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# OCTOBER

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*Plato and the Simulacrum*

*Introduction to*

*The Tables of Destiny*

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*To Be Continued:*

*A Note on Some Recent Mondrians*

*A Reply to Heath*

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## Ointments, Makeup, Pollen\*

JEAN CLAY

translated by JOHN SHEPLEY

*A few solitary flowers stood up  
in long flowerbeds and in a  
frightened voice said: Red.*  
— Rilke, *The Notebooks of Malte  
Laurids Brigge*

Manet does not have a style, he has all of them. "Imitator," *pasticheur* — the reproach echoes throughout the 1860s in Thoré, Mantz, or Gautier.<sup>1</sup> Manet treats the artistic heritage the way Walter Benjamin's *flâneur* handles merchandise. The Louvre is a *passage*, a market stand, where the painter strikes his bargain. The history of art is on sale, the past is flattened, desacralized, manipulated, instrumentalized — the end of *aura*. We are no longer in a vein of reverent quotation, but of tapping and recycling. Manet skims from anywhere — he reverses, assembles, tinkers. In this wholly prosaic rapport with tradition, the history of art — its institutions and rules — is denied the silent authority that it had exercised on every young painter since his first stroke of the brush.

The flattening entails the end of hierarchies and schools, the end of the great canonical antitheses (Poussin versus Rubens, Ingres versus Delacroix).

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1. Péladan, in a text that moreover contains pertinent remarks on Manet's practices, extols "his excellent pastiches and daring *crépons*," adding that "half of Manet's canvases are slavish copies of the masters" (Joséphin Péladan, "Le procédé de Manet," *L'Artiste*, February 1884, quoted in Pierre Courthion, *Manet*, II, Geneva, 1953).

According to Degas, "Edouard himself, though he prided himself on slavishly copying nature, was the most mannered painter in the world, never making a brushstroke without thinking of the masters . . ." (Paul Valéry, *Degas, danse, dessin*, Paris, 1965 [1938], p. 201).

By drawing simultaneously on Titian, Raphael, Hals, Velázquez, Ribera, Zurbarán, Murillo, Le Nain, Watteau, Goya, Géricault (and countless others, the list of whom grows longer every day thanks to the ferocious effort of the iconographers); by borrowing from Japanese art; and by seeking inspiration in photography, Manet subverts the notions of linear continuity, progress, and source. We are faced with the paradox of an oeuvre that, at the very moment when it becomes saturated with references, suspends the possibility of a genealogy of forms. It is precisely because he quotes—and by his mode of quotation—that Manet breaks with the fiction of an art history always already grounded in precedent. In squandering the past, he only adds to the uncertainty of its future: all teleology collapses in a chaos of references, into which meaning, plan, and program sink as well (the Enlightenment is still present in Goya, as is the democratic ideal in Courbet).

"You don't create a book with books, and you don't create a painting with paintings."<sup>2</sup> There is no better expression than this statement by Castagnary of the abyss that separates the goals of the naturalists (he invented the term in 1863) from Manet's practice. Castagnary does not possess the theoretical means to make a distinction between the eclecticism reigning in the Salon and the enterprise of a man who, by the juxtaposition of fragments taken from here and there in the history of art, puts considerable strain on the formative rules of the painting of his time. He does not discern what it is in Manet that derives from an ambition other than reproducing "the life of the countryside" and "the life of cities." He finds him on occasion "more fanciful than observant, more whimsical than powerful" (1869).<sup>3</sup> But how is one to integrate into the documentary and mimetic ideology of naturalism such operations as these: in order to paint *La Pêche* (1860–61), Manet mingles, reverses, and synthesizes four paintings by Carracci and Rubens.<sup>4</sup> In *The Old Musician* (1862), the figures are borrowed respectively from the engraver Schlesinger, Velázquez, Watteau, and Manet himself (*The Absinthe Drinker*)—while the body of the central figure is inspired by a marble statue of the third century B.C. representing Chrysispos, and the head by a gypsy encountered in the Batignolles quarter (the vegetation occupying the left corner of the work comes from a lithograph by Nanteuil after Velázquez's *Drinkers*).<sup>5</sup>

2. Jules Antoine Castagnary, *Salon de 1864*. Quoted in Michael Fried, "Manet's Sources, Aspects of His Art, 1859–1865," *Artforum*, vol. VII, no. 7 (March 1969), p. 74, note 141.

Castagnary's remark echoes melodiously in the other, more famous one by Mallarmé, which overlaps and cancels it: "But, Degas, you don't make verses with ideas. . . . You make them with words" (quoted in Valéry, p. 140).

3. Quoted in John Rewald, *The History of Impressionism*, New York, 1961, p. 224.

4. Charles Sterling and Margareta Salinger, *French Paintings* (catalogue), New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1967, vol. III, p. 26.

5. See Alain de Leiris, "Manet, Guérault and Chrysispos," *The Art Bulletin*, vol. XLVI (September 1964), p. 401 ff. And for a more recent discussion, see Theodore Reff, *Manet and Modern Paris*, Washington, D.C., National Gallery of Art, 1982, pp. 174 ff.



Edouard Manet. *The Old Musician*. 1862.

*Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe* (1863) condenses two famous works: the composition is from Raphael (it is taken from the *Judgment of Paris*, as engraved by Raimondi) and the theme from Titian (*Fête Champêtre*). Manet is not content to borrow this or that gesture, type, or drapery — he appropriates the whole group. Note that he does not depart from the engraving; he paints a kind of “tableau vivant”: his brother Gustave, the sculptor Leenhoff, and a model mimic Raphael’s figures. The classical skeleton is clothed with modern flesh. Manet superimposes historical reference and present-day subject. He makes a nature out of culture.<sup>6</sup>

Smooth and compact, the nudes in *Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe* and *Olympia* stand

6. Françoise Cachin, in the catalogue of the recent Manet exhibition at the Grand Palais in Paris and the Metropolitan Museum in New York, speaks specifically of “tableau vivant”: “Manet passes from the object of reference — Raphael’s nymph — to a particular model, whom he directs to imitate, as it were, the classical pose. He reverses the operation to be performed in the studio according to school doctrine, and transforms the ideal into the real” (*Manet*, Paris and New York, 1983, p. 170).

out in a provocative way against a more "pictorial" context.<sup>7</sup> Precise linearity of contour, uniform lighting of bodies (little or no shadow): enough modeling to avoid the (Ingresque) working sketch; enough drawing to isolate the figure in the painting. The influence of photography has been seen here — less perhaps of photomontage (already frequent in the 1850s, with its awkward qualities and disconnected lighting effects)<sup>8</sup> than of the semi-porn photo — "academics," "artistic poses" — which becomes widespread in these same years, and available to painters and collectors.<sup>9</sup> Gerald Needham considers the "pornographic" documents of the period (at which people peered in the stereoscope) as an important source for *Olympia*.<sup>10</sup> He mentions a number of contemporaneous pictures that combine a setting borrowed from painting (that of the odalisque) and a less than ideal nude who stares boldly at the spectator. "By emphasizing the angularity of the human body," writes Needham, "[Manet] knew that he could give *Olympia* that immediacy and reality that so startled the people who saw it." The bulge of the kneecap (criticized by classical painters, as by Gérôme and the eclectics), the silhouetting, the steady lighting, the haunting stare of the "bestial Vestal" (Valéry) can be said to have been transposed from photography. Victorine would appear to be all the more shocking in that she forms a blot on a background that rejects her, just as a reclining, unclothed model forms a strange blot against the cardboard decor of a photographer's studio. Manet would thus have assumed the violence of this "real-effect" that was still disconcerting for people of the Second Empire.<sup>11</sup> In some way, what he painted was not Victorine Meurent but her photograph, not her image but a reproduction of it — in accordance with the code for pornographic albums of the period (likewise Warhol and Lichtenstein paint not objects but what is perceived of them in the ebb and flow of the mass media). Thrust to the front of the stage,

7. In the sense of *malerisch* ("painterly"), as opposed to "linear." Manet shows no "concern for the envelope" (to use a term of the period). Compare with Titian's *Fête Champêtre* and *Venus of Urbino*, or Goya's *Maja desnuda*, "models" for the artist, where the bodies share in the atmospheric continuity.

On the other hand, the watercolor on the same theme, contemporaneous but later (*Manet* catalogue, no. 67), is like a "critical reading" of the canvas: a setting whose spatial ambiguities anticipate Cézanne, the merging of *Olympia* with the broad clear area of the bedclothes.

8. See Robert A. Sobieszek, "Composite Imagery and the Origin of Photomontage," *Artforum*, vol. XVII, nos. 1-2 (September and October 1978).

9. Baudelaire points out its success in his *Salon of 1859*: "Shortly thereafter, thousands of eager eyes were glued to the viewing holes of the stereoscope as though to the garret windows of eternity. The love of obscenity, which is bedded as deeply in the natural heart of man as his love for himself, was not about to let slip such a fine opportunity for self-satisfaction."

10. Gerald Needham, "Manet, *Olympia* and Pornographic Photography," in *Woman as Sex Object*, New York, 1972, p. 83.

11. An intrusive violence that might be compared as gesture with Juan Gris's introduction of a mirror into a painting.

In the recent *Manet* catalogue, p. 179, Françoise Cachin publishes an example of the "art photo" contemporaneous with *Olympia*.

restored to the status of an erotic instrument, Victorine is obscene; but this much-denounced obscenity lies neither in the supposed "professional" coldness of the model, nor in the otherwise conventional treatment of the nude; it is due to the integration of a figurative practice foreign to painting. The photograph contaminates the painted image—accelerating here again what Walter Benjamin called the decline of the aura. The *condensation* of various paintings would be completed by another synthesis: between two dissimilar modes of figurative representation.

At the level of "devices" (to use the Russian formalists' term) that turn Manet's efforts into work *about* painting, one should mention—in addition to appropriation, inversion, and condensation—a tendency temporally, sequentially, to decline (in the grammatical sense) a given visual idea. This diachronic development leads him to confront, within the economy of a series, a constant element with one or more variations. Here the painting, in many cases, is a "weak unity" (the expression is used by Michel Foucault in connection with books). As later with Gauguin, any production of an image, for Manet, is capable of being declined through a range of media: from drawing to engraving (itself developed in several states), from oils to lithography. We will see a number of examples of this later on. As Duret recalls, Manet often executed watercolors based on his canvases.<sup>12</sup> Tabarant writes that he would sometimes do his pastels on Holland paper, then repeat them on prepared canvas—while to us they seem the miraculous fruit of the moment.<sup>13</sup> Commissioned to depict the singer Faure as Hamlet (1867), he did two portraits, the poses almost identical, on canvases of the same size (both signed): the first canvas is a web of quick, nervous strokes that pare away the jagged silhouette of the baritone—who seems to disintegrate in the theatrical sparkle that produces him—the second is a dull and somber mass on a neutral background. Two styles. Almost two painters.

Certain figures also persist, whose strength and frequency can be compared, in some cases, to an effect of traumatic images. It is not a matter of indifference that the crowd watching the execution of Maximilian, even though it comes from Goya, is the same one as in *The Dead Toreador* (before being cut). And that the firing squad that executes communards in *The Barricade* is the very same one, reversed, that shot the emperor of Mexico. Or that the body lying at the foot of the barricade in *Civil War* is that of the *The Dead Toreador* (which, according to the logic of recycling already described, is inspired by the *Dead Soldier* long attributed to Velázquez, as well as by one version or another of Gérôme's *Dead Caesar*).

There is a similar persistence of a graphic element—or a portion of layout: the line that winds across the whole breadth of *Little Cavaliers* (Manet's

12. Théodore Duret, *Histoire d'Edouard Manet et de son oeuvre*, Paris, 1902, p. 134.

13. Adolphe Tabarant, *Manet et ses oeuvres*, Paris, 1947, p. 445.

copy of a supposed painting by Velázquez, c. 1856) reemerges to divide the dancers in *The Spanish Ballet* (1862). The same horizontal development of a line, but softer, controls the crowd in *Music in the Tuileries* (1862) or *Masked Ball at the Opera* (1873). Another, more angular line distributes the irregular group in *The Old Musician* or the firing squad in *Maximilian*. Other echoes, belonging to the artist's unconscious: the bottom of the dress in *Jeanne Duval* (1862) recurs in the parterre in the *Exposition Universelle* (1867), the pilings in Venice (1875) in the trees in *Music in the Tuileries*, and the curve of the horizon in the landscapes and seascapes of the years 1860-70 in the rounded wall in *Maximilian*, and so on.

To generalize here about an oeuvre founded entirely on *willful discrepancy* would be to fall into a trap. Actually it is an indescribable oeuvre, one that constantly breaks the rules that it has just set for itself. One can say nothing about it—about its fabrication, its palette, its conceptions of perspective, its “backgrounds”—that is not immediately contradicted by this or that group of paintings. The notion of *style*, in the current sense,<sup>14</sup> loses all relevance, as do those of *developing* and *maturing*. Manet's oeuvre does not develop, it simply operates by displacement. It proceeds like the species according to Cuvier: by abrupt and catastrophic mutations. Here is an artist who simultaneously paints smoothly and distinctly (*In the Conservatory*) and *alla prima* (*Woman Reading*), in a gritty fashion (*Rochefort*), and a *tachiste* one (*Cabaner, Moore*). On one side he approaches Courbet, on the other de Kooning. Within the space of a few weeks he offers the *Dead Christ* and *Races at Longchamp* (1864), *Berthe Morisot with Hat, in Mourning* and *Masked Ball at the Opera* (1873). If one did not perceive correctly the kind of restless movement that runs throughout it, one would think that the recent retrospective at the Metropolitan was a group exhibition. This incongruity is unmatched until Picasso. Girodet, at the turn of the nineteenth century, in his singular and stubborn determination to “do something new” (neither David nor Ingres had any such aspiration), envisaged each of his paintings as an unprecedented attempt (within the framework of his own experiments). And indeed, if one excludes the portraits, his work is a combination of memorable endeavors that cannot be described in the same terms.

With Manet we are dealing with something else. There is repeated cleavage and conflict among the components of the painting. It is no longer a matter of painting masterpieces, or entities, but of introducing elements of torsion and contradiction. Of inventing painting while destroying it. A borderline art, always reactive, with no other aim than to place all tradition, even its own, in an untenable position. Here, in defiance of the law, a perverse component of painting is manifested that will be one of its moving forces until Robert

14. “By style is meant the constant form—and sometimes the constant elements, qualities, and expression—in the art of an individual or group” (Meyer Schapiro, “Style,” in *Anthropology Today*, ed. A. L. Kroeber, Chicago and London, 1953).

Ryman.<sup>15</sup> How to produce discordances, pictorial aporias? How to constrain the forces contending before our eyes in the painting? Manet, by this reckoning, would not be a painter, but discrepancy at work in painting. And this may have been his — albeit unformulated — program.<sup>16</sup>

For example, the most glaring discrepancy is between the play of illusionist depth and the demands of the surface. There is discrepancy between the *trace* (which belongs to the gesture) and the *tracé* (which belongs to the sign). Discrepancy and incertitude, adroitly handled, between the *ébauche* (lack of fulfillment, incompleteness) and the *esquisse* (self-sufficient, worthy to be in a confrere's collection: *Claude Monet in His Studio*, Coll. Hammer). It all takes place, Hanson notes, as though Manet were "perversely avoiding the kind of aesthetic resolution which might endanger the vitality of his art."<sup>17</sup> Hence the anomalies, the oddities that still strike us today, and which in his time earned him the reputation of being eccentric and deliberately provoking, in the manner of Warhol: the two right feet of the *Absinthe Drinker*, Christ's wound on the wrong side, the guitar strummed with the left hand, the Mexican rifleman with white leggings, the impossible Paris of *The Burial*, the ghostly reflection in the mirror of the *Folies-Bergère*, and so forth.<sup>18</sup>

\*

One tries to grasp — beyond tactical considerations and those of the market — what it was that made it improbable that Manet would adhere to realism, naturalism, or impressionism, all of them schools endowed with a tyrannical and comprehensive doctrine, and even, in the last case, with a style. There is nothing about him to suggest the prolonged patience of a Monet, who proceeds from painting to painting, from series to series, from campaign to

15. This would perhaps be the true mainstream (whose only law would be to question the law) and not the positivist reduction proposed by Greenberg under this sign. A mainstream that today takes second place with the uncritical reexamination of the neoprimitivism and expressionism of 1910-20. Manet's triumph at the Metropolitan coincides with his second death.

16. Let us note, however, the agreement of witnesses. To Antonin Proust in 1882: "It has been my ambition not to stand still, not to redo the next day what I did the day before, to be constantly inspired by a new aspect, to try to make a new note heard" (Antonin Proust, "L'art d'Edouard Manet," *Le Studio*, January 1901, quoted in Courthion, I, p. 39).

To Mallarmé: "No one should paint a landscape and a figure by the same process, with the same knowledge, or in the same fashion, [whereby Manet is only stating the method of his friend Fantin; but he adds:] nor what is more, even two landscapes or two figures. Each work should be a new creation of the mind" (Stéphane Mallarmé, "Les Impressionistes et Edouard Manet," *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, November 1975). This text, mentioned in the *Oeuvres complètes*, Paris, 1945, p. 1624, was originally published as "The Impressionists and Edouard Manet," in *Art Monthly Review*, vol. I, no. 9 (September 30, 1876). The French manuscript was lost; thus the 1975 version is a translation from the English by Philippe Verdier.

17. Anne Coffin Hanson, *Manet and the Modern Tradition*, New Haven, 1977, p. 204.

18. Seymour Howard, "Early Manet and Artful Error: Foundations of Anti-illusion in Modern Painting," *Art Journal*, vol. XXXVII, no. 1 (Fall 1977), pp. 14-21.

campaign, attached for half a century to the intermittences of light.<sup>19</sup> For Manet, impressionism—the open air, the seizure of the moment, the comma-shaped brushstroke, the uniformity of texture, the interaction of colors in nature—is only a phase, albeit the last, in a career devoted to the questioning of painting in general. After all, if there is a Velázquez-Manet, a Hals-Manet, and an Ingres-Manet, there is also a Cézanne-Manet, a Lautrec-Manet, a Vuillard-Manet, a Matisse-Manet, . . . and the variety of effects in the sequence of his painting sufficiently expresses the potentialities of a process exacerbated more by dissatisfaction, an impulse to be different, than by any commitment to consistency.

Manet recognizes himself neither in the classical conception of composition (an order, an architecture),<sup>20</sup> nor in the romantic conception (an organic unity in movement). It is obvious that the notions of internal equilibrium and harmony scarcely interest him. He is indifferent to mastery of the surface, which presupposes a mastery over the world, and above all a subject set in its place and responsive to an arrangement that it completes and legitimizes. Manet seems struck by compositional “fatigue.”<sup>21</sup> It is less a matter of challenging a certain order than of recording a distance from the very idea of pictorial coherence. “It” is not required to hold. Distortions, perspectives, aberrations, “slips” of the brush: we are entering a phase in which painting is ridding itself of the dream of self-sufficient totality on which it had been based since Alberti. And the appropriations from the masters, mentioned above, can also be understood as a critical interpretation, a way of destabilizing the steadfast serenity, the illusion of masterpieces.

Manet is generally content to borrow, as a convenience, formulas that have stood the test of time. Most of his paintings are simply centered in a manner that recalls Velázquez (*The Buffoon Pablillos*), Ribera (the effect of “photographic” suspense in *The Clubfoot*), Watteau (*Gilles*), etc.<sup>22</sup> Another for-

19. Even if at the end, with the *Waterlilies*, a threefold reversal takes place: topological (the central subject becomes the surroundings), effusive (symbolism, pantheism), and anti-object (Monet revisited by American abstraction).

As for the notion of *series* in the two painters: in Monet a series is created by variations of the referent (light); in Manet, by variations in treatment (of medium and style).

20. “The disappearance of academic construction in painting is, on the contrary, the open path to the expression (thereby even to the exaltation) of the psychological processes most incompatible with social stability. This is what largely explains the lively reaction provoked for more than half a century by the progressive transformation of painting, till then characterized by a sort of hidden architectural skeleton” (Georges Bataille, *Oeuvres complètes*, Paris, 1970, vol. I, pp. 170-71).

21. Zola in 1867: “. . . what is called composition does not exist for him.” And Péladan, sixteen years later: “With no ideal, no composition, no emotion, no poetry, no drawing, incapable of composing a painting, Manet is only a painter and a painter of fragments” (Péladan, p. 160).

22. Having finished the portrait of his friend Duret (1868, Petit Palais), Manet took it up again later, adding a stool and various colored objects. He changed nothing in the original layout. In the artist’s eyes, the massive intervention of a new and brightly colored element does not disturb the arrangement of the work.

mula, inherited from classicism and neoclassicism: the use of a vertical or horizontal strut (or both) to ensure the structural rigidity of the work and free the contrapuntal function of the figures and objects (*Olympia*, *Reading*, *Zola*, *The Balcony*, *In the Conservatory*, *Nana*, *The Bar at the Folies-Bergère*, etc.).

As though it were enough for him to spin out the centering principle laterally, Manet also sometimes adds rows of isolated figures, strangers to each other. Coexistence without connection — especially striking in *The Old Musician*, whose composite sources have been noted. This additive conception achieves a formal result in *The Beach at Boulogne* (1869), constructed in the manner of a musical stave. Alain de Leiris has shown that the painter had begun by drawing isolated pencil sketches from life, and later transcribed them as such, in the same sketchy style, over the whole breadth of the canvas (thereby raising the incompleteness of the sketch to the solemnity of the painting).<sup>23</sup> The diachronic character of the observations in *The Beach at Boulogne* is in some way compensated and restored by the wide intervals between the groups. It is these intervals that have the task of conveying — by the visual dispersion they impose on the gaze — the successive moments of observation. There is, as though by torsion, spatial resolution of a temporal fact.

The frieze construction — or that of superimposed bands — thus allows Manet to evade compositional hierarchies (just like his use of centering, which

23. Alain de Leiris, "Sur la plage de Boulogne," *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, vol. LVII (1961), pp. 53-62, quoted in Hanson, p. 200.



Edouard Manet. *The Beach at Boulogne*. 1869.  
(Mr. and Mrs. Paul Mellon Collection, Upperville,  
Virginia.)

works together with it).<sup>24</sup> This construction, when saturated, leads to the establishment of a compact curtain, of a mass that tends toward indistinctness; in *Music in the Tuileries* and *Masked Ball at the Opera* the gaps are not merely effaced, but muddled and camouflaged by the overlay of a colored web endowed, especially in the first case, with increasing autonomy.

It is for the same purpose that Manet adopts the opposite position, when, mindful of Japanese prints and Degas's contemporaneous concerns with cropping, he replaces a contemplative vision of the world (that of Corot) with a quick and violent depredation—"as of a scene," writes Mallarmé, "by a glance encompassed in a cupping of the hands." A mandorla that cuts off that other mandorla, the pupil of the eye.<sup>25</sup> Too close, too full, too rapid—the question is then no longer of an order, of an orthopedics of the gaze, but of a gust of visual material to which one yields, not in the presence of the subject but *before* its formulation—a flash already received beforehand *as painting*—and while the canvas is certainly not the clear transcription of this instantaneous seizure (several detailed sketches have sometimes preceded it), it retains the lesion of it, as a syncope (*Races at Longchamp, Folkestone, The Burial, Café-Concert*).

The art of the Far East was for Manet the means for pushing his visual paradoxes to the point of rupture. Sandblad dates this kind of forced trope from 1862: a *Spaniard* executed in the technique of a Japanese watercolor.<sup>26</sup> The same author, following many others, sees in *The Fifer* a Japanese silhouette pinned on a Velázquez background. As for *The Balcony*, the arrangement would be from Goya, the dresses and pots from Velázquez, and the frontal projection a transposition from the Ukiyo-e.

It is also Oriental perspective that inspires the overhang (the vantage point of the crow's nest) from which *The Battle of the Kearsarge* is organized (as well as *Asparagus* in the Louvre). For his *Mile V . . . in the Costume of an Espada*, Manet transposes Western modeling into an arrangement alien to it: "Many scenes of Japanese life present a ground plane which rises sharply to a high horizon on which distant objects in small scale seem to appear almost suspended behind the head or shoulders of standing figures."<sup>27</sup> By pinning like a butterfly his group of picador and bull (borrowed just as it is from Goya's *Tauromachia*) at two thirds of the height, Manet expresses as early as 1862 a cold indifference to any logical representation of space.<sup>28</sup> It is this that consti-

24. Some have seen, among recent influences, those of newspaper illustrations, of Constantine Guys, or even of *Burial at Ornans*, highlight and scandal of the Salon of 1850-51 (cf., in particular, the preparatory charcoal drawing in the Besançon museum, *Courbet* catalogue, Réunion des Musées Nationaux, Paris, 1977, p. 227).

25. Mallarmé, p. 152.

26. Nils Gösta Sandblad, *Manet, Three Studies in Artistic Conception*, Lund, 1954, p. 82.

27. Hanson, p. 188. The author shows a Japanese print whose conception is very close to that of *Espada*.

28. Mallarmé on Manet and perspective: ". . . this wholly and artificially classical discipline, which makes our eyes the dupes of a civilized upbringing" (Mallarmé, p. 152).

tutes the painting's importance—beyond the fascination exercised by its monstrous aspect. And despite criticisms and sarcastic comments, the artist takes care not to change the organization when he uses it again for a watercolor and an engraving. In *Espada* (which is a masquerade besides), Manet does not substitute one system of perspective for another—as, for example, Gauguin and Van Gogh did at Les Alyscamps. He deliberately fabricates an antistructure, a monster unfit by its contradictions to provide a consistent transcription of empirical space. The stakes of painting are lowered on the canvas. The speculation that begins here opens directly on cubism (considered as a regulated opposition of mutually exclusive systems of projection).


After all, the tradition of composition could only lose much of its interest for a painter who tends to bypass the problem of the surface in order to reach, as though by a rotation of forty-five degrees, the category of the stratified, of layers, of thickness.<sup>29</sup> Examining Manet's paintings (the paintings, not photographs of them), one can see that the artist, as though seeking to overcome in the texture the old distinction between form and background, comes to produce out of it a new surface by weaving, overflowing, and overlapping. In Manet—and soon in Matisse—the “backgrounds” rise up, cross, create surfaces, and participate in the definition of the object. To take only one example: in the *Model of the Bar at the Folies-Bergère* (Dijon), the green and pink interweavings of pastel only partially cover the front of the jacket, exposing the undergarments like so many scabs, garlands of pale spots. Another reverse: the “background,” very often painted last, clearly encroaches on the figure, which—a new aporia—all of a sudden finds itself emerging from a lower layer of paint (*Soap Bubbles*, 1867; *The Brunette with Bare Breasts*, 1872, etc.). Likewise, in *On the Beach* (1873), the yellow of the sand hems in the two seated figures. By executing his “backgrounds” later, Manet runs counter to empirical experience. Whatever stands out in the distance in a landscape is presented as closest to the spectator (Poussin, by his openings of light, frequently uses this method). One can observe that the overlapping of strata of color operates even in the details of works, and may involve more than two depths: in *Girl Serving Beer* (1879), the “background” covers the singer, who in her turn covers a woman spectator in the middle ground, and so forth. Another form: in *Music in the Tuileries*, the sinuous line that runs like a scar between the foliage and the crowd of strollers is made up of little piles of pigment—rolls, swellings—verging sometimes to one side, sometimes to the other.

