SEMEIA

an experimental journal for biblical criticism

1

1974

Semeia

Semeia is an experimental journal devoted to the exploration of new and emergent areas and methods of biblical criticism. Studies employing the methods, models, and findings of linguistics, folklore studies, contemporary literary criticism, structuralism, social anthropology, and other such disciplines and approaches, are invited. Although experimental in both form and content, *Semeia* proposes to publish work that reflects a well defined methodology that is appropriate to the material being interpreted.

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Inquiries and manuscripts should be sent to the Editor *pro tem*, Robert W. Funk, Department of Religious Studies, University of Montana, Missoula, MT 59801. In view of the purpose stated above, authors should consider whether their work is more suitable to the *Journal of Biblical Literature* or other scholarly journals before submitting manuscripts to *Semeia*.

Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate and accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope of appropriate size.

A style sheet will be published subsequently in *Semeia*. Meanwhile, prospective authors should consult the remarks of the Editor in the first issue and observe the general style and format of articles printed in the first two numbers.

Semeia is complemented by a monograph series of comparable purpose, to be known as *Semeia Supplements*. The Editor *pro tem* is William A Beardslee, 1728 Vickers Circle, Decatur, GA 30030. Inquiries and manuscripts too long to be published in *Semeia* should be addressed to him. Dan O. Via, Jr., University of Virginia, is Associate Editor *pro tem*.

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SEMEIA 1

A Structuralist Approach to the Parables

Editor of this Issue:

Robert W. Funk

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ABBREVIATIONS

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SEMEIA
AN EXPERIMENTAL JOURNAL FOR BIBLICAL CRITICISM
AN INTRODUCTION

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0. This first issue of *Semeia* calls for an introduction that will place its contents in context, and this in a double sense. On the one hand the papers which follow deal with the parables of Jesus with the use of tools and methods that are widely unfamiliar. It should be helpful to place these new developments in the context of modern parable-study and to characterize the newer approaches. More generally it will be desirable to recognize the wider context of contemporary explorations of language and literature, explorations which furnish the chief impetus to the founding of this new journal and which orient the studies that follow.

1.1 In both respects it will be illuminating to recall the circumstances which led to the formation of the Parables Seminar in the Society of Biblical Literature, for whose first sessions at the Chicago Annual Meeting in 1973 the following papers were prepared, and to review the genesis of this journal which was prompted by such similar considerations.

In June 1972 Robert Funk, Executive Secretary of the Society, proposed to a number of scholars with special interest in the parables the formation of a seminar on this topic to succeed the Gospels Seminar whose five-year term was to terminate at the Los Angeles meeting that year. "We have reached, as it seems to me, the end of a first creative burst of activity centering in the study of the

parables and are about to embark on a second. Those of us who made contributions to that first effort are now rethinking our positions in an effort to find new directions. Meanwhile, younger scholars have entered the discussions with fresh vigor."

Dominic Crossan consented to draw up proposals and these were discussed at Los Angeles. It was immediately evident that what can be called a post-Jeremias approach was mooted, whether by Crossan with his "ontological-poetic" formula, or by others indebted to Ernst Fuchs and his pupils, Jüngel and Linnemann, or by Dan O. Via, Jr. who had made such a break-through with his 1967 volume and who with others mediated the interests of Güttgemanns' *Linguistica Biblica* team as well as the activities represented by French structural criticism.

Those involved in the planning, including also James M. Robinson and Norman Perrin, recognized that the new options as to method were of importance for all biblical studies but that the parable-form offered special advantages. That same fall the SBL Research and Publications Committee approved the proposal to form a Seminar on the Parables for a five-year term with Crossan as chairman and a steering committee to include with him Dan Via and Jack Kingsbury. Drafts of the papers which follow were discussed at the Chicago meeting.

1.2 Meantime, in October 1973, Robert Funk had drawn up a proposal to his successor as Executive Secretary, George MacRae, for an "Experimental Journal for Linguistic and Literary Arts in Biblical Studies." Viewed in the light of an "information exchange," the periodical would serve as a vehicle for innovative work in progress and for communication among workers in all aspects of language running from literary criticism to linguistics. Funk called attention to the emerging interest in such matters in existing sections and groups in the Society such as those on Biblical Criticism and Literary Criticism, Linguistics, Art and the Bible, The Bible and the

Humanities, the task-force on Genre, and the Seminar on Form Criticism and that on Paul. He reminded us also of the desirability of involving non-biblical colleagues and specialists, and of keeping in touch with parallel initiatives in the American Academy of Religion.

So far as the format of the journal was concerned it was recognized that in biblical studies the relevant methods to be drawn on are often not yet sufficiently refined to encourage the kind of article appropriate for example to the *Journal of Biblical Literature*. Funk's proposal was approved by the Research and Publications Committee in January 1974, and the title and editorial structure of *Semeia*, as well as of *Semeia Supplements*, were provisionally decided on at a consultation the following March.

2. The wider context both of *Semeia* and of the Seminar is thus already suggested. One can seek a single formula and say that the new concern as in so many fields today is with a better understanding of language in all its aspects. Or one can list related fields to which we look for guidelines, as on cover 2 of the journal: linguistics, folklore studies, contemporary literary criticism, structuralism, social anthropology, and other such disciplines and approaches.

Of course biblical study has of itself long been led to interest in certain aspects of poetics, oral and written forms, narrative styles, genre, trope and comparative mythology. But such advances as were indeed made in these areas were understandably conditioned by the rhetorical and aesthetic canons of the time, whether romantic or rationalist, and handicapped by the isolation so widely associated not only with the biblical texts but even with its philology.

There is no reason to disparage older methods and contributions of biblical study or to make undue claims for new strategies, least of all to set up a controversial front between different schools at work in our field. It

is simply that philology and interpretation, including biblical, find themselves faced today with new considerations and tasks. One of the most interesting observations made in recent reviews of the history of biblical criticism is that some of the pioneers like Herder, Overbeck, Gunkel and Norden had wider concerns with language-forms and "how language works" than were pursued by their followers. Their widely humanistic scope and curiosities were narrowed in the sequel.

Our newer approaches to language and text are not therefore discontinuous with the tradition. At the various levels of vocabulary, grammar, syntax and discourse we seek to take advantage of new sophistications. These investigations have to do with such matters as the dynamics of human speech and communication, language modes and patterns, the apperception of hearer or reader, the social-cultural nexus of all language-phenomena, and the relation of language to referent and to reality.

There are many points at which properly linguistic considerations have been at home in our field. Others have come to the fore in recent study. One example would be our better awareness of the limitations of lexicon and theological dictionary. The meaning of a term or motif is governed by its context including that of the linguistic form in which it is found. Another example would be the light thrown on translation-phenomena as exemplified in Eugene Nida's article in *JBL*, March 1972. Recently also one can recognize inputs from secular literary criticism at various points in dealing with biblical materials.

3. Particularly revealing, however, is the study of forms oral and written. I give some attention to this because it illustrates the continuity of earlier methods with the concerns of this journal. Biblical criticism can take pride in the fact that the beginnings of form-criticism were contemporaneous with the beginnings of structural analysis in other fields such as linguistics, folklore study and ethnology. Form-criticism represented a

genuinely structural analysis of oral narrative in particular, with respect both to its taxonomic operations and its analysis of style and action. This applies both to the work on the narratives of Genesis, for example, and to work on the gospel tradition. It should perhaps be noted, however, that such investigation, as in the case of early folktale analysis, confined itself largely to the syntagmic dimension, the story and plot line.

Recent reconsideration of this aspect of biblical study has drawn attention to various areas of unfinished business, as Norman Petersen's paper so well shows. With respect to oral narrative and its "short forms," we observe that the first form-critics were influenced by since controverted views of folklorists that all such recitals were "community products" or even spontaneous expressions of the folksoul. Such pre-literary forms should rather have been recognized as in some sense artistic speech, whether tale, fable, myth or riddle, as we have come to see in the case of the "Negro spiritual." Each telling represented a viva-voce particular version for a particular "audience" or hearing. The point is that the *Sitz-im-Leben* of the oral forms, also those carried over into Scripture, had a linguistic as well as a sociological character, involving language-codes and communication factors peculiar to each occasion and each form.

Oversight at this point led form-criticism to take too little account of the radical difference between the oral and the written stages of transmission of the material. If an earlier oral form of a narrative can be identified--with its immediate dialogual situation--then that particular *communication* will be very different from that of the same or a similar unit later taken up into a written context for a different and more general "public." The form and function of the ensuing cycle transformed the import of each "short form" included in it.

But what is true here of the transition from the oral to the written stage is also true of subsequent

re-appropriation of such material in new literary complexes right up to the composition of a Gospel or other biblical writing. Thus a large qualificiation has also to be registered against tradition-criticism and redaction-criticism as practised. Continuities can be exaggerated and genre or gestalt considerations can be neglected. We are by way of recognizing these considerations today, but the many significant implications require the aid of disciplines running from studies of epic style to the sociology of language-forms. The tasks indicated would suggest among other things a recasting of Bultmann's *History of the Synoptic Tradition* (his masterful thesaurus of forms is descriptive and sociological rather than properly functional), and a carrying out of Overbeck's desideratum of a history of the literary forms of early Christianity.

4. When we move from these new concerns already somewhat explored in biblical studies to other areas envisaged in this journal new questions arise. Biblical scholarship has been increasingly receptive to enrichment from such related disciplines as comparative literature to linguistic structuralism. Those not initiated hear only that structuralism, besides being "much spoken against," is also a "house divided against itself." They are also understandably on guard against fashion and mode, and may well suspect it of positivism in some of its adepts. They may reluctantly admit that, in view of its influence in other fields not only in social sciences but in the humanities, at least some biblical scholars should give attention to it.

The first thing to say, no doubt, is that anything we can learn about language concerns us dearly. As Roman Jacobson observes, *Linguistica sum: linguistici nihil a me alienum puto*. This bears not only on language as communication and semantic, and upon its modes and genres, but also upon its deeper laws and logics. If these analytic operations with language and even its

greatest texts--the study of the "machinery of speech--seem remote or even profane, there is yet something to be said for the demystifying of language.

I find a parable here in some remarks about the music of Bach and the organ by William H. Scheide of Princeton. The organ is an impersonal instrument. He who plays it cannot impose his affectivity upon it. (It was only by a tour de force and a violence *contra naturam* that the modern music hall could produce an organ that can sob!) The organ thus contrasts with violin and piano, instruments responsive to the subjectivity of the performer. But it is today very much thanks to the impersonality of Bach's art and that of his period that we are able to overcome the habituation and vulgarization of subsequent periods, especially the nineteenth century. The best of contemporary music whether "high" or popular is thus liberated and purified. Similarly we need to acquire distance from layers upon layers of habituated and superficial response to language determined by modern affectivity and emotional cliché. This can apply to our reading of Scripture or the classics. It may well be that structuralist or other austere scrutiny of such texts will open our eyes to their import in ways that have long been obscured.

5.1 I have noted that there is already an ongoing agenda in biblical studies that points to new strategies. In the New Testament field this is particularly evident in our recent attention to the "genre" of such early Christian forms as gospel, epistle and apocalypse, and the character and role of other media such as the covenant-formulary, the manual, the testament and the aretalogy, as well as such shorter forms as hymn and parable. The theory of genres, however, requires that we go beyond description to function. It is a question of how the language-convention works, a fuller understanding of its signals at different levels. We have learned much from Fuchs and his pupils about language-event. We can also learn from

linguistics.

5.2 Another area where much confusion reigns is that of symbolics including mythology. We can only overcome our unsystematic grasp of this major aspect of language by the use of more rigorous tools now offered. As an illustration I can point to Wayne Meeks' appeal to social anthropology, including the structural approach of Edmund Leach, in his paper on "The Man from Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism," *JBL*, March 1972.

5.3 High priority in biblical studies today attaches to the language-mode of narrative both because of its place in Scripture and because of the extensive study of its phenomenology in extra-biblical fields. Indeed, it is in this area that structuralists have already been drawn into discussion of biblical texts. Here also the study of the parables is open to new resources. I therefore move here to the immediate background of the papers in this issue of *Semeia*.

6.1 Analysis of human fabulation, recital and story-telling draws attention first of all to universal and even ontological features. The narrator breaks silence ("I will open my mouth in a parable," Ps 78:2; Mt 13:15), awakens consciousness and imagination, draws the hearers into a fictional world whose movement and orientation nevertheless have correspondences with their human reality. Story-telling also has its cultural determinations, not only in its imagery but in its special logic and action, responding to fundamental apperception. Each climate produces its own flora. Yet there are widely recognized invariants in the pattern and machinery of the story, most fully traced out in the study of the folktale and the fairy tale, and evident also in the parables of the Gospels. At the level of opening, complication and denouement we can recognize the observations of Aristotle. In this aspect of sequence (syntagma) one can distinguish as our contributors do, various patterns of opportunity, crisis

and resolution, as well as over-all movements toward either gain or loss.

But still in this sequential aspect there is a further feature in which the parables answer to the wider analysis of the tale. This has to do with the protagonist or more generally the dramatis personae. Superficially one can observe oppositions of hero and villain, or, for example good son and bad. But more inward analysis attends not to the characters themselves but to the roles and functions which they occupy. Here we recognize the schema or constellation of agencies whose interplay leads to the denouement. This sixfold "actantial" analysis which plays so large a part in our discussion is widely recognized in the structural study of narrative, and is therefore explored here in the study of our narrative parables.

When the sequential aspect of tales and parables are thus scrutinized in both aspects of threefold development and functions, evidently there are underlying patterns which remain constant. There are only so many "slots" but these can be filled in many different ways. So we have "structure" or matrix in one sense. This reminds us of language itself: with a limited number of sounds and grammatical and syntactic options we can "generate" an almost limitless number of statements and texts.

If such morphological analysis of the parables sounds purely descriptive yet one should not underestimate its significance. At the least it undercuts various subjective or dogmatic readings which do not take account of the full "score" (in the musical sense) of the text. Nor can we be unmoved to find that Jesus' fictions, his make-believes, rejoin the very same logics which underlie whether the Russian folktale or American Indian recitals. Furthermore, this kind of scrutiny may well also uncover significant differentia with respect to his stories which have much to say as to his whole word and deed. The

papers that follow will suggest other fruits of the investigation.

6.2 It should be noted here especially with reference to other kinds of biblical texts that narrative-analysis opens up a still further dimension. This is notably true of mythological narrative. Here those elements or motifs which run sequentially through the recital can now be correlated, as it were vertically, with analogous motifs in other texts--compare the two orders of a musical score--and these being symbolic open up deeper resonances in the myth. Here we have structuralism as associated with cultural anthropology. The light thrown on deeper layers of cultural history in this way and on recurrent paradigms of world-making is familiar in the work of Levi-Strauss, and has its analogy in psychoanalytic analysis of dreams.

Structural investigation of this kind has often been compared to archaeology. Where biblical writings are at issue this operation would be a second kind of stratigraphy beyond that represented by the excavation of buried forms. Now it is a question not of exposing a succession of overlays in a historical-evolutionary dimension, but of identifying a grammar common to all such layers. Here we have an operation of decoding or looking for the "figure in the carpet" which can tell us much about the basic orientation of some human family or epoch or the ultimate logic of human consciousness itself.

In the texts of Scripture it is true that biblical theology has long sought to identify such a deeper continuity and a deeper pattern in kerygmatic or doctrinal terms. But such formulations always lag behind the eloquence of the symbolic material. Mankind is always the prisoner of its language and its long accumulation of mental habit. Theological tradition is thus subverted and we need the more direct kind of thrust beneath the incubus of sedimentation, whether of language or categories, that is afforded by structuralism.

Structural investigation can therefore also be compared to open-heart surgery. Going deep into the sacred text the procedure appears neutral and austere, not being concerned with meaning in the usual sense. But this attention to the laws and workings of language can alert us to the bearings and dynamics of a text otherwise overlooked. Even in the case of the parables, not a mythological form, one can see in the papers which follow that issues of real significance are illuminated. I have in mind such matters as the vexed question of the example-stories and their genre and that of the differentia of Jesus' parables.

6.3 The disadvantage for biblical studies of this new method or arsenal of methods is that they are in many respects a carry-over of (1) widely varying conceptions of the task, (2) from very different kinds of rhetorics, and (3) often resting upon an extrapolation from categories and antinomies respecting language itself (de Saussure) which as scientific point to a self-enclosed, inner-related system. That is, the pursuit, acknowledged or implicit, is often one that brackets out meaning. But structural method is one thing and structuralism as a philosophy is another. Fortunately there are linguists like Jacobson and language philosophers like Ricoeur who are at pains to obviate any such methodological reduction.

7.0 To build a bridge from these general considerations to the parable discussion which follows a few remarks are in order. As I have noted, the parable form has special advantages for the testing of the new methods. It falls in the mode of narrative, has a central importance in the beginnings of the Gospel, and, with some qualifications as will appear, is fairly clearly identifiable as a form or genre.

7.1 For uninitiated readers it will perhaps only be necessary to recall three matters. The usual three-fold classification of the parables, of which one is the

exemplary-story, is summarized near the opening of Professor Crossan's second paper. In the second place, it has been widely agreed that the parables of Jesus, at least, are not to be read as allegories (understanding allegory in its modern and more limited sense). Again, we have also come to stress the creative-poetic character of these parables, both as compositions and as extended metaphors rather than their teaching or polemic function in particular confrontations of Jesus' ministry. They were revelatory rather than didactic.

7.2 Better understanding of biblical texts and styles relates on the one hand to their *poetic*, as illuminated by contemporary investigation of literary forms, and to their *semantic*, involving the dimension of communication or speech-event. Beyond the shape of the text itself there is the transaction of hearing which has its own laws and operations. But the two aspects are inseparable and "structuralism" involves both. Thus a genre is both a pattern and a medium. Norman Petersen's paper makes this abundantly clear. We may hesitate to use the modern literary category of "genre" for such biblical vehicles as oracle, covenant-formulary, parable or gospel, but the same considerations often apply.

One can distinguish some of the uses of the term "structure" in the discussions that follow. It can be used non-technically just to refer to the arrangement of a single text (surface-structure), as we parse a sentence. This becomes more technical when we refer it back to a pattern or "structure" common to a number of texts. With reference to narrative and in the context of modern literary criticism the term can be used of such patterns as comedy and tragedy, romance and irony. Since such plot-categories can be profoundly related to cultural attitudes they can be seen as genuinely structural.

Structure proper thus appears when we recognize a "set" of features or motifs characterizing a number of texts, with the combinations and permutations thus

available. Here we have something like a genre with both its relative stability and its variants. The narrative parable has this character. What is important about a genre and its structure is the common "world" or apperception or repertoire of speaker and hearer, such that the medium is already a message along with the other signals of the content. Here the "machinery" of the story, or in this case, the parable, involves, as suggested, three levels: (1) the plot or sequence, (2) the roles or "actants," (3) the metaphor. Attention to such internal organization, including such aspects as causality, helps us to avoid short-cuts in interpretation as well as to recognize differentia as between individual parables and as between parables generally and other stories.

Finally, "deep structures" looks to more basic patterns and logics determining a wide variety of such genres or structures, which can include non-verbal behavior like art, ritual and social configurations. Deep structures open up matrices both of linguistic forms and of symbolic meaning.

Petersen's paper is particularly relevant here in providing background for our use of such related terms as form, genre and structure. He calls attention to the varied ways in which biblical scholars use the term "genre," and makes useful distinctions, especially as they bear on the vicissitudes of form-criticism and tradition-criticism. With respect to the parables he urges, in discussion with Via, that they can only be assigned to a genre if they are seen as shared cultural media in a linguistic community. It is not enough to identify their common structural features. Jesus' parables, however original, presupposed an already existing model and code of communication known to his hearers. In this sense they were variants of such a wider linguistic structure, and could be said to be "generated" from it.

It is another thing, Petersen notes, to seek to go another step behind such a linguistic structure, shared

by Jesus with his hearers. In this case we would be moving outside of Jesus' linguistic community and looking for analogies of his parables in other cultures and epochs. Intriguing proposals have been made here with reference to modern parables of Kafka, Borges and Zen masters, but Petersen reminds us that in all such explorations we are occupied with universal types rather than with inductively identified genres. And in such cases "deep structure" involves cross-cultural logics and "the broader realm of the hermeneutic of human discourse."

8.0 In the studies of the parable-form which follow one can recognize a choice of approaches. One can begin with an internal analysis of the narrative parables as Crossan does (and as Funk does in a paper related to his Critical Note in this issue), and then invoke general structural tools from other disciplines as they become relevant to the discussion. Or one can begin with such tools and schemas to see how they illuminate these particular specimens of story-telling.

8.1 Crossan makes it clear that his focus is on the historical Jesus and the study of the parables in that light. He begins with tradition-critical considerations and moves on to literary-metaphorical texts both to determine the original shape (and beginning and end) of a parable and to identify its meaning. He has called his approach "the ontological-poetic." In his second paper he introduces properly structural criteria, and in his later reply to Via he is led to give large place to their procedures.

8.2 On the other hand Via's focus is not directly on the historical Jesus but on a body of narrative texts, indeed ascribed to him. His approach is strictly in terms of the givens as examples of the narrative mode to be explored by tools developed on other similar fictions. This method can be called the "generative-transformational" and extrapolates from recognized models to the special case of

the parable and its own particular variants. This approach is important because it is more detached and because it represents a test of the suitability of such strategies when brought to bear on biblical language-forms. The clash of the two methods is mutually illuminating especially as regards their further exercise with other biblical forms.

8.3 The different approaches of Crossan and Via determine different conclusions especially at two points. With regard to "parable and example" Crossan, with his concern for metaphorical tension and the ontological "clash of worlds" in Jesus' sayings, extricates true parables from the several exemplary-stories in Luke. Via on grounds of structural analysis of such matters as functions, causality, total paradigm and metaphor finds that these, notably the Good Samaritan, depart at many points from the parable type.

8.4 In his second paper, that on the Servant Parables, Crossan also finds a clash of worlds and a reversal of categories. Though a group of these are structured in one pattern to enforce the expected correspondence of service and reward, another group dissolves both the rhetorical pattern and the presupposition. The Gospel shatters all categories! This reading reflects his own revision of the traditional form of the texts and some appeal to Jesus' creativity as story-teller. For Via, however, the parable-genre is thus infringed. But here Crossan introduces a fundamental query. Perhaps those widely recognized structural models which Via follows hold mainly for texts (folklore and certain kinds of myth) reflecting a static or homogeneous culture. Crossan suggests that even Via's first "texteme," the fundamental opposition of what we can call "success or failure" (comedy and tragedy) is relativized by a deeper structure in which either can be rejected.

8.5 Robert Funk in his comment also raises questions

about the texteme-models employed by Via. Yet all three agree that such structural tools must be part of the on-going discussion. Both Crossan and Funk give high priority to a "structure of reversal" in Jesus' parables. If Via's schemas raise questions--and he himself looks on them as mainly exploratory--one may also look for further clarification of Crossan's ontological version of the reversal-motiv. Though it bears immediately on only some of the parables it is evident that Crossan finds it central in Jesus' witness. Using Petersen's distinction one could ask whether this structural assignment does not fit better with the category of universal type than that of inductive genre.

8.6 Funk in his closing queries points to one aspect of language and of our texts largely by-passed by both Crossan and Via. What about the hearer or reader and their response and "answering imagination"? What we may need is objective tools like those of Via but modulated so as to be more at home in the linguistic community of Jesus' hearers, and so as to reflect the deep structures of Israel. Fortunately the discussion of the parable will continue in the next issue. The findings here can then be applied and tested on other forms and in other horizons.

THE SERVANT PARABLES OF JESUS

John Dominic Crossan
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ABSTRACT

Servant parables are stories centered on a master-servant relationship at a moment of critical reckoning. Nine such parables are examined and their original content is distinguished from traditional and/or redactional transformations. Of these, one, the Servant's Reward, was originally a proverbial saying rather than a full parable. The other eight fall into two groups whose structures are in complete antithesis to each other. Group A includes the Doorkeeper, Overseer, Talents, and Throne Claimant. Its structure has action leading to reckoning, the master departing and returning to the servant, and appropriate rewards and/or punishments being meted out for good and/or bad service. Group B contains the Unmerciful Servant, Unjust Steward, Wicked Husbandmen, and Vineyard Workers. Its structure has reckoning leading to action, the servant departing and returning to the master, and rewards and punishments are not at all according to one's expectations. The clash or duel of structures is explained as the linguisticality of Jesus' teaching of "permanent" eschatology.

"For no thought is contented. The better sort,-
As thoughts of things divine,-are intermix'd
With scrùples, and do set the word itself
Against the word:
As thus,-'Come, little ones'; and then again,-
'It is as hard to come as for a camel
To thread the postern of a needle's eye.'"
(Shakespeare's *King Richard II*, V, 5)

"The cancellings, the negations are never
ultimate, are never one last wipe
that clears the lens, a farewell
to supersession, finale of ruin."
(R. Howard, "Prose for Borges,"
TriQuarterly 25 [1972] 9)

0. A recent work on the Servant parables (Weiser: 1971a) included seven pericopes in this category and investigated them on all three levels of the transmission (Jesus, community, evangelist) /1/. This present study is exclusively interested in the level of the historical Jesus and most especially concerned with the meaning of these parables for Jesus himself as distinct from any later meaning in the usage of the primitive communities. It seeks to take seriously recent suggestions that Jesus had a radically different functional purpose for his parables than that which interested the primitive church. Above all it wishes to delineate as carefully as possible which parables are to be included as Servant parables and to study the unity and diversity within this theme /2/.

1. The Theme of the Servant.

1.1 The first and most important point is the exact delineation of the theme: what parables are to be included in the category of Servant parables? Alfons Weiser's book studied seven parables: the Wicked Husbandmen (Mark 12:1-9; Matt 21:33-41; Luke 20:9-16), the Great Supper (Matt 22:1-14; Luke 14:16-24), the Unmerciful Servant (Matt 18:23-35), the Servant's Reward (Luke 17:7-10), the Doorkeeper (Mark 13:33-37; Luke 12:35-38), the Overseer (Matt 24:25-51; Luke 12:42-46), and the Talents (Matt 25:14-30; Luke 19:12-27). His criterion is not that explicitly clear (45-46) but seems to include both theme (the centrality of the master-servant relationship) and term (for instance, the use of δοῦλος). Thus he distinguishes: (i) Servant parables properly so called: the Unmerciful Servant, Servant's Reward, Doorkeeper, Overseer, Talents; (ii) Servant parables in a looser sense: Wicked Husbandmen, Great Supper; (iii) parables which include servants but are excluded from the study: Wheat and Darnel, Prodigal Son, Going to Judgement (servants not central); the Vineyard Workers (οἰκονόμον in Luke 16:1) which pertain to the subject matter "weder terminologisch noch thematisch."

This classification is not secure enough to form the basis for a thematic study. Too much emphasis on the presence or absence of any special word for servant is peculiarly vulnerable to criticism on the level of the historical Jesus where *ipsissima verba* are probably out of the question. One also notes the wide variety of power and authority given to the servant in the parables of rabbinic Judaism: he can be a household slave or a very important court official.

1.2 The criterion suggested in this paper involves two axes: a master-servant relationship or superior-subordinate relationship and a moment of critical reckoning between them. Servant parables are those whose central story line concerns such a relationship at some instance of critical confrontation between master and servant. No point will be made concerning the use of this or that term for the servant, or for the master either. The term used for the servant or master may be of some significance on the traditional or redactional levels of the transmission (for example, the servants in the Wicked Husbandmen or the Great Supper) but it cannot be presumed to be of significance for Jesus and then used as a norm for selecting Servant Parables.

In the light of this criterion nine parables will have to be studied. These can be indicated in comparison with those used by A. Weiser. The Great Supper is excluded because it does not center on the common theme of master-servant reckoning. Master and guests are central and the servants are simply functional messengers in the story. The Wicked Husbandmen (but as in Gos Thom 93:1-15) will be accepted but the critical confrontation is between master and tenants (as servants or subordinates) and not between the master and those servants who function merely as messengers. Six of Weiser's parables will be kept as they focus on the twin axes of the theme: the Doorkeeper, Unmerciful Servant, Overseer, Talents, with the Throne Claimant (Luke 19:12b,14-15a, 27) as a separate problem,

and the Servant's Reward. But two more parables will have to be added as well: the Unjust Steward (as Luke 16:1-7) and the Vineyard Workers (as Matt 20:1-13) since, whatever the term used for the subordinate, these both involve a master-servant or superior-subordinate relationship at a crisis of reckoning.

The order in which these parables will be studied is important for the present understanding of their thematic unity. It is not implied that Jesus created them in this order or uttered them in this sequence. No matter in what order they are studied their thematic unity reflects backwards and forwards from one to the other. Taken together they form a musical harmony, as it were, in which no single one is heard adequately until all are heard fully /3/.

2. The Development of the Theme.

2.0 The first cluster of parables (=Group A) to be studied consists of the Doorkeeper, the Overseer, the Talents, and the Throne Claimant. These will be seen individually and then later a comparative structural analysis of them will be added.

2.1 The Doorkeeper (Mark 13:34-37; Luke 12:36-38)

This parable is contained in a rather changed format in two independent versions: one helps to terminate Mark's eschatological chapter, and the other is now part of Luke's teaching of the disciples in 12:22-48. Despite their independent development in the tradition and despite their final redactional modifications the narrative lineaments of a coherent story can be discerned behind both versions /4/. Both accounts now appear as third-person narratives imbedded in second-person injunctions. In Luke the second-person admonition of 12:35 moves through 12:36a (καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅμοιοι) into the third-person parable in 12:36b-38. In Mark the relationship of second-person and third-person is more complicated. It begins with second-

person admonition in 13:33 and then moves into the third-person parable in 13:34. But in 13:35-36 the two viewpoints are intertwined: γρηγορεῖτε ... οἴδατε, ἔρχεται; and, reversed, εὕρῃ, καθεύδοντας. In both cases the return of the master is associated with the coming of the Son of Man: see Mark 13:26 and Luke 12:40. But in both cases the present versions and situations of the story contain some rather unlikely elements. In Mark a doorkeeper is expected to keep watch night and day for a departed (ἀπόδημος) master who may return at any time. In Luke the servants (all of them?) have only to watch for a master returning that night from a feast but when and if they do their duty, they will be served at table by the grateful master. Clearly the association of returning master and coming Son of Man has changed the story so as to render some of its elements quite unlikely /5/. The basic story is still quite visible behind these changes. The master departs for a night-time feast; he enjoins the servant (doorkeeper) to watch so as to expedite his returning entrance; the later that return is the more difficult will it be for the servant to be awake but also the more important will it be that he be awake. This accepts the situation of the night-time feast in Luke rather than the vague and general ἀπόδημος of Mark /6/. It accepts the singular servant, the doorkeeper, of Mark rather than the plural servants of Luke /7/. Finally, it prefers the timing of the return in Luke (second or third watch) to the fourfold possibility given in Mark: one will hardly return from a night-time feast at sunset. The story is coherent, possible, and even mildly amusing. There is the inference that the returning master will need even more assistance, and therefore watchfulness, the later the hour at which he seeks to find his house /8/. The implicit threat of punishment in Mark 13:36 (μή) appears in Luke as reward at the eschatological banquet, but, no doubt, this theme of sanction is basic to the entire situation at least implicitly.

2.2 The Overseer (Matt 24:45-51; Luke 12:42-46).

This parable comes from Q /9/. It balances a positive and negative possibility within the imagined situation of the same single servant. The positive (good or faithful) and negative (bad or faithless) reactions of the servant are carefully integrated so that the hearer can easily imagine both possibilities. It is the temptation afforded by the master's delay in returning that might turn a good servant into a bad one. Hence, Matt 24:48 and Luke 12:45a are crucial for the integrity and realism of the narrative. It may well fit into the problem of the parousia's delay but it did not derive therefrom. Without its presence the change of the good servant into an evil one is left unexplained and the parable loses much of its persuasive force. The presence of κακός in Matt 24:48 (not in Luke 12:45) may be an indication of a tendency to break the parable into a story concerning two servants, one good (ὁ πιστὸς δοῦλος) and one bad (ὁ κακὸς δοῦλος).

The positive reaction in Matt 24:45-47=Luke 12:42-44 has three moments: the commission (45=42), the return (46=43), and the reward (47=44). The alternative and negative possibility in Matt 24:48-51=Luke 12:45-46 has three corresponding points: the omission (48-49=45), the return (50=46a), and the punishment (51=46b) /10/. It should be noted how carefully the parable stays within the realistic possibilities of such a master-servant relationship.

2.3 The Talents (Matt 25:14-30, Luke 19:12-27).

2.31 Two originally separate parables have been fused and not too happily, in Luke 19:12-27. The parable of the Talents (or whatever was the original unit of money) appears in 19:12a,13,15b-26, and that of the Throne Claimant in 19:12b,14-15a,27. The rewarding of the servants by their appointment over various cities in 19:17,19 represents an intrusion from the Throne Claimant theme into the subject of the Talents parable /11/. There is no trace of

the Throne Claimant parable in Matt 25:14-30 and it is quite unlikely that he would have carefully removed it had he found it already fused in the Q text /12/. Therefore, Luke and Matthew did not find this parable in Q but in their own special sources /13/. The Throne Claimant parable can be left aside for the moment and the two versions of the Talents parable compared.

It is clear that there is a common narrative behind the separate versions in Matthew and Luke. This can be shown in two major areas. The structure of the story and the sequence of the elements are completely parallel: situation (25:14-15=19:12a,13), return and reckoning (25:20-21=19:16-17), second servant rewarded (25:22-23=19:18-19), third servant punished (25:24-30=19:20-26). Secondly, there are striking similarities in the incident of the third servant, in sequence, in concepts, and most especially in vocabulary. Notice the following common phrases in 25:24-29 and 19:20-26: θερίζων ὅπου (ὸ) οὐκ ἔσπειρας; φοβηθείς/ἐφοβούμην; πονηρὲ δοῦλε; ἤδεις ὅτι; τὰ ἀργύριά μου τοῖς τραπεζίταις/μου τὸ ἀργύριον ἐπὶ τράπεζαν; καὶ ἐλθὼν ἐγὼ ... σὺν τόκῳ; ἄρατε ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ... καὶ δότε τῷ ἔχοντι; τῷ ἔχοντι δοθήσεται; τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος καὶ ὃ ἔχει ἀρθήσεται. The basic parable shows clearly through the variants, and even the minor differences do not destroy the general similarity /14/.

2.32 Two differences are of more importance. First, there is the presence of Matt 25:16-18 with no parallel in Luke. It tells what the three servants did while the master was away. Is this original or did Matthew add it himself? The content of 25:16-18 is not specifically Matthean either in concept or vocabulary and must therefore have come to him in his special source for this parable /15/. Indeed, the dramatic value of 25:16-18 within the unfolding of the narrative argues for its originality. It has two functions. The contrast between the first two servants and the third is immediately established, and questions are immediately posed for the hearer's mind:

why did he do this (to be answered in 25:24-25) and what would happen about it (to be answered in 25:26-28). The result of 25:16-18 is to draw the hearer immediately into the world of the parable so that already one is taking sides and wondering what will happen /16/.

