$3.50



HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD QUARTERLY:

The Journal of Psychohistory

WINTER 1975 • VOL. 2, NO. 3

KISSINGER: A PSYCHOHISTORY

PEDAGOGY AS INTRUSION

ENGLISH INFANTICIDE

AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

PSYCHOHISTORY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS & PRESIDENTIAL PERSONALITY

REVIEWS OF PSYCHOHISTORY



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The Journal of Psychohistory

2315 Broadway • New York, New York 10024 • 212–873–3331

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SUBSCRIPTION RATES: U.S. and Canada, and equivalent in foreign currencies: Individuals–$14.00 one year, $26.00 two years, $38.00 three years; Institutions–$20.00 one year, $38.00 two years, $56.00 three years. Available in microform from Xerox University Microfilms. Abstracted in *Psychological Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts, Child Development Abstracts and Bibliography, Historical Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life.* Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-646416.

CONTRIBUTIONS: The Journal welcomes contributions of articles on childhood and the family, past and present, psychohistory in its broadest terms, individual or group, applied psychoanalysis except for purely literary studies, political psychology, and the psychology of historical movements. All manuscripts should follow the University of Chicago *Manual of Style* and be double-spaced, including footnotes.

PUBLICATION: *History of Childhood Quarterly: The Journal of Psychohistory* is published quarterly and copyright © 1975 by Atcom, Inc., 2315 Broadway, N.Y., N.Y. 10024. Statements of fact and opinion are made on the responsibility of the authors alone. Second-class postage paid at New York, New York.



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FROM THE SOURCES

ENGLISH VICTORIAN CHILDHOOD AND THE EMPIRE:

"I can recall my mother with undimmed clearness, bending over my cot when I was about three and cooing a little song . . . I did not, of course, know she was my mother, but quite soon I perceived that she had rights on the floor where I resided, and as she moved about in a calm, stately, possessive manner, in robes which, at a very early stage in my existence, caught and excited my attention, gave orders, and 'looked' as if she ought to have rights, I accepted her naturally as the creature of a peculiar world who, though she did not belong to my sphere, like nurse, or like 'Rose' who slept with us, yet possessed a communicable authority and knew more about me than I knew about her. . . .

My father remains a blank for quite a long time . . . his home was divided into the three parts usual in a Victorian household, forming three perfectly distinctive aggregations which were always classified by 'us,' when we were old enough to talk and form opinions, as 'upstairs,' or the 'top,' 'our' part and 'theirs.' Our sympathies as the intermediate floor, in between authority and service, were rather with the upstairs contingent than with the lower . . . the downstairs people, for all their fine clothes and bearing, did not dwell on our floor, and were not on equal terms, and when I first became conscious of them, appeared to me somewhat in the light of invaders, not only of our precincts, but of our very persons. . . .

Some Victorian children, of course, hardly ever knew their parents until they went to school, when they again lost them. I can remember a great Victorian who had eleven children, who would often call out at luncheon: 'Hi! You there, George or Dick, or whatever your name is, don't sit on the salt!' The poor man could not recollect the names of his progeny, and it was hardly to be expected that he should . . . I was in bed. That was the first occasion on which I really saw him, and I gazed at him in wonderment. His hair was very black and his whiskers stood out with a threatening combativeness . . . he picked me up, and to my consternation, placed my face against his cheek, murmuring loud noises which I felt were intended to soothe me . . . He looked at me for a long time and I looked at him. When he put me back in bed again I was conscious of a plunge into a new and speculative world. I suppose I was four at the time. . . .

A boy's haziness about the personality, and, of course, the purport, of his male parent is, perhaps, natural, and certainly must have been the rule rather than the exception under the Victorian usage, which so subdivided and inevitably estranged the family. Admittedly, it made the Empire, which is a large point in its favour. . . ."

—Austin Harrison, *Frederick Harrison: Thoughts and Memories*. New York, 1927, pp. 46-49.

Kissinger: A Psychohistory

DANA WARD

I. INTRODUCTION

"Nixon, he is not fit to be President."

—Henry Kissinger

Just before Richard Nixon was elected President, the Institute for Defense Analysis prepared a study of the bureaucracies responsible for national security policy in the hope that the incoming President, whoever it would be, might be better prepared to deal with the demands of formulating foreign policy. The study concluded: "Neither practitioners nor students of national security policy should over-emphasize the importance of the process or the procedures of decision-making. In the last analysis, the force of personality tends to over-ride procedures."[1] With such an admonition from a knowledgeable group of analysts it is indeed curious that political scientists have been so hostile toward psychohistorians who attempt to incorporate personality into their political analysis. The teaching positions in most political science departments are filled either with individuals who possess only a nodding acquaintance with the principles of psychology, or with a few social psychologists whose idea of psychology reminds one of sixteenth century taxonomists. The consequence of this attitude is a one-eyed vision of politics.

We should likewise not attempt an explanation of political life from a solely individual, psychological point of view. Political action is the process by which individuals turn upon their history to transform their lives. There *are* givens in the world, forces, structures and belief-systems, that require specific responses. But the style of response, the personality factor, is as crucial as the imperative to respond. Political style, then, becomes a critical issue in studies which follow a psychohistorical approach: a method of study which takes into consideration both personal and collective motivation.

In this essay, which is a prelude to a more comprehensive study, I hope to demonstrate the impact of Henry Kissinger's personality on the foreign policy decision-making process. The political emphasis in this essay is primarily on the first administration. A discussion of the second administration up until resignation will be reserved for a later essay.

As will be demonstrated below, there are a number of basic tensions in Kissinger's psyche which influence the manner in which he perceives the world and consequently the actions which he recommends and undertakes. While on a personal, inner level Kissinger tends to have an undervalued sense of self which gives rise to depression, timidness, and lack of confidence, he presents a public figure of arrogance, strong will and competence. Kissinger has a tendency to use theoretical abstractions as a means of keeping people away, yet he exhibits a counter-vailing, excessive need for love and praise. Accompanying this tendency toward abstraction is a lack of concern for human considerations in his intellectual formulations. Most importantly, for our purposes, there seems to be a tension between the avoidance of, and compulsive confrontation with, risks. This tendency leads Kissinger to place himself in situations where he can publicly test his will and consequently prove his inherent "goodness" and "worth". An attempt also will be made to assess the role that Kissinger's attachment to historical and contemporary individuals has played in his attempt to resolve the inner tensions mentioned above. Finally, I will try to demonstrate that these various tendencies coalesce into a configuration of behavior typical of the depressive, or dysmutual, personality,[2] and that the patterns of behavior attendent upon such an organization of personality have combined to affect specific policy decisions such as the invasion of Cambodia, the mining of Haiphong, the secret peace negotiations, the peace settlement, and our relations with our "allies".

II. THE EARLY DAYS IN GERMANY

"One cannot escape the feeling that the President's advisor is a man who would like to be loved."

–*Look*, August 12, 1969

Fuerth, the town in which Alfred Heinz Kissinger was born early in the morning on May 27, 1923, was a South German industrial city with a population at the time of about 64,000. Fuerth was a natural settling place for many Jews who were not allowed to live in nearby Nuremburg. The city had a century-old reputation for religious toleration, and one of the families attracted to Fuerth was that of the Kissingers. But the Kissingers were not to enjoy the fruits of religious toleration. While Fuerth's reputation perhaps forestalled the effects of Hitler's rise to power, in the end Fuerth, too, would bear the scar of Hitler's terror. Through either emigration or extermination, "of Fuerth's pre-1933 population of 3,000 Jews, only 70 were on hand to attend the first post-war religious services."[3]

Obviously, life for Jews in Fuerth was not easy. With the passage of the Nuremburg laws in 1935, the somewhat stable middle class lives that, even through the depression, many were able to maintain were permanently disrupted. And among those families that suffered humiliation, privation and death at the hands of the Nazis were the Kissingers. Included among those who were killed by the Nazis were twelve relatives in Kissinger's family.[4]

Louis Kissinger was the head of the Kissinger household. In 1922, at the age of 35, he married Paula Stern, then 21 and his former student, who came from a middle-class Jewish family. A year later their first of two sons was born. The birth certificate listed the child's name as Alfred Heinz, but until fifteen years later when he changed his name to Henry, the Alfred was dropped and he would be called Heinz. Another year passed and in 1924 the second and last of the Kissinger children was born and named Walter Bernhard. Louis Kissinger, "a gentle, soft-hearted teacher in a girls' 'high school.' ",[5] was himself a son of a village school teacher. The home that he maintained for his wife and two children can be best described as middle class. The Kissingers lived in a five-room flat containing many books and a piano, and they were well enough off to be able to maintain a servant. Louis Kissinger was a deeply religious man, and the children were brought up accordingly. The elder Kissinger was a respected man in his community. In Germany, the position of *Studienrat* which he held at the Madchen Lyceum was of much greater social standing than the equivalent status of a high school teacher in the United States. A boarder who lived with the Kissingers in the early thirties has recalled: "Mr. Kissinger is a very serious, conscien-

tious individual. Upper-most in his mind was providing for his family. And I think he felt he couldn't take too many chances."[6] To be deprived of his teaching position then would have had a devastating affect upon him and his family. That however, was precisely what occurred in 1935 when the Nuremburg laws forbade any Jew from holding a government position. Louis Kissinger lost his job and with it the economic security his family had enjoyed until then.[7]

But economic security was not all that the Kissingers were to suffer. In addition to the strictures on holding government jobs, the Nuremburg laws also required that Jewish children leave public schools to attend special, all-Jewish institutions. Thus Heinz was forced to attend the special school. Heinz was not a particularly bright student while in Germany–at least according to the usual indicators such as grades.[8] But in light of his brilliant performance in more favorable circumstances after he left Germany, we would not be totally off base if we assumed that Heinz's grades suffered as a result of the adverse conditions during this period.

One could hardly blame young Heinz if his mind were not on his studies. He would have had to be aware of the fragility of his father's status and his father's anxiety undoubtedly would have been transmitted to the children. But if somehow the situation at home escaped Heinz's attention, he became painfully aware of what it meant to be Jewish when he was on the streets of Fuerth. "Jewish children, when they ventured onto the streets or playground would be cornered and beaten up by Hitler Youth. Among the children getting this bloody lesson in politics was Heinz Kissinger."[9] In his later years, Kissinger would comment, "My life in Fuerth passed without leaving any lasting impressions. I can't remember any interesting or amusing incidents."[10] But the lessons of the street did leave a lasting, although hardly amusing, impression. One of the incidents that he does remember is that: "The other children would beat us up."[11] This was a painful reminder that he was not like the others. In his later life, while there were numerous other factors, his treatment at the hands of other children would be one contribution to Kissinger's anxiety about being left out and disliked.

Aside from a few references to soccer and to the beatings suffered on the streets of Fuerth, Henry Kissinger has been uniformly reluctant to attribute any significance to his early life, or for that matter, to even talk about it. While a member of the White House staff, Kissinger sloughed off reporters' questions about his life in Germany by saying that his life in Fuerth "left no lasting impressions", or "that part of my childhood is *not* a key to anything."[12] Even more strongly: "I was not consciously unhappy. I was not so acutely aware of what was going on. For children those things are not that serious. It is fashionable now to

explain everything psychoanalytically, but let me tell you, the political persecutions of my childhood are not what control my life."[13]

If not to children, then to whom are "those things" serious? Kissinger was fifteen years old when he left Germany, an age when he simply could not have been unaware of what was happening around him. By 1938 Jews were being murdered on the streets, and that year marks the beginning of Hitler's systematic roundup of Jews after the murder of Vom Rath. It would seem that Kissinger's poor memory is a sustained effort to decrease the value and importance of his early life. This period in Germany was the "bad time"–it only served, in Kissinger's view, as a restraint, an obstacle to be overcome, and once overcome, forgotten.

A child three years older than Henry also lived for five years in the Kissinger household as a boarder, yet his memory of that period is somewhat less hazy: "The whole community was aware of what was coming. And maybe being so close to Nuremburg where they had the Party Congresses we got an earlier warning."[14] Living in the same household the young boarder received a very different, almost opposite, impression; rather than being unaware, the Jewish community in Fuerth seems to have received an earlier warning of the coming chaos.

Kissinger has devoted his entire life to trying to understand how such disruptions as Hitler's persecution of Jews and expansionary provocations arise, and how best to avert the pain and suffering attendent upon such disruptions, yet he refuses to make the connection that his own experience as an object of such chaos was important for his later pursuits. Throughout Kissinger's work is the theme of the opposition between the forces of chaos and the forces of order.[15] Kissinger's concerns for balance and chaos are not unrelated, but rather they form two sides of an almost arithmetic law in Kissinger's psycho-logic. As has been said, "The corollary of Kissinger's sense of the tragic is his passion for international order."[16] Indeed Kissinger has been described by close friends as possessing a "morbid preoccupation" with the contemplation of chaos. Thus it would appear that Kissinger's denial of the importance of his early years is somehow over-determined; rather than those years being unimportant as he would have us believe, they are the rock upon which his personality and life have been built.

In an article which attempted to describe the social origins of the depressive personality, Howard Rome has pointed to the tendency for such individuals to view the world as one in which chaos is the predominant characteristic. He says: "It is a world in which man's views of the universe–if he has any–offer little hope and less consolation, in which his view of his fellowmen is jaundiced and malign. It is a world whose predominant characteristic is chaos."[17] Kissinger is certainly not without his views of the universe. As will be shown in the latter discussion of his intellectual work and in the discussion of his identity, Rome's de-

scription of the "ideology" of the depressive personality is consistent with Kissinger's view of the world and himself. We must assume that the conditions of Kissinger's early life in Germany are the social root of what will be shown to be a depressive personality. But the social origins of the depressive personality are only half of the equation. To fully understand the development it is imperative that we look to early childhood family relations.

The depressive personality is a diagnostic category for a broad, but specific range of behavior. It is not intended as a pigeon-hole, but simply a conceptual tool for trying to understand the dynamics of an individual's interaction with the world. The analysis of numerous case studies has revealed that the depressive personality is the consequence of a particular kind of family politics. The basic family alignment is characterized by ambivalent parents and a favored sibling. The father is often uninvolved with the children, and the mother may feel resentment toward her husband, may never really have wanted to be a mother, or feels that the child is both a burden and an obstacle before her escape from marriage. Lack of involvement or absence from the family on the part of the parents leads to a sense of abandonment on the part of the child; he feels alone. This feeling is reinforced if there is a sibling who receives the attention of the parents. The sense that the child derives from the parents' behavior is that one is not automatically loved and accepted, nor is one automatically good. Acceptance and goodness are earned, and love is the reward. The corrollary is that the child feels basically worthless and bad.

It is this sense of worthlessness and the inability to elicit love which is the root feeling of the depressive personality. The predominant feelings experienced by the child are weakness, inferiority, and a lack of self-esteem. There is a tendency to withdraw from others, and an inability to form meaningful relationships for fear that the other will discover one's worthlessness.

The behaviors which result from the familial politics and existential experience of the self are many. "The dysmutual tries to overcome his low self-esteem in many ways, one of which is through extreme ambition. Some dysmutuals, in milder stages of the disorder, rather than escape into manic moods, try to compensate for feelings of inferiority by excessive work, long working hours and an over-all drive for supremacy."[18] In addition, "Dysmutuals are *insatiable* in love, sex, friendship, glory, status or possessions."[19] They tend also to be tactless, alienating their friends. "They are perpetually depressed and always on the defensive. Pleasant and friendly moods are like rays of sunshine that break through the clouds."[20] There is in addition a tendency to be vulnerable to criticism. Finally, the dysmutual "repeats the pattern of his childhood, forever trying to induce women to love him."[21]

It should be emphasized that the depressive personality can range from well integrated to psychotic depression. The purpose of classification is not to determine how neurotic an individual might be. The category simply represents an over-all pattern of behavior, world view, and values which are consistent regardless of the degree of personality integration. By matching the hypothesized behavior with the actual behavior we are able to assess the validity, or falsity, of the hypothesis. From there we can begin to understand the dynamic tensions and the reasons behind actions. To what degree then do the characteristics described above fit the family pattern in the Kissinger household?

The impression received by most people who knew the family and have commented upon it was that the Kissinger household was a harmonious one. Both parents were respected by the children and there seems to have been little conflict between the parents. Just as uniformly, the impression has been that Mrs. Kissinger was the dominant influence in the family. Based upon an interview with a man who as a child came to live with the Kissingers, it has been said: "While Louis was the authority figure in Fuerth, his wife dominated the family with her charm, a quality that became more significant later, in exile. 'He was the boss, but she was a strong woman, a very intelligent, aggressive woman.' "[22] Interviews that I had had with Kissinger's friends have also born out this impression. It is felt that the power behind the paternal throne lay with Mrs. Kissinger. As we will see below, it is Mrs. Kissinger who is the model for action and who in the early years in New York was the economic and social backbone of the family.

Louis Kissinger, in fact, was little involved with the children. And it may be this lack of involvement which was the most predominant characteristic of the father's role in the family. Even much later this attitude is reflected with respect to Henry's rise to power: "Louis Kissinger, now 87, had been a bit diffident about his eldest son's success, because it entailed so much travel on the Sabbath, a Washington Heights rabbi said. But with the Nobel Prize, Louis' joy was complete. 'Henry had made good to the n^{th} degree.' "[23] This comment coming from a man close to Louis Kissinger may very well reflect the ambivalent atmosphere in which Henry grew up—one in which he was expected to make good in order to be loved. Indeed, one suspects that making good was by no means enough, given his father's "diffident" attitude even after so much success.

Every indication is that for the most part the children were the mother's responsibility. Louis Kissinger's most immediate involvement was as an administer of familial justice, although Mrs. Kissinger herself was not the least bit hesitant to assume that role. As the boarder in the family recalls: "From a disciplinary point of view, if she didn't like anything she didn't need Mr. Kissinger. If Walter or Henry did something

wrong she took matters in her own hands and didn't burden her husband with the everyday events. She is a very resolute, energetic woman. A strong willed woman."[24]

The first pattern of behavior which emerges that may shed light on the significant events in Henry's early development is the difference between him and his brother Wally. His father recalls, "Henry was always the thinker. He was more inhibited than Wally. Wally was more the doer, more the extrovert."[25] The boarder in the family also recalled when I asked about the differences between the two boys, "Like night and day. Now remember, it was a long time ago, but Walter was the more out-going. . . . Henry was withdrawn, studious and a dreamer . . . I would say Henry takes after his father and Walter after his mother."[26]

The differences between Walter and Henry are an interesting comparison. All who knew the family in the German years recall that Henry was even then a loner, withdrawn and timid. Walter on the other hand seems to have impressed others with his ingenuity and his outgoing, aggressive manner. Surprise is often expressed by those who knew the family in the early years that it was Henry and not Walter who has emerged upon the public scene. But what is important is that there is a sharp contrast in personality between the two boys which would lead one to ask what is the source of that difference. Indeed it is not unusual for an active and expressive child to draw more attention than one who is withdrawn, reinforcing established patterns. But what was the initial source of the differentiation in personalities?

The difference between the two boys must lie much earlier in their development. Unfortunately there is no direct evidence. We can only postulate that with the arrival of the second child, Henry experienced a sense of loss as a result of his mother's need to devote attention to the new-born child. While it is highly doubtful that there was any frank rejection of Henry, the arrival of the new sibling could have led to a sense of neglect, followed by a withdrawal into the self and a sense of self-depreciation. Of course, without any direct source of verification this is simply speculation, but speculation which would begin to explain the earliest experiences which led to basic patterns of behavior in Henry's later years.

Frequently a child who is accustomed to the attentions of his mother interprets the diminished attention that comes with a new sibling as rejection. This sense of rejection is at the core of the depressive personality and its result is a withdrawal into the self. *If* this is what occurred in Kissinger's case it would begin to explain the differences between himself and Walter. And Kissinger's experience vis a vis his brother would be marked by a sense of unsuccessful competition which would reinforce the tendency to withdraw.

In the families of severely disturbed depressive personalities the familial relations are usually characterized by "a hostile mother, a disinterested or hostile father, and siblings favored by the mother."[27] But it is important to note that "parental rejection need not be associated with pathological hostility; an infant may feel rejected whenever his mother is sick, hospitalized, or unable to take care of him, when she is pregnant with another child, (or) when she works outside her home."[28]

To what extent then do Kissinger's parents fit this pattern which can lead to depressive anxiety? The evidence is agonizingly skimpy, but there is some nevertheless which would indicate that Kissinger felt a sense of rejection and ambivalence from his mother, disinterest from his father, and lived with siblings who were more favored. On this last point we have more substantial evidence upon which to base our judgment.

In 1930, when Henry was seven, another boy, Jack Heiman, came to live with the Kissingers. Jack was ten at the time, and because there was no Jewish school in his village he came to Fuerth to attend the Isrealitische Realschule where Henry was also going to school. Jack boarded with the Kissingers and moved into the boys' room. Today Heiman is a handicrafts dealer in Chicago and he recalls of his life then: "When I think of it today . . . they treated me like a third son. In fact they leaned over backward to be less strict with me. They never hit me, and they weren't bashful with Henry and Walter. They really got it. We were all in the same bedroom at night sometimes too noisy and rambunctious while Mr. Kissinger was grading papers. He'd come in and hit them—but not me, even though I was equally guilty."[29]

Here Henry was faced with the entrance of a "third" son who is obviously given preferential treatment. To make matters worse, it appears that Jack became closer friends with Walter than with Henry. "I was closer to Walter even though he was the younger."[30] Thus it would be understandable if Henry got the feeling that he was low man on the totem pole.

Jack's amnesty from corporal punishment was not the only special treatment afforded him by the Kissingers. "I remember that during the time I was there, every afternoon she spent her time tutoring me. She didn't have to but she did. And the boys didn't need it. I was the dummy. They treated me like a third son."[31] Heiman insists that the boys felt no resentment over the fact that their mother devoted her afternoons to him and not to Walter or Henry. But the attention given Jack could hardly have gone unnoticed.[32]

One form of behavior which may have been a means of overcoming this specific situation, but most certainly the more general milieu, was what seems to have been a highly competitive relationship between Jack and Henry. Jack recalls, "Henry always had a strong desire to win. Be-

hind the house there was a little yard, and every free moment we went down and tried to play against one another. Henry was a very determined individual."[33] Henry was determined to win against the competitor for his mother's attention, perhaps thereby to win her love.

Mrs. Kissinger was described variously by Heiman as "very strong and astute", "very intelligent", "aggressive", "energetic", "resolute", and "strong willed". She was active in her community and "in addition to being a house wife had other intellectual interests."[34] The one characteristic which is particularly important is that "she just wasn't satisfied with housework."[35] It was this dissatisfaction which precipitated Jack's tutoring as a means by which she could exercise her mind and perform a useful function. At the same time however her dissatisfaction must have been communicated to the children. How would they interpret this communication? Were *they* the cause of her dissatisfaction?

There is one further comment by Heiman which might provide some insight into the atmosphere of the Kissinger household. In this case Heiman is speaking generally, and not in specific reference to the Kissinger household: "This kind of upbringing breeds bashfulness and insecurity. You don't have the opportunity to be on your own. Parents do not impose their will on kids as much now as then, and I think we matured later because of this."[36] The children obeyed the family laws and tried to live up to their parents' expectations, but they were hard tasks and great expectations. It is a situation in which it would be difficult to feel good about oneself and in which there was little one could do to change the situation. Thus we have the essential elements for the development of the depressive personality: an ambivalent attitude on the part of the parents, depreciation of self-esteem, and a sense of powerlessness.

Of course, none of these feelings were in any way so extreme as to border on the pathological. All I am trying to establish is whether there is any evidence for a familial base upon which the social repression experienced by Kissinger could build an edifice whose most prominent characteristic would be depressive anxiety and the patterns of behavior characteristic of such an organization of personality. Such a supposition is consistent with Kissinger's later personality patterns; all I can here show is that it is not inconsistent with what can be reconstructed of his childhood experience.

It is likely that it was with respect to religion that the greatest paternal expectations were placed upon the children. Until Henry went into the army he would be an extremely religious youth: "He put on tfillin (phylacteries for morning prayers) and went to synagogue regularly."[37] It also seems that Henry's rebellion against his father was in this most crucial area.

Louis's decline as the central figure in the family is the predominant change in the family relations, a change upon which many have com-

mented. The man essential to Kissinger's own personal transformation, Fritz Kraemer, has said:

> You can do damage to the soul of a man and never touch his body. For five years, the most formative years (10-15), Henry had to undergo this horror. And the real horror is the breakdown of the world. Imagine what it means when your father, who was your authority, the father you admire . . . is suddenly transformed into a frightened little mouse."[38]

When the Kissingers left Germany, Louis' role in the family was even further undermined. "Louis Kissinger, a former teacher over 50 then and fated to end his working life as a bookkeeper, had to accept his changed status meekly."[39] We will discuss this process further below, but what happened in Kissinger's relation to his father was to set Henry on a search for strong individuals who would not accept things so meekly. The immediate form this process took was to renounce the role expectation that was most important to his father. "As his father's shadow diminished, Henry slipped out from beneath it, beginning his long rebellion against orthodox Jewishness."[40] This was Henry's way of saying "I will not accept things as they are."

What would the timid and withdrawn youth of Fuerth do with the resentment and hostility which he must have felt as a consequence of his familial and social experience? What would he do with the rage he must have felt over his treatment as a Jew? "In the 30's in the streets of Fuerth, he was powerless".[41] He could do nothing and his father could do nothing. About the only viable alternative for the young Heinz would have been to turn his rage inward and withdraw further into his protective shell. This would seem to be the path he followed, and his turning inward would have consequences in the formation of his self-image.

Kissinger was to learn many lessons in Fuerth that he would carry with him the rest of his life. He was to discover what it meant to be powerless, to be out of control of one's life, to see his heroes standing helpless, overtaken by events. As Kissinger moved out into the world, he would confront situations that would stir memories, perhaps unconscious, of the time spent in Fuerth. As he faced those situations he would often respond as he had learned to respond in the past. And, as he began to form his world view in more explicit terms, he would bring his past with him to be incorporated into his vision. At times, the responses that were adequate for the past would carry him through the present difficulty. But just as often the old ghosts would come back to haunt him—the insecurities, the fear of not being accepted—and his response, both for himself and, as special assistant to the President, for the nation, would confound his difficulties. It was in Fuerth that Kissin-

ger experienced the tragedy which he feels has given him an understanding of the world different from other Americans who, having "never suffered disaster, find it difficult to comprehend a policy conducted with a premonition of catastrophe."[42]

III. THE RETREAT ACROSS THE OCEAN: THE SEARCH FOR A HERO

> "Sooner or later, these states on the fringe of the Eurasian land mass would be drawn into the Communist orbit. The source of our culture and our values would then be alienated. Americans, for the first time in our history, would live in a world where we were foreign in the deepest sense, where people would share neither our values nor our aspirations, where we might meet hostility everywhere outside of North America."
>
> —Kissinger, *Necessity for Choice*

When Heinz became Henry in New York, it would be some time before he was comfortable with his new identity—the symbol of which was his name change. The move to New York would not substantially change his condition. His father still would find making a living extremely difficult, his mother would become the family's primary financial support, and, most of all, Henry would still be different from the majority. Like in Fuerth, there would be other refugees who shared his differentness, but to the majority he was still unacceptable, and this feeling would continue to activate his earlier depressive anxieties.

The most immediate symbol of his differentness was his accent. " 'I was terribly self-conscious about it (his accent)' he says, 'I finally lost my self-consciousness over it, I'd say about 1957 or so.' "[43] The date at which he attributes his loss of self-consciousness is by no means arbitrary. It was in 1957 that Kissinger was to be finally "accepted". This was the year that the public recognized Kissinger's worth, for his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* was published and stayed on the best seller lists for fourteen weeks. However, his acceptance was not total, particularly in the intellectual world.[44] And Kissinger's fear that he would not be accepted stayed with him. It is still one reason that until the last year of the first administration he did not allow his heavily accented voice to be recorded in most news conferences.[45]

Kissinger's chief of staff in the first administration, Brigadier General Alexander Haig, has remarked that Kissinger "is not always sure he'll be accepted. He doesn't really believe anybody likes him."[46] It is this trait that is the most prevalent vestige of his life in Fuerth and the early days

in New York. His uncertainty is what led some of his colleagues at Harvard to characterize him as a "damp-handed" professor. And it was this uncertainty about his self that led Kissinger to turn inward and retreat into the seeming safety of his inner world. If he never confronted other people, then the world he had maintained within his self would not be disrupted.

Kissinger never really gave anyone the chance to reject him. He placed himself in a sort of exile after he left Germany that was not simply political. As before, the manner with which he dealt with the threatening environment of New York "was to go deep in his shell. From 1939-43 when he was going to George Washington High School in New York, Kissinger seems to have made no friends—hence the survival of the German accent."[47] Thus his fear of being unacceptable inadvertently insured that the mark of his difference would not leave him. Perhaps on one level Kissinger was afraid of being swallowed up by the majority. In that case his retreat might be an attempt to maintain what little vestiges of his self he still retained.

As was mentioned, when the Kissinger family left Germany for New York, young Henry's position in the world was not fundamentally changed. True, there was no longer an imminent fear of death, but Kissinger was still the outsider, still in his own mind unacceptable because of his differentness. For youth, such a cultural position can be just as threatening to the psyche as the political persecutions in Germany were to the person. So in a strict sense, Kissinger was right in saying that the political persecutions of his youth were not what control his life. But the implication that there are no answers to Kissinger's adult life to be found in his youth is utterly wrong. Many of the cultural obstacles in front of social acceptance that Kissinger found in Germany, he would also find in America.

His years in New York passed without any great crisis or turning point. During his days at George Washington High School he worked after school in a shaving brush factory squeezing acid out of the brush bristles for the Leopold Ascher Co., and after a while he was promoted to delivery boy. For the most part Henry remained uninvolved with others and withdrawn.

Accompanying Kissinger's tendency to withdraw into himself was a tendency to avoid confrontation with others. He recalls that "if he was walking down the street in New York and saw a group of boys approaching the other way, he would cross to the opposite sidewalk."[48] This may have been an appropriate response given his experience in Fuerth, but nowhere do we have evidence of Kissinger testing his courage and walking through the crowd. Nowhere do we see his willingness to "contemplate the abyss, . . . as a challenge to be overcome—or to perish in the process," which he now advocates.

This tendency to retreat in the face of confrontation however is a trait which intellectually Kissinger dislikes strenuously. Behind his severest criticisms of historical figures and one of the major criticisms of the Kennedy Administration was his abhorrence of a "wait and see" attitude or of a policy that avoided confrontation. For example in *The Necessity for Choice* Kissinger argues:

> History for Communism is an incentive for action, a guarantee of the meaningfulness of sacrifice. The West, on the other hand, has a tendency to use evolutionary theory as a bromide. Waiting for history to do its work for it, it stands in danger of being engulfed by the currents of our time.[49]

Failing to act in the face of the historical imperative is the major sin in Kissinger's international catechism.

Like many of Kissinger's likes and dislikes, this particular idiosyncrasy also has its roots in Fuerth. While Kissinger's father was a respected man in his community, he was not a forceful man. He was the "gentle and soft-hearted" man whom Kissinger has described as "a man of great goodness in a world where goodness had no meaning."[50] In other words, his father was a man whose qualities were irrelevant in the real world. "His father was stripped of his post and humiliated . . . he had been broken in spirit."[51] "In Manhattan, of course, his erudition was irrelevant and he had to fall back on drearily unskilled clerical work."[52] Louis Kissinger was not a man who would, or could, stand up against the wave of history. Rather, he would wait things out, wait to see what would happen. Like many other intellectuals "he waited hopefully for Germany to come back to its senses."[53] Finally he was convinced that waiting was not the answer; but it was not through great deliberation that he came to this conclusion. It was forced upon him by his wife. It was Mrs. Kissinger who was responsible for getting the family out of Germany in 1938. She was the model of action. She made arrangements with relatives in England, took English lessons, and the family escaped from Germany.

Kissinger's mother, like many other refugee women, must have possessed a strong sense of self, for she adapted very well to her new role in America. She was not used to menial labor and in New York where the only work she could get was as a cook, she would have needed a strong sense of self to accept the change in status. The change was generally a difficult thing to handle in most of the German-Jewish refugee families who came to America, particularly for men. It was difficult for men in the family to carry on as they had been able to do in Germany. This was the case in the Kissinger family. And "the change in status is something which the children (Henry and Wally) were conscious of."[54] Although Louis Kissinger had been less of a forceful figure

in the family than his wife while they were in Germany, he was still the primary provider and deserving of the children's respect. But in America even this position was undermined.

Kissinger respected and loved his father, but there was that wish that his father would act, that he would stand up and confront history. Kissinger in the midst of the "bad times" was looking for a hero, and he was to be disappointed that it was not his father.[55] A long-time personal acquaintance of Kissinger has said, "About the deepest things in one's life one can say nothing. Imagine the horror of life in Nazi Germany, imagine seeing a father whom one has loved and revered being made to give up a job, being humiliated. And all this when one is young and defenseless, and so impressionable."[56] Kissinger eventually found men both in history and among his contemporaries who preached the gospel of action and the necessity of confronting history, and it was to these men that he attached himself. But like his father, these men too would ultimately be irrelevant to their times.

Kissinger's search for a hero gave him a version of understanding that he could use in the days of turbulent uprisings by America's youth in the sixties and seventies. On several occasions he has remarked that the youth of today are looking for heroes. After a march in 1969, when Kissinger consulted with a few of the demonstrators, he remarked to a reporter: "I can understand the anguish of the younger generation. They lack models, they have no heroes, they see no great purpose in the world."[57] One must wonder if it is not Kissinger's own anguish in Fuerth, when he needed a model of action, a hero to look to and when there was no purpose in the world, that provides the basis of his understanding. And in a more revealing statement he says:

> I find quite chilling the similarities between the revolutionary romanticism of some of our more radical students today and the young German intellectuals of the 1930's—and I don't mean the Nazi thugs but those idealistic students who were looking for commitment for its own sake. My primary feeling about our students is sadness over the conditions that produced them. They are looking for heroes—not brothers, but for fathers.[58]

Yet if the rhetoric of the youth movement is to be believed, it is not fathers for which youth is looking. The paternalistic patterns of the past are the targets of youthful dissent. The youthful vision of the future is a world not marked by paternalism, but by brotherhood. If anything, the youth movement could be interpreted as an oedipal rebellion in which the fathers are to be struck down and the brothers are to share the power once concentrated in the person of the father. Kissinger's mistake in his interpretation of the youth movement is that he attributes to the young the same need for a hero which he felt as a child. In

Kissinger's mind, hero is father. But in myth, the hero was always a peer, a son, and in the group-process literature it has been found that the heroic figure always emerges from peers and not from leaders.

It is interesting that what Kissinger would like to see established in American foreign policy is a heroic vision. He would hope to provide the "great purpose in the world", or what he calls the Administration's "unifying principle". What he finds distasteful is what he regards as an unheroic policy. For instance, in *Necessity for Choice* he states:

> There was a time when the West believed that an overwhelming economic superiority guaranteed its triumph over Communism—without ever being able to describe just how. Though this attitude was fatuous, it is no less fatuous to draw so much comfort from the hope that when the Soviet Union equals our economic performance it will become as consumer-oriented and bland as we are. This is hardly a heroic attitude, nor one likely to appeal to a world where millions strive for a new sense of direction.[59]

Just as youth need heroes and heroic visions, so do other nations. In order to solve the problems of the world we must rally round our hero. In the following revealing quote Kissinger lays out what role the Presidency must play in providing this heroic figure. The introductory words are Landau's:

> Kissinger's outburst in response to antiwar demonstrations . . . are the haunted dreams of a child of Weimar, the dread specter of revolution and political anarchy, the demise of all recognizable authority: "When you look around the world you see student riots in Berlin, which have co-determination with the universities. You have student riots in Paris which do not have co-determination. You have student riots in the United States which has a race problem, Vietnam and slums. And you have student riots in Holland which has no race problem, no slums and no Vietnam.
>
> "Therefore, you could conclude that what we are facing in this world is not capricious students—I will not say anything as pat as this—but a resolve against a condition of modern society which is much deeper than any policy issue—a state of mind which, precisely because it will not grapple with specific issues, and just with a mood, is very hard to deal with—which leads to rebellion against authority of any kind, not just the authority of this President, but the authority of any President, whether he be president of a university or the President of the United States.
>
> "What we have to attempt to do, really, all of us, is to preserve some vestige of authority in this country, if we are ever going to move with confidence and competence toward a better future. What we have to do in Vietnam inevitably has some elements of ambiguity.

> "We have to convince the American people that we will pull out our troops, but we have to convince Hanoi that the withdrawal is not independent of their actions, so that they have an incentive to negotiate. We have to do many things which cannot be done unless the intermediary leadership in this country . . . will at least support the proposition that there is only one man who can bring peace in Vietnam, and that is the President of the United States. If confidence in him and in all institutions is systematically destroyed, we will turn into a group that has nothing left but a physical test of strength and the only outcome of this is Caesarism."[60]

It would be some time after coming to America that Kissinger's quest for a hero would be fulfilled, and once fulfilled his ambitions would also be significantly altered. Before he went into the army to his fateful meeting with Fritz Kraemer, Kissinger held the modest ambition of becoming an accountant. While at George Washington High School, Kissinger was a straight-A student and upon graduation he began to study accounting at night sessions at the City College of New York, following his father's adopted profession. But after a short time he was drafted in 1943 and would soon go off to war and the turning point of his life.

The most significant aspect of Kissinger's life in New York was his failure (or success) at not becoming assimilated to the American culture. He would always be German. He always maintained a sense of regret at having had to flee from Hitler. "He was not among those refugees from Hitler Germany who could look back on their birthplace only with discomfort and bitterness; he was instead one of those refugees who regretted having to leave their country behind."[61] And, "Kissinger would feel an overwhelming affinity for the greater historical and cultural tradition into which he had been born."[62] We are unable to know what the sources of this affinity are, but a good guess would be the influence of his family life. In his parent's apartment it was Germany. Since he never established real roots in America until much later, his experience even in New York was German. And when in time he became interested in intellectual pursuits, it was not American writers that he would read, but Europeans. Thus the fundamental pillars of his identity are German, but since he was no longer in Germany, his adjustment to his new environment was forestalled. He would find a means of entering the American world and acquiring some form of American identity through that great leveler and Americanizer, the U.S. Army. The army would thrust the stamp of America on the young unformed Kissinger.

IV. THE ARMY: A NEW IDENTITY

> "Our Generation has succeeded in stealing the fire of the gods and it is doomed to live with the horror of its achievement."
>
> –Henry Kissinger

In order to understand the significance of Kissinger's army experience, it will help first to look at the task facing him in his adolescence.[63] Adolescence is the period in an individual's life during which he gradually enters the adult world and takes on roles for which life in the family has prepared him. This period begins at about age twelve and can, under special conditions, continue on into the late twenties and early thirties. Emancipation from the family and the establishment of a place in the greater culture are the goals of adolescent development. It is the time when the abstract social order and the subjective, inner, familial world become integrated. All the preparation for adulthood which should take place during the earlier years is called upon as a guide to the individual's entrance into the greater society. "To enter history each generation of youth must find an identity consonant with its own childhood, and consonant with an ideological promise in the perceptible historical process."[64] Hopefully there is a continuity between the childhood experience and the ideological and concrete structure of the greater culture. When this continuity is lacking, the normal development of adolescent identity formation is disrupted and in many cases prolonged. And it is just such a discontinuity which Howard Rome argued provided the sociological contribution which, along with the familial foundation, contributes to the depressive personality.

Erikson has described this period of prolonged adolescence in the following manner:

> The libido theory offers no adequate account of a second period of delay, namely, prolonged adolescence. Hence the sexually matured individual is more or less retarded in his psychosexual capacity for intimacy and in the psychosocial readiness for parenthood. This period can be viewed as a psycho-social moratorium during which the young adult through free role experimentation may find a niche in some section of his society, a niche which is firmly defined and yet seems to be uniquely made for him.[65]

Kissinger has shown just the sort of reduced capacity for intimacy of which Erikson speaks above, and which is characteristic of the depressive personality. His inability to make friends, his problems with his marriage, and his relations with women can be viewed partially as the consequence of the historical disruptions which played upon earlier feelings of disorder and rejection. Kissinger, unsure of who he was, was unable to give of himself to others for fear of having nothing left for his

own. Kissinger would not find his secure niche until he moved out of his familial world and found a new structure which would provide the necessary roles and role models with which he could identify and in which he could integrate himself.

The role experimentation of adolescence took on a completely different light in view of his new environment. The turning point came with his entrance into the United States Army. In the Army, Kissinger was able to become an actor, although in a circumscribed sense, rather than an object of history. While army life required submission to a hierarchical order, it also provided channels for action far beyond the scope Kissinger had experienced previously. This partial transformation from object to agent is particularly crucial, for accompanying it is a change in Kissinger's character. The balancing factors which form the dynamic tension of his personality are developed during this period.

The army performed three functions in this process: first, it provided the first stable, structured, environmental order outside the family circle; secondly, it provided for his encounter with Fritz Kraemer, the man who was his first heroic model; and thirdly, it provided Kissinger with a means of retribution, an outlet for action against those who had manipulated his earlier life. As Beloff puts it: "It seems that the real transformation from the oppressed and teased foreigner Heinz, to the successfully and proudly integrated American Henry, came during his army service in WWII."[66] It was in the army that Kissinger was able to find the compromise between his conflicting identities. Kissinger gathered his forces and came to terms with himself through an environment in which lines of authority were clearly drawn, roles were explicitly understood, and where he could be reasonably sure of what to expect from day to day. In the army Kissinger could have faith in his environment and the men of authority to whom he could look for guidance.

One of these men would stand up above all and would come to play a role in Kissinger's life up to the present. Kissinger had been sent, after he had been found to have an exceptionally high IQ, to a special training program composed of draftees the army was using as insurance, if they needed special skills later in the war. After six months the program was dropped because of its "undemocratic" character, and Kissinger was transferred to the 84th Division stationed at Camp Clairborne, Louisiana. It was there that Kissinger met Private Fritz Kraemer. Kraemer was a refugee from Prussia where he had been trained as a lawyer and received two PhD's. Kraemer, according to Landau, was:

> fiery and flamboyant and yet indisputably old-world, a capricious European adventurer . . . Kraemer was a highly intelligent man, winning and captivating in his brilliance, yet his was an intelligence that could not be duplicated by schooling and academic

> training alone; it was an intelligence filled with eccentricity and high drama, an intelligence that bemoaned the limitations of impotent scholarly thinking and pulsated with the electricity of Kraemer's own life.[67]

While Landau might have been a bit carried away in his description, it is clear that Kraemer was an eccentric. Today Kraemer works in the Pentagon and is unique for being the only monocled individual there.

Kraemer had asked the commanding general of the 84th if he might be allowed to address the troops on the reasons the U.S. was fighting the war against Germany. The gospel Kraemer preached to the college recruits was "that it was their duty to engage in combat as well as in intellectual exercise because after all, one needed soldiers as well as thinkers to fight a war."[68] This eccentric European had impressed Kissinger with his speech. Kissinger wrote him a note which read: "Dear Pvt. Kraemer: I heard you speak yesterday. This is how it should be done. Can I help you somehow? Pvt. Kissinger."[69] Kraemer responded to the note asking for a meeting and so began their friendship.

"Kraemer took Kissinger under his wing and used every trick in the book to get him made an interpreter in the 84th Division."[70] And as the war progressed and the division moved to Europe, Kraemer would do much to advance the career of the young Kissinger.

> When the division took the city of Krefeld, it found the city government had vanished along with the fleeing Nazi troops. Something had to be done to provide for the city's nearly 200,000 people. Kraemer suggested, in his matchlessly persuasive way, that since this young Kissinger spoke German, and had an extraordinary intelligence besides, he should be put in charge of reorganizing Krefeld's government.[71]

As preview to a later government re-organization, Kissinger proved extremely efficient and capable. Within three days the government was functioning again.

In recognition of his ability, within a year Kissinger would be head of the district of Bergstrasse. "He had complete power to arrest anyone for anything, lived in a castle, and when he was transferred, the people of Bergstrasse begged to keep him there."[72] In contrast to his last stay in Germany, he had certainly become recognized and valued by others.

It was also at Bergstrasse that Kissinger took on his first mistress: "He appropriated a villa, commandeered a Mercedes and took his first mistress—the young widow of a Wehrmacht officer."[73] But one of the characteristics which seems to emerge in this period is the manipulative manner in which he operated. He had many girlfriends, and was "relaxed and casual in his approach."[74] A friend at the time has com-

mented that when talking about women Kissinger "would conceptualize about the phenomenon of power in an occupied country like Germany. He told complicated stories about how he would get the women who wanted to ingratiate themselves to those in authority . . . He always talked in manipulative terms. He was the man with the gun, the Jeep, the coffee, stockings, chocolate."[75] Although this appears to contrast sharply with the shy and timid boy of Fuerth, in the shallowness of the relationships there is a string of continuity. It has been found by psychoanalyst Frieda Fromm-Reichman that the typical depressive personality "seeks and quickly forms superficial relationships and tends to be clinging and exploitative."[76] The behavior is in response to the feeling of rejection and is an attempt to induce others' love as a substitute for the feeling of lovelessness as a child. The depressive personality is forever in search of a greater love because he is never convinced that anyone could really love him, a theme which we will discuss below in Kissinger's other relations to women.

After his duty in Bergstrasse, Kissinger, through Kraemer's intervention, was appointed to the faculty of the European Command Intelligence School as a 22-year-old sergeant instructing officers up to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In the end the disparity of rank became too embarrassing and he was discharged from the army and hired for a short time at $10,000 a year. Kissinger had come a long way. From the shy, withdrawn refugee, he had come to be a man of means and influence—however limited it might be.

Kissinger had found the outlet for action against those who had manipulated his earlier life. While the army had provided a structured environment, it had also given him a more meaningful vehicle for resolving his inner confusion. The army had provided Kissinger with the means of his return to Germany as the triumphant liberator. It was in the Army that Kissinger could prove his worth to those, including himself, who had doubted it.

The military was well suited to meet Kissinger's needs. As Erikson has said, the army is: "one of the social institutions which undertake to channel as they encourage initiative and to provide atonement as they appease guilt."[77] The army, then, for Kissinger was on one level a means of appeasing his own guilt at blaming his father for not acting against Hitler. By his own role in the occupation, he could give to his father's life some relevance since his father sired a son who was part of the group of men united together against the wave of history. In effect, Kissinger completed the life which his father left unfinished. Kissinger was able to submit to the authority of an ordered life as a compromise "toward sanctioned ways of action", a compromise which worked as support for him on both sides. Kissinger found in the army the sym-

bols that would represent the consolidation of his earlier inner conflict, a channelling of inner dynamic conflicts into useful and culturally accepted modes of expression.

It was also a means by which he could express inner hostility in a socially accepted manner. Remembering that repressed hostility is considered to be at the core of the depressive personality, the outlet for aggression provided by the army helped to unblock some of his inner tension and allow the confident and competent Kissinger to emerge. Here is the source of the transition from the oppressed Heinz to the proud Henry.