Finally, it is by scraping his surface that Manet ensures the confusion of

29. Whereby he anticipates certain experiments of contemporary art. But one should put it the other way around: contemporary painting makes it possible to see what it was in his work that opened up the space of our modernity. For the question of thickness, see especially: Christian Bonnefoi, “A propos de la destruction de l'entité de surface,” dossier Ryman, *Macula*, nos. 3-4 (1978), and “Entretien avec Christian Bonnefoi,” *Macula*, nos. 5-6 (1979). See also J. Clay, “Pollock, Mondrian, Seurat: la profondeur plate,” in *L'Atelier de Jackson Pollock*, Paris, 1982.


strata. Worked by a pointed object, the layers mingle in a fibrous, threadlike, inextricable texture. This practice also constitutes the originality of his lithographs. If one compares them with those of Fantin-Latour, one notes in the latter, of course, an abundant and daring use of the scraping tool. But when Fantin transgresses the limits of objects, the freedom of gesture remains subordinated to a mimetic conception—even when what it imitates, in its effusive fluidity, is the bursting of light, whose flow it espouses. By radicalizing the procedure, Manet changes its nature. *The Balloon*, contemporaneous with Fantin's *Embroiderers* (1862), is a texture of hatchings, of highly varied grays, obtained by going over the same lines, effacing them, repeating them, a harassment of the surface that muddles the indications of the figures. In the middle distance, the strollers are obliterated by the scraping tool and turned into lint, or straw. Delineations are effaced, and interest rests on that tension in which Manet holds us between the scene and its erasure, between the illusion of depth and the creation of a surface by the autonomous motion of the artist's hand.

In *The Execution of Maximilian* (1868), two kinds of white clash by being juxtaposed: the untouched white of the blank spaces (the gaiters and sword belts), and the white of the scraped areas, which range from the simple scratch (necks, bottoms of jackets, ground, walls) to the confusion of the crowd (a mishmash of human figures at the top of the picture, the extension of something that looks like a European cemetery in the distance). These whites,



Edouard Manet. *The Balloon*. 1862.

*Edouard Manet. The Execution of Maximilian. 1868.*



*Edouard Manet. Civil War. 1871-73.*



so close in value, so different in texture, combine: they come together in one area (body and smoke) to create an interstice, a fold, a throbbing of space, an infinitesimal density wherein the unusually spiritless death of the condemned men is glossed over.

The indifference to the execution with which one taxes the artist is perhaps especially a matter of whites. As in the painting that is its source, there is in the lithograph a disjunction between the economy of the drama and that of the light. The dispersion of light areas (as in the horizontal line of the belts) contradicts the emotional concentration (Goya encloses the victims in a dazzling triangle). In *The Barricade*, the whites, more diffuse, this time invade the

whole space. In front of the same firing squad, a communard dies in a corner, pathetically brandishing his cap, his arm already corroded, buried, and pushed back into the neutrality of the sheet by the relentless scurrying of the engraving tool.

In his lithographs, Manet severs with particular boldness the contour and substance of the object. The third-floor windows in *The Barricade* are merely a flourish inscribed *alongside* the gray surface of the openings. In *Civil War*, the paving stones decompose in the same way.<sup>30</sup> This displaced condition, or position *alongside*, goes back to the mechanism of *willful discrepancy* that I mentioned before. If we join Alain de Leiris in examining Manet's drawings,<sup>31</sup> we find, amid the diversity of styles, a few works of a sovereign mastery, with an assured and continuous line, and even without second thoughts (portrait of the artist's parents, studies for *Olympia*, etc.). There are also, at the other end of the scale, some "little figures [*bonshommes*]," childish-looking scrawls, to which we will come back. Between the two: an early group of youthful drawings executed in Italy, after the masters, in the 1850s—fairly free copies of frescoes (Fra Angelico, Ghirlandajo, Andrea del Sarto) and reliefs (Luca della Robbia). Many of these drawings are characterized by a double outline (what Leiris calls "a two-step method"). A first line, light and flowing, faithfully follows the subject. The second, on the other hand, far from simply reinforcing the first, openly distinguishes itself from it. Thick, arbitrary, often reduced to a few straight segments, this second drawing crushes outlines, hardens curves, and sometimes runs across the image (incisions, streaks), contradicting its mimetic purpose.

For the most active draftsmen of the past, the Guercinos, Rembrandts, and Rosas, overflow has to do with approximation, excess presupposes the norm, and the line, even if "impulsive" and disordered, relates to the figure and the scene.<sup>32</sup> With Manet, we are no longer dealing with *pentimenti*, correction, and approximation. Between the first and second network of lines, the mimetic wish seems to give way, supplanted by something like a critical repetition, a *dysgraphie* (to adopt a term used by Barthes in connection with Twombly). These drawings give a taste of the *unfolding* operation that will be at the core of the artist's work. What he will later execute, under the sign of the series, through a whole apparatus of tracings, photos, engravings, and so forth, can already be found *condensed* on the same page in the "Florentine copies," but with

30. The procedure anticipates one of the most notorious features of cubism.

31. Their number has been estimated between 600 and 700. Alain de Leiris, *The Drawings of Edouard Manet*, Los Angeles, 1969.

32. In the late eighteenth century, one finds in the paintings of Hubert Robert and in his counterproofs a deliberate use of *divergence*. The artist plays around with the regular lines of perspective that he has previously drawn on his canvas or sheet of paper. He distorts them, displaces them. But it is still only a question of insidiously introducing, for a surplus of fantasy, a governing apparatus that is the basis of his *Views* and the instrument necessary for our vertigo.



*Edouard Manet. Drawings. Louvre, Cabinet des Dessins.*



its development—from the flat sheet of the layered work (*de la feuille au feuilleté*)—foreshadowed.

These outlines represent neither the truth of the subject nor the energy of the draftsman. Poverty of execution. No manual gift. No “knack.” Some heavily slanted “circumflex accents”—small gougings visible when held up to the light; sometimes an interlacing of little loops, a whole stenography: like a search for clumsiness. A hardness of the pencil that restores the feeling of the surface and moves the drawing in the direction of calligraphy.

Examining another group of youthful drawings, mainly pencil studies of drapery, Leiris notes that depth and tactile values are not rendered in them by



*Edouard Manet. The Races. 1865-72.*



*Edouard Manet. The Queue at the Butcher Shop. 1870-71.*


variations in density, but by a suspension: there is an absence of line whenever it is a question of indicating a change of plane.<sup>33</sup> This way of enlisting the blank spaces, of putting them to use in the *creation of mass*, prefigures the "geological" white spaces of Cézanne's watercolors (of which we are reminded by Manet's draperies, seen from the side, with their flat, broad, firm lines, without gradation). This same wish to create mass — but "in reverse" — can also be seen in the later drawings, devoted especially to contemporary life. Manet uses hatching extensively. This invests the whole with form: a frontal and synthetic image, often partitioned by a single black line. The artist favors compact volumes: silhouettes from behind, in great number; sailboats; a cat licking its fur, flat as a pancake. In his frontal attack, Manet operates as though he had cut through the object with a cleaver; we see its section: the distorted arms and legs take on the appearance of peninsulas.

Above all, the unity of the form no longer coincides with that of the object. Several objects show a tendency to merge in the same form, giving rise to unexpected configurations: puddles of people, couples combining to form a single spot or area. These composites, these new signifying units, are also produced by the surface: the hatchings espouse its flatness, which secretly influences the drawing. The most striking example of this tendency — but I will come back to it in examining the sequence in which this work has its place — is the lithograph *The Races*. In order to "render" the horses galloping toward the finish line (and toward the onlooker), Manet intrepidly draws his customary network of black lines. He treats speed — the essence of modernity glorified by Baudelaire — the way he treats the sagging silhouette of an absinthe drinker.

Needless to say, Manet constantly takes into consideration the empirical reality of the support — its two-dimensional nature. As all histories of art remind us, it is with him that the "definitive flattening" of painting takes place. We have seen some of his procedures: spaces left blank, equal thickness of line, hatchings, rubbing (*frottage*). His etchings offer others: the granular mat quality of the aquatint (learned from Goya); the weaving of a regular network of large stitches that blocks the opening of the gaze (*The Tragic Actor*); the identity of value and texture between objects and "background" (in *The Queue at the Butcher Shop*, the dazzling white of the umbrellas connects with the same white denoting distance).

In some of Manet's paintings, the (two-dimensional) support is replaced, represented by a screen that confines the scene to the foreground. The quite correct perspective rendering of Olympia's body ends by stumbling against the verticality of a curtain placed "too close." The wall in *Maximilian* cuts the spatial continuity like a cleaver. It closes off the scene and reduces the great event to this cramped space. I see the proof that the wall is the representation of the support in its proportions: exactly half of the total height of the painting, as though

33. Leiris, *Drawings*, p. 45.



Edouard Manet. *The Dead Christ with Angels*.  
Left: oil, 1864. Center: water color, 1865-67.  
Right: etching, 1866-67.

the artist, without realizing it, had felt the need to connect structurally the material *background* of the work and the *background* of the historical drama. And the *veduta* that opens in the upper part only makes this closing off more obvious. The neoclassicists of the eighteenth century were well aware of the effectiveness of the contrast between open and closed. Hence David in his *Count Potocki*.

There is flatness in Manet, but perhaps still more a *movement* toward the flat. To express this movement, let us posit for a moment, at the expense of etymology, the illusion of a double front in painting: *surface* and *superficies*. There would be (at least) two kinds of frontality: first, the one that is organized in accordance with the support, leaning on it and clinging to it—Gauguin in general, Vuillard until 1905, the Nabis, or again Juan Gris, and even analytical cubism before stenciling and pasted paper are used for the specific purpose of adding play and ambiguity, and opening up the space-plane. Matisse (prior to 1918) would belong to this category, which strives to equate the support and the painting. The omnipresence of blank space in many of his paintings constantly reminds us of the material foundation of the work. But even in his most frontal compositions, the creator of *The Red Studio* likewise allows allusion to three dimensions to remain (modeling of a body, perspective view of a bit of architecture, etc.). With him the image is never flat: it *tends toward* flatness. It is *in motion* toward the surface. The painting is the suspended expression of a process that does not come completely to a head.

It has been said that Manet suggests this tension—but in the other direc-



tion. Like an expanding mass that collides with the obstacle of a windowpane, his figures end up crushed against the *superficies* of the painting, against the film separating us from them.<sup>34</sup> The petals of the white peonies (Louvre) adhere to this invisible glass, just as the horses at Longchamp, interrupted in full gallop, hurl themselves at it (Washington version). Hence likewise the cuts with the cleaver, and the distortions in the outlines of bodies, of which I have already spoken. This effect of presence brought nearer quite obviously owes much to the painter's flat and heavy touch, to his rejection of halftones, as well as to his cramped settings. But there are some works in which this kind of touch is not used, and which still give us a feeling of inaccessible proximity. On comparing the versions of *The Dead Christ with Angels*, one sees how, by different procedures, Manet keeps accentuating his push toward the *superficies*. Thanks to the lighting, to the viewing angle, to the daring frontal pose, and to the closing off of the represented space, the dead Christ, in the version on canvas, seems on the point of sliding toward us. His archaicizing monumentality, however, holds him back. In any case, it is the "staging" that arouses our conflicting feelings. But in the Louvre watercolor, which repeats the same subject in reverse, the lighter parts of the body are now set off by gouache highlights, all equal in

34. Françoise Cachin, in the recent Metropolitan Museum catalogue, also perceives a glass pane in Manet's painting. She locates it between the foreground of *Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe* and the figures: "Only the dour gaze of Victorine seems to pass through a glass separating the foursome from us the spectators and from the still life" (*Manet*, exhibition catalogue, Paris and New York, 1983, p. 169).

value, thus flattening the figure *on a single vertical section*. Finally, in the etchings, it is the blank spaces that replace the parts highlighted by gouache. A papercutter seems to have descended on the figure of Christ and his shroud. From the first state to the third, the artist hardens the contrast between the dark stretches and the shining whiteness of the paper. In the final version, a cluster of luminous spots occupies the whole center of the image, which here too one might think to be pressed against an invisible glass. A double game of summons and aloofness that some (Florissoone, Bataille) have called Manet's "supreme indifference."

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I have suggested above that Manet may have been the first artist to feel the constituent elements of the painting (of his time)—surface, border, color, texture, gesture—to be dissociable. And that where painting had hitherto tended from the outset toward unity (supported as it was as much by a strictly mimetic aim reactivated by a realism of Courbet, as by an age-old conception of harmony, of *concinnitas*),<sup>35</sup> Manet, for his part, made use of these constituents as in a play of variables that one might test, "try out" one by one, favoring this or that element in such a way that the work was not the governed resolution of tensions, but just the opposite: the coalescence of conflicting elements *at work*. And if the picture is indeed, in this context, a "weak unity," in which forces intersect and struggle, these forces themselves participate in *series* that go beyond the conclusion of the painting. Manet illustrates by anticipation Foucault's observation: "To the last dreamers, one should point out that a painting (and probably in every sense of the word) is formally a 'series of series.'"<sup>36</sup>

"Synthetic and an abridger"—such was Baudelaire's expression to characterize Guys or Corot. Applied to Manet, it is false. When Huysmans writes: "M. Manet paints by abridging nature as it is and as he sees it," he thinks he is making the artist a champion of *fa presto*, whose activity would belong exclusively to the *iconic*, and who would try to seize "from life," by way of notation, of the sketch, the essential structure of the object—just as a Carpeaux deploys all his *prestezza* to set down in a few touches thrown on the canvas the *Bal aux Tuileries* or the *Attentat de Bérézowski* (Louvre, both from 1867). This observation neglects what, in Manet, pertains not to abridgement but to

35. "[Alberti] introduced—or rather reintroduced—into the theory of the representational arts what was to become the central concept of Renaissance aesthetics, the hoary principle of *convenienza* or *concinnitas*, perhaps best rendered by the word 'harmony': '[The painter] must take pains, above all, that all the parts agree with each other; and they will do so if in quantity, in function, in kind, in color, and in all other respects, they harmonize (*corresponderanno*) into one beauty'" Erwin Panofsky, *Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art*, New York, 1969, p. 26.

36. Michel Foucault, *L'Archéologie du savoir*, Paris, 1969, p. 19.

*equivalence*: the contraction and displacement of mimetic indications, which are arranged arbitrarily here and there without taking any further account of the structural identity of the object, in accordance with an economy that could be called *quantitative*, the artist being content to show the substance or color of the object, detached from its representational coherence. In *View of the Exposition Universelle* (1867), a string of cruciform or shapeless red spots, distributed in disorder against the green of the plants, has the function of furnishing the *equivalent* of a flowerbed without ever trying to resemble it. In the foreground of *Races at Longchamp* (Washington), an even scattering of tiny black and yellow spots enlivens the turf. In the creamy brightness of a pastel face (*Méry Laurent*, Dijon)—the paradoxical anticipation of Fautrier's *Hostages*—Manet “plants” other small bursts: red blur of the lips, starry blue translucence of the eye, mingled with fragments of bare canvas, a miraculous look of exquisite water. Certain portraits (*Cabaner*, *Moore*) are constituted by a scaffolding of linear or curved spots—pinks, yellows, blues—that are unrelated to any anatomical facts. Streaks whose overlapping forms an eyesocket, and their transverse latticework, a cheek. Did anyone, before Manet, push so far the separation between painting and bone structure, accentuating the gestural deconstruction of the human figure to the point of treating head, clothing, and setting in the same way?<sup>37</sup> The difference in treatment, if there is one, between the head and the rest is no longer a matter of touch but of layer: it resides in the sometimes increased thickness of the faces. Now the artist paints, not unknown persons or types (as Daumier did), but identifiable individuals, friends. This is the elating function of the model for Manet. Before anything else, he sees there a means of exhilaration. Cheerful consumption—and restitution *alongside*.<sup>38</sup> The artist looks at his “subject” the way Laforgue, almost in the same period, looks at a paint-

37. Perhaps one should mention Frans Hals, for a few extreme paintings (the middle ground of *The Regents*). But Péladan observes: “When one paints in grainy *pastosità* and without glaze, there is a logical behavior of the brush, one that must espouse not only the modeling but the very line of the forms. One can study this question of the sense of touch in Frans Hals and Rembrandt. Let us take, for example, *The Man in the Fur Cap*: there we see the impasto conducted according to the drawing with an infallibility and rectitude that take nothing away from the contingency of value; in the paintings of Hals, one can inspect even the traces of the hairs of the brush, and one does not perceive that perpetual randomness of the brush that, in Manet, causes the color to overflow beyond the line, as in those vulgar, hastily printed chromolithographs” (Péladan, p. 172).

For his part, Thoré-Burger, as early as 1863, regretted that “under these brilliant costumes, the person himself is somewhat lacking. The heads ought to have been painted differently from the draperies, with more accents and depth” (Théophile Thoré-Burger, *Salon de 1863*, quoted in Michel Florisoone, ed., *Manet*, Monaco, 1947, p. 117).

38. “I took a chair behind him and watched him work. Manet, although painting pictures from the model, was not copying nature at all; I took note of his masterful simplifications. The head of his wife was being modeled; but his modeling was not obtained with the means that nature indicated. Everything was curtailed: the tones were clearer, the colors brighter, the values closer . . .” (Georges Bonniot, *La Grande revue*, 10 August 1907).

ing: he needs a "spasm of the eye,"<sup>39</sup> and the clothing in the studio is switched around and divided up until the brush begins to flow. There is his fascination with veils, hats, ostrich feathers, boas, fox stoles — Méry's fur coat, Nina's bolero with yellow embroidery — themes more adjectival than substantive.

And then, as though inadvertently, along comes an incongruous, violent, fierce image (awakened perhaps by the obscuring irruption of black veils) — almost a blunder: Morisot as gorgon, chthonian specter,<sup>40</sup> a painting that falls apart in an agglomeration of thick impasto like pellets of clay, forcing us to accept not only the rigidity of the *pose*,<sup>41</sup> but something like a portrait *from* death — already substituted for the death it foreshadows. An image in the future

39. "For me, painting without the spasm of the eye is platonic, courtly, castrated love — an unlocalized love" (Jules Laforgue, *Mélanges posthumes*, 1903 [reprinted Geneva, 1979]).

40. "Friendly Medusa," Mallarmé called her; "easily, dangerously silent," Valéry; "Goyaesque character," Jacques-Émile Blanche.

41. *Poser* (to pose). Popular Latin *pausare*, "to cease, to stop" (in this sense already in Plautus), hence, in the Latin of Christian inscriptions, "to repose (in speaking of a dead person)." Bloch and Wartburg, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*.



Edouard Manet. Portrait of Berthe Morisot with Hat, in Mourning. 1874.



Edouard Manet. Young Girl with a Veil. 1873.

perfect tense, where mourning begins: I paint while knowing that this portrait will survive you; I paint what you will have been. I cannot paint you otherwise than in this cruel way, for this idea is already gnawing at my canvas.

To what extent is Manet able to increase the separation between the figural facts and the autonomy of the pictorial substance? His strategy is often to choose "subjects" where the separation is in some way presupposed by the nature of the referent. A shimmer of fabrics, satin, taffeta, crêpe, which the artist, taking his cue from Velázquez, depicts by dissociating the "shine" (*les luisants*)—a term liked by Delacroix) and the folds of the garment.<sup>42</sup> Manet plays like a virtuoso on all the indications of light—from the meticulous touch (the oranges in the *Folies-Bergère*) to the broad and extended frontal touch the size of a hand (*Mallarmé*) or of a back (*The Pavers*). Other expedients: objects distorted, veiled, or filtered through a screen: the magnifying effect produced by a vase filled with water, mottled mirrors, the billowing sea. Or again: screens and tapestries offering only an erratic distribution of colors. And even portraits of dogs, shaggy balls of fur. Not that the "subject" here dictates the style: in the Renaissance (and even as late as Ingres) these themes were painted with the extreme care of the miniaturist. It is the style that dictates the "subject," allowing the painter to feign, with impunity, separation within separation.

But to what extent? Every touch in Manet's more advanced canvases raises the same question. How far can the procedure of equivalence, of the quantitative, be pushed? Everything happens, as I said at the beginning, as though the painter were constantly belaboring the breaking point, and at each application taking the risk of formlessness. A "perverse mirror" (*Mallarmé*), the painting is henceforth the place where the old solidarity of sign and gesture, figure and substance, the readable and the visible, threatens to come undone. Is the muddle of speckles denoting the crowd in the background of the *Bullfight* (1866), or behind the barriers of *Races at Longchamp*, acceptable (readable)—even though Goya has prepared us for such excesses in his treatment of *masses*? Are those "displaced" hands acceptable, those stumps of yellow matter (or colored peonies)—and of which the artist sometimes gives us an old-fashioned modeled version as a counterpart in the same painting? Is the gross rhomboidal touch under the eye of the drinker in *Café-Concert* acceptable? And Nina's right sleeve, a telluric chaos? And the white commas with which *The Pavers* are striped? And the pigment spread like butter on Monet's face?

Note also, in several works, the doubling of the contour, which has been attributed to their unfinished state (*Clemenceau*, etc.). But the *Nu de dos* (Zurich,

42. By his random distribution of highlights all over the fabric he paints, Velázquez deconstructs the expressive and structuring effect of folds in Veronese or Tintoretto (and especially in El Greco). We already find occasionally this chance application of light spots in a few of Titian's paintings (*Portrait of Aretino*, Florence).

Manet also turns to advantage the display of light as surface and the lessening of contrasts in Chardin, whose works he studied closely.

1878), which is signed and shows continuous and displaced lines around the silhouette of a woman (as though preparing a cutout), is sufficient proof that for Manet (as soon for Cézanne) the completion of the form should not be taken for granted—and that the line can also be interpreted, beyond illusionism, as variation, counterpoint, exposure (and therefore aesthetic appropriation) of an incertitude.

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Color is, par excellence, the instance in which the process of contraction and isolation that characterizes the work of the artist operates. It has often been pointed out that while impressionism organizes the interaction of colors, all of them solid, Manet abruptly juxtaposes them, and when necessary encloses them by a net. Sometimes it is to the wallpaper or tapestry that he delegates the function of chromatic stimulation (*Nana*, *Autumn*). Or again: just as we have seen color dispersed in small bursts within a face, so it is distributed in independent spots over the whole painting. The energy of the light tones, concentrated in a few strong points, suffices—in accordance with a procedure that will recur in modern cinema with Godard—to enliven the whole (*Zola*, *Duret*, *In the Conservatory*, *The Bar at the Folies-Bergère*). Mallarmé discovers this periodic nature of the color in *Masked Ball at the Opera*: “The maskers thus do nothing in the painting but break, by the tones of a few fresh bouquets, the potential monotony of the background of black suits . . . a modern crowd . . . could not have been painted without a few bright notes to assist in enlivening it.”<sup>43</sup> The procedure applies, moreover, to the blacks: many of Manet’s paintings are strewn with broad dark gashes—veins in the folds of fabrics, shreds of dangling contours, a hodgepodge of disordered black touches on a light background (*Berthe Morisot with Muff*, 1869).

Conversely, the artist sometimes tends, not to scatter a few lively tones, but to subject a single tone to gradations in value. In *The Escape of Rochefort*, the same blue-green, highlighted by black or white accents and with the gray undercoat occasionally showing through, governs the surface, to the virtual exclusion of any warm color. In the small landscapes at the end of the artist’s life, the separate touches, from black to green and from green to yellow, are juxtaposed in accordance with a declination that suggests the modulations of Cézanne.

Recent studies have sought to attribute some of Manet’s innovations to

43. Stéphane Mallarmé, “Le jury de peinture pour 1874 et M. Manet,” *Oeuvres complètes*, Paris, 1945, p. 697. See also Duret: “Others attenuated the brightness of the colors, merged the tones, enveloped the contours in shadow. He suppressed the shadows, brought everything into the light, juxtaposed distinct tones, and placed a few accentuated notes of color throughout” (Duret, p. 118).

Couture, his teacher in the 1850s. His sketches, with their broad chalky flat areas, would account for the flat touch of the younger artist. But the lights in Couture, those formidable frontal constructions so striking in their materiality, which dramatize the chiaroscuro, are reabsorbed each time into the logic of illusionism: they are consistent with the areas of shadow, which are subject to gradation.<sup>44</sup> We are in the presence of a neo-Caravaggism that, even when it pushes the contrast of light and dark to the extreme, has no other purpose than to produce coherent and compact representation of the subject. The plastic constituents coalesce for a single end — which absorbs them. Manet's flat touch, the frequent elimination of shadows or their frontalization as a surface effect — these are so many procedures obeying another logic. And still more his general conception, which belongs, as we have seen, less to conciseness and the sketch than to quantitative equivalence. It is a question of bringing the mechanisms of representation to light, and showing representation itself as a process.

Beyond the imitation of his teacher (Diderot spoke of "a little easy and limited technique, what we call among ourselves a protocol"), the affinities are rather to be sought in Guys (of whom Manet owned sixty works and whose portrait he painted). His transparent pools of watercolor overlap as if by chance, and the kind of independence that presides over the relation between line and color spot (a relation in which they do not converge but try to outdo each other) finds its response in the studies for *Jeanne Duval* and for *Music in the Tuileries* (1862), in *Odalisque* (1862-68?), and *Study of Legs* (1876-78). The "painter of modern life" probably helped to release early in Manet this freedom that led him to allow formless areas and nuclei of confusion to proliferate by metastasis. Their initial effect — as in *Tuileries* and *Exposition Universelle* — is to make the spectator lose his bearings, causing a crisis that we will have to scrutinize.