2.33 A second question concerns the original ending of the parable. One can immediately omit Luke 19:27 since it is part of the Throne Claimant parable and could not have been the original ending of the Talents story. One must also omit Matt 25:30 (no Lukan parallel) because of both its allegorical and eschatological application and its Matthean vocabulary (See Weiser, 1971a:254 and Jeremias: 60). Neither is the original ending to be found in the common Matt 25:29=Luke 19:25-26. This was originally an independent logion: see Mark 4:25=Matt 13-12=Luke 8:18. Its paradoxical nature (who has nothing will lose it) does not apply that well to the present situation because, (i) only the first servant, and not the second one, receives any increment from the third servant's failure, and (ii) this latter does in fact have something to be taken away from him /17/. This leaves Matt 25:28=Luke 19:24 as the original ending. This has the compositional advantage of returning the parable to its beginning so that Matt 25:28 recalls 25:20 and also the inaugural 25:15. This is visible also in Luke where his 19:24 can recall 19:16 and also 19:13. However, the real ending in the pre-Lukan narrative was 19:27, of course, and this concerned the citizens of the Throne Claimant.

The main story is quite clear. Two servants are rewarded /18/ for their work and a third is punished for his prudent if useless inactivity /19/. The structural rhythm of the story still appears quite clearly in the Matthean account and we can conclude with a glance at its careful choreography, noting especially the main verbs.

	Scene 1	*Scene 2*	*Scene 3*
Situation:	25:14 (ἐκάλεσεν)	25:15d (ἀπεδήμησεν)	25:19 (συναίρει λόγον)
Servant 1:	25:15a	25:16	25:20-21
Servant 2:	25:15b	25:17	25:22-23
Servant 3:	25:15c	25:18	25:24-28

In scene 1 there is one main verb: ἔδωκεν. In scene 2 there are two main verbs: ἔκερδησεν (16=17) and ἔκρυψεν (18). In scene 3 these last two verbs beget two others: ἐκέρδησα (20=22) leads to καταστήσω (21=23) and ἔκρυψα (25) leads to ἄρατε (28b).

2.4 The Throne Claimant (Luke 19:12b,14-15a,27)

The category of Servant parable will have to include this story as well. It concerns a superior-subordinate (ἄνθρωπός τις εὐγενής and πολῖται) relationship in a critical confrontation. The very fact that it could be so easily fused with the other Servant parable of the Talents points it already towards this category.

The historical background to the parable is well known. Archelaus seeks rule over Judea and goes to Rome to plead for it; fifty Jewish delegates follow him to dispute his request; he is successful and returns to take a bloody revenge for their opposition (see Jeremias: 59 and Zerwick: 654-674)). It was already clear from the master in the Talents parable (see Matt 25:24,26=Luke 19:21,22) that Jesus was interested in realistic rather than idealistic masters. So there should be no surprise at this use of Archelaus here. There is no presumption in this group of parables that general morality is under discussion. Such terms as good or bad, reward or punishment, pertain exclusively within the master-servant relationship which forms the thematic parameter.

3. The Reversal of the Development.

3.1 The four parables investigated so far have a certain normalcy about them: good (faithful, successful)

servants are rewarded, and bad (faithless, unsuccessful) servants are punished, and each can be presumed to have known and expected such an outcome. In the Doorkeeper punishment is left implicit in Mark 13:36 and reward noted explicitly in Luke 12:38. In the original version the sanctions may have been totally implicit. In the next two parables there is an explicit division into good rewarded and bad punished. This is carefully balanced and evenly stressed in the Overseer and the Talents parables. So also with the Throne Claimant. The citizen-servants who had opposed his accession were punished for their infidelity upon his return. Whatever the meaning and intention of these parables, they all seem to move in a quite expected and normal manner. It makes little difference to this normalcy whether the point is that the servant should recognize his situation and act accordingly or the point is the promise and threat of reward and punishment. In either case we move within a horizon of expected order and orderly expectation. The servant can only know how to act on the presumptive correlation of good with reward and bad with punishment.

There is, however, a second cluster of parables (=Group B) in which this horizon of expected normalcy is not so apparent and in which this development of the theme in Group A is questioned, probed, and finally contradicted /20/. This cluster includes the Unmerciful Servant, the Servant's Reward, the Unjust Steward, the Wicked Husbandmen, and the Vineyard Workers. The Unmerciful Servant begins with a bad servant who is not going to be punished due to the master's pity. But when he fails to act accordingly with his own debtor, the master reverses his original decision and punished him quite fully. This parable has clearly deviated from the expected normalcy of Group A on one level and yet reverted to it again on a second level. One agrees that this is how it could (would? should?) be. The parable serves as a good transition from Group A to Group B. The Servant's Reward

introduces a flat contradiction to the previous development in Group A: even good servants are not rewarded, it would seem. The Unjust Steward and the Wicked Husbandmen move even more basically away from the expected normalcy. In both cases bad servants are not punished but seem rather to do better as such than as good servants. In the former case the gain is somewhat amusing (Via: "picaresque") but in the second instance it is quite lethal. But it is with the Vineyard Workers that this group reaches its clearest and most complete reversal of the preceding situations in Group A: good servants do not get what they expected while bad servants get more than they deserved. The contrast is at its sharpest and can be seen most clearly between the normalcy of the Talents in Group A and the surprise of the Vineyard Workers in Group B.

At this point it is already clear that something rather disturbing is happening to the theme of the master-servant relationship at its moment of reckoning. If we are dealing with a constant and coherent world in which good is rewarded and bad punished, the former group of parables stand well in their complacency. But this latter group bring this very complacency and order and world into question. It is all very well to tell parables in which servants must recognize their situation and act accordingly as long as it is quite clear what such prudent activity entails /21/.

3.2 The Unmerciful Servant (Matt 18:23-35).

The parable appears only in Matthew where it forms the climax of his advice to a divided community /22/. Its Matthean function is quite clear: if they do not forgive their brethren God will withdraw his forgiveness from them. Whatever may be its practical and tactical value within a disturbed community, its content is somewhat more problematic when it is abstracted from this context and taken as a basic statement concerning God /23/. It is one thing to advise forgiveness of others on the model of

God's forgiveness of us (Luke 6:36; Matt 5:48). Is it exactly the same to state emphatically that God does not forgive us our unforgiveness? Or, minimally, is God not also bound by the ideal just given in Matt 18:21-22 /24/?

The parable itself is a small masterpiece of dramatic staging. A glance at the structure makes this evident /25/.

	Scene 1	*Scene 2*	*Scene 3*
Introduction:	18:23-25	18:28	18:31
Words:	18:26	18:29	18:32-33
Action:	18:27	18:30	18:34

The precise literary economy of this sequence can be noted at three main points. (i) The three scenes are bound closely together by the introductory situation of each: *master* and servant in 18:23-25, servant and fellow-servant in 18:28, fellow-servants and *master* in 18:31. (ii) The almost verbatim agreement of 18:26 and 18:29 counterpoints the very different reactions they engender in 18:27 and 18:30. (iii) The conclusion in 18:32-34 is especially appropriate from a dramatic and literary viewpoint: since 18:30 was not modelled on 18:27 (so 18:32-33), then and instead, 18:27 will be remodelled on 18:30 (so 18:34).

Apart from the concluding 18:35 in which Matthew interprets the parable for his context, the dramatic unity of the narrative is flawless and shows no signs of internal changes of any importance. The ordinary human reaction to such a story would be that the servant got what he deserved and should certainly have known better in such a situation. The emphasis is not on the master's mercy but on the servant's lack of mercy or even common sense and on his sheer stupidity in displaying his lack at that time.

3.3 The Servant's Reward (Luke 17:7-10).

It has been argued that, (i) the original version of this parable included only 17:7,9; (ii) the Q version had 17:7,9,10ac; and (iii) the Lukan redaction added in 17:8,10b and rephrased the given version of 17:9 using

χάριν ἔχειν and διαταχθέντα (Weiser, 1971a:107-114).

The parable begins with τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν. All the NT examples of such logia expect and demand the answer: Nobody! But this can engender either a negative or a positive result. If negative, the sequence is: Which of you would ...? Nobody would! If positive, the sequence is: Which of you would not ...? Nobody would not! (=Everybody would!) /26/. Secondly, such logia have a general formal pattern of: Situation, Circumstances, and Action. Although the line of demarcation is not always absolutely clear, these three successive moments are usually distinguishable. Leaving aside Luke 17:7-10 for the moment, the other six instances of τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν can be outlined as indicated in the table below. It is clear that such terse logia as Matt 6:27=Luke 12:25 or even Matt 7:9-10=Luke 11:11-12 are almost too short to warrant this formal division, but the sequence is already evident in Matt 12:11=Luke 14:5. It has the Situation: ἄνθρωπος ὃς ἔξει πρόβατον ἕν; the Circumstances: καὶ ἐὰν ἐμπέσῃ τοῦτο τοῖς σάββασιν εἰς βόθυνον; and the Action: οὐχὶ κρατήσει αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγερεῖ. This structural pattern may also assist in the interpretation of the parable in Luke 11:5-8 /27/. It can be outlines as follows:

Texts	Situation	Circumstances	Action
Matt 6:27 =Luke 12:25	6:27a =12:25b	6:27b =12:25b	6:27c =12:25c
Matt 7:9-10 =Luke 11:11-12	7:9a,10a =11:11a,12a	7:9b,10b =11:11b,12b	7:9c,10c =11:11c,12c
Matt 12:11 =Luke 14:5	12:11a =14:5a	12:11b =14:5b	12:11c =14:5c
Luke 11:5-8	11:5a	11:5b-7	11:8
Luke 14:28-30	14:28a	14:29-30	14:28b
Matt 18:12-13 =Luke 15:4-6	18:12a =15:4a	18:12b 15:4b	18:12c-13 15:4c-6

Thirdly, the NT examples are in single format in some cases but in double or parallel format in other instances. Examples of the single form (Matt 6:27=Luke 12:25) and the double form (Matt 7:9-10=Luke 11:11-12) appear with the

negative result (Which of you would act like this? Nobody would!). Examples of the single form (Matt 12:11= Luke 14:5; Luke 11:5-8) and of the double form (Matt 18: 12-13=Luke 15:4-6 & 8-9; Luke 14:28-30 & 31-32) also appear with the positive result (Which of you would *not* act like this? Nobody would not! = Everybody would!).

When Luke 17:7-9 is placed against this formal background there are two obvious anomalies. (i) The double format is not very parallel: 17:7-8 is long and concrete while 17:9 is short and abstract. (ii) There is a confusion of negative and positive results, from 17:7 (nobody would!) to 17:8 (nobody would not! = everybody would!) and 17:9 (nobody would!).

This form-critical problem draws attention to the possibility of redactional change in 17:7-9. As indicated above, A.Weiser argued that 17:8 was a redactional creation of Luke and that the vocabulary indicated this. But while the vocabulary of 17:9 was just as Lukan as that of 17:8 he maintained that here Luke had only rephrased an original verse. The only reason for postulating this pre-Lukan verse, which is now completely lost since the present main words (ἔχει χάριν ... τὰ διαταχθέντα) are all Lukan, is that there should be a double format to the parable, and 17:9 is the "Apodosis" of 17:7. However, a glance at the data given above shows that the single format is as frequent as the double one in such logia. Therefore, it seems far better to argue that all of 17:8-9 is a Lukan creation whose overall effect is a softening (eschatological banquet as reward in 17:8b) of the harsh saying in 17:7.

The rest of the argument of A. Weiser referred to above is quite persuasive. The Q version of 17:10 would have contained the opening οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς and the closing phrase λέγετε ὅτι ... πεποιήκαμεν. The intermediary 17: 10b is a Lukan insert to bring 17:10ac into line with his own 17:9. This means that the original logion was 17:7;

that Q had 17:7,10ac, and that Luke added in 17:8-9,10b. At this stage it is clear that originally we did not have a parable but a proverb in 17:7. It is also clear that this distinction is somewhat fluid, a single image (proverb) can easily be developed into a narrative image (parable).

3.4 The Unjust Steward (Luke 16:1-7)

This parable concerns a master (ἄνθρωπός τις ἦν πλούσιος) and a steward (οἰκονόμον) at a time of critical reckoning for this latter. This must be considered as another Servant parable /28/.

There is already a scholarly consensus that a variety of applications have been appended to the parable of the Unjust Steward in 16:1-13 /29/. But the consensus breaks down completely when one discusses where the original parable ended and the additions began. Scholars have argued for an original ending at 16:9 (Hooley and Mason: 47-59; Krämer, 1960:279-291 and 1968:370-375; Caemmerer: 69-76; Williams:293-297; Bigo: 267-271; Hiers:30-36) or 16:8b (Descamps: 49-53 and Lunt: 132-136) or 16:8a (Fitzmyer: 23-42; Moore: 103-105; Via: 156-157) or 16:7 (Jeremias: 45-46, 181-182). There are two obvious objections to the parable as an example of alms-giving (16:8b, 9), even allowing for a transition from material to spiritual levels. (i) If it is the master's money, should one give alms from somebody else's property? (ii) If it is not the master's money, should one give alms by reducing larger amounts of usury to smaller quantities? The problem of 16:8a is equally well known. (i) If the κύριος is the master of the parable, is it really likely he would have praised the steward? (ii) If it is Jesus himself, we are already out of the parable and into commentary by the tradition.

Some recent studies have argued that the steward was not doing anything unjust in 16:5-7 but was simply reducing his own usurious profits within the agency which

the master had farmed out to him /31/. This may well be true and would probably not change the central drive of the story in any case, but it does not pay sufficient attention to the pivotal function of 16:2 (Drexler: 286-288). Whatever is happening in 16:5-7, there was already a problem between master and steward in 16:2 ("wasting his goods"). When 16:2 *and* 16:5-7 are read together within the literary economy of the story one has a picture of laziness organizing itself under crisis. The steward has not obtained sufficient return for the master and is therefore being removed (16:2). In such a situation he may as well get some terminal benefits from the master's losses and so he ingratiates himself with the debtors (16:5-7). When he is later out of a job they will, hopefully, feel grateful for his help and maybe even a little responsible for his firing (16:3-4).

The parable is a carefully formed mini-drama in 16:1-7. It is as elegantly constructed as was that of the Unmerciful Servant. There are again three scenes but here each scene is an internal diptych:

Scene 1 (16:1-2): Master and Steward.

(a) 16:1a (relationship given οἰκονόμον) — 16:2a (accusation retold: ἀκούω)

(b) 16:1b (accusation made: διεβλήθη) — 16:2b (relationship gone: οἰκονονεῖν)

Scene 2 (16:3-4): Steward and Self.

(a) 16:3a=16:4a (τί ποιήσω & ἔγνων τί ποιήσω)

(b) 16:3b=16:4b (ὅτι...οἰκονομίαν & ἵνα...οἰκονομίας)

(c) 16:3c=16:4c (problem and solution)

Scene 3 (16:5-7): Steward and Debtors.

(a) 16:5a=16:7a (ἕνα & ἑτέρῳ)

(b) 16:5b=16:7b (πόσον ὀφείλεις in both)

(c) 16:6a=16:7c (ὁ δὲ εἶπεν, Ἑκατόν in both)

(d) 16:6b=16:7d (δέξαι σου τὰ γράμματα καὶ γράψον in both)

The construction is quite clear and only a few comments are needed on Scene 1 in 16:1-2. The chiastic structure of this unit is important in setting up both the problem and the avenue of solution: ἀπόδος τὸν λόγον τῆς οἰκονομίας. The steward is dismissed for incompetence and yet is allowed to set up the "accounting" at which he now has nothing to lose and everything to gain by further but calculated incompetence. The cleverness of the steward consisted not only in solving his problem but in solving it by means of the very reason (low profits) that had created it in the first place. In the light of all this the parable ends quite adequately at 16:7, but again the pattern in Group A of Servant parables is being challenged: a bad servant, from 16:2 as well as 16:5-7, is not really punished.

3.5 The Wicked Husbandmen (Mark 12:1-8; Matt 21:33-39; Luke 20:9-15a; Gos Thom 93:1-15).

The understanding of this parable was argued in detail elsewhere (Crossan, 1971:451-465) and this will be presumed here. The original version is basically what is found in Gos Thom 65 (=93:1-16), with no allusions to Isa 5:1-7 and no citation of Ps 118:22-23 /32/. It concerns an absentee landlord who sends servants for the rent of his property. When the tenants reject the messengers he, rather naively, presumes they do not recognize them or accept their authority, and so he sends his son whom he thinks they will accept: compare Gos Thom 93:9 ("perhaps they did not recognize him") with 93:12-13 ("Perhaps they will respect my son"). Seeing their chance to possess the vineyard by killing the heir, they move swiftly to accomplish this design. The parable is quite similar to that of the Unjust Steward but the humorous has here given way to the murderous.

This must also be considered a Servant parable because it concerns a master-servant or superior-subordinate (ἄνθρωπος ... γεωργοῖς) at a moment of critical

reckoning /33/. Once again, however bad and evil servants are not only not punished but seem even to be rewarded in their evil design.

The construction consists of an opening which gives the Situation (93:1-3) and this is followed by three Scenes. Scene 1 concerns the first servant (93:4-9), Scene 2 is the second servant (93:10), Scene 3 is the son (93:11-15). The balanced harmony of Scenes 1 and 3 give the story its realistic plausibility and also its literary and dramatic unity:

Scene 1: First Servant.	*Scene 3*: Son.
He sent his servant.	Then the owner sent his son.
they would have killed him.	they killed him.
The servant came.	(No parallel!)
His master said: 'Perhaps	He said: 'Perhaps they will
they did not recognize him.'	respect my son.'

Both the story and construction end the parable where it does in Gos Thom 93:15 and no more is needed.

3.6 The Vineyard Workers (Matt 20:1-13).

The story concerns a vineyard owner (ἀνθρώπῳ οἰκοδεσπότῃ) who hires workers (ἐργάτας) for a day's work (20:1). It must be considered as part of the theme of the Servant parables /34/.

Where exactly did the original parable end. There is a consensus that 20:16 does not belong to the original version /35/. But most scholars have accepted 20:1-15 as the basic story. It will be argued here that the original ended with the rhetorical question of 20:13 /36/. It would actually make very little conceptual difference if 20:14 were original, but the question of the presence or absence of 20:15 is rather crucial. The contrast of ὀφθαλμὸς πονηρός (see Mark 7:22 and Matt 6:23) and ἐγὼ ἀγαθός has necessarily brought moral considerations into the very climax of the parable itself, and the commentators rely heavily on 20:15 for their interpretation

and application of the parable /37/. But for the following four reasons 20:15 should be considered as an addition by Matthew to the original story.

(i) Language. The combination of ἀγαθός and πονηρός is present in all but one of Matthew's uses of ἀγαθός: Matt 5:45; 7:11,17,18; 12:34-35; 22:10; 25:21,23, 26. This combination, present also in Matt 20:15, is not typically characteristic of Mark (see, for instance, 3:4) or Luke (see, for example, 8:8,15). Secondly, the very use of πονηρός itself is characteristically Matthean, and especially as ὁ πονηρός or τὸ πονερόν /38/.


(ii) Context. There is a close contextual and conceptual relationship between Matt 19:16-30 and 20:1-16. This shows explicitly in the repetition of 19:30 in 20:16. In Mark 10:17-18=Luke 18:18-19 Jesus was addressed as διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ and refused to accept this title with the comment, τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν; οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἷς ὁ θεός. But Matt 19:16-17 very carefully rephrased all this so that Jesus is addressed simply with διδάσκαλε and responds with τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἀγαθός. In other words, Jesus does not refuse the title of ἀγαθός in Matthew and the phrase εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἀγαθός could now refer to himself as God's representative. It is the "good" Jesus of 19:17 who will return as Son of Man in 19:28 and will dispense judgement as the ἐγὼ ἀγαθός of 20:15. Thus, 20:15 is a Matthean recapitulation of 19:17 and is intended to bind the parable more firmly into its present contextual position and meaning.

(iii) Concepts. It is not at all clear that the action of the master is "good." It is certainly not unjust (20:2=13), but most people would not call it "good" except in a rather perverse way. Most people would call him "good" and generous if, having given the last hired one denarius, he had increased the pay proportionately for the others.

(iv) Aesthetics. Not only is a rhetorical

question a very good ending for a parable since it draws the hearer more deeply and immediately into its world, but the question in 20:13 (οὐκ ἀδικῶ σε· οὐχὶ δηναρίου συνεφώνησάς μοι) explicitly and chiastically recalls the opening commitments of 20:2,4 (συμφωνήσας ... ἐκ δηναρίου ... δίκαιον) and this concludes the story both logically and dramatically. In summary, then, 20:15 must be removed from the original version and, most likely, so also should 20:14. Its function was probably to prepare for 20:15 (note the θέλω in both verses).

Once again we can note the construction of 20:1-13. There are two scenes differentiated by the balance of the initial 20:1 (πρωΐ ... μισθώσασθαι ἐργάτας) in 20:1-7, and the opening 20:8 (ὀψίας ... ἐργάτας ... μισθόν) of 20:8-13. In the former scene five groups are hired but only three groups receive any emphasis and the vocabulary contacts already indicate this: compare 20:2-4 with 20:7. The second scene appears to open in 20:8a in expected harmony with 20:1. But 20:8b introduces already an unexpected note: ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἕως τῶν πρώτων. This already points to the reversal of expectations which ensues in 20:9-13, and it also cuts down the groups under discussion to two: the first and the last. The rest are forgotten, The reversal can be diagrammed as follows:



This reversal is high-lighted by a comparison with the Talents in Matt 25:14-30. There the order is always the good servants first and the bad servants last. The Vineyard Workers followed this sequence in the first scene and reversed it in the second one /39/.

The story of Jesus went out of its way to avoid

the intrusion of morality /40/. There is no injustice on the part of the master (20:2,4,13) and there is no culpable laziness to be punished on the part of the servants (20:6-7). Can one imagine a perfectly reasonable situation in which perfectly reasonable expectations are rudely overthrown? The reversal is sharpened not only by the contrast of first and last but also by the contrast of "day" in the ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν ἀργοί of 20:6 with that in the τὸ βάρος τῆς ἡμέρας in 20:12. The owner, whose motivation is not discussed and is irrelevant in any case, is not one who is especially generous but one who violates expectations /41/. But what comes across most forcibly within the theme of the Servant parables is that the normalcy of Group A is here completely overthrown.

4. The Structure of the Reversal.

4.0 For the purpose of the present analysis we shall concentrate on the eight Servant parables and leave aside the Servant proverb in Luke 17:7. The purpose is to see how the reversal of the theme's development is reflected in the structure of the two groups of parables and to underline the subject-structure relationship involved /42/.

4.1 Syntagmatic and Paradigmatic Structures.

A certain amount of attention has been paid in the preceding analysis to the structure of the Servant parables in terms of sequence of elements. The next step is to study the interplay of paradigmatic and syntagmatic structures within the theme of the Servant.

This distinction, which might also be expressed as the difference between structuralist and structural analysis, has been summed up by Alan Dundes /43/ thus:

> "Lévi-Strauss is certainly aware of the distinction between Propp's syntagmatic structure and his paradigmatic structure. In fact, Lévi-Strauss's position is essentially that linear sequential structure is but apparent or manifest content, whereas the paradigmatic or schematic structure is the more important latent content. Thus the task of the structural analyst, according to Lévi-Strauss, is to see past or through the superficial linear structure to the 'correct' or true underlying paradigmatic pattern of organization."

The main purpose of this section is to move from syntagmatic into paradigmatic structure within the Servant theme.

4.20 The Structure in Group A.

4.20 The four parables in this group move within the horizon of expected normalcy: good servants are rewarded and/or bad ones are punished. This normalcy of world is reflected in a very marked homogeneity of sequential structure. In fact the functional elements of this Group "fit into one consecutive story" as was also true in Propp's analysis of the Russian fairy-story (25, 64). This homogeneity can be indicated under three rubrics: development, elements (functions), and expansion.

4.21 (i) Development. The master-servant reckoning is developed in Group A along two lines. The story involves action by the servant and reckoning by the master, but it is the action which begets the reckoning so that the former begins and the latter terminates the story development. The "problematic" or "complicating element" /44/ in Group A always concerns the action, not the reckoning. In the Doorkeeper, it is the *night*-time with its danger of sleep that creates the tension of interest. In the Overseer it is the *delay* in the return which engenders the problem. In the Tenants it is the *decision*, the choice of how and what to do with the entrusted money, that develops the story. Finally, in the Throne Claimant, it is the *danger* of such an action that renders the story of tensive interest, even in its present residual fragmentation. It is an all or nothing situation. So, in Group A, action begets expected reckoning in all cases, but the story interest was created by divergent possibilities of action and problem. Secondly, the space in which the story can unfold its tensive problematic is furnished by the fact that the master departs leaving the servant on his own and then returns to see and judge what has happened.

4.22 Elements. Within this basic pattern the choice

and sequence of elements are remarkably homogeneous /45/:

	Doorkeeper	*Overseer*		*Talents*	*Throne Claimant*
Command	Mark 13:34b	24:45	-	25:14-15c	-
Departure	Mark 13:34a	-	24:48	25:15d	19:12
Activity	Luke 12:36b	24:46b	24:49	25:16-18	19:14
Return	Mark 13:35 Luke 12:36a	24:46a	24:50	25:19	19:15a
Reward	Luke 12:38	24:47	-	25:20-23	-
Punishment	Mark 13:36	-	24:51	25:24-28	19:27

4.23 (iii) Expansion. Despite this homogeneity of thematic development and elemental sequence, variety is still present in the four parables because of the process of expansion from the Doorkeeper (sanctions implicit originally?), to the Throne Claimant (bad punished), to the Overseer (good rewarded *or* bad punished), to the Talents (good rewarded *and* bad punished). This latter parable brings this development to its fullest format and its most careful construction.

4.3 Structure in Group B.

4.31 There are three major structural differences between Group A and Group B. In Group A normalcy of world was reflected in harmony of sequence and homogeneity of development. In Group B the questioning of this normalcy is reflected in the total lack of sequential homogeneity. Each of the four parables is carefully constructed within its own closed unity but there is no common pattern or sequence of elements discernible across all four of them. There is, of course, a structural resemblance between the triadic outline of the Talents in Group A and some of the parables in Group B, but not much can be made of this because of its general folkloric background and its presence in other parables as well, for example, the Sower /46/. In other words, as soon as the normalcy of world in Group A is questioned in Group B, the sequential homogeneity of Group A disappears and no other sequential harmony appears within Group B itself.

4.32 The second major difference is that these parables create their narrative space in the second and opposite possibility to that in Group A. Now it is the servant who departs and then returns to the master to report. The Unmerciful Servant (προσηνέχθη in Matt 18:24) and the Unjust Steward (φωνήσας in Luke 16:2) are called before their respective masters. The Wicked Husbandmen moves a step further along this line: master and servants (tenants) stay in their initial positions and messengers go backward and forward between them /47/. But in the Vineyard Workers it is again the servants who depart (ἀπέστειλεν in 20:2; ὑπάγετε in 20:4,7) and return to the master (ἤλεσον in 20:8). Indeed, even the Servant proverb in Luke 17:7 follows this pattern of Group B (εἰσελθοντι).


4.33 The third difference is that the parables in Group B have located their problematic ("complicating element") at the opposite end of the narrative to those in Group A. There action begot expected reckoning, but here reckoning begets unexpected action. In Group B the reckoning appears at the start of the story and it is its presence that introduces the interest and tension of developmental possibilities /48/. The initial and causal function of the reckoning is immediately clear in the Unmerciful Servant (Matt 18:23), the Unjust Steward (Luke 16:1-2), and the Wicked Tenants (Mark 12:2). It is not so immediately evident in the case of the Vineyard Workers, but it is referred to again in general terms in 20:4. This places the reckoning before the eyes of the workers and of the hearers from the very start and so creates the expectation which will be reversed at the story's conclusion (note the ἐνόμισαν of 20:9).

4.4 Comparative Structure of the Groups.


It is now clear that these parables are best described as parables of Reckoning. The comparative structure of the two groups shows how the thematic development concludes by questioning and then reversing itself. The

two structures are outlined in diagram below, using these abbreviations: M=Master; S=Servant; R=Reward; P=Punishment; G=Good; B=Bad; D=Departure; Rt=Return; A=Action by servant; Rk=Reckoning by master. A glance at the two structures makes it evident how they unfold along various sets of binary opposites.

Structure of Group A.



Structure of Group B.



5. The Interpretation of the Structure.

5.0 The final and most important point is what all this means. This can be assessed more readily by placing these Servant parables against two backgrounds. The first one is the general background of oral tradition in folk-lore and in myth. The second one is that of the biblical tradition itself.

5.1 Servant Parables and Oral Tradition.

The preceding analysis raises certain questions concerning the parables of Jesus as the compositions of an oral poet, and it may be helpful to put them in the wider framework of oral poetics.

5.11 (i) Oral Poetics. Could it be that Jesus told the parable of the Talents, for example, over and over again with minor variations within the same general content and structure and that the tradition might have preserved two or more such individual tellings (Funk, 1966: 163)? If such were the case, one could never really find an "original" version. In actual practice this seldom happens. One is usually forced to choose between the available versions because of standard traditio-critical

principles and not just because of a drive towards an archetypal version. There is, however, an even more difficult problem. If Jesus told the same parable over and over again, could it be that the tradition preserved one version which was not any concrete ("original") telling but a structural outline or skeletal story? In other words, when traditional and redactional layers are removed from the Talents, is what remains as the "original" version the structural outline of a multiform and many-times-told parable of the historical Jesus /49/.

Before attempting any answer to the problem two facts must be noted. This must be considered a very real possibility and well within the traditions of oral deliverance and oral remembrance. For people raised in a writing culture the term *ipsissima verba* means exactly what it says. When we apply the phrase to an oral tradition we tend to presume it means precise verbal fidelity to an original with some allowance for the limits of memory and recall. But the evidence would indicate that people who are operating within a tradition of oral deliverance and remembrance, even if there is also a tradition of writing available in their culture, may even use a term such as *ipsissima verba* where they actually mean what we would describe as *ipsissima structura*. The problem is not that they cannot recall the original properly but that they have no such concept of a dominant "original" at all /50/. Secondly, the data we have is not nearly sufficient for any apodictic answer. What is given here should be considered as tentative and intended to provoke discussion rather than to close the question /51/.

The data of the Servant parables indicates a negative answer to the above question. In these parables, at least, Jesus makes (i) major changes of content within the same structure: see Group A; (ii) major changes of structure within the same theme: compare Groups A and B; but we have no direct evidence that he makes (iii) minor changes of detail within the same story content. We do

not know how often or if ever again Jesus worked with so many parables within the same theme /52/, and it may be dangerous to extrapolate from this one rather striking case. But we do know that the primitive communities had obvious reasons for preserving the theme of the master-servant relationship and its crisis of reckoning, so it is quite likely that we have this one case preserved not because it was the only one of its kind but because it was the one most wanted for retention. In so far as one can generalize from the case of the Servant parables, then, it would seem that the parabolic creativity of Jesus consisted in variations of structure within the same theme and in variations of content within the same structure *but not* in variations of detail within the same content. No doubt it took such a restless probing of structure /53/ to express adequately the challenge Jesus was offering to his tradition /54/.

5.12 (ii) Myths. This may be clarified somewhat by comparison between Jesus' parabolic system on the Servant theme and the standard development within a mythic system. There is one very obvious similarity and one even more striking divergence. Both will represent a point of transition to the next and final stage of this presentation. The similarity consists in the fact that the message of both parabolic and mythic system resides in the structure itself. It is therefore necessary to have many variations in content in order to make the structure as obvious as possible. If one merely repeated the same story content with but minor changes of detail the emphasis would be on basic content and not on basic structure. In the words of C. Lévi-Strauss (1967:226):

> "The question has often been raised why myths, and more generally oral literature, are so much addicted to duplication, triplication, or quadruplication of the same sequence. If our hypotheses are accepted, the answer is obvious: The function of repetition is to render the structure of the myth apparent."

The difference between Jesus' parabolic intention and the usual mythic function is just as important. Edmund Leach /55/, following Lévi-Strauss, has drawn attention to the

mythic system's function of mediating between contradicting opposites. Jesus' parabolic system, on the other hand, does not intend to mediate contradiction but to create it. It does not quell the fire it finds but casts upon the earth the fire that was not there /56/.

5.13 (iii) Folklore. It is at this point that Jesus' parabolic system (only on the Servant theme?) is most clearly distinguishable from folklore (more narrowly, oral literature) in general. Folklore stabilizes society, but Jesus' Servant parables subvert society. Two quotations from W. R. Bascom (33, 297) are illustrative:

> "In addition to the obvious function of entertainment or amusement, folklore serves to sanction the established beliefs, attitudes, and institutions, both sacred and secular, and it plays a vital role in education in nonliterate societies."
>
> "There is no difficulty, of course, in finding instances in folklore where laziness, complacency, or the lack of ambition and initiative are condemned, but are there any which suggest that the individual destroy or even disregard the institutions and conventions of his society."

The function of oral literature and of Jesus' parables could hardly be more opposed to one another.

5.14 (iv) "Fictions." Frank Kermode /57/ summed up what we have been discussing in one terse phrase: "Myths are the agents of stability, fictions the agents of change." In this sense, Jesus' parables are oral "fictions."

5.2 Servant Parables and Biblical Tradition.

Throughout this century the assertion that Jesus proclaimed an eschatological message has become gradually more and more axiomatic. But within the tradition whence Jesus came one must distinguish an older prophetic eschatology and a more contemporary apocalyptic eschatology (von Rad: 99-125, 301-308). For our present purpose this distinction rests on two contrasts. (i) Prophetic eschatology was concerned with an ending of world, while apocalyptic eschatology looked to *the* ending of *this* world. (ii) The former had no concept of another "world" above

or beyond this one, while the latter could only accept the ending of this one so easily because it envisaged a far better one elsewhere. It is also clear that behind these two views there are radically different views of time at work (Funk, 1969:175-191).

Scholarship has tended with wide consensus to describe Jesus' message as apocalyptic eschatology. But this consensus has become extremely problematic recently for two reasons. (i) It is no longer at all certain that Jesus ever spoke of the future coming of the Son of Man (Conzelmann, Käsemann, Vielhauer, Perrin, Koester, for example /58/). (ii) Other sayings with a clear future orientation have been steadily removed from the historical Jesus and assigned to either tradition or redaction /59/. The question that this inevitably raises is whether Jesus is speaking out of the ancient prophetic eschatology precisely in order to oppose and deny the current apocalyptic eschatology /60/. He was not announcing that God was about to end the world (i.e., for us, the planet), but he was proclaiming God as the One who shatters world repeatedly and always. If, for instance, he forbade calculations of the signs of the end, it was not calculations nor signs he was opposed to, but end. God is the One who poses permanent and unceasing challenge to man's ultimate concern and thereby keeps world free from idolatry and open in its uncertainty /61/.

