3/1" (a previous visit on January 3, 1906); below the line "Urf. Hauptstr. 46, Blütenstr. 9" (the addresses in Urfahr, a suburb of Linz, to which the Hitlers moved in the late spring and late summer of 1907 respectively); "Spit. d. Barmh. währ. d. Op. 1 h." (Sisters of Mercy hospital during the operation one hour); "Pfl. Vb." (treatment, bandage); "Pfl. Vb." (Pfl. Vb. "Bespr." (consultation—obviously with Adolf, as a simple date signified a consultation with Klara); "Rch. betr. Kr. 60.—" (bill comes to 60 Crowns); above the line "bz. //neue Rch." (paid; new bill begins); "Bespr. Herr" (consultation with Mr.; cf. previous "Bespr."); "Bespr." (prescription); "Bespr."; "a conto bz." (sums paid in advance for materials: the "2/12" indication above and the "3/10" one below the line were visibly interpolated and bracketed before the next regular line was penned); "M.J." (morphine, iodoform); "J." (iodoform alone) repeatedly; "Jodofgaze, Binde" (iodoform gauze, bandage, nearly spelled out: cf. "Bespr. Herr" above); "ex. let." (fatal issue); "bz. an Dr. K. f. Vertr. Kr. 4.—" (paid Dr. K. 4 Crowns for substitution); "Rechnung beträgt 150 fl" (bill comes to 150 Florins, or 300 Crowns; unabbreviated notation in another hand); "bz. Kr. 300.—" (paid 300 Crowns).

Hitler Humboldtstr. 31
Urf. Hauptstr. 46, Blütenstr. 9
Spit. d. Barmh. währ. d. Op. 1 h.
Pfl. Vb.
Pfl. Vb.
Rch. betr. Kr. 60.—
bz. //neue Rch.
Bespr. Herr
Bespr.
a conto bz.
M.J.
J.
Jodofgaze, Binde
ex. let.
bz. an Dr. K. f. Vertr. Kr. 4.—
Rechnung beträgt 150 fl
bz. Kr. 300.—

definitely appears to have returned home upon being informed that his mother's condition had worsened (because of his absence?)—which would situate his return between her visit to Bloch on Thursday, October 17, and his own the following Tuesday.

For the intensive iodoform treatment that followed, Bloch presumably bought the iodoform gauze in five-meter strips as was most economical. Their price in Austria that year was 3.75 Crowns for gauze at 10%, 4.80 at 20%, and 5.80 at 30% iodoform.³⁰ The part of those prices that went for the iodoform content comes to 1.32, 2.64, and 3.96 Crowns respectively.³¹ That year's price for iodoform powder was 0.90 Crowns for ten grams. Therefore each of Bloch's forty-two applications of iodoform gauze to Klara Hitler involved the following average quantities for a total cost of 59 Crowns "maximum" or 35 Crowns "minimum":

solution	grams of iodoform		meters of gauze	
	maximum	minimum	maximum	minimum
10%	5.5	3.2	1.9	1.1
20%	8.6	5.1	1.5	0.9
30%	10.5	6.3	1.2	0.7

The "maximum" total cost is the sum of the three "*a conto*" payments if the one for October 3 is 15 Crowns; if it is 18 Crowns, then the amounts under "maximum" above should be increased by some five percent. The "minimum" cost figure excludes the "*a conto*" payment for October 3, as the next "*a conto*" payment was made before the iodoform treatment began. And it counts only 15 of the 24 Crowns paid "*a conto*" on December 2, since these 24 Crowns may have been meant to last a month, or thirty-one days, whereas the patient lived only nineteen days more. The exclusion is implausible, though, as it would mean that 15 or 18 Crowns were spent on materials not noted that were used in treatments not noted. An unexpended balance of 9 Crowns could have been subtracted from Bloch's final charges for services amounting in that case to some 309 Crowns, but the very fact that he noted no balance suggests that the "*a conto*" payments were expended in full—and indeed, had the first twenty-five applications (through December 2) cost 15 plus 20 Crowns, then 24 Crowns would have just covered the last seventeen applications at the same rate. That "*a conto*" entry for October 3 is especially puzzling in that Bloch inscribed it on his record only after having reached the one for November 4 and having interpolated the one for December 2 (not to mention his changing 18 to 15 Crowns or vice versa). An "*a conto*" payment on October 3 would have been for a treatment previously agreed upon which would then have been deferred—agreed upon in Adolf's presence, that is, and deferred in his absence. As for the figure of forty-two applications, it comprises every date noted from the second November 6 through December 20 even though one "J." and five underlinings are missing. If the iodoform treatment is taken to have begun earlier than Bloch's notations show, the "*a conto*" payment dated October 3 cannot be left out of account; the "minimum" columns would then fall, while the "maximum" quantities would decrease by some sixteen-and-a-half percent at most for up to seven additional applications.

The "minimum" figures for the entire treatment can be matched for the second "*a conto*" period alone if the 20 Crowns are distributed over twenty-four applications beginning with the first "J." on November 6:

<i>solution</i>	<i>grams of iodoform per application</i>	<i>meters of gauze per application</i>
10%	3.3	1.1
20%	5.1	0.9
30%	6.3	0.7

Only one of the "*a conto*" sums covers an even amount of medication: 24 Crowns bought five five-meter strips of 20% gauze. If 20% gauze was used, the uneven portion of the earlier "*a conto*" payment or payments could have been for the bandage, which I left out of account above because its price was both small and uncertain. The price of the morphine was negligible: one gram in solution, with dropping bottle and all, cost 1.50 Crowns and yielded about a hundred injections. The fact that Bloch nonetheless noted the two morphine injections indicates that his record was a complete "case history" (as the Nazi archive labeled it) and not just a basis for billing.

I can devise only three credible itemizations of Bloch's charges for services (in Crowns):

	<i>per</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>
	office visit	2	2.50	2
	house visit	3	5	4
	treatment	3	1	2
<i>first bill:</i>				
20 office visits		40	50	40
5 treatments		15	5	10
1 hospital visit, 1 minor surgery, 2 bandages, ethyl chloride		5*	5*	10*
total		60	60	60
<i>second bill:</i>				
8 office visits		16	20	16
49 house visits		147	245	196
42 treatments		126	42	84
prescription; " <i>a conto</i> " debit or credit		7*	-11*	0*
total		300	300	300

*plus the amount, if any, by which the bill was rounded down

All three are on the low side of the range of fees permissible in Germany that same year.³² Sets *B* and *C* are likelier than set *A* because (1) Bloch can hardly have charged as much again for applying the iodoform gauze as for the house visit itself, (2) the ratio of house to office visit fee for Germany in 1907 was generally 2:1, (3) it would be contradictory for the "*a conto*" money not to have sufficed, and (4) Bloch was not a man to have rounded a bill up 7 Crowns (minus a possible charge for the prescription noted). Set *C* in turn improves on set *B*, since 10 Crowns is much more realistic than 5 Crowns for the third, composite item of the first bill, and since the 4 Crowns that Bloch paid

Dr. K. on December 21 would hardly have been below his own fee for a house visit. And if set *C* holds, the "*a conto*" payments were spent in full.

However it is sliced, the expense of 359 Crowns (including the "*a conto*" payments) for Klara Hitler's final treatment came to a good ten percent of her estate.³³ And by any reckoning consonant with the evidence, the patient cannot have escaped severe, and indeed fatal, poisoning. Officially the cause of her death was cancer,³⁴ but it was Bloch who prepared the death certificate.³⁵ The lethal dose of iodoform is put variously at between two and four grams for a single application, four to six grams in one day, and six to twelve grams in a week, absorption through an ulcerating wound being most toxic and a diseased organism being most susceptible. On the other hand, in the controversy over iodoform poisoning that broke in the 1880's some doctors reported single postoperative applications of 50, 100, 200, even 300 grams without deleterious effect.³⁶ The decisive factor was pinned down only after other antiseptics had largely taken over in the 1920's: *repeated* use. A few subjects are susceptible straight off, but repeated applications will sooner or later sensitize the others.³⁷ In no published report I have found of iodoform treatment with or without resultant systemic poisoning (and I think my files are just about complete) did the frequency of application even approach that recorded by Bloch. At that, Klara Hitler was slow to succumb: in twenty cases of fatality tabulated by one researcher, death came some twenty days on the average after the first application, Klara's forty-six days being exceeded only twice.³⁸ A blatant feature of iodoformism is that the iodoform absorbed into the system enters the saliva, producing a burning thirst together with an inability to drink (things taste poisoned).³⁹ This itself yields a short proof of Klara's iodoformism if conjoined with Hitler's remark of December 28, 1944, that the Allies were sure he was dead already "or at all odds am down with cancer somewhere and can't live any more or drink any more"⁴⁰: how *else* is the connection he drew here to be explained? Iodoformism also affects the brain, inducing a psychosis with symptoms that Hitler himself later reduplicated when chilled by death: hallucination after his gas poisoning, insomnia after the Putsch, dizzy spells after Stalingrad.

Bloch clearly had a bad conscience over his treatment, since in his later recollections he substituted for the iodoform "an injection of morphine from time to time" and then "an injection every day."⁴¹ Morphine would indeed have stilled the pain at small cost: why then did he pack on that yellow stuff day by day that stank to heaven, burned like hell, and cost a pretty Heller? It was not normally prescribed for cancer,⁴² let alone prescribed at such a tempo. Furthermore, Bloch was known to all Linz as the "poor folks' doctor"⁴³ or "benefactor of the indigent."⁴⁴ And in his recollections he stressed that he was outspokenly pessimistic about Klara Hitler from first to last: his account exudes an extreme sense of helplessness and hopelessness even about relieving her pain.⁴⁵ The view behind that sense found its way into *Mein Kampf*, where Hitler said of his mother's death: "It was the conclusion of a long, painful illness that from the first offered little prospect of recovery."⁴⁶ But Hitler was not resigned at the time. "Incurable, the doctor says," Kubi-zek remembered him declaring the first thing after his return from Vienna and

visit to Bloch. "Fire came into his eyes. Anger flared. 'Incurable—what does that mean?' he exclaimed. 'Not that the illness is incurable, but only that the doctors are unable to cure it. . . .'"⁴⁷ Correspondingly, Bloch recalled that Klara's illness "seemed to torture her son," who pressed him to relieve her pain.⁴⁸ This is the context in which Bloch substituted that "injection of morphine from time to time" for the daily iodoform. The indication is that Hitler urged this drastic treatment at his second consultation with Bloch after his return from Vienna. In one of his most transparent later passages on Germany's cancer he argued for desperate remedies, however risky, just because death was imminent and denounced the supreme senselessness of performing such an "operation" halfheartedly because of a defeatist outlook.⁴⁹ His referent cannot have been the *surgical* operation that Bloch, for all his defeatism, did promptly order and that not Bloch, but Karl Urban, performed.

Consciously or unconsciously the bereaved always blame the doctor for the patient's death. The peculiarities in Hitler's case are that he punished himself first, apparently with good cause, and that his rancor toward the doctor was so slow to emerge and then so monumentally ghastly. He punished himself through a hypochondria centered in an imaginary stomach cancer ("Men develop cancer most frequently in the stomach, women in the breast," said *Meyers Lexikon*⁵⁰) that was already shaping up by July 26, 1911, the date of a letter addressed to "Dear Franzl" and beginning: "I am glad to be able to let you know that I am already feeling quite well. . . . It was definitely no more than a little stomach spasm, and I am now trying to cure it myself by a diet (fruit and vegetables) since the doctors are truly all idiots. I find it simply ridiculous to speak of a nervous ailment in my case when I am the healthiest of men otherwise. . . ."⁵¹ To Bloch personally, meanwhile, he was continually devoted, from his New Year's card of at least a year after Klara's death ("The most cordial New Year's wishes from your ever grateful Adolf Hitler!"⁵²) through Bormann's, and hence Hitler's, request some thirty years later for Bloch to be photographed in his consulting room⁵³; Bloch enjoyed "special protection" after the Anschluss and could emigrate to New York in the fall of 1940.⁵⁴ Even against Bloch impersonally—that is, against "the Jew"—Hitler did not release his wrath for long years afterwards. In *Mein Kampf* he claimed to have developed an anti-Semitic world view gradually during his five years in Vienna. But he also claimed that by age thirty, when he entered politics, his political development was complete, and this second claim is so patently false that it must cast doubt on the first.⁵⁵ The four witnesses to his anti-Semitism before or during World War One are Kubizek for early Vienna, Josef Greiner⁵⁶ for later Vienna, Hans Mend and Balthasar Brandmayer⁵⁷ for the List Regiment. Perhaps they can be discredited: Brandmayer's account was Hitler propaganda, Mend privately circulated a "Mend protocol" against his own earlier narrative,⁵⁸ Greiner was a liar, and Kubizek mixed fact and fancy. The one witness the other way for Vienna, the crook and forger Reinhold Hanisch,⁵⁹ can also be impugned. But this leaves two supremely qualified witnesses against his anti-Semitism during World War One,⁶⁰ a half dozen solid testimonials on him before or during World War One that conspicuously fail to mention anti-Semitism,⁶¹ and lots more circumstantial evidence of this sort

such as the lack of a single anti-Semitic word in his surviving letters before 1919, his frequent, normal contacts with Jews before and during the war, and a Nazi archivist's discovery about young Hitler's favorite actors and singers in Linz which holds as well for Vienna: "Amusingly they were almost only Jews."⁶² I have saved the last word for Hitler's regimental comrade Ignaz Westenkirchner. Asked if the runner Hitler was an anti-Semite, Westenkirchner quoted a remark of Hitler's on a dim-witted buddy of theirs named Stein: "It would be well if all Jews were no smarter than Stein." And he added: "That was the only anti-Semitic remark I remember. When he discussed Vienna, he also spoke of the all too great influence of the Jews, but without animosity."⁶³ That is, he was no more of an anti-Semite than nearly any Austro-German or Reich German of the time. The anti-Semitic rage and the anti-Semitic world view were still to come.

They came as a reaction to his gassing of October 15, 1918. Several of his comrades were caught with him beside La Montagne in that bombardment before dawn; each one holding the lappet of another's jacket, they were led by one Hermann Heer (who alone was not fully blinded) to safety in Linselles, whence they were conveyed to a field station at Oudenaarde.⁶⁴ The next day Hitler was evacuated to Ghent, and from there he was shipped by train to the military hospital at Pasewalk, arriving on October 21; he was discharged on November 19. The official records of his twenty-nine-day hospitalization itself were evidently all rounded up and destroyed by the Gestapo beginning in 1933—those regularly deposited in Pasewalk, Berlin, and Munich, and the copies made for his next military unit, for the officials involved in the several proceedings against him under the Weimar Republic, for the members of the Bavarian Landtag commission that investigated his attempted Putsch between 1924 and 1928, and so on down to the copy reportedly seized with the papers of Admiral Canaris, head of the Secret Service, in July 1944⁶⁵ and the one that was in Himmler's possession⁶⁶ and is not in his files.⁶⁷ One indication of the contents of those records is afforded by an exchange at the Putsch trial. To Hitler's contention that on his release from Pasewalk he could still read only a large headline, the presiding judge objected: "You were discharged as fit for war duty," to which Hitler replied: "The Pasewalk hospital paper was drawn up under the Revolution already. The individual was practically ignored; we were called up and mustered out in hordes."⁶⁸ Another indication comes from Wilhelm Hoegner, co-rapporteur of the Landtag commission, who as an emigrant in 1934 wrote: "According to the medical report he was pronounced fit for active duty again on November 13, 1918; at that time he no longer complained of anything but a burning of the membrane."⁶⁹ Hoegner's papers had "fallen into the Nazis' hands in 1933," he told me, but "in writing my book I still remembered that statement about Hitler's gas poisoning verbatim."⁷⁰ The Pasewalk document can have contained no more sensational statement than that one; otherwise Hoegner would have remembered it too in 1934, or indeed have published it already in the latter 1920's in his anonymous pamphlet against Hitler.⁷¹ This inference will stand even against the affirmation by Felix Kersten, Himmler's masseur, that "Hitler's medical paper had . . . quite obviously been utilized" for a psychiatric opinion on Hitler

secretly prepared for Himmler (possibly by Max de Crinis) in late 1942 which argued that Hitler's "gas poisoning . . . was poorly treated, so that he was for a time in danger of blindness. Signs of a syphilitic infection also appeared. He was put through Pasewalk and released as cured," but in 1942 the infection "was still continuing its fearful ravages."⁷² No such signs can have appeared on that Pasewalk paper without having been spotted before, and Hitler showed no trace of syphilis when tested for it in 1944.⁷³ As for his blindness, it was a standard temporary effect of mustard gas, a part of the pat syndrome that also involved swelling, burning, and moaning and that ordinarily cleared itself up in the course of a few weeks.⁷⁴

Why, then, did Hitler go after that document as soon as he was able? Perhaps for no good reason—as with his two old post cards to Bloch, which the Gestapo seized for him immediately after the Anschluss.⁷⁵ But he had good cause if the name of the physician who treated him was shown, for this was the chief psychiatrist, Edmund Forster, who diagnosed psychopathic hysteria. This diagnostic blunder was facilitated by two circumstances: mustard gas poisoning was new to German military hospitals; and Hitler was mentally hard hit, as already shows in his having been referred on arrival to Forster and a psychiatric assistant, Karl Kroner.⁷⁶ A passage by Forster in a publication of 1922 would seem to cover Hitler's case as it appeared to Forster in its early stages: "War hysterics, who from fear of the front produced every imaginable symptom, then got sent by inexperienced doctors to hospitals in the rear and even back home, where with their special technique they knew just how to take away from invalids for themselves all the resources meant for the war wounded, spoke only with indignation about slackers and told whoever would listen how they could not understand that cowards should exist at such a time. If they were not unfortunately sick, they would be reporting for any run of duty up front, however dangerous."⁷⁷ In any event, Hitler underwent a mental crisis as news of the spreading revolution reached Pasewalk beginning on November 5-6⁷⁸: he relapsed into blindness accompanied by despair, from which a hallucination delivered him. The relapse figures in his account in *Mein Kampf*: "It went black around my eyes again."⁷⁹ And since he did recover his eyesight in the normal course, he had necessarily recovered much of it already by the time the revolution began.⁸⁰ Still, at his Putsch trial just before *Mein Kampf* he mentioned no relapse, but only his crisis ending on November 9⁸¹: "That night I decided that, if I recovered my sight, I would devote myself to politics."⁸² And from both these accounts he omitted that night's hallucination that he had recounted repeatedly for years before.

"Hitler made it known early," Ernst Hanfstaengl told Roosevelt, "that while in the infirmary of Pasewalk he received a command from another world above to save his unhappy country. This vocation reached Hitler in the form of a supernatural vision. He decided to become a politician then and there. He felt that his mission was to free Germany."⁸³ To Karl von Wiegand, Hitler related in 1921 or 1922 "how this divine mandate came to him" in Pasewalk: "' . . . as I lay there, it came over me that I would liberate the German people and make Germany great.' . . . The message . . . contained in it the promise, the assurance that he would succeed in his mission."⁸⁴ In Jan-

uary 1923 the *Frankfurter Zeitung* repeated from a "weekly political letter mailed confidentially by the Ring-Verlag" the story "that at the time of the Revolution, Hitler had lain in the infirmary as a battle casualty stricken with a kind of blindness from which he was delivered by an inner rapture that set him the task of becoming his people's deliverer."⁸⁵ A month later Ludwell Denny learned the story from Hitler's entourage in Munich: "In the hospital he was subject to ecstatic visions of victorious Germany, and in one of these seizures his eyesight was restored."⁸⁶ A first collection of Hitler's speeches, in proof by the time of the Putsch, was prefaced by a biographical sketch that Hitler must have checked: it added a motherly nurse to the Pasewalk scene who holds in her arms the blinded soldier agonizing along with Germany and who, under a "higher constraint," speaks "words of faith in Germany's resurrection. And a miracle comes to pass. He who was consecrated unto eternal night, who had suffered through his Golgotha in this hour, spiritual and bodily crucifixion, pitiless death as on the cross, with senses keen, one of the lowliest out of the mighty host of broken heroes—he becomes *seeing*! The spasms of his features subside. And in an ecstasy peculiar to the dying seer, new light fills his dead eyes, new radiance, new life!"⁸⁷ How Hitler next told it survives in Rudolf Olden's biography: "... certainly Hitler seems to have been nervously deranged, disturbed [in Pasewalk]. This emerges from the pre-trial interrogations for his later high treason trial. He heard 'voices,' and the voices summoned him to become Germany's deliverer."⁸⁸ After this, he seems not to have mentioned the hallucination again outright—only, and continually, a God-given mission dating from Pasewalk to restore Germany. But he did not forget. "Do you know that I was once blind?" he shouted at Richard Breiting in May 1931. "As the Reds were laying waste to Germany in November 1918, I lay blind in the military hospital. I became seeing then. I go my way to the last."⁸⁹

The hallucinated message varied in the telling: Germany would be saved, or liberated, or resurrected, or victorious. Worse, it was conveyed now by voices, now by images, now by a sixth sense. Does this mean that Hitler just invented or imagined the hallucination after November 1918? Hardly, for an invented or imagined hallucination would be less apt to vary in the telling than a real one. Anyhow, its significance for his unconscious life would be no different, only his defenses against that coded message to kill the Jews would have been too strong to be sprung all at once. A more serious possibility is that Forster induced the hallucination through hypnotic suggestion as in the novel about him and Hitler by Ernst Weiss, *Der Augenzeuge* (The Eyewitness).⁹⁰ Weiss, a Jewish doctor from Brno and Prague, became a playwright and novelist in Berlin under the Weimar Republic; he fled Germany in April 1933 and committed suicide in Paris in June 1940.⁹¹ *Der Augenzeuge*, his last work, was ended in the spring of 1939⁹² and typed that summer.⁹³ It was obviously informed by Forster himself: "A.H.," down with hysterical blindness in the psycho ward at Pasewalk, claims to have been hit by gas while on his last "run" ("*Patrouillengang*": the word used by Forster above), plays the incapacitated war hero, deflects scarce resources from the treatment of others' "bodily wounds," and so forth in the Forster vein.⁹⁴ After the gripping Pase-

walk episode, the novel turns on the doctor-narrator's efforts to secrete his private record of his Pasewalk "miracle cure" abroad beyond the Gestapo's reach in the summer of 1933. Those efforts miscarry in Basel, and thereafter the doctor-narrator, a disheartened emigrant in Paris, is more Weiss himself than Forster. Actually Forster died on September 11, 1933, in Greifswald, where he had been Dean of the Medical Faculty of the university before Hitler took power and also Professor and director of the psychiatric clinic until August 31, 1933, when he was suspended and put under investigation for harboring a subversive attitude toward the new regime.⁹⁵ Reportedly he shot himself.⁹⁶ The report may even be true, for that way he eluded persecution while his wife and two minor children still qualified for pensions. "Suicide . . . need not necessarily be pathological," he had written that spring; "... *completely healthy persons* can choose suicide after mature and free reflection as the only practical way out of a difficult situation . . ."⁹⁷ The suspension and investigation were ordered against Forster by Bernhard Rust, Prussian Minister of Education—certainly not at Hitler's behest, for such pressure on Forster might have brought out his Pasewalk story; if anything, Hitler had Forster suicided to prevent this. Probably Rust and his Prime Minister, Hermann Göring, saw Forster's hand in the revelations made abroad that summer that Rust was a certified psychopath and Göring a former morphine addict.⁹⁸ For Forster had been in Paris that summer, presumably in mid-July: this was attested following his death by an editorial in *Das neue Tage-Buch* (Paris) which disclosed that he had certified Rust's psychopathy for a criminal court and had treated Göring in a Berlin clinic.⁹⁹ The editorialist added: "In conversation with a collaborator of *Das neue Tage-Buch* he remarked resignedly that probably 'his turn' too would soon come and that we should not be surprised if we heard one day that he was 'bumped off.'"¹⁰⁰ That collaborator was presumably Walter Mehring, who in 1964 recalled Weiss's doctor and then his real-life prototype, whom Hitler "had bumped off . . . as eyewitness of the miracle cure; which sequence does not, to be sure, come into the novel; neither does that creepy Parisian exile episode when, in the Café Royal, that psychiatrist, Professor at the University of Jena [*sic*] at the time, treasonably revealed the ominous Pasewalk hospital documents to the collaborators of *Das neue Tage-Buch*: Leopold Schwarzschild, Joseph Roth, Ernst Weiss, and me."¹⁰¹ This must refer to the summer of 1933, even though Ernst Weiss was domiciled in Prague at the time: he would have been just visiting Paris at that juncture.¹⁰² It must also refer to, not the hospital document, but Forster's notes from Pasewalk that apparently underlay his lines on war hysteria and that he apparently did seek to secure from the Gestapo. Did he give those notes to Ernst Weiss? Weiss wrote too long after his encounter with Forster to have been simply remembering.¹⁰³ And Weiss declined to publish *Der Augenzeuge* in Europe, but instead sent the manuscript to America, for unexplained "political reasons"¹⁰⁴—which would fairly parallel Forster's exporting his notes. In his choice of suicide over flight in June 1940, Weiss may also have been following Forster, whose death he had omitted from *Der Augen-*

zeuge, substituting his own life of exile—*fusing* this with Forster's life narrated in the first person singular.

The story that Klara Pölzl entered Alois Hitler's household at age fifteen goes back to Konrad Heiden.¹⁰⁵ It can be doubted, since Heiden's papers do not disclose his source¹⁰⁶ and since the earliest official trace of Klara's residence in Braunau is the petition she filed with Alois on October 27, 1884, for a papal dispensation to permit their marriage as nominal second cousins.¹⁰⁷ Jetzinger and Kubizek both subscribed to the story,¹⁰⁸ but that proves no more than its plausibility. Yet a strong presumption in its favor is created by an attestation of 1940 by Alois's sometime cook covering at least the last eight or nine months of those nine years: Klara was then living with Alois and discharging the household functions while his second wife, Fanny, was dying of tuberculosis in the country nearby.¹⁰⁹ It is hard to imagine that the living arrangements at Alois's were chaste, given his previous record and the folk ways of rural Austria, where the legitimate births hardly outnumbered the illegitimate. Besides, it would have to be imagined that from chastity on Fanny's account Alois and Klara went to unchastity right after her burial—an all too abrupt lapse from delicacy. Could they, alternatively, have practiced contraception in Fanny's time? The only effective contraception in use thereabouts was coitus interruptus, and all the signs are that Alois was too domineering and self-willed, too sexually demanding and socially indifferent, to have frustrated himself night after night because of Klara's singular qualms about illegitimacy.

The chance of a gestation exceeding 280 days is hardly one in thirty according to the only detailed distribution curve I have found,¹¹⁰ and well under one in ten as I estimate from all other data analyses available to me.¹¹¹ Cases of the mind blocking, and unblocking, fertility abound: witness the barren wife who finally gives up and adopts a child only to become pregnant overnight. Or the barren wife who becomes pregnant by means of fertility drugs, but then with grave emotional consequences: the gradual realization that such a woman really did not want a child and that this, "through action on the hormone system, led to the shutting off of ovulation" has given "second thoughts" about those drugs to Dr. Walter L. Herrmann, who pioneered their use in America.¹¹² I am quoting from a press clipping sent to me since my talk in New Orleans, one of many communications to the same effect of which the most expressive concerns two women who survived Auschwitz in their youth: their menstruation ceased for their entire stay there and resumed afterwards.

A sudden loss such as the one Klara Hitler sustained of her three children is the more traumatic since it is felt as a punishment. And unconsciously, a punishment entails guilt, for which Klara had ready grounds: she had married her "Uncle" as she called him,¹¹³ and this after waiting out his two earlier wives' deaths, then conceiving the first of those children with unseemly promptitude. Her maternal loss can only have hit her the harder in that her two stepchildren survived the epidemic. To be sure, infant mortality ran high in those parts—statistically she could almost expect to lose two of her six children¹¹⁴—but that can hardly have dulled the blow.

To relive the experience behind a mental trauma is routine.¹¹⁵ The following chart will clarify how Klara relived hers:

Children of Alois Hitler born Schicklgruber
(6/7/1837-1/3/1903)

by Klara Hitler born Pölzl
(8/12/1860-12/21/1907)

<i>Child</i>	<i>Born</i>	<i>Early Death</i>	<i>Cause</i>	<i>Conceived [Estimate]</i>	<i>Following an Interpregnancy Interval of</i>
Gustav	5/17/1885	12/8/1887	diphtheria	[8/17/1884]	
Ida	9/23/1886	1/2/1888	diphtheria	[12/23/1885]	[7 mos. 6 days]
Otto*	1887	1887	[diphtheria]	[2/1887?]	[5 mos.?]
Adolf	4/20/1889			[7/20/1888]	[8 mos.?]
Edmund	3/24/1894	2/2/1900	measles	[6/24/1893]	[50 mos. 4 days]
Paula	1/21/1896			[4/21/1895]	[12 mos. 28 days]

*Otto is known only from Jetzinger, p. 56, quoting Paula: born in 1887 in Vienna, died "after a few days," and from Kubizek, p. 48: died "three days after birth," but in a 1946 interview, John Toland Collection, Paula did also count four children of her mother's who "died very young of infant diseases." Klara's second interpregnancy interval must have been shorter than the first, since one as long would have put Otto's birth into 1888. But a nine-month baby could not have been born before late August 1887 even if Ida was not nursed at all. December 1887 is out, as Klara was then in Braunau, where Gustav and Ida died. That leaves September-November—and the later the likelier.

Her three missing pregnancies between Adolf and Edmund can be measured with the help of John Knodel's close analysis of data for 1905 on fecundity in three Bavarian villages,¹¹⁶ since one of these, Schönberg, is in the same corner of Upper Bavaria as Simbach, the German side of Braunau. Knodel's data derive from an official Bavarian inquiry the results of which were summarily tabulated in a publication of 1910.¹¹⁷ This provides figures not for Simbach itself, which did not report, but for several localities close by. The closest, Burghausen (some twelve miles southwest, and washed by the Salzach as is Braunau by the Inn), showed 86.1% of newborn children not breastfed in 1905, a figure so close to the corresponding one of 87.2% for Neumarkt,¹¹⁸ which encompasses Schönberg, that Knodel's computations for Schönberg can be taken as strongly indicative for Simbach-Braunau. The percentages for the next closest localities to Simbach that reported also approximate that for Neumarkt: Altötting¹¹⁹ 85.5%, Pfarrkirchen¹²⁰ 90.4%, and Eggenfelden 91.9%. The infant mortality rates shown for these localities next to Braunau likewise cluster around the Schönberg ones. Now, the time from Klara's first to her fourth delivery would need to have been, not the 3.93 years it was, but 4.40 in order to accord exactly with Knodel's figures for mean intervals between successive legitimate births in Schönberg according to the longevity of the previous child.¹²¹ Klara was running a little short. Had she run just that short again, Edmund would have been born 1.45 rather than Knodel's mean of 1.63 years after Adolf and hence, assuming a nine-month gestation, conceived some eight-and-a-half instead of some ten-and-a-half months after Adolf. In point of fact, Klara's interpregnancy interval following Adolf's birth was forty-and-a-half months long, or nine-and-a-half months longer than her trau-

matic maternal experience (August 17, 1885, to January 2, 1888). Finally, Paula should have been born 1.71 years after Edmund instead of the actual 1.85 for Knodel's mean to have been hit on the nose. Naturally, that mean was unbinding in an individual case, even for Schönberg, and my second decimal places are silly. It remains that Klara's case is decidedly normal throughout if the interval between Adolf's birth and Edmund's is reduced by the length of her maternal trauma, whereas this interval is way out of line not just with the rest of her childbearing record, but with every other childbearing record I have seen for a secure, ongoing marriage. It will not do to ignore the anomaly with the idea that there were lots of possible reasons for it such as abortions or miscarriages. Abortions are not for a mother short three children, and miscarriages would read the same way psychologically as infertility. Still in all, this reading cannot be proved right from Klara's side, but only in the context of Hitler's relationship with Germany.

If lactation was rare in the vicinity of Braunau, lengthy lactation was practically unknown. No child was still at the breast after twelve months in Neu-markt, Altötting, Pfarrkirchen, or Eggenfelden in 1905 (out of a few hundred infants in each locale); only Burghausen returned one child (out of 283) still being breastfed after thirteen months in 1905, and two after twelve months in 1906. Unfortunately, I have no figures on breastfeeding in Klara's native Waldviertel,¹²² a likelier place of reference for her in her maternal trauma than Braunau. A 1926 chronicle of folk ways in the Waldviertel states: "The care and feeding of nurslings often leaves much to be desired. The best off are those who are given the breast. But children are often raised only on bottles ('bottle babies') or comforters"¹²³—an "often" that looks less extreme than in Upper Bavaria. Klara herself was the seventh of eleven siblings born over almost two decades and hence probably breastfed, although six died in early childhood. The chronology rules out Klara's having breastfed her own children much until Adolf. With Adolf she can have reverted to her mother's presumable practice and also have acted on information that breastfeeding was beneficial (such information was behind the Bavarian investigation, for instance, and the Waldviertel chronicle). Breastfeeding tends to delay the resumption of fertility after childbirth, only not indefinitely: between two and three years would seem to be the limit as far as physical causality is concerned.¹²⁴ Whether or not baby Adolf was breastfed, it affected his orality that breastfeeding was highly erotized in his neck of the woods. To quote the 1905 enumerator for Altötting and Burghausen: "Many a mother believed that to confess that she was suckling her child herself was something to be ashamed of and admitted the performance of this duty only after repeated questioning and then with blushing."¹²⁵

Adolf was overfed at the outset: his one surviving baby picture advertised this. That he was breastfed can be evidenced only indirectly, from the adult record—and yet compellingly. Theoretically, his colossal oral animus can point as well to nonindulgence as to overindulgence of his first vital craving even is 87.2% of adult Mühldorfers did not orate about "feeding ground" and perhaps even though a Hitler harangue was like a charade of the later, sadistic breastfeeding that follows teething. A sure sign that he was reviving

old oral ecstasy and not just an old hankering after it is that he did regularly achieve it with his mouth opened upon Germany. Another is his lifelong tendency to relax into blissful contentedness after strain and danger by gorging himself with goodies. Within days of his triumphant defense at his Putsch his weight had risen to 170 pounds¹²⁶ with outside help from many a "foster mother,"¹²⁷ and two months after his release he still "looked positively pudgy" from "the sweets that he ate in prison."¹²⁸

But yet again, no psychohistorical signs are "sure" in isolation. Nor here is the thing signaled (an oral-sadistic fixation) instructive if taken alone, for then it elucidates no more than those very signs of it ("feeding ground," ranting, sweets)—a proceeding nearly circular, like a zero. The parts of a psychohistorical explanation are just that in the most restrictive sense: parts.

I cannot here begin to evidence the exclusiveness of the origin alleged (iodoform, mustard gas) for the track of Hitler's politics that led to Auschwitz. And I have not begun to evidence my derivation of the track that led to Stalingrad from a shared mental effect, a collective psychic process, an "inner will of the nation" which Hitler felt he was serving. I shall therefore point, in closing, to two big connecting grounds for that derivation. One is that referents in Hitler's personal experience are lacking for all the specifics of his "*Lebensraum*" policy (land-grab, Russia, Bolshevik, eastward, British benevolence, and so forth), whereas the specifics of his Jewish policy refer back to his Bloch complex in their grisly entirety. (I stress "specifics": oral covetousness of itself yields no specifics.) The other is that Hitler's "*Lebensraum*" policy relates to a hypothetical German aim of reliving 1918 just as a conscious purpose would relate to an unconscious one. Ostensibly Hitler aimed to *correct* Imperial Germany's war policy so as to *reverse* its outcome. Thus Hitler handled that traumatic need he sensed in his mass following *like unconscious material of his own*. Could that need, then, have been imaginary if referents for its specifics were indeed lacking in his personal experience?

The evidence I did bring should suffice for the chief material facts involved in the Führer's formation as I presented it in New Orleans—or if not, I am ready with more. Of my personal debts for this particular run of material, the biggest are to John Toland, Bradley F. Smith, the late Ernst Deuerlein, and (for the historical demography) John Knodel—phenomenal researchers all. This documentary note should not suggest that the factual matter all came first and its interpretation followed. Often an interpretation called for new facts which then checked out. This at least proves the heuristic value of psychohistory—if that matters to its detractors.

Rudolph Binion teaches in the Comparative History program at Brandeis University. He has done scholarly research in several fields. His most important psychohistorical work is Frau Lou (Princeton, 1968).

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3. Max Domarus, *Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945* (Munich, 1965), II/2, p. 2239.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 2242.
5. Hitler to Stahlhelm leaders, undated, sent May 11, 1929, partially printed from BAK Sammlung Schumacher 373 in Albrecht Tyrell, *Führer befiehlt... Selbstzeugnisse aus der 'Kampfzeit' der NSDAP* (Düsseldorf, 1969), pp. 319 ("den inneren wirklichen Willen des Volkes"; also, "dem Volkswillen an sich"), 320 ("dem wirklichen inneren Volkswillen"; also, "dem natürlichen inneren Willen des Volkes").
6. Gustav Stresemann to 4. Ausschuss, May 19, 1927, in *Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918. Vierte Reihe im Werke des Untersuchungsausschusses*, 12 vols. (Berlin, 1925-1929), VII, 2, p. 306.
7. Otto Lurker, *Hitler hinter Festungsmauern* (Berlin, 1933), p. 11, report dated January 8, 1924; similarly, Staatsarchiv für Oberbayern, Staatsanwaltschaft, No. 3099: 69, report dated December 19, 1923 ("a traumatic nervous injury").
8. Quoted by Ernst Hanfstaengl, in National Archives, "Hitler Source Book," p. 903.
9. August Kubizek, *Adolf Hitler, mein Jugendfreund* (Graz, 1953), pp. 42, 43, 50.
10. Act One. Also Margareta in Franz Grillparzer's *König Ottokars Glück und Ende*, Act One: "I have no child,/ Nor any hope of ever suckling one,/ Because I will not far more yet than *can* not!"
11. Kubizek, p. 50.
12. "My Patient, Hitler. By Dr. Eduard Bloch as told by J. D. Ratcliff," I, *Collier's*, March 15, 1941, p. 36.
13. "Hitler Source Book," p. 21.
14. BAK NS26/65/43.
15. *Ibid.*, 35.
16. Franz Jetzinger, *Hitlers Jugend* (Vienna, 1956), p. 172.
17. Johann Schmidt, in BAK NS26/17a; Maria Koppensteiner, *ibid.*
18. Letter of September 16, 1971, from Akademie der bildenden Künste, Vienna.
19. "Adolf Hitler in Urfahr," appended to Bleibtreu report in BAK NS26/17a. Jetzinger, p. 176, says this neighbor always insisted Adolf came only after Klara's death—an error evidently due to the *Linzer Volksblatt*: *ibid.*, p. 300.
20. Kubizek, p. 157.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 156; also p. 158.
22. "My Patient," p. 36. Bloch even thought this was before Klara's operation. He also misdated Klara's fatal illness 1908, presumably following Hitler's *Mein Kampf*: his photostat of his medical record did not show the year (see illustration).
23. 1946 interview of Paula Hitler, John Toland Collection, pp. 3-4.
24. Kubizek, pp. 159-161; BAK NS26/65/90-95 (Bloch's "Erinnerungen an den Führer und dessen verewigte Mutter" and Bloch to Bleibtreu, November 16, 1938), "My Patient," pp. 36-37, "Hitler Source Book," p. 21; Paula Hitler, p. 3.
25. Kubizek thought he had lost Adolf's correspondence for this period (Kubizek, p. 150) even though he preserved it intact for every other period.
26. Quoted in Bleibtreu report, BAK NS26/17a, with a second, New Year's card. Adolf took one earlier "Vienna trip," in 1906, but was evidently not Bloch's patient at any time before 1907 or Bloch would have shown the corresponding record.

27. Letter from Österreichisches Eisenbahnmuseum, September 12, 1972.
28. Letter from Akademie der bildenden Künste, July 31, 1972.
29. Kubizek, p. 153 (also to Klara: pp. 153, 192). *Ibid.*, pp. 188-193: when Kubizek roomed with him in Vienna the following spring, Adolf at first even pretended to be attending the Academy's classes. But before leaving Linz that February he avowed his failure to his mother's landlady, who then obtained for him an introduction to a prominent stage designer in Vienna: see Werner Maser, *Adolf Hitler. Legende Mythos Wirklichkeit* (Munich, 1971), p. 82.
30. Official prices for 1907 were supplied by the Österreichische Apothekerkammer, April 16, 1971, and September 16, 1971, and related pharmaceutical information by Vester's Archiv für Geschichte der Pharmazie, March 20, 1971.
31. But the charge for iodoform content was slightly degressive: for regularity, 580 should have been 585.
32. See the Countway Library's copy, annotated in 1907, of Albert Moll, *Ärztliche Ethik* (Stuttgart, 1902), pp. 177 ff.
33. Jetzinger, pp. 180-181, assuming that the medical expenses hardly added up, estimated the estate "at least 3000 Crowns." Cf. Bradley F. Smith, *Adolf Hitler. His Family, Childhood and Youth* (Stanford, 1967), p. 111; Maser, p. 80.
34. BAK NS26/65/85.
35. "My Patient," p. 37.
36. See Ferdinand Fürst, *Klinische Untersuchungen über die Jodoformgazetamponade* (Marburg, 1889), p. 5; Aloys Zimmermann, *Über Psychosen in Folge von Jodoformgebrauch* (Bonn, 1893), p. 10.
37. See especially Enzo Bizzozero and A. V. Ferrari, "Sull'Idiosincrasia all'iodoformio," *Giornale italiano di Dermatologia e Sifilologia*, IX (1931), 3-23. But earlier warnings were rife: "To avoid a cumulative effect, the iodoform pack is to be changed as infrequently as possible," ran one such in the *Wiener medizinische Presse* of 1882 quoted by H. Braun, in *Centralblatt für Chirurgie*, IX (1882), 279.
38. F. König, "Die giftigen Wirkungen des Jodoform, als Folge der Anwendung desselben an Wunden," *Centralblatt für Chirurgie*, IX (1882), 101-127, 273-278.
39. See especially Gottfried Ewald, "Die Jodoformpsychose und ihre Stellung innerhalb der exogenen Prädispositionstypen," *Monatsschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie*, XLVII (1920), 129-132, 141-142, or Albert Bourdette, *De l'iodoforme et de l'iodoformisme* (Paris, 1893), pp. 13, 27.
40. *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen. Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945*, ed. by Helmut Heiber (Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 746-747.
41. "My Patient," p. 37; "Hitler Source Book," p. 21. He did this even with his photostat of the record handy.
42. Its use for cancer is mentioned by Jacob Wolff, *Die Lehre von der Krebskrankheit*, III (Jena, 1913), 2, p. 216, with two references, one of 1883 for cancer of the uterus and one from 1887 that does not check.
43. Kubizek, p. 156.
44. Letter from Österreichische Apothekerkammer, Landesgeschäftsstelle Oberösterreich, November 10, 1971.
45. "My Patient," pp. 36-37; BAK NS26/65/90-92.
46. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich, 1935), p. 16. Cf. "My Patient," p. 36: "Without surgery, I explained, there was absolutely no hope of recovery. Even with surgery there was but the slightest chance that she would live."
47. Kubizek, p. 157.
48. "My Patient," p. 37.
49. *Hitlers zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928*, ed. by Gerhard L. Weinberg (Stuttgart, 1961), pp. 75-76.

50. *Meyers grosses Konversations-Lexikon*, X (Leipzig, 1908), 609.
51. Facsimile in Johannes von Müllern-Schönhausen, *Die Lösung des Rätsels [sic!] Adolf Hitler* (Vienna, n.d.), pp. 195-196. Were those "doctors" Alfred Adler? Thirty-three years later Hitler made no fuss about calling the trembling of his left limbs "my nervous ailment": *Lagebesprechungen*, p. 609 (July 31, 1944).
52. Quoted by Bleibtreu in BAK NS26/17a.
53. For Hitler's "personal cassette" then being assembled for an exhibit: BAK NS26/65/44; letters from Frank Kren, September 24, 1971, and Gertrude Kren (Bloch's daughter), October 4 and November 22, 1971.
54. Letter from Österreichische Apothekerkammer, Landesgeschäftsstelle Oberösterreich, November 10, 1971; "My Patient, Adolf Hitler," II, *Collier's*, March 22, 1941, pp. 71-72; Sefton Delmer, *Black Boomerang* (London, 1962), p. 31. "My Patient," II, 72: Hitler reportedly called Bloch a "noble Jew" to guests from Linz at the 1937 Nuremberg Party Rally, adding: "If all Jews were like him, there would be no Jewish problem." Yet Hitler repeatedly warned against distinguishing good from bad Jews, and the quotation is psychoanalytically too nifty to be true.
55. See especially Eberhard Jäckel, *Hitlers Weltanschauung* (Tübingen, 1969). In *Mein Kampf*, p. 239, Hitler said he saw his own political development come alive again when in September 1919 he read Anton Drexler's anti-Semitic *Mein politisches Erwachen*: "in it was mirrored a process that I too had to go through in my own flesh twelve years before." This suggests that Drexler's pamphlet was the starting point for his self-version, since those twelve years put him back to just before that fatal autumn of 1907. He used the same phrase "*am eigenen Leibe*" (in one's own case or, literally, one's body or flesh) to explain in *Mein Kampf*, p. 220, that to him and his comrades hit by mustard gas in October 1918 its effects were not yet known "as far as experiencing them in one's own flesh was concerned"—and this was his experience in his own flesh of his mother's agony of 1907.
56. Josef Greiner, *Das Ende des Hitler-Mythos* (Zurich, 1947); also as quoted in Wilfred Daim, *Der Mann, der Hitler die Ideen gab* (Munich, 1958), pp. 27-34, 248-249. Georg Lanz von Liebenfels, as quoted by Daim, pp. 20-21, said only that Hitler had inquired about back numbers of Lanz's anti-Semitic *Ostara*.
57. Hans Mend, *Adolf Hitler im Felde 1914-1918* (Munich, 1931); *Meldegänger Hitler, erlebt und erzählt von Balthasar Brandmayer, mitgeteilt von Hans Bayer* (Überlingen, 1933), pp. 32, 36-37 (p. 37: "he alone among us had recognized the fact become a certainty that the war was plotted by Freemasons and Jewish powers").
58. See Maser, pp. 138-140.
59. Reinhold Hanisch, "I Was Hitler's Buddy," *The New Republic*, XCVIII (1939), p. 271 ("In those days Hitler was by no means a Jew hater. He became one afterwards") and *passim*.
60. Fritz Wiedemann (Hitler's regimental commander), *Der Mann, der Feldherr werden wollte* (Dortmund, 1964), pp. 33-34, 209; Ernst Schmidt (Hitler's closest wartime buddy), interview c. 1946, John Toland Collection ("he did not make anti-Semitic speeches or remarks").
61. Karl Honisch on Vienna in BAK NS26/17a; Hans Raab, Hans Bauer, and Heinrich Lugauer on World War One in BAK NS26/47; Adolf Meyer, *Mit Adolf Hitler im Bayerischen Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 16 List* (Neustadt/Aisch, 1934); Georges Scheltenbrand, "War Hitler geisteskrank?" in *Ein Leben aus freier Mitte. Festschrift für Prof. Dr. Ulrich Noack* (Göttingen, 1961), pp. 331-341.
62. Bleibtreu memorandum dated November 1, 1938, BAK NS26/17a. Cf. Werner Maser, *Die Frühgeschichte der NSDAP* (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 69, on the known customers for Hitler's paintings.
63. Interview c. 1946, John Toland Collection.