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At this point in our inquiry, it is the word *procedure* that will give us a better grasp of Manet's contribution (in the categories of representation and the series). Procedure does not mean *technique*. It is, from our point of view, its opposite. The word *technique*, as used, for example, by Zola, relates to the idea of control, of mastery. In 1879, he points out "the difficulty that [Manet] encounters in execution. . . . I mean that his hand is not equal to his eye. He has not been able to establish a technique for himself . . . when he starts out, one

44. The distinctive look of the sketches is moreover very attenuated in the finished painting, which remains the goal: "A fine sketch can attract people around you, friends and colleagues may sincerely admire what you have begun, but you must finish, you must express more" (Thomas Couture, *Méthodes et entretiens d'atelier*, Paris, 1867, p. 235).


never knows how he will reach the end, or even if he will reach it at all. He acts by guesswork."<sup>45</sup> For Zola, writes Gaëton Picon, "between the conception and the work, there is and can only be the mediation of technical execution; the positive aspect of this void, this initial incertitude, does not cross his mind."<sup>46</sup> For the artist to expose himself to the void of which Picon speaks means to put himself in a position of instability, of *proclivity*: not a fall into the ungovernable (which would amount to *astasia*) but a negotiation by the artist coming to grips with the material he has chosen to invest, in a ceaseless oscillation between the plan and the process of carrying it out. The work is not thought out in advance and then *executed*: it formulates *itself*, it conducts *itself*, it verifies *itself* through the successive clarifications by which it is established. It emerges, beyond the shock that launches it, from the painter's acceptance of the coincidences and discrepancies contained in his material. An unprogrammed succession of pictorial effects that suggest to him, by their effect on each other, the invention of his own gestures. Just as the poet "yields the initiative to words" (Mallarmé), assured that they will organize themselves according to the unconscious of language, so the painter means to open and offer himself to the simultaneously logical and unforeseeable arrangements of formative pictorial elements.<sup>47</sup>

The procedure merges with the work: it must be foreseen — as the way of beginning — for the work to be unforeseeable. This modern certitude is already expressed in Manet. In order to *bring forth* the painting, we see him accepting — better still, arousing — the risks of the pictorial process. The procedures he sets in position give him the means to ensure the production of images while avoiding any stylistic prescription. These procedures are: *the series* and *speed*. They are defective, flawed: they incorporate loss as a condition and means of production. Thus, as we will see, the tracing does not have for Manet the mission of reproducing, but of filtering and interpreting. It is an aesthetic operator. It safeguards the general design, the structure of the whole — but it selects: through the translucent veil of the paper, the artist sees certain parts stand out which he isolates and transfers to the new work. It all takes place as though Manet were multiplying the repetitions and filterings in order to increase the possibilities for beginning and displacing the autonomous chain of the pictorial signifier. The work is spread out in time, *deferred*, as though to encourage productive discrepancies. It relates to the sequence and the layered (anticipated, as we have seen, in the superimposed drawings of the Florentine period). Each stage — painting, drawing, engraving — is a pause, a *station* in a general process. The *Races at Longchamp* series includes, in addition to various

45. I refer to Jean-Paul Bouillon's critical edition, published under the title: Émile Zola, *Le Bon combat*, Paris, 1974, p. 205.

46. Gaëton Picon, preface to Zola, *Le Bon combat*, pp. 19-20.

47. Which anyway belong not to some "essence" of painting, but at best to long historical duration. The "essence" of painting shifts with the vicissitudes of the latter.



Edouard Manet. Races at Longchamp. 1867-71.

sketches done on the spot, at least nine states:<sup>48</sup> (1) *a horizontal watercolor* (1864; Fogg Art Museum), consisting of two joined sheets. It shows a group scene: the arrival of the horses on the right, and a fashionable public, carriages, and so on; (2) *a very large canvas* (approx. 80 x 200 cm) that repeats the same arrangement. Exhibited in 1865, it was later destroyed by the artist (two fragments survive); (3) *an oil sketch* (Chicago, c. 1867), which shows only the right-hand portion of the first composition (as though Manet had separated the two sheets he had joined in 1864); (4) *a canvas*, exhibited in 1867, an enlarged repetition of the sketch (disappeared); (5) *a lithograph* (1865-69?); (6) *an oil sketch* in which the horses appear at the center (c. 1867); (7) *an oil on wood* (1872-75; Washington), where they occupy the foreground; (8) *an oil study* in which the horses go beyond the edge; (9) *a drawing*, pencil and watercolor (Cabinet des Dessins, Louvre).

If one rapidly examines this downward progress through the most diverse surface supports, one notes that the artist in the beginning adopts a broad vision, with panoramic and picturesque ambitions. But he soon realizes that he is in the process of diluting the strong point of his undertaking: the powerful and paradoxical invention that as yet appears only as detail, namely, to treat the galloping of the horses by freezing them, not in profile, in accordance with the tradition of Stubbs, Ward, or Géricault, but from the front, at the price of a

48. Theodore Reff has counted them in *Manet and Modern Paris*, pp. 132 ff.

rotation of forty-five degrees. He decides therefore to sacrifice the panoramic point of view and to extract the portion in which his painting operates at the maximum of tension. From work to work, we see the horses take on importance, coming to occupy at the end the whole field of the image. The graphic paradox (speed seen from the front) will find its resolution in the morphological mutation of the object represented. The enlargement of the horses is the price paid for expressing what the profile would have indicated directly by the representation of the gallop: the horses, dark, swerving, and twisted blots, express speed by the anatomical discrepancies they manifest. Paradox within paradox: Manet is careful to treat the race with the airy, fluid means suggested by its fugacity. He copiously accentuates the rough mat quality, the static opacity of the oil; in the lithograph, he restores the irruption of the horses by frontal hatchings. He seems to bear down on one of the terms — weight — only so as better to convey the radical nature of his solution: expressive distortion.

The result is the drawing in the Louvre. It was obtained by tracing another, unknown drawing of one of the sketches (no. 6). The intervention of the tracing produces not only an image, but an unusual aesthetic object, inconceivable in its time however much one practiced current methods of drawing. By refinement and selection, Manet's outline, uniform in thickness, makes a new, composite, incomplete, open form emerge, a single spot (*tache*), a single organism in which several objects are condensed — and which still manages to cover, as though to ensure the windowpane effect of which I spoke, a broad series of hatchings that crosses the field.

There are other series that would repay an analysis. In reading Sandblad, one understands how the different versions of *Maximilian* are "superimposed": the work is the film of their transformations.<sup>49</sup> I have also mentioned the circulation, by tracing and photograph, of an iconographic pattern: the firing squad. There exist five versions of *Jeanne or Spring* (1881-82): painting, reversed photograph, drawing (on the back of the photo), three-color linecut reproduction (executed with the artist's endorsement by Charles Cros's process). In general, Manet uses the photograph as a means of transfer. It allows for a twofold reduction: the composition is produced in the desired size (that of the engraving being planned), and the colors are mechanically redistributed in black and white, transposed in terms of value. But, as Carl Chiarenza points out, in the case of *Jeanne*, the photograph has other effects: in the drawing that appears *directly on the back of the proof*, certain blurred or obscure parts are reinterpreted by transparency — calligraphic accents with the brush, blank space, scrawls, scribbles, and so on.<sup>50</sup> And the engraving, whether it borrows from the photograph (recto) or the drawing (verso), also undergoes transforma-

49. Sandblad, 3rd part.

50. Carl Chiarenza, "Manet's Use of Photography in the Creation of a Drawing," *Master Drawings*, vol. VII (Spring 1969), pp. 38-45.

tions. Manet, as a pragmatist, quickly understood the advantages to be derived from photography — not only for its fidelity, but for its betrayals.

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With the unfolding of the series, speed is one of the agents that allows Manet to wrench the painting from the conditionings of a *form* already there, and from the prescriptions of a style. It is not simply a question of going fast (like Horace Vernet), but of *breathing speed into the painting* in order to change the nature of the figurative inscription from top to bottom. This involves the establishment of a new unit of time: the sitting. Manet subordinates his work to this requirement; the picture must be painted in a day. This is a rule he sets for himself, an aesthetic modality imposed on the work in advance, and which determines its outcome. Of course, all of Manet's pictures — if only the large-sized ones — were not painted in this way (and X-rays reveal some occasional *pentimenti*). But the important thing is that he tends to it, that he sees it as a preliminary to the action, and says so: in 1879, writes Antonin Proust, one of his "idées fixes" was to "paint my portrait on an unprepared white canvas in a single sitting. . . . After having used seven or eight canvases, the portrait came all at once. Only the hands and some portions of the background were left."<sup>51</sup> And Manet himself explained to Proust: "I accomplish nothing all alone [without the model], all the more since I finish on the same day I begin, but I often have to start all over again and then it takes several days." For Manet did not stop working fast, and his contemporaries complain of the endless number of sittings that he imposes on them: "All the artist's intimates noted with astonishment, a respectful astonishment, the trials of endurance that his models had to undergo and on whom an unusual number of sittings were imposed."<sup>52</sup> He paints fast, but he rubs out. Rubbing out, repeating, rubbing out — it is this sequence that counts. One can, says Jamot, "correct by adding or correct by effacing": Manet prefers the second path.<sup>53</sup> It is a question of staking out the act of painting, shrinking it, thickening it, keeping it at the level of crisis, and avoiding as much as possible the softening practice of retouching. Mallarmé witnesses "the fury that hurled him on the empty canvas, confusedly, as though he had never painted before." From Manet, he understands that "you throw yourself into it completely, all over again each time."<sup>54</sup>

51. Antonin Proust, *Edouard Manet, Souvenirs*, quoted in Courthion, I, p. 192.

52. Courthion, I, p. 34.

53. Paul Jamot, *L'Amour de l'art*, May 1932, p. 149. Berthe Morisot wrote to her sister in 1870: "Meanwhile he is starting his portrait [of Eva Gonzalès] over again for the twenty-fifth time. She poses every day, and in the evening her head is washed out with black soap. You see how encouraging it is to ask people to pose! . . . For the moment, all his enthusiasms are concentrated on Mlle Gonzalès, but her portrait is still making no progress. He tells me that he is at the fortieth sitting and the head has been wiped out once again. He is the first to laugh about it" (quoted in Étienne Moreau-Nélaton, *Manet raconté par lui-même*, Paris, 1926, vol. I, p. 113).

54. Stéphane Mallarmé, "Quelques Médaillons et portraits en pied," *Oeuvres complètes*, p. 532.

The artist prefers those techniques that allow for speed: etching or lithography. He becomes interested in a process of Bracquemond's that makes it possible to draw directly on the copper plate.<sup>55</sup> He invents a different way of using pastel: "In a sense, however, they are paintings, since the color has been applied with a brush, the lively strokes of which are clearly visible and like those of his oils."<sup>56</sup> And as for the canvas, it ought to glide: "A white canvas, very fine, with no grain. Manet seems to have coated it with a thin layer of oil, which he wipes before attacking that part; oil spread in such a way that each application of the sable brush glides like a watercolor brush."<sup>57</sup>

Why this rapidity? And what is the meaning of the spots it produces? We know Zola's physiological explanation: the artist "sees in color spots"; his "personality . . . consists in the manner in which his eye is organized."<sup>58</sup> A variation on the theme "only an eye, but what an eye," applied in turn to Courbet, Monet, and so on, along with its negative version: "the artist with sick retinas" (Huysmans on Cézanne). But if the cause is not in the subject, it may be in the object. Manet is often said to have set down the hurly-burly of the modern city, the restlessness of the boulevards, the technical and industrial acceleration of the Second Empire. But Balzac in 1830 had also described urban life, in many passages, as a seething mass of fleeting spots. Furthermore, Manet, unlike Daumier or Degas, is interested almost exclusively in a motionless world: still lifes, people posing, seated or standing — no less static than the figures of Corot. And when he paints the *Dead Christ*, the hand is "displaced." One would probably have to go back to the creation of the painting, and seek the *raison d'être* for his touch in the conflict between the gesture and the sign.

55. Jean-Paul Bouillon, "Bracquemond, Rops, Manet et le procédé à la plume," *Nouvelles de l'estampe*, March-April 1974, pp. 3-11.

56. Charles Sterling and Margaretta Salinger, p. 51 (about the portrait of Louise de la Vigne). The authors add: "This unusual technique accounts for the great freshness of effect and also for the surface, which is richer and smoother than that of the conventional pastels. The use of primed canvases instead of paper also contributes to the difference in appearance. Some of the color is applied in the conventional manner with chalk sticks, but for the more important and expressive passages Manet used a technique that consisted of dipping his brush in a mixture of color, possibly ground pastel chalks, and water."

57. Jacques-Émile Blanche, *Les Arts plastiques*, Paris, 1931, pp. 53-54. We point out that Blanche, a little earlier in the same text, speaks not of *effacing* but of *covering* the work already done: "There is a second, a third . . . a twentieth state to which no one since Manet has carried his work, and in which Manet keeps the same freshness, the same fluidity above multiple layers of semi-blots in which he has preserved the pleasurable texture of flesh." One may observe that such a number of layers is hardly compatible with the physical look of the paintings. In an earlier work, the same author, who in his youth had watched Manet paint, writes about *Jeanne or Spring*: "The rhododendrons, the cobalt blue sky, against which the silhouette stands out, 'come' always 'in front of' the figure. He scratched out and began all over again ceaselessly." Likewise for *The Equestrienne*: "I have seen Manet efface it, scratch out the top hat, and redraw it in line to make it 'hold' over the chignon" (Jacques-Émile Blanche, *Manet*, Paris, 1924, pp. 51-52).

Partial or total scratching out and covering over? Rather it would be a question of a *new start* that Manet wished to make coincide, as much as possible, with each sitting.

58. Zola, p. 81.

Impressionism, to be sure, tends during the artist's lifetime to a uniform reduction of the various time intervals of painting. It is a matter of seeing more quickly, of painting with the most expeditious means, of paintings that ascribe less to meditation than to *effect* (in Monet's sense). Moment, spot, and spasm all go together. And this development is obviously nourished by the changes of tempo characteristic of life in a modern capital. Manet is part of this trend. In one of his letters, he mentions the "rapid and summary manner" in which he has treated a detail. He boasts of having executed the head of the *Spanish Singer* in two hours. And Matisse was to write: "He was the first to act by reflexes and thus to simplify the craft of painting. . . . Manet was as direct as it was possible to be."<sup>59</sup> But at the same time it would seem that we cannot, in the particular case of our painter, consider the question of speed without combining it with the notion of quantitative equivalence mentioned above. For him, speed is the means of scrambling the figures (their iconic structure), of seizing the before and after of the world in a precipitate of pigment (*Portrait of George Moore*, Mellon Collection)—and, as a corollary, of permitting a polysemy of the color spot. Double stasis: *speed* as an instrument of representational condensation—like a fan whose movement would blend the motifs; and the *spot* as the producer of things *outside the text*: unforeseen images, slips, "paragrams," whose presence in Manet's paintings makes the practice of examining details photographically so delightful and justifiable (the "pincers" in *Père Lathuille*); to which are added, more fluid still and beyond the uninvited images, the effects of meaning engendered by any material since the yoke of designation is loosened (Barthes on Réquichot: "The material is unfailingly symbolic: in perpetual displacement . . . the material is never in its place").<sup>60</sup>

Walter Benjamin, in connection with writing and against the thesis of the arbitrariness of signs, develops a theory, a theoretical fiction that may help us to understand what belongs, in Manet, to the proliferation of secondary effects. Reading (any deciphering of a text) might be said to have absorbed and still contain traces of the ancient divinatory practices (reading entrails, reading the stars) on which the cosmic mimesis of archaic periods was based (the identity of stellar configurations and the destiny of men). There would thus be, *stored* on the page we are reading and woven in with the instrumentality of signs, a second meaning, subliminal and mimetic in origin. And "the rapidity of writing and reading" would be, says Benjamin, the condition that permits the fleeting release of the buried elements.<sup>61</sup>

59. Henri Matisse, *L'Intransigeant*, 25 January 1932, quoted in Florisoone, p. 122.

60. Roland Barthes, "Réquichot et son corps," *L'Obvie et l'obtus*, Paris, 1982 (1973), p. 203. Example of metaphoric "flash": Bataille on the close-up portrait of George Moore: "Never perhaps has the human figure been closer to the innocence and elusive truth of the oyster" (Georges Bataille, *Manet*, Geneva, 1955, p. 120).

61. Walter Benjamin, "On the Mimetic Faculty," in *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, ed. Peter Demetz, New York, 1978, p. 335.

By painting the things/spots of the world quickly, Manet in his turn produces traces on the canvas, double meanings, condensations of meanings and effects, echoes — whose archaic connotations one would do well not to overlook. This is not to question the current conception of a modern and urban Manet. Rather, it means merging two complementary images, as indeed Benjamin does when he describes the Berlin of his childhood, the Berlin of the beginning of the century where he was preparing himself to understand the Paris of the Second Empire.<sup>62</sup> Through the darkness of a sewer opening or in the glitter of one of his mother's jewels, what crops forth, sustained by a flood of metaphors most of which borrow from the preindustrial world, is also, in the very heart of the booming city, something like a twofold prehistory: that of a place and that of a body.


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The establishment, prior to the work, of procedures (methods of production) that guarantee a formal development independent of any stylistic presuppositions is echoed and amplified in Baudelaire's conception of *modernity*. What Manet arranges on the scale of his painting, the poet means to apply to the whole culture of his period. We know that the friendship of the two men was close, that it very likely began during the winter of 1858-59, and that two future canonical works — *Music in the Tuileries* and *The Painter of Modern Life* — were created at the height of their relationship.<sup>63</sup> Baudelaire loathed "progress," industry, "Americanism" — and, in general, a society determined to confine the artist and the poet to the status of parasite or entertainer. "The world is going to end" (*Fusées*), and classical culture — with which the writer himself had been imbued since childhood — is manifestly unsuitable to fill the spiritual void that is being foretold. Baudelaire's plan aims at nothing less than the formation of a modern aesthetic: an art without recollections, nourished by the side issues, pulsations, and tensions of contemporary life. He wanted to reascend the stream of the classical heritage, on this side of ideal Beauty ("here we are not concerned with Winckelmann and Raphael"), very far from the "tall lanky freaks" of the school of David, who "conceal their modesty under antique

62. W. Benjamin, "Enfance berlinoise," in *Sens unique*, Paris, 1978. See also, by the same author, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn, London, New Left Books, 1973.

63. Baudelaire, according to contemporary sources, "did not forsake Manet" during the preparatory phase of *Music in the Tuileries* on the same location. For Jean Adhémar, who relies on Claude Pichois, the poet had for some time dreamed of making Manet the hero of his text. As for the famous sentence, "You are only the first in the decrepitude of your art" (*Correspondance*, 11 May 1865), it should be taken in the opposite sense: it is Manet's fluctuations, a certain return to the museum picture (*Olympia*, *The Dead Christ*) and the apparent abandonment of the path opened by *Music in the Tuileries* that is being denounced (Jean Adhémar, "L'Education de Baudelaire faite par son père," *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, March 1979).

*Edouard Manet. Portrait of George Moore. c. 1879.  
(Mr. and Mrs. Paul Mellon Collection, Upperville,  
Virginia.)*



swords" (1855). As Gautier later explained, what fascinated Baudelaire about Guys was "the complete absence of antiquity, that is to say the classical tradition" (1868). And Baudelaire himself: "It is probably a fine thing to study the old masters in order to learn how to paint, but it can only be superfluous exercise if your goal is to understand the nature of beauty in our day."<sup>64</sup>

The new references are to be barbarous, eccentric, and unsophisticated. Baudelaire is interested in "that singular statuary," the toy; he is captivated by fashion plates, magazine illustrations, makeup, Indian tattoos, strolling players, the English pantomime, "commonplaces," "vulgar locutions," the phenakistoscope (a variation of Faraday's disk), and so on. He calls for a history of caricature (which Champfleury will write, in five volumes, 1865-80, as well as an *Histoire de l'imagerie populaire*, 1869). It is a question of reversing the norms, of establishing a new tradition on the cultural margins of the period, of exploring the heterogeneous corpus of the "crude arts."<sup>65</sup>

This first objective — the turning around of culture — is based on a second: appropriating and turning against the adversary, in a manner of spiritual judo, the energy of the society and city ("the enormous whore"), in order to release its "epic aspect" and open "the chief and essential question, which is to know whether we possess a particular beauty inherent in new passions." Here a figure beckons, as Benjamin points out:<sup>66</sup> that of a ragpicker as permanent agent for "recycling" the rubbish of mercantile society. Born of industrial expansion, he attracted Manet's attention (painting and drawing of 1865) as well as Baudelaire's: "Here is a man charged to collect the debris of a day in the capital. Everything the big city has rejected, everything it has lost, everything it has scorned, everything it has broken, he classifies and collects. . . . He makes a selection, an intelligent choice; he amasses, like a miser a treasure, the garbage that, having been chewed up by the god of Industry, will become objects of utility and enjoyment."<sup>67</sup>

It is this enjoyment that engrosses Manet. And is not his industry, too, perhaps merely a recycling: the melting down and transmutation of a city's debris in the quantitative economy of the canvas by means of speed?

"Enjoyment (*jouissance*)" — the word recurs in Baudelaire to express immersion in the crowd: "enjoyment at taking up one's abode in numbers, in fluctuation and movement, in the fleeting and infinite." "He who easily espouses the crowd knows feverish enjoyments . . . an ineffable orgy." And

64. Baudelaire, "Le Peintre de la vie moderne," IV.

65. Whereby he brings together a whole current, already perceptible in romanticism during the years 1840-50 — Töpffer, Courbet, Duranty, Champfleury, Gautier, Flaubert, etc. — which sees resources in naive forms and extols popular imagery, marionettes, etc. See Meyer Schapiro, "Courbet and Popular Imagery," in *Modern Art, 19th and 20th Centuries: Selected Papers*, New York, 1978, pp. 47-85.

66. Benjamin, *Baudelaire*, pp. 35 ff.

67. Baudelaire, "Du Vin et du hachisch," quoted by Benjamin, *Baudelaire*, p. 117.

about Guys: "His passion and profession are to *espouse the crowd*." For Baudelaire, such empathy must produce a new language, "a poetic prose . . . supple and abrupt enough" to reflect "the habit of huge cities" (preface to *Le Spleen de Paris*). It ought to produce a painting, as he shows in connection with Guys. But this empathy is also marked in Manet, if one only compares *Music in the Tuileries* to the numerous engravings of the period on the same theme; close as it is to them sometimes in its general conception, the painting is quite different for the quantity of affect concentrated in each touch.

Idler (*flâneur*), artist, detective: all of them steal through the city, on the lookout for "the lived experience of shock" (Benjamin). And Paris, notes Antonin Proust, "has never known an idler who idled more profitably [than Manet]. . . . He would draw a trifle, a profile, a hat, in a word a fleeting impression."<sup>68</sup> For Baudelaire, "the lover of universal life enters into the crowd as into a huge reservoir of electricity. One can also compare him to a mirror as huge as that crowd, to a kaleidoscope endowed with consciousness, which, at each of its movements, reproduces the multiplicity of life and the animated grace of all its elements. He is an *I* insatiable for the *not-I*, rendering and expressing it at every moment in images more living than life itself, which is always unstable and fleeting."<sup>69</sup> And in *Fusées* this sentence, itself enigmatic: "The pleasure of being in crowds is a mysterious expression of enjoyment at the multiplication of numbers."

Dispersion, reduction — what is at stake is a kaleidoscopic bursting of the subject caught in the crackle of urban stimuli. The poet or painter becomes *unstable*, in accordance with a sequence described by Baudelaire: he is a "convalescent," and this convalescence "is like a return to childhood. The convalescent, like the child, enjoys to the highest degree the faculty of interesting himself keenly in things, even the seemingly most trivial ones. . . . The child sees everything as new; he is always drunk."<sup>70</sup> Drunk, childish, convalescent, the poet or artist is the one who takes advantage of his weakness — all the more receptive to the world the more vulnerable he is, all the more ready to perceive the cracks in it as they pass through him. Hence his productive capacities: ". . . genius is merely *childhood rediscovered* at will, childhood now endowed, for its own expression, with virile organs. . . ."

The spirit of childhood: charm, passions, mischievousness — all of them traits conceded to Manet by his contemporaries. The detour through naive drawing seems in him a means — a brutal means — of ensuring his own strengths and cutting short any academic conditioning. The Dijon watercolor,

68. Proust, *Edouard Manet, Souvenirs*, pp. 29–30.

69. Baudelaire, "Le Peintre de la vie moderne," III.

70. *Ibid.* In the same passage, the poet speaks of "the fixed and animal-like ecstatic gaze of children faced with something *new*, whatever it may be, face or landscape, light, gilding, colors, shimmering fabrics, the enchantment of beauty embellished by cosmetics. . . ."

from which the artist was to derive his *Kearsarge at Boulogne*, could appear in a school playground. See also (anticipation of Hartung) his scribbles that occupy the right part of *The Races*. (Loops and zigzags here cover not figures, as one often reads, but a few broad vertical lines drawn with the blunt end of the lithographic crayon.) Note again the figures in *The Rue Mosnier*, no less disconnected than in Dubuffet from any anatomical standards. Or even the rough sketches, boots, hats, bathers, and scribbled signatures to which the artist is addicted in his last suburban residences.

But for Baudelaire, poetic and artistic expression, even if nourished by childhood, remains a kind of sickness—a *transport*: “I declare that inspiration has some connection with *congestion*, and that every sublime thought is accompanied by a more or less violent nervous shock that resounds even in the cerebellum.”<sup>71</sup> Under the curtailing gaze, the city turns to stone, the work grows heavy with a sedimentation that thickens it, and it is struck by “that faculty of catalepsy” of which Benjamin speaks, and which “is manifested countless times in Baudelaire’s poetry like a sort of imitation of death. . . .”<sup>72</sup>

Captured in the brevity of a modern, undeceived gaze born in the flash of the guillotine, Paris becomes hollow and turns into necrotized tissue, with its tiered galleries of bones, its piles of skulls and femurs photographed by Nadar in 1861—and whose shadow seems to lie across Baudelaire’s footsteps, a huge death’s head, the brown and light spots of the pavements being laid down in stretches on Haussmann’s new boulevards, the same death’s head that chatters right in the middle of the painting from which Nina de Callias stares out at us—and this time without benefit of anamorphosis.

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I recognize Manet’s touch in what Benjamin writes about Baudelaire. He speaks of “an uninterrupted succession of tiny improvisations,” of “fencing” whose feints, dodges, and points reproduce the shocks and hazards of the poet’s life.<sup>73</sup> Manet’s touch: brief impulses, curtailed gesture, restrained breadth—something both admirably precise (he is, as they say, a masterful “*toucheur*”) and suspended. Focillon, in studying the etchings, mentions “light accentuation,” “abridged vivacity, as though contained,” and “sparing, largely discontinuous touches.”<sup>74</sup> And Mallarmé, quoting the artist’s words, speaks of them the way Fénéon, ten years later, will speak of Seurat’s pointillism: “The hand [according to Manet] must become an organ of impersonal abstraction, guided solely

71. *Ibid.*

72. Benjamin, *Baudelaire*, p. 124.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

74. Henri Focillon, “Manet en noir et blanc,” *Maîtres de l’estampe*, Paris, 1969 (1927), pp. 177 ff.

by the will, and forgetful of all previous dexterity."<sup>75</sup> Here there is nothing comparable to Ingres's arabesque, which administers the whole surface from the outset; nor with the corporeal investment of Matisse, for whom "to draw is to make an expressive gesture that has the advantage of permanence."<sup>76</sup> Line, in Manet, was sometimes able to acquire continuity, but it never stems from jubilation, from physical élan. The "fury that hurled him on the empty canvas" is by no means the energy of the romantics, the "impulsive optimism" that made Delacroix imagine that the truth and expressive power of the (figural) image would burst forth in an uncontrollable stream. A body pierced by the vital spirits of nature, which pass in transit over the canvas before going on to strike and transport the spectators—no one is further than Manet from this pathos, this connivance between the world and the body. He is as indifferent to organic composition, all élan and movement, as he is to classical structure.