When Jesus was read in the light of apocalyptic eschatology it was expected that his message would show up in the very form of his announcement /62/. So also when, to the contrary, he is interpreted as the proclaimer of *permanent eschatology*, there should be some signs of this message in the very form and structure of his language /63/. This shows especially in paradox because this is to language what eschaton is to world and the former is an appropriate linguisticality for the latter. In recent research this heightened paradoxicality has been noted in two areas of Jesus' language, areas in which he might be

described as moving strands of wisdom tradition into conjunction with prophetic and against apocalyptic eschatology (Beardslee, 1970b:61-76, 1970a:30-41, 1972:92-103; Crossan: 1971-2; Perrin, 1972:543-572). This paper adds a third area to this research. The eschatology of language goes outward in widening ripples from proverb to parable to parabolic theme.

There is a supreme and double irony in the Servant theme. The motif of the departing and returning master fitted perfectly into the apocalyptic expectation of the coming Son of Man in the primitive community. Yet this motif in Group A was *already* subverted by Jesus in Group B where it is now the servant who departs and returns. Secondly, the eschatology of Group A is one in which action begets expected reckoning. But this is subverted in Group B in which the reckoning begets unexpected action, and that is a different eschatology.

Be prudently ready for the advent of God, But, unfortunately, the advent of God is that which shatters prudence. Or, as W. H. Auden put it even more tersely, "The Real is what will strike you as really absurd."

NOTES

/1/ For my review see *JBL* 92 (1973:136-137). See also Harrington.

/2/ This study will presume the traditional and redactional investigations of A. Weiser but will attempt to redo completely the level of the historical Jesus.

/3/ This comparative and cumulative reading on a musical analogy is like the reading of the thematically united myths in C. Lévi-Strauss (1967 and 1969). See also the comments of J. Lacan: "But one has only to listen to poetry...to know in fact that all discourse aligns itself along the several staves of a score" (112). Even more to the general thesis of this paper is his statement: "One thing this structure of the signifying chain makes evident is the possibility I have, precisely insofar as I have this language in common with other subjects, that is insofar as it exists as a language, to use it in order to say something quite other than what it says. This function of the word is more worth pointing out than that of 'disguising the thought' (more often than not indefinable) of the subject; it is no less than the function of indicating the place of the subject in the search for the truth" (113).

/4/ See the detailed and very persuasive analysis of A. Weiser (1971a:131-153, 161-177) and especially 174-175. As a parable of Jesus it called for readiness before the coming consummation of the Kingdom according to this author. So also Weiser (1971b).

/5/ It is here presumed, with almost all the commentators, that parables are "possible" stories, either of typical and recurrent cases of of likely and imaginable occurrences. This "principle of realism" makes reconstruction of the *functional elements* of the original parable somewhat easier than is the case with other logia. Parables, as realistic possibilities, fit into the category of "feigned history." See the comment of J. R. R. Tolkien (xi): "I cordially dislike allegory in all its manifestations, and always have done so since I grew old and wary enough to detect its presence. I much prefer history, true or feigned, with its varied applicability to the thought and experience of readers. I think that many confuse 'applicability' with 'allegory'; but the one resides in the freedom of the reader, and the other in the purposed domination of the author."

/6/ So Jeremias (54) as against Weiser (1971a:174) who gives the "Grundform" with: "wie wenn jemand sein Haus verlässt." In assessing original elements one might ask concerning each, "que se passerait-il si cette notation n'était pas dans le texte?" So Bovon (20).

/7/ The similarities in theme and vocabulary between Mark 13:34-36 and the Gethsemane incident in 14:32-42 do not prove that the doorkeeper in 13:34b (=Peter, renamed Simon in 14:37!) must be a Markan redactional precision. The failure of the Three in general and of "Simon" in particular (14:34,37,40,41) is a Markan creation: see Kelber. This creation has, of course, influenced the Markan redaction of the Doorkeeper parable, but it did not furnish him with it in the first place.

/8/ Hence "night" is as important as "return" and it is the former that renders the latter critical. See Dupont (1970).

/9/ See the detailed analysis of Weiser (1971a:178-225), and especially the comparison of the Jesus and Q parables (203). He argues that Matthew is closer to the Q text than Luke but that most of this latter's changes are stylistic.

/10/ The Q text is still visible behind Matt 24:51a= Luke 12:46b. The addition in 24:51b is Matthean. One might consider διχοτομήσει αὐτόν as some sort of misunderstanding of the original Aramaic. See Jeremias (57), and also Black (256-267). The most likely original would have intended: "And he will divide (for) him his portion and set him with the faithless ones."

/11/ As Jeremias (59) noted, the presence of 19:24-25 after 19:17 if rather "meaningless." The fusion is pre-Lukan since such is not his usual method of literary composition.

/12/ Note how Matthew had taken the vengeful owner of 21:41 (ἀπολέσει) and introduced him as the vengeful king of 22:7 (ἀπώλεσεν). See Dillon.

/13/ So also Weiser (1971a:226-272). As usual this analysis is presumed for the traditional and redactional levels.

/14/ For example, Matthew has three servants who get five, two, and one talent (25:15) and produce five more. two more, and the same one talent, respectively. Luke has ten servants who get one mina each (19:13), but only three reappear at the reckoning and they have produced ten, five, and the same one mina, respectively. The threesome is original. There are also three in *The Gospel of the Nazarenes*, 18: see Hennecke & Schneemelcher (149). Minas rather than talents seem more original on the principle of realism, and note also the ὀλίγα of Matt 25:21,23, but the Matthean proportions (5/5;2/2;1) seem more likely than the Lukan ones (1/10;1/5;1). Finally, Matthew has the third servant bury the talent while Luke has him hide it away in a napkin. Most likely the idea of burial was necessitated by the change from mina to talent, and so is secondary.

This disagrees with A. Weiser (1971a:248). There does not seem to be any real indication that his action in Luke is more careless than in Matthew. In both cases the master accuses him of stupidity and failure rather than of carelessness in hiding the money. Significantly, the structure of Matthew has held firm even while the details may have changed.

/15/ Weiser (1971a:236-238) concludes on linguistic and conceptual grounds that these verses were in Matthew's source.

/16/ It might be conjectured that the advent and fusion of Luke 19:14 into this original parable caused the elimination of the equivalent there to Matt 25:16-18.

/17/ On this logion as a generalizing addition to the parable see Weiser (1971a:253); Jeremias (62); Dodd (115-117); Via (114-115). The function of Luke 19:25 is connective (see also the preparatory 19:24a). Obviously, the logion was added before the two variants of the parable had gone their separate ways.

/18/ The original reward is already obscured by eschatological coloring in Matt 25:21,23 and by the Throne Claimant intrusion in Luke 19:17,19 (minas, cities). In the light of Matt 25:28 and Luke 19:24 it might be conjectured that the reward was to retain charge and responsibility for the full amount they had gained and to continue to trade therewith. This would be what was originally behind Matt 25:21a,23a and Luke 19:17a,19a.

/19/ The parable has been interpreted as an attack by Jesus on the prudent exactitude of Pharisaic piety. See Kamlah (1968); and Dupont (1969). But surely this piety was extremely active, and a Pharisee would see himself represented by the prudent and achieving servants rather than by the safe and inactive one. It has also been suggested that the parable is not from Jesus at all. See Fiedler. For the legal background see Derrett (1965) (1970:17-31). But the parable is itself a closed literary unit and no amount of data can change the fact that within the parable's world the first two servants are rewarded as good and the third is punished as bad.

/20/ It is precisely this basic presumption of normalcy in the master-servant relationship which characterizes the rabbinical parables on this theme. See the examples in Weiser (1971a:22-41). But note his comments (114-117) concerning Luke 17:7-10. These should be widened to include the use of this entire Servant theme by Jesus.

/21/ In this sense Jesus is upsetting the conventions and expectations of his own theme. Hirsch (263) quotes the comment of Schleiermacher: "'Uniqueness in

speech shows itself as a deviation from the characteristics that determine the genre.'" See also the comments on Aristotle's term *peripeteia* by Kermode (18, 53) as a "falsification of one's expectation of the end" or a "falsification of expectation, so that the end comes as expected, but not in the manner expected."

/22/ So Thompson. But it should be considered (on the analogy of 1 Cor 8: see p. 59, n. 40) that (i) 17:24-27 may refer to two specific groups within the community: 17:25b,26 (no!) and 17:25a,27 (yes!), and that (ii) 18:1-14 warns the former, while (iii) 18:15-35 warns the latter group.

/23/ Once again the analysis of Weiser (1971a:75-104) is presumed here. He says that the original parable of Jesus meant that each should forgive others as God had forgiven him. But if the teaching was simply this the parable should have the forgiven servant in turn forgive his brother servant. When Conzelmann (284) claims that, "the parable of the unmerciful servant is the basis of the demand that we for our part should practice forgiveness of sins," he ignores the OR ELSE inherent in the parabolic narrative.

/24/ One finds oneself in complete agreement with the statement of Linnemann (123) that, "Only experience can show that mercy is the way the world is ordered"; and with that of Via (143) that, "it is not that our forgiveness confers upon us the capacity to forgive. The one who has really experienced forgiveness *will* forgive." But do these assertions really arise from *this* parable with *this* ending?

/25/ Taken from Thompson (211). One might have expected 18:35 to have concluded with, "if you do not forgive your brother as your Father in heaven has forgiven you," rather than with, "if you do not forgive your brother from your heart."

/26/ Jeremias (103, 158). The OT examples in Isa 42:23; 50:10; Hag 2:3 seem also to require the answer: Nobody!

/27/ The Situation is the simple 11:5a, τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν ἔξει φίλον. The Circumstances are a diptych involving the friend speaking (εἴπῃ) from outside the house in 11:5b-6 and the other person answering (εἴπῃ) in 7 inside. The Action is in 11:8. But the format has been broken in that 11:8 is no longer a question but a statement (λέγω ὑμῖν) and this renders the analysis problematic. This λέγω ὑμῖν is here taken as a changed version of the original conclusion which was still part of the whole question introduced by the initial τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν. For importunity even if not out of friendship? This disagrees with the analysis of Jeremias (158-159) who ends the question at 11:7. But

11:7 is intended as a perfectly reasonable initial refusal (more a grumbling protest) and that is why it is given in some detail. See also Güttgemanns (7-11) who speaks of the "'Unmöglichkeit' der Antwort (v.7)." But the real impossibility is in 11:8 and this is underlined by the chiastic structure of the verse: (a) οὐ δώσει, (b) ἀναστάς, (c) διὰ ... φίλον / διὰ ... ἀναίδειαν, (b') ἐγερθείς, (a') δώσει. In a word: Who would not eventually give in?

/28/ As against Weiser (1971a:46). His omission is very strange especially in view of Kamlah (1963). But compare Matt 24:45 (δοῦλος) with the parallel Luke 12:42 (οἰκονόμος), and note that Luke uses δοῦλος thereafter in 12:43,45,46. If Luke changed δοῦλος into οἰκονόμος here (see Weiser: 178, 219-222), might he not also have done it in 16:1,3,8? Hence the omission of the Unjust Steward from the Servant parables is hardly permissible.

/29/ The classical statement is that of Dodd (17): "We can almost see here notes for three separate sermons on the parable as text." He ended the parable at 16:7. But see also Fletcher.

/30/ See Marshall.. Actually, however, ending the story at 1 :8a (without 8b) would not change the present interpretation too much.

/31/ Derrett (1961) (1970:48-77). See also Derrett, " 'Take thy bond ... and write fifty' (Luke xvi.6). The Nature of the Bond." *JTS* 23 (1972:438-440).

/32/ Any interpretation of this parable on the level of the historical Jesus must first establish the exact content of its original version. For example, if the punishment was not in the original, the parable could not have referred to the possible results of Zealotry: see Newell.

/33/ Weiser (1971a:49-57) studies this parable and that of the Great Supper even though they are "nicht eigentliche Knechtsgleichnisse" (45). But it is the servant-messengers and not the servant-tenants he is interested in. This is a graphic example of the difficulty of studying the parable on all three levels at the same time (synchrony versus diachrony?). Jesus was not interested in the servant-messengers but the evangelists were very much so. Does one classify the parable according to Jesus' interests or to theirs?

/34/ Despite Weiser (1971a:46) who finds it pertains neither to the terminology nor the theme of the subject. It is included in Kamlah (1963:285-286).

/35/ Dodd (94); Jeremias (34-35, 136-138); Linnemann (85-86); Via (148). The basic reason is its reflection (with οὕτως ἔσονται) of Matt 19:30 from Mark 10:31.

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/36/ On questions, and answers, at the conclusion of parables see Bultmann (182-183).

/37/ Dodd (94) speaks of the "employer, out of sheer generosity and compassion for the unemployed ... a striking picture of the divine generosity"; Jeremias (139) says that, "God is depicted as acting like an employer who has compassion for the unemployed and their families"; Linnemann (86) comments that, "The master of the house is able, however, to show that justice has been satisfied: what appeared as a breach in the ordered system of justice was in truth the appearance of goodness, and goodness cannot be disapproved." See also Mitton (1966).

/38/ Matthew: 24; Mark: 2; Luke-Acts: 12-8; John: 3; rest of the NT: 26. Note for example, its insertion in Matt 9:4 over Mark 2:8=Luke 5:22 or in Matt 15:19 over Mark 7:21. Note especially the use of ὁ πονερός in Matt 13:19 as against ὁ σατανᾶς in Mark 4:15 and ὁ διάβολος in Luke 8:12.

/39/ This 20:8b is more than a device to have the first around to witness what happens to the last. Their presence could have been presumed in parabolic economy even if not explicitly mentioned. Indeed, it would seem that 20:12 shows that the last are still around when the first are paid. In any case, there is a more profound reason behind 20:8b than merely keeping the first around and Matthew's addition of 20:16 to this parable is not too far off the mark.

/40/ Compare the rabbinical parable in Jeremias (138-139). In this case there is a sound reason for the "inequality" of reward.

/41/ There could be no *total* reversal of salary without the point of the parable shifting drastically. The owner does not pay the last the most and the first the least. In such a story the hearers would probably focus on the "injustice" of the owner. Jesus must tell a story which is quite possible and which does not raise irrelevant moral considerations. It is expectations that are to be reversed, thus the ἐνόμισαν in 20:10. See Via (154) who concludes that, "Our very existence depends on whether we will accept God's gracious dealings, his dealings which shatter our calculations about how things ought to be ordered in the world." They shatter also our very ideas of graciousness.

/42/ Recall Susan Sontag's prefatory summary of Roland Barthes' thesis (1967 : xvii) : "For Barthes a language and a style are 'objects,' while a mode of *écriture* (writing, personal utterance) is a 'function.' Neither strictly historical nor irredeemably personal, *écriture* occupies a middle ground; it is 'essentially the morality of form.'"

/43/ In his "Introduction" to the second edition (1968) of the English translation (1958) of V. Propp (xii). See also the distinction and discussion of symbolic, paradigmatic, and syntagmatic consciousness as "(perhaps) the three imaginations of the sign" in Barthes (1972:205-211).

/44/ I am very grateful to Prof. Robert Tannehill whose written reply to a first draft of this paper drew my attention to this feature which I had not then considered. I am not certain if he would agree, however, with the use to which I have put his suggestion here and below.

/45/ The Doorkeeper can only be reconstructed from both versions. The Overseer and the Talents follow the Matthean texts to avoid undue complication of the outline. The Throne Claimant is, of course, from Luke.

/46/ C. L. Mitton (1964). Recall the "Law of Three" as noted clasically (1908) by Axel Olrik.

/47/ The master here is an absentee landlord and not a departing and returning master, So Gos Thom 93:1-4 as against the ἀπεδήμησεν of Mark 12:1=Matt 21:33=Luke 20:9. Hence there is no returning master in this parable either. So Gos Thom 93:16 as against Mark 12:9=Matt 21:40=Luke 20:16. One presumes that the whole logic of the story is that the master must operate at a distance and through intermediaries in attempting to "bring" the tenants to him.

/48/ Prof. Robert Tannehill has noted in his above mentioned reply that the principles of V. Propp (67) demand that one define a "function *according to its consequences*" and that "identical forms adapt themselves to different functions." Therefore, a reckoning which initiates a story is functionally different from one which terminates it.

/49/ A. B. Lord (100-102) asserts that, "In oral tradition the idea of an original is illogical." But this presumes that the *only* type of oral poetry is epic narrative which is metrical, musical, and very traditional in story, theme, and formula. It must be noted, to the contrary, that Jesus' parables are neither metrical nor musical (hence no necessity for fixed formulaic patterns), are short and dramatic rather than long and epic, and are s specifically anti-traditional in intention. Any application of the Parry-Lord methodology to Jesus' parables must respect these differences.

/50/ See especially Lord. Yugoslav poet-singers working in an epic tradition of oral narrative poetry claim they can hear and repeat thousands of lines "word for word" (26-29). But when one hears such a "repetition" it is a creative act of fidelity to the basic story with its general structure and sequence of elements and not a

a case of *ipsissima verba* (103-5, 223-234).

/51/ The problem is still present for theories holding that Jesus' words were taken and remembered as sacred tradtion, for example, Gerhardsson (1961 and 1964). What was accepted as "sacred tradition" for the parables: words or structure?

/52/ See Crossan (1973). Especially interesting in this regard is the recent article by Ellena.

/53/ Piaget (5-6) describes structure as, "comprised of three key ideas: the idea of wholesness, the idea of transformation, and the idea of self-regulation." A structure is a "system closed under transformation."

/54/ Lord (155) states apodictically that, "oral poets who are not traditional do not exist." But, once again, there are other types of oral poetry besides traditional epic narrative. There is not only Greece and Yugoslavia, there is also Israel.

/55/ Leach (11) summarized it as follows: "despite all variations of theology, this aspect of myth is a constant." The reversed structures of the Abraham and Jepthah sacrifice stories (Gen 22:1-18; Judg 11:30-40), noted on 37-38, are an interesting analogue to the development of the Servant theme.

/56/ In such a situation the anti-traditional oral poet would be rather like his writing brother as cited in Marcuse (192) who says: "Understanding of my poetry presupposes the collapse and invalidation of precisely that universe of discourse and behavior into which you want to translate it."

/57/ Kermode (39). Note also the "ficciones" of world-dissolution ("fulminación") in Jorge Luis Borges.

/58/ For a recent summary of the discussion see Walker (482-490).

/59/ For example, Mark 9:1. See Perrin (1969).

/60/ Perrin (1963:178, 185) had already noted this point.

/61/ This would answer my own question (1973:265, n. 82): "The question might be raised whether Jesus is anti-apocalyptic or anti-eschatological. Or, in other words, is the eschatology of Jesus radically different from any in late Judaism and/or the primitive church.

/62/ Robinson. Take, for example, Luke 11:20. How does this represent a tension of temporal succession from present exorcism to future kingdom? Is it not rather a

tension of paradoxical simultaneity? Exorcism is eschaton. The action of God is an ending of world, of the sufferer's world of demonic possession, in this case. And if (an) exorcism can be (an) eschaton then, as Ezra Pound said in Canto 92,

"Le Paradis n'est pas artificiel
but is jagged
For a flash,
for an hour.
Then agony,
then an hour,
then agony."

/63/ In discussing the conjunction of form and content in Pascal's *Pensées*, Lucien Goldmann commented: "For Pascal's message is that Man is great in that he searches for absolute values but small in that, without ever ceasing to search, he knows that he can never approach these values. The only form to express this content is, of course, one which does not prove the contrary; which doesn't show either a man who has abandoned the search or one who has approached the goal. The fragment is such a form."

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PARABLE AND EXAMPLE IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS

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ABSTRACT

The Good Samaritan, the Rich Fool, the Rich Man and Lazarus, the Pharisee and the Publican, the Wedding Guest and the Proper Guests are found only in Luke. They have been classified form-critically as exemplary-stories (*Beispielerzählungen*), that is, models of right and/or wrong behavior. This classification is certainly correct for the level of the redaction and probably for the tradition as well. But in all cases there is a certain tension between the story and its present interpretive frames. This tension is explained if these stories were originally parables of Jesus before they were changed into examples by the tradition and/or the evangelists. As parables, all, save the Rich Fool, are attacks on the hearer's world whereby he may experience the kingdom of God as eschatological or world-shattering presence.

0. This article has three main purposes: (i) to discuss the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) in some detail to decide what form of discourse the historical Jesus, as distinct from the later tradition or the final redaction, intended it to be when originally given; (ii) to extrapolate from this one parable and investigate, but in lesser detail, the other major "exemplary stories" in the parabolic teaching of Jesus and to ask whether there are any such authentically stemming from Jesus himself; (iii) on the basis of this analysis to raise certain problems and questions with regard to method in parable exegesis and to meaning in parable interpretation.

I. THE GOOD SAMARITAN: EXAMPLE OR PARABLE?

1. The Good Samaritan as Example

1.0 For the sake of simplicity the technical classification of "exemplary story" will usually be called an "example," but this latter term will always have the full connotation of that literary phenomenon classified as "exemplary story."

1.1 In his classification of figurative speech in the synoptic tradition R. Bultmann distinguished among /1/: (i) "*Metaphors*...shortened comparisons lacking the comparative word" (e.g. Matt 5:13); (ii) "*similitudes*...distinguished from comparisons or figures only by the detail in which the figure is painted" (e.g. Matt 18:12-14); (iii) "the *Parable*...gives as its picture not a typical condition or a typical, recurrent event, but some interesting particular situation" (e.g. Luke 16:1-7); and (iv) "*Exemplary stories* have a striking formal relationship to parables...even if they have no figurative element at all... exemplary stories offer examples = models of right behavior" (169-179). The following are classified in this category: the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:30-37); the rich fool (Luke 12:16-21); the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31); the Pharisee and the Publican (Luke 18:10-14); and, as "the first part of an exemplary story," the wedding guest (Luke 14:7-11) and the proper guests (Luke 14:12-14). One notes in passing that all are from Luke.

1.2 One problem must be indicated immediately: of the four classes cited from Bultmann the first three are sharply distinguished from the last one. Metaphors, similitudes, and parables are all figurative speech and differ among themselves only in whether such language is terse or developed and is using a typical case or an individual situation. But examples are essentially different in that, as Bultmann noted, they may "have no figurative element at all." They are stories of how one should or should not behave in certain situations and, while

being also paradigmatic for other cases, these stories could be actually lived out in practice: for example, the sower parable is not an agricultural lesson in how to sow, but the Pharisee and the publican is taken as a direct lesson in how to pray /2/. The implications of this problem will have to be faced at the end of this article.

1.3 A glance at some recent literature on the subject confirms that the Good Samaritan is classified and/or interpreted as an exemplary story by many of the major books on the parables. J. Jeremias (201-205) considers the formal classification of the parables "a fruitless labour in the end" (20) but interprets the Good Samaritan as meaning: "The example of the despised half-breed was intended to teach him that no human being was beyond the range of his charity. The law of love called him to be ready at any time to give his life for another's need" (205). E. Linnemann (1966) accepts the classification explicitly /3/ and explains: "The story certainly leaves no doubt that what really matters is to act as the Samaritan did...in the same simplicity...governed completely by the need of the man who confronts us" (56). G. V. Jones (80-109) follows the classification only to the extent of comparing metaphors, similitudes, and parables with allegory, but no line is drawn between these former classes and examples. He interprets the Samaritan with: "The parable is not a pleasant tale about the Traveller Who Did His Good Deed: it is a damning indictment of social, racial, and religious superiority" (115), and later describes it as: "a memorable illustrative story" (120), which "issues the challenge to decide between the life of involvement or non-involvement" (154), so that a man "understands and does what is actually required of him in his situation" (156). N. Perrin (1967b:87n.1) followed Jeremias in ignoring the distinction between the classes in so far as any programmatic methodology is concerned /4/. But he understands the parable in question as: "an 'exemplary story' and as such concerned to teach by example, in this

instance the example of true neighbourliness...to teach that the crucial aspect of human relationships is response to the neighbour's need" (123-124). D. O. Via,Jr. (11-13) accepts the classification explicitly and notes: "The behavior and attitude sketched in The Good Samaritan and The Rich Fool (example stories) are not comparable to or analogous to what a man should do or avoid but are exactly what he should do or avoid" (12). In this general consensus that the Samaritan is an example rather than a parable there is one striking exception. C. H. Dodd (1-2, 100) does not use the classification and never discusses any of the examples save for a passing reference to Augustine's allegorization of the Samaritan and to threefold aspects of this parable.

2. The Good Samaritan as Parable

2.0 This consensus that the Good Samaritan is an example appears quite unassailable when Luke 10:25-37 is read in its present unity culminating with the admonition, "'Go, and do the same yourself'" (10:37b). But does this unity come from the redaction, the tradition, or the historical Jesus?

2.1 From redaction to tradition

2.10 In attempting to separate the various layers of the pericope the complex can be broken down into four units: the question concerning eternal life in 10:25-28; the question regarding one's neighbour in 10:29; the parable of the Samaritan which must at least include all of 10:30-35; and the question in 10:36, answer in 10:37a, and concluding admonition in 10:37b.

2.11 (a) 10:25-28. The question concerning eternal life in Luke is very similar to that regarding the greatest commandment in Mark 12:28-31 = Matt 22:34-40. Their literary comparison would seem to indicate that a question put to Jesus and leading up to the citation from Deut 6:5 and Lev 19:18 was present in both Q and Mark and that, as

usual in such cases, Matthew conflated the text of Q and Mark while choosing the context of Mark, while Luke chose both the text and context of Q (Streeter: 186-191, 210-211). The evidence is as follows: (i) the common use of Q explains the νομικός, (ἐκ)πειράζων, διδάσκαλε, ἐν τῷ νόμῳ of Matt 22:35-36 = Luke 10:25-26; (ii) the conflation of Q and Mark in Matthew and the choice of Q over Mark by Luke shows in Matt 22:35 = Mark 12:28 = Luke 19:25: Mark has ἐπηρώτησεν, Luke has ἐκπειράζων, and Matthew has ἐπηρώτησεν...πειράζων; (iii) from Q Luke has the lawyer answer with the OT citations and Jesus approve his reply, while Mark has Jesus answer with the quotations and the lawyer approve his solution; and in this Matthew follows Mark to the extent of having Jesus answer but gives no approval from the questioner; (iv) Luke follows Q in that the question is: "'what must I do to inherit eternal life'" in 10:25, and this question is recalled in the conclusion in 10:28: τί ποιήσας ζωήν becomes τοῦτο ποίει καὶ ζήσῃ. Matthew follows Mark in having the question the greatest commandment, not eternal life.

This literary analysis serves to draw attention to the fact that while Luke 10:25-28 is continued smoothly by the second question of 10:29 into the parable of 10:30-35, no such parable is present in Mark or Matthew. Obviously the parable is not so intrinsically united with the previous unit as to be inseparable from it.

2.12 (b) 10:29. The second question picks up the πλησίον which ended the preceding 10:25-28 and repeats it. But the neighbour is still seen as the one *to whom* something is done, the recipient of help not the giver: "But the man was anxious to justify himself and said to Jesus, 'And who is my neighbour?'" But the literary analysis of the preceding 10:25-28 within the synoptic tradition raises the question: does this unity of 10:25-28, 30-35 stem from Jesus, from the tradition, or from the redaction of Luke?

2.131 (c) 10:30-35. There is a logical inconsistency between the meaning of πλησίον in 10:27,29 and in 10:36 so that the parable of 10:30-35 which is located between these two frames is pulled in opposite directions. In 10:27,29 the neighbour is he to whom love must be offered; in 10:36 the neighbour is he who offers mercy to another's need. In other words, the prefixing of 10:27,29 would indicate that the neighbour in the parable is the wounded man by the roadside; but the suffixing of 10:36 would mean that the neighbour is the Good Samaritan. In noting this discrepancy one does not deny that it could be explained as intending to stress that love, mercy, or being a neighbor is a two-way street binding both the wounded Jew and the helpful Samaritan /5/. The value of the discrepancy is that it indicates the possibility of some sort of literary combination of divergent sources on the traditional or redactional level.

The divergent use of πλησίον in a passive sense (one to whom) in 10:27,29 and in an active sense (one who) in 10:36 indicates that the unity of the complex is not that of an authentic and original dialogue between Jesus and a questioner in 10:25-27. In other words, the parable of 10:30-35 would fit quite well with 10:28-29 showing that the neighbour is anyone in need; and it would also fit well with 10:36 indicating that the neighbour is the one who assists another's need; but it cannot go with both 10:27,29 and 10:36 simultaneously. With which "application" does the parable go? In view of the fact that Luke 10:25-28 (Q) was found also in Mark 12:28-31 and conflated in Matt 22:34-40 it seems best to conclude that the originally separate units were Luke 10:25-28 (29) and 10:30-36 (37) and that they were united because of the common theme of the πλησίον, but with its divergent meanings not totally harmonized and so bearing witness to the divergent pieces of tradition in use /6/.

2.132 If Luke 10:25-28 (29) and 30-36 (37) were originally not united from Jesus himself, was their unification

effected in the pre-Lukan tradition or in the redaction of Luke? To be more specific: was the combination of the two pericopes already present in Q and thence retained by Luke while being broken apart in Matthew? This latter possibility seems to be the best solution. The main argument is that the compositional unity of 10:25-37 has been accomplished with a careful regard for the stylistic peculiarities of the controversy dialogue of the rabbinical tradition and this seems far more likely to have happened in the pre-Lukan tradition than to be the redactional creation of Luke himself. This will be seen in more detail below (cf. §2.142). Also, if the combination of 10:25-37 was already effected in Q it is quite easy to see why Luke would want to retain it because of his interest in Samaria and the Samaritans (cf. Luke 9:52; 17:11,16; Acts 1:8; 8:1,5,9,14,25; 9:31; 15:3), while Matthew would have a positive reason to omit it: "'do not enter any Samaritan town'" (10:5).

2.14 (d) 10:36-37. The conclusion to the parable involves a question (36), its answer (37a), and an admonition (37b). From a formal and stylistic point of view there is no difficulty in a parable ending with a rhetorical question or even with a question and answer, although this latter usage may very often represent traditional or redactional expansion /7/.

2.141 The question in 10:36: "'Which of these three, do you think, proved himself a neighbour to the man who fell into the brigands' hands?'" has as its core the words τίς ...δοκεῖ σοι. In the rest of the synoptic tradition this interrogative form appears only in Matthew: (i) in both parables (17:25; 18:12; 21:28), and controversies (22:17, 42), and in 26:66; (ii) in both singular (σοι: 17:25; 22:27) and plural (ὑμῖν: the other uses above); (iii) but always at the start of the unit rather than the end; and (iv) with an answer given, in parabolic situation, in 17:25; 21:28 but not 18:12. The rhetorical question seems to be a more original form, and the question and answer an

obvious change as soon as the questioner became identified as an individual or smaller group. Presumably the crowd was not supposed to answer such rhetorical questions. This would argue that the parable extended at least as far as 10:36 as a rhetorical question, and it would have been easy to change an original ὑμῖν into σοι at the same time as 10:29 was used to link it into 10:25-28 and a continuous dialogue with an individual questioner was being fashioned.

2.142 The answer in 10:37a is a more difficult problem. Questions and answers terminate parables in Mark 12:1-9 (both by Jesus), in Matt 21:28-31, and in Luke 7:41-43. And certainly the answer does no more than correctly indicate what would be left rhetorically implicit if 10:36 terminated the parable. There could be only one answer. In itself, then, it is possible that 10:37a belonged to the parable originally.

But there is another argument which indicates more persuasively that all of 10:37 stems from the same creative moment when 10:25-28 was added to 10:30-36 by means of the connective 10:29. This arises from the formal stylistics of the controversy dialogue /8/. The structural unity and balance can be outlined as follows:

Question (lawyer):	10:25	10:29
Counter-question (Jesus):	10:26	10:30-36
Answer (lawyer):	10:27	10:37a
Counter-answer (Jesus):	10:28	10:37b

Whoever united the previously separate units of 10:25-28 and 10:30-36 did more than merely juxtapose them and rely on the word-linkage of the πλησίον in 10:27,29,36 to hold them together. This pre-Lukan redactor /9/ carefully developed the parable in 10:30-36 by the new frames of 10:29 and 10:37 so that the final result was a beautifully constructed double-controversy dialogue: in each half the question leads immediately into the counter-question, either biblical or parabolic, and in each half the lawyer's answer receives Jesus' counter-answer of approval.

The two halves of the new creation end with very similar injunctions to action from Jesus: εἶπεν δὲ αὐτῷ...ποίει (10:28 = 37b). Formally it is perfect, but materially there is always the divergent meaning of πλησίον in 10:36.

2.15 In summary: this is not an authentic dialogue between a lawyer and Jesus in 10:25-37; neither is it two controversy dialogues in 10:25-28 and 10:29-37 word-linked by πλησίον. A single controversy dialogue in 10:25-28 has been very carefully and skilfully expanded into a double controversy by taking the parable of 10:30-36 and framing it with 10:29 and 10:37. Most likely this new creation was pre-Lukan and present in the Q text whence Luke accepted it but Matthew removed its second half because he did not like it. Formal and stylistic harmony combined with material and conceptual disharmony have argued the conclusion: the parable of the Good Samaritan was originally independent of its present context and it was terminated originally by a rhetorical question in the plural in 10:36.

2.2 From tradition to Jesus

The parable in 10:30-36, ending in a rhetorical question, has been isolated as an independent piece of tradition. As such was it a creation of the primitive community or an authentic parable of Jesus? It is presupposed here that it is possible to attain to the teaching of the historical Jesus and that the criterion of dissimilarity is the best methodological tool to judge whether the earliest available form of a pericope comes from Jesus himself /10/. The *content* of 10:30-36 with its evident idealization of a Samaritan makes this narrative extremely dissimilar from the viewpoint of ancient Judaism. On the other hand, while its content would not be at all uncongenial to the Samaritan interests of, for example, Luke-Acts, the very *form* of the pericope makes it quite dissimilar to the creativity of the early church for whom parables were not exactly a speciality. Accordingly,

as judged by the principle of dissimilarity, the parable of 10:30-36 stems from the historical Jesus.

At this point it might be hoped that the most difficult part of the investigation was over. But in reality the most difficult part is still ahead: from redaction to tradition to Jesus is comparatively easy when the next step is from image to meaning. It is here that the technical tools and methodological principles are least secure and established.

The classification and interpretation of the Good Samaritan as exemplary story (*Beispielerzählung*), as a normative example rather than as a figurative parable, is completely correct as far as the tradition and the redaction are concerned. The overall context of Luke 10:25-37 and especially the parting injunction of 10:37b unmistakably designate it as an example story. But when this traditional context is removed and 10:30-36 stands alone as a creation of the historical Jesus, how is it to be classified and interpreted: example or parable?

2.3 From image to meaning

2.30 In a limited investigation such as this the analysis of meaning will have neither the prefatory guidelines of Jesus' non-parabolic teaching nor the confirmatory studies of all his other parables for assistance. It will have to probe for understanding with one main external help, the theory of what a parable is and does, and one main internal aid, the structural stylistics of the narrative itself.