64. Hitler's military records: BAK NS26/12/8-18. Concordant testimony by Hans Raab, Hans Bauer, Heinrich Lugauer, Ignaz Westenkirchner, and—for Hermann Heer—Stadtverwaltung Rothenburg ob der Tauber, letter of December 21, 1970, and Trudl Schmidt, letter of January 22, 1971. Hermann Heer's military records: Kriegsarchiv, Munich, 1385 Res. I. R. 16, 5. Kp., Bd. 1, 1-1166, 1. Div. D/23, 9, p. 239, and Krankenbuchlager Berlin, letter of January 14, 1971.
65. Pierre and Renée Gosset, *Adolf Hitler*, I (Paris, 1961), 71 n. 1.
66. Felix Kersten, *Totenkopf und Treue* (Hamburg, [1952]), p. 209.
67. At the Library of Congress.
68. BAK NS26/1927-1/32. The *Münchener neueste Nachrichten*, February 27, 1924, p. 9, specified: "The presiding judge then reads out of the military hospital paper that . . ."
69. Wilhelm Hoegner, *Die verratene Republik* (Munich, 1958), p. 123.
70. Letter of March 5, 1971.
71. *Hitler und Kahr. Die bayerischen Napoleonsgrößen von 1923*, in two parts (Munich, 1928). No allusion can be found either in the 1631-page transcript of the commission's hearings: Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Munich, MA 103476.
72. Kersten, p. 141.
73. Erwin Giesing material in John Toland Collection and (garbled) in Maser, *Hitler*, pp. 437-438; categorically confirmed by Hanskarl von Hasselbach (Hitler's attending physician), interview of March 17, 1970. (Hitler was probably suspected of having syphilis because his last personal physician, Theo Morell, was a specialist in syphilis.)
74. See especially Hermann Büscher, *Grün- und Gelbkreuz. Spezielle Pathologie und Therapie der Körperschädigungen durch die chemischen Kampfstoffe* (Leipzig, 1932), pp. 63-131, in particular pp. 111-113 on the eyes.
75. Bleibtreu report, BAK NS26/17a. (His conscious memory was almost as long as his unconscious memory.)
76. Attestation by Karl Kroner, 1943, John Toland Collection.
77. Edmund Forster, "Das Nervensystem," in *Lehrbuch der pathologischen Physiologie*, ed. by H. Lüdke and C. R. Schlayer (Leipzig, 1922), p. 300. The context is a discussion of psychopathy, hysteria, and "the difficulty of diagnosing hysteria." Forster's rule for identifying hysteria—if the symptoms procure an advantage and are played up—necessarily misled him about mustard gas poisoning.
78. BAK NS26/1927-1/36.
79. Hitler, p. 223. The repetition is underscored by his saying next that he groped and stumbled back to his ward, as two pages earlier he had pretendedly groped and stumbled back to safety after his gassing.
80. See Büscher, p. 112.
81. In *Mein Kampf*, pp. 222-225, the crisis lasts some days beyond November 10.
82. BAK NS26/1927-1/37.
83. Hyde Park, "Adolf Hitler," December 3, 1942, p. 40. Compare the interrogation report on Hanfstaengl in the "Hitler Source Book," p. 901: "He told Hanfstaengl that while he was in the infirmary at Pasewalk in the fall of 1918 he received a supernatural vision which commanded him to save his unhappy country. As a result of this experience he resolved to become a politician and devote his energies to carrying out the command he received."
84. Karl H. von Wiegand, "Hitler Foresees His End," *Cosmopolitan*, April 1939, p. 152.
85. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, January 27, 1923, p. 1.
86. Ludwell Denny, "France and the German Counter-Revolution," *The Nation*, March 14, 1923, p. 295.
87. Adolf-Viktor von Koerber, *Adolf Hitler. Sein Leben und seine Reden* (Munich, 1923), pp. 6-7. According to Konrad Heiden, *Adolf Hitler*, I (Zurich, 1936), 65,

- Hitler commissioned Koerber to do the sketch, and *Der Fuehrer* (Boston, 1944), p. 138, Koerber wrote up what Hitler told him for this purpose.
88. Rudolf Olden, *Hitler* (Amsterdam, 1935), p. 62. No records of those interrogations survive in the archives. Olden's notes presumably sank with him in the Atlantic in 1940.
 89. Edouard Calic, *Ohne Maske* (Frankfurt, 1968), p. 46.
 90. Ernst Weiss, *Der Augenzeuge* (Munich, 1963), pp. 147-150.
 91. Eduard Wondrák, *Einiges über den Arzt und Schriftsteller Ernst Weiss* (Icking, 1968) and "Ernst Weiss in Prag" (typescript, 1973).
 92. Hermann Kesten, "Vorwort" to Weiss, p. XXII.
 93. Mona Wollheim, *Begegnung mit Ernst Weiss. Paris 1936-1940* (Munich, 1970), p. 73.
 94. Weiss, pp. 135-151. The big Forster theme sounded here is that of the nuances distinguishing hysteria from simulation.
 95. Universität Greifswald, *Personalverzeichnis*, Wintersemester 1925/6 through Wintersemester 1933/4; Karl-Heinz Elsaesser, "Zur Geschichte der Psychiatrie in Greifswald," *Festschrift zur 500-Jahrfeier der Universität Greifswald 17.10.1956* (Greifswald, 1956), II, 411; letter of August 21, 1972, from Universitätsarchiv, Greifswald.
 96. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 13, 1933, p. 2; *Le Temps*, September 13, 1933, p. 2; *The Times*, September 16, 1933, p. 9; *The New York Times*, September 12, 1933, p. 9.
 97. Edmund Forster, "Wann muss der praktische Arzt Suizidneigung vermuten und wie verhält er sich dann," *Münchener medizinische Wochenschrift*, May 19, 1933, p. 766.
 98. *Braunbuch über Reichstagsbrand und Hitler-Terror* (Basel, 1933), pp. 127-129 and facing pp. 57 and 73. These were among the few authentic items the *Braunbuch* contained. *Ibid.*, p. 383: although the *Braunbuch* was completed toward the end of June, material was still added in July.
 99. Leopold Schwarzschild, "Die Woche," *Das neue Tage-Buch*, September 16, 1933, p. 273—with a sex crime for Rust and cocaine addiction for Göring. *Das neue Tage-Buch* was the successor in Paris to *Das Tagebuch* of Berlin. The *Braunbuch* was concocted by Otto Katz, who had been business manager for *Das Tagebuch* (Arthur Koestler, *The Invisible Writing* [New York, 1954], p. 199) and must have dealt with *Das neue Tage-Buch*, which published the *Braunbuch* material on Göring's morphinomania as soon as the *Braunbuch* appeared ("Aus Goerings Irrenhaus-Akten," *Das neue Tage-Buch*, August 12, 1933, pp. 161-162). The documentation on Göring originated in Sweden, however, and the information on Rust was not documented.
 100. Schwarzschild, p. 273.
 101. Walter Mehring, *Die verlorene Bibliothek*, revised edition (Munich, 1964), p. 248. The elided phrase erroneously has Forster a victim of the Blood Purge of 1934.
 102. Eduard Wondrák, letters of January 8 and postmarked April 4, 1973: Weiss registered in Prague at his mother's address on April 12 and in a hotel on September 16, 1933. Walter Mehring has ignored my inquiries.
 103. Mona Wollheim, telephone interview of September 14, 1972: Weiss's conversation and diaries contained no indication that *Der Augenzeuge* was conceived, let alone begun, before the winter of 1938-1939.
 104. Kesten, pp. V, XXII.
 105. Heiden, *Fuehrer*, pp. 40-42.
 106. Letters of December 12, 1972, and January 10, 1973, from Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich.
 107. Text in Kubizek, pp. 47-48, from copy in Linz. Letter of November 17, 1972,

from Stadtamt Braunau am Inn. The two had become second cousins eight years earlier when Alois had, with dubious justification, had himself legitimated as the son of Klara's maternal grandfather's brother, long since deceased.

108. Jetzinger, pp. 50-53; Kubizek, pp. 46-47.
109. Rosalia Hörl, in BAK NS26/17a.
110. Nicholson J. Eastman and Louis M. Hellman, *Williams Obstetrics* (New York, 1961), p. 222 (based on 14,078 cases).
111. *Ibid.*, p. 221; Francis H. A. Marshall, *The Physiology of Reproduction* (London, 1956), I, 357; Richard J. Harrison, *Reproduction and Man* (New York, 1967), p. 19.
112. *New York Post*, February 16, 1973, p. 12.
113. Rosalia Hörl, in BAK NS26/17a.
114. See John Knodel, "Infant Mortality and Fertility in Three Bavarian Villages," *Population Studies*, XXII (1968), 313, Table 11, and my discussion of this article below. But *ibid.*, p. 305: children under age one accounted for almost all the mortality up to age ten, so that the life expectancy of Klara's first- and second-born was already quite high before their death.
115. See my "Repeat Performance: Leopold III and Belgian Neutrality," *History and Theory*, VIII (1969), 213-259.
116. Knodel, pp. 297-318.
117. Alfred Groth and Martin Hahn, "Säuglingsverhältnisse in Bayern," *Zeitschrift des bayerischen statistischen Landesamtes*, 1910, pp. 78-164.
118. That is, for the Mühldorf district, for which only the subdistrict Neumarkt reported: *ibid.*, p. 109.
119. The subdistrict is meant; the district of this same name takes in Burghausen as well.
120. The subdistrict Pfarrkirchen alone reported for the district of this same name, which includes Simbach: *ibid.*, p. 115.
121. Knodel, p. 310, Table 7.
122. But Leopold Moll, *Säuglingssterblichkeit in Österreich* (Vienna, 1914), which I have yet to obtain, may contain some.
123. Heinrich Rauscher, "Volkskunde des Waldviertels," *Das Waldviertel*, III (Vienna, [1926]), 44. (Reference kindly supplied by Lutz Berkner.)
124. This is indicated by the data tabulated in P. Cantrelle and H. Leridon, "Breast Feeding, Mortality in Childhood and Fertility in a Rural Zone of Senegal," *Population Studies*, XXV (1971), 526, and by Robert G. Potter *et al.*, "Lactation and Its Effects Upon Birth Intervals in Eleven Punjab Villages," *Journal of Chronic Diseases*, XVIII (1965), 1130-1132. Anent Klara's shorter interpregnancy intervals before Adolf's birth, see A. Perez *et al.*, "Timing and Sequence of Resuming Ovulation and Menstruation After Childbirth," *Population Studies*, XXV (1971), 491-503, and H. Leridon, "Nouvelles données biométriques sur le post-partum," *Population*, XXVII (1972), 117-120. A pioneering historical study germane to all these questions is John Knodel and Etienne van de Walle, "Breast Feeding, Fertility and Infant Mortality: An Analysis of Some Early German Data," *Population Studies*, XXI (1967), 109-131.
125. Groth and Hahn, p. 107.
126. Medical report of April 2, 1924, in Lurker, p. 68. Hitler closed his defense on March 27, and sentence was passed on April 1.
127. BAK NS26/114/7, on Carola Hofmann; see Ernst Hanfstaengl, *Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus* (Munich, 1970), p. 157, on Hitler's other matronly providers—his "motherly friends," as he himself put it in Henry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1942* (Stuttgart, 1963), p. 193.
128. Friedelind Wagner, *The Royal Family of Bayreuth* (London, 1948), p. 30.

COMMENT BY GEORGE H. STEIN

History rarely repeats itself, but historians often repeat history. The recency of historical views is, therefore, no guarantee of their originality. Indeed, a good many historical "reinterpretations" and biographical "reassessments" represent nothing more than restatements or refinements, in currently fashionable language, of earlier views that have been out of fashion (or simply out of circulation) for a time. Take the case of Adolf Hitler, for example.

During and immediately after World War II, the Nazi dictator was widely regarded as a madman. This view, spontaneously adopted by the general public, was reinforced by the writings of journalists and historians as well as by the appearance of clinical analyses that purported to lay bare Hitler's twisted psyche. Given the relative paucity and unreliability of the factual evidence available at the time, it is not surprising that these early psychobiographical efforts were highly speculative. Nonetheless, they produced some suggestive, even plausible, interpretations of Hitler's character and motivations. The specific diagnoses, to be sure, varied considerably. Some clinicians labelled Hitler a paranoid, others an hysteric (a classical term no longer used in psychiatric practice). Several thought he was both. The specific abnormalities attributed to Hitler also covered a broad spectrum. Unresolved Oedipal conflict, fear of incest, sado-masochistic tendencies, syphilophobia, sexual perversion—all these and more were mentioned in the clinical literature of the 1940s. Despite their differences in regard to detail, however, virtually all of the clinical investigators agreed that Hitler was mentally deranged and that both his personal behavior and his public actions were, at bottom, conditioned by the psychic disorders from which he suffered. Even the now famous, formerly secret, report prepared for the Office of Strategic Services in 1943 by a team of psychoanalysts headed by Dr. Walter C. Langer added little but supportive detail to the clinical picture outlined by others in preceding years. Once again Hitler's personality and policies were ascribed to various psychic abnormalities, among which sexual perversion figured prominently.

In contrast to the war years, the 1950s witnessed a sharp decline in psychological probing on the part of those who studied Hitler closely. This is not the place to discuss in detail the reasons for this development. But changing times, interests, and intellectual styles certainly had much to do with it. While historically-oriented psychologists and psychiatrists increasingly shifted their attention from the actions of great men like Adolf Hitler to the relationship between individual psycho-dynamics and mass political behavior, professional historians, taking advantage of the flood of documentary material released in the wake of the Nuremberg trials, were generally too occupied with the demanding task of accurately reconstructing the external course of events to probe into the unconscious motivations of the historical actors. Besides, a reaction had set in among scholars against the long-standing view of Hitler as a lunatic. One need not look far for the reason. The notion of the demented dictator had taken on all the aspects of an alibi. The more Hitler's putative insanity was invoked as an excuse for the horrors of the Third Reich,

the less this explanation commended itself to historians striving to render a full and objective account of the period. And render they did, not only objectively but also thoroughly. For the 1950s and 1960s, with their vast output of writing on recent German history, were the years during which historians laid the broad and solid foundation on which all future knowledge of both the Third Reich and its creator must be based.

And what of the picture of Hitler that emerged from all this? Simply stated, the writings of such historians as Alan Bullock, H. R. Trevor-Roper, A. J. P. Taylor, Ernst Nolte, James H. McRandle, and Bradley F. Smith combined to create a portrait not so much of a mentally deranged individual as of an extraordinarily complex and undeniably gifted man with an insatiable lust for power and a seemingly infinite capacity for evil. Without denying the element of irrationality that colored Hitler's ideas, these scholars showed that his policies had a certain rationality and coherence. By discarding old clichés and simple-minded labels and by refusing to reduce Hitler's personality to the sum of his presumed psychic hangups, they enabled us, for the first time, to catch a glimpse of the whole man. That is precisely why their scholarship on Hitler is at once so impressive and so enduring. To say this is not to suggest that the more sober and differentiated appraisal of Hitler that has dominated historical scholarship for the past two decades is necessarily entirely correct or complete, nor is it to deny the existence of abnormal elements in Hitler's character; it is merely to point out that with the appearance of Alan Bullock's path-breaking biography in the early 1950s the attitude of historians (and to some extent that of the general public as well) began to change. In short, a new age of interpretation had begun, one in which Hitler's life and career could be viewed in terms of categories other than those of demonology and psychopathology.

That phase, however, may in turn be coming to an end. Once again we seem to be witnessing a shift in interests and intellectual styles. Among historians, the trend toward multi-disciplinary work has led to the establishment of a nominally new field of scholarship—psychohistory. While some of its practitioners have sought to move beyond the psychology of individual historical personages, others have taken the traditional path of psychobiographical investigation. Among the latter, several have recently focused their attention on Adolf Hitler. The first historian to break into print was Professor Robert G. L. Waite. He did so in 1971 with two provocative articles which, I presume, represent early installments of his forthcoming *The Psychopathic God*, a full-length biography of Hitler. Waite's collaborator, Dr. Norbert Bromberg, a psychiatrist, has also written about Hitler's character. Whether or not Waite and Bromberg were initially prompted to launch their own psychoanalytical investigations by the availability of the formerly secret OSS report, which was declassified in 1968, it seems evident that they were influenced by the work done by Dr. Langer and his associates during World War II. Just how much they were influenced by this earlier study became fully clear to me only while I was preparing my commentary on the paper Professor Waite was scheduled to deliver at the 1972 meeting of the American Historical Association. After comparing Waite's several studies (as well as Dr. Brom-

berg's contribution) with both the original Langer report and the clinical literature on Hitler published during the 1940s, I came to the conclusion these recent efforts represented little more than a refined restatement and modest extension (particularly in regard to Hitler's putative sexual abnormalities) of earlier psychoanalytical views on the subject.

I hasten to add that this is merely an observation, not a criticism. Just as current interpretations are not necessarily original, so older views are not necessarily invalid. Besides, not being a psychohistorian, I have no wish to deal directly with any of these clinical diagnoses of Hitler. I want only to point out that interpretations of Adolf Hitler's character and motivations seem to have come full circle in little more than a single generation. Thirty years ago virtually everyone outside of Germany (and not a few people inside the Third Reich as well) regarded Hitler as a lunatic. Fifteen years ago this view was relegated to the outer fringes of historical scholarship. Today it is once again occupying a central place. For Professor Waite, for Dr. Bromberg, for Dr. Langer (who has recently published a revised version of his wartime report under the title of *The Mind of Adolf Hitler*), and for Mr. Robert Payne (who has just produced a massive and already best-selling popular biography entitled *The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler*)—in short, for those whose writings currently hold the spotlight in this country—the essential fact about Hitler, the key to his behavior, is that he was a psychopath.

Now, this may well be true. But so far no one has proven it. Mr. Payne, for example, does not go much beyond asserting that Hitler was abnormal. This is regrettable but, I suppose, forgivable in what is after all intended to be a popular biography. And what of the work of the professionals? Theirs, of course, are serious and conscientious efforts. And they should not, indeed cannot, be lightly dismissed. But, as I argued at considerable length in New Orleans, the views championed by the Langer-Waite-Bromberg school of psychohistory, while suggestive, are far from conclusive. Although I made no direct effort to pass judgment on the substance of Professor Waite's psychological interpretations (a task for which I lack the requisite clinical expertise), I did (as I had been asked to do) attempt to evaluate the soundness of the historical evidence on which they were based. This I found wanting. I have neither the desire nor the space to repeat my commentary here. Let me simply say that I found the facts presented illusive and the sources used unreliable. These shortcomings were especially evident in connection with Professor Waite's central assertion: namely, that Hitler was sexually perverted and that this abnormality powerfully shaped not only his personal behavior but also his public policy. To be sure, this interpretation has a long history, and doubtless it will continue to seem plausible to those who are temperamentally or professionally disposed to such views. But the fragmentary historical evidence adduced in support of this colorful thesis is, in my judgment, wholly unpersuasive. For what it is worth, I might add that many of the points I raised at the AHA meeting have since been underscored by the appearance, in the April 1973 issue of the *American Historical Review*, of Professor Hans Gatzke's probing article-length review of Walter Langer's *The Mind of Adolf Hitler*.

To avoid any misunderstanding, it may be well to stress that my critique of the sexual perversion theory advanced by Messrs. Waite, Bromberg, and Langer should not be interpreted, as it has been in some quarters, as an attack on psychohistory. Quite the contrary. I think we need more, but better, psychohistory. And I suspect that we will get it when more of its practitioners begin to emulate Professor Binion's willingness to strike out in new directions and to adopt his insistence on hard factual evidence to support psychological interpretations.

I shall return to this last point shortly. But first let me note that Binion's article delivers a good deal more than its title promises. Written by a scholar who is as well versed in the discipline of psychology as he is in that of history, it presents a strikingly novel psychological interpretation not only of Hitler's concept of *Lebensraum* but also of his deadly anti-Semitism. Apart from the considerable contribution it makes to the theory and practice of psychohistory, Binion's study also touches on more conventional historical concerns. Historians have long recognized that anti-Semitism and the doctrine of eastern expansion—both expressed in various, often separate, manifestations long before either National Socialism or Hitler appeared on the scene—became the two central, mutually interdependent, elements of Hitler's fully developed *Weltanschauung*. They must now ponder the possibility that Hitler's murderous hatred for the Jews and his compulsive drive for living space in Eastern Europe were inextricably linked in his psyche as well. It is, then, one of the special merits of Professor Binion's presentation that it offers us, for the first time, a coherent psychological explanation for Hitler's otherwise inexplicable dual policy of brutal conquest and racial extermination.

Critics of psychoanalytical biography have frequently decried, perhaps justifiably, its excessive concern with early experiences of the sexual nature. In contrast to the orthodox Freudian analysis, linked to a classical Laswellian approach, which characterizes the psychohistorical work of Messrs. Langer, Bromberg, and Waite, Professor Binion has combined a number of more-or-less traditional Freudian elements with some refreshingly modern formulations. And the result, it seems to me, is a considerable advance in the debate surrounding the personality of Adolf Hitler. It is true, of course, that the connection between Dr. Bloch's treatment of Klara and Hitler's subsequent hatred for Jews has been drawn before. And some of the other elements of Binion's analysis have previously been mentioned by others. But even these points have been given new meaning and added weight by the way in which they have been interpreted and by the degree to which they have been buttressed by the new factual evidence that Binion has managed to uncover.

Binion, then, argues his case spiritedly and with solid evidence. But perhaps even more important in the long run is the attempt he seems to be making to move from micro- to macro-analysis, from the individual to the collective psychology—and back again. It has often been remarked that unless the emotional experience of the individual historical actor can be meaningfully related to that of the wider group and vice versa, psychohistory will remain limited to biography. And unless both individual and group analysis are thoroughly grounded in the concrete historical and social developments of

the time, both will remain mere psychopathology. Binion's article demonstrates that he is acutely aware of this, and we may expect that the larger study of which it is a part will tangibly reflect this awareness.

Before moving on to a consideration of Professor Binion's documentary addendum, it may be worthwhile to compare, however briefly, his general thesis with that of his principal rival in the field, Professor Robert G. L. Waite, as the latter presented it at the 1972 meeting of the AHA in New Orleans. The most obvious observations that can be made in comparing these two psychological interpretations of Adolf Hitler have to do not so much with their respective approaches as with their contradictory conclusions. It is of course true that they agree on several points. For example, they both agree that the central element, the driving force, in Hitler's adult life was his irrational hatred of Jews; both agree that his relationship with his mother during childhood and adolescence was not only unusually close but also decisive in his emotional development; both agree that after his mother's tragic death he transferred his strong maternal attachment to Germany, which became a kind of psychic mother-substitute for him; and, finally, both agree that his emotional problems not only sparked a violent animosity toward Jews but also decisively influenced the course of Nazi Germany's foreign policy.

So much for the major points of agreement. But the differences are far more important than the similarities. They are, indeed, fundamental. For what these two equally controversial interpretations do not agree upon are both the causes and the nature of Hitler's psychological problems. At the risk of once again oversimplifying for the sake of comparison, it can be said that Professor Waite sees Hitler's anti-Semitism and his whole monstrous career as having sprung from a particularly abhorrent sexual perversion, which in turn had grown out of a genital abnormality (monorchism) combined with a deeply disturbed, possibly incestuous, childhood relationship with his mother. Professor Binion, on the other hand, attributes Hitler's hatred of the Jews and what followed from it to a two-stage adult trauma, which in turn linked backward to his mother's own trauma and forward to Germany's collective trauma. There is one more thing. Professor Waite, like his clinical predecessors in the field, explicitly states that Hitler was mentally ill, characterizing him as a "patently pathological" person. Professor Binion, though he identifies some serious character disorders in Hitler's makeup, seems unwilling to associate himself with so radical a diagnosis. I see no way to reconcile these two psychological interpretations. If one is correct, surely the other must be incorrect. Of course, there is a third possibility: that neither is correct. My own feeling is that we will never really know. But this merely reflects my assessment of the limitations of psychohistory, whose value, I believe, lies in opening new vistas rather than in establishing final proof. And there can be no doubt that Professor Binion has provided a dramatic new perspective on Adolf Hitler.

Had Binion merely published the paper he read in New Orleans, this in itself would have constituted an important event in psychohistorical scholarship. In fact, he has done a great deal more. He has added to his original presentation a full set of reference notes as well as an extensive essay on the

sources he used in preparing his paper. Whatever psychiatrists may say about all this, historians will recognize it as an extraordinary feat of historical sleuthing. In a field where psychoanalytical speculation all too often takes the place of painstaking research, Professor Binion stands out as one who has delved deeply into a broad range of source materials. As a result, he has made discoveries of importance not only to psychohistorians but also to "conventional" scholars with an interest in Hitler and his times. Because this information was not included in the original paper neither Dr. Bromberg (the other commentator in the session) nor I could comment on it in New Orleans. Apparently some observers scoffed at the notion that Binion had the factual evidence to back up his arresting assertions. I was not one of them. Now obviously, Binion's analysis is not beyond criticism, nor are all of his factual data necessarily unassailable. But I find it difficult to understand how anyone familiar with his previous publications (is there anyone interested in psychohistory who is not?) could possibly doubt that his work would be based on anything but the most comprehensive and searching examination of the available sources. To say this is not necessarily to endorse Binion's psychological interpretations; it is merely to point out that they are, in my opinion, based on the same high level of serious scholarship as his previous historical writings. At any rate, Professor Binion has now laid out his voluminous evidence so that others can evaluate the degree to which it substantiates his findings. Those who choose to do so will doubtless be busy for a long time to come.

*George H. Stein is Professor of History at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He is the author of *The Waffen-SS* (Cornell, 1966) and editor of *Hitler* (Prentice-Hall, 1968), a volume of biographic material. He was one of two commentators on the panel on which Professor Binion read his paper in New Orleans.*

COMMENT BY BRADLEY F. SMITH

The current Hitler carnival featuring books, movies, magazine articles, TV shows and all the accompanying ballyhoo is not a setting in which the serious scholar can harbor high hopes for a judicious hearing. If he is a psychohistorian who has based his work on careful documentary investigation, the prevailing tension between psychohistorians and traditional historians adds further doubts as to whether he will receive his due. Rudolph Binion's decision to brave both of these unfavorable omens and publish a serious psychohistorical inquiry into Hitler's anti-Semitism and pursuit of *Lebensraum* thus deserves our special thanks.

In appraising my remarks on Binion's article, the reader should be aware that I am a traditional historian rather than a psychohistorian, and do not consider myself competent to judge the psychoanalytic dimensions of the work. I do think, however, that Hitler's career requires a far broader and

deeper examination of the psychological dimension than has been undertaken heretofore. The inadequacy of much of the traditional historical explanation may be seen by asking whether Hitler's career is explicable in terms of a man consciously pursuing goals which have been established by a rational and realistic appraisal of "things as they are (or were)." Allowing for the wooliness of many of these terms, such as "rational" and "realistic," and even taking into account the effects of social context and historical distance, it is still difficult to feel comfortable with the notion that Hitler's view was "normal" or that it accurately mirrored the conditions of his time. Of course one may argue, as most traditional historians have done, that Hitler donned ideological spectacles and that his vision was thereby distorted (note that Hitler himself stressed the word *Weltanschauung*, so the visual figure of speech is not farfetched). But for all the effects of ideology—not to speak of the psychological dimensions in ideology formation and commitment—it alone won't do. For ideology does not provide us with a satisfactory means of dealing with many aspects of Hitler that just don't fit—the passion and rage, the turns and twists in his political career, and the relish he showed for hate, death and destruction.

Traditional explanations have had a particularly difficult time with Hitler's anti-Semitism and the steps, or flow of events, that led to the "Final Solution," i.e. mass extermination. Hitler's intertwining of hatred and political cunning, the savagery of the persecutions, and the murky administrative and decision-making process which culminated in the exterminations, all constitute a supreme moral challenge and at the same time serve as the ultimate obstacle to an historical explanation of the Nazi regime. So on the issues of Hitler's anti-Semitism and the "Final Solution," Binion is focusing on points where psychohistorians should receive a cordial welcome from traditionalists. (As we will see below, the welcome mat may not as yet be so readily extended on the question of Hitler's idea of *Lebensraum*.)

My comments are not intended to be a detailed dissection of Binion's article. They will first focus on portions of the article concerned with anti-Semitism which I think throw light on the current traditional-psychohistorical controversy, and then turn to some questions about the historical framing of Binion's investigation of the *Lebensraum* problem.

Nearly every discussion between traditionalists and psychohistorians turns on the question of documentary usage, so it is appropriate that we begin there. Of the large amount of material which Binion has included in his "About my Sources" section, I will focus on the evidence relating to Hitler's presence in Linz during the last three months of his mother's terminal illness, i.e., October-December 1907, since it is the documentary foundation stone of Binion's psychological explanation. It also has a paradoxical attraction, for as Binion has persuaded me to change my opinion on this issue, he has also raised some serious doubts in my mind about the role of "facts" in psychohistory.

Let me quickly summarize the evidence. In their "memoirs" both August Kubizek and Dr. Bloch paint glowing pictures of Hitler's return to Linz so that he could nurse his dying mother. Their testimony is suspect, not only be-

cause they make numerous mistakes of fact,¹ but because their lavish portrayal of Hitler's solicitude for his dying mother fits too neatly with a major *Leitmotiv* of both their writings—their bewilderment that Hitler turned out to be such a bad man, since when they had known him he was such a nice boy. The picture of the loving son and the dying mother helps to push the creation of "monster Hitler" off to later times and onto other "companions." The credibility of Bloch's statements is strengthened, however, by the fact that he retained the texts of two postcards which Hitler had sent to him. Bloch claimed that he only kept the cards (until the GESTAPO confiscated them) because he wanted to retain mementos of a boy who was devoted to his mother. It is difficult to see why Bloch would have kept the cards for thirty years unless some such strong personal impression had been made upon him. Unfortunately, Dr. Bloch's account of the text message on one of the cards raises an additional point of confusion, for as Binion indicates, Hitler signed himself "your ever grateful patient Adolf Hitler" and there is no indication from any source that Adolf himself was ever a patient of Bloch. So where the cards fit in—one is undated and the other card contains New Years greetings, presumably from early 1908 after Klara Hitler's death—and what they signify about the relationship between Bloch and Adolf Hitler is at least obscure.

Mein Kampf, as usual, adds nothing but additional confusion since Hitler's account muddles together his failures in secondary school with his mother's death to project an image of himself as the heroic orphan who was forced to strike out on his own at the age of eighteen (in fact his financial situation was never as dire as *Mein Kampf* suggests and his iron determination to play Horatio Alger was an autobiographical fiction). In any event, *Mein Kampf* makes no mention of whether or not Hitler was present during his mother's last illness.

Franz Jetzinger in his book *Hitlers Jugend* focuses attention on a postmaster's wife who was a neighbor of the Hitlers in Urfahr and who lived on into the post-*Anschluss* Greater German Reich, from which she received preferential treatment. During the Nazi era, this lady claimed that she was the one who summoned Adolf from Vienna at the time of his mother's illness, and although as Jetzinger admits she babbled on "in her senile way," she repeatedly asserted that she and Klara's sister Johanna nursed Klara during her last illness and that "Adolf erst *nach* dem Tode seiner Mutter gekommen sei."² Remarks by this same woman are clearly the basis for the article summary "Adolf Hitler in Urfahr!"—apparently another product of the post-*Anschluss* Führer cult, in which the postmaster's widow is again said to have summoned Hitler from Vienna to his mother's sick bed. Since it seems to have been a Nazi article, with every reason to dramatize the picture of the devoted son Adolf nursing his mother at her death bed, the lack of such a portrayal inclined me to believe that the Nazi journalists could get the old lady to say that she had summoned him all right, but they couldn't get her to say that he had arrived in time.³ Balancing off all of these confusing possibilities, gaps and tainted witnesses, I concluded a few years ago that Adolf most likely did not arrive in Linz before his mother died.

Now Rudolph Binion presents two pieces of strong evidence that tip the other way. The first is the statement by Paula Hitler from the John Toland collection that Adolf was there through the whole period. The second is Binion's truly splendid decipherment of Dr. Bloch's medical record (akin to a modern Linear B) which seems to me to establish that Adolf was in Linz at least part of the time during Klara's final illness. I add the qualification, part of the time, because of Bloch's notational distinction between "Besprechung" and "Besprechung Herr." The latter notation must certainly have applied to Adolf, the only other male to which the "Herr" could even theoretically have applied was Adolf's brother-in-law, Leo Raubal, a very unlikely possibility. But there were two other people who could have been referred to by the notation "Besprechung," specifically Adolf's half sister, Angela Raubal, and Klara's sister Johanna who appears to have nursed Klara during her illness and whose residence in January 1908 was officially listed as "Blütengasse 9, Urfahr", i.e. the Hitler residence.⁴ Thus some question remains whether the "Besprechung" notations in Bloch's account refer to Adolf, for they could refer to Johanna or even Angela. But this is only a question of whether Adolf was there through the whole three months. On the central point Binion's investigation has convinced me that in a murky situation the evidence now tips in favor of the conclusion that Hitler was probably in Linz when his mother died.

As a traditional historian, I don't feel the evidence is ironclad, but it would be good enough to use the possible or probable effects of witnessing his mother's final death agony as part of a general pattern of crises and alienation which characterized Hitler's later childhood and early youth. As such, it could take its place as part of what might be seen as a horizontal layer of alienating circumstances—his failures in secondary school, overindulgence by his mother, the failure to gain admission to the art academy, etc. Some of these items could be documented better than others, but they all concern possibilities or probabilities rather than certainties when we come to estimate their impact on the young Hitler. However, when one takes the single incident of Adolf's presence at his mother's deathbed and uses it as the foundation stone to construct a vertical psychohistorical explanation of Hitler's subsequent behavior, then the importance of authenticating that incident becomes critical. Self-evidently, in a vertical structure, if the foundation stone is shaky, even if the superstructure is strengthened by a firm theoretical framework, the whole structure may appear to wobble. As we all know, logical verification of statements of historical fact has innumerable pitfalls, and even if we follow the spirit of Faust and recognize that it is not the good spirit "who always denies," it is still easier to deny than to verify historical assertions. In this particular case, I still have some doubts, not because of any failure on Binion's part, but due to the skimpy extant documentation on Hitler's early years and the logical problems inherent in building vertical historical structures on single foundation stones.

Although the portion of Binion's article devoted to the topic of anti-Semitism primarily summarizes the more extended remarks which he made in an earlier paper, there are a few conceptual questions which may be briefly

touched on here. One new aspect of his discussion is the question whether or not Hitler was "anti-Semitic" prior to his personal and political crisis in 1918-1919. Anyone looking at the evidence should agree that the positive documentation for Hitler's pre-1918 anti-Semitism is meager, but the support that can be marshaled in favor of the idea that he was not anti-Semitic is also weak. At all times it is much more difficult to prove that something did not exist than to prove that it did, especially if the point at issue is what an individual man thought or felt. However, it seems to me that the primary difficulty in this case is summarized in Binion's statement referring to Hitler prior to 1918 in which he says, "he was no more of an anti-Semite than nearly any Austro-German or Reich German of the time. The anti-Semitic rage and the anti-Semitic world view were still to come." Even now, after countless efforts to delineate the line between "simple prejudice" and "ideological racism" it is a very tenuous distinction, and it is extremely difficult to keep the line of demarcation clear when applied to a particular individual. For a young man such as Hitler to have grown up in turn-of-the-century Austria without having his social anti-Semitism infected by ideological anti-Semitism seems to me nearly impossible. Binion is surely right that there is no evidence that the anti-Semitic rage was there before 1919, but the absence of ideological anti-Semitism is much more difficult to establish and, without laboring the point further, I don't see where it is critical to his case.

The concluding portion of Binion's discussion of anti-Semitism deserves brief comment since it too seems to touch on a difference of approach between traditional history and psychohistory. Binion says that the expulsion program, the Euthanasia program, and the "Final Solution" constituted a "psychological continuum for Hitler" related to his mother's last illness and death. The problem that perplexes me is what do we do with Hitler's other actions relevant to persecution of Jews and maltreatment of the handicapped? What of the sterilization law of 1933, the anti-Jewish boycott of the same year, the Nürnberg laws of 1935, the *Kristallnacht* in 1938, the establishment of murderous ghettos in Poland in 1939-1940, and the mass slaughter produced by the *Einsatzgruppen* in Russia during 1941? In short, if the three high points of expulsion, Euthanasia, and the Final Solution "formed a psychological continuum for Hitler," did the other points in the persecution, maltreatment, and killing also fit that continuum or were they exceptions?

Having struggled with the anti-Semitic issue for a number of pages and as usual ended up with a series of anticlimactic question marks, it seems high time to turn to the problem of Hitler's advocacy of eastern *Lebensraum*. Here my comments will focus primarily on the historical framework of Binion's interpretation rather than on methodological considerations. Historians have long been puzzled by what appears in *Mein Kampf* (vol. I) to have been Hitler's abrupt conversion to the desirability of conquering *Lebensraum* in the east. The customary explanation is to point to the influence of Rudolf Hess, who enjoyed a close working relationship with Hitler during his incarceration in Landsberg prison. According to this explanation, Hess, who had been a student of the geopolitician Karl Haushofer, served as an intermediary to bring the ideas of his old professor to the attention of his new

Führer, and the result was the eastern *Lebensraum* section in *Mein Kampf*. A fairly extensive investigation has been made of the influence of Haushofer on Hitler during this period and it seems likely that Haushofer did visit Hess and Hitler in Landsberg prison and did provide them with geopolitical materials.⁵ However, Hitler was never inclined to be anyone's pupil. And there is an obvious difficulty in the argument that Haushofer was the driving force behind Hitler's notion of launching a *Lebensraum* crusade against Russia, for Haushofer simultaneously advocated an expansion of *Lebensraum* and a close alliance with Russia. Despite some confusion in his thought, the potential zones which Haushofer envisioned for German *Lebensraum* lay in central Europe and overseas; especially for the latter goal, Haushofer saw England as Germany's natural enemy and Russia as Germany's natural ally.⁶ So more must have been involved in Hitler's advocacy of a march after eastern *Lebensraum* than a pedagogical triumph by Karl Haushofer.

In the early 1960s, a number of German scholars began to reinterpret the *Lebensraum* problem while demonstrating that Hitler's views on foreign policy underwent significant changes between 1919 and 1925.⁷ These studies culminated in the appearance of Eberhard Jäckel's *Hitlers Weltanschauung* in 1969. Jäckel argued that Hitler's foreign policy program was initially little more than a crude tirade against the Treaty of Versailles⁸ and against France, which Hitler portrayed as the primary and mortal enemy of Germany. From there, during the years 1920-1923, Hitler gradually developed the thesis that Germany should form close alliances with Italy and England in order to destroy Versailles and to facilitate a war of revenge against France. During his confinement in Landsberg, Hitler then produced the program for a campaign against Russia in order to obtain *Lebensraum*. But the latter idea took shape in Hitler's mind quite independently from the development of his foreign policy thinking during the previous four years, and, more significantly, it did not fit in well with the old primary goal of the overthrow of Versailles and a showdown with France. In the years 1925-1928, according to Jäckel, Hitler struggled with the problem of reconciling these two foreign policies and finally did so, at least to his satisfaction, by concluding that Western alliances were necessary to demolish France, thereby safeguarding Germany in the west and freeing her to launch a campaign for *Lebensraum* in the east. The old primary goal of the defeat of France had thus become a preparatory step to the new objective of a military conquest of land in Russia.

Recently Jäckel's view of Hitler's two foreign policies—the war of revenge against France and the attack on Russia for *Lebensraum*—has been seriously questioned by a young German scholar, Axel Kuhn, who argues that Hitler's early foreign policy ideas were not marked by a radical shift in 1924 but were shaped by a series of changes which took place between 1922 and 1924.⁹ At the risk of oversimplifying a carefully formulated thesis, let us look at the main points in Kuhn's case. Like Jäckel, Kuhn sees Hitler's first foreign policy objective as the overthrow of Versailles, but notes how bitterly Hitler condemned Great Britain as well as France during the years 1919-1921. Kuhn also demonstrates that in his denunciation of Versailles, Hitler repeatedly mentioned that the treaty crippled Germany's ability to support her popula-

tion (*"Politik der Zahl"*) and that the loss of territory in Europe as well as the loss of her colonies was a mortal blow to the future of the Reich.¹⁰ Two additional themes loom large in the picture Kuhn presents of Hitler's early views on foreign policy—his insistence that all Germans be united in one Reich and his bitter attacks on "Jewish Bolshevism." Hitler thus had two primary foreign policy enemies—"Jewish Bolshevism" and the defenders of the Versailles Treaty (France and Britain)—as well as two primary foreign policy goals aside from the overthrow of the treaty, namely the formation of a greater German Reich and the acquisition of the economic foundations to support a large, expanding German population.

In the course of 1921-1922, Hitler toyed with alliance possibilities which would further his foreign policy objectives. France was dismissed out of hand, and England received little more consideration, for both were "basic" enemies of Germany. Hitler was intrigued with the prospect of a German-Russian alliance aimed against the Versailles treaty and Britain's imperial domination of the world, but the precondition for such an agreement, in Hitler's view, was that the Whites must win the civil war and Russia must cease to be the home of "Jewish Bolshevism."¹¹ At no point in this stage of his career did Hitler look sympathetically upon an actual, or possible, agreement with Soviet Russia. Hitler was attracted by the prospect of a partnership with Italy even before Mussolini became Premier, yet in the Italian case too, there was a serious obstacle. As a result of World War I, Italy had acquired the South Tyrol, which contained a large German population. A German-Italian alliance would necessitate the German renunciation of the South Tyrolean Germans, a volatile issue in South German states such as Bavaria, and one which would clearly compromise Hitler's goal of a greater German Reich. So whichever way Hitler turned in 1921 and early 1922, there was no alliance possibility which coincided with all of his foreign policy objectives.

Then in late 1922 and 1923 circumstances in Germany and Europe changed in ways that induced Hitler to make adjustments and compromises. Mussolini came to power in Italy (October 1922), making a German-Italian alliance more attractive to Hitler, while the Soviets' victory in the Russian civil war made a German-Russian alliance extremely unattractive. In addition, France and Belgium invaded the Ruhr (January 1923), and in the ensuing political turmoil, Britain condemned French policy, a sign that the wartime Anglo-French alliance was on the verge of collapse. The Ruhr invasion also created such political havoc in Germany that it enhanced Hitler's hope of attaining power, and thus it was incumbent upon him to develop a "realistic" foreign policy. As Kuhn demonstrates, Hitler went quietly about the task of producing such a foreign policy in 1923, first by espousing an Italian alliance, even at the cost of sacrificing the South Tyrolean Germans and compromising his pan-Germanic ideal,¹² and secondly by the gradual reversal of his position on England. Heavily emphasizing the British interest in maintaining a balance of power on the continent, Hitler argued that in 1923 British-German cooperation could be achieved on the basis of common opposition to French expansion.¹³

Hitler's gradual formulation of a foreign policy based on a German-Italian and a German-British alliance took place over the year from late 1922 to November 1923. Since Hitler was primarily concerned with German domestic politics and was pointing toward an imminent attainment of power, it is not surprising that his foreign policy developed comparatively slowly. In any event, by the time of the Beer Hall Putsch on 8/9 November 1923, Hitler recognized that he had tarnished the ideal of a Greater Germany by advocating an Italian alliance, but he had not yet come to grips with the fact that by espousing an English alliance, he had compromised his belief in the "*Politik der Zahl*," for such an alliance would require Germany to relinquish her claims to colonies and her dreams of *Weltpolitik*.¹⁴ Once his trial was over, Kuhn argues, Hitler had an opportunity to think over the implications of his position, and then it didn't take much prompting from the likes of Rudolf Hess and Karl Haushofer to show him that the solution to the problem of the "*Politik der Zahl*" might lie in seizing *Lebensraum* from the land of "Jewish Bolshevism."

If Kuhn's explanation is confirmed by subsequent research and discussion, for here again we face the problem of fragmentary documentation, Hitler's foreign policy views in 1924 were the product of a gradual evolution, and the traditional picture of Hitler's abrupt leap to *Lebensraum* politics in Landsberg prison will have to be sharply modified. Perhaps Binion's account of the psychological forces at work will still be applicable without modification, but it is important to note that at the present time, the historical picture is not very stable.¹⁵

In conclusion, one may ask whether my questions, qualifications and comments constitute a condemnation of Binion's article. They most decidedly are not intended to, for not only do I feel that he has advanced our understanding, to use the hackneyed phrase, but in the light of the Hitler carnival mentioned in the first sentence of this commentary, he has achieved much more. By late 1973, it is abundantly clear that no definitive picture of Hitler is now possible, in part because nothing appears capable of stopping the onrush of Hitler publications. Apparently no amount of repetition, moral indignation, or even boredom can stop them, and so we will have to live with a permanent Hitlerian presence.

Someone once said in praising Mark Twain that "he made the common people laugh, and who in the history of literature has done more?" One may say of Rudolf Binion that he should make Hitler biographers pause and ponder, and who in the age of permanent Hitleriana can hope to do more?

Bradley F. Smith teaches history at Cabrillo College. He has written Adolf Hitler. His Family, Childhood and Youth (Stanford, 1967) and Heinrich Himmler. A Nazi in the Making, 1900-1926 (Stanford, 1971). He is now collaborating with Mrs. Agnes F. Peterson on an edition of Himmler's speeches.

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1. That neither Kubizek nor Bloch is very reliable does not constitute a matter of disagreement between Binion and myself (see Binion's note 22 and his text between notes 58 and 59). Every scholar concerned with this period finds it necessary to ignore much of what they say, prayerfully accept some of their statements and ruefully acknowledge that we probably are not very consistent.
2. Underlined in the original. Franz Jetzinger, *Hitlers Jugend* (Vienna, 1956), p. 176.
3. Binion has remarked that he thinks my doubting interpretation of this item is overstrained, which it may be.
4. Jetzinger, *Hitlers Jugend*, p. 183.
5. Karl Lange, "Der Terminus 'Lebensraum' in Hitlers *Mein Kampf*," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 13, no. 4, October 1965, pp. 426-437.
6. See esp. Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer. Geopolitics in Action* (Port Washington, N.Y., 1966), pp. 150-153.
7. See esp. Günter Schubert, *Anfänge nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik* (Cologne, 1963) and Fritz Dickmann, "Machtwille und Ideologie in Hitlers aussenpolitischen Zielsetzungen vor 1933" in Konrad Repgen and Stephan Skalweit (eds.), *Spiegel der Geschichte. Festgabe für Max Braubach zum 10. April 1964* (Münster, Westphalia), 1964.
8. For a penetrating evaluation of German blind and bitter rejection of Versailles, see Gerhard L. Weinberg, "The Defeat of Germany in 1918 and the European Balance of Power," *Central European History*, vol. 2, no. 3, September 1969, pp. 248-260.
9. Axel Kuhn, *Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm* (Stuttgart, 1970).
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37, 39, 63, and 65.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-69.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-45, 72-74, and 81-83.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-95.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-104.
15. Even if the emphasis on 1924 is retained as the turning point for Hitler's commitment to an eastern *Lebensraum* policy, there are other factors in that period which would have helped to make the idea congenial to him. Friedrich Heer has suggested that a "crusade" against "Jewish Bolshevism" would readily gain support from conservative clerical circles in Bavaria (Friedrich Heer, *Der Glaube des Adolf Hitler. Anatomie einer politischen Religiosität* [Munich and Esslingen, 1968], pp. 239-240), and this may have played some part in Hitler's thinking after the Putsch failure. Probably more important was the fact that the Putsch attempt had elevated Ludendorff to a kind of dual-Führer status with Hitler (see Wolfgang Horn, *Führerideologie und Parteiorganisation in der NSDAP (1919-1933)* [Düsseldorf, 1972], pp. 160f.) which became an especially serious problem for Hitler since the court jailed him and left Ludendorff free to carry on political activity. As it turned out, Ludendorff bungled his opportunities, but throughout 1924 it was obviously in Hitler's interest to rise above the various factional struggles and especially to elevate himself above Ludendorff. An espousal of his own "eastern expansion policy" can thus be seen in part as an effort to trump Ludendorff's ace. There is a hint from the mid-1930s that Hitler long remained sensitive about any suggestion that he had stolen Ludendorff's program, for Hermann Rauschning quotes Hitler as saying: "In the east and south-east, I do not follow General Ludendorff or anyone else; I follow the iron law of our historical development." Hermann Rauschning, *The Voice of Destruction* (New York, 1940), p. 39.

COMMENT BY GEORGE L. MOSSE

Professor Binion's article illustrates the basic dilemma of psychohistory. He has made a contribution to our better understanding of some tendencies latent in Hitler's personality through his examination of the two traumas: that connected with his mother's death and the experience in the hospital at Passau after the war. However, I have strong doubts about the conclusions which Professor Binion draws from these investigations. Though he states that he has provided only part of Hitler's psychological picture, nevertheless he does attempt to account for all of Hitler's actions against the Jews and his conquest of Eastern Europe by these traumas which he has analysed in some detail.

Values break through in any discussion of historical causes, and Professor Binion is certainly entitled to his value system based upon Freudian psychoanalysis. But it seems to me that he has, in consequence of his pre-suppositions, ignored some important historical evidence: he gives too much priority to psychological theory as against the historical dimension which must have helped to form Adolf Hitler's mind and thought. Let us take one example: can it really be maintained that Hitler awoke from his trance in 1918 determined to kill the Jews, or is his anti-Semitism of much earlier origin? The article discusses some of the evidence against Hitler's early anti-Semitism in a somewhat inconclusive manner. The important book on Hitler's Vienna period by Friedrich Heer is not mentioned, and yet it contains ample evidence about Hitler's anti-Semitism in Vienna.¹ The evidence provided by Wilfried Daim about Hitler's relationship with Lanz von Liebenfels in that period is brushed aside because Hitler only saw Lanz in order to buy back issues of his racist journal *Ostara*. But Daim adds that Hitler also told Lanz that while in Vienna, he had regularly bought this journal.² At the very least such evidence is as weighty as the point by Professor Binion's witness that he himself never heard Hitler make an anti-Semitic remark. But, even apart from such conflicting evidence, it is undeniably true that the *content* of Hitler's racism was determined by the sect of which Liebenfels was a leading member, as well as by the Munich "cosmic" philosophers such as Alfred Schuler.³ This content was deepened after the war by his political mentor Dietrich Eckart. In opposition to the very concrete content of Hitler's racist thought, the hallucinations which Professor Binion describes are so general that they could be duplicated almost at random. Moreover, the article's argument that Hitler could not have invented these hallucinations seems to me especially weak. Here a controversial clinical factor is introduced into what should have been demonstrated through historical proof. It seems much more likely that the pragmatist Hitler exploited these hallucinations for his own political advantage as he did everything else. For example, he discovered in 1921 that emphasis upon the Jewish question acted as cement for the new Nazi party.⁴ Professor Binion will have to face the evidence for such pragmatism in making his psychoanalytical studies.

The linking of the Euthanasia program with Hitler's childhood experience seems to me the weakest part of Professor Binion's argument. For one thing, sterilisation etc. was not a Nazi invention. The basic law which made Euthanasia possible (the 1933 law to protect the community from inheriting genetically undesirable characteristics) had precedent: the State of Indiana enacted such a law in 1907.⁵ Moreover, racial eugenics were an integral part of racial thought. It is difficult to see the relevance of a childhood trauma to actions which logically grew out of the acceptance of this racial thought, and which any racist in power would have tried to implement—especially if he was a disciple of the peculiar and mystical racism of Liebenfels and Schuler.

Surely in history it is very difficult to separate the special and the general—especially in a case like Hitler's where a political leader was so much in tune with popular longings and aspirations. Hitler was never "retarded" as Professor Binion states; he was provincial and formed his taste, like many Europeans, upon the neo-classicism which he had studied in his Viennese youth. But as the artistic was for Hitler a matter of central importance, the fact that he derived his tastes from the Vienna of his youth might also reflect upon the chronology of his anti-Semitism. The ideal of beauty which he transferred to his political movement after the war was shared by most of his countrymen, and so was the concept of ugliness (typified by the Jew) which, I believe, he imbibed at the identical time during his apprenticeship. Moreover, Hitler did not really talk his way to the top, as Professor Binion puts it, but he acted within a carefully worked out *mise en scène* which transformed his speech into one symbolism among many others. Politics for Hitler was a liturgical rite, informed by traditional German categories of beauty and ugliness; a style of politics which enabled so many to identify with the Nazi movement as a political drama.⁶ But this essential factor in Hitler's success does not seem related to the traumas discussed—for then the whole nation, which followed him so willingly, would have been traumatised.