At the start, then, nothing. No organic, biological origin, no reservoir of impulse, no bodily exuberance. Nothing between the body and the (syncopated, unprimed) touch, nothing between the gesture and the surface (no taking charge of the area of the painting).

A double game with the spot (*tache*), back and forth between two demands, two strata of the painting. Manet strives to violate the space between the image and the "background"—a "background" no longer topographical but textural, present in every square inch of the painting, a "background" pasted in front of the image, and stretched toward the *superficies*. The unity of the work, always hoped for, always comforting, decomposes into a multitude of small geological dramas, textural elevations, and accidents in which it is the onlooker, torn between the image and its defection, who chooses. The subversion of the image by its material, with a resulting amputation of the *istoria*, of the iconic pattern that had guaranteed its coherence.

Spots that cease to denote. Mortified surfaces. Here the succulent blue of that eye becomes matter, just enough matter to keep me from reappropriating the figure for myself in its first burst, and making my return to the sphere of pleasure. A fall outside of the image, disillusion. The painting would be this Eurydice, this experience of falling, this intimate spreading out of two intervals of the gaze—between which the cutting edge of something irreversible is inserted. Nothing would remain but a mineral desert, ruins, a structure of exclusion. The painting *turns*. The surface is galvanized, provoking a shock, a small but unfathomable upset, a dull stupor, a furtive commotion, an ankylosis. The painting is petrified (and so are we). What is at stake is the spell of which Valéry and Bataille spoke, but it is a spell thrown at the spectator. A twofold demand: this would have been the theme of Poe's story "The Oval Portrait" if

75. Mallarmé, "Les Impressionistes et Edouard Manet," p. 149.

76. Henri Matisse, *Écrits et propos sur l'art*, ed. D. Fourcade, Paris, 1972, p. 67.



*Edouard Manet. Portrait of Victorine Meurent. 1862.*

the advent of the image and the detachment and decay of the model had condensed on the surface of a painting.<sup>77</sup> Look at Hals for an example of verve, of very free, flaking, and jagged strokes. But not this wreckage, this collapse of matter, these deposits *in excess*—as on Victorine Meurent's chin (in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts portrait), where nothing but a lack of strength, an indifference to the mimetic, forces the artist to break the curve of the face with thick daubs of light ocher (as though the superfluous lines of his youthful drawings were coming back). Manet, writes Bataille, is "searching for a risk that goes beyond and upsets the expected arrangement of the image."<sup>78</sup> However far you stand from *Nina*, the arm remains a succession of yellow slabs, and the veiling over the shoulder a luscious flow of green and gray pigment. It was Zola's error to believe that with Manet, as with seventeenth-century painting, it was enough to stand "at a respectful distance" to bestow unity and placidity on the figure.

Connivance of the rapid (quickly seen, quickly painted) and the heavy (the image drawn toward the weight of its material); the overlapping of the quick and the dead. Mallarmé was aware of this fatal adherence of the material as background of the painting ("this art made of ointments and paints"). He was aware in Manet of the possible defection of the image, when he spoke of "a spell easily broken by an added touch."<sup>79</sup> His remedy is to pause briefly, "a minute," the time required "for a spectator to see and admire what is represented, with just enough readiness to allow the truth."<sup>80</sup> As though by lingering, loitering before the canvas, looking back like Lot's wife, one ran the risk of seeing the sort of riveting give way that holds the two states of the work, simultaneously superimposed and merged, together.

The swing from one state to the other, and the shock effect it involves, have nothing in common with the acceptance, through clarification, of an abstract canvas. It is by no means a question of ascertaining *under* the figure the advent of a certain *tachisme*. Nothing is established here of a new nonfigurative consistency. The work does not sink further into the amorphous flabbiness of inert and muddy paint. In the "gradation" between figure and texture, the first is endlessly reified and congealed *as surface*, and it is this hardening that is

77. Concerning *Madame Manet in the Conservatory* (1879), Jacques-Émile Blanche points out "that miraculous vein in which modern seriousness, the modern touch, and a sort of funereal solemnity are combined." And a little earlier: ". . . no one would risk entrusting his head to the portrait painter. The result was thought to be 'dead,' expressionless" (Blanche, *Manet*, pp. 38-39).

Paul Mantz, in 1884, in a retrospective article on Manet, mentions "his pastels in which *morbidezza* softens forms" (*Le Temps*, January 16, 1884). Antonin Artaud, in 1927, finds in his painting "something gamy, turning green" (*Oeuvres complètes*, vol. I, Paris, 1956 [1927], p. 179). And Bataille writes of *The Execution of Maximilian* (Mannheim version): "This painting strangely suggests the anaesthetizing of a tooth; it emits a feeling of encroaching numbness" (Georges Bataille, *Manet*, Geneva, 1955, p. 52).

78. Bataille, *Manet*, p. 102.

79. Mallarmé, "Le Jury de peinture," p. 698.

80. Mallarmé, "Les Impressionistes et Edouard Manet," p. 152.

shown to us, the ever recommenced burying of objects and human forms in the *superficies* of the painting.

Bataille has written an authoritative description of this "sliding," which is not "neglect of the (figural) subject but something else." He compares it to a "sacrifice, which alters, destroys, kills the victim, *without neglecting it*. After all, the subject of Manet's canvases is less destroyed than bypassed; it is less annulled to the advantage of the naked painting than *transfigured* in the nakedness of that painting. . . . No one loaded the subject more: if not with meaning, with what, being simply *beyond* meaning, is more than it."<sup>81</sup>

As though to exorcise a deadening oscillation, Mallarmé undertakes to add an airy principle to the interpretation of Manet's works.<sup>82</sup> Objecting because of its brutality to the use of artificial light in the art of the female portrait—for then "the subject of the work would be reduced to the woman herself"—he explains that the painter's subject is not the face, but the suspension of down that separates us from it. The painter has more to do "with this pollen of flesh than with any human charm." And in order to be perceived and appreciated, this subtle deposit requires "daylight, that is, space with the transparency of air alone." Mallarmé's imagination here assigns to painting all that is *close by* the woman, the volatile cloud that envelopes her, the light mist by which she is grazed. In the text that follows, the author, not without a certain duplicity, plays on the confusion between "air" as (impressionist) theme, suitable for producing the dilution of forms, the mingling of the objects represented, and "air" as "medium," effectively intervening in the *application* of pigment and infiltrating itself into the interweaving of brushstrokes: ". . . since no artist has on his palette a transparent and neutral color corresponding to open air, the desired effect can only be obtained by the lightness or heaviness of touch, or by the regulation of the tone. Now Manet and his school use a fresh and simple color, lightly applied."<sup>83</sup>

Thus it is no longer a question of *representing* the vibrations of light, but of *presenting* the gaps, the interstices, the layers of paint. Paint so airy and ductile that one must at all cost prevent it from thickening and becoming a leaden mass: "Is it that this atmosphere, which the artifice of the painter spreads over the whole surface of the painted object, is not going to disappear when the completely finished work appears as though repainted?" Finished picture equals re-

81. Bataille, *Manet*, p. 103.

82. Mallarmé, "Les Impressionistes et Edouard Manet."

83. Many of Manet's paintings lend themselves to the interpretation here given by Mallarmé. And not only by their themes—which so often refer to those of the poet, gauze, veils, fans, tulle, curtains, vases, reflections, everything that floats and interposes itself, arousing and postponing desire—but also by their manner: "Manet, with his sable brushes or his thin, flat, square ones, would pile up stratifications of semi-blots. . . . The successive layers of silvery white, mixed with a few pinks and a touch of ocher and Venetian red, did not seem to bear down on each other, but to become lighter by contact" (Blanche, *Les Arts plastiques*, p. 53).

painted picture. The layers crushed, the "air" vanished. The work exists only by the suspension of its powders hanging over the canvas. To stare at these is to kill the work (and by powder, Mallarmé means the coloring agents in the oil as well. In speaking of Morisot, he evokes "the fragile powder of the paint").

In a context dominated by naturalism (Duranty's manifesto *La Nouvelle peinture* is from this same year, 1876), one should note that Mallarmé in no way proposes—as his Wagnerian and symbolist followers were soon to do—an escape outside the sphere of the tangible; he does not suggest the autonomy of color and line insofar as "they think for themselves." He proceeds to the opposite, by raising the stakes in mimetism. It is a question of carrying mimetism onto the terrain of the painting's fabrication.

Not to paint women, but *the way* these women are painted. Not faces, but that which, on these faces, is painting: makeup. To paint, not the structure of the model (bones, muscle), but the surface areas where the object offers itself as light sedimentation, and to render these sprinklings of powder by the powder of the pigment. Manet, in this respect, would have chosen to identify the object that he paints and the procedure that makes it possible to paint it. He would flatten the referent on the canvas, favoring in his choice of objects the rich surfaces that are already those of painting.

But whether he pushes the separation between model and figure to the limit (this happens when he covers someone's features with a thick layer), or on the contrary proceeds by a surplus of mimetism (by painting not the object but what produces painting in the object), it is all the same in the end. What is crushed in both cases is the denotative function, the exercise of the copy. Either the artist brutally challenges the process of representation (first case), or else he annuls it by the identity of the two terms: the object and the painting. The ultimate Mallarméan reversal: if the face is only worth something to the artist because it is already a painting (a painted/cosmetic surface), the painting in its turn is worth something as a face. It has the properties of one: penetrated by air and light ("which makes everything come alive"), fleeting, mobile, it must contain nothing "completely arrested, so that we can feel that the shining light that illuminates the painting, or the diaphanous shadow that veils it, are only seen in passing, just at the moment when the spectator looks at the subject represented, which, composed of a harmony of reflected and ceaselessly changing light, cannot be supposed to seem constantly the same, but throbs with movement, light, and life." Beyond Hoffmann's fiction of a living surface, a surface/skin (the homology of painting and the transparence of flesh once engaged the minds of Diderot and Hegel)—what speaks to us today in Mallarmé's text, and coincides with certain contemporary experiments,<sup>84</sup> is the

84. Thus the notions of weight, density, and transversality of the layer were at the center of the discussions held by the JaNaPa group in Paris in 1978. See the above-mentioned issue of *Macula*, 1979.

hypothesis there formulated, in view of Manet's paintings, of a painting as something overhanging, suspended, and dense, creating weight in space. Ointments, makeup, pollen: it is still a question of performing, albeit in an infinitely slight way, a transverse section in the painted surface, considered as a henceforth problematic place of apposition, and by the same token emptying it of whatever persists here or there of compositional economy.

Manet paints painting — that of the museums, that of faces. By signing his work, he exposes himself to the trials and tribulations of the world.

## Plato and the Simulacrum\*

GILLES DELEUZE

translated by ROSALIND KRAUSS

What is meant by the "overthrow of Platonism"? Nietzsche thus defines the task of his philosophy, or more generally, the task of the philosophy of the future. The phrase seems to mean abolishing the world of essences *and* the world of appearances. Such a project would not, however, be Nietzsche's own. The double objection to essences and appearance goes back to Hegel, and further still, to Kant. It is unlikely that Nietzsche would have meant the same thing. Further, this way of formulating the overthrow has the drawback of being abstract; it leaves the motivation for Platonism obscure. To overthrow Platonism should, on the contrary, mean bringing this motivation to light, "tracking" it down — as Plato hunts down the Sophist.

In very general terms, the motive for the theory of Ideas is to be sought in the direction of a will to select, to sort out. It is a matter of drawing differences, of distinguishing between the "thing" itself and its images, the original and the copy, the model and the simulacrum. But are all these expressions equal? The Platonic project emerges only if we refer back to the method of division, for this method is not one dialectical procedure among others. It masters all the power of the dialectic so as to fuse it with another power and thus to represent the whole system. One could initially say that it consists of dividing a genus into opposing species in order to place the thing under investigation within the correct species: thus the process of continuous specification in the search for a definition of the angler's art. But this is only the superficial aspect of the division, its ironic aspect. If one takes this aspect seriously, Aristotle's objection is clearly applicable; division is a bad and illegitimate syllogism, because it lacks a middle term that could, for example, lead us to conclude that angling belongs to the arts of acquisition and of acquisition by capture, and so forth.

The real goal of division must be sought elsewhere. In the *Statesman* one finds an initial definition: the statesman is the shepherd of men. But all sorts of

\* "Platon et le Simulacre" is an excerpt from *Logique du Sens* by Gilles Deleuze to be translated and published by Columbia University Press.

rivals—the doctor, the merchant, the laborer—come forward to say, “I am the shepherd of men.” In the *Phaedrus* it is a matter of defining madness, and more precisely, of distinguishing well-founded madness, or true love. There, too, many rush forward to claim, “I am the possessed, I am the lover.” Division is not at all concerned, then, to divide a genus into species, but more fundamentally with selection from among lines of succession, distinguishing between the claimants, distinguishing the pure from the impure, the authentic from the inauthentic. Hence the repeated metaphor which likens division to the testing for gold. But Platonism is the *Odyssey* of philosophy. The Platonic dialectic is not a dialectic of contradiction nor of contrariety, but one of rivalry (*amphisbetesis*)—a dialectic of rivals or claimants. Division’s essence appears not in breadth—in the determination of the species of a genus—but in depth—in the selection of the lineage: the sorting out of claims, the distinguishing of true claimant from false.

To accomplish this, Plato proceeds once again by means of irony. For, when division arrives at this actual task of selection, everything occurs as though the task has been abandoned and myth has taken over. Thus, in the *Phaedrus*, the myth of the circulation of souls seems to interrupt the effort of division; so, in the *Statesman*, does the myth of archaic times. Such is the second trap of division, the second irony, this evasion, this appearance of evasion or of renunciation. For the myth really interrupts nothing. On the contrary, it is an integrating element of division itself. It is the property of division to transcend the duality of myth and of dialectic and to join, internally, the power of dialectic with that of myth. The myth, with its constantly circular structure, is really the narrative of foundation. It allows the construction of a model according to which different claimants can be judged. In effect, that which must be founded is always a claim. It is the claimant who appeals to foundation, and it is on the basis of his appeal that his claim is seen to be well or poorly founded, not founded. Thus in the *Phaedrus* the myth of circulation reveals what souls, prior to their incarnation, could see of Ideas, thereby giving us a selective criterion by which well-founded madness, or true love, belongs to those souls who have seen much and thus have many dormant but revivable memories; while sensual souls, forgetful and narrow of vision, are denounced as false claimants. It is the same thing in the *Statesman*. The circular myth shows that the definition of the statesman as “shepherd of men” literally fits only the archaic god. But from it, a criterion of selection emerges according to which different men within the City share unequally in the mythical model. In short, an elective sharing corresponds to the matter of the selective method.

To share is, at best, to have secondhand. From this arises the famous Neo-Platonic triad: the unsharable, the shared, the sharer. One could just as well say: the foundation, the object of the claim, the claimant; the father, the daughter, and the fiancé. The foundation possesses something firsthand, allow-

ing it to be shared, giving it to the claimant — the secondhand possessor — only insofar as he has been able to pass the test of the foundation. The shared is what the unsharable possesses firsthand. The unsharable shares; it gives the shared to the sharers: justice, the quality of being just, just men. Of course, within this elective sharing, we must distinguish all sorts of degrees, a whole hierarchy. Is there not a third- and fourthhand possessor, continuing to the *n*th degree of debasement, up to the one who possesses no more than a simulacrum, a mirage, himself mirage and simulacrum? *The Statesman* distinguishes this in detail: the true statesman or the well-grounded claimant, then the parents, the auxiliaries, the slaves, all the way to the simulacra and counterfeits. A curse weighs on these last. They embody the evil power of the false claimant.

Thus the myth constructs the immanent model or the foundation test, according to which the claimants must be judged and their claim measured. It is on this condition that division pursues and achieves its goal, which is not the specification of concept but the authentication of Idea, not the determination of species but the selection of lineage. Yet how are we to explain the fact that of the three great texts on division — the *Phaedrus*, the *Statesman*, and the *Sophist*, the method of division is paradoxically employed not to evaluate just claimants but, rather, to hunt down the false claimant as such, to define the being (or rather the nonbeing) of the simulacrum. The Sophist himself is the simulacral being, the satyr or centaur, the Proteus who intrudes and insinuates himself everywhere. Construed thus, however, the ending of the *Sophist* may well contain the most extraordinary adventure of Platonism. Plato, by dint of inquiring in the direction of the simulacrum, discovers, in the flash of an instant as he leans over its abyss, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it calls into question the very notions of the copy . . . and of the model. The final definition of the Sophist leads us to the point where we can no longer distinguish him from Socrates himself: the ironist operating in private by elliptical arguments. Was it not inevitable that irony be pushed this far? And that Plato be the first to indicate this direction for the overthrow of Platonism?

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We have proceeded, then, from a first determination of the Platonic motive: to distinguish essence from appearance, the intelligible from the sensible, the Idea from the image, the original from the copy, the model from the simulacrum. But we have already seen that these expressions are not equivalent. The distinction moves between two sorts of images. *Copies* are secondhand possessors, well-grounded claimants, authorized by resemblance. *Simulacra* are like false claimants, built on a dissimilitude, implying a perversion, an essential turning away. It is in this sense that Plato divides the domain of the *image-idols* in two: on the one hand the *iconic copies* (likenesses), on the

other the *phantasmatic simulacra* (semblances).<sup>1</sup> We can thus better define the whole of the Platonic motive—it is a matter of choosing claimants, of distinguishing the good from the false copies, or even more, the always well-founded copies from the simulacra, ever corrupted by dissemblance. It is a question of insuring the triumph of the copies over the simulacra, of repressing the simulacra, of keeping them chained in the depths, of preventing them from rising to the surface and “insinuating” themselves everywhere.

The great manifest duality—the Idea and the image—is there only for this purpose: to guarantee the latent distinction between the two types of images, to give a concrete criterion. For, if the copies or icons are good images, well-founded ones, it is because they are endowed with resemblance. But resemblance must not be understood as an external correspondence. It proceeds less from one thing to another than from a thing to an Idea, since it is the Idea that comprises the relations and proportions that constitute internal essence. Interior and spiritual, resemblance is the measure of a claim. A copy truly resembles something only to the extent that it resembles the Idea of the thing. The claimant only conforms to the object insofar as it is modeled (internally and spiritually) on the Idea. It merits a quality (for example the quality of justness) only insofar as it is founded on essence (justice). In short, it is the superior identity of the Idea that grounds the good claim of the copies, grounding it on an internal or derived resemblance. Let us now consider the other type of image, the simulacra. Their claim—to the object, the quality, and so forth—is made from below, by means of an aggression, an insinuation, a subversion, “against the father” and without passing through the Idea.<sup>2</sup> Groundless claim, covering over the dissemblance of an internal imbalance.

If we say of the simulacrum that it is a copy of a copy, an endlessly degraded icon, an infinitely slackened resemblance, we miss the essential point: the difference in nature between simulacrum and copy, the aspect through which they form the two halves of a division. The copy is an image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance. The catechism, so fully inspired by Platonism, has familiarized us with this notion. God made man in His own image and to resemble Him, but through sin, man has lost the resemblance while retaining the image. Having lost a moral existence in order to enter into an aesthetic one, we have become simulacra.

1. *Sophist*, 236b, 264c.

2. Analyzing the relation between writing and logos, Jacques Derrida finds this very figure of Platonism: the father of logos, logos itself, writing. Writing is a simulacrum, a false claimant, insofar as it tries to capture logos through violence and trickery, or even to supplant it without going through the father. See “La Pharmacie de Platon,” *Tel Quel*, no. 32, pp. 12ff. and no. 33, pp. 38ff. (Translated into English by Barbara Johnson in Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1981, pp. 61-171). The same figure is to be found in the *Statesman*: the Good as father of the law, the law itself, the constitutions. Good constitutions are copies, but they become simulacra from the moment they violate or usurp the law, in escape from the Good.

The remark of the catechism has the advantage of stressing the daemonic character of the simulacrum. Doubtlessly it still produces an *effect* of resemblance; but that is a general effect, wholly external, and produced by entirely different means from those that are at work in the model. The simulacrum is constructed around a disparity, a difference; it interiorizes a dissimilitude. That is why we can no longer even define it with regard to the model at work in copies — the model of the Same from which the resemblance of the copy derives. If the simulacrum still has a model, it is another one, a model of the Other from which follows an interiorized dissimilarity.<sup>3</sup>

Take the grand Platonic trinity: user, producer, imitator. If the user is at the top of the hierarchy it is because he judges the results, making use of a true *knowledge* which is that of the model, of the Idea. Copies can be said to be imitations to the extent that they reproduce the model; since, however, this imitation is noetic, spiritual, and internal, it is a true production guided by the relations and proportions that constitute essence. There is always a productive operation in the good copy and, corresponding to this operation, a correct *judgment*, if not knowledge. Thus we see that imitation is determined as having a pejorative meaning only to the extent that it is nothing but a simulation, or that the term applies to nothing but the simulacrum and designates the effect of resemblance only in an external and unproductive way, obtained by trick or subversion. In that case, not even correct opinion is at work, but a sort of ironic encounter that replaces the modality of understanding by an engagement outside of knowledge and opinion.<sup>4</sup> Plato specifies the way in which this unproductive effect is obtained. The simulacrum implies great dimensions, depths, and distances which the observer cannot dominate. It is because he cannot master them that he has an impression of resemblance. The simulacrum includes within itself the differential point of view, and the spectator is made part of the simulacrum, which is transformed and deformed according to his point of view.<sup>5</sup> In short, folded within the simulacrum there is a process of going mad, a process of limitlessness, as in the *Philebus* where "the more and the less always lead to a further point," a constant development, a gradual process of subversion of the depths, an adept avoidance of the equivalent, the limit, the Same, or the Like: always simultaneously more and less, but never equal. To impose a limit on this development, to order it to sameness, to make it resemblant — and, for that

3. The Other is, indeed, not only a defect that affects images; it, itself, appears as a possible model as against the good model of the Same. See *Theaetetus*, 175e, *Timaeus*, 28b.

4. See *Republic*, X, 602a; and *Sophist*, 268a.

5. X. Audouard has clearly demonstrated this aspect: simulacra "are those constructions that include the angle of the observer, in order that the illusion be produced at the very point where the observer is located . . . It is not the status of nonbeing that is stressed, but this slight deviation, this slight dodge in the real image, that is tied to the point of view occupied by the observer, and which makes it possible to construct the simulacrum, work of the Sophist" ("Le Simulacre," *Cahiers pour l'analyse*, no. 3).

part which might remain rebellious, to repress it as deeply as possible, to confine it within a cave in the bottom of the ocean—such is the goal as Platonism strives for the triumph of icons over simulacra.

Platonism thus grounds the entire domain that philosophy recognizes as its own: the domain of representation filled by iconic copies defined not by an extrinsic relation to an object, but rather by an intrinsic relation to the model or ground. The Platonic model is Sameness, in the sense that Plato speaks of Justice as nothing other than justness, or of Courage as courageousness, and so forth—the abstract determination of the foundation being that which possesses at firsthand. The Platonic copy is the Like—the claimant who receives at one remove. To the pure identity of the model or the original there corresponds exemplary similitude, to the pure resemblance of the copy there corresponds a similitude called imitative. But for all that, one cannot say that Platonism continues to develop this power of representation for itself. It is content to stake out the territory, which is to say to ground it, to select it, to exclude from it everything that threatens to confuse its boundaries. But the deployment of representation as well-founded and limited, as finite representation, is more surely the project of Aristotle: representation crosses and covers the whole field that extends from the highest genera to the minutest species, and the method of division at this point takes on a traditional aspect of specification that it had not possessed under Plato. We can fix a third moment when, under the influence of Christianity, there is no longer the attempt only to found representation, rendering it possible, nor to specify or determine it as finite, but rather to render it infinite, to assert its claim to the limitless, to have it conquer the infinitely great as well as the infinitely small, opening onto a Being that exists beyond the highest genera and onto a particularity that resides within the minutest species.

Upon this endeavor, Leibniz and Hegel left the stamp of their genius. But if we have not done with the issue of representation, it is because the double requirement of the Same and the Like persists. Quite simply, the Same discovered an unconditioned principle capable of setting up its rule within infinity: namely, sufficient reason; and the Like found a condition by means of which it could be applied to the unlimited: namely, convergence or continuity. In effect, a notion as rich as the Leibnizian compossibility means that, monads being assimilated to unique points, each series that converges around one of these points is extended in other series, converging around other points. Another world begins in the vicinity of the points, causing the series thus obtained to branch off. We thus see how Leibniz excludes divergence by means of distributing it in the domains of the “noncompossible,” preserving the maximum convergence or continuity as a criterion of the best possible world, which is to say, of the real world. (Leibniz presents other possible worlds as “claimants” that are less well-founded.) The same is true for Hegel in that it has

recently been shown to what extent the circles of the dialectic turn around a single center, depend on a single center.<sup>6</sup> Whether it's the mono-centering of circles or the convergence of series, philosophy does not leave the matter of representation behind when it goes off in quest of the infinite. Its intoxication is only feigned. Philosophy continues to pursue the same goal, Iconology, adapting it to the speculative demands of Christianity (the infinitely small and the infinitely large). And always there is the selection from among claimants, the exclusion of the eccentric and divergent, and this in the name of a superior finality, an essential reality, or even a meaning to history.