Fritz Kraemer's contribution to this consolidation was not simply material advancement. He played a central role in Kissinger's cosmos of symbols. This flamboyant, eccentric German may have seemed a bit odd to the young draftees, but not to Kissinger. In the American desert Kissinger had found a German oasis which would quench his thirst for a link between his old and new worlds. But this oasis was part mirage. Kraemer, like Kissinger's father, was an irrelevant man. He lived in an age that had passed him by. Kraemer, like Kissinger's later patron "Wild Bill" Elliot, was a man who longed for the days of aristocracy. He held nothing but contempt for the present and its absurd worship of technical achievement and hence lack of appreciation for personal eminence. Thus his attitude was of almost pure cynicism. He recently remarked when speaking of Kissinger: "The medium brilliant can be overawed by their own or somebody else's brilliance. The truly brilliant will understand that brilliancy means nothing."[78] Without action, brilliance is impotent. Here was a man that saw the world as something to be manipulated. Principles are meaningless unless acted upon and brilliance irrelevant unless used. Thus here was a man who would represent to Kissinger what he would have liked his father to be—a man of action who was willing to stand up against the forces of history. The irony, of course, was that Kraemer too was an outsider, a man who really did not fit his times, and in a sense he too was irrelevant to the world in which he lived. But most importantly, Kraemer represented the means by which Kissinger could consolidate his inner chaos, and rather than retreat from the world as he had done in the past, turn upon it and act.

Kraemer's importance in Kissinger's development is best shown by the role he played in the young man's decision to change his occupational goals. It can be assumed that it was the groundwork laid by his teacher-father that led to the ease with which Kraemer, the intellectual, became a father-figure. Kraemer's age, his German origin, and intellectual background, combined with Kissinger's search for an actor, provided the basis for this identification and opened him to being molded, in some degree, by Kraemer's philosophy.

> What Kraemer evoked in Kissinger himself was important in shaping the younger man's future: a profound interest in learning and in the intellectual process, and an almost obsessive desire to grasp the roots of man's historical experience. . . . The constant company of a man like Kraemer accentuated something far more important: the *impulse* to learn.[79]

And so rather than becoming an accountant, Kissinger decided to be an intellectual.

What must have been a turning point was an exchange that Kissinger recalled some time later. Soon after Kraemer's speech to the troops, Kissinger recalls, "He told me I had a good political mind. It was a thought that had never occurred to me."[80] Suddenly somebody of short acquaintance says point blank that he was "unbelievably gifted" (which were the words according to Kraemer)[81] and it was a thought that had never occurred to him. It would not be too far-fetched to say that this exchange marked the beginning of the transition from the inward-turning Heinz to the outward-turning Henry. Kissinger had embarked on the road to what would become his adult identity.

V. HARVARD

> "The relationship between a woman and a man of my type is unavoidably very complex. One must be cautious. Oh, how hard it is for me to explain these things."
>
> –Henry Kissinger in the *New Republic*, December 16, 1972

Carrying out his decision to follow an intellectual career, Kissinger won a New York State Scholarship and was admitted to Harvard. He left his $10,000-a-year job and went to Harvard in September of 1946. Going to Harvard was a major turning point in Kissinger's own expectations. He consciously saw it as a real chance to do something with his life. "It was a raising of expectations and he viewed Harvard as *the* big decision in terms of family, friends, and army experience."[82] Kissinger would go to Harvard thinking of himself as a G.I. Bill man who might not otherwise have been able to go if it were not for the army.

Kissinger entered Harvard then, after having just experienced both the security of an ordered environment and the horror of two holocausts–the German and the American in Japan. For the first time a sense of an integrated self seems to have come to Kissinger, even though there was still much doubt about his past. Yet there is quiet. For the time the turbulance and fear of the preceeding years had subsided and

calm had taken its place, but a calm that had a mushroom cloud hanging over it. The years spent studying at Harvard were years of reflection, a time when Kissinger was able to try to make sense of what lay behind.

Little is known of Kissinger's years at Harvard. But there are at least two significant sources of data. The first, as might be expected, is another of the flamboyant, out-dated men to whom Kissinger attached himself. William Yandell Elliot, affectionately and sometimes not so affectionately known as "Wild Bill", was a professor of Government at Harvard. He had been all-American tackle and a Rhodes scholar at Vanderbilt, and had written a book in 1924 describing the forces that would result in fascism in the next ten years. From those pillars of success Elliot never went much higher. Although he was considered to be one of the powers of the Harvard faculty, he was always more than a little annoying to his students and fellow faculty members. One of Kissinger's contemporaries at Harvard has compared Elliot to the "Big Daddy" in "Cat on a Hot Tin Roof". Elliot, who comes from a small town in Tennessee, was known for throwing students who disagreed with him out of his office. He was a man who, like Kraemer, held disdain for the common man. Elliot

> had attended Balliol College, Oxford, at a time in the 1920's long after the place had been over-taken by the spirit of Benjamin Jowett, the notion that societies trained their elites—and senior scholars prepared their young disciples—for positions in government and other public service . . . It was this apparition, this tattered image of a by-gone age that Kissinger latched onto while a Harvard undergraduate, and the experience would be lasting.[83]

Thus there is a marked similarity in the two men who played such an important role in Kissinger's young life. This role is best described in Joseph Kraft's article on Kissinger in *Harpers:*

> To shock Henry Kissinger out of the depths, to charge him with purpose and ambition required men who were themselves outsiders—a couple of flamboyant personalities nostalgic for vanished features of an aristocratic life they presumed to embody and full of snobbish contempt for present times . . . They delivered to him an antidote against the quietude of his early life, a reason for not being the victim he had been. They taught the principle and embodied the practice of struggle against anarchy . . . It was that do or die credo which struck fire with Kissinger. He had known the time when there was "no place for goodness". He made it his life's work to show that force could be used to avert tragedy and catastrophy.[84]

The second source of data is the product of his Harvard years: Kissinger's PhD thesis, subsequently published as *A World Restored,* is a

testimony to his past and the blue-print for Kissinger's own philosophy. His study of Metternich and Castlereagh in the nineteenth century and their battle against Napoleon's revolutionary tide was, as he himself admits, an attempt to help solve some of the parallel problems faced by the modern Western powers in stemming the tide of the East. But before we look in depth at the significance of *A World Restored*, let us bring Kissinger through Harvard.

The most significant event of Kissinger's undergraduate years was his marriage. After a seven-year courtship, Kissinger married Ann Fleischer on February 6, 1949. He and Ann had met while Henry was working his way through high school back at the shaving brush factory. Ann was also of a refugee family and shared the same sort of cultural background, although she was not particularly motivated to excel academically. "The men who knew her as boys invariably describe Ann Fleischer as 'reserved' or even 'introverted'."[85] While they were at Harvard she worked in a furniture store and seemed to enjoy being out of the academic world and doing something different. While Ann has been said to have developed toward a more independent personality since the divorce, at the time she was, as a very close friend described her, "gentle and dependent. She has a slight taste for martyrdom, but she is generous and warm-hearted, giving and fearful. She needs to serve and this need is accompanied by dependence."[86] In other words, Ann, in marked contrast to Kissinger's mother, was hardly the type of person who would dominate a relationship.

Ann did not share Kissinger's intellectual world with him, and if she took an interest in what he was doing it was largely because it was Henry that was doing it. There was a pretty clear boundary between their private life and Kissinger's professional life. This boundary was even maintained to the extent of Kissinger later building a study over his garage which had a separate entrance. "Ann was proud of the study, but one Cambridge friend recalls a day when Kissinger 'invited me up there to see it, and have a drink, and Ann came up to sit with us. He told her to get out–he didn't want her there'."[87]

They led a very traditional life in their domestic arrangement. Ann was loyal and serving and Kissinger expected her to perform her wifely duties. Later on in the marriage when Kissinger was writing the book on nuclear weapons for the Council on Foreign Relations, she was still not expected to interfere with his work. As one commentator described the situation: "He worked with single-minded concentration on it (*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*). He lived with his wife in a New York apartment, and when he came home at night he forbade her to talk to him because it would interrupt his train of thought."[88] From what is said about their relationship by friends, Kissinger was hard on her and was not particularly supportive or understanding. He was not at all

patient with her and would tell her in no uncertain terms when he was irritated. "Henry didn't think Ann was intelligent and he had a tendency to be cruel to her in public. Knowing that she was sensitive he would deride her and criticize her telling her that what she was talking about was absurd and unimportant."[89]

The main problem was that Kissinger would have liked her to have been more independent, but at the same time he expected her to maintain a subordinate position in the relationship. Ann herself contributed to the problem in that "she bent excessively and this did not enlarge Henry's respect for her or his patience."[90] The marriage seems to have occurred largely because it was expected; after such a long time the courtship was naturally expected to end in marriage. "Ann certainly expected it for some time and this was the major quality about it. Henry doesn't like to commit himself in many ways. She needed commitment and Henry stood away from it."[91]

It was the kind of marriage where the man gets involved with his profession and leaves the wife behind. They were basically not compatible and finally they grew apart. The break was not immediate and clear-cut. They would spend weekends together, on the surface because of the children, but also because he too found it hard to let go. Even after the divorce he would have Ann sew buttons for him and perform other "wifely" tasks.

The significant characteristic of Kissinger's relationship to Ann was his continuing assault upon Ann's value as a person. In Kissinger's eyes Ann was an unintelligent, unimaginative, unimportant individual and he never lost an opportunity to let her, and those around him, know that this was his opinion. If indeed it was the case that Ann was the zero Kissinger treated her as, it would hardly seem necessary to engage in such a frontal assault upon her being.[92] But on the contrary, Kissinger found that it was necessary to berate Ann even though it does not seem that Ann was the nothing which he made her out to be. Ann, if anything, had the seeds of a more independent personality since "there were aspects which now have become more marked and visible since she has been on her own."[93] What seems to be at work here is yet another aspect of Kissinger's projective system which places on others the qualities which he fears are his in an attempt to rob his "bad" self of the power over him. Laing's comment on such a person is particularly cogent. He states: "By destroying in his own eyes, the other person as a person, he robbed the other of his power to crush him."[94]

This type of behavior is a basic characteristic of the depressive personality. Feelings of powerlessness and rejection are behind it. The depressive personality is "forever trying to induce women to love him. As long as he is involved in pursuit he is submissive and over-affectionate but when his courtship has been accepted, he rejects the woman and

looks for another mother-substitute who will love him more."[95] This flight from rejection and powerlessness, the root of depressive anxiety, will manifest itself through most of Kissinger's adult life.

Kissinger's life in Germany and later New York must have been an important contribution to his characteristic insecurity and mistrust because it was an environment which was unpredictable and out of control. The corollary of the renunciation of relationship with others is the need to be in control. An environment which is out of control can cause an individual to retreat into the boundaries of the self. Kissinger's withdrawal and problems with interpersonal relationships is the psychological foundation of the fundamental axiom of his political philosophy: "if it [society] cannot master the environment it will become its victim."[96] The characteristics of mistrust and insecurity can still be seen as definitive of his relationships throughout his years at Harvard and even after his student years.

Kissinger majored in philosophy as an undergraduate and was particularly interested in Spengler. "One of Kissinger's closest colleagues, Stanley Hoffman, made the remark that Henry 'walked, in a way, with the ghost of Spengler at his side.' "[97] But his concern with Spengler was not a whole-hearted embrace. As one commentator states:

> The unending decay and death of successive civilizations that seemed inevitable to Spengler was a notion that the young Kissinger rejected. His experience in Germany had taught him that one must never accept inevitability, and that one must do everything in one's power to wrest balance and order from chaos and destruction.[98]

Landau commits a fundamental error in his analysis of Kissinger's philosophy in the above quote. Kissinger did indeed accept the inevitable decline of civilization. What was important to Kissinger was that the change in the system is ordered. Kissinger's acceptance of the inevitable is predicated on the belief that one must do everything possible to slow or contain its progress. But Landau is correct in pointing to the influence of Kissinger's past on his academic pursuits. It can hardly be a coincidence that Spengler, the philosopher of gloom, found a place in the heart and mind of the serious and gloomy Harvard undergraduate. As a youth Kissinger had witnessed one of Western Civilization's most agonizing moments. It would only be natural for the young man to seize upon Spengler's concept of decline as one of the factors in his ideological simplification of the universe. In Spengler he found one of the building blocks for the "identity consonant with his own childhood" of which Erikson speaks.

Kissinger wrote his undergraduate thesis on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant. The quiet, withdrawn Kissinger of Fuerth and New York had

found enough words by the time he got through his undergraduate work to write a 350-page paper that resulted in the school setting a limit of 150 pages on all undergraduate theses in the future. In his thesis, "The Meaning of History", Kissinger criticized Kant and Spengler because their philosophies left little room for human action and will. According to Spengler and Kant, civilization was moving toward its predestined end and nothing man could do would stop it. Kissinger's past experience had shown him the necessity for human choice and action. His father's passivity, Kraemer's gospel of action, and Elliot's preaching of that gospel kept Kissinger searching for the fit between his past and his future.

Kissinger earned his BA in three years, graduating *summa cum laude* in 1950, and went on to graduate school in the Government Department. In those days, if one had been a *summa* as an undergraduate, you were not required to take the oral examinations for your higher degrees. So this set Kissinger apart from the other students both in his own perception of himself and the perception of him by his fellow students. But Kissinger seems to have been able to use this separateness as an integrating factor, a source of the proudness he now has for his acting alone; while the others were studying for their orals, Kissinger was working with professors on their books. The others looked upon him as something special. He was probably the most talked-about graduate student at the time, although scarcely the best liked. "People saw him as arrogant and argumentative. He was moody, unhappy and sour. It was a cause to remark if Henry was in a good mood. He was very sharp with people, and stubborn."[99]

Kissinger looked to older men for his close relationships with but a few notable exceptions. One of the few close friends of his peer group at Harvard was Klaus Epstein, and Kissinger spent a great deal of time together with him discussing history and international politics. Epstein read and criticized every page of Kissinger's piece on Metternich and it is said that he was influential in Kissinger's view of history. Even at this early date Kissinger had begun to be identified by his classmates as the guy who was always talking about the balance of power. One of his classmates has commented, "Balance was seen as Henry's thing. He was preoccupied with balance and order."[100]

In the debates of the time about the Soviet Union, the bomb, and the partition of Europe, Kissinger always took a hard line and had a tendency to couch his arguments in black and white terms. He would often become the center of a discussion at parties but generally it was a discussion between himself and one other person with several others listening in but not participating. Kissinger gravitated toward pontification in such situations. He was much more comfortable in a "discussion that was not personal but dealt rather with political, historical or other academic questions. He was not spontaneous, flexible or playful."[101] His

discussions then reflected another typical depressive characteristic. His pontification in discussions and also in his writing are like the expressions of depressive neurotics who "are full of tabloid wisdom and express their cliché statements as if they were great and original ideas."[102] Thus Kissinger tended to be heavy-handed in his social discourse and uncomfortable dealing with peers on a personal basis.

Kissinger was one of the few students who got along with both of the poles of power in the Government Department–Carl Friedrich and Elliot. Most students didn't get along with both men but Kissinger had a good rapport with the two. They were awe-inspiring figures in the department and Kissinger "always seemed to like powerful personalities who bring together not only the academic world, but the world of the present and participation in that world."[103] Kissinger at one point was so close to Friedrich that he was identified as *his* professor. Kissinger was struck by both men but did not seem to be over-powered by them. "He was not a 'little Elliot"or a 'little Friedrich'."[104] It was Elliot with whom he maintained the most lasting friendship, and Elliot was the most influential of the two in Kissinger's own thinking.

It was in the two years after he finished his undergraduate work that Kissinger found the philosophical framework which would unite history's progress and man's will. He fell upon Hegel's dialectic of history to fill the gap in his personal philosophy. Hegel's philosophy accepted the progress of history but left the end of its path open to speculation. There was room in the dialectic for heroic human action. Man's will could steer civilization away from one obstacle and another as man careened down the hill of history. Hegel's philosophy:

> maintains only that in each epoch, there will arise a civilization and, more rarely, an individual, whose duty it will be to guard and transmit the historical spirit and transmit it without ever attaining a full comprehension of all the implications it bears in the context of mankind's final destination.[105]

But history's final destination is left open for great men to exert their will. Hegel's philosophy of the "rare" individual would fit nicely Elliot's Oxford training. Under Elliot, Kissinger would be trained for the role Hegel postulated.

Kissinger continued to wrestle with the meaning of history and for his master's paper he dropped Kant and substituted Hegel, who took his place beside Spengler and Toynbee in Kissinger's philosophical cabinet. Kissinger got his master's degree in 1952 and under Elliot's tutelage would go on to his PhD degree in 1954 as well as winning the Sumner Prize for outstanding work on the prevention of war.

In his PhD thesis, Kissinger traced the role of one of Hegel's rare historical individuals who transmit the spirit of an age. Kissinger studied Metternich as he adjusted the fulcrum of Europe's balance of power.

VI. THE ROAD TO WASHINGTON

> "The intricate web of destiny in which we, both as individuals and as nations, are called upon to function, has caused most of us to become obsessed with personal and national insecurity."
>
> –Howard Rome, "Depressive Illness: Its Socio-Psychiatric Implications"

The man to whom *A World Restored* was dedicated, William Elliot, continued to play the central role in Kissinger's life for the next few years until Nelson Rockefeller emerged on the scene. But Rockefeller never did occupy a position of such closeness to Kissinger as Elliot had during and after the graduate years. Elliot played a role much like that of Kraemer. Elliot, like Kraemer, was much older than Kissinger. Both men had a flare and style which was unmistakable. Their style was, to Kissinger, a mark of confidence backed by a tradition of intellectual order. Both longed for a more aristocratic age and possessed fiery and flamboyant personalities which made them stand out among their seemingly more placid contemporaries. Both attempted and succeeded with varying degrees to put their own personal stamp on Kissinger's thinking. Elliot was looking for a disciple and Kissinger was looking for someone to follow. And it was Elliot who began to build the contacts Kissinger needed as he climbed his ladder of success.

When Kissinger received his PhD it was assumed by most, including Kissinger himself, that he would naturally be offered a teaching job at Harvard.

> But although his name was seriously considered and well supported, the decision went against him. Details of the argument are of course academic secrets, but according to one of the members of the faculty at that time, he was not only judged personally a difficult colleague (he had the reputation of being much nicer to his superiors than to his subordinates) but still more important the professors suspected that he was less interested in the university or in teaching and research than in making a career in public service.[106]

There was another offer at the same time at the University of Chicago and at the University of Pennsylvania. Chicago did not generally make offers that they thought would be turned down. According to one reporter,[107] Kissinger had led the University of Chicago to think that he would accept their offer. Even though Chicago offered him a higher position, when Harvard came up with a part-time teaching position in the Department of Government, he accepted the Cambridge offer. His

reason for taking the lesser position was based primarily upon the fact that he would be closer to Washington both geographically and in terms of his personal contacts.

During his year as an instructor, Elliot and Kissinger founded and directed the International Seminar which would later serve Kissinger as a major source of international contacts.[108] Again with Elliot's help, Kissinger founded and edited *Confluence* which was a scholarly journal used to debate policy issues.

Then came Kissinger's biggest break up until then. In the winter of 1954-55 a job as the managing editor of *Foreign Affairs* opened. The editor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, solicited some of his friends at Harvard to see if they had any young prospects for the job. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. suggested Kissinger, and Armstrong asked Kissinger to come to New York for an interview. Armstrong didn't give him the job but thought Kissinger might be useful in another capacity. The Council on Foreign Relations had been conducting a study group on the question of nuclear weapons and their effect on foreign policy. Armstrong was associated with the group and suggested that Kissinger apply for a spot as the writer of the study group's findings. Kissinger sent in his credentials, including recommendations from Elliot, Schlesinger, and McGeorge Bundy. He was offered the job and accepted. The study group had been meeting for some time to discuss problems of nuclear strategy and by the time Kissinger joined the group, most of the work had been done. What the group needed was a fresh mind to put their work together into a book. The result was Kissinger's best-selling, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*.

The book is the cornerstone of Kissinger's popular reputation in the academic world, and for a while his reputation went beyond the confines of the ivy-covered buildings. The book stayed on the best-seller lists for fourteen weeks. What his personal contacts could not do for him, the popularity of his book would. Indeed, Richard Nixon, then Vice-President, was photographed with a copy of Kissinger's book sticking out of his suit. His later books would never attain the popularity that *Nuclear Weapons* did. But the book, while hailed for its originality, was an editing job more than anything else.[109] Of course, Kissinger put his own stamp on the ideas and contributed a few of his own, but here we have an example of Kissinger's greatest asset–his ability to present and order arguments. Jeane Davis, secretary for the NSC staff told me that the key to Kissinger's relationship with Nixon was Kissinger's ability to organize and present the options to the President in a clear and coherent manner. Ms. Davis has said, "Nixon is a lawyer and he is influenced by hard factual material. At certain points the President's instinct might point in one direction, but when he sees

the options objectively laid out, he's enough of a lawyer to be influenced."[110] Kissinger's ability to synthesize arguments, as demonstrated in *Nuclear Weapons,* has been a key factor in terms of his ability to influence presidential decisions.

The central thrust of *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* is a criticism of the defense establishment for not creating a place in its planning operations for anything other than full-scale nuclear war. The book is an attempt to offer an alternative approach in which nuclear weapons could be used in limited war. Kissinger argues that through diplomacy the U.S. would be able to make its intentions not to engage in full-scale war known to the other side. Presumably this knowledge would insure that the "enemy" would not respond out of proportion to the threat. Thus there is a great reliance upon persuasion in his formula. He feels that if the opponent is adequately informed, then their response will be appropriate should limited nuclear war "become necessary".

But there is an internal contradiction in Kissinger's logic on this point. In Landau's words:

> How did Kissinger ever think that diplomacy could settle questions of such strategic importance when he himself proclaimed in what was probably the most pronounced internal contradiction in his thinking, that "the emphasis of traditional diplomacy on 'good faith' and 'willingness to come to an agreement' is a positive handicap when it comes to dealing with a power dedicated to overthrowing the international system."?[111]

Kissinger came to repudiate in part the position taken in *Nuclear Weapons.* In an article entitled "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? A Reappraisal", Kissinger stated:

> Several developments have caused a shift in my view about the relative emphasis to be given conventional forces as against nuclear forces. These are 1) the disagreement within our military establishment and within the alliance about the nature of limited war; 2) the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the increased significance of long-range missiles; 3) the impact of arms-control negotiations.[112]

As can be seen, the reasons he gives for his change of position are purely tactical. Because the practical obstacles in front of the type of co-ordination necessary are too great, it would be unadvisable to attempt limited nuclear war. There is no reason to believe that if the problems of control could be overcome that Kissinger would have been unwilling to use tactical nuclear weapons. For instance, if somehow Kissinger could have gained the assurance of China and the Soviet Union that they would not view the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam as a

threat to their national security then Kissinger would have been perfectly willing to use such weapons. Indeed something approaching this is what occurred in the mining of Haiphong harbor. The possibility that a foreign ship would be sunk in such an action has carried with it many of the fears of confrontation with the big powers as has the use of nuclear weapons in the past. This remains true even though Kissinger reduced some of the risks involved through his talks with the Chinese and Russians.[113]

In 1956 while Kissinger was working with the Council on Foreign Relations and writing *Nuclear Weapons*, the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund had organized a series of panels to discuss foreign and domestic policy. Kissinger became the director of these panels and was responsible for writing their reports. "The national security panel report of the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, billed as 'the answer to Sputnik', became a public document of enormous prestige and influence; Kissinger was its author."[114] The paper followed fairly closely the lines of *Nuclear Weapons*, arguing for a strategy based upon limited war and the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

However, it was not the paper which was the most important product of his association with the Fund. It was during this period that Kissinger began to cement his ties to Nelson Rockefeller. Kissinger had met Rockefeller in the early fifties at a military conference in Quantico, Virginia. They continued to keep in contact, but primarily on a business basis. Kissinger was an expert and Rockefeller needed advisors. And as Kissinger's reputation began to grow, Rockefeller would call upon Kissinger more and more as an advisor.

"The two men (Kissinger and Rockefeller) were dauntless interventionists, men who believed that the U.S. had the responsibility to show its muscle in every area of the world and they felt strongly that America must live up to its destiny."[115] Most importantly, both Rockefeller and Kissinger shared a concern for the establishment of order and the necessity to stand up against those forces which would disrupt that order. Once again we find Kissinger attaching himself to a man who is a staunch interventionist and who possessed a willingness to be tough. "Kissinger, like his hero Metternich, put his great talents at the service of a rickety and anachronistic order. 'The willingness to engage in nuclear war when necessary' said the Rockefeller report, 'is part of the price of our freedom.' This, the ferocious conventional wisdom of the Pentagon, runs like a leitmotiv throughout his work."[116]

Like that theme, the type of men he associates himself with also form a certain continuity. "The rungs on Kissinger's ladder to success have a common characteristic. At each major step upward he has been the protegé of men who believed in military strength, and, if necessary,

war, and who were obsessed with the postwar struggle for hegemony between the U.S. and the USSR, and fearful of the revolutionary tide in the poorer countries."[117] In Rockefeller we see a man whose personal style is a toned-down version of Kraemer and Elliot but whose intellectual maxims fall into the same sort of willingness to confront the forces of history. By the time Kissinger began to associate with Rockefeller, his own ideas were fairly well established. He was ready to make a commitment to a man not so much because of the man's person, although still important, but upon the basis of the congruity between the man's ideas and his own. Twelve years later Kissinger would commit himself to the ideas of Nixon, a man for whom he had no personal respect. Perhaps because of his growing confidence in his own ability and his own ideas, Kissinger became able and willing to accept the challenge of trying to put his ideas into action even if the man who would make the final decision was not a man who Kissinger particularly admired.

As a result of his connections, Kissinger was given a job as a consultant to the Kennedy Administration, and it was then that he encountered the frustration of trying to do battle against the Executive Bureaucracy. He had extremely painful experiences while working for Kennedy. "It would be difficult to underestimate the sense of injury Kissinger suffered at the hands of the slick, fast-talking Kennedy White House aides who sloughed him off as a quirksome academic trying to peddle his bag of silly ideas."[118] From Landau's account of Kissinger's days as a Kennedy advisor it appears that the stumbling block before his success centered around jealousy of access to the President. Kissinger's old colleague and friend, McGeorge Bundy, was angered at Kissinger's attempts to circumvent him and see the President directly. Bundy gave Kissinger the choice of either becoming a full-time consultant or going back to Harvard. Kissinger was not yet willing to leave the security of a tenured position at Harvard simply to be stuck at a low level of influence, so Kissinger stopped making the trip down to Washington. "From all of these encounters, Kissinger suffered a feeling that he would not blithely forget in later years."[119]

There is another version of the Kennedy days which also throws light on Kissinger's personality. According to an article in *Newsweek* that appeared almost a year into the first Administration, " 'It was less Henry's views than his style that hurt him,' recalls a sympathetic colleague who served with him at the time, 'he simply wasn't light-footed enough for the Kennedy circle."[120] A story in *Time*[121] tells of Kissinger's pursuit of exerting influence on policy to the point that Kennedy himself was said to be a bit annoyed with the professor's insistence. In short, Kissinger was just in the way of the fast-moving knights of Camelot. The glamour and smoothness of the slick Kennedy aides simply

overshadowed the pedantic German and his rather stuffy views. What strange irony that it would be the stodgy professor who would become the glamour figure of the Nixon Administration.

Ultimately, Kissinger would resort to submitting anonymous reports through a friend at State in an attempt to have his views expressed. For the most part however, Kissinger's association with the Kennedy Administration was minimal. All told, Kissinger's service was less than 18 months. "His departure was expedited after he took his wife, Ann, on a personal tour of India, Pakistan, and Israel—identifying himself at each stop as a White House consultant, thus giving the trip an official imprimatur and annoying some Kennedy people."[122] Again, both the self-inflated importance and the anonymous, unsolicited advice are basic behavior patterns of the depressive personality: "distortion of truth to please people or to impress them, exaggeration . . . (and) the offering of unsolicited guidance," are processes of compensation for depressive anxiety. Unfortunately, such characteristics often seem to be part of the necessary qualifications for political office.

Kissinger made a couple other forays into the executive arena before his assignment as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Johnson had begun looking for a way out of Vietnam when Kissinger mentioned to Averill Harriman that he had an informal channel to Ho Chi Minh through a French acquaintance. Johnson decided it might be helpful to relay some information on U.S. policy to Ho through Kissinger's informal contact. Kissinger was sent to Paris to open up the flow, but the talks seem to have had little effect. At any rate, Kissinger got a taste of the kind of secret negotiations he would carry on during the Nixon years.

By far the more important association than his governmental service was his role as an advisor to Rockefeller in the '64 and '68 campaigns. From the first association back in '56, Kissinger would continue his relationship with Rockefeller. He maintained his position as head of the Study Fund, and while he published four more books elaborating and updating the basic principles established in *A World Restored*, he would also enjoy a close association with Rockefeller as he made his bid for power. It was as a result of his work for Rockefeller that Nixon once again became aware of the professor who writes about nuclear weapons and had some pretty good ideas about foreign policy.

VII. A TWO-ACT COMEDY OF ERRORS

> The opening to China has been an important element in the mechanics of my success. And yet this is not the main point . . . The main point comes from the fact that I have acted alone. The Americans love this immensely. The Americans love the cowboy who leads the convoy, alone on his horse, and nothing else. Perhaps not even with a gun, because he does not shoot. He acts, and that is enough, being in the right place at the right time.
>
> —Henry Kissinger, *New Republic*, December 16, 1972

Thanks to Freud, modern man has a greater appreciation for the seemingly lesser events of an individual's life. Often the most minor occurrences can be tied into the broader totality and can be seen as representative of fundamental aspects of the psychic structure. Slips of the tongue or pen, and dreams are among the seemingly insignificant aspects of our lives that Freud brought to the forefront of psychological inquiry. There are two such seemingly minor incidents in Kissinger's relations with his colleagues which shed light on an evaluation of Kissinger's personality. While the two events are neither slips nor dreams, Freud's work should remind us that what seems insignificant is not necessarily meaningless.

The first incident is related by Landau:

> His initial clashes and rivalries in Cambridge were not nearly so tied to animosity as they were to his almost total degree of personal insecurity. One close colleague remembers an occasion on which he and Kissinger attended an academic conference outside Cambridge, but accidently saw little of each other during its course. The colleague returned home to find a long, impassioned note from Kissinger accusing him of failing to nod hello or otherwise offer greetings at certain times during the conference, and exclaiming that unless he could offer Kissinger some explanation for this conduct, their friendship would have to come to an end. The colleague responded not with an apology, but with a straight forward explanation of why Kissinger's assertions were uncalled-for and somewhat silly, and Kissinger apologized for the outburst. Such episodes reinforced the feeling that Kissinger's occasional difficulty relating to his colleagues was not that he was personally indecent, . . . but that he was . . . a man who saw himself disliked or persecuted far more often than was the case.[123]

The second encounter is of a similar character. This incident, once again, involves a fellow faculty member. Kissinger was at a conference

with another Harvard professor with whom he had planned to have dinner in order to discuss some problems that were related to the conference. When the friend suggested that they dine together in a hotel room so they could talk without interruption, Kissinger accused his colleague of not wanting to be seen in public with him.[124] The man pointed out how absurd the accusation was and they went on to have dinner in the room.

Kissinger's central fear in both of these incidents is that of rejection. His perception of both encounters was wholly out of proportion to what was called for by the occasions. It would appear that this anxiety has been a life-long characteristic and is what led to Haig's reference to Kissinger's "uncertainty" about being accepted. Both these incidents are clear evidence of Kissinger's lack of self-esteem. The clinical evidence seems to indicate that in a high percentage of cases these characteristics, fear of rejection and lack of self-esteem, point to basic insecurity from infancy with corresponding reinforcement of insecurity in social relations. The usual result is the constellation of characteristics which make up the depressive personality.

I have tried to show that the basic dynamics of Kissinger's personality generally fit the outlines of the depressive character. While the behavioral and social data is fairly clear, the familial data is less so. Certainly Kissinger's family experience provides the foundation upon which the broader culture placed its stamp.

I postulated a feeling of rejection on Kissinger's part as a result of the arrival of his brother Walter as the initiating experience. This was followed by the entrance of the "third son" who receives preferential treatment, and is allied with Walter, creating a familial situation of rivalry in which Kissinger perceived himself as the loser. His parents' ambivalence further contributed to the familial basis of his depressive anxiety.

In terms of behavior patterns, Henry's withdrawn nature, lack of involvement with others, his treatment in Fuerth and New York, his "moodiness" at Harvard, treatment of his wife and women in general, his tendency to be solicitous to superiors and hostile to inferiors, his self-enhancing distortions in India, his unsolicited advice to Kennedy—are all further behavioral substantiation of our judgement of his personality as depressive.

Other characteristics which were not fully elaborated upon are the frequent humorous references on Kissinger's part to his "megalomania" and what others have described as his self-depreciating humor. Since "megalomania is a defense against feelings of inferiority",[125] his humor would also seem to provide further substantiation of the analysis. Kissinger has also evidenced a tendency to over-work and over-eat (once remarking that when he negotiates, he eats, and will probably gain 300

pounds over the Middle East). These again are characteristics of depressive anxiety. "People who are given to this kind of depression feel defeated, lack self-confidence, blame themselves, feel isolated and forsaken, have a pessimistic outlook on life . . . over-eat or under-eat, and dwell on past events."[126] All of these characteristics belong to Kissinger's repertoire.

Even his success is part of the picture: "The dysmutual [depressive] tries to overcome his low self-esteem in many ways, one of which is through extreme ambition. Some dysmutuals, in milder stages of the disorder, rather than escape into manic moods, try to compensate for their feelings of inferiority by excessive work, long working hours, and an over-all drive for supremacy."[127] These characteristics are evidenced in Kissinger's behavior in the First Administration when he literally exhausted scores of aides on the National Security Council with his long and intensive hours.

His emotional threat to resign last June is again a consequence of his fear of rejection. The typical depressive is "exceedingly sensitive and vulnerable to criticism."[128] His public threat to resign came as a result of the criticism of his role in the taping of his subordinates on the Security Council Staff. This was not the first, only the most dramatic, threat of resignation. Aside from much talk about resignation during the Vietnam period, when Kissinger was on Rockefeller's staff, whenever Kissinger's access was blocked by veteran staff members, his "*habitual* solution was to march into Rocky's office and 'resign' ".[129]

An aspect of this constellation of behavior which has had significant ramifications for American foreign policy is the tendency toward personal isolation. As the opening quote in this chapter indicates, Kissinger's "acting alone" has been elevated to the highest significance in his conduct of policy. This is in marked contrast to his fear of being unacceptable, rejected and alone. What was a private experience and fear of being alone in his youth has been transformed into a value in his intellectual formulations. As in his "cowboy" statement it is the actor standing alone who is supposedly loved by the Americans, and, as Kissinger argues, the policy-maker must be willing to stand alone if his accomplishments are to be of value. Thus it is the ability to stand alone and face the abyss which is the primary value in Kissinger's estimation of a policy-maker's greatness. What we must assume was the beginning of Kissinger's reformulation of being alone into a virtue was his relation to Kraemer and later being singled out from among his student contemporaries at Harvard as an exceptional individual. Rather than being isolated as one of the unacceptables, Kissinger was set apart and above the other students at Harvard. He must have experienced some of his being separate and different as being better and in a sense greater

than his contemporaries. And this also fits the depressive's compensating feeling that he is unique and superior. It must have been then that the negative aspects of being alone–the separateness, unacceptability, and unattachment–were counter-balanced by the attributes and advantages of being singled out. Although being alone, as Kissinger himself states has always been a part of his style, it has not always carried with it the positive connotations he now attaches to it. One distinctive advantage of being alone, as Kissinger may have discovered in his youthful withdrawal, is that being alone, one cannot be easily rejected.

What Kissinger has done is transform the anxiety-producing condition of being alone in the everyday world into a positive requisite in the world of statesmanship. What Kissinger saw as Metternich's and Bismarck's most important characteristic has become the significant aspect of his image in the American public. Although not a Prince, but a cowboy, Kissinger sees himself as the loner, a hero standing before the unresistable forces of history.

Kissinger was motivated to take up his "lonely" profession in part by the fact that the solitude of the statesman is seen as noble. First Kissinger experienced the pain of isolation which was then followed by the pleasure of singular achievement at Harvard. He would follow upon this theme by writing about the profession of statesman, characterizing it as a lonely undertaking, and then go on himself to take up the noble occupation.

Consonant with his self-image as the loner, Kissinger is not the type to seek out the advice of others. And if he does attempt to gather opinions from others, as his early reputation in the NSC seems to indicate, it is largely for appearance sake. This same process has been replicated in the conduct of relations between the U.S. and its allies. The complaints by Europe, Japan, Taiwan, and Thieu, over their neglect or superficial consultation is not unlike Kissinger's personal relationships. Remembering that one reason given for not initially granting him a position at Harvard was the judgement that he tended to be solicitous towards his superiors and hostile to his inferiors, we can begin to appreciate the failings of his personal diplomacy. In recent years, Kissinger's personal experience has had a major effect upon our national experience. His inability to empathize with others, his compulsion to face risk in order to prove his worth, and his tendency to act alone have in fact become significant components of American public policy.

VIII. A WORLD AND SELF RESTORED

> The statesman is . . . like one of the heroes in classical drama who has had a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it directly to his fellow men and who cannot validate its "truth".
>
> –Henry Kissinger,
> *A World Restored*

In this part of the paper I will attempt to draw upon the themes developed in the previous section in order to offer some partial explanations of American foreign policy, primarily in the first Administration. I emphasize "partial" because I will look at a limited number of issues, focusing on one dimension–that of personality. What follows is a look at Kissinger's writings, particularly *A World Restored*, in relation to the style of Kissinger's operation, the handling of the peace negotiations, the invasion of Cambodia, and the mining of Haiphong harbor.

In the words of I. F. Stone, "The best clues to Kissinger as a diplomat still lie in his study of Metternich."[130] While Harvard has placed the actual PhD on "restricted circulation", the public can view a slightly revised version of his thesis in his book *A World Restored*, which although written first, appeared after the success of his first book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. In *A World Restored*, we see Kissinger first flexing his intellectual muscle and we can trace the development of his later philosophy from the foundations established here. Indeed it could be argued that there has been no basic change in Kissinger's outlook from then until now. The same principles he culled from his study of Metternich have been systematically applied to the modern world situation. The China policy, the Pakistan debacle, the State of the World Messages, all reflect the principle of balance and the role diplomacy plays in the control of this balance, all of which Kissinger first elaborated in *A World Restored*.

In addition to the importance of the book in terms of public policy for foreign affairs, the book is a personal testament of Kissinger's own life. He does not disguise the true focus of his study. He states:

> Napoleon is not exactly equivalent to Hitler or Castleraugh to Churchill. Whatever relationship exists depends not on a precise correspondence, but on a similarity of the problems confronted. And the conclusions will reflect–just as with any other generalization–the ability to abstract from the uniqueness of individual experience.[131]

While Kissinger did not intend "the uniqueness of individual experience" to refer to himself, the evidence indicates that the lessons of his youth were incorporated in his understanding of history.

Reading through *A World Restored*, one cannot help but be struck by the parallels between Europe after Napoleon and the world after Hitler. Kissinger makes a conscious attempt throughout the book to lead the reader to make comparisons between the two historical periods. And if the reader failed to see the similarities, the final chapter reveals explicitly the reason for the author's concern for the period. Kissinger went back into history to discover the connections of the past with the present. It is an attempt to place in perspective the chaos from which the world had just escaped and that had touched the personal lives of so many like Kissinger himself. The book is both an ordering into a logical continuum of the forces of history and an attempt to identify the problems which those forces will generate—the problems which must be confronted by an America emerging onto the world stage after WWII. In addition, Kissinger's personal life merges with the task he sees facing the U.S. He must resolve the inner chaos and uncertainty of his earlier life in order to achieve a maturity capable of sustaining himself as he assumes his adult role and moves out into the world. *A World Restored* is the testament of a youth's struggle to achieve an identity that the world until then had denied him. The work describes not simply a world restored, but a self restored.

One of the more interesting aspects of *A World Restored* can only be appreciated looking back with a view of Kissinger's own period of statesmanship. It is difficult to know to what extent symbols become models of action or are simply appropriate to developments which preceeded the attachment. Certainly both are a function of symbolic representation; but whatever the case, much can be learned of predictive value by looking at a political actor's model of action.

The similarity between the picture that Kissinger paints of Metternich and the image of Kissinger as statesman is astounding. A comparison of the two reveals the pervasiveness of the identification. One of the more remarkable aspects of the public Henry Kissinger has been his newsworthiness. Not just his value as a headliner for the *Washington Post*, but his ability to capture the covers of Hollywood's gossip magazines with his "between-the-covers" escapades. Of course, the secrecy in which he has enveloped himself is a primary source of intrigue, but much of the "hot" news value lies more in his playboy image—an image that somehow fits like a suit two sizes too large. There is something of a contrived air about this image, and it would be impossible to place all the blame on over-zealous journalists. Few other public officials had date-books like Henry Kissinger. When questioned about his proclivity for dating Hollywood starlets and beautiful models, Kissinger tries to disclaim any personal responsibility. He says that the young ladies are simply attracted to his position and not to his person: "I find the playboy image very amusing",[132] "I am their celebrity of the hour, the new

man in town. I don't kid myself."[133] Aside from the lack of self-value which lies beheath the statement, it is curious that he bothers carrying out the ruse. Indeed, he enjoys his role, and it has proved useful in the past as during the secret Paris negotiations, when he could use his dates as a front. However, it appears more as if Kissinger is living up to an image, an image provided by his role model, Prince Metternich. Kissinger writes of Metternich:

> His conversation brilliant but without ultimate seriousness, equally at home in the salon and in the cabinet, graceful and facile, he was the beau-ideal of the eighteenth century . . . He would have moved through the drawing rooms of the fashionable world with his undeniable charm and grace, subtly and aloofly conducting his diplomacy with the circuitousness which is a symbol of certainty.[134]

It is as if the nineteenth century has come alive with the dashing statesman flitting between salon and high level negotiation. Kissinger in Paris is the epitomy of Metternichian style. Kissinger, here, has almost written his own history.

In addition, there is a striking parallel of language in his article on Bismarck which sheds light on the importance of personal style in Kissinger's hero-matrix. He writes of Bismarck: "Proud in bearing, self-confident in expression, the speaker represented the *beau-ideal* of the Junkers, the large landholders who had built up Prussia."[135] Kissinger is particularly attracted to those individuals who in his eyes possess a proud certainty and sense of self. These men are the "beau-ideals" whom everyone admires. These are men who are rooted in an environment in which they received positive reinforcement on all fronts; it is to men like these that Kissinger looks for models.

In order to balance a fear of inadequacy, Kissinger has turned to symbols of power, action, assuredness, or vitality. Metternich's and Bismarck's style, along with that of Kraemer and Elliot, all share to some degree a flamboyant assuredness which Kissinger's insecurity kept him from having. He had a certain confidence, but confidence is more an attribute than a fundamental form. Confidence is tacked on, learned as it were, after the establishment of the basic form of security or insecurity. The style of Metternich, Bismarck, Kraemer and Elliot was an attribute which Kissinger incorporated as a means of identifying with the security which he thought was inherent in their style. It is significant that before his appointment as special assistant for national security affairs "Kissinger's major qualm about Nixon, it appears, was the President-elect's lack of individual assertiveness."[136] Thus it seems that individuals who display an outward confidence and assertiveness are extremely attractive to Kissinger.

Metternich grew up in an age described in *A World Restored*, in which "nobody who lived after the French Revolution would ever know how sweet and gentle life could be. And the certitude of the time of youth never left Metternich."[137] It was precisely this "certitude of the time of youth" that Kissinger is lacking and which formed one of the corner stones of his attraction to Metternich. It is most revealing that Kissinger focuses on the tranquility of Metternich's youth as the source of his confidence, for it is this tranquility which Kissinger would most have desired as a substitute for his "bad times". Thus lacking the inner calmness of certainty, Kissinger reacts with a front of arrogance in the hope that his inner chaos will go undiscovered by others and so that he might convince himself in his moments of doubt.[138]

Kissinger has admitted of himself that "living as a Jew under the Nazis, then as a refugee in America, and then as a private in the army isn't exactly an experience that builds confidence."[139] Elsewhere he has said of the Harvard period: "I was completely unsure of myself. I had gotten out of the Army and I felt like an imigrant again."[140] The first half of his life was marked by extreme uncertainty. Today however, Kissinger can look back on his life and be satisfied that he overcame the barriers of his youth. Indeed, he can even say that the "bad times" were unimportant. But as a graduate student at Harvard, because of his admitted lack of confidence, he would have needed examples of men who overcame great barriers and survived to make history. Metternich then as one such man is even given a fantasized origin[141] in order to make him better fit Kissinger's need for symbols of identification, symbols which would aid him in his effort to understand his past and to consolidate a sense of self.

If we look at Kissinger's modern heroes, DeGaulle and Chou En Lai for instance, they are men who also have overcome incredible obstacles, men who have always faced adversity and won—men who have stood alone and passed the test. Kissinger has even talked recently of Nixon's "heroic" qualities. Nixon too is a man who overcame incredible obstacles and came back to shape history. Kissinger himself acknowledges his preference for such individuals. He has said that "the models he would prefer are those 'to whom it is given not only to maintain perfection of order but to have the strength to contemplate chaos, there to find material for fresh creation'."[143]

But the positive identifications are not all that are present in his treatment of Metternich. Those who stood idly by against Napoleon are subject to extreme criticism. In his discussion of Prussia in 1806, there appears a criticism which would be reverberated in his critique of the past American foreign policy. Kissinger remarks:

> It is the nature of statesmen conducting a policy of petty advantage to seek in vacillation a substitute for action. A policy which lets itself be influenced by events—which in the formal phrase 'awaits developments' is likely to seek the remedy against a decision recognized as erroneous in adopting its extreme opposite without considering the intermediary solutions.[144]

This is the other side of Kissinger's hero coin; the side which includes his father. Those who vacillate, those who are indecisive, those who do not act in the face of the imperative to act, are apt to be overcome by events which pass them by. At every point in which Kissinger confronts inaction he is negatively critical. In his article on Bismarck for instance, he says; "a policy that awaits events is likely to become their prisoner." If we remember Kissinger's reluctance to leave Germany, his father's vacillation, Louis's wait-and-see attitude, followed by the sudden reversal into flight, Kissinger's four years of intransigence in Vietnam is given added meaning.