But this is exactly what Professor Binion claims as following from the logic of his arguments. Yet, what does such a concept, usually applied to an individual, mean when applied to a whole nation? Very little, I think. It is claimed that the German *Drang nach Osten* was somehow traumatic, but such a statement is meaningless unless it is shown that Italian or British expansion was not traumatic, while the German thirst for living space had this peculiar characteristic. I doubt whether this can be demonstrated. More to the point was the German discussion about young and old nations deriving from Germany's late entrance into world politics. But the consequences of these discussions can be analysed in purely historical terms, as Fritz Fischer demonstrated, and without reference to extraneous categories of individual psychoanalysis somehow transferred upon a whole people.⁷ All nations which were strong enough have attempted to create additional living space for themselves; there is nothing traumatic about that.

The criticisms which I have made could be countered by making much more modest claims for psychohistory. Professor Binion's researches, up to this point, can show us tendencies latent in Hitler's character without jumping to the conclusion that they were the sole cause of Hitler's most important

actions. Historical causation is never total; cultural, economic and social factors come into it, the whole sweep of contemporary history to which Hitler related himself with such success. Perhaps it is difficult for psychoanalysis, which thinks of itself as a science, to tolerate other causations besides its own. I am sure that most psychohistorians will want to reject such unicausal explanations, for they do not advance us much further into historical reality.

Perhaps I might add one more remark: Freudian psychoanalysis bears the ideological mark of its founder, linked as he was to the ideas of liberalism and enlightenment. The presuppositions of this kind of psychoanalysis can have very undesirable side effects when categories relevant to individual cases are projected upon the larger canvas of history; if the Germans were traumatized, if Hitler was somehow pathological or retarded, then the significance of National Socialism is reduced to a once-only episode. It could then be said that Hitler and his movement (indeed the German nation) deviated from the course of world history (defined as the healthy world of a liberalistic positivism), and once the daemonic forces were laid to rest the world would again become rational and liberal as well. These are dangerous illusions which falsify history, especially history in an age of mass movements and mass politics. Professor Binion has avoided such a mistake, though it is inherent in his analysis. I hope he will face this problem head on, in an extension of his study. We come back even here to the problem of the special and the general which has been the theme of my remarks.

Psychoanalysis can no longer be ignored by historians, but the problems I have tried to raise cannot be ignored either. Perhaps a solution to the criticisms which I have felt compelled to make can come through a debate such as this.

George L. Mosse is Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin. He is the author of several works on pre-Nazi and Nazi culture, including The Crisis of German Ideology (New York, 1964), Nazi Culture (New York, 1966) and Germans and Jews (New York, 1970).

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1. Friedrich Heer, *Der Glaube des Adolf Hitler* (Munich, 1965). This book discusses not only the Catholic anti-Semitic component in Austria and how this must have affected Hitler, but also his reading of Weininger, Trebitsch and Ostara (p. 168).
2. Wilfried Daim, *Der Mann, der Hitler die Ideen gab* (Munich, 1958), p. 21. Bradley Smith believed that the reading and study of anti-Semitic literature was the most important factor in Hitler's anti-Jewish ideology. Bradley Smith, *Adolf Hitler, His Family, Childhood and Youth* (Stanford, 1967), p. 149.
3. His contact with Schuler etc. has been discussed in my *Crisis of German Ideology* (New York, 1964) and will be discussed in more detail, I am sure, in the forthcoming book by Ellic Howe on Hitler and the Volkish sects.
4. I.e. Georg Franz Willing, *Die Hitlerbewegung* (Hamburg, 1962).
5. Walter Schulte, "Euthanasie und Sterilisation im Dritten Reich," *Deutsches Geistesleben und Nationalsozialismus* (Tuebingen, 1965), p. 76.
6. Here I have to refer to my study, which will be published in the spring of 1974: *The*

Nationalisation of the Masses; Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich (Howard Fertig, New York). People who knew Hitler, such as Gerdy Troost and Albert Speer, assert that Hitler never progressed beyond the world of his youth, i.e. 1880-1910. This evidence has to be given serious consideration. It would require a great deal of new evidence to prove that the anti-Semitism of his world did not affect him then. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York, 1970), p. 42.

7. Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York, 1967).

COMMENT BY NORBERT BROMBERG

The term psychohistory, in some respects, is an unfortunate one. It seems to suggest that generally history is written without any psychological consideration and that therefore psychohistory is a superior form even if it includes the use of psychological theories and hypotheses as facts, or the misuse of psychological concepts and clinical findings. The fact of the matter, of course, is that the writing of history has never consisted of a mere concatenation of bald facts without any interpretation involving the psychological insight and judgment of the historian. Interpretation based on psychological considerations is often part of good historical writing. What distinguishes so-called psychohistory from just history is that it replaces unscientific, "common sense" psychology with psychoanalytic psychology.

Psychoanalysis has three aspects. It is not only a form of psychotherapy and a research tool, but also the best general psychology that we have. As a developing scientific general psychology, it integrates psychoanalytic clinical findings with those of other disciplines. Some of these are cultural anthropology, direct observation (of infants and the interaction between mothers and infants) and experimental studies such as those involving dreams, perception, etc. Thus, psychohistory, if we must use that term, should consist of the integration of well founded psychoanalytic concepts in the writing of history. This is not to suggest that hypotheses and theories have any less a place in psychoanalysis—applied or unapplied—than in other sciences. It merely means that when they are used in any context, theories should be clearly designated as such.

Binion presents us with an imaginative and intriguing theory which holds that nations react to traumas with the same tendency to repeat them that the traumatized individual often manifests. He offers us no basis for this assumption but states it as a fact. The same is true about his other hypotheses. For instance: There can be no doubt that Klara suffered very much before the birth of Adolf. But it is a far leap to say that "... he sucked in that maternal trauma with his mother's milk" or that, "The closest personal influence behind this justification [for the "living space" theory] was his nursing and, behind that, his mother's maternal trauma which had fed into his nursing," or that, "His mother's maternal trauma went with his orality because it had

gone into his nursing as she relived her trauma unconsciously—and for this reason too it went into his prescription for Germany's unconscious reliving of the German trauma," or that, "... the contrived, controlled repetition of a traumatic experience is an effort at assimilating it, so that this assimilative effort of his mother's as he was nursing must have come through to him as the counterpart that it was to his own oral activity, which was also a losing effort at assimilation—of the mother-breast, the mother, the universe entire." Careful studies, some of which I have cited elsewhere, revealed that depression and other states which a mother may suffer, may have specific effects on her infant. But I know of no studies that demonstrate that a mother's trauma, or her efforts to assimilate it, are transferred as such to her infant either literally or figuratively through her milk.

Another pillar of the structure on which Binion's thesis rests is the claim that there was a link "in Hitler's psychology" between his two purposes: killing Jews and conquering Russia. The first of his two aims, that of killing the Jews, "derived from a trauma in two stages dated 1907 to 1918 respectively." From this point on, Binion tries to negotiate a number of hurdles with questionable success.

While a great deal of apparently painstakingly detailed circumstantial data is adduced that Klara Hitler was poisoned by Dr. Bloch's iodoform treatment, there is no direct evidence of it, nor that it "affected her mind."

If Klara were poisoned, there is no evidence that Adolf was aware of it or even suspected it. Nevertheless, Binion postulates that Hitler associated his own battlefield gas poisoning with the iodoform poisoning that his mother is supposed to have suffered in 1907.

After recovering from the gas poisoning Hitler had a relapse associated with an hysterical trance. "In his trance *he was not expressly called upon to kill Jews*; nonetheless he emerged from his trance resolved on entering politics *in order to kill the Jews* by way of discharging his mission to undo and reverse Germany's defeat" (italics mine). If he was not expressly called upon to kill the Jews, that is, if he did not expressly tell himself to kill the Jews in his trance, how can it be said that he emerged from it resolved on entering politics "in order to" kill the Jews?

The sentence following the one just quoted reads: "The Final Solution actualized his deepest reaction to his gas poisoning of 1918 associated with his mother's death at Bloch's hands in 1907." (I cannot help noting that on the basis of his circumstantial data Binion has already convicted Dr. Bloch as Klara's murderer.) But the gas poisoning method was not immediately used for the extermination of the Jews. It was applied only later when other methods were found not adequately efficient for the size of the undertaking. Thus, if earlier extermination methods had been adequate to the task, the Final Solution would more obviously have had no relation to Hitler's gas poisoning and his mother's alleged iodoform poisoning.

There is so much evidence to the contrary, that it would be interesting to know what the basis is for the statement that Hitler's message about the Jews "did not penetrate the consciousness of his individual listeners or readers any more than did his later message about eastward expansion . . ."

The sources for all the statements in the paper are not given on the grounds that the source material is so voluminous and complex that it would require a book-length presentation. I shall therefore comment on the sources that are mentioned for one of the issues that is basic to the paper's thesis: the time that Hitler first became ragefully anti-Semitic. In the first place, to say that before 1918 Hitler was "no more of an anti-Semite than nearly any Austro-German or Reich German of the time," and that "the anti-Semitic rage was still to come," is to ignore the evidence that from his adolescence on, Hitler was full of rage and all his dislikes and hates were rageful.

But there is much more evidence that Hitler's anti-Semitism started as he, himself, says around 1907. Even though Binion recognizes that Hitler probably unconsciously blamed the Jewish doctor, Bloch, for Klara's death in 1907, he insists that the anti-Semitic ideas which this furthered did not surface in their great intensity until 1918. This, despite the evidence of four witnesses to the contrary (in addition to Hitler, himself) about whom he expresses the hope: "Perhaps they can be discredited." Against these he presents two "supremely qualified" witnesses who claim that they never or hardly ever heard Hitler utter an anti-Semitic word during World War One. Indeed, a Nazi archivist is quoted as having discovered that Hitler's favorite actors and singers were "almost only Jews." To cite this as evidence of Hitler's lack of anti-Semitism is to betray a lack of comprehension of Hitler's personality structure. Without going into details in this matter, one has only to be reminded that, from childhood on, Hitler allowed very few things to stand in the way of the gratification of his wishes. Long after he had adopted his anti-Semitic world view, he was not the least disturbed to learn that the cook he preferred was a Jewess and therefore continued to keep her serving him.

Among the four witnesses to Hitler's anti-Semitism long before 1918, is August Kubizek, his companion for about two-and-a-half years during their adolescence. Binion finds him reliable enough to quote him in another context but dismisses him, in this connection, as one who "mixed fact and fancy." I have read Kubizek carefully and found no evidence for this. True, the book contains passages which involve the mixing of fact and fantasy, but these relate to Hitler's behavior and thinking which the admiring Kubizek reports. There is no reason for holding Kubizek responsible for these. Those who have no comprehensive view of Hitler's personality structure and think of him as an essentially normal individual, albeit with a few eccentricities, either ignore Kubizek's descriptions of Hitler's bizarre adolescent behavior or attribute the descriptions to Kubizek's failure to separate fact from fantasy. The truth of the matter is that Kubizek's observations of his friend's behavior are entirely consonant with the behavior and personality of the adult Hitler. Moreover, the incidents in which the adolescent Adolf vented his anti-Semitic rages are presented in such specific detail and vividness that it is difficult to believe that they were made out of the whole cloth.

The issue of the validity of Kubizek's presentation of the bizarre behavior of the adolescent Hitler points to an additional requirement in the writing of psychohistory—insofar as it involved psychobiography. Noting how difficult it is to evidence single elements of a psychohistorical interpretation, Binion

quite correctly says: "The pieces must *all* fit together, with the facts *all* stacked up behind them . . ." I would add that once that has been done with a single element of a psychohistorical interpretation, it will still not carry final conviction unless *that element, in turn*, fits into the total picture of the personality involved. If the historian or the psychoanalyst discusses, for instance, Hitler's concept of *Lebensraum* or of anti-Semitism, or of women, or of any other subject, outside the setting of Hitler's total personality, he is no different than one of the fabled blind men who derived his concept of the elephant by examining one part of him. His understanding of even that one part must remain deficient and defective.

Having noted all this, it must be pointed out that there is much additional evidence in support of the idea that Hitler identified with his mother in many respects. It is quite valid, therefore, to assume that his mother's suffering and injury for which Adolf unconsciously held Dr. Bloch responsible, Hitler experiences as though it were inflicted on himself. This *contributed* to Hitler's rapidly developing anti-Semitism, but its violent intensity derived from sources related to its development.

The extensive and detailed research on the iodoform medication which Klara received is very impressive. Nevertheless, as every physician who has prescribed drugs knows, the variations in samples of the same drug and in the responses to it of different individuals, is so very great that it is very difficult to make a certain diagnosis of poisoning on the basis of even very plausible deductions about dosage and frequency alone.

Though there is ample evidence in both psychological factors as well as gross historical factors to account for Hitler's anti-Semitism and his eastern policy, the concept of multidetermination would certainly allow for an additional factor such as Binion suggests. But it can obviously not be considered *the* factor accounting for these ideas. While there is no evidence to support one of the ideas basic to Binion's thesis (that nations tend to repeat traumatic experiences as individuals do) I know of no evidence that definitely disproves it. Someday evidence may even be brought to light to prove it. In the meantime, assumptions and theories should be recognized and designated as such. Otherwise hypotheses are built on hypotheses and the unwary may find themselves leaning on a house of cards.

Norbert Bromberg is a member of the Department of Psychiatry at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine. He was, with Professor Stein, a commentator on Professor Binion's paper for the American Historical Association meeting in 1972.

COMMENT BY GERTRUD M. KURTH

I am very impressed by the cogency of Dr. Binion's psychological sleuthing. Above all I am astounded by the historian's nearly uncanny ability to uncover the psychoanalyst's cherished minor but indispensable facts and to

integrate them into a psychologically, culturally and historically solid and convincing picture. It seems to me that for the first time most of the bizarre horrors of the Hitler era have become psychodynamically intelligible. With all due respect, I would like to comment on a few aspects of these findings.

First, it would seem to be fruitful to formulate, albeit hypothetically, in terms of ego functions Hitler's childhood trauma that must have underlain the traumas of his later life. Certainly the death of her three children in so short a span of time must have unbalanced whatever kind of emotional adjustment Klara Hitler had. Above all, it must have made her feel both helpless and guilty, and the assumption seems warranted that she resorted to finding a concrete cause for the tragedy. If indeed it was the premature weaning that had left her three babies unprotected, she would have the power to forestall a repetition by extending and even overextending the nursing period. In other words, she most probably overfed and/or overprotected the fourth child, Adolf, in order to defend herself against what must have been profound anxiety over the possibility of losing him. Moreover, it seems quite likely that, in what may have been a kind of panicky tension, Klara handled the infant at the breast in a manner that transmitted to the baby a threat of being overwhelmed. It is also characteristic for mothers in this kind of situation, in which a later-born child is invested with the function of restoring the mother's self-esteem as a mother, that the nipple is nearly forced into the baby's mouth whenever he screams, regardless of what is actually troubling him.

Clearly, such maternal behavior is bound to interfere with the development of the infant's and the toddler's ego functions, specifically with the development of individuation and autonomy. Concomitantly, the child's ability to develop viable and ego-syntonic identifications and durable object-relations is severely undermined. In fact, it is legitimate to say that the mother who stunts her child's development by forcing him to remain a baby for too long virtually "kills" some of the child's indispensable functions. In addition, we may take it for granted that the growing boy, Adolf, heard innumerable times the tale, not only of the mother's tragic loss, but also of his "ordained" purpose to make up the loss to her and to replace the dead siblings. Thus at a most tender age the little boy was burdened with a responsibility far beyond his ability to bear. In terms of every child's concrete thinking, the little boy understood that he had incurred, in fact had been born into, the obligation of protecting and "restoring" his mother. However, the other side of this coin was the child's interpretation of his mother's guilt feelings to mean that she had actually "killed" her three children and consequently could harbor murderous designs on him by overfeeding him with her "poisonous" milk.

It is to this traumatic situation that Hitler seems to have regressed when faced with the traumas of his adolescence and young manhood, and against which he later defended himself by projecting the unconscious conflict onto the gigantic screen of the German trauma of 1918. Inasmuch as Klara also concretely may have blamed the death of her children on both her husband's sexual demands and her own sexual needs, the little boy Adolf would at some point during the Oedipal period have added the imperative to "rescue" mother from father's attacks. A parallel line of contradictory "messages" that

the little boy was bound to receive was that the dead siblings' guilt consisted in having abandoned their mother. Certainly Adolf acted out in adolescence the unconscious demand not to leave his mother, but instead to take care of her and be the protecting parent.

So far, I have done no more than to rephrase and elaborate on Dr. Binion's psychohistorical findings. There is one point, however, which I would like to modify. Dr. Binion sees Hitler's "orality," in particular his compulsive speech-making, as primarily aggressive. The evidence seems irrefutable that Hitler's prime tool, namely oratory, also represented feeding, i.e., the unconscious identification with the mother. In other words, Hitler did to the German "masses" what had been done to him in the first place: he stuffed the food down their throats—an action that by implication is also hostile and aggressive. In fact, his speeches are replete with formulations that reflect the fluidity of ego boundaries and identifications where the Führer and Germany alternate as mother and child. It has to be borne in mind that the child's defensive identification with the aggressor serves the purpose of protecting himself against becoming aware of the parent's aggression.

There is one further point on which I would like to comment, and that is the social compliance which Hitler found in the German people and which provided the fertile ground for the "final" re-enactment of the childhood drama. There can be no doubt that the shock produced by the sudden realization of the loss of the war in 1918 was defended against by denial and subsequently played a considerable role in this compliance. However, I feel sure that the experience of concrete and substantial deprivations the Germans had to endure during and immediately after World War One played an equally essential role. The shortage of supplies vital for survival—food, fuel, and the like—was severe enough to cause extensive suffering and regressive anxiety. Moreover, the Inflation of the early 1920's and the Depression of the early 1930's, entailing unemployment and poverty, brought the additional shortage of emotional supplies such as self-esteem and self-confidence. In other words, it was this unique combination of economic and social crises that made it possible for Hitler to activate in the German people the same unconscious conflicts as motivated him.

Gertrud M. Kurth is a clinical psychologist on the staff of the Brooklyn Veterans Administration Outpatient Clinic and in private practice. She is the author of "The Jew and Adolf Hitler" and other psychoanalytical studies of Nazism.

COMMENT BY ANDREAS DORPALEN

Some years ago, William L. Langer, the Harvard historian, suggested as a promising subject for psychohistorical investigation the origins of the religious revival sparked by the Black Death of 1348-1349 and subsequent epidemics.

Langer thought that useful insights might be obtained through an exploration of this religious response in terms of repressed anxieties, unconscious guilt feelings derived from the infantile repression of sexual and aggressive drives and death wishes, and regression to infantile concepts in the face of uncontrollable forces. Jacques Barzun, of Columbia University, questioned the value of such a project. Even if documentary research would produce the pertinent data, he wondered, what more would we know than we do know now by attributing that religious reaction to popular ignorance, superstition, inadequate science, and strong institutionalized religion?¹

The chances are indeed that such an investigation would produce little that would enrich our understanding of the popular reaction to the Black Death. The reason is obvious: Psychoanalysis is here being asked to provide novel explanations in a situation in which the analyzands respond to a problem they face in a normal way—normal, that is, by contemporary standards of religious expectations, cultural mores, and scientific comprehension.² The need for analysis arises in everyday life in the case of psychological problems that are considered “abnormal,” i.e., serious deviations from consciously or unconsciously established norms. Similarly the psychohistorian can produce helpful new insights only for corresponding historical situations.

No such problem of “normality” seems to exist in the case of Hitler—here was a man clearly “abnormal” in his anti-Semitism, aggressiveness, and brutality. Still, this is obviously too simplistic an answer, for there were untold numbers who shared these traits. As Professor Binion rightly points out, Hitler’s effectiveness rested on affinities he had in common with millions of Germans (and, for that matter, non-Germans), and this commonality of concerns and values raises the question as to whether or to what extent he should be considered “abnormal.” His abnormality, then, requires a more precise definition than the one outlined above—in the interest of historical accuracy as well as for the purpose of circumscribing more clearly the areas in which the psychoanalyst may help to provide answers which the historian cannot find by himself.

In discussing Hitler’s anti-Semitism Dr. Binion makes the point that Hitler’s attitude before 1919 was what might be called “normal” in the context of this discussion. Prior to the Revolution of 1918, he concludes, Hitler was “no more of an anti-Semite than nearly any Austro-German or Reich German of the time.” (I am assuming here that this statement, summing up his preceding discussion of Hitler’s pre-1919 attitude, expresses his views more accurately than an introductory one that, “On balance, the evidence that he [Hitler] was not an anti-Semite until after World War I, despite his own account in *Mein Kampf*, is compelling.”) This assumption (and it cannot be more than that) of a “customary” anti-Semitism would help to explain the conflicting testimony we have on the question of Hitler’s pre-1919 anti-Semitism: if it was of the kind shared by almost everyone else, why should those who had contact with him before 1919 remember any anti-Jewish remarks of his some 15, 20, let alone 50 years later?³ (That Hitler’s own account of his anti-Semitic development should not be considered authentic, Eberhard Jäckel has shown in a careful critical examination of the pertinent

passages of *Mein Kampf*: Hitler wrote them to demonstrate the "organic growth" of his convictions which enabled him, he suggests, to go into politics with a fully developed world view. Thus he met that sine qua non of popular confidence in a leader, as he saw it—he never had to change his mind on any major political problem.)

The question arises why Hitler after 1918 became the obsessive Jew-baiter who in the end caused the murder of millions of human beings. Binion seeks to provide the answer by psychoanalytical probings. He proves himself a resourceful historical sleuth in attributing the death of Hitler's mother most directly to iodoform poisoning rather than cancer and within this context to the excessive application of the iodoform treatment, apparently at young Hitler's urging, by the attending Jewish physician, Dr. Eduard Bloch. Binion also shows that the death of Klara Hitler caused a deep shock to her son that kept reverberating in his fear of suffering from cancer himself and in his persistent recourse to the imagery of cancer and poison in his speeches and writings.⁵ I find no evidence, on the other hand, that Hitler bore any grudge against Dr. Bloch, consciously or subconsciously, either at the time of Klara's death or at any later time. Nor do I see any evidence that Hitler associated his own gas poisoning in 1918 with his mother's earlier poisoning.

In fact, as for Dr. Bloch, the material that Binion has gathered on him shows that Hitler even in later years continued to look on Bloch as he most likely looked on Jews generally in the days of his youth, allowing that some of them, and among them Bloch, were "good ones" or even "noble," as he is quoted as having said of the doctor as late as 1937. *Mutatis mutandis* Hitler's attitude toward Bloch parallels that he displayed toward August Kubizek, his one friend during those years in which he had contact with Bloch. Even at the height of his power Hitler showed a genuine interest in that one-time friend, although by Hitler's own standards the quiet unassuming Kubizek, who led a humdrum petty-bourgeois existence as a minor small-town official, should have aroused nothing but contempt in the Fuehrer. There are other indications that Hitler looked on his prewar life as one quite apart from his later years; when in retrospect he described his youth in Linz as "those happiest years of my life," he ought perhaps not be taken too literally, but there was doubtless an element of sincerity in this remark.⁶

It seems to me that the "normal" strand in Hitler's post-1918 anti-Semitism may provide a more fruitful starting point for an explanation of the all-consuming hatred that he began to display in 1919.⁷ In November 1918 Hitler returned to a Bavaria rampant with anti-Semitism. Munich, famed for its tolerance in prewar days, was a hotbed of anti-Jewish organizations.⁸ The immediate cause of this turnabout was the assumption of the minister-presidency by an Independent Socialist and Jew, Kurt Eisner. The establishment, a few months later, of a Soviet-type regime among whose leaders were also several Jews gave further impetus to these activities.⁹ In the absence of any evidence to the contrary it must be assumed that Hitler, deeply upset about Germany's misfortune and looking for an explanation for the catastrophe, grasped at the "Jewish peril" like so many others as just that explanation he needed. In itself, then, his susceptibility to the prevailing rabid anti-Semitism

was not unusual and presents a problem in social rather than individual psychology.

Still, the question remains why he among the myriads of anti-Semitic orators was to have so much greater an impact on his audience than anyone else. His "message," of course, was incomparably more impassioned, more stirring and frightening, than any other.¹⁰ Binion, as mentioned before, has pointed to the characteristic imagery of his language—his unending comparisons of Jews to cancers and poisoners of blood; references to parasites and blood suckers keep also recurring. Konrad Heiden, who observed Hitler's political beginnings in Munich from 1920 on, explained his effectiveness in these terms:

With unerring sureness Hitler expressed the speechless panic of the masses faced by an invisible enemy and gave the nameless specter a name. . . . One scarcely need ask with what arts he conquered the masses; he did not conquer them, he portrayed and represented them.¹¹

This helps to explain Hitler's effectiveness, and while it does not explain expressly the furious forcefulness of his anti-Jewish expostulations, the passage implicitly bears out Dr. Binion's view that Hitler gained his hold on the masses by harmonizing his own pathology with that of Germany. While Binion's diagnosis of the Fuehrer's pathology is open to question, the statement does point to a direction in which the explanation for Hitler's forcefulness might be sought. Cancer poisoning the human system, his own fears of suffering from cancer, Jews poisoning German blood and the German national body—do not these ever-present anxieties add up to the fear, conscious or subconscious, that he himself was tainted by Jewish blood and eroded by it just like the entire nation? Hitler's father, we know, may have been fathered by a Jew, and while Hitler denied this, there are indications that the thought of his actual or possible Jewish descent kept haunting him. Possibly these fears made themselves felt with special intensity after 1918 when racial anti-Semitism began to spread widely. For racial anti-Semitism, because of its biological argumentation, denies the possibility of a Jew's capacity for "improvement," while religious anti-Semitism at least allows for "redemption" by means of conversion.

However, the recurrent association of Jewry with incest in *Mein Kampf* and elsewhere also suggests contributing anxieties rooted in an incestuous family background and possibly in incestuous fantasies. Still other explanations have been presented, and it is not unlikely that Hitler's anti-Jewish obsessions must be attributed to a combination of causes. Evidently much exploratory work remains to be done before more than tentative conclusions can be reached.¹²

As for Dr. Binion's analysis of Hitler's *Lebensraum* concept, I find its correlation with the mother-son relationship very persuasive although I would not have put it quite as categorically as he does. I am aware that what Binion considers a happy relationship has been diagnosed by others as severely disturbed. The two diagnoses need not be incompatible; Erik Erikson has suggested that Hitler had a highly ambivalent attitude toward his mother, and his

multi-faceted relationship with her, growing out of different experiences at different periods of his life, may have created a variety of susceptibilities.¹³ Thus the nutritional function of *Lebensraum* which, as Binion shows, plays so important a role in Hitler's concept of *Lebensraum* is associated by Binion with Hitler's experiences as an infant—a time in which, according to all indications, the mother-son relationship seems to have been close and harmonious. The continuous equation of *Lebensraum* with feeding ground is indeed noteworthy; it distinguishes Hitler's concept from the usual understanding of the term with its military implications, its connotation of limitless growth and expansion, and a feeling, in the words of the philosopher Oswald Spengler, of "horizons, vistas, distances, clouds, and the idea of the far-flung fatherland embracing a great nation."¹⁴

But *Mein Kampf* also contains occasional passages in which the concept of *Lebensraum* as feeding ground is conjoined to its function as the basis of world power and conquest: "The National Socialist movement must endeavor to eliminate the discrepancy between our population and our area—the latter viewed not only as a source of nourishment, but also as a point of support for power politics. . . ." Or: "Germany will be either a world power or will not be at all. To be a world power, however, it requires that size which nowadays gives its necessary importance to such a power and which gives life to its citizens." This bears out Binion's suggestive remark that the eastward expansion for which Hitler called "pointed beyond itself toward world conquest which points back to that satiety at the breast when self and world were one." In his concluding remarks in *Mein Kampf* Hitler does indeed make clear that he wants Germany to become the "master of the world."¹⁵

Binion's association of Hitler's anti-Semitism with the drive for world conquest is also convincing: "[I]n this theme of world conquest that second message [of the "Jewish menace"] was continuous with the first in its final tendency, which emerged progressively, of internationalizing the Jewish peril so that Germany needed world power to destroy the world enemy."

I have misgivings, however, about some aspects of Binion's explanation of the political, i.e., "normal," origins of Hitler's concept of *Lebensraum*. The association of his policy of eastern expansion with General Ludendorff's drive into the Caucasus in 1918 and the parallelism of Hitler's rise and Ludendorff's downfall are not supported by the available data. One remark of Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann is hardly sufficient to bear out the claim that the loss of the far-flung territorial conquests in the east made the defeat of 1918 especially unbearable to the Germans. In fact, the Nazi Party and probably Hitler himself at first saw a potential ally in Russia (rather than a target for recovering lost territories), provided she rid herself of her "Judaebolshevik" rulers.¹⁶ Important conservative circles, too, called for collaboration with Russia, in keeping with Bismarck's foreign policy, and so, of course, did the Communists. Nor is there any indication that Ludendorff ever enjoyed in his own right the national standing that Binion attributes to him. What prestige the general had, he derived from his association with Field Marshal Hindenburg, and that association had come to an end with Ludendorff's dismissal in October 1918.

Hitler's implementation of his call for more space through an eastern expansion should instead be traced back to the geopolitical doctrines of the geographer Friedrich Ratzel and the latter's disciple, General Karl Haushofer. Their ideas reached him in the early 1920's through his aide and secretary, Rudolf Hess, a student of Haushofer, and through Haushofer himself.¹⁷ What he had sensed vaguely before about the potentialities of space¹⁸ was now presented to him as scientific fact. Haushofer's teachings revolved specifically around the immense economic and military potential of Russia and the growing mobility and hence superiority of landpower over seapower; he therefore called for a Russo-German alliance—a power bloc able, in the age of railroads and airplanes, to offset the mobility of the British Navy and break through the barrier the British Empire had thrown around Europe and Asia.¹⁹

Hitler turned Haushofer's plan around and called for an alliance with Britain (and Italy) in order to secure his back for the conquest of Russia by which he would meet Germany's need for *Lebensraum*. He developed this plan in 1923 when Britain objected to the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr basin. London's attitude prompted him to assume that Britain could be drawn over to Germany's side.²⁰ This goal of an eastward expansion he pursued with an unshakable persistence which brings us back to the urgings of his "feeding ground" motivation.

The facets of Hitler's complex personality which have been discussed here are not the only ones that have baffled historians. Anyone familiar with Hitler's life history knows of many personal traits of his that analysis might make more easily understandable. These aspects of him of course are not part of the task that Binion has set himself, but having the floor, I can't pass up the opportunity of calling attention to them.

There was, for example, a marked compulsive streak in Hitler's make-up that drove him into the military occupation of the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, the Czech crisis, and the invasion of Russia. All these were moves which by his own admission involved serious gambles and not just calculated risks.²¹ Possibly they derived their compulsive momentum from the feeding trauma that Binion has postulated; possibly they were propelled by abnormal sexual impulses as Robert Waite has suggested;²² possibly they may be traced to his persistent fear of an early death or still other causes or combinations of causes.

Hitler's insistence on all-out struggle as a needed life-giving impulse, a theme that he never tired of stressing, also awaits an explanation, as does the overpowering impact of his very presence which so many who experienced that presence have attested. There is a need also for the exploration of such marked idiosyncrasies as his strong preference for darkness and night over the brightness of daylight, sunshine, and snow, or his aversion to any activity on water, from innocuous boatrides to major naval operations. This latter trait appears to have left its imprint on his dilatory preparations for the invasion of Britain in 1940 and may have affected his strategy on other occasions involving some naval action. Did it perhaps also inject itself into his reversal of Haushofer's program and contribute to his decision to seek "feeding ground" in Russia rather than overseas?

There remains the even more basic problem whether Hitler's anti-Semitism and his quest for *Lebensraum* and world conquest were not merely aspects of a much-farther-reaching objective. Did he aim only at *territorial* world conquest? In *Mein Kampf* he indeed suggests that his true goal was the social and cultural restructuring of the world, with men merely serving as disposable bricks for the erection of the new edifice. In this context he refers to the membership of the Nazi Party contemptuously as human material, and he speaks of and deals with human beings in general with equal disdain on innumerable occasions. Was his anti-Semitism merely the tip of an iceberg of all-embracing hatred and contempt for his fellow men? His policies during the Second World War support this assumption, and so do some of the plans for the postwar world that Hitler sketched out in his table talk.

The impulses for this need to restructure the world apparently reach far back into his youth when first he sensed that he did not fit into the world as it was.²³ In pursuit of this question psychohistorians will have to devote more attention to Hitler's relationship with his father, whose restless, imperious ways probably had a far greater impact on the shaping of Hitler's personality than has been acknowledged in recent studies, in contrast to earlier ones. (Hitler's strikingly deferential attitude toward Hindenburg, who bore a marked physical resemblance to Alois Hitler, may be an indication of the continuing impact of the father on his son.) Here again, however, Hitler's own role will have to be placed in the wider setting of a world weakened by the dehumanizing effects of an expanding technology and unsure of its bearings.

Obviously there are still a great many strands to be unraveled in Hitler's complex personality and differing analyses to be reconciled, modified, or discarded before more definitive answers can be provided. To attain such results, the terms of psychohistorical investigations will have to be defined more clearly. The need for considering the general conditions within which a historical figure or group are functioning has already been mentioned. In addition, since the rules of historical and analytical evidence differ, historical must take precedence over analytical evidence in case of irreconcilable conflicts. That the psychohistorian cannot question the analyzand(s) places an additional handicap on his probings and requires him to draw his conclusions with special caution. A very careful distinction must also be made between facts and assumptions and the latter resorted to with great circumspection.²⁴

Within these terms, however, psychoanalysis has much to offer to the historian—in particular in the case of as enigmatic a person as Hitler. To the arduous task of understanding the mind of the Fuehrer Dr. Binion has contributed some important new insights.

Andreas Dorpalen is Professor of History at The Ohio State University. His numerous works in modern German history include Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic (Princeton, 1964) and The World of General Haushofer (Port Washington, 1966). He organized and chaired the panel on which Professor Binion's paper was delivered.

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1. William L. Langer, "The Next Assignment," *American Historical Review*, LXVIII (1957-58), 296-302; Jacques Barzun, "History: The Muse and Her Doctors," *Ibid.*, LXXVII (1972), 40-41.
2. This becomes even clearer when the reaction to the Black Death is compared with the response to a wave of suicidal insanity that swept a French village in the early 1950's. On this latter occasion it was taken for granted that the cause of this mania could be ascertained scientifically. An immediate investigation determined that the victims had all eaten bread made from contaminated flour whose consumption affected their brain. In this case no resort to religion was required to deal with the situation.
3. On this last point see also the observations of Albert Speer on his inability to remember any of Hitler's anti-Semitic remarks because, as he says, "Hitler's hatred of the Jews seemed to me so much a matter of course that I gave it no serious thought." *Inside the Third Reich* (New York, 1970), p. 112; see also *ibid.*, p. 94. All in all, however, the question of Hitler's pre-1919 anti-Semitism can probably no longer be answered with certainty. What testimony we have was given long after the event quite apart from other reservations about it noted by Binion. He points out rightly that none of Hitler's pre-1919 letters and postcards contain anti-Semitic remarks, but too few survive to permit any firm conclusions.
4. Eberhard Jäckel, *Hitlers Weltanschauung: Entwurf einer Herrschaft* (Tübingen, 1969), pp. 147-52. On the whole Hitler's adherence to positions once taken was remarkable. Characteristically he liked to speak of his "unshakable determination" once he had made up his mind. See, for example, *Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1947-49), XXVI, 335.
5. Two particularly characteristic examples can be found in Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (New York, 1941), p. 201; Henry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier, 1941-1942*, ed. by Percy Ernst Schramm *et al.* (Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 216-17. As for his persistent fear of cancer see Picker, p. 222; Speer, pp. 103-04; Albert Krebs, *Tendenzen und Gestalten der NSDAP: Erinnerungen aus der Frühzeit der Partei* (Stuttgart, 1959), pp. 136-37.
6. August Kubizek, *Adolf Hitler: Mein Jugendfreund* (Graz/Göttingen, 1953), pp. 328-33, 337-43, 344-46, 348; Hitler to Kubizek, Aug. 4, 1933, *ibid.*, facing p. 16.
7. Binion claims that Hitler's rabid anti-Semitism "can be dated quite precisely from his hospitalization of October-November 1918." I know of no evidence to support this statement. Hitler's first documented anti-Jewish utterance after the war was made in September 1919; Hitler to Adolf Gemlich, Sept. 16, 1919, reprinted in Ernst Deuerlein, "Hitlers Eintritt in die Reichswehr," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, VII (1959), 203-04.
8. Georg Franz, "Munich: Birthplace and Center of the National Socialist German Workers Party," *Journal of Modern History*, XXIX (1957), 319 ff.; Allan Mitchell, *Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919: The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 192-93, 275, 325; Reginald H. Phelps, "Hitler and the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei," *American Historical Review*, LXVIII (1962-63), 978.
9. On the special circumstances accounting for Eisner's minister-presidency see Mitchell, Chapt. III; also Arthur Rosenberg, *Imperial Germany: The Birth of the German Republic, 1871-1918* (London, 1931), pp. 268-70.
10. See the two police reports of April 6 and 9, 1920, contrasting Hitler's rousing comments with the "boring" anti-Semitic speeches of two other speakers, in Reginald H. Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner im Jahre 1920," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, XI (1963), 277-78; see also Phelps' comment on p. 284, and same, "Hitlers 'grund-

- legende' Rede über den Antisemitismus," *ibid.*, XVI (1968), 400.
11. Konrad Heiden, *Der Fuehrer* (Boston, 1944), pp. v, 106.
 12. Some interesting studies are available, among them Gertrud M. Kurth, "The Jew and Adolf Hitler," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, XVI (1947), 11-32, and Robert G. L. Waite, "Adolf Hitler's Anti-Semitism: A Study in History and Psychoanalysis," in Benjamin B. Wolman, ed., *The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of History* (New York, 1971), pp. 192-230. But they too raise questions from the historian's viewpoint.
 13. Erikson's views are reported by Robert G. L. Waite, in Walter C. Langer, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler* (New York, 1972), p. 225.
 14. *Mein Kampf*, pp. 1, 168, 315, 935-36; *Hitlers Zweites Buch*, ed. by Gerhard L. Weinberg (Stuttgart, 1961), pp. 53 ff., 70-71, 84, 120-24, 206, 219; Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York, 1932), I, 64, 153, 58; also Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics* (New York, 1942), pp. 58-60.
 15. *Mein Kampf*, pp. 940, 950, 994.
 16. Wolfgang Horn, "Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers aus dem Frühjahr 1924," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, XVI (1968), 284-91, 293 n. 67; Jäckel (fn. 4), p. 35; Hitler's speech of Apr. 17, 1920, in Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner" (n. 10), p. 297.
 17. Karl Lange, "Der Terminus 'Lebensraum' in Hitlers *Mein Kampf*," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, XIII (1965), 430-33; Horn, p. 293.
 18. Jäckel, p. 39.
 19. Weigert (fn. 14), Chaps. V and VI; Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power* (New York, 1942), Chaps. V and XI.
 20. *Mein Kampf*, Chapt. XIV; *Hitlers Zweites Buch* (n. 14), Chaps. XI-XVI; Jäckel, pp. 36-37.
 21. For details and source references on this and the following observations see Andreas Dorpalen, "Hitler—Twelve Years After," *Review of Politics*, XIX (1957), 486-506, and "Hitler, The Nazi Party, and the Wehrmacht in World War II," Harry L. Coles, ed., *Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military* (Columbus, 1962), pp. 67, 72-73, 86 ns. 1 and 8. On Hitler's aversion to boatrides see Ernst Hanfstaengl, *Hitler: The Missing Years* (London, 1957), pp. 137-38.
 22. In a paper read at the meeting of the American Historical Association at New Orleans on Dec. 28, 1972.
 23. On this aspect the memoirs of Kubizek (n. 6), documented by letters and postcards of Hitler, are invaluable as a source; see esp. pp. 72-73, 82-83.
 24. The sweeping condemnation of psychohistory by the British historian H. R. Trevor-Roper is of course unjustified, but his strictures on the indiscriminate resort to assumptions and the confusion of proven facts and unprovable assumptions deserve careful attention. See Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Was halten Sie von Hitler, Doktor?" *Die Zeit*, April 20, 1973.

COMMENT BY DIETRICH ORLOW

It is a distinct pleasure to comment on Professor Binion's article not only because it is a highly significant contribution to the body of motivational research about Hitler, but also because the author's sophisticated and exhaustive

archival research makes it unnecessary to spend a great deal of time detailing inadequacies of the documentary base. Conventional historians often delight, and not always without justification, in criticizing their "psycho"-colleagues for erecting rather intricate interpretive edifices on quite shaky documentary foundations. With Professor Binion this is clearly not the case: the documentary appendix to the article shows without a doubt that his statements of fact and date can be accepted by historians of whatever persuasion or specialty.

Consequently, the commentator is able to concentrate his remarks on what is both the heart of Professor Binion's article and the core of the ongoing discussions (and disputes) between psychohistorians and their conventional colleagues, i.e., the nature and use of descriptive/prescriptive typologies and patterns of causation. To begin with, it might be well to remember that all historians use prescriptive typologies under the guise of descriptive accounts. When the conventional historian speaks of a "left liberal member of the rising middle classes," he is in effect typifying for the reader that individual's position in a social organism and, at least implicitly, prescribing a set of behavior patterns for that historical figure. This is not essentially dissimilar from the psychohistorian's use of the typologies "oral-aggressive" or "anal-aggressive." There is a major difference, however, in the type of motivational evidence that is adduced in arriving at the typologies. In the case of the conventional example, the factors are essentially economic or political, at any rate concretely observable; the psychohistorian draws his parameters more broadly and includes sub- or unconscious as well as conscious factors. Since the former seldom find their expression in what historians have traditionally accepted as documentation, the conventional historian is likely to confront his psychoanalytically inclined colleagues with a cold "Show me the documents." This is another way of saying that unless the subconscious desires have yielded conscious evidence, they are not acceptable as part of a causal explanation.

It is testimony to Professor Binion's skill in working with the available documentation that he has succeeded in linking the conscious and subconscious factors in Hitler's motivation to such an extent that his account is convincing to a sympathetic conventional historian. There remain a few loose ends (how can one know that breast-feeding "constituted" Hitler's infancy?), but overall I found Professor Binion's explanation of Hitler's hunger for *Lebensraum* and the "Führer's" anti-Semitism coherent and logical. That is to say, I did not feel that I was asked to undertake an excessive number of leaps of faith with nothing but psychoanalytical typologies to support me during the flight.

Professor Binion certainly presents convincing evidence that the maternal trauma which affected Klara Hitler transferred itself to her son. Similarly, the transformation of Hitler's adolescent love-hate relationship to Dr. Bloch into the all-encompassing anti-Semitism of the later Führer is put into a scheme of causal explanation that has a high degree of verisimilitude. In short, I think Professor Binion has given us the best explanation yet of the psychological basis of Hitler's pathology.

But this, of course, is only half the story. Historical psychopaths are of interest to historians only if they exercise an influence beyond themselves or their immediate family. There remains, in other words, the social side of the Hitler = Germany equation, the socio-political behavior of the politically articulate German people between 1918 and 1933. I must confess that I am a little more doubtful when Professor Binion uses the psychoanalytical typologies to link Hitler's personal trauma to the motivational factors that led a large number of Germans to follow his political siren call. The applicability of psychoanalytical typologies to groups and their use as descriptive/prescriptive typologies of mass behavior seemed to me to require rather excessive leaps of faith. It is true of course that Professor Binion is not primarily concerned with the German side of the equation, but I think it is fair to point out some of the difficulties that beset a psychohistorical explanation of mass political behavior. For example, there is the problem of different causes yielding similar results. Professor Binion shows at some length that Hitler's anti-Semitic expressions reflect unconscious efforts to deal with his personal trauma. Yet, it is not difficult to show that Hitler's anti-Semitic phraseology was not far different from that of a large number of other professional and social anti-Semites. The image of exorcizing the Jew runs through the entire anti-Semitic literature of Europe before and after World War I. Were the other anti-Semites similarly "oral-aggressive"? If so, this particular typology becomes too undifferentiated to be of much use as an explanatory tool.

This is equally true of the explanation for the receptivity of Hitler's message among the Germans. Professor Binion cites an "unconscious national need" which caused the positive correlation between Hitler's political message and the Germans' support of it and him. But while Professor Binion is uniquely convincing in his efforts to show that Hitler's politics met an unconscious personal need, this same causality seems excessively vague when transferred to the group context. Hitler's pathology accompanied him from infancy; his actions and words are expressions of his trauma. The German trauma on the other hand seems to have had long periods of dormancy. If the mesh between Hitler's and Germany's pathologies was triggered by the defeat of 1918, it is difficult to see why Hitler had so little political support until 1929.

All of this is not to suggest that Professor Binion is necessarily "wrong," but merely to underscore three points with which, I am sure, he would readily agree: psychohistorical explanations of causality without the sort of outstanding conventional research work done by Professor Binion are as unsatisfactory as glib conclusions reached in any other branch of the historical sciences, group behavior cannot be explained simply as an addition of individual behavior patterns, and finally, the often forgotten truism that psychohistory alone, too, cannot provide exhaustive explanations for all historical occurrences. On the other hand, how much a good psychohistorian working with conventional and specialized tools can contribute is amply evidenced by Professor Binion's excellent discussion.

Dietrich Orlow is Professor of History at Boston University. He is the author of The Nazis in the Balkans (Pittsburgh, 1968) and The History of the Nazi Party in two volumes (Pittsburgh, 1969, 1973).

REPLY BY RUDOLPH BINION

Given the printer's deadlines, I cannot reply to all seven comments at once, but must respond to them each in turn and, worse, point by point.

In receiving so handsome a tribute from George H. Stein, I should have the good grace just to glow. But I cannot let Professor Stein's "assessment of the limitations of psychohistory" go uncontested. His view is that final proof is unattainable in psychohistory, so that in the last resort there is nothing to choose between rival psychohistorical readings of the Hitler records. I would argue the very opposite. In any kind of history, that explanation has the edge which is best evidenced or, in case of a tie, which explains the most. But psychohistory offers a further test of truth: subjective assent. We cannot empathize with prices in sixteenth-century Europe to feel whether the influx of bullion from America really did cause their rise; we can empathize with Hitler to feel whether Dr. Bloch really was "the Jew" for him. A right reading in psychohistory is like a dead language deciphered or a code broken: it not only checks, but you *know* it is right.

Scholarly scrapping with Bradley F. Smith is for me a joy to the head and heart because we are both such sticklers for detail. Our sharing this foible permits me to plunge right into his grand commentary by way of two minutiae. They concern successively Hitler's two post cards to Bloch. Hitler could have styled himself Bloch's patient in 1907 after his consultations of September 5 and 27, and therefore during his stay in Vienna that followed. And from Bloch's several statements taken together it appears that the New Year's card, like the other one, came from Vienna, which would rule out 1908.

Next, that postmaster's widow. Jetzinger's version of her babblings does not suggest that she summoned Adolf to his mother's sickbed. Furthermore, the "Urfahr" article based on her account disproves Jetzinger's line "...she *always* insisted that Adolf came only *after* his mother's death" (first italics mine) at least literally. The first relevant sentence of the "Urfahr" piece reads: "Adolf Hitler, who was notified by the postmaster's wife of his mother's serious condition, interrupted his studies and rushed to her sickbed." The next sentence has Dr. Bloch treating her "most considerately and conscientiously." In the next after that, Dr. Urban is also consulted. And the next brings in Hitler's sister and his Aunt Johanna. Only then comes: "On December 21 of the year 1907 Frau Hitler died . . ." The sense of this narrative sequence is purely and simply that Adolf arrived before his mother died. And it was no Nazi article that featured Hitler's devotion to a kindly Jewish doctor.

Indeed, this first drew Nazi archivist Bleibtreu's eager attention to Bloch, about whom Hitler had briefed only the Gestapo. Does Jetzinger's second-hand evidence (his source is the *Linzer Volksblatt*, no date) weigh *at all*, then, against the independent, concordant testimony of Kubizek, Bloch, and Paula Hitler? But Bloch's 1907 record is itself conclusive. Bloch's heading "Hitler" would not fit a Raubal or Johanna Pölzl without some special indication like the one used to distinguish even the younger Hitler, "*Bespr. Herr.*" For this same reason, the "*Bespr.*" notations must correspond to "*Bespr. Herr.*" as the "*J.*" notations do to "*Jodofgaze, Binde,*" likewise nearly spelled out that once. Thus Adolf's presence at his mother's deathbed would make an *unshaky* "foundation stone" for my "vertical structure" were it not a cap stone of sorts instead as the constructing actually went. For only after I was convinced, from long study of Hitler's authenticated words and acts, that he had experienced his mother's death with traumatic immediacy (and unconsciously attributed it to poisoning by a Jew) did I dig around that dark passage of his youth.

By "anti-Semitic world view" I meant the conviction that was Hitler's as of 1919 that the world's affairs turned on the antithesis between Jew and non-Jew. Such a conviction was blatantly not that of Westenkirchner's Hitler: I can see no problem of demarcation here. Incidentally, I picked up new material in June on two of my four witnesses to Hitler's anti-Semitism before late 1918: the Nazi Party blacklisted applicant Mend in 1933 for a long criminal record of fraud and applicant Greiner in 1939 for arrant unscrupulousness (Berlin Document Center). True, it is not crucial to the case for Hitler's iodoform trauma or for his gas trauma whether he became an ideological anti-Semite in between. But I am not out to make cases; I am just investigating, and here reporting a few findings some more, some less certain. Hitler's conscious formation as an anti-Semite is central to my concern, and psychoanalysis is of little help in retracing it.