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Aesthetics suffers from an agonizing dualism. On the one hand it designates a theory of feeling as the form of possible experience; on the other, it marks out a theory of art as the reflection of real experience. In order for these two meanings to join, the conditions of experience in general must become the conditions of real experience. The work of art would, for its part, really then appear as experimentation. We know, for example, that certain literary procedures (other arts have equivalents) allow one to tell several stories at the same time. This is certainly the essential character of the modern work of art. It is in no way a question of different points of view on a single story understood as the same, for these points remain subject to a rule of convergence. It is, on the contrary, a matter of different and divergent narratives, as though to each point of view there corresponded an absolutely distinct landscape. There is of course a unity of the divergent series, as divergent, but it is a continually decentered chaos, itself at one with the Great Work. This unformed chaos, the great letter of *Finnegan's Wake*, is not just any chaos, it is the power of affirmation, the power of affirming all heterogeneous series, it "complicates" within itself all series. (Whence Joyce's interest in Bruno as the theoretician of complication.) Within these basic series a sort of *internal reverberation* is produced, a resonance that induces a *forced movement* that overflows the series themselves. The characteristics are all those of the simulacrum when it breaks its chains and rises to the surface. It then asserts its phantasmatic power, its repressed power. As we recall, Freud already showed how fantasy results from at least two series, the infantile and the postpubescent. The affective charge connected with fantasy is explained by the internal resonance of which the simulacra are the carriers, and the impression of death, of ruptured or dismembered life, is ex-

6. Louis Althusser writes of Hegel: "*A circle of circles, consciousness has only one centre, which solely determines it; it would need circles with another centre than itself—decentred circles—for it to be affected at its centre by their effectivity, in short for its essence to be over-determined by them*" (*For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster, New York, Vintage Books, 1970, p. 102).

plained by the amplitude of the compulsion that produces them. This, then, is the way the conditions of real experience and the structure of the work of art reunite: the divergence of series, the decentering of circles, the constitution of a chaos that comprises them, the internal reverberation and amplified movement, the aggressiveness of the simulacra.<sup>7</sup>

Systems of this sort—formed by the placing in contact of disparate elements or heterogeneous series—are in one sense extremely common. They are signal-sign systems. The signal is a structure which is divided into differences of potential, assuring the communication of disparate elements. The sign is that which flashes between two bordering levels, between two communicating series. It seems that all phenomena, insofar as their ground is located in dissymmetry, in difference, in constitutive inequality, correspond to these conditions: all physical systems are signals, all qualities are signs. It is true nonetheless that the series that border them remain exterior; and by the same token the conditions of their reproduction also remain exterior to other phenomena. In order to speak of the simulacrum it is necessary that their difference be *enclosed*. There is undoubtedly always a resemblance between series that reverberate. But that is not the issue; the issue, rather, is the status or position of this resemblance. Let us take the two formulations: “only that which is alike differs,” and “only differences are alike.” Here are two readings of the world in that one bids us to think of difference in terms of similarity, or a previous identity, while on the contrary, the other invites us to think of similarity or even identity as the product of a basic disparity. The first one is an exact definition of the world as icon. The second, against the first, defines the world of simulacra. It posits the world itself as phantasm. Now, from the point of view of this second formulation, it makes little difference whether the original disparity, on which the simulacrum is constructed, is big or little; it could happen that the basic series have only slight differences. It is enough, however, that the constituting disparity be judged in and of itself, not prejudged on the basis of any previous identity, and that it have *disparis* as its unit of measure and communication. Then resemblance could only be thought of as the product of this internal difference. It matters little that the system be in a state of great external resemblance and small internal difference, or the reverse, from the moment that resemblance is produced on the curve and that difference, small or large, continually occupies the center of the system thus decentered.

Hence, to overthrow Platonism means: to raise up simulacra, to assert their rights over icons or copies. The problem no longer concerns the distinction Essence/Appearance or Model/Copy. This whole distinction operates in

7. On the modern work of art, and particularly on Joyce, see Umberto Eco, *L'Oeuvre ouverte*, Paris, Seuil. In the preface to his novel *Cosmos*, Gombrowicz offers profound comments on the constitution of divergent series and on their manner of reverberation and communication within the heart of chaos.

the world of representation. The goal is the subversion of this world, "the twilight of the idols." The simulacrum is not degraded copy, rather it contains a positive power which negates *both original and copy, both model and reproduction*. Of the at least two divergent series interiorized in the simulacrum, neither can be assigned as original or as copy.<sup>8</sup> It doesn't even work to invoke the model of the Other, because no model resists the vertigo of the simulacrum. And the privileged point of view has no more existence than does the object held in common by all points of view. There is no possible hierarchy: neither second, nor third. . . . Resemblance continues, but it is produced as the external effect of the simulacrum insofar as this is constructed on the divergent series and makes them resonate. Identity persists, but it is produced as the law that complicates all series, causing them to return within each one as the course of compulsion. In the overthrow of Platonism it is resemblance that speaks of interiorized difference, and identity, of Difference as a primary power. Similarity and resemblance now have as their essence only the condition of being simulated, that is, of expressing the operation of the simulacrum. Selection is no longer possible. The nonhierarchical work is a condensation of coexistences, a simultaneity of events. It is the triumph of the false claimant. He simulates father, claimant, and fiancé, in a superimposition of masks. But the false claimant cannot be said to be false in relation to a supposedly true model, any more than simulation can be termed an appearance, an illusion. Simulation is the phantasm itself, that is, the effect of the operations of the simulacrum as machinery, Dionysiac machine. It is a matter of the false as power, *Pseudos*, in Nietzsche's sense when he speaks of the highest power of the false. The simulacrum, in rising to the surface, causes the Same and the Like, the model and the copy, to fall under the power of the false (phantasm). It renders the notion of hierarchy impossible in relation to the idea of the order of participation, the fixity of distribution, and the determination of value. It sets up the world of nomadic distributions and consecrated anarchy. Far from being a new foundation, it swallows up all foundations, it assures a universal collapse, but as a positive and joyous event, as de-founding (*effondement*):<sup>9</sup> "Behind every cave . . . there is, and must necessarily be, a still deeper cave: an ampler, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abyss behind every bottom, beneath every 'foundation.'"<sup>10</sup> How could Socrates recognize himself in these caves that are no longer his own? With what thread, since the thread is lost? How could he get out and how could he still tell himself apart from the Sophist?

8. See Blanchot, "Le Rire des dieux," *La Nouvelle revue française*, July 1965: "A universe where the image ceases to be second in relation to a model, where imposture pretends to the truth, or, finally, where there is no more original, but an eternal sparkle where, in the glitter of detour and return, the absence of the origin is dispersed" (p. 103).

9. Translator's note: *effondement* is a neologistic play on *effondrement* or collapse.

10. *Beyond Good and Evil*, §289.

That the Same and the Like might be simulated does not mean that they would be appearances or illusions. Simulation designates the power to produce an *effect*. But this is not only in the causal sense, because causality, without the intervention of other meanings, would remain completely hypothetical and indeterminate. It is in the sense of "sign," resulting from the process of signals. And it is in the sense of "costume," or even better, of masks, expressing a process of disguise where, behind each mask there is still another. . . . Simulation constructed in this way is not separable from the Eternal Return, because it is in the Eternal Return that the overthrow of the icons or the subversion of the world of representation is decided. There, everything happens as if a latent content blocked a manifest content. The manifest content of the Eternal Return could be determined in accordance with Platonism in general. It then represents the manner in which chaos is organized through the action of the demiurge, and according to the model of the Idea that imposes on it similarity and resemblance. In this sense the Eternal Return is the process of going mad mastered, uni-centered, determined to copy the eternal. And this is how it appears in the foundation myth. It installs the copy within the image, it subordinates the image to resemblance. But this manifest content, far from representing the truth of the Eternal Return, acts as the mark of a mythical use and survival within an ideology that can no longer support that truth and to which its secret is lost. It is fitting that we recall how much the Greek spirit in general, and Platonism in particular, is repelled by the Eternal Return taken in its latent meaning.<sup>11</sup> We must grant Nietzsche's claim that the Eternal Return is his own vertiginous idea, fed only by esoteric Dionysiac sources unknown to or repressed by Platonism. Nietzsche's own rare explanations remain at the level of the manifest content: the Eternal Return as the Same which causes the Like to come back. But how are we to overlook the disproportion between this flat truism, that goes no further than a generalized order of the seasons, and Zarathustra's emotion? Or better, the manifest statement that exists only to be dryly refuted by Zarathustra? Once addressing the dwarf, another time his animals, Zarathustra reproaches them with the transformation into platitude of that which is particularly profound, with making a "tired refrain" of that which is quite another music, with changing into circular simplicity that which is especially tortuous. In the Eternal Return one must pass by way of the manifest content, but only to reach the latent content located a thousand feet below (cavern behind all caverns . . .). Then, what seemed to Plato nothing but a sterile effect, reveals in itself the inalterability of masks, the impassibility of signs.

11. On this reticence of the Greeks, and most notably Plato, with regard to the Eternal Return, see Charles Mugler, *Deux thèmes de la cosmologie grecque*, Paris, Klincksieck, 1953.

The secret of the Eternal Return is that it in no way expresses an order that it opposes to chaos, and masters it. On the contrary, it is nothing but chaos, the power of affirming chaos. There is a point at which Joyce is Nietzschean — when he shows that the *vicus of recirculation* cannot affect or spin a “chaosmos.” For the coherence of representation, the Eternal Return substitutes something entirely different, its own c[ha]o-errance. For between the Eternal Return and the simulacrum there is a connection so profound that one is only comprehended by the other. What returns are the divergent series, as divergent: that is, each one insofar as it displaces its difference from all the others; and all, insofar as they complicate their difference in the chaos without beginning or end. The circle of the Eternal Return is a continually eccentric circle with a constantly decentered center. Klossowski is right in saying that the Eternal Return is “a simulacrum of doctrine.” It is indeed Being, but only when “being” is for its part simulacral.<sup>12</sup> The simulacrum functions in such a way that resemblance is necessarily retrojected onto the base series, and an identity is necessarily projected onto the forced movement. The Eternal Return is then indeed the Same and the Like, but only insofar as they are simulated, products of simulation, of the functioning of the simulacrum (will to power). It is in this sense that it overturns representation and destroys icons. It does not presuppose the Same and the Like, but rather, sets up that which differs as the only Same and makes of unlikeness the only resemblance. It is the single phantasm for all the simulacra (the being of all the beings). It is the power of affirming divergence and decentering. It makes of them the objects of a higher affirmation. It is under the power of the false claimant that everything is forced to pass and repass. Further, not *everything* is allowed to return. The Return is still selective, establishing differences, but not at all in Plato’s way. What it chooses are all the processes that oppose choice. What is excluded, what *is not allowed* to return, are those things that presuppose the Same and the Like, those things that pretend to correct divergence, to recenter the circles or to make order of chaos, to provide a model and make a copy. As long as history lasts, Platonism will occur only once, and Socrates falls under the knife. Because the Same and the Like become simple illusions, precisely from the moment they cease to be feigned.

Modernity is defined by the power of the simulacrum. It behooves philosophy not to be modern at any price, nor yet to be timeless, but to extricate from modernity something that Nietzsche called the *untimely*, which belongs to modernity, but which must also be turned against it — “in favor, I hope, of a future time.” It is not in the great forests nor on pathways that

12. Pierre Klossowski, *Un si funeste désir*, Paris, Gallimard, p. 226. And pp. 216–218, where Klossowski comments on the words of Joyful Wisdom, §361: “The pleasure in simulation, exploding as power, repressing the so-called character, submerging it often to the point of extinction. . . .”

philosophy is elaborated, but in the cities and streets, including even their most *factitious* aspects. The untimely is established, in relation to the most distant past, in the overthrow of Platonism, and in relation to the present, in the simulacrum conceived as the matter of this critical modernity, and in relation to the future, in the fantasy of the Eternal Return as belief in the future. The artificial and the simulacrum are not the same thing. They are even opposed. The factitious is always a copy of a copy, which must be pushed *to the point where it changes its nature and turns into a simulacrum* (the moment of Pop Art). It is at the core of modernity, at the point where modernism settles its accounts, that the factitious and the simulacrum stand in opposition as two modes of destruction may: the two nihilisms. For between the destruction which conserves and perpetuates the established order of representations, models, and copies, and the destruction of models and copies which sets up a creative chaos, there is a great difference; that chaos, which sets in motion the simulacra and raises a phantasm, is the most innocent of all destructions, that of Platonism.

*I would like to thank Annette Michelson for her assistance in the preparation of this translation. — trans.*

Introduction to  
*The Tables of Destiny*

PAUL SCHMIDT

On February 25, 1911, the twenty-six year old Russian poet Velimir Khlebnikov wrote to his brother Alexander: "I am making a diligent study of numbers and have discovered quite a few laws for them. I intend to keep going and work it all out completely, though, until I get some answers as to why it all behaves this way." That diligent study was to become almost an obsession as Khlebnikov tried to work out an all-embracing system of correspondences between languages and the "language of the stars"; between human behavior and the movement of the universe.

The origins of this enterprise may be traced to the adolescent Khlebnikov's reaction to the Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War; the poet tells us in a brief memoir written in 1919, "I swore to discover the laws of time, and carved that promise on a birch tree (in the village of Burmakino, Yaroslavl) the day I heard about the battle of Tsushima. I've been working at it for the last ten years." Khlebnikov's purpose is powerful and plain. "I wanted," he continues in the essay below, "to discover the reason for all those deaths."

So we come at once to the perception that lies at the source of modern philosophical speculation and of the great poetic structures of human culture. "I had not thought death had undone so many." Who can, indeed, encompass that thought? For Khlebnikov, trained as a mathematician, the free play of numbers offered the possibility of circumventing the disasters of history. To study the past in order to envisage the future is no new idea; what is new here, however, is the conception — unrelated to the cabalistic tradition of numerology — of numbers as the unifying force that creates, in some predictable way, the relationships within which we perceive meaning.

Khlebnikov takes the objective universe of classical mathematics — a world of unique entities with inherent properties and fixed relationships among them — and tries to explain the subjective universe that we as human beings inhabit as a function of the mathematical one: to make numbers explain and influence human behavior in the same way that human language does. He attempts to reconcile an abstract self-contained system like mathematics with the

human world of ambiguity and the pervasive presence of metaphor. His attempt, no matter how it may be judged "objectively," is a powerful metaphoric act, an act of poetry on an awesome scale. Yet although poetry was his means to this attempted end, Khlebnikov is by no means a mystic. He saw himself rather as a Leibniz, a Lomonosov, a Lobachevsky: thinkers with a vision of the whole, creators of new forms that would penetrate the surface of phenomena and yield a new art that might change the human condition.

In a wry little poem printed in 1914, Khlebnikov describes concisely the underlying principle of his view of history, the idea of an equilibrium produced by the shift from positive to negative states:

The law of the see-saw argues  
That your shoes will be loose or tight,  
That the hours will be day or night,  
And the ruler of earth the rhinoceros  
Or us.

It is this notion of an equilibrium in a shift from the positive to the negative, from victory to disaster, that underlines the essay below.

By the winter of 1921-1922, only a few months before his death, Khlebnikov had formulated many of his ideas on the role and function of numbers in human existence, and began to collect them for a book to be called *The Tables of Destiny*. Three sections of this book were printed as pamphlets while he was still alive; another five sections remain in manuscript, as yet unedited and unprinted. We present here the first of the three published sections, printed in the spring of 1922.

An Excerpt from  
*The Tables of Destiny*

VELIMIR KHLEBNIKOV

translated by PAUL SCHMIDT

Suppose I make a timepiece of humanity,  
Demonstrate the movement of the century hand—  
Will war not wither like an unused letter, drop  
From our alphabet, vanish from our little gap  
Of time? Humanity has piles, got by rocking  
In armchairs forever and ever, compressing  
The mainspring of war. I tell you, the future is  
Coming, and upon it my superhuman dreams.  
I know you are true believing wolves—  
I squeeze my shots into the bullseye like yours—  
But can't you hear fate's needle, rustling  
In her wonder-working seams?  
The force of my thoughts will inundate  
The structures of existing states—  
Kitez, magic city, will rise from its lake;  
Serfs no longer blinded by an old stupidity.  
When the band of Presidents of Planet Earth  
Will feed our appalling hunger with a new crust,  
Then the rough lug nuts of existing states  
Will yield easily to the turn of our wrench.  
And when the bearded lady  
Throws the long-awaited stone,  
That, you will say,  
Is what we've been wanting  
For centuries. Ticking timepiece of humanity!  
Move like the arrow of my thoughts!  
Grow as governments destroy themselves, grow  
through this book, let Planet Earth  
be sovereignless at last! PRESPLANEARTH alone  
will be our sovereign song.

I tell you, the universe is the scratch  
of a match on the face of calculation,  
and my thoughts are a lock pick at work  
On a door, and behind it someone is dying . . .

The fate of the Volga may serve as a lesson for the study of destiny. The day the Volga river bed was sounded was the day of its subjugation, its conquest by the powers of sail and oar, the surrender of the Volga to mankind. The sounding of Destiny and a thorough study of its dangerous places should make its navigation a calm and easy matter, just as sailing the Volga became safe and easy once buoys with red and green lights marked the danger spots—the rocks, shoals, and sand bars of the river bottom. In the same way we can study the fissures and shifting shoals of Time.

Analogous soundings may be made in the stream of Time, establishing the laws of time past, and studying the channel of time to come; by sounding destiny we proceed from the lessons of past centuries in order to arm the mind with new eyes, eyes of the intellect, that can make out events still in the distant future.

It has long been a commonplace that knowledge is a kind of power, and to foresee events is to be able to control them.

Here are two equations: one concerns and outlines the destiny of England; the other provides a basic outline in time of India.

It is important to remember that in general opposed events—victory and defeat, beginning and end—are united in terms of powers of three ( $3^n$ ). The number three is the wheel of death, as it were, for the initial event.

Moscow, January 16, 1922

“Crowned with dawns”

A Wake at the Neighbors’  
(time to carry out the body)

I discovered the pure laws of Time in 1920 in Baku, the land of fire, in a tall building that housed the Naval dormitory where I was living with Dobrovsky. The exact date was November 17th.

A huge slogan “Dobrokuznya” was scrawled at an angle on the wall, a heap of brushes lay beside buckets of paint, and a constant refrain in my ears insisted that if someone named Nina would only show up, then out of the city of Baku would come the name of Bakunin. His enormous tattered shadow hung over us all. A sculptor began a bust of Columbus in a lump of green wax and unexpectedly produced a head of me. It was a good omen, a sign of good hope for someone sailing toward a new land, toward the continent of time. I

wanted to find a key to the timepiece of humanity, to become humanity's watchmaker, and to map out a basis for predicting the future. All this took place in the land where man first encountered fire and tamed it into a domestic animal. In the land of fire—Azerbaijan—fire changes its primordial appearance. It does not fall from heaven like a savage divinity, engendering fear; rather it rises from the earth like a gentle flower and almost begs us to pick it and tame it.

On the first day of spring in 1921 I went a supplicant to the eternal fires. Caught unawares at night by the fast-dropping twilight, I slept in the open steppe, on the bare ground, among clumps of grass and spiders' webs. The terrors of night surrounded me.

I discovered the equation for the inner zone of heavenly bodies of the solar system on September 25, 1920, at the Prokult conference in Armavir, on the back benches of the meeting hall; during all the inflammatory business speeches, I computed the times of those stars in my notebook.

This equation for the first time shackled the stellar magnitudes to one another and subjected them to one general law, in tandem with the community of human beings.

I first resolved to search out the laws of time on the day after the battle of Tsushima, when news of the battle reached the Yaroslavl district where I was then living, in the village of Burmakino, at Kuznetsov's.

I wanted to discover the reason for all those deaths.

I remember springtime in the north country and the clink of bridle and stirrups; they used to make the horses trundle them across the fields in a special barrel, in order to give the rusty iron the silvery glitter of a new bridle and harness. The poor old horses in the north had to drag around a barrel filled with their own chains.

I had a true and hopeful helper in my task—the chance encounter, in that famine of print, with the very book I could not do without.

So it was Comrade Bushy-brows himself who gave me a chronicle of the events of 1917–1920; it was this that allowed me to begin calculating days, which was the next step.

I can still hear the panting breath of that traveling companion of mine.

I am firmly resolved, if these laws do not win a place among humans, to teach them to the enslaved race of horses. I have already expressed this firm resolution in a letter to Ermilov.

The first truths about space attained the force of social law in the surveyor's art, in order to determine the taxes upon circular or triangular plots, or to make an equitable adjustment among the inheritors of a piece of land.

The first truths about time seek points of support for the equitable demarcation of generations, and transfer the desire for equity and law into a new dimension, that of time. But in this case as well the motivating force is that same old desire for equity, the division of time into equal time-estates.

Humanity, as a phenomenon caught up in the flow of time, was aware of the power of time's pure laws, but feelings of nationality were strengthened by recurring and opposed dogmas, all attempting to depict the essence of time with the paint of words.

Doctrines of good and evil, Ahriman and Ormuzd, eventual retribution — all these express the desire to speak of time before any measure for it was available, using only a bucket of paint.

And so the face of time was painted in words on the old canvasses of the Koran, the Vedas, the Gospels, and other doctrines. That great face is adumbrated here also in the pure laws of time, but this time with the brush of number, and thus we take a different approach to the task of our predecessors. The canvas contains no words, only precise number, which functions here as the artist's brush stroke depicting the face of time.

Thus in the ancient task of time-painting a certain shift has occurred.

Time-painting has abandoned the indeterminacy of words and now possesses an exact unit of measurement.

Those who think they can ignore the pure laws of time and still make correct judgments will seem like the old tyrant who had the ocean whipped because it destroyed his ships.

They would do better to study the laws of navigation.

First I discovered the characteristic reversibility of events after  $3^5$  days, 243 days. Then I continued to increase the powers and extents of the time-periods I had discovered, and began to apply them to the past of humanity.

That past suddenly became transparently clear; the simple law of time suddenly illuminated it in its entirety.

I understood then that time was structured in powers of two and three, the lowest possible even and odd numbers.

I understood that the true nature of time consists in the recurrent multiplication of itself by twos and threes, and when I recalled the Old Slavic belief in the powers of "odd and even" I decided that wisdom was indeed a tree that grows from a seed. The superstition is all in the quotation marks.

Once I had uncovered the significance for time of odd and even, I had the sensation of holding in my hands a mouse trap in which aboriginal Fate quivered like a terrified little animal. The equations of time resemble a tree, simple as a tree trunk in their bases, and slender and complexly alive in the branches of their powers, where the brain and living soul of the equations are concentrated; they seem to be the reverse of equations of space, where the enormous number of the base is crowned by one, two, or three, but never anything further.

They were, I decided, two opposite movements within a single stretch of calculation.

I envisaged them very concretely: mountains, enormous stone masses as a

base upon which the power perched like a bird of prey in repose, the bird of consciousness, for space — compared to what seemed like the slender trunks of trees, and flowering branches with living birds fluttering in them.

For space, time seemed an inflexible exponent; it could never be greater than three, while the base was alive, and limitless; for time, on the contrary, two and three were the "fixed" foundation, while the exponent lived a complex existence in the free play of magnitudes. Where I had previously been conscious of the empty steppes of time, there had suddenly sprung up orderly multinomials based on three and on two, and I felt like a traveler before whom suddenly appeared the crenelated walls and towers of a city no one even knew existed.

In the famous old legend the city of Kitezh lay sunk in a deep dark lake in the forest, while here, out of each spot of time, out of every lake of time arises an orderly multinomial of threes with towers and steeples, just like another Kitezh.

Series such as  $1053 = 3^{3+3} + 3^{3+2} + 3^{3+1}$ , where the number of members is the same as the base number, the exponent of the leading power is twice three, and the other exponents diminish by one, or the well-known number  $365 = 3^5 + 3^4 + 3^3 + 3^2 + 3^1 + 3^0 + 1$ , have on the one hand disclosed the ancient relationship of the year to the days and on the other hand given a new meaning to the old legend of the city of Kitezh.

A city of threes with its towers and steeples rings loudly from out of the depths of time. An orderly city with numerical towers has replaced previous visions of spots of time.

I did not dream up these laws: I simply took the live magnitudes of time, tried to strip them to see what were the laws by which these magnitudes changed one into the other, and constructed equations based on the experience. And one after the other the numerical expressions for magnitudes of time revealed a strange kinship with the expressions for space, at the same time that they moved in a reverse direction.

Number is a cup into which we may pour the liquid of any magnitude whatsoever, while the equation is a device that yields a string of magnitudes where the fixed numbers are the motionless nuts of the equation, its framework, and the magnitudes  $m$ ,  $n$  are the mobile elements of the contrivance, the wheels, levers, and fly-wheels of the equation.

In my mind I would occasionally compare the numbers in an equation whose magnitudes were fixed with the skeleton of a body, and the magnitudes  $m$ ,  $n$  with the muscles and flesh of a body, the whole suddenly brought to life like animals in a fairy-tale.

In the equation I distinguished muscular structure from bone.

And behold, equations of time appeared as mirror images of equations of space.

Equations of space came to resemble extinct fossilized animals with huge skeletons and tiny skulls: the brain is the crown of the body.

If the expression for volume is  $A^3$ ,  $A$  here can increase to infinity, but the exponent will always be three.

Three is the fixed magnitude, the bone of the equation.  $A$  is its liquid part; for two inverse points in time the expression  $3^a + 3^a$  or  $3^n + 3^n$  (or simply  $3^n$ ) is very distinctive. Such a time-expression unites event and counter-event in time.

An event of movement  $A$  and its reverse  $-A$ . Here the fixed base is three and the infinitely increasing exponent is  $n$ — isn't this a reverse flow of the computation?

What the ancient doctrines spoke of, what they threatened in the name of vengeance, now becomes cruelly simple through the force of this equation; its dry language contains all the force of "Vengeance is mine, and I shall repay" and the terrible, unforgiving Jehovah of the ancients.

Indeed, the law of Moses and the entire Koran is very probably contained in the iron force of this equation.

But think how much ink we save! What a rest for the inkwell! In this we see the growth of progress through the centuries. With the colors of blood, iron, and death we can adorn the phantasmal outlines of the expression for  $3x$  days.

Behavior and punishment, act and retribution.

Say the victim dies at the initial point.

The killer will die after  $3^5$ .

Suppose the initial point was a step of conquest, marked by a major military success for some wave of humanity. Then the second point, after  $3^n$  days, will mark an end to that movement, the day of its rebuff, a day that shouts: Whoa! Stop! even though all during these  $3^n$  days the whip of fate kept cracking to shouts of: Hey! Giddap! Forward!

So the day of the battle of Mukden, February 26, 1905, which stopped the Russian advance to the East, an advance that began with the taking of Isker by Yermak and his band, occurred  $3^{10} + 3^{10} = 2 \times 3^{10}$  after the taking of Isker on October 26, 1581.

The battle of Angora on July 20, 1402, which established a limit, a fixed threshold to the western push of the Mongols, occurred  $3^{10}$  after the Tartars' enormous success, their conquest of Kiev on December 6, 1240, which marked the beginning of the approach of the East, when the East turned to the West and removed its warlike visor.

The battle of Kulikovo Field, August 26, 1380, stopped the westward drive of the Eastern populations, those waves of Huns, Slavs, Magyars, Polovtsians, Pechenegs, and Tatars. But it occurred  $3^{11} + 3^{11} = 2 \times 3^{11}$  after the sack of Rome by Alaric on August 24, 410, when Rome was burned to the ground. The taking of Constantinople in 1453 by the Turks set limits to the an-

cient Greek drive to the east. But this event, the fall of the Greek capital, happened  $3^{11} \times 4$  after the year 487 B.C., when the Greeks had conquered the Persians and surged into the East.

The Roman drive toward the East began around the year 30 B.C. (August 4, 30, the taking of Alexandria by Octavian).