IX. THE VIETNAM TEST

> "The United States cannot accept a military defeat, or a change in the political structure of South Vietnam brought about by external military force; once North Vietnamese forces and pressures are removed, the United States has no obligation to maintain a government in Saigon by force."
>
> —Henry Kissinger, *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1969

Throughout Kissinger's writing and speaking there is a pervasive tendency to place his truths of statesmanship in the context of a test. In *A World Restored*, for example, among several other such tests: "The test of a statesman, then is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends."[145] In reading any of Kissinger's books, one cannot help but notice this grammatical structure. Usually the "test" is linked to some form of "adequacy", "strength", or "ability". For example, "the test of statesmanship is the adequacy of its evaluation before the event."[146] The pervasiveness of this choice of terms in Kissinger's writings and statements would seem to indicate that the root of Kissinger's testing lies in his own doubt about himself and his environment. Taken with what we already know of Kissinger's personality it is reasonable to conclude that "the test of" is a means of dealing with his doubt about his own personal reception by his environment. His tests are tools in organizing the world. By testing for the existence of certain desirable qualities, he knows when to advance and when to retreat, when he is strong and when he is weak.

The significant aspect of this mode of perception is the doubt which is inherently attendent upon such ambiguity. What one needs is the courage to face that doubt, or in Kissinger's terms, contemplate the abyss. Therefore, courage is transformed into the primary value, for you need courage to confront the uncertainty. Kissinger castigates those policy-makers and intellectuals who lack this courage: "The corrollary of the tentativeness of most views is an incurable inward insecurity. Even very eminent people are reluctant to stand alone and they see in concurrence one of their chief tests of validity."[147] This very evaluation of courage, acting alone, and certainty is the consequence of Kissinger's formulation of his own life. Kissinger's past doubts and fears of confrontation have been projected onto others, while being alone is raised to a virtue. But there is, inherent in the view that courage, assertiveness and certainty are the primary values of a statesman, a perpetuation of uncertainty since you must also always be testing your will.

This, then, is the process by which personal motives are transformed into political action. We generally look simply at the rationalizations or political prescriptions of a political actor. That is, if a political actor feels that even ambiguous threats to American power such as "communist aggression" in Vietnam must be met with force, then that formula is usually viewed as the reason for an action taken or the reason for supporting such action. Rarely do we ask ourselves why a certain principle is believed or valued. Let us then take a closer look at the private motivation in Kissinger's testing process as manifested in Vietnam.

The most significant and confusing aspect of the manner in which Vietnam was handled in the Nixon Administration is two-fold: on the one hand is the congruity between the *form* advocated by Kissinger to end the conflict before his appointment as assistant to the President and the actual execution of the negotiations; and on the other hand, the almost absolute disjunction between the actual *substance* of the settlement and Kissinger's pre-appointment prescriptions.

The essential form of Kissinger's plan for negotiation was his two-track formula whereby the United States and Hanoi would hammer out the military questions, leaving the settlement of the political questions to the Vietnamese themselves. Of course the major obstacle before the accomplishment of this split was the North's insistance that the political questions be resolved before they even began to talk about the ending of military actions. But Kissinger countered in his *Foreign Affairs* article that if the United States got bogged down in negotiating explicit details of the political question, then U.S. interests would be squandered. He argued that if the U.S. attempted to negotiate a political settlement it would have to be on the basis of tacit bargaining rather than a formal agreement. In other words, Kissinger felt that if the war were to be re-

solved, the major issues would have to be left formally unresolved. Ambiguity was the order of the day. And it remains the most curious aspect of the final agreement. On the surface, everything political still remained to be resolved, but in fact the die had already been cast.

Two of the substantive quagmires which Kissinger warned the United States to stay away from are central to the final settlement. And it was the fact that these two factors were included that lay behind the North's willingness to settle. As Kissinger warned:

> Negotiating a ceasefire may well be tantamount to establishing the preconditions of a political settlement. . . . A tacit defacto ceasefire may prove more attainable than a negotiated one. By the same token, a formal ceasefire is likely to predetermine the ultimate settlement and tend toward partition. Ceasefire is thus not so much a step toward a final settlement as a form of it.[148]

The reason for this assessment is that in Vietnam there are really no symmetrical lines of engagement. The "enemy" cannot be driven back to an imaginary front-line because there is no front line. The "enemy" is everywhere. So if a ceasefire was negotiated, the only way to insure the political viability of the South would be to insure the withdrawal of enemy troops. Thus Kissinger's first warning was that enemy troops could not be allowed to remain in the South or the peace would be lost.

The second warning was closely tied to the first. In this instance Kissinger argued that the United States cannot be a party to negotiating a coalition government. "The issue is whether the United States should be party to an attempt to *impose* a coalition government. We must be clear that our involvement in such an effort may well destroy the existing political structure of South Viet Nam and thus lead to a communist takeover."[149] The reason that a coalition government will lead to a communist takeover is illustrated by one of Kissinger's examples of difficulties a coalition would bring about:

> Communist ministers would be foolhardy in the extreme if they entered Saigon without bringing along sufficient military force for their protection. But the introduction of communist military forces into the chief bastion of governmental strength would change the balance of political forces in South Viet Nam.[150]

Obviously, the ambiguity with regard to enemy troop withdrawal in the terms of the final agreement was a substantial departure from Kissinger's original position; and since the ceasefire has taken place, as Kissinger warned, the communist troops are acting very much like an occupation force. South Vietnam has now become a partitioned country: there are communist territories and government territories, and again as Kissinger argued, the military partition will inevitably lead to, at a minimum, a political division of power.

While it is not the United States which *imposes* the coalition government on the South, it is the United States which agreed to the conditions which, after a "suitable interval", will result in its equivalent. Such is the nature of Nixon's "honorable peace". The disengagement from Vietnam proved to be similar to a local town father straightening his tie as he emerges from the local house of prostitution.

This of course raises the question of why we spent four additional years fighting for the South to determine its own future when in the end the terms of the agreement foreclose that future. It is a question which will never have an adequate answer.

A partial answer, however, would be that Kissinger and Nixon simply spent four years testing our strength and will, and ended by failing the test. The U.S. steadily increased the level of violence in its test of strength but, unlike a weight lifter, kept adding to the weight even after it became apparent that the weight could not be lifted. If Vietnam had not been viewed as a test, the United States never would have dragged out the war for so long.

The war was a test on many levels. In one sense it was seen as a test of credibility. As Kissinger argued,

> However fashionable it is to ridicule the terms credibility or prestige, they are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on our steadiness. The collapse of the American effort in Viet Nam would not mollify many critics; most of them would simply add the charge of unreliability to the accusation of bad judgement. Those whose safety or national goals depend on American commitment could only be dismayed. In many parts of the world—the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, even Japan—stability depends on confidence in American promises.[151]

But confidence and trust are of little value when the end result is a worse position than what was started with. If the other countries, which are supposedly looking at Vietnam as a test of the American word, looked at the hard reality they would realize that the United States cannot guarantee internal security with any sort of effectiveness short of destroying the country in order to save it. Those nations would do better to direct their attention to the ills in their own society that give rise to instability than to hope for salvation in the form of American military might.

In general, American conduct in Vietnam was a series of test probes designed to demonstrate purposefulness and strength. The Cambodia invasion for example was a test probe which was designed, among other things, to demonstrate to the Soviet Union and Hanoi that the United States was willing to stretch the limits of the war to the extent necessary to end the conflict. In Kissinger's words, the Soviets will judge the U.S.

according to "the general purposefulness" of U.S. performance in Vietnam. We must demonstrate a willingness to face up to the risks of global diplomacy or the Soviets will be encouraged to step up pressures elsewhere. As Nixon said in his speech announcing the Cambodia invasion: "It is not our power, but our will and character that is being tested tonight."[152] Presumably, if we were to fail the test, the communists would look upon the United States as a paper tiger.

The dynamics of the Cambodia invasion are remarkably similar to the way the decision to mine Haiphong, which is discussed below, came about. The communists in both situations were conducting successful military operations, the U.S. military evaluation of the possibility for success in both instances was dubious at best, in both instances the reasons given for the moves were not necessarily military, but political and psychological, and in both instances the decisions were made in the face of substantial disagreement within the highest levels of the U.S. national security system.

Kissinger's role in the decision was central. It was Kissinger who spent the entire day alone with Nixon the day before the decision was made. On the day of the decision Nixon and Kissinger compared a set of pluses and minuses each had worked out for the operation. "Nixon glanced at Kissinger's list, Kissinger at Nixon's. The lists were almost identical."[153] The only people in the entire NSC system who were in favor of the decision were Nixon, Kissinger, and, predictably, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the most part, the "formalized machinery of the NSC was largely bypassed and . . . there were frequent direct contacts between White House officials [read Kissinger] and members of the JCS, with Secretary Laird feeling at times inadequately informed."[154] Rogers also opposed the action, and at one point Kissinger had a meeting with five of his brightest aides to get their views; all were against.[155] Nixon and Kissinger were truly alone.

The Kalbs tell us that during this period, "Kissinger's innate conservatism surfaced. His old fear of America's going the way of the Weimar Republic . . . obsessed him."[156] Kissinger, as he told a group of editors, felt that "what was at stake here was the problem of authority in this society altogether."[157]

It looks, then, as if we have most of the necessary ingredients to activate Kissinger's most fundamental psychological tensions. Here was a perfect opportunity for a test of "character" (as specifically stated by Nixon). There was the necessity to stand alone against great opposition and there were the unavoidable risks—both domestic and foreign—involved in carrying the war beyond the boundaries of Vietnam proper. That these factors were a part of Kissinger's position is difficult to refute in light of the terms used by Nixon to announce his decision—a decision in which Kissinger was the closest and most influential collab-

orator, and undoubtedly had a hand in the wording of the announcement. The mood of the announcement was reported by the *New Yorker* in much the same manner as described here. They reported: "According to the President and members of his Administration, the invasion was intended not simply to do something, but also to *prove* something—something about America's 'character' and 'courage' " [158] Thus the Cambodia invasion is one of the best examples of the role Kissinger's testing and risk-taking played in our Vietnam policy. Had an individual been in Kissinger's place who was not "obsessed" with the prospect of America's decline, who did not view the situation as a crisis of authority, who did not feel compelled to demonstrate his willingness to face the abyss alone, who did not need to prove his strength, then it is likely that a different path would have been followed. The question remains, if Kissinger had said no, would Nixon have gone ahead totally alone?

Cambodia is another example of Kissinger's tendency to rely on no other person's judgement but his own. It would seem that this is a further manifestation of Kissinger's self-righteousness (which permeated his relationships from the time at Harvard when he was judged a "difficult colleague" to his management of the NSC staff where he is said "to bully and berate those underneath him") in collusion with Nixon's needs. This is further evidence that the "all-or-nothing" quality in Kissinger's moral and intellectual judgements remains.

But it is particularly at this point that the importance of a psychological understanding of Kissinger is best revealed. Erikson has discussed the characteristics of self-righteousness in these terms:

> It is the all-or-nothing quality of the super-ego, this organ of moral tradition, [that] makes moral man a great potential danger to his own ego—and to that of his fellow man. . . . The resulting self-righteousness can later be most intolerantly turned against others. . . . Moral Man's initiative is apt to burst the boundaries of self-restriction, permitting him to do to others in his or in other lands, what he would neither do nor tolerate being done to his own home.[159]

We have discussed the danger to his own ego in the tendency of Kissinger to treat himself with a certain self-contempt. But the tendency to direct this contempt outward, as in his bullying of his subordinates, his wife, and colleagues, takes on a new character once Kissinger is Special Assistant. It would not seem to be a coincidence that the tactical nuclear weapons advocated for use by Kissinger would take place in underdeveloped countries, nor is it a coincidence that the willingness to engage in limited war is largely restricted to those countries. Likewise, it was Kissinger, who in his wisdom declared that Vietnam simply is not a moral issue[160] and proceeded to orchestrate the violation of the bound-

aries of Cambodia, doing to others what he would not tolerate being done to himself. It is the distinction of such "moral men" that morality is posited solely in their person, to be distributed according to their view of what deserves to be considered a moral issue. Rather than bullying subordinates or his wife, he became a principle actor in the bullying of North Vietnam in an attempt to force them into a settlement on American terms.

Another of the more important choices in this process was the decision to mine Haiphong. The decision to mine Haiphong Harbor can be set in perspective by looking at *National Security Study Memorandum #1* (NSSM#1) which was the first task assigned to the NSC staff when Nixon came into office. It was an over-all study of the Vietnam situation and one section was devoted to the feasibility of cutting off the shipment of war materials to the North by mining Haiphong and submitting overland routes to intensive bombing. The 548 page report was secret until released by Senator Gravel and printed in part by several newspapers and journals, including the *New York Review of Books.*[161] This study was to provide the basis for Nixon's secret plan to end the war; the major feature, as Whalen reported,[162] was the Haiphong move. Interestingly enough, nowhere in the report was there mention of Vietnamization, the path ultimately chosen. In addition, with regard to the effectiveness of the blockade against Haiphong, the report ranged from doubtful to strongly negative. The CIA flatly stated that

> All of the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied. . . . Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown that . . . air strikes . . . can not successfully interdict the flow of supplies.[163]

The State Department was more disposed to the operation, but the Defense Department felt the operation would be unsuccessful unless "the air campaign would be conducted in such a manner as to be free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in the North in the past."[164] But the DOD admitted that the lifting of such restraints necessarily "would accept high risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve destruction of war supporting targets."[165] Although State and the DOD were somewhat positive in their responses, the answers were hedged with all sorts of "ifs" that ended up saying that if the North was willing to devote sufficient man power to their transportation operations, they would be capable of overcoming the obstacles American actions would place before them.

Nixon himself realized that even if the operation could be successful it would involve great risk of bringing the Soviets directly into the pic-

ture in a confrontation that could lead to the apocalypse. He said before his election, "We can't invade North Vietnam. The only thing left is Haiphong and that involves risks with the Soviets."[166] So apparently, because of the uncertainty that the operation would achieve what it was intended to achieve, and therefore involve too substantial a cost for such minimal returns, the plan was put on the shelf for three years. In the meantime Nixon tried his Vietnamization policy.

But what happened to force Nixon into falling back on this dubious plan? There were several pressures which led to the decision. First, it could be argued that the decision to mine Haiphong was simply part of a calculated negotiating process in which increased levels of force alternate with periods of negotiation, until the costs for the enemy become too great to sustain. Certainly this interpretation fits the Nixon-Kissinger formula for negotiation and at some level provides one of the base lines from which the decision was made. However, the second line of argument deserves greater credibility. This argument is that Nixon was forced into a corner by the North Vietnamese offensive which shattered the image that Vietnamization had succeeded. And directly related to the second line of argument, a third would be that with the domestic situation in poor shape, an apparant failure overseas would dash Nixon's hope for victory in the up-coming elections and revitalize the war as a political issue. Let us look then at the implications of these arguments.

As election time grew nearer and all the efforts to end the war seemed futile, the last thing Nixon could have afforded would have been a major failure overseas. On top of the resentment of workers over wage control, the frustration of consumers over rising prices, the anger at the inequality of the tax structure, and the burning fuse beneath the busing bomb, a washout in Vietnam would have been more than the American voter could have taken.

However, just after Easter in 1972, the North Vietnamese offensive shattered the image of progress so painstakingly created by the Nixon Administration. While the North Vietnamese troops began to overwhelm the half-hearted resistance of ARVN, it looked as if Nixon's Vietnam policy would join the long list of Administration failures. It became apparent that the progress reported by Nixon like the progress reported by Johnson before him, was but an image. Thus Nixon began to look in desperation for a new image that would conceal the shattered pieces of the old.

What Nixon needed was an action that would be so dramatic as to cause enough commotion to draw attention away from North Vietnam's advances, thereby not compounding the embarrassment on the domestic front. Thus in an effort to win votes at home, Nixon pulled his trump

card. Called on to do double duty, his unrevealed plan of 1968 was pulled out from the bottom of the secret National Security Memorandums in an attempt to renew his lease on Pennsylvania Ave.

NSSM#1 makes clear that the plan which Nixon improvised in a moment of off-the-cuff questions and answers during the 1968 election campaign was the plan to confront the Soviets with a blockade of Haiphong. And as indicated by Nixon's cancelled speech on Vietnam,[167] the President felt that Vietnam could only be settled by confronting the Soviet Union's role in supporting North Vietnam. Nixon's plea in his cancelled speech was to bring the Soviet Union to the bargaining table, but, to use his own words, "in the language of realism that the Soviets understand". The speech is littered with similarly veiled military threats, and Nixon cites John Kennedy's action in the Missile Crisis as the type of realism the United States needs to make "a fresh start."

The North Vietnamese offensive in 1972 was embarassing Nixon and was a direct affront to American strength. The only answer was to come back with something stronger than anything that had been tried before. The North's offensive had darkened the abyss and it became necessary to face up to the risks "or perish in the process". Nixon had stated that he would not "be driven into the sea", and was therefore ready to make the decision which in I. F. Stone's words at the time, was "potentially the gravest decision ever taken by an American President for it sets off a slow fuse that could ignite World War III."[168]

But aside from balancing the threat to American strength, the blockade would serve an extremely useful political function. By painting a picture of crisis, Nixon had hoped to rally the American people behind the Presidency as they had rallied so often in the past in times of crisis. He succeeded according to a Harris poll late in May of 1972. Nixon obviously is a man not unaware of the impact of foreign crisis and summit trips on domestic popularity. As Whalen describes Nixon, "He conceived the Presidency almost entirely as a foreign policy making office. He also had a lively appreciation of the potential domestic political rewards of personal diplomacy. Whenever Johnson's Glassboro meeting with Kosygin came up, Nixon noted with amazement that nothing had happened there, yet Johnson's poll-rating jumped sharply."[169] We can be sure that the lesson did not go unlearned.

But what of Kissinger's part in the decision? There have been conflicting reports on Kissinger's position, and the variance stems largely from Kissinger's attempt to keep his image as the administration's dove intact among intellectuals. I was in Washington at the time of the Haiphong crisis and spoke with a number of people working on the NSC staff. It was clear from these interviews that Kissinger was in favor of the move, even though later some of the sources bought Kissinger's later "doubts" story. After the event, Kissinger let loose with a few

hints that he was not one hundred percent behind the President's decision. I must agree with the Kalbs that it is highly possible Kissinger was simply manipulating the press and as an aide put it, "agonizing about his image with the liberal community."[170]

It is almost certain Kissinger took an active and supportive role in the decision. He had secretly gone to the Soviet Union and as an aide told me "felt out the Communists". The Kalbs tell us that "Moorer and Kissinger were the strongest advocates of B-52 strikes against North Vietnam's capital and its major port."[171] Kissinger needed a "signal" that the U.S. would not tolerate being humiliated by the communist offensive at any cost, including the upcoming summit.

The costs however could have been much greater than a cancelled summit. How far could the Soviet Union and China go in ignoring the destruction of their own ships in Haiphong?[172] Certainly the risks of big power confrontation were great even with the secret consultations. Not only were the risks great, but militarily the move was thought to be at best dubious. Once again risk and being alone were central to the dynamics of decision-making.

Both Kissinger and Nixon felt that the North's offensive was an affront to American power and that, therefore, we would have to respond or be embarrassed militarily—a condition which Kissinger had stated was unacceptable (see opening quote to this chapter). We must conclude that the decision to mine Haiphong was heavily colored by psychological proclivities which forced Kissinger not to run away from risks, not to allow himself to be embarrassed, and not to allow the situation to get out of control.

The decision to mine Haiphong is important in pointing up the most dangerous aspects of the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine in both its intellectual rationalizations and psychological mind-set. The Haiphong incident is an excellent example, as was the Cambodia decision, of the basic presuppositions of global diplomacy. In I. F. Stone's words:

> It is now clear that Nixon took the gamble on Vietnamization in the hope that if this failed, a bigger gamble would succeed. The bigger gamble . . . was either to buy off Moscow and Peking or, if that didn't work, to use the threat of nuclear confrontation to make them stand by while we destroyed North Vietnam from the air. In other words, if his gamble failed he was and is prepared to gamble America's future and the world's. This is the reality behind Nixon's proclaimed "search for a generation of peace."[173]

Had an administration been in office that did not view Vietnam as a test and which did not feel the need to demonstrate strength and face risks, there is a great probability that the war would not have lasted an additional four years.

X. UP FROM THE TEST

> "To cooperate without losing one's soul, to assist without sacrificing one's identity, to work for deliverance in the guise of bondage and under enforced silence, what harder test of moral toughness exists?"
>
> –Henry Kissinger,
> *A World Restored*

Consistently Kissinger has shown that "it is the strong opponent that counts."[174] His concern in the peace negotiations were so exclusively centered upon Le Duc Tho that he over-looked Thieu, which resulted in the December blood bath.[175] "Allies are tiresome necessities, but adversaries pose a challenge that can be capped with the sweet triumph of a hard bargained deal."[176] It was Kissinger's need as a youth to organize the chaos which surrounded him that sent him in search of strong figures. That search may have ended, but its lessons for Kissinger remain.

In a review of the Kalb's book, Ronald Steel summarizes the impression one receives after reading their account. I invite the reader to compare this summary with the characteristics of the depressive personality with which we began this essay:

> one sees his hypersensitivity to criticism, his insistence on personalizing any disagreement, his self-pity and much-advertised paranoia, his lack of self-confidence (which may explain his fear of appearing 'soft' and his hard-line position on military policy), his insensitivity to those serving under him, and his obsequiousness toward those of higher standing. These are not unique traits, and are not more contemptible than those of many great men. But they are important if we are to understand the person Kissinger is.[177]

Kissinger did not stay in his youthful cocoon. He would come back from total non-involvement with others to the point of being the center of world attention, involved in all our lives. There was a point in Kissinger's life when he quit "crossing to the other side of the street."

Today Kissinger continues to view his own performance in terms of uncertainty and as a test, as in his remarks about his own period of statesmanship. He has said, "The great danger of any policy is to project the present into the future. You have to base your bet on a judgement which cannot be proved true. This takes inward strength. It takes someone who is not worried by being alone a while."[178] A bet is another form of test. There is the same uncertainty and in effect a bet is simply a test of intuition, or, in the sense implied by Kissinger, of knowledge

of the situation. The policy-maker does not base his *decision*, but his *bet*, on a judgement which cannot be proved.

When there is a bureaucratic structure in which all information is funneled through one channel, and responsibility for decision-making is a "lonely process", this tendency toward risk-taking increases the possibility of losing the bet or failing the test. It is refreshing to have leaders who at least tacitly recognize their fallibility, but when all the chips are in the pot it would be best to *avoid* risks than to have to always confront uncertainty. Brodine and Selden summarize this tendency toward risk-taking in their admirable analysis of the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine entitled *The Open Secret*. In their words:

> Kissinger's entire system minimizes the opportunity for those who would avoid risk to affect the final outcome of a decision. . . . When wise and humane counsel is needed we may anticipate instead a confrontation called for by those 'strong nerves' characteristic of the Kissinger ideal of statesmanship, that willingness to 'fact up to the risks of Armageddon' in the hope that the other side will back down.[179]

Brodine and Selden's statement turned out to be prophetic in the case of the "Red Alert" initiated by Kissinger in October of 1973. Here was a clear case in which the crackpot realism of the Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine brought us into a direct and, by most unofficial accounts, unnecessary confrontation with the Soviet Union.[180]

Thus Kissinger, backed by American fire power, has offset his past avoidance of risks, behavior for which he severely castigated others, with a need to place himself in situations where he could demonstrate his courage, strength, adequacy or ability. His entire philosophy as expounded in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* is based on the "willingness to face up to the risks." This is in marked contrast to the young boy who ran to the other side of the street to avoid the risk of an oncoming threat. Unfortunately, today his personal tests become meshed with national tests. The danger of course is that in an attempt to prove his worth, Kissinger is apt to attempt to pull something off, the resources for which he lacks.

There is a second aspect to this sort of behavior. As emphasized in his cowboy statement, and his bet statement, and his statement referring to the lack of courage on the part of intellectuals and policy-makers, the political actor is viewed as one who must act *alone*. Kissinger made a revealing comment on the subject when he said: "This romantic and surprising character suits me because being alone has always been part of my style, or, if you wish, of my technique."[181] If we remember Kissinger's lauding of Metternich's technique which was a

"symbol of certainty" then it would seem that Kissinger views himself in much the same romanticized manner in which he viewed his "beau-ideals". But somehow Kissinger decked out in chaps and spurs, riding his horse with a briefcase tucked beneath his arm is a tragically ridiculous figure.

"Being alone" was the symbol of the Nixon Administration. Decisions were not cooperative and consultative decisions, but "lonely" decisions. Nixon's retreat to Camp David or to Key Biscaine before major decisions had an air of deliberativeness about them. But there is another side to the coin. If one makes decisions alone there is no one present who can sense or see doubt. No one to turn to and admit uncertainty, no one to see weakness. Neither is there anyone to suggest alternatives. Psychologically, being alone is one means of protection from a world perceived as hostile and is a protection against a self which is experienced as unembodied or dismembered in the presence of others. To what extent this is the motivation behind both Nixon's[182] and Kissinger's retreat into isolation has yet to be investigated; but from what we know of Kissinger's past and his personality, being alone serves as a means of protection against revealing doubt or uncertainty and is felt as a "safe" and "strong" condition. Thus a personal, psychological characteristic became a public, governmental method of operation. Decisions became personal tests; national pride was tested in Vietnam and our willingness to stand up and fight was tested in Haiphong and reflected in Red Alerts.

If we take Kissinger's marked intellectual preference for facing risks and his belief that leaders must stand alone on certain issues against public opinion, we can begin to understand his psychological readiness to escalate the level of violence in Vietnam. The four years of Nixon's first administration far exceeded the boundaries of violence set by President Johnson. It was after Nixon's election that the United States moved into Cambodia, mined Haiphong Harbor, bombed Hanoi, and, to an extent not matched in any other period, exported violence in the form of "protective reaction strikes" outside the area of Vietnam proper. All of these actions involved steadily increasing risks of big-power confrontation.[183] In terms of magnitude, the actions taken during this period far exceed the level of violence and destruction of other post WWII brinksmen. While the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis were equally tense moments in our history, they were in no way equal in terms of actual death and destruction attendant upon U.S. actions in Vietnam. Measured in actual human suffering, the bellicosity of Dulles or Kennedy brinksmanship is more than equalled by the Nixon-Kissinger version of Global Diplomacy.

It may well be the "loneliness" theme which provides for the increased readiness to ignore the human costs of violence. One aspect of the depressive personality that is an important component of this style

is the tendency toward withdrawal and lack of involvement or empathy with others. It is significant that Kissinger's concerns are largely with the abstract; with women in occupied countries, not specific individuals; with women as a hobby, not in their uniqueness; with order and chaos, and not individual lives and individual deaths. When extended to the actual conduct of decision-making, this tendency results in the abstract pursuit of empty phrases like "peace with honor" or "a generation of peace". It was largely as a result of the consultative nature of Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis that a blockade was settled upon rather than the more violent "surgical air strikes" which were Kennedy's first instinctive reaction.[184] The pressure of others who were involved in the actual decision-making was one of the reasons why an alternative was settled upon. In Kissinger's "lonely road" there is no opportunity for those who would exercise caution to have their views heard.[185]

There can be little doubt that at the bottom of Kissinger's political action are his private motivations. In a later work I will go more into the political issues, but for the moment, I hope I have established the psychological beginning to an understanding of Kissinger's role in American foreign policy.

Kissinger is searching for an external order that can substitute for his inner chaos. Uncomfortable with ambiguity, he responds with a pervasive moral certainty. Countering internal threats to his being, he projects his anxiety onto appropriate objects in the real world and invests them with an affect that indicates an intensity much greater than might seem appropriate. The displacement is then transformed into an intellectual rationalization in an attempt to tame and strip the fears of their power over him. As a political actor he attempts to transform his intellectual rationalizations into political reality.

How much of this political reality is the product of Kissinger's actions and how much is Nixon's, is the most unsatisfactory aspect of the analysis. Their compatibility makes this task particularly difficult. Indeed, the compatibility of the two men is reminiscent of Wilson and Colonel House in which House played upon Wilson's needs to satisfy his own ambition.

William Appleman Williams once commented on the Nixon-Kissinger relationship in much the same manner. Williams describes Nixon as a man fleeing forward from a lack of a sense of self. As Nixon has said, "Any person tends to vegetate unless he is moving on a fast track."[186] Thus when Nixon and Kissinger met, Kissinger's desire for control of his environment overcame a strong personal dislike of Nixon and combined with Nixon's need for a new frontier. "Kissinger understood (or sensed) . . . [that] for a man fleeing forward the last frontier is the world. There is the virgin land where a man can find and fulfill himself (see H. N. Smith's *Virgin Land*). And no doubt about it, the making of

foreign policy within *that* idiom *is* the fastest track of all."[187] But like all tracks, it is circular and the race becomes an endless repetition. Unfortunately, as Marx pointed out long ago, the second time around is a farce.

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REFERENCES

I would like to express my gratitude to Marvin Zonis, Susanne Rudolph and Ted Wysocki who read and criticized the paper at an early stage in its development, and to Lloyd deMause for his suggestion of the concept of the depressive personality and for his skill and thoughtfulness as an editor.

1. *The President and the Management of National Security*, Clark and Legere, eds., (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 8.
2. The analysis of the depressive personality is based upon Wolman's account in *Call No Man Normal*,Benjamin B. Wolman, (New York: International Univer-
3. sities Press, Inc., 1973).
3. *Chicago Daily News*, Gaylord Shaw, May 2, 1972.
4. *Harpers*, J. Kraft, January, 1971.
5. *New York Times*, November 14, 1971.
6. Interview on August 28, 1974 with Jack Heiman.
7. From talks with friends of the family, there is some reason to think that Louis Kissinger had believed in the pre-Nazi myths of the German culture, and that to a large extent he held an assimilationist attitude. For that reason the shock of Hitler must have been that much more distressing and unbelievable to him. This would account for his stunned reaction to Hitler's rise as will be discussed below. However, I should caution the reader that there is no direct evidence of this assimilationist attitude, only inferences made by old friends.
8. *Atlantic Monthly*, "Professor Bismarck goes to Washington", by Nora Beloff, December, 1969.
9. *Chicago Daily News*, Gaylord Shaw, May 2, 1972.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Time*, Feb., 14, 1971.
12. *New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1971.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Heiman interview, August 28, 1974.
15. For more on this subject see my master's thesis at the University of Chicago: *Kissinger: A Study in Personality*.
16. *Reader's Digest*, October, 1969.
17. Howard Rome, "The Social Origin of the Depressive Personality", *Psychiatric Annals*, June, 1974.
18. Wolman, *op. cit.*, p. 244.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
22. Heiman interview, August 28, 1974.
23. *New York Post*, series ran between June 3 and June 15, 1974, hereafter cited as *Post* Series.
24. Heiman interview, August 28, 1974
25. *Chicago Sun Times*, October 24, 1971, "He's President Nixon's Brainchild", by Lloyd Shearer.

26. Heiman interview, August 28, 1974.
27. Wolman, p. 231.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 230-1.
29. *Post* series.
30. Heiman interview, August 28, 1974.
31. *Ibid.*
32. The question of course is what was Walter's response? Perhaps because of his special relation to Jack, his more secure sense of self, or a closer relation to his mother (which must be investigated further) Walter may have been better able to deal with the situation. Naturally this is a major gap in the data which we hopefully will be able to fill later.
33. Heiman interview, August 28, 1974.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Post* series.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Chicago Daily News*, May 2, 1972, Gaylord Shaw.
42. Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Grosset & Dunlap: New York, 1964), p. 83.
43. *New York Times*, November 14, 1971.
44. See David Landau, *Kissinger: The Uses of Power* (Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1972), p. 75-77 for details of the intellectual reaction.
45. Based on two interviews with ex-members of the National Security Council Staff. Another reason of course has to do with the White House relationship with the press and other political considerations.
46. *Harpers*, January, 1971, article by J. Kraft.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. Henry Kissinger, *The Necessity For Choice* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 8.
50. *Harpers*, January, 1971, article by J. Kraft.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Atlantic Monthly*, Beloff, December, 1969.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Interview with the author, December 16, 1972.
55. I use the term "hero" because even though "hero" is a word which tends to brind faint smiles and visions of knights and damsels in distress, the word is used repeatedly by Kissinger in his own conversations and writing. To Kissinger, a hero is a specific sort of individual who acts alone in the face of overpowering obstacles.
56. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
57. *Look*, August 12, 1969.
58. *Time*, December 22, 1969, p. 23.
59. Kissinger, *Necessity for Choice, op. cit.*, p. 290.
60. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 130-31.
61. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
63. For the theoretical foundation of what follows see Erik Erikson; *Identity: Youth and Crisis, op. cit.*, *Young Man Luther* (New York: Norton, 1962), *Childhood and Society*, (New York: Norton, 1963), and *Insight and Responsibility* (New York: Norton, 1964).
64. *Identity: Youth and Crisis, op. cit.*, p. 257.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
66. *Atlantic Monthly*, Beloff, December, 1969.
67. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 18-19.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
69. *New York Times Magazine*, November 14, 1971, p. 107.
70. *Ibid.*

71. *Ibid.*
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Post* series.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*
76. Wolman, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
77. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis, op. cit.*, p. 184.
78. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 20-21.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
80. *Chicago Daily News,* Gaylord Shaw, *op. cit.*, May 2, 1972.
81. *Ibid.*
82. Interview with a friend of Kissinger's from the Harvard days, December, 16, 1972.
83. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 40-41.
84. *Harpers,* Jan., 1971.
85. *Post* Series.
86. Interview by the author with a close friend during and after the Harvard years on December 16, 1972.
87. *Post* Series.
88. *New York Times,* November 14, 1971.
89. Interview, December 16, 1972.
90. *Ibid.*
91. *Ibid.*
92. An alternative interpretation might be that Kissinger cared about what the "public" thought of his judgement. In that case his assault upon Ann would be a public advertisement that he too knew she was no credit to him. But I feel this interpretation has less validity than that which is developed in the body of the paper; for if he cared about what the public thought of his judgement then it would seem that he would not want to call attention to his "mistake".
93. Interview with one of Kissinger's old friends on December 16, 1972.
94. R. D. Laing, *Divided Self,* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Inc.; 1971), p. 48.
95. Wolman, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
96. Kissinger, *Necessity for Choice, op. cit.*, p. 303.
97. Charles Ashman, *Kissinger: The Adventures of Super-Kraut* (Secaucus, New Jersey: Lyle Stuart, 1972), p. 59.
98. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
99. Interview on December 16, 1972 with an old friend.
100. Interview, Dec. 16, 1972.
101. *Ibid.*
102. Wolman, *op. cit.*, p. 247.
103. Interview December 16, 1972.
104. *Ibid.*
105. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
106. Beloff, *op. cit.*
107. *Ibid.*
108. An interesting sidelight to the International Seminar is that in April of 1967 "The summer school International Seminar at Harvard which Professor Kissinger directs was identified as the recipient of funds used by thirteen foundations as conduits for the CIA. He denied any knowledge of the origin of the money and said that the program had not been influenced by it." *New York Times,* December 4, 1968.
109. As Landau has written, "The great bulk of his writing contains ideas that have originated elsewhere. His first publications on limited nuclear war drew heavily from earlier work by Bernard Brodie, James Gavin, and Edward Teller . . . His ideas about negotiation and tacit communication depended almost entirely on the writings of Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn . . . To say that Kissinger was an intellectual pioneer in any of these areas would be a gross overstatement." Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

110. Interview on May 10, 1972.
111. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 48, quoting Kissinger in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 37-8.
112. Kissinger, in *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security*, ed. Brennan, 1961, p. 143.
113. Interview with a member of NSC staff, May 11, 1972, and below.
114. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
116. I. F. Stone, *New York Review of Books*, November 2, 1972, p. 22.
117. I. F. Stone, *New York Review of Books*, October 19, 1972, p. 14.
118. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
120. *Newsweek*, December 22, 1969.
121. *Time*, February 14, 1969.
122. *Post* Series.
123. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 84-85.
124. J. Kraft, *Harpers*, January, 1971.
125. Wolman, *op. cit.*, p. 248.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
127. Wolman, *op. cit.*, p. 244.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
129. *Post* Series.
130. I. F. Stone, *New York Review of Books*, November 2, 1972, p. 23.
131. *A World Restored*, *op. cit.*, p. 331.
132. *Chicago Daily News*, Shaw, May 2, 1972.
133. *Chicago Sun Times*, Shearer, October 24, 1971.
134. *A World Restored*, *op. cit.*, p. 8-9.
135. Kissinger, *Daedelus*, Spring, 1968.
136. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
137. *A World Restored*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
138. A critic has argued that Kissinger's arrogance may simply be a cultural characteristic and not a peculiarity of Kissinger's personality. I feel that Kissinger's arrogance may well be supported by German cultural traditions which lean toward the arrogant, but that given the language in the preceeding quote I doubt that culture was, in this respect, the determining factor. The language romanticizes the tranquility of the pre-revolutionary world and emphasizes the impossibility of attaining certitude after disruption. Kissinger knew what it was like to live through revolution and would attempt to incorporate the certitude of pre-revolutionary life by copying Metternich's style–but lacking the certitude of youth, his behavior results in arrogance.
139. *Harpers*, J. Kraft, *op. cit.*, January, 1971.
140. *Post* Series.
141. See my masters' thesis for details, *op. cit.*
142. See Beloff, *op. cit.*, p. 87, and a television interview on CBS's *60 Minutes*, November 18, 1972.
143. Beloff, *op. cit.*
144. *A World Restored*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
145. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
146. *Necessity for Choice*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
147. Kissinger, "Policy Maker and the Intellectual", reprinted from the *Reporter*, March 5, 1959, in Selected Materials from Senator Jackson's report of the subcommittee on Government Operation, *Organizing for National Security*, 1960, p. 256.
148. *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1969, "The Vietnam Negotiations", Henry Kissinger.
149. *Ibid.*
150. *Ibid.*
151. *Ibid.*
152. *U.S. News & World Report*, May 11, 1970.
153. Marvin and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little Brown & Co.), 1974, p. 161.

154. *New York Times*, June 14, 1970.
155. *Harpers, op. cit.*, January 1971.
156. Kalb and Kalb, *op. cit.*, p. 164.
157. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
158. *New Yorker*, May 9, 1970.
159. Erikson, *Childhood and Society, op. cit.*, p. 257.
160. *Look*, August 12, 1969.
161. *New York Review of Books*, June 1, 1972.
162. Richard Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag* (New York: Houghton Miflin Co., 1972).
163. *New York Review of Books*, June 1, 1972, quoted from NSSM #1.
164. *Ibid.*
165. *Ibid.*
166. Whalen, *op. cit.*, quoted in I. F. Stone, *NYRB*, June 1, 1972.
167. *Ibid.*
168. *NYRB*, June 1, 1972, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
169. Whalen, *op. cit.*
170. Kalb and Kalb, *op. cit.*, p. 301.
171. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
172. There were reports, unacknowledged by China or the Soviet Union, that at least one ship was damaged. See *Facts on File*, May 1972.
173. *NYRB, op. cit.*, June 1, 1972.
174. *NYRB*, September 19, 1974, p. 25.
175. For details see Kalb and Kalb, *op. cit.*, and "Behind the Cease Fire Agreement, by Tad Szulc, *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1974.
176. *NYRB*, September, 19, 1974, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
177. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
178. *Newsweek*, August 21, 1972.
179. Brodine and Selden, *The Open Secret: The Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine in Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 7.
180. For details see: Roger Morris, "Kissinger and the Brothers Kalb", *Washington Monthly*, July/August, 1974.
181. Fallaci, *op. cit.*, December 16, 1972.
182. For evidence of Nixon's retreat see a similar approach to mine in Bruce Mazlish's *In Search of Nixon* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972).
183. The most risky being the mining of Haiphong Harbor with the possibility of damaging foreign ships.
184. See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971).
185. And I am not holding the Kennedy system up as a model of decision-making, but simply saying that the increased circle of decision makers changed the flow of the process and helped, to a small degree, to balance some of the personality factors–a balance which was lacking in the Nixon Administration.
186. William Appleman Williams, *New York Review of Books*, February 24, 1972, quoting Nixon.
187. *Ibid.*

All back issues of the *Journal* are available at $3.50 each ($2.50 each for 10 or more copies). Many college classes have begun using the *Journal* as supplementary material, in particular the Hitler Symposium issue (Vol. I, No. 2) in history courses, the Evolution of Childhood Symposium issue (Vol. I, No. 4) in History of Childhood courses, and the current issue which you are now reading has been ordered for several political psychology courses. You may obtain copies of all issues by writing *History of Childhood Quarterly*, 2315 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10024.

Pedagogy as Intrusion: Teaching Values in Popular Primary Schools in Nineteenth-Century America

BARBARA FINKELSTEIN

One function of teachers in popular primary schools in nineteenth-century America was then, as it is now, to instruct students in the fundamentals of literacy.[1] But there is considerable evidence suggesting that teachers engaged in activities which can be understood as attempts to direct the social and moral as well as the intellectual behavior of their students–to shape their attitudes, to form their patterns of behavior, and to endow them with manners and morals. Indeed, the literature of school description suggests that teachers in popular primary schools throughout the nineteenth century conveyed values to students in a rigid and highly controlling manner.[2] Their behavior toward students within classroom settings both complimented and extended the intrusive mode of child-rearing as defined recently in the pioneering work of Lloyd deMause.[3] Teachers it would seem, had responsibility for maintaining and transmitting traditional values in a society undergoing drastic economic and social dislocations.

Both deMause and Phillipe Ariès (in a rare instance of agreement) have emphasized the simultaneity of the discovery or recognition of modern childhood and the emergence of parental attitudes of vigilance over the lives of their children. Both have agreed that these two concurrent, if not causally related events, conferred a new quality and possibility to child-rearing–that of an "over-controlling," carefully planned regimen of protection and supervision.[4] For parents, it meant minute

attention to, and constant preoccupation with, their children. "The child raised by intrusive parents was nursed by the mother, not swaddled, not given regular enemas, toilet trained early, prayed with but not played with, hit but not regularly whipped, punished for masturbation, and made to obey promptly with threats and guilt as often as with other methods of punishment."[5] While neither child-oriented nor, as deMause puts it, empathic, intrusion nonetheless represented an alternative to the shocking history of infanticide, abandonment, negligence and indifference which appears to have characterized the treatment of children until well into the eighteenth century.

Phillipe Ariès has linked the recognition of modern childhood and the emergence of what deMause calls the intrusive mode of child-rearing to the growth of systematic, deliberate and sustained age-graded schooling outside the household.[6] No such link appears to have existed in colonial America, but there is reason to believe that the commitment of American parents to intrusive modes of child-rearing helps to explain why, by the mid-nineteenth century, schools had become important agencies of acculturation—as important in many respects as the family and the church.

Colonial Americans were heirs to the tradition of intrusive child-rearing. The manuals of conduct, the prescriptions of preachers, the injunctions of Selectmen, and the corpus of colonial law, all suggest the need for eternal parental vigilance over the lives of children. A well-ordered family was expected to induce children to be obedient, pious, diligent, civil, mannerly and clean. The family also assumed principal responsibility for preparing children in learning and in labor and for seeing to their ability to read and understand the "principles of religion" and the "capital laws of the country."[7] Lawrence A. Cremin has made the interesting point that the colonial household was an even more important agency of education than was its English counterpart.[8]

The variety of nurturing practices thus far documented[9]—early weaning from mother or wet-nurse, and generous, if not brutal, use of the rod in order to break the will, harden the emotions, and discipline the intellect—were carried out chiefly by the family, but with the help of churchmen and schoolmasters. Churchmen sermonized and cathechized with the sanction of public authority to enforce their preachments.[10] Less commonly, schoolteachers, in an infinite variety of contractual relationships and environmental settings, supplemented the educational efforts of families.[11]

The ability and the desire of colonial parents to transmit culture in accordance with moral and legal precepts within the household was undermined by the time of the American revolution. Bernard Bailyn has brilliantly argued that the social as well as educational functions of apprenticeship and bonded servitude were being subverted as servants

and apprentices escaped to freedom and independent wage labor. Without the help of skilled indentured servants, colonial parents had to share the extraordinary responsibilities of intrusive child-rearing with educational agencies outside the home. The emergence of evening schools and of independent masters to transmit vocational and even literary skills represented, as Bailyn has suggested, the differentiation of household functions into new social structures.[12]

Both Bailyn and Cremin have advanced the idea that the ability of churchmen to secure conformity to their faith through public utterance and indirectly through the household, was limited in the unstable, highly mobile, and heterogeneous society of the eighteenth century. As they gradually lost the full sanction of public authority, churchmen built schools and colleges which were designed to persuade and exort, to secure uniformity of belief as well as to convey literacy. Church schools, like evening schools, provided parents with yet another differentiated institution of education.[13]

Schools were becoming more important adjuncts of the home, not only because families and masters could no longer assume all of the responsibilities of intrusive child-rearing within the household, not only because churchmen built schools when they were no longer able to compel piety effectively through public utterance, but because parents themselves felt ambivalently toward their children. John Walzer, identifying, analyzing, and documenting ambivalence in the attitudes of some eighteenth-century colonial parents toward their children, intriguingly suggests that sending children to school at an early age represented on the one hand, a parental desire to be rid of children, while at the same time, represented a holding-on—an important part of inculcating proper attitudes and ideals and at the same time providing a place of confinement, protection, and restraint outside the home.[14]

Schools continued to become increasingly available to parents after the revolution. The story of their growth and development has been told many times over, in different ways by different historians.[15]

The fact that parents supported schools by sending their children—and in increasingly large numbers over time in the nineteenth century—might well reflect the institutionalization of ambivalence as well as the recognition by parents of their inability to protect, to restrain, to transmit values, and to purvey literacy effectively without the support of educational institutions outside the household.