2.31 (a) *The point of a parable.* Since Jülicher at the end of the last century it has been customary to distinguish between allegory and parable and to note the many lessons which are to be derived from the interpretation of the various elements of the former while stressing the single dominant lesson which comes across in the latter case. More recently, however, this distinction, so articulated, has been questioned and scholars have wondered if

there might not be intermediate stages between the single lesson of the parable and the multiple lessons of the allegory. This will be noted again later (cf. §4.2) when a more essential and fundamental difference will be suggested between these two literary forms. For now it suffices to mention that however one differentiates between allegory and parable there is agreement that there are always two points to be distinguished in each: a literal point which stems from the surface level of the narrative; and a metaphorical point which lives on a much deeper level and appears in a mysterious dialectic with the former point. In distinction to this an example works on only one level and has only one point.

This distinction of the two points is usually clear and non-controversial in most of the parables of Jesus. For example: the parable of the wheat and the darnel in Matt 13:24-30 /11/. Imagine a hearer of Jesus nodding his head in agreement that here was a wise man and that he himself had just learned what to do if ever he was in such an agricultural crisis. Our judgement would be immediate: he has missed the point completely; or, more precisely, he has mistaken the literal point for the metaphorical point. Even those who might disagree on what this metaphorical point actually is would agree that the man is mistaken in grasping only this literal - even if very true and highly useful - application (cf. §§ 4.0-4.4).

When we move from the "amoral" world of agriculture into parables which present "moral" actions the danger of confusing the literal and metaphorical levels is greatly increased. If the protagonist is presented in a downright immoral action confusion ensues but at least the distinction between literal and metaphorical points is usually maintained. The classic example of this confusion is, of course, the parable of the Unjust Steward in Luke 16:1-7 /12/. But, whatever the scandal of the literal level, one is still sure that Jesus is not giving an example-story on the conduct of fiscal and administrative

responsibilities /13/. The scandal of the confusion of points, seen as early as the somewhat incredulous comment of Luke 16:8a, derives from a failure to keep literal and metaphorical levels separate, and the presumption that the morality of the literal level must be good. But all of this becomes even more distressingly easy to do when *the major protagonist of a parable is performing a morally good action on the literal level*. In this case it is very simple to remain on the literal level and convert the parable into an example. It is the general thesis of this article that every exemplary story noted above is actually a parable whose literal level has been taken as a moral injunction (do/do not do like this man) and whose metaphorical challenge has been ignored. This is what has happened to the Good Samaritan.

2.321 (b) *The structure of the narrative*. The next point is to look at the stylistic structure of Luke 10:30-36 to see where the emphases of the narrative actually fall. This can be outlined as follows:

(a) 10:30a: ἄνθρωπός τις...λῃσταῖς περιέπεσεν (10 words)

(b) 10:30b: terse description of the action of the robbers (10 words)

(c) 10:31: ἱερεύς...ἰδὼν...ἀντιπαρῆλθεν (14 words)

10:32: Λευίτης...ἰδὼν...ἀντιπαρῆλθεν (12 words)

10:33: Σαμαρίτης...ἰδὼν...ἐσπλαγχνίσθη (10 words)

(b′) 10:34-35: long description of the action of the Samaritan (50 words)

(c′) 10:36: τίς...ἐμπεσόντος εἰς τοὺς λῃστάς (13 words)

In indicating this structure and especially in counting the word distribution in the Greek text it should be clear that no assertions are being made concerning mathematics or chiastics. This is simply an attempt to appreciate consciously, abstractly, and rather woodenly the unconscious and intuitive perfection of a poet's rhythm and a master's style.

2.322 The narrative comes to a first climax in the balanced reactions of 10:31-33: priest+Levite/Samaritan/

/saw/ /passed by/moved to compassion. This linguistic balance places the rift between priest and Levite on the one hand and the Samaritan on the other. The second and final climax is the rhetorical question of 10:36. Once again, as in 10:31-33, the same three are in question but now the emphasis has shifted from clerics versus Samaritan with τίς τούτων τῶν τριῶν πλησίον δοκεῖ σοι...In literary sequence the robbers recede into the background, the clerics follow them into stylistic oblivion, and in 10:36 the hearer(s) has only one person left to face, and to face by his own necessary decision: the Samaritan judged as good.

2.323 This structural climax which leaves the hearer(s) confronted with the Good/Samaritan seems to be the focal point on the literal level of the narrative. From this it would not seem adequate to place the emphasis on the clash between the victim and the robbers even when these are seen as allegorical cyphers for historical realities /14/. Neither does it seem sufficient to place the focal interest on the clerics as against the Samaritan, that is, on the primacy of charitable reaction over cultic scruple (cf. Lev 21:1-4; Num 19:11-16; Ezra 44:25) (Castellino: 134-140), because: (i) the clerical circles of Jesus' day were not exactly models of proper religious attitude; (ii) to be anti-clerical it would have sufficed to have the third person outside clerical circles - any Jew would have done, and such may have been exactly what the audience was expecting /15/. Neither is the point that the Samaritan has performed a good deed so that emphasis falls on his loving reaction to the injured man as if this action was to be taken as a new departure in human relations /16/. The focal point must remain, not on the good deed itself, but on the *goodness* of the *Samaritan*. When the story is read as one told to a Jewish audience by the Jewish Jesus it is impossible to avoid facing the good man not just as good but as Samaritan, and it seems very unlikely in its original historical context that any other

meaning for Samaritan save the of socio-religious outcast would have come through to the hearers even if present in Jesus' intention /17/. Hence the internal dynamism of the story and the historical situation of Jesus' day agree that the literal point of the story challenges the hearer to put together two impossible and contradictory words for the same person: Samaritan (10:33) and neighbour (10:36). The whole thrust of the story demands that he say what cannot be said: Good+Samaritan /18/. On the lips of the historical Jesus the literal point demands that the hearer respond to the story by stating the contradictory, the impossible, the unspeakable. From this it is already clear that the literal point is not that of an example in which the hearer is invited to go and do likewise. In such a story the naming of the man as a Samaritan would be unnecessary, distracting and, in the final analysis, inimical to the persuasive power of the story on a Jewish audience. It would have been far better, for such a purpose, to have made the wounded man a Samaritan and the helper a Jewish man outside clerical circles.

2.324 If we abandon finally and completely the idea of an example, as deriving from the tradition and not from Jesus, is it possible to see this as a parable and so to suggest the leap from the literal point just outlined to the metaphorical point which is the real purpose of the literary creation? The literal point confronted the hearers with the necessity of saying the impossible and having their world turned upside down and radically questioned in its presuppositions. The metaphorical point is that *just so* does the kingdom of God break abruptly into a person's consciousness and demand the overturn of prior values, closed options, set judgements, and established conclusions. But the full force of the parabolic challenge is that the *just so* of the metaphorical point is not ontologically distinct from the presence of the literal point. The hearer struggling with the dualism of the Good/Samaritan is actually experiencing in and through this the

inbreaking of the kingdom upon him. Not only does it happen like this, it happens in this.

None of this denies in any way that what the Good Samaritan does is a good action absolutely to be imitated. Jesus, of course, takes this totally for granted and his story would have no point at all unless it is clear that what the Samaritan did was good. But so with every parable on the literal level: the audience must recognize the normalcy, be it of typical happening or possible instance, within which the literal level moves. On the literal level the hearer could answer that no Samaritan would act like that and the case is immediately closed. But if he can accept the literal level and come to say "Good Samaritan," then the kingdom of God has come upon him in this experience. The conclusion would be that tradition encased Luke 10:30-36 in 10:25-37, and scholarly classification followed its lead in terming it an example rather than a parable; a parable of the historical Jesus was "misinterpreted" by having its literal point taken instead of its metaphorical point and all the more easily in that the former involved a morally excellent action. But the original parabolic point was the arrival of the kingdom of God upon the hearers in and through the challenge to utter the unspeakable and to admit thereby another world which was at that very moment placing their own under radical judgement.

II. THE PROBLEM OF THE EXAMPLES

3.0 The parable of the Good Samaritan has been interpreted as an authentic parable of the historical Jesus which both tradition and redaction reduced to the status of an example. The next point is to investigate, but in less detail /19/, the other exemplary stories given in Bultmann's classification and still followed in recent works on the parables.

3.1 The rich fool (Luke 12:16-21)

3.11 This parable appears also in the Gospel of Thomas, GT 63, but in a more terse version /20/. The complex in Luke 12:13-21 has four different units: Jesus' refusal to judge an inheritance problem in 12:13-14; his warning against avarice in 12:15; the parable of the rich man in 12:16-20 and the concluding moral generalization in 12:21. Signs of literary suture show in the singular dialogue of 12:13-14 (εἶπεν αὐτῷ) and the plural of 12:15 (εἶπεν... πρὸς αὐτούς) repeated in 12:16-21 (εἶπεν...πρὸς αὐτούς). Secondly, 12:13-14 appears also in the Gospel of Thomas, but in GT 72; and 12:16-20 which is present in abbreviated form in GT 63 lacks any corresponding moral application to 12:21 (οὕτως). These phenomena would indicate that the narrative of Luke 12:16-20 = GT 63 has been taken up by the tradition into a moral complex warning against material goods at the cost of heavenly riches.

3.12 When the parable of 12:16-20 is isolated from its context and compared with GT 63 certain differences are immediately clear: (i) with regard to the rich man: in GT he simply plans some long-term but quite sensible business arrangements, but in Luke 12:17-19 the man's address to his soul has strong overtones of moral carelessness and unconcern, since he is now making plans for his soul's future rather than his money's use; (ii) with regard to the climax: in GT it is the tersely effective: "that night he died" and there is no mention of God at all, but in Luke 12:20 God is expressly introduced, he terms the man ἄφρων (cf. Ps. 13:1 LXX), and announces his death for that night. No doubt there may be moral disapproval hermeneutically implicit in GT 63 and it is intended to be read against riches, but such moral indictment is clearly explicit in Luke 12:16-20, and emphasized in general terms in 12:21 /21/.

3.13 If this story is an example, a negative exemplary story telling how not to act as the Samaritan told how to

act, one must judge that Luke has a more original and effective version then Thomas /22/. But if it was not originally and authentically from Jesus an example but a parable then: (i) the literal, and quite amoral, point is the tragic or pathetic story of a rich businessman making good, solid administrative plans while death stands waiting for nightfall; (ii) the metaphorical point is that well known from so many of the other parables: the necessity of making immediately a proper decision when confronted with the ultimate urgency of Jesus' message concerning the kingdom of God. The rich man's business plans were perfectly normal and amoral - but sadly senseless on his last day on earth. He failed to appreciate the crisis in which he stood /23/. As a parable, not an example, the version of GT 63 is more original and closer to Jesus' own telling; there is no explicit moralizing. The literal climax snaps like a whip around the shoulders of the hearers and through and in its surprise the call of the kingdom is heard, in parable as parable.

3.2 The rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31)

3.21 The present position of 16:19-31 is in the literary unity of 16:1-31 (Derrett, 1961:198-219, 364-380) which contains: (i) the frames formed by the parables of the Unjust Steward beginning with ἄνθρωπός τις ἦν πλούσιος in 16:1-7, and of the rich man and Lazarus likewise starting with ἄνθρωπος δέ τις ἦν πλούσιος in 16:19-31; (ii) the logia in between in 16:8-18 which are initially interpretative of 16:1-7 but eventually seem work-linked or theme-linked to one another /24/; (iii) an overall context which stresses the proper use of material goods, from the unjust steward who does it by alms (16:9!) to the rich man who fails to help Lazarus.

Whatever may be the redactional activity of Luke himself in all this it is clear that the positioning of 16:19-31 within the larger complex places the emphasis on the proper use of worldly goods and on the failure of the

rich man to do so. But if 16:19-31 is isolated from this context and the focus is placed on its own internal content which could such a story have meant for the historical Jesus: example or parable?

3.22 The concluding section in 16:27-31 can hardly be accepted as originally authentic if the principle of dissimilarity is taken seriously. There are too many links between this termination and Luke 24 to be coincidence and 16:27-31 must be taken as stemming form the early church rather than the historical Jesus. For example: (i) the theme of disbelief in 16:31 (οὐδὲ...πεισθήσονται) and in 24:11,25,41 (ἠπίστουν...πιστεύειν...ἀπιστούντων); (ii) the double mention of Moses and the prophets in 16:29,31 and in 24:27,44 /25/; (iii) the mention of one resurrected from the dead in 16:31 (ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστῇ) and in 24:46 (ἀναστῆναι ἐκ νεκρῶν); and (iv) the use of μετανοήσουσιν in 16:30 which appears so often in Acts 2:38; 3:19; 8:22; 17:30; 26:20 in kerygmatic contexts. Methodoligically, even if not apodictically, Luke 16:27-31 cannot be taken as part of the original parable of Jesus, Most likely it is pre-Lukan /26/ but post-resurrectional application of the parable in the line of an allegorical allusion to the Jewish refusal to accept either Moses and the prophets as witnesses to the resurrection of Jesus or the risen Jesus himself.

3.23 It has already been established in scholarship that the story of situational reversal in 16:9-26 has basic affinities with folk-lore materials in both Egyptian and Jewish tradition /27/. But what appears clearly in both the Egyptian tale of Si-Osiris and the Jewish one concerning the poor scholar and the publican Bar Ma'jan is the *moral* judgement implied by the situational reversal. In the Egyptian version: "He who has been good on earth, will be blessed in the kingdom of the dead, and he who has been evil on earth, will suffer in the kingdom of the dead" /28/. The titles of scholar and publican carry their own immediate moral overtones in the Jewish account.

What is striking in this background is Jesus' omission of any moral preparation for the reversal or any ethical judgement on the earthly status of the participants /29/. In a situation where riches could easily be construed as God's approval, and sickness understood as God's curse, it cannot be immediately presumed that - as stated - Luke 16: 19-26 would automatically beget moral judgement for Lazarus and against the rich man.

It is possible that the early church adapted the current folk-tale for its own added point in 16:27-31, but in the light of their handling of such a parable as just seen in Luke 12:16-21 it is unlikely they would have done so and refrained from internal moral comment (alms? unconcern for God?) within the adapted 16:19-26. It seems best to accept 16:19-26 as an actual parable of Jesus: (i) whose literal point was a strikingly *amoral* (in contrast to its source) description of situational reversal between the rich man and Lazarus, and (ii) whose metaphorical point was the reversal of situation and expectation, of value and judgement, which was the kingdom's inbreaking into human consciousness in the teaching of Jesus. As the judgements which have to be passed on the clerics as against the Samaritan are forcibly reversed, so also are those which might be expected concerning the sick beggar and the rich man. Jesus was not interested in moral admonition on the dangers of riches - the folk-tale had already done that quite admirably - but in the reversal of human situation in which the kingdom's disruptive advent could be metaphorically portrayed and linguistically made present.

3.3 The Pharisee and the publican (Luke 18:10-14)

The story of the Pharisee and the publican receives a clear interpretation in the opening 18:9: "He spoke the following parable to some people who prided themselves on being virtuous and despised everyone else. When the phrase τοὺς πεποιθότας ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς of 18:9 is

compared with the phrase of Paul in 2 Cor 1:9 concerning πεποιθότες...ἐφ'ἑαυτοῖς it takes on much more serious overtones /30/. For in 2 Cor 1:9 it is satanic pride that is in question and the trust in self is opposed to trust in God: ἀλλ ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ. But if the prologue in 18:9 hints at satanic pride (man against God), this is hardly true of the story in 18:10-14 (man against man). The Pharisee has: (i) gone up to the Temple (ii) to pray (iii) by thanking God. He may certainly be indicted for human pride and for exalting himself over the publican, but this is a long way from satanic pride and exalting oneself against and over God. Accordingly, the application in 18:9 does not fit with the narrative in 18:10-14. Likewise the concluding comment in 18:14b: "For everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, but the man who humbles himself will be exalted" appears elsewhere in Matt 23:12 and Luke 14:11. It announces future eschatological judgement by God (passives) and this is somewhat redundant and even a little contradictory to the divine judgement just recorded now in 18:14a. The parable must be isolated from its present frames in both 18:9 and 14b and seen as a unit in 18:10-14a. If these are removed and anti-Pharisaic prejudice is not too implicitly presumed the narrative tells of a Pharisee who prays exactly according to the approved way of the time as both Qumran and Talmudic tradition bear witness (Jeremias: 142). And, on the other hand, the publican is not even as clearly repentant as is the one in Luke 19:1-10.

The literal point of the parable is a startling story of situational reversal in which the virtuous Pharisee is rejected by God and the sinful publican gains approval. The metaphorical point is the same as that of the Samaritan or of Lazarus: the complete and radical reversal of accepted human judgement, even of religious judgement, whereby the kingdom forces its way into human awareness. What Jesus is saying is: (i) can you imagine in human experience situations of total reversal in which

the complete opposite to expectation presents itself and must be accepted?; (ii) here is a story of such an incident which you will recognize as possible; (iii) so also - like this story and in this story - is the kingdom's arrival.

3.4 The wedding guest (Luke 14:7-11)

3.41 In Luke 14:1-24 there is an evident literary unity in which various pericopes involving the theme of a banquet are placed together in a banquet situation (de Meuss: 847-870): (i) healing at a banquet (φαγεῖν ἄρτον) on the sabbath in 14:1-6; (ii) the parable of the wedding guest (εἰς γάμους) given to fellow-guests at this same meal (τοὺς κεκλημένους) in 14:7-11; (iii) the lesson given to the host (τῷ κεκληκότι) concerning meals (ἄριστον ἢ δεῖπνον) in 14:12-14; (iv) the logion concerning the eschatological banquet (φάγεται ἄρτον) in 14:15; (v) the parable of the great banquet (δεῖπνον μέγα) in 14:16-24. This literary situation is at once elegant and artificial so that the parable of 14:8-11 has been smoothed into its place by the application to Jesus' fellow-guests in 14:7 although there is no evidence that their taking of the first places created any problems in the "actual" situation of the meal where Jesus was present. Also the application if original would hardly have specified only εἰς γάμους but would surely have referred to any meal. The parable, opened by 14:7, concludes with 14:11 concerning the reversal of the exalted and the humble which, as already seen, involves the future eschatological judgement of God.

3.42 The injunction contained in 14:8-10 does not fit particularly well with its opening application and neither does it go well with its concluding 14:11. In itself it has to do with table etiquette and its motivation could be described at its most positive as utterly banal and more accurately as rather immoral: take low seats at a banquet in order to be moved up higher and obtain glory before

one's fellow-guests /31/. If one jumps immediately from earthly table etiquette to eschatological rewards it may be possible to accept the parable as it stands: as one might humble oneself on earth to obtain glory on earth so humble yourself on earth to obtain glory in heaven. Even leaving aside 14:11 as an addition could this be the point of the parable as it came from Jesus? This is a possible explanation and more convincing than that Jesus was giving (immoral) advice on table manners /32/. But another interpretation can be offered which is close to the meaning of the other parables seen already. In the parable of 14: 8-10 the literal point is an everyday experience in which men can easily imagine a total reversal of situation. Jesus is saying in effect: can you imagine a situation in which man in first place ends up in last and vice versa? He tells a story whose literal point and whose quite convincing possibility is of a man who takes the first seat at a banquet, others arrive and take the intermediate seats, so that when a guest of great distinction arrives the first person must not only give up his first place but take the lowest. This example of situational reversal on the literal level points towards how the kingdom arrives and breaks in upon a man so that he experiences God's rule at the moment when his own world is turned upside down and radically reversed.

3.5 The proper guests (Luke 14:12-14)

3.51 The literary situation is completely artificial as has just been noted. It can hardly even be considered an example since it reads more like a precise and straightforward moral injunction: do this rather than even do like this.

3.52 A digression is necessary at this point. The parable of the great supper appears in Matt 22:1-10; Luke 14:16-24; and in GT 64 /33/. It has long been understood that Matt 22:1-10 has allegorized the parable into an image of the history of salvation (Trilling: 251-265 and

Hasler: 25-35), and by his addition of 22:11-14 actualized it in application to the tension within the Matthaean community /34/. Luke 14:16-24, especially in the double action in 14:21,23 (ἔξελθε twice), may have also allegorized it to refer to Jewish converts and Gentile believers /35/. But more evident is the moralization of the parable in 14:21: "bring in here the poor, the crippled, the blind and the lame." In GT 64 there is also moralization, but against the invited guests who refused to come by the terminal comment: "Tradesmen and merchants (shall) not (enter) the places of my Father." This may be a possible allusion to Zech. 14:21, but it serves primarily as a moral condemnation of the invited guests - but an externally appended one. If one removes both the allegorizing influences from Matthew and Luke /36/ and the moralizing overtones of Luke and Thomas the parable is left as a clear illustration of situational reversal /37/. On the literal level: the invited guests offer perfectly reasonable excuses but when all (i.e. each singly) do so there is an empty banquet. The host's angry reaction is to go out and fetch anyone the servants can find to fill the empty seats. No doubt there could be poor among those so found but this is utterly outside the point which is a strictly amoral one. The intention is to fill the banquet and not allow the refusing guests to ruin the evening. This is fundamentally amoral and invites the hearers to recognize a situation of total and radical reversal: the invited are absent, the non-invited are present. As parable it provokes the hearers to face the metaphorical point of the kingdom's arrival as radical and absolute reversal of their closed human situation.

III. PARABLE AND EXAMPLE: METHOD AND MEANING

4.0 The conclusion from the preceding sections is that the form-critical classification of exemplary stories is correct on the traditional and/or redactional level but does not derive from the teaching of the historical Jesus.

The change from parables to examples usually showed up in contextual strain as a minimum problem (e.g. the Samaritan) or even conceptual banality (e.g. the wedding guests) as the maximum difficulty. If this conclusion involved only minor changes in classification, the entire discussion might seem a little pedantic. But there seem to be far-reaching alterations in facilitating the way which parables became and were accepted as examples both with regard to method in parable study and to meaning in parable hermeneutic, especially on the level of the historical Jesus.

4.1 There are three major steps involved in a full methodology of parable investigation, and within these, of course, it is quite possible to focus on whichever facet is of particular interest to the investigator. The first step is the problem of separation: the isolation of the redactional and traditional levels so that the original authentic parable of the historical Jesus can be seen in itself. This step is quite well documented in modern scholarship /38/.

4.2 The next step does not seem to have received nearly sufficient emphasis. This is the transition from image to meaning on the level of the original parable. There are two separate points to be considered. One is the necessity of having some established idea of Jesus' "non-parabolic" teaching so that the reader of the parables can move from the literal to the metaphorical level intended by Jesus himself /39/. Logia and actions with the lowest symbolical content serve to point the reader in a certain direction; the parabolic material invites him to leap from the literal level towards the metaphorical - but the direction of the leap is indicated through the non-parabolic teaching. This is not at all to suggest that non-figurative logia are more important than figurative parables, or that parables are mere subsidiary examples for abstract propositions, but to suggest that, methodologically, one needs full prior investigation of

the non-parabolic teaching to appreciate the meaning intended for the parables by Jesus. To understand a parable one must at least be "looking in the same direction" as its creative author. There is another and possibly more important element in moving from image to meaning, from the literal to the metaphorical level. This is one's idea of the nature and function of the literary form which the historical Jesus is using. As noted earlier the debate between allegory and parable has entered into reaction to Jülicher's absolute dichotomy, especially in so far as this makes the essential distinction in terms of one dominant lesson in a parable as against many separate lessons in an allegory. Obviously this distinction is a little apodictic and one could easily imagine intermediate positions. There seems, however, to be a more essential distinction: allegory is always logically subordinate and functionally secondary with regard to abstract proposition and statement, and without this abstract "key" the allegory remains locked; parable is that which is never so subordinate and secondary but which essentially says what cannot be said in any other better or clearer fashion /40/. When allegory is seen as fundamentally reducible to abstract proposition, and parable as essentially irreducible to such a statement, the gulf between them is absolute, and at the same time example is seen as being on the other side of allegory and even farther from parable itself /41/. Example and allegory agree in that both are reducible to abstract and non-figurative statement; they disagree in that example has only one narrative level and only one point, but allegory has two narrative levels and both a literal and metaphorical point. Allegory and parable agree in that both operate on two levels: they disagree in that allegory is reducible and parable is not. The presence of the class of developed example stories in the teaching of Jesus and the ease in mistaking parables for examples (and seeing example within other parables?) denotes a serious misunderstanding of the nature and

function of parable /42/. The parables of Jesus are not a relative tactic of pedagogic art to illustrate abstract maxims to which they must remain logically secondary and functionally subordinate and towards which they are historically dispensable and so ultimately expendable. They are an absolute exigency of poetic art to provoke insight into a deeper reality so that they could never be secondary or subordinate to any other form of language and are never discardable in any final analysis.

4.3 The third step in the complete methodology has received much attention in recent works. This is the problem of relevance and the attempt to let the parables speak to the contemporary reader as well as the first hearer /43/. But this step, which is sometimes more effective in showing the perennial value of the parable as an aesthetic form of art than in proving its eternal force as a normative standard for life, must be considered as logically sequential to the preceding step in the method: what was the intended metaphorical point and ultimate referent of the parable as parable?

4.4 The point of these methodological considerations is to suggest that the acceptance of parables as examples, and the possible influence of example-thinking and moralization in many other parables, shows a very fundamental misunderstanding of the parable as poetic art and most effectively blunts the perennial challenge of the parable itself. The parable does not belong to the realm of didactic tools and pedagogic tactics but comes from the world of poetic metaphors and symbolic expressions. Whatever may be its resemblance to rabbinic usage in form or even in content it is essentially different from these because of its irreducible function as poetry: it is never subsidiary to a dogmatic proposition nor even to a biblical text /44/. It is servant only to the revelation that pushes forward to vision in and through it. When Jesus' original parables are seen as the metaphors of a poet rather than the examples of a teacher, the last word may

be given to another poet /45/, who experienced,

> The metaphor not means but end,
> Not the technique
> But the vocation, the destiny.
> Let it be
> One metaphor, deeper each time
> With the life that fills it;
> Let the meaning come from the abundance,
> Not from the brilliance, not from some new rhetoric
> Pretending to hate rhetoric
> But from the overflow of meaning
> Demanding even as the poem is heard
> The next poem, and the next
> That are one poem.

NOTES

/1/ The German words are: *Bildwörter, Gleichnisse, Parabeln, Beispielerzählungen.*

/2/ Wilder (80) accepts the existance of such exemplary stories for Jesus: "Some of the parables are straight narratives about a given individual case, ending with an application: the Good Samaritan, the Rich Fool; or sometimes about more than one person, as for example the Pharisee and the Publican. Here we have 'example-stories,' not symbolic narrative. The point is in these cases that we should go and do likewise, or take warning by the given example."

/3/ "Illustrations must be distinguished from similitudes and parables...the way they work is different: the parable adduces a correspondence (*analogia*) but the illustration produces an example (*exemplum*)." The parable in question is analysed on pp. 51-58 and it is stated on p. 53: "It is not a similitude but an illustration: the correct attitude does not have to be established in some other area of life, and then transferred to the problem at issue, but the subject that is in question is 'brought to language' directly by a particularly well-chosen instance as an example."

/4/ "We are not going to pay attention to the German division of the parables into three groups: *Gleichnisse* (similes), *Parabeln* (parables) and *Beispielerzählungen* (example stories). The parable of the Good Samaritan is discussed on pp. 122-124.

/5/ Derrett (1964:34) "A parable which shows that *ḥesed* is a natural emotion and that it is to that that God referred in demanding *ḥesed* might seem to be the perfect commentary on the two verses, and to fit our context as a hand fits its glove." Cf. also Giavini and Downey.

/6/ As argued by Linnemann (1966:56-58) and especially p. 138 n.1 and pp. 141-143 nn.16-17. The opposite view is defended by J. Jeremias (202). But Miss Linnemann holds that the question and answer in 10:29-37 as a unity may go back to Jesus himself and that there are two scribal discourses in 10:25-28 and 10:29-37 which are united by word-linkage (neighbor).

/7/ Bultman (182-183): "some parables end with a question directed to the hearer...it is questionable on occasions when the similitude is given in a framework by the answer being provided in the text, whether the framework is as original as the similitude itself. Here the editorial work of the evangelists has to be taken account of, as is perfectly clear from Luke 10:36f."

/8/ R. Bultmann (41), in discussing the rabbinic and synoptic controversies, notes: "The *reply* to the attack follows more or less a set form, with special preference for the counter-question or the metaphor, or even both together"; and (42): "The typical form for an answer is the counter-question, and often it appears in such a form as to be a metaphor in form, too. Sometimes instead of the metaphor the *counter-question* is a detailed *parable*, sometimes ending with a question, or at any rate interrogatory in form."

/9/ This confirms the earlier statement that it was not Luke himself who united the units of tradition since he would hardly be so attuned to the formal stylistics involved. H. Binder argues that Luke combined 10:25-28 and 10:30-37a with his own 10:29 and 37b: "Luk x.30-7a ist ein selbständiges Überlieferungsstück, genau so wie die Frage nach dem größten Gebot" (176). Kahlefeld (74-77) thinks that Luke added 10:29 and 10:36-37.

/10/ Cf., for example, the excellent summary of N. Perrin (1967b:38-39):"the earliest form of a saying we can reach may be regarded as authentic if it can be shown to be dissimilar to characteristic emphases both of ancient Judaism and of the early Church." For a complementary method to this cf. Walker.

/11/ This is here understood as: (i) a parable of the historical Jesus showing a wise decision in a critical situation; (ii) which has received a *traditional* interpretation in the seven allegorical indices of 13:38-40a; and (iii) has had another *redactional* interpretation added by Matthew himself in 13:40b-43: note how the field is the world in which good and evil are mixed together in 12:36-40a, but becomes the church, the kingdom of the Son of Man, in which there are good and bad Christians, in 13:40b-43. For a similar view of the Matthaean church in redacted parables of Matthew cf. Dillon.

/12/ This is understood, like the wheat and the darnel parable, as: (i) Jesus' image of a wise decision in a critical situation; (ii) which received a *traditional* comment and interpretation in 16:8; (iii) and a collection of further interpretations, presumably already linked mnemonically together (μαμωνᾶς) in the pre-Lukan tradition, in 16:9,10 - 12,13 now appended as a further *redactional* attempt at explanation. Cf. Fitzmyer and Moore. Even if his actions were not historically so unjust as they might appear to us at first glance (cf. Derrett, 1961), it is clear that Christian tradition has always had trouble with this parable. In a bibliography of parable exegesis for the sixties twice as many articles were written on this parable as were done on the next competitor, the Good Samaritan. Possibly the backlash of moralizing?

/13/ The interpretation of the parable as an exemplary story for almsgiving is as ancient as it is unconvincing: cf. Caemmerer; Williams; and Bigo. Nor is it rendered a more convincing example if taken as a model for the renunciation of wealth itself: cf.(Krämer 1960 and 1968).

/14/ Daniel suggests that the victim was an Essene attacked by Zealots. It is always possible that motifs from real life actuality or from OT events (cf. for example I Kings 13:11-32) can be taken up into the composition of a parable. But the point is always determined by their new situation in parable rather than by their pre-parabolic origins.

/15/ Cf. Jeremias (204): "According to the triadic form of popular stories, the audience would now have expected a third character, namely, after the priest and the Levite, an Israelite layman; they would hence have expected the parable to have an anti-clerical point. It would have been completely unexpected and disconcerting for them to hear that the third character, who fulfilled the duty of love, was a Samaritan."

/16/ The OT presented examples of behaviour just as good, in fact even better since kindness and mercy is being shown to beaten attackers, and Jesus may even have had this incident in mind when constructing his own parable: cf. II Chron. 28:9-15 as noted in Derrett (1964) and Furness.

/17/ Gerhardsson understands Jesus as using the Hebrew root (*r'h*) whence comes neighbour and also shepherd and so referring cryptically to himself. For a criticism cf. Funk (1965 and 1966:199-222).

/18/ In other words: Jesus places the hearer in a position where the being which is striving to reveal itself in language demands that he voice his welcoming recognition and response to its arrival and revelation. This would seem a particularly clear example of the language-event of the new hermeneutic.

/19/ Hence less attention will be paid to the distinction between tradition and redaction and the emphasis will be on the separation of both these layers left somewhat united from the level of the historical Jesus.

/20/ Guillaumont et al. (35) as 92:2-10: "Jesus said: There was a rich man who had much money. He saïd: I will use my money that I may sow and reap and plant and fill my storehouses with fruit so that I lack nothing. This was what he thought in his heart. And that night he died. Whoever has ears let him hear." Cf. Montefiore and Turner (50,55,77) and Jones (230-240).

/21/ Montefiore and Turner (57): "The point of Luke's parable is the futility of rich ease...In Thomas the point of the parable is the futility of attempting material self-sufficiency." This is hardly a correct view.

/22/ Montefiore and Turner (50): "The Lucan version is here to be preferred."

/23/ Such parables which challenge to immediate right decision concerning the kingdom sometimes tell of a person who decides correctly in a crisis (unjust steward) or else of one who decides badly in such a situation (wedding garment: Matt 22:11-14) or even of persons who go in both directions (talents, bridesmaids). The challenge and the point remain the same in all cases. Cf. Jeremias (165): "in Luke 12:16-20 we have eschatological parable. Jesus expected his hearers to apply its conclusion to their own situation: we are just as foolish as the rich fool under the threat of death if we heap up property and possessions when the Deluge is threatening." But Linnemann (1966:22) states: "only in rare and exceptional cases do they (Jesus' parables) give an exhortation," and she footnotes *(b)*: "e.g. the illustration of the rich fool, Luke 12:16-21, though it is questionable whether this goes back to Jesus."

/24/ The three logia in 16:10,11,12 are word-linked by πιστός, πιστοί, πιστοί respectively; the complex of logia in 16:9,10-12,13 are connected by μαμωνᾷ, μαμωνά, μαμωνᾷ respectively in 16:11,13; the theme of money links 16:9-13 with 14-15; God appears in 16:14-15 and 16:6, and law in 16:16 and 17-18.

/25/ On this theme in Luke cf. Schubert.

/26/ Because Jeremias (182-183) notes that Luke rejects 89 out of the 90 historic presents in Mark, yet there are two here in 16:23,29, so presumably Luke himself did not create 16:27-31; and besides his own interest seems to be riches and alms rather than resurrection.

/27/ So Jeremias (183): "the Egyptian folk-tale of the journey of Si-Osiris, the son of Setme Chamois to the underworld, which concludes with the words: 'He who has been good on earth, will be blessed in the kingdom of the dead, and he who has been evil on earth, will suffer in the kingdom of the dead.' Alexandrian Jews brought this story to Palestine, where it became very popular as the story of the poor scholar and the rich publican Bar Ma'jan." And he concludes in his interpretation on p. 186: "Since the first part is drawn from well-known folk-material, the emphasis lies on the new 'epilogue' which Jesus added to the first part," i.e. on vv. 27-31 rather than on vv. 19-26. So he sees it as a parable of crisis in which one brother has failed to act correctly and the five others are still living under the sword of decision.

This certainly treats the story as a true parable and the main objection is the difficulty in taking 16:27-31 from the historical Jesus even in a basic form: the mention of Moses and the prophets and of resurrection from the dead shifts the emphasis completely off the five brothers and towards the messengers who might save them. Dunkerley suggested all of 16:9-31 as a forewarning to the disciples of the resuscitation of Lazarus (John 11).