That "continuum" was a psychological one comprising three consecutive delayed reactions to a trauma. Even Hitler's own actions that he himself regarded as politically or ideologically related were not thereby related psychologically, let alone in the quite peculiar way of that "continuum."

The political distance "from revisionism to the war for *Lebensraum*"—to quote from the title of a chapter by Kuhn—was enormous. Revisionism was a clamoring to undo the victors' peace; Hitler's foreign program beginning in 1924 was one for conquering territory in Europe that had never been German. The move beyond revisionism was Hitler's alone in Weimar politics; it was—to quote a subtitle of Kuhn's this time—"Hitler's solitary decision." Kuhn explains it as a consequence, drawn in Landsberg, of Hitler's "decision" of 1923 that England should be Germany's ally. But it was not a forced consequence: alternatives are readily imaginable for Hitler in 1924 even if his "decision" about England is taken to have been binding on him then. Hitler may nonetheless have come to his program *by way of* the idea that a British alliance would require a European rather than a colonial sphere for German expansion, but that is something again. My question is *why* he struck out in his new foreign direction, and with a sustained intentness previously reserved for his thrust against Jewry.

Kuhn's argument is, moreover, vulnerable to counterevidence, including the first quotation in my lecture. Thus tight, or close-fitting, explanations are not peculiar to psychohistory. A tighter explanation explains more, but it and the material it fits must be that much more solid.

For Professor Smith, the proper province of psychohistory is historical irrationality. This is hardly restrictive, as little is ever done from rationality alone. And was Hitlerism distinctly less rational than the Stalinist terror, or the Maginot Line, or Appeasement, or the "phony war" of 1939-1940, or the rest of European politics in its time?

Now to the "problems" that George L. Mosse "tried to raise."

Friedrich Heer's book contains no evidence of Hitler's anti-Semitism in Vienna, only evidence of possible influences on his later anti-Semitism. In Daim's version of Lanz von Liebenfels' statement of 1951, Hitler came to Lanz's office once in 1909 saying he bought *Ostara* "almost regularly" and wanted to complete his set. I cited the part about back numbers alone for brevity's sake, since it by itself seemed to come as close as the complete statement to signifying that young Hitler was a believer. Either way, that was not very close. Hitler was always an eclectic reader interested in far-flung systems of belief; in Vienna he certainly read racist just as he did Marxist papers; the question is what he then believed. Another party to that Lanz interview noted in a diary résumé of it: "The 20-year-old Adolf Hitler, open to all national tomfoolery, visited, as L.L. related, him too . . ." (Daim, p. 244)—which sets the record straight. We really have no proof Hitler even read *Ostara*: thus George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, p. 295. If Hitler supposedly went to Lanz as a proselyte, how come he merely asked about those back numbers and, when Lanz supplied them without charge, left never to return? And how in that case did Lanz learn and remember his name? This testimony of a venerable visionary claiming to have originated Hitler's ideas weighs precious little against that of a matter-of-fact, sixty-two-year-old workman who had served four years with Hitler day in, day out as regimental runner. But "Binion's witness" is a miscount: that witness was just the only one I found to gage young Hitler's anti-Semitism between zero and infinity, so I called him up last. The most compelling witnesses of the lot are in fact the two on the zero side cited in my Note 60—especially Ernst Schmidt, as it is hard to see why Hitler would have concealed his anti-Semitism from his best buddy in World War One. If Hitler turned anti-Semitic only in October-November 1918, he then still had ten full months to assimilate sectarian lore à la Lanz and Schuler (as remembered from prewar Vienna, or as propagated against Bavaria's postwar revolutionaries) before his first documented political writings and speeches—which show no trace anyhow of those "peculiar and mystical" teachings. Should Professor Mosse care to check, the basic references are: Bayerisches Staatsarchiv, Sonderabgabe 1478; BAK NS26/51; Ernst Deuerlein, "Hitlers Eintritt in die Reichswehr und in die Politik," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, VII, 177-227; Reginald H. Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner im Jahre 1920," *ibid.*, XI, 274-330, and "Hitlers 'grundlegende' Rede über den Antisemitismus," *ibid.*, XVI, 390-420.

What can be meant by duplicating Hitler's hallucination almost at random?

A hallucination is no clear political asset: the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of January 1923 reported Hitler's for the sake of editorializing about "a remarkable case of war neurosis." Hitler did exploit the hallucination pragmatically, but only after a decade or so and in thickly veiled form. He certainly could be pragmatic or, better, tactically adroit about his anti-Semitism, but Professor Mosse had best not now start facing the massive evidence that he meant it nonetheless and finally pushed it beyond all pragmatic bounds.

I did not suggest that the Nazis invented sterilization or anything else. No basic law, but a personal order, underlay Hitler's Euthanasia program. Euthanasia proper (mercy killing) has nothing to do with racial eugenics. Nor was racial eugenics a consideration behind Hitler's program for gassing incurables out of the insane asylums. The eugenicists were all set before then with compulsory sterilization for hereditary defects, whereas in the Euthanasia program no distinction was drawn between hereditary and nonhereditary mental disorders. The American interrogators inquired about racial eugenics in the preliminaries to the Euthanasia trial of 1946-1947: its patent irrelevance emerged. As for sterilization, its relevance that emerged from the preliminaries and the trial itself was that Hitler's interest in it was confined to eliminating hereditary insanity (his father's possible stay in an asylum leaps to mind: see Müllern-Schönhausen, pp. 198-203) and was subordinate to his overall purpose of eliminating the insane. A complete record of the trial is available at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, and reams of related interrogation reports survive in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. But Professor Mosse need not bother disabusing himself about Euthanasia, for in any case an ideological cluster does not *ipso facto* constitute a psychological complex.

I said that Hitler was retarded intellectually and emotionally at the time of his mother's death: what has this to do with the artistic tastes he may have acquired in Vienna? I was paraphrasing Hitler himself in saying that he talked his way to the top. Nazism as a liturgical rite is already covered by Klaus Vondung's *Magie und Manipulation* (Göttingen, 1971) more than adequately, as it seems to me, and yet short of Hitler's speeches being reduced by their *mise en scène* to mere aesthetic symbols.

The German expansionism that climaxed in World War One can be explained in terms of young against old nations, or of business interests as per Fritz Fischer, without resultant distortion; the German expansionism programmed by Hitler and pursued under him can not. Germany overestimated its own strength to a point of absurdity in the earlier play for world power—which was not a land-grab primarily, or a *Drang nach Osten* until huge vistas of eastern conquest opened up in 1917-1918. Hitler ostensibly drew the consequence of the 1918 defeat when he urged a replay from a reduced power base and with the enlarged aim of world dominion. His program was thus no routine policy of expansion by a nation "strong enough," even apart from its central provisions for exterminating, decimating, or enslaving other peoples. But I am only laboring the obvious here. Of all the sophisticated and penetrating studies of continuity and discontinuity between Wilhelmian and Hit-

lerian expansionism, the most germane is Andreas Hillgruber's masterly *Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege* (Göttingen, 1967).

Professor Mosse's dicta on multiple causes and the sweep of history hardly incline me to reconstrue the psychohistorian's job, which is to explain past doings (whether individual or typical or collective). Doings are often enough responses to cultural, social, or economic circumstance, perhaps always in at least some degree. But responses can vary widely, so that such "factors" do not themselves ever explain a particular doing: the why remains, more or less narrowly circumscribed. Nor is it possible to prejudge the degree to which a given course of action, such as Hitler's toward the Jews, was set in response to cultural, social, or economic circumstance. Its particular causality must be searched out—and not by deriving Hitler's aims toward the Jews from his ideology without examining which came first. Hitler himself traced that course back to Pasewalk, which is therefore a likelier place for the search to start than Alfred Schuler's private lectures of 1922 which we do not even know Hitler attended (Mosse, *German Ideology*, pp. 75-76).

How could I avoid a mistake if it were inherent in my analysis? But the mistake Professor Mosse mentions is inherent only in his reading of Freud.

Bromberg has it nice and wrong that "psychohistory . . . should consist of the integration of well founded psychoanalytical concepts in the writing of history." In practice, this means for Bromberg to write monorchism, castration anxiety, and exposure to parental coitus *a tergo* into Hitler's childhood as main formative influences on the ground that their typical aftereffects are to be found in Hitler's adulthood, beginning with disprovable "defects in ego functions" and penny-shocker perversions. For Bromberg, the alleged after-effects evidence the supposed formative influences, which then explain the alleged aftereffects, with a circularity that rolls right by the bulk of the records. My text is a forty-six-page paper by Bromberg called "Hitler's Childhood," which lists forty-six sources: thirty-one are clinical studies, while six (all in English) bear on Hitler's childhood—seven counting an earlier paper of Bromberg's own. True, Bromberg's practice involves the complicating factor of incompetent historical research. But the most that a competent historian could attain with the same approach is still only primal scenes to explain personal characteristics that go back to primal scenes in some, but not other, cases on the clinical rolls—a far cry from explaining a specific political course.

To correct Bromberg: psychohistory consists in the application of psychoanalysis to historical subjects. The psychohistorian has to work out of the records themselves—the full records, and those only. That way his results will necessarily express his material—and if they go beyond clinical findings, so much the better for the clinicians. Bromberg does now know of a study in progress to demonstrate that a young mother's trauma of losing all her children together came through to her next-born as she fretfully overindulged and overprotected him—that Hitler's first, central, vital object relation was conditioned by his mother's clutching him to the breast more than his feeding required, and that his visceral awareness of her need was informed as he

later learned of her traumatic loss. Such a singular start in life is, I suppose, the less apt to appear in clinical registers since it need not lead to symptoms in others any more than it did in Hitler. My evidence for it in Hitler's case will be, not thirty-one studies of "unconscious perception of mothers' child-loss traumata by breastfed compensatory children," which would prove nothing in his case, but his relationship to Germany rendered inwardly intelligible. As for nations, they never turn up in psychoanalysts' consulting rooms, so that traumas affecting them can only be investigated historically. I, alas, did not hatch the idea of a nation reliving a trauma; Freud did. A collective mental process raises knotty problems of conceptualization and research which I have discussed elsewhere in connection with Hitler's Germany. I could here document only a few elements of my talk (this well may seem strange to Bromberg) and picked ones related to Hitler's childhood and youth as most appropriate to this journal.

Bromberg needs briefing on the use of gas in the Holocaust. As the USSR was invaded beginning on June 22, 1941, *Sonderkommandos* killed Jews and others by mass shootings and, increasingly, with mobile gas vans. But only gassing was ever envisaged for the extermination Hitler ordered that same summer of European Jewry as a whole. As Eichmann told it that summer, "*Es käme nur Gas in Frage*": thus Rudolf Höss, *Kommandant in Auschwitz* (Stuttgart, 1958), p. 154. The personnel and techniques for gassing the Jews came from the Euthanasia program after Hitler on August 24, 1941, ordered it terminated. Hitler personally busied himself over the physical procedures for Euthanasia and then their transfer to Poland for the Final Solution. He acted primarily through the *Kanzlei des Führers*, headed by Philipp Bouhler. His order for constructing gas chambers went to Bouhler at the start of the war against Poland: a commission left Berlin on October 17, 1939, to set one up in Grafeneck while Criminal Police Inspector Christian Wirth devised one in Brandenburg. The Euthanasia order itself followed at the end of October (antedated September 1). Karl Brandt, Hitler's attending physician named with Bouhler to administer the program, thereupon reflected for some days, then advised Hitler to use gas—a sign of the secretiveness with which Hitler ran this operation, like the next one, even internally. Hitler's idea of using gas to kill the Jews went back, by his early attestation, to rancor over his own gas poisoning. This last sentence is an abridgment of one by which Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die deutsche Diktatur* (Cologne, 1969), p. 461, introduces a famous quotation from *Mein Kampf*: "Had twelve or fifteen thousand of those Hebraic nation-spoilers been put under poison gas at the start of the war and during the war as hundreds of thousands . . . had to suffer from it on the battlefield, then the millionfold sacrifice at the front would not have been in vain." Hitler's conscious consideration in prescribing gas for the extermination of mental incurables and then Jews was not efficiency, but solely—incongruous as this was—humaneness. His insistent, incessant concern was for his victims to die quickly, painlessly, and unsuspectingly: this is documented many times over and without contradiction. That concern was dated 1907. Should Bromberg care to know what he is talking about, he can start finding out from these few references for the foregoing: National Archives, Testi-

mony of Karl Brandt, 1 October 1945, p. 7, and Vernehmung des Viktor Brack vom 4.9.1946, pp. 10, 23; *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg* (Nürnberg, 1949), XX, 540, and XLII, 551-562 (SS-65), 563-565 (SS-67); *Amtliche Niederschrift des Militärgerichtshofes in Sache Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika gegen K. Brandt u. Genossen*, pp. 2407-2420, 2494, 2497, 2502, 2506-2507, 2687, 7657, 7753, 7760-7762; Eichmann trial, Sessions 10 and 11 (preferably in the German transcript: Bezirksgericht Jerusalem, Strafact 40/61, Protokoll der Sitzungen), and Judgment, Paragraphs 141, 161.

Who in Germany besides Hitler himself was conscious even after twenty years—in September 1939—of his message of death to the Jews? Yes, my evidence for mother Hitler's poisoning by Dr. Bloch's iodoform is "circumstantial" and not "direct," just like the evidence for her sexual relations with father Hitler. Whatever that story of the Jewish cook is supposed to prove, an instructive exercise for Bromberg would be to try verifying it beyond the source cited by Robert L. G. Waite.

One of Bromberg's six sources for Hitler's childhood is Gertrud M. Kurth's classic "The Jew and Adolf Hitler." Appropriately, Dr. Kurth's hypothetical reconstruction, out of her clinical experience, of the impress of mother Hitler's trauma on nursling Adolf's emergent ego now tends to supply the deficiency noted by Bromberg in the clinical literature.

Dr. Kurth is right that, figuratively speaking, Hitler fed his mass audiences besides feeding off them. And she is right again that Germany was the more receptive to Hitler's call for additional feeding ground because of a trauma of deprivation due to the Allied blockade—a trauma reactivated by the Depression in particular. The dire physical and nervous ravages wrought by malnutrition in Germany between 1914 and 1919 were duly stressed in the Reichstag commission that investigated the defeat: *Die Ursachen*, IV, 190-209 and *passim*. Need I point out that neither of these two insights of Dr. Kurth's was drawn from clinical studies of mass oratory or national hunger?

Andreas Dorpalen would confine psychohistory to the study of "serious deviations from . . . established norms." But "'normal'" acts have their psychology too, which includes unconscious purposes. Why should the psychology behind, say, a normal war or religious institution or scientific discovery or domestic practice be unfit for investigation as against a statesman's quirks? In any case, the abnormal "strands" of a given human existence cannot be "unraveled" as Dorpalen supposes without the normal strands being unraveled along with them.

My two statements that Professor Dorpalen quotes on Hitler's beginnings as an anti-Semite do differ. The later one reflects a discussion of last spring with John Toland and Dietrich Orlow, who convinced me that "not an anti-Semite until after World War One" was a needlessly big mouthful, given the currency of unimpassioned, undoctinaire anti-Semitism in the Austria and Germany of Hitler's youth. Even so, I meant only to sharpen Westenkirch-

ner's point for him without conceding it myself. I was, and am, still searching. My best guess now is that, between 1907 and 1918, Hitler's anti-Semitism was manifested only against Jew-substitutes: thus Karl Honisch's attestation that in early 1913 the two targets of Hitler's fury were "ever and again . . . the Reds and the Jesuits" (BAK NS26/17a), Hitler's letter of February 1915 to Ernst Hepp wishing an end of "foreignism" and "our domestic internationalism" (BAK NS26/4), and Ernst Schmidt's account of Hitler's starting in the last year of World War One to scream wildly against "pacifists and shirkers" (John Toland Collection).

Hitler's grudge against Bloch was unconscious; his grudge against "the Jew" was its conscious manifestation. This is the clear sense of my analysis, which rejoins Gertrud M. Kurth's "The Jew and Adolf Hitler," cited by Dorpalen. Dorpalen must have a psychohistorical blind spot not to see the ubiquitous evidence if only in the "impassioned" Hitlerian rhetoric he mentions about the Jews as "cancers and poisoners of blood." I did not ground that piece of my talk systematically for want of time. The same holds for Hitler's unfailing association of his two traumas (1907, 1918), which was most graphic in his hypochondria—for example, in his psychogenic stomach gas that he feared was cancerous—and in the gassing of the Jews. Besides, I had grounded both in a talk at the previous American Historical Association meeting—briefly, yet sufficiently. And I could not begin to document either (except indicatively, as in my reply to Bromberg on the gassing of the Jews) without swelling the addendum about my sources to grotesque proportions.

Yet Dorpalen repeatedly takes issue with me on points I did not demonstrate or document—quite as if I had meant to present a final accounting. "In the absence of any evidence to the contrary," he characteristically writes, "it must be assumed" that Hitler's anti-Semitism dates from the Red Terror in Bavaria rather than from his gassing and therefore "presents a problem in social rather than individual psychology." First, I do have evidence to the contrary—plenty. Second, had I none as Dorpalen implies, his assumption would still not be obligatory by a long shot. And finally, even were his assumption obligatory, the psychology of Hitler's particular conversion to anti-Semitism would remain as legitimate a subject of inquiry as ever. Or can Dorpalen believe that nothing personal entered into the "furious forcefulness" of an anti-Semitic message "incomparably more impassioned, more stirring and frightening, than any other"?

Evidently he cannot, for he next brings in Hitler's fears, "possibly . . . felt with special intensity after 1918," that his father's father might have been a Jew. Hans Frank's famous recollection *in extremis* of having been charged by Hitler in late 1930 with a genealogical investigation to refute newspaper rumors of Jewish blood in the Hitler veins is rendered highly credible by Hitler's half nephew's independent account of the antecedent circumstances: "Hitler Source Book," pp. 926-927. (The letter to Hitler slyly mentioning a skeleton in the family closet would have come from Alois Jr. and referred to Alois Sr.'s dubious legitimation.) But this only goes to show that in 1930 Hitler did not conceive that he could have been partly Jewish. And to my knowledge, those "indications that the thought of his actual or possible

Jewish descent kept haunting him" all postdate 1930. This in its turn supports the rest of Frank's story: that Frank's investigation turned up presumptive evidence of an actual Jewish grandfather. But here I am digressing.

My quotation from Stresemann was not offered as "sufficient to bear out the claim that the loss of far-flung territorial conquests in the east made the defeat of 1918 especially unbearable to the Germans." My claim was that the colossal eastward extension of German power in 1917-1918 made defeat unthinkable and hence, when it came, unbelievable. My evidence from 1917-1918 for that claim is, again, plentiful even if none was shown. Stresemann's remark was quoted as the only exception I knew to the rule that, in the incessant postwar discussion of the incredible defeat, the great confidence generated by the eastern conquests of 1917-1918 went unmentioned.

Ludendorff ran Germany's Third Supreme Command, which ran Germany politically and militarily, for two years beginning in late August 1916. His senior partner, Hindenburg, was in practice his side kick. This was public knowledge in Germany at the time and passed into German historical consciousness undisputed. The *locus classicus* for Ludendorff's dictatorship is Chapter Four of Arthur Rosenberg's *The Birth of the German Republic*, cited by Dorpalen; it perfects formulations developed by Rosenberg on, and with the full accord of, the Reichstag commission that investigated the causes of the 1918 defeat for a decade afterwards (see *Die Ursachen*, especially IV and V, *passim*). As for present-day German historiography, the references at my finger tips are altogether concurrent: all the relevant sections (by Eberhard Kolb, Udo Bermbach, Gerhard Ritter, Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, Wolfgang Sauer) of *Vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik*, ed. Eberhard Kolb (Cologne, 1972); Egmont Zechlin, in *Erster Weltkrieg*, ed. Wolfgang Schieder (Cologne, 1969), p. 159; Hillgruber, *Deutschlands Rolle*, p. 59. Incidentally, if Dorpalen did not deny Hitler's Ludendorff precedent, he could see the prototype, dated March 1918, of Hitler's all-or-nothing politico-military gambles.

Hitler did appropriate lots of terms, concepts, and even ideas from the geopoliticians, and his plan for Germany and England to carve up Russia together is somewhat describable as Haushofer's program in reverse. But Hitler's earliest pickings from geopolitics date from 1924, when he read Ratzel and Haushofer in jail, whereas the plan is recorded for 1922 already in the first quotation in my lecture. So much for Dorpalen's intellectualized derivation of brutal Barbarossa.

No, those "important new insights" of mine are not fragments salvaged for future synthesizers from a special explanation I was unable to pull off. I did not even set myself the particular task Dorpalen indicates, but left the choice of my topic to him when I agreed to speak on his panel in New Orleans. My full subject of research is Hitler's relationship with Germany. My full explanation awaits the necessary free time. Meanwhile, I did not postulate any "feeding trauma" for Hitler, whatever that would be. And do I choose "analytical" over "historical" evidence or fail to distinguish "assumptions" from "facts"?

Mercifully, Dietrich Orlow has queried only three particulars of my presentation. As regards the first, I meant that Hitler's whole relationship with his mother, not just the breastfeeding, "constituted" his infancy. As to the second, I explained Hitler's anti-Semitism not by the typology "oral-aggressive," but by the hate side of his "love-hate relationship to Dr. Bloch." Hitler did indeed use stock anti-Semitic images: who, in politics, fashions new images? The question is which stock images he used—or did not use, such as "exorcizing the Jew." Thirdly, a trauma in an individual does normally pass through a considerable initial "period of dormancy" while the traumatic event is denied. It took eleven years and an acute personal and national crisis before Hitler "resolved" to act on his trauma from his mother's poisoning—"resolved," that is, to become a politician. I indicated a single "period of dormancy" for the German trauma of defeat, with Hitler sensing midway, in 1924, the national need, then still "dormant," to relive the traumatic experience.

But in all this Professor Orlow is mainly, and rightly, calling for proof I have yet to show. For the rest, his conception of the uses and abuses of psychohistory matches my own in full. This meeting of minds with a redoubtably hardheaded institutional historian is even more encouraging to me than his generous regard for my efforts in his field of expertise. It proves that dialogue is possible where, as Bradley Smith put it to me lately, the recent exchanges across the divide between psycho- and other historians reminded him of a San Francisco mayoralty contest in which the most decorous statement made was "So are you!"

Before signing off, I wish to emend a sentence of "About My Sources." Edmund Forster did commit suicide; he could instead have accepted dismissal with a three-quarter pension, but feared that the Gestapo would come after him by night. I learned this in June from the file on Forster in the Universitätsarchiv, Greifswald, and an interview in Freiburg im Breisgau with his surviving son, Dr. Balduin Forster. My other findings about Forster were confirmed and amplified in Greifswald and Freiburg.

FROM THE SOURCES

Cause of Death, Seventeenth Century:

"Friday. Early this morning, my Daughter Mehetebel, dyed suddenly, in its nurses Arms; not known to bee dying, till it was dead; of some sudden stoppage by Wind; *the Wind passed over the Flower, and it was presently gone!* . . . [Written in the margin:] I had no sooner done my prayers, but the messenger gave mee to understand that the Child had been for above an Hour before, by its Death, gone beyond the reach or use, of our Prayers. (Alas, the Child was overlaid by the Nurse!)"

Cotton Mather, *Diary of Cotton Mather*. Vol. I. (New York, n.d.), p. 179.

THE FOUNDLINGS OF FLORENCE, 1395-1455

RICHARD C.
TREXLER

Continuing the study of unwanted children in Renaissance Florence which he began in the last issue of the Journal, Richard Trexler again breaks new ground in describing what he terms "some of the dynamics of abandonment" in fifteenth-century Italy, making use of both the statistical record and literary sources to present a moving portrait of a society attempting to bring infanticide under control through social action

Charity is an ambiguous human activity. Individual kindness documents the power of the giver and the weakness of the recipient. Giving to a charitable institution seems to favor altruism, but in fact permits a tax write-off. Interning the helpless appears to aid them; it also atrophies the human sentiment of solidarity.

This rich man's problem is particularly great when the recipient is an infant who, for whatever reasons, cannot be supported by her parents. Without institutionalization, the infant dies. Having been interned, she has no individual defender, no real civil status—we call her an "it"—, nor is she capable of opposing the order which mistreats her. Contributing nothing to the commonweal, she has no claim upon it. She is the child of the state, and the state is a fickle parent.

Foundling homes have always aimed at stabilizing the public order by syphoning off mouths which threaten family and state survival. A Florentine dictum of 1513 gets to the heart of the matter:

If we were to confess the truth, one can absolutely say that [the foundling home of the Innocenti and the hospital of Santa Maria Nuova] have been and are two firm and solid columns maintaining this sublime Republic and its liberty.¹

The salvation of unwanted newborn infants did, however, serve other purposes, ones just as important to medieval and early modern society as social preservation. Failure to receive the newborn children increased infanticide and simple abandonment, and as a moral censor, the Florentine commune could not tolerate such practices, for they set a bad example for citizens. Just as important, the absence of foundling homes denied heaven to unbaptized children.

Moral and material benefits derived from foundling homes were as inextricably bound together as were the disadvantages attendant upon their absence. They could help increase population, and at the same time increase God's blessings upon the city:

One may firmly believe that through these [foundlings] and because of the prayers of these infants, who shine in purity, our most high and omnipotent God in his piety and mercy will not only deign to conserve this his city and state, but allow it to grow daily.²

The mixture of motivations was patent. Without saving unwanted children, the family unit was threatened and the citizenry scandalized by infanticide and desertion. By creating and supporting foundling homes, citizens created merit-making opportunities for themselves which in turn led to divine support for the city. What could be more altruistic than to allow children to live, more useful than the prayers of innocents?

The most haunting implication in the care of unwanted children by foundling homes was not directly motivational but institutional. Infants put out to nurse were given to mothers whose own infants had either died, been abandoned, or themselves been given to wet-nurses (*balie*). The lives of the innocents, like those of any child put to nurse, depended on the death or dislocation of cohorts. By feeding its charges back into the rural family, the urban foundling home, whose purpose was to stabilize that structure, inexorably contributed to its dissolution, and to the deaths of other children.³

Much has been written in the last century on the social problem of abandonment since the population explosion of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. There is no lack of statistics, tables, and autopsy reports for this period.⁴ Yet the sheer mass of the modern problem has stunted attention to the living human beings caught in the web of an unequal social order. Little is known about the individual mother or father who deserted the nineteenth-century child.

Study of foundling homes in earlier centuries has scarcely begun.⁵ The present article examines the constituency of the foundling homes of Florence in the first half of the fifteenth century. It tries where possible to go behind the raw data of sex and age to the texture of abandonment and care, even to the sensibilities of parents forced to desert their infants. From a description of the qualitative as well as the quantitative configurations of foundling care, the uncertainty of life and the ambiguity of motives in dealing with children in this age can be appreciated.

The basic public institutions of Florentine child welfare developed between the thirteenth and early sixteenth century. First to surface were receptacles

for unwanted children. Of these, Santa Maria da San Gallo was the earliest, appearing in documents dating from the end of the thirteenth century. It had probably accepted infants long before that date.⁶ Santa Maria della Scala followed, founded by private donation in 1316.⁷ Both institutions received the sick poor as well as infants. By the early fifteenth century, the older facilities had proved inadequate, and in 1419 the commune of Florence in conjunction with the silk guild decided to build a home specifically for foundlings. Santa Maria degl'Innocenti, as this great asylum was called, opened in 1445 and quickly became the central caritative institution for infants in Florence, and indeed for the Florentine dominion.⁸

A clearing house for lost or deserted children was also instituted at an early point. From at least mid-trecento the confraternity of the Misericordia took in lost or abandoned children, caring for them until they were claimed by their frantic parents or until it was certain they had been abandoned. A famous fresco of 1386 pictures the children placed on display by the captains. Overjoyed parents rush to claim their little ones. Other children sit disconsolately by, waiting in vain for parents who will not appear.⁹ Such unfortunates, "having remained some days in the house of the said Misericordia, and not being sought after . . .," were sent to one of the foundling homes.¹⁰ In 1389 the hospital of the Scala implied that its foundlings consisted mainly of those who were brought there after "having been lost for a certain period of time."¹¹

The Camaldolan monk Ambrogio Traversari described the Scala and its operative plan in a letter of 1435:

There is within the walls of the city of Florence a place, called a *brephotrophium* in Greek, where exposed infants of uncertain parentage are cared for, more than 200 of both sexes. Customarily they are first given over to wet-nurses for breast feeding. When they are weaned, they are diligently cared for within this institution. Boys are sent to learn their letters; girls learn womanly things. When they later become adults, the boys learn a trade which will support them; the girls are married, with the institution providing a dowry.¹²

Boys might wander the streets if they could not find work. Girls should not. The failure to successfully integrate female innocents and even legitimate girls into general society on their reaching adolescence led to the creation of conservatories or warehouses for unwanted adolescents. These institutions did not fully develop until the cinquecento, but the need for them was already pressing in the quattrocento. In 1454, only nine years after the opening of the Innocenti, a pious confraternity described the situation in no uncertain terms. Due to lack of parents or poverty, many young girls could not be reared "as honor required." If grown, they could not find husbands equal to their own social position.¹³ The conservatory which the sodality intended to build would take in indigent young girls, provide them with a dowry, and keep them until a husband could be found. As a result, poor and dignified families of the city would be relieved, prostitution would be discouraged, and through the "infinite marriages" to be arranged, population would increase.¹⁴

As far as can be determined, this particular institution never materialized. Partly as a result of its failure, legitimate unwanted girls from upstanding families started to flow into nunneries, which became another prime Florentine welfare institution. By the early sixteenth century, thirteen percent of all the females in the city were ensconced behind monastic walls.¹⁵ Similar arrangements for legitimate poor girls and grown foundlings were long in coming. In 1518, a Florentine testator endowed the building of a nunnery at the Innocenti for those female innocents who "do not want to marry and who want to preserve their virginity." Those girls closest to puberty were to be favored.¹⁶ At that late date, the asylum still had no effective method to prevent girls from slipping into prostitution after puberty.

A final institution for child care was developed toward mid-cinquecento. Homes for children past weaning but not yet adolescent, those three to ten years old, became an absolute necessity in the 1530s when hordes of these children were deserted by their parents and begged in the streets of Florence. Pleading that those unfortunates were also human beings, the first Grand Duke of Tuscany instituted homes and asylums for them during the 1540s.¹⁷

The present state of Florentine historical research does not permit definitive correlations between the evolution of child-welfare institutions and changing social fact. In certain areas, the import of environmental factors cannot be ignored. During the quattrocento the late marriage age of men certainly encouraged the generation of illegitimate children.¹⁸ But was this late age of marriage new? High marriage dowries and the commune's inability to cope with the problem clearly increased the number of unwanted girls in the quattrocento. But had not Dante referred to this problem a century before?¹⁹ The list could be extended: immigration and emigration patterns, military affairs, distributions of wealth. All of them influenced the birth and disposition of children. None have been studied from their point of view.


The relevance of the slave and servant population of Florence to the problem is more difficult to establish. Some writers have made the presence of slaves in the city responsible for the thoughtless production of bastards.²⁰ But were the free servant girls of Florence less promiscuous or more respected than their unfree sisters? Not only does the demography of these two groups remain uncertain; their social import upon the city has scarcely been scientifically examined.²¹

Any future explanation of child-welfare chronology must be based on such material factors, but it will not ignore the relation of the problem to its perception. It is at least conceivable, for example, that earlier centuries had no child problem in part because infanticide was tolerated. Or it may become clear that the law conspired against infants by its ignorance of a category of crimes against them.²² What was sad in the twelfth century may have been hideous in the sixteenth.

The manageable problems are difficult enough. It is at best premature to introduce such explanations for child abandonment as "Renaissance moral decline" and "courtly culture." The factual condition of children within a better understood society must be determined before such momentous moral problems can be faced.

The remainder of this article describes the children accepted into the foundling homes from the end of the fourteenth century until about 1455. This half century predates the great crisis in child care of the early sixteenth century, when over 900 children were being admitted each year to the Innocenti, when infanticide in a countryside stripped bare of child refuges became so common that the bishop had to start mass prosecutions of the guilty, and when starving children in great numbers roamed the streets of the city.²³ It shows the emerging problem, and some of the enduring dynamics of abandonment.

In 1419, the city decided to build the Innocenti because of the inadequacy of the two existing homes. The following table shows the matriculation into San Gallo during this period, and the effects of the opening of the Innocenti in 1445.



After a dip during the period 1404-1413, admissions to the hospital of San Gallo increased through the opening of the Innocenti. In 1377, San Gallo had only 38 children living with wet-nurses.²⁵ In 1448 "a much larger number than usual" was being deposited, and San Gallo supported at that date 115

residing with *balie*, and 45 living in the hospital itself.²⁶ The books of the Scala have not survived for this period, but other sources show that it too was supporting an increasing number of infants.²⁷ In 1319, three years after the hospital had opened, 60 infants were supported by the Scala.²⁸ In 1373 it was said that the citizens of Florence had "growing devotion" for the Scala, and by 1389 more than 130 children were residing with wet-nurses.²⁹ In 1396 the hospital claimed it housed 150 nursing infants.³⁰ Writing after 1445, a Florentine memorialist claimed that the Scala continually had 200 children or more residing with *balie*.³¹

As early as 1395 both the Scala and San Gallo had petitioned the government for aid because of the *maxima quantitas puerorum* which they supported.³² But Table I shows forcefully that the availability of a large new asylum quickly multiplied the number of children interned. Those supported by the older institutions had only been a fraction of the unwanted children. In its first eleven months, the Innocenti admitted more children than San Gallo had ever taken in a year.³³ Three years after opening, the Innocenti had already assigned more than 260 infants to wet-nurses, and new children were entering every day.³⁴ By 1456, the number had increased again, and the home warned the civil authorities that it might have to close for lack of funds to support such a population, and described the horrendous results of such an act.³⁵

What had happened to all these children before the new home had opened? Had they simply been deserted in the streets, wasted, killed, or had they been retained in the private homes of the city? To answer these and other questions, one must first know more about the children and parents, people who, as the city-fathers so self-righteously described them, abandoned their offspring "against all nature."

The overwhelming majority of children who were brought to the foundling homes came directly from a particular residence. Depositions given the hospitallers by bearers of the infants are not always reliable, since many of the porters had something to hide. Yet what they did reveal generally rings true. They occasionally said that the child had been found: a married couple asked to be made the godparents of the infant they had found;³⁶ a friar baptized an infant he found on the street for fear it would die;³⁷ pilgrims on their way to San Gallo for the indulgences brought *trovatelli* with them.³⁸ But these cases were unusual. With rare exceptions, even true foundlings were discovered in front of a shop or upon an altar, or at the door of a country hospital.³⁹ Desertion to fortune, by a ditch or the river, was most uncommon.⁴⁰

A few children came from the Misericordia, the asylum for lost children. How many children went from there to the Scala we do not know; this hospital's records for the period are not extant. But between 1395 and 1463, only two two-year-old girls came to San Gallo from the Misericordia.⁴¹ Of the first hundred admissions to the Innocenti, only three were brought by employees of the Misericordia, and two of the children's mothers were known to be slaves; the infants were not lost.⁴² Obviously, parents who wanted their children to have a chance at life took them or had them brought to the foundling homes, or at least put them where the Misericordia would find them.

In early modern Germany, the porters of children to foundling homes formed a particular artisan group with set tariffs.⁴³ In Florence, however, this was not so. The bearers of the first 100 infants to the Innocenti were a mixed lot. They identified themselves as follows:

TABLE II⁴⁴
PORTERS OF FOUNDLINGS TO THE INNOCENTI, 1455-1456

Relatives:		
Fathers	2	
Mothers	2	
Parents together	0	
Grandmother	2	
Grandfather	1	
		Total: 7
Unrelated:		
Women	37	
Wet-Nurses	6	
Men	14	
Boys or Youth	6	
Miscellaneous	9 ⁴⁵	
		72
Unknown and Unseen:	21	21
		Total: 100

In interpreting this table, two facts should be kept in mind. The period 1455-1456 was one of relative calm. During periods of war and famine, the number of *parents* bringing their children to the hospital increased dramatically. Second, many of the porters identified simply as women or boys or men were servants or friends of the parents. Two interesting results from the table do, however, provide sure aids to understanding attitudes toward desertion. First, one-fifth of the bearers avoided being seen. Yet all but ten of those who personally delivered a child were willing to provide the authorities with information on the parents. Forty-nine of the carriers gave the mother's name or, if she were a slave, her owner's name. Fifty-one refused. Less than half as many gave the father's name (23). The other porters were either recalcitrant or unknowledgeable.

In general, then, the carriers exercised caution in identifying themselves and especially the fathers of the children. They displayed no overwhelming aversion to being seen. The time of day when they deposited the children indicates this. Of 90 entrance times recorded for the same 100 first admissions to the Innocenti, approximately 51 fell between sunrise and sunset, with 39 other children being left at the grate during the night. Still, only four of the latter were deposited in the four hours before dawn when the whole city slept.

During periods of relative stability, the children brought to the homes were predominantly of urban provenience. Thus in the decade 1404-1413 when only 92 children were admitted to San Gallo, one single child of the 20 whose provenience is known came with a private person from the area of the dominion away from the city and its walls, and one other was brought in

from a district hospital.⁴⁶ All the other children started from the city or hard on its walls.

The picture for 1430-1439 was very different. The Florentine district of the Casentino fell victim to treacherous mercenary bands and local princes.

The whole land of the Casentino . . . emptied itself of women and children. They bathed their skin with the tears which flowed from their eyes, and came toward the city with their tiny children, some hanging from the neck, some carried in their arms. . . . The great mass of the poor women with their children . . . was received by the Florentines with open arms and paternal love. . . .⁴⁷

In this decade, 261 children entered San Gallo. Of the 83 places of origin recorded, 51 were from the city, but three-eighths of them, 32, came from outside.⁴⁸ As might be expected, the proportion of children from the city and countryside in times of crisis depended on the location of the crisis.

No vital statistic regarding abandoned children remained unaffected by environmental conditions. Consider the ages of matriculants to San Gallo during the same two decades (Table III).

In periods of low admissions the hospitallers received almost exclusively children less than one year old. In fact, seven out of ten had just been born; one may assume that abandonment had been premeditated since they were immediately abandoned by their parents. This was a population of children who could not walk, and were still reliant on the breast for their nutrition. If those under three years of age are included in the total, fully 95.9% of the children entering were of pre-weaning age.

The situation during the 1430s was significantly different. True, one of every two children was immediately abandoned, but a full 30.5% of those admitted were more than one year old, and almost one in five was beyond the normal age of weaning (ca. 2 years). Catastrophe brought into the hospital more children of higher age.

With the opening of the Innocenti in 1445, a division of labor took place with San Gallo, and perhaps the Scala. The new home installed a grate which limited the size of infants who could be deposited. Older children were taken to San Gallo.⁵⁰ This fact explains why so few children beyond the age of weaning are found among those whose age was recorded when they entered the Innocenti. The hospitallers recorded an age estimate for only 52 of the first 360 admissions. Of this number only five were more than six months old, 16 more were between one and six months of age, while the remaining 31 were three weeks old or less. The great majority of children whose ages were not estimated may be assumed to have been newborn. Most were taken to the city baptistry the day after their admission, an indication they were less than three weeks old.⁵¹

Under all conditions, more girls entered the asylums than boys. In the decade 1404-1413 the figure stood at 61.2%. In a majority of cases, consequently, parents waited till birth and then abandoned girls. The typical deserter was not a parent who had no room for any child of either sex, not consequently the wet-nurse who *had* to sell her milk, not the prostitute, not

TABLE III⁴⁹
 STATED ESTIMATES OF CHILDREN'S AGES DURING PERIODS OF
 LOW AND HIGH ADMISSIONS AT SAN GALLO

	1404-1413	1430-1439		1404-1413	1430-1439
<i>Days</i>			<i>Percentage of Total Ages Given</i>		
1	41 (56.2%)	85 (36.2%)			
2	6 (8.2%)	18 (7.6%)			
3-6	3 (4.1%)	16 (6.8%)	Less than one week	68.5	50.6
<i>Weeks</i>					
1		4			
2	2	7			
2 to 3	2	3	1 to 3 weeks	5.5	6.
<i>Months</i>					
1	4	2			
2	5	9			
3	1	3			
4		2			
5	1	5			
6		3			
7		1			
8	2	2			
9		3			
10	1	1	1 to 10 months	19.2	13.2
<i>Years</i>					
1-1½	2	11			
1½-2		4			
2		11	1-2 years	2.7	11.1
3	1	16			
4		7			
5		6	3-5 years	1.4	12.3
6		4			
7	2	2			
8		4	6-8 years	2.7	4.3
9		2			
12		3	9-12 years	0	2.1
15		1	adolescence	0	.4
totals*	73	235			

*The total admissions for these two periods were: 1404-13: 93; 1430-9: 261.

the desperate unmarried mother. The reasons for the favor shown boys need no detailing. It might simply be mentioned that the boy stemming from the union of a citizen and a servant girl stood a better chance of being accepted by the citizen's wife into the home than did an infant girl.⁵²

When catastrophe occurred, as it did in the 1430s in the countryside, the percentage of girls increased as did their age.

If they place [their twelve year old girl] with others as they are asked to do every day, it would end badly. And therefore I pray you for the love of God to accept her so that she may be conducted to honor, if it please God.

She would otherwise be harmed, and would become evil, as do the other young servant girls.⁵³

Fully 66.3% of the matriculants to San Gallo in this decade were girls. In crisis the least valuable sex was most vulnerable.

Computing the sex ratios for the new asylum of the Innocenti, however, yields unexpected results. In the first 100 admissions to that home, only 54 females are counted, a marked difference from the rule at San Gallo, where the ratio was always above 61%. In the eight and a half years from its opening in 1445 until the end of August 1453, the Innocenti admitted 708 children; 58.9% were girls, 41.1% were boys.⁵⁴

This statistically significant drop in femininity from previous levels must be seen in conjunction with the fact, previously shown, that the opening of the Innocenti saw a quantum jump in the number of children received into foundling institutions. The new home did not pick up from the others. It ushered in a whole new experience. What explains these two sets of data? Excluding the possibility that San Gallo and the Innocenti preferred different sexes in admissions, and there being no evidence that the older hospitals had ever refused children or sought out parents—thus keeping numbers down by endangering anonymity—one is led to the following hypothesis: the size of the Innocenti and the facilities it offered encouraged parents to abandon in greater numbers that sex which, in the more constricted foundling asylums of an earlier period, they had kept when they could: infant boys. Like other theses advanced in previous pages, this one could be tested by an examination of Innocenti records in successive decades.

The physical condition of the infants brought to the foundling homes was not noteworthy; the children were hungry, perhaps, but in good physical condition. However, some terribly explicit descriptions of mutilated children can be found. Two sisters, two and three years old, came into San Gallo in 1431, "almost out of their senses, for from the way they looked they had been mistreated." They had been found in a ditch near the convent of San Marco.⁵⁵ But these were older infants. The same home also took in an occasional sick child, or one with physical handicaps who was unacceptable to any other hospital. But among the newborn children only one admission to San Gallo, that of a set of twins "very scrawny, because they were born before their time," mars the otherwise remarkable evidence that the abandoned children had not been mistreated.⁵⁶ The first 100 admissions to the Innocenti give a thoroughly representative picture. A month-old child had had smallpox. Four others were scarcely born when brought to the Innocenti, two covered with blood, their umbilical cord not yet tied, another half dead, livid, and with his mouth full of mucous, and the last of the four with his umbilical cord hurriedly tied with a piece of shoemakers' thread.⁵⁷ In 95 of the 100

cases, the child arrived with trivial pieces of cloth its only dowry, but otherwise in acceptable physical condition.⁵⁸

The first duty of the guardian who welcomed the innocent to its new home was to determine if it was baptized, for Christians believed that unbaptized innocents who perished were condemned to eternal perdition. If the infant arrived with a tiny sack of salt worn about its neck, the administrators knew that the child had not been baptized.⁵⁹ Otherwise they relied upon the deposition of the porters, or, when this was not forthcoming, upon their own estimates of age. At San Gallo the hospitallers assumed in such cases that a child estimated to be fifteen days old or less had not been baptized, while those over twenty days old were assumed to have received the sacrament. If they arrived in good condition, unbaptized children were sent on the following day to the communal font at San Giovanni, a half mile from the asylum of San Gallo, a third of a mile from the Innocenti. When assumed baptized because of their age, infants were simply named by the home and conditionally baptized. The foundling homes saw no reason to spend any more money on baptisms than necessary. "Because she was so old [ten months], we did not have her baptized in San Giovanni, but in the house, because we hope she had been baptized."⁶⁰

Sometimes an infant arrived on the point of death. This was the one case where the Catholic church, and the local baptistry, permitted and demanded immediate baptism by the nearest adult. The following entry gives the flavor of such an admission:

She was put naked in the hole in the wall unbaptized, a newborn child all full of blood on the head and on the rest of her back. Her umbilical cord had not been tied, and we could neither see nor know who had brought her; he had fled away. The said girl had been born in that instant. She was brought on the second day of January, 1445, Sunday evening at four and one half hours of the night. Frate Mariano of the Servites and a companion were here, and frate Mariano baptized her in the house, because it seemed to us that she would die. We did everything to warm her head and dry out all her parts. We had her umbilical cord tied and we washed away all the blood with warm white wine. On the following morning the third we had her baptized at San Giovanni with the aforementioned name [Smeralda].⁶¹

In a majority of cases, the hospitallers either knew or assumed that the children had not been baptized. Using the first 100 admissions to the Innocenti as a sample, one finds that 68.3% of those whose vital statistics were given had not been baptized. More than two-thirds of the parents left it to the Innocenti.

It might seem surprising that parents who took such good care of the children they abandoned endangered their souls. Reflection removes surprise. By diocesan and canon law laymen were prohibited from baptizing on their own except *in articulo mortis*.⁶² Baptisms cost money, and for those desperate poor who abandoned their children, the ritual was beyond their means. Parents were also dissuaded from taking bastard infants to the city or rural font by shame, and for fear that their sin would become priestly and public knowl-

edge. Had not Leonardo Bruni said that the Innocenti allowed Florentines to hide their blush from mortal men?⁶³ Florentines were certainly acquainted with the bad *exemplum* of the hospitaller who allowed the abandoned to die without baptism because of the expenses involved in their care.⁶⁴ But as the letters of harried parents show, and as the *spedalinghi* of the Innocenti and San Gallo were pleased to assert, the people of Florence had faith in the loving spiritual and temporal care which would be lavished on the innocents by their hospitals.⁶⁵ All in all, it was best to leave the baptism to the hospitals.

After the gateman had clarified the spiritual state of the infant, he was required to obtain from the porter as much information about the child as he could. Where and when had she been baptized, and by whom? What was the porter's name? The parents' name, domicile, and occupations? Where had the foundling been discovered? Did the bearer know why the child had been given up?⁶⁶ The administrator also carefully recorded all the pieces of clothing and other materials which were brought with the child, paying special attention to any "sign," such as an epistle or a particular symbol which would identify the provenience of the child.

This careful procedure served two purposes. The identification of the child might aid the hospital in obtaining from the parents or guardians some stipend which would help alleviate the financial burden of the house.⁶⁷ Secondly, identifying marks such as a cross or a circle made it possible for parents to come to the hospital, pay the cost of upkeep, and reclaim their own child with no chance of mistake, a practice which the foundling homes were of course interested in fostering.⁶⁸ The conflict in the mind of the deserter can easily be imagined. A symbol could give away the father's identity, bringing him and his family to shame. Without a sign, however, there was no chance of reclaiming a child desperately wanted but, for the moment, financially or socially impossible.

Who were these fathers and mothers who yielded their offspring to the republic? The safest statement about them is one of the most difficult to tabulate: excluding admissions in times of personal or environmental (see below, Table IV) catastrophe, the majority of parents had conceived the child out of wedlock. In the first 100 entries to the Innocenti, for example, only one child can be definitely described as legitimate; his mother had just died.⁶⁹ Not many other legitimate children could have been among this number. Thirty-four of the mothers were said to be slaves, their partners being various freemen from Florence, and six other unions were clearly illegal.⁷⁰

Porters obviously did not hesitate to identify the mother when she was a slave, nor did they draw back from identifying her owner. They did so in 32 of the 34 cases in this sample. The results are illuminating. Only about half (15) of the owners were from the patriciate of Florence.⁷¹ Another 14 were Florentines of professional or artisan status without outstanding names.⁷² The remaining three owners were said to be foreigners.⁷³

When it came to identifying the father of the slave's child, however, the porters were silent. Despite the strong presumption that the owners might be the fathers, only in one of the 34 cases did the porter say that a slave's child had been sired by a Florentine citizen: the mother of Mariano Manovelli

brought the child and admitted that it had been fathered by her son.⁷⁴ The rules were almost absolute: the name of the father of a slave girl's child was taboo; these children were rarely reclaimed or subvented by their fathers.⁷⁵

Many porters told the hospitallers that the father was a "buon cittadino" who would pay all costs, but such assertions were not taken too seriously by the authorities.⁷⁶ As often as not these identifications were forgivable deceptions by parents who could not keep the child, but wanted him or her to survive the hardships of life as an innocent. Assuming that children of "honest" parents were better cared for in the home, the parents naturally urged the porters to assert such dignified parentage. The administrators knew from experience that such pretensions were practically never followed by either redemption of the child or contribution to her welfare. When one porter refused all information except that the child's father was a rich citizen who would come to take her, the *spedalungo* departed from his practice of baptizing according to the saint's day and christened this little girl "Richa."⁷⁷

An examination of the data related to the children of slave girls shows that, almost without exception, parents considered slave parentage in itself sufficient justification for abandonment. Occasionally a shamed father hinted that he would have kept the child mothered by a slave but had to give it up "so as to avoid arguing with his wife," or because "his wife did not want to see it because it was the child of their slave."⁷⁸ But in general, the anxiety attendant on abandonment which we shall encounter among other social groups was absent among such fathers. The scribe's entry is free of second thoughts.