When Rome became master of the Mediterranean and subjugated the Eastern capital, Alexandria.

That year marked the full flowering of Rome, the essential step toward the East;  $3^{11}$  days later brought the year 455 (July 12, 455), the year of Rome's fall and destruction.

The East shattered its opponent's sword: Bulgaria was conquered by the Turks at the battle of Tyrnovo on July 17, 1393;  $3^{11}$  days later a reverse event occurred: she was declared independent by the treaty of Berlin on July 13, 1878. Here the law of  $3^n$  unites the point of enslavement, of hands in chains, and the point of independence.

Let us now demonstrate our truth, that an event upon reaching an age of  $3^n$  days changes its sign to the reverse (the positive-unit factor as an indicator of direction gives place to a negative-unit factor [ $+ 1$  and  $- 1$ ]), that upon completion of the time sequence represented by the numerical structure  $3^n$ , events stand in the same relation to each other as two trains proceeding in opposite directions along the same track, by means of the modest powers of  $n$ .

The large exponents are concerned with the dance and drift of states, their baton controls the great hopak of invasions and movements of peoples; while the small ones concern the lives of separate individuals, controlling them by means of retribution, or by shifts in the structure of society, translating into numbers the ancient original, the old tables written in the language of words. "Vengeance is mine, and I will repay."

So the military agent Min put down the Moscow uprising on December 26, 1905; he was killed  $3^5$ , 243 days later, on August 26, 1906.

The avenging hand of Konopliannikova, or fate itself, pulled the trigger of the revolver that shot him.

Tsar Nikolai Romanov was shot on July 16, 1918,  $3^7 + 3^7$  after he dissolved the Duma on July 22, 1906.

The American president Garfield was killed on July 2, 1881,  $3^5$  days after his election to the post on November 2, 1880.

The attempt upon the life of the Governor-general of Poland, Count Berg, took place 243 days after the beginning of the uprising; in other words, Judgment Day, the day of vengeance, took place  $3^5$  after the event that called for that vengeance.

The freedom fighter Robert Blum was executed on November 9, 1848,  $3^5$  after the beginning of the 1848 uprising (March 13, 1848).

The Tsarist government's debts were recognized by Soviet Russia on No-

vember 6, 1921,  $3^6 + 3^6 = 1458$  days after the beginning of Soviet power on November 10, 1917, when they had been declared null and void.

The Miliukov-Kerensky government of March 10, 1917, was set up  $3^5$  before the government of Lenin and Trotsky on November 10, 1917.

The defeat of Vrangel's successor Kolchak and the end of the civil war occurred on November 15, 1920,  $3^6$  after Kolchak's proclamation of a "Provisional government" on November 17, 1918.

The abandonment of the front line by the troops and the disbanding of military units on December 7, 1917, occurred  $3^5$  after Miliukov's declaration on April 9, 1917, about "war to the end" and loyalty to the Allied Powers.

Universal Education Day, August 11, 1918, occurred  $3^5 + 2^2$  after the Tolstoyan mood of the period of troop disbandment on December 7, 1917.

The English struck at the Continent  $3^n$  after the Battle of Hastings, when their island was invaded by an army from the Continent.

The Battle of Hastings, which represented the victory of the Continent over the Island, took place on October 3, 1066; the indigenous population was totally defeated, the island occupied by hordes of Danes;  $3^9 + 3^9$  later occurred the Battle of Glenville, when the English defeated the French on June 13, 1174.

$3^{10}$  later occurred the naval battle of Bornholm, July 22, 1227, when the English avenged themselves on the Danes by defeating their recent conquerors. The island was avenged. Thus in turn were the French and the Danes defeated at sea  $3^n$  after the reverse event—the defeat of the English.

Thus do yes and no constantly reverse themselves.

We have seen the military duel of East and West, we have seen how the sword falls from the hands of one of the two combatants  $3^n$  days after a successful attack, when one or another capital city is turned to rubble and ashes.

Isker, Kiev, Rome, London form one series. The battles of Mukden, Angora, Kulikovo Field, and Bornholm resounded  $3^n$  days after the first series.

Threshold, obstacle, and stoppage become movement; victory is given to the conquered, destruction to the conqueror. The event makes a turn of  $2d$ , two right angles, and forms a negative turning point of time. The midnight of the event becomes its noonday, and reveals the regular working of the timepieces of humanity, ticking in the capital cities of states long blown to dust.

Those who have no ordinary watch, needfully and necessarily wear the great timepiece of humanity, and pay heed to its regular movements, its tick-tick-tick.

After a lapse of time of  $3^n$  days the second event moves counter to the first, in reverse, like a train speeding in the opposite direction, threatening to derail the purpose of the first event.

The "truth" is, and we put the word in quotation marks for those who still care to doubt it, that events are spatially determined; specifically, the direction of motion of a force becomes a dependent variable.

The computation is made in days—the natural quantities of time. Here we have a quantitative connection, discovered through experiment, between the principles of time and space. The first bridge between them.

It derives from a careful study of the live quantities of time and the law of numbers by which these quantities convert one into another.

If we compare the live natural volumes of blocks of wood with right-angled sides and equal edges, these volumes will convert one into another according to some law.

Given  $A^3$  or  $n^3$ , where  $n$  or  $A$  is the length of an edge in the law of volumes, then the exponent three (a fixed number, a fetter of quantities) is the solid bottom and fixed banks of the equation, while the base  $A$  is the moving water, the flow of the equation, and any quantity whatsoever may be proposed for it:  $A$  is the river of the equation.

For the law of live areas, by which areas convert one into the other, the relation  $A^2$ ,  $n^2$  will be valid, and here the fixed number is 2.

On the contrary, quantities of time convert one into the other according to a law of  $3^n$  days and  $2^n$  days: here we have an unrestricted exponent, free as the wind, and a restricted base, the three or two.

The river of the equation flows through the powers, and its banks are the base  $3 =$  a fixed number, while  $n$  is free and may be any possible number.

The delightful notion occurs, that in fact there is no time and no space, there are only two different forms of calculating, two inclines to the same roof, two paths through a single edifice of numbers.

Time and space together seem to comprise a single tree of mathematics, but in one case the imaginary squirrel of calculation moves from the branches to the base, in the other from the base to the branches.

These operations on quantities demonstrate the art of determining the greatest possible equality by means of the smallest possible inequality.

How many centuries would it take to determine (write out) a number, where a column of three threes is the exponent of three, using only decimals?

Whereas here we are able to define it in an instant, extracting it from the sequence of others, by having recourse to equalities of a higher order.

We might call this the law of the least consumption of ink, the “ink-conservation” principle.

The inclination toward the smallest possible numbers is another law, a kind of Nirvana, the teachings of Buddha in the realm of numbers.

In the calculation that time makes, a gravitation to the numbers that surround the world of nothing (that is, one, two, and three) determines the structure of the base; its fixed bases are threes and twos. In spatial equations three, two, and one are the exponents.

And the base, on the contrary, goes to infinity.

Could we possibly refer to time as space turned upside down?

Raising to a power represents extreme economy in the use of ink; a succession of centuries can be written out (extracted from a sequence of others) with two or three strokes of a pen. This art lies at the foundation of both spatial calculation and the calculation of time.

But where space is concerned it is the exponent that is created by the propensity toward the smallest possible numbers, the greatest proximity to zero, while in the case of time it is the base.

*Spatial quantities*

The constraint of three or two	In the base	In the exponent
		X
Infinite increase of the number (numerical freedom)	X	

*For time*

Two or three constrained	In the base	In the exponent
	X	
Infinite increase of the number		X

Or space and time are two inverse directions of the same calculation, that is  $M^n$  and  $N^m$ .

In the lives of individuals I have noticed an especially turbulent time period with the structure  $2^{13}$  and  $13^2$ . It calls forth triumphs beneath the sign of Mars or Venus, it doesn't matter which.

So Boris Samorodov, who raised the revolt on the White ships in the Caspian, did so  $2^{13} + 13^2$  after his birth.

As I see it, the spirit of courageous deeds was called up in him by two to the thirteenth power, counting from his birth.

If indeed the pure laws of time exist, then they must govern without distinction everything that is subject to the flow of time, be it the soul of Gogol, Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*, the planets of the solar system, shifts in the earth's

crust, the terrible change from the kingdom of reptiles to the kingdom of men, from the Devonian era to an era marked by the interference of man in the life and structure of Planet Earth.

In fact, in the equation  $x = 3^n + 3^n$ , the interval of time for negative shifts, if we make  $n = 11$ , then  $x$  will equal the time between the destruction of Rome in 410 by peoples from the East, and the battle of Kulikovo Field, which put an end to the advance of those same peoples, a rebuff to the East. If we let  $n = 10$ , we get  $x$  equal to the time between Yermak's expedition and the retreat of Kuropatkin: these points represent the beginning and the end of Russian penetration of the East.

If we let  $n = 18$ , we get the time between the Tertiary age and our own. And, finally, if  $n = 23$ , then  $x = 369,697,770$  years, or the interval between the earth's Devonian age when reptiles were the lords of creation and the present day, when the earth is a book with the shrieking title "Man." And does not this secret language based on three serve to explain the superstitious terror that man feels for reptiles, our infrequent and inoffensive enemies?

Between the Devonian age and our own, according to the determinations of Professor Holmes, there has elapsed a period of  $3^{3^3-2^2} + 3^{3^3-2^2}$  days or  $3^{23} + 3^{23}$  days.

That period of time marks the change from the domination of glitter-scaled reptiles to the domination of naked man in his soft envelope of skin. Only the hair on his hand, like a wind blowing from centuries gone by, recalls his past. Considered from this perspective, people can be thought of as anti-reptiles. The crawlers on the ground were replaced by human beings, who fall and rebound constantly, like a ball. According to the pure laws of time, whose herald and trumpeter I hereby announce myself, both the life of the earth's crust and shifts in the structure of human society are equally subject to the very same equations.

Here is the law of English sea power:  $x = k + 3^9 + 3^9n + (n-1)(n-2)2^{16} - 3^{9n-2}$ , where  $k =$  the day in 1066 when the island was conquered by the Danes at the Battle of Hastings. Let  $n = 1$ , then  $x$  falls on the year 1174, the year of the struggle with France; let  $n = 2$ , and  $x$  comes out as 1227, the year of the struggle with Denmark; let  $n = 3$ , and  $x$  comes out as 1588, the year of the Spanish Armada.

All these wars guaranteed to Albion domination of the seas. And this was indeed to have been expected, because the equation is built on the base of three, and its initial point was an English defeat.

<i>Day Unit</i>	<i>In Years</i>	
	Taking a year equal to 365 days	Taking a year equal to 365¼ days
$2^0 = 1$		
$2^1 = 2$		
$2^2 = 4$		
$2^3 = 8$		
$2^4 = 16$		
$2^5 = 32$		
$2^6 = 64$		
$2^7 = 128$		
$2^8 = 256$	a year minus 109 days	a year minus 109 days
$2^9 = 512$	1 year and 147 days	1 year and 147 days
$2^{10} = 1024$	3 years minus 71 days	3 years minus 72 days
$2^{11} = 2048$	6 years minus 142 days	6 years minus 143 days
$2^{12} = 4096$	11 years and 81 days	11 years and 79 days
$2^{13} = 8192$	22 years and 162 days	22 years and 157 days
$2^{14} = 16384$	45 years minus 41 days	45 years minus 52 days
$2^{15} = 32768$	90 years minus 82 days	90 years minus 104 days
$2^{16} = 65536$	179 years and 201 days	179 years and 156 days
$2^{17} = 131072$	359 years and 37 days	359 years minus 53 days
$2^{18} = 262144$	718 years and 74 days	718 years minus 106 days
$2^{19} = 524209$	1436 years and 148 days	1436 years minus 212 days
$2^{20} = 1048576$	2872 years and 296 days	
$3^0 = 1$		
$3^2 = 9$		
$3^3 = 27$		
$3^4 = 81$		
$3^5 = 243$		
$3^6 = 729$	2 years less 1 day	2 years less 2 days
$3^7 = 2187$	6 years less 3 days	6 years less 4 days
$3^8 = 6561$	18 years less 9 days	18 years less 13 days
$3^9 = 19683$	54 years less 27 days	54 years less 40 days
$3^{10} = 59049$	161 years and 284 days	161 years and 244 days
$3^{11} = 177147$	485 years and 122 days	485 years and 1 day
$3^{12} = 531441$	1456 years and 1 day	1455 years and 2 days
$3^{13} = 1594323$	4368 years and 3 days	4365 years
$3^{14}$		

The life of centuries by the light of  $3^n$ . The eternal duel, illuminated by the torches of  $3^n$ . The staff of victory changes hands, passed from one warrior to another. Waves of two worlds, the alternating spears of East and West, clashing through the centuries.

March 5, 11313 B.C. The conquest of India by the Aryans. A wave of Whites from the West.	$3^{13} + 3^7 - 2 \times 3^5$	November 10, 1256. Conquest of Baghdad by the Mongols under Hulagu; a wave of Mongols pouring from the East.
August 24, 410. Alaric sacks Rome, the capital of the West. A wave from the East pours into the West.	$3^{11} + 3^{11}$	August 24, 1380. The Battle of Kulikovo; it acts as a dam against the people from the East; East meets with a rebuff.
July 2, 451. The rout of Attila, rebuff to the East.	$3^{12} - 2^7$	February 26, 1905. The Battle of Mukden, rebuff to the East.
October 26, 1581. Yermak conquers Isker, the capital of Siberia. A wave against the East.	$3^{10} + 3^{10}$	February 26, 1905. The Battle of Mukden, a halt to the Russian advance to the East.
September 3, 36 B.C. The Battle of Naulochus, Roman wave in the West.	$3^{19} + 3^{11}$	September 26, 1904. The Battle of Shakha. A halt to the West.

Let us make the bones of these times speak; let us clothe them with the flesh of human life and grant to the cliffs of time the voice of events in  $3^n + 3^n$  days.

August 24, 410. Alaric takes Rome; a wave from the East against the West.	$3^{11} + 3^{11}$	August 26, 1380. The Battle of Kulikovo Field. A halt to the peoples of the East.
October 26, 1581. Yermak takes Isker; a Russian wave against the East.	$3^{10} + 3^{10}$	February 26, 1905. The Battle of Mukden; rebuff to Russia.
October 3, 1066. The Battle of Hastings; the subjugation of England.	$3^9 + 3^9$	June 13, 1174. The Battle of Glenville; island-England defeats the Continent.

May 18, 1899. The Hague peace conference of kings.	3 <sup>8</sup>	May 9, 1917. The Peace Proposal of Labor at the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies.
July 22, 1906. The State Duma dissolved by order of Nikolai Romanov.	3 <sup>7</sup> + 3 <sup>7</sup>	July 16, 1918. Nikolai Romanov is executed.
November 1, 1917. Beginning of Soviet power in Russia.	3 <sup>6</sup> + 3 <sup>6</sup>	November 7, 1921. A shift to the right, negotiations concerning the assumption of Russia's debts.
December 26, 1905. Uprising in Moscow put down by Min.	3 <sup>5</sup>	August 26, 1906. Min assassinated by Konopliannikova.
May 21, 1792. The king deals with foreign powers.	3 <sup>4</sup>	August 10, 1792. The taking of the Royal Palace.

The nineteenth century in the flaring torchlight of 2<sup>n</sup> days and 3<sup>n</sup> days.  
The growth of events after 2<sup>14</sup> days.

June 19, 1815. Waterloo, a rebuff for the West. Victory of the eastern half of the Continent over the western half.	2 <sup>15</sup> - 3 <sup>2</sup>	February 26, 1905. Mukden, a second rebuff to the West. The direction of the event is exactly the same. Victory for the East.
"The little mailed fist of Germany" in 1870. Sep- tember 2, 1870 = Sedan. 2 <sup>14</sup> days later Bismarck's winged words about "blood and iron" began to fly like zeppelins, and like the teeth of the magic dragon became a war in the air, on sea and land, underground and underwater; they hissed across the trenches	2 <sup>14</sup>	"The big mailed fist of Germany," July 11, 1915. World War.  Germany's iron fist, which once threatened only France, now threatens the whole of Planet Earth.

like a poisoned wind, like  
exhalations of death.

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
November 14, 1860.  
The taking of Peking  
(the sea-peoples besiege  
the continent of Asia).

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
September 23, 1905.  
The Russo-Japanese War.  
2nd victory for the sea.  
The continent is conquered.

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*Mondrian's New York Studio, 1944.*



*Installation. Brancusi + Mondrian. Sidney Janis Gallery, New York. 1982.*

## To Be Continued: A Note on Some Recent Mondrians

NANCY TROY

Piet Mondrian's ascetic lifestyle was already legendary before his death on February 1, 1944. The sparseness and apparent simplicity of his paintings seemed to confirm his reputation as "a spectacular devotee of solitary life,"<sup>1</sup> and those who knew the artist were not surprised that scarcely any personal effects were to be found in the New York studio he left behind. One would expect the disposition of his estate — which passed into the hands of his friend, fellow artist, heir, and executor, Harry Holtzman — to have been a relatively straightforward matter involving documentary material on the one hand and works of art on the other. The large number of texts and manuscripts Mondrian had written in several languages posed no problem, for, as Holtzman was already promising in December 1944, these would be translated into English and published in a volume of collected writings.<sup>2</sup> Among the drawings and paintings, only the fragile condition of the unfinished tape pictures would have aroused special concern.

So far so good. But what of the studio itself, or indeed the entire apartment Mondrian had occupied on the top floor of a brownstone at 15 East 59th Street? What was the status of that place, in view of the fact that Mondrian had applied rectangles of colored cardboard to most of the wall surfaces and had also fashioned a good deal of the furniture himself? To his enduring credit Holtzman recognized the importance of the apartment, particularly the studio, though from the beginning he was not quite sure how he ought to deal with its peculiar situation on the border between art and life. For several months he kept the place intact and invited anyone interested to come to see the spaces in which Mondrian had lived and worked. But as he acknowledged at the time to a correspondent of *The New Yorker*, "I don't know if I'm doing too much or too little, keeping the place up like this. I can't do it forever of course; I don't want

1. "Lines and Rectangles," *The New Yorker*, XVII, 3 (March 1, 1941), 8-10.

2. See Harry Holtzman, "Introduction," in Piet Mondrian, *Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art*, 1937, and *Other Essays*, 1941-1943, *The Documents of Modern Art*, ed. Robert Motherwell, New York, Wittenborn and Company, 1945, p. 6. The promised collection has not yet appeared.

to be silly about it."<sup>3</sup> Eventually Holtzman had to give up the lease, but before doing so he arranged with another artist and friend of Mondrian, Fritz Glarner, to make photographs and a short film of the apartment. He also made tracings of the studio walls, carefully noting the size and location of each colored rectangle before all of them were removed and stored away. At this point, Holtzman later wrote, the studio was given "up to 'history.'"<sup>4</sup> Several pieces of furniture as well as the rectangles of colored cardboard were retained but, divested of their original functions within the context of the actual environment, these isolated elements became documents like the photographs that recorded the now-dismantled studio as a total design entity.

In the ensuing years the studio came to be widely known through the dissemination of these photographs. One of them, showing Mondrian's unfinished painting, *Victory Boogie Woogie*, on an easel at the far end of the studio has received particular attention, doubtless because it forcefully demonstrates the new working methods Mondrian developed in New York and the close connection between his easel paintings and his conception of the environment as a whole. Just as Hans Namuth's photographs of Jackson Pollock painting gave credence to a view of that artist's process as product, so this image of Mondrian's studio emphasized his collage techniques and contributed to the consideration of his unfinished tape paintings, and eventually of the studio itself, as independently self-sustaining works of art in their own right. This was a gradual process in which the studio as documented in the photographs functioned as evidence to support the artistic value of the unfinished paintings and, once *their* status as works of art had been secured, these, in turn, unfinished works could be pressed into service to attest to the aesthetic importance of the studio, so that it too could be wrested from the grasp of history — no longer as a mere document, but as a collection of "original" fragments that are now being given a second life, reincarnated as works of art.

The fragile nature of Mondrian's unfinished paintings evidently became a problematic issue early on, and it seems that even the degree of their un-finish was open to debate. In 1948 Perle Fine was commissioned to make a copy of Mondrian's *Victory Boogie Woogie* that, unlike the eroding original with its myriad small strips of tape, could easily travel and be placed on public view. Fine's was no mere replica, however; it was a finished version that, when exhibited, was accompanied by a statement making the following claim: "According to his own words, he [Mondrian] had reached the end of this experimental stage of the painting of the *Victory Boogie Woogie*. At the time of his death only the final replacement of the pieces of tape with pigment and the sharpening of the edges of the colors which would have provided the precision . . . character-

3. Quoted in "Studio," *The New Yorker*, XX, 9 (April 15, 1944), 20.

4. Harry Holtzman, "Piet Mondrian's Environment, Part 2," in *Mondrian: The Process Works*, New York, The Pace Gallery, April 11-May 16, 1970, p. 5.

istic of his finished work remained undone.”<sup>5</sup> Presumably Fine had taken care of this last bit of work, making reference to Mondrian’s canvas as a document of his intentions. What she produced was an entirely new object whose precision corresponded with the prevailing conception of Mondrian’s oeuvre, as his own unfinished painting apparently did not. The confusion thus generated between the work of art and the document was only straightened out after a protest initiated by Fritz Glarner, who noted “the unsolved problems that Mondrian pointed out” in the picture before his death.<sup>6</sup> As a result the unfinished painting was restored to its proper place in Mondrian’s oeuvre, and the *Victory Boogie Woogie* we know today is the same work found in Mondrian’s studio in February 1944.

Not all the tape pictures have fared quite so well. In 1977, when Holtzman set out to restore *New York City, New York* with a view to its inclusion in the Centre Pompidou’s “Paris—New York” exhibition, he was unable to find tapes in the appropriate colors and so he made his own, using acrylic paints on thin paper strips that he then attached to the canvas with a medium that required heat in the adhesion process.<sup>7</sup> The result is neither a “Mondrian” nor a Holtzman replica of a Mondrian; instead it is a hybrid, touched by the master but obviously retouched (and overworked) by his disciple as well. With its taut lines and strident colors, it retains hardly a trace of the tentativeness that the worn tapes, thumbtacks, and pinholes impart to the several other tape pictures Mondrian left when he died. An unfinished work, it has been finished off by another hand. Not that Holtzman completed Mondrian’s process, for he did not finish *New York City, New York* as Fine had finished *Victory Boogie Woogie*, by painting in place of the tapes. But neither did he restore the picture by preserving its original elements intact. Instead he made certain that his own, new tapes would be permanent, thereby insuring the permanence of an image whose claim to artistic value resides in its recording of Mondrian’s creative process. Now, however, few of the actual marks of that process are still in evidence. In its present form the picture functions merely to signify a process of which it is no longer in fact a product. In his zealous effort to assure it a place in the catalogue of Mondrian’s works, Holtzman actually deprived the picture of precisely those elements on which its claim to inclusion ought to be based.

Nevertheless, it is as a *bone fide* Mondrian that *New York City, New York* has consistently been treated, most recently in two exhibitions where it, in turn,

5. Quoted by Fritz Glarner in an undated note to Katherine S. Dreier, The Katherine S. Dreier Papers, Yale Collection of American Literature, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. The Fine replica was apparently exhibited at the Baltimore Museum of Art in April, 1948; see below, note 6.

6. Fritz Glarner, Letter to Katherine S. Dreier, May 3, 1948, The Katherine S. Dreier Papers, Yale Collection of American Literature, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.

7. Harry Holtzman, in an interview by the author, March 29, 1979.

has contributed to the authentication process that another category of Mondrian's production, his so-called "wall works," is currently undergoing.

The first of these shows, "Brancusi + Mondrian," held at the Sidney Janis Gallery in December 1982, included twenty-five "paintings, drawings, and watercolors" attributed to Mondrian in the accompanying catalogue. *New York City, New York* was among these works, as were two objects identified as *Wall Work #5* and *Wall Work #6*, both of which were dated (in the catalogue) 1943-44. In fact, *Wall Works #5* and *#6* had been made only six months before the exhibition, in the summer of 1982—constructed out of some of the rectangles of colored cardboard that Holtzman had removed from the walls of Mondrian's New York studio thirty-eight years before. Mounted on plywood and framed behind glass, these compositions were exhibited not only as easel paintings but also as if there were no difference between them and the others beside which they hung. Indeed it was precisely this bracketing between more familiar and authentic images — with which they were obviously meant to be compared — that endowed the "wall works" with a degree of apparent legitimacy. *Wall Work #5*, for example, was displayed alongside *Composition in Color Planes, V*, an oil painting of only slightly smaller dimensions dating from 1917 that also involves the juxtaposition of colored rectangular elements on a white ground. The beholder was presumably expected to believe that Mondrian had explored the same relationship of figure and ground, enclosure and extension, in both of these superficially similar objects. No mention was made of the fact that a frame was crucial to the efficacy of the 1917 oil painting, whereas the "wall work," in its original state within the context of Mondrian's studio, in the early 1940's, had been predicated on the absence of any defining edge. Turning to his right, the visitor to the exhibition encountered *New York City, New York*, whose tapes would supposedly provide a reassuring precedent for the collage elements of which *Wall Work #5* is composed. If he should still harbor a suspicion that Mondrian never made such things as "wall works," he could consult the catalogue, in which he would find a photographic close-up of a portion of Mondrian's studio taken in 1944; it, too, was identified as a "wall work."<sup>8</sup> So the system of reciprocal authentications was complete: individual fragments of the studio's coloristic arrangement had been isolated to create a series of framed objects whose claim to existence was based on an appeal to photographs of the studio. But these, in turn, were no longer simple documents of a total environmental design that had been given "up to 'history'" almost forty years before. Not only were the photographs being called upon to legitimize the newly created objects, they themselves were also being reinterpreted in the pro-

8. See *Brancusi + Mondrian*, New York, Sidney Janis Gallery, December 2-31, 1982, in which the illustration of catalogue number 44 (incorrectly indicated as number 45) is a photograph not of the exhibited *Wall Work #6*, but of the same cardboard forms, as originally mounted in Mondrian's studio.

cess of comparison. The "wall work" objects now functioned as documents, retroactively conferring "wall work" status on isolated areas of Mondrian's studio seen in the photographs.