On isolated homesteads scattered throughout the country in the nineteenth century, nuclear families were widely dispersed. Thousands of yeomen farmers who needed the labor of their children, nonetheless sent their children to school during slack seasons—usually the winter and/or summer. Young children between the ages of 3, 4, and 5 frequently accompanied older brothers and sisters to school when their

labor was not needed at home. Indeed, the literature of school description indicates that the thousands of one-room schools, scattered throughout the nation, almost always housed a compliment of the very young. Doubtless, overworked parents were relieved to be rid of their small charges for a time, in an arrangement that would secure literacy as well as keep the children from idleness.[16]

In the cities there were even more compelling reasons for sending children to school. Rapid alterations in family patterns in middle-class urban America–as suggested to date–placed the responsibility of child-rearing almost exclusively in the hands of mothers. In cities–and their growth was impressive during the nineteenth century–opportunities for work drew fathers physically away from the domestic sphere. Isolated from informal ties to relatives and neighbors, without a rich network of kinship and friendship, urban middle-class women and men were hindered from meeting other city dwellers in an intimate or communal manner.[17] Forced to rear their children unassisted by wet-nurses, with limited help from domestic servants, relatives or husbands, advised by popular writers such as Catherine Beecher, Sarah Hale, and Lydia Signourey to keep the domestic hearth free of pollution from the values of the market place, enjoined by the likes of Jacob Abbott and Horace Mann to do a mother's duty by rearing children vigilantly and by sending them to school,[18] it is hardly surprising that the common school reformers found a sizeable public that was ready to support the public schools by sending their children. For parents who did not require the labor of their children, and who were committed to intrusive nurture, the schools must have appeared to be an alternative to the streets, and the teachers to be parent-surrogates with special skills.[19]

For the poor and unskilled–whose ethnicity and social origins varied–survival depended on the wages of all members of the household. Before 1850, children and mothers as well as fathers were likely to work.[20] While there is evidence to suggest there were immigrant and poor parents who willingly sent their children to school,[21] there is also reason to believe that any children of poverty were in school because they were persuaded by the church, or often by civil authority. What had been a useful extension of home-rearing for the English speaking middle classes, was, for many poor, to become a lesson in the virtues of intrusive nurture.[22]

While the literature concerning the non-cognitive aspects of teacher behavior is at best sparse, it is clear that there were teachers, students, and observers who understood that pedagogues undertook moral and political as well as intellectual responsibilities within the classroom setting. Some obviously believed that children were by nature not only imperfectly literate, but morally deficient, and proceeded as though the teacher should act not only as mental disciplinarian to students, but as

moral overseer. This attitude was beautifully rationalized in the poetry of a rural schoolmaster: "an endless throng of heedless children in mad pursuit of illusive childish joys dance by his station. If left unwarned they would surely choose the downward way . . .".[23] A Pennsylvania teacher of the 1850's expressed similar fears about his first class when he intoned that the whole future life of these boys and girls ". . . might be rightly shaped or malformed" in his classroom. His intention was to instill ". . . a right appreciation of the world, its people and its destiny."[24] A woman teacher suggested that she never neglected to ". . . instill into the minds of pupils a sense of the nobleness of doing right because it was right . ." Less grand, but no less to the point, was this assertion of the Boston grammar schoolmasters who had controlled popular schooling in Boston in the 1830's and 1840's:

> The object of the elementary instruction of our schools . . . is, not alone to impart a certain amount of knowledge to the pupils, but to give . . . training . . . to discipline and strengthen their minds, and prepare them, as far as possible, for that independent action, which will be required of them in the discharge of the duties of life.[25]

Twenty years later, the Boston School Committee defined the teacher's obligation as moral and spiritual as well as intellectual:

> Taking children at random from a great city, undisciplined, uninstructed, often with inveterate forwardness and obstinacy, and with the inherited stupidity of centuries of ignorant ancestors; forming them from animals into intellectual beings, and . . . from intellectual beings into spiritual beings; giving to many their first appreciation of what is wise, what is true, what is lovely and what is pure.[26]

The Baltimore school commissioners also emphasized moral intrusion when they asserted that the successful teacher had to raise the moral and intellectual powers of the youngest citizens and suppress the lower passions and propensities.[27]

Other teachers, characterizations of whom appear with greater frequency in the second half of the century in populous village and large urban schools, expressed their supra-intellectual aspirations using political rather than moral metaphors. One woman, for example, likened her role in the classroom to that of a governor, whose primary function was to secure a voluntary compliance to law and order without recourse to police powers. "Always a governor, never a tyrant," hung on her walls.[28] A teacher in a New Jersey village school confiscated a knife from a violent student, not with an exclamation of moral censure, but with a concern for social order. "I confiscate this weapon . . ." he cried, "in the name of the commonwealth."[29] Similarly, a mother-teacher

writing in a popular magazine, likened the school to a "miniature kingdom, with its rulers and executive officers, its honors, penalties and forfeitures . . . rewards and punishments."[30]

The social and political concerns of the teachers can be inferred not only from their stated aspirations, but from characterizations of the classroom situation. William A. Mowry, a professional teacher in rural schools for over half a century, suggested that country schools and teachers performed a unique socializing function. The farm he explained, ". . . furnishes the members of only one family as companions." But the district school to a large extent, remedies this defect and gives the very best social stimulus to children:

> Here the boys receive their first lessons in true democracy. All children of the neighborhood meet on a common level. To all are accorded the same rights, to all are assigned the same tasks, in all the same powers are developed, and all are subject to the same discipline. Each boy measures himself with his peers. . . .[31]

"A school . . .," recalled a Southern gentleman who had attended old field schools in the South in the 1840's and 1850's, "is a world within itself. In it the inhabitants learn to give and take as they must do in the larger world after school days are over."[32] And a New England master who had taught in the 1820's, '30's and '40's remembered years later that he ". . . had charge of forty children . . . from every kind of family, representing every phase of human nature. The bright and the stupid, the roguish and the ugly, the restless and the turbulent were all huddled in together, a little world in embryo . . ."[33] ". . . quite apart from any special subject matter," remarked Henry Johnson, "we received our most amazing practice in fundamental social virtues."[34] While some of this may well have reflected the romanticism or ideology of the viewer, much of it was doubtless accurate observation.

Foreign travelers were equally sensitive to the social and political possibilities of moral training. Education, explained Patrick Shirreff, ". . . is most effectual when combining industrious and moral habits with the highest degree of mental cultivation. . . ."[35] David Macrae, another traveler who had observed schools in the 1870's, remarked that teachers ". . . sent students forth not only instructed, but disciplined—taught how to behave themselves as little citizens of the republic in which every boy is to be a gentleman, and every girl a lady."[36] Alexander Macmillan was struck by the extreme sensitivity of Americans, and especially of American parents and teachers "as to character."[37]

While the literature, as we have seen, is not without descriptions of teachers who were conscious of and committed to their roles as moral overseers or political stewards, the typical teacher was not overly conscious of these roles. Nonetheless, he or she engaged in activities that even went considerably beyond moral training.

Even in their most narrow capacity as mental disciplinarians, teachers were indirectly, and probably unconsciously, involved in the formation of social loyalties. Their tendency to rely almost completely on the texts meant that students, as they learned to read, write, cipher, and draw maps, imbibed the moral maxims, the political pieties, and the economic and social preachments of the writers whose books the students were commonly asked to memorize.[38] And in the process, the teachers served as agents of the adult community, not only by insisting that students accept the pieties of the texts, but by creating relationships which rested on the assumption that the students if not morally evil were at least morally and rationally undefined, incapable of proper behavior without external compulsion. Indeed, teachers behaved as though they believed that one of their principal duties was to create an environment that would suppress spontaneity, would discourage communication between students, and they would force pupils to suspend their impulses and derive standards of conduct solely from the teacher.

East, west, north, and south, in every kind of teaching situation, we find that teachers consistently pressured students to learn the value of conformity to law. One expression of the commitment was, of course, their near universal demand for obedience. Even the most humanitarian pedagogues insisted that schooling could not proceed properly without the recognition of the absolute authority of the teacher. "The first step which a teacher must take . . ." enjoined Jacob Abbott in a lecture to the American Institute of Instruction in 1831, "is to obtain the entire unqualified submission of the school to his authority."[39] Francis Wayland echoed these sentiments in a widely-publicized book on moral science: ". . . it is the duty of the instructor to enforce obedience, and of the pupil to render it." He goes on to explain that the pupil is inferior and is under the obligation of obedience.[40] Millard Fillmore Kennedy, a New England Schoolmaster for some thirty years, recalled these requirements for a successful teacher. ". . . the teacher has to have absolute power. . . . He was expected to rule by 'suasion, if he chose, by rough-and-tumble force if necessary."[41]

Not surprisingly, the need for classroom obedience was often portrayed as indispensable to the preservation of social order in the larger society. The grammar schoolmasters of Boston, distressed with what they believed to be Horace Mann's misunderstanding of authority lines in the school, posited this maxim:

> Implicit obedience to rightful authority must be inculcated and enforced upon children as the very germ of all good order in future society; no one, who thinks soundly and follows out principles to their necessary results, will presume to deny.[42]

Little different were the sentiments expressed some forty years later in the report of a national commission of school administrators in 1874:

"The teacher has an obligation to train the pupils into habits of prompt obedience to his teacher . . . in order that he may be prepared for a life wherein there is little police-restraint on the part of constituted authorities."[43] C. D. Arfwedson, who observed scores of schools in New York City in the early 1840's commented that social order was well served by teachers who kept students in strictest subordination.[44] Another observer quipped that "turbulent boys soon learned they had no power and submitted."[45] David Macrae, who visited schools in New York in the 1870's, admired the ability of the teachers to inspire respect for and conformity to law.[46]

Needless to say, the insistence of teachers on obedience was not lost on their students. "Pedagogues . . . ," quipped one, "were installed to rule in dominant dignity and undisputed sway in their learned domain, with something like the divine right of kings."[47] An anonymous pupil who described his teacher in Kingston, New York, in the eighteen-twenties claimed that he embodied all the characteristics of a "dread monarch."

> The district school is often taught by
> some stern and robust man
> Who thinks all virtue must be sought
> in his coercive plan;
> Who like a power none can evade,
> would but command and be obeyed.[48]

Even more astute was this judgement rendered by an urban teacher who recalled his most severe teacher in New York City in the 1830's:

> . . . it must not be inferred that he was a brutal tyrant. It was only that the fundamental law of the school was obedience to rules, and seldom did any fellow incur chastisement, that he did not also have to listen to the quotation of Solomon's proverb, "The way of the transgressor is hard!" With all his severe discipline, there was no teacher in the school who was so generally loved.[49]

Alfred Holbrook described what was probably a near-universal sentiment in the schools of the 1820's and 1830's, that "disobedient boys required a brand of 'muscular Christianity.' "[50] Apparently Solomon's injunctions against spoiling children were frequently invoked by teachers in disciplining their errant students—yet another example of their commitment to stamping-in conformity to law.[51]

In the one-room schools of the countryside, where teachers typically combined a career in teaching with a career in farming, and boarded at the houses of their students, and where they knew and played with students out-side the schools, we find that teachers used a whole arsenal of measures to distinguish their office as teacher from their relation-

ship as parent, confidante, or friend.[52] That they made this distinction was reflected in the differing relationships between students and teachers on the playground and in the classroom. Hiram Orcutt, a rural schoolmaster in New England, described the difference in this way:

> Out of school hours I mingled familiarly with them, joined them in their sports, and sympathized with them in all their joys and sorrows. In their homes . . . and on the playground we stood on a common level. In the classroom, however, I was recognized as master, and so complete was their loyalty . . . that I could punish . . . without the least opposition on the part of the offender.[53]

A student who was raised in Andover, Massachusetts, recalled a lady whom she was sure "would have liked to kiss away the tears that followed the snaps [of a thimble] . . . but," she continued, "she was too much of a martinet for that so she contented herself with sniffs so loud and peculiar that we came to consider them a natural and necessary part of the proceeding."[54]

The most frequently described distancing device was, of course, the unilateral use of the rod which teachers displayed prominently and used consistently.[55] Conspicuous placement of quince, birch, maple, or hazel-tree whips, and of whipping posts "spoke volumes as to order and lessons well-learned." In the words of an Oregon teacher, "they were silent but forceful admonitions" to potentially disruptive or inattentive scholars.[56] Some particularly well-organized pedagogues had several rods hung behind their desks and developed thrashing into a fine art. A Texas student explained his teacher's system in this way: "The larger switches were graded, partly by the size of the boys and partly by the gravity of the offense." Some of the rods were little hazel-tree twigs while "the fourth size . . . was of oak and would have been better called clubs."[57]

Some teachers asserted their physical superiority in the opening days of school—a necessary distancing mechanism perhaps—in a classroom where students equated authority with muscle. A teacher who recalled his boyhood on the Tennessee frontier praised his favorite mentor as the one who could "beat them all at ball, jump a great distance and keep order. . . ."[58] Another, who was raised in the 1820's, admired his schoolmaster, Uncle Hugh, who could "fight for and with his flock even to the extent of engaging in duals."[59] A New England teacher prided himselt on his ability to use "Muscular Christianity,"[60] and another physically overpowered the big boys during the first day of class because he knew that "muscle was considered to be almost as important as brains."[61] There is even a story of a teacher who kept an unloaded Colt revolver in his desk in order to impress unruly boys in the opening weeks of class.[62]

Descriptions are legion of teachers who combined the cruelest physical torture with the more subtle persuasion of humiliation to maintain their authority and to secure obedience.[63] A Normal school principal described schooling in Oregon in the 1860's and '70's recalling that recalcitrant students would be "sent [to the] front to stand and face the pupils until his memory returned."[64] The experience of a Hardin County, Iowa man who attended schools in the 1860's suggests that his teacher had incorporated the collective wisdom of all other experts at humiliation. Not only did his teacher require disobedient students to stand with their arms extended or with a finger on a certain nailhead in the floor for a considerable time, but he often compelled them to sit on the girl's side, or forced them to squat in tortuous positions for hours on end.[65]

The fact that encounters between students and teachers in classrooms were likely to be physical as well as intellectual may well explain the characterizations of teachers by amateur wits and poets who recognized a muscular basis of pedagogical authority. An anonymous student described a Kingston, New York, teacher of the 1820's in this way: "He was a pedagog of the old stamp, with a most hearty belief in the code of discipline inculcated in the proverbs of the wise Jewish monarch whose name he so aptly bore . . . his rod was his scepter. . . ."[66] Brief and to the point is this widely quoted poem, devised by a woman recalling her Hoosier girlhood in the 1820's and 1830's:

> Brisk wielder of the birch and rule
> The master of the district school.[67]

The school, recalled a Pennsylvania teacher, was governed all together by the physical force of the ferule or rod. "The masters were neither educators, instructors, teachers nor trainers." "They specialized," he went on "in the use of the rod and cowskin, the rule and leather spectacles. . . ."[68]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, where teachers in country schools, not infrequently graded students into classes of equivalent achievement, teachers sought to combine moral persuasion with physical coercion in order to establish voluntary compliance to rules and regulations.[69] The literature is replete with descriptions, both abortive and successful, to make students aware of and responsible for their wrongdoings.[70] One popular way was to require students to keep a record of infractions. Henry Johnson described one teacher's utter failure:

> To develop a scrupulous honesty and a high sense of honor we kept a record of our deportment and reported the exact percentage in response to roll call at the end of each day. For our guidance, Miss Pember made a list of possible offenses with a

> scale of pena'ties . . . whispering:–2 points; hair pulling:–4; spit balls:–6; putting rubber in the stove:–15. If we fell below fifty, we had to stay after school and receive one tap of a ruler on the hand for each point below 50. This prompted competition for the lowest score. The taps became more numerous and the class, numbering 40, had to be divided into squads only one of which could be punished on the same day and the ruler taps lagged further and further behind. . . . She . . . lasted until Christmas vacation.[71]

No more successful were the efforts of another teacher who sought to encourage diligence by calling the roll at the end of each day and eliciting the words "perfect" or "imperfect" from his students. The rattan awaited students foolish enough to admit of imperfection.[72]

The tendency of the typical teacher to demand respect for and submission to his authority as master of the school, was in no way qualified when he himself behaved in less than saintly fashion. Indeed, the rural literature abounds with descriptions of teachers who commanded obedience to their office, at the same time as they vigorously drank, courted the girls, swore, and smoked in the schoolrooms.[73]

Informality within the classroom occurred, it would seem, only as a kind of ceremony or ritual, which eventually became part of the tradition of country schooling. Barrings-out–annual events during which students sought to fortify the schoolhouse in order to prevent the entrance of the master, and where the masters used every artifice to enter the classroom and reassert their authority as pedagogues–also symbolize the authority that the office of teacher was supposed to carry.[74] The following description of a barring-out in Pennsylvania schools in the 1840's and 1850's conveys a sense of ritualized informality that suffuses in the rural literature:

> On arriving at the door and finding it fastened, the teacher, affecting to be greatly enraged at the audacity of his school demanded . . . that it be immediately opened; but the answer from within was cool and defiant . . . when the conditions of surrender were presented to him . . . [he] indignantly pronounced them outrageous, and tore the paper into ribbons. He then declared that he was coming in if he had to pull the house down . . . and soon returned with the ax on his shoulder. . . . At this juncture the teacher vigorously assaulted the door, pounding it with an ax until he split it in several places. This availing him nothing, he climbed to the roof and commenced tearing away the clapboards. . . . His next point of attack was the south window. With the ax he tore off the cleats which held the sash in its place. . . . A little parley now ensued, when it was agreed that neither party was to strike or injure the other, but by all fair means at his command

> the master was to get in if he could, and the school were to keep him out if they could.[75]

That some teachers in rural schools in the last half of the nineteenth century seemed to be breaking with a tradition of corporal punishment seems evident. The new emphasis, at least as depicted in the literature, on fear of parental punishment and on the confinement of caning and whipping to blatantly disruptive students, suggests a profound and basic change in attitude toward education, a change which had already been manifested as much as twenty years earlier in the cities.

Throughout the nineteenth century, teachers in cities relied less completely than their rural counterparts on physical coercion to assure their authority. The commitment to inducing obedience took on other forms and flourishes. Teachers sought to secure conformity, not only by emphasizing the distinction between the office and the person of the teacher, not only by expelling students for violations of rules and regulations, not only by delivering sermons on the necessity of respecting constituted authorities, but by applying principles of military discipline to the classroom situation.[76] Joseph Lancaster provided the model for countless teachers in the early generation, and exemplified the spirit of the typical urban teacher throughout the period under discussion. In his manuals, Lancaster left no minute of the day unexplained, left no student unattended. The plans were symbolized by his declaration, "A place for everything and everything in its place."[77]

Lancaster arranged the instructional system so that students would at all times be responsible to a designated authority. There were monitors to take attendance, monitors to keep order, monitors for recess, and monitors in charge of monitors. The assignment of monitorial status to students had the advantage not only of enticing each student to seek superior rank, but of providing supervision and instruction for each student all of the time.[78] The beauty of the system, remarked an English traveler, "is that nothing is trusted to the boy himself; he does not only *repeat* the lesson before a superior, but *learns* it before a superior . . . under the eye and command of a master."[79]

Not only did the monitorial system provide for a hierarchy of offices to which every student was bound by threat of physical or mental punishment, but the Lancasterian masters enforced rules and regulations which proscribed every conceivable physical movement of the students as well. In effect, teachers forced students to suspend their impulses; to derive their standards of conduct from the will of the master. The elaborate and carefully enforced rituals and ceremonials were designed, in the words of one Lancasterian master, "to beget a love of order and propriety and dispose students to the habit generally of doing things in a mechanical and systematic manner."[80] Not only did students have to

hang their coats on signal, move to their seats on signal, rise and sit on signal, they had to perform their intellectual tasks in proper physical form.[81] Opening exercises, for example, were conducted in this manner: "He (monitor) opens the door, rings the bell, and the scholars without, leave off their sports and pour into school. They array themselves against the wall around the room as military companies, each class under its own monitor as captain. . . ."[82]

Physical regulations were no less stringent during recitations:

> While reading, as the eye rises to the top of the right hand page, the right hand is brought to the position seen in figure 4, with the forefinger under the leaf, the hand is slid down to the lower corner, and retained there during the reading of the page . . . This also is the position in which the book is to be held when about to be closed; in doing which the left hand, being carried up to the side, supports the book firmly and unmoved, while the right hand turns the part it supports over the left thumb. . . . The thumb will then be drawn out between the leaves and placed on the cover; when the right hand will fall by the side.[83]

A student who attended a Lancasterian school in New York recalled that every boy had to have his "left palm enclosed in his right behind his back, in a sort of self-handcuffed state, and woe be to him who is not paying attention when the order is given, or if tardy in obeying it. . . . 'hadn't hands behind' . . ." was a significant offense in this school.[84]

The intrusive pedagogical mode that characterized monitorial schools in the first half of the nineteenth century was also characteristic of teacher behavior in non-Lancasterian urban schools–legion after 1850. Like their predecessors, teachers who were now teaching in classes grouped by age, tended to identify the enforcement of physical ritual with the development of obedience, virtue, and conformity to rules of whatever nature. Some observers from Baltimore admired this procedure in a New York Primary School:

> The regularity of their movements, their simultaneous enunciation, their young voices mingling in the melody of their childhood's songs. . . . When they sing "Now we all stand up," they spring to their feet, the entire mass with apparently a single motion. When they sing "Now we all set down," they drop into their seats. "Now we fold our arms," all arms are folded. "Now we are nodding, nid, nid, nodding," the sea of little heads move to right and left. . . .[85]

An anonymous critic of other New York City public schools interpreted what he saw in this way:

> They sat, the girls on the one side and the boys on the other, each eyes fixed upon the wall directly in front. There was no motion. . . . The rows of children, right and diagonal, were as regular as rows of machine-planted corn. A signal was given at which every face turned instantly, as though on a pivot toward the face of the directress. She bade them good-morning, and in one breath, the whole school responded. At another signal every face swung back on its pivot to the original position. . . .[86]

The observations, criticisms, and recollections of various writers all suggest that the physical uniformity symbolized in the opening exercises carried over to the classroom recitations.[87] When a mathematics problem was proposed by the teacher, recalled one writer who described New York schools in the 1860's, "down would go all the slates and the work of ciphering would proceed . . . as the work was completed . . . the slates would pop up against the breast, one after another; and when a boy was called upon to explain, up he would jump, rattle off his explanation, and then thump down again amongst the perfect stillness of the rest. . . ."[88]

The attempt to instill habits of obedience and conformity is most dramatically illustrated perhaps, in a description written by Joseph Mayer Rice. In the New York City classroom which he described, the teacher had carried the passion for obedience and mechanical submission to regulations so far that she had confused them with the instructional task at hand:

> During several daily recitation periods, each of which is from twenty to twenty five minutes in duration, the children are obliged to stand on the line, perfectly motionless, their bodies erect, their knees and feet together, the tips of their shoes touching the edge of the board in the floor. The slightest movement on the part of the child attracts the attention of the teacher. The recitation is repeatedly interrupted with cries of "Stand straight," "Don't bend the knees," "Don't lean against the wall, and so on. I heard one teacher ask a little boy: "How can you learn anything with your knees and toes out of order."[89]

The descriptive literature also suggests that the typical urban teacher of the late nineteenth century substituted social and psychological pressures for physical coercion to induce obedience. Thus, we find not only a dearth of descriptions and recollections of physical coercion by students, teachers, or observers in these city schools, but explicit statements applauding its demise. The school commissioners of Baltimore, for example, whose report of 1873, followed a school-by-school inspection of the city's primary schools, declared that ". . . our teachers are now generally abandoning corporal punishment except in extreme

cases, and resort to milder and more successful methods of controlling their students."[90] By 1874, they declared, probably with undue optimism, that corporal punishment had been abandoned entirely in a few schools.[91]

Complaints about soft pedagogy, all but non-existent in the earlier literature, confirm its abandonment by many city teachers. Detroit schools in the 1870's, for example, inspired this poetic caveat:

> About this time the schools began
> To slack the use of the *rattan;*
> They said "O, no, it will not do
> To use the rod on children so."
>
> Parents have ceased to remonstrate,
> So children begin to demonstrate;
> And teachers try with various plans,
> Coax, plead, entreat, and keep off hands.
>
> Some teachers fall into the way
> of letting the children sleep and play.[93]

One finds in the urban literature of the second generation, the emergence of measures designed by teachers to tweek the consciences of their students. Moral 'suasion' seemed to be a tactic used often by women in order to control disruptive behavior.[94] A mother recalled the response of a teacher to a student who had shouted "By Moses. A'int it cold!" as he entered a Boston school room. Moral 'suasion' took the form of a gentle lecture:

> . . . she sketched, in language suited for childish comprehension, the early history of the exposure of the "pretty infant" in a "little rush cradle" on the shore of the Nile . . . how the good God called him to set free so many slaves; what a humility and reverence he always showed . . . how many trials he went through . . . how, at last, after all his labors, he was not allowed to enjoy the beautiful prospect along the Jordan. . . . Don't you think Moses deserves more respect and honor than Oscar showed to his name when he used it in the form of swearing, yesterday?

After she had finished the lecture, she sent the students home in order to think about the processes through which they had gone to expunge improper words from their vocabularies.[95] A less gentle, though nonetheless real, appeal to conscience is described by a student whose teacher announced publicly that she was not a fit person to be in school with such a good name.[96] A New York City teacher explained to a visitor that they maintained order by appealing "to the self-respect of the girls themselves, and the older show an example to the younger."[97] It is

noteworthy that the element of rivalry was not absent in these attempts to control the social behavior of students.

What we find in urban schools, is that the regulations required students to consult an authority for the most minute standards of conduct. They could satisfactorily submit to the rules and regulations of the teachers only by purging themselves of their individuality, by submerging their identities, and by incorporating the goals of the teachers as their own. In fact, the teachers demanded nothing less than perfect adherence to the values of self-control, self-restraint and self-government.

The classroom deportment of the teachers reflected not only a commitment to developing in students a respect for and submission to constituted authority, but a devotion as well to cultivating their capacity for self-reliance. Somewhat paradoxically, we find that with all the stress on conformity, teachers engaged also in a series of activities designed ultimately to isolate students from each other, to make them intellectually as well as socially independent within the classroom setting.

In all the descriptive literature, I was able to discover only three descriptions of teachers who proceeded as though students should or could, through informal discussion, assist each other in learning their lessons.[98] Indeed, almost every related description suggests that recitations were organized so that students would learn independently. In the so-called loud schools of the 1830's and 1840's, teachers literally forced students to learn their lessons in isolation, by demanding that each one "con" his lesson aloud.[99] Other teachers who abandoned the loud school format, transmitted the value of self-reliance by demanding silence and by punishing whispering with abandon. Indeed, the descriptive literature is burdened with both praise and censure of teachers whose demands for silence were vigorously enforced, who consistently discouraged communication, and who punished with enthusiasm any abridgements of the rule of silence.[100]

The widespread popularity of competition in all its forms can also be interpreted not only as an incentive to instruction, but as a vehicle for heightening the desire of students to work independently, to seek out the variety of prizes provided in every classroom situation by surpassing rather than helping fellow students.

Still another expression of the commitment of the teachers to self-reliance through intellectual independence was their harsh treatment of cheating, which they apparently viewed as the ultimate violation of their assumption that children could best learn through their own efforts and without the collaboration of their classmates. The literature is filled with descriptions of punishments administered for aiding and abetting,

or for receiving help in answering questions.[101] A Southern man recalled the following punishment after he had helped a girl with her lessons:

> [The teacher] . . . carried me down to the spring . . . in the shadow of an old cottonwood log; he repeated a verse from the Bible, about sparing the rod and spoiling the child; he then knelt, and prayed a short prayer, in which he asked his Heavenly Father to forgive the awful crime of which I had been guilty, and then rose, and catching me by my long hair, almost lifting me from the ground, he administered an awful whipping.[102]

In city schools and in large village schools of the '80's and '90's, we find that teachers, commensurate with their new view of corporal punishment, were more likely to punish cheating by humiliating or suspending students, or by reporting them to their parents.

Teachers also sought to isolate students from one another by preventing eye-contact among them. "My first teacher . . . ," recalled a Pennsylvanian, who had attended school in the 1850's, "Was Robert Venable. I do not know where he came from, but one thing I do remember, the scholar had to keep his eye on his book whether he was studying his lesson or not."[103] Another description of a rural schoolmaster in Tennessee explains that he single-handedly fashioned desks for his students and placed them in neat rows before him. "This placement of desks and benches had . . . ," he explained, "the advantage of making it difficult for students to look at one another."[104] "No playing or visiting was tolerated," recalled an Iowa man who had attended a one-room school in the forties. A breach of that rule resulted in a ". . . heavy . . . stroke from the [master's] open palm."[105] A student who attended schools in Fort Henry, New York, in the 1870's, lamented this regulation in a bleak bit of poetry:

> There's another about as difficult,
> But it's one he often repeats,
> For we like to see what our neighbor is doing,
> And we turn about in our seats.[106]

In the monitorial schools of the cities, masters literally forced students to look at the monitor and the textbook when they assumed their positions for recitation—a regulation designed to cultivate self-reliance along with self-discipline. Little different were the demands for correct posture in large urban schools of the 1850's, '60's, '70's, '80's, and '90's. Edward Austin Sheldon described a Boston school in the 1870's where the students who stood on the floor "had the attitude of soldiers. They stood in a perfectly straight line, held books equidistant from their noses."[107] And Joseph Mayer Rice made the following observations of a

New York City teacher, whose principal had presided over the school for twenty-five years:

> All children in the room stare fixedly at a point on the blackboard. When material of whatever nature, is handed to the children . . . (it) is then passed along sideways until each child in the row has been supplied. During this procedure the children are compelled to look straight in front of them, and to place their hands sidewise in order to receive the material, without looking whence it comes.[108]

Given the emphasis on the maintenance of order, it is hardly surprising that teachers embodied in their activities a respect for property, for the rights of property holders, for the legal order of things—sometimes, indeed, with an excess of zeal. Rules prohibiting students from touching the teacher's desk and its contents, harsh punishments for students who were caught stealing, (an act which led one teacher to conclude that moral evil had contaminated his kingdom)[109] penalties for students who defaced the property of other students or who destroyed books, or wrote graffiti on the walls of classrooms or cloakrooms, all were vigorously and consistently enforced in every teaching situation.[110] Indeed, there is even a description of a Hartford teacher who would not permit children to touch their books except when they were reading.[111]

Throughout the nineteenth century, we also find ubiquitous descriptions of teachers who had conscientiously censored standards of social and emotional behavior, unrelated, it would seem to intellectual progress.[112] Even in the most primitive school settings, teachers praised and censored various kinds of social and emotional behavior. A Hoosier, for example, remembered an informal understanding with the parents of students whom he was teaching. "[We] agreed . . ." he explained, "in requiring children, at home and at school, to cultivate good habits and polite manners, to avoid profanity and all immoral and vulgar language or conduct." Indeed, he went on, ". . . the teacher was censured if he did not punish offenses deservedly. . . ."[113] A New England teacher suspended a student from school for showing indecent pictures on the playground.[114] One Southern lady complained that her pedagogue had usurped parental rights when he threatened to suspend any students who went dancing at night.[115] And the literature of the one-room rural school is laden with descriptions of teachers who imposed various sanctions on students who fought with one another outside the classroom. Some were whipped, others placed at the foot of the class as punishments for socially unacceptable behavior outside the school.[116]

Descriptions of rural pedagogues suggest that they were much concerned with the possibility of illicit contact between boys and girls. Observers describe a variety of means employed by teachers to separate the

boys from the girls. Some teachers simply placed boys and girls on opposite sides of the room.[117] Others went at the problem of the sexes more enthusiastically. An Oregon normal school director recalled that "boys and girls never sat together." "Such . . ." he said, "would have been 'awful.' "[118] Other observers remembered teachers who literally built barriers inside the classrooms to separate the boys and girls. Descriptions of this academic though perhaps not so cozy equivalent of a bundling board are not unusual.[119]

Descriptions of pedagogues in the urban schools throughout the nineteenth century, and in the village schools of the second half of the century, suggest that these teachers were considerably more preoccupied with parental perogatives than their rural counterparts—a fact which might reflect the absence of homogeneous standards among the larger group. Not only did they censor non-academic deportment, but they consistently evinced interest in the personal habits of the students.[120] William Andrus Alcott related this incident in a Hartford, Connecticut school in the 1830's: "The younger teacher had assisted them in taking off their clothes and placing them properly, and if personal cleanliness had been in any instance neglected . . ." Alcott observed, "she possessed the requisite and appropriate means of remedying the evil." One day, he went on, "I found the teacher out of doors washing one of her pupils . . . it produced the desired effect:—that for some time past not one scholar had been sent to school dirty, to where there formerly were ten."[121] Another observer, David Macrae, explained that Americans have a punctilious attitude to the clothing and deportment of children. They are, he went on "all clean—a point to which great attention is paid in American schools."[122] Indeed, observers were typically struck by the passion which urban teachers displayed for personal hygiene.[123] There is even a description of a teacher who administered medicine to ill-looking children.[124]

Good manners were encouraged. William Henry Venable described an exercise in a Buckeye village school, which, he adds, "was designed to fit students for the actual duties of life:

> . . . [he] went so far as to require his pupils to imitate what he supposed to be the polite usages of people of "quality". . . . Before beginning and after closing each recitation, every class, its members ranged in orderly rank, saluted the master with a becoming reverence. . . . All the boys formed a sort of military line, facing the girls arranged opposite in a seemly row, and when the word "Obeisance" was pronounced, the young cavaliers responded with an elaborate bow, receiving in return a profound curtsey. . . Nor was the practice of conventional etiquette restricted to polite rehearsals on the puncheon floor of the humble log schoolhouse. The boys were admonished to practice gentlemanly

> deportment . . . and, above all, never to neglect the gallant habit of lifting the hat, on meeting a woman.[125]

Bronson Alcott remembered a teacher who gave the order to "go straight home, and be civil . . ." to everyone.[126] A Pittsburgh man who attended schools in the 1840's remembered two outstanding rules: No cursing or swearing as well as no fighting–in or out of the classroom.[127] Frederick Marryat recalled these signs in a New Jersey schoolhouse in the 1870's. "No kissing girls in school time;" and "No *licking* the *master* during holydays."[128]

Some rare teachers even went so far as to try to inculcate certain linguistic niceties, not as a matter of correct speech, or effective expression, but as a matter of social style. A Boston lady, for example, bitterly recalled this scene:

> Our new teacher was trying to establish the custom of having the pupils address her by her name rather than by calling her "teacher.. . . .
>
> "Are these right, teacher?"
>
> She smiled and replied, "Say Miss Mills."
>
> ". . . Miss Mills–er–er–teacher is this right?"
>
> Then she looked serious and said, "Do not say teacher, just say Miss Mills."
>
> Once again I tried, "Miss Mills–er teacher is this–" Oh, that awful habit!
>
> . . . Then she said, "Now after me. Miss Mills, is this right?"[129]

And one teacher even considered facial expression to be matter of considerable importance. William Andrus Alcott described the following scene in his Hartford school in the 1830's:

> About this time, one or two very young pupils became rather ill-humored. The teacher proposed, in a very gentle manner, to draw the appearance of their "sour faces" on the slate; which immediately soothed their countenances. . . .[130]

The behavior of the teachers as moral overseers, political stewards, and as parent surrogates involved them ultimately in the preservation of social order. By demanding diligence, industry, consideration for others, and achievement they reinforced the moral order of society. By demanding conformity to rules and regulations, they upheld the legal order of things. By promoting competition and by protecting private property, they reinforced economic order. By demanding respect, they reinforced the order of age and youth. And the generality did all this by generous use of the rod, and by pedagogical authority designed to harden the emotions, to break the will as well as to discipline the intellect. The teachers were indeed extending the intrusive mode. There

were of course, the inevitable exceptional teachers who transmitted values in a gentle, guiding, "socializing mode," but they were unusual throughout the century.

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2. The descriptive literature comprises recollections, observations, analyses, and criticisms of classroom procedures written by a multitude of individuals using a variety of methods. The inherently subjective character of each source and the limited number of schools described in each source requires cautious use. The collected data can convey some sense of variety in classroom procedures, but cannot document with any certainty, the frequency of each type of behavior in American schools. Because those who describe schools are a select group, and because the sources themselves are selectively published and preserved, there are bound to be distortions.

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67. Rachel Quick Buttz, *A Hoosier Girlhood* (Boston: Richard G. Badger, The Gorham Press, 1924), p. 51.
68. L. B. Balliet, "A Lehigh County English School Seventy Years Ago," *The Pennsylvania-German*, IX, 1 (January, 1907), p. 526.
69. The following sources contain particularly graphic descriptions of this universially described phenomenon: George Henry Gerberding, *Reminiscent Reflections of An Octogenarian* (Minneapolis: Augsburgh Publishing Company, 1928), p. 12; Joseph Garner Estill, *Episodes in the Life of a Commonplace Man* (Lakeville, Conn.: Priv. Prin.,1939) p. 25; Paul Henry Hanus, *Adventuring in Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), p. 28; Jeremiah Hubbard, *A Teacher's Ups and Downs from 1858 to 1879* (Richmond, Indiana: Palladium Steam Printing House, 1879), p. 48.
70. There are, of course, descriptions of teachers who abandoned physical coercion for moral persuasion.

71. Henry Johnson, *The Other Side of Main Street, A History Teacher from Sauk Centre* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1928).
72. Joseph Garner Estill, *Episodes in the Life of a Commonplace Man* (Lakeville, Conn.: Priv. Prin., 1939), p. 25.
73. For examples, see: Alice Mendenhall George, *The Story of My Childhood* (California: William A. Smith, 1927), p. 65; James Marion Sims, *The Story of My Life* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1884), pp. 60, 64. Matters were little different in urban centers. See: William Graham Johnston, *Life and Reminiscences from Birth to Manhood of William G. Johnston* (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1901) p. 203; *Report of the Committee Appointed to Visit Public Schools of Philadelphia, New York, Brooklyn and Boston to the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore* (Baltimore: H. A. Robinson, 1867), pp. 35-36.
74. Descriptions are legion of barrings-out in rural schools. For particularly graphic illustrations, see: I. L. Kephart, "Barring-Out the Teacher," in Asa Earl Martin and Herr Hiram Shenk, *Pennsylvania History as Told by Contemporaries* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), pp. 392-96; Joseph S. Williams, *Old Times in West Tennessee* (Memphis: W. G. Cheeney, 1873), pp. 285-86; John Massey, *Reminiscences* (Nashville: Church, South, Smith and Lamar, 1916), p. 51; John S. Van Voorhis, *The Old and New Monongahela* (Pittsburgh: Nicholson Printer and Binder, 1893), p. 53; Judge Decatur Franklin Morrow, *Then and Now; Reminiscences and Historical Romance* (Macon: The J. W. Burke Company, 1926), p. 228.
75. John Lewis Franklin, "Life of Ezekial Boring Kephart; Statesman, Educator, Preacher," quoted in Asa Earl Martin and Herr Hiram Shenk, *Pennsylvania History as Told by Contemporaries* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), pp. 392-96.
76. There is evidence to suggest that teachers in the city also distinguished their person and their office by whipping students and delivering sermons. For examples, see: Sarah Smith Bixby, *Adobe Days* (Los Angeles: Zake-Zeitlin, 1931), pp. 122-23; Arthur Howard Hall, *Old Bradford School-Days* (Norwood, Massachusetts: The Plimpton Press, 1910), p. 156.
77. Joseph Lancaster, *The British System of Education: being a complete epitome of the improvements and inventions practised by Joseph Lancaster: to which is added a Report of the Trustees of the Lancaster School at Georgetown, Columbia* (Washington: Joseph Milligan, 1812); Joseph Lancaster, *The Lancasterian System of Education with Improvements by its Founder* (Baltimore: Published for the author, 1821), p. 4. The sources around which this discussion of Lancasterian schools turn, portray schools in eastern cities—New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Baltimore, Pittsburg. But there is guidance to suggest that monitorial schools in cities further west resembled those of the eastern metropolises. Civic leaders from places such as Cincinnati and Lexington dispatched men to study schools in Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. Richard C. Wade, *The Urban Frontier, The Rise of Western Cities, 1790-1830* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 105-25. Articles appear frequently in the *American Annals of Education and Instruction* and describe the progress made by western cities in establishing monitorial schools.

    Allusions to Lancasterian schools can also be found in other periodicals. See for examples: *American Journal of Education* 1826-1830; *Western Academician and Journal of Education and Science.*

    The Joseph Lancaster Papers located in the American Antiquarian Society in Worcester, Massachusetts, also contain references to Lancasterian schools in many cities.

    Manuals, prepared by Masters of Lancasterian schools in particular locations, too indicate their omnipresence. See for example: William Dale, *A Manual of the Albany Lancasterian School* (Albany: n.i., 1820).

    There are also monographs which describe the development of Lancasterian schools. See: Charles Calvert Ellis, *Lancasterian Schools in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: n.i., 1907); John Franklin Reigart, *The Lancasterian System of In-*

struction in the Schools of New York City (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University Press, 1916); Several other historians allude to the presence of Lancasterian schools in particular states. See for examples: Moses Edward Ligon, *A History of Public Education in Kentucky* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1942), p. 33; Charles Lee Coon, *North Carolina Schools and Academies: 1790-1840: A Documentary History* (Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton Printing Company, 1915), pp. 722-45; William Arthur Maddox, *The Free School Idea in Virginia Before the Civil War* (New York City: Teachers College, 1915).

78. Joseph Lancaster, *The Lancasterian System of Education with Improvements by Its Founder* (Baltimore: Published for the Author, 1821), *passim.*
79. Quoted in Paul Monroe, *Founding of the American Public School System; A History of Education in the United States* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), p. 369.
80. Joseph Lancaster, "On the Science of the Human Mind," American Antiquarian Society Manuscript Collections, The Joseph Lancaster Papers.
81. Almost all authors describe this kind of physical uniformity. For examples, see: "My School-Boy Days in New York City Forty Years Ago," *New York Teacher, and American Educational Monthly,* VI (March, 1869), *passim;* Edward Strutt Abdy, *Journal of a Residence and Tour in the United States and North America* (London: John Murray, 1834), pp. 152-153; Anne Royall, *Sketches of History, Life, Manners in the United States* (New Haven: Printed for the Author, 1826), p. 256, William Bentley Fowle, "Boston Monitorial Schools," *American Journal of Education,* I, 1 (January, 1826), pp. 39-40; John Griscom, *Memoir* (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1859), p. 209; Thomas Hamilton, *Men and Manners in America,* 2d Amer. ed. (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea and Blanchard, 1833), pp. 52-57; Basil Hall, *Travels in North America in the Years 1827 and 1828* (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1829), pp. 24-30; Carl David Arfwedson, *The United States and Canada in 1832, 1833 and 1834* (London: R. Bentley, 1834), p. 240.
82. "My School-Boy Days in New York City Forty Years Ago," *New York Teacher, and American Educational Monthly,* VI (March, 1869), p. 93.
83. Quoted in Paul Monroe, *Founding of the American Public School System; A History of Education in the United States* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), pp. 367-68.
84. "My School-Boy Days in New York City Forty Years Ago," *New York Teacher, and American Educational Monthly,* VI (March, 1869), p. 95.
85. *Report of the Committee Appointed to Visit Public Schools of Philadelphia, New York, Brooklyn and Boston to the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore* (Baltimore: H. A. Robinson, 1867), pp. 35-36.
86. "Two Representative Schools," *New York Teacher, and American Educational Monthly,* V (July, 1868), pp. 275-78.
87. Joseph Mayer Rice, *The Public School System of the United States* (New York: The Century Company, 1893), *passim;* Paul Henry Hanus, *Adventuring in Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), pp. 28-29; Ellwood P. Cubberley, *The Portland Survey: A Textbook on City School Administration Based on a Concrete Study* (Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Company, 1916); Andrew J. Rickoff, *Past and Present of Our Common School* (Cleveland: Leader Printing Company, 1877), p. 79.
88. "Two Representative Schools," *New York Teacher, and American Educational Monthly,* V (July, 1868), p. 256.
89. Joseph Mayer Rice, *The Public School System of the United States* (New York: The Century Company, 1893), p. 98.
90. Baltimore School Commissioners, *Forty-First Annual Report, 1872* (Baltimore: Public School Commissioners, 1873), p. 55.
91. Baltimore School Commissioners, *Forty-Second Annual Report, 1873* (Baltimore: Baltimore School Commissioners, 1874), p. 54.
92. Jeremiah Hubbard, *A Teachers's Ups and Downs from 1858 to 1879* (Richmond, Indiana: Palladium Steam Printing House, 1879), p. 14.
93. Jeremiah Hubbard, *A Teacher's Ups and Downs from 1858 to 1879* (Rich-

mond, Indiana: Palladium Steam Printing House, 1879), p. 14. Also: James Howard Patterson, *Of Me I Sing; or Me and Education* (Nappanee, Indiana: E. V. Publishing House, 1940), p. 34. Similar complaints can be found in the following descriptions: Gail Hamilton [Mary Abigail Dodge], *Our Common School System* (Boston: Estes and Lauriat, 1880), p. 255; Frederick C. B. Marryat, *A Diary in America, with Remarks on Its Institutions* (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1839), III, pp. 280-87.

94. I do not mean to imply that teachers in other settings in the early generation did not use moral persuasion. Indeed, they did, but they typically coupled it with physical coercion of one kind or another. In the descriptive literature of the 1850's, 1860's and 1870's, teachers consistently and consciously preferred this method. There are, of course, the inevitable exceptions. Roger W. Babson, *Actions and Reactions* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 19; Paul Henry Hanus, *Adventuring in Education* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1937), p. 28; Meredith Janvier, *Baltimore in the Eighties and Nineties* (Baltimore: H. G. Roebuck and Son, 1933), pp. 136-37. Nor do I mean to imply that all women depended exclusively on moral persuasion. For an example of one who preferred physical coercion, see Isabella Bacon Bond, *Memoirs of Isabella Bacon Bond* (Boston: Priv. Prin. 1934), p. 55. "A Mother's Visit to a Primary School," *Massachusetts Teacher*, XXII (April, 1869), pp. 159-60.
95. "A Mother's Visit to a Primary School," *Massachusetts Teacher*, XXII (April, 1869), pp. 159-60.
96. Thomas Garth, ed., *Old School Days; Being Reminiscences of a Passing Generation* (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, n.d.), p. 40. Tardiness was probably a problem since teachers typically constructed rituals to prevent it. David Macrae, *The Americans at Home: Pen-and-Ink Sketches of American Men, Manners, and Institutions*, popular ed. rev. (Glasgow: John S. Marr and Sons, 1875), pp. 473-74. Frederick William Ballinger, *Recollections of an Old Fashioned New Englander* (New York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1941), p. 15.
97. David Macrae, *The Americans at Home: Pen-and-Ink Sketches of American Men, Manners, and Institutions*, popular ed. rev. (Glasgow: John S. Marr and Sons, 1875), p. 473.
98. When teachers used students as monitors, they endowed the monitors with special status, differentiating them from fellow-students and formalizing relationships between students. For exceptions to this rule, see: Leila Patridge, *The "Quincy Methods" illustrated. Pen Photographs from the Quincy Schools* (New York: E. L. Kellogg and Company, 1885), *passim;* Edward Austin Sheldon, *Autobiography of Edward Austin Sheldon*, ed. by Mary Sheldon Barnes (New York: The Ives-Butler Company, 1911), p. 168; Elizabeth Palmer Peabody, *Record of Mr. Alcott's School*, 3d ed. (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1874), *passim.*
99. For good descriptions of loud schools, see: Rebeca Latimer Felton, *Country Life in Georgia in the Days of My Youth* (Atlanta: Index printing Company, 1919), pp. 58-60; Barnabas C. Hobbs, "Early School Days," in Jas. H. Smart, ed., *The Indiana Schools and the Men Who Have Worked in Them* (Cincinnati: Wilson, Hinkle and Company, 1876), p. 20; Judge Decatur Franklin Morrow, *Then and Now; Reminiscences and Historical Romance* (Macon: The J. W. Burke Company, 1926), p. 227.
100. The demand for silence appears to have been near universal. For an exception, see: Edward Austin Sheldon, *Autobiography of Edward Austin Sheldon*, ed. By Mary Sheldon Barnes (New York: The Ives-Butler Company, 1911), p. 168.
101. For examples, see: Arthur Howard Hall, *Old-Bradford School-Days* (Norwood, Massachusetts: The Plimpton Press, 1910), p. 12; C. Louis Barzee, *Oregon in the Making; '60's to Gay '90's* (Salem, Oregon: Statesman Publishing Company, 1936), p. 61; David Macrae, *The Americans at Home: Pen-and-Ink Sketches of American Men, Manners, and Institutions*, popular ed. rev. (Glasgow: John S. Marr and Sons, 1875), pp. 475-76.