The one other group whose anonymity was unquestioningly preserved by the hospitallers were clerical parents. Hospitallers were themselves ecclesiastical persons, and interested in maintaining the reputation of the estate. Thus in 1412 the scribe of San Gallo wrote at two points:

According to what she told me, [the newborn girl] came from a nunnery, which I will not mention for reputation's sake.⁷⁹

A friar brought [the newborn girl] in a basket with which they go to beg bread, and secretly put her in the children's cottage. For reputation's sake I will not mention the order to which the friar belonged who brought her.⁸⁰

With the exception of slave and clerical parentage, illegitimacy does not seem to have furnished sufficient moral or material justification for abandonment. Again and again signs of concern and shame appear in the separate pages devoted to each infant. In eleven of the first 100 cases of the *Innocenti*, the father sent along a note directed to the hospitaller. Most are scribbles asking no more than mercy for the child. Others are full letters portraying the human qualities of their senders.

Although I am poor, poverty or diffidence at being able to feed him is not the principal reason for sending him. Rather it is in the main the

fear of scandal which could follow if such a thing were known. And to flee this, I have turned to Your Prudence. . . .⁸¹

We were asked to raise the boy well here, to flee great scandal and shame.⁸²

The illusion and hopes of desperate fathers are magnificently brought out in the following letter contained in a matriculation entry:

Wednesday on the said date, approximately before the third hour, a worker who did not want to say his name brought us a girl born in the moment. He brought with him a writing which speaks of a boy, but he who brought him brought a girl. And the tenor of the writing says as follows: 'Jesus, 1429. *Rogo vos sicut charissime pater dominus prior*, that this boy-child be attended to by you, that he be given to a good wet-nurse who has fresh milk. And if he could be placed [with a wet-nurse] near the Casentino, I would be most thankful, for it would help for us to be near each other. But above all I pray you in love not to concede him to anyone except to one who shows you the true sign, for it is he who wants to pay you for every cost and be always obligated before God and the world. *Dominus vos custodiat ab omni malo. Die primo mensis Martii.*' And the said girl-child had salt with her as a sign that she was not baptized. We had her baptized and bestowed the name Alessandra.

The only other entry in this block is: "She died on the second day of June, 1430."⁸³

Another father asked the local parish priest's indulgence for his act:

Tuesday night about midnight a boy-child of about two years old was left with us, and he carried writing that read as follows: 'It is necessary to say a few words to you, honorable father. I recommend this child to you in the name of the only God. Please baptize it and let his name be Matteo and Domenico. Ignore the fact that he brings so little with him, for in the future you will be reimbursed in such a way as to make you content, and before two months are up. And send him to the hospital of San Gallo and in God's name ask the lord prior to have good care taken of him and he will be well reimbursed, both for the cost of the wet-nurse and every other thing. Be patient and do not be angered because you found him at your doorstep. And for God's sake, do not make any commotion! Carry him secretly [to San Gallo] and do not bother to keep this writing, which in time will be sought out. Dear Ser Domenico, I commend [the boy] to you. I have not been able to bring myself to write my name, because I do not want it to come into the hands of anyone, so that it will not be publicly known. You are a great help. For God's sake, for God's sake, for God's sake, I commend [the boy] to you.' We had him baptized and named him Matteo and Domenico.⁸⁴

The entry gives no indication that the boy was ever further aided by his father.

Invaluable as such missives are for piercing the psychological makeup of a few fathers—and I encountered no letters from mothers—they only take one

so far. Illegitimacy was not in itself enough to extinguish moral compunction, the parental sense of obligation; these parents' harbored guilt feelings and illusions. But so often in these letters, personal tragedy obscured the social forces—the disdain of neighbors, for example—which lay below expressions of individual guilt and shame. Some of the writers clearly wished that society were free enough to allow them to keep their creations at their sides, or wealthy enough to permit support. Their repeated assurances that in the future they would identify themselves symbolized the utopic freedom men and women postulate to give meaning to their acts. Like most humans then and since, however, they chose an illusion rather than resistance to the social order.

These social forces are seen at work with devastating earnestness in periods when war and famine ravaged the country. In the period 1430 to 1439, environmental conditions were so massively causative—the children were older, more often rustics and females, and legitimate—so dramatic, that a diligent and sensitive scribe at San Gallo took note of them often enough to make tabulation worthwhile. Table IV summarizes the most specific reasons for abandonment given by carriers or parents during this decade.

Only the diligence of the scribe of San Gallo accounts for the extensive depositions which make this chart possible. None of the other early records of that hospital or of the Innocenti affords a statistical insight into the social motivations of parents. It is all the more important, therefore, that the anguish of familial tragedy and social injustice not be silenced by the historian's calculator. Here are examples of the reality behind the numbers:

War:

Because she had no bread to give her by reason of the war and the costs.

Because the father . . . left in desperation and she did not know where, because they had lost or had had burned everything they had, and she was dying of hunger.

Because of hunger and war, since they had not harvested anything and she said Salvi was carried off to Siena, and she believed he would never return. For this reason she commended the girl to the hospital.⁸⁶

She was brought in because of the war underway at Poppi; the mother could not feed her because, having lost everything she had, she had taken flight.⁸⁷

Family Conditions:

Thursday on the said date, the weaver Antonio di Tommaso di Jacopo of the parish of San Felice in Piazza [of Florence] brought us four of his children both male and female, one of whom he said was named Andrea, of six years, the second a girl he said was named Lisa and was five years old, the third a girl he said was named Salvestra of four years old, the fourth a boy he said was named Piero and Pagolo and was two years old. He said that he gave them to the said hospital because the mother has been dead some months and he has been sick for several months with seven children, and that he has

TABLE IV⁸⁵
JUSTIFICATION FOR ABANDONMENT, SAN GALLO, 1430-1439

<i>A. Inability to support.</i>		
I. War		11
II. Poverty		17
III. Work requirements		
a. Servants	6	
b. Wet-nurses	<u>3</u>	9
IV. Family conditions		
a. Intact marriages		
1. Too many children	6	
b. No functioning parent		
1. Orphans	4	
2. Abandoned	2	
3. Father dead and mother remarried	2	
4. Father dead or missing and mother dying	2	
5. Wet-nurse no longer paid	2	
c. Single parent		
1. Abandonment by husband	4	
2. Abandonment by wife	1	
3. Husband is widower	4	
4. Husband is disabled	1	
5. Husband is worthless	1	
6. Wife is widow	1	
7. Wife is beggar	<u>1</u>	31
<i>B. Societal Norms.</i>		
I. Clerical Parent		
a. Monk	1	
b. Friar	1	
c. Secular clerks	4	
d. Nuns	3	
e. Third order	<u>1</u>	10
II. Fear of "scandal"	2	
III. Wife refuses husband's bastard	<u>2</u>	4
<i>C. Mixed justifications of support and norms.</i>		
I. Slave-mothers		<u>23</u>
	Total:	105

consumed everything he owns, and so much so that he can no longer feed them. And thus he prays us that for the love of God we should accept them. And we did that; they were all scabby and sick because of the poor care.⁸⁸

Work Conditions:

Because of poverty; through war she had lost everything she had. She had to hire herself out as a servant.⁸⁹

She could not feed her, and she wanted to hire herself out as a wet-nurse to be able to live.⁹⁰

Because she could not feed her and she neither knew how to nor could she keep her with her, being the servant of others.

The father did not want to do anything. It was necessary for her to hire out as a wet-nurse if she wanted to live, because she was dying of hunger.

Perhaps the 1430s were not a normal decade. Certainly Florentine society was not the only one inhuman enough to force mothers to abandon their infant children so they could sell their milk. But human beings do not experience their lives *in specie saeculorum*. Seldom enough do the very words of the victims reach up to us. They should be grasped, the hundreds of similar letters carefully examined for their imposing human and social content. They are especially valuable for students of Florence, that still magical, mythic city of cultured burgher *insouciance*.

With the opening of the Innocenti in 1445, parents needed to fear less for the future of their child. The new asylum was spacious and uncrowded. Males, the valuable sex, flowed into the Innocenti at a higher rate than before. The life of the innocents in these early years would at least be better than the children could have enjoyed outside.

Within a few years of opening, however, the Innocenti dashed such confidence. Conditions developed within the home which made it possible for children to die there as quickly, yes, even more frequently, than in general society. The parent in 1445 left his child with hope. The deserter of the end of the century could wager he was consigning his child to death. An examination of death expectancy in these first years initiates an attempt to understand the dynamics of foundling mortality.

TABLE V⁹¹
CUMULATIVE DEATH EXPECTANCY OF ENTRANTS TO INNOCENTI, 1445-1451
IN PERCENTAGE OF ENTRANTS

Less than	1445	1446	1447	1448	1449	1450	1451
1 Year	26.2	23.7	29.9	53.6	43.3	47.9	57.6
2	29.5	28.8	45.	59.4	52.2	53.5	
3	31.1	33.9	50.6	62.3	53.3		
4	32.8	42.4	58.6	62.3			
5	39.3	44.1	60.9				
6	42.6	44.1					
7	44.3						

Parents left an infant with the foundling home because they believed society had more resources to care for it than they. Surprisingly, the experience of the first two years at the Innocenti bore them out. The death rate in the new home was no larger than that in general society.⁹³ In a hospital of minimum crowding, and with a sufficient supply of *balie*, spared famine and

TABLE VI⁹²
MONTH AND PLACE OF DEATH OF INNOCENTI FOUNDLINGS,
MARCH 12, 1445 TO DECEMBER 16, 1452

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Hospital</i>	<i>Wet-nurse</i>
Jan.	15	3	11
Feb.	12	6	6
Mar.	14	5	9
Apr.	13	6	7
May	24	6	16
Jun.	28	18	9
Jul.	41	23	17
Aug.	50	29	21
Sep.	41	11	28
Oct.	34	9	25
Nov.	23	8	15
Dec.	27	9	17
	322	133 (42.5%)	181 (57.5%)

pestilence, the first innocents had as good a chance as any children.⁹⁴ To this day bastards die in infancy about three times as readily as legitimate children.⁹⁵ Thus the first two classes of the Innocenti were "fortunate" indeed.

As long as incoming infants could quickly be moved out of the hospital to the wet-nurses, the foundling system offered room for confidence. The monthly mortality rates show that infants' chances were poorest if they were in the hospital during the summer or with the rural wet-nurses in late summer and early fall. The diseases of the summer and fall were more dangerous than the cold of winter. Under optimal conditions, the rural *balie* saved lives.

In early February, 1454, a scribe calculated that in slightly more than nine years, 395 of the 738 matriculants had died, 53.5% of the total.⁹⁶ Long-term operation was more sobering than initial optimism. Overcrowding, with its potential for epidemic and crushing financial burden, was still only on the horizon, still only a minor factor in high mortality.⁹⁷ In these years, the great threat to life came from catastrophic events. Table VII helps to locate the years and the causes of these events.

From the death-expectancy figures in Table V, the reader has already surmised that 1448 and 1451 were the two years of catastrophe in the early years of Innocenti operation. Table VIII first shows where they died. In 1448 and 1449, for example, more than twice as many children died at wet-nurse as at the hospital. Contrarily, in 1451 and 1452 many more children perished in the hospital than with the rural wet-nurses. Isolating the two classes of 1448 and 1451 to determine when within the first year of life mortality occurred will provide all the elements necessary to determine the cause of death.

Even without verification from other documents, these tables show that in 1448 children were going to the wet-nurses and dying of infectious disease. The class of 1451 never enjoyed the risk of epidemic. The hospital was not sending the arrivals to *balie*, and they died in the hospital. Comparing the 1451 rates of death in the early months to those of 1448, one sees that in 1451 roughly half of those who would die in the first year perished before

TABLE VII⁹⁸
PLACE OF DEATHS OF INNOCENTI FOUNDLINGS BY YEAR, 1445 TO 1452

<i>Died in the Year</i>			<i>Entered in the Year, Died Before 1453</i>	
<i>Hospital</i>	<i>Wet-nurses</i>		<i>Hospital</i>	<i>Wet-nurses</i>
5	6	1445	12	15
9	8	46	9	16
10	17	47	17	33
13	29	48	12	30
15	48	49	13	34
20	39	1450	15	23
34	19	51	35	20
26	15	52	19	10
132	181		132	181

TABLE VIII⁹⁹
AGE AND PLACE OF DEATH BEFORE THE FIRST BIRTHDAY,
ENTRANTS OF 1448 AND 1451, DIVIDED BY SEX

	<i>1448</i>					<i>1451</i>				
	<i>Hospital</i>	<i>Wet-nurses</i>		<i>% of 1-Year</i>		<i>Hospital</i>	<i>Wet-nurses</i>		<i>% of 1-Year</i>	
	<i>M</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Mortalities</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Mortalities</i>
<i>Before</i>										
1. <i>month</i>	4	2	1	1	21.6	8	5	1		27.4
2.	2		3	1	37.8	5	4		2	49.
3.	1	1	1	3	54.1	3	2	2		62.7
4.				5	67.5	2		1	2	72.7
5.	2		1	2	81.1	1		2	1	80.4
6.					81.1	1				82.4
7.			2	3	94.6				3	88.2
8.			1		97.3			1	2	94.1
9.					97.3		1			96.1
10.					97.3					96.1
11.					97.3	1				98.
12.			1		100.				1	100.
	9	3	10	15		21	12	7	11	

they were two months old, as compared to 37.8% for the year 1448. The mortality of the class of 1448 was almost as high as that of 1451—pestilential epidemic could be as devastating as starvation. But it occurred more frequently among the wet-nurses and at a later age.

External documentation confirms the evidence of the tables. In 1448 Tuscany and the whole of northern Italy were struck with the plague.¹⁰⁰ Entering the city in the fall, it apparently had no significant impact on the Innocenti, due probably to the low density of the house. Elsewhere in Florence, however, its effects were substantial. Early in October, the government took steps to meet the threat.¹⁰¹ Eleven people were said to have died on the 29th of the month. Five days later, the estimate was four or five per day.¹⁰² In the Dominican friary of San Marco, five young friars perished.¹⁰³ At the behest of

the bishop, the Signoria ordered processions to implore God's mercy.¹⁰⁴ The Innocenti successfully isolated itself. It was in the countryside that the hospital's children suffered.

Since the census in the Innocenti was still fairly low—the density of later years made epidemic almost unavoidable—and since a significant part of the general society also put its children out to wet-nurse, it may be that Innocenti mortality in 1448 was a microcosm of wider society. The same cannot be said for the deaths of 1451. Certainly there were parents in general society who stopped paying their privately hired wet-nurses. But when the government did the same, catastrophe followed. In 1451 the commune simply stopped paying the Innocenti the interest due it on the hospital's investment in the public debt.¹⁰⁵ The result was famine. The children could not be put out to wet-nurses, for the hospital could not pay their wages. Innocents were left to die.

Though the commune attempted in the 1450s to stabilize the income of the home so as to avoid a repetition, the steadily climbing resident census posed a continuing threat in subsequent years. Other famines followed. In 1484 the hospitallers pleaded with the government for new subventions to avoid a replay of one just past. Of course, no contemporary chronicle mentions these disasters, but then, this was not the type of subject one talked about. Yet everyone knew. It was, said the governor of the asylum,

... a thing which harms everyone, to be able to say that men as naturally mild and pious as is the Florentine *popolo* could, I do not say support, but narrate and hear [such a thing] without horror and fear.¹⁰⁶

The future would hold many more tears, and great horrors. Florentine society's inability to reintegrate the graduates of the institute helped guarantee great warehouses of the unwanted, streets full of begging children, and recurring pestilence in the Innocenti. The increasing number of matriculants sent into the countryside caused major social dislocations and increased the mortality of rural as well as urban babies.

Could the commune of Florence have prevented this disaster while maintaining a system of open admissions to the Innocenti? In the nineteenth century the same type of question exercised the social planners of Europe. Did social welfare for infants create more problems without solving previous ones?¹⁰⁷ No complete response can yet be hazarded for the Florentine case, since so little is known about the causes of increased matriculations, the pay arrangements of the *balie*, and many other factors. The present article does, however, provide certain information in this regard.

The prejudice against females, it has been shown, was continuous; in a previous article I have shown that it was institutionalized in the operation of the Innocenti, and that it was deadly.¹⁰⁸ The marked increase in total admissions to the homes after the Innocenti opened in 1445 coupled with increased masculinity, suggest that increased facilities stimulated parents' readiness to abandon. If the sex ratios at the Innocenti had turned out to be the same as at San Gallo, one could not present this view. But the increase in the

favorable sex's census may mean that some of the children swelling the rolls would otherwise have been kept in private homes. This tends to support the nineteenth-century "Protestant" argument that open-admissions foundling institutions, while they may have prevented some infanticide, actually stimulated the desertion of children from tolerable economic and social familial conditions.¹⁰⁹

The deserters were not heartless or brutal. Children were in good physical condition when they were abandoned, and the depositions of parents show a keen sense of remorse at the loss of their children, excepting those of slaves and clergy. It remains to be seen whether the unprecedented desertions of the later part of the quattrocento and cinquecento were accompanied by an increasing indifference to the act. The paternal depositions of this period could provide an answer. They deserve careful study.

Alimentary, fiscal, and military catastrophes very significantly affected the vital statistics of the matriculants. Yet the loss of children was not completely beyond the control of members of the community. Contemporaries were quick to blame the wet-nurses for malice. This paper shows that the commune itself, even in the early years when the financial burden was not crushing, deserted its children rather than its other responsibilities. Republican governments in turn only reflect the determination of citizens to deal with social problems. The attitude toward, if not the treatment of, the child, was not our own. Like women and slaves, infants' value—little enough to start with—rose and fell according to their condition. In 1447, a father came forward to reclaim his child from the Innocenti. He paid only part of the cost which the hospital had incurred in caring for the child. The scribe explained why:

We let the rest go, because the boy was sick when we returned him.¹¹⁰

Richard C. Trexler teaches Renaissance History at the University of Illinois, Urbana. He is at present working on a historical sociology of the Florentine clergy. The present article is part of a projected monograph on the unwanted child in Tuscany, 1200-1700.

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2. *Archivio di Stato, Firenze, Provvisioni* (hereafter *ASF, Prov.*) 147, ff. 169v-171r (Dec. 29, 1456). On the concept of salvation by innocents, see my "Ritual in Florence. Adolescence and Salvation in the Renaissance," to appear in H. Oberman and C. Trinkaus, eds., *The Pursuit of Holiness* (Leiden, 1973) pp. 200-264.
3. See my "Infanticide in Florence. New Sources and First Results," *History of Childhood Quarterly* 1 (1973): 98-116.
4. Bibliography is to be found *ibid.*, n. 2.

5. Semichon's and Hügel's works are cited *ibid.*, n. 7; L. Lallemand, *Histoire des enfants abandonnés et délaissés* (Paris, 1885); W. Platz, *Geschichte des Verbrechens der Aussetzung* (Stuttgart, 1876).
6. ASF, Prov. 4, f. 8r (May 19, 1294); printed in L. Passerini, *Storia degli stabilimenti di beneficenza e d'istruzione elementare della città di Firenze* (Florence, 1853), pp. 935ff.
7. ASF, Prov. 14, ff. 176v-177r (May 17, 1316). In 1319 the hospital was caring for infants; *ibid.* 16, ff. 47v-48r (Mar. 26, 1319).
8. Passerini, *Storia*, pp. 685-694, whose 1444 date of opening resulted from failure to convert the Florentine year to the moden chronology.
9. The date of and confraternity pictured in this painting were determined by Passerini, *Storia*, pp. 455 ff.
10. *Archivio degli Innocenti, Firenze* (hereafter AIF), II,6, f. 130v (1396).
11. "In educando et alendo pueros qui ad dictum hospitale deferuntur, tamquam certo tempore carentes;" ASF, Prov. 77, ff. 312r-314r (Feb. 19, 1388sf).
12. The letter does not name the Scala. Mehus identified it with the Innocenti, impossible for chronological reasons. The occasion of the letter was an indult for an adolescent confraternity which met in the hospital; the Scala was the only hospital hosting such a group; Ambrogio Traversari, *Latinae epistolae . . .*, ed. L. Mehus, II (Florence, 1759), c. 39.
13. The confraternity was the Tempio, in charge of the consolation of executed criminals; ASF, Prov. 145, ff. 97v-100r (July 20, 1454).
14. "Unum monasterium sive locus aptus pro retinendo puellas et conservando eas in vita honesta et bonorum morum. . . . Cum quotidie per experientiam dignoscatur, quod plurime tum ob defectum parentum, tum ob paupertatem et defectum substantie, non possint nutriri neque conduci eo modo et forma prout secundum honestatem exigeretur, nec postea nutrite ad honorem conduci, cum plurime remaneant innupte et sepe in malum exitum tendunt, quia male conducuntur. Unde ut provideatur et detur remedium quod talia inconvenientia non sequantur et ad hoc ut altissimus deus, mediantibus talibus operibus misericordie et caritatis, subveniat casibus et indigentis nostre civitatis. . . . Et adtento etiam quanto sit utile rei publice, quia ex predictis sequi habent infinita matrimonia et fieri nuptie, et per consequens repleti et multiplicari hec civitas populo, et resultabit etiam ex hoc novo pietatis opere, fama et reputatio magna huic civitati;" *ibid.*
15. R. Trexler, "Le célibat à la fin du Moyen Age: Les religieuses de Florence," *Annales E.S.C.*, 27 (1972): 1329-50.
16. ASF, *Diplomatico, Santa Maria degli Innocenti*, Feb. 22, 1517sf.
17. A. D'Addario, *Aspetti della controriforma a Firenze* (Rome, 1972), pp. 464-471, especially p. 468.
18. D. Herlihy, "Vieillir à Florence au Quattrocento," *Annales E.S.C.* 24 (1969): 1341f, 1346.
19. "Non faceva, nascendo, ancor paura
la figlia al padre, ché il tempo e la dote
non fuggian quinci e quindi la misura
Non avea case di famiglia vòte;
non v'era giunto ancor Sardanapalo
a mostrar ciò che in camera si puote"; *Paradiso*, 15:103.
20. Representative in this respect is A. Zanelli, *Le schiave orientali a Firenze nei secoli XIV e XV* (Florence, 1885).
21. See most recently I. Origo, "The Domestic Enemy: Eastern Slaves in Tuscany in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," *Speculum* 30 (1955): 321-66.
22. Subsequent legal scholarship may show that the laws forbidding infanticide and

abortion must be classed as crimes against society rather than against individuals.

23. For references to later developments, see my "Infanticide," p. 102.
24. The table is based on *AIF*, II, 6-11 (*Balie e Bambini*), and *AIF*, XVI, 1-6.
25. *ASF, Estimo* 338, ff. 10r-11v.
26. *ASF, Prov.* 139, ff. 60rv (May 24, 1448).
27. The only *Balie e Bambini* register surviving for the Scala is for the years 1510-1535; *AIF*, III, 15.
28. *ASF, Prov.* 16, ff. 47v-48r (Mar. 26, 1319).
29. *Ibid.*, 61, ff. 82v-83r (June 28, 1373); 77, ff. 312r-314r (Feb. 19, 1388sf).
30. *Ibid.*, 85, ff. 160v-161v (Aug. 25, 1396). G. Bruscoli thinks this figure inflated; *Lo spedale di Santa Maria degl'Innocenti* (Florence, 1900), p. 20.
31. *Archivio del Seminario Maggiore, Firenze, Codex Rustici*, f. 55v. The post-1445 date is clear from the fact that besides the description of the Scala and San Gallo (f. 79r), the author described the operation of the Innocenti (ff. 55v-56r). It may be recalled that Traversari had used the figure 200 in referring to the Scala in 1435; see above, p. 75.
32. *ASF, Prov.* 84, ff. 98v-100r (June 25, 1395).
33. It must be kept in mind that the comparable figures for the Scala are not known. If the *Codex Rustici* is correct, however, the matriculation to that home was maintained after the opening of the Innocenti.
34. *ASF, Prov.* 139, ff. 46v-47v (Apr. 29, 1448).
35. *Ibid.*, 147, ff. 169v-171r (Dec. 29, 1456).
36. *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 74r.
37. *Ibid.*, II, 9, anno 1432.
38. *Ibid.*, II, 6, ff. 91v, 95v (May, 1395).
39. Of the 261 admissions to San Gallo in the period 1430-1439, for example, only one child was found in this way: in front of a shop. A case of a child left on an altar: *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 190v. I encountered only three cases of children being left at country hospitals, one at that of the Carthusian Certosa; *ibid.*, f. 42r; another at a hospital outside the city gate, *AIF*, II, 7, a. 1406; the third at a hospital in the town of Montelupo; *ibid.*, a. 1411.
40. Of the above 261 admissions to San Gallo, only three children were found in the street or by the river. The sample 1430-1439 is based on *AIF*, II, 9-10. For a rare case of children found in a ditch, see below, p. 82.
41. *AIF*, II, 6, ff. 3r, 130v (1394, 1396).
42. *AIF*, XVI, 1, ff. 17r, 26v, 30v. Unless otherwise noted, all tabulations dealing with the first 100 infants received in the Innocenti were made from *AIF*, XVI, 1 (*Registro de Fanciugli*).
43. O. Werner, *The Unmarried Mother in German Literature* (New York, 1917), p. 7.
44. See n. 42.
45. This includes 3 couples, 3 slaves, two familiars (one of the Signoria), and a "person."
46. The sample 1404-1413 is based on *AIF*, II, 7.
47. G. Cavalcanti, *Istorie Fiorentine*, ed., G. Di Pino, (Milan, 1944), pp. 397f.
48. At all times I have included among the rustics only those who assertedly brought their children from the country. The rural origins of the parents is not sufficient; they might have been city residents.
49. Based on the references in n. 46 and n. 40. Under "one day" are included those said to be just born. These figures are almost exclusively the estimates of hospital administrators and not of the porters of the children.
50. Bruscoli noted that in 1483, San Gallo housed only older children (18 girls between sixteen and eighteen); *Lo spedale*, p. 16. But an examination of earlier data shows that the division of labor was initiated in the first years of the Innocenti: On May

- 15, 1463, the scribe of San Gallo computed the number still alive of those who had entered since Nov. 11, 1456. Intrapolating for the six calendar years 1457-1462, one finds that 134 of the 158 who had entered were alive and with wet-nurses. This extraordinarily low death rate can only be explained by the children being older; *AIF*, II, 11, ff. 127v-129r.
51. See below, p. 83.
 52. This would seem to at least partially explain the higher masculinity of richer families in Florence in 1427; see my "Infanticide," p. 101.
 53. *AIF*, II, 9, a. 1433.
 54. "Si truova essere stati rehati in questa chasa fanciugli 708 tra maschi e ffemine e vera 291 maschi e 417 femmine, de quali sono morti insino a detto di 381. . ."; *AIF*, XIV, 1, f. 65r. (Aug. 31, 1453).
 55. "Erano quasi ismemorate perche secondo che parevano erano state male tenute"; *AIF*, II, 9, a. 1431.
 56. "Lunedì a di decto mona Antonia di Nanni Berlinghieri da Lunari ci meno una fanciulla femina deta danni 4 o circa. Era inferma e disse che niuno spedale laveva voluta accettare. Disse cherra figliuola di Domenico di mona Pippa e disse che aveva nome Margherita"; *ibid.*, f. 118v (Aug. 18, 1432). "Molti scriati perche erano nati innanzi al tempo, e sicondo che dissono, erano figliuoli di suor Nanna, monaca del munistero di San Baldassare"; *ibid.*, 9, a. 1437. Mutes occasionally turned up. The father of one, "la quale e atratta sorda, ciecha, e mutola," had been executed; *ibid.*, 7, a. 1413.
 57. The five cases are respectively at *AIF*, XVI, ff. 28r, 10r, 33v, 5r, and 44r, one Giorgio, who "avea leghato il belicho chonuno spaghetto."
 58. That is, their physical condition was not remarked by the scribe. Cases where a child was placed dead through the grate are encountered only later; see for example *AIF*, XIV, nn. 119, 216, 281.
 59. "E recho a cholo il sale per sengnio non era batezato"; *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 44r. Such bits of salt were commonplace.
 60. A 15 day old assumed unbaptized: *AIF*, II, 7, f. 54v; a 20 day old assumed baptized: *ibid.*, 6, f. 101v. The quote is *ibid.*, 10, a. 1437.
 61. *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 33v. Another case of emergency baptism was that of a premature girl whom the authorities named Innocente; *ibid.*, f. 37v.
 62. In the fourteenth century Florentine bishops learned that if too much leeway were given, laymen would avoid the priestly rite; R. Trexler, *Synodal Law in Florence and Fiesole, 1306-1518* (Vatican City, 1971), p. 67. Following a decree of the Clementines, they restricted lay baptisms.
 63. "Oggi si v'è cercando di preparare dove essi abbin'occasione d'occultare, e tor dalle fronti loro quel rossore, il quale non sarà possibile nascondere, ne celare, per la colpa di fragilità contratta, nel cospetto dell'Altissimo Iddio"; Del Migliore, *Firenze Illustrata*, p. 308.
 64. Salimbene De Adam, *Cronica*, ed. G. Scalia, I (Bari, 1966), p. 105.
 65. One of the reasons populations of the Innocenti and San Gallo were increasing, said their governors, was "quia etiam scitur quod ibi optime gubernantur"; *ASF, Prov.* 139, ff. 46v-47v (Apr. 29, 1448); "Ex bona gubernatione que sit in presentiarum per dictum hospitale"; *ibid.*, ff. 60rv (May 24, 1448).
 66. By law of Dec. 30, 1451, the commune itself ordered the Innocenti to keep a book listing the first and middle names of all matriculated children, the day they were taken, and baptismal information; *ASF, Prov.* 142, ff. 380v-382r.
 67. This stipend was adjusted according to the health of the child when it was returned; see below, p. 93.
 68. Examples of these symbols are recorded at *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 9r (a consecrated candle

and a baptismal amulet minutely described; such amulets can be seen in many paintings of baptisms); *ibid.*, f. 16v (an amulet); *AIF*, II, 9, a. 1435 (three rosaries of wood). Parents sometimes cautioned the hospitals not to yield the child except to someone bearing the "true sign"; see below.

69. The father was a swordmaker; *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 40r.
70. Two of the six fathers were foreigners; one was a soldier; one child had been born out of wedlock in the countryside; another resulted from a couple living together in Florence; one father secretly gave his name to the *spedalungo*.
71. The families of the owners were the Ridolfi, Alberti, Boscoli, Parenti, Bardi, Cerretani, Panciatichi, Martelli, Pitti, Minerbetti, Soldani, Migi, Manelli, Pucci, and Altoviti. Of the slave-owners identified in the records of San Gallo, one holds more than passing interest: Cosimo de' Medici; *AIF*, II, 9, a. 1437.
72. These included Antonio di Taddeo, a *lanaiuolo*; *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 32v, the spicer Cambio di Giovanni; *ibid.*, f. 41r, and Maestro Simone, M.D.; *ibid.*, f. 51r.
73. These included Francesco Contarini, "gentile huomo da Venezia," whose lover had given birth to her child in the house of Manno Temperanni; *ibid.*, f. 3v, and two Pisans.
74. *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 22v. Subsequent entries in this volume do show an occasional Florentine patrician identified as the father of a slave's child. Vieri di Tommaso Corbinelli and a slave belonging to the lawyer Otto Niccolini, whose child entered Feb. 10, 1447 and died one week later; *ibid.*, f. 72r; Baldassare del Rosso del Buon-delmonte, whose child entered Feb. 22, 1449; *ibid.*, f. 170v. Riunigi degli Strozzi; *ibid.*, f. 172v; Francesco Manovelli; *ibid.*, f. 184r.
75. Early exceptions were: the wife of Nerone di Nigi came to the Innocenti in 1445 and admitted that a child left anonymously belonged to her slave; *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 7v. Again, "Dipoi vene qui Bastiano di Meo di Piano di Ripoli della famiglia degli Azzi e disse era suo figliuolo"; *ibid.*, f. 13r. Finally, Francesco de' Ginori and his wife came forward and recognized an anonymous child of a slave-girl as being of their nephew; *ibid.*, f. 22r. In a case at San Gallo, mona Giovanna, the wife of Jacopo Ardinghelli, confessed that the newborn child was the son of her husband and their slave Niccolina; *AIF*, II, 6, f. 114v.
76. In the 1430s at San Gallo, this was very common. See for example *ibid.*, 10, a. 1439 (twice). See also the letter quoted below, p. 86.
77. *AIF*, XVI, 1, f. 78v.
78. *AIF*, II, 9, a. 1437; *ibid.*, 10, a. 1439.
79. *AIF*, II, 7, a. 1412.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*, 10, a. 1437.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*, 9, f. 65v. The latin phrases may indicate that the father was a member of the clergy.
84. *Ibid.*, f. 161v.
85. There was a total of 261 admissions during this period. For archival references, see n. 40.
86. All three of these motivations were given in 1432; *AIF*, II, 9. On the military operations around Barbialla, Avertina, Gello, Linari, and Colle, from whence these unfortunates came, see N. Machiavelli, *History of Florence* (New York, 1960), pp. 178-179.
87. *AIF*, II, 9, a. 1436.
88. *Ibid.*, 10, f. 12r (Jan. 30, 1438).
89. *Ibid.*, 9, a. 1433; "Fante" is translated as servant, although it may have implied wet-nurse at times.

90. The following quotes are from *ibid.*, aa. 1433, 1435, 1435.
91. Based on *AIF*, XIV, 1.
92. Based on *ibid.*, this table includes all deaths for which a month was available.
93. D. Herlihy has determined that around 1427 the death rate in the first year of life for the population of nearby Pistoia was 21%; *Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia* (New Haven, 1967), p. 283.
94. In September, 1450, for example, the Innocenti scribe noted that a three year old had died at *balia* and a five year old in the hospital from plague. Clearly, infection from *morbo* was not yet a significant life-expectancy factor at the Innocenti; *AIF*, XIV, 1, nn. 14, 21.
95. For Italian mortalities 1928-1930, see G. Chiassino and M. Natale, *Ricerche sulla mortalità infantile* (Rome, s.d.), pp. 26f.
96. *AIF*, XIV, 1, f. 65v.
97. For later materials, see *Relazione storica-descrittiva del regio spedale degli Innocenti (Brefotrofio) di Firenze* (Florence, 1912), p. 41; L. Passerini, *Notizie storiche dello spedale degli Innocenti di Firenze* (Florence, 1853), p. 33.
98. Based on *AIF*, XIV, 1.
99. Based on *ibid.*
100. Alessandra Macinghi negli Strozzi, *Lettere di una gentildonna fiorentina del secolo XVI ai figliuoli esuli*, ed. C. Guasti, (Florence, 1877), p. 43.
101. *ASF, Prov.* 139, ff. 125r-126r (Oct. 3, 1448).
102. Strozzi, *Lettere*, pp. 37, 43.
103. *Biblioteca Laurenziana, Biblioteca di San Marco*, cod. 370 (*Cronica del Convento*).
104. Strozzi, *Lettere*, p. 43.
105. The Innocenti was actually struck by two communal attacks on its privileged tax status. In September, 1451, the commune laid a 25% gabelle upon any land passing from tax-supporting to charitable entities; *ASF, Prov.* 142, ff. 216v-217r (Sept. 10, 1451). The archbishop finally forced the government to cancel the law under threat of excommunication; R. Morcay, *Saint Antonin. Archevêque de Florence (1389-1459)*, (Paris, 1914), p. 481f. Probably at about the same time, the government stopped paying interest on investment credits held by those not paying taxes. A law to that effect was passed in January, 1452; see the paraphrase of its contents in *ASF, Prov.* 161, ff. 271r-272r (Mar. 12, 1470). In 1456, the hospital still said it could not meet costs; *ASF, Prov.* 147, ff. 169v-171r (Dec. 29). In 1466 it admitted that the 456 wet-nurses were refusing to serve because they were not being paid; *ibid.*, 157, ff. 21v-22v (Apr. 16).
106. *Ibid.*, 174, ff. 157v-161r (Feb. 18, 1483sf).
107. Hügel, *Findelhäuser*, pp. 395f.
108. Trexler, "Infanticide."
109. Hügel, *Findelhäuser*, loc. cit.
110. "El resto li lascio per dio, perchel fanciullo era malato quando lo riebbe"; *AIF*, XIV, 1, n. 148.

CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE AMONG THE THIRTEENTH- CENTURY SAINTS

MICHAEL
GOODICH

Adolescents in every period of history rebel against the narrow-minded materialism of their parents in the name of higher ideals. But each adolescent rebellion takes a form peculiar to its period, based upon the kind of childhood preceding it; only when the content of that childhood is known can we understand why a thirteenth-century rebellion takes an ascetic religious form, an eighteenth-century American rebellion takes the form of a Great Awakening, and a twentieth-century produces a campus rebellion. In the following essay, Michael Goodich begins the task of linking the childhood experience of thirteenth century saints with their adolescent rebellion, drawing upon some of the most difficult sources to work with—medieval hagiography—in a manner designed to yield useful information on life patterns during the high middle ages.

The most neglected period in the history of European childhood has been the middle ages. Medievalists in the past have been content to study institutional, legal, or economic history, and have only recently turned to social history. Still, while the techniques of quantification and computer technology have been successfully applied in a number of areas—demography and agrarian history, for example—a psychohistorical study of the period has yet to be attempted. Historians of medieval religion have likewise been even more lax and have concentrated largely on church structure and ideology to the detriment of the psychology of religion. Nevertheless, a wealth of untapped sources are available with which to begin a study of the mental constitution of this period. Although autobiographies are sparse until the Renaissance, there remains a substantial body of first-hand documentation concerning the behavior patterns of medieval man, and even in that most obscure region of

all, his childhood.¹ In this paper I have isolated one particular psychological "type," the thirteenth century saint, who in many ways personified the social ideals of the age. For it was his or her allegedly pious behavior which became the paragon against which all human action was measured, whose character was presented to the young as an ideal worthy of emulation. Among those raised either officially or unofficially to the honors of veneration are kings and queens, philosophers, diplomats, martyrs, social activists, and recluses. The list encompasses such well-known figures as Francis of Assisi, Thomas Aquinas, Dominic and Louis IX of France, alongside such relatively unknown saints as the servantgirl Radegund of Augsburg, and the lifelong hermit, Leonard of Camaldoli.

One of the difficulties involved in the collection of data dealing with the formative years of the saint, or any other figure of the middle ages, lies in the differing concerns of medieval biographers and hagiographers.² For them, the essence of the saint's mission resides in the period after his conversion to the religious life, and his biography is not so much the celebration of one individual, but of the entire value system or style of life which he personifies. In a large number of contemporary biographies, the early years are given in the barest outline, purely as an introduction to the miracles and virtues practiced by the saint in adulthood. If the work has been composed under the patronage of the saint's family, a long digression will describe his illustrious parentage, or the etymological source and connotations of his name, and then skip to late adolescence and his ecclesiastical career. Thus, evidence concerning the formative years must often be perceived indirectly through amplification upon otherwise apparently offhand remarks. Of the over five hundred saints who became the objects of local or universal cults from 1215 to about 1334, perhaps no more than ten percent possess reliable data concerning their early years, and an even smaller number left autobiographical material of one kind or another: letter, apologiae, visions, etc. Nevertheless, some broad emotional patterns common to strongly motivated religious figures in all ages also appear among these Catholic saints: childhood neglect or deprivation, resentment against an absent or allegedly cruel father, and a period of emotional stress in late adolescence which is resolved through religious commitment.³

The vast majority of the saints came from families of the wealthy noble and urban elite which governed Europe in the thirteenth century. Consequently, considering the child-rearing practices which prevailed in this milieu, a significant number experienced emotionally deprived childhoods, with either one or both parents away on Crusade or other professional duties, maintaining separate households, or sending their children away to nurses, relatives or monasteries for rearing. Furthermore, families were large, often exceeding ten children. The result was that the sensitive child could be easily lost or neglected; while the insecurities and frequent wars or pestilence of the time carried away one or both parents, leaving many an orphan with only the church as a substitute parent. Particularly among the wealthy, marriages of convenience were common, with children becoming engaged at seven and married at twelve or thirteen.⁴ Thus the responsibilities of adulthood were

often thrust upon children at an extremely young age. In adulthood, after such a scarred childhood, the saint might react with a violent rejection of those parents or values which he perceived as the source of his misery.

The standard hagiographical legend begins with a prologue which eulogizes the saint's virtues. This is frequently followed by an account of the prenatal portents or prophecies which will help to explain the subject's pious inclinations. A frequently reiterated theme concerns the saint who was allegedly born to infertile parents after prayers to Heaven. As a result of their good fortune, the thankful parents destine their son or daughter for a religious career.⁵ Some mothers are provided with supernatural messages which foretell their children's extraordinary future. During her pregnancy, the mother of the Franciscan Francis Venimbene was unable to feel the weight of her son's body within her, which was taken as a sign of greatness.⁶ Dominic's mother, Joan of Aza, reportedly dreamed before her son's birth that she was carrying a little dog who would come out bearing a torch to set the world afire; and at his birth, bees allegedly alighted upon his lips and Joan saw an imprint of the moon on the child's forehead. Both these images were taken to prophesy Dominic's enlightening mission.⁷ It was likewise said that Franca Visalta's mother seemed to be carrying a dog in pregnancy, whose bark would fend off sinners.⁸ Peter Celestine appeared to be clothed in ecclesiastical raiments at birth; while the mother of Francis of Siena dreamed that she would give birth to a lily.⁹ Before Clare of Assisi's birth, her mother Ortolana prayed to the Virgin, asking for an easy delivery. As she knelt down, a voice came to her reporting that these fears were groundless for she would bring forth a light to illuminate the world.¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas's mother, Theodora, was visited by a holy man who revealed that her son would be pious, that he would be baptized Thomas, and should be placed in the Benedictine monastery of Montecassino.¹¹

Such auspicious signs, however, are probably more the stock literary weapons of the hagiographers, or retrospective justifications for greatness, than actual representations of reality. The biographers did, however, come closer to the truth when they described the relative gloom in which many of the saints were raised. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries were periods of greatly increased birthrate in Europe, not to be equalled again until the nineteenth century. Thus, many were raised within large families, and probably suffered from the corresponding loss of attention. Where brothers and sisters are mentioned, they often come in clusters. Peter Celestine was one of at least ten; Thomas of Cantilupe, Hedwig of Poland, and Flora, were one of seven children; Roseline of Villeneuve had at least four brothers, and James of Certaldo at least three.¹²

One of the most frequently found images of childhood among the saints is that of a child whose attitudes and behavior before the age of seven are those of an old man or woman, "quasi senex" or some such phrase. "Like an old man," Anthony Manzoni of Padua is depicted fasting, attending mass, and listening to sermons, avoiding the usual pleasures of childhood; although bearing a youthful body, Peter Nolasco was suffused with "aged prudence."¹³ Richard of Chichester, Hedwig of Poland and Gerardesca of Pisa are por-

trayed as pious adults in the guise of children, with little time for their playmates and childish pranks.¹⁴ Bartholomew Buonpedoni allegedly showed such signs of greatness that when he conversed with his companions, a spark of fire was seen to come from his mouth.¹⁵ Both Robert of Knaresborough and Rose of Viterbo spent their early years loitering about churches and monasteries, rather than in the company of their peers; while already at the age of seven, John of Alvernia fled his father's farm and his playmates in order to contemplate the passion of Christ and mortify his flesh.¹⁶ The precocious Margaret of Città di Castello wore a hairshirt and restricted her diet to bread and water, while Louis of Toulouse reportedly preferred to sleep on the damp ground than on his royal bed, and eschewed sweets, which children are wont to favor.¹⁷ According to the contemporary biographer of Herman Joseph of Steinfeld, the saint was raised in poverty and always avoided childish games. "He did not have an insolent expression," the author reports, "speak blasphemous words and thrust his arms and legs about too much, practices which generally mar the majority of infants in our day." At seven, when he began his schooling, Herman avoided the games of children and frequented the church, where he often spoke with the Virgin, who provided the child with some money to purchase shoes to cover his snow-laden bare feet.¹⁸

A touching tale is told of Thomas Aquinas as evidence of his early propensity for religion and scholarship. At one time Thomas, his mother and nurse, were attending a bath at Naples. When the nurse decided to take the infant home, he suddenly started to cry, and a piece of paper was found in his clenched fist. After he had returned home, an impression of the *Ave Maria* was discovered on his palm. Thomas continued to cry, even after being slapped around by his nurse; he only ceased when the paper was returned to his hand, which he then put to his mouth. In a similar way, indicative of his Dominican love of sacred learning, Ambrose Sansedonius of Siena avoided the opulent volumes of secular literature which his parents had given him, but preferred works of religion.¹⁹

From the available evidence, it would appear that those saints attached to the less rigorous, more established orders like the Cistercians, Benedictines, or canons, led less turbulent childhoods, and merely fulfilled familial desires in their religious vocation. Many grew up from infancy in an environment which tended to reinforce their latent religious urges; to them, the religious life was a natural regime. Among the ruling classes, a position in the church was a common alternative to military service or commerce, and the route to sanctity and ecclesiastical preferment was therefore well-paved by relatives who occupied a similarly exalted position. This vocational choice was made early in childhood and there are few signs of reaction to the parental decision.

A significant number of saints were thus immediately related to other respected members of the church, themselves often also venerated saints. The family of Edmund Rich, Archbishop of Canterbury, boasted a host of religious personages: his brother, Robert, was a secular canon; Nicholas, a Cistercian; and an unnamed third brother retired to the monastery of Eynsham; his two sisters, Margery and Alice became nuns at Catesby. The Flemish bourgeois

gentleman, Bartholomew de Vleeschewer of Aä, who became the subject of an adoring biography by his daughter Beatrice, led his daughters Sibylla, Beatrice, and Christina, and a son, Wicbert, into the religious life after the death of his wife. The noble Odrawaz family of Poland produced three saints in one generation: Hyacinth, a canon-turned-Dominican, his brother, Ceslaus, and a cousin, Bronislava, who became a Norbertine nun at Hyacinth's urging.²⁰

The largest number were joined by a brother or sister in the pursuit of the religious life. This surely cemented the original resolve which had impelled the youth toward religion. The ties which bound the two siblings were sometimes so great, their lives so intertwined, that both were, on occasion, later venerated in tandem. Thus, the brothers Otto and Herman of Heidelberg are honored together, while the Scottish royalty Alexander of Foigny and Matilda of Lappion, both became Cistercians in northern France. The brothers Menricus and Berthold of Westphalia were actuated by the same vision of Mary to enter religion.²¹ This phenomenon of dual conversions was particularly common among women: Agnes of Liège and her sister, Juliana of Cornillon; Clare and Joan of Montefalco; the Franciscans tertiaries, Adriana and Margaret of Cortona; Gertrude the Great and Mechtild of Hackeborn.²² Clare of Assisi, despite initial opposition, was able to entice her mother Ortolana, her sister Agnes, and her nieces Balbina and Amata de Coccorano into the cloister of Poor Clares. Similarly, Hugh of Tennenbach, Gerard of Lunel and Douceline all followed the advice and example of older brothers in entering religion.²³

A considerable number belonged to families which count several saints within the thirteenth century to their credit. The Andechs of central Europe produced twenty-one saints between 1150 and 1500. The royal house of Castile could boast five figures among the thirteenth century saints; while the Sienese Piccolomini and Patrizi include two each. In such instances, however, sainthood merely represents the church's desire to reward a faithful clan rather than an outstanding individual.²⁴

A common practice among the upper classes was to send the younger son, who had been marked out for an ecclesiastical career, to his mother's brother for rearing. Most often, the boy then followed his uncle into the episcopate after apprenticeship as a canon, archdeacon, and dean of the cathedral to which his uncle was attached. His biographer reports that "immediately after completing the nursing period," Angelo of Furci was sent to his uncle's monastery for rearing.²⁵ Although Dominic's mother Joan and brother Mannes were both raised to the honors of veneration, it was his uncle, the dean of Palencia, under whose tutelage he was raised.²⁶ In the same way, Thomas Cantilupe and his brother Hugh were influenced at age seven by their uncle, Bishop Walter of Worcester, to follow an ecclesiastical vocation. Abbot William of Eskill was sent as a very young child (*infantulus*) to be raised by his uncle, Abbot Hugh of S. Germain des Prés; Albertus Magnus was likewise entrusted to his uncle in Paris for tutoring.²⁷ Among the female saints, Sperandea of Cingoli fell under the influence of her aunt and uncle, Jennaia and Sperandeo, while Roseline of Villeneuve was raised by her aunt and uncle, Saints Elzéar and Delphine of Sabran.²⁸

Many of the saints, on the other hand, were involved with the new mendicant orders (e.g., Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinian hermits, and Carmelites), the beguines or reformed Benedictine congregations, all of which demanded rather severe standards of personal poverty and social service, and at first appeared to be a threat to social stability. Such saints tended to experience more turbulent childhoods, and parental neglect or absence, which yielded deep resentment or anger. Many were orphaned or lost at least one parent at an early age, usually a father. Under such conditions, the church could fill the vacuum left by the absent parent.²⁹ Given the frequent military campaigns and the demands of citizenship, especially in the Italian communes from which a majority of the saints came, the number of absent fathers would have been quite high, and prolonged separation a common feature of childhood. Throughout his first twelve years of life, the father of King Louis IX of France was either in the East on Crusade or fighting the Albigensians in southern France; the formative influence on his character was therefore his pious and sainted mother, Blanche of Castile.³⁰ Both Louis of Toulouse and Lawrence O'Toole of Dublin, for example, spent part of their childhood years as hostages away from home as a result of political dealings.³¹ Even Francis of Assisi's father, a wealthy cloth merchant, was absent at the time of his son's birth, probably on business in France; on his father's return, the infant's name was changed from John to Francis.³² In the life of Thomas Aquinas, his father, one of the leading noblemen of Naples, is a veritable phantom, and his mother, Theodora, plays the leading role.³³ Such fathers, who seem to play no role whatsoever in their children's upbringing, appear to be the rule rather than the exception.