This equation, or confusion, of art work and document was reinforced by an exhibition mounted by the Museum of Modern Art during the summer of 1983. Entitled "Mondrian: New York Studio Compositions," the show focussed attention on the entire series of eight "wall works," here exhibited together for the first time, in an arrangement closely approximating that of Mondrian's studio. Stripped of their frames and protective glass, the plywood supports were embedded in the walls so that their discreteness as autonomously constituted objects was disguised as much as possible. No longer treated as isolated works of art, the cardboard rectangles reverted to the status of documents insofar as they functioned to reconstruct the coloristic arrangement of the original studio space. The inclusion of two pieces of furniture from the studio added to the effect of authenticity, as did the presence of *Victory Boogie Woogie*, which was hung at one end of the room where it assumed the position it occupies in one of the 1944 photographs. Several of these, in turn, were displayed in two adjacent galleries, alongside the majority of paintings and drawings that comprised the exhibition. One reached the studio reconstruction after passing through these areas, where a wall text explained the relationship of the studio to Mondrian's other work. In a sense the roles of paintings and studio had been reversed: the paintings were marshalled to create a setting for the studio, establishing a conceptual milieu in which that space could be considered not only a work of art, but also an example of the ultimate environmental goal to which Mondrian aspired. Thus reduced to the status of preliminary projects, the paintings, like the photographs, functioned here to document the position of the studio in Mondrian's oeuvre.

All this would be eminently acceptable if the distinction between the studio as a work of art given "up to 'history'" in 1944, and the studio as documented in the reconstruction of 1983, could be maintained. Although the forms of both are the same, the original studio is accessible today only through the photographs that convey its essential character as a lived-in space that was constantly in flux.<sup>9</sup> Of course the reconstruction is valuable for its approximation of the studio's arrangement, but because it includes the actual cardboard rectangles that Mondrian had used, it bears the mark of authenticity, which reopens the question of whether it should be considered a document or a work of art. Complicating the issue is the fact that the reconstruction is really a collection of individual objects: the eight "wall works" temporarily brought together by the museum. So long as these remain together, imbedded in the

9. This is made evident by a photograph showing the many pinholes that dotted Mondrian's studio walls, indicating that the colored rectangles had often been moved around.

museum's walls, their status as disinterested documents can be enforced; but when the exhibition is dismantled and the "wall works" are once again isolated, framed behind glass, they reemerge as those same problematic "Mondrians" to which the Museum of Modern Art has now given an imprimatur of an entirely different value. In this case the desire to document a work of art has been fulfilled only at the risk of participating in the process of making art-works out of materials that ought properly to remain documents. With respect to Mondrian's work, these are not the same thing.

As historians have become interested in the environmental work not only of Mondrian but also of such artists as Theo van Doesburg, Vilmos Huszar, El Lissitzky, and Piet Zwart, galleries, and particularly museums, have responded by producing full-scale reconstructions whose documentary value has sometimes proved far more questionable even than the Museum of Modern Art's recent foray into this area: witness the Stedelijk Van Abbemuseum's "corrected" version of Van Doesburg's 1924 *Flower Room*, which has made numerous appearances since its inauguration in 1968; or the Pace Gallery's 1970 interpretation — in Formica, no less — of Mondrian's *Salon de Madame B . . . , à Dresden*, a design for an interior that had in fact never been executed by the artist.<sup>10</sup> Although these are particularly egregious examples of how documents can be manipulated to ends that thus far appear to have gone largely unexplored, one should not assume that they are entirely unrelated to the scores of reproductions through which a generation of museum visitors has come to know the lost work of Naum Gabo, Katerina Kobro, Alexander Rodchenko, Vladimir Tatlin, and the Stenberg brothers, among many other artists. Even Duchamp's Ready-Mades now exist in thirteen editions of copies signed and numbered by the artist — in themselves an ironic restatement of the issues addressed by the originals. Clearly, the pervasiveness of all such objects, situated in the ambiguous realm between the document and the work of art, and welcomed with increasing frequency into the context of the Museum, demands serious, theoretical attention.

10. These reconstructions are briefly discussed in my book, *The De Stijl Environment*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983, pp. 145, 151, and 208, n. 15.

NOËL CARROLL

Whether, in fact, the hypothetical cabal of Cavell, Danto, and Carroll has been and continues to be more instrumental than Stephen Heath in the professionalization of contemporary cinema studies is a question I leave to informed readers to answer. Heath, at least, says he regards professionalism as reactionary and responds to the epistemological objections propounded in my "Address to the Heathen"<sup>1</sup> by whining that he will not sink to such rank professional preoccupations. It is part of a pernicious conspiracy, Heath would have us believe, to consider epistemology to be the formal inspection and evaluation of theories. Thus, maintaining what he fancies to be his political purity, Heath never addresses the core objections of AH: that suture theory is, strictly speaking, vacuous; that his deployment of psychoanalysis is not properly constrained by consideration of countervailing cognitive-psychological hypotheses; that his analyses of the various mechanics of subject positioning are based on equivocation; that his metaphors are uselessly obscure; that his notion of unity is illicit; that his concept of the cinematic apparatus defies the pragmatic requirements of theory building.

Instead, Heath raises a smokescreen in order to disguise the fact that he is not dealing with issues raised in AH and wastes a great deal of time itemizing my alleged misrepresentations of QC. But surprisingly, nearly half of his complaints—such as his attack of my quotation of Hegel (AH, p. 93)—are extracted from side comments made in my footnotes which are peripheral to the central, still uncontested points made by AH. Perhaps we can explain Heath's footnote fetish by postulating that he takes literally the idea of weighing arguments and that he was unable otherwise to add bulk to the slim PN.

When Heath finally mounts his three sustained counterattacks—concerning perspective, illusion, and interminability—in only one of these, the section

1. In what follows, AH refers to my "Address to the Heathen," in *October*, no. 23 (Winter 1982). QC refers to Stephen Heath's *Questions of Cinema*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1981; PN refers to Heath's "Le Père Noël," *October*, no. 26 (Fall 1983).

on interminability, is he defending himself from objections directed at the core of what is unique to his theory. In the discussions of illusion and perspective he is attacking general introductory points of mine that are not integral to the central epistemological arguments brought against distinctive elements of Heath's theory — such as the apparatus and suture. There is certainly nothing wrong in attacking me. But I am astonished that instead of defending what is unique to his own theory, Heath spends his longest sections rejecting my positions on perspective and illusion in the name of such semioticians as Coleridge. Respecting editorially imposed limitations of space, I shall address only a few of his points.

*Misrepresentation: Or, the Author Is Not Dead*

The frequent lack of logical and grammatical connectives in QC and its strained use of words often make it difficult to ascertain what is being said. I therefore expected that some questions would arise over my characterizations of its substance, but I could not have anticipated misrepresentation as Heath's main line of defense. Retrospectively, it appears that the turgid style of QC is an evasion tactic. The ambiguity of the formulations in QC allows them to be applied under one interpretation, but they can, when challenged, be defended under another interpretation, one that turns an ostensibly radical hypothesis into a truism. For example, Heath depicted the relation of narrative and perspective in cinema as an interlocking system which overcomes the potential disturbances of film movement in virtue of the narrative's capacity to *center* subjects — a capacity which reinforces what sounds like a functionally equivalent effect of perspective (for example, QC, pp. 36–37). But when this is attacked as equivocation, we are told that all that was claimed by the initially obscure text was the paltry and widely known truth that, historically, one finds that perspective paintings have been used to portray narratives. But why does one need the particular terms “centering” and “positioning” if that is all one wants to say? In PN Heath has undertaken a rereading of QC that represents it as a string of self-evident truths whose rejection implies perversion.

*On Point-of-View Editing*

In section iv of PN, Heath rejects my characterization of his account of point-of-view editing as a “perspective system” that is somehow geometrically engineered. Yet in his lengthy introduction to the relation of shots in point-of-view editing, we read:

If in the left of the frame an actor in close-up is looking off right, he has an empty space in front of him; if the following shot shows an empty space to the left and an object to the right, then the actor's look appears to cross an *orientated, rectilinear*, and thus *logical* space: it

seems to bear with *precision* on the object. One has an eye-line match. The look, that is, joins form of expression — the composition of the images and their disposition in relation to one another — and form of content — the definition of the action of the film in the movement of looks, exchanges, objects seen and so on. Point of view develops on the basis of this joining operation of the look, the camera taking the position of a character in order to show the spectator what he or she sees (QC, p. 46, italics added).

The quotation that initiates the preceding passage is from Mitry. And though Heath goes on to criticize Mitry's account of the "subjective image," he never explicitly parts company with the idea that the relation of the character to what he sees in the point-of-view schema is "rectilinear," "orientated," "logical," and "precise."<sup>2</sup> Since Heath has already told us that point-of-view is "a kind of perspective within the perspective system" (QC, p. 44), what are we to make of these claims about rectilinear space? Heath might claim that he neither endorses nor criticizes Mitry on the issue of rectilinear space, but simply drops the quotation as some sort of historical documentation (whose point remains unspecified). Yet even Heath must know that if one quotes a passage, does not criticize it, and employs it materially in one's exposition, then that counts as an endorsement. Clearly, in the section above, Heath bases the "joining operation" of the point-of-view schema on the model of the eye-line match, which is characterized as a logical, rectilinear — shall we say "geometrically accurate" — organization of space.

The preceding discussion of rectilinear space is couched in "appearance talk." This can be interpreted in at least two ways. Saying the space *appears* rectilinear can mean that it *looks* and *is* rectilinear in its construction, just as when I ask if the dean appeared healthy I am asking for accurate information about his state. Or, saying that the space *appears* rectilinear could mean that the space looks rectilinear but that this is a deceptive illusion. Spectators believe the relationship between shots is geometrically precise, but it is not. In AH, I show that neither of these alternatives is relevant to point-of-view editing. It is unnecessary for the editor to arrange point-of-view schemas by means of the rules of perspective nor do audiences mistakenly believe, nor must they mistakenly believe, that the relation of shots in a point-of-view schema is geometrically precise. I emphasize instead that pragmatic considerations of the narrative context will be of prime importance in the reception of the point-of-view structure. Undoubtedly Heath will say that this is his position, but then why did he include that nonsense about logical, rectilinear space?

2. In PN, Heath says that his use of "overlay" indicated that he did not have geometry in mind. Is this supposed nonrelation to geometry part of the dictionary meaning of "overlay," or some well-known jargon usage, or is it a desperate, *ad hoc* invention by Heath?

In addition, Heath misconstrues my invented *King Kong* example. The problem is that if the space is rectilinear, then the image of Darrow should be taken from a high angle about thirty feet overhead, whereas, I contend, the point-of-view schema will work if the shot is taken at eye-level. Moreover, this incongruity will not be explained by the type of account Heath offers of the Gutman case in *Maltese Falcon* because mine is not an example of subjective marking. It is just a violation of rectilinear mapping. But the spectator would understand the cut despite its failure to match the ostensible geometry of the scene.

#### *Causation*

Heath claims that my footnote about his stand on causation is a misrepresentation. I said the analyses in QC are causal (AH, p. 92) because the conception of contradictions—what Heath studies instead of causes—are treated as compelling forces that *produce* states of affairs, because QC explicitly uses the concept of the *causation of the subject* and because the use of metaphors, like those of the cinema machine and the apparatus, strike me as cause-talk. Did Heath deny his analyses are causal? He wrote:

. . . it must be seen that the notion of determination which has proved—or has been made to prove—such a stumbling block for ideological analysis *cannot be conceived of as a problem in cause-and-effect with its answer an explanation from an absolute point of origin* (as though historical materialism were to be, in Engel's words, "easier than the solution of a simple equation in the first degree"). *Analysis will be concerned not with determinations in this mechanistic sense but with contradictions*, it being in the movement of these contradictions that can be grasped the set of determinations—the "structural causality"—focused by a particular social fact, institution or work (QC, pp. 6-7).

I take this as a statement that Heath does not study causation as it is typically understood, but studies something new—"structural causality"—which must be segregated by quotation marks in the manner of a neologism and which is grasped by the movements of contradictions. Heath, of course, refrains from defining any of his terms, but we are left to think that his study is of something other than causality as that is normally conceived.

It seems obvious that the only reason the above passage offers ideological analyses' not being construed as "a problem in cause and effect" is that cause and effect analysis asserts an "absolute point of origin," a totally obscure formulation that is only given the vaguest explication in terms of some sort of analogy with the facility of solving equations in the first degree. But the ordinary notion of cause and effect is not tied to expression in such restricted math-

ematical terms. Moreover, I see no reason to think that "structural causality" is at all different from causality *simpliciter* and certainly not in virtue of some demonstrated difference in the symbolic formulations of these concepts.

In PN, Heath parenthetically defines "point of origin" in a new way. Now it indicates that the study of ideology should not be economist. OK. But this still does not show that "structural causality" traffics in "contradictions" that are different from ordinary causes and effects.

*In Praise of Lacan*

Section vi of PN is devoted to a throwaway remark that I make in a footnote in which I say that Heath congratulates Lacan for the discovery of *lalangue*. In QC (p. 80), Heath asserts that *lalangue* overcomes shortcomings of the *langue/parole* distinction vis-à-vis understanding the subject in language. Given Heath's commitments, isn't this something that recommends *lalangue* to the serious film theorist (even if Heath may want to modify other aspects of Lacan)?

What is so peculiar about this little distraction of Heath's is that he ignores the fact that my footnote is attached to one of the most damning objections I make against suture theory. In order to avoid vacuity, a theory must not only explain why x is the case but also under what circumstances x would not be the case. If I attempted to explain both why a certain flower would live and why it would die by saying "God wills it," my explanation would be vacuous. Similarly, Heath deals with both classical Hollywood films and structuralist-materialist films in terms of suture. There seems to be nothing an avant-garde filmmaker can do to achieve nonsuture; attempts to subvert suture result instead in an intensity of meaning. Thus, by explaining everything, suture explains nothing. Since it is this rather deep issue which preoccupies the page of AH that Heath concerns himself with, why is he wasting space on the question of whether or not he is congratulating Lacan?

*Lumière*

In PN vii, Heath reproduces two paragraphs from my footnote 31 (AH, p. 115). In one paragraph I present Heath's discussion of Lumière and also something called the "reproduction thesis," while in the other paragraph I comment that Heath *seems* to be arguing that what is wrong with the reproduction thesis is that in saying films reproduce reality it ignores the issue of selection. By using the word "seems," I was signalling that one could not be certain of what Heath was claiming. I thought he was asserting that Lumière's claims about his films were incorrect because the films were not objective insofar as they were representations of "chosen subjects," and that, furthermore, this ob-

jection could be extended to the claims of the reproduction thesis. Searching Heath's original passage (QC, p. 4), one finds *no other reason* given for whatever the problem is with the reproduction thesis except that images are chosen subjects about which we have the right to ask the why and the wherefore of their choice. I spoke of *selection* and Heath uses *choice*. But I do not see how my use of a synonymous characterization of the problem should raise any difficulties.

Heath believes that I misconstrued that which he was identifying as the problem. Whereas I thought the problem concerned objectivity, Heath holds the issue is that the reproduction thesis overlooks that films have ideological contents and usages. And selectivity is offered as the explicit mark of this ideological implication. But then are not films always bound to be ideological? And if they are ideological, doesn't that exclude them from the realm of objectivity? In most usages, to be ideological entails a failure in objectivity. Moreover, Heath himself has said that this section of QC is heavily Althusserian. And does that not imply that if films are ideological, then they at least are not scientifically objective (in the somewhat extended sense of science Althusser employs)? Furthermore, what beyond the fact that images are selected from somewhere for a chosen use is given by Heath as a reason to hold that the images are somehow problematic?

Heath implies that he has some really complex notion of objectivity that would not fall afoul of my simplistic objections. But the burden of producing that account is his; he does not refute me by merely suggesting that he has such an unspecified concept up his sleeve. Also, when he produces this concept of objectivity, we will still have to return to the passage in question to see how the argument there fares in light of this secret definition. Lastly, Heath says I have an entity-view of objectivity. I would have thought that my repeated emphasis on the methodology and practice of rational inquiry would have more than suggested that my notion of objectivity is not an entity-view, but a pragmatic view.

#### *Unity and Production*

In PN iii, Heath accuses me of falsely attributing to him the belief that "a coherent narrative film is not really a unity unless it reveals that it is a production—a fictional world constructed by a team of cineastes and by a process of suture" (AH, pp. 151-152). But Heath has wrenched this sentence out of context. In fact, the idea is not attributed to him. It occurs within a series of proleptic arguments by which I attempt to imagine and to refute counterarguments that a "follower of Heath" (AH, p. 151) *might* attempt to concoct in order to deal with my objections to one of Heath's "interminability arguments." I assume that prolepsis is a respectable strategy in rational inquiry. Its purpose is to foreclose certain directions of argument before they are proposed. Heath

may not think that this particular line of argument is worth foreclosing, but he cannot claim that I have said he holds the position in question. I am only warning interested parties to steer clear of this option.

Heath thinks the countermove I envision is extremely ill-advised. So do I. For once, Heath and I agree. Our disagreement, I surmise, is that Heath does not believe anyone would try this gambit. But I have heard the claim that this or that film is not unified exactly because its various processes of production (specified according to the *parti pris* of the commentator) are not acknowledged. But, then, it would follow that were the film unified, it would acknowledge its processes of production. Given the dialectics of the filmworld, I believe that such an argument might be mounted, since it is entailed by the strategy that discovers failures of unity on the basis of a work's masking that it is a production. I agree with Heath that it is a confused position, one whose very manner of implementation is not straightforwardly intelligible. That, of course, was my point.

*Unity and Diversity*

In PN ii, Heath completely misrepresents the issue. I hold that within the Western tradition of the arts — to which, as a matter of historical fact, narrative film belongs — spectators are instructed to derive aesthetic pleasure from the relations of coherence between the complex and diverse elements that comprise artworks. We learn to attend to patterns of notes, recurring plot motifs, systematic character contrasts, correlations between formal elements and themes, and so on. For this sort of appreciation to occur we must presuppose that the spectator knows that the artwork and/or film is composed of heterogeneous elements and dimensions. That is, I deny that in the tension between unity and heterogeneity there is a point where some totalizing impression of homogeneity dominates the spectator.

I do not deny that at certain stages in his account, Heath does imply that pleasure comes from the play of unity and diversity. But for Heath it appears that an illusion of homogenizing totality always prevails, at least as far as the spectator's experience is concerned. The fiction film works to produce an illusion of homogeneity for the spectator; that is, the spectator fails to recognize that the film is a heterogeneity. But this is what I reject — the idea that there is any point where the spectator is overwhelmed by an impression of homogeneity so compelling that all recognition of heterogeneity disappears.

In AH, I based my contention that spectators are not swept away by illusions of homogeneity on the grounds that artworks and/or films are explicitly disseminated within our tradition as unities-in-diversities rather than as homogeneities per se. In addition, when asked why they think such and such a film is unified, spectators report "because the film's parts hang together" and

not because they, the spectators, undergo some ecstatic ALL-IS-ONE experience. And, of course, "unity" is always unity in terms of something—parts, elements, aspects, dimensions, and so on. So to experience unity is to experience the unification of *parts*. There is no homogeneity per se, though QC appears to assert that for the spectator viewing film, there is some overriding illusion of this sort.

Heath muddies the waters by saying that he, as observer and theoretician, knows both that spectator pleasure in films, at certain stages, results in the tension between unity and diversity, and that, again as a theorist, he knows films are heterogeneous. I never disputed that as a theorist he upheld these beliefs. Rather, I question the validity of his theoretical claim that *spectators* are ultimately overwhelmed by the homogeneity effect.<sup>3</sup>

#### *Interpellation*

I wrote, "Heath's basic premise is that a prime function of ideology is to construct subjects. (This is also known as positioning or 'interpellating' subjects)" (AH, p. 91). Heath counterposes this to part of a sentence from QC that says, among other things, that interpellation is not the key to ideology. Clearly I made some error, but it is not, I believe, one that has deep repercussions for later criticisms in AH, especially those involving objections to Heath's suture theory.

My primary claim in the preceding quotation is not challenged by Heath, viz., that ideology is concerned to construct subjects. My error is in parenthetically defining "subject construction" by means of "interpellation," whereas interpellation is only an element in subject construction. The subject is not simply positioned by the ideological address but there is also interaction between the subject (subjectivity) and discourse—the subject sutures or fills in the discourse. Thus, adding part of what is deleted in PN, "interpellation can in no way be the key either to ideology or to subjectivity (the fact of the individual), *the two being held as interdependent*" (QC, p. 103, italics added).

What is the consequence of this? It suggests that my initial account of Heath's program is too Althusserian, but, then, Heath himself admits that he is initially Althusserian. By the time Heath develops the concept of suture and the importance of the subject's part, however, I am explicitly aware that the emphasis has been added to the subject's "filling-in" operation and my criticisms accommodate this (e.g., AH, p. 131). That is, when Heath presents us

3. Heath discusses the culminating homogeneity of narrative film in his "simple definition" of film narrative in QC, p. 136. A rereading of this *definition* makes me wonder why Heath believes it inappropriate for me to remind him that opening scenes need not be repeated at the end of narrative films. For in that definition Heath says that S, which is defined as an initial *state*, leads to S', which is a return to S.

with his version of suture, which is meant to overcome the simplicities of the initial Althusserian allegiances, my arguments against his position have followed apace and gained in complexity. Specifically, I contest his psychoanalytic account of the subject's suturing of film discourse by means of an alternative cognitive-psychological perspective. That Heath realizes that my initial elision of subject construction and interpellation cannot be traced to my ensuing, detailed attacks on his theory is shown by the fact that he finds the error in no later sections of AH.

### *Interminability*

Heath begins his section "Interminability" by misrepresenting me. In AH (pp. 140-141), I opened with a brief contextualizing remark to the effect that there is a widespread tendency nowadays to regard texts as in some sense infinite. I mentioned two positions within this trend: that each reader has his own meaning, and that since words are interdefined they are claimed to lead to infinite semiosis. Heath vociferously spurns allegiance to these tenets. Why does he bother? I never attributed them to him. I specified that he has his own position which is concerned with ceaseless subject construction.

Another major misinterpretation in this section is the fantasy that my objections to Heath's position are grounded in speech act theory. Admittedly, I attempt to make the enounced/enunciation distinction intelligible to English-speaking readers by stipulatively reframing it as a distinction between a statement and a speech act (AH, p. 148). But no reference is made to the formal machinery of speech act theory, nor does any argument rely on this theory. If I had meant to employ it, I would have introduced it explicitly as I have done in the past when I have employed it.<sup>4</sup> Instead, all I did was to Anglicize the enounced/enunciation distinction.

In my original attack on Heath's use of the enounced/enunciation distinction I stressed (a) that I did not see how this distinction established a pervasive *split* in the subject, and (b) that I did not see how any such split in the subject in linguistic representations could be extrapolated to cinematic representation. I offered a battery of arguments to show that the mere fact of the distinction did not portend a *split*. And I also searched for an argument from Heath which would demonstrate that the distinction entailed a split subject. In his response, Heath still refrains from supplying an argument, preferring oracular, apodictic pronouncements. He writes, "Carroll refuses the distinction but if by some misfortune he can't get rid of it, then he'd rather be two whole subjects than a

4. See my "Language and Cinema: Preliminary Notes for a Theory of Verbal Images," in *Millennium Film Journal* #7/8/9. N.B.: I am not now chiding Heath for failing to have read this piece nor can anyone who has read AH *honestly* claim that I reproached Heath for not being familiar with my writing.

split, a subject in process. Still, split there is, of the subject in language which is more than the positions, the representations ceaselessly effected and assumed" (PN, p. 107). Of course, I never said the distinction couldn't be made; I only questioned whether it entailed a split subject. All Heath has done in response is to beg the question by asserting that there is a split.

Heath challenges my dissolution of the supposed subject split in the case of the statement, "When I think what a healthy child I once was" (QC, p. 117). The nature of Heath's rebuttal is a rhetorical question which for some unstated reason he believes I can't answer. He demands to know the criteria by which I count the adult and the sickly child as the same enduring substance. To meet Heath's attack I need only produce the requested criteria. So: A is the same person as B if and only if A and B have the same (i.e., numerically the same) mental states and perform the same (numerically the same) actions. Here the criteria are stated tenselessly. But we can apply this format to the sickly child/adult case in the following way: An adult, A, is the same person as the child, B, if and only if the mental states that A possesses and the actions that A performs are the same actions (numerically) that B will perform and the same mental states (numerically) that B will have.

Heath charges that I have no place for the unconscious in my framework; this is false, since I endorse the concept when employed under the proper constraints (AH, pp. 131-132). Indeed, I even propose the way in which the unconscious will figure in questions of numerical identity (AH, p. 101). Since the unconscious will count as some sort of mental state, then if A and B are the same person, they will have the numerically same unconscious states, motives, intentions, and so forth.

Heath asks whether the kind of thing I identify as a continuing entity is a mind or a body. This, I think, places the question at the wrong level of abstraction. The self-identifiable sickly child/adult persists under the sortal-concept *human being* rather than under that of either mind or body. Heath may be asking what makes something a member of the class human being, but this is logically separate from and not directly relevant to the debate about the metaphysical conditions for numerical individuation. Nor do I believe that the question of what a human being is will be answered by an unqualified vote for mind or body. But again this is a separate matter from that which is at stake: the request for criteria that would be operable for use with questions of numerical identity such as Heath asks in PN footnote 59.<sup>5</sup>

5. Here Heath unleashes a barrage of vague and confusedly connected questions. He challenges the idea of a substance by saying it is a major philosophical topic. But I have no idea of how to respond to such an unfocused observation. What specific inadequacy is this weighty aside supposed to reveal about my position? Also Heath's suspicion that I am talking about bodies when I speak of identifying continuing entities seems to confuse epistemological questions about the public criteria for how we say A is the same as B with metaphysical questions about the criteria for numerically individuating human persons where A = B. Moreover, I do not understand what Heath means in footnote 59, PN, by claiming that the enduring subject cannot be

Among the linguistic phenomena to which Heath briefly alludes as evidence of subject splits is the future tense. This is adduced to meet my challenge to him to specify some third-person subject splits insofar as the best evidence Heath offers for subject splits in QC is based on a first person case of the liar paradox. I can almost grasp why someone might imagine that the liar paradox suggests some kind of split. But the future tense can hardly be worked into even such a loose, intuitive suggestion. If I say "That naval officer will be the next King," where is the split subject? There are not two grammatical subjects. Nor are there two ontological subjects, that is, two distinct referents: the naval officer and the King. For the naval officer and the King are the same human being. The only way to derive two subjects would be to attempt to argue that the naval officer is not *now* the King. The entity in question, however, is not standardly individuated under the sortal-concept *naval officer* but under that of *human being*. Furthermore, even if there were split subjects in future-tense, linguistic representations, what would that have to do with film? Film lacks a system of tenses. Moreover, were one metaphorically to extend the idea of tenses to film (e.g., to say that flashbacks were in the past tense), one would still have to admit that the (metaphorically characterized) use of the future tense in film (flashforwards?) is very rare. Hence, if Heath means to base the putative existence of subject splits in film on the idea of a filmic future tense, then he must acknowledge that such splits are infrequent, rather than generic phenomena obtaining in all cinematic representations.