/28/ As cited in Jeremias (183) and he notes the amoral tone of Jesus' story with: "The lack of emphasis on his guilt...is explained by the fact that Jesus was drawing on material which was well known to his hearers."

/29/ Bultmann(204): "the Egyptian and Jewish stories defend the divine justice and show that reward and punishment are meted out in proportion to piety and sin, whereas Luke 16:19-26 simply teaches the reversal of earthly fortune in the world to come as a warning to the rich and a consolation to the poor." On p. 197 he also mentions another possible Jewish background for all of 16:19-31 in the story of a "rich and godless couple" where the dead wife sends back warning to her husband from Hell and he repents and is saved. But here the moral point is very clear.

/30/ Cf. Jeremias (139-140). He also notes the intensely semitic tonality of 16:10-14.

/31/ This is very similar to the case of the man on his way to judgement in Matt 5:25-26=Luke 12:58-59, but here Luke does not turn it into an example of rather banal human prudence as does Matthew, but leaves it as it originally was: a parable of crisis inviting the hearers to recognize their situation of ultimate urgency and act accordingly and immediately. Cf. Caird.

/32/ So Jeremias (20): "rule"; and (192): "Jesus therefore is actually giving a direction for table-manners." But the parallel adduced to Prov 25:7: "better to be invited, 'Come up here' than be humiliated in the presence of the prince," is hardly convincing. This latter proverb lacks completely the crassly immoral opportunism of the logion of Jesus (if it is) on table-manners: note the ἵνα of 14:10.

/33/ Guillaumont (35-36) as 92:2-35. The invited guests are now four in number because it is with these rather than with the uninvited that GT is concerned (cf. 92:34-35). The forced invitation is: "Go out to the roads, bring those whom you shall find, so that they may dine" (92:32-34).

/34/ Swaeles and Dillon. The originally separate parable of Matt 22:11-13 would have been an original one of crisis unwisely handled (cf. note 23 above): Bauer.

/35/ Cf. Jeremias (64) but Glombitza,(166) thinks Luke's version is more basic and closer to Jesus' teaching which was not a parable at all originally.

/36/ The version of GT 62 is closest to the original since there is no internal allegorization and the moralization is externally appended at the end. The only internal expansion is that the triadic invitation now involves four cases: cf. Mitton.

/37/ If Jesus had wished simply to warn his audience parabolically of their critical situation (act now before it is too late!) it would have sufficed to have had some guests accept and some others refuse (e.g. with the excluded bridesmaids). But he intended a situation of reversal rather than merely one of exclusion, as against Linnemann (1966:88-97): "While the fate of the unwilling guests in the parable is already decided, it is left open for Jesus' listeners. They still have the decision before them." Cf. also her article (1960).

/38/ Jeremias is the classic example of this methodology. But much less space (42-49 as against 66-89) and a far kinder judgement is accorded the church's moralizing (48: "by the hortatory application the parable is not misinterpreted, but 'actualized'") than on its allegorizing of Jesus' original parables" (19: "Jülicher...rid the parables of the thick layer of dust with which the allegorical interpretation had covered them"; and 89: "most of the allegorical traits which figure so prominently in the present form of the parables are not original...discarding these secondary interpretations and features..."). The question arises whether there is still far too much moralizing left in Jeremias' own interpretations, and whether the idea of exemplary story, even if not the classification, has had too much influence on the exegesis on the level of the historical Jesus. On the other hand, Linnemann (1966) traces the parable of the bridesmaids (124-128) back only to the church and not to Jesus in any form. In general the earliest form of a parable discernible would have a strong presumption of authenticity because of the criterion of dissimilarity: Jesus' parables are different in function from those of the rabbis, and the early church was hardly at home with this usage in so far as we can see how they used Jesus' own parables.

/39/ Compare, for example, the work of Dodd on the parables with that of Perrin (1967b) on the historical Jesus - not with regard to conclusions but exclusively with regard to methodology. Dodd spends the first *half* of his work dealing "with those sayings which are more or less explicit, even thought making use of symbolism." Then, having established therein his view of Jesus' teaching of realized eschatology, he uses this "as an hypothesis to be tested by applying it to the interpretation of the parables" (84) which takes up the second *half*

of his book. This seems a better methodology than that of Perrin who studies logia and parables together. This is not to put parables ontologically below propositions but to put propositions methodologically before parables. Cf. also the investigation of parables and logia respectively in Robinson (1955). It will certainly be of great significance in interpreting the parables how one sees Jesus' view of time: cf. Funk (1969).

/40/ The major emphasis in bringing parable and all allegory closer together has been the criticism of the dichotomy: parable has only one main lesson and all narrative details serve this while all the details in an allegory carry their own lessons. On this cf. Black; Brown; Tinsley; Goulder. But when parable is seen as poetic metaphor the chasm between it and allegory becomes impassible: cf. the comment of Ricoeur (163-164): "An allegory can always be *translated* into a text that can be understood by itself; once this better text has been made out, the allegory falls away like a useless garment; what the allegory showed, while concealing it, can be said in a direct discourse that replaces the allegory. By its triple function of concrete universality, temporal orientation, and finally ontological exploration, the myth has a way of *revealing* things that is not reducible to any translation from a language in cipher to a clear language." This is also true of allegory as against parable. Or again cf. Heidegger (1961:160): "the unconcealment of being is not simply given. Unconcealment occurs only when it is achieved by work: the work of the word in poetry, the work of the stone in temple and statue, the work of the word in thought..." This mention of poetry in first place is not accidental. Cf. Heidegger (1949:283): "poetry is the inaugural naming of being...."

/41/ Funk (1966) has a brilliant chapter on "The Parable as Metaphor" (133-162) in which this understanding of parable as poetic metaphor is strongly emphasized. Yet the succeeding chapters on the great supper (163-198) and the Good Samaritan (199-222) seem somewhat anti-climactic and the reason seems more than the necessary disappointment in any abstract statement of a poetic intuition. The more fundamental problem is the failure to distinguish the literal level with sufficient clarity before moving to the metaphorical: e.g. the "riff-raff" (188) may not belong to the literal point of the great supper parable. But he has noted the problem of parable versus example. On p. 211 n. 52: "It is strange that Julicher's reading of the Good Samaritan as a *Beispielerzählung* has gone virtually unchallenged. The Lucan tratition has given support, however, to a moralistic reading, terminating as it does with the exhortation, 'Go and do likewise'." And later in note 47: "The other parables identified as exemplary stories are...Naturally we are not considering here whether the designation is appropriate in these other cases..." But the interpretation of the Good Samaritan given here is

still moralistic even if rather existential. Cf. Perrin 1967a.

/42/ Function and intention rather than form and content determine the distinction. The Samaritan was interpreted as pure parable in this article, yet Luke saw it as an example, and Augustine made it into a beautiful allegory: cf. Dodd (1-2). What is meant by stating that example (or allegory) is reducible to abstract proposition may be seen clearly when the Samaritan is taken as example and so concludes with σὺ ποίει ὁμοίως in 10:37b. The story itself may be pedagogically more persuasive but it adds nothing to the abstract moral injunction in Luke 6: 31: "Treat others as you would like them to treat you (ποιεῖτε αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως)." Cf. Vincent (esp. 90, n.2).

/43/ Cf. especially the existential hermeneutic of Linnemann (1966) and the works of Jones and Via already noted. For critical reaction see Summers and Blackman.

/44/ Bornkamm (69): "The rabbis also relate parables in abundance, to clarify a point in their teaching and explain the sense of a written passage, but always as an aid to the teaching and an instrument in the exegesis of an authoritatively prescribed text. But that is just what they are not in the mouth of Jesus, although they often come very close to those of the Jewish teachers in their content, and though Jesus makes free use of traditional and familiar topics. Here the parables are the preaching itself and are not merely serving the purpose of a lesson which is quite independent of them." This disagrees with Jones (79): "The main difference between the parables of Jesus and those of the rabbis is that the former are the work of one with a superbly creative imagination providing profound insights without parallel," and he footnotes (1): "Perhaps the nearest approach in the parables of Jesus to rabbinic exposition of a text is the parable of the Samaritan, which may be regarded as an exposition of the meaning of love of one's neighbour." On the level of the historical Jesus the parables were never textual (biblical) commentary, and it is still doubtful if they were really used for this in the early church: cf. Cave (1965 and 1969).

/45/ Rago (1963:54). Cf. also his comments in "The Vocation of Poetry" (1967;340): "To be a poet at all is to be present to the ontology that is hidden in words. And what shall we say of metaphor? We might begin with the definitions we were taught as children, seeing it as a mere figure of speech rather than as speech itself, as a depth of speech that is otherwise impossible," and in "The Poet in His Poem " (1969:414): "There is the metaphor that is less a metaphor, because it is the metaphor I choose, there is the metaphor that is more deeply, irrevocably a metaphor, because it chooses me," or (415), "And what is the metaphor as we see it now? No mere

figure of speech, but the transmutation that itself is poetry: a matter of content: the style that is the man." Later in the poem cited above appear these lines: "If all has been for the poem/The poem has been/For the silence it comes from/For the silence/It must create." All of this recalls the words of Heidegger (1959) cited in Ott (87): "Heidegger says: 'Every great poet composed from only a single poem...The poem of a poet remains unspoken. None of the individual poems, not even the total of them, says it all. Nevertheless, each poem speaks from the whole of the one poem and each time speaks it. Out of poem's realm flows forth the wave that in each case arouses speaking as a poetic utterance.'"

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PARABLE AND EXAMPLE STORY:
A LITERARY-STRUCTURALIST APPROACH

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0. The purpose of this paper is to develop briefly a position from which to respond and then to respond to two provocative and sensitive articles by Professor John Dominic Crossan. Parts 1-3 will deal with his "Parable and Example in the Teaching of Jesus" (1974a). He develops his position primarily in connection with The Good Samaritan and then extends it to several other presumed example stories. Part 4 of my paper will consider his "The Servant Parables of Jesus" (1974b).

1.1 Crossan argues that Luke 10:25-28 and 10:30-36 were originally separate. 10:37 also is an addition, and it is 37b which turns the narrative into an example story. Thus the unit which Crossan has chosen to analyze and interpret is 10:30-36 (§§2.10, 2.132, 2.142).

Methodologically Crossan points out that, according to prevailing opinion, a parable has two points, a literal one which stems from the surface level and a metaphorical point which is based on a deeper level. An example story, on the other hand, has only one point and one level. Crossan's thesis is that the alleged example stories of the Gospels are really parables whose deeper level and metaphorical point have been missed (§2.31)

For Crossan the focal point of The Good Samaritan at the literal level is the shocking and unexpected juxtaposition of Samaritan (10:33) and good neighbor (10:36). The metaphorical point is that similarly the kingdom

of God abruptly breaks into a person's consciousness, overturning prior and established values and conclusions (§§2.322-2.324).

1.2 The literal point of The Rich Fool (Luke 12: 16-21) is that a man makes plans for his earthly security while death is awaiting him that night. The metaphorical point is that one must make a proper response when confronted with the urgency of the kingdom's message (§3.13).

1.3 With respect to The Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-26; 16:27-31 is taken to be an addition) (§§3.22-3.23), The Pharisee and the Publican (Luke 18:10-14) (§3.3), and The Wedding Guest (Luke 14:7-11) (§§3.41-3.42) in each case a story about the reversal of human expectations is seen as a metaphor of God's overturning man's certainties.

1.4 A final point of Crossan to be noted is his contention that one must have some idea of Jesus' teaching from non-symbolic statements in order to know in what direction to move in leaping from the literal to the metaphorical meaning of a parable (§4.2).

2. Crossan has made an interesting case and added to our understanding of several texts. I am sympathetic with Crossan's view that example stories are more didactic and pedagogic, less exciting and creative of meaning, than parables (§§4.2-4.4). But that value judgment does not make the alleged example stories parables if there are compelling substantive reasons for regarding them as example stories. My thesis is that there are such compelling reasons and that we shall have to continue to make do with them as example stories.

2.1 I shall first set out the perspectives from which I will offer my critique and then make a number of comments regarding Crossan's position, though these two aspects of the task will not be kept in watertight compartments.


2.11 Narrative exists as two levels or dimensions. As *story* it is objective statement creating a world of events and persons who are real from the viewpoint of that created world. Story is characterized by such as the use of the third person, and the aorist and pluperfect tenses. As *discourse* narrative is subjective articulation, a word spoken by a narrator to a hearer. Discourse is characterized by such as the use of "I" and "you," adverbs like "today," the present and future tenses, and evaluative statements. The narrative may be story and discourse at the same time with the discourse level being signified in various ways along the story line. On the other hand, either story or discourse may be a fairly discrete enclave within the other (Todorov, 1966:126, 1968:108; Genette: 18-19).

2.12 Within the story level two other levels (there are actually more) may be identified and distinguished.

2.121 Plot (sequential analysis). Each of Jesus' eight narrative parables (the first eight narratives listed in figure #1) is a tightly cohering organic unity of three episodes. In classical fashion these three episodes fulfill the sequential functions (a function is an element which has a correlation with another element) of opening, maintaining, and closing the sequence (Barthes, 1966:6-9; Todorov, 1966:125).

2.122 Actants (*actantiel* analysis). An actant is not a character but is a function, role, or status whose quality is to be the subject of or participant in a constant action. The actant is perhaps usually a personal character, but it may be an object, institution, feeling, disposition, condition, etc. Grammatically it corresponds to the present participle. A story may have any number of characters but no more than six actants, though it may have fewer. This means that one actant may be represented in several characters and that one character may fulfill more than one actant. According to the *actantiel* scheme widely

held in structural analysis a subject (S) desires to possess an object (O) or communicate it to a recipient (R), the object proceeding from an ordainer (Or). In this effort the subject may be aided by a helper (H) or impeded by an opponent (Op) /1/.



2.123 From the sequential (plot) and *actantiel* levels of several of Jesus' narratives I have chosen sixteen textemes. A texteme is a formal unit of meaning larger than a word which belongs to the basis or deep structure of competence which generates genres and texts. These sixteen textemes have been ordered in eight pairs, eight binary oppositions, and at least one member of each pair actually appears in one or more of Jesus' narratives. If only one member appears, the other, its opposite, is logically implied as belonging to the reservoir of possibilities. This collection of textemes is selective, representative, and illustrative. It does not include *all* of the textemes (what analysis could?), but I believe that it includes the most important. Therefore, I will speak of this group *as if* it were the total basis of Jesus' narratives, and I do not think that this will distort the picture in principle or qualitatively, though it will distort it quantitatively at points.

The eight binary oppositions are as follows:

(1) falling (tragic) plot movement/rising (comic) plot movement (a/b)

(2) episode pattern: action-crisis-denouement/ episode pattern /crisis-response-denouement (c/d)

(3) subject receives object/subject does not receive object (e/f)

(4) subject desires to possess object (intends to be recipient)/subject desires to communicate object (does not intend to be recipient) (g/h)

(5) causal connection between events/chrono-

logical connection between events (i/j)

(6) subject unifies action/subject is in only part of action (k/l)

(7) subject distinguished from ordainer/subject identified with ordainer (m/n)

(8) subject and ordainer are related as inferior to superior (employee to master)/subject and ordainer are equal or the relation is undefined or the distinction is based on a local circumstance (o/p).

These textemes are correlated to fourteen of Jesus' narratives in figure #1, and the following observations may be made about that diagram:

(1) The deep structure or basis, the total competence of Jesus for composing narratives, may be represented by the formula a/b+c/d+e/f+g/h+i/j+k/l+m/n+o/p. This deep structure, if all of the possible combinations were realized, is capable of generating two hundred and fifty-six ($256=2^8$) different surface structures, two hundred and fifty-six narratives with different literary forms. An actual narrative (performance text) would be the union of a surface structure with content (concrete characters and events). Out of the two hundred and fifty-six possibilities the fourteen narratives of Jesus manifest only seven different surface structures.

(2) The formula a/b+c/d+e/f+g+i+k+m+o represents the "intermediate" structure which is the genre, narrative parable of Jesus (manifested in the first eight narratives in figure #1). Genre is a generative matrix which, by selection and combination of textemes, linguistic functions, and other phenomena produces ever new texts of its generic type, which are transformations of each other. A comparison of this formula with that of the deep, basis structure will show that certain selections have been made which distinguish the first eight narratives as a genre (narrative parable). The relationships of this genre to the other six narrative will have to be discussed

individually. This genre is seen to have five constants and three variables. Thus it could theoretically generate eight (2^3) different surface structures, but as a matter of fact in the eight extant narrative parables it has only generated four. The concept of genre will be further defined and approached from a slightly different angle below.

(3) The surface structure of each of the fourteen narratives is represented in figure #1 by the eight single letters in each horizontal axis /2/.

2.13 I turn now to the problem of metaphor. A metaphor is composed of two elements: a vehicle which is relatively well known and a tenor which is less well known. Meaning passes from the vehicle to the tenor. Ordinarily the vehicle is concrete and the tenor abstract or both are concrete; but one may have an abstract vehicle and concrete tenor, which is striking because of its rarity. The really important factor in constituting a metaphor is the semantic distance or tension between vehicle and tenor which must be overcome through "semantic motion." The motion is usually achieved by a combination of epiphor (extension of meaning through comparison) and diaphor (creation of new meaning through juxtaposition and synthesis). This motion gives a new vision of reality by evoking a sense of similarity between what were seen as dissimilars: a new vision which comes as a shock, but a shock of recognition (Wheelwright, 1962:70-71; Ullmann: 184-190). The distance overcome by the motion, and hence the intensity of the new vision, is at its greatest in what Beda Allemann calls an absolute metaphor. This is one in which there is really no logical term of comparison between the vehicle and the tenor. He offers as an example two lines from a poem by Nelly Sachs:

> "Wailing wall night!
> Carved in you are the psalms of silence"
> (Allemann: 114-115)

3. At this point I move to my attempt to show that

the alleged example stories are in fact that and not parables, my critique of Crossan.


3.1 Crossan, as we have seen, draws the meaning of the narrative--the overturning of the expected--and its generic status--parable--from the juxtaposition of Samaritan (10:33) and (good) neighbor (10:36). But this procedure is not justified because it ignores the autonomy of the story. The story is complete in its three episodes at 10:35. Thus both Crossan's interpretation and his generic classification are based, not on the story itself, but on the relationship of the story to Jesus' question to the hearer (the scribe) /3/.

We may develop this point more precisely by reference to the distinction between story and discourse. Crossan's outline of the unit which he interprets (§2.321) suggests that the statement about the traveller's going from Jerusalem to Jericho and falling among robbers (10:30a) is parallel to Jesus' question to the scribe (10:36) as a to a´. But that parallelism is at most based on a certain similarity of vocabulary and is not structural.


Luke 10:25-37 is a discrete unit in Luke's story. Prior to 10:25 Jesus is dealing with his disciples and subsequent to 10:37 he is involved with Mary and Martha (and it is also suggested that the disciples are present). Thus 10:25-37 is a distinct unit of Luke's *story*, though it contains certain elements of *discourse*, such as the evaluative statement that the scribe desired to justify himself (10:29a). Within *Luke's story* unit is *Jesus' discourse* with the scribe (10:25b-10:37). Observe, for example, the use of the future tense in 10:25 and the second person singular in 10:28 and 10:36-37. Within Jesus' *discourse* with the scribe (10:25b-10:37), the unit 10:30-35 (omitting "Jesus replied" in 10:30) is a discrete enclave of *story*. Now Louis Marin has shown that the decision as to where one closes a unit for analysis and the decision about where it opens are reciprocal (Marin:

38-41). Since Crossan chose not to include the discourse in 10:25b-29, structural logic forbids his including the discourse in 10:36, which belongs to 10:25b-29; 10:36-37. Thus the unit 10:30-36 is not a legitimate one for analysis, which rules out Crossan's juxtaposition of 10:33 and 10:36 and thereby his interpretation and generic classification of the unit.

The employment of the *actantiel* model displays how different the choice is between 10:25-37 and 10:30-35 as the unit for analysis:




If one chooses 10:30-35 then we have:



Within the story (of Jesus) the ordainer and subject are identical. The Samaritan wants to communicate to the traveller healing which proceeds from his own (the Samaritan's) will and concern. He is helped in his effort by the oil, wine, donkey, and the innkeeper. One might think that the robbers are his opponents, but paradoxically they are also helpers. They create the situation in which he can show compassion. If the priest and levite are not in the strictest sense the Samaritan's opponents, they are, nevertheless, his opposites.

If one chooses as the unit Luke 10:25-37, we have:



Jesus wants to communicate to the scribe from his own understanding the meaning of "neighbor." He does this with the help of the story, but whether the scribe "gets" or accepts the meaning, becomes a real recipient--whether the opposition posed by the Jewish way of seeing neighborliness is overcome--remains uncertain.

Crossan (§2.131) states that the story (10:30-35) could fit with 10:29 (where "neighbor" is he who receives help) or with 10:36 (where "neighbor" is he who extends compassion) but not with both simultaneously. Is it not, however, one of the achievements of the unit 10:25-37 to mold certain elements of tension into a unity? This is to say that the text is what Wheelwright calls tensive language. And one way in which tensive language operates is to contain the tension between metaphorical vehicle and tenor (Wheelwright, 1962:45-49, 55-56). In 10:25-37 the action of the Samaritan is the metaphorical vehicle which holds together two ways of expressing the metaphorical tenor--neighbor as the one helped and neighbor as the helping one. The story is an answer to two questions--who is my neighbor and who acted as neighbor--an answer which shows that the two questions are really one. The question: What are the limits of neighborly responsibility? The answer: none. To maintain Crossan's position is to force the text 10:25-37 into what Wheelwright calls steno-language, language in which each term has only one meaning which it must retain throughout a given discourse (Wheelwright, 1962:34-35, 1954:55-59). Such a position works in direct contrariety with Crossan's own express intention to see The Good Samaritan as metaphor, a question which must be taken up again later.

My primary conclusion at this stage of the argument is" Crossan's effort to interpret The Good Samaritan and to classify it generically as parable is vitiated by the failure to observe the autonomy of the story which failure is at the same time a confounding of story and discourse in a case where the story is a discrete enclave within the discourse.

3.2 This section will be composed of comments about and conclusions drawn from figure #1.

3.21 According to Todorov a genre is a kind of classificatory structure--a certain configuration of possibilities drawn from the total system of formal literary properties (plot, causality, point of view, etc.). It is constructed by abstracting from several works a number of traits which they have in common and which are deemed to be more important than other traits which they do not have in common (Todorov, 1968:99-103, 150, 154-157; 1966:125). In order to connect this with what has previously been stated about genre we may say that working *a posteriori* the genre is constructed from existing syntagms or performance texts, but the *a priori* assumption is that the texts were generated by that genre.

In the light of this we may observe that the first eight narratives in figure #1 vary only with respect to oppositions 1-3 and consistently agree with respect to the five oppositions 4-8. Five of these eight narratives have, in fact, the same surface structure /4/. This justifies us, I think, in maintaining that there is a genre--narrative parable of Jesus--with two sub-genres, comic and tragic, each of which shows still further slight variation with regard to the episode pattern. These eight narrative parables do not have two protagonists. The protagonist (whose action or fate shapes the plot) is always the *actantiel* subject who is represented by a servant-son-subordinate figure. The *actantiel* ordainer is not the protagonist. In The Prodigal Son the ordainer (father) is also the helper, but in The Unjust Steward the ordainer (rich employer) is also the opponent before he is finally, and surprisingly, a helper (along with the debtors). In all of the parables with a tragic plot, however, the ordainer is identical with the opponent: he prevents the subject from possessing the object which he intends to possess.

3.22 The Wedding Feast I would call a parable but a modified one. Among the five oppositions with respect to which all of the narrative parables agree, The Wedding Feast manifests three variations. Yet I would classify it as a parable because it does have plot movement and a discernible episode pattern, although the plot is fragmented. Also the connections are more causal than chronological. It is comic even though the subject does not *receive* the object as he does in the comic narrative parables (Prodigal Son and Unjust Steward). It is comic because he does not intend to receive the object (as in the two parables just mentioned), but rather he successfully communicates it (communicates a feast to the street people). In The Wedding Feast the protagonist who gives the action such unity as it has is the king (not the subordinate figure as in the narrative parables). Moreover, the king fulfills both the actants subject and ordainer, while in the narrative parables these two actants are always represented in different characters. It is the coalescence of the *actantiel* ordainer and subject in the king figure which produces in the Wedding Feast a certain disjuncture in the plot, a shift of emphasis from plot to theme, and a shift of thematic subject matter from the existential (anthropological) to the theological /5/.

3.23 The Good Samaritan has a plot movement which is broadly comic and an episode pattern that is roughly action-crisis-denouement. But this plot is not organically united as are the plots of the narrative parables: the denouement is not a real denouement; it is not the fruition of the travelling victim's actions, decisions, and discoveries. In the narrative parables the figure who is present in all of the episodes and gives the plot its shape is the *actantiel* subject. But in The Good Samaritan the figure who is present throughout and who gives the plot its shape is the victim, the *actantiel* recipient, while the *actantiel* subject, the Samaritan, appears only in the last episode. That is why the plot lacks organic *unity*.

The Good Samaritan is comic, not because the subject successfully possesses the object, as in The Prodigal Son and The Unjust Steward, but because, not intending to possess it, he successfully communicates it, as in The Wedding Feast.

Todorov has distinguihsed three types of causality: what I will call sequential causality (an action is caused by another event or condition), psychological causality (an action is caused by a character trait), and philosophical causality (an action is an illustration or symbol of a concept or idea) (Todorov, 1968: 124-125). All of the narrative parables manifest sequential causality at some point, but it does not appear at all in The Good Samaritan. The victim's travelling is not represented as the cause of his misfortune but rather as the occasion for it. The conjunction implied between the going down to Jericho and the being beaten is not "therefore" (causality) but "and then" (chronological consecution). Nor does the victim's plight cause the Samaritan to help him. The traveller's miserable situation does not cause the priest or levite to help him, and neither does it cause the Samaritan to do so. The Samaritan's compassion (10:33) causes his action (psychological causality).

There is a tendency in the narrative parables, especially the comic ones, to moderate sequential causality with psychological. The father prepared a feast because the lost had been found (sequential), but he initially welcomed his son because he had compassion (Luke 15:20)--the theological implication of which is that man cannot "cause" God to be gracious.

In summary, we have seen that while the eight narrative parables vary with regard to plot movement and episode pattern, the plot is always an organic unity. In The Good Samaritan it is not. Furthermore with respect to the five oppositions on which the narrative parables always agree, The Good Samaritan manifests five variations,

that is, it displays the other member of the opposition all five times. On the basis of my analysis of plot and actants I conclude that The Good Samaritan does not belong to the genre, narrative parable of Jesus.

3.24 The other four narratives present a mixed picture. Lazarus and the Rich Man has the same surface structure as the first five narrative parables, but there is philosophical as well as sequential causality. The rich man, who seeks relief from his torment, cannot obtain it because his former manner of life is now being requited (sequential) but also because there is an impassable gulf between the saved and the damned (philosophical). Thus the transcendent world is directly represented in a mythological way.

The Pharisee and the Publican has the same surface structure as The Prodigal Son, but God is directly addressed in prayer in the story rather than being imaged by a human figure. It could also be said that the plot is flawed. The Publican's (*actantiel* subject) crisis is only implied in the initiating action rather than being a separate episode, and the denouement belongs to the discourse rather than to the story ("I tell you....") (Luke 18:14a). There is no clear causal connection between the publican's prayer and the pronouncement that he was justified (18:14a), thus leaving room for the grace of God. But 18:14b does introduce causality and virtually turns humbling oneself into a meritorious work.

The Rich Fool with regard to the five constant elements in the narrative parables manifests two variants. As for the episode pattern, the crisis is no more than suggested by the term "Fool." God again appears as a character in the story but not so mythologically as in Lazarus and the Rich Man. The rich man's anticipated death in the end is not so much the consequence of his previous life as the standpoint from which it must be evaluated. Hence the denouement is again discourse.

The Wedding Guest displays the same surface structure as The Prodigal Son, and in conformity with the narrative parables God does not appear as a character. However, the indicative modal nuance of the narrative parables has been replaced by the imperative. This means that whereas discourse is subordinate in the narrative parables to story, in The Wedding Guest the story has been absorbed in discourse.

Before drawing a conclusion about the generic class of these four narratives I want to turn once again to the question of metaphor.

3.3 The narrative parables are metaphors of the kingdom of God: they give a new vision of everyday existence as transected by the surprising incursion of the transcendent. The metaphoric tenor is the kingdom of God (heaven), and the vehicle is the narrative. Sometimes the tenor is explicitly mentioned (Matt 20:1--The Workers in the Vineyard), and sometimes it is not (The Prodigal Son; The Unjust Steward). But whether or not the kingdom (tenor) is explicitly mentioned, it is always represented implicitly and subsidiarily in the story by the king-master-father figure who is the *actantiel* ordainer. The king-master-father figure in the story is involved in a dramatic encounter with a son-servant-subordinate figure who is the *actantiel* subject. Thus the tenor is drawn into and becomes a part of the vehicle, a story suggesting a paradigm of human existence. That is why it is legitimate to say that the parable gives a new vision of human existence as crossed by the divine. Or perhaps more properly: the kingdom is seen as a qualification of human existence. The important point to remember is that the parable is a *metaphor* of the kingdom of *God* because the semantic distance and tension between the divine and the human is supported by the distance between ordainer (king-father) and the subject (servant-son) who are always separate and distinct characters.

Now what do we see in The Good Samaritan? Actually without including 10:36 in the unit for analysis, in a Jewish context the juxtaposition of Samaritan and compassion (10:33) contains enough semantic distance to make the story a metaphor. But this tension is a function of the relationship between subject, object, and recipient: a Samaritan desires to communicate compassionate healing to a Jew. To be a metaphor of the kingdom of God the semantic tension would have to be between ordainer and subject, but in The Good Samaritan those actants are identical. Therefore, this narrative is a metaphor which gives a new meaning to the responsibilities of neighborliness but is not a metaphor of the kingdom of God, and on this ground is not a parable.

With regard to the other four alleged example stories, the literal and metaphorical meanings which Crossan proposes are so similar that the metaphorical meaning does not really get off of the ground. There is not enough semantic tension or distance to be overcome between the two levels for the texts to be regarded as metaphors. Therefore, they are not parables. They remain illustrative examples of what one is to do or not to do.

My argument has rested largely on formal literary considerations. Crossan, however, has suggested that the difference between parable and example story is not one of form and content but rather one of function and intention (§4.2). But can these two determinations be so easily separated? Can texts which differ so substantially in deep structure, narrative form, and content function in the same way? One might *make* them function in the same way, but is it proper to interpret and classify a narrative contrary to its own structurally constituted textuality, its quality of being one form of expression and not another (Perrin: 366-370)?

3.4 One final question: If we take Jesus' non-symbolic statements as the clue to the metaphorical meaning

of the parables (Crossan: §4.2), do we not--despite Crossan's efforts to avoid these consequences (§§4.2-4.4) --undercut the (semi-)autonomy of the parables and prevent them from being real metaphors, truly new semantic transformations?

4. My response to Professor Crossan's "The Servant Parables of Jesus" will be briefer, more circumstantial, and less systematic than the response to his previous article. Perhaps my comments can be grouped under the two headings, theological and formal-structural, though it would be arbitrary to try to keep these entirely separate in the case of the parables. Crossan's interpretations are again very challenging and evocative of comment.

4.11 Crossan is working with two groups of parables, one of which he sees as presenting a normal, orderly world in which the good are rewarded and the wicked are punished (§§2.33, 3.1). But in the second group of parables this normal, just, complacent world is questioned, probed, and finally overthrown (§§3.1, 4.31). He sees The Talents as being typical of the orderly world and The Vineyard Workers as representing the clearest reversal of that world. In The Talents two servants are rewarded for their work and a third is punished for inactivity (§§2.3-2.33). In The Vineyard Workers, however, the good servants do not get what they expected while the bad get more than they deserved (§3.6). But "good" and "bad" are metalinguistic terms which are not actually used in the parable of the workers and may not be appropriate for the world of this parable. Let us stick closer to the parable and speak simply of the full day workers (Crossan's "good") and the part day workers (Crossan's "bad"). The self-understanding of the part day workers is not developed. But the full day workers are accorded a recognition scene in which they show themselves not to be good but rather just. They think of themselves as people who can justify their own existence in terms of the "just" order of the world; otherwise they would not have complained about the

surprising generosity of the owner to the part time workers. Because they believe that they can justify themselves through the just *order*, they will not or cannot accept grace--the unexpected.

Crossan's overall interpretation suggests that in Jesus' servant parables there is a movement from one world to the other, or a dialectic between these worlds, that is between the world of order and the eschatological world of the unexpected (§5.2), but do these *two* worlds really exist in Jesus' servant parables? The full day workers of The Vineyard Workers will not accept the risk involved in the unexpectedness of grace. (This point will be substantiated further in the next section dealing with formal-structural matters.) And it is for refusing to take a risk that the one talent man loses his opportunity. Thus I think we may question whether we are really moving in two different worlds.

4.12 Crossan has suggested that in The Unforgiving Servant it is implied that God does not forgive our unforgiveness, and he has stated that in this parable the emphasis is not on the king's mercy but on the servant's lack of it (§3.2).

One may express the unfolding of a narrative in more than one way, and the different ways available may cause the transition points and emphases in the narrative to be seen at different places. Some narratives will invite one scheme and other narratives will invite another. The Unforgiving Servant seems to be especially appropriate for the scheme of Claude Bremond: (1) The possibility of a process (of amelioration or degradation) is opened up: virtuality is created; (2) the process is developed or it is not; (3) a goal is reached or it is not (Bremond: 60-62).

Now in The Unforgiving Servant the first episode opens up for the servant a many faceted possibility, one of whose facets is to become a forgiving man. But he

does not become a forgiving man; he is merciless. Instead of actualizing the process of amelioration which has opened up he actualizes a process of degradation which reaches its natural and organic issue or goal. Thus the theme growing out of the form (or surface structure) is not that God does not forgive man's unforgiveness but that man (or this man) did not actualize the possibility that was opened up for him and sadly arrived at the goal of the process he chose to actualize, a process quite at variance with the possibility opened up to him. It is not that God does not forgive unforgiveness but that the servant did not really internalize the forgiveness offered to him. That he should have is quite in harmony with the union of indicative and imperative which is so characteristic of Jesus, Paul, and John. Since everything in the narrative flows from the king's initiating action and is judged by it, I would opine that the emphasis is on the king's mercy, on the possibility which was not grasped. This obviates any legalistic interpretation of the parable, though it did not prevent Matthew from giving one in 18:35.

4.2 My next step is to construct a grid of syntagms (syntagm: a linear, irreversible chain of words, the text as it stands) and paradigms (paradigm: elements from the different texts which have some kind of correlation) (see figure #2). I will make some comments about this diagram and about Crossan's paper in the light of it.

4.21 The Prodigal Son is included in the diagram because, as both figure #1 and figure #2 show, it belongs to the same genre as a number of the parables which Crossan discusses; therefore it enlarges somewhat our conception of Jesus' narrative competence.