While parental absence, or premature separation as the result of wet-nursing, education, or death might well be interpreted by a young man or woman as a sign of neglect, the most commonly mentioned cause of such separation was the hallowed practice of oblation, or the admission of children to monasteries before puberty. One of the most persistent controversies among canonists in the thirteenth century concerned the rules governing admission to the monastic or mendicant life.³⁴ Can parents destine their offspring in childhood or infancy for a monastic career without their consent? What is the lowest permissible age of profession—fourteen, eighteen or twenty? What is the minimum length of novitiate? The frequent papal injunctions on these matters suggest that young monks were growing increasingly restive over the strict parental controls, which had allowed the system of oblation to create monasteries peopled with veritable prisoners: young women whose families could not afford a proper dowry, young men whose parents feared the excessive division of their properties or who expected at least one son to extend the family's influence in the church. All of those saints who served as canons, for example, at least seventy-five, including Dominic, were probably made oblates at an early age. According to a rule dating to 591 A.D., children placed in a monastic community by their parents were required to make profession if their parents so desired, and such oblates were considered true monks, with all the responsibilities this entailed.³⁵ In some instances, children were dispatched to nunneries or monasteries as early as three years old, al-

though seven is a more common age. Nor could they leave the order under any conditions without express permission. While by the thirteenth century, fourteen eventually became the age of discretion for males and twelve for women, any youth contemplating flight in his teens, after a substantial family investment in his oblation, would probably face a grim economic prospect. Thus, many of the monks and nuns were virtual prisoners since childhood, and only acquiesced in adulthood to this captivity as the best of two poor choices. Even a girl who had reached puberty, and had then fled and borne a child, must return if her parents so ordained, for she had at one time donned the religious habit and accepted the benediction.³⁶ Although such harsh rules were somewhat mitigated by the institution of a one-year probationary period during which the youth might choose to leave, evidence of dissatisfaction is apparent from the frequent calls for the return of fugitive monks.³⁷ How might a young man or woman feel about parents who had abandoned him or her at an early age to a never-ending regime of fasts, prayer and self-denial? Since over ninety percent of the saints were attached to religious orders, we may assume that a correspondingly high number entered not so much out of personal choice, but rather as a result of a parental decision in childhood. We may thus assume that parental absence was a common phenomenon, except as in the case of Hugh of Lincoln and his father, when both child and parent joined together.³⁸

Of those whose age of profession is known, twenty-five percent were clearly oblates or made profession immediately upon reaching puberty, which suggests that they were already residing in the monastery. These are concentrated within the older orders—Benedictine, Cistercian, Vallumbrosian, Camaldolensian. Most common are young noblewomen, like Imana of Loss, Margaret of Hungary and Christina of Retters.³⁹ In the case of Lutgard of Aywières, the contemporary biographer reports that when his daughter was born, Lutgard's father, "as was customary," invested twenty marks, hoping to use the profits earned in order to enhance her future dowry. Unfortunately, he lost all but one mark in this venture; when she reached marriageable age, her father permitted Lutgard to choose a religious career rather than marriage.⁴⁰

Thus, the typical saint's vocational choice was generally the product of a parental decision, and although some evidence of emotional tension produced by parental neglect is suggested, there are few signs of overt abuse by parents of their children mentioned in these sources. Instances of such cruelty do, however, exist. Ambrose of Siena, because of a congenital deformity, was immediately sent away to a poor nurse just outside of the city.⁴¹ His mother experienced such great grief over her son's ugliness and her attendant misfortune that she is portrayed praying to God for an end to her misery. Of course, she is more concerned about her own inconvenience than her son's discomfort. Ambrose was cured in a church, and after a year returned to the family. Perhaps some latent resentment of this treatment remained, for he resisted parental demands that he follow a secular career. Likewise, because of her blindness, Margaret of Città was completely abandoned by her parents at seven; while Werner of Oberwesel was apparently so mistreated by his step-

father that he was forced to leave for Trier. Maltreatment of Margaret of Cortona by a wicked stepmother forced her to leave home to become the paramour of a nobleman of Montepulciano; this scar always remained with her.⁴²

Werner is, in fact, one of a small subgroup of saints, the child-martyrs, whose deaths reflect the typical bogeymen of the medieval Christian mind; the serving-maid Margaret of Louvain was killed by robbers in the woods; Radegund of Augsburg was eaten by wolves.⁴³ The majority were alleged victims of Jewish blood lust. The thirteenth century represented a high point of ritual murder charges against the Jewish communities of Europe, and resulted in the virtual destruction of western European Jewry. The typical scenario involved a poor Christian child who is forced, because of penury, mistreatment or orphanage, into service to the Jews. During Easter his masters then kill the child, whose mutilated body is found in a cistern or hole. The child is then proclaimed a martyr to Jewish atrocity, and the Jews suffer exile, death and confiscation.⁴⁴

As adolescence and a vocational decision approach, however, in many hagiographical sources, instances of overt parent-child conflict correspondingly increase. Only in a tiny minority of cases, however, do purely ideological differences appear to have played a role in parental opposition to conversion or religious profession. Catherine of Parc-les-Dames, the daughter of a Jewish inn-keeper at Cambrai, fell under the influence of a Christian priest who frequented her father's hostel. At five she was already having visions of the Virgin and soon abandoned her home for a Cistercian nunnery. Despite the pleas of her family, assisted by the duke of Brabant, she refused to return to her former faith.⁴⁵ Likewise, Peter Martyr, who later became Dominican Inquisitor in Lombardy and was assassinated by Albigensian heretics, appears to have come from a family which harbored Cathars. At seven, Peter is portrayed refuting the dualist views of a heretical uncle, who warned that the boy's logic might someday harm the heretics, and urged that he be withdrawn from school.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the Carmelite, Angelo of Jerusalem, reportedly came from a Jewish family, all of whose members converted to Christianity, some entering the Church.⁴⁷

Voiced parental hostility in the choice of vocation was especially common among those who joined the more radical orders, which were less likely to lead to ecclesiastical preferment. Such orders, stressing absolute poverty, solitude, or self-denial, represented a complete break with the affluence of the saint's upbringing, and constituted a distinct rejection of parental values.⁴⁸ Instances of parental hostility and generational conflict become almost archetypal, especially among founders of such religious orders, e.g. Francis of Assisi, Clare of Assisi and Diana of Andalo. On an ideological plane, this tension was expressed in the increasing scorn exhibited by the young toward the prosperity of their elders, which gave birth to Utopian movements, like the Humiliati and Franciscans; to Christian fundamentalism and Joachitic apocalypticism, both of which justified attacks on clerical and civil authority. The particular interest in missionary activity of the generation following the IV Lateran Council in 1215 suggests further that the young were more acutely

aware of the desperate condition of a Christendom threatened internally by heresy and externally by Mongol and Moor. The moral reform of the Alleluia of 1233, a product of this youthful enthusiasm, during which campaigns were undertaken against heresy, prostitution, abortion, and other offenders of Christian morality, corresponds with the deep penetration of the Mongols into Hungary and Poland, and the worst defeats suffered by the papacy at the hands of Frederick II.⁴⁹ Apparently, the violence of the Albigensian and eastern Crusades had not successfully counteracted the dual menace of heresy and Islam. This was most directly felt in Italy, where the young responded with a more peaceful and pious form of Christian evangelism. They often experienced a feeling of admiration mixed with hate toward their parents. This attitude, Kenneth Keniston has shown, has characterized the radical young in America;⁵⁰ in both periods, revolutionaries have come from comparable affluent milieus. And in both instances, adolescent revolt has produced movement toward economic reform with strong moral overtones.

This generational conflict was most graphically expressed by the secular Sienese poet Cecco Angiolieri (ca. 1260-1312), the son of a banker to Pope Gregory X.⁵¹ While many of his themes are traditional, much of Cecco's poetic ire is directed against his parents' supposed miserliness. Cecco cannot woo his beloved Becchina because his father will not provide him with the funds to buy her gifts (Son. xxiii).⁵² He castigates the old man for not dying and leaving his son a fat inheritance (c-cv). The death of the old skinflint leaves Cecco delirious with joy (cvii), as he tells the inhabitants of hell to make room for another resident. Suddenly, filled with fear that his hatred for the dead parent will damn him to eternal wandering (cvi), Cecco repents of his infamies against his father (cix). But this freedom is short-lived. His mother, Lisa, turns out to be as niggardly as her dead spouse, and she works in league with a certain Mino dei Tolomei to deprive Cecco of his wealth (cx-cii). Cecco's invective against Mino is so scurrilous that most editors have refused to print it. The scorn formerly heaped on his father is now displayed by the outraged man against his mother "Medea," whom he accuses of trying to poison him (cxii, cxv).

Cecco's clashes with his parents were mirrored in his attitudes toward political authority. Although he took part in the Guelph campaigns of 1281 and 1288/89, in 1281 he was punished for leaving his post without authorization during the battle of Maremma; in 1282 and 1291 he was punished for violating the curfew. Between 1291 and 1302 Cecco was banished from Siena. It is suggested by some commentators that this exile was political. On February 25, 1313, five of his children appeared before a notary to renounce their inheritance because of their father's indebtedness. In Cecco's case, the marked estrangement of parent and child led to financial difficulties, but this may appear to mask political differences. The severity of his attacks upon his father, however, suggest deeper conflicts stemming from the childhood relations of parent and child.

Among the saints, the lives of Francis (1180-1226) and Clare of Assisi (ca. 1194-1253) became the patterns of youthful revolt against parental authority. The official biographies by Thomas of Celano particularly emphasize the ele-

ment of parental disapproval. The *Vita* of Francis, well-known to all mendicants, begins with a prologue which sets the stage for a conflict between the saint and his father.⁵³ In keeping with the Augustinian view of sin and its genesis found in the *Confessions*, Thomas places the blame for Francis's early debauchery on the education provided by his parents, who raised their son to love the vanities of the world. The habits of adulthood, he argues, are merely the fruits of seeds planted in childhood. This addiction to sin, however, is contrary to nature; but as long as one is surrounded by evil, the task of freeing oneself from it is all the more difficult. Only in adolescence, when the young man is freed of parental constraints, can he unlearn the vices which have so long distorted his perception. Thus, Celano viewed Francis's early life as an illustration of the conflict between evil and good, with evil apparently represented by Francis's father, Peter Bernardone, and the conspicuous wealth of his class, and good, being the ideal of poverty which Francis propounded.

At the time of Francis's birth in 1182, his father, a cloth merchant, was abroad. Francis had at least four brothers and, like many young knights of his day, devoted his time to banquets, singing and other vain pursuits, while he acquired merely the rudiments of learning. Little else is known of his early life, except that in about 1205 he had a vision of his home filled with armor, rather than the bolts of cloth with which it was usually stocked. As a result, he joined the army of Walter of Brienne in support of the pope against the Perugians. After a second vision, he returned home, and resumed his former life; but after falling ill, he began to regret this regime of supposed debauchery.

In about 1206, his father sent him to Foligno in order to sell some cloth; on the road home, he stopped at the old, partially destroyed church of S. Damiano. Here, he had a vision, which demonstrated to him the sacredness of poverty, and gave the proceeds of his cloth sale to the local parish priest. Because he had been away longer than expected, Peter went out looking for his son; when he discovered the youth in the ramshackle church, and heard that he had decided to change his former life, Peter became incensed. Fearing the ire of his father, and the derision of his friends, Francis thereupon sequestered himself in a cave for a month. Upon his return home, Celano reports, the saint was considered insane by his fellow citizens, and taunted by them for his sloth. Meanwhile, his father had grown even more angry. He locked Francis in a dark room for several days, and whipped and chained him. But the saint remained steadfast in his resolve. Even his sympathetic mother Pica's entreaties were to no avail, so she set her erring son free. When Peter returned to discover his wife's perfidy and son's continued stubbornness, he finally brought Francis before Bishop Guido II of Assisi (d. 1228) in order to force his son to return all the squandered wealth. Francis thereupon dramatically stripped naked before the bishop, symbolically denuding himself of all his possessions, and began his evangelical career. The *Legenda trium sociorum* quoted Francis as saying: "Up till now I have called my father Peter Bernardone, but because I have decided to serve God, I return to him the money about which he is concerned, and all of the clothes which I possess of him, desiring only to say:

'Our father who is in heaven.'"⁵⁴ Thus, Francis was quite explicit in disowning his natural parent and replacing him with a celestial father.

Francis was to become a great paragon of youthful revolt against his father. The turning point in his life had come in late adolescence. After years of opulence and sensuality, he began to identify with the poor and withdraw from pleasure-seeking.⁵⁵ In Rome, he went so far as to borrow the robes of a beggar, and ask for alms, until finally, he devoted himself to the care of that most downtrodden class of all, the lepers. During a 1209 interview with the bishop of Assisi, who noted the difficulties which he would encounter in his quest for absolute poverty, Francis allegedly uttered the clarion call of his movement, a protest against the environment of his parental upbringing: "... if we have possessions, we will need arms to protect them. From this disputes and quarrels arise, while the love of God and one's neighbor is much hindered. Consequently, we don't wish to possess any worldly goods."⁵⁶ Here Francis explicitly states that private property is the root cause of social conflict. As a result, he dedicated himself to a total rejection of the primarily materialistic values by which he believed his father lived. A similar hostility to the commercial interests of their fathers was later expressed by John Pelingotto, son of a cloth-maker of Urbino, and Anthony Manzoni of Padua.⁵⁷

The same kind of displeasure greeted the conversion of Francis's follower, Clare of Assisi, foundress of the Poor Clares.⁵⁸ Clare was likewise born into the urban aristocracy of Assisi, whose large family had been exiled to Perugia between 1198 and 1203. Around 1210, after hearing a sermon of Francis and conversing with him privately, Clare fled with her friend Pacifica di Gueffuccio to the Benedictine house of S. Mari degli Angeli. Pursued by her family, she moved to S. Paolo at Bastia before they were reconciled to her decision. Thereafter she was joined by other daughters of the Assisian nobility, who no doubt experienced similar hostility from their families. Diana of Andalo (d. 1237), foundress of the Dominican nuns, likewise faced parental opposition to her decision to join Dominic.⁵⁹ Her father, after two marriages, had sired many children, including Diana, Loderingo and Brancalone, a senator of Rome. Although her grandfather was favorably disposed to the new order, both Diana's father and the bishop of Bologna opposed her. When she presented them with a *fait accompli*, she was mistreated by her family and their clients, isolated for a year, and severely beaten.

The most graphic illustration of generational conflict within the Franciscan order comes from the *Cronica* of Salimbene de Adam, doubly valuable because of its autobiographical nature.⁶⁰ Salimbene de Adam (1221-1287) came from a large, extended, urban aristocratic family similar to that of Clare, Francis and Diana. He had three sisters and two brothers, one of whom was born to his father's concubine. Several members of the family became Franciscans and Poor Clares, much to the older man's disgust. Guido de Adam, like Peter Bernardone and Clare's father, presents the image of the dour patriarch jealous of his prerogatives. While his father is always depicted in the most negative light, Salimbene's paternal grandmother, Ermengard, who lived a hundred years, played a decisive role in Salimbene's childhood, and in his eyes laid the foundations of his later religious vocation. Imelda da Cassio, the

author's mother, was described as a humble woman "who never bore an angry appearance" and became a Poor Clare at the end of her life. Nevertheless, throughout his life Salimbene bore a grudge against her, too. In the year of his birth, Parma had been struck by an earthquake. Since his parents' home stood beside the baptistery of Parma, Imelda feared that the building might collapse upon them. She therefore hurried to her parents' home with two of the historian's sisters in tow. Salimbene was left behind; in recollection, he wrote: "Because of this I did not love her so much, since she should have taken greater care of me, a boy, than of the girls. She said they were easier to carry because they were smaller." This grudge helps to explain the extreme coldness with which Salimbene treated both of his parents. When he became a Franciscan in 1237, Salimbene pointedly discarded the Ghibelline political sympathies of his family, and defended the beleaguered church against Emperor Frederick II, who was a veritable Antichrist in the eyes of the idealistic youth of the age. As his father's sole legitimate heir, Guido de Adam never forgave Salimbene for renouncing the family fortune. With his induction at sixteen years four months, he even discarded his given name Balianus de Sagitta, and assumed a new name. This completed his renunciation of the past.

In 1238, Guido complained to the emperor, who was then at Parma, that his son had been unjustly taken, and wrote to the Franciscan Minister-general Elias, asking for his return. Guido was received at Assisi bearing his letters to Elias and Frederick. Brother Illumnato, Elias' secretary, showed these letters to Salimbene, who was then at Siena. When the young minorite came to the monastery at Fano, Elias suggested that he return to his family. In the meantime, Guido came to the cloister with a band of knights and in the presence of the Franciscan brethren, asked his son to come home. Salimbene refused; Guido then appealed to the sorrows felt by mother and father alike. Unmoved, the young man urged his father to put God first, and quoted the words of Matthew 10:32-37:

"But whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven. . . For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against the mother-in-law. And a man's foes shall be they of his own household. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me."

Thus, Salimbene's decision represents a conscious rejection of parental values, akin to those of Clare and Francis, who turned away from the political affiliations and commercial involvements of their parents.

Guido responded by blaming the brethren for falsely deceiving his son, and asked to speak to the youth alone. After they had departed, Guido promised Salimbene all his wealth; but the young man, relying upon Biblical quotations, persevered. In despair, his father cursed the brethren throughout eternity, and departed. The youth's decision to remain with the mendicants was confirmed that very night; for he dreamed of seeing the Virgin bearing the child Jesus above the altar; she asked the young minorite to kiss her son, which he did, and commended him for publicly remaining adamant in his faith.⁶¹

Nevertheless, throughout his life, the historian was pursued by his father's anger.⁶² As Guido was travelling between Assisi and Fano, the brethren were forced to hide their charge at the home of Martin of Fano. At Pisa, ca. 1243/47, Salimbene again had a vision, this time of soldiers sent by his father from the imperial court to take him away from his chosen vocation. Still he remained adamant. The same day, someone came to him bearing greetings from his parent, and relaying his father's wish to see him before his death. Salimbene angrily quoted the words of Ezechiel 16:3: "... thy father was an Amorite, and thy mother an Hittite." The Biblical text goes on to describe a child who, at birth, was not cared for, but was "cast out in the open field, to the loathing of thy person, in the day that thou wast born." The messenger, aware now of Salimbene's attitude toward his elders, left in confusion. The chronicler thus quite consciously linked his rebelliousness to the childhood neglect which he suffered.

Just as in the case of Salimbene, if the parties were of high social standing, the pope sometimes intervened when new Dominicans were threatened by parental anger as a result of their choice of calling. In a letter of May 15, 1235 to the archbishop of Naples, Gregory IX described how, after a certain youth had entered the Dominican house at Naples, his relatives, "sons of Belial . . . and heretics," attacked the monastery, killed some of the brethren, and burned down the house. After excommunicating the wrongdoers, Gregory asked his correspondent to seek the support of the secular power in pursuing them.⁶³ Considering Frederick II's animosity toward the mendicants, as evidenced in Salimbene's case, one may wonder what the outcome was. Such violence closely parallels the case of Thomas Aquinas,⁶⁴ who came from a prominent Ghibelline, i.e., anti-mendicant and anti-papal, family of southern Italy, and who chose to join the Friars Preachers at the height of Frederick's power. Thomas, son of Landulph, Count of Aquino, had at least four brothers and four or five sisters; two of his brothers were soldiers in the emperor's army, while two of the girls eventually entered religion. At five, Thomas was made an oblate at the fashionable Benedictine monastery of Montecassino, perhaps in the hope that his ecclesiastical career might be thereby enhanced. Thus, since early childhood, Thomas had been separated from his family. In 1235/37, he left the abbey, perhaps because of political turmoil in the area, to study at Naples, where he was a student of the Dominican Peter of Spain. At thirteen he joined the Dominicans (ca. 1240/44). When his family heard about the decision, his mother Theodora rushed to Naples with her retainers in order to prevent Thomas's continuance in the order. Presumably, political considerations played some role in her decision, but the brethren feared that Thomas might relent and took their young charge to Terracina. She consequently wrote her sons and asked their help in restoring Thomas to the family. When Theodora reached Rome, the Dominicans had already removed Thomas and were on the road to Bologna or Paris. But they were apprehended by Thomas's family. The Dominicans fled, and Thomas returned to his parental estate, shut up for two years at Roccasecca and Monte S. Giovanni Campano.

Because this armed attack had been made with the knowledge of the emperor, protests were lodged in Rome. Meanwhile, sequestered in the family

castle, Thomas was permitted few visitors. One biographer alleges he was beaten by his brothers and seduced by his sisters. Finally, after a year, his mother relented, and Thomas was permitted to rejoin the Dominicans. A somewhat similar event occurred in the life of the Augustinian Augustino Novello, scion of the Neapolitan nobility and chancellor to King Manfred. Augustine wanted to study at Bologna, presumably with the aim of following an ecclesiastical career. But his mother opposed this, and enrolled him in Rome, where she stayed with her son.⁶⁵

Thus, some rather clear patterns emerge concerning the childhood years of the thirteenth century saints. The chief responsibility for child-rearing lay in the hands of the mother, or in the case of well-to-do families, the wet-nurse. In many instances, the fathers play no role and only appear in early adolescence to interfere with the youth's religious impulses. Some were placed in monasteries, oblates from their earliest years, or were sent off to some ecclesiastical uncle for an education. The loss of one or both parents is equally common, thereby increasing the desire to secure a substitute parent within the church. While many of the saints grew up in an environment which cultivated pious impulses, and were related to other religious figures, a minority faced strenuous opposition to their vocations. Such encounters occur in the lives of some of the leading figures of the period—Thomas Aquinas, Francis and Clare of Assisi, Diana of Andalo. In some cases, as in the life of Salimbene, deep psychological resentment is clear; in others, ideological differences, fear over a lost heir, or marital anxieties provide the touchstone for such conflicts. Even the secular poet Cecco Angiolieri gives voice to the kind of generation gap which afflicted the urban bourgeoisie and nobility of the thirteenth century.

The research concerning the normal age of religious profession and its psychological character is confirmed in the lives of these saints. For example, one leading psychologist of religion, Edwin Starbuck,⁶⁶ sent out a questionnaire to one hundred and ninety-two Protestant Americans in an effort to establish a pattern for the conversion experience. He found that "conversion is a distinctly adolescent phenomenon" most likely to occur between the age of ten and twenty-five, during the period of most rapid physical and psychological growth, after or just before puberty. This is confirmed among our saints, who overwhelmingly experience a conversion crisis within this age period. At a time when intellectual and spiritual development coincide, Starbuck points out, motives toward conversion dominated by fear—fear of hellfire, remorse over an alleged sin, social pressures—play the largest role. This element of fear was especially emphasized by the many preachers who fanned out across Europe in the thirteenth century, and whose grim forebodings no doubt influenced many an impressionable youth, especially those without a secure family nest.⁶⁸

As the budding youth strives for identity, Starbuck continues, instinct overrides reason; dejection and sadness, generally based on a sense of sin rather than a positive striving toward righteousness, lead to inner turmoil, and finally to a feeling of joy and peace. In all instances, there is a latent predisposition to convert which the conversion experience merely triggers. In

adolescence, this religious transformation is usually regarded as a "unifying and joyful awakening" which may sometimes be associated with hallucinatory experiences and drastic behavioral changes. The largest number of such conversions among the saints, as among Starbuck's sample, occur before twenty; in men, between sixteen and nineteen; in women, between thirteen and sixteen, in the period of most rapid bodily growth.⁶⁹

Joel Allison has suggested that many converts have used religion to replace their deficient, weak, or absent fathers with some forceful figure represented by the church or God.⁷⁰ Those with the strongest conversion experiences exhibit a marked rebelliousness toward religion following an initially pious childhood, during which a religious or highly moralistic mother served as contrast to an "immoral" or sacrilegious father. These findings seem to be confirmed among the thirteenth century saints. Maria, the mother of Pope Celestine V, Pica Bernardone, Francis's mother, and Joan of Aza, Dominic's mother, are but three such pious women who are pictured as spiritual beacons who led their children to religion.⁷¹ On the other hand, the strong-willed secularistic father is an equally common theme in hagiography; Peter Bernardone, Clare's and Diana's father, the father of Humiliana dei Cerchi, who disowned his daughter when she refused to remarry, all exemplify this theme. We have seen that a considerable number of saints suffered the loss of at least one parent, and some of both. The grief of loss may have led many to religion in order to recreate the strong hand and sense of security which had formerly guided their lives.

Among those whose religious calling was not merely the product of a parental decision to place their children in a monastery, a vision or dream are the most frequent events which trigger the call to convert.⁷² According to current wisdom, both phenomena were regarded as bearers of a prophetic message, and were especially common among melancholics or holy men and women. But while the vision is generally quite explicit and is accompanied by voices, the dream is unspecific and requires further elucidation. As Aquinas pointed out, dreams are often an agency of God's revelation, and may themselves influence the course of events by producing anxiety in the recipient. And adolescence was universally regarded as the age most receptive to dream and vision-messages.⁷³

But, clearly, such dreams or visions never occur in a psychological vacuum, and merely serve to resolve conflicts which have long plagued the recipient. James Pratt,⁷⁴ a student of William James,⁷⁵ after studying some of the more well-known examples of the conversion experience, concluded that there are two types of conversion. In one, the believer is torn between discordant internal forces which strive for resolution; in the other, the convert simply accepts certain philosophical assumptions, without experiencing great emotional trauma. The anxieties with which the convert wrestles are often of a sexual nature, and the dream or vision which leads to conversion expresses this pent-up sexual guilt. Peter Celestine, for example, always displayed a strong sense of guilt over his alleged sinfulness, and made especially strenuous efforts to avoid the sight of women. In the first days of his eremitical solitude, Peter attempted to visit a neighboring hermit, and was approached by two

women who tried to destroy his resolve. These two demons again visited him, this time in the nude, accompanied by all manner of beasts, in order to tempt the twenty-year-old youth.⁷⁶ When a blind woman came to Peter seeking aid, he tried to put her off because of her sex. Later in his career, knowing that Peter abhorred the sight of women, one man went so far as to clothe his ailing six-year-old niece in boy's garments in order to present her to Peter for the cures which medicine could not provide. One witness recalled during the saint's canonization trial that in his early days as a hermit, Peter particularly feared women.⁷⁷

The most remarkable example of Peter's sexual anxieties is found in the *Autobiography*.⁷⁸ Once, following a nocturnal emission, Peter was uncertain whether or not to celebrate the mass. Some monks advised him to do so, others disagreed. He decided to seek God's counsel. That night he had a wondrous dream in which Peter saw himself ascending a mountain to reach the castle which surmounted it. As he walked he noticed a great cloister, and in the midst of the cloister stood the gate to a palace, which was surrounded by numerous cells peopled by monks dressed in white, i.e. Benedictines. Celestine was determined to enter the palace, but was frustrated by his reluctant mule. As he ascended, the animal tagged along willingly, but after a few steps, the evil beast began to defecate. Seeing this, Peter was discouraged and dared not continue. At the top of the stairway, three persons, barely distinguishable from each other, appeared. One of this Trinity, Jesus Christ, urged Peter on, saying that the creature had defecated for its own sake, not Peter's. The hermit then awoke, satisfied that his fears had been resolved through divine intervention as expressed in the language of a dream. Subsequently, Peter realized that such an involuntary emission, like the mule's natural need, carries no guilt. In one of his own writings,⁷⁹ Peter, citing Gregory the Great, pointed out that if the pollution is the product of intoxication, it is a venial sin, and is especially sinful if it derives from a consciously evil thought. If it is the result of illness or superfluity, then no sin is involved. Thus, Peter was exonerated for his act, despite the anxiety it had produced. Three popular preachers of the period, James of Vitry, Caesarius of Heisterbach and Bartholomew of San Concordio agree in minimizing the seriousness of involuntary emission; only failure to confess results in a severe penalty.

Such sexual guilt, mirrored in dream-life, seems likewise to have played a role in the conversion of the courtly novelist and poet-turned-philosopher, Raymund Lull; such prophetic and admonitory visions fortuitously visited Raymund at every turning-point in his life. According to his *Autobiography*, one night this seneschal to the King of Aragon sat down to compose a love poem to his mistress. As he reclined on his bed, he saw on his right an image of the crucified Christ; but he dozed off and forgot the incident. Eight days later, when Lull took up his composition, the image of Jesus reappeared. He again fell asleep, but the incident recurred four more times. On the final occasion, the poet concluded that God was asking him to serve the Lord, and Lull decided that he could do this best by undertaking to convert the Saracens by abandoning his secular life and studying Arabic.

While similar visions directed him to join the Franciscans, assisted him in composing his first philosophical tracts, and advised him to journey to North Africa in order to convert the heathen, this initial conversion experience was of a clearly sexual nature, and may be explained by events to which Lull does not directly allude. At the age of twelve, the scion of a noble Majorcan family, Lull had joined the court of King James of Aragon, where he became one of the leading chivalric poets of the age. Although married at about twenty-two, he continued his amorous adventures, despite his siring two children. This amoral behavior surely created severe internal conflicts which were only partially resolved as a result of the celibacy demanded by his religious call. In later life, his remorse over his youthful desire for women was overwhelming; the beauty of women was described as the "disease and perdition" of his eyes. Although the oft-repeated tale that Lull's conversion dates from seeing the cancerous breasts of one of his mistresses, is probably apocryphal; one cannot doubt that guilt over his alleged past sensuality played a role. His behavior continued to be somewhat erratic even after the conversion, for he did not completely abandon his family until ten years later, and his wife, Blanche, refused, quite sensibly, to permit him to disinherit the clan by giving all his wealth to the church.

This late adolescent dream or vision which actualizes a latent potentiality to convert, is a common element in the hagiographical legend of the period. The dream is often cloaked in symbolism and requires further interpretation. The vision, on the other hand, is often accompanied by the appearance of persons who explicitly point out to the recipient the preferred course of action. The character of the apparition will depend very much upon the nature of the choices faced by the visionary, and his or her predisposition to receive this particular visitor. Thus, before admission to the Dominican order, Robert of Uzès had contemplated joining the more radical Brethren of the Sack. During his first mass as a priest, Robert saw a hypocritical member of this order, as well as a Dominican who urged him to become a Preacher.⁸³ Sylvester Gozzolini, founder of the reformed Benedictine order of Silvestrines, likewise was visited by St. Benedict, who asked him to revitalize his ancient rule.⁸⁴

But the most frequent supernatural guest during the thirteenth century was the Virgin Mary, to whom so many churches, monasteries, lay confraternities and religious orders were dedicated.⁸⁵ The Servite order was formed by Seven members of the Florentine *Laudesi Mariae* after a vision of the Virgin on the Feast of the Assumption of Mary in 1233; their prior membership in a lay confraternity devoted to Mary indicates a predisposition to "conversion."⁸⁶ Likewise, even before receiving instructions from the Holy Mother in 1218 to establish the Mercedarians, Peter Nolasco had decided to distribute his wealth to the poor.⁸⁷ In northern Europe, the most frequent recipients of visits from the Virgin were those saints associated with the Cistercian order, which had been founded during the flowering of Mariolatry in the twelfth century. Beguine women who hovered between marriage and pious seclusion, were especially prone to such visitations: Beatrice of Oliva, Catherine of Parcles-Dames, Lutgard of Aywières, and many more. All apparently used the

Virgin's advice in order to confirm their prior religious drives, which may have originally derived from the sexual demands of marriage.⁸⁸

Among members of the newer religious orders and lay saints not officially connected to an order, the conversion crisis often represented a period of great inner turmoil which, to the outside world, took on the appearance of severe mental and/or physical illness. The dissipation of these symptoms was accompanied by a religious vision and the advent of a dominant idea or philosophical notion in the convert's mind. Thus, after his first vision, Raymond Lull was overcome by an evangelical desire to convert the pagans; Francis was impelled to carry the idea of poverty to the limit; and Peter Celestine sought utter solitude in pursuit of the eremitical ideal. In the realm of psychopathology, this phenomenon is called "logophania."⁸⁹ This "illness," which leads to a period of great creativity coupled with relative emotional stability, has been divided into four general phases, all of which are observable in the life of the thirteenth century saint: 1) a period of deep intellectual or meditative effort, 2) growing obsession with some dominant idea, 3) liberation from suffering coupled with a euphoric or enthusiastic revelation or illumination, and, 4) a transformation of the personality.⁹⁰ This syndrome of creative illness is observable among mystics who experience a "dark night of the soul," writers suffering creative blockage, and shamans who withdraw voluntarily in order to perform some praiseworthy social act.⁹¹ And the mystic, intellectual and cult object are characteristic poses of the saints we have dealt with. As a result of this illness, the sufferer is strengthened, rather than weakened, and feels a sense of liberation.

The curative effect of conversion was already observed by Caesarius of Heisterbach, who tells of a certain knight named Ludwig who became extremely ill and was urged to convert.⁹² After receiving his wife's consent, he did so, and his illness disappeared. While still a student at Paris, Caesarius relates, the abbot of Morimund failed woefully at his studies, and, as a result became severely depressed.⁹³ The devil, ever watchful, asked the young fellow to become his man in return for knowledge, but the youth withstood these blandishments. Satan thereupon gave him a magical stone which, if held firmly, would give him wisdom. Sure enough, during the scholarly disputations, the student confounded everyone; nevertheless, he again fell ill, called a priest, and admitted to consort with the devil. After throwing away the stone, he died. Thereafter, he passed through Purgatory, but awoke from death, much to everyone's surprise. The resurrected man became a Cistercian, and was well-known for his self-mortification. An anonymous late thirteenth century English Dominican exemplarist⁹⁴ tells of a certain scholar of Cambridge who was suffering a high fever when the Preachers first came to England. After seeing a vision of God sitting in judgment on the damned with the aid of the Dominicans, the student recovered and became a friar. Similarly, a contemporary Franciscan collection⁹⁵ relates the story of a blind man of Assisi who heard of the miracles wrought by the Dominican preacher Nicholas of Juventio. The blind man undertook the journey to Apulia in search of light, but returned home still sightless. The devil, however, promised to restore his sight if he remained obedient to him. The man regained his

sight, but lost his soul. His damnation rested upon refusal to truly convert and repent.

The saints were no less likely to experience symptoms of physical illness during the course of their conversion crises. Francis himself, according to Thomas of Celano, was overcome with sickness in the course of his youthful debaucheries.⁹⁶ During the period of recuperation, he visited his former haunts with the aid of a walking stick, but found no joy in these sites of his former happiness. Subsequently, his doubts grew stronger, leading to the conversion to mendicancy, which was accompanied by a dissipation of the symptoms of disease. The saint's fifth disciple, Morico, joined the minorities following a miraculous cure wrought by the saint;⁹⁷ while one of Clare's early followers, her cousin Amata Martini, who suffered from dropsy, was healed by Clare following the renunciation of her betrothal.⁹⁸ The second convert made to the Franciscan order by Agnello of Pisa in England was a mute, William of London; after his induction, he allegedly regained the power of speech;⁹⁹ similarly, the secular canon, Otto of Halberstadt, became a Franciscan after the blessed Euphemia cured him of a throat tumor.¹⁰⁰ Salimbene¹⁰¹ reports that while John of Parma was under the care of his uncle, a priest of S. Lazare in Parma, he fell ill and was near death. One day, comforted by God, John quoted the words of Luke 118.17 to those standing by: "I shall not die, but live, and declare the works of the Lord. The Lord hath chastized me sore; but he hath not given me unto death." Thereafter, John recovered, began to study with great fervor, "walked in the way of God," and joined the Franciscans.

This phenomenon is reported somewhat less frequently among saints of the other orders. After a life of crime as a highwayman near Siena, Franco Lippi suffered a sudden blindness; as a result, after hearing a sermon of Ambrose Sansedonius, he became a recluse and Carmelite *converso*.¹⁰² Augustine Novello was wounded during the battle of Benevento in 1266; at that time, he promised to enter religion if he should be freed of his illness. He was indeed cured, and joined the Augustinian hermits.¹⁰³ Reginald of Orléans similarly was cured of sickness through a vision of the Virgin, who presented him with the Dominican habit; thereafter, he resigned his deanship and joined the preachers.¹⁰⁴ Bernard Tolomei founded the Olivetan order at the age of fifty-one, shortly after suffering blindness.¹⁰⁵

Thus, for the vast majority of saints, the ground had been laid by late adolescence for the charismatic powers they were to exhibit. Like the shamans of Siberia or America, these hallowed figures frequently separated themselves from the community for a term of isolation, self-denial and purification in preparation for re-entry into society as a prophet or healer.¹⁰⁶ While many suffered a severe illness or sudden crisis of conversion, the grounds for such a transformation had existed since infancy. The thirteenth century saint had characteristically experienced a deprived childhood, separated for long periods from one or both parents. The only solace in this hostile environment was the "father" abbot, "mother" abbess or Mother Church, who provided much of the emotional sustenance and purpose which his or her parents had failed to supply. In the case of members of the new religious orders,

which clearly stood for social reform or even revolution, we have seen that overt parental hostility was almost the norm: Francis, Clare, Selimbene demonstrate this fact. This generational conflict was not restricted to the religious, however; for the Sienese poet, Cecco Angiolieri, demonstrates a similar estrangement from his parents which must have afflicted other well-placed Italian clans. The voiced basis of this conflict rested on the adolescent's refusal to remain the subservient executor of his parents' wishes. The son refuses to enter the family business or follow the accepted line of ecclesiastical preferment; while the young woman fears the responsibilities of married life and chafes under the autocratic rule of her parents.

Michael Goodich teaches history at the University of Haifa in Israel.

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67. Gorlow and Schroeder, *Motives*, 241-51. A questionnaire was addressed to one hundred and seventy-five active Pennsylvania churchgoers of all denominations. It was found that the desire to study religious writings, to gain inner peace or the promise of salvation, to receive assurance of everlasting life, and to gain personal security, ranked highest as motives for church attendance. Fear, or at least the search for security of one kind or another, again remained the basis of religious conviction, as it did in the thirteenth century.
68. For a discussion of the role of fear in the good sermon, see Humbert of Romans, *De eruditione praedicatorum*, ed., J. J. Berthier, *Opera de vita regulari*, 2 vols. (Marietti, 1956), II, 444 (c. 28); William Paraldus, *Summa de virtutibus et vitiis* (Basel, 1497), 63 ff; John of San Gimignano, *Liber de exemplis et similitudinibus rerum* (Cologne, ca. 1478), Lib. 1, c. 17; Salimbene, *Cronica*, 561-63; Stephan of Bourbon, *Anecdotes historiques, légendes et apologues*, ed. A. Lecoy de la Marche (Paris, 1877), 29-30.
69. Starbuck, *Psychology*, 28.
70. Allison, *Religious Conversion*, 23-38.
71. Peter Celestine, *Autobiografia*, 56 ff; Thomas of Celano, *Vita prima*, 13-15; M.-H. Vicaire, *Saint Dominic and His Times*, trans. Kathleen Pond (New York, 1964), 18 ff.
72. Ernst Benz, *Die Vision* (Stuttgart, 1969), 104 ff. for examples of the conversion vision.
73. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, III.95.6, in *Opera omnia*, ed., Pietro Fiaccadori, 25 vols. (Parma, 1852-1873), III; Simone Collin-Rosset, ed., "Le Liber thesauri occulti de Paschalis Romanus (un traité d'interprétation des songes due xiie siècle)," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 30 (1963), 111-98; R. A. Pack, ed., "De prognosticatione sompniorum Libellus Guillelmo de Aragonia adscriptus," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 33 (1966), 237-93; Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, in *Opera omnia*, ed., August Borgnet, 38 vols. (Paris, 1890-1898), IX, 122-212.
74. Pratt, *Religious Consciousness*, *passim*.
75. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1968). The first edition appeared in 1902.
76. Peter Celestine, *Autobiografia*, 60-61.
77. Franz Xaver Seppelt, ed., *Die Akten des Kanonisationsprozesses*, in *Monumenta Coelestiniana*, in *Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte*, 19 (Paderborn, 1921), 309 ("I am a sinner, I am not worthy of reaching God . . ."), 222 ("Why have you brought this woman here? Don't you know that women ought not to be here?"), 247, 233 ("... he fled the contact of men, but especially the sight of women.")
78. Peter Celestine, *Autobiografia*, 62-63.
79. Peter Celestine, *Opusculum Nonum*, in Margaritus de la Bigne, ed., *Maxima bibliotheca veterum patrum*, 28 vols. (Lyons, 1677), XXV, 852.

80. Goswin Frenken, ed., *Die Exempla des Jakobs von Vitry*, in *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters*, 5 (Munich, 1914), no. 24; Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, ed., Joseph Strange, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1851), I, 114; Bartholomew of San Concordio, *Summa de casibus conscientiae* (Augsburg, 1475), cap. *Pollutio*.
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85. For a description of visions of the Virgin, see John Alexander Herbert, *Catalogue of Romances in the Department of Manuscripts in the British Museum*, 3 vols. (London, 1910), II, 586-97.
86. Max Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche*, rev. ed., 3 vols. (Paderborn, 1933), I, 576-78; for other Servite visions, see *AB*, 13 (1894), 386-87; 14 (1895), 166-97; *AS*, 23 August IV, 655-719.
87. *BS*, X, 844-852.
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89. Viktor von Weiszaecker, "Der Widerstand bei der Behandlung von Organkranken," *Psyche*, 2 (1949), 481-89.
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91. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism* (New York, 1957), 380-412; Edmond Jaloux, "L'Inspiration poétique et l'aridité," *Études carmelitaines*, 22, vol. 2 (1937), 31-45; Carl-Martin Edsman, ed., *Studies in Shamanism*, in *Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis*, 1 (Stockholm, 1967), 17 ff.
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93. *Ibid.*, 36-37.
94. Stephen L. Forte, ed., "A Cambridge Collection of Exempla in the Thirteenth Century," *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum*, 28 (1958), 138-39.
95. Livario Oliger, ed., "Liber exemplorum fratrum minorum saeculi xiii," *Antonianum*, 2 (1927), 254.
96. Thomas of Celano, *Vita prima*, 7-9.
97. Bonaventure, *Legenda maiora S. Francisci*, in *Analecta francescana*, 10 (Quaracchi, 1926-1941), 874-75.
98. *AS*, 20 February III, 169 ff.
99. Thomas of Eccleston, *Tractatus de adventu fratrum minorum in Angliam*, ed. A. G. Little (Manchester, 1951), 14.
100. Bartholomew of Pisa, *Liber de conformitate . . .*, in *Analecta francescana*, 4 and 5 (Quaracchi, 1904-1905), IV, 328.
101. Salimbene, *Cronica*, 297.
102. *BS*, V, 1252-53.
103. *AS*, 19 May IV, 618.
104. Jordan of Saxony, *Libellus*, cap. 51 ff.
105. *AS*, 21 August IV, 464 ff.
106. Ivan A. Lopatin, *Social Life and Religion of the Indians in Kitimat, British Columbia*, in *University of Southern California Social Science Series*, no. 26 (Los Angeles,

1945), discusses the creation of the shaman within this North American tribe. These rituals closely parallel the novitiate of the Christian monk or nun. For examples of such a trial, accompanied by seizures and hallucinations which border on schizophrenia see *AS*, 16 April II, 462-70 (William Gnoffi of Polizzi); 22 June IV, 270-454 (Christina of Stommeln).

FROM THE SOURCES

Training the Will (1835):

"Mrs. L. was teaching her little daughter, between two and three years old, to count upon her fingers; the child went on very well to ten; here she stopped; the mother said 'ten,' and added 'you must remember the next time;—it is the little finger, and when you call the one before it nine, you will then think of ten.' The process of counting was recommenced, but having said nine, the child laughed and affected ignorance—the mother began to look serious, and said 'ten,' which the child repeated several times successively after her. But, so often as the counting was renewed, the child stopped at ten, waiting for her mother to tell her. At first, the mother thought she might have forgotten, but being at length convinced that she was obstinate, she began to treat her with severity. Telling her in the first place that she should punish her if she refused to call the ten when she came to it, and at length seating her in disgrace at a distance from herself. After a long course of discipline, varied in different ways, the little girl, who had maintained perfect self-command, said, 'I will be good, I will count ten.' She then began, and when she came to this number, as if making a violent effort to conquer herself, she said 'ten,' and burst into a violent fit of weeping. Her mother soothed her, and told her how much better it was to be obedient than to be wilful, and how she had been pained to be obliged to punish her. . . . the same child, when learning to read, would sometimes stop at a particular letter or word which her mother knew very well she understood. On these occasions she had only to say, 'E. have you forgotten to count ten?' and the hesitation was at once overcome. Would not the character of this child have been essentially different had she obtained a victory over her mother at that time?"

Mrs. Willard and Mrs. Phelps, Eds., in *Progressive Education, Commencing With the Infant*, by Mme. Necker de Saussure (Boston, 1835), p. 218.

THE EFFECTS OF CHILDHOOD BEREAVE- MENT AND PARENTAL REMARriage IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: THE CASE OF THOMAS MORE

WILLIAM
SAFFADY

How did children in pre-modern times react to the high death rates of the adults who cared for them? That they "must have been" inured to death because it was frequent is doubtful. As John Angier wrote in his diary in 1657: "My wife died. . . . One night after her death, the children were in the parlor praying together; and, hearing a noise, I went to the door, and heard my son at prayer with his sister: he acknowledged to God that they had despised Father and Mother, contrary to God's command, and therefore God hath taken away their Mother; he desired God that they might not provoke him by their sin to take away their Father also; which did much affect me." In this study of the effects of parental death and remarriage on Thomas More, William Saffady touches, therefore, on themes common to many in the period, and speculates upon their effects on his adult personality and on history.

In *The World We Have Lost*, Peter Lazlett devotes a part of a chapter to the high incidence of childhood bereavement and parental remarriage in pre-industrial English society, noting that "in the twentieth century it is tempting to speculate on the emotional effects of this break-up of marriages and homes on the children . . . but it may be unwise to go as far as this. The emotional pattern of that society has vanished forever and people may then have had quite a different attitude to sudden death, orphanage, widowhood and living with step-parents The society of the pre-industrial world was inured to bereavement and the shortness of life. It clearly had to be."¹ Half of Lazlett's statement is correct beyond doubt: it is tempting to speculate about the emotional effects of childhood bereavement and parental remarriage in a society where both were far more common than they are today. In the second half of the twentieth century most people would have little hesitancy in predicting

more than usual developmental difficulties for children who have suffered the loss of a parent by death, while the real and imagined trauma inflicted by step-parents attract so much attention that they require no additional comment. By the same token, most people, historians, psychologists, or otherwise, would tend to agree with Lazlett's assumption that such childhood sensitivity to object loss and significant changes in family structure is peculiar to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. George Krupp, a psychoanalyst commenting on socio-cultural considerations involved in the study of bereavement, insists that the intensity of bereavement reactions was markedly diminished in past societies when there was less dependence in childhood and greater freedom to fulfill libidinal desires shortly after puberty.²

Lazlett and Krupp seem to be expressing a consensus viewpoint, yet the idea that the death of parents had a less significant effect on the lives of children in the past appears inadequate on at least three counts. First of all, common sense suggests that children are children and that the death of a parent must have some impact on them. It doesn't seem possible that children could ever become inured to the loss of a parent. No matter how many parents of other children die, a child has only one mother and one father to lose. If anything, awareness of the increased incidence of parental death should heighten rather than lessen anxiety.³ Second, historians of childhood have demonstrated the prevalence and devastating effects of abandonment in many forms on children in the past.⁴ Why should abandonment by death have a less significant impact? Third, no one has ever examined biographical source material relating to men and women who experienced early object loss in past societies to determine whether or not the loss had any effect on subsequent development. We know what types of developmental difficulties result from the death of a parent today. Why not look for evidence of the same difficulties in the past?⁵ This article examines the life of Thomas More in that way.

Thomas More was born on February 7, 1477, the second child and first son of John More and Agnes Graungier.⁶ His mother died when he was about six years old.⁷ It is impossible to render an exact date. His father remained unmarried for about fifteen years, and then married again three times.⁸ Young More attended St. Anthony's grammar school in London's Threadneedle Street from about the age of seven until the age of twelve, when his father secured him a position as a page in the household of Archbishop John Morton, then lord chancellor to King Henry VII and later a Cardinal.⁹ He entered Oxford in 1491, leaving the studies he pursued there to enter New Inn, one of the London Inns of Court, to study law in 1493, probably at his father's insistence. In February, 1496, he left New Inn for Lincoln's Inn. At the time of his father's second marriage, More was studying law there. By the time this second wife died, and his father remarried again, More had left Lincoln's Inn an "outer barrister," had written some poems and translated a Latin life of Pico della Mirandola, and had married Jane Colt, eldest daughter of John Colt of Netherhall. By the time his father married for the fourth time, More was a responsible public official, having served as under-sheriff of the city of London and on several royal diplomatic missions. In 1518, he accepted an offer to enter the royal service officially. He was by then a scholar and writer of

international reputation, the translator of Lucian, the author of *Utopia*, the historian of the reign of Richard III, a member of the scholarly club Doctor's Commons, a friend of European humanists. His own wife died in 1511, leaving him with four children, and he remarried almost immediately to Alice Middleton, widow of John Middleton, a London mercer who died in 1509. His father's fourth marriage ended with his death in 1530. By that time, More had attained the lord chancellorship, the realm's highest office. John More's widow survived until 1543. More himself was executed in July, 1535.