102. Lamar Fontaine, *My Life and My Lectures* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1908), pp. 14-15.
103. J. F. Schaeffer, "Letter," in Myron Carleton Lough, "Early Education in West Virginia," *Transallegheny Historical Magazine*, I, 2 (January, 1902), p. 152.
104. Hiram Orcutt, *Reminiscences of School Life; An Autobiography* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: University Press, 1898), p. 67.
105. George Duffield, *Memories of Frontier Iowa* (Des Moines: Bishard Brothers, 1906), p. 53.
106. L. Adda Nichols Bigelow, *Reminiscences* (Chula Vista, California: Denrich Press, 1917), p. 3.
107. Edward Austin Sheldon, *Autobiography of Edward Austin Sheldon*, ed. by Mary Sheldon Barnes (New York: The Ives-Butler Company, 1911), p. 168.
108. Joseph Mayer Rice, *The Public School System of The United States* (New York: The Century Company, 1893), p. 33; See also: *Report of the Committee Appointed to Visit Public Schools of Philadelphia, New York, Brooklyn and Boston to the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore* (Baltimore: H. A. Robinson, 1867), p. 83.
109. Hiram Orcutt, *Reminiscences of School Life; An Autobiography* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: University Press, 1898), p. 67.
110. For examples, see: Alfred Holbrook, *Reminiscences of the Happy Life of a Teacher* (Cincinnati: Elm Street Printing Company, 1885), p. 32; Jeremiah Hubbard, *A Teacher's Ups and Downs from 1858 to 1879* (Richmond, Indiana: Palladium Steam Printing House, 1879), p. 59; William Smith Knowlton, *The Old Schoolmaster; or Forty-five Years with the Boys and Girls* (Augusta, Maine: Burleigh and Flynt, 1905), *passim*.
111. William Andrus Alcott, *A Word to Teachers: or, Two Days in a Primary School* (Boston: Allen and Ticknor, 1833), p. 37.
112. Though one finds descriptions of teachers engaging in activities usually associated with motherhood, the ties between teachers and pupils do not appear to have been affectional. Instances of kissing or hugging or of consoling students are rarely encountered. For a lonely example, see: Alfred Holbrook, *Reminiscences of the Happy Life of a Teacher* (Cincinnati: Elm Street Printing Company, 1885), p. 30.
113. Barnabas C. Hobbs, "Early School Days," in Jas. H. Smart, ed., *The Indiana Schools and the Men Who Have Worked in Them* (Cincinnati: Wilson, Hinkle and Company, 1876), pp. 17-18.
114. William Augustus Mowry, *Recollections of a New England Educator*, 1838-1908 (New York: Silver Burdett and Company, 1908), p. 50.
115. Rebeca Latimer Felton, *Country Life in Georgia in the Days of My Youth* (Atlanta: Index Printing Company, 1919), pp. 61-62.
116. For examples, see: Rachel Quick Buttz, *A Hoosier Girlhood* (Boston: Richard G. Bodger, 1924), p. 62; William Reed, *Life on the Border Sixty Years Ago* (Fall River, Massachusetts: Robert Adams, 1882), p. 62; George Henry Gerberding, *Reminiscent Reflections of an Octogenarian* (Minneapolis: Ausburg Publishing House, 1938), p. 12.
117. Flo V. Knisely Menninger, *Days of My Life; Memories of a Kansas Mother and Teacher* (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1939), p. 40; William Smith Knowlton, *The Old Schoolmaster; or Forty-Five Years with the Boys and Girls* (Augusta, Maine: Burleigh and Flynt, 1905), p. 45; Bernard G. Burtnett, "The Old Marble School at Union Corners," *Quarterly Bulletin of the Westchester County Historical Society*, X, 1 (January, 1933), p. 13; C. Louis Barzee, *Oregon in the Making; '60's to Gay '90's* (Salem, Oregon: Statesman Publishing Company, 1936), p. 65.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
119. Isaac Freeman Hall, *In School from Three to Eighty; Pictures of American Life, 1825-1925* (Pittsfield: Press of the Eagle Printing and Binding Company, 1927), p. 142; John Morris Dodd, *Autobiography of a Surgeon* (New York: Walter W. Neal, 1928), p. 142.
120. The censoring of non-academic deportment is present in almost every

school according to descriptive literature. But in cities, teachers consistently attended to matters relating to hygiene, cleanliness, speech, and dress. These activities suggest that they sought to correct as well as to supplement the training which pupils received at home.

121. William Andrus Alcott, *Confessions of a Schoolmaster* (Andover: Gould, Newman and Saxton, 1839), p. 3.
122. David Macrae, *The Americans at Home: Pen-and-Ink Sketches of American Men, Manners, and Institutions,* popular ed. rev. (Glasgow: John S. Marr and Sons, 1875), pp. 472-73.
123. Even in the early period we find these observations. See for examples Joseph Lancaster, "Memoranda of Visits to Public Schools in New York and in Philadalphia," 1838, American Antiquarian Society, Manuscript Collections, The Joseph Lancaster Papers; Baltimore School Commissioners, *Annual Reports for the years 1826-1834* (Baltimore: Public School Commissioners, 1836), *passim.* Francis Milton Trollope, *Domestic Manners of the Americans* (London: Printed for Whitaker, Treacher and Company, 1832), *passim.*
124. John Massey, *Reminiscences* (Nashville: M. E. Church, Smith and Lamar, 1916), p. 48.
125. William Henry Venable, *A Buckeye Boyhood* (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1911), pp. 47-48.
126. Amos Bronson Alcott, *New Connecticut; An Autobiographical Poem* (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1889), p. 135.
127. George Henry Gerberding, *Reminiscent Reflections of an Octogenarian* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1938), p. 12.
128. Frederick C. B. Marryat, *A Diary in America with Remarks on Its Institutions,* III (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1839), p. 287.
129. Isabella Bacon Bond, *Memoirs of Isabella Bacon Bond* (Boston: Priv. Prin., 1934), p. 55.
130. William Andrus Alcott, *A Word to Teachers; or, Two Days in a Primary School* (Boston: Allen and Ticknor, 1833), p. 25.

Statement of ownership, management and circulation, required by Act of August 12, 1970; Section 3685, Title 39, United States Code. 1. Title of publication: History of Childhood Quarterly: The Journal of Psychohistory. 2. Date of filing: Sept. 26, 1974. 3. Frequency of issue: Quarterly. 4. Location of known office of publication: 2315 Broadway, New York, NY 10024. 5. Location of headquarters or general business offices of the publisher: 2315 Broadway, New York, NY 10024. 6. Name and addresses of publisher, editor and managing editor: Publisher: Ed Brown, 2315 Broadway, New York, NY 10024; Editor, Lloyd DeMause, 2315 Broadway, New York, NY 10024; Managing Editor: H. Eugene McGlone, 2315 Broadway, New York, NY 10024. 7. Owner (if owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given): ATCOM, Inc., 2315 Broadway, New York, NY 10024; Ed Brown, 2315 Broadway, New York, NY 10024; Lloyd DeMause, 2315 Broadway, New York, NY 10024. 8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities: None. 9. For optional completion by publishers mailing at the regular rates (Section 132.121, Postal Service Manual): H. Eugene McGlone, Executive Vice President. 10. Not applicable. 11. Extent and nature of circulation: A. Total number of copies printed (net press run): Average number copies each issue during preceding 12 months: 5,437. Actual number of copies of single issue published nearest to filing date: 5,050. B. Paid Circulation: 1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales: None; None. 2. Mail subscriptions: 2,840; 2,608. C. Total paid circulation: 2,840; 2,608. D. Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means. 1. Sample, complimentary, and other free copies: 32; 41. 2. Copies distributed to News Agents, but not sold: None; None. E. Total distribution (Sum of C and D): 2,872; 2,649. F. Office use, left-over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing: 2,565; 2,401. G. Total (Sum of E & F should equal net press run shown in A): 5,437; 5,050. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete: H. Eugene McGlone, Executive Vice President.

Infanticide in the Province of Canterbury During the Fifteenth Century

R. H. HELMHOLZ

Gratian's Decretum (1140) and the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX (1234) contained the basic law of the Church in medieval Europe. In both are texts devoted to the proper punishment of infanticide.[1] Synodal legislation from individual provinces and dioceses also includes provisions condemning those who took the life of an infant.[2] The existence of these laws suggests that ecclesiastical sources may provide solid evidence about infanticide in medieval Europe. The apparent absence of prosecutions for homicide of infants from secular jurisdictions similarly suggests that we look to ecclesiastical sources before concluding that evidence about it is beyond historical recall.[3] And, in fact, two recent articles in this journal have made excellent use of ecclesiastical records in probing the subject.[4]

This short article is meant to continue that process, by examining the surviving fifteenth century court records of one part of the Western Church, the Province of Canterbury. Much larger than the northern Province of York, the Province covered all of southern England and Wales. Generalizations based on the records of the southern Province do not necessarily hold for the northern. But at least the records are those of the courts which had jurisdiction over the great bulk of the English population during the fifteenth century.

There are, it will be observed, several deficiencies in the provincial court records from the point of view of a modern historian. Not least

of these is the scarcity and irregularity of their survival. The fifteenth century is the first for which substantial numbers of court records remain. But the records which have survived from this period do provide good evidence of the existence of infanticide. And they do yield some valuable evidence about the circumstances which surrounded both its commission and its punishment.

The relevant evidence comes largely from *ex officio* Act books. These books were the records, compiled in every diocese, of disciplinary proceedings brought against men and women accused of violating the Church's law. Sometimes combined with the records of instance causes, that is civil litigation between two parties, sometimes placed in separate Act books, *ex officio* proceedings make up a substantial part of the remaining records of the medieval and early modern Church courts.[5] And in the Act books, spread among the prosecutions for fornication and adultery, for laying violent hands on clerks, for conducting secular business on Sundays, are proceedings against men and women accused of infanticide. The entries do not tell us all that we wish to know. For example, we can seldom learn whether the child killed was legitimate or not. Nor is the motive of the killer ever apparent. And statistics drawn from the Act books must be treated with extreme reserve, as will be demonstrated below. But the records do normally give the name of the person summoned, the detailed charge against him or her, the person's answer (if he or she appeared), and the disposition of the cause, whether flight by the accused person out of the court's jurisdiction, denial and successful compurgation, or conviction and punishment. What do these records tell us?

To begin with, the records demonstrate the existence of infanticide in later medieval England beyond doubt. Successful prosecutions and the detail with which some of the deaths are recorded make this indisputable. Thomas Patrick and his wife, Denise, for example, were cited before the Consistory Court at Rochester in 1447. Thomas admitted killing their child by holding it under water until it drowned.[6] Stephen Colyn, appearing at Canterbury in 1470, threw his illegitimate son into a ditch, where the child died.[7] Agnes Coke of Malling allowed her child to be burned to death in a fire.[8] Joan Meller and her husband were convicted in 1448 of having left their child exposed, in consequence of which the child perished.[9] The Act books contain quite a few cases of killing by drowning, burning, or exposure. Even after the passage of centuries, they do not make pretty reading.

The Act books also contain several prosecutions for some kind of abortion. Most are cases in which a third party had caused the death of a fetus by his mistreatment of the mother. John Wren, cited to appear before the Commissary court of the diocese of London in 1487, was charged with having "wounded his wife during the time she was preg-

nant so that he killed the child in her belly."[10] Thomas Deneham of Minster in the diocese of Canterbury was prosecuted in 1471. Against him it was objected that, although he knew his wife to be pregnant, he "imposed such inordinate labors [on her] that she aborted."[11] George Hemery was charged by the judge of the Consistory court of Rochester in 1493 with placing medicines in a drink given to a woman "in order to destroy the boy he had procreated."[12] A few cases record prosecutions against a mother for causing an abortion herself. For instance, the servant of Joan Gibbes of the parish of Deal (also named Joan but with no surname given in the court record) was accused in 1469 of having "killed the infant lately in her womb by means of herbs and medicines."[13] Whatever the exact sort of abortion involved, however, these prosecutions were apparently treated together with conventional infanticide.[14] There is no indication that they were dealt with more or less severely than killing a newly born infant. The same procedure and similar penances were used against offenders.

The largest part of the prosecutions recorded in the Act books were, however, for the suffocation of an infant. When a location was specified in the records, the suffocation usually occurred in bed. No doubt almost all of these were cases of overlaying, that is, of cutting off an infant's circulation by laying on top of the child. For example, Stephen Tiler and his wife Joan were cited before the Rochester court for having "smothered their daughter [who was] lying between them in bed."[15] Alice Michel of Hythe was accused of having "lain on top of her boy in bed until he was dead."[16] Numerous cases specify simply that the accused "suffocavit prolem."[17] The remaining records contain more such instances of infanticide than any other sort. They fully support the suggestion modern historians have drawn from ecclesiastical legislation that overlaying was the principal means of infanticide and the major problem for the Church courts.

It is noteworthy that these prosecutions for infanticide by overlaying contained no allegation of intent to kill. Nor did any of the defendants plead lack of volition to escape punishment. Purely accidental death of a child might not have been punishable. But accidental death which occurred because the accused had been careless or negligent was culpable. It was enough that the child had been killed through the fault of the accused.

This result in practice was in accord with the formal canon law. Under the canons, negligent infanticide was to be punished as well as intentional killing.[18] Lack of desire to kill was cause for mitigation in the degree of punishment, not reason for absolution. That this law was followed in practice is clear not only in the overlaying cases, but also in a number of prosecutions in which the description of the death of the child was described in enough detail to make clear that only negligence

was shown. In 1453, for example, the Consistory court at Rochester ordered penance by public whipping to be imposed on Thomas Bayware of the parish of Halling when it was found that Thomas had left his house with a fire lit, the doors closed, and his two children inside. The children, aged two and four, were killed when the house caught fire.[19] Of course, this result may possibly be what Thomas intended. But it is at least equally plausible that he had been merely negligent. The important point is that the court made no distinction between the two types of infanticide, except in the severity of the penance assigned.

The punishment of both negligent and intentional killing is a matter of more than strictly legal interest. It shows that the Church courts were not concerned solely with the sin of the parent. The safety of the child was also important.[20] Were the sin of the parent alone important, it would have made no sense to punish those who had done nothing *intentional* to harm the infant. Punishment of unintentional killing was meant to indicate to the parents that unless they took enough care with their children to keep them alive, they risked prosecution in the Church courts and consequent public penance.

Synodal legislation which forbade placing children in the same bed with adults shows the same concern. The danger to the infant lay in accidental, even more than in intentional, suffocation.[21] Such legislation is inconsistent with a desire solely to punish the sin of the killer. To require parents to be careful in the way they arrange for their children to sleep must represent a judgment that children are deserving of protection. The aim of the Church clearly extended beyond chastisement for sin. It extended to the protection of children's lives.

To return now directly to the evidence of the court records, it should be stressed that not all those who were accused of infanticide admitted the crime. Indeed, many did not. In cases of denial, the courts of the Province of Canterbury assigned canonical compurgation as the method of proof. Infanticide is normally a secret crime, and any other sort of proof may well have been impossible. Compurgation required that the accused take a solemn oath of innocence before the court. And he had to find a specified number of neighbors as compurgators or oath helpers, who would swear that they believed his oath was true. They swore to their belief in the word of the accused, not to the truth of the underlying facts, which must often have lain outside their first-hand knowledge.[22] In a fairly typical entry from the Canterbury records, for example, Harriet Hadvarden of Lyminge, accused of destroying her child, denied the charge. She was assigned a day to purge herself *cum tercia manu,* that is, by means of her own oath and that of two compurgators.[23] She found two suitable compurgators, they took the oaths successfully, and Harriet was dismissed by the court.

Canon law allowed a considerable amount of discretion to the judge in the use of compurgation. He had, in the first place, to pass on the acceptability of those selected. And the number of compurgators assigned lay largely within the judge's control.[24] For example, the fifteenth century Rochester and Canterbury records show cases of the assignment of seven, five, and two compurgators in infanticide cases.[25] The records do not reveal any reason for the divergent numbers required. But no illegal action or abuse of discretion on the part of the judge was necessarily involved. In this instance, the law allowed him to assign a form of compurgation in accordance with his assessment of the persons and the crime involved.[26]

However, the existence of such wide discretion, together with the incompleteness of many of the final parts of Act book entries, does make it impossible to generalize confidently about the way compurgation worked or about its effectiveness in practice. It must be enough to say that canonical compurgation was used in almost all cases. The remaining Act books reveal a single case in which a special inquisition was called to investigate a charge of infanticide.[27] It may be worthy of note that canonical purgation was the same method of proving guilt and innocence that was used in most *ex officio* prosecutions. Adultery, fornication, and infanticide were treated alike as far as concerned the method of proof.

If the accused admitted the charge of infanticide, or if he denied it but failed in the assigned canonical purgation, the Church court assigned a public penance.[28] The penance was apparently much like those Professor Trexler has unearthed at Florence, except that the English records do not ordinarily refer to the direct use of charitable payments as penance, which was apparently the practice in the Italian court.[29] To take one full example, Joan Rose was convicted at Canterbury in 1470 of killing her son. The judge ordered that Joan should dress in penitential garb and "go before the procession in the parish church of Hythe on three Sundays with a wax candle of half a pound in her right hand and the knife with which she killed the boy, or a similar knife, in her left."[30] She was also ordered to go twice around the markets of Canterbury, Faversham, and Ashford in a similar fashion. This was obviously meant as a humiliating public admission of guilt, and as a warning to others against the crime of infanticide.

The penance was not, however, equivalent to secular punishment for homicide. There is no sign that any punishment, beyond the sort detailed above, was imposed on infanticides. Once the penance had been performed the guilty person was quit of prosecution in the external forum. No referral was made to the secular arm. The evidence suggests that no independent secular prosecution was undertaken.[31] And a pub-

lic penance, no matter how humbling, is a temporary thing. Of course, the Church courts had no power to shed blood. It can therefore be said that they imposed the maximum penalties their law allowed. But the fact that infanticide was regulated largely as a public sin by the Church, and that penances similar to those used for other wrongful conduct within ecclesiastical cognizance were thought suitable clearly supports Dr. Kellum's argument that infanticide was considered as "something less than homicide" in medieval England.[32]

Another piece of evidence which supports this argument is the extent of the penances awarded in practice. In 1481 before the Commissary court at Hereford, for instance, the suffocation of a child combined with fornication was punished by six public whippings. But in the same year and Act book, three public whippings were awarded for adultery and fornication, and six public whippings were awarded to a man who admitted fathering an illegitimate child, no suggestion of infanticide being recorded.[33] In other words, the treatment meted out to the person guilty of infanticide did not differ in kind, or even necessarily in degree, from that thought appropriate for sexual offenses. The most severe penance I have found called for public penance lasting over a seven year period. But this occurred in the case of drowning a boy who was almost seven years old.[34] Killing a child of a relatively advanced age must have seemed to call for more serious punishment than the killing of an infant. The evidence of the Act books, incomplete as it is, does tend to confirm the notion that infanticide was not considered as homicide, by ecclesiastical judges and by ordinary people alike.

The most disappointing aspect of using the Church court records to shed light on the subject of infanticide is the question of incidence. One wants inevitably to know, how much infanticide was there? And to this question the Act books give no reliable answer. The largest number of prosecutions for the crime I have found for any one year is four. This was the number recorded in the Commissary court of the bishop of London in 1487.[35] But one case a year is a more usual number for most courts surveyed, and in some years none at all was recorded. In fact, my search through the records at Lichfield produced no cases in any year for the Consistory court of that diocese.[36] But even if we could assemble some average figures, they would tell us little about actual incidence. This is true for two reasons.

First, as Professor Trexler points out, there is no necessary relationship between the number of prosecutions and actual frequency of the practice.[37] Infanticide is a crime people try to hide. There is no guarantee that all instances of it would come to light, or even that any percentage of the total would appear in the Church records. And there are additional traps. Not all those prosecuted were necessarily guilty. Many of the accused denied the crime and successfully underwent compurga-

tion. But even were we to exclude these, we should be little better off, since successful wager of law does not necessarily prove innocence. Until we understand more about this aspect of canonical practice, it would be wrong to make generalizations about how effective (or ineffective) canonical purgation was in the detection and punishment of crime.

Second, there is no diocese for which we have all the *ex officio* records. Jurisdiction over public sin was widely dispersed in medieval England. The courts of bishops, archdeacons, rural deans, capitular bodies, and some other ecclesiastical dignitaries possessed it in various places.[38] And in no part of the Province of Canterbury do enough *ex officio* records survive from the fifteenth century to cover all the courts which had jurisdiction in one entire area. Thus, even if we could determine what percentage of the total number of acts of infanticide committed was actually reported to the Church courts, and what percentage of those persons accused was in fact guilty, we would still not be able to give a reliable total for the number of cases in any particular area, as opposed to any particular court. There is, unfortunately, no escape from the reluctant generalization Professor Trexler made about Florence. The English records can properly be used only to indicate that the practice of infanticide "was common enough."

Of the sex of those involved in infanticide the Act books tell us slightly more. No evidence is forthcoming which bears on the thesis that female children were killed more often than male.[39] The Act books do record that the accused *suffocavit puerum* often enough to make it clear that not only girls were killed.[40] But normally they used the neutral word *proles.* The sex of the child is not given, so that we know simply that a child has been killed. No proportional figures can be given.

There is, however, slightly better evidence on the sex of those accused of the crime. The English records suggest that more women than men committed infanticide (or at least were accused of having done so). But they also show it was by no means an exclusively female crime. For example, of the ten prosecutions recorded in the diocesan court at Canterbury between 1469 and 1474, eight were brought against women, two against men.[41] Between 1447 and 1455 at Rochester, there were thirteen prosecutions for infanticide. Of these five were against women, three against men, and five against a man and woman together.[42] It would therefore be wrong to conclude that in England at least, infanticide was committed exclusively by women.

Most of the infanticide prosecutions in the Church courts of the Province of Canterbury seem to have involved the parents of the child. At least this is a safe generalization if the sourt scribe used the adjective *suum* or *suam* correctly in preparing his record, since most entries use the possessive pronoun in describing the child killed. That is, they say

that the accused had caused the death of *prolem suam* or *puerum suum.* Where the adjective was omitted, sometimes it is still likely that the infant was the child of the person accused, and that the scribe simply did not bother to include the fact of parentage. This was probably true in many prosecutions against a husband and wife together. In a few cases where the records make clear that the guilty person was not the parent, there was nevertheless a relation with the infant, as in the case of Agnes Turnour, prosecuted at Canterbury in 1474. She was the child's grandmother.[43] This still leaves, however, some entries unaccounted for. It is not a large number. But it may well be that these entries record prosecutions against persons other than the parents of the child. As is true for many questions of importance to modern historians, the Act books provide some evidence on this one, but no statistical conclusions.

This, in brief summary, is the evidence about infanticide in fifteenth-century England which can be drawn from the court records of the Province of Canterbury. One scarcely needs to suggest that it is evidence only. It is incomplete and often inconclusive. But it is surely evidence worth having, part of the picture historians must reconstruct. It shows clearly that infanticide occurred in practice, and that the Church courts undertook prosecution against it. What is harder to assess with accuracy is what the records prove about contemporary attitudes towards infanticide. If modern historians are correct that the secular courts did not in practice proceed against the crime of infanticide, certainly it is important that the Church, more than the royal courts, exercised regular jurisdiction over it. Certainly it is important that ecclesiastical penance, rather than secular punishment, seemed an appropriate way to deal with convicted infanticides. This, together with much of the evidence outlined above, gives support to the argument that infanticide was not considered the equivalent of homicide in medieval Europe.

It would be a mistake, however, to go much beyond this. It would be wrong to conclude that because infanticide was apparently treated as something less than homicide, it was therefore no crime at all. To speak, as some writers have done, about a "common law freedom of abortion" is unwarranted if the phrase implies that one could cause the death of a fetus with impunity.[44] The royal courts were courts of limited jurisdiction in medieval England. They assumed that local and ecclesiastical courts would take cognizance of a great deal of unlawful conduct.[45] It does not follow that because the royal courts did not regularly punish a particular type of conduct, the conduct was therefore permissible according to Common Law.[46] What it does show is that in contemporary eyes, jurisdiction over the crime was properly lodged outside the royal courts. Infanticide, in the present state of the evidence, appears to be one such crime. But the Church was a legitimate public authority in medieval Europe. Its role in punishing unlawful conduct deserves to be taken seriously. The fifteenth-century records of the Province of Canterbury do give reasons for thinking that medieval

men did not regard infanticide with the horror we associate with premeditated homicide. But they do not show that society regarded the fate of infants with indifference.[47] On the contrary, they show that some protection was afforded children against both intentional and negligent killing. Infanticide was a crime punishable by a regular system of public courts.

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REFERENCES

1. C. 2 q.5 c.20; X 5.10.3. I have used the current system of citation to canonical texts throughout, as given in *Traditio* XV (1959) pp. 542-64, and the modern edition of the texts, *Corpus Juris Canonici*, ed. A. Friedberg, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1879). Citations to the *glossa ordinaria* are taken from the edition printed in Rome, 1582.
2. *Councils and Synods with other documents relating to the English Church II: 1205-1313*, eds. F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1964), pp. 32, 137, 183, 234-35, 274, 302, 351, 410, 432, 520, 590. For Italian parallels see Richard C. Trexler, *Synodal Law in Florence and Fiesole, 1306-1518* (Vatican City, 1971), pp. 126-27.
3. See Barbara A. Kellum, "Infanticide in England in the later Middle Ages," *History of Childhood Quarterly* I (1974), pp. 371-75, with references noted therein. On the possibilities for research into the field see Lloyd deMause, "The Evolution of Childhood," in *The History of Childhood*, ed. deMause (New York, 1974), pp. 1-73, esp. pp. 28-29, and Mary Martin McLaughlin, "Survivors and Surrogates: Children and Parents from the Ninth to the Thirteenth Centuries," *ibid.*, pp. 101-81, esp. pp. 120-22.
4. Kellum, "Infanticide in England," and Richard C. Trexler, "Infanticide in Florence: New Sources and First Results," *History of Childhood Quarterly* I (1973), pp. 98-116.
5. A brief description of these records can be found in Dorothy M. Owen, *The Records of the Established Church in England excluding parochial records* (British Records Association, 1970).
6. [Kent County Record Office, Maidstone] Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 69r: "Et fatetur submersionem prolis sue in aqua."
7. [Dean and Chapter Library, Canterbury Cathedral] Act book Y.1.11, f. 84r: "Post partum huiusmodi prostravit puerum in quadam fossa aquosa." In Rochester Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 191v (1452), Agnes Hamond was summoned "quia proiecit puerum non baptizatum in sepe," but only the summons is recorded.
8. Rochester Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 74v (1447): "Notatur quod necglexit prolem in tanto quod periit igne." She admitted the charge and was assigned "solemn penance" in the cathedral. For French examples of similarly gruesome incidents, see Y.-B. Brissaud, "L'infanticide a la fin du moyen age, ses motivations psychologiques et sa repression," *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, ser. 4, vol. 50 (June, 1972), pp. 229-56.
9. Rochester Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 91r.
10. [Guildhall Library, London] Act book MS. 9064/2, f. 179r: "Et eciam ver-

beravit uxorem suam in tanto quod tempore quo impregnata est occidit puerum in ventre eiusdem uxoris sue." A similar case is recorded in Canterbury Act book Y.1.3, f. 12v (1416). The accused successfully underwent canonical purgation to establish his innocence, however.

11. Act book Y.1.11, f. 126r: "Sciens Hevelyng esse inpregnatam et gravidam imposuit eidem tales inordinatos labores quorum occasione peperit abortium."
12. Rochester Act book DRb Pa 4, f. 232v: "Administrat medicinas in potum ad distruendum puerum procreatum per ipsum." Hemery later fled the court's jurisdiction, apparently in preference to conviction and punishment.
13. Canterbuty Act book Y.1.11, f. 57r: "Per erbas et medicinas interfecit infantem nuper in utero suo." A later instance is recorded in Act book Y.2.10, f. 100r (1521).
14. See *glossa ordinaria* ad C. 2 q. 5 c. 20 s.v. *consuluisti:* "Tunc puniantur, quia sunt homicidae, cum homicida dicatur etiam qui conceptum in utero deleverit per abortum." The records show no evidence of dispute about the time of "quickening" of the fetus. See, for example, Glanville Williams, *The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law,* (New York, 1957), pp. 151-152; David W. Louisell and John T. Noonan, Jr., "Constitutional Balance," *The Morality of Abortion: legal and historical perspectives* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 223-26.
15. Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 234r (1454): "Filiam suam inter eos in lecto iacentem oppresuerunt."
16. Canterbury Act book Y.1.10, f. 130r (1472): "Supraiecuit puerum suum in lecto usque ad mortem eiusdem."
17. [County Record Office, Hereford] Act book 0/14, f. 68r (1481); London Act books, MS. 9064/1, f. 38v (1470), MS. 9064/2, fols. 170r (1487); 173r (1487); Canterbury Act book X.1.1, fols. 69r (1454), 113r (1455); Rochester Act books DRb Pa 2, fols. 125r (1449), 215r (1453); DRb Pa 4, fols. 234v (1493), 274r (1495). See also Kellum, "Infanticide in England," pp. 369-71; McLaughlin, "Survivors and Surrogates," notes 102-107.
18. X 5.10.3: "De infantibus autem qui mortui reperiunter cum patre et matre et non apparet, utrum a patre vel a matre oppressus sit ipse vel suffocatus, vel propria morte defunctus, non debent inde securi esse parentes, nec etiam sine poena." The theme was discussed by medieval canonists. See, for example, Hostiensis, *Commentaria in Libros Decretalium* (Venice, 1581), who concludes ad X 5.10.3, no. 1: "Qui non adhibet omnem diligentiam quam potest in levi saltem culpa est." Lyndwood, *Provinciale* (Oxford, 1679), 307 s.v. *ne opprimantur:* "Si autem levis culpa praecesserit, poenitentia trium annorum est indicenda; ut d. c. ulti. Ubi autem nulla praecesserit negligencia vel culpa, non est aliqua poenitentia imponenda."
19. Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 239v: "Compertum est quod due proles sue fuerunt cremate et destructe eorum culpa quia ipsi clausis hostiis dimiserunt proles in domo cum igne, unde tota domus combusta fuit et proles similiter." Another example of negligence only expressly recorded as having been alleged against the parent is found in the same Act book, f. 74v (1447). For a clear statement of the canonical principle, see *glossa ordinaria* ad C.2 q.5 c. 20 s.v. *homicidii:* "Non tamen punitur ratione homicidii, sed ratione negligentiae, . . ., minor etiam iniungitur poena sive poenitentia ab ecclesia pro negligentia."
20. For an appreciation of this point see John T. Noonan, Jr., *Contraception; a History of its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 85-88. I am also grateful to Professor Trexler for raising this matter with me, and for helping me to think the question through, although I am not at all sure that he agrees with my position.
21. *E.g.* the diocesan statute of Exeter I begins: "Quia contingit interdum ibi perpetrari homicidium ubi nulla voluntas set casus mortis causam prestiterit, . . ." *Councils and Synods* I, 234.
22. X 5.34.13.
23. Canterbury Act book Y.1.10, f. 201v (1474).
24. See, for example, Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea* V (Venice, 1574), tit. *de purg. can.*, no. 4: "Sed certe hodie tenent omnes, quod numerus compurgatorum arbitrarius est."

25. Compare Act book DRb Pa 4, f. 234v (1493): eight handed compurgation, with idem, f. 232v (1493): six handed compurgation, and with Canterbury Act book Y.1.10, f. 130r (1472): three handed compurgation. Many of the entries do not specify the number to be used, reciting merely that the accused was given a day "ad purgandum se."
26. There were, however, some rules which were mandatory for accused persons, depending on their status, and for some crimes. The most important of the former was probably that the compurgators be *eiusdem ordinis* as the accused. See Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea* V, tit. *de purg. can.*, nos. 4-5.
27. Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 239v: "Et facta inquisicione per vicarium ibidem Johannem Turnour, Robertum Pathe et alios de parochia predicta Omnium Sanctorum compertum est quod due proles sue fuerunt cremate . . ."
28. The penance to be imposed when the accused failed in compurgation was the same which would be assigned for the crime itself. See Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea* V, tit. *de purg. can.*, no. 7: "Regulam trado tibi, quod sicut puniretur de crimine, de quod impetebatur, si convinceretur considerato modo agendi, sic punietur si in purgatione deficiat." The nature of the penance was, of course, also subject to judicial discretion. See, for example, Joannes Andreae, *Novella Commentaria in Libros Decretalium* (Venice, 1581) ad X 5.10.3, no. 1: "Hodie penitentiae sunt arbitrariae."
29. "Infanticide in Florence," pp. 108-09. On the discretion vested in the judge in assigning suitable penance see X 5.12.6.
30. Canterbury Act book Y.1.10, f. 42r: "Et iudex iniunxit eidem quod camisia tunica solummodo induta, . . . , procedat processionem in ecclesia parochiali de Hyth tribus diebus dominicis cum candela cerea dimidii libri in manu dextera et cultellum in sinistra cum quod occidit puerum vel similem cultellum et quod circuiat simili modo mercatum Cant' bis et simili modo bis circa mercatum de Feversham et bis circa mercatum de Asshford simili modo."
31. Barbara Westman, "The Female Felon in Fourteenth Century England," *Viator* V (1975), *passim;* Kellum, "Infanticide in England," pp. 372-73.
32. "Infanticide in England," p. 375. See also Williams, *Sanctity of Life*, p. 25, who misrepresents the attitude adopted in practice as opposed to legal theory.
33. See Act book 0/4 (1481), pp. 68, 70, 71, 75.
34. Rochester Act book DRb Pa 4, f. 146v (1481).
35. Act book MS. 9064/2, fols. 168v, 170r, 173r, 179r.
36. However, the *ex officio* prosecutions found were included in the instance Act books. The number is too small to make possible any conclusive statements about practice in this diocese.
37. "Infanticide in Florence," p. 103.
38. See my *Marriage Litigation in Medieval England* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 144-46.
39. For this subject, see Emily R. Coleman, "Infanticide dans le haut moyen age," *Annales* (1974), pp. 315-35, dealing however with an earlier period.
40. *E.g.* Canterbury Act book Y.1.11, f. 84r (1470); but the same Act book also used the terms *infans* and *proles* to describe the children (fols. 57v, 74v, 174v). I have found only two cases in which the scribe specifically used the word *filia* to describe the child killed; Canterbury Act book X.1.1, f. 69r (1454); Rochester Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 234r (1454).
41. Against men: Act book Y.1.11, fols 84r (1470), 126r (1471). Against women: Y.1,10, fols. 42r (1470), 130r (1472), 201v (1474); Y.1.11, fols. 57r (1469), 144r (1472), 175v (1472), 185r (1472), 322r (1474).
42. Against men: Act book DRb Pa 2, fols. 215r (1453), 239r (1453), 255v (1455); Against women: DRb Pa 2, fols. 74r (1447); 111v (1449), 125r (1449), 191v (1452), 228r (1453). Against both: DRb Pa 2, fols. 69r (1447), 91r (1448), 111v (1449), 234r (1454), 275r (1455).
43. Act book Y.1.11, f. 322r: "Notatur quod eius consensu interfactus erat infantulus cuiusdam filie eiusdem."
44. See Cyril C. Means, Jr., "The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom," 17 *New York Law Forum* (1971), pp. 335-410. It is certainly permissible to argue, as Pro-

fessor Means does, that American courts are not bound to accept the ecclesiastical law as part of the English Common Law as received in the United States. It is likewise permissible to argue (although it is conjectural) that crime crimes society considered as heinous were tried by the royal courts, so that the omission of a crime from royal jurisdiction indicates a lower degree of importance. What cannot be reasonably maintained is that any conduct not punished by the secular courts necessarily was legal. Professor Means comes close to falling into this position when he says, at p. 336, that "women enjoyed a common-law liberty to terminate at will an unwanted pregnancy, from the reign of Edward III to that of George III."

45. See G. O. Sayles, *The Court of King's Bench in Law and History* (London, 1959) p. 12; S. F. C. Milsom, *Historical Foundations of the Common Law* (London, 1969), p. 356.
46. Much the same could be said of heresy, for example. The most terrible punishment was imposed by the secular government for the latter crime, but the question of guilt or innocence could be tried only in the ecclesiastical courts.
47. See for example the sentiment echoed in the *glossa ordinaria* ad X 5.10.3 s.v. *nec etiam sine poena:* "Si vero sponte hoc fecerunt, tunc gravissima poenitentia debet eis imponi, aliquantulum maior quam pro alio homicidio quia magis peccare videtur proprium filium occidendo."

FROM THE SOURCES

Whipping Little Girls (1712):

> At age 5, father once kissed her instead of whipping her when he discovered her reading: "I was by my father greatly indulged—indeed, I cannot say but it was in some measure necessary he should by this gentleness qualify my mother's severity to me: otherwise it must have broke my heart for she strictly followed Solomon's advice, in never sparing the rod; insomuch that I have frequently been whipped for looking blue on a frosty morning; and, whether I deserved it or not, I was sure of correction every day of my life."
>
> Letitia Pilkington, *Memoirs of Mrs. Letitia Pilkington. 1712-1750.* (New York, 1928), p. 31.

Autobiography as a Key to Identity in the Progressive Era

MILAN JAMES KEDRO

Autobiography, or the conscious expression of a human being's history based upon his realistic and mythical memories, is extremely important, for an individual's interpretation of his past makes a continuing contribution to his present and future. But because of the ego-fulfilling nature of autobiography and its reliance upon partial or selective information, the historian must exercise caution in his interpretation of such a source. One check on autobiographical evaluation is to employ psychological theory and search out from among pluralistic motives those crucial recurrences in each man's development that establish major trends for his life. With this methodology it may be possible to compare attitudes toward critical human experiences shared by people who display similar behavior patterns, thus acknowledging a new focus from which to examine that illusive period that has come to be called the Progressive era.

The following variegated study is a partial attempt to overcome for Progressivism what Erik H. Erikson has described as a "blind spot" in our interpretation of history, "a tendency to overlook the fateful function of childhood in the fabric of society."[1] This applies also to an historical appreciation of the adult consequences of memorable childhood experiences, and how these experiences are evinced in social behavior.[2] This autobiographical investigation of four reformers, two mugwumps, and two labor leaders explains the differing modes of Progres-

sive response to the economic and social quandaries of that era through the portrayal of shared normative motivational patterns developed from childhood onward.

Effective collective autobiographical analysis of Progressive era personalities depends upon comparable information for illustrative individuals who experienced the difficulties of an urban-industrial environment, yet manifested diverse and often contradictory resolutions to the multitudinous problems facing America in the optimistic atmosphere of the early twentieth century.[3] At first glance the reformist chronicles examined here, those of Clarence S. Darrow, Richard T. Ely, Frederic C. Howe, and Thomas L. Johnson, appear diverse enough in themselves. But to maintain balance and achieve some realization of the pluralistic nature of the period, the autobiographies of the more conservative Theodore Roosevelt, William Allen White, Samuel Gompers, and Terence V. Powderly are analyzed alongside those of the four reformers. Such a cross-sectional study of Progressives should expose divergent changes in attitude and provide for better understanding of an individual's ultimate attainment of either a reformist, mugwump, or laborite identity during a period of rapid change in America's social and economic fabric.

Any examination of adult Progressive attitude structures must begin with home nurture. Childhood with its implicit cognitive system of the family, adolescent conflicts with family ideologies, and the young adult's reliance upon various dependency processes must be taken into account to determine these eight individuals' identity formation, motivation, and their adult roles in the Progressive milieu.[4] Facilitating our investigation in one area of home nurture is a study by William R. Hutchison which determined that late nineteenth-century liberal ministers often "spoke of the influence of a kind of person almost entirely missing from the conservative chronicles—of a parent or uncle or close family acquaintance who was somewhat heretical or freethinking by family standards but was clearly more admired in that circle than accepted in the community."[5] It is of significance that in a similar fashion Darrow, Ely, Johnson, and Howe viewed their fathers as influential forces during the maturation of their own freethinking attitudes.

Tom Johnson attributed his hatred for all forms of bondage to the anti-slavery teachings he had learned at his Southern papa's knee.[6] Clarence Darrow remembered his father as a "visionary and dreamer," happy in his reputation as the "village infidel" with a sensitive nature that "tied him to every hopeless cause that came his way."[7] Likewise, Ely's father, Ezra, a humanitarian with an aesthetic New England conscience, desired to "correct the abuses he saw about him. . . ."[8] The elder Howe, too, impressed young Frederic with his "quiet broadmindedness;" the father's "independence of judgment and humorous

and tolerant quality" were unusual traits for the small community in which the Howes lived.[9]

But in conjunction with their fathers' positive liberal traits were severe problems that the reformers encountered with family ideology due to certain negative economic paternal characteristics that they recalled having sensed even as children. As Clarence Darrow put it, "I early came to see shortcomings rather than strengths" in my parents.[10] Clarence observed that his college-educated father, Amirus, neglected his work to read "even when he sorely needed money."[11] Darrow wrote that "neither by nature nor by training [had Amirus] any business ability or any faculty for getting money."[12] The story repeats itself with Tom Johnson's father, Albert, who emerged from the Civil War "penniless" and borrowed capital in an attempt to operate his Arkansas cotton plantation with free labor, an experiment that ended in "complete failure."[13] Frederic Howe, as well, confessed that his father was "a poor businessman," for Mr. Howe's furniture firm was always "in a bad way."[14] And Ezra Ely's New England conscience "asserted itself in . . . ways which were financially injurious;" when the family desperately needed his income, Ezra quit a railroad engineering job rather than work on the "Sabbath." The Elys also "experienced all sorts of bad luck on the farm," because Ezra knew little about agriculture.[15] This lackadaisical concern for monetary success coupled with the reform fathers' freethinking qualities would be of substantial importance in contributing to their sons' ambiguity toward financial gain in later years.

Interestingly, in the memories of their offspring, the elder Roosevelt and White were definitely not economic "failures," nor were they the sort of nonconformist fathers pictured by the reformers. On the contrary, the two mugwump fathers were hard working, respected citizens of their communities who enjoyed élite roles. Thus they provided their sons with an easier path to positive identification. White remarked that he had "great pride in Pa" and early realized that his father, Allen, "belonged to the ruling class."[16] William's father was a freethinker on several issues, but his son also remembered him as a "strict disciplinarian." Allen White believed in child labor, his "Puritan blood" and "a vast phantasm of his own industry and exemplary childhood, backed him up when he [harnessed Will] to the harsh, hard work of the world."[17]

Roosevelt's father, too, combined insistence on discipline "with great love and patience."[18] Speaking of Theodore, Sr., the younger Roosevelt commented that he had never known a man "who more whole-heartedly performed every duty; [or] approached his [father's] combination of enjoyment of life and performance of duty." But Theodore, Sr., could also show "much wrath against a bully or oppressor,"

and this power of the mugwump fathers was dramatically captured in Roosevelt's statement that his father, the best man he had ever known, "was the only man of whom [he] was ever really afraid."[19] In addition to drawing upon this strength, the adolescent Roosevelt was also inspired by his father's "practical charitable work;" the Sunday mission class that Mr. Roosevelt taught so impressed the boy that he catechized one himself as a teenager and during his four years at Harvard, during which time news of his father's death reached him, leaving a void within the young college student. Much later, coincidentally assuming the office of the presidency upon his father's birthday, Roosevelt remarked: "I have realized it as I signed papers all day, and I feel that it is a good omen that I begin my duties in this house on this day. I feel as if my father's hand were on my shoulder and as if there was a special blessing over the life I should lead here."[20]

Unlike the reformist autobiographies, the White and Roosevelt chronicles present a keener sense of respect for father and his unflinching work ethic. The mugwumps recreated their fathers' roles as they became adults, never questioning childhood teachings. For example, Roosevelt, in his autobiography, commenting upon his early reading habits, remarked that everything he studied as a child and adolescent "instilled the individual virtues, and the necessity of character as the chief factor in any man's success—a teaching in which I now believe as sincerely as ever."[21] Obviously, the mugwump fathers tried to prod their sons out from under "mother's skirts," attempting to make them independent, sober, and reliable in their work or study at an early age.

In comparison to the reformers and mugwumps, the laborites entered life under more arduous circumstances and later had little to say concerning their parents. Indeed, to provide for a large family on a small income left a laboring father few spare moments to devote to his sons. Moreover, he often needed his children's economic assistance to maintain the family even at a subsistence level.[22] Separated by nationality and religion from the other groups, the fathers of Powderly and Gompers were first generation immigrants. Terence Powderly, Sr., a good Catholic, migrated from Ireland after his arrest and conviction for poaching on a lord's estate.[23] Powderly recalled that his father "spent no time in saloons" and was a diligent worker for the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company. Terence Sr. only expected that his son work hard, not provoke quarrels, and above all never run away from a fight.[24] At thirteen, young Terence, the eleventh of twelve children, went to work for the Delaware and Hudson Railroad.

Solomon Gompers, a descendant of the poor, Jewish Amsterdam branch of the family, determined that he could no longer make ends meet as a cigarmaker in England, and in 1863 departed with wife and children bound for America.[25] Samuel Gompers remembered "a natural

independence and dignity" about his father, but like Mr. Powderly, Solomon depended upon his son as a wage earner. Six-year-old Samuel began his education at the Jewish Free School in East London but quit at the age of ten to begin his working career. In his autobiography the American Federation of Labor leader commented: "Like all children of the poor, we early found our way to the city streets–the place where we began contacts and struggles with our fellows. It is the education of the street that produces that early shrewdness in the children of those who 'have not' that leaves an ineradicable difference between them and the children of those 'who have.' "[26]

The laborite autobiographers, advancing to middle-class status as they entered adulthood, apparently found it difficult to identify with a father who had been forced by economic reasons to contribute to his son's lack of schooling and childhood deprivations. Gompers could not hide a long-felt injustice when he remarked that "though I left school at an early age to help earn a living, I did not then realize the wrong society had done me."[27] Both Powderly and Gompers felt that an imbalanced economic structure was to blame for their misfortunate childhood, but they nevertheless neglected to recount the sincere kinship with father later recalled by their reformer and mugwump contemporaries.