4.22 There are various ways of expressing the threefoldness of the basic narrative pattern.

4.221 There is, of course, Aristotle's famous beginning, middle, and end (Aristotle: 7).

4.222 For Barthes the basic narrative sequence is

composed of three cardinal functions which open, maintain, and close the narrative (Barthes, 1966:5-8, 9-10).

4.223 And we have already observed Bremond's initiation of possibility, process, and goal (Bremond: 60-62).

4.23 I should like to note Lévi-Strauss' view that the fullest syntagm may be used as the clue to the structure (genre) (Lévi-Strauss: 148) and E. D. Hirsch's argument that if a work is seen to belong to a certain genre, then the details can reasonably be expected to follow the principles of that genre (Hirsch: 72-74, 89-90, 113). There is no reason to question the genuineness of the prodigal's reception at his home, and Crossan (§2.33) agrees that Matt 25:28, the denouement of The Talents, is an original part of the parable. Thus it would seem that in Jesus' narrative parables it is a generic principle that the denouement, the end, is expressed; the close of the narrative is stated; the goal's being reached or not being reached comes to explicit narrative expression. The burden of proof is on the one who would argue otherwise.

4.24 It should be observed that in the action-crisis-denouement pattern both action and crisis usually have two parts: action (opportunity and response); crisis (question and response). In the crisis-response-denouement pattern the crisis of the action-crisis-denouement pattern may be developed in such a way as to preserve the three-foldness: crisis (questioning of existence)-response-denouement (The Unjust Steward). This entails dropping out the action or opening function altogether, and turning the two parts of the crisis function (question and answer) into two independent functions--opening and maintaining.

On the other hand, the crisis-response-denouement pattern may preserve the two parts of the crisis (question and response) and insert the two part action function (opportunity and response) *as* the response (The Unforgiving Servant).

4.25 The distinction between signifier and signified

should be maintained. The signifier is the external bearer of meaning composed of sounds, objects or images. It is the word or text. The signified is--tautologically defined--that which is meant by the one who uses the sign, the sign being composed of signifier and signified. The signified is also the chosen--neither innocently nor neutrally--vantage point from which the text will be read (Barthes, 1967:38-40, 42-48; Schiwy: 37; Chomsky: 31-33; Barthes, 1972:253-254, 258-259, 1964:164-167, 171-172). Thus it is both pre-understanding and new understanding.

4.26 Crossan sees The Unjust Steward (§3.4) as having three scenes: (1) Master and Steward (16:1-2); (2) Steward and Self (16:3-4); (3) Steward and Debtors (16:5-7). Crossan does not regard 16:8a as a genuine part of the parable. He believes that the steward has *cleverly* solved his problem by the end of 16:7 and that it is not psychologically probable that the master would have praised the steward (16:8a).

I think that it is quite credibly possible that a crafty, scheming master might have had the capacity to see the situation with detached humor and praise the steward. It is art that gives us the world and not the world which we use to judge the credibility of art. We do not know from 16:6-7 that the steward was successful but only that he tried; nor do we know apart from the employer's praise (16:8a) whether it was really a clever risk. But the main point is that Crossan's third scene (16:5-7) is not really a separate function; it rather continues to maintain the process begun in 16:3-4 in operation. Without 16:8a the parable has no express closure, denouement, or statement about whether the *actantiel* subject attained his object. And the genre gives us a right to expect it. Thus 16:8a should be considered a part of the parable.

4.27 Crossan would have The Wicked Husbandmen (§3.5) end with Mark 12:8. But the logic of the genre again

requires something like 12:9 or at least 12:9a, suggesting the punishment of the wicked servants. It is true that 12:9a belongs to the discourse and not to the story, but it is required by the *narrative*. This is a different situation from The Good Samaritan narrative where the narrative was completed with the end of the story at Luke 10:35, thus making the discourse in 10:36 an illegitimate part of the unit for analysis which begins with the discrete story at 10:30.

4.28 In the judgment of Crossan The Vineyard Workers (§3.6) ends quite satisfactorily at Matt 20:13, from both the logical and dramatic standpoints. In his opinion it would make little conceptual difference whether 20:14 were original or not.

But it does make a formal difference, and because form and content inhere in each other in art it also makes a conceptual difference. Without something like 20:14a the parable has no third or closing function. Shall I say it again? The genre teaches us to expect an express denouement. It is one of the signifieds of Jesus' parables that actions have consequences which come to expression. That is part of the logos of the genre. One must not just read the individual syntagms but must read the paradigms from left to right. Without 20:14a the parable could be interpreted as meaning that God deals with some people on the basis of justice and with others on the basis of grace. But when the full three-fold narrative pattern is recognized--when the expulsion of the grumbling full day workers is seen as a part of the parable--then the theme becomes the estrangement from the source of unexpected generosity of those who believe that they can justify themselves in the order of justice.

4.29 The diagrams of Crossan in §4.4 attempt to show that in parable group #1 reward and goodness go together and punishment and badness go together, whereas in group #2 the situation is reversed: the good are punished while

the bad are rewarded. But if we allow the Wicked Husbandmen its ending the bad are punished. And if the same is accorded to The Vineyard Workers the self-justifiers are estranged from grace. In The Unforgiving Servant the merciless (bad) man is clearly punished. And the rewarded unjust steward, because he took risky action, is "good" from the standpoint of the parable's signified.

4.210 Crossan draws some conclusions (§5.11) about the creativity of Jesus as story teller. I think that one must be very circumspect about such judgments. My merely representative deep structure in figure #1 shows that Jesus had the theoretical competence to generate two hundred and fifty-six different surface structures. A more complete analysis with the concomitant feeding of more textemes into the deep structure would multiply the theoretical competence many times. My analysis of fourteen narratives, however, shows that Jesus actually generated only a very few surface structures. Where between this small number and 2^n did Jesus' *practical* competence lie?

Figure 1

	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8	
	a/b		c/d		e/f		g/h		i/j		k/l		m/n		o/p	
1. Talents	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
2. Ten Maidens		x	x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
3. Wedding Garment	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
4. Wicked Husbandmen		x	x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
5. Workers in Vineyard	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
6. Unforgiving Servant		x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x
7. Unjust Steward		x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x
8. Prodigal Son		x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x
9. Wedding Feast		x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x
10. Good Samaritan	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
11. Rich Fool	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
12. Pharisee and Publican		x	x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
13. Lazarus and Rich Man		x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x
14. Wedding Guest	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	

Figure 2

syntagm ⟶

	Action			Crisis		Response=Action		Denouement	
	initiative of protagonist	opportunity	response	protagonist's existence questioned	response	opportunity	response	well being	loss
Prodigal Son	prodigal (subject) asks for property	father (ordainer) gives it to him	prodigal leaves home and squanders money	by his condition by himself	self-awareness decision action			he is received	
Talents		talents given by master (ordainer)	one talent man (subject) hides his talent	by master	one talent man defends himself and reveals inauthentic anxiety				loses his opportunity
Wicked Husbandmen		vineyard is let out by owner (ordainer)	is rented by tenants (subject)	owner requests returns	tenants refuse and maltreat the messengers				suggestion that they lose the vineyard

Vineyard Workers		owner (ordainer) hires workers	they accept the job	action by owner provokes full day workers (subject) to question owner	owner responds (note transformation)				full day workers are expelled
Unforgiving Servant				king (ordainer) questions servant (subject)	servant asks for time (and it is granted)	fellow servant (helper/ opponent) asks for time	first servant refuses		first servant loses his freedom
Unjust Steward				rich man (ordainer) questions steward (subject)	reflection and action by steward			steward is praised	

↑

NOTES

/1/ See Roland Barthes (1971:29, 36-37) and Geoltrain (72, 78-79). Greimas developed this model.

/2/ This three-fold scheme or division is a certain modification and adaptation of some ideas of Erhardt Güttgemanns. See Güttgemanns (1972a:6, 7, 13, 14; 1972b: 4; 1971:171, 174-175, 178, 228-229).

/3/ Robert Funk (210-222) also classifies The Good Samaritan as a parable, but he, similarly to Crossan, must get outside of the story to do so. He attributes to the fictitious character--the Samaritan--a being brought into the world of love by the story. This *may* be true for the audience, but is *not* for the Samaritan. He is part of the story, not someone affected by it.

/4/ One of these five, The Workers in the Vineyard, though its plot is tragic its thematic emphasis is comic. See my book (1967:149-155; 1970:141-146).

/5/ For an elaboration of this from a slightly different point of view see my article (1971:179-182); see also 1970 (173-177).

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ON THE NOTION OF GENRE IN VIA'S "PARABLE AND EXAMPLE STORY: A LITERARY-STRUCTURALIST APPROACH"

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ABSTRACT

Because Via derives his notion of parable as genre only from Jesus' narratives, he misses the more commonly held point that genres are cultural media shared within a linguistic community. Therefore, while he identifies genre as an intermediate structural level in a generative grammatical paradigm, his failure to locate this paradigm within a more comprehensive communications model (R. Jakobson) precludes his seeing the codal dimension of genre and allows him to reduce genre to a logical stage in the generation of an utterance or text. The communications model and other structuralist insights place the notion of genre in a different light by emphasizing on the one hand the empirical qualities of surface (compositional) structures and generic structures, and on the other hand the universal, innately human aspects of universal types. Alternatives to Via's model are discussed, and by relating them to the categories of traditional biblical criticism a revised agenda for literary criticism in biblical studies is proposed.

0. In principle, if not always in detail, my sympathies are with what Via has set out to do in his essay, namely to determine formal and structural criteria which will enable us to identify and differentiate the various forms of Jesus' utterances. My concern is to make some adjustments in his detail for the sake of the principle. Specifically, I am concerned with the role of genre in Via's generative genetics of structural entities. In

focusing on this issue I will set aside other questions related to his textemic and *actantiel* analysis. I am aware that they are or may be related to the problem of genre, but I am persuaded that they can only be approached after the notion of genre has been clarified. Because this clarification is critically necessary at the present stage of structuralist biblical criticism, where the notion of genre is not taken seriously, the problems of textemic and *actantiel* analysis will have to be discussed in another communication.

1. Via on Genre

1.1 In his first comments on genre Via refers to what he later describes as three generatively related structural entities--deep structures, intermediate generic structures, and text or surface structures: "A texteme is a formal unit of meaning larger than a word which belongs to the basis or deep structure or competence which generates genres and texts" (2.123). Diagram 1 (mine) represents this generative stemma:

Diagram 1:

text

↑

surface or text structure

↑

intermediate generic structures

↑

deep structures

For methodological purposes, we should also note that Via "chooses" his textemes from several of Jesus' narratives and speaks of the textemes "as if" they comprised the total, deep structural basis and competence of Jesus for composing narratives. "An actual narrative (performance text) would be the union of a surface structure with content (concrete characters and events)" (2.123[1]).

1.2 From these textemes one can create a formulaic representation of Jesus' deep structural competence, and from his selection from this basis in the formation of his

narratives one can also represent formulaically "the intermediate structure which is the genre, narrative parable of Jesus...Genre is a generative matrix which, by selection and combination of textemes, linguistic functions, and other phenomena produces ever new texts of its generic type, which are transformations of each other" (2.123[2]).

1.3 A comparison of the two representational formulas (i.e., of deep structural capability and of intermediate structural selections) "will show that certain selections have been made which distinguish the first eight narratives [in Via, fig. 1] as a genre (narrative parable)" (2.123[2]).

1.4 The surface structure of each narrative can also be represented in such a way as to show the further textemic selection which is made from the intermediate structure (2.123[3]).

1.5 "According to Todorov a genre is a kind of classificatory structure--a certain configuration of possibilities drawn from the total system of formal literary properties (plot, causality, point of view, etc.). It is constructed by abstracting from several works a number of traits which they have in common and which are deemed to be more important than other traits which they do not have in common. In order to connect this with what has previously been stated about genre we may say that working *a posteriori* the genre is [re-]constructed from existing syntagms or performance texts, but the *a priori* assumption is that the texts were generated by that genre" (3.21; the bracketed prefix is mine).

1.6 "...there is a genre--narrative parable of Jesus..." (3.21).

2. Critique

2.1 My criticism is that if Via is correct, that "there is a genre--narrative parable of Jesus," then Jesus

was speaking in a completely private idiolect which only a structuralist analyst could pretend to comprehend /2/. Since Via presumably does not believe this any more than I do, the question is, have I misunderstood Via, or has he missed something in his treatment of genre?

2.11 I think the problem arises with the idea that genres can be reconstructed from the utterances or texts produced by a single individual. To be sure, we can *tentatively* deduce the nature of a genre from such limited data, just as we can deduce the linguistic and semantic traits of a previously unknown language from a single text, once we have cracked its linguistic and semantic code (cf. linear B, the Rosetta stone, etc.). However, when we make such linguistic breakthroughs we conclude that the language was the language of a linguistic community and not merely that of the writer. So also, I must argue, with genres.

2.12 In order to unpack this point let me begin by stating a proposition which most critics would subscribe to in one form or another, with quibbling about detail--to be sure--but with agreement in principle: *Genres are cultural media (codal elements or conventions) which function on levels of linguistic competency beyond the scope of the sentence, i.e., supra-sententially, within every linguistic community* (cf., e.g., Hirsch; Hendricks, 1967-1973; Jakobson and Wellek, 1960; Ben-Amos; Guillén; Doty, 1972; Pavel; etc.) /3/.

2.13 Since Via has referred to Todorov, the following from Todorov's recent dictionary article on genre (Ducrot and Todorov, 1972) is relevant to my proposition, and to what I wish to make of it: "Les *genres* forment, à l'interior de chaque période, un système; ils ne peuvent se défenir que dans leur relations mutuelles" (195). Thus, genres are not only codal elements within a culturally specific system, they are to be distinguished from one another by their structural characteristics: "L'étude des genres

doit se faire à partir des caractéristiques structurales..." (193). But Todorov also goes further in this essay and argues that the word *genre* be used to describe the structural entities which are arrived at inductively from texts, while *type* should be used to refer to deductive entities which are postulated within a theory of literary discourse (193; cf. Ben-Amos for a parallel distinction between analytical categories, i.e., Todorov's types, and "ethnic genres"). Both types and genres are structured entities, but the former are arrived at deductively and the latter inductively. As I will indicate below (2.54-2.57), the notion of paradigm is closely associated with the former (as in Lévi-Strauss) while the notion of syntagm is closely associated with the latter (as in V. I. Propp) /4/. Be this as it may for the moment, although Todorov does not speak about supra-sentential structures he clearly conceives of genres as constituting a shared cultural system, and as having structural properties. Moreover, when he speaks about structural patterns in the work of a single author, as he does in connection with the Decameron, he specifically refers to plot structure, not generic structure (cf. Todorov, 1969). By limiting himself to Jesus' narrative, therefore, Via would appear to stand closer to Todorov's notion of plot than to his notion of genre. This judgment is further supported by the fact that Greimas, whose *actantiel* model Via borrows, clearly distinguished between narrative structure and genre: "Narrative structures are not to be confused with the so-called 'literary genres.' (For example, the same narrative structure can be found in a novel or a play)" (Greimas, 1971:793). Indeed, because he is interested in narrative *grammar*, Greimas is virtually unconcerned with the question of genre; and this fact raises questions about using his *actantiel* model in dealing with genres. Via has not dealt with this problem (nor have Crossan and Patte in their forthcoming papers in *Semeia* 2, 1974) /5/.

2.14 Thus, and on the assumption that my proposition

is acceptable, it appears that Via has confused matters by reading his *typology of Jesus' utterances*, about which I have no immediate qualms, as a *generic* typology. In this, I think, he is wrong. Simply, if Jesus were to have communicated anything to his audiences besides his generically idiolectal virtuosity (à la Mark 4:10-12?), the audience would have had to have comprehended on some level of awareness his generic as well as his linguistic code. They might have understood words, sentences, and plot, but they could not have understood the kind, i.e., genre, of utterance Jesus issued. Without a generic key, we might ask, how could they differentiate between a "parable," a proverb, and a riddle? Or, as in the case of the Gospels, between biography, historiography, hagiography, or something else? (N. B: The *history* of the Jesus traditions reflects breakdowns in communication--or even new communications--when they were passed from one linguistic community to another; i.e., they were construed differently by audiences with different codal expectations. Cf. the changing views of miracle stories and the addition of allegorical interpretations to parables in the process of cultural translation through which the Jesus traditions passed.) To repeat, the audiences must not only have been able to uncode Jesus' structured sentences, but also the supra-sentential structures which differentiated "parables" from proverbs, riddles, prophecies, etc., all of which were options within their cultural system(s). As I will suggest later, form-critics have provided some criteria for speaking about such supra-sentential structures, and so have folklorists. Indeed, it would appear that folkloristic structuralism at this point has more to offer us than literary structuralism, for folklorists, like form-critics, deal with small, originally oral utterances.

2.2 If we think of genres as shared cultural media a number of consequences follow for Via's generative genetics.

2.21 The first consequence has to do with the

relationship between a typology of Jesus' utterances and a generic typology. I agree with Via that in identifying genres analytically it is methodologically necessary to begin inductively with actual narratives (text performances) and inquire into their surface structures, whether we are working with simple texts like parabolic narratives and fairy tales, or with complex texts like letters or so-called "gospels" (on which see section 3ff., below). I agree that by identifying the formal and structural properties which a certain group of texts share as differentia from other groups of texts, we can postulate a structural "matrix" (model) which is "deeper" than the surface structure of any given text in a group. Within one and the same text, and with the help of other texts, we can perceive both compositional (surface) and generic structures. This point, of course, is as critical for the study of a letter or a "gospel" as a whole text as it is for the exegesis of a parable. It should be a fundamental point in any future program for biblical literary criticism.

2.22 With Via, too, I would also identify the deeper structural dimension as the genre dimension. But against him I would insist that the group of texts with which we begin must include examples from people other than Jesus. If it does not, all we can reconstruct from our corpus is a typology of *Jesus'* utterances, not of genres which Jesus shared with others in his linguistic community. (The same principle obtains in the study of the Pauline letter in relation to Greco-Roman or Semitic epistolography.) At least in the present paper by Via (and as a distinctive feature in relation to most other studies of parables I have read), criteria have been established only for a typology of Jesus' utterances but not for a genre called *parable*, and certainly not for a genre--"parable of Jesus." If genres are shared media, there can be no such thing as a genre--parable of Jesus.

2.23 Clearly, Via can redeem his argument simply by dropping the word "genre" when he means "type of Jesus'

utterance." On the other hand, if genres are shared media the student of parable qua genre is not helped by this maneuver; he has hardly begun his work.

2.3 The second consequence of seeing genres as media suggests that Via will not have redeemed his argument after all if he only substitutes one phrase for another. The notion of genres as media works havoc with his generative genetic stemma (diagram 1) and calls into question the grammatical model within which he frames his argument. Here I see two fundamental problems.

2.31 The simplest of the problems is Via's use of the word "generate." When he says, following transformational-generative grammarians (hereafter, TG) and some generative poeticists, that the deep base structure generates genres and texts, or that generic structures generate texts, he commits the same fallacy perpetrated by those form-critics who speak of traditions as "community products." In fact, "structure" is as poor a choice of a subject for the verb "to generate" as "community" is for verbs of speaking or writing /5/. People, the disclaimer goes, generate and communicate utterances, not communities, genres, matrices, or structures. More importantly, however, the notion of generativity is bound up with grammatical description in such a way as to virtually preclude understanding genres as media. Chomsky, for example, is to be heeded when he says that "the grammar of English generates structural descriptions for the sentences I am now speaking" (Chomsky, 1968/1972:104). That is to say, a speaker follows, consciously or otherwise, the linguistic code of his community in generating utterances, whereas a grammarian creates a grammar which generates, when activated, structural descriptions of the implicit rules followed by native speakers. Indeed, these rules are the product of the grammar and the theory upon which it is based. They are the product, therefore, of grammarians /7/. Now grammarians are simply not concerned with the question of genre. This is true of traditional grammarians

who limit themselves to sentences or sequences of sentences (as in discourse analysis) /8/; and we have seen that it is also true of Greimas, who is concerned with narrative grammar. While some few folklorists have attempted to treat genres within a generative framework, it is fair to say that they have not yet succeeded /9/. Thus, while Via follows TG grammarians and some generative poeticists with his generative model, he departs from them when he inserts the notion of genre into the model. The question is, can the model receive this insertion without being radically transformed? I doubt it, but to doubt it is as insufficient as the assertion that it can. More work has to be done before any answer can be assumed /10/.

2.32 The problem opened up by Via's use of the word "generate" leads to two interruptions of his generative stemma (diagram 1), first by the understanding of genres as shared media, which introduces the audience of a text or utterance, and second by the introduction of a speaker or writer who must be located either between the deep and generic structural levels or before the deep level. While Via refers to Jesus as a speaker, it is not clear from his discussion as to where the speaker should be located. Indeed, unless I have completely misread Via's argument, the deep and generic structural levels exist only in Jesus' head! Of course, this cannot be the case if genres are cultural media. However, since Via has not dealt with the points I have been making, I submit in diagram 2 a revision of the stemma depicted in diagram 1:

Diagram 2:

audience
↑
utterance/text
↑
surface or text structure
↑
generic field or system
↑
speaker

These alterations effectively redesign Via's grammatical

model in terms of the classic communications model introduced by Roman Jakobson (1960) /11/.

2.33 The significance of diagram 2 is that it isolates as a separate analytical problem the question of how a speaker/writer has shaped his utterances in relation to the generic system of media in his linguistic community. Within this problem I see three centers and stages of study: (1) analysis of texts (compositions) for the distinctive structural features by which they may be generically differentiated /12/; (2) analysis of the items and syntax (i.e., the principles by which the items are arranged) /13/ which are constitutive of each genre; (3) analysis of the relationship between composition and genre in each utterance or text. (N.B.: It is in connection with these stages, and especially with how we determine what constitutes items and syntax, that discussion of textemic and *actantiel* analysis would make the most sense, not with the "deep structures" which must now be entertained.")

2.34 The second problem the notion of genres as media poses for Via's stemma and its grammatical model has to do with his "deep or base structure." I have intentionally omitted this rubric from diagram 2 because generic and surface structures there comprise a discrete area of inquiry which raises questions about the significance of Via's "deep structures." Once again we may begin with two points.

2.35 First, because textual and generic structures are bound so closely together--we only have the latter in the former, and then in texts--and because generic structures are metaphorically deeper than surface structures /14/, one way to deal with the "deep structures" would be to incorporate them into the notion of generic structure as indicated in diagram 2. However, this possibility is dependent on the degree to which TG generative mappings for natural language sentences can be analogically applied

to supra-sentential structures. In the present state of research I do not see either sufficient agreement among linguists, who are arguing about whether their base structure, their diagrammatic starting point, is syntactical or semantic, or a convincing folkloristic or generative poetical approach to genres. Perhaps the present comments on genre will stimulate further reflection on possibility number one.

2.36 Second, because both TG linguists and folklorists (some of whom are also anthropologists) have dealt with sentential and supra-sentential structures as *universal* rather than merely culture-specific phenomena, i.e., as something other than learned cultural media, we also have to consider another possibility vis-à-vis "deep structures," one which has to do with *universal types* of expression (see above, 2.13), types which may be thought of as *really-deep structures* /15/. These structures require further consideration because of their problematical relationship to cultural media and because of their significance for a structuralist hermeneutics in biblical criticism.

2.37 As I have suggested, the work of structuralist critics in folklore studies is more closely related to what biblical students have been doing than the work of structuralist literary critics /16/. Both folklorists and biblical critics do most of their work in what biblical students call "kleine Formen," the smaller and simpler units of originally oral utterance (e.g., proverbs, riddles, fairy tales, legends, and, for example, "parables," prophecies, and apophthegms). While the folklorists tend to confuse matters by speaking, e.g., of "the" riddle both as cultural medium or genre and as universal type, and by using the word "genre" to identify both dimensions of "riddle," precisely the difference between genre and type is of hermeneutical significance /17/. Thus, while in any given culture a form of utterance may be named "riddle," the folklorist is also aware that other,

culturally unrelated linguistic communities employ the same type of utterance, for the same purposes, and may even have a similar name for it. Consequently the folklorist, who is largely concerned with creating a universal taxonomy of folkore (due to the massive amounts of data with which he is confronted), studies both the culture-specific phenomena and the paradigmatic, universal models on which he sees all of the culture-specific phenomena to be based. The universal paradigmatic types are a clue to the form, content, and functions of riddles everywhere.

2.4 In this context, I am reminded of the desideratum expressed by Via in his *The Parables*: "What is needed is a hermeneutical and literary methodology which can identify the permanently significant element in the parables and can elaborate a means of translating that element without destroying the original intention" (23f.). If structuralist critics of folklore are correct in their view of types and genres, Via's desideratum might be satisfied. If so, however, the student of parables should look for analogous utterances not in modern literary parables /18/, but in the utterances from *other cultures* which correspond to the things which in biblical cultures are comprehended by the words *mashal*, *mathla*, *parabolē*, and *paroimia*, i.e., "parable" /19/. The universal type to which these things belong must be discovered. On the other hand, while Lévi-Strauss' work on myth identifies permanently significant elements in myths in terms of a universal type, his focus on the type leads many to find him lacking in his appreciation of the individual myths and their "original intention."

2.41 Corresponding to Todorov's previously cited distinction between genres and types is that made by the folklorist Dan Ben-Amos between "analytical categories and ethnic genres." Ben-Amos' concern, too, has been to correct his colleagues' confusing use of "genre" to refer indiscriminately both to cultural media (genres proper) and to universal types (analytical categories). Both

Todorov and Ben-Amos are at pains to disassociate the notion of genre from genre-names and to define genres as structured modes of expression within cultural systems of expression. For each of them, genres are expressive mode which are differentiated relatively systematically by cultural conventions; in the forefront of such convention but by no means exhausting them, are structural traits which function as conventional signals by which one differentiates between expressive modes, whether as a sender or as a receiver, whether as a native speaker or as an analyst (see also Hirsch, and Jakobson, 1960). Types, on the other hand, are the creations of analysts (not of native speakers), the means by which analysts account for similarities observed in the expressive repertoires of different and unrelated cultures. "Types" and "genres" thus refer to different objects of inquiry, universal categories on the one hand and culture-specific phenomena on the other.

2.42 Obviously, Ben-Amos is interested in making the distinction I have been trying to make, a distinction between two different realms of inquiry, on the one side *the search for universals in the particular* (types), and on the other side *the search for the typical (i.e., generic) within the particular*. (N.B.: Aristotle's *Poetics* reflects the latter quest since epic, tragedy, and comedy are genre names which differentiate between expressive modes within the system of Greek genres in Aristotle's time. Thus, when Via uses "tragic" and "comi in connection with the parables and the alleged genre "gospel," he does so in an analytical, universal sense. Whatever the value of his usage, his view that "gospels" are tragedies with comic endings is not coincident with the view of genre I am trying to defend. In my view, his use of "tragedy" and "comedy" obscures the analytical issue which is at stake--the relationship between composition and genre.")

2.43 The hermeneutical question which arises from

the distinction between genre and type has to do with how universal types are related to genres as media. While I am incapable of answering this question programmatically, certain observations may be made with regard to the question of genre and its relation to Via's "deep structures." Perhaps the observations will also shed some light on the wider hermeneutical problem.

2.5 I have noted that in Via's stemma (diagram 1) both deep structures and intermediate generic structures appear to be located only in Jesus' "head." While I may have spoken just a bit mockingly of this idea, there is an element of truth in it which requires comment.

2.51 As linguists and folklorists have seen, cultural genres and natural languages and learned by individuals from their cultures. On the other hand, however, and taking Chomsky (1968/1972; cf. Pavel) and Lévi-Strauss (1963, reprinted from Sebeok, 1958) as examples, the *universals* of language and types reside not in culture but in the linguistic-conceptual structurational operations of the human mind as such--they are *not* learned from the culture (see further Greenberg, 1963). Thus if we set aside evolutionary diffusionist theories of language and culture, as structuralists do, the perception of universals in human discourse requires that we postulate a subjective ("mental") receiving and sending capability in the human mind, a capability which manifests itself evidentially in a finite system of structured options for communication. Suffice it to say that the study of this capability and of these options has barely begun, and that it is not limited to folklorists and linguists (cf. Eliade, Freud, Jung, etc.).

2.52 Regardless of how far along this research is, the distinction between learned and "innate" structures allows us further to identify the two realms of inquiry mentioned above (2.42) as historical exegetics on the one hand (the typical in the particular), and as anthropological

on the other (the universal in the particular). "Anthropology," however, must now be understood to include virtually all of the humanistic disciplines. It is in this sense, too, that the French structuralists have seen structuralism as the key to the unity of "the sciences man" (cf. Macksey and Donato).

2.53 In this light, I will limit my comments to the distinction between genre and type as it bears on the study of texts. Accordingly, we may go a step further, now, and distinguish between syntagmatic and paradigmatic analysis (cf. Dundes in Propp, 1968 and the Marandas, 1971b). In taking this step I will report on what others have been doing and thinking, differing from them in the conclusions I will draw for the present paper.

2.54 Structurally, genres are fundamentally syntagmatic models, i.e., models comprised of a limited number of items which appear within a fixed sequence but with allowances for a limited range of permissable variables or transformational options (e.g., in the areas of *dramatis personae*, of actions which can fill syntagmatic [sequential] slots, and of the means by which one can extend simple texts into complex texts, as in "trebling"). *The* prototype of this approach to genre is Vladimir Propp's study of the Russian fairy tale (1958/1968) /20/. In Propp there is no room for Via's deep structural generative basis for genre, because the genre *is* the deep structural basis for the generation, i.e., production of texts. (Indeed, if we use the word "generate" to describe Propp's theory, we must do so in connection with the communications model, where genre is codal, not in connection with Via's grammatical model, where genre seems to be a logical stage.) The closest Propp comes to a really-deep structure is in an evolutionist lapse in which he speaks of an *Ur*-tale as an *Ur*-text or *Ur*-event like Freud's primal Oedipal conflict (Propp, 1968:89f.; cf. 106). However, unlike Freud this *Ur*-tale is not a subjective (mental) structural type with a possible historical basis. It is

rather a fundamental generic structure. In Propp there are speakers, genres, and texts (cf. Propp, 1968:112f.), and he has shown us how to identify the genre from the texts. Like Chomsky's grammarian (2.31 above) Propp, in effect if not in intent, created a grammar which generates descriptions for a genre of tale--the fairy tale, Russian --told by Russian speakers (cf. his linguistic analogy, 1968, 15). But Propp's "grammar" is syntagmatic, like the item and arrangement model of what is, historically, *structural* linguistics, not paradigmatic like the item and process model of TG grammarians (see Hockett, 9-37 and *passim*) /21/.

2.55 The model for speaking of universal types as structural *paradigms* is of course Lévi-Strauss' work on myth (1963; cf. 1960). While recognizing the cultural and authorial peculiarities of specific texts, and while recognizing the contribution of Propp to the analysis of cultural phenomena, he found it necessary to move to another, paradigmatic structural level of abstraction in order to account for similarities between texts (myths) produced by culturally unrelated people (Lévi-Strauss, 1960). Consequently, rather than using a model based on linear, syntagmatic sequence, Lévi-Strauss disavowed sequence and constructed a simpler and more abstract model based on groups of binary oppositions (cf. Via's textemes, which are a variant of Lévi-Strauss' mythemes) which could be distributed sequentially in a number of ways in myth-texts. Once this model had been arrived at, he then proceeded to identify "myth" deductively--a myth is a story in which binary oppositions are systematically mediated. Thus the key to the interpretation of such texts is not their compositional or generic structure but the universal paradigm which finds expression in texts.

2.56 Whereas Propp could, amazingly enough, account for almost every element in a (Russian) fairy tale with his thirty-one syntagmatic functions (the classes of actions of no more than seven kinds of *dramatis personae*),

Lévi-Strauss reduced the structurally significant items to bundles of universalized binary oppositions, and significant syntax to the ways in which the oppositions are resolved. (N.B.: He did not introduce the generative model to map the logical movement from paradigmatic structure to text.) Further, the means by which Lévi-Strauss represents the structure of *a* myth is through a synchronic grid not, as with Propp, through a linear chain of syntagms (cf. Lévi-Strauss, 1963; when he uses formulas to represent mythic structure the formulas are derived from logic and represent the paradigmatic relationship of the resolved oppositions; Propp's formulas are always strictly linear, corresponding to the sequence of elements in the generic and textual structures.) Syntagmatic structures and genres as media are simply not the things with which Lévi-Strauss is concerned (cf. 1960). Reminiscent of Harnack, they are the discardable husks which conceal the (paradigmatic) kernels of real meaning. Yet, as with the critics of Harnack, the husks do exist and they are important, as linguists, folklorists, and even form-critics insist. Therefore, because they do exist and are functional in communication, we cannot simply ignore them or swallow them up in some wider or more transcendental notion of meaning. Accordingly, when we remember that for Lévi-Strauss (1963) myth is a *tertium quid* between *langue* (linguistic competency as defined by grammars) and *parole* (linguistic performance), and when we also remember that folklorists have identified types which have the same status as myth in Lévi-Strauss (e.g., fairy tale, riddle, proverb), a way of preserving the husks and some of paradigmatic theory suggests itself. It might be suggested that analogous to the theoretical distinction between *langue*, myth (i.e., type), and *parole* is the culture-specific distinction between the system formed by a natural language, the generic system of that linguistic community, and the spoken and written utterances produced within it. Thus universal linguistic competency is related to culture-

specific competency in a natural language, universal types are related to genres, and so on. However, there are some problems. In the first place, Lévi-Strauss has had to bend Saussure's distinction between *langue* and *parole* in order to interject his notion of myth. Besides being outside the realm of linguistics, where the sentence is the limit of structural concern, this notion of myth is oriented to structural semantics, whereas, until recently, TG grammarians see semantics as epiphenomenal to structural and transformational syntax. As suggested earlier, other students of narrative (Franco-German structuralists) are not interested in genres as media, and therefore they are of little help, at least with regard to genres. In the second place, while the analogy I suggested may be a useful way of distinguishing between parallel categorical systems, the nature of the relationship between the parallel items remains to be explained. TG grammarians are at work on the relationship between linguisticality and language systems, but until they solve the problem of the relationship between syntax and semantics, and come to agree on the notion of generativity and the meaning of generative mappings, we cannot assume anything in this area. And I have already said that the relationship between types and genres is an open question; in fact my point has been to pose the question of their relationship. Suffice it to say that an answer to the question will prove to be of great hermeneutical significance. It will help us to see how universals are related on the one hand to cultural code systems, and on the other to the structurational capabilities of the human mind which expresses itself in such systems. At the present, those who are interested in genre will have to rely on Propp; Lévi-Strauss is talking about something else.

2.57 The distinction between syntagmatics and paradigmatics is based on the work of Propp and Lévi-Strauss. My comments on these two approaches would be incomplete without at least a passing reference to their epigones.