In order to best understand the effects of the death of his mother and the subsequent remarriages of his father, More's emotional reactions will be analyzed under three headings: 1) pathological reactions to early object loss that persisted in later life, 2) developmental consequences of early object loss, and 3) the impact of changes in the family structure produced by his father's remarriages. Under each heading, the presentation will consist of a summary of psychoanalytic opinion expressed in significant theoretical and clinical contributions accompanied or followed by evidence from available historical source materials indicating the applicability of the psychoanalytic observations in More's case.¹⁰

1) PATHOLOGICAL REACTIONS TO EARLY OBJECT LOSS

To understand pathological reactions to object loss, it is first necessary to understand the normal response to bereavement. All subsequent psychoanalytic work has built on the foundation laid down in Freud's 1917 paper, "Mourning and Melancholia."¹¹ In it, Freud identified mourning as an identifiable psychological process required for the successful dissolution of a relationship terminated by death. Successful mourning is characterized by acceptance of the finality of loss accompanied by a withdrawal of emotional attachments from the lost object. This "work of mourning" is only accomplished at the expense of great amounts of time and energy. The bereaved person temporarily withdraws his interest from his immediate surroundings and dwells painfully on memories of the deceased, bringing these memories to consciousness where they can be decathected. This clinical picture was as familiar to people in the sixteenth century as it is today. More himself had seen such men "so drowned in sorrow that they fall into a careless deadly dullness, regarding nothing, thinking almost of nothing, no more than if they lay in a lethargy."¹² At the end of successful mourning, reality wins the day. The loss is accepted. The mourner is free to establish new relationships.

Deference to reality is not inevitable, however, and there is some question whether bereaved children are able to mourn at all. Martha Wolfenstein, whose work provides the clearest statement of current psychoanalytic thinking on the nature of childhood reaction to major object loss, contends that the child's ego is not sufficiently developed to undertake a demanding adaptive response like mourning. The hallmark of the child's reaction is the apparent absence, rather than the presence, of grief. Typically, there is no withdrawal from everyday activities, no prolonged sadness, no preoccupation with

thoughts of the deceased, and, consequently, no decathexis. Instead of mourning, the child responds to loss with denial, fantasies of return and reunion, and identification with the lost object. Far from terminating the severed relationship, the child invests his energy in prolonging it. Decathexis is replaced by hypercathexis.¹³

The most interesting and significant thing about Wolfenstein's work for the historian of childhood is the freedom of its theoretical framework from constraints of time and place. Children, whether in sixteenth century England or twentieth century America, are unable to mourn. They simply lack the resources. They must cope with loss in some other way. If Wolfenstein is correct, we should be able to marshal biographical evidence demonstrating the use of pathological defenses in More's response to the death of his mother, a response not limited to his childhood years but continuing well into later life.

a) Pathological Denial

More never accepted the finality of death. "We say a man is dead," he explained in the *Expositio Passionis*, "when the soul leaveth the body dead, and so departeth from it, and yet dieth not at all."¹⁴ In the epitaph he wrote for his own tombstone, he expressed his continuing hope "that we may find death not completely a death for himself but rather the gateway to a happier life."¹⁵ He attacked Simon Fish savagely for denying the efficacy of prayers for souls in purgatory, accusing him of "laboring to have us their fathers, their mothers, their friends and all their kin left lying in the fire here helpless."¹⁶ In the *Dialogue against Tyndale* he defended the proposition that saints and others in heaven see men on earth and watch over them.¹⁷ Facing execution, he wrote his daughter that his was a case "in which a man may lose his head and yet have none harm."¹⁸ The *Dialogue of Comfort* lamented the prevalence of "manifold foolish unfaithful words" attacking the belief in the immortality of the soul.¹⁹ R. W. Chambers, the author of the standard biography of More, maintained that no one has ever felt so earnestly that "the noble living and the noble dead are branches of one society."²⁰ Christopher Hollis agreed that More's loyalty to Christendom extended in both time and space to include the dead as well as the living.²¹

Certainly, prevailing religious beliefs supported this denial of death's finality in the sixteenth century as they do today.²² The fact that denial may conform to prevailing standards of normal behavior, however, has no bearing on its pathological nature. The normality or abnormality of a defense mechanism stems from its inner structure, not the degree of its conspicuousness.²³ In More's case, denial persisted in both Christian and non-Christian contexts. His Utopians, for example, "believe that the dead move about among the living and are witnesses of their words and actions."²⁴

b) Expectations of Return

Denial is supported in the child's mind by an inability to conceptualize death as anything other than prolonged absence or abandonment.²⁵ Success-

ful detachment from a lost object demands a recognition of the finality of death, but the equation of death with mere absence undermines reality by leaving open the possibility of a return. Edith Jacobsen has most fully demonstrated the existence of preconscious and even conscious expectations of return in adults bereaved in childhood.²⁶ More himself believed, albeit unconsciously, in the possibility of such a return. His Utopians, for example, felt that the dead never really leave the living: "It would be ungrateful of them to reject absolutely all desire of revisiting their friends to whom they were bound during their lives by mutual love and charity."²⁷ Several of the epigrams develop the same theme in poignant fashion: "Thrice my mistress swore by you, lamp, that she would return. She has not come. Punish her if you are a god. Some night when she is pleased with you, go out upon her dalliance and deprive her cursed eyes of your blessed light."²⁸ And again: "Break, sad heart, pitiably engulfed in deepest woe. Let this be the end of your punishment. Show your mistress your bloody wounds. In short, it is she, and only she, who will keep us two apart. Alas, how long shall I in my misery thus weep and complain."²⁹

c) Pathological Identification

As Wolfenstein points out, identification frequently operates in the service of denial. As Gregory Rochlin explains, "figures who appear to be given up or lost are permanently held with bonds that are impervious to being severed."³⁰ By internalizing the lost object, the bereaved person hopes to keep him alive within himself. More admitted in a letter to John Budeaus that he doubted "whether it is good ever to possess things which are pleasing and dear unless you can keep them."³¹ The evidence for identification with his mother is less transparent than the evidence demonstrating denial, but indications of identification in response to loss are still discernible.

In the broadest sense, this identification took the form of a morbid brooding on the theme of death in life, including an identification of the living with dead. Even More's most hagiographical biographers have found his preoccupation with the closeness of death "almost obsessional."³² "Death lies hidden right in our bodies," he maintained, "the truth is that from the very hour of birth, life and death advance with identical step."³³ Few of the epigrams employ so clearly the language of bodily identification and incorporation, but More returned to the theme of death in life repeatedly, developing an equation of More equals death equals mother. Death is described as "the mother of peace."³⁴ Just as each man has only one mother, so "death alone visits miserable mortals only once."³⁵ "We are all death's creatures," he insisted, "the uncertain air, with a bit of breath, keeps us alive."³⁶ And again, from his morbid treatise on *The Four Last Things*: "wake we, sleep we, eat we, drink we, mourn we, sing we, in what wise soever we live, all the same while die we."³⁷ Like the spirits of lost loved ones, death is ever present, waiting, watching.

There is good indication that More maintained an identification with his dead mother through self-mortification. Roper, evidently drawing on infor-

mation supplied by More's daughter Margaret, reported that he practiced ascetical fasting, beat himself with whips and knotted cords, and wore a hair-shirt.³⁸ Although an act of self-mortification can have many meanings, the earliest psychoanalytic literature stressed the relationship between masochism and identification with the mother.³⁹ At least one of the epigrams suggests that harm done to oneself is harm done to one's mother, and vice versa.⁴⁰ The same idea is conveyed in the Utopians' opinion that to inflict pain on oneself is "an extreme madness" and a sign of a mind "ungrateful to nature, to whom it disdains to be indebted, and therefore renounces all benefits."⁴¹ The implication is clear: to punish oneself is to punish nature, the introjected mother. Self-inflicted tortures are commonplace in descriptions of the behavior of individuals supposedly possessed by spirits.⁴²

2) DEVELOPMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF EARLY OBJECT LOSS

Although psychiatric and psychoanalytic opinions on the significance of childhood bereavement for later emotional development vary, most investigators agree that the loss of a parent in childhood acts as at least a sensitizing factor where later developmental difficulties are concerned.⁴³ Some of these difficulties are rooted in the experience of growing up in a family lacking the parent of one or the other sex. Others result from the prolonged utilization of pathological defense mechanisms, especially denial, as a means of coping with loss. Drawing on their extensive studies of patients who have lost a parent in childhood, Sol Altschul and Joan Fleming have delineated the detrimental effects of prolonged denial most clearly. Unconscious denial absorbs energies required for growth and the establishment of new relationships following loss. It has a generally stunting effect, leaving the ego more or less impoverished. Frequently, the pre-loss self is hypercathected and energy is expended in efforts to maintain the self-image current at the time of the loss.⁴⁴ This is especially unfortunate because the developmental demands reality makes of a one-parent child are usually greater than those that face a child who grows to maturity in a family with both parents. Arnold Eisendorfer, in an article listing some of the problems of children who have lost a parent,⁴⁵ stressed the importance of the relationship between the child and the surviving parent. This relationship is intensified as the child, having already lost one parent, becomes excessively dependent on the other, repressing his hostility toward him or her. Eisendorfer found evidence of marked oral dependence and defiance, accompanied by an immature ego incapable of dealing with either id impulses or reality. In addition, the bereaved child maintains a strong identification with the dead parent and uses that identification as a basis for his relationship to the survivor. In cases where the child and the surviving parent are of the same sex, an unconscious homosexual bond may constitute a condition of love in the child's mind. In short, the one-parent child may become trapped in a vicious circle of dependence, inhibited behavior, defiance, repressed aggression, anxiety, and greater dependence.⁴⁶

a) Dependence

Eisendorfer based his ideas on the observation of emotionally-disturbed patients in the twentieth century, but evidence drawn from More's life suggests that childhood bereavement posed similar developmental problems for sixteenth century Englishmen. H. Goitein, whose introduction to a little-read 1926 edition of Robinson's translation of *Utopia* presented a primitive, psychoanalytically-informed commentary on the relationship between More and his father, was the first to stress the significance of dependency in that relationship.⁴⁷ Although Goitein's work suffers from some serious factual and interpretative errors, it contains some shrewd observations confirmed by other authorities. More's own epitaph summarized his relationship with his father succinctly: "The son, all through his father's lifetime, had been compared with him, and was commonly known as the young More; and so he considered himself to be."⁴⁸ "Being a father," he wrote in earlier years, "is not a tie which can be ignored. Nature in her wisdom has attached the parent to the child with a Herculean knot."⁴⁹ Other written works demonstrate the strength of the tie most clearly.

In *Utopia*, for example, male children remain subject to the oldest parent in the household.⁵⁰ More was especially fond of the plays of Terence and made frequent allusions to them. Terence dealt extensively with the theme of the relationship between fathers and sons.⁵¹ In the *Dialogue of Comfort*, Anthony, who assumes the role of advisor and comforter, is described as a "natural father" to his kin.⁵² The *Expositio Passionis* contains several long passages dealing with the relationship between Christ and God the Father: "As he was God, he was equal with his Father, and in that he was God also, as he was of like power with his Father, so had he like will too. But as man was he in power very far beneath him."⁵³ The Marian priest Robert Parkyn attributed a poem entitled "Help Me, Oh Father" to More's tower period.⁵⁴

More displaced some of this dependency onto other persons. As a young man, he maintained obviously dependent friendships with several older men—Colet, Linacre, Grocyn.⁵⁵ In fact, he had few friends his own age.⁵⁶ In the same way, his dependent relationship with his own father led him to a virtually complete reliance on the opinions of the fathers of the early church. R. C. Marius pointed out that More emphasized the importance of patristic literature as the single reliable source of scriptural interpretation to such an extent that he frequently consulted the writings of church fathers in preference to the Vulgate itself.⁵⁷

Distorted and intensified by the loss of his mother, the dependency in the relationship showed itself clearly in the emotional crisis provoked by John More's death in 1530. More, writing in the third person, described his reaction to this loss succinctly and poignantly: "he felt the loss of his father, and as he looked upon the four children he had reared and his eleven grandchildren, he began in his own mind to grow old."⁵⁸ Family and friends knew him as the "young More" and he framed his identity in those terms. Even though he was a father and a grandfather, he remained a child in his own mind. This was especially unusual because, in the sixteenth century, a man was generally

considered old at forty.⁵⁹ More was over fifty when his father died. Clearly, he had hypercathected a youthful self-image, much as Altschul's patients did.⁶⁰ His father's death forced a reorientation that provoked anxiety and consequent physical illness.

On May 16, 1532, More resigned his position as lord chancellor, pleading ill health, and retired from public life. Two letters, written less than a month later, delineated the symptoms of this illness: chest pains, shortness of breath, listlessness, anxiety. Writing to Erasmus on June 14, 1532, he reported that these complaints were of several months duration and were being treated by a combination of diet, rest and medication. "The discomfort and pain it causes do not bother me as much," he admitted, "as the worry and fear over the possible consequences."⁶¹ A letter to John Cochlaeus, written the same day, began with a comment on the deaths of Zwingli and Oecolampadius and continued with a report of his own poor health containing the clear implication that he was dying too.⁶² Writing from prison two years later, More told his daughter Margaret that he had spent many nights lying awake, "with heavy and fearful heart forecasting all such perils and painful deaths as by any manner of possibility might after fall unto me . . . while my wife had weened I had slept."⁶³

In a 1944 study that drew on both independent observations and the work of previous investigators, Erich Lindemann analyzed grief as a recognizable syndrome characterized by somatic distress, shortness of breath, a general lack of muscular power, and anxiety. These symptoms, Lindemann explained, might be precipitated by an earlier death, even one that occurred many years before the trauma at hand.⁶⁴ In a 1965 study, George Krupp described a patient who experienced a morbid grief reaction like More's following his father's death.⁶⁵ Krupp reported that, although his patient acted "as if" he were a man, he really saw himself as a boy and viewed his father as "the big person who called the tune to which he danced." More, obviously reflecting his relationship with his own father, discussed the relationship between God and Christ in much the same way: "Albeit inasmuch as he was man, his will and his Father's will was not all one, yet unto his Father's will was his in every point so conformable, that never was he found to vary from the same."⁶⁶ And again, from the *Answers to the Supper of the Lord*, More spoke in the person of the dying Jesus: "Albeit the sensual part of my manhood would of the nature of man abhor, shrink and withdraw from the greivous pain of such an intolerable passion, yet shall my will both of my godhead be all one with the will of my father, and thereby in such manner obedient unto his father as we say a man is obedient unto his own reason."⁶⁷ Beneath his patient's "as if" role, Krupp found a desire to replace the father coupled with a "premorbid personality of profound ambivalency and dependency." He had wished his father dead many times, but when the wish came true, he was left alone with no one to take care of him.⁶⁸ The same ambivalence and dependence precipitated More's pathological grief reaction.

b) Repressed Hostility

Like Eisendorfer's patients, More repressed all hostility toward his surviving parent. As Stapleton explained, "he was, in truth, throughout his whole life most reverent to his father: never did he in any way give offence to him nor take offence at any word or deed of his."⁶⁹ All of More's biographers stressed his sweet temper. He is "incapable of maintaining rancor," Erasmus told Polydore Vergil.⁷⁰ More was clearly unable to deal with anger. He admired Pico because he never got angry.⁷¹ The epigrams warned of the danger and futility of rage: "not only will you do yourself harm but also whatever drives you will continue to do so."⁷² Yet, he realized that unvented anger did not obligingly disappear: "Wind if you keep it too long in your stomach, kills you; on the other hand it can save your life if it is promptly let out."⁷³ The fact that More's expression of anger went unnoticed by his contemporaries should not be taken as indication of its absence. The ability to show a false front was one of his most highly-developed traits and he prided himself on it.⁷⁴

It appears most clearly in his history of the reign of Richard III, the story of a "dissembler" who hid his real feelings behind a mask of sincerity. As Robert Reiter pointed out, the history is really an inverted panegyric, a saint's life in reverse.⁷⁵ More concentrated on the disparity between Richard's public behavior and private character. Perversion was the hallmark of the latter, but the perversion remained hidden and essentially unnoticed: "He was made the only man chose and thought most meet to be protector of the king and his realm," when, in reality, "the lamb was betaken to the wolf to keep."⁷⁶ Richard was a liar, pretending to kiss, meaning to kill. As A. F. Pollard noted, the history is essentially a play,⁷⁷ and like any dramatic work it frequently reveals more about the author than about the subject. The beast Richard, "malicious, wrathful, envious, and from his birth, ever forward,"⁷⁸ represents the dark side of More's own personality, the anger he was forced to repress, the ambition he was forced to disavow. Like Richard, More defended himself against these untoward impulses by converting them into an insincere affection and feigned subservience, just as "a mind that knoweth itself guilty is in a manner dejected to a servile flattery."⁷⁹

Stapleton, drawing on information provided by intimates of More's household, reported that while More was a student his father kept him entirely dependent on him for money. He "was not allowed to have even a farthing at his disposal." His father's rule was so strict that he had no money even to have his boots mended unless he asked for it.⁸⁰ Although, in later life, More openly praised his father's parsimony as a true builder of character, he harbored an unconscious resentment that found disguised expression in bitter written attacks on misers and tyrants. *The Book of Fortune*, a set of verses he wrote as a young man, condemned covetous fools who are only parted from their wealth by death: "If you will say there be no such fools, I might say that I have seen some in my time."⁸¹ Several of the epigrams attack misers.⁸² Others take comfort in the equality produced by sleep and death: "He is dreaming who thinks that in this life he is rich; and when death wakes

him up, he sees at once how poor he is."⁸³ The Utopians used gold to make chamber-pots and mark slaves. Raphael argued for the abolition of private property as incompatible with justice and general prosperity.⁸⁴ Edward Surtz maintained that *Utopia* represented a "cry of distress over the exploited poor" and that Raphael's communism aimed at the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain in early life,⁸⁵ a view consistent with the assumption that More harbored unconscious resentment against his father's financial stringency and wished for a life of greater self-indulgence.

The epigrams dealing with tyrants are especially bitter. The sleeping tyrant is a useless creature, "like a lifeless log or like a recent corpse. Under these conditions, if you were not lying protected, like a coward unseen indoors, your own life would be at the disposal of any man."⁸⁶ Raphael denounced rulers who use poverty to blunt the rebellious spirits of their subjects.⁸⁷ The idea that tyrants provide a focal point for unconscious feelings of hostility against parents, especially the father, is found in the earliest psychoanalytic literature.⁸⁸

c) Oedipal Difficulties

In a 1931 article, Otto Fenichel examined the unique oedipal difficulties of children who have lost a parent by death, stressing especially identification with the deceased and confusion of sexuality and death, accompanied by regression to the oral level of libidinal organization.⁸⁹ Twenty years later, an important article by Margaret Meiss demonstrated the importance of both parents for successful resolution of oedipal conflicts.⁹⁰ In 1960, Peter Neubauer, building on foundations laid down by Fenichel, Meiss, and Eisendorfer, contended that bereavement during the oedipal period intensifies the fears and wishes of an already existing positive oedipal complex, while fixating the conflicts uppermost in the relationship at the time of the loss. The lost parent's image in the child's mind never changes. The dead parent retains the characteristics he or she possessed at the time of death, becoming alternately idealized or frighteningly endowed with punitive, magical powers. Like Eisendorfer, Neubauer emphasized the significance of repressed aggression and the development of a negative oedipal complex in the child's relationship to the surviving parent.⁹¹

In the absence of the mother, More's father had to bear the brunt of intensified love as well as intensified hatred: "Erst were you father and now must ye supply the mother's part also."⁹² He turned to his father for the affection an absent mother could not provide. In the *Dialogue of Comfort*, for example, a work that resembles Boethius' *The Consolations of Philosophy* in so many respects, the comforter is a father rather than a mother figure.⁹³ For the Utopians, God is "parens," both mother and father in one.⁹⁴ Several of More's writings, especially the controversial and devotional works of his later years, contain indications of oral dependency needs accompanied by the imagery of latent homosexuality. A vivid and revealing passage from the *Answers to the Supper of the Lord* defended the actual consumption of Christ's flesh in the eucharist: "The fathers and mothers oftentimes put out

their children to other folk to nurse. But I (may our saviour say) nourish and feed my children with mine own flesh."⁹⁵ In allowing himself "to be touched and eaten and very teeth to be infixed in his flesh," Christ enables man, More contended, to achieve spiritual union with him.⁹⁶ His English *Treatise on the Passion*, in a passage that clearly reveals the phallic imagery and homosexual significance of transubstantiation, compared the changing of the bread into flesh with the changing of Aaron's rod into a serpent.⁹⁷ More transferred some of this intense affection to older friends. David Bleich analyzed the homosexual components in More's relationship with Erasmus.⁹⁸ At the end of his life, More projected some of his own homosexual impulses onto Hugh Latimer.⁹⁹

Like Neubauer's patients, More retained an image of his dead mother as a kind of powerful, magical figure, able to bless or destroy. This led him to idealize women on the one hand and despise and fear them on the other. His 1501 letter to John Holt presented an adulatory description of Katherine of Aragon's entry into London: "She thrilled the hearts of everyone; she possesses all those qualities that make for beauty in a very charming young girl. Everywhere she receives the highest praises, but even that is inadequate."¹⁰⁰ The epigrams praise her as an ideal queen, more devout than the Sabine women, more unselfish than Alcestis, more eloquent than Cornelia, more loyal than Penelope.¹⁰¹ Several passages in the controversial works praise the Virgin Mary as the height of human perfection.¹⁰² The epigram on choosing a wife praises woman's inner depth.¹⁰³

Yet for all this adulation, More was a man ill-at-ease with women. Erasmus reported that he invariably preferred to deal with them in joking fashion.¹⁰⁴ He considered women naturally inferior to men, "more light and less to be regarded."¹⁰⁵ He treated his first wife with a hard hand,¹⁰⁶ and spoke contemptuously of marriage in general. A wife is a burden, he maintained, but she can be a blessing in disguise "if she dies in time to leave you all she owns."¹⁰⁷ He fully accepted the classical philosophers' view, rooted in the deepest layers of the unconscious, that woman is "vir laesus," wounded man. One of his merry tales from the *Dialogue against Tyndale* mocks a wife's "gear" as "somewhat short."¹⁰⁸ A famous passage from *Utopia*, advocating the naked display of girls to suitors, developed the same theme: "Foul deformity may be hidden beneath these coverings."¹⁰⁹

Beneath this contempt lay a deep-seated fear. Woman could be castrator as well as castrated. Women could be dangerous: "Let your wife stomp on your foot tonight, tomorrow she will rise early to stomp on your head."¹¹⁰ Woman's dark face is clearly depicted in his verses on Fortune:

"Sometime she looketh as lovely fair and bright
as goodly Venus mother of Cupid
She beckett and she smileth on every wight
but this cheer feigned, may not long abide.
There cometh a cloud and farewell all our pride.
Like any serpent she beginneth to swell
And looketh as fierce as any fury of hell."¹¹¹

Several of the epigrams developed the same theme.

A final and very significant consequence of the death of More's mother was a confusion of sexuality and death. His life-long masochism was the most obvious expression of that confusion. More's Pico, for example, encouraged lovers to "suffer harm for his love, and to think that hurt sweet."¹¹² But the confusion found expression at levels deeper than the obvious. Like Pico, More felt that "the lover is of colour dead and pale."¹¹³ He believed that death brings union. The true lover longs to be with his love at all cost, "though it were death."¹¹⁴ In his epitaph, he described his affection for his two wives and his hope for reunion with them: "Well I pray, that the grave, that heaven, will bring us together. Thus death will give what life could not."¹¹⁵ Dying Utopians prefer to "go to God than to be kept longer away from Him even by a very prosperous career in life."¹¹⁶ Most significantly, More unconsciously believed that love had the power to kill: "Alas, whatever in this miserable world attracts miserable man withers at once and dies like the early rose."¹¹⁷

3) EFFECTS OF PARENTAL REMARRIAGE

Unlike bereavement reactions and the developmental consequences of early object loss, the effects of parental remarriage and the childhood experience of living with a stepparent have not attracted much attention among psychoanalysts. The psychoanalytic literature on the unique emotional difficulties of stepchildren is informative but hardly voluminous. Freud had nothing to say in this important matter, and Fritz Wittels was the first to demonstrate the extent to which the stepchild's libido is shattered by changes of love object.¹¹⁸ Subsequent contributions have concentrated on the stepchild's reactions to the stepparent or changes in the relationship with the surviving natural parent. Helene Deutsch has written most extensively about the peculiar and delicate role of the stepmother, contending that the stepmother provides a suitable real object for the unconscious hostile impulses remaining from the child's terminated relationship with his dead natural mother.¹¹⁹ Flugel agreed that the relationship between stepparent and stepchild is an especially intense one.¹²⁰ Because the unconscious has no conception of time, the intensity of the relationship does not vary inversely with the age of the child at the time of parental remarriage. Children often feel the loss of a parent by remarriage with less intensity than an adult. This was certainly the case with More. Although his father did not remarry for the first time until his son was about twenty-one years old, More harbored strong unconscious feelings of resentment and betrayal.

a) Hostility toward the Stepmother

Although Erasmus maintained that More was a model stepson who admired his three stepmothers greatly, evidence from his written works indicates otherwise. The epigrams are especially full and revealing: "You were putting wreaths of flowers on your stepmother's monument, convinced that with her death her evil traits had perished; but suddenly the monument

toppled and crushed you. Stepson, if you are wise you must avoid even the tomb of your stepmother."¹²¹ And again: "Even a loving stepmother is a misfortune to her stepson. Phaedra, who was cruel to Hippolytus, proves the point."¹²² Another epigram, dealing with the relationship between Herod, his wife, and John the Baptist, denounced Herodias as a "deadly parent" and "cruel stepmother."¹²³ In his history of the reign of Richard III, More described the queen as "a mother far worse than a stepmother."¹²⁴ He praised his own second wife for loving his children as if they were her own, "a rare attainment in a stepmother."¹²⁵

b) Feelings of Betrayal

Often the surviving natural parent must bear the brunt of even more intense feelings, feelings that are made even more difficult to handle by the effects of prolonged denial, identification, and repressed anger. Fast and Cain have demonstrated the continued influence of the dead parent on surviving members of the family,¹²⁶ an influence all too obvious among More's Utopians. Else Heilpern, whose 1943 article remains the most substantive contribution to the psychoanalytic literature on the developmental problems of stepchildren, suggested that the child's intense identification with the dead parent leads him to interpret the survivor's remarriage as an act of rejection and betrayal. "If my mother could have been abandoned and replaced so easily," the child feels, "perhaps her value was not so great, nor is mine."¹²⁷ Fenichel, in one of the most famous contributions to the literature on sexual perversion, described the feelings of a young stepchild who had maintained a pathological identification with a lost mother: "His heart cried out to his father: 'Do not put away the memory of your first wife. Remember her; she still lives in me. Love me, your first wife, more than my stepmother.'"¹²⁸ More's epigram on the coronation of Henry VIII captures much of the same feeling: "If anyone loved either of these roses, let him love this one in which is found whatever he loved."¹²⁹ The available evidence suggests that More felt unconsciously angry, betrayed and abandoned by his father's remarriages.

The epigrams capture these feelings most clearly: "This is what every man says, nature has not produced anything in this life more troublesome, more burdensome, to man than these wives of ours. That is what he says, but he still marries. Yes, when his sixth wife dies he marries a seventh."¹³⁰ Vives reported that More encouraged his children to study Quintilian's first declamation. It deals with a stepson accused of murdering his father following his remarriage.¹³¹ More's anger was rooted in feelings of betrayal, feelings of having been illegitimized, that the relationship between his father, his mother and himself was irrevocably over.¹³² He was unable, however, to confront his father directly, and his hostility was forced into indirect expression. Some of it was displaced onto heretics.

The question of whether or not More persecuted heretics has attracted so many conflicting responses that little can be gained by exploring it further. One thing is certain: whether or not More persecuted heretics, he hated them. The controversial works are the most consistently virulent of all his writings.

The most recent literature has raised questions about the marked contrast between More's reportedly even temper and his asperity and tenacity in dealing with Luther and Tyndale.¹³³ Although some of his virulence was rooted in theological opinions, More's attitude toward Protestant thought is most fully understood when the feelings related to his father's remarriages are taken into account.

More raised three major objections to Luther and, to a lesser extent, to Tyndale: 1) that Protestants were traitors to the true Church; 2) that the insistence on justification by faith alone represented a serious deviation from orthodoxy; and 3) that Luther and his followers violated accepted sexual standards. None of these charges were original with More, but the elaboration of his objections was marked by the peculiar imprint of his own personality and life circumstances.

The first and third objections were the most important. To More, all heretics were traitors to the Church, "the spouse of God indeed, and therefore by all holy fathers commonly called the mother of all Christian people."¹³⁴ Far from being holy fathers, Luther and Tyndale were bad fathers, veritable Judases, devils incarnate.¹³⁵ The references to Luther as a degraded father-figure are pointed: he is "friar, father, toper Luther," "once a friar, later a pimp, then again a friar, afterwards an apostate, then again a pander, finally a cloute-pate."¹³⁶ Like More's own father, Luther possesses "legal schrewness . . . undoubtedly learned by long experience."¹³⁷

Having abandoned the true mother, Luther turned to sexual profligacy. He denied the sanctity and permanency of the marriage bond. He "took out of religion a spouse of Christ, wedded her himself in reproach of wedlock, called her his wife, and made her his harlot, and in double despise of marriage and religion both liveth with her openly and lyeth with her nightly in shameful incest."¹³⁸ The point of his invective is obvious: "Who does not know how continence was once prized? How strictly conjugal fidelity was commanded, how esteemed by the ancients the chastity of widows?"¹³⁹ Luther teaches "that no man or woman is bounden to keep and observe any vow that he hath made to God of virginity, or widowhood, or other chastity of marriage." He denies the mother Church in favor of "the religion of the Bohemian back country, where matrimony means nothing but to increase and multiply and to mate in church like a pack of dogs."¹⁴⁰

More clearly indicated his objections to the doctrine of justification by faith alone: "to say that man is born of God through faith only is like saying that he was begotten by his father without his mother."¹⁴¹

The events surrounding the divorce and remarriage of Henry VIII provided the most sensational and, ultimately, the most unfortunate opportunity for More to act out conflicts arising from his father's remarriages. More developed an early attachment to Katherine as an idealized mother figure.¹⁴² Erasmus confirmed that attachment in a letter written shortly after More's retirement from public life.¹⁴³ More's unconscious equation of king and father appears clearly in several of the epigrams.¹⁴⁴ Anne Boleyn loomed in More's unconscious mind as the evil stepmother. Chambers' suggestion that the language of the epigrams dealing with Herod's feast and the murder of John the Baptist

by Herodias seem to point to Anne, even though they were written long before More knew of her existence, supports this conclusion.¹⁴⁵ In the same way, Roper's report of More's seemingly prophetic statement concerning Anne's eventual replacement in the king's favor by other wives has greater meaning when viewed in the context of his own father's remarriages.¹⁴⁶ It should also be noted that Henry's was not the first marriage that More had opposed. Like John the Baptist, "scorning death while he branded the marriages of kings illegitimate,"¹⁴⁷ More had earlier caused difficulties for Henry VII by speaking out in Parliament against a subsidy to be awarded on the occasion of the king's daughter's marriage to James IV of Scotland. If Roper's report of the incident is correct, More's opposition worked to the disadvantage of his father who was imprisoned for his son's recalcitrance and forced to pay a fine.¹⁴⁸ The incident occurred sometime after John More's marriage to his second wife.

Weighing the evidence, it seems that parent loss and remarriage had as much power to shape lives in the sixteenth century as it has today. In More's case, the utilization of pathological defense mechanisms as a means of coping with loss encouraged a general impoverishment of ego function, much as it did in the cases reported by Fleming, Altschul, and others. Like the patients observed and treated by Eisendorfer and Neubauer, More's relationship to his surviving parent was intensified by excessive dependence on the one hand and repressed hostility on the other. The establishment of an unconscious homosexual bond as a condition of fatherly love, accompanied by an alternate idealization and depreciation of women, attest to the presence of the same oedipal difficulties observed in twentieth century one-parent children. More's father's remarriages produced the same feelings of anger, betrayal and abandonment reported by investigators working with stepchildren today. His need to act out conflicts stemming from a lifetime of real and imagined loss eventually led to his death.

This thesis is strengthened by findings of investigators who are studying the experience of childhood in past societies. Sixteenth-century English children were generally treated as unimportant and received little parental attention or affection, a condition hardly conducive to the development of a well-integrated ego capable of sustaining major object loss with a minimum of damage. In addition, many sixteenth-century children were subjected to what Lloyd deMause describes as "the most prevalent form of institutionalized abandonment"—nursing out.¹⁴⁹ It may well be that loss of wet-nurse was the most devastating loss a child could experience in the sixteenth century, and that many children faced parent death with an ego already shattered by abandonment. However prevalent parental death may have been, the evidence suggests that sixteenth century children were no more successful in escaping its effects than children are today.¹⁵⁰

William Saffady is a historian who is Archivist and Records Management Specialist for the University Archives, Wayne State University, and is now working on a study of Francis Parkman which will explore the relationship between childhood experience and the development of particular historiographic views.

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impregnation seems obvious. For the period 1480-1482, the intervals between the birth of one child and the probable conception of the next averaged about five months, yet the More family register recorded no births after 1482. At that time More's mother would have been about thirty years old, too young to have experienced declining fertility. Sixteenth-century England knew only one reliable contraceptive technique—abstinence, a technique which John More and his wife had evidently not utilized before 1482. Death sometime shortly after that year seems likely, possibly as a result of a subsequent pregnancy. Cf. Pearl Hogrefe, "Sir Thomas More's Connection with the Roper Family," *Publication of the Modern Language Association*, vol. 47 (1932), pp. 523-33; Thomas Stapleton, *The Life and Illustrious Martyrdom of Sir Thomas More*, trans., Philip E. Hallett, ed., E. E. Reynolds (New York: Fordham University Press, 1958), p. 1; John Knadel and Etienne Van der Walle, "Breast Feeding, Fertility and Infant Mortality," *Population Studies*, vol. 21 (1967), pp. 109-31, on the relationship between breast-feeding and ovulation in past societies; E. A. Wrigley, "Family Limitation in Pre-Industrial England," *Economic History Review*, second series, vol. 19 (1966), pp. 82-109, on birth control and evidence for declining fertility; J. B. Post, "Ages at Menarche and Menopause: Some Medieval Authorities," *Population Studies*, vol. 25 (1971), pp. 83-87, on ages for the cessation of menstruation in the middle ages; John Demos, *A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970) for estimates of death during childbirth in pre-industrial society. Cf. Erasmus, *Colloquies*, trans., C. R. Thompson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 27: there is not a single one of you who, if he once experience childbirth, would not prefer standing in a battle line ten times over."

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17. *The English Works of Sir Thomas More*, vol. 2: *The Dialogue Concerning Tyndale*, ed., W. E. Campbell (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1931), pp. 147-48, cited hereafter as *English Works*; cf. "The Confutacyon of Tyndale's Answer," in *The Works of Sir Thomas More wrytten in the Englyshe Tonge* (London: William Rastell, 1557), pp. 340-43, 518, 724, 806, cited hereafter as *Works (1557)*; cf. W. E. Campbell, "Sir Thomas More's Longest Book," *Dublin Review*, vol. 223 (1949), pp. 119-26.
18. To Margaret Roper, 1534, *Selected Letters*, vol. 60.
19. *Dialogue of Comfort*, p. 330.
20. R. W. Chambers, "The Saga and the Myth of Sir Thomas More," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. 12 (London: Humphrey Milford, 1926), p. 215.
21. Christopher Hollis, "Thomas More, European," *Studies*, vol. 24 (1935), pp. 379-90.
22. Ida Greer, "Grief Must Be Faced," *Christian Century*, vol. 62 (1945), pp. 269-71 argues that religion helps bereaved persons by encouraging them to continue to interact with lost loved ones through prayers and days of remembrance; cf. George Krupp and Bernard Kligfield, "Bereavement Reaction: a Cross-Cultural Evaluation," *Journal of Religion and Health*, vol. 1 (1962), pp. 222-46.
23. Cf. Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (New York: International Universities Press, 1946), pp. 98, 117.
24. Thomas More, *Utopia*, ed., Edward Surtz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 137; on *Utopia* as a source for psychohistory cf. Frank Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History of Utopian Thought," in *Freedom from History* (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 115-51.
25. Cf. Philo, *Legum Allegoria*, III, 13.2: "When we have lost a brother, or a son, or a friend whose life we shared, we call ourselves abandoned and forlorn," translated in Andre-Jean Festugiere, *Personal Religion among the Greeks* (Berkeley: University Press, 1954), p. 63.
26. Edith Jacobsen, "The Return of the Lost Parent," in Max Schur, ed., *Drives, Affects, Behavior*, vol. 2 (New York: International Universities Press, 1965), pp. 193-211.
27. *Utopia*, p. 136.
28. Leicester Bradner and Charles A. Lynch eds., *The Latin Epigrams of Thomas More* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), #35, p. 154, hereafter cited as *Epigrams*.
29. *Ibid.*, #63, p. 162; cf. #64, pp. 162-63 on the broken promises of an unfaithful

mistress.

30. Gregory Rochlin, *Griefs and Discontents: the Forces of Change* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965); for examples of obvious identifications in response to loss, see Colin Murray Parkes, *Bereavement: Studies of Grief in Adult Life* (New York: International Universities Press, 1972), especially pp. 89-105, and Martin W. Peck, "Notes on Identification in a Case of Depression Reactive to the Death of a Love Object," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, vol. 8 (1939), pp. 1-17; Freud, "New Introductory Lectures," *Standard Edition*, vol. 22 provides some interesting observations on the relationship between identification and oral incorporation.
31. *Selected Letters*, #28, June, 1520.
32. Theodore Maynard, *Humanist as Hero: the Life of Sir Thomas More* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1947), p. 107; cf. Chambers, *Thomas More*, p. 57.
33. *Epigrams*, #112, p. 177; cf. #10, p. 174; #38, p. 154; "Life of Pico," in *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 386.
34. *Epigrams*, #52, p. 159.
35. *Ibid.*; cf. *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 359 on death as the price mother nature demands for life.
36. *Epigrams*, #114, p. 178.
37. *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 475; cf. H. W. Donner, "St. Thomas More's Treatise on the Four Last Things and the Gothicism of the Transalpine Renaissance," *English Miscellany*, vol. 3 (1952), pp. 25-48; Germain Marc'hadour, "Thomas More's Spirituality," in R. S. Sylvester, ed., *Action and Contemplation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 125-59 on the centrality of the meditation on death in More's thought.
38. William Roper, *The Life of Sir Thomas More, Knyghte*, ed., Elsie V. Hitchcock (London: Early English Text Society, 1935), p. 48.
39. Cf. the well-known passage from "The Economic Problem of Masochism," *Standard Edition*, vol. 19: "If one has an opportunity of studying cases in which the masochistic phantasies have undergone specially rich elaboration, one easily discovers that in them the subject is placed in a situation characteristic of womanhood." The psychoanalytic literature on religious asceticism and self-mortification is hardly voluminous. Karl Menninger, *Man Against Himself* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1938), pp. 87-143, and Theodore Reik, *Masochism in Modern Man* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Co., 1941), especially pp. 349-59 remain the most widely read works. R. W. Medlicott, "St. Anthony Abbot and the Hazards of Asceticism: an Analysis of Artists' Representations of the Temptations," *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, vol. 42 (1969), pp. 133-40 has never attracted the attention it deserves. Herbert Mursillo, "The Problem of Ascetical Fasting in the Greek Patristic Writers," *Traditio*, vol. 12 (1956), pp. 1-64 presents the standard non-psychoanalytic position most clearly: "We are here in the presence of a different world, a world whose motivations cannot be glibly isolated and judged in the light of modern psychology." Henri Joly, *The Psychology of the Saints* (London: Duckworth and Co., 1898) remains interesting only as an example of pre-Freudian religious psychology. Gregory Zilboorg, "A Psychiatric Consideration of the Ascetic Ideal," in *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1962), pp. 63-77 is typical of the work done by Zilboorg following his conversion to Catholicism.
40. *Epigrams*, #118, p. 179.
41. *Utopia*, p. 102.
42. George R. Scott, *The History of Corporeal Punishment* (London: Torchstream Books, 1948), p. 24; cf. Mark, v, 2-5 for an example.
43. Two studies by Alistair Munro, "Childhood Parent Loss in a Psychiatrically Normal Population," *British Journal of Preventative and Social Medicine*, vol. 19 (1965), pp.

- 69-70, and "Parental Deprivation in Depressive Patients," *British Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 112 (1966), pp. 443-57 are representative of the British psychiatric school that has come out most strongly against the importance of early object loss as a predisposing factor in the developmental difficulties of adolescence and adult life. On the other side, American psychoanalytic investigators have most strongly insisted on the correlation between childhood bereavement and adult mental illness. Herbert Barry and Erich Lindemann, "Critical Ages for Maternal Bereavement in Psychoneuroses," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, vol. 22 (1960), pp. 166-81, presents evidence indicating that maternal bereavement in childhood is statistically more frequent among neurotics than among the general population. Bettie Arthur and Mary L. Kemme, "Bereavement in Childhood," *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, vol. 5 (1964), pp. 37-49 presents the results of an intensive study of eighty-three disturbed children whose intellectual and emotional difficulties were related to childhood object loss. Other studies presenting similar conclusions from varying points of view include: Herbert Barry, Jr., "The Significance of Maternal Bereavement before the Age of Eight," *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, vol. 62 (1949), pp. 630-47; Irving E. Alexander and Arthur M. Adlerstein, "Affective Responses to the Concept of Death in a Population of Children and Early Adolescents," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, vol. 93 (1958), pp. 167-77; Herbert C. Archibald, D. Bell, C. Miller and R. D. Triddenham, "Bereavement in Childhood and Adult Psychiatric Disturbance," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, vol. 24 (1962), pp. 343-51; Felix Brown, "Depression and Childhood Bereavement," *Journal of Mental Science*, vol. 107 (1961), pp. 754-77; George H. Pollack, "Childhood Parent and Sibling Loss," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, vol. 7 (1962), pp. 295-305; John Bowlby, "The Influence of Early Environment in the Development of Neurosis and Neurotic Character," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, vol. 21 (1940), pp. 154-78; Moses Laufer, "Object Loss and Mourning in Adolescence," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, vol. 21 (1966), pp. 269-93; Adele E. Scharl, "Regression and Restitution in Object Loss: Clinical Observations," *Ibid.*, vol. 17 (1962), pp. 471-79.
44. Joan Fleming and Sol Altschul, "Activation of Mourning and Growth by Psychoanalysis," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, vol. 44 (1963), pp. 419-33; Sol Altschul, "Denial and Ego Arrest," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, vol. 16 (1968), pp. 301-18.
 45. Arnold Eisendorfer, "The Clinical Significance of the Single Parent Relationship in Women," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, vol. 12 (1943), pp. 223-39.
 46. The same ideas are developed in Bertram Lewin, "A Type of Hypomanic Reaction," *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, vol. 37 (1937), pp. 868-73 and by Irene Fast and Albert Cain in an unpublished paper entitled "Disturbances in Parent-Child Relationships Following Bereavement." I would like to thank Dr. Cain for providing me with a copy of this paper.
 47. H. Goitein, "Introduction" to Thomas More, *Utopia* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1926), pp. 3-22.
 48. *Selected Letters*, #46; Brian Byron, *Loyalty in the Spirituality of St. Thomas More* (Nieuwkoop: B. De Graaf, 1972), p. 147 presents some interesting observations on More's relationship with his father.
 49. *Epigrams*, #248, pp. 230-31.
 50. *Utopia*, p. 79; More's father lived with him in old age, despite the fact that he was married and in contrast to the custom of the day. John Demos, "Families in Colonial Bristol, Rhode Island: an Exercise in Historical Demography," *William and Mary Quarterly*, vol. 25 (1968), pp. 40-57 suggests that the nuclear and not the extended family was the rule in the early modern period.

51. See, for example, the play *Adelphoe* which deals sensitively with the question of conflict of wills between father and son.
52. *Dialogue of Comfort*, p. 160.
53. *History of the Passion*, p. 46; cf. "The Answer to the First Part of the Poysoned Booke which a Nameless Heretic hath named The Supper of the Lord," *Works* (1557), p. 1052.
54. A. G. Dickens, "A New Prayer of Sir Thomas More," *Church Quarterly Review*, vol. 124 (1937), pp. 224-37.
55. *Selected Letters*, #2; cf. William Nelson, "The Friendship of Thomas More and John Colet: an Early Document," *Modern Language Quarterly*, vol. 1 (1940), pp. 459-60.
56. Some of More's biographers have taken this for a sign of precocity. Cf. E. E. Reynolds, *Thomas More and Erasmus* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1965), p. 34; Chambers, *Thomas More*, p. 75.
57. R. C. Marius, "Thomas More and the Early Church Fathers," *Traditio*, vol. 24 (1968), pp. 379-407; cf. G. Kernan, "Thomas More, Theologian," *Thought*, vol. 17 (1942), p. 291.
58. *Selected Letters*, #46.
59. Creighton Gilbert, "When Did a Man in the Renaissance Grow Old?," *Studies in the Renaissance*, vol. 14 (1967), pp. 7-32.
60. Richard Pace, *De Fructu qu ex Doctrina Preceptur* (New York: Ungar, 1967), reported that More's scholarly opponents "criticize him and term everything he says childish;" cf. Edward Surtz, "Richard Pace's Sketch of Thomas More," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, vol. 37 (1958), pp. 36-50.
61. *Selected Letters*, #44.
62. *Ibid.*, #45.
63. *Ibid.*, #61; on the pain of mental anguish, cf. *Dialogue of Comfort*, p. 47.
64. Erich Lindemann, "The Symptomology and Management of Acute Grief," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 101 (1944), pp. 141-48; cf. Helene Deutsch, "The Absence of Grief," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, vol. 6 (1937), pp. 12-22. Pathological reactions to bereavement, especially parental bereavement, are hardly unique to the twentieth century. The so-called Roman Penitential, written in about 830 A.D., for example, contained provisions prohibiting self-lacerations following the death of a parent. Cf. John T. McNeill and Helena M. Gomer, *Medieval Handbooks of Penance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 313.
65. George Krupp, "Identification as a Defense against Anxiety in Coping with Loss," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, vol. 46 (1965), pp. 303-14.
66. *History of the Passion*, pp. 46-47.
67. *Works* (1557), p. 1052; cf. Germain Marc'hadour, "Obedient unto Death: a Key to St. Thomas More," *Spiritual Life*, vol. 7 (1961), pp. 205-21; Chambers, *Thomas More*, p. 396.
68. In the *Dialogue of Comfort*, p. 126, Anthony's imminent death will leave his nephew "an orphan."
69. Stapleton, p. 3.
70. To Polydore Vergil, September 5, 1525, Allen, vol. 6, #1606, pp. 159-60; cf. Erasmus to Richard Whitford, *Ibid.*, vol. 1, #191, pp. 422-23.
71. *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 357.
72. *Epigrams*, Appendix 1, p. 357.
73. *Ibid.*, #21, p. 150.
74. Cf. the messenger's comments to More in *English Works*, vol. 2, p. 37: "Ye use to look so sadly when ye mean merrily, that many times men doubt whether ye speak in sport when ye mean good honest." Harpsfield, p. 65 listed mock conformity as

one of More's significant attributes.