Similar to the labor-class fathers, the mothers of Powderly and Gompers shared few characteristics with their upper-class counterparts. It is entirely plausible that the laborer sons experienced a more traumatic crisis of early infancy than the other autobiographers examined here. With less adequate maternal care, the laborites' innermost mood of basic mistrust was perhaps established in childhood. At any rate, the labor class mothers had to prepare for a hastened parting with their sons. Naturally, Powderly and Gompers matured earlier than the other boys, since, by thirteen or fourteen they were apprenticed and on their way to a predetermined independence from the family unit.

Typical of the laborite mother, Terence recalled that Mrs. Powderly "did agricultural work at times" to help support her children. She often physically punished Terence, and the labor leader wrote: "She made me work the first day I was able to do anything, kept me going when there was anything to be done, made no allowance for overtime, and if I didn't do it right the first time she had a most persuasive and convincing way of causing me not to forget the next time. . . . She didn't spoil the rod through failure to employ it."[28] Out of necessity for survival, labor class mothers, painful as it must have been for them knowing both the warm affections of the home and the cold realities of the world, braced their sons for an early break with the family.

This was not the case for the reform or mugwump autobiographer, however. The mothers of Roosevelt and White, especially, were remembered as affectionate and lenient women by their sons. Theodore com-

mented that his mother, Martha Bulloch, "was a sweet, gracious, beautiful Southern woman, a delightful companion and beloved by everybody."[29] Martha possessed a sense of humor that often led her to overlook Teedie's mischief; she would warn him not to repeat offenses under the penalty of informing his father, "he being the dispenser of serious punishment."[30] While traveling in Europe, asthmatic ten-year-old Roosevelt wrote in his childhood diary that "I was very sick last night and Mama was so kind telling me storrys [sic] and rubbing me with her delicate fingers."[31] White, too, was "coddled" by his mother, Mary Hattan. As a boy he "went to her for protection," frequently siding with her against his disciplinarian father.[32]

Contrary to the genteel maternal tradition of the mugwumps, the reformer's mother proved to be the parent who provided her son with his source of economic motivation and his desire for status. Unable to achieve total identification with a financially unsuccessful father, the four reformers attributed their drive for success to maternal influences. Johnson pictured his mother, Helen Loftin, as very energetic, courageous, and self-reliant. Cleveland's reform mayor believed that his optimism, "his turn for mechanics," and his inventive intellect were inspired by his mother.[33] Indeed, it was Helen who obtained Tom's first full-time job for him at a rolling-mill in Louisville.[34] Darrow recounted that his mother, Emily Eddy, who died when Clarence was but fourteen, "was more efficient and practical" than his father and did much to save "the family from dire want."[35] Harriet Mason, Ely's mother, retained the same "tremendous energy, ingenuity, and versatility" that Johnson saw in Helen Loftin. Mrs. Ely used her talents as artist and teacher to send Richard and his brother and sister through school.[36] And like the others, Frederic Howe's mother shared in the burdens of family financial responsibility. She "kept house on a very small allowance. . . . A sharp line was drawn between necessary and unnecessary expenditures," and from his experiences with mother, Howe received "a money measure of life and a fear of prodigality from which . . . [he] never escaped."[37]

In forming an identity the four reformers seemingly took only what they perceived to be the positive, nonconformist aspects of the father and combined these with the desire for social and economic advancement apparently predominant in the mother. This particular synthesis of positive parental traits is not found in the mugwump nor in the laborite autobiographies. Their personalities tended to rely heavily upon either an élitist family ideology or a peer-group labor philosophy, while the reformer was probably more introspective in his identity formulation.

Closely associated with parental influences and home nurture were the religious backgrounds of the eight families. Darrow, Ely, and Howe, for example, descended from a long line of Calvinistic, congregationalist

denominations, which sheds light on both their virtue and individualism. Refusing to legislate morality, Tom Johnson's rejection of Calvinistic efforts to regenerate society tied him strongly to the reform group, for these reformers eventually discarded the dogmatic religious teachings of their youth.[38] Already in adolescence they were questioning ritualistic religious philosophy. At Allegheny College the winter revival meetings found young Frederic Howe "inwardly rebellious, outwardly passive."[39] And to the great distress of his Presbyterian father, while attending Columbia College Richard Ely developed a strong belief in universal salvation, and for a time he desired to become a Universalist preacher.[40]

Shunning traditional religious doctrines, the reformers to varying degrees inherited the "moral traditions of rural evangelical Protestantism . . . [with] its ethos of personal responsibility."[41] Their autobiographies suggest that "the Protestant code of duty left a permanent imprint on their thinking, but that the [religious] conversion experience either eluded them or was rejected in favor of a purely ethical Christianity."[42] This code of duty was reinforced by the essential virtues and a common set of allusions derived from their childhood educational experiences with *McGuffey Reader* moralisms that permeated nineteenth-century school systems and helped to confirm the standards for small-town life.[43] With such an upbringing, Darrow could remark to a gathering of laborers in New York City that "whatever the copybooks and the old school readers may have told us, and whatever we learned when we were children in school, we have found out that most of these things were fallacies. The man who worked did not get rich, and the man who was kind and generous and loving wasn't the man to get rich. Virtue didn't always have its reward. Virtue was generally its only reward, instead of its own reward."[44] Nevertheless, Darrow continued to sympathize with and work for the "virtuous," the men like his father Amirus and his friend "Gene" Debs, those who fought for the "hopeless cause."

Tending to secularize Christianity, the four reformers, perhaps as "modern postmillennialists," initially "lent to reform thought much of its optimism, its perfectionism and its faith in the ability of brotherhood, united to the modern scientific spirit, to conquer all the evils of the world."[45] In the last analysis, each of the four was a moralist, and a review of their autobiographies reveals a tremendous amount of self-accusation and guilt.

Devoid of such self-guilt, the mugwumps remembered more stable, consistent, and apodictic religious pasts than their fellow Progressives. Roosevelt attended Sunday school regularly at the Presbyterian Church on Madison Square, and every evening Teedie said his prayers for his mother and in the morning recited them again for his father.[46] White attended the "Campbellite Sunday school at nine o'clock, every Sun-

day morning, and the Presbyterian at twelve, and the Methodist at half past two."[47] At school Willie sang gospel hymns, and the teacher read from the Bible to start the day off right.[48] Like Roosevelt, White continued to attend a young man's Bible class in the Presbyterian Church throughout his college years. The mugwumps' religious training advanced unencumbered into adulthood and followed a social service orientation.

In a corresponding fashion, the laborites conveyed a service ethic to their religions. In his autobiography Powderly compared labor leaders to Christian martyrs: "Christ, if I read him aright, did not die for the unjust rich man any more than he did for the lazy, poor man. He lived and worked for the industrious poor, for them He agitated, for them He died."[49] And when their family's respective religions did not meet the test of their newly acquired peer group values, the laborites were ready to discard religions as a mere "opiate" for the masses, modifying their faith to serve their labor class ideology.[50] For example, when certain priests began to criticize the Knights of Labor, Powderly came to believe that "while the Catholic Church is a marvelous and wonderful institution, the practices of many of its spokesmen are neither godlike nor divine."[51] Samuel Gompers, raised in the Jewish faith, "though not scrupulously orthodox," spoke in words familiar to Powderly's revamped Catholicism when he commented that "somehow I have never been able to separate an act of worship or service, as I prefer to call it, from some concrete human need. . . . Service has been to me the great spiritual purpose that illumines life."[52]

This blending of the social service and religious doctrine presents a subtle bond between the mugwumps and laborites investigated in this study. William Allen White's belief, first felt when he was only seventeen, that "Jesus died to save the world by demonstrating . . . the indestructability of truth," is not far removed from Powderly's or Gomper's interpretation of religious ethics.[53] It is worthy of mention, however, that the mugwumps acquired their service doctrine from a reliance upon their family ideologies which stressed the importance of leadership, while the labor leaders developed their brand of service from a peer group ideology that emphasized class consciousness and the justification of efforts for economic equality of opportunity on the part of workingmen. The more apparent traditional religious beliefs and conservative ideologies underlying the mugwump and laborite identities, and the religious symbolism that pervades their autobiographies, is not as overt or in some cases entirely missing from the reformist chronicles. The reformers proposed to overhaul social and economic systems rather than to provide quasi-religious social services for the less fortunate of their society.

The mugwump and laborite conservatism also carried over into a shared anti-foreign, or more precisely anti-Southern and Eastern European and anti-Oriental attitude. Richard Hofstadter in *The Age of Reform* astutely observed this link between certain Progressives and labor leaders, and in so doing noted that William Allen White's "nonsense about race" in *The Old Order Changeth* made for interesting comparison with the extremism expressed by Edward A. Ross in *The Old World in The New.*[54] In a conference with President Roosevelt at Sagamore Hill, Gompers was happy to hear the president declare "emphatically that under no circumstances must Chinese workmen be permitted to enter the United States whether they were skilled or unskilled."[55] And Powderly, as chief of the Bureau of Immigration, commented in 1908 that "I am not afraid of immigration. We can take care of all the aliens that come, provided they are good ones, capable of developing into proper citizens—and we are seeing to it that none but the good ones come."[56]

Familial political persuasions are of some importance as well in determining Progressive era identities. While this paper cannot reveal in entirety the political complexities within these eight families, autobiographical analysis suggests that there was a greater degree of internal political cohesiveness among the four reform families. Mothers and fathers of reformers shared the same political perspectives even if the family happened to be switching from one party to another. (Ultimately Darrow, "born of an Abolition father and mother,"[57] and Howe left the Republican party for the Democratic; Ely abandoned the Republicans to become a Wisconsin Progressive; Johnson discarded the Southern Democracy of his forebears for a progressive Democratic stance.) This cohesive reform family characteristic was less apparent in the mugwump and laborite families, where the autobiographers readily noted political distinctions between parents on questions of party loyalty, choice of candidates, abolition, or general political outlook.[58]

The reformers, guided by familial liberalism, would not become the staunch party standard-bearers that White and Roosevelt became. As a school boy, White envisioned himself a silk-stockings Democrat like his father. But during late adolescence, after his father's death, fitting into the Kansas community William made the natural switch to Republicanism with only slight guilt feelings. And after all, as Roosevelt pointed out while stressing a conservative family ideology, "a young man of [his] bringing up and conviction could join only the Republican party. . . ."[59]

The labor leaders, on the other hand, lost interest in major parties in proportion to their desire to propagate peer group ideologies; quite often they supported third parties or became independents.[60] Powderly

entered the Greenback-Labor movement, and Gompers, a Republican supporter in his early years, had his party faith "rudely shattered" with the public scandal of the Grant administration during 1873. In the final analysis, the laborites tended to pursue a non-partisan political policy, and as Gompers said, "always sought to use political situations for labor's advantage."[61]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is necessary to recognize that each of these Progressives expressed memories of a stage of growth, usually occurring in adolescence, that most aptly may be termed an identity crisis. This crisis led them toward the developmental path of an adult ideology.[62] The mugwumps and laborites, depending upon established ideologies, went through a less severe transition from childhood to adulthood than did the reformers. But of greater significance is that the reformer experienced the tribulation of an additional early crisis not felt by his Progressive counterparts. This was described by the reform autobiographers as a "conversion" episode, usually taking place in early adulthood, which can be associated with Erikson's discussion of the integrity crisis for the *homo religiosus*.

Using Erikson's phraseology, the four reformers differed from the mugwump or laborite personalities by a consciousness of their own singularity and humanity. Early in life they extended their identities to the borders of the known universe, while the mugwumps and laborites merely adopted departmentalized identities prepared for them by family and community.[63] The continuous trauma of the integrity crisis, coupled with their synthesized and sometimes dualistic identities, perhaps contributed to the reformers' self-guilt, a trait not shared by the mugwumps or labor leaders. Suffering the martyr's strife, the reformers found it necessary to withdraw from society at times, seeking relief in a self-imposed hermitage. A few examples from the reform autobiographies are well worth citing in order to demonstrate the strength of applying the integrity crisis hypothesis to the evolution of the reform personality.

Tom Johnson had successfully reached adulthood by identification with businessmen for whom he had worked since the age of fifteen, but he came to question his whole life-style as he experienced a "conversion" episode and adopted a new "surrogate father" when twenty-nine years old. "At the very height of [his] money-making career," Johnson's whole outlook on the universe underwent modification when he read Henry George's *Social Problems* and *Progress and Poverty*. He was convinced that with the single-tax "George had found the great truth and a practical solution for the most vexing of social problems. . . ."[64] George's idealistic philosophy began to take full hold of Johnson sometime after he witnessed the devastation of the Johnstown flood in 1889. Visiting Johnstown, the sight of his railway mill, he was moved to

tears and denounced "special privilege" for having allowed an upper class hunting and fishing club's defective dam to cause such a catastrophe.[65] Slowly Johnson became the possessor of integrity and began to develop and defend his new reformist life-style against all threats; he began to ask himself "the questions of how to escape corruption in living and how in death to give meaning to life."[66]

In the year preceding the Johnstown flood, Clarence Darrow left small-town Ohio for Chicago and joined the Single-Tax Club in that Midwestern metropolis. Before he departed from Ashtabula, Darrow had read *Progress and Poverty* and felt that he had "found a new political gospel that bade fair to bring about the social equality and opportunity" that had been the dream of many idealists. But it was Judge John P. Altgeld's *Our Penal Code and Its Victims* that unlocked the door to a philosophy that was "a revelation" to the young lawyer and had a "marked influence" upon his life. The judge was the first man whom Darrow sought out after his arrival in Chicago, and Altgeld took a deep, personal interest in Clarence's affairs.[67]

Sensing his inheritance of father's liberal spirit, reinforced by Altgeld's philosophy, Darrow came to recognize that he had a strong emotional nature that caused him "boundless joy and infinite pain." The young man's sympathies were always with the poor and suffering, and he tried to relieve their sorrows so that he himself "might be relieved."[68] Providing an outlet for these emotions, the catalytic event in Darrow's early adulthood, his own "Johnstown flood," was the 1894 American Railway Union strike. Darrow wanted the strikers to win and was so moved by their plight that he was forced by conscience to resign his job as general attorney for the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company. Eventually he came to defend the union leader, Eugene V. Debs.[69]

In a fashion typical of these reformers' integrity crises, Richard Ely in 1880 returned to New York City from his doctoral studies in Germany and fell into despair. Unable to agree with Henry George's doctrines, the knowledge that Ely had gained under his Heidelberg professor and mentor, Karl Knies, was enough to ignite the young economist's conscience with the pangs of self-guilt for the urban blight that surrounded him. In his autobiography Ely recalled that "as I walked through the streets of New York, my heart sank within me. The city was dirty and ill-kept, the pavements poor, and there were evidences of graft and incompetence on every hand. Is this my America? I asked myself."[70] Without a job, strolling silently among the ill-clad, hungry masses, Ely "looked from the bridge down to the railway tracks, and they suggested this only—suicide."[71] But Richard's initial desire to seek relief in death was overcome by a passion to reform society, and he "vowed to do whatever was in [his] power to bring about better conditions."[72]

Howe, too, encountered an integrity crisis when he joined Tom Johnson's reform program in Cleveland.[73] Writing his life story in the mid 1920s, Howe commented that "change could only come through political action. It involved education, agitation, possibly control of the government by new groups."[74] But even more striking was Howe's memory concerning a basic inner conflict representative of the four reformers' synthesized identities: "I wanted wealth, even though I knew that great wealth could only be gotten by means of which I disapproved. I wanted approval from my crowd and from myself as well. That was my conflict. It was for the most part subconscious."[75]

This desire to climb as many rungs of the golden ladder as possible, an inheritance, perhaps, of mother's status drive, mellowed as the reformers reached maturity and placed greater emphasis upon father's intellectual, freethinking qualities.[76] Once the trauma of the integrity crisis was under way, the four reformers could no longer accept worldly, monetary success without undergoing feelings of guilt. Initially motivated to achieve and to succeed by their visions of a hard-working mother, they realized that too much success could fracture that part of their ego identities fashioned after father's positive characteristics. Grand scale monetary accomplishments offered in a turn-of-the-century America that venerated the millionaire could be attained only if these reformers denied a commitment to their singularity, humanity, and compassion. Success was possible within their composite identities, but an all-consuming materialism was a transgression that their consciences would not condone.

The reformer's adolescent identity crisis, which anticipated his more mature crisis, was often a recurring trauma leading to the early acquisition of integrity. The extreme force of this early two-fold identity trauma was captured in Frederic Howe's statement that "I am not nearly as old as the records of birth in Meadville . . . make me seem. My life really began in the early nineties instead of the late sixties. It began at Johns Hopkins University."[77] For the sake of brevity, every identity crisis will not be discussed here, but they are readily apparent to the discerning reader of these eight autobiographies.[78]

The reformer's identity crisis was more severe than that of the mugwump or laborite because he experienced greater singularity and felt "particularly sinful, lonely, unprepared for the battles ahead, morally inferior to others, cut loose from the aims that parents and relatives [had] proposed."[79] Not sharing this burden, the two mugwumps entered adulthood through a resigned and dependent adolescence, shielded from the vulnerability of dealing with an expanded world's uncertain complexities by the canopy of a restrictive family ideology. The anxiety of individuation borne by the adolescent reformer may have been too great for the mugwump to suffer.

The adolescent laborite, choosing an alternative ideology and discarding childhood's family philosophy, accepted his peer-group's constrictive articulation of the needs of the working classes. Gompers early identified with trade unionist Karl Malcolm Ferdinand Laurrell. Flashbacks of Samuel's childhood, when "the narrow [London] streets echoed with the tramp of men walking . . . in groups with no work to do . . . crying . . . 'Lord strike me dead—my wife, my kids want bread and I've no work to do,' " were reinforced by the labor ideology that Gompers acquired from Laurrell and others. Gompers then realized that as a child of the working classes he had developed "a subconscious guiding impulse" that was now developing into the "dominating influence" of his life.[80] Similarly, Powderly "canonized" the miner and labor hero John Siney as his personal patron saint.[81] Their identities firmly established as young men, Gompers and Powderly would never question their roles with the emotional strain of a reformer's integrity crisis.

Both the laborite and the mugwump personalities investigated in this study, with ideologies somewhat devoid of personal thought and reflection, seemingly depended upon outside, established systems for security, identity, and motivation. Rejecting their negative identities of youth, the more introspective reformers established positive self-images through their respective integrity crises. Closely associated with identity formation in all cases were the differing effects of cultural continuity on each individual's motivation and outlook due to parental and environmental factors.

It is apparent that the reformers, mugwumps, and laborites overlapped in some areas of home nurture, childhood, or adolescent reminiscences. As human beings all of us undergo similar developmental patterns, and these natural trials of growth unite the individuals who comprise this autobiographical analysis. But more important, it seems, are the differences in personal autobiographical remembrances about family and upbringing displayed by these Progressives. Their individuation from youth onward, when viewed in relation to their shared recollections of childhood and common normative motivational patterns, may help to explain their adult roles in the Progressive era.

One last point deserves special emphasis; this is that autobiographical analysis that adopts psychological theory need not be a futile quest for a collective ego. Indeed, a psychological examination of Progressivism must begin with changing individuals who possess pluralistic motives and live in a complex society. From this perspective, then, which in some ways posits family life as the strongest of all historical forces, the historian may begin to relate analyzed individuals' shared motivations to groups in flux and perhaps better comprehend Progressive era ideologies and institutions.

Conceivably an in-depth psychohistorical inquiry into Progressive era personalities may only serve to reiterate Peter G. Filene's able summation of recent composite biographies and simply repeat from a psychological vista that the "characteristics which had been presumed to be peculiarly 'Progressive' turn out to be common to all political leaders of the era."[82] But Progressivism was more than politics, and it appears likely that certain singular traits common to the reform psyche might emerge from an expanded psychohistorical study that would make delineation of Progressive era personality types feasible, and ultimately this perhaps would produce a more sound historical conception of the Progressive era.

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The author wishes to thank Dr. Lyle W. Dorsett and Dr. John C. Livingston of the University of Denver for their criticisms and encouragement.

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19. Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*, pp. 7-8 and 10-11.
20. Pringle, *Roosevelt*, p. 5; see Pringle, Chapters 1-5, esp., for a good account of Roosevelt's family ideology with a lead-in to the thesis that Roosevelt the adult "was the most adolescent of men" (p. 4); Roosevelt is pictured as more responsible in Carleton Putnam, *Theodore Roosevelt: The Formative Years, 1858-1886* 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), an excellent study of the effects of the early years upon Roosevelt's adulthood. See esp. Chapter 5, "An Invalid Rebels," for a comment on Roosevelt's early crisis of adolescence. Roosevelt's illnesses have been covered in detail in many accounts and need not be repeated here. Pringle said it succintly when he noted that "in those days of childhood illness lies the clue to the evangelical vitality of later years" (*Roosevelt*, p. 4); see also Howard K. Beale, "Theodore Roosevelt's Ancestry, A Study in Heredity," *New York Geneaological and Biographical Record* 85, (October 1954): 196-205.
21. Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*, p. 25.
22. Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, *Facing Life: Youth and the Family in American History* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 148-153, where the authors overstate their case by presenting a middle and upper class viewpoint. Their diagnosis of disquieting family anxieties after 1870 is perhaps correct, but their assertion that "gone were the days when the boy left home at fourteen to make his way as best he could," is fallacious when one considers the laboring classes in America (p. 148).
23. Terence V. Powderly, *The Path I Trod, The Autobiography of Terence V. Powderly*, edited by H. J. Carman, H. David, and P. N. Guthrie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 5.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 14, and 17.
25. Samuel Gompers, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor, An Autobiography*, 2 vols. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1948), 1, p. 24; Rowland Hill Harvey, *Samuel Gompers, Champion of the Toiling Masses* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), pp. 3-7; Florence Calvert Thorne, *Samuel Gompers–American Statesman* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957), pp. 1-3.

26. Gompers, *Seventy Years*, 1, p. 2.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
28. Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, pp. 17-18.
29. Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*, p. 11.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Roosevelt, "Childhood Diary," 10 October 1869, in Pringle, *Roosevelt*, p. 5.
32. White, *Autobiography*, pp. 35-36 and 53; Everett Rich, *William Allen White: The Man from Emporia* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1941), pp. 15-23; David Hinshaw, *A Man from Kansas: The Story of William Allen White* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), pp. 31-32.
33. Johnson, *My Story*, pp. 1-4.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
35. Darrow, *Story of My Life*, pp. 13-14, 16, and 27.
36. Ely, *Ground Under Our Feet*, pp. 21 and 51-52.
37. Howe, *Confessions*, pp. 12-14.
38. Johnson, *My Story*, p. 170.
39. Howe, *Confessions*, pp. 11 and 16-18.
40. Ely, *Ground Under Our Feet*, pp. 16 and 54-55.
41. Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), pp. 204-207.
42. Jean B. Quandt, *From Small Town to the Great Community: The Social Thought of Progressive Intellectuals* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), p. 9.
43. Henry Steele Commager, "Foreword" to *McGuffey's Fifth Eclectic Reader 1879 Edition* (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1962), v-xiv.
44. Darrow, "Darrow's Address In New York," *The Miners Magazine* (24 September 1908): 7.
45. Quandt, "Religion and Social Thought: The Secularization of Postmillennialism," *American Quarterly* 25, (October 1973): 407.
46. Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*, pp. 11 and 16.
47. White, *Autobiography*, p. 61.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
49. Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, pp. 38-39.
50. Harvey, *Gompers, Champion of the Toiling Masses*, p. 8.
51. Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, p. 371.
52. Gompers, *Seventy Years*, p. 17.
53. White, *Autobiography*, p. 108.
54. Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, p. 180; see White, *The Old Order Changeth* (New York, 1910), pp. 128-130, 197-199, 252.
55. Gompers, *Seventy Years*, 2, p. 162.
56. Powderly, "Labor Blind to Traitors," *The Miners Magazine* (1 October 1908): 7.
57. Arthur Weinberg (ed.), *Attorney for the Damned* (New York, 1961), pp. 523-524, cited in John C. Livingston, "Clarence Darrow: Sentimental Rebel" (Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History, University of Wisconsin, 1965), pp. 153-154.
58. Cf. Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*, p. 11; White, *Autobiography*, pp. 61 and 72; Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, pp. 11-12; Gompers, *Seventy Years*, 1, pp. 18-19 and 151.
59. Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*, p. 55.
60. Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, pp. 67-72; Gompers, *Seventy Years*, 1, pp. 75-77.
61. Gompers, *Seventy Years*, 1, p. 77.
62. Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1962), where Erikson defines the identity crisis as a period in life "when each youth must forge for himself some central perspective and direction, some working unity, out of the effective remnants of his childhood and the hopes of his anticipated adulthood; he must detect some meaningful resemblance between what he has come to see in himself and what his sharpened awareness tells him others judge and expect him to be" (p. 14).

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-263.
64. Johnson, *My Story*, pp. 48-50.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 36 and 44.
66. Erikson, *Young Man Luther*, pp. 260-261.
67. Darrow, *Story of My Life*, pp. 41 and 96.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-69.
70. Ely, *Ground Under Our Feet*, p. 65; Benjamin G. Rader, *The Academic Mind and Reform: The Influence of Richard T. Ely in American Life* (Louisville: University of Kentucky Press, 1966), pp. 7-8 and 13-15.
71. Ely, *Ground Under Our Feet*, p. 285.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
73. Howe, *Confessions*, pp. 95 and 136.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 224.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
76. It is highly noteworthy that Dorothy Ross, in *G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), concluded that Hall, somewhat like the reformers examined in this study, but perhaps for different underlying reasons, developed both an aggressive and a constrained character (pp. 10-11); Joseph F. Kett in a review of Ross's book accurately commented that Ross hypothesized that "Hall's home life . . . planted the seeds of a lifelong internal conflict between masculine (active and aggressive) and feminine (submissive and affective) ideals. Although Hall never could articulate the hostility which he felt, his feelings toward his father remained deeply ambivalent, in contrast to the warm affection he felt toward his mother. . . ." (*The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 4, [Spring 1974]:690).
77. Howe, *Confessions*, p. 1.
78. For discussions of possible identity crises, see Johnson, *My Story*, pp. 7-13; Darrow, *Story of My Life*, p. 27 *et passim;* Ely, *Ground Under Our Feet*, p. 16 *et passim;* Howe, *Confessions*, pp. 11 and 16-18; Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*, pp. 23 and 26-28; White, *Autobiography*, pp. 161, 187, and 202; Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, pp. 26-27 and 35; Gompers, *Seventy Years*, 1, pp. 5, 45, and 68-75.
79. Bertram Wyatt-Brown, "New Leftists and Abolitionists: A Comparison of American Radical Styles," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 53, (Summer 1970): 261.
80. Gompers, *Seventy Years*, 1, pp. 70 and 5.
81. Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, pp. 23-25.
82. Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary for 'The Progressive Movement,'" *American Quarterly* 22, (Spring 1970): 30.



Psychohistory and Psychotherapy

LLOYD
deMAUSE

The following speech was delivered to the Psychiatric Conference of the Tufts-New England Medical Center, Boston, Massachusetts, on March 7, 1974.

During the long summer of 1973, as the Watergate hearings began to reveal the full extent of the illegal activities of Richard M. Nixon, I would often have lunch with associates in the mental health field, and invariably our discussions turned to the personality of Nixon. Surprisingly, my friends each described for me quite similar profiles of his character. Previously, they said, it had seemed that Nixon was a typical obsessive-compulsive personality, reasonably well integrated, warding off a great deal of repressed hostility through typical defense mechanisms, chiefly overcontrol of himself and others, and through a variety of over-moralistic projects. In short, he had seemed little different than, say, the average compulsive businessman who was so frequently seen in psychotherapy.

But, with Watergate, it was becoming more and more evident that this appraisal of Nixon was superficial, that his compulsive traits were only protective coloration which allowed him to blend in with the predominant American personality-type. Instead, it was becoming apparent that he was closer to the psychopathic personality-type, making paranoid lists of enemies and ordering their illegal surveillance and per-

secution, tape-recording secretly on a wholesale basis, and so on down the familiar list of Nixon-directed activities. Every one of the character-traits familiar to those who regularly treat psychopathic personalities began to be revealed: the shifting moral standards and patchy superego, the continuous confusion between what is right and what is narcissistically needed, the paranoid insecurity and compensatory grandiosity, the shallow inter-personal attachments, the lack of the capacity for guilt or even regret, the overcontrol combined with an increasingly unpredictable impulsivity.

Sometimes our lunch-table discussions went further, and we would speculate on whether a real analysis of Nixon's childhood would confirm this diagnosis, since psychopathic personalities generally could be traced to a great deal of emotional abandonment and even violence in the family, whereas the family patterns of obsessive-compulsive personalities usually centered more on the problem of parental overcontrol and excessive demands. But regardless of the different turns our discussion took, we usually ended our luncheon with a weak joke, which usually ran something like: "Well, with all these awful things now coming out about Nixon, I sure hope he doesn't feel he has to show he still has balls by pushing the little red button or something!"

Since at that time I had just started a scholarly journal of psychohistory, I made it a point to ask each of these psychotherapists if they would write up some of their professional opinions for publication, including the possibility that there was a danger of Nixon, like other psychopathic personalities, reacting to exposure and ridicule by having to prove his potency, and that this might take the form of precipitating an international nuclear crisis solely for personal interpsychic reasons. As you might suspect, all of my friends refused to commit their opinions to writing. It was not just that they were reluctant personally to state their opinions; beyond this, they appeared to believe that psychotherapists *should not be allowed* to express professional opinions on political problems, that somehow the professional status of the psychotherapist *prohibited* him or her from analyzing political behavior. "I'm a specialist," was the feeling. "Let the social scientists handle political events."

A few months later, on October 23, 1973, what we joked about, what we most feared, happened. Using as a pretext a completely insignificant political event, the Russian demand that they be allowed to include some Soviet troops in the U.N. Middle-East peace-keeping force, Nixon pushed the Red Alert button, and two million American soldiers went into a state of war-time readiness, including the arming of 15,000 nuclear bombs. I don't know what your personal response to this Red Alert was, but my own reaction was to go home, put my family and dogs into our car, and head north toward Canada. Luckily, as in the

Cuban missile crisis, the Russian leaders recognized a case of *machismo* as well as my psychoanalytic friends did. They quickly backed off on their demand, and for a second time in a decade we all narrowly escaped being blown off the face of the earth.

The reaction of my friends in psychotherapy to the October Red Alert, like the reaction of the rest of the country, was a studied silence. Their analysis of Nixon's personality and his need to prove his potency had been proved spectacularly accurate, to the extent of achieving that much-desired scientific goal of prediction. Yet, unbelievably, I now found I could no longer get anyone to discuss anything about Nixon's personality, nor about the Red Alert. It was if an unspoken agreement existed which considered the topic "bad manners," "unprofessional" in the extreme. Now when a gap in logic appears in the thinking patterns of a patient undergoing psychoanalysis, the therapist is trained to suspect the existence of a powerful unconscious fantasy. Let us call a shared fantasy of similar effect a "Group-fantasy," and, further, let us call that Group-fantasy shared by the mental health community which strenuously denies the direct application of the insights of psychotherapy to history "The Group-fantasy of Specialization."

This Group-fantasy of Specialization has at least three subordinate beliefs. The first is that there exists a separate group of individuals called "social scientists" who have a body of knowledge somehow beyond psychology which better explains an individual's public behavior than depth psychology does. The second belief is that there exist entities called "social structures" and "political institutions" which are something over and above the individual psychological mechanisms which psychotherapists are used to dealing with in their patients. And the third belief is that there exist places called "universities" which house these "social science" specialists, who are alone qualified to describe and explain these "social structures" and "institutions."

Now, let us for a moment imagine that, through a process similar to that of the lifting of repression in individual psychotherapy, this Group-fantasy of Specialization were one day to be rationally examined, and, like all infantile fantasies, to disappear, and psychotherapists were all to realize that their psychological science and their ability to explain, weigh and predict the motivations and behavior of individuals is *identical* to that science which the "social scientists" had long dreamed of constructing. Let us suppose that psychotherapists were suddenly to realize that the 75-year split between the academic and the mental health community was in fact a reflection of two opposing attitudes, one admitting and one rejecting the existence of unconscious mental activity; that psychoanalytic psychology had been minimally tried and then vigorously rejected by every department in the university over the

past four decades; and that, further, most of the theories of the "social sciences" have been motivated by a *flight from psychology,* a vast defensive response to the growing discoveries of depth psychology.

The concrete result of such a destruction of the Group-fantasy of Specialization, I would argue, would be for every unit within the mental health field to set up a psychohistory section. This psychohistory section would assume an obligation to accomplish research toward the construction of a new science of psychohistory, which would include everything from political psychology and group psychohistory to the history of childhood and psychobiography. One of these new psychohistory sections might want to examine contemporary political leaders; another might want to reach out into the community and construct a taxology of family types, with generalizations on the kinds of personal and political behavior which result from childhood in differing kinds of families; a third might attempt to reconstruct the Watergate hearings as a kind of group-pr ess, examining its group-unconscious determinants, and so on. But each unit within the psychotherapeutic community would assume some research project of fairly long-term commitment, and would publish their research results as contributions to the new psychohistory.

This assumption of responsibility would be similar to the dual responsibility historically assumed by the universities for both teaching (for which they receive money) and research (for which they have to find the money). It may be argued that money for psychohistorical research is not currently available to psychotherapy centers. In response, I would suggest that if the Federal government were to propose a law requiring all mental health clinics to report the content of all their therapy sessions to the F.B.I., there would be little difficulty among psychotherapists in finding the money and the time needed to organize the defeat of such a clear and present danger to the professional existence. I would further suggest that it is only the Group-fantasy of Specialization which prevents psychotherapists from similarly seeing events like last October's Red Alert as equally clear and present dangers. History is indeed happening all around us, and the tools necessary to understand public behavior and motivation are identical to those used to understand private behavior and motivation. A separate social science does not exist; we must yet create it as an extension of psychotherapy. And the name we shall give this new science shall be psychohistory.

Let me describe briefly one such research project in psychohistory which has already produced several unexpected results. For the past five years, I have headed a research project investigating children's lives in the past for the Association of Applied Psychoanalysis. What we found in examining diaries, letters, autobiographies, pediatric and peda-

gogical literature back to antiquity was that good parenting appears to be something only historically achieved, and that the further one goes back into the past the more likely one would be to find children killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorized and sexually abused by adults. Indeed, it soon appeared likely that a good mother, one who was reasonably devoted to her child and more or less able to empathize with and fulfill its needs, was nowhere to be found prior to modern times. In the book which resulted from the project, entitled *The History of Childhood,* I wrote that it seemed to me that childhood was one long nightmare from which we have only gradually and only recently begun to awaken.

Now it is no secret to you as psychiatrists that childhood in many homes even today remains a nightmare, but what is most fascinating is that each type of family with which you are familiar from your practice was once the predominant type of family in the past. When you arrange parenting modes on a scale of decreasing health, from empathic down to the most destructive child-battering parents, you have also listed historical modes of child care reaching back into the past. It is as though today's child abuser were a sort of "evolutionary arrest," a psychological fossil, stuck in a personality mode from a previous historical epoch when *everyone* used to batter children.

Parents in antiquity, for instance, were found to have murdered their newborn children, regardless of economic situation, and in many other ways to have transmitted powerful death wishes to their children. Only when the strength of the infanticidal mode is recognized does it become understandable why early religions focused so exclusively on sacrificial themes. Early Christianity, for example, directly acted out the killing of a Son under orders of his Father. Believers were "buried with Christ" and then resurrected as first a repetition and then a denial of infanticide, were baptised as a repetition of the washing of those newborn babies who were going to be allowed to live, and anticipated a Last Judgment which was as real to them as the First Judgment which every newborn experienced, laying on the ground and waiting for the father to lift it up into life or to cast it into Hell (which the Jews named Gehenna, after the Valley of Hinnom, where children were sacrificed to Moloch). By joining in Christ's death, believers avoided being killed by the Father, as they in their childhood watched their real-life siblings being killed by their fathers after being born, joining the millions of infants who filled the rivers and latrines of antiquity and medieval times.

During the medieval period, the infanticidal wishes of parents toward their legitimate offspring decreased, and the emotional reality of childhood began to evolve more around the fear of abandonment, either emotional or actual, to wet-nurse, monastery, nunnery or foster family. As in badly abandoned and abused children today, who have never had a stable relationship and who from their earliest years have been forced

to take care of themselves, the average medieval child grew up to be a psychopathic personality, unable to develop mature attachments, developing instead personal dominance-submission patterns known to historians as feudalism. The feudal bond of personal loyalty, an attempt to deny the possibility of abandonment, combined with the typical psychopathic need for violence, gives medieval Europe its restless, marauding character, centering on the psychopath's world view of everything as consisting solely of exploiting or being exploited.

The Renaissance and early modern period was one of enormous ambivalence toward children, the child being more highly cathected than previously, but also, because emotionally closer, more dangerous, a container for parental projections, a devil or animal which had to be beaten into human shape, molded at every step, and generally made to feel that he or she was essentially bad inside. The result, again like contemporary highly ambivalent families, was a manic-depressive personality, continuously guilty and often self-destructive, under the attack of a severely rejecting superego. The paradigmatic depressive character, Hamlet, provides the characteristic list of depressive symptoms; but what is most interesting is his feeling that his melancholy is an *achievement,* an advance on the psychopathic medieval personality. And, of course, he is right–in the sense that being loved and hated by ambivalent parents is indeed a step higher than being abandoned by unloving and uncaring parents, even today.

The eighteenth century saw a new kind of parent, closer than ever before to the child, but over-controlling and intrusive to a degree only rarely seen in today's families. The child, it is true, was no longer swaddled, nor was it usually sent out to a wet-nurse, but was instead made an active part of the mother's ongoing interpsychic defense system. It began to be both toilet-trained in its earliest months and severely punished for masturbation for the first time in history, and, as with the children of intrusive and overdemanding parents today, the predominant personality type which resulted was the obsessive-compulsive character, Freud's "anal personality," Eric Fromm's "hoarding character." It is this compulsive personality which has dominated the modern world, with its Faustian drive to control nature and its massive need to displace interpersonal aggression onto the social sphere. Only in the twentieth century are we slowly beginning to overcome the compulsive personality through a less intrusive, more helpful and empathic mode of parenting for some of our children.

Perhaps my brief summary of some of the findings of our little project in psychohistory will convey to you a taste of the excitement we have felt in using the tools and concepts of modern psychotherapy in a wider context. New kinds of questions have been generated at every turn, questions which can only be asked and answered within the con-

ceptual framework of psychotherapy: Exactly what causes changes in parent-child relations over a series of generations? Why do some family lines show progress and others seem to stagnate? Why do some areas seem to lag far behind others? How can we better describe childhood modes and resulting personality-types? How might these concepts better explain our social problems? And, finally, merging into the field of contemporary family therapy, how can we facilitate those life-enhancing factors in childhood which further its evolution, applying our leverage for change where it is most meaningful, to childhood? Until we can extend our psychotherapy into a new science of psychohistory which can begin to give us answers to questions like these, we will no doubt continue our habit of giving highly destructive weapons to infantile leaders, who may yet use them to solve their personal problems and thereby end both our psychohistory and our psychotherapy together in one big bang.

Lloyd deMause is Editor of this Journal.

FROM THE SOURCES

Cold-Water Bathing (1797):

"To see a little infant, three or four days old . . . washed up to the loins and breast in cold water . . . itself in one continued scream, and the fond mother covering her ears under the bedclothes, that she may not be distressed by its cries, has ever struck me as a piece of unnecessary severity, and favours as little of kindness as plunging an infant a second or third time into a tube of water with its mouth open, and gasping for breath in the old fashioned mode of cold bathing . . ."

H. W. Tytler, translator, in St. Marthe's *Paedotrophia; or, The Art of Nursing and Rearing Children.* (London, 1797), p. 63.

REVIEW ARTICLE

Psychological Analysis and Presidential Personality: The Case of Richard Nixon

STANLEY ALLEN RENSHON

The Presidential Character, by James David Barber. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972. Pp. ix, 479, $10.00.
President Nixon's Psychiatric Profile, by Eli S. Chesen, M.D. New York: Peter Wyden, 1973. Pp. 245. $6.95.
In Search of Nixon, by Bruce Mazlish. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972. Pp. x, 187. $6.95.
Nixon's Head, by Arthur Woodstone. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972. Pp. vii, 248. $6.95.

The psychological analysis of political leaders has met with ambivalence and skepticism since its introduction in the early nineteen hundreds.[1] In part, the reaction has arisen from a series of methodological objections[2] which have occasionally been confronted, but by no means surmounted. Most acute is the problem of applying constructs and theories to political leaders which have accumulated mixed or insufficient evidence for validation. Further complications are introduced when the object of analysis is a controversial political leader occupying the highest elective office in the nation. Yet it is precisely because the problems in this case are so great that successes or failures may stand out in sharp relief.

The student of personality and politics is therefore advantaged by having not one, but four studies which purport to provide a psychological analysis of Richard M. Nixon, until recently thirty-seventh President of the United States. The significance of having multiple psychological

studies of the same subject, which utilize different theoretical and disciplinary perspectives,[3] should not be underestimated. The four books under consideration provide a rare opportunity in the psychological study of leadership to approximate Campbell and Fiske's call for a multi-trait, multi-method approach to psychometric validation.[4] The availability of multiple studies facilitates inferences about the utility of particular constructs and theories, as well as potentially providing insights into the character of Richard Nixon. While the tendency for theorists with methodological interests is to stress the former, both are important. Construct and theory validation efforts should not obscure the potential contributions of such assessments for the improvements and maintenance of democratic institutions and procedures.

RICHARD NIXON, THE MAN AS PRESIDENT

Had Richard Nixon chosen to remain a private citizen for the last four decades, this review would perhaps be neither necessary, nor possible. But of course, Mr. Nixon chose not to do so, transforming his character from a private matter to a public concern.

Political theorists have periodically pointed to the link between the nature of a polity and the character of its leadership.[5] The frequently repeated, but partially correct, assertion that we are a nation of laws, not men, should not obscure the important relationship between the viability of institutions and procedures in democracies and the men we choose to lead us. Such links may be difficult to bring into sharp focus at lower levels of the leadership hierarchy, but they emerge with greater clarity in the case of the Presidency.

Just why this is so merits at least a brief review. A primary consideration is the President's unique range and scope of potential influence. The power of the President is not supreme, but neither is it illusionary. While the President cannot command automatic compliance (although there are sufficiently important areas where he can), the range and scope of his influence reaches into every sector of American life. The quickening tempo of influence accumulation in the Presidency has been aptly caught by the concept of the "Imperial Presidency". But the enumeration of granted, delegated and usurped power does not give a complete picture of the role of the office in America.

Consideration must be given to its emotional role in the psychic economy of American political life. The origins of this attachment begin in childhood and extend throughout the life cycle. Research has suggested that the child's earliest attachments to the political system are to the President.[6] Generally, the image of the President is positive and based on emotional ties divorced from specific information. Because it is the earliest political attachment, the child develops a history of interaction and emotional commitment to the Presidency that is simply unmatched by any other institution or role incumbent. The

dramatic psychophysiological reactions to the death of a President in office provide some indication of its depth.[7]

This early and persisting emotional attachment to the Presidency is reinforced by his symbolic role in American political life. He is the man at the top and the most visible symbol of action and responsibility. Expectations for program initiation and resolution of pressing social or economic problems are perceived to be his responsibility, regardless of his commitment or degree of involvement with them. As Lasswell pointed out long ago, Republican farmers who have experienced bad weather will still vote against an incumbent Republican administration, in spite of the failure of any research to demonstrate a link between party affiliation and ability to control weather.[8]

This sense of responsibility so pervades the assumptive framework of American politics that we see nothing unusual about characterizing myriad events, trends, and institutional changes under the rubric of "the Kennedy or Eisenhower Years". We even characterize particular institutions in this way, speaking of the "Roosevelt or Nixon Court". These characterizations relate to a more basic meaning than simply the initiation of particular bills and laws. The President not only symbolizes what we are, as a people, but what we might become. He is not only our national "superego", but our national "ego ideal". As such the moral responsibilities of the office are immense.

Given the importance of the Presidency, it is not surprising that our selection procedures have been periodically criticized. Many suggested reforms, however, are structural or procedural and may obscure an underlying problem. For example, suggestions have been made that the President's term be limited to one six-year period. This proposal optimistically assumes that whatever constitutional or political damage done by a particular President will at least be limited to the term of his office. Unfortunately, recent events suggest that Shakespeare's description of the final disposition of men's evils, is equally applicable to Presidential indiscretions. Another suggestion calls for a greater number and variety of groups to take part in the selection process. Such a procedure no doubt helps to democratize Presidential selection; but its impact on Presidential character is less certain. In other words, neither procedural nor institutional changes, by themselves, will make it more likely that leaders are selected whose characters are consonant with the assumptions and practices of democratic politics.

With these and other considerations in mind,[9] suggestions have been put forward for some type of psychological screening of political candidates. Thus one psychiatrist recently suggested that, "candidates before being allowed to enter a political race ought to be cleared by a board of physicians and psychiatrists to make certain that they are healthy in mind and body."[10] Such suggestions are not new. Close to three decades ago Harold Lasswell suggested the formation of a *National Personnel Assessment Board,* with multidisciplinary membership, expert in the description of democratic and anti-democratic personality. When such an institution had developed prestige and acceptance, "sooner or later

candidates for elective office will have enough sense of responsibility to submit voluntarily to an investigation by the Board. . . ."[11] Lasswell's optimistic assessment of candidates' sense of responsibility aside, such procedures present a number of problems. For example, neither proposal differentiates pre-candidacy screening and post-election monitoring. I suspect both may be necessary.

Having said this, agreement on specifics becomes difficult. Should such screening be public or private, mandatory or optional? Should the screening panel be limited to M.D.'s, or is the psychological health of our political leaders too important to be left to psychiatrists? Should such screening be limited to the Presidency or should it be required for other offices? If so, which ones? While such questions are beyond the immediate focus and scope of this paper,[12] they are all preceded in importance by a question that is directly related to the four books under consideration. Namely, to what degree and in what areas can we have confidence in the psychological assessments that are made about political leaders, in this case Richard Nixon. Our confidence in the validity and reliability of the assessments will determine the degree of plausibility we would assign the concept of pre- or post-election assessment mechanisms.

DIMENSIONS OF PSYCHO-POLITICAL ASSESSMENT

It is not to be supposed that valid assessment will be an easy matter, for the criteria themselves are under debate. The problem is not simply as some critics assert that such procedures are not or can never be "scientific". Such criticisms assume that validity can only be established by one kind of evidence, the ability of a theory to predict observable consequences on the basis of previously prescribed sequences. While frequently utilized, this evidential mode is not the only one available to social scientists. Rychlak[13] describes another kind of validation process based on what he terms "procedural evidence"; "when we believe a theoretical proposition because of its intelligibility, its consistency with common sense knowledge, or its implicit self evidence, we are using as grounds for this belief procedural evidence".[14] Much controversy has flowed over the relative superiority of one form of evidence over the other, but in fact both are intimately connected. Procedural evidence is frequently the basis of experimental evidence, and experimental evidence becomes part of the ongoing basis of procedural verification.