To be brief, the Parisian structuralists (e.g., Barthes, Greimas, Bremond, and to a certain extent Todorov), the Bonn linguistic theology group (e.g., Güttgemanns), and some American folklorists (e.g., Dundes, Colby, Georges, and the Marandas) have attempted to raise Propp's syntagmatics to a level of universal applicability. In some cases this has resulted in a straightforward shift to a paradigmatics like that of Lévi-Strauss (Greimas, Bremond, the Marandas), while in other cases Propp's insistence on sequence has been retained but with a reduction in number of his "functions" in order to account for what *all* fairy tales have in common (Dundes). Because this reduction is in the service of universal types rather than of genres, it amounts to little more than a sequential paradigmatics. But the ultimate point is that in all cases the Proppian notion of genre has been swallowed up in a concern for types. Ben-Amos is a voice crying in the wilderness.

2.58 To conclude: The distinction between type and genre suggests that one aspect of Via's (really) deep structure takes us beyond the historical-exegetical analysis of texts and genres and leads us into the broader realm of the hermeneutics of human discourse. My point is that while each realm is important, they must not be confused with one another as they most often are. A good structuralist principle, indeed the fundamental principle, is to focus on an object of inquiry as a whole. Genres and types are different objects, belonging to different systems and having different evidential bases. Further, since our starting point in each case is with utterances or texts (unless we opt to begin deductively from a theory of utterance or text, which I do not wish to do), culture-specific analysis as such is methodologically independent of and prior to the study of universals and to hermeneutics. While in fact we may be doing all of these at the same time, the court of last resort is always the commensurability of an interpretation (or analysis) with what is interpreted. My own, admittedly limited, perception of

the current state of research is such as to make me very wary indeed of what is going on between genres and types, and rather reluctant to begin putting things together with the finality suggested by the notion of hermeneutics.

3. My comments on genre would be even more incomplete if two further issues were not raised, namely the ambiguous use of the word "genre" in biblical criticism (too), and the notion of supra-sentential structures and its relation to this ambiguity.

3.1 We biblical students use the word "genre" (*Gattung*) relatively indiscriminately to refer both to "kleine Formen" and to "literary" genres, understanding the latter to refer somehow to whole texts and the former to refer to the *pre-literary* shape of their parts. Indeed, we even use the word "genre" to refer to texts which share a common story, holding that the common story is the basis for postulating generic identity even when in some cases the commonality is based on source relationships (cf., e.g., Cross, on ancient Near Eastern creation stories, and Koester, on Gospel source relationships as constitutive of a genre named "gospel"; for the most recent discussion of many of these issues, see Knierim). On the other hand, while some of us use the word "genre" in at least three different ways, others also distinguish between "Form" (as of parts) and "genre" (*Gattung*, as of wholes), and wish to study the latter on the analogy of the former (Conzelmann; Robinson, 1964, rev. 1971).

3.2 In order to clarify this terminological confusion, I submit the following observations on the contribution of biblical studies to the notion of supra-sentential structure. In the process, I will try to suggest how biblical studies might evolve in relation to the kinds of things discussed in connection with Via's paper.

3.21 It is important to recognize that form-criticism was a structuralist /22/ enterprise comparable to other

contemporary movements in linguistics (Saussure, Jakobson), folklorists (Propp), literary criticism (the Russian Formalists and the Prague Structuralists), anthropology (Hubert and Mauss) and in psychology (the Gestaltists). While this little list exhausts the fields I am directly aware of, others could no doubt be added. The point, however, is that in a variety of disciplines the first three decades of this century were a time for a relative retreat from historical and genetic explanation (diachronics) to systemic explanation (synchronics). For many of the most creative minds in this period the notion of system entailed a focus on whole objects, within which the parts were seen to be arranged as functions of the whole. Wholes, items (i.e., parts), the systems of their arrangement within wholes, and functions--these were the concerns of form-critics as well as of others, although form-critics more than others relapsed into genetic explanation once their struaturalist insights had been made about the "kleine Formen" (e.g., in their movement from form-criticism to tradition history) /23/. Thus, even though the word "structuralism" was only coined by the Prague School in 1934 (Wellek, 1970:275f.), the thing to which the word referred had been around for some time--much as is the case with so-called "redaction-criticism."

3.22 By calling form-critics structuralists I do not with to suggest that their task has been completed. To the contrary, more recent and self-conscious structuralist ideas and procedures should be used to clarify, re-write, and carry further the form-critical program. My principal point is that form-critics have produced ample if not complete evidence for speaking about supra-sentential, i.e., generic, structures. They have done so by identifying whole units--"Formen"--on the basis of an inventory of their constituent items/parts, and of the formal systems by which the items are syntagmatically arranged. Thus, while a given text is comprised of structurally grammatical ("well-formed") sentences, its form-critical structure is

not identical with the structure of its sentences (see, e.g., the relationship between sentence structure and supra-sentential, form-critical structure in the similitudes of Matt 13:44-46) /24/. Even though they often confuse type with genre, folklorists make the same distinction when they speak about linguistic structure and folkloric structure; folkloric structure is synonymous with form-critical structure. In this light, sentences or parts of sentences constitute or point to the items of supra-sentential structures /25/. Supra-sentential structures are therefore structurally analogous to sentence structures. Via has referred to this analogy in *actantiel* terms by noting the analogy between *actant* and the present participle, and between textemes and words (§2.122 and §3). Without thinking in terms of genre, most structuralists operate with the analogy between sentential and supra-sentential structures. Form-criticism would benefit from the sharp distinctions and new criteria suggested by structural criticism. I would therefore recommend that the several sections in Bultmann's *History of the Synoptic Tradition* which are entitled "The Form and History of..." be re-read and re-written in this light, and with the help of modern folklore criticism. However, in any re-doing of form-criticism one would do well to observe that form-critics frequently use the word *style* to refer to phenomena we would today speak of as structural. Accordingly, a new effort in form-criticism would also have to take into consideration more recent studies of style by both linguists and literary critics (cf. Love and Payne; Chatman; Riffaterre, 1971). Suffice it to say that style is both authorial and generic, and that careful analysis is required in order to determine the relationship between them in each text; the distinction between authorial and generic, of course, corresponds to the distinction between composition and genre.

3.3 I will assume that the preceding comments offer sufficient basis for speaking about "kleine Formen" as

supra-sentential structures, as linguistically informed media of an order above or beyond the sentence /26/. My final point is that the proposed analogy between "Formen" and genres requires that we consider a supra-sentential structure which is "above" or "beyond" the "kleine Formen."

3.31 It is well-known that form-critics denied the existence of literary genres in biblical writings. They were impressed by the fact that especially Christian writings lacked generic affinities with the high art of classical antiquity, and they were equally impressed by the fact that they could discern the pre-literary history of virtually all of the material *in* our texts. Thus they concluded that our texts were historically sub- or non-literary, and went on to formulate a hypothesis which I will call the evolutionary theory of biblical writings: the writings have evolved from individual texts (traditions) to intermediate collections of texts, to the full texts as we have them. Our final texts, therefore, are no more than editions of collections or traditions, and the genres of the terminal editions are determined by the types of traditions contained in them. Thus we have law books as collections of laws, revelation books as collections of revelations or visions, and song books as collections of songs (Gunkel). Needless to say, the people who wrote such books (usually anonymously) were not authors in any modern or ancient sense of "author," but editors or collectors.

3.32 In this way, those "structuralist" students of the "kleine Formen" lost sight of, and ideologically ruled out of consideration, generic structures independent of the "kleine Formen." Strangely enough, however, these were often the same people who knew of and talked about letters and ancient epistolography, who said that "apocalypse" was a Jewish genre, and who cited close relationships between Luke-Acts and the hellenistic genre, historiography. Yet in spite of this knowledge they did not follow through and conclude that texts which bore the

traits of these genres--e.g., letters, apocalypses, and history-writing--were shaped according to principles of selection and arrangement which do not derive from the form-critical types of material contained in them.

3.33 Had the form-critics drawn the conclusion that literary (or sub-literary) genres operated like "Formen," they would have provided evidence for a further dimension of structured media which lies beyond the sentence and beyond the "kleine Formen." They would have seen that while "Formen" are the media by which pre-literary traditions are shaped, genres are the media by which formed traditions are transformed into what we may call, following Propp, literary functions within extended texts. In this sense, "parables" as one kind of unit in our present Gospel texts are a kind of function (the actor does this type of thing, or that type, or these types), as are prophecies, miracle stories, and so on. As functions, therefore, parables-in-texts are syntagmatic items which function in relation to other items and not independently, as in their pre-literary state.

3.34 This point was missed by form-critics, apparently because they viewed traditions-in-texts as pre-literary sources, as items independent of their narrative contexts. Correspondingly, the literary or textual dimension of our extended texts was limited to introductions, conclusions, and summaries, all of which appear in the interstices between originally independent traditions. By focusing on the traditions (sources) when looking at extended texts, form-critics could not see the whole and its structural characteristics, either compositionally or generically. They were simply looking at something other than the whole, namely the pre-literary traditions or sources. They did not see that if we have pre-literary traditions as the object(s) of our inquiry, we cannot at the same time have whole texts (or genres) as our objects. In each case we are looking at different objects and at different structures. While it is both legitimate and

necessary to separate such objects, form critics made a critical error in denying the existence of one of them, genres, and the significance of another, compositions or texts. For form-critics, whole texts and their genres were but accidents of traditio-historical accretion.

3.4 Happily, more recent form-critics have moved beyond the pre-history of textual parts to textual wholes in such a way as to bring into focus not only the composition of whole texts (but see the role of *redaction* in redaction criticism) /27/, but also the generic structures which were authorially employed in the arrangement of material in such texts.

3.41 For example, Klaus Baltzer has self-consciously gone beyond the criticism of "kleine Formen" on the basis of form-critical principles. While he calls his supra-sentential structure "the covenant formulary," not a genre, he shows how the formulary operates in certain genres, and how in others it is generically constitutive (e.g., in the testament and manual of discipline). Although the relationship between "formulary" and genre remains to be clarified in his work, his bold positional statement should be taken seriously in reading part 2 of his book, where the question of genre emerges:

> Our study will not be content with working out the 'smallest units'; it will attempt to show that *it is possible to give a form-critical explanation for the assembly of literarily diverse elements, belonging originally to different literary* [i.e., form-critical] *types, to form a larger whole.* This would provide a counter-example to Eissfeldt's statement: 'Gunkel's own proposed method shows that his way of examining and presenting the material in literary-historical terms can only be applied to the smallest unit--the single narrative, the single legal statement, the single poem and so on. It cannot deal with the larger units and is quite unable to deal with the books as we have them.' (98; brackets and italics are mine)

3.42 Baltzer has successfully disproven the form-critical theory of literature for those texts and genres

with which he has worked. Because of his success, and in spite of whatever deficiencies we may see in his categories and methods, his point calls for a re-examination of other studies which have pointed in the same direction without knowing it. I think especially of the studies of Matthew by Bornkamm and Stendahl, both of whom highlighted items and principles of arrangement peculiar to Matthew among the Gospels, but common to a genre some name, manual of discipline (cf. Robinson, 1965). Unfortunately, because Matthew used Mark as a *source*, and because Mark is allegedly a generic "gospel," both Bornkamm and Stendahl concluded that Matthew is also (and still) a generic "gospel." Here, obviously, there is a choice to be made: are the structural traits of Matthew derived from a source or from a generic model? The answer would seem to be prejudiced by the fact that it is where Matthew differs from Mark that his distinctive, manual-like affinities are to be found. Thus, what is distinctive of Matthew's composition is not what he has from his source(s), but what he has in common with manuals. Bornkamm and Stendahl have shown that these distinctive features are structurally constitutive of Matthew's total composition.

3.43 Since the source relationships between at least the synoptic Gospels seem to produce most of the problems in current genre study in biblical criticism, we may also refer to Luke-Acts. The often-noted traits which Luke-Acts (together) share with (other) hellenistic history books should require that the "gospel"-status of Luke's first volume be measured against the generic traits of Luke-Acts together.

3.44 Outside of Gospel studies, source questions are less significant and genre questions more readily handled, even though the form-critical atomization and fragmentation of whole texts still prevails in most quarters. For example, new directions have been suggested in the study of letters, pointing towards a holistic and syntagmatically generic understanding of them. Without having read Propp,

John White, in *The Form and Structure of the Official Petition* (1968/1971; cf. 1971), comes very close to a Proppian analysis. Less Proppian in language, but perhaps closer in insight, is Carl Bjerkelund's *Parakalō*, wherein form-critical fragmentation is subordinated to a more comprehensive understanding of the body of the Pauline letter as consisting of *eucharistō* and *parakalō* sections--sections which take us beyond the formulaic sentences in which these verbs appear. Thus the *eucharistō* includes everything from the end of the salutation, and beginning with the *eucharistō* or its surrogate, up to the *parakalō* sentence (or its surrogate); the *parakalō* section then begins with its opening sentence and concludes just before the formal close of the letter. (For the formal and material consequences of this hypothesis, see Bjerkelund, *passim*.) Bjerkelund's study of the letter approximates Propp's views of *dramatis personae* and their functions in narrative. The letter writer is now the only actor, and the verbs of which he is the subject provide the chief clues to his functions and their syntagmatic sequence. To my mind, therefore, the use of Propp by those involved in the study of ancient epistolography might prove to offer the most substantial evidential basis for a structuralist treatment of genres in biblical and related literature. However, in close competition would be the students of apocalyptic who took Propp seriously. It is becoming increasingly clear that many revelation writings are much more than mere collections of visions and other "apocalyptic" things. Klaus Koch says as much, but he still tends to think of genres largely in terms of items and fails to carry through his own perception of consistent syntagmatic patterns in their arrangement. Indeed, from his comments on "apocalypse as literary type" (cf. 23-35) one could reconstruct a generic, structural description which would be fully consistent with Baltzer's point, and easily translatable into Proppian terms.

3.5 While the movement beyond "Formen" to genres

has obviously barely begun, the efforts in this direction suggest that like formed-traditions, the texts which contain such traditions are influenced (in-formed) by supra-sentential and supra-form-critical structures. Indeed, in texts based on pre-shaped traditions (e.g., Gospels) one can speak of a hierarchy of structural entities--sentences, "Formen," genres. Sentences are syntagms made up of words; "Formen" are syntagms made up of sentences or parts thereof; and literary genres are made up of formed traditions. *However*, as useful as this hierarchy may be for such texts, it is dangerously misleading because it implies that all genres *must* include "Formen" or formed traditions. Thus the notion of a hierarchical relationship must be rejected because it obscures the *analogy* between "Formen" and genres.

3.51 Once again Propp's syntagmatics comes to our aid. Form-critically, "Formen" are different kinds of expression which originated and were initially passed on independently of any narrative context. This form-critical hypothesis is based on the analysis of the form of units which now appear in narrative contexts. If we return to the narratives which were the form-critics' point of departure, we find that the "Formen" also refer to multiple kinds of actions which occur in extended texts. Here is where Propp enters the picture and illuminates the analogy between forms and genres, for such kinds of actions correspond to Propp's functions. The kinds of actions which become the typical functions of *dramatis personae* are the items within the syntagmatic structures by which genres are differentiated. Thus the kinds of actions contained in parables, prophecies, miracle stories, etc., are generic functions (cf. the different kinds of functions found, e.g., in the Greco-Roman Romance). Accordingly, it is only by identifying the distinctive selection of such items and the syntagmatic structure of their relationship within a corpus of texts that we become capable of assigning texts to their generic families (cf. Todorov, §2.13 above

now modified on the basis of Propp). Such a study of the synoptic Gospels and their putative generic relatives is now in order for Gospel studies. Reference has already been made to Matthew and Luke-Acts. For Mark and John other texts would have to be brought into consideration, such as those discussed long ago by Reitzenstein (1960) and Schmidt (1923), both of whose efforts should, like Bultmann's *History*, be re-done in the light of structuralist insights.

3.52 Thus the analogy between "Formen" and genres should not be taken to imply a vertical hierarchy of structures, even though in some texts (Gospels) such a hierarchy suggests itself. To the contrary, the point is that "kleine Formen" and literary genres constitute classes on a single level, the level of supra-sentential structures. Both are genres. "Kleine Formen" are simply smaller and simpler than literary genres, while structurally they are analogous to one another. Propp's syntagmatics is equally applicable to both cases. It may be that the two classes may be further differentiated by seeing the "Formen" as oral media and the literary genres as writing media.

3.6 Finally, in pointing to the peculiarity of many biblical texts--they contain pre-shaped material which is reshaped in them--we also point to an issue which differentiates biblical criticism from folklore studies on the one hand and from literary criticism on the other; the texts with which we work are fundamentally different from theirs, and the purposes of our working on them are also different.

3.61 Our texts are not like the modern, purely authorial creations with which the literary critic works, but for the most part more or less heavily edited collections of other texts, be they traditions or sources. Redaction-criticism has helped us to deal with this problem, and taken us in the direction of literary criticism, but it must now modulate further into a bona fide

composition-criticism that begins rather than ends with whole texts. If it does, a structuralist literary criticism of biblical writings will have to move even closer to literary criticism than redaction-critics have done, in order to make us fully aware of the integrity of biblical writings as texts. Yet unlike literary critics, our first task will be to determine in each case whether or not our text is integral (cf. the Gospel of John and the questions about the ending of Mark and of Romans). Once this has been achieved, a structuralist biblical criticism will work not with questions of redaction and tradition, but of composition and genre.

3.62 Similarly, our texts are not merely pre-literary folk-texts either, but authorially collected and edited compositions of such pre-literary texts. Thus, if we are to make use of work done by folklorists, we are going to have to affirm the necessity of doing form-, source-, and redaction-critical work before we can do what folklorists do. Only in this wasy will we be able to justify isolating, e.g., *a* parable and treat it as something other than a functional item in a composition, or as something other than a generic function. Happily, this work is something biblical students have been involved in for decades, although we still have much to learn from folklorists, whom we stopped relying on with Gunkel and Bultmann.

3.63 Biblical students not only work with different texts from those worked with by folklorists and literary critics, they also work with them for different purposes. For better or for worse, the biblical student is essentially a historian whereas the folklorist, at this stage in the history of his discipline, is a taxonomist who is ultimately interested in cultural operations. While we can learn something from him, we must be careful to see that he is talking about something other than what we are talking about. So also with the literary critic who is ultimately concerned with the literariness of literature,

having isolated one corpus of texts from his culture as literary, and having relegated other texts to the realm of the non-literary. Thus a fundamental distinction in literary criticism is foreign to biblical criticism. And since linguists are now moving into discourse analysis and narrative grammar, we should also remember that their concerns are ultimately with grammar, not with texts.

3.7 Perhaps the ultimate point of all my comments in this paper is that while we can learn from other disciplines, we cannot merely apply their categories, methods, and theories to our texts. By the same token, and equally importantly, we cannot contribute to other disciplines in the sciences of man until we have learned to "do our own things." While we are learning, we will benefit from the other disciplines only to the extent that we are as critical of them as we are of our own.

NOTES

/1/ Via's paper, published in this issue of *Semeia*, has also appeared in abbreviated form in *Linguistica Biblica* 25/26 (1973) 21-30. I have used the longer version which was submitted to the SBL Parables Seminar, November, 1973. My own paper was submitted to the same meeting of the seminar and now appears with notes and some revisions which clarify and bring my argument up to date.

/2/ Cf. Eliseo Vivas: "No artist, however talented, can make objects each of which is in a class by itself. If he could, his work would be totally idiotic [in the etymological sense of the word], utterly private...His work would say nothing to anyone but himself" (103). Vivas seems to have in mind the notion of code when he says that "...classes lose their utility...when the poet cannot count on a homogeneously educated audience" (100).

/3/ The notion of supra-sentential structures is intended to extend Roman Jakobson's classic description of the hierarchy of linguistic structures: "...in the combination of linguistic units there is an ascending scale of freedom. In the combination of distinctive [phonological] features into phonemes, the freedom of the individual is zero: the code has already established all the possibilities which may be utilized in the given language. Freedom to combine phonemes into words is circumscribed; it is limited to the marginal situation of word coinage. In forming sentences with words the speaker is less constrained. And finally, in the combination of sentences into utterances, the action of compulsory syntactical rules cease, and the freedom of any individual speaker to create novel contexts increases substantially, although again *the numerous stereotyped utterances are not to be overlooked*" (Jakobson and Halle; my underlining). Justification for an extension comes from the final clause in the quotation and is amply documented in the literature cited in §2.12, and further in my paper itself. The common denominator of all structural analyses of utterances beyond the scope of the sentence is the intent to go beyond the sentence by using the analogy of sentence grammar, be it tagmemic, structural, or transformational-generative.

/4/ I believe that it was Dundes who introduced the distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic approaches to narrative in his introduction to Propp, although the distinction was employed by Greimas (1965) in a somewhat different way (see note 6, below).

/5/ The last five sentences are additions to my original manuscript, but their substance was discussed in the seminar. Since the seminar, I have become increasingly persuaded that while grammatical structures, whether sentential or "narrative" (Greimas: "translinguistic"), may

offer clues which will distinguish between genres, they are not and cannot be identical with generic structures themselves. Moreover, it is clearer to me now than it was then that the debate between Via and Crossan is distinctive and problematical precisely because they have introduced the notion of genre into the framework of a Franco-German structuralism in which the notion is ignored. In my opinion, the notion of genre, as discussed in my paper, entails a rather systematic revision of the Franco-German enterprise. On the other hand, I think it is the notion of genre which can form a constructive bridge between now traditional biblical criticism and the broader range (than the Paris-Bonn developments) of formalist and structuralist criticism.

/6/ The notion of "community product" in form-criticism has two dimensions which are readily taken into account within the communcations model referred to in §2.32, above, and sketched in n. 11, below. The first dimension has to do with the anonymity of the "speaker" who has created a saying of Jesus or a story about him. "Community" refers to the anonymous speaker (cf. Jakobson and Bogatyrev in Matejka and Pomorska). In terms of the communications model, therefore, one simply substitutes "anonymous speaker" for "Jesus," and hopefully also for "community." The second dimension is that of the typical sociological contexts in which certain genres were operative in the preservation of the Jesus traditions. As is evident in the diagram in note 11, the speaker and his audience share not only the speaker's message, but also the (sociological and historical) context in which the message is sent, and the code (linguistic and generic) in which it is cast. Thus context and code are reciprocally related, both formally and historically, as form critics have long held. Consequently, no message lacks either the contextual or the codal "input." As for the form-critical distinction between the situations of Jesus, the transmitting churches, and of Gospel writers, the communications model is applicable to all of them. Each "situation" implies a different message and correspondingly different audiences, speakers, codes, etc. In relation, now, to my comments in §2.31, my point is that while "community product" can be comprehended within the communications model and its codal understanding of genre, the idea that genres "generate" anything cannot. The subject of the verb "generate" in TG grammar is ultimately the grammatical rules which transform one syntactical structure into another (see Chomsky, 1957, 1965). It is in this sense, too, that Greimas (e.g., and simply, in Greimas, 1965) sees the sequential structure of a given text as a transformation of a prior paradigmatic, i.e., logical, not sequential, structure. In the two instances where I recall Greimas' comments on genre (1966:175, and 1971:793), genre is not paradigmatic. In Greimas, 1965: 165f. (a review of Propp!), he sees a parallelism between surface (syntagmatic) structure and *actantiel* structure; in Greimas, 1966:175, he says that a structure of *actants*

constitutes a genre; and in Greimas, 1971:793, on narrative grammar, he says that narrative structures are not to be confused with literary genres. Now the two earlier works move beyond Propp's generic analysis of the Russian fairy tale by correcting it in such a way as to deal with the much broader notion of narrative (*récit*). Thus he has either misunderstood or intentionally gone beyond what Propp had set out to do. In the essay of 1971, however, he seems to have moved beyond his own earlier ideas by rejecting his earlier wedding of surface structure and generic structure. He is now interested in narrative grammar, in a generative framework. Indeed, he explicitly says that he wishes to *generalize* what Propp said about the fairy tale in order to show its applicability to narrative in general (1971:798, and *passim*). Therefore, Greimas is not only uninterested in genre, he does not deal with it in generative terms either.

/7/ The grammars of linguists do not, like the Lord-Parry theory of epic composition, describe how a speaker produced an utterance, but descriptions of sentences and their grammaticality. Grammars deal with linguistic systems primarily, and with actual sentences only to the extent that they illustrate the system.

/8/ For discussion and literature, see Hendricks, 1967; W. A. Koch; and Petöfi and Rieser. See also Greimas, 1971.

/9/ This is implied in the Marandas (1971b:20 and n. 10), painfully evident in Köngäs Maranda in the Marandas (1971a:189-232), but suggestively in Scott (1969), where, however, no firm conclusions for the generic structure of the riddle are offered. When the Marandas (1971b:16-94) deal with genres, they do so in a manner similar to Lévi-Strauss and Greimas. They presuppose generic classes and identify logical structures, but they do not clearly--to me--speak to the question of generic structure.

/10/ The last eight sentences of this paragraph are additions to the original manuscript. When subsequent additions are not directly related to Via and only attempt to clarify points implicit in the original, I will not call attention to them.

/11/ Both diagrams 1 and 2 are slight variants of the diagrams in my original paper. In diagram 1 I have added the rubric "text" because it is in the quotation from Via. In diagram 2, "surface or text structures" have been added to conform to diagram 1, and "audience" now appears as a result of further thinking. I now see more clearly than I did a year ago that my criticism of Via entails a more radical change from a generative grammatical model (Via's) to a communications model. While this was implicit in the original paper, I have now made it explicit. I think the communications model must be the broader

framework within which any textual model must be located in order to account for the codal dimension of genre. I think, too, that the textual model should be structured on two parallel horizontal lines, the top line representing in Proppian fashion (cf. Propp, 1968:92-117) the coded version of the generic structure, and the bottom line the coded version of the surface structure. The purpose of the model is to compare generic and surface (compositional) structures, not to render a generative account of how the latter derived from the former. (Of what use is it to know or speculate on generativity if we are trying to comprehend genres and texts?)

Because of the importance of the communications model, I submit a reporoduction of Jakobson's diagram, together with a brief list of those who have commented on it. (Unfortunately, I do not have a comprehensive list.) Jakobson's diagram and comments may be found in Sebeok (1960:353ff.). It is a model of the *factors* involved in all verbal communication; the diagram below conflates the model of factors with a corresponding model of their *functions* (Sebeok, 1960:357).

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                    CONTEXT
                    REFERENTIAL

ADDRESSER/EMOTIVE   MESSAGE/POETIC   ADDRESSEE/CONATIVE
                ........................
                    CONTACT/PHATIC

                    CODE
                    METALINGUAL
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Besides Jakobson's explanation of the model, see the earliest comments on it by Wellek (Sebeok, 1960: 414ff.). Further: Riffaterre, in Ehrmann; Güttgemanns (1971:33ff.); and Richards. The textual model suggested above would deal principally with Jakobson's MESSAGE and CODE, but the wider range of issues the biblical critic is concerned with are also represented in the total model. Suffice it to say that the possibilities of the model can only be seen by reading Jakobson and those who have commented on it.

/12/ See above, §2.21, and below, §§2.54 and 3.33-3.51

/13/ The notion of items and syntax are obviously derived from linguistics, but they have also been taken over by anthropologists. Within linguistics, however, the notions have been dealt with in two different but related ways. The first, which is identified with structural linguistics proper, is in terms of items and their sequential (i.e., syntagmatic) *arrangement*. The other is identified with TG grammar, which focuses on items and (transformational) *process*. For a discussion of the linguistics context, see Hockett, 1968, in which 9-37 are especially important for the modern history of linguistics

and the kinds of problems which found their answers in the arrangement and process models. For a discussion of analogous developments in anthropology, see Van Baal, chapter 9, which also contains a convenient presentation of Lévi-Strauss' views. Durbin discussed the broader range of linguistic models in anthropology. Since anthropology has become relevant for the "social description of early Christianity," Van Baal and Durbin are most useful.

/14/ It should be remembered that "surface structure" is not identical with the text itself, and that it may have several levels, e.g., generic traits, plot structure, sequential arrangement of units, style. Structure is, as Via indicates, something within and around which we see a text to be shaped. Further, and consistent with the historian's use of the communications model, *we* do not perceive the ancient text aesthetically, or as a message to *us*, but analytically. Because we are not members of the community in and for which our texts were produced, we have to reconstruct analytically their total communications context and code and thereby come to an understanding of the message-as-delivered. If this is the historian's task, the task of the theologian or preacher is, through his own hermeneutical techniques, to make the old message a new one. This, I take it, is the purpose of Güttgemann's "linguistic theology"; it is also the purpose of Amos Wilder in his forthcoming essay in *Semeia* 2, 1974, wherein he also refers to Ricoeur's similar concern.

/15/ Cf. Van Baal (chapter 9), on the two meanings of structure, Pavel, on Chomskian structure and narrative grammar, and Lévi-Strauss' review of Propp (1960).

/16/ On structuralist literary criticism, see, e.g., Blumensath, Friedrich, and Scholes. See further sections §2.4 and §3.61-3.63 of my paper.

/17/ On the confusion of terminology, see Ben Amos. For examples in the study of riddles see, e.g., Georges and Dundes (1963), Abrahams and Dundes, Scott, Harries, and Hamnet. Apart from illustrating the confusion resulting from a failure to distinguish between type and genre, these essays also show how difficult it is to relate morphological description to meaning, a significant and vexing problem for linguists and folklorists. Lévi-Strauss and Greimas have solved the problem by seeing the morphological structure of a text as the transformed product of prior semantic structure, as have the Marandas. But, as I have suggested, their failure to deal with genres as media leaves something to be desired--an understanding of the media by which people shaped their utterances. Logic and grammar simply do not account for the media.

/18/ For example, the parables of Borges and Kafka stand in the cultural tradition of Jesus' parables and therefore may have a cultural relationship which obscures

the distinction between type and genre. Thus, that Africans and American Indians employ the same type of utterance (e.g., riddle or fairy tale) raises different issues than those raised by the parables of Jesus, Kafka, and Borges (cf. Funk, and Doty, 1973).

/19/ Since Via (and Crossan, to whom he is responding) refers to the genre of "parable," and wishes to distinguish between "parable" and "example story," it is well to recall Jeremias' devastating evidence against seeing the words for "parable" as genre-names (20). He has shown that the words refer to a variety of kinds of utterance, each of which belongs to a different "genre." As a category of classification, therefore, the notion of "parable" is on a level with such other notions as "irony," "the comic," "the tragic," etc. Thus the proper course for us would seem to be, first to determine what genres are comprehended by the words for "parable," second to do a generic study of them, third to look for analogous genres in other cultures, fourth to determine if there are types corresponding to these genres, and fifth to ask what ancients saw in all of these genres that would allow them to use words for "parable" to describe them all. In fairness to Via (and Crossan), however, it should be noted that by viewing "parable" in the narrow sense, to define one genre among many comprehended by the word "parable," he is working in the area of my first two courses. On the other hand, it is also fair to say that the other courses suggest that Via and I have different programs in mind. The question is, are the two programs equally legitimate and viable?

/20/ It is important to observe that Lévi-Strauss (1960, but with knowledge of Propp from Jakobson since 1940; cf. 123) and Greimas (1965), and virtually everyone else except those following strictly linguistic models, began their narrative-critical efforts with reviews of Propp. My saying that Propp is *the* prototype of narrative criticism is therefore far from being an exaggeration. Propp is inescapable. From my own experience, moreover, I must also say that the only way to comprehend Propp and his potential significance for biblical studies is to read him *and* to test his theories against the tales with which he worked. Only in this way can the enormity of his contribution be appreciated. Only in this way, too, can one judge the value and validity of what others have found in him, or taken out of him.

/21/ See further note 13, above. One of the confusing features of current discussion in narrative criticism is the notion of transformation. As I have suggested in note 6, in TG linguistics and in Greimas the notion accounts for the process by which one structure (paradigmatic) becomes another (syntagmatic). In TG grammar, the generation of a sentence is said to result from the application of transformational rules to a deep structure.

In Greimas (1965), the transformation is from a logically paradigmatic structure to a sequential (syntagmatic) text structure. What is confusing is that Propp also used the notion of transformation to account for *the variations of a syntagmatic generic structure which appear in specific fairy tales* (texts; Propp, 1968, and especially Propp, 1972). But what is confusing is not Propp; it is rather that he has been viewed in the light of other notions, notions derived from linguistics on the one hand, and from logic on the other (on some confusion between logic and linguistics, see Stenius). For Propp, transformations are typical variations of syntagmatic items, i.e., variations of amplification, deformation, inversion, intensification and weakening, internal substitution, realistic substitution, and confessional substitution (Propp, 1972). Moreover, rather than viewing these transformational types as logical or grammatical, Propp sees them as the results of historical and social factors in the lives of tales and in the history of the genre. Strikingly, Propp does not use the word transformation when he deals with a matter which is much closer to its meaning in TG grammar, namely in connection with the several ways in which complex tales can be composed--concatenation, interruption by an episodic "move," multiple interruptions leading to narrative anacolouthon, two tales in one, with a variety of possibilities (two beginnings, one ending, etc.) (cf. Propp, 1968:92-96). In this light, one can only say that the re-interpretations of Propp have not only moved from syntagmatics to paradigmatics, they have also moved from genre to something else--in some cases to universal types, in others to logical or grammatical description.

/22/ This is perhaps an appropriate point for a caveat against limiting the title "structural" to recent Franco-German structuralists. Since any study dealing with structure, of whatever kind, needs to be called structural, the title should not be limited to those dealing with the structures Lévi-Strauss, Greimas, and Güttgemanns talk about. It would be better to recognize their own claims to be doing semiotics or semiology and call them semiologists or semioticians, and to use the words "structural" and "structuralist" in the broader sense. Unfortunately, Lévi-Strauss (1960) has had the effect of making the word "structuralist" refer only to the kind of thing he and his colleagues do. Thus "structuralist" has come to mean "orthodox." Such nonsense should be stopped before we waste any more time on labels which will identify accurately the kinds of things we are studying. As many have said, structuralism refers to a focus on structures, not to an ideology about them.

/23/ The movement from form-criticism to tradition-(not form-) history was, of course, a function of the historiographical concern of form-critics. While the movement may be termed a relapse from the perspective of structural analysis, it should be remembered that biblical

studies, less than some other disciplines, never lost sight of the fact that systems exist in time, and that they do change (cf. Jameson, 1972, for a criticism of the structuralist's distinction between diachrony and synchrony). On the other hand, to dispatch structural analysis by saying that it is ahistorical is simply too facile, and reflects too naive a view of the history of research. Structural analysis came on the scene as a response to rampant evolutionism and historicism. I expect that the pendulum will swing back and that some sort of dialectical balance between synchrony (system) and diachrony (history) will be found. For myself, at least, I think it both appropriate and necessary for biblical students, or some of them, temporarily to suspend historical concerns until the morphology of our evidence has been clarified. Once the "objects" of our inquiry have been clarified, we will have to return to the question of their history--the history in which they functioned and the history which they had.

/24/ See the literature on riddles in note 17, and consider also the phenomena of chiasm and parallelism.