75. Robert E. Reiter, "On the Genre of Thomas More's Richard III," *Moreana*, vol. 25 (1970), pp. 5-14. In psychoanalytic terms, "dissembling" is the equivalent of reaction-formation, the conversion of an emotion into its opposite as a means of defending against it. Cf. Anna Freud, pp. 96, 190. Reaction-formation has its roots in the anal phase of psycho-sexual development. For an early commentary on scatology in More's works, with special reference to Richard III, see John Harrington, *A New Discourse on a Stale Subject called the Metamorphosis of Ajax* (London: R. Field, 1596).
76. R. S. Sylvester ed., *The Complete Works of Sir Thomas More: Richard III* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 24.
77. A. F. Pollard, "Sir Thomas More's Richard III," *History*, vol. 17 (1933), pp. 317-23; cf. L. F. Dean, "Literary Problems in More's Richard III," *Publication of the Modern Language Association*, vol. 58 (1943), pp. 22-41.
78. *Richard III*, p. 7.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 82. The idea that our popular portrait of Richard III, which stems largely from More's influential history, has its origins less in accuracy than in More's own repressed impulses has never been fully explored. Yet if *Richard III* is, as Pollard maintained, really a play, and if the huge body of psychoanalytic literature on drama and dramatists is correct, the conclusion seems inevitable. More reported that Richard was deformed, carrying his "left shoulder much higher than his right." Erasmus's letter to Von Hutten noted that More carried his right shoulder much higher than his left, an interesting reversal of character traits in keeping with the theory that Richard personified the "other side" of More's character. Cf. *Richard III*, p. 8; Allen, vol. 4, #999, p. 19. On More's ambition, cf. *Selected Letters*, #11; Allen, vol. 3, #816; *English Works*, vol. 2, pp. 19-20; William Nelson, "Thomas More, Grammarian and Orator," *Publication of the Modern Language Association*, vol. 58 (1943), pp. 337-42; G. R. Elton, "Thomas More, Councillor," in Sylvester, ed., *Action and Contemplation*, pp. 87-122. Interestingly, More purchased Crosby Place, the home of Richard III, in 1523 at a time when his own power and influence at court was growing. Cf. Philip Norman, *Crosby Place* (London: Committee for the Survey of the Memorials of Greater London, 1908). On the subject of id impulses, More's thought on the relationship between soul and body followed Plato, and Freud, in depicting the ego as a rider of the id horse: cf. *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 493 on sensuality that "pampereth the body that the soul can have no rule thereof, but carrieth it forth like an headstrong horse."
80. Stapleton, p. 3.
81. *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 486.
82. *Epigrams*, #58, p. 161; #116, pp. 178-179; #117, p. 179, #53, p. 159.
83. *Ibid.*, #61, p. 161; #121, p. 180; #22, p. 150; #89, p. 171; #81, p. 168.
84. *Utopia*, pp. 52-55, 86, 147-49. On the relationship between More and Raphael, see David M. Bevington, "The Dialogue in Utopia: Two Sides to the Question," *Studies in Philology*, vol. 58 (1961), pp. 496-509 which maintains that Raphael and persona More represent polar positions in More's own mind. Roger Ascham, The Scholemaster, in *Whole Works*, ed., J. A. Giles (London: John Russell Smith, 1864-1865), vol. 3, p. 252 suggests that More and Raphael carried their cloaks in the same idiosyncratic manner.
85. Edward Surtz, *The Praise of Pleasure* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 199; cf. "The Link Between Pleasure and Communism in Utopia," *Modern Language Notes*, vol. 70 (1955), pp. 90-93; "Interpretations of Utopia," *Catholic Historical Review*, vol. 38 (1952), pp. 156-74. J. H. Hexter, *More's Utopia: the Biography of an Idea* (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), p. 38 maintains that "More's

- revulsion against pomp and display is embedded in levels of his being deeper than his discriminating intellect and rational consciousness." On the relationship between Hexter's work and psychological interpretations of More, see Frank Manuel, "Review of Utopia," *History and Theory*, vol. 6 (1967), pp. 127-30. For additional examples of More's rejection of wealth, cf. *English Works*, vol. 1, pp. 356-58; *Selected Letters*, #4.
86. *Epigrams*, #96, pp. 172-73; cf. #91, p. 171, #92, p. 171; #102, p. 174. At More's suggestion, he and Erasmus translated Lucian's *Tyrranica*. Cf. Craig R. Thompson, *The Translations of Lucian by Erasmus and Thomas More* (Ithaca, New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1940), pp. 29-35.
 87. *Utopia*, p. 55; cf. the remarks of Ernest Jones, "The God Complex," in *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis* (London: Hogarth Press, 1951), vol. 2, p. 263.
 88. Cf. J. C. Flugel, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family* (London: Hogarth Press, 1950), p. 18; Weston LaBarre, "Family and Symbol," in George Wilbur and Warner Muensterburger eds., *Psychoanalysis and Culture: Essays in Honor of Geza Roheim* (New York: International Universities Press, 1951), pp. 156-67.
 89. Otto Fenichel, "Specific Forms of the Oedipus Complex," in *Collected Papers* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), pp. 204-20; cf. *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1945), pp. 91-98. On identification with the lost parent and its significance for oedipal development, the classic work is Marie Bonaparte, "Die Identifizierung einer Tochter mit Ihrer Verstorbenen Mutter," *Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Psychoanalyse und Imago*, vol. 15 (1929), pp. 481-500; cf. I. F. Grant-Duff, "A Psychoanalytical Study of a Phantasy of St. Theresa de L'Enfant-Jesus," *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, vol. 5 (1933), pp. 345-53.
 90. Margaret Meiss, "The Oedipal Problems of a Fatherless Child," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, vol. 7 (1952), pp. 216-29.
 91. Peter B. Neubauer, "The One-Parent Child and His Oedipal Development," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, vol. 15 (1960), pp. 286-309.
 92. "A Rueful Lamentation" in *English Works*, vol. 1, pp. 366-67; cf. A. F. Pollard, "The Lamentation of Queen Elizabeth," *London Times Literary Supplement*, vol. 21 (1932), p. 499.
 93. On Boethius as a model for More's *Dialogue of Comfort*, see Leland Miles, "Boethius and Thomas More's Dialogue of Comfort," *English Language Notes*, vol. 3 (1965), pp. 97-101.
 94. Cf. Germain Marc'hadour, *The Bible in the Works of Thomas More*, vol. 4 (Nieuwkoop: B. De Graaf, 1971), p. 53.
 95. *Works* (1557), pp. 1113-14; cf. Leland Miles, "Protestant Colet and Catholic More: a Study of Contrast in the Use of Platonism," *Anglican Theological Review*, vol. 33 (1951), pp. 30-42, similar material can be found in "A Treatise to Receive the Blessed Body," *Works* (1557), pp. 1265-68, and P. E. Hallett, *English Prayers and a Treatise on the Holy Eucharist by Thomas More* (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1938).
 96. *Works* (1557), p. 1114.
 97. *Ibid.*, pp. 1329-40.
 98. David Bleich, "More's Utopia: Confessional Modes," *American Imago*, vol. 28 (1971), pp. 24-52; cf. Marie Delcourt, "L'Amitie d'Erasmus et de More entre 1520-1535," *Bulletin G. Bude*, January, 1936, pp. 7-29; *Selected Letters*, #5; Allen, vol. 1, #191, pp. 422-23; J. A. K. Thomson, "Erasmus in England," *Vortrage der Bibliothek Warburg*, vol. 9 (1930), pp. 64-82.
 99. *Selected Letters*, #54.
 100. *Ibid.*, #1.

101. *Epigrams*, #1, p. 143.
102. *Supplication of Souls*, p. 320; *English Works*, vol. 2, p. 68.
103. *Epigrams*, #125, pp. 181-84.
104. Allen, vol. 4, #999.
105. Cf. *Selected Letters*, #20: to William Gonnell exhorting him to encourage his daughters to study industriously "so that nature's defects may be redressed;" *Ibid.*, #31 and #35; *English Works*, vol. 2, p. 49; *Works (1557)*, p. 1272; John Marsden, *Philomorus* (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1878), pp. 192-95; Marc'hadour, *The Bible*, vol. 4, p. 75.
106. Cf. Erasmus, *Colloquies*, p. 120 for details, and the comments in P. S. Allen, "More and Netherhall," *London Times Literary Supplement*, vol. 17 (1918), p. 654.
107. *Epigrams*, #68, p. 163; cf. #156, p. 194 on the theme, the only good wife is a dead wife.
108. *English Works*, vol. 2, pp. 161-62; cf. *Epigrams*, #169, pp. 198-99; Freud, "On the Sexual Theories of Children," *Standard Edition*, vol. 9: "If a little boy obtains a sight of the genitals of a little sister, what he says will show that his prejudice is already strong enough to influence the perception; he does not remark on the lack of the penis but invariably says, as if consoling and reconciling, that her widdler is still small, but when she is bigger it will soon grow."
109. *Utopia*, p. 110; cf. Freud, "The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido," *Standard Edition*, vol. 19: "We know, too, to what a degree depreciation of women, loathing of women, and a disposition to homosexuality are derived from a final conviction of women's lack of a penis."
110. *Epigrams*, #140, p. 188.
111. *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 338; *Epigrams*, #24, pp. 150-51; *History of the Passion*, p. 100; Robert Coogan, "Petrarch and More's Concept of Fortune," *Italica*, vol. 46 (1969), pp. 167-175.
112. *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 389. On More's attitude toward sex in general, see *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 461; "The foul delight and filthy liking that riseth of sensual and fleshly pleasure, which is never so pleasantly spiced with delight and liking but that it bringeth therewith such a grudge and grief of conscience that it maketh the stomach wamble and fare as it if would vomit." More, in contrast to the accepted sexual ethic of the day, did not even approve of intercourse for purposes of conception. Cf. *Epigrams*, #40, p. 155. On medieval sexual ethics, see Dennis Doherty, *The Sexual Doctrine of Cardinal Cajetan* (Regensburg: Verlag Freidrich Putset, 1966), especially pp. 31-50.
113. *English Works*, vol. 1, p. 391.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 389.
115. *Selected Letters*, #46.
116. *Utopia*, p. 146; cf. *Dialogue of Comfort*, p. 126; Henri Meulon, "La Pensée du Ciel chez Thomas More," *Moreana*, vol. 27 (1970), pp. 5-12; *Works (1557)*, pp. 1314-15.
117. *Epigrams*, #50, p. 158.
118. Fritz Wittels, *Set the Children Free*, trans., Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1933), pp. 198-210.
119. Helene Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1945), vol. 2, especially pp. 436-46; cf. Janet Pflieger, "The Wicked Stepmother in a Child Guidance Clinic," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, vol. 14 (1943), p. 242.
120. Flugel, p. 98.
121. *Epigrams*, #223, p. 217. It should not be assumed that because More was twenty-one years old when his father remarried for the first time that this remarriage was less traumatic to him. He was still a student and remained financially dependent on

his father. He was apparently still resident in his father's house and did not officially reach the age of majority until about a year after the marriage took place. In cases where the parent remains unmarried for a long time, as More's father did, the impact of remarriage can be even greater.

122. *Ibid.*, #225, p. 218.
123. *Ibid.*, #208, p. 213.
124. *Richard III*, p. 193.
125. *Selected Letters*, #46. This accounted for much of the attraction of his second wife. While More viewed his first wife as a spouse, he saw his second wife as primarily a stepmother. Dame Alice was the widow of a London mercer, as two of More's stepmothers had been. His marriage to her gave him the opportunity to relive the trauma of his father's remarriages. She was the domineering figure in the household, and More responded to her assertiveness with regression to adolescent behavior. Their relationship was limited by Alice's image as a stepmother figure in More's unconscious and the consequent feelings of guilt produced by fantasies of oedipal rivalry. The unconscious equation of marriage to a widow with incest is not uncommon, and in the middle ages special penances were provided for persons entering into remarriages of any sort. The theme of the validity of marriage was an important one throughout More's life and eventually led to his death. Evidence indicating that he felt reservations about his second marriage can be found in the queen mother's opposition to Edward IV's marriage to the widow Elizabeth Grey (*Richard III*, p. 62, and the elaborated Latin text, p. 241); the choice of the name Raphael for his Utopian narrator, the name given to the angel who exorcised spirits detrimental to marriage in the book of Tobit (cf. Elizabeth McCutcheon, "Thomas More, Raphael Hythlodæus and the Angel Raphael," *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, vol. 9 (1969), pp. 21-38); and his desire to marry without the asking of banns. Further discussion of More's second marriage can be found in Francis G. Murray, "Feminine Spirituality in the More Household," *Moreana*, vol. 28 (1970), pp. 92-102; Theodore Maynard, "Poor Lady More," *America*, vol. 50 (1934), pp. 397-98; Dom David Knowles, "The Historian and Character," in *The Historian and Character and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 7; Allen, vol. 4, #999, p. 19; *Selected Letters*, #12; and *English Works*, vol. 2, p. 222. On the implications of marriage to widows, cf. A. J. Cochrane, "A Little Widow is a Dangerous Thing," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, vol. 17 (1938), pp. 494-508; Carroll Camden, *The Elizabethan Woman* (New York: Elsevier Press, 1952), pp. 64-103; James Frazier, *Fear of the Dead in Primitive Religion* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1936), vol. 3, pp. 199-235; Edwin S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief* (New York: Scribner's, 1914), pp. 194-234, especially p. 209. *Epigrams* #105, p. 175, and #225, p. 218 develop the theme of incest with the stepmother. *Works* (1557), p. 574 suggests that aggression against the father is the underlying motive for incestuous attraction. On this point, cf. Benjamin Shambaugh, "A Study of Loss Reactions in a Seven Year Old," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, vol. 16 (1961), p. 510.
126. Irene Fast and Albert Cain, "The Stepparent Role: Potential for Disturbances in Family Functioning," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, vol. 10 (1965), pp. 485-95.
127. Else P. Heilpern, "Psychological Problems of Step-Children," *Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review*, vol. 6 (1943), pp. 163-76.
128. Otto Fenichel, "The Psychology of Transvestism," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, vol. 9 (1930), p. 211; reprinted as "On Transvestism," in Robert Fleiss ed., *The Psychoanalytic Reader* (New York: International Universities Press, 1948), pp. 5-20.

129. *Epigrams*, #5, p. 145.
130. *Ibid.*, #68, p. 163, cf. #120, p. 179. There is no question but that this refers to John More. Witness, More, quoting his father in *English Works*, vol. 2, p. 107: "Every man is at the choice of his wife that ye should put your hand into a blind bag full of snakes and eels together, seven snakes for one eel, ye would I wene reckon it a perilous choice to take up one at adventure though ye made your special prayer."
131. Juan Luis Vives, *Opera Omnia*, vol. 2 (Valentiae Edentorum: In Officina Benedicti Manfort, 1782), pp. 484-87. E. E. Reynolds, *Margaret Roper* (New York: P. J. Kennedy, 1960) explains the declamation.
132. Cf. the popular introduction to the problem of stepchildren, Anne Simon, *Step-child in the Family* (New York: Odyssey Press, 1964), p. 149, and Annie M. White, "Factors Making for Difficulty in the Step-Parent Relationship with Children," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, vol. 14 (1943), p. 242; on betrayal and illegitimacy in More's writings, cf. Gustav Cross, "More's History of Richard III and Lust's Dominion," *Notes and Queries*, vol. 202 (1957), pp. 198-99.
133. J. M. Headley, "Thomas More and Luther's Revolt," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, vol. 60 (1969), p. 145; Knowles, p. 7; G. R. Elton, "Sir Thomas More and the Opposition to Henry VIII," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, vol. 41 (1968), pp. 19-34. Cf. Francis Attebury, *An Answer to Some Considerations in the Spirit of Martin Luther* (Oxford: at the Theatre, 1687). For a survey of historiographical opinions on More's relationship to heretics, see R. W. Chambers, *The Place of Thomas More in English Literature and History* (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1937), especially pp. 4-8, 48.
134. *Works* (1557), p. 685; cf. J. M. Headley ed., *The Complete Works of Thomas More: Responsio ad Lutherum* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 169, 211, and 411-16.
135. *Works* (1557), pp. 959-60; *Responsio*, p. 161; *History of the Passion*, pp. 59-60. On the relationship between the father and the devil in western thought, see Ernest Jones, *On the Nightmare* (New York: Liveright Publishing Co., 1951), especially pp. 155-82. The irrational element in More's attitude toward heretics is highlighted when one considers that he failed to differentiate between various theological positions in his attacks. For More, all heresy was uniform and all heretics were one. Cf. Steven W. Haas, "Simon Fish, William Tyndale, and Sir Thomas More's Lutheran Controversy," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, vol. 23 (1972).
136. *Responsio*, pp. 83, 437.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 81; cf. *Selected Letters*, #13: "to be a judge is the lot of many, and sometimes of very bad men." More's father was a judge of the king's bench.
138. *Works* (1557), p. 361, cf. pp. 359, 404, 462-64.
139. *Responsio*, p. 687.
140. *English Works*, p. 265; cf. *Responsio*, p. 221; *English Works*, vol. 2, p. 685: "The children of God spy out their father and mother. He (Tyndale) meaneth of likelihood God for the father. But what church meaneth he for his mother. For he cannot spy out the unknown and the known Catholic Church which is the spouse of God in deed, and therefore by all the holy fathers commonly called the mother of all Christian people, he will not know her for his mother. And so I see well Tyndale meaneth for his mother some old mother maude, some bawdy church of heretics." In early life, More was attended by a nurse named Mother Maude.
141. *Works* (1557), p. 539.
142. See above n. 100.
143. Allen, vol. 10, #2755, pp. 123-24.
144. *Epigrams*, #91, p. 171; #93, p. 172; #94, p. 172.

145. Chambers, *Place of Thomas More*, p. 57.
146. Roper, p. 77.
147. *Richard III*, p. 246, translated out of the Latin text.
148. Roper, p. 7; Harpsfield, p. 8; R. L. Mackie, *King James IV of Scotland* (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1958), pp. 90-112 gives factual details concerning the marriage. *Epigrams*, #165-66, pp. 197-98, #2, Appendix 1, p. 237 denounce James IV as a traitor.
149. See above n. 4; M. J. Tucker, "The Child as Beginning and End: Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century English Childhood" will appear in the same volume.
150. Assuming that More experienced the degree of ego impoverishment associated with the prolonged use of pathological defense mechanisms in response to loss, a legitimate question arises about his undoubted ability to reach the height of success in an adult world that put personal resources to the severest test. A five-year study of hospitalized and non-hospitalized patients who had lost a parent in childhood indicated that, in cases where basic needs were gratified by excessive dependence on the surviving parent, there was no disturbance of either the work ego or intellectual ego. In More's case, dependence was the price of success. Cf. Josephine R. Hilgard, Martha F. Newman, and Fern Fisk, "The Strength of the Adult Ego Following Childhood Bereavement," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, vol. 30 (1959), pp. 788-89.

FROM THE SOURCES

Observing the Golden Mean in Disciplining Children (1540 A.D.):

Children "are not such as do obey for shame, but for fear: not such as do abstain from wicked things, for filthiness sake, but for punishment. Fear is to be driven into children, correction and punishment is to be given, that being brought to some fear, they may leave their wickedness . . . For parents must observe the golden mean, least that they amase their children with too much threatening: discourage them with their too sharp and bitter reproaches: or with their rigor and cruelty kill and murder them . . . some furious parents . . . have vied to strike and buffet their children about the face and head, and to lay upon them like malt sacks with cudgels, staves, fork or fire shovel, or whatever came nighest into their hands, yea, and very often also, have cast them on the ground, and spurned and kicked them like dogs, which manner of correcting I judge is to be detested and abhorred . . ."

Bartholemew Batty, *The Christian Mans Closet*, (London, 1581), p. 25.

BOOK



REVIEWS

THE CASE OF SCHREBER, THE INTRAPSYCHIC WORLD, AND MODERN CHILD REARING: A REVIEW ESSAY

Morton Schatzman, *Soul Murder: Persecution in the Family* (New York: Random House, 1973), \$6.95, 193 pp.

Reviewed by PETER LOEWENBERG

The case of Daniel Paul Schreber (1842-1911) is one of the most widely studied cases in the history of psychiatry. He suffered a mental breakdown in 1884 after his defeat in a bid for a Reichstag seat. In 1893, as the Presiding Judge of the Appeals Court in Leipzig, he suffered his second psychotic break during which he wrote his famous memoirs detailing his delusions.¹ It is these *Denkwürdigkeiten* that Freud used to make his classic interpretation of the psychodynamics of psychosis in 1911.²

Since that time much has come to light about the reality in which Judge Schreber grew up. His father, Daniel Gottlieb Moritz Schreber (1808-1861), was a leading German physician, health cultist, and was widely regarded as an authority on child rearing. Niederland has shown in a series of articles that are "required reading" for the Schreber Case that father Schreber's methods of child discipline were the cause of the Judge's adult delusions and were directly reexperienced in fantasies of being strapped, bound, and restrained by an all-powerful God.³

Now Schatzman uses the family data of the Schreber Case in order to develop his transactional theory of paranoia.⁴ He says the point to be learned is that the paranoid Judge Schreber was indeed persecuted by his father, the doctor, while he forbade the son to realize or resent it. Schatzman presents the detailed data first interpreted by Niederland in which the boy was forced into daily cold baths, his "misdeeds" were mercilessly written down on a "punishment board" for an "hour of reckoning" at the end of each month, his posture was enforced by a series of orthopedic straps, braces, and devices used while standing, studying, and sleeping. Masturbation was strictly tabooed and "pollutions" were treated by enema. The father's language about "pure rays of the concept of God (of the loving Universal Father)" returned in the son's delusions of "Rays of God" which mocked him by calling him "Miss Schreber" in allusion to the emasculation he was about to undergo.⁵ Small wonder, one feels, that the elder brother also went insane and committed suicide.

Schatzman is ahistorically teleological in his approach to the case: Papa Schreber persecuted his son and we know better. We know the correct non-persecutory way to raise children. But do we? There is a smugness about the present-minded certainty of Schatzman's point of view. Certainly we know more about child raising than we did when Freud began psychoanalysis eighty years ago. But we will also know much more eighty years from now. In 2053 many of the practices which are today the pride of modern pediatrics and pedagogy will be looked at with a horror equal to that which we and Schatzman summon up for Dr. Schreber's prescriptions for healthy growth and development.

We must be on guard against confusing novelty and the "modern" with progress. There is a danger in using the acknowledged pruderies and barbarities of the nineteenth century, such as father Schreber's format for child raising, to deny our own perversities and monstrosities of child care and rearing. What, in the light of this account, we must ask, are we *now* doing to children in the name of the "best modern medical science"? What kind of orthopedic devices, braces, separation from mothers in early infancy, "necessities" in the name of sterility and hygiene "for the child's own good" are being perpetrated by us in the service of unconscious sadism and the need to control? The most seductive rationalization of all is to say: "There is no choice." The pediatrician's trump card is the simple formula "the child will forget it." The premise is that if the infant cannot articulate its complaint, it doesn't hurt. Yet recent research increasingly shows that traumas from youngest infancy leave residuals as symptoms and are even recoverable as memories from as early as age three months.⁶ If we ever are to achieve a better world it will have to be through a truly child-centered culture which is attuned to children's emotional needs. Most of our "modern" teachers, child care personnel, and physicians, let alone the public, have not yet assimilated the existence and implications of infantile sexuality. The idea that the love life of an adult is conditioned by what he experienced from birth to his fifth year is still strange and incomprehensible to most contemporaries. One of the reasons for the depreciation of all whose vocations have to do with infant and child care, such as baby sitters, nannies, kindergarten teachers, and mommies is certainly the fact that we have universally once been small, helpless, and *totally dependent* on such mothering or mother-surrogate figures. The memory traces of this absolute and painful dependence must be repressed or defended against by disparagement of these child-oriented, largely women, workers who in actuality are performing the most important task for the future of the species—raising the next generation of human beings.

Schatzman has some difficulties in coping with psychoanalytic object relations theory. He understands the term "object" to mean that "it" cannot respond or relate, that "it" is necessarily inert. To Schatzman "it" is a person who is not alive, never acts or experiences; "it cannot affect or be affected by anyone" (p. 106). However, the "object" in psychoanalytic theory is in the first instance the mother's breast, then the mother or mother surrogate, and finally what was initially a "part-object" expands with the child's growing awareness of the world to include fathers, siblings, playmates, and other significant adults. There is nothing in object relations theory incompatible with the object having initiative of its own. Mothers are recognized as being moving, feeling, beings who greatly influence infantile development in the early weeks of life. The point of difference between Schatzman's transactional theory and object relations theory is obscured by his terming objects inert.

The critical difference is that object relations are *intrapsychic*. "Objects" are internalized and become inner saboteurs or sources of self-esteem and they must be dealt with intrapsychically.⁷ Object relations theory works with *inner* persecutors whereas Schatzman is *interpersonal*. Much that is of value would be lost by giving up the intrapsychic world. It would have done Judge Daniel Paul Schreber little good to have told him that he was persecuted by his father. The inner persecutor was too well established, too integral an introject to be explained that way. It was him, his selfhood, and had to be worked within terms of the self. To give up the intrapsychic view of personality would be a regression of the first order. It would mean giving up the best of what has been learned of psychodynamics in the twentieth century. To add an interactional, interpersonal view to the intrapsychic can be valuable. Schatzman, rather than adding, tends to obscure and replace the intrapsychic world.

Schatzman is also excessively literal when he questions the idea of castration fear. He argues with Freud's interpretation that the boy Schreber dreaded the threat of castration by his father. "Where is Freud's evidence?" asks Schatzman, as though he is so literal-minded he cannot see that the material from the Schreber Case, which he himself cites, is evidence of an intrusive, manipulative, and often terrifying father who physically restrained, strapped, and bound his children. One of the consequences of all of the enforced postures, halters, braces, enemas, and the minute monthly accounting of the child's "transgressions" by the father was that the man fantasied being in the hands of an all-powerful, intrusive, manipulative God. This is the recurrent dominant delusion of Judge Schreber's paranoia. The fear of the omnipotent father and Schreber's extreme hypochondriasis, which included fears of the pumping out of his spinal cord and "little men" in his feet,⁸ are castration anxiety. Schreber's defense against this dread was the classical homosexual one of denying his rivalrous feelings, retreating from competition, and symbolically saying, "I am not a man, I am a woman, and therefore no threat to you." What Schreber actually experienced, by his own description, is the delusion that God demanded femaleness from him. He felt he had to impress the divine rays that: "I am a woman luxuriating in voluptuous sensations."⁹

At the conclusion of his examination of the Schreber Case, Schatzman attempts to make the important transitions from the crucial case to the social norm and thence to cultural patterns and historical events. He moves both backward and forward in time from his case study. We are taken back from Dr. Schreber to Fichte, and from Fichte to Luther. He also comes down from Schreber as a precursor of the Nazis to the contemporary Soviet Union and B. F. Skinner. In fact, he tells us, "totalitarian societies from Sparta to Soviet Russia have practiced principles of child-rearing that Dr. Schreber preached—especially the emphasis on obedience and discipline" (p. 175). Here Schatzman senses something which Wilhelm Reich first saw and expressed,¹⁰ but which has not yet been adequately conceptualized—the family is the primary political group—and as such the model for all later relations of the individual to society. Authoritarian fathers make for authoritarian children and authoritarian politics.¹¹ Children relate to abstractions, such as "the government," in an anthropomorphizing manner as they relate to family authority.¹² They also relate to the death of a political leader as a transference from a family leader.¹³

Here we are in the area of the child-training patterns as determinants of national character, a thesis that undoubtedly has much validity. The operationalization of the transition from national character modality to the indi-

vidual case, and *vice versa* has been the subject of much methodological controversy.¹⁴ Schatzman, as a clinician, makes the leap from father Schreber's child-rearing methods to Hitler with ease and without misgiving. There is much to be said for his thesis. In the German case, the evidence from the biographies and memoirs of Nazi mass murderers indicates that they learned their affect blocks in the homes of their childhood. Commandant Rudolf Hoess of Auschwitz describes himself as a "solitary child" who "was never happier than when playing or working alone and unobserved."¹⁵ "My father," he writes,

brought me up on strict military principles. . . . It was constantly impressed upon me in forceful terms that I must obey promptly the wishes and commands of my parents, teachers, and priests, and indeed all grown-up people, including servants, and that nothing must distract me from this duty. Whatever they said was always right. . . . From my earliest youth I was brought up with a strong awareness of duty. In my parent's house it was insisted that every task be exactly and conscientiously carried out. . . . My father took particular care to see that I obeyed all his instructions and wishes with the greatest meticulousness.¹⁶

The schizoid, affectionally inhibited and repressed quality of Hoess' childhood is especially remarkable and is directly related to his later life role as automaton executioner:

I never remember any display of tenderness. . . . I had always, from my earliest years, fought shy of any sign of tenderness, much to the regret of my mother, and of all my aunts and other relatives. . . . I was never able to have any warmer feelings for [my two sisters]. They have always been strangers to me.

I had the greatest respect, however, for both my parents, and looked up to them with veneration. But love, the kind of love that other children have for their parents, which I myself later learned to know, I was never able to give them. Why this should have been I have never understood. Even today I can find no explanation.¹⁷

Schatzman does not refer to the case of Commandant Hoess. But one way to give substance to his point would be to pursue research into the child-training patterns of SS and Concentration camp personnel.¹⁸ There remains a considerable leap from a pattern among such people to a national norm which would permit one to say, as Schatzman does: "anyone who wishes to understand German 'character structure' in the Nazi era could profitably study Dr. Schreber's books" (p. 171). Yet, Schatzman is probably right in this as in so much else clinicians feel and tell us about prior to social science operationalization. If Niederland's papers have been necessary ancillary reading on the Schreber case, Schatzman is now an important interactional supplement to both.

Peter Loewenberg teaches German History, European Cultural and Intellectual history, and Psychohistory at UCLA and is on the faculty of the Southern California Psychoanalytic Institute. He is currently working on a psychobiography of Otto Bauer with Arnold A. Rogow.

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15. Rudolf Hoess, *Commandant of Auschwitz*, trans., Constantine FitzGibbon (New York: Popular Library, 1961), p. 21.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
18. Henry V. Dicks has interestingly pursued such inquiry in *Licensed Mass Murder: A Socio-psychological Study of some SS Killers* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

KINSHIP AND FAMILY SIZE IN HISTORY

Peter Laslett and Richard Wall, editors, *Household and Family in Past Time: Comparative Studies in the Size and Structure of the Domestic Group Over the Last Three Centuries in England, France, Serbia, Japan and colonial North America, with further materials from Western Europe, with an Analytic Introduction on the History of the Family by Peter Laslett* (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1972), xii + 623 pp. \$37.50.

Reviewed by EDWARD SHORTER, *Univ. of Toronto*

It's hard to tell just who the whipping boy in this volume is. Some of the contributors flay away at the vapid postwar generation of western sociologists who assumed without knowing that families in the dim reaches of time were "extended." Others persecute the conservative European sociologists of the nineteenth century, such as Frédéric Le Play, who *knew* the extended family existed because they saw it around them, yet who wanted to pile it with more moral significance than it could bear. But there has to be a whipping boy, or this volume, dedicated to establishing the fictitiousness of the extended family in history and the reality of the nuclear one, would never have been written. The actual data it reports are otherwise not very interesting, and lacking a good reason for parading all these census lists of household members in various places and times, the researchers selected an indifferent one.

These twenty-two essays were first delivered at a 1969 conference on the history of the household and the family, organized by Peter Laslett of the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure. But the intellectual origins of the enterprise date back to before 1964, when a number of researchers at the Cambridge Group began to analyze nominal lists of the members of households in scattered English villages for the early modern period. Why they decided the enterprise was worth undertaking is not entirely clear, in view of the difficulty of determining kin relationships from the English data (most English sources make the spotting of relatives in the household possible only when they have the same last name as the household head). Nor does the traditional logic for examining household size seem to have animated the Cambridge Group: the mediaevalists's search for a multiplier which would permit him to estimate the size of the population from the number of hearths. Laslett indeed concludes that a single multiplier is chimerical, so much does household size vary from one place and social class to another. The contributions of the Cambridge Group to the conference deal with numbers rather than structures, suggesting a research project caught in the same momentum that carries a snowball downhill; even though no compelling intellectual reason existed for studying how many people on the average lived in households, they would study it anyway, the data being easily available and all.

Unfortunately, this English preoccupation with household *size* led a number of other contributors to organize their essays around the same theme; how did the number of people who lived behind a single front door, or whatever criterion for "household" was selected, vary from one place, class and time to another. Such is the power of momentum that this essentially uninteresting aggregate, the body count (as we Americans say) in the household, has sufficient force not only to eject this incredibly expensive volume from the Cambridge University Press, but to threaten to become the next Big Ques-

tion in social history. One can just see the graduate students out there, nominal lists of the population of Obergladbach in 1721 clutched tightly in hand, readying a further avalanche of household size studies. I can imagine few efforts intellectually less promising since the French began to drench us with local studies of the Revolution years ago.

It would be unfair to claim there are no important problems embedded within this domain. Kinship structures are crucial to an understanding of social mechanisms. And Laslett repeats many times, and is echoed by other contributors, that kinship is really what is most worth studying. What efficacy did the network of family ties have, as compared with such competing sources of solidarity as the guild or village community, in Old Regime Europe? How has the world of emotion and authority among men and women who were held together by the ties of blood and sex changed during the massive social transformations of the last two centuries? Has kinship become more important, less important, or just different, in binding people together? And what about childrearing? Is it true that in the Bad Old Days children were raised by larger familial groups than just the nuclear family—Mom and Dad? Or perhaps indeed children were socialized by communal groups stretching far beyond the family? The contributors to this volume would not, I think, dispute that these are the most worthwhile problems. Disagreement comes only when the sources at hand, house-by-house lists of the population, don't give direct access to these questions. Does one press on anyway, or does one decide to try another tack? The dilemma is an urgent one, for census-takers' lists make wonderfully compact research projects, and books such as this can become models for years to come.

The volume's great contribution is to standardize the vocabulary for discussing household structure. In the introduction Laslett proposes some careful definitions for a field beset by looseness of usage. Here are the essential ones:

—*The nuclear family* (simple family, conjugal family) means just Mom, Dad, the kids, plus whatever servants happen to be around. Servants, by the way, mean most often, in the language of European social history, live-in farm laborers or helpers in the craft shop rather than personal servants; they till the fields rather than bring coffee in the morning.

—*The extended family* means the nuclear family plus relatives, just as long as no other married couples are included. The extension may be "upwards" to aunts, uncles, widowed grandmothers and the like, "downwards" to the grandchildren of the household head, or "laterally" to the brothers and sisters of the heads.

—*The multiple family household* means two or more nuclear families living together, either married brothers (*frères*) or the married son of an older couple. In this category belong the "stem" families whom Le Play made famous, the son who brings his bride right into Mom and Dad's household, becoming upon Dad's retirement the family head. With the father's death the household passes from multiple to extended, as just the grandmother and the son's little family are left, or indeed to nuclear when the grandmother passes on. Then as the son's own son marries and installs his own bride in the household the cycle starts again.

It is really only around this latter variety of household that the fascinating historical problems circle for Western Europe and North America, because most workers in this field apart from Richard Sennett concede that having an Aunt Minnie in the household doesn't make all that much difference in terms of relations between the spouses or raising the children.¹ It is only when two

married couples share the same kitchen that basic patterns of affect and authority within the household threaten to depart from that 1954 Long Island model which both sociologists and historians have dancing in the backs of their brains. The Yugoslavian *zadruga*, which thrusts together several conjugal units from combinations of generations, is clearly a different ballgame from Bethpage. How does the tension between personal ambition, conjugal intimacy, and duty to a family which stretches before and behind one in time, differ from the English yeomanry, where nuclear families were the undisputed rule, to the Austrian peasantry, where "stem" families were commonplace? Will the psychodynamics of an insurance salesman's nuclear family in Winnetka differ significantly from those of the multiple family household of some merchant dynasty in Bordeaux? And if so, is it because household structure is different? Will the fertility of lower-class women in London differ from that of lower-class women in Tokyo because for the former only the husband and the other kids are around the house, whereas for the latter a whole matrix of lateral, ascending and descending kin must be faced across the breakfast table? To the extent that questions such as these produce clear answers, it will be worth our while to debate about the rise and fall of the stem family, or indeed to ask if it ever existed at all.

The hypothesis of this book is that the stem family never existed. Oh, not that there were never *any* multiple family households west of the *zadruga*, but that the representative experience of the overwhelming majority of the West European and North American populations since time out of mind has been with nuclear families. Laslett himself was convinced by the papers at the 1969 conference: "What I have called the null hypothesis in the history of the family, which is that the present state of evidence forces us to assume that its organization was always and invariably nuclear unless the contrary can be proven, was certainly an outcome of these interchanges." (p. xi) While Laslett is probably right about the nuclear character of most households in England and North America, there have been nonetheless large reaches of time and territory where the stem family has in fact been the *rule*. The effect, therefore, of all these sneers at Le Play and other less well-informed enthusiasts of multiple family households is to tip the "Laslett school" in to a certain imbalance. The tendency of Laslett's argument is to ignore these substantial cases, or else to shove them to the margin as "exceptional." Yet, in truth, for many agricultural regions of Western and Central Europe, it was the nuclear structure that was exceptional, and, exactly as Le Play suggested, the stem family that was commonplace.

This assertion of error, or at least of one-sidedness, on the contributors' part is serious enough to justify presenting a bit of evidence for the counter case. First of all, we have the logic of demography. Laslett asserts that the grisly mortality of Old Regime society sufficed to shear off the generation of oldsters before they could become grandparents in a three-generation multiple family household. And it's true that in such wretchedly poor and disease-ridden areas as the Sologne in France, about which Gérard Bouchard has so splendidly informed us, the chances of a couple's surviving until the birth of a grandchild were minimal. Yet in France as a whole during the eighteenth century there was at least a 42 percent possibility that a given child would have one complete set of grandparents about his cradle, and only a 16 percent chance that no grandparent at all would be still living.² So even in the eighteenth century the demographics of the question do not rule out the possibility of three-generation stem families.

Then there is the evidence of household organization itself. According to Lutz Berkner's recent study of the Lower Austrian county of Heidenreichstein in the eighteenth century, multiple family households were commonplace among the propertied peasantry as a retired farming couple would continue to live in the same Bauernhof as their married son. The chances were therefore high that a given individual would in the course of his life cycle be exposed to some "stem" family experience, whatever difference that may have made.³ Laslett, who as the footnotes make clear (on pp. 21, 55, 71 and 150-151) wishes that this challenge to his "null hypothesis" would go away, argues that Heidenreichstein was an aberrant case, typical of no larger region of Western Europe. Yet the evidence is simply not to be blinked at that such stem families, in which a married son lived with his aging parents on the same farm, was in fact characteristic of much of Austria and Southern Germany. In my research on Bavaria, for example, I came across numerous cases of parents formally transferring the title of the farm to a married son, then withdrawing in *Austrag* to a little attic room or side building.

No less were extended families the case in wide regions of southern and central France, as numerous nineteenth-century observers testify. Indeed there existed in some *départements* not just the two-couple stem family but *zadruga*-like clans (*communautés familiales*), headed by a patriarch.⁴ Finally, in the Laslett volume itself there are tales to tell of stem families elsewhere in Western Europe. In 1749, for example, no less than twenty percent of all households in the Dutch dirt-farm province of Overijssel embraced three generations. Because one might assume that many other households which in that year were reported as nuclear had previously been complex, or were later to be so—because the grandparents had either already died or the son had not yet married, we may assume that stem-family life represented a massive reality for these people. Michael Anderson tells us that in the English town of Preston around 1851 most elderly people whose children were still alive resided with them. And so forth. We are agreed: nowhere in Western Europe do multiple family households constitute a majority of all households, owing to the large number of people whom accidents of mortality and nuptiality forced to live alone. Yet, even so, a strong possibility existed that a given peasant, or urbanite of rural origins, in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe would have brushed against a stem family at some point in his life cycle. The case just will not wash that the nuclear family has since the Reformation represented the standard form of domestic life in western society.

Within these twenty-two contributions there are high points and low ones. To mention some of each, starting with the most worthwhile:

—Laslett's own lengthy introduction on the history of the family is a major addition to the literature, first reviewing long-range theories on family evolution, then presenting guidelines for the analysis of household structure, then finally comparing English findings with results for colonial America, France, Germany and Italy not available elsewhere in this volume.

—Thomas K. Burch's paper on how household size varies under different assumptions about the birthrate and life expectancy, demonstrates the role of fertility as the principal regulator of household size. In addition to exposing an audience not terribly conversant with mathematical demography to a most useful kind of theoretical exercise—the construction of model tables—Burch's essay also provides a sense of what family forms may be expected to accompany what ranges of household size.

—Michael Anderson's piece on the Lancashire cotton town of Preston represents one of the neatest bridges between social theory and household composition data assembled anywhere to date. It is Anderson's fine sensitivity to the reality of a given historical situation which permits him the most important "finding" in the volume, namely that for a while household complexity *increased* with industrialization as working mothers sought live-in relatives to take care of their children. An expanded version of this thesis is to be found in his recently published book.⁵

—A. M. van der Woude's article on Holland in early modern times highlights the impact of pastoral as opposed to arable agriculture on household structure, and deals a death blow to the sociologist E. W. Hofstee's notions of the extended "agrarian-artisan" family in traditional society.

—E. A. Hammel's contribution to the *zadruga* is brilliantly done, showing how each of these large, complex peasant households has its micro history of rise and fall, the institution as a whole changing little over the centuries.

—John Demos's speculations about the psychodynamics of the Puritan family, though completely out of place in a volume of this nature, are nonetheless refreshing, coming as they do at the end of a 500-page trudge through frequency distributions of household sizes.

Other essays are less memorable. All those on Western Europe save van der Woude's fail to take on a sufficiently ambitious body of data, or bloc of questions, to be interesting. Etienne Hélin, writing on Liège in 1801, for example, found out virtually nothing while managing (I suppose) to increase the cost of the book by at least two dollars. And Edward Pryor's piece on Rhode Island from 1875 to 1960 is a model of what you do in a history essay when you've no story to tell and no very good ideas of what made the people you've taken on tick.

Finally, Laslett's own substantive piece on changes in English household size over the last three centuries is something of a disappointment, and illustrates in a nutshell why concentrating on how many people lived in a given household may be less productive than other approaches to family history. He is cutting here into three intriguing areas of inquiry: (1) Household structure, nuclear or extended? (2) Fertility, how and why has it changed? (3) The developmental cycle of the household, or what interaction existed between children and servants as the agricultural family's workforce? Now, Laslett can't comment convincingly on household structure because he can spot kin only if they have the same last name as the family father. Many kin, who presumably were classed by Laslett and his contributors as servants (and were so as well) didn't bear the father's name. Thus he is able to assure us only that households sheltering more than one conjugal unit were a tiny minority, which is noteworthy but hardly dramatic. Laslett chooses not to comment on fertility, save for speculating about birth control on the basis of an exceedingly dubious correlation analysis, which uses the village rather than the household as the unit of investigation. His failure to treat the number of children present more systematically is regrettable because many other scholars will find fertility the most interesting component of the aggregate household. And Laslett can't clarify the third problem—the interaction between servants and children within the life cycle of a given household—because the English sources did not record the ages of the children. So we fail to find out from this sea of means, means of means, group sizes, and standard deviations anything we really wanted to know. (Whenever you suddenly see a string of reports on standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis you know the researcher is

staggering under DATA-TEXT output, whose most compelling characteristic for him is doubtless the number of pounds it weighs).

The merit of Laslett's piece on England, and of this genre of historical literature in general, is the presentation of an explicandum. Laslett gives us a homogeneous series on the number of people living in the average English household since the seventeenth century. The mean scarcely changes until the threshold of the twentieth century, when the fertility decline, underway already for some time, finally gathers enough steam to pull downward household size. How did this stability manage to persist in the face of dramatic social changes? What shifts occurred in the internal composition and emotional relationships of the household? These are questions to which Laslett points the way for further research.

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THE LIMITS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Henry V. Dicks, *Licensed Mass Murder: A Socio-Psychological Study of Some S.S. Killers* (New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1972).

Reviewed by GEORGE M. KREN, *Kansas State Univ.*

The attempt to use psychological (usually Freudian) modes of perception as a heuristic for history, psychohistory, has with few notable exceptions concentrated on explaining the behavior of public individuals. The achievements of this method are substantial when adequate sources are available to a sensitive observer. Erikson's *Young Man Luther*, one of the outstanding offspring of the union of history and psychology, has added new dimensions to our understanding of the Person of Martin Luther. Yet, as Erikson would be the first to maintain, the triumph of the Reformation in much of Europe is not accounted for simply by the sensitive Eriksonian analysis of Luther, but largely by analysis of sixteenth century political, economic, and religious developments. Leaders do not simply impose their will on miraculously appearing disciples but must create loyalty by appealing to conscious and unconscious desires and aspirations of potential followers. Great leaders do not determine

history by themselves, and the profoundest psychological explanations of any individual can at best explain only portions of history. Bureaucracies frequently function as if they were independent of human control; institutional patterns often elude the conscious volition of individuals. There is a great danger that historians, having belatedly discovered Freud, are repressing their knowledge of Karl Marx and Max Weber.

Dicks' *Licensed Mass Murder* is a unique achievement, which avoids seeing history through the eyes of the great man. Attempting to understand the causes of the German genocide program, he conducted detailed psychiatric interviews with eight convicted S.S. killers, all of whom had been involved in mass killings. The result is an important work.

The formative influences of the generation that achieved maturity after World War I was the authoritarian structure of Imperial Germany where "authority was transmitted from the pinnacle of the Kaiser through a step ladder of aristocrats . . . soldiers and bureaucrats . . . down to the smallest functionaries. At each level a touchy sense of rank consciousness demanded and received due deference from the lower orders. . . . It was the Prussians, the most austere of Germans with their rigid military and feudal hierarchy, who clothed this idea . . . with power. . . . The typical Wilhelminian family was both a mirror and the seedbed in which these now generalized cultural patterns were transmitted. . . . The father, even if he had to kow-tow to his superiors all day . . . had his home in which to play undisputed master. The German wife was typically subordinate." (34-35)

The theme of the authoritarianism of the German family is, of course, not new. Dicks is particularly conscious of the importance of early influences: The answer to all the world's ills, he writes in what comes close to a manifesto, "is apparently good mothering [which however] is complicated by other factors." (23) He shows clearly in his examination of the life histories of the S.S. men the cultural prohibitions which usually restrained the German mother from expressing any tenderness. The biographies of the S.S. men investigated conform very much to a typical authoritarian pattern.

The cultural setting for authoritarianism certainly deserves explanation. But it was not, as Dicks suggests, Protestant aristocratic Prussia with its emphasis on discipline, duty, work and soldierliness (35) that became the source of national socialism. The greatest support for national socialism was in Austria and Bavaria. Hitler, Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner were Austrians: Himmler came from Bavaria. Bavaria and Austria were the center of the Nazi movement, while it was never popular in Prussia. The only politically significant opposition to Hitler's tyranny came from a group of predominantly Prussian, militaristic army officers. National Socialism came to power not as a military-authoritarian movement but as a revolutionary force. The committed Nazi militant was a nihilistic adventurer who found meaning in sheer enthusiasm which he could give to the movement. The ideal Nazi personality was not the rigid (and ethical) Prussian officer but the eternal youth, the permanent rebel, the perpetual adolescent who found authority and the demands of society unpalatable.

The most fascinating portion of Dicks's book are the interviews. No quick summary can do justice to the ability of the author to draw from these individuals not only their external life histories, but the inner meaning which they ascribed to their experiences. In almost all cases they present personalities damaged in childhood and adolescence. Their relationships with their parents were generally unsatisfactory.

The evidence elicited by Dicks confirms much of Peter Loewenberg's analysis of the Nazi youth cohort, particularly as it deals with the significance of the absence of the father during World War I and the privations suffered during and after the war.¹ The analysis of these S.S. men shows, at times brilliantly, how some individuals placed in situations where there were no legal or social pressures against sadistic excesses, felt free to engage in them. (There is something absurd in speaking about excesses in a death camp.) Sadism was certainly part of Auschwitz. It was in a sense a fringe benefit for the sadistically inclined, who were provided with the freedom to commit sadistic acts of their own choosing without restraint or criticism. But, though ever present, the sadism of individuals was not the essence of Auschwitz. Dr. Ella Lingers, a prisoner in Auschwitz between 1943 and 1945 stated that "I know of almost no S.S. man who could not claim to have saved someone's life. There were few sadists. Not more than 5 or 10 percent were pathological criminals in the clinical sense."²

The real horror of Auschwitz is not to be found in the pathological excesses of individuals, but in the systematic bureaucratically organized and efficient killings of individuals, again bureaucratically defined as victims. The model for Auschwitz is not the Marquis de Sade, but the slaughterhouses of Chicago.

Similarly the essence of Vietnam is not the My Lai massacre and other specific excesses, but the official, formally legal violence from defoliation to Napalm to free-fire zones.³ No psychological analysis of the individuals engaged in carrying out officially sanctioned destructiveness will explain these horrors. Given a minimum of indoctrination, individuals placed within a military-bureaucratic organization have with few exceptions no difficulty at all in participating in officially sanctioned violence. Some years ago a German book on anti-semitism carried the suggestive title *Er ist wie du*: the Jew is a person like you. This also applies to our analysis of those engaged in mass killing in Auschwitz or in Vietnam. The personality and character structure of those who ran Auschwitz is as irrelevant to the operation of the camps and to our understanding of them as the personality structure of U.S. pilots is to the bombing of Haiphong. It is abundantly evident that members of legal military organizations will carry out formally legitimate orders without examining the ethical content of the order.

The unsolved riddles are: How do some individuals in a position of power come to believe that the welfare of their country, or race, or class, or way of life requires the physical extermination of others; how do a few exceptional individuals, such as Hans Jägerstätter or Kurt Gerstein, without support from any peer group and at the risk of their lives find the strength to refuse to participate and indeed to oppose socially and officially sanctioned violence and evil? Our survival may well hinge on our ability to find these answers.

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FROM THE SOURCES

Renaissance Infant Care:

"The Turks have a wonderful way of raising little children . . . For though they swaddle the infant all over, still they leave bare the opening in his bottom. In doing this, they do not have to wash their sheets so often. Their cradles are inlaid in tightly stretched leather, in which they make a round hole. Above it, the bare bottom of the infant is always kept . . . A little pot is underneath . . . and seated or lying in the cradle . . . the infant does his business into it. Thus they do not need as much linen as we do for infants raised in our fashion, and [their babies] are not so smelly. Nor are they so annoying or difficult to raise, for even when they begin to grow and go about by themselves, they are kept seated on the opening in the cradle until they're old enough to control themselves.

Now swaddled infants, who are covered in front, will piss in whatever bit of linen is put on them. [The Turks] have an arrangement for this, too. They have little tubes made of wood, which are sold by mercers. These are hollowed out and turned up at one end, and there is placed the infant's member. They make two kinds, one for males and one for females. [The tube then goes between the legs and takes the urine to the pot under the cradle.] This custom is very suitable for the Turks, who are always seated on their rugs. If they didn't do things thus, their children would soil things everywhere.

[The Turks] don't make pap or the other foods that we are accustomed to give little children in Europe . . . The mothers there nurse them at the breast and give them nothing else until they are ten months or a year old . . . This is true throughout the area of the Levant where the people are not accustomed to making pap or other food out of milk. And we don't have to look so far away to find similar customs, for most often even the Italians nurse their children with breast milk only until they're just past a year old, and after a year, their nurses mash up whatever they themselves are eating, and especially nuts with bread. [The Italians] have no information about paps; they make the children a good soup or a bread soup (*panade*). As for the Turks, when they want to sit their infants up, they sit them up only on the opening of their cradle, so they don't have to wash and dry them. When they're a year old and begin to chew, they give them the same meats that they eat and don't hesitate to have them eat onions, which they mash up with bread or meat. Also they don't care what they put the infants to sleep on, for they don't use feathers at all. Such is the custom throughout the country of the Turks, both among the rich and the poor, for they are not so crazy about their children as we are in Latin countries."

Pierre Belon, *Les Observations de plusieurs singularitez et choses memorables, trouvées en Grece, Asie, Judee, Egypte, Arabie et autres pays estranges* (Antwerp, 1555), ff 317^r-318^v. Contributed and translated by Natalie Z. Davis, Univ. of California, Berkeley.

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