The picture is further complicated in personality theory because each analysis must deal with manifest behavior, assumptions about psychological dynamics, and relate each of those to "life path" analysis. These areas are usually referred to respectively as phenomenology, dynamics, and development.[15] Although the three areas are given differential attention in the books under discussion, each is an important and necessary part of any psychological analysis.

The first area refers to the basic descriptive categories that emerge from observation of the political leader. Presumably the word "emerge" denotes a process by which the observer systematically records the leader's behavior until certain repetitions occur and patterns emerge. In practice, this process is complicated by theory, which leads the observer to "be on the lookout" in an *a priori* manner for particular behaviors. This need not be irreparably damaging to the validity of the analysis, especially if, as in the present case, there is multiple agreement about the basic behavior acts.

The basic descriptive categories may refer to particular or periodic states of the individual (moods), reoccurring behavior traits (e.g., flexible behavior) or behavior patterns (e.g., giving more of the budget to the police than to welfare). Such description may refer to either the "core character" or "presentation self". The former refers to those characteristics which are existent at "deeper", less public levels of personality, while the latter refer to those characteristics which operate at more public, assessable levels of personality. An example of the latter would include behavioral routines, specific acts, and verbal presentations for public purposes.

Having said this we must mention a number of problems that do arise in conjunction with phenomenology. First, there must be adequate operational criteria which specify the selection process for behaviors that are subsumed under a particular category. For example, if we say that Richard Nixon is behaving compulsively, we must be careful to specify which behaviors show that and justify our selection in terms of a plausible operational definition of compulsive behavior. Sampling of behavior is also a problem, but one that is rarely mentioned and less frequently dealt with. Many studies make little systematic attempt to sample behavior within a given period to see to what extent the behaviors selected for analysis are representative. This is important because many psychological analyses of political leaders, including several under consideration, make dichotomous assignments to particular traits without sufficient consideration that they may be continuums. It would therefore be of interest to know by what sampling and number of behaviors a person was assigned to a particular category. Instead the assumption appears to be that it is the political impact or importance of the behaviors and not their ubiquity, that makes them important keys to understand the character of political men. While debatable, the assumption does have the virtue of linking private character with political contexts.

Thus, Barber's contention that certain Presidential types (of which Mr. Nixon is one) become psychologically rigid when confronted with situations that challenge their power or rectitude positions alerts the reader to the crucial importance of the interplay between character and situation. Additionally, the study of political leadership requires attention to the political implications of private character. While the understanding of the total person is a laudable aim, political analysis must be careful *to specify the points* at which private character are connected to

public acts. This requires that the political receive at least equal emphasis with the psychological.

The transfer of concern from description to explanation marks the emergence of psychodynamic analysis. Here the attempt is to explain the characteristics uncovered in the previous static analysis. Dynamics are the theoretical glue that link and hold together particular observational categories. The origins of most personality data cause some confusion at this point. Insofar as personality refers to intra-psychic phenomena it must be inferred from behavior, either verbal or physical. Sometimes the description of the behavior and the explanation for it are alarmingly close to circularity. As an example, we might take the several instances in which President Nixon lashed out at his enemies (e.g., after 1962 California loss, during press conferences during Watergate, and in farewell speech to the White House Staff). Let us say that we agree that in these cases President Nixon acted defensively. When we turn to an explanation of his behavior it is highly suspect to state that President Nixon behaved that way because he is defensive. What was at first an adverb describing his behavior has become an adjective describing his personality, and both are drawn from the same data! Generally then, care must be taken to separate behavioral from psychological traits.

Another pressing problem is that the same characteristics or behaviors may result from radically different dynamics. For example, Nixon's previously noted hostility outbursts might be the result of perfectly adequate reality testing, or it might originate in his insecurity, or to perceived threats to his power or self-esteem positions. As Freud's concept of overdetermination (multidetermination) suggests, each, some, or all of these might be accurate. The psychohistorian must be alert to contextual matters if he is to build a plausible case for the operation of one or multiple dynamics.

When we move from the analysis of relations to the analysis of origins, our concern is psychogenesis. In the case under consideration there is a serious lack of systematic data on the important early experiences of Nixon's childhood and young adulthood. This lack is all the more unfortunate when such data are potentially available with some effort. Such information is important for two reasons. First, it helps us to evaluate alternative explanatory formulations. If we know the history of gratifications and deprivations of a particular dynamic, we can have some way to estimate its intensity, duration and the situations under which it will become activated. Hypotheses based on this information can then be examined in the light of prior, current or future events when possible, as the Georges did in their justly famous analysis of Woodrow Wilson.[16] Another reason for concern with psychogenesis is that when certain experiences become linked with particular characteristics and dynamics, they may operate as warning signals or indicators to individuals concerned with either public or professional assessment of political leaders. Clearly, I am not talking about a single incident but configurative patterns that are evident in early and subsequent development.

A NOTE ON METHODS, THEORY, AND THE ANALYSIS OF RICHARD NIXON

Generally, theory concerns the hypothesized relationship among constructs while method is broadly concerned with generating evidence about theory. At a minimum, theory requires a series of specifications: of constructs, of operational indicators of constructs, of linkages between constructs, and relations between constructs at different levels of analysis (e.g., phenomenology and dynamics). Further complications are introduced because most personality theories subsume multiple "middle range" theories. For that reason, the failure to validate particular constructs need not lead to the dismissal of the whole theory. This is important to keep in mind when evaluating the complex multi-construct, multi-level theories that are utilized to examine Richard Nixon.

Although we will take up these points in greater detail, it should be mentioned here that the four books under consideration vary widely in their systematic concern for theory in general, and for psycho-political theory in particular. At the two extremes are the Barber and Woodstone books. Barber's attempt to present a well-developed theory of personality and political context is clearly the most ambitious undertaking of the four books. That he does not entirely succeed should not detract from the originality and promise of his work. At the other extreme is the almost total lack of systematic theory that characterizes the Woodstone book. In between these two extremes fall the work of Chesen and Mazlish. The latter has been heavily guided by Freudian theory and constructs in spite of his references to Eriksonian theory. Dr. Chesen's approach is no doubt indebted to Freudian theory but appears more eclectic. This may reflect his psychiatric training and clinical experiences, but more likely it reflects an assumption that available theory may operate to throw shadows on important areas as well as light.

Theories perform a variety of functions, several of which are related to aspects of methodology. Theory suggests the nature of relevant information as well as indicating its temporal and situational location. All of the books rely on secondary analysis to some degree. That is, no author conducted systematic interviews with friends, parents, relatives or colleagues of President Nixon. That such interviews would have been difficult does not make them less important.

Each of the authors approaches the problem of methodology in a slightly different way. The Woodstone book is written by a journalist whose major methodological mode appears to be the relating of incidents which purport to be indicative of President Nixon's behavior and character. Although Mr. Woodstone quotes from some of the standard works on Richard Nixon (as do others), the greatest part of his book appears to consist of stories that he picked up in his rounds as a reporter and writer. One can appreciate Woodstone's concern that "Because the point of view is provocative and because *I pursue it relentlessly* . . . I figure that many of my Washington sources will not appreciate my using their names." (p. vii) I have less sympathy however for

Woodstone's lack of documentation for a variety of quotes and reports on supposedly public incidents. The book contains not one reference, nor is there a bibliography; nor for that matter is there an index, table of contents or chapter titles. Such deficiencies make it difficult for the reader interested in more than a recitation of potentially interesting tales to evaluate the information he is being asked to accept as substantiating a point of view (theory implies more systematic linkages than Woodstone's book entitles him to).

Another interesting methodological variation is to be found in the Chesen book. Here we are informed that his book rests on the premise that "intelligent and serious judgements about other people (can be made) simply by watching them testify on television". (p. 4) In what must be one of the most novel recent approaches to psychological analysis, we are informed that Mr. Nixon's profile, "was compiled in my own room as I watched my own television set, using methods that are completely open to public question and scrutiny". (pp. 5, 6) I suspect that what Dr. Chesen means here is that his findings are open to scrutiny, because nowhere could this reviewer find a systematic exposition of the categories of description that informed Dr. Chesen's television analysis.

We are told that hundreds of hours were spent analyzing President Nixon and his associates. The question arises, therefore, whether the television coverage (itself biased in regard to sampling of *Presidential* behaviors) was the source of the analytical theory, or whether it provided the data utilized to confirm the theory.

There are conflicting indications about which of these is accurate. First, Chesen notes that, "My subjects are well known people, and I have depended at times on some general knowledge about them *which is available through the media*". (p. 8) Even if we agree that such information may be derived from television, this in no way enlightens us as to whether Dr. Chesen derived his theory in this manner. The implication here is that he did. If he is only saying, however, that he could have, the question remains as to the relationship between theory and data. Chesen's use of a detailed clinical description of a fictional character (Steve Cleansman) suggests that there is a meta-theory underlying his utilization of television which is derived from his clinical work. This is no drawback to the theory, but it is to his assertion that individuals could come to the same conclusions as he did, by virtue of extended attention to the television. In either case the relationship between theoretical constructs and operational indicators must be specified, whether the data source is television or general information.

One more problem must be noted with regard to this novel methodological approach. We are told that Chesen spent hundreds of hours studying Richard Nixon, John Ehrlichman, John Dean, John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, James McCord, Bernard Baker, Herbert Kalmbach, L. Patrick Gray and Richard Kleindienst, as well as others such as Spiro Agnew and Billy Graham. Just what the distribution of time spent for each of these is not given, but the book deals almost exclusively with

Richard Nixon and presents only several paragraph-long vignettes about most of the others.

What is bothersome about this is the author's assertion that, "The gavel to gavel televised coverage of the Senate Select Hearings on campaign practices, give the psychiatrist [why psychiatrists? Laymen were also supposed to be able to benefit] an unprecedented opportunity to examine and gain insight into the mental workings of the men who have administered our government and contributed to the corruption of our political process. *A book of this kind could not have been initiated prior to the summer of 1973".* (p. 9) When we combine this with the author's previous assertion that intelligent people could come to conclusions about other people, presumably including the subject of the analysis, Richard Nixon, by "watching them testify on television", (p. 4) serious questions are raised. It appears that much of Chesen's "hundreds of hours" of television viewing were spent watching Watergate, yet the principal subject of analysis never appeared on television in that context. Since we are not told in what situations Chesen analyzed Mr. Nixon on television, we must assume that he relied on either televised press conferences, talks, or news reports, each of which has its problems. In view of Chesen's assertion that he, "studied Nixon and his associates as patients" (p. 8) and that "my television set served me well as a surrogate for opportunities not otherwise available to me or anyone else" (p. 8), these omissions are particularly unfortunate. While Chesen's claims may be accurate for President Nixon's associates, no evidence is introduced to support these contentions for President Nixon. The impression is left that Dr. Chesen's considerable insights into the character of Richard Nixon are derived from other than his stated methodology.

This is unfortunate because Chesen has touched upon an exciting new tool for the analysis of political leadership. The use and analysis of pictures and films in anthropology dates back to the early nineteen hundreds and more recently the analysis of video taped therapy sessions has become commonplace. As a tool for political analysis, however, it is still relatively untried. Chesen is to be commended in spite of the difficiencies for pointing to its potential use, if only in an indirect way. There is no reason why video-tape methodology employing the analysis of gestures, which Chesen does analyze, use of space,[17] eye blinks as indicators of stress,[18] facial expressions[19] and hesitation rates in speech[20] cannot be utilized *in conjunction* with more traditional methodologies for the psychological assessment of political leaders. Such data-gathering modes would be especially appropriate for the continued monitoring of political leaders, and would help the psychohistorian to overcome the problem of access.

The data-gathering techniques of the Barber and Mazlish books rely on original analysis of secondary data. Barber's sources are wider in scope but then he is dealing with a number of Presidents in his book other than Mr. Nixon (although he does devote a significant portion of the book to him). In Barber's introduction we learn that, "several grad-

uate students raked through biographies with my instruments". Since Barber has sought to present a new theory of personality and Presidential behavior, it can be assumed that his "instruments" reflected his theoretical concerns. Unfortunately, no indication is given as to the content of the instruments in the book under discussion. We are not told whether there was any attempt to gauge inter-coder reliability, or for that matter which if any parts of the instruments proved to be particularly helpful or unsuccessful. It is only in the later paper that we are given some indication of the coding procedures which totaled 39 pages.[21] Barber does admit some difficulties with his procedure, but how these were rectified remains obscure. It is important to learn the inclusion rules and obtain some idea of their reliability, and additionally to allow other researchers to utilize the same procedures to see if similar results are forthcoming. Barber has apparently taken a long step in making such psychological analysis less impressionistic, and more systematic, and the widest possible use of the coding and analytic procedures will provide important and useful information for theory validation or modification

The same points that have been made regarding specification of inclusion criteria apply to Mazlish's analysis. Like Barber and to a lesser and unknown extent in the cases of Chesen and Woodstone respectively, Mazlish relies on secondary materials. Not that Mazlish is very happy with these sources. After noting that all of his references repeat the same unsubstantiated stories with small variations that makes him wonder which version is authentic, Mazlish concludes that his, "sources do not measure up to the standards that with which an historian would feel comfortable". (p. 181) It may well be that the small variations that upset Mazlish may be less important than the general themes that run through such stories, and as Mazlish points out in reference to the temper of Richard Nixon's father, there are certain characterizations that do appear to have a substantial basis of validity. Another way out of the dilemma proposed by Mazlish, which parallels our previous discussion of "procedural evidence", is to rely on the "density" of the data. By this, Mazlish means the "accumulation of data in a definite configuration. (p. 154) As a general strategy this approach has much to recommend it. The real questions, however, concern the adequacy of the analysis as well as the data, and it is to this that we now turn.

NIXON'S HEAD

From a professional standpoint, Woodstone's book is the least satisfactory of those being reviewed. Not that it isn't interesting, and sometimes informative. The book contains numerous anecdotes, which are accompanied by occasionally insightful, but more frequently polemical psychological commentary. Interpretations are presented with no at-

tempt to justify or validate them; the reader being asked in effect to accept them as a matter of faith.

Early in the book Woodstone alerts us that:

> Not every claim made for President Nixon is truthful, nor are many made against him. Seeing no sense in balancing one argument against the other in order to appear objective, I have selected only those facts that I think significant and linked them together to offer a hopefully accurate if somewhat pointed view of Richard Nixon. (vii)

This constitutes a theory of epistimology that is deservedly rare, but sufficiently frequent in the psychological study of political leaders to cause more than passing concern.[22] Given Woodstone's assertion in sentence one, what follows is simply astounding. That there is no pretense of objectivity is less damaging than the lack of effort to achieve it. Nowhere is the careful weighing of information[23] and attention to configurations of psyche and circumstance that characterize the Barber and Mazlish books in evidence. Woodstone's book is certainly not the most flagrant example of the misuse of psychological analysis[24] but in many ways it is sufficiently close to raise important problems for this branch of psychohistory.

One of the problems that pervades books like this is the emphasis on pathology and illness.[25] On the back cover of the book we are asked, "Is Nixon's continually close relationship with John Mitchell symbiosis, a mutual reinforcement between two *dependent and disturbed individuals?*", "Is there psychological evidence to indicate that he is *anal compulsive?*", "Was Nixon treated by a New York psychiatrist from 1952 to 1956!" Woodstone's answer to these questions, is of course, yes. This kind of psychological sensationalism, although beneficial for publishers, is a good deal less so for the scholarly and concerned community.

We are always ready to believe the worst about our enemies, and perhaps Richard Nixon may be more deserving of our enmity than others. But there is a difference between passing political or moral judgement, and psychological analysis. A consideration of the complexities, ambiguities, and strengths of the leader must be part of the psychological analysis of political men. Woodstone briefly alludes to this requirement, in noting that, "too much neatness can make the best psychological theories suspect, (p. 213, fn. 2) but he appears to ignore his own insight. Richard Nixon is not a helpless, psychological misfit stumbling from crisis to crisis. As both the Mazlish and Barber treatments point out, the Nixon character does contain strengths. Whether these strengths are sufficient when viewed in conjunction with the rest of Nixon's character to make us comfortable with a Nixon Presidency, is of course, another matter.

Even in cases where behavior has traditionally suggested weakness, the analyst must be careful. Woodstone's interest in whether Nixon visited a New York internist, who later switched his practice to psychiatry,

is a good illustration. After many pages of speculation, we are left with the strong inference that Richard Nixon *did* see Dr. Arnold Hutchneker in the latter's role as psychiatrist. From this, we are no doubt to assume that Mr. Nixon was in some way mentally ill, suffering from psychosomatic symptoms, and therefore unfit for public office. Could it not also be suggested that the desire to obtain help is a sign of mental health? And what if Dr. Hutchneker had helped his patient and brought about a change in Nixon's character? Woodstone apparently recognizes such a possibility noting that during 1966 along with other factors, "perhaps ... Nixon's visits to (Dr.) Hutchneker, kept Nixon's ego at safe levels". (p. 101)

Now it may be argued with some justification, that public office is not the context in which to work out private problems, but the question really is what kind of problems. Clearly, periodic disassociative states qualify, but what about sporadic feelings of self-doubt? The day may not be far off when high level public officials, and especially the President, will have therapeutic aid available for minor problems with the same ease that now characterizes medical aid. For this to happen, the public must begin to think of temporary depression, self-doubt, and other minor maladies as part of the normal potential of all people, including Presidents.

Having said this I would like to suggest that the book is not without merit. Along with these problems, Woodstone's material does cast light on a number of Nixon's characteristics (phenomenology). The numerous anecdotes lacking a systematic theoretical framework, are perhaps best used as raw data. From these, several characteristics emerge, including:

1. The attempt to aggregate power to himself as a means of controlling others. The stylistic means to this end is described in 2 below.
2. The great effort extended to master the environment by preparation (in the Hiss case we are told Nixon worked 18 to 20 hours a day) and attention to detail.
3. The tendency to expose himself to unnecessary risks and to seek out, or at least not shrink from situations which can be construed as tests of aspects of his character or resolve.
4. Ambivalences about conflict. Nixon likes to portray himself as cool in a time of conflict and emotion, but does admit satisfaction at points with the direct expression of hostility, as in the case where he physically lashed out in South America at a demonstrator.
5. Ambivalences about strength and weakness, and his concern about appearing weak. Thus, Nixon describes his personal confrontation with the late Nikita Khruschev was motivated by a desire to not be seen as, "dealing from a position of weakness". His debates with Kennedy were similarly motivated by the feat that he would, "open himself to the charge that I was

afraid", not to mention the speculation that accompanied his incursions into Cambodia.

6. The tendency to focus great attention and energy on "enemies", rather than accept conflict as part of political life, especially in view of his own history of relentlessly pursued partisanship, and sharply worded campaigns.
7. His ambivalence towards authority figures, which if we are to believe the information presented, includes not only Eisenhower, but his advisors, including Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Agnew, as well as his wife Pat.
8. The discontinuity of the self image, and the attendant concern with the management and presentation of self. Particularly interesting is Woodstone's account of a talk to newspaper reporters following his famous "Checkers Speech".

The patterns that can be drawn from Woodstone's material regarding phenomenology will be replicated by others we will examine. We will find, however, more apparent disagreement when we discuss dynamics. Woodstone's major explanation for these patterns is the need for respect, which although unexamined by Woodstone would be concerned with deprivations of self-esteem. Woodstone notes that, "It is when his own pride is injured that Nixon usually becomes more dangerous to himself than anyone else", (p. 51) and, "In his life long preoccupation with himself, Richard Nixon has found that challenges (to him) are degrading, as if the smallest doubt (about him) were somehow a jeer". (p. 95)

Just how characteristics and dynamics came into existence (ontology) is given almost no attention. Woodstone spends only a few pages dealing with Nixon's childhood, and agrees with Mazlish's point that the accounts of Nixon's childhood, "are incomplete, even when they are not transparently biased or conflicting". (p. 242, fn. 1) Woodstone speculates that the origin of Nixon's "obvious" problem (being anal compulsive) may result from one or another *single incidents,* but in the end realizes that, "more probably all played a role in his development". Woodstone does make brief attempt to relate Nixon's problems directly and primarily to his father in conjunction with a brief but overly simple summary of one aspect of the richly diverse theories of Freud. But I think he is on safer ground when he observes that, "beginning with his parents, other people have always brought Nixon grief". (p. 93)

Woodstone's book emerges a generally undistinguished example of this kind of work, although it is not without merit. It certainly raises in the strongest possible terms questions about the congruence between Nixon's personality and the assumptions and requirements of democratic government. But such questions will not be seriously confronted as long as psychological terms like "anal compulsive" or "neurotic" are used as ideological clubs, rather than psychological tools. The psychological analysis of political leaders is no place to test the limits of literary license.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S PSYCHIATRIC PROFILE

Despite problems with methodology, substance, and interpretation, Chesen has written what is in many ways a remarkable book. Psychoanalytically informed, the analysis attempts to build an explanation of Richard Nixon's personality that links characteristics, dynamics, and development. On the whole, the result is highly plausible, if not entirely satisfactory.

This book, like Woodstone's, was written for a general audience, which is a source of both strengths and drawbacks. Such a strategy does result in the lessening of clinical terminology with its specific referents and histories, which are seldom explicated in these kinds of analyses. On the other hand, it does lead to decreased emphasis on the complexities of such ventures. Here Chesen seems ambivalent. On one hand we are told that his methodology would allow millions of Americans to arrive at conclusions similar to his about Nixon simply by watching TV, while on the other, we are told that physicians (psychiatrists?) have a special kind of insight to offer in such kinds of analyses. It appears to this reviewer that the author is correct in his second assertion and overly optimistic in his first.

The desire to present the Nixon profile to a lay audience results in the selection of a presentation strategy that partially detracts from the subsequent insightful analysis. Chesen spends a good part of his book detailing the characteristics, dynamics and development of a "fictional case history" named Steven Cleansman. Although Chesen explicitly states that his fictionalized creation, "is not a prototype of any person; he is a prototype of the defense mechanisms used by many persons. . . . It is a device to make our study of Nixon and his associates somewhat clearer", (p. 55) he in fact cannot resist the temptation to make direct analogies

So, in several places after Chesen has moved on to an analysis of Richard Nixon he looks back to his "fictional case" to draw support for his analysis by noting the similarities. Thus, in discussing Nixon's fear of his father we are told, "This provides another similarity to Steve Cleansman's history"; (p. 67) in a discussion of Nixon's parents, we are told, "just as Frank Nixon reminds us of Mr. Cleansman, Hannah Milhous, a powerful agent of the church, resembles Mrs. Cleansman", (p. 73) and in a discussion of Nixon's family identification patterns, Chesen notes that, "Here we see another very important pattern reminiscent of Steve Cleansman; Young Nixon gravitated towards his mother. . . . It is also more than a coincidence that both Cleansman and Nixon achieved much more than other members of the family". (pp. 76-77)

There is nothing inherently wrong about reasoning by analogy, but such a strategy imposes at least one requirement on the practitioner; namely, that there be a correspondence of facts. The requirement may be met in one of two ways. The most satisfactory would be a direct correspondence between the facts in case A (Mr. Cleansman) and case

B (Richard Nixon). This is admittedly difficult when the "fictionalized" case is an aggregation and synthesis (according to what rules?) of many cases, but not insurmountable. An example might be if both case A and case B had lost brothers to illness at approximately the same time. A second way in which correspondence may be generated is by utilizing incidents which are shown to be plausibly (functionally) equivalent in order to generate dynamics which are then considered analogous. An example of this approach would be to reason analogously from having a mentally retarded sibling as did case A, Steve Cleansman, to the dramatic loss of two brothers as happened to Richard Nixon. This is much more difficult and requires some attention to supporting the assumed equivalence. This support is not evident in the Chesen analysis; the correspondence is simply assumed.

The real importance of Chesen's work is not to be found in his presentation of a fictionalized case history, but in his analysis of Richard Nixon. Chesen presents a well-integrated theory of Richard Nixon which uses the following model: Childhood experiences → anxieties about self → behavior → anxieties about self. The first three are of course the by-now-familiar trio of ontology, dynamics, and phenomenology. But Chesen has added an important feedback loop which links past and present behaviors with current dynamics, in a way which makes effective use of Freud's insights into the relatedness present and past. In Nixon's particular case the diagram resembles a vicious circle described clinically by Karen Horney.[26]

The characteristic described by Chesen can be summarized by two key related concepts, *ambivalences* and *personal control.* Each of these major characteristics, subsume a number of micro-characteristics which deserve mention. Especially in the case of Nixon's ambivalences, several dimensions may be noted:

1. *Ambivalences towards his abilities.* On one hand Chesen notes Nixon's lack of self-confidence as evidenced by his problems with decision making, and his tendency to downplay whatever advantages he does have, as when he was an incumbent in the '68 election or when his opponent was George McGovern. On the other hand, there is a pattern of grandiosity as when Nixon exempts himself from the laws of physiological dynamics that link the mind and body. Before the Kennedy debates, Nixon injured his knee and had to be hospitalized. In spite of great pain, and lack of sufficient recovery time, Nixon's assertion the he "never felt better mentally" does raise questions.
2. *Ambivalences towards himself.* Closely related to the above is Nixon's discontinuous self-image. At some points he exhibits an excessive preoccupation with being "found out", as for example when he refused to have his picture taken during Eisenhower's heart attack for fear it would reveal an "unconscious, unintentional" bit of information. Apparently Nixon's assumption is, that if people really knew what I was thinking (i.e., in

this case that I might like to be President) they wouldn't like me. A correlary to that is that if I allow myself to think such thoughts I am not a good person. On the other hand, Nixon's tendency to describe his life and experiences in superlatives, as if they were very important is well known.

3. *Ambivalent conflict behavior.* On one hand, Nixon prides himself on remaining cool under pressure and maintaining his calm, especially when others have lost theirs. On the other hand, there have been those periodic impulsive outbursts for which Nixon has become known, as for example at his 1962 news conference and his physical lashing out towards a demonstrator in South America. Yet while Nixon can display anger he does appear to have difficulty in face-to-face conflict situations, as in his recent inability to personally fire Mr. Cox from his position as Watergate investigator, or his inability to confront either John Mitchell or John Dean during the Watergate investigation.
4. *Ambivalence towards strength and weakness.* Here Chesen argues that this is one aspect of his ambivalent feelings towards his parents, specifically those aspects which are "Milhous" (mother) and those that are "Nixon" (father). At issue here, says Chesen, is the association of strength with his mother, and weakness with his father, an interpretation I will dispute shortly. This confusion of identifications and sex role traits, is evidenced in Nixon's concern about not being found weak (presumably like his father).

In addition to these dimensions of ambivalence, important stress must be laid on the characteristic *seeking of control.* The function of this behavior in Nixon's psychic economy will become clear shortly, but it is its ubiquity that commands our attention. Out of this preoccupation with control, a number of sub-characteristics emerge, as for example the attention to minute detail in the preparation for a competitive situation. Examples can be found in Nixon's law school behavior, the Hess preparation previously mentioned, and the enormous preparation put in before Nixon's trip to Moscow ("for months before the trip I spent every spare moment studying") (p. 124). Another sub-characteristic is Nixon's dislike of the unexpected (and although Chesen does not mention it, his low tolerance for ambiguity). In this regard Chesen's remark that "Nixon himself loves the unexpected" (p. 120) is misleading, for while it is true that Nixon does delight in the confounding of his critics, as by going to China, it is only when *he* is doing the surprising that it is enjoyable.

What emerges from this analysis is quite compatible with the material to be found in Woodstone, and as we shall see in Mazlish and Barber also. The question now arises as to what are the underlying dynamics of these characteristics, and here Chesen presents a simple, but powerful motivating force, *anxiety*. Although related to fear, anxiety is

concerned with generalized and not specific objects. In this case the generalized objects are Nixon's own conflictual impulses. Unlike Maslow's self-actualizing individual, who has transcended his dichotomies,[27] Nixon continues to be torn by conflict. Thus his ambivalences are indicators of this conflict *as well as being causal agents in the present time space.* We know from Allport's studies of functional autonomy,[28] that such dynamics, once started begin to take on a life of their own.

The specific nature of Nixon's anxieties is a more difficult problem and one which I feel Chesen does not adequately confront. I suspect that Nixon's anxieties are directly related to a life-long identity crisis, and an inability to find a comfortable definition of "who am I". Because he has no consistent set of internal standards, every act must be a source of potential conflict, and it is this conflict that generates anxiety that "the wrong thing" will be done. Chesen alludes to the high standards that Nixon sets for himself, but does follow through by linking Nixon's unreasonable self-standards, and his fear that he will not measure up. The gap between the two results in a case of anticipated or potential deprivation of the psyche. At base one could argue that this is a problem of self-esteem as does Barber, but this might obscure the important link between feelings of self-esteem and the multiple dynamics of a stable identity.

I mentioned before that Nixon's anxiety results from his conflicts, of which his present ambivalences are both indicators and causes, but clearly present dynamics cannot be responsible for the development of the original conflicts. Thus, we are dealing with two sets of conflicts, not one. The second set deals with present concerns and have already been described, but the first have to do with earlier experiences and are linked to developmental concerns.

Chesen points out, in agreement with Woodstone and Mazlish, that the materials available for Nixon's childhood are of dubious quality, but he asserts that *such materials are not necessary.* This is an important argument and one that certainly deserves consideration from psychohistorians and others in this area. Chesen's position appears to be (he does not fully articulate it) that an analysis of ontology (development) does not require specific information, but rather information which will support certain dynamic statements. For example, if we know from the basis of clinical studies, that mother absence has a deleterious effect on psychological development, and if we know that Richard Nixon experienced such an absence, that we are justified in concluding this had *similar* impact on him. This is use of analogy that I have already discussed. Presumably one would take into account not only specific incidents *but patterns of experiences.* Thus it is not only that Nixon's mother was absent for at least two years, but that two brothers died, that his father was punitive and argumentative, that the family experienced economic as well as physical dislocation, etc. This is an attractive argument for psycholcgically-oriented analysts, who must frequently deal with inexact material. It should, however, receive careful scrutiny. Until a series of these studies are built up, it will not be impossible to

do more than speculatively link certain kinds of development experiences with particular psychological and behavioral patterns. The alternative is, of course, to abstain from such endeavors, or to use concepts which presuppose the kind of data which generally are unavailable to psycho-historians, a position that Chesen criticizes (in my evaluation, legitimately) Mazlish for taking.

This is not to say that there are no problems with Chesen's specific application of his general approach. For example, Chesen concludes that Mr. Nixon's enormous respect (not ambivalence?) for authority is derived from his religious experiences at the Quaker church with his mother. As evidence for this, he points to the fact that Nixon's *grandmother* frequently used "plain speech". In fact, as Chesen points out (as does Mazlish), Nixon's mother was using both plain (thee and thou) and regular speech, making her a "liberal" by church standards. It is Nixon's father, not his mother who was more of a fundamentalist.

In another place, we are told that after the death of her fourth son, Nixon's mother indicated that it was difficult to understand the ways of the Lord, "but we know that there is a plan and the best happens for each individual" (p. 74). It is from this that Chesen speculates Nixon's emphasis on planning is derived. Since there is a plan (unknown), one must make plans to protect oneself from the unknown so the reasoning goes. Why, however, make plans if everything is already arranged?

Finally I wish to mention in this regard the treatment of Frank Nixon. Chesen argues that Frank is "weak, unsuccessful and submissive" (p. 80), while Nixon's mother is "powerful, ambitious, hardworking, and dominating" (pp. 79-80). This role and attendant trait reversal is used to account for the beginnings of Nixon's insecurities. No strong evidence is presented for these characterizations and indeed, Chesen himself appears to be ambivalent about them. Later he describes Frank as, "argumentative, punitive, hot tempered, extroverted", hardly the kind of person to be dominated by his wife (who by the way, is described as "gentle and peace-loving" in that same passage). It appears to me that the conflict is not between strength and weakness but between two kinds of "strength"; the loud aggressive displays of strength (Frank Nixon) and the stoic "inner strength" that seems to have characterized Hannah. Both are evident in Richard Nixon.

Much is made by Chesen (and Mazlish) of Frank Nixon's failures. Yet there is in the man a remarkable, but little appreciated endurance and persistence. He did not succeed, but he did not give up. This ability to persist in the face of economic and psychological adversity would seem to indicate at least some degree of ego strength, which has, but should not be confused with, self-esteem. This personality aspect has also been evident in Richard Nixon throughout his career.

Aside from Frank's ego-strength and Mazlish's characterization of him as "a good man in a family dominated by strong women" (p. 27), he appears to have been remarkably similar to the fathers outlined in the famous *Authoritarian Personality* Study.[29] Chesen describes him as, "a violent man, . . . often to be feared, especially during the course of an

argument" (p. 67). From Chesen (and Mazlish and Barber) we know that Frank Nixon was emotionally cold and distant, but very demanding. Richard's reaction was passive. According to Chesen (quoting Mazlish), "Richard took his spankings without a whimper" (p. 89), and there is little to suggest they were infrequent or mild.

When we add up the death of two brothers, the absence of Nixon's mother for several years (leaving Richard alone with his father), his father's failures and coldness, Richard Nixon's own illnesses, his systematic introduction to fundamentalist religion, his inability to experience any large degree of autonomy while growing up, his father's violent temper and physical punishment, the family's economic insecurity, and his mother's example of stoic persistence throughout the greatest of adversities, it seems a small wonder that Richard Nixon emerged from childhood with conflicts and ambivalences.

Chesen believes these conflicts are over his own view of himself as a man, reflecting the attribution of importance to Frank Nixon's supposed "passivity". An alternative formulation would suggest that the experiences that Richard Nixon endured in childhood were sufficient to result in conflicts and ambivalences towards his parents, his life, and himself. When we add to this Chesen's contention that some of these conflicts grew out of double-bind situations,[30] the resultant anxieties about the world, the people in it, and most importantly the self, are both developmentally plausible and clinically probable.

THE NIXON CHARACTER, WATERGATE AND BEYOND

We have already noted that interest in Richard Nixon is related to his public role and not his private life. It is the assumption that the two are connected which gives impetus to these studies. Chesen provides an interesting and at some points brilliant analysis of the importance of personality for political behavior and in the case of Presidents, the quality of our political lives. The analysis of the psychological sources of Nixon's anti-communism is provocative. More politically important is his analysis of the relationship between President Nixon and his advisers. Long ago, Lasswell noted "that the unconscious components of the personality result in poor personnel selection is dramatically obvious in some cases. . . ."[31] Lasswell called the examination of the leader's personality in relation to his personnel selections "impact analysis". Chesen's probe into Richard Nixon and John Mitchell, Spiro Agnew, John Ehrlichman, and others is brief but incisive.

But it is really with his analysis of the relationship between Nixon's character and the (at that time) evolving story of Watergate that is potentially his most important contribution. Chesen details why, contrary to the assumptions of "role analysts" and those who give primacy to the situation, the study of personality is so important to the analysis of politics. It is true that Chesen does provide a primarily psychological interpretation of Watergate which excludes a variety of other approaches

(e.g., legal, institutional). It is also true that Chesen remarks that given Nixon's personality, Watergate was, "a process of natural evolution—*inevitable*" (p. 160, emphasis added). While I disagree with the phrasing (probable is much more likely than inevitable), Chesen does present a highly plausible argument, which appears to have received independent confirmation from the recently published Watergate tapes.[32]

It is beyond the bounds of this paper to detail Chesen's analysis on Watergate. Nixon's need for control is an obvious etiological factor in the genesis of the "plumber's unit" and the resultant set of events that constitute Watergate. Nixon's ambivalence towards himself and others has also been a factor. The important questions relate to the psychiatric and political implications of these findings.

On the question of Nixon's "mental health", Chesen is cautious, and with good reason.[33] Chesen does say that Nixon does not suffer from "mental illness", but is not ready to vouch with the same confidence for Nixon's emotional stability. He notes Nixon's quivering voice, uncontrolled modulation, jumbled syntax, facial expressions, mechanized body posture, and expression of physical hostility (shoving his Press Secretary).[34] But Chesen thinks Nixon would do well in an international crisis, *as long as it was not a non-personal crisis.* Chesen thinks that, "the threat of a world war poses less of a vexation for Nixon that the outcome of Watergate, San Clemente and other personal scandals" (p. 228). As we shall see, this is remarkably close to the Barber prediction, of which Chesen was apparently unaware.

Chesen also appears to be cautious about drawing any political implications from his analysis. No institutional changes are suggested, and I would like to suggest why. Americans are fond of frequently repeating that they have a government of laws. But this obscures the important relationship between the character of the men who lead us and the viability of our democratic procedures and institutions. Until we reform the men as well as the institutions, the possibilities of future Watergates exist. Chesen does indicate that his profile might have had some impact if released before, "the scandalous year of 1973", but whether at that point the medicine is curative or preventive should certainly be considered. I will return to this point in the conclusion.

IN SEARCH OF NIXON

Mazlish's book is one of the earliest attempts to provide a psychological analysis of Richard Nixon and has served as both a stimulant and model for psycho-historical research. As such, his model is important, not only as the basis for the present analysis, but also with regard to its utility as a foundation for psycho-historical inquiry.

Mazlish defines psychohistory as, "a fusion of psychoanalysis and history" (p. 165). This should, I believe, be taken as an assumption and not a necessity. In seeking to resolve the apparent inconsistencies of Nixon's behavior Mazlish specifically eschews "surface analysis", by

which he apparently means political necessity or expediency. It is only by recourse to "deeper" analysis that such inconsistencies will be resolved (this assumes that consistency of character is a necessity). In order to provide such "deep" analysis, Mazlish asserts that, "we must turn to the body of theory and fact that concentrates most deeply on this problem: psychoanalysis" (p. 5). I wish to stress that Mazlish appears *not* to be talking about psycho-dynamic analysis of the kind that characterizes Chesen's work. Indeed, he criticizes Barber by suggesting that although he is, "gifted with psychological insight, Barber does not explicitly use psychoanalysis, a dynamic approach" (p. 164).

Yet Mazlish does suggest that classical psychoanalytical theory may not be completely relevant to political figures because of its close connections with psychotherapy. I assume that it is pathology that Mazlish is concerned about and not therapy itself,[35] and indeed, we are told that psychohistory (in contrast to orthodox psychoanalysis), "emphasizes strengths and liabilities, creative and adaptive powers, as much as if not more than the usual difficulties pictured in psychotherapy" (p. 5). So we are left with orthodox Freudian theory minus the emphasis on pathology.

There is one more problem, however, with requiring that psychohistory marry psychoanalysis, which is that the information typically required given Freudian theory is simply unavailable. This information includes detailed knowledge of the subject's relations with his mother, father, and siblings, as well as access to dreams, free associations and symbolic meanings. Just what specific theory and constructs we are left with is never made explicit by Mazlish, but is surely an important point.

Mazlish believes that he has successfully bypassed the problems of "orthodox" psychoanalytical theory, because Richard Nixon, "could not readily be analyzed in terms of classical psychoanalytic theory about the Oedipal complex, even if we had wished to do so (which we didn't)" (p. 152). Attempting to bypass orthodox theory and lacking a systematic replacement has led to problems, which the avoidance of a single concept does not solve.

Mazlish's delineation of Nixon's characteristics (phenomenology) relies on character rather than behavior traits. In summing up his work, Mazlish emphasizes three such traits: (1) the absorption of Nixon in his roles; (2) Nixon's ambivalences and (3) his use of denial. The first two are quite compatible with the previous analyses, but the third has not previously been given such a place of prominence. This prominence is puzzling in view of Mazlish's own concentration on projection throughout the book as a major Nixon defense mechanism (pp. 85, 131). Nor does Mazlish attempt to relate the two as does Chesen in his analysis of Nixon's anti-communism.

Somewhat more puzzling is Mazlish's analysis of the dynamics that underlie these characteristics. It is here that the lack of systematic theory is most evident. Mazlish's solution to the problem of dynamics is to propose a need for every behavior, few of which he has specified in his summary of major characteristics. Thus I counted no less than

fourteen proposed "deep" needs, each of which purportedly accounted for Nixon's behaviors. Thus we are told that Nixon has a need for strong women (p. 116), a need for enemies (P. 85), a need for power (p. 118), a need for weak men (p. 116), a need for control (p. 124), a need for love (p. 56), a need for strength (p. 116), a masochistic need to confront self-doubt (p. 67), a need for incessant movement (p. 44), a need for crisis (p. 26), narcissistic needs (p. 56), a need for respect (p. 56), a need to go beyond his father (p. 28), and a need to test himself (p. 94).

It is likely that Mazlish considered some of these to be synonymous, but if so, an explication and elaboration of their linkages to both each other and to the behaviors they are erected to explain would have been helpful. Other elements being equal, if one had to select on the basis of parsimony alone between the two psychoanalytically-informed theories, the choice I suspect would be Chesen. But then "other elements" are rarely equal.

Mazlish's disclaimers not withstanding, the book does appear to be heavily weighted towards the pathological.[36] We are told that one of the advantages of psychohistory is that it deals with both role and personality (more on this shortly), and that, "it is only in recognizing the former (role), that we begin to isolate the latter (personality) compulsions. . . ." (p. 11). Elsewhere there is talk of many Nixon obsessions, strong qualities of anality, characteristics that reappear compulsively, oral qualities and death wishes. Such characterizations add little to the analysis and at some points appear to be almost gratuitous. Mazlish is aware of their speculative nature but fails to heed his own good advice about using concepts for which there is inadequate data.

Mazlish, like Chesen relies on a strategy of dynamics rather than specifics when dealing with Nixon's childhood and its relation to his personality characteristics. Since insufficient information is available to support an orthodox Freudian superstructure, one must be content to conjecture that a particular pattern is likely to have resulted in a general set of outcomes. Like Chesen and Barber, Mazlish places great emphasis on the pattern of deprivations that we have previously discussed.

While the analysis of developmental origins is similar to those previously discussed and need not be repeated, certain points of clarification may be helpful. Mazlish's treatment of Nixon's identifications is somewhat different from Chesen's. Mazlish suggests that, "Nixon, who so resembled his mother in her traits of hard work and persistence, eventually turned these traits to use in terms of an identification with the father" (p. 27). I must admit to being unclear about the meaning of this. Those traits (I have suggested they were characteristic of Frank also) were no doubt put to use in a variety of contexts, how are they related to father identification?

One must be careful to differentiate correspondence between child and parents and identification. If this isn't done, identification can take on a variety of meanings from simple mimicry of behavior, which characterizes the early acquisition of political party preference in children,

to the internalization of parent's norms, values, beliefs or attitudes as part of the child's core personality. In some cases what is attributed to "identifications" may be accounted for by other factors. For example, Mazlish suggests that, "as we have seen, inspired by his father's diatribes against competitive politicians, he decided to become a lawyer-politician" (p. 51). In fact, we know that Nixon's entry into politics was serendipitous. That he became a lawyer is true, but perhaps this is not so difficult to understand given Richard's quick mind, great attention to detail, and oratorical debating skill. Add to this the desire to be part of the American dream, and law becomes a highly probable selection. My point is not to insist that this isn't a case of identification, but to suggest that every parent-child correspondence not be assumed to provide evidence of this rather complex process.

These minor problems aside, Mazlish's discussion of Nixon's development is unique in that it successfully attempts to place Nixon's development within a larger social context than the immediate family. The latter is an important contribution to psychohistorical analysis. In the concern for specifying the relationship between psyche and context, it is frequently forgotten that the leader grows up in a particular cultural and historical period, in which certain standards operate as assumptions, and in which certain problems are stressed over others. What Erikson had done earlier in this regard for Gandhi,[37] Mazlish has accomplished for Nixon.

While Mazlish's attention to the wider cultural context is important, he does appear to underestimate the importance of the immediate context in which personality dynamics must be played out. Mazlish apparently does not feel comfortable with this omission, in spite of his disclaimer that, "almost the entire historical and *situational* dimension is missing" (p. vii). He tells us that Presidential behavior is a function of the demands of the role rather than of the personality, but fails to specify in what situations this is accurate. Moreover, since there is no attempt to conceptualize or operationalize Presidential roles (as does Barber) there is little possibility that he will be able to provide those important answers.

Mazlish does provide a clue in this important area. He notes that Nixon might take office at a time when there are demands for "deflationary" policies in domestic and foreign affairs as well as in economic policies. Thus, one aspect of action constraints, is what Barber has called the climate of expectations. Just how these larger expectations are *perceived and acted upon* by different personality types should be the subject of research not assumptions.

There is another important aspect of context which is dealt with only by Mazlish and deserves extended consideration from future research. That is, "How are we to distinguish what is particularly personal to Nixon from what is characteristic of all politicians" (p. 109). That Mazlish does not definitively answer this question is less important than the raising of the issue. Rephrased the question might ask, what specific personality characteristics appear to be selected out of and into

our political recruitment system, and what are the specific mechanisms by which that is done? It would be interesting to compare the assumptions of democratic government regarding the nature of its leaders, with the product that is encouraged by current procedures. One suspects the existence here of one of those ubiquitous gaps between expectations and practice.

When viewed from the perspective of the two previously examined books, *In Search of Nixon*, presents a mixed picture. On one hand Mazlish has brought to the task considerable historical sophistication. His extensive treatment of Nixon's middle years is particularly impressive as is his integration of larger cultural concerns with aspects of Nixon's personality development. One must also commend his raising of larger issues about the correspondence between American character and the selection of political leadership, as well as many specific aspects of his analysis. What difficulties there are lie in the failure to clearly distinguish between behavioral traits and underlying dynamics and to present a systematic set of linkages. On this point, Chesen is much more convincing. Yet it must also be added that the Woodstone, Chesen and Mazlish discussions of President Nixon's phenomenology are remarkably similar; it is the dynamics and development aspects that appear to be the cause of disagreement. One must also mention the additional and unnecessary problems generated by Mazlish's too literal adherence to early Freudian concepts and dynamics and his attempt to stretch the analysis to fit them. One can only conclude this analysis by agreeing with Mazlish that, "a recalcitrant fact and a highly speculative psychological inference do not make for a very secure psycho-history" (p. 67).

ON PREDICTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

As a method of transition from the Mazlish to the Barber book, I would like to briefly touch on the problem of prediction. The ability to make accurate predictions is one (not the only) demonstration of the validity of a theoretical model. While traditionally not the concern of historians, it is very much an issue for those analysts from various disciplinary backgrounds whose goal is the systematic understanding of political leaders, and those smaller numbers among this group who wish to utilize this understanding in the public policy arena.

Traditionally the tensions in this area have been between those who seek generalized regularities in human behavior (nomothetic) and those who seek full understanding of the idiosyncratic configurations of development, psyche, context and circumstance of an individual (ideographic). Work in the former area has traditionally been the province of psychometricians, while work in the latter area has traditionally been related to the biographical approach. Sterile arguments about their relative superiority aside, it should be clear that both can be productively related in a mutually beneficial way. It is evident that ideographic work draws on generalizations to apply in the specific case, and it is equally

clear that the generalizations are tested and in many cases modified in accordance with their "fit" or lack of it in individual cases, whether aggregated or not. Assuredly, there is a boundary, beyond which the two approaches must go their separate ways, but that this line has been reached is debatable. The attempt to systematize case studies should not therefore be viewed as an attempt to impose a single, acceptable mode of inquiry. At this stage of development, such a strategy would be premature and counter-productive. But if the goal of such studies is the greater understanding of individuals, then the efforts to provide confidence in the models utilized for understanding should be respected, if not welcomed by both approaches.