As evidence for subject splits, Heath, omnisciently, writes:

When Carroll brings out his "in a certain patriarchal way of speaking, it is said that a woman is not complete until she has borne a child," we still have an enounced and an enunciation, a statement and the fact of its production, with Carroll implicated there as a subject. That he projects his distance as ego, proposes himself as subject-master of a simple analogy that in no sense concerns him and is just a term in the pure reason of an argument devoid of any "I," does not stop the discursive act, the reality of the production of the utterance, the involvement of him in that produced utterance quite differently from the projected place of his subject-mastery (PN, pp. 106-107).

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*reflected* in language. If he means that identity conditions cannot be stated then he will have to demonstrate the failure of the proposal above. If he means that the enounced/enunciation distinction blocks my regarding the sickly child and the adult as ontologically the same person, then he has merely begged the question again. Heath's talk of my supposed commitment to a "pre-anything I" leads me to think that he is confusing empirical questions of genetic psychology, on the one hand, with logical, ontological, and linguistic questions of reference. If Heath means to establish the split subject on the basis of maturation, let him bring forward evidence from developmental psychology and not from the philosophy of language.

Where are we to locate the subject split in my utterance? There are not two grammatical subjects in its main clause. Moreover, the sentence in question does not split the reference of what it identifies as a common mode of speech in our culture. I wrote the sentence, reporting a linguistic practice that I do not indulge in. But for whom does this constitute a split? For the reader? Why? He knows the article was written by me; that I write about others does not split the reader's identity. Nor am I split because I speak of others. Yes, one can make a distinction between me and those I write about. But exactly where is the division or split to be found—that is, in what *ostensible subject*? Heath maliciously charges that I had an immoral intent in writing the given sentence. The theoretical issue, however, should not be obscured by the slander. If *x* has a motive for uttering a sentence, but the motive is not expressed in the utterance—*x* says “The apples are delicious” in order to please the neighbor who grew them—neither *x* himself nor anyone who overhears him is split, though each is numerically distinct from the other. What possible connection could this kind of case have to Heath's other purported evidence of splits in language: the liar paradox and the future tense? You can only lump all this disparate material together by free association if you start out by trying to find something in every case that can equivocatingly be described by some connotation of the word “split.” But that is to accept antecedently the notion of a split rather than to demonstrate its acceptability.

In the preceding passage from Heath, the enounced/enunciation distinction is identified as that between the statement and the fact of its production. If, in certain cases, there is a distinction between the grammatical subject of a statement and the speaker, whom one might call a psychological subject—who, moreover, is distinct from the psychological subjects who hear the statement—how do these admitted distinctions, of which it makes no sense to say that they are masked in ordinary language, portend a split in any of the subjects isolated by our distinctions? The liar paradox might be advertized as “splitting” the grammatical subject in some ill-defined way, but Heath fails, except by way of his unwavering ambiguity concerning the reference of the term “subject,” to demonstrate how any psychological subject is split in language or in representation in general.

Heath spends a great deal of energy attacking an analogy that I draw between films and cars. I introduced the analogy to short-circuit an opposition between the film as enounced in the past versus the film as present enunciation, which opposition seems to suggest that the film is in some univocal sense both complete and not complete. Heath writes, “A film is always finished, enounced; and finished, enounced even in its enunciation which is given, fixed, repeated at every ‘showing’ or ‘screening’” (QC, p. 216). And in the next paragraph he adds, “Yet in that fixity, that givenness, there is nevertheless, the making of the film by the spectator.” Initially I thought that this was meant to propound a

paradox because I thought that the liar paradox was the model for the enounced/enunciation distinction. Now apparently Heath rejects the idea that the distinction entails a paradox, though, as I have shown, this is advanced at the cost of sacrificing what little evidence there is for the idea of subject splits. Even if there is not meant to be an outright paradox in Heath's formulation, however, I still think that the argument that employs the car/film analogy is worth making because the apparent opposition Heath still insinuates needs dissolving.

The opposition above appears to be that the film is complete as a production (*yet, nevertheless*) also remains to be completed by spectators, that is, sutured, made coherent, filled in. Notice, first, that we have moved from a relation between a speaker and his production to that of a message and its receiver. But also there is no opposition here. The film is an *embodied* object (not a physical object *simpliciter*) which is complete in terms of its construction *as a numerically distinct* entity before its release, while it is also an object for use that remains to be completed, that is, to *fulfill the purpose for which it was made*. Hence, there is no *univocal* sense in which it is both complete and not complete. It is complete in the sense of having been constructed as an object even if it has yet to be "completed" in the extended sense of fulfilling its purpose. Thus, there is nothing theoretically interesting in the fixity/present enunciation, complete/not complete opposition. Indeed, there is no opposition if we explicate the terms at issue. If there were, we could call every object made for use, like a car, both complete and not complete. But this seems absurd.

Heath challenges this argument by attacking the car/film analogy. Films are different from cars; for example, films communicate, cars transport. But how do these and other disanalogies show that films can be said to be complete and not complete in some univocal sense while cars cannot be?

#### *Illusion*

Heath begins "Brecht" with a few self-serving misreadings of "A Brief Digression: The Legacy of Brecht's Errors" (AH, pp. 103-109). In this section I was primarily attacking a tendency of '70s film theory that castigated the visual dimension of mimetic cinema as illusionistic, an idea that film theorists unquestionably associated with Brecht. Heath complains that neither he nor Brecht believes that cases of visual representation prompt illusions.

The case for Brecht is mixed. Some passages (e.g., AH, p. 104) show that Brecht did slip into illusion/delusion talk. On the other hand, I explicitly acknowledge the existence of other writings which suggest that the passages that I quote may not reflect the core of Brecht's thinking (AH, p. 104). I then note, however, that the illusion/delusion thesis, which film scholars thought they got from Brecht, was still worth attacking because of its influence on film

studies. Since I make it clear that it is film studies and not Brecht that is under fire, why does Heath waste his energy vindicating Brecht?

Furthermore, I never attributed a simple illusion/delusion model to Heath but refer (AH, pp. 108, 109, 141) to his position as a variation on the Brechtian framework—one that demands an entirely unique set of counter-arguments. Indeed, my attack on the simple illusion/delusion model is called “A Digression” because it *precedes* the attack on QC.

In this section my basic thesis is that the characterization of the relation between film spectators and what they see in terms of illusions is misguided. For anything that is properly called a visual illusion either deceives or is liable to deceive normal percipients in standard viewing conditions. But cinematic images are not illusions in this sense. For example, information derived from binocular and motion parallax in standard conditions quickly reveals that cinematic images are two-dimensional, not three-dimensional stimuli.

In addition, surface irregularities such as scratches, grain, flickers, marks for reel changes, the glow of reflected light, and so on require that the film viewer “see through” the medium to comprehend the represented scene. But to “see through” these irregularities must presuppose that the percipient knows it is viewing a cinematic image. Likewise, many of the institutionalized, appreciative responses to films presuppose our knowledge that cinematic images are representations. For example, to commend a film as *lifelike* entails that the film is being compared knowingly to something *else*—obviously what the film represents. The illusion/delusion theorist, however, holds that the viewer believes the cinematic image is its referent. But if normal practices entail that viewers know they are watching cinematic images, then it follows that the normal viewer believes he is viewing cinematic images and not their referents. That is, combining the illusion/delusion theory with certain ordinary facts about cinema viewing we derive a contradiction—that the viewer both believes and does not believe he is viewing cinematic images.

I suggest that we dissolve this contradiction by abandoning as contrary to fact the proposition that people in any literal sense believe that cinematic images are the referents of said images. Instead, let us say that spectators regard cinematic images as representations of objects and events in virtue of a delimited range of recognizable similarities that obtain visually between the image and what it denotes. This rids us of the idea of illusion which is not only empirically outlandish, but which also affords us no particular explanatory advantages over a recognizability model. That is, we can explain why films are engaging, exciting, enthralling, and so on because people recognize the events the films stand for and viewers are so moved by such events. We learn nothing about movie responses by saying people believe they are in the presence of the actual referents of cinematic images. Indeed, such a theory would have to become very complex to explain why no one flees from Godzilla.

The most dazzling portions of Heath's section on illusion are his attempts to show that my position is self-contradictory. Heath uniformly essays this by taking my original sentences out of context, changing their meaning, and juxtaposing his version of what I say to snippets from other sections of AH. Heath quotes my "Most plays and films, when seen in standard viewing conditions, don't look like events and locales outside the theater" (AH, p. 106). He interprets this as a blanket statement "denying that plays and films can have relations of looking like events and locales" (PN, p. 94). Heath then notes that this does not correspond to my use of resemblance elsewhere, since I say that mimetic pictures refer by way of resembling objects (AH, p. 113). But tellingly, Heath drops the qualification that I consistently make: that resemblance in mimesis is always in terms of resemblance in certain respects, that is, not exact resemblance.

Heath's refutation hinges on the interpretation one gives to "like" in the original statement (AH, p. 106). It occurs in a paragraph concerned to argue that people don't mistake things such as film images for their referents because of the dissimilarities between film images and what they are images of. In this context, "don't look like" obviously means that film images cannot be taken as having *exactly* the same visual properties as their referents. That "like" can mean having "*exactly* the same qualities" is a perfectly acceptable dictionary sense, and it is obviously the appropriate meaning given my context. Images from *Rio Lobo* don't look exactly like what they represent nor do they look exactly like Wooster Street. Thus, I can keep the three things separate. On the other hand, when I say mimetic pictures resemble their referents, I carefully add that this is resemblance in certain respects. It is not contradictory to assert that cinematic images do not share exactly all the visual qualities of their referents—indeed they don't share enough to fool people normally—while also maintaining that these images share some recognizable visual characteristics with their referents. My original statement was not a blanket denial of the possibility of *any* similarities, but a denial that cinematic images look exactly like their referents. I neither contradicted myself nor did I foreclose the possibility of the existence of some recognizable similarities between cinematic images and what they denote.<sup>6</sup>

Heath then abruptly jumps to a different discussion in which he tears a passage of mine out of context, cutting into the argument midway so that no one can tell either what distinctions are being made or why. The section under dispute comes from AH, pp. 115–116. In the broader context, what is at

6. Heath wonders why I employ "Most" in my statement. This was simply to allow for the possibility that there may sometime be some isolated case where the standard viewing condition does provide an exact likeness. I know of no such case, but I did not wish to say that it is absolutely impossible that someone might stage a counterexample that would fool viewers. For the time being, however, we should not build our theories on such far-off possibilities.

issue here is whether or not we identify the camera image with our own vision. I deny that we do. I claim that if we did, we would phenomenologically experience the image in its entirety as co-extensive with our visual field. We would be "inside" the visual field of the camera image as we are "inside" our own sensations and perceptions. But this "insideness" does not characterize our experience of camera images. Most of the time the camera "sees" more than we do; its boundary is wider than ours. Characteristically we can only focus on those portions of the image where there is action. The visual field of the camera affords possibilities of perception. It enables us to scan and to gather new sensations and perceptions from the self-same image as, for example, when a new detail appears in the background of a deep-focus shot.

We look *at* camera images; we don't see-in them, that is, we treat the image (as a whole) as existing independently from our sensations rather than treating the image (as a whole) as a replica of our occurrent perception. We are "outside" the image as a whole rather than experiencing the image (as a whole) as though it were co-extensive with our perception (i.e., as if we were "inside" the projector beam in the way we always feel "inside" the visual boundary of our occurrent perceptions).

What is being compared here as more similar is the experience of looking at cinema images and the experience of looking at reality, and these are analogized in terms of a feeling of the existence of something independent of our perception — a feeling of "outsideness" that accompanies both. I claim that this makes *seeing* a motion picture like seeing a real/nonrepresentational event. But I add that it is only in virtue of this specified comparison that I introduce the Cavellian notion that the *experience* of viewing a film is like our *experience* of viewing the world — that is, we look *at* both. Heath brings forth a contradiction by noting that ten pages earlier I said that most films do not look like events. Well, again, it is not contradictory to say that films do not look *exactly* like the events they denote, but that they do bear similarities to the originals in some respects. Moreover, Heath claims that my stipulation of "outsideness" as the only relevant point of comparison is wrong because there are other points of resemblance. But with this argument Heath misconstrues what it is I am comparing. The screen image is not being compared to the event. At this point, what I am discussing is the comparison of the *experience* of seeing a picture with the *experience* of seeing an event. Here the only pertinent similarity I find is "outsideness." The fact that the image and the event may resemble each other in many more respects is irrelevant to the question of how the experiences *qua* experiences feel similar. What other phenomenological similarities does Heath think obtain between these experiences?

When Heath parodies my denial that we take film images as real in any sense, he is at his most willfully myopic as a reader. Mine is unquestionably a statement made in an argument where what is presupposed as relevant is the standard dichotomy between representations of things and real things in

themselves. What I am asserting is that we do not take cinematic representations of things to be the very three-dimensional objects and events they depict. Obviously camera images are also existing objects (both physical and phenomenal). But in the argument in question the dichotomy between real thing and nonexistent thing is never at issue.

Throughout my attack on cine-Brechtianism I explicitly rely on a strong sense of illusion, a deception sense. I admit that there may be a weaker sense in which any pictorial representation is called an illusion if it shares a specifiable range of recognizable visual similarities with the kind of entity or action it depicts (AH, p. 106). But I explicitly oppose this weaker sense; and I do not believe theorists should use it, including Gibson, White, Hagan, Gombrich, et al, with whom I agree on other matters.

Heath wants to defend the weak sense of illusion. He characterizes film viewing in terms of having "a belief that one is watching *a kind of reality of life.*" One reading of this less than luminous notion might be that we see that a given film has certain recognizable similarities to something else, viz., to what it depicts (whether living or *dead* or *inanimate*). But then why connect this to the notion of "illusion?" What is to be gained by formulating the connection as one of illusion rather than one of recognizability? Of course, Heath may have something more in mind by his obscure "kind of reality of life," but until he defines this expression, what he means is anyone's guess, though it does sound like the strong sense of illusion.

If we discard the notion of illusion, we can characterize our emotional, aesthetic, and intellectual responses to films by saying that we know that a given film represents x (or, represents x as-a-so-and-so), something we find gripping, involving, exciting, boring, funny, historically accurate, anachronistic, engrossing, and so on. Why do I have to feel that I am in India in order to be uplifted by *Ghandi* or to be impressed by its historical details (indeed, how could I be impressed by its *historical* details if I thought I was with Ghandi in India)? Can't I simply recognize that the film depicts the kind of courageous life that excites me and that the film incorporates more period details than many other films I have seen of India? Heath should explain what the weak sense of illusion allows him to account for that another explication in terms of knowledge and recognizable similarities cannot. Instead Heath only recycles old saws such as that of the suspension of disbelief, an unlikely hypothesis that proposes that we are always, contrary to all available phenomenological evidence, thrusting ourselves into a special cognitive state whenever we encounter representations.

#### *Perspective*

Heath begins his discussion of perspective by denying that he holds a deception sense of illusion. But in his introduction to the topic of perspective,

he quotes his own statement (QC, p. 28) in which he points out that a component element of the account of perspective on which he relies is "deceptive illusion." Heath never rescinds or qualifies this aspect of the operating definition of perspective in his essay. He also refers to Renaissance perspective as a "trap for the look" (QC, p. 70). This is a strange mode of expression for one who does not wish to cast perspective in a pejorative light.

Is Heath a conventionalist as regards perspective? He claims that in painting from the Quattrocento onwards "there is a real utopianism at work, the construction of a *code*—in every sense a vision—projected onto a reality to be gained in all its hoped-for clarity much more than onto some naturally given reality" (QC, p. 29, italics added). Heath makes clear that he believes that the alleged fidelity of perspective is really a matter of our cultural habituation to this code both in his unqualified quotations of P. Francastel and also in his statement that "For five centuries men and women exist at ease in that space; the Quattrocento system provides a practical representation of the world which in time appears so natural as to offer its real representation, the immediate translation of reality itself" (QC, pp. 29–30).

Characteristically, Heath sets some red herrings swimming. He points out that there are some very convincing perspective illusions. So what? I never denied that it was possible to construct deceptive visual illusions—consider the Ames experiments.<sup>7</sup> My point throughout was that such rare cases are not the primary data for discussing the standard practices of representation in our culture. Heath wonders why I do not consider the use of perspective apart from pictures. Why should I? Isn't our disagreement about pictorial perspective? Heath insinuates that I wrongly accuse him of claiming that perspective uniquely suits capitalism. But the *footnote* in question (AH, p. 114) makes no mention of Heath and it explicitly cites Brakhage and Berger as proponents of this view. Heath also repeatedly suggests that I correlate perspective and truth despite the fact that I explicitly reject this correlation in favor of the notion of pictorial fidelity (AH, p. 114). Throughout his rebuttal, Heath produces examples of theorists who describe perspective in terms of illusion. In AH (p. 111) I acknowledged that this would be easy to do. My question was whether this traditionalist position was correct. And, of course, I never deny that conventions are involved in representation. Most of my arguments throughout AH emphasize the importance of conventions. I only attack the conventionalist position on *perspective* that Heath and Francastel seem to be proposing.

Heath's frontal attacks on my account of perspective fail dismally. He claims that I say perspective is accurate, but that it is not. It shows railroad tracks converging, but this is false. Yet if he looks at my position, he will note that I say I am dealing with *accuracy as a matter of degree* (AH, p. 112). I say that

7. See, for example, the chair-illusion that is illustrated in R. L. Gregory, *The Intelligent Eye*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1970, p. 29.

perspective is *more* accurate than competing mimetic pictorial systems. It is perfectly compatible to hold this while also admitting that the system may contain inaccuracies.

Heath challenges my claim about perspective's relative superiority vis-à-vis spatial accuracy by means of a counterexample: English Ordinance Survey Maps. I do not know whether there is something special about these maps since I have been unable to acquire one. If they are like American road maps, however, then it is clear that they are not viable counterexamples to my thesis. I claimed that perspective is more accurate in terms of affording spatial information than any other mimetic *pictorial* system. Maps are not pictures. One must be taught to read a map; the mountains on a map are not recognized perceptually as mountains but are coded, often by color. Heath believes that I cannot exclude maps from consideration unless I define mimetic pictorial systems in a circular fashion, using perspective as my species differentia. False. I do not use perspective as a condition for picturing. Rather pictures are, in part, objects that have visually recognizable similarities to their referents such that we can perceptually identify what they refer to. Maps are read, not recognized.

Heath claims that my assertion that perspective is the only mimetic pictorial system grounded in scientific laws is a tautology. Why? The Japanese floating-eye style, the ancient Egyptian frontal-eye style, and what Deregowski calls split-type drawings<sup>8</sup> are all examples of mimetic pictorial systems but they are not grounded in scientific laws. That perspective is and these other systems are not is a fact and not a matter of logic or meaning.

Heath's most important attack on my characterization of perspective is that in using the concept of "appearance" in my account I unwittingly contradict myself. That is, I claim to portray perspective without reference to illusion or to replicas of vision. Yet, purportedly, by speaking of appearance I have covertly smuggled both these elements into my position. I say perspective, compared to other mimetic, pictorial systems, is more accurate in terms of affording spatial information — that is, information about the appearance of the relative disposition of objects in space. Heath interprets this to mean that "perspective gives us accurate information not as to true distance but as to appearance, appearance to the eye" (PN, p. 85). And "'appearance' in 'Address' shores up a version of the eye/camera analogy" (PN, p. 86).

The word "appearance," however, need not mean "illusion," nor was I using it in that sense. When a policeman questions witnesses about the appearance of a bank robber, the last thing he wants is a report of an illusion. He is requesting a description, a veridical one, of the visible characteristics of the culprit. Except for certain contexts, such as Platonic dialogues, where the

8. Jan B. Deregowski, "Illusion and Culture," in R. L. Gregory and E. H. Gombrich, ed., *Illusion, Nature and Art*, New York, Scribners, 1973, p. 183.

operative dichotomy is Appearance versus Reality, an appearance is the outward aspect of any physical thing. There is no reason to suspect that in ordinary language "The milk appears spoiled" means "The milk is not spoiled." Talk about appearances can be talk about how things are, not about illusions.

Also, talk of appearances need not refer to a particular instance of vision, that is, to a specific occurrent visual experience, but may refer to what is visible.<sup>9</sup> That is, a perspective picture described as affording spatial information about appearances is not being characterized as providing a phenomenologically recognizable replica of a specific act or kind of act of vision but as providing information about the structure of ambient light in an optic array which, in turn, is the sort of thing from which humans derive reliable information about the layout of things in space. I used the word "appearance" to signal that the spatial information in perspective paintings is visual. That's not controversial, I hope. But my commitment to perspective paintings affording information about the structure of light in optical arrays hardly commits me to the belief that perspective is a point-perfect replica of the experience of normal seeing. It is not a representation of seeing; it affords spatial information from the optical structure—from the appearance—of the layout of the environment. Moreover, the information afforded by perspective is *more accurate* than that available from any competing, mimetic pictorial system.

Just about the funniest thing that Heath ever read is a claim I make in a footnote (AH, p. 114) that perspective responds to a deep, biologically motivated concern with where things stand in space. I made this point to refute the suggestions of Brakhage and Berger that perspective somehow uniquely suits capitalism. Also, by reference to this biological, evolutionary factor, I think that we can explain the rapid and easy dissemination of perspective across cultures and economic systems. Surely such an explanation seems more plausible than the vision of armed coercion insinuated by Heath's quotation of Francastel: "[W]ith their technical superiority, they [the Europeans] imposed that [Quattrocento] space over the planet" (QC, p. 29).

Of course, I never say or imply that hunter-gatherers and shipping magnates use perspective drawings in the manner of maps. Nor do I deny that one can write a useful history about a given culture's adoption of perspective. My only point, *contra* Heath, is that biological considerations have some place in our explanations of pictorial representation. Not everything is reducible to social/economic/ideological history.

Heath suggests that I am an extreme empiricist, yet he never defines what he means by *empiricist* except by way of a silly metaphor about stumbling over laws and some mystical gibberish about the world's not containing knowledge

9. I owe the distinction between vision and the visible to John L. Ward, who proposed it to me in a letter dated June 30, 1983. Also, for simplicity's sake, I am dealing throughout this section with cases where the picture is of an existing person, place, or thing. Certain readily available complications must be added to deal with representations of invented entities and events.

of itself. What Heath appears to be accusing me of is believing that we discover scientific laws by looking. If I did in fact believe that discoveries were a simple matter of looking, why would I have stressed the importance of competition between research programs as an indispensable means of endorsing one over the other? Would not Heath's extreme empiricist be able to establish the viability of a single research program by comparing it to what Heath calls the world "out there"? Did I not also emphasize the pragmatic nature of explanation in the concluding section of AH? Perhaps Heath is unable to distinguish between pragmatism and what he calls extreme empiricism.

*Positivism*

One of the accusations Heath makes is that I am a "positivist." I'm not sure Heath knows what a positivist, logical or otherwise, really is. I do not subscribe to a verifiability principle in either AH or anything else I've written. Does Heath think I am a positivist because I demand that social scientific theories must be couched in generalizations? Well, I've never said that either. And though I believe there exist social scientific and even psychoanalytic explanations that employ satisfactory generalizations, I do not believe that all such explanations require lawlike generalizations. So I'm not a positivist, or at least not a logical positivist, in the usual sense of that term. Also, I can't be a positivist for the same types of reasons I couldn't be called an extreme empiricist.

Heath says I am a positivist (in his sense) because I only accept biological or cognitive-psychological accounts. This is quite false and can only be the result of a slipshod reading of AH. I accept many different types of explanation and styles of analysis. I constantly refer to institutionalized practices and thus endorse explanations in terms of conventions—so, sociology and social history can fit within my purview. I accept psychoanalytic explanations along with biological, evolutionary, and cognitive-psychological ones. I employ the techniques of analytic philosophy but also take advantage of phenomenology. Nor do I reject the possibility of ideological analysis.<sup>10</sup> Rather, I attempt to find the method which, in competition with other methods, best addresses the phenomena at hand in terms of our specific questions. I do not spurn any approach as a possible source of knowledge on a priori grounds. I am open to any method that will deliver the best explanation in light of the questions we are asking.

As this suggests, I do not believe that every kind of explanation is equally appropriate to every kind of case. Limitations have to be acknowledged

10. For example, in AH, despite Heath's misreading, I considered *Fort Apache*, *The Bronx* to be a candidate for ideological interpretation. I merely asserted that the film's pictorial verisimilitude would not be a significant variable in such an interpretation.

concerning the applicability of various methods. Specifically, I believe that there are some limits to the range of things that can be explained psychoanalytically. This is, of course, where the difference between Heath and me arises. I endorse the use of psychoanalytic explanations, but only under certain constraints, whereas Heath uses them to explain almost everything human, including how we make sense of film editing.

Psychoanalytic theory is designed to explain the *irrational*. The general paresis and epileptic fits due to injury to Broca's area in the brain are *nonrational* and thus not a subject for psychoanalytic enquiry. Similarly, I believe that when an agent does something that is rational, we have no *prima facie* reason to investigate further into the causes of his actions. That is, a methodological constraint on psychoanalytic explanation is that it not be mobilized until there is an identifiable breakdown in rationality. Not all beliefs, not all social, aesthetic, emotional, and cognitive responses are candidates for psychoanalytic investigation. Insofar as psychoanalysis is designed to conceptualize irrational behavior, which is only identifiable as a deviation from some norm of rational behavior, there is no work for it to do where the behavior in question is of an *unmistakably* rational sort.

The basic concepts of psychoanalysis are metaphoric extensions of the concepts of the rational—e.g., motive, intention, wish, drive, need, and so on. That is, the concepts are all purposive, ends-seeking. The difference is that these forces are conscious and deliberative in rationalist psychology, but they are metaphorically extended to unconscious forces in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, by examining unconscious intentions and repressed operations, explains actions, purposively characterized, that cannot be explained by conscious or merely tacit intentions, beliefs, and reasonings. But—once again—where an adequate rationalist explanation is available, we do not require psychoanalysis. Note, however, that unlike the frothing positivist of Heath's reverie, I have no opposition to psychoanalysis properly employed.

Nor am I opposed to ideological analysis. Yet I insist that we must first ascertain that the phenomena we investigate are best approached by seeing them as ideological. If we are investigating a belief (or recommendation) imparted by a film, then we must test to see if it is ideological by establishing that it is false (or unreasonable) *and* that it functions in some system of social domination. If we are concerned to discover whether a symbol system—such as a natural language or a pictorial style—is ideological, then we must establish that it excludes the possibility of the representation of certain facts and interests for the purpose of upholding some practice or institution of social domination. I believe that the technical jargon of certain branches of the law may be relevant examples of this. Thus, I do not oppose ideological analysis *per se*. I merely disagree with QC in its insistence upon the explanation of all phenomena under discussion in terms of ideology and psychoanalysis. Indeed, I am more of a pluralist and less of a reductionist than Heath is.



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
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
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
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