One of the methods by which models may be validated is their "predictive validity". Admittedly, this is a difficult and complex route, especially when dealing with retrodictive predictions. Freud's cautions in these cases about the apparent continuity and inevitability of tracing the causal chain backward, are well worth keeping in mind. But the case of President Nixon presents a different problem and opportunity, for all four books were written while he was still in office and therefore the possibility of approaching the question of predictive validation became at least possible. Three of the four books examined specifically take up the problem of prediction (only Woodstone does not).

The problem of prediction is complicated by some apparent confusion about just what a successful prediction might look like. This is perhaps most evident in Mazlish's book, and deserves attention lest it inadvertently have a chilling effect on future efforts in psychohistory.

Mazlish is quite certain in his conclusion that, "psycho-history is basically a retrospective inquiry" (p. 165). Little disagreement will be found here, especially when the objects of analysis are historical figures. But Mazlish goes on to express skepticism that psychological analysis (which should be carefully differentiated from the more restrictive marriage that Mazlish proposes for psychoanalysis and psychohistory) can ever yield a "true prediction".

As an illustration he points to his own attempt to explain Nixon's use of the word "bums" and states, "what I was 'predicting' was that 'bums' meant something special in Nixon's psychic economy, and that under special conditions it was likely to appear as a term of opprobium" (p. 162). Actually Mazlish does not explicitly specify the objective characteristics of the special circumstances to which he refers. Moreover, he appears to propose a one to one correspondence between explanation and prediction, a position that should be debated, not assumed.

These problems aside, one is justified in asking for his criteria for "true predictions", especially in view of the fact that the above example is given to draw attention to the "keen distinction" between his efforts and "true prediction". It is therefore of interest to learn that, "if as in the natural sciences, the psycho-historian could state with utter certainty that Nixon's personality would compel him to keep Agnew as his Vice President in 1972, that would be true prediction" (p. 162). This is an extraordinary philosophy of science stance.

First, it requires and assumes one hundred percent certainty as a criterion. Professor Mazlish is perhaps unfamiliar with Heisenberg's "Principle of Indeterminacy"[38] (sometimes referred to as the uncertainty principle), but certainty no more exists in the natural sciences than in the social sciences or humanities. It appears preferable to talk in terms of greater or lesser probability. Secondly, Mazlish's statement requires that a "true prediction" deal with a specific behavior, i.e., a decision to keep Spiro Agnew. I think he is quite correct to suggest that psychohistory cannot forecast (one would add with regularity) a specific act (behavior), such as a trip to Peking. But the point is, *it doesn't have to.* Prediction can refer to either specific behaviors or *to classes of behaviors or feelings.* Thus we may not be able to predict which *specific response* President Nixon might make in particular circumstances, but it may be (and I would argue is) possible to suggest the kind of behavior to look for, i.e., a hostile response given certain circumstances. Further specification of the behavior will be related to attention to past situations and present opportunities. Lastly, a reading of Mazlish's statement suggests that since psychohistory is concerned with personality, it is this variable that must carry the burden of prediction. The suggestion that a true psychohistorical prediction would require, "that Mr. Nixon's *personality compel* him", leads to unnecessary and avoidable problems. Clearly, any attempts at prediction will have to involve careful attention to *both* personality and context, as Mazlish himself has so insightfully pointed out in other places.

In view of Mazlish's feelings about prediction it is interesting to examine his own attempts to do so in his book, of which there are three. The first has already been mentioned, the second involves an attempt to "predict" whether Mr. Nixon's statement regarding Eisenhower's decision to keep him, was really that he ought to "fish or cut bait" or the more anal, (less polite, respectful, and political inexpedient) "shit or get off the pot". Mazlish suspects ("predicts") the latter and proves to be correct, but calls this prediction trivial. I feel he underestimates his own insight, for as he correctly points out it is, "indicative of the pattern that one begins to discern through the use of the psycho-historical method" (p. 102). To this insight one need only add that patterns extend in time as well as space.

But it is Mazlish's third attempt to "predict" President Nixon's behavior that is the most interesting. On page 125 we are informed that in 1968 Mazlish made some provisional estimates about Mr. Nixon's future behavior. We are told that when Prince Henry (no relation to the present Secretary of State) became King Henry, he confounded his critics by "his totally changed behavior" (p. 126). The question that Mazlish poses then is, "will Nixon be another Henry IV, a 'new Nixon'?" If we take these statements literally, Mazlish's first prediction is that Richard Nixon's behavior will not totally change. I feel that Mazlish was on safe grounds in predicting "no".

A correlary prediction (p. 126) was that the demands of the situation into which Nixon moved (i.e., the climate of political expectations)

might not severely test him and in that case one should look for the fundamental features of his character, especially his pragmatism continuously to reassert themselves" (p. 126). (One wonders why this fundamental character feature (pragmatism), is unmentioned in Mazlish's summary of Nixon's outstanding personality traits. If however, the climate of expectations of the comfortable are challenged by those who want policy expansions, not contractions, then Mazlish suggests Nixon might "lose his cool".

The third prediction is that Nixon "will continue to agonize over decisions, but will eventually make them with a good sense of timing" (p. 127). The fourth prediction is that he "will continue to create crises as a means of testing himself and assuring greater public support". The last prediction is that he, "will continue to make irreconcilable statements" such as promising future Vietnams and giving aid to Thailand.

Mazlish is to be commended for his effort. He has taken an innovative step in spite of his subsequent reservations. His examination of the Haynsworth-Carswell nominations, the Cambodian episode and the New China policy, in the light of his "predictions" is well done and insightful. Whether and in what ways they relate to his predictions is another matter. There is certainly abundant *a priori* reason to expect that few people and perhaps especially men like Mr. Nixon would dramatically change. Mazlish is excellent in tracing the continuities, but the question was phrased in a way that heavily predetermined the result. A specification of what specific behaviors, feelings, or psychological mechanisms would or would not change would have been helpful. In other places, Mazlish does suggest that Nixon's ego control has improved and his maturity increased. Why? Will it continue?

The second prediction requires that given a clash of expectations concerning government policy Mr. Nixon might "lose his cool". Does Cambodia qualify as such a situation? If so, is Mr. Nixon's depression and closeness to breakdown what Mazlish means by "losing his cool"? Or would loss of temper rather than sanity have sufficed? Since the meaning was not specified there is no way to evaluate that. Mazlish concludes his discussion by suggesting that it shows that Nixon didn't change, which relates to hypothesis one, not his second prediction.

The fourth prediction is that he will create crises, and Mazlish's explanation of Supreme Court nominations is certainly convincing in one respect. Whether he fought so hard in order to prove himself is not so clear. Mazlish does not appear to consider alternative explanation (e.g., political expediency, personal ideology) with any seriousness, a procedure that would have increased our confidence in his results. Thus the behavior prediction appears supported, but not the dynamic that was appended to it. One must stress again that the same overt behavior may have different or multiple dynamics underlying it.

Finally, the predictions that he will continue to agonize but make decisions leads me to ask what the alternatives are? No agonizing? No decisions? What kind of decisions? Similar questions could be asked of the irreconcilable statements prediction. I wish only to add that the two

examples that Mazlish gives are not necessarily irreconcilable. One can give military aid to a country without committing troops although the pressures to do so may increase under these circumstances.

To point to these problems should no way undercut the many important insights that Mazlish has generated, and his sensitivity and concern in doing so. What it does point to is the care that must be used in approaching this problem. Mazlish is quite correct in pointing out that this is a tremulous enterprise for psychohistorians. It is most likely inapplicable in most of the cases in which historians deal; but when psychohistory passes from historical to contemporary analysis of political leaders, attempts to utilize the predictive mode may provide beneficial information for theories which are utilized to explain the past. My intent is not to point out that Mazlish is right or wrong, but to indicate how such attempts might be improved in the future. Mazlish's pioneering effort and others like it cannot help but sharpen the theoretical tools for history and political analysis.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER

As I have already indicated, the Barber work is the most ambitious of the four books. One reason for this is that he attempts to construct a theory of Presidential behavior, rather than concentrate on a particular political leader. Unlike Chesen and Mazlish, who are both to some degree indebted to Freudian theory, Barber has attempted to rely more heavily on the psychology of adaptation.

Barber's paradigm is explicitly self-conscious about both personality and politics, and one of his accomplishments is a largely successful effort to systematically link the two. While the theory he presents will no doubt be modified in subsequent use, this work stands as a major contribution in this area. My review of Barber will not be as detailed as a work of such range clearly requires, First, space limitations preclude such treatment, but more to the point, this article follows a lengthy review of *The Presidential Character* by Alexander George in *World Politics.*[39] Many of the points that would have appeared in this review (and others besides) have been eloquently and searchingly analyzed in the George paper and I see no reason to repeat them all here. I will therefore confine my remarks to some general considerations.

PRESIDENTIAL PERSONALITY

Barber conceptualizes the Presidential personality by reference to five major organizing concepts; the power situation, the climate of expectations, role, style, world view and character. The first two are macro considerations, the last two micro, and the concept of role mediates the two levels.

If we define power as the ability to force compliance, then the power situation that surrounds a President is always a matter of degree. Here such factors as the thrust of the Supreme Court, level of public support for the President and the distribution of party, regional, and ideological power in the Congress must be considered. The "climate of expectations" refers to public requirements or general themes that are existent when the President assumes office. These include, (1) reassurance, a "return to normality", (2) a sense of progress and action, and (3) public need for legitimacy, what I previously referred to as the "ego ideal" aspect of the Presidency. Although Barber notes that these expectations shift, one wonders how, to what extent some or all are always present, and to what degree they are related to each other. One must also recall that the United States consists of a series of mass publics, some of whom will no doubt have different climates of expectations.

Style is Barber's method of connecting personality with the immediate political context. It consists of a President's habitual way of performing his three political obligations: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework. All Presidents must do some of each, but it is the relative weight of effort that pinpoints style. This is an important contribution, and one that no doubt will be built upon and further refined and clarified. Although developed for Presidential role, there appears no reason why its applicability could not be examined in non-Presidential political roles.

Barber also notes that beyond a particular style balance, lies a particular habit or mode of coping with these style demands. The explication of linkages between these two are somewhat unclear, and are not systematically related to ideosyncratic personal skills. The nature of the relationship, if any, between style and climate of expectations is also an interesting problem. While style is a personal attribute, its success might be related to whether it is consonant with public expectations. For example, given the current public need for legitimacy *and* reassurance, what is the impact of Gerald Ford's apparent stylistic emphasis on personal relations? What would the impact be in this situation if it were other?

While all of the above are important, it is the last two factors that form the core of Barber's work. The world view consists of the President's primary, politically relevant beliefs, particularly in his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts of his time. If, "style is his way of acting then world view is his way of seeing" (p. 8).

Clearly, the most important of the five concepts for Barber is character, which is defined as "a person's stance as he confronts experience" (p. 8). Character is in turn analyzed with regard to two dimensions. The active-passive dimension refers to the degree of energy invested in life and in political roles. The second dimension (positive-negative) refers to the "felt satisfaction" in the general fit between a person and his experience. More on this shortly. By combining the two dimensions into a character typology, Barber arrives at four types: the Active-positive, the

Active-negative, the Passive-positive, and the Passive-negative. My remarks generally will be confined to the second of the four types, since that is where Richard Nixon is placed by Barber.

Three other points require mention. First, Barber suggests that character has its main development in childhood, world view in adolescence and style in early adulthood. This view is consistent with post-Freudian developments and emphasis. Secondly, character provides the thrust for world view, although it does not determine it; and third, that all the arrangements of motives, beliefs and habits are, "in the service of his need for self-esteem" (p. 8). At least the last two of these assumptions may be debatable.

While Barber is to be commended for his introduction of cognitive psychology into personality studies, his conceptualization seems inadequate in two ways. First, the enumeration of world view is probably incomplete, and second, the lack of attention to a specifically *political* world view along the lines of George's "operational code",[40] is a theoretical gap. Regarding the first, a number of options are available. In another context I have examined the concept of basic beliefs which are defined as basic operating assumptions about the world, the validity of which are rarely if ever challenged.[41] I have suggested these include (1) assumptions about personal control, (2) assumptions about the world (whether it is a friendly or hostile place), (3) assumptions about time and space (i.e., expected time between actions and rewards), (4) assumptions about people (whether they can be trusted or not), and (5) assumptions about the self (whether positively or negatively perceived). Contrary to Barber's assumption, I think a strong case can be made for the genesis of these world views in early childhood in the successful or unsuccessful attempt to satisfy basic needs. Viewed from his perspective they would develop concomitantly with character. Indeed, it is possible to suggest *that character at the phenomenological level is a reflection, at least in part, of these world views.*

On the political side, the failure to specify a political world view leads Barber to overestimate the importance of character at the expense of cognitive factors. For example, when discussing President Johnson's world view little mention is made of Johnson's belief in the domino theory, although it certainly appears to have been an important part of his political causality beliefs.

RICHARD NIXON—AN ACTIVE-NEGATIVE PRESIDENT

Because Richard Nixon is placed squarely, but not without ambivalence (compare pp. 347, 348 with pp. 418, 441-42) in the Active-negative category, it seems worthwhile to outline its major charactistics:

Active-negative: The contradiction here is between relatively intense effort and low emotional reward for that effort. The ac-

> tivity has a compulsive quality, as if the man were trying to make up for something or escape from anxiety nto hard work. He seems ambitious, striving upward, power-seeking. His stance toward the environment is aggressive and he has persistent problems in managing his aggressive feelings. His self image is vague and discontinuous. Life is a hard struggle to achieve and hold power, hampered by the condemnations of a perfectionistic conscience. Active-negative types pour energy into the political system, but it is energy distorted from within. (pp. 12-13)

The reader will immediately notice that Barber *has gone well beyond his original formulation of character and world view* and introduced a variety of new psychological dynamics. This becomes even more evident when Barber discusses such types and lists sixteen characteristics,[42] many of which have not been previously mentioned, including compulsion, and a dependency on positive responses from the environment. One can see here the mix of phenomenological and dynamic levels of analysis, which should be cause for both concern and caution.

These important problems aside, the characterizations of this type do strongly resemble the descriptive material we have already examined on Richard Nixon. Turning to dynamics we have already noted some confusion in Barber's descriptive characteristics and dynamic statements. Contrary to the impression Barber gives about all needs, habits, etc., being in the service of *self-esteem*, he explicitly recognizes that at least in the active-negative case other personality needs may be operating. Thus, we are told that the Active-negative type is concerned with power and personal virtue; in other words, in the case of Richard Nixon, there is a need for power as well as esteem. Whether either or both are instrumental or terminal needs may be less important than the recognition that political men are motivated *by a variety of needs*, not only self-esteem. Attention to Maslow's delineation of a need hierarchy might be helpful in this regard.[43]

This point is related to another that has to do with developmental patterns. Barber's analysis of the childhood of Active-negative types leads him to conclude that, "in each case the boy was subject to strong deprivations of self-esteem. From the child's perspective these deprivations were imposed by parents who denigrated, abandoned, or failed to provide for the child" (p. 141). This is accurate as far as it goes but it *significantly underestimates* the occurrence and importance of multiple, patterned deprivations in the genesis of the Active-negative character type. For example, the economic deprivation of Johnson and Nixon's families leads to physiological and safety deprivations *as well as* to esteem deprivations. The death of Hoover's parents affected his sense of personal control as well as his affection needs, and finally Wilson's parents seemed to have severely curtailed his automony as well as his esteem. My point here is that it is the pattern of multiple deprivations, not only self-esteem which may have ontological significance for the development of this personality type.

One final point must be made regarding Richard Nixon and Barber's character dimensions. As George has pointed out there is some reason to question the validity of Barber's assertion that the two dimensions, "stand for two central themes of anyone's life", and that "they lead to four basic character types *long familiar* in psychological research".[44] One might add that Barber's assertion that they are separate dimensions also requires further validation. To some extent, a great investment of activity might very well correspond with high effect towards that investment, regardless of the "real" joy, because of cognitive mechanisms which function to reduce dissonance.[45]

In addition, Richard Nixon's purported negative affect towards the considerable energy that he invests in the office may be questioned. If we are to believe Mazlish and others, Nixon certainly appears to have liked his role as President, at least before Watergate began to unravel. Timing and degree may be important here. George notes that Barber shows some ambivalence about whether Nixon is an Active-negative or an Active-positive.[46] An alternative formulation is that Nixon was a negative *until* he reached his long sought after goal of the Presidency. Once in it, he began to enjoy it. As the Watergate and Nixon's problems began to escalate, he may have found that the Presidency was no longer fun. Certainly by the time of his resignation it had ceased to be so. If this is a plausible alternative, then it suggests that in some cases the Active-negative character may not be as fixed as Barber has suggested.

Fixed or fluid, the Active-negative type does present problems for democratic political systems. The danger is, "a rigid adherence to a failing policy" (p. 347). The alternative is defeat, and, "that is the ultimate threat. For him surrender is suicide, an admission of guilt and weakness. Having invested all his moral capital in the cause, he will—he must—plunge on to the end" (p. 57). In that process the harm to democratic institutions, processes, and procedures, may be the most dangerous by-product.

Space does not permit a detailed treatment of Barber's predictions concerning President Nixon. More specific in his formulations than Mazlish, Barber has I think fared somewhat better. George's analysis of Barber's predictions is thorough and critical. I believe that a major problem of Barber's prediction about Nixon's rigidification is a failure to sufficiently understand that the process may not proceed unimpeded towards a conclusion. There may be cessations and reversals as well as progressions. My own feeling is that the Watergate had many of the characteristics of an active-negative crisis and that Nixon's behavior as pieced together from the tapes and his subsequent public behavior provides substantial confirmation of Barber's hypothesis. More work will have to be done to differentiate those situations which appeared to present a possibility for the onset of crisis but did not (e.g., Cambodia and Watergate).

CONCLUSION

This consideration brings us again to an issue raised in the beginning of this paper concerning the psychological assessment of political leaders before their elevation to office. One assumption of any such mechanism is that the assessment instruments have a high degree of validity and reliability. With reference to that, the four studies that we have reviewed give some cause for optimism. At the level of phenomenology, there does appear widespread agreement as to Richard Nixon's behavioral characteristics. A greater element of disagreement is evident at the dynamic level of analysis, but here I would like to suggest that the disagreements are not fundamentally opposed in their basic assumptions and are potentially reconcilable. There is a great deal of overlap between the concepts of control and power, and self-esteem needs and identity confusion (ambivalence). None of these are incompatible with the idea of basic anxiety.

At the level of developmental analysis one perceives a wider gap. Perhaps I am overly sanguine, but even here I perceive that the potential for greater integration is possible. All the authors deal with the same data and in a general way infer the same implications from the same patterns. Differences do appear and should not be minimized on specifics, however, such as Nixon's early identifications and the importance of Nixon's brothers.

Optimistic though they are, nominations for any political candidate screening board would be decidedly premature. Crucial problems remain at all levels of analysis, but especially at the dynamic and developmental stages. One must consider the possibility that such optimism would *not* have been generated by four analyses of another political leader.

That is, the remarkable degree of reliability may be a function both of the instruments and the man. In many ways, Richard Nixon may be an ideal type, an extreme case. Thus our instruments although not sharply refined, may be sufficiently so to provide rough discriminations. That they would work so well on "mixed types" is doubtful. But perhaps, it is only the extreme types that public policy need be concerned with. Lasswell suggested, that assessment boards ought only to say whether candidates possessed *minimum* character qualification.[47] This is still decidedly complex, but as these four books indicate in varying degrees, we have taken a firm step down the path.

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2. Paul Rozan, *Freud: Political and Social Thought*, (New York: Vantage, 1968); and Fred Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1968).
3. James David Barber is a Professor of Political Science at Duke University. Eli Chesen, M.D. is a Psychiatrist and Chief of Mental Health at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. Bruce Mazlish is a Professor of History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Arthur Woodstone is a New York newspaper editor and writer.
4. D. T. Campbell, and D. W. Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multi-Trait, Multi-Method Matrix, *Psychological Bulletin*, 56, 1959, 81-105.
5. Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Constitution and Character", *Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review* 46, 1959, 3-18.
6. Robert Hess and J. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); and Fred Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).
7. Paul Sheatsley, and J. Feldman, "The Assassination of President Kennedy: A Preliminary Report on Public Reactions and Behavior", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28, 1964, 189-215; and Martha Wolfenstein, and G. Kliman, (Eds.). *Children and the Death of A President* (New York: Doubleday, 1965).
8. Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (New York: Viking, 1930).
9. It is accurate to say that many such suggestions arise from a concern with severe psychiatric impairment of public officials. While certainly not infrequent, such cases do not exhaust the reasons for such policy recommendations.
10. Arnold Hutchneker, "A Suggestion: Psychiatry at High Levels of Government", *New York Times*, July 7, 1973, p. 40.
11. Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Viking, 1948), p. 187.
12. In a future book I will examine the whole question of the psychological screening and monitoring of public officials, analyzing the alternative public policy suggestions that have been put forward. See Stanley Renshon, *Mental Health and Political Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, forthcoming).
13. Joseph Rychlak, *A Philosophy of Science of Personality Theory* (New York: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1968).
14. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
15. Fred Greenstein, *Personality and Politics, op. cit.*
16. Alexander George, and Juliette George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* (New York, Dover, 1964).
17. Edward Hall, *The Hidden Dimension*, (New York: Doubleday, 1966), and Edward Hall, "A System for the Notation of Proximic Behavior", *American Anthropologist*, 65, 1963, pp. 1003-1026.
18. E. H. Hess, "Pupillometric Assessment" in J. Schlien (Ed). *Research in Psychotherapy: Vol. III* (Washington, A.P.A., 1968); for a political application of this technique see Robert Frank, "Eyeblink Responses to Political Stimuli: A Psycho-physiological Analysis of the McGovern-Humphrey Debates", *Experimental Study of Politics*, 2, 1973, pp. 211-233.
19. Ray Birdwhistle, *Kinesics and Context* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); and E. Haggard and K. Issacs, "Micromomentary Facial Expressions as Indicators of Ego Mechanisms in Psychotherapy", in L. Gottschalk and A. Auerbach (Eds) *Methods of Research in Psychotherapy* (New York: Appleton-Crofts, 1966).
20. F. Goldman-Eisle, Psycholinguistics: *Experiments in Spontaneous Speech* (New York: Academic Press, 1968).
21. James D. Barber, "Strategies for Understanding Politicians", *American Journal*

of Political Science, 4, 1974.

22. The American Psychiatric Association has apparently set up a task force to study some of the professional, ethical and theoretical problems that arise in the psychological analysis of political leaders. While motivated no doubt by sincere concern for some of the excesses that have occurred, it is to be hoped that the task force commits no excesses of its own. The issuance of a conduct code in this area may help to solidify and in some cases produce professional norms. Presumably such a code would reflect the knowledge that no disciplinary or professional orthodoxy has a monopoly on psychological accuracy and sensitivity.
23. At one point Woodstone observes that, "for the author's purpose the absence of detailed information seemed all to the good". (p. 213, fn. 2).
24. The most recent candidate for this dubious distinction is a psychological analysis of John F. Kennedy, the title of which *(The Kennedy Neurosis)* reflects the authors' prejudices rather than a well balanced conclusion. For a brief but important statement of the dangers of the Clinch book and others like it, see the perceptive commentary by George and George. See Nancy Clinch, *The Kennedy Neurosis* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1973 and Alexander George and J. George, "Psycho-McCarthyism, *Psychology Today*, June, 1973, pp. 94-98.
25. The presumption of pathology pervades the analysis. *Woodstone apparently equates character problems with mental illness, an isomorphism that is dubious.* Additionally neither context nor circumstances are taken into account. We are told for example, that Nixon became "disorientated" during a campaign (pp. 39-40), the evidence for which is a momentary failure to identify one in a long series of cities that he stopped in only briefly to give speeches. But, we are told, "the generally unstable level of Nixon's behavior over several days *might* indicate something other than normal physical exhaustion" (p. 40).

    At Nixon's justly famous 1962 press conference, Nixon is described as having "broken down" (p. 88). A quote by Jung suggesting that, "When you are not at one with yourself in a given matter . . . you are approaching a neurotic condition" is then used to introduce the inference that Nixon was neurotic on that occasion because "is there any doubt on that morning that Richard Nixon was not at one with himself?" (*Ibid.*). Additionally, regarding that press conference, we are informed that it was, "riddled with ambiguity, anger and example upon example of, "the waxy flexibility that is essentially neurotic but on occasion has been mistaken for intelligence. . ." (p. 76). Mr. Woodstone has apparently confused flexibility with equivocation, either or neither of which may spring from the same underlying character dynamics.
26. Karen Horney, *Our Inner Conflict* (New York: Norton, 1945), and Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: Norton, 1937).
27. Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, (New York: Harper, 1954).
28. Gordon Allport, *Growth and Pattern in Personality* (New York: Holt, Winston, and Rinehart, 1961).
29. T. Adorno, *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).
30. A double bind consists of a situation in which two mutually contradictory communications are given and both withdrawal from the situation and making explicit the contradictions are impossible. A case might be the mother who says "I love you" in a nasty voice while administering punishment. If it is pointed out that her voice is giving a message that contradicts the content of her words, this itself is taken as a sign of "backtalk" and "disrespect" and thus cause for further punishment. Over two decades ago in a classic paper Gregory Bateson and his associates pointed to the role of family double-bind situations in the etiology of schizophrenia. See G. Bateson, *et al.*, "Towards a Theory of Schizophrenia", *Behavioral Science*, 1, 1956, pp. 251-264.
31. H. Lasswell, *Power and Personality*, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
32. The publication of the Watergate tapes provides an additional and unusual data source, from which to validate analyses. Chesen did not believe they would be of much value (p. 187), but I think he was mistaken. From the information revealed so far, it seems clear that President Nixon forgot he was

on tape at many points and the resultant exchanges provide a most intimate view of the man and his behavior.

33. The concept of mental health is one of the most widely and continuously debated concepts in psychology. For a brilliant discussion of definitional and epistimological problems see, Ruth Maklin, "Mental Health and Mental Illness: Some Problems of Definition and Concept Formation", *Philosophy of Science*, 39, 1972, pp. 341-365.
34. Chesen's attention to these kinds of micro-details is unusual, and should be more frequently utilized. There is no reason, as I have pointed out, that these kinds of data cannot be collected and analyzed more systematically given the techniques now available. See footnotes 17 through 20.
35. See his discussion of the "therapeutic" uses of psycho-history on p. 170.
36. Mazlish does note that there are "positive" aspects of Nixon's character but these references are relatively scarce and add to approximately three paragraphs (pp. 125, 135, 145). Moreover, at least some of the compliments paid to Mr. Nixon are problematical. Thus we learn on page 125, that one indication of Nixon's personal growth and maturity, is his ability to come to grips with, "his death wishes towards the father figure, Eisenhower". On page 135 Nixon is complimented for having great "strength of character" (what I have previously referred to as ego strength), "because he suffered merely a depression and not a breakdown, although the latter may have been close", during the months of April-May, 1970. Finally on p. 125, we are led to the conclusion that one of Nixon's positive or strong points is that, "His aggressive projections are in tune with those of many of his fellow Americans".
37. Erik Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth* (New York: Norton, 1969).
38. For an excellent discussion of this point see Rychlak, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-118.
39. Alexander George, "Assessing Presidential Character", *World Politics*, 26, 1974, pp. 234-283. My thinking on the Barber book has been informed by his discussion.
40. Alexander George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", *International Studies Quarterly*, 13, 1969, pp. 190-222.
41. Stanley Renshon, *Psychological Needs and Political Behavior: A Theory of Personality and Political Efficacy* (New York: Free Press, 1974).
42. These are: (1) high concern with self, (2) all or nothing quality, (3) now or never quality to behavior, (4) resistance to self definition, (5) denial of self gratification, (6) concern with controlling his aggression, (7) the temptation to fight or quit, (8) the perception that the world is a dangerous place, (9) division of humanity into the weak and grasping, (10) social causality seen as conspiracy or chaos, (11) the invoking of abstract principles, (12) a persistent and emphatic style, (13) extension of primary style emphasis to a total style, (14) dependency on positive responses from environment, (15) tendency to focus anger on personal enemy, and (16) feelings of compulsion ("I must").
43. Abraham Maslow, *op. cit.;* Maslow distinguishes five needs: (1) physiological, (2) safety, (3) love, (4) self-esteem, and (5) self actualization. For an important discussion of the Maslow need hierarchy in politics see: James Davies, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1963). For an empirical application for the need hierarchy to political life see Jeanne Knutson, *The Human Basis of the Polity* (Chicago: Aldine, 1972).
44. Alexander George, "Assessing Presidential Personality", *op. cit.*, p. 247.
45. For a good review of balance theory in social psychology and personality theory see: David Glass, "Theories of Consistency and the Study of Personality" in E. Borgatta and W. Lambert (eds.) *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 788-854.
46. Alexander George, "Assessing Presidential Personality", *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261.
47. Lasswell, *Power and Personality*, *op. cit.*, p. 148.



BOOK REVIEWS

The First Part of the Revelation of Moses the Son of Jehoshar. **(Argonaut Books, P.O. Box 50, Ft. Lee, N.J. 07024) $15.00 postpaid. 300 pages.**

Reviewed by Lloyd deMause

Last winter, this anonymous book arrived at the editorial offices of the *Quarterly*. On its opening page, it proclaimed what it called

THE SIMPLE TRUTH

1. **The "human race" consists of three species, not one.**
2. **The first of these consists of beings who are only superficially human. In fact, their human occupants have been evicted.**
3. **The place of the original occupant has been taken by a demon.**
4. **The second species is occupied humanity. The original inhabitant is still present, but, so to speak, confined to a dungeon in the castle keep.**
5. **The third species is de-demonized humanity. It is very rare. Its representatives are called prophets. They are customarily crucified.**

What followed this opening was like no other book I had ever read: searing historical aphorisms, brilliant psychological formulations, demonic scripts, dark dialogues and Nietzchean thunderbolts of prophecy, all written in a language that ranged from multilingual literary allusion to scatological blank verse, and which, through the clarity of the author's anger, managed to achieve a style beyond anger, beyond pretension, even beyond irony.

In short, the book gave me so much pleasure and was so full of psychohistorical material that I arranged to have selections from it pub-

lished in last Winter's issue of the *Quarterly*, hoping to demonstrate to our readers yet another facet of our "new psychohistory". The response to this publication in the journal was like nothing that could have been imagined: hundreds of cancellations poured in from furious subscribers, contributing editors resigned, literally thousands of subscribers refused to pay for their volumes received, and a flood of mail had to be answered as to why such insulting, worthless, pornographic material was ever printed in a scholarly journal. So many readers demanded to be guaranteed protection from a repetition of such an upsetting experience before they would renew their subscriptions that I purchased several boxes of single-edged razor blades which I sent out with an explanatory letter saying they should slice out any offending material from future issues of the journal and read only what they considered safe to their mental health.

Not that other issues of the *Quarterly* have been immune from similar shocked outrage. Eminent historians have circulated letters of protest complaining that putting pictures of masturbating girls and articles on Hitler in the same journal "demeaned the Holocaust." Others wrote in saying *any* explanation of Hitler's motives was tantamount to excusing his actions. The legal section of the Anti-Defamation League even began an investigation of us, claiming our material was anti-Semitic, while several Americal Nazis wrote claiming the opposite.

Nor have recent issues escaped similar response. My own piece on "The Evolution of Childhood" brought another flood of letters and cancellations of subscriptions, most of them questioning my *own* childhood, or claiming "you talk of empathy for children–how about a little empathy for *parents* for a change!" One historian, when using my piece in a class of college seniors, experienced the most extreme reactions to it by the entire class, ranging from violent disbelief that human beings could act in such a fashion to one student who got up in the middle of the reading of one section of the paper and had to leave the class because she was so beside herself she "couldn't stand listening any longer."

It appears that psychohistory is extremely upsetting. Historians and social scientists have for so long avoided the emotional causes of large-scale events that when we connect the personal with the social it is bound to be terribly anxiety-releasing. But the release of anxiety is, of course, necessary for all growth. Only those whose desire to grow–and whose tolerance for anxiety–has reached the intensity of a desire for exorcism should read this book. Others had best stay with the usual scholarly fare. As the author puts it:

> In the graduate schools, one learns vigilance.
> "A feeling! Kill it before it reproduces!"
> *
> Can I have some thick-porridge FEELING, kind sir?
> No, brat. Only thin-gruel symbolism.
> *

The Schreber Case. William G. Niederland, M.D. New York, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co. 172 pp. $8.95

Reviewed by Morton Schatzman, M.D.

Not every day have I a chance to review a book by someone who knows I have written an article[1] and a book[2] on the same subject; who has read my article and knows of my book; and who does not mention in his book, even in his bibliography, me, my work, or the issues my work raises.

As readers of the *History of Childhood Quarterly* may recall,[3] Daniel Paul Schreber (1842-1911), an eminent German judge, began a career as a mental patient at forty-two and spent thirteen years in mental asylums. In 1903, at sixty-one, he published *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness,*[4] a book he compiled from notes about his experiences while 'suffering from a nervous illness.' Schreber is considered a classic case of paranoia and schizophrenia. In 1911 Freud published an analysis[5] of Schreber's paranoia based upon Schreber's *Memoirs.* Freud had never met Schreber. Freud's study of Schreber became a pivotal statement of the psychoanalytic theory of psychosis and has had much influence. It is the origin of the view, held by many psychoanalysts, that paranoia arises as a 'defence' against homosexual love.

Schreber's father had been a leading German physician and pedagogue. He published books about his methods of bringing up children that were widely read. He said he applied his methods to his own children. He believed a child's obedience and discipline to be more important than anything else. In order to make children subject to adults, he developed an elaborate system of child-rearing. Freud, who knew of the father, did not, in his analysis of the son, use the father's writings as data.

In 1959 William Niederland,[6,7] an American psychoanalyst, pointed out some striking likenesses between some of the son's odd thoughts, for which he was considered mad, and his father's techniques of raising children. Niederland has also brought to light other interesting features about Schreber's case. In my studies of Schreber I have found Niederland's pioneering work invaluable. However, as I have pointed out,[8] Niederland has failed to see that his findings about Schreber's father's approach to children call for new hypotheses, some of which must be non-Freudian, about the origins of the son's feelings of persecution. Instead Niederland has tried to accommodate his data, sometimes awkwardly, to fit Freud's views.

Niederland's *The Schreber Case* is mainly a collection of previously published material on Schreber–six articles by Niederland, which he has here 'amended', 'abridged', and 'expanded'; and excerpts from two articles each by Maurits Katan and Robert B. White, and one by Arthur Carr. Katan's, White's, and Carr's papers first appeared in psychoanalytic journals, as Niederland's did, and none criticize Freud's classic analysis of Schreber. Merl M. Jackel's two-page 'Note on Soul Murder: Vampire Fantasies' appears here for the first time. *Soul Murder* is the

title of my book on Schreber, but Jackel, like Niederland, neither deals with nor mentions me or my work. Jackel offers some psychoanalytic speculation on an aspect of the case, but gives no new facts. Niederland presents here his own previous perspectives on Schreber, and offers no fresh ones. Niederland told me in person three years ago that he 'has a trunk full' of unpublished material on Schreber. Yet he cites no new data here. He and Franz Baumeyer,[9,10] a German psychiatrist, had already published all the information about Schreber appearing in this book.

My work on the Schreber case, published after all these articles on Schreber (except Jackel's), has set forth many new links between the son's feelings of persecution and the father's ideas about raising children. I have also developed theories for connecting the father's persecutory child-rearing methods with his son's feelings of persecution as an adult. I have suggested that perhaps other cases of paranoia can also be understood as resulting, at least partly, from childhood persecution.

My criticism of Niederland's, Freud's, and other psychoanalysts' approach to Schreber relates to my belief that psychoanalytic object-relations theory, though helpful, is ultimately inadequate for understanding how people affect each other, and especially how parents' behavior can affect children. Psychoanalytic theory cannot render intelligible someone's disturbed experience or behavior in terms of disturb*ing* behavior by someone else towards that person. I have written:

> Psychoanalysis is a psychology of individual persons seen as subjects. It regards the other people in the subjects' lives from the subjects' point of view. When psychoanalysts consider their subjects' or patients' relationships with other people, they call those other people objects. By 'objects', psychoanalysts mean people who are the objects of their subjects' or patients' acts or feelings. In psychoanalytic theory individual subjects choose 'objects' (i.e. other people), relate to them, love them, internalize them, represent them symbolically, split them into parts, fear them or lose them. However, in the theory, the 'objects' themselves do not undergo experience or originate action. They cannot see, feel, know, plan, wish, hope, love, or work. Therefore, although psychoanalysts use the term 'object' to represent a person, the person it represents is unreal. The 'object' is a person of a kind who is not and could not be alive.
>
> The unfolding of an individual occurs in the context of, and can be defined by, the development of his relations with others. If I am to understand someone, I must assume he has lived among people who engage in the same form of experience and behavior that I attribute to him.
>
> In order to comprehend a relationship between two individuals –husband and wife, mother and child, or father and son–we must take into account that each individual experiences the world and originates behavior. Of course psychoanalysts know that other

persons experience and act upon their patients and that certain persons who dealt with their patients as children influenced them greatly by their behavior. But in so far as psychoanalysts speak of object-relations, their theory does not adequately account for this influence.

Theories of object-relations in their present form developed long after Freud's analysis in 1911 of Daniel Paul Schreber. But parts of Freud's analysis of Schreber can be seen as precursors of these theories. . . .[11]

In discussing Freud's view that Schreber's paranoia results from repressed homosexual desire for his father, I have said:

> The father, in Freud's analysis of Schreber, does not experience or act upon the son. He is, for Freud, an object towards which the son's desire is directed. But he (or it) in no way governs, determines, limits, opposes, suppresses, fears, desires, rouses, inflames, sustains, acknowledges, or even knows of his son's alleged desire for him; the same is so for any desire his son could ever have. . . .
>
> Every relationship between a parent and child is unique. In order to understand a given relationship, it is best to start with a minimum of presuppositions and to obtain as many facts as possible. If one aims to ascertain a given sector of that relationship, such as the child's feelings towards the parent, it would be helpful to have an idea of how *this* parent experiences and treats the child. To understand Schreber's feelings towards his flesh-and-blood father or towards his internalized father, it is pertinent to know what feelings his father, in particular, would have been likely to elicit in him.[12]

Freud could have approached Schreber's case in this way, but did not. Although Freud was an avid reader, and although Schreber's father's books were easily available, there is no evidence that Freud read them. Niederland has read and reported on them. However, Niederland, despite having uncovered much important and fascinating material about Schreber's father, and despite having seen that some of the son's feelings of persecution can be linked with certain behavior of the father, has not seen that psychoanalysis has no theory that enables it to do justice to his findings, or to mine.

Having already replied[13] to an essay by Niederland[14] where he discusses my article on Schreber (but does not consider what I see as the crucial differences between us), I shall add only some notes here; Niederland, in that essay, which does not appear in his book, says:

> Schreber's father "told parents to persecute their children", as Dr. Schatzman puts it. . . . Schreber's father insisted that all these sadistic and coercive procedures should be applied by parents

> *iucunde*, as he described it in Latin–that is, *in a manner pleasurable and stimulating to the child.* In other words, in addition to the aggressive and punitive aspects, many seductive and emotionally and physically enticing factors were involved in the father's actions and teachings–all of which were apt to induce feelings of love, pleasure, and/or sexual arousal in the child. . . . To limit the essential features of the father's behavior to real persecution is both simplistic and reductionist. . . .[15] (Niederland's italics).

'Sadistic and coercive procedures' that are 'seductive' and 'enticing' seem designed to induce masochism in a child. If a child derives 'feelings of love, pleasure, and/or sexual arousal' from such procedures, he has already become, presumably as the result of such procedures, a masochist. Niederland thus implies that including or reinforcing masochism in a child is not persecution. I find this unacceptable

Niederland, in the same essay, said:

> The factor of real persecution undoubtedly can play a role in the formation of paranoid symptomatology. . . . But real persecution is not a specific factor in paranoid conditions.[16]

Niederland does not explain how 'real persecution' could 'play a role', but not be 'a specific factor'. He does not cite evidence or provide arguments to support his view about the non-specificity of 'real persecution'. In fact, Niederland himself, in his work on Schreber, has advanced much evidence that is compatible with the conclusion that persecution *is* a 'specific factor in paranoid conditions.' Other authors, such as Edwin Lemert, an American sociologist,[17] have also reported evidence that supports such a conclusion.

However, not everyone who is persecuted develops clinical paranoia.[18] Many German parents may have brought up their children by Dr. Schreber's methods or by similar methods, without the children growing up to be 'paranoid'. It would be important to consider how persecutory child-rearing practices affected those children who, despite such practices, did *not* become clinically paranoid. Those children's parents' sadistic and coercive behavior towards them may be related to later political developments in Germany: the children became, as adults, Hitler's contemporaries.

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17. E. M. Lemert, "Paranoia and the Dynamics of Exclusion", *Sociometry*, Vol. 25 (1962), pp. 2-20.
18. Nor is past or ongoing persecution necessary for paranoia to develop in adults. Regular administration of amphetamines to laboratory subjects can induce clinical paranoia in virtually all of them.

Love, Sex, and Marriage Through the Ages. Bernard I. Murstein. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1974. $16.95. 639 pages.

Reviewed by Henry Ebel,
Richmond College, C.U.N.Y.

I, dear reader, have a penis and two testicles. They have played an important role in my life. *You* are either comparably equipped, or possessed of a clitoris and a vagina; and your sexual organs have, I'm sure, been at least as significant to you as, say, your Ph.D., or your first book, or your professional reputation.

Once we put the matter in this way it becomes clear that the human species has been in the grips of (to use Cardinal Newman's phrase) some terrible aboriginal catastrophe. Before and after D. H. Lawrence, the penis appears in literature and art—and it appears infrequently—as either a ludicrously comic and degrading object (satyrs, Aristophanes, and the significantly undersized and unhirsute pudenda that the Greeks put on their Good Guys), as a sniggering allusion (Chaucer's "pricking" monk, Falstaff's "May I never spit white again," the erectile Norman in the margin of the Bayeux Tapestry), or as a frightening fecal violator (Japanese art of the nineteenth century, and the apotheosis of hard-core porno chic entitled *Behind the Green Door*).

The subject of the vagina I leave to Philip Slater's classic *The Glory of Hera.* Though I cannot resist observing that even Slater doesn't do justice to the impact of Greek painting and sculpture, where the bot-

tomless black pupils and toothy leering mouth of the Gorgon exemplify our lunatic terror of what we all agree, in our saner moments, is an essentially toothless organ.

And the clitoris? Dear reader, I have in my 36 years read much literature and history and stared at not a little art, and not before the rise of pornography in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have I found the faintest acknowledgment that the clitoris even *exists*. As far as I can make out, it is an organ capable of providing at least as much pleasurable sensation as the nose. Yet noses are everywhere, the clitoris nowhere. Ah, you say that that is because the clitoris is "hidden". Well, it's not too hidden if one makes the effort to look. And it is certainly less hidden than such an omnipresent artifact as the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

Speaking of Jesus, we have to give this prominent pre-Christian credit for at least recognizing, in a calm tone, the existence of the toilet.[1] (Except for smutty relief, did those gay pagans the Greeks ever do comparable justice to our daily defecations?) Perhaps Jesus even got around to some comparable good sense on the subject of fucking, only to have his words excised from that editorial catastrophe, The New Testament. People like Clement and Jerome were obviously capable of almost any kind of scribal hanky-panky where sex was concerned. "My face was pale and my frame chilled from fasting," the latter declares, "yet my mind was throbbing with desire and the fires of lust kept bubbling before me when my flesh was as good as dead." Is that supposed to mean that he had erections? And if so, what did he do with them?

As a species, we have done just about everything with sex except be calm about it (sneezing is also a tumultuous act, but no one demands an X rating for Disney's *Snow White*), in which case it follows as the night does the day that the history of love, sex, and marriage through the ages is the history of a collective and ongoing disaster. You will agree, will you not, that a remarkable number of people still get sexually aroused by the extravaganza staged under the direction of the late and apparently lamented Adolf Hitler? In that case, there is more tunnel at the end of the light.

Well, what can I say about this silly and utterly professorial book? It accepts the pathologies of our species as an interesting series of norms to be classified, described and footnoted in the same spirit as the admirable and constructive behavior of the saner species. And where our pathology is most intense–in our historic and historical inability to *discuss* the details of male and female sexuality–Professor Murstein is altogether too polite to ask rude questions. Why in God's name *should* a woman be regarded–often even by herself–as a reeking garbage pail from whose cavernous carnivorous mouth there periodically erupts the unspeakable lava of her menstruation? How did we get so crazy?

If we are to trust his bibliography, Professor Murstein has read well over a thousand books and articles in preparation for writing this book. But he has somehow managed to miss Philip Slater and Joseph Rheingold. Socrates, he primly tells us, "about whom we find no evidence of physical relationships with youths, clearly loved some of them intensely." In the *Symposium*, Alcibiades is more direct:

> So I got up, and, without giving him a chance to say a word, I wrapped my cloak round him–for this was in the winter–and, creeping under his shabby old mantle, I took him in my arms and lay there all night with this godlike and extraordinary man–you can't deny that, either, Socrates. And after *that* he had the insolence, the infernal arrogance, to laugh at my youthful beauty and jeer at the one thing I was really proud of, gentlemen of the jury . . . and believe it, gentlemen, or believe it not, when I got up next morning I had no more *slept* with Socrates, within the meaning of the act, than if he's been my father or an elder brother.

Turning from Professor Murstein to Plato, one knows where one is: in the presence of a grown-up, beyond the reach of gee-whiz profundities and the building up of yet another book by the accretion of file cards. Whether the "one thing" Alcibiades was proud of was his penis or his anus I leave to more learned men for a decision. Whatever it was, Socrates wasn't interested; and why *that* should have been the case in so gay a place as Athens someone besides Professor Murstein will have to explain.

REFERENCE

1. "Do you not see that nothing that goes from outside into a man can defile him, because it does not enter into his heart but into his stomach, and so passes out into the drain?" (Mark 7:18) The Greek for "drain" is a shade less elegant than our New English Bible: it is *aphedron*, "latrine".

TWO NEW CENTERS FOR FAMILY HISTORY ANNOUNCED:

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A multi-disciplinary symposium on "Education, State, and Family: An Historical Critique" will be held March 14-15, 1975 by the Department of History, State University College, Fredonia, N.Y. 14063. Papers include Michael Katz, "Growing Up in the Nineteenth Century: A Forgotten Phase of Development"; Joel Spring, "Social Uses of Education"; and Colin Greer, "The Coming of the Schooled Society."

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