/25/ Cf. Jakobson's linguistic hierarchy cited in note 3, and the following from Halliday: "structure is the ordered arrangement of one or more items of the same rank to form an item of the rank above..." (192).

/26/ For conscience's sake, I should note that the linguistic nature of genres may be disputed. However, I stand by the position taken in note 3. I am impressed not only by the analogy between sentence structure and supra-sentential structures, but also by the fact that the latter are signalled by the former and only perceived through them.

/27/ Perrin marks a transitional point when he says: "Standing in the shadow of Dibelius and Bultmann the tendency is to assume tradition unless the opposite can be proven, and in reaction against that the tendency might become to see Markan composition unless the opposite can be proven" (19). Perrin is standing on the point where he will have to decide to go one way or the other. In the study cited, he is still in the shadow of Dibelius and Bultmann, but leaning out of it about as far as he can go without taking the next step. Thus the structural analysis of which he speaks (e.g., 1, 5, 7ff.) still finds the segmentation of Mark's narrative based on source distinctions, and the "syntax" by which the segmented "items" are arranged does not go beyond the mere segmentation. In the last analysis, if the step out of the shadow is taken sources and redaction will become irrelevant; sources are merely other objects of inquiry than the whole in which they are found. Thus if we begin with the whole of Mark's narrative and seek its own principles of narrative

segmentation and arrangement we may come up with some new results. I have attempted to do this in terms of plot analysis in a working paper for the SBL "task group on Gospel as genre" (Petersen, 1972), and am working on a monograph on segmentation and arrangement in Mark 1:14-10:52. Another monograph in the narrative structure of Luke-Acts was completed in 1969, but will require further revision in the light of subsequent publications in structural analysis and narrative criticism. I mention these only to suggest the basis for my own confidence in what might be expected when we move out of the shadow.

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CRITICAL NOTE

Dan O. Via, Jr., "Parable and Example Story: A Literary-Structuralist Approach." (Via, 1974)

John Dominic Crossan, "Parable and Example in the Teaching of Jesus." (Crossan, 1974a)

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1. My chief criticism of Via is that the structural categories he brings to the parables are not all equally suited to the material to which they are applied. Unless one takes a flat position on the question of universals, particularly with respect to sets of binary opposites, structural categories ought to be based on, or amenable to, empirical data. Even Lévi-Strauss concedes as much. A forthcoming study will indicate what the results might be when a structural analysis is developed out of the parables themselves (*Semeia* 2, 1974). The study is of course preliminary and incomplete.

2. Via struggles to fit all the parables into one of two categories: tragic/comic (rising/falling action). I am in agreement with the effort and believe he succeeds with one group of parables (Unjust Steward, Unmerciful Servant, and possibly the Wicked Tenants), exhibiting a common structure: R, the major respondent, develops two responses, one to D (the Determiner), the other to r (a secondary figure), which form the nucleus of the parable. For a larger group of parables, however, Via is forced to ignore the clearly marked double movement in order to discover a single directionality. He must therefore hammer and trim the text of parables like the Laborers in the Vineyard (1967:151, 152) and the Great Supper (1971:177f.)

until they fit. Parables with the structure R1 - D - R2 (two major and differing responses to the Determiner) have both comic and tragic movements. To be sure, one or the other may be more pronounced in the narrative, but both are present. Parables in the second group include, in addition to the two mentioned, Talents, Ten Maidens, Good Samaritan, Prodigal. The structural difference between these two groups is developed more fully in "Structure in the Narrative Parables of Jesus," *Semeia* 2, 1974.


3. Via's insistence on the unifying effect of one chief character (1971:180, 182) goes together with his effort to classify the parables as exclusively either tragic or comic. It probably also goes together with a kind of anthropocentrism that dominates Western literature. In any case, there are other means of unifying a narrative, among which thematic unity is one.

Aesthetically speaking, Via's remark (1974: §3.23) that the Good Samaritan lacks organic unity is to blink the obvious narrative power of the story and is to use the term unity in so restricted a sense as to diminish its usefulness. The Good Samaritan may not be a parable for other reasons, but it is narrative, and rather good narrative at that. There should be some way to account for its excellent qualities as narrative, among which unity in some form is certainly one.

4. I have trouble with Via's texteme analysis (1974:§2.123). The sixteen textemes, consisting of eight binary oppositions, prompt a number of observations.


The first binary opposition, tragic/comic plot, appears to coincide with the third: subject receives object/subject does not receive object. Is there ever a tragic plot in which the subject receives the object, or a comic plot in which the subject does not receive the object? If not, Via has made a distinction without a difference and skewed the subsequent quantification of Jesus' narrative competence.

In his paradigmatic analysis (1974:fig. 1), however, we note that in a comic plot in both the Great Supper and the Good Samaritan the subject does not receive the object. The reason for this, we are told, is that the subject does not intend to possess the object, but rather to communicate it (1974:§§3.22, 3.23). That means that binary opposition (3) (subject receives object/subject does not receive object) is actually subordinate to one branch of binary opposition (4) (subject desires to possess object/subject desires to communicate object), thus:



To order (3) and (4) on the same level involves a logical contradiction in the scheme.

We have already observed that the binary pair, tragic/comic, are not suited to all narrative parables (§2); furthermore, there are more than two episode patterns (Funk 1974). These observations affect binary oppositions (1) and (2). Further, in §3 a question was raised about the pair, subject unifies the action/subject is only part of the action. There is also a logical flaw in ordering (7) and (8) on the same level; as in the case of (3) and (4), (8) is actually subordinate to the first branch of (7):



These observations considerably reduce the force of Via's paradigmatic analysis. I cannot agree that the textemes he has chosen are the most important or that they represent the narrative competence reflected in the

parables accurately.

5. Another of Via's binary oppositions contrasts causal and chronolgoical causality (1974:2.123). He remarks that "all of the narrative parables manifest sequential causality at some point, but it does not appear at all in the Good Samaritan" (1974:3.23). I agree that there is no sequential causality in the Good Samaritan, but I find none in the Great Supper either (contra Via, 1974:3.22), unless one regards the final statement of the host as authentic: the hall must be filled with street people *so that* none of the uninvited may get in.

Sequential causality, on the other hand, is fully explicit in the Prodigal, the Unjust Steward, and the Unmerciful Servant. The Laborers and the Talents occupy middle ground: sequential causality of sorts is found only in the so-called recognition scene; elsewhere connectives are purely temporal.

There are thus three levels of sequential causality, which I believe are connected with a quality of narrative I would call explicitness.

Via also refers to psychological causality in the Good Samaritan (1974:3.23): the Samaritan had compassion, therefore. . . . The note struck in the Good Samaritan appears to correspond to a similar emotive note (compassion, anger, praise, etc.) struck in the third section (crisis and denouement) of seven of the narrative parables.

The preceding remarks imply that the opposition causal-chronological may not be adequate to the narrative parables on any level, and that psychological causality may not be appropriate to the parables at all. It may be appropriate to recall Bultmann's dictum (1968:190), derived from the analysis of folktales, that the events of parabolic narrative are completely unmotivated, by which he means that the narrative never stipulates why characters act as they do. Obviously this claim requires some

correction, as indicated above, but it may be nearer the truth than Via's claim that all narrative parables are characterized by sequential causality. The task before us is to map the extent and types of sequence markers in the narrative parables before drawing generic conclusions.

6. Structuralism has precipitated a rash of abstract analytic schemes which take too little account of the surface (linguistic) features of the parables. On this score, discourse analysis as developed by linguists like Sydney Lamb, H. A. Gleason, Jr., Eugene Nida, Kenneth Pike, is a needed corrective. Discourse or narrative analysis endeavors to investigate the following kinds of phenomena:

A well-formed text exhibits a cohesiveness that is not characteristic of a body of randomly selected sentences. How may this cohesiveness be accounted for linguistically (in addition to semantically)? Put differently, what is the "grammar" of the paragraph, the story, the description, or other types of discourse?

A narrative is characterized by a set of sequence markers linking sentences, paragraphs, etc. Of what types are they and how do they function?

How are the participants in a story identified? Does the means of identification tell us anything about rôle in the narrative? Can one distinguish figures in the foreground from background participants linguistically?

A narrative consists of a series of events to which participants are related. Into what units is the narrative line cut? How are participants related to the events and to each other linguistically?

"A narrative is a device to make the audience in some way observers" (Gleason, 1968:41). How, then, does the narrative invite the observer to view the events?

It is evident that discourse analysis impinges upon literary criticism and structuralism at many points

in pressing questions like those listed above. Attention to linguistic features of narrative will further enrich the techniques of the biblical scholar.

7. The work of Via and Crossan overlooks one characteristic of the parable hitherto widely recognized, viz. that the parable precipitates the hearer's judgment. The parable therefore belongs to that class of literature, including the riddle and fable, which has a discourse or dialogue context as such. This may be the reason parables may be opened or closed, for example, by a question directly addressed to the audience. And it appears that such questions on occasion may belong to the basic narrative line of the parable, i.e. fulfill an essential function in the story.

This feature of the parable is a subspecies of one characteristic of narrative generally: narrative is a device which invites hearers or readers to witness a series of events in a certain way, from a certain perspective (§6; cf. Todorov:74). The listener as witness is not entirely passive, however. The narrative, like the painting or sculpture, calls for an act of answering imagination. In the case of the parable or riddle, the story locates the domain more or less precisely in which audience response is required. And the carefully constructed parable will evoke response even against the hearer's will.

The question is thus not one exclusively or simply of the autonomy of the narrative in the Good Samaritan (Via, 1974:3.1), but the way in which the narrative triggers the answering imagination. And this question requires an answer apart from whether the question of neighbor posed at the end of the parable is integral to the story or not.

One way in which the narrative parables precipitate the hearer's judgment is to set up contrasting responses which prompt the listener to take sides in the story. The temptation to take sides is particularly strong

because the parables first reinforce the everyday view of reality by exaggerating or caricaturing it, and then offering some form of comic criticism that appeals to an element latent in the audience. The parable thus tends to polarize the hearers along the lines suggested by the contrasting responses of R1 and R2 (cf. §2).

The lines along which polarization takes place must be signaled by an unambiguous code in the narrative; like highway markers along the interstate, they must be legible at a glance. So we have pairs like Levite, priest/Samaritan, laborers hired first/last, invited/uninvited, etc. The narrative development of the polarization, however, may remain relatively non-explicit, or it may be drawn out explicitly. The Prodigal is an example of a fully explicit parable in this sense: the response of both sons is fully elaborated in turn. In the Great Supper, by contrast, the response of the invited is confined to excuses; they are not permitted a recognition scene, and the uninvited are given only a passive role. The difference in explicitness is correlative with the degree of answering imagination required: in the Prodigal the listeners have the options spelled out for them; they have only to wait and choose, as it were. In the Great Supper, the real choice is not spelled out; indeed, the parable is over before the hearer senses that a choice has been made. How the listener works out his relationship to the options posed by the parable is left mostly to his private imagination.

The Unmerciful Servant is like the Prodigal in being fully explicit; the Good Samaritan is like the Great Supper in being non-explicit. And these characteristics tend to be correlated with other features, such as sequential causality (§5). Via's analysis takes it as axiomatic that the narrative parable is by definition a fully explicit narrative. He finds the "gappiness" of the Great Supper problematic for that reason (1971:179f.): he is not prepared to concede that the deep structures of a narrative

need not come to expression each time it is particularized.

The order in which the responses occur in the narrative also contributes to explicitness or non-explicitness. In the Prodigal and the Unmerciful Servant, the act of grace (and its reception) precedes the tragic action: the hearer has the advantage of knowing what is being offered before being given the opportunity to reject. In the Great Supper and the Good Samaritan, on the other hand, the respondent who does what is "expected" (Funk, 1974) rejects what may be taken as an unclear offer or opportunity; he prefers to wait and see what happens. The narrative then closes off further possibilities for him, without giving him the chance to reconsider. Only when the second response is in does it become clear that he miscalculated in the first place. This type of narrative is relatively non-explicit in inviting the hearer to take sides along the way.

I am inclined to regard the non-explicit narrative as a more powerful form of the parable. The non-explicit parable gives its root metaphor the greatest latitude for interpretive claim, and the hearer is taken in more completely, surprisingly, unguardedly, by the inexplicit. The explicit parable limits the range of its claim by carrying more of its interpretive horizon along in the narrative. I am therefore forced to disagree with Via's assessment of the Great Supper as "less close to preconceptual, poetic language" (1971:183).

8. It is not possible to take up the problem of metaphor, posed by both Crossan (1974a) and Via (1974). I agree with Crossan that the parable of the Good Samaritan has nothing to do with the question of neighbor. Via's inclination to hang on to the category of "example story," goes together with a certain proclivity for reading the parables allegorically, albeit in a very subdued form. On the other hand, Via is correct is charging Crossan with metaphor neglect (1974:3.4 with reference to Crossan,

1974a:304) when he wants to interpret the parables in the light of Jesus' non-parabolic discourse. If Crossan has not withdrawn that point (1974c:3.0), I hope he has forgiven me for not reading the Great Supper non-metaphorically (1974:305, n. 2). For my own part, I continue to adhere to the view that the genuine parables are to be read metaphorically, but not literally metaphorically.

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STRUCTURALIST ANALYSIS AND THE PARABLES OF JESUS

A Reply to D. O. Via, Jr., "Parable and Example Story: A Literary-Structuralist Approach," *Semeia* 1 (1974)

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ABSTRACT

The Good Samaritan as *story* is limited to Luke 10: 30-35. This was not originally an example but a parable. Were it an example the Samaritan should be in the ditch and the helper a Jew. From Greimas' schema the story can be analyzed as a duel of Subjects (Samaritan v. Priest/Levite), but it challenges the hearer's expectation that these latter would help their fellow Jew while the former would certainly not do so. As such it attacks world rather than exemplies action. Good + Samaritan summarizes neither tragic nor comic action but is a contradiction in terms for the hearers. So also with many other of Jesus' stories. Parables became examples and commentators must explain the strange "mercy" of the Unmerciful Servant's master or the strange "goodness" of the Vineyard Workers' employer.

0. Prolegomena on Methodology.

0.1 My primary interest in parables is in those of the historical Jesus. I am not, however, particularly interested in quests, either old or new, possibly because I tend to prefer the Celtic twilight to the Arthurian sunlight. I am concerned with the Persona of Jesus and not with his personality, with the authorial self and not with the autobiographical self, even if such were available. The term "historical Jesus" is accepted here as is the phrase "the other Borges" in that essay in which the personal Borges discussed the authorial Borges and conc-concludes, necessarily, with "Which of us is writing this

page I don't know" (see"Borges and myself," 1970a:98-99, 1970b:51, 1967:200-201, 1962:240-241). Or, if one prefers, my interest is simply in a dirrerent parabolic synchrony than that of their final evangelical situation.

0.2 I take it for granted that one cannot make any statements about the historical Jesus without distinguishing this synchrony very carefully from that of the synoptic tradition /1/. I have used the standard traditiocritical method in establishing the linguistic level of the historical Jesus. I am also taking it for granted that no structuralist analysis of the parabolic system of Jesus is possible before or without the establishment of the exact content of that original system.

> It is perfectly clear, that in any analysis that aims at a transition from texts to the underlying system--no matter, whether it is to be some kind of decipherment or decodation--our making sure that the text under consideration is homogeneous, free from whatever heterogeneous insertions, is a necessary preliminary stage.
>
> (Wierzbicka:627)


This may well be done by other methods than the traditiocritical one, but, at least, no conclusions should be offered about the historical Jesus without a declaration of methodology concerning how one distinguishes his synchrony from that of the synoptic tradition, and then its consequent application.

1. The Good Samaritan: Parable or Example?

1.1 I accept completely Via's distinction of "discourse" and "story" (Via, §2.11). He concludes: "Since Crossan chose not to include the discourse in [Luke] 10:25b-29, structural logic forbids his including the discourse in 10:36, which belongs to 10:25b-29; 10:36-39" (Via, §3.1). I agree: *structural* logic forbids it, but not *traditiocritical* logic, and I was using the former (but see also Crossan, §2.2 below). However, for the present argument, I now accept Luke 10:30-35 as a "discrete enclave of *story*" (Via, §3.1) and will ignore 10:36

hereafter. Indeed, I shall usually ignore 10:30a as well. My countercriticism is that the "interpretation and generic classification of the unit" (Via, §3.1) comes even more forcibly from the internal closure of the *story* in 10:30b-35 than it did from the contrast of 10:30-35 (*story*) with 10:36 (*discourse*) in my earlier article.

1.2 In discussing this *story* in Luke 10:30-35 Via uses the *actantiel* model suggested by A.-J. Greimas /2/. It is as follows, with Via's terms in parentheses:



I accept this *actantiel* grid for purposes of the present discussion but in full awareness that, (i) it was originally designed for mythical narratives /3/ and with a very special eye to the Russian fairy-story investigated by V. Propp /4/, and (ii) its usage elsewhere will need great delicacy and sensitivity (so R. Barthes, 1971:36). This is especially true if parables and myths have diametrically opposed purposes.

> In addition to the obvious function of entertainment or amusement, folklore serves to sanction the established beliefs, attitudes, and institutions, both sacred and secular, and it plays a vital role in education in nonliterate societies.
>
> There is no difficulty, of course, in finding instances in folklore where laziness, complacency, or the lack of ambition and initiative are condemned, but are there any which suggest that the individual destroy or even disregard the institutions and conventions of his society.
>
> (Bascom:33, 297)

> So, despite all variations of theology, this aspect of myth is a constant. In every myth system we will find a persistent sequence of binary discriminations...followed by a "mediation" of the paired categories thus distinguished.
>
> (E. Leach:11)

> Myths are the agents of stabililty, fictions the agents for change. Myths call for absolute, fictions for conditional assent.
>
> (Kermode:39)


1.3 There is only one point in Via's preparatory methodological exposition where I have a problem. This may be of no practical importance and, if it is not, can be dropped immediately. Via says that in *actantiel* analysis a "story may have any number of characters but no more than six actants, *though it may have fewer*" (Via, §2.122; my italics). If I understand Greimas correctly, he would maintain that there cannot be fewer than six actants and that when two actants are absorbed into the same character it may be of some importance for generic or sub-generic classification /5/. Propp (1968:82-83) had also commented on one case where one actor must fulfill two *actantiel* functions:

> One should also make mention of the fact that the hero [Subject] often gets along without any helpers [Helper]. He is his own helper, as it were. But if we had the opportunity to study attributes, it would be possible to show that in these instances the hero takes on not only the functions of the helper, but his attributes as well. One of the most important attributes of a helper is his prophetic wisdom....When a helper is absent from a tale, this quality is transferred to the hero. The result is the appearance of the prophetic hero.

It will, therefore, be of some significance how one distributes the data of the text along the *actantiel* schema.

This also indicates the special attention which must be paid to the Helper and Opponant actants. In effect, their mythical origins indicate that they are the residual representations of the supernatural forces of good and evil /6/. It would therefore seem necessary to insist that the Helper and Opponent must be capable of valid efficient causality to help or to hinder the Subject. For example, the magic sword given by the good magician is Helper, and the magic poison of the evil ogre is Opponent. But the ordinary sword the hero carries and the ordinary gate the hero must open and pass through can hardly be signified as Helper and Opponent. They are but the instruments of the Subject.

1.4 Via has distributed the Good Samaritan *story* in 10:30-35 across the *actantiel* grid as follows:



I have three major criticisms against this distribution. These concern Receiver (traveller), Helper (oil, etc.), and Opponent (priest and levite).

1.41 Receiver. This actant is described by Via as the "traveller" even though the Ordainer/Subject is identified as "Samaritan." The former is described in general terms relative to his purpose, but the latter is defined in precise terms according to his socio-religious allegiance. But in the text of Luke 10:30 the Receiver is identified as, ἄνθρωπός τις κατέβαινεν ἀπὸ Ἰερουσαλὴμ εἰς Ἰεριχώ; and in 10:33 the Ordainer/Subject is introduced as Σαμαρίτης δέ τις. This identifies the "traveller" with three spatial specifics: Jerusalem, down (especially, but not exclusively [Luke 2:59] appropriate for Jericho), and Jericho. Is Via correct is ignoring this phrase and simply calling the Receiver a "traveller"? Or, as François Bovon suggests /7/, "on se demande chaque fois: que se passerait-il si cette notation n'était pas dans le texte?" In a structuralist typology of narrative point of view L. Doležel (541-552) distinguished between "texts with speaker (S-text) and texts without speaker ($\bar{S}$-text)" and also between "two kinds of speaker, two sources of verbal activity in the narrative structure: narrator and characters." This gives the following table:

3rd person	Narration in the Narrator	Character
passive	Objective	(not realized)
active	Rhetorical	Subjective

It is clear that the *story* in Luke 10:30b-35 is Objective rather than Rhetorical: there is no editorial comment from

the narrator (for example, condemning the robbers or praising the Samaritan), and there is Subjective character dialogue in 10:35. But for our present purpose the following comment is important (545): "S-texts are incorporated into the time-space system of the speaker, whereas S̄-texts are lacking such orientation...the temporal and spatial position of the speaker is, of course, the centre of the time-space system in S-texts."

It is at this point that the crucial function of 10:30b becomes clear. It intends to identify the traveller *precisely as a Jew* but it does so necessarily in an indirect and oblique way which is an indication of the time-space situation of the narrator and his audience. The narrator, one would infer, must be *a Jew speaking to Jews* and probably in a Jerusalem situation. It is one of those cases where, as Wayne Booth (301) put it, "the reader is called on to infer the author's position through the semi-transparent screen erected by the narrator."

> Analogies. (i) What does the opening, "A traveller and a Negro met on a train," tell one about the narrator: (ii) In a film about a fight between a U.S. destroyer and a German submarine does the narrator's position show differently if it is entitled, "The Enemies" (neutral?), or, "The Enemy Above" (pro-German) or, as it actually was, "The Enemy Below" (pro-U.S.)? And, by the way, does my sequence of "a U.S. destroyer and a German submarine in that order say anything about my position?

In summary. The narrator identifies the Subject/Ordainer explicitly, directly, and onomastically as a Samaritan but he identifies the Receiver implicitly, indirectly, and topographically as a Jew. The difference is due to the narrator's position and that of his audience: a Jew talking to Jews, and most likely in a Jerusalem setting (be it historical or fictional). This is argued from the intrinsic data of the *story* itself and it reflects outward to its situation and not from prior knowledge of that situation itself.

1.42 Helper. The Helper actant is *not* represented


by the oil, wine, innkeeper, as argued by Via, §3.1. These are simply instruments of the Subject's action. They exert no necessary causality and cannot be construed as Helper in the strict sense in which *actantiel* analysis must use this term. Neither can the robbers be considered as Helper. They are part of what Propp (1968:24-25, 119-120) calls the "initial situation" which he described as follows: "Although this situation is not a function, it nevertheless is an important morphological element." But the story could just as easily have begun with the man falling into a roadside ravine and lying there half-dead.

The Helper is the Samaritan himself, and therefore special emphasis is placed on the "extraordinary" (Propp: "prophetic") nature of this personage who must be Subject, Ordainer, and Helper in the story.

1.43 Opponent. The Opponent is *not* the priest and levite as suggested by Via. They have departed the stage before the Samaritan is even introduced. Their real *actantiel* position will have to be studied below but the clue is already present in Via's own statement, "If the priest and levite are not in the strictest sense the Samaritan's opponents, they are, nevertheless, his opposites" (Via, §3.1). We shall return to these "opposites" later.

The *actantiel* opponent is, quite simply prejudice or socio-religious exclusivism. It is this which can oppose with real causality the Samaritan's decision to assist the Jew in distress. It is clear, of course, that an actant need not be a person (Via, §2.122).

1.5 How, then, should the *actantiel* schema be applied to 10:30b-35? I would suggest the following model:



It is immediately clear that the *actantiel* grid has become complicated by the presence of a S'/S" Subject which creates in effect a double schema. Roland Barthes (1966: 17) had already noted this problem in distributing the many personages of a narration along this grid:

> le modèle actantiel proposé par Greimas...semble bien résister à l'épreuve d'un grand nombre de récits: comme tout modèle structural, il vaut moins par sa forme canonique (une matrice de six actants) que par les transformations réglées (carences, confusions, duplications, substitutions), auxquelles il se prête, laissant ainsi espérer une typologie actantielle des récits.

In other words, there is here a balance between a negative (S'-O) and a positive (S"-O) reaction along the main axis. Priest, Levite, and Samaritan are noted in accordance with the "Law of Three" (Olrik:129-141). But it is clear that the Priest-Levite form one group in the similarity of their response: ἱερεύς ... ἰδών ... ἀντιπαρῆλθεν and Λεΰιτης ... ἰδὼν ἀντιπαρῆλθεν (10:31-32).

1.51 On S'. In 10:30 the *Jewish* traveller was specified as such indirectly by three topographical indices: Jerusalem, down, Jericho. We now have three further specifications, but of a socio-religious nature: Priest, Levite, Samaritan. These six rubrics are extremely important because, (i) they represent an intrusion from historical reality into what one assumes to be a fictional narration, and (ii) with regard to Jesus' parabolic system, such an extensive intrusion of "reality" never occurs again /8/. Why specify the first two as Priest/Levite? Any two persons would serve as negative foil and still preserve the folkloric threesome. But *any* two would spoil the integrity of the story by giving the hearer/reader no reason why the first two would have passed by. In other words, it loads the dice for the Samaritan. By identifying the first two with the ritual worship of the Temple and with implicit problems of ritual purity, a valid reason is offered why they would have passed by and indeed why they would have "passed by *on the other side*"

(ἀντιπαρῆλθεν), keeping as far away as possible from the possible contagion of a seeming corpse (ἡμιθανῆ in 10:30). In other words, the story maintains maximum plausibility by specifying the first two as Priest and Levite and obliquely appealing to the hearer's intelligence with the phrase "on the other side."

1.52 On S". It was already seen, from *within* the story itself in 10:30b, that the story is told from the viewpoint of a Jew talking to (Jerusalem?) Jews. This is now confirmed by a second feature, also within the story. As I have already noted the Greek text gave only 46 words to all that precedes the Samaritan's arrival on the scene (10:30b-32) but devotes 60 words to his reaction (10:33-35). Obviously, there is a reason for so much care and detail lavished on every detail of the Samaritan's action. Somebody is being persuaded, indeed smothered in persuasion. From the *story* alone one could deduce that a Jewish narrator is telling this story to a Jewish audience and one would guess from internal evidence alone that "Jews have no dealings with Samaritans" (John 4:9).

1.6 In summary, then, my counter-criticism to Via's analysis of the Good Samaritan (i) accepts Luke 10:30b-35 as a "discrete enclave of *story*" but (ii) insists that it is a parable and not an example, a metaphor-story of the Kingdom's advent as a world-shattering event, from the *story* alone.

1.61 It seems necessary to insist on this point a little. Take four possible stories:

	Story 1	*Story 2*	*Story 3*	*Story 4*
Person A	traveller	Jew	Samaritan	Jew
Person B	a person	Priest	Priest	Priest
Person C	another	Levite	Levite	Levite
Person D	a third	Jew	Jew	Samaritan

One might paraphrase the first three stories as follows: (1) that's life, at the least, and, help your neighbor, at the most; (2) help your neighbor, along with some easy anti-clericalism; (3) help your neighbor, anti-clericalism,

and even if your neighbor happens to be an enemy: love your enemies! Story 3 is already radical enough, but Story 4 can only be described as deliberately provocative. One cannot simply equate Story 3 and Story 4 (=Jesus' parable). What Via terms "the responsibilities of neighborliness" (§3.3) would have been amply shown in Story 3. For this point Story 4 would probably be counter-productive!

> Analogies. Laboratory Experiment 1. During the Vietnam War in the U.S. tell Story 4 to a militaristic audience: Person A = one of us, but put obliquely, "a man going from Saigon to Hue"; Person B = an ARVN soldier; Person C = a U.S. Green Beret; Person D = a Viet Cong guerilla. Laboratory Experiment 2. Tell Story 4 to a Catholic audience in Northern Ireland at the moment: Person A = one of us, but put obliquely, "a man with a store in the Bogside district of Derry"; Person B = a Roman Catholic nun; Person C = a Roman Catholic priest; Person D = a Protestant terrorist.

Are we really to go on telling one another seriously that Story 4 is an invitation to charity when it is quite clearly a declaration of war. Story 3 invites to supreme love, the love of an enemy. Story 4 is a calculated overturning of one's categories and a calculated challenge to world; those who are "good" act as "bad" (Priest/Levite) and those who are "bad" act as "good" (Samaritan).

1.62 I have deliberately stayed within the closure of the parable's world in this discussion. Obviously the only reason that the parable has such provocative force is because of what the terms (Jerusalem, down, Jericho, Priest, Levite, Samaritan) mean in a certain context, because of the socio-psychological semiotics inherent in these expressions (on this see van Dijk, 1971:30, and 1972:90, 100, 107). It must also be recalled that narrative *competence* must take into account "the linguistic and non-linguistic presuppositions of the utterance" as has been noted by J. Ihwe (11).

1.7 At this point I wish to make a rather long quotation from Via, §3.3:

> Actually without including Luke 10:36 in the unit for analysis, in a Jewish context the juxtaposition of Samaritan and compassion (10:33) contains enough semantic distance to make the story a metaphor. But this tension is a function of the relationship between subject, object, and recipient: a Samaritan desires to communicate compassionate healing to a Jew. To be a metaphor of the kingdom of God the semantic tension would have to be between ordainer and subject, but in *The Good Samaritan* those actants are identical. Therefore, this narrative is a metaphor which gives a new meaning to the responsibilities of neighborliness but is not a metaphor of the kingdom of God, and on this ground is not a parable.

This is much more important than whether any one parable is such or is an example. We have here a crucial prescriptive claim: (parables = ?) narrative parables = metaphors of the kingdom of God = semantic tension between Ordainer and Subject. These conclusions are based on the preceding texteme analysis of the deep structure (competence) of Jesus' parabolic narration. This present counter-criticism must now focus on the texteme analysis itself. It is from here that the debate on the Good Samaritan as parable or example really arises.

2. Textemes and Narrative Parables.

2.1 I agree with the general theory of texteme analysis as proposed by Via (§2.123).

2.2 Via did not explain how he chose the eight binary oppositions but I presume it was inductively from Jesus' parables rather than deductively from some logical theory of narrative formation (for example, see C. Bremond, 1966:60-76, 1970:585-590). In such a situation one will have to guard against creating a vicious circle by (i) reading all the parables of Jesus and not just some of them, and (ii) by establishing very carefully their content for Jesus himself rather than presupposing this was the same as for the synoptic tradition.


2.3 I wish to focus very closely on the first binary opposition because I think we have a divergence

here which inevitably causes others elsewhere, including the whole parable versus example discussion.

2.31 Via describes this opposition as follows: "(1) falling (tragic) plot movement/rising (comic) plot movement (a/b)." Thus a/b will reappear in the deep structure or competence of Jesus' narration and also in the "intermediate" structure which generates the genre "narrative parable of Jesus" (Via, §2.123). This tragic/comic opposition formed the basis for the interpretive section of his book, and is therefore very important in Via's parabolic theory (1967). The terms tragic/comic are there defined as, respectively, "a plot moving downward toward catastrophe and the isolation of the protagonist" (110), and "a plot that moves upward toward the well-being of the protagonist and his inclusion in a desirable society" (145). I would accept these definitions completely, but I want to consider if they are basic enough for a deep structure, both in general deductive theory and in specific inductive practice for the parables of Jesus.

2.32 The statement of Via (§2.123) must be recalled: "If only one member [of a binary opposition] appears, the other, its opposite, is logically implied as belonging to the reservoir of possibilities." But what if tragic/comic as such is but one member of a binary opposition?


2.33 The discussion can begin with this statement from Paul Hernadi /9/: "As archetypes of plot structure, Comedy, Romance, Tragedy, and Irony reveal four basic patterns of the human imagination." This distinction between "works which evoke a homogeneous world from works whose world is capable of changing rapidly" gives the following *double* binary opposition which creates, I presume, an entire compass of combinations (134):



← Desirable world of innocence

← Frustrated world of experience


2.33 I would like to rephrase this a little and apply it to Via's a/b texteme. This opposition of falling=tragic and rising=comic plot presumes an even more fundamental one which can be put rather crudely as follows: UP=GOOD and BAD=DOWN. For example: the terms up=good and bad=down represent a hidden schema without which one could not tell a falling=tragic from a rising=comic plot. But logically and deductively if one starts with such an up/down or good/bad binary opposition, other and more fundamental binary oppositions are engendered besides tragic/comic, for example:



The point of this analysis is not merely to be pedantic about rather obvious logical possibilities. It is introduced because I am convinced that many of Jesus' parables intend an attack on the UP/DOWN or GOOD/BAD basis of normalcy and that falling or rising plot is secondary to this first purpose. Indeed, this is why one so often finds falling (tragic) and rising (comic) plots within the same parable, for example, the Prodigal and the Dutiful Sons

in Luke 15:11-32.

2.34 In other words, I wish to introduce a very elementary and basic texteme which can probably be put in more elegant language but is basically this: up/down or good/bad categories of existence are accepted or rejected (y/z). I would diagram my counter-criticism of Via's first texteme (a/b), then, as follows:



The parables in which this texteme y/z appears are indicated by the terms in italics. They are, of course, respectively, the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:30-35), Pharisee and Publican (Luke 18:10-14), Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31), Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-32), Great Feast (Matt 22:1-10; Luke 14:16-24; Gos Thom 81:28-82:3--especially and despite the expansion from three refusals to four), Places at Table (Luke 14:8-10), and Vineyard Workers (Matt 20:1-13, with 14-15 as a Matthean addition). In all these cases we are dealing with parables in which the binary oppositions of certain positions (Clergy/Samaritan; Pharisee/Publican; Rich & healthy/Poor & afflicted) or certain actions (Prodigal Son/Dutiful Son; First-seated/Last-seated) or certain situations (Invited Guests/Uninvited Guests; First-hired/Last-hired) would be expected to beget certain results or conclusions and beget instead the exact opposite, a double and indeed a polar reversal.

2.35 In summary, then, the crucial difference between my analysis and that of Professor Via is the presence or absence of the texteme "normalcy" accepted/"normalcy" rejected (y/z) in the deep structure of Jesus' parabolic system. If this is not present my analysis will have to

be redone; if it is present Via's deep structure and "intermediate" genre of narrative parable will have to be rethought /10/.

3. The Servant Parables as Two Groups.

3.0 The preceding sections of this paper were prepared as a reply to Via §0-3.4 . [Postscript: I have already withdrawn the suggestion Via criticizes in his §3.4: see *JBL* 92 (1973) 261, note 62.] The rest of this paper will take up Via's comments on "The Servant Parables of Jesus' in his §4.-4.29 for the Parables Seminar and also the written replies of other members of the Seminar. For all of these I am extremely grateful.

3.1 Completion and Incompletion. "Aristotle's famous beginning, middle, and end" (Via, §4.221) is quite useful for the analysis of plot. But the terms beginning (-before,+after), middle (+before,+after), end (+before, -after) can seldom be taken mechanically and it is quite possible that one may claim the essence of all three and yet interpret them quite differently. Three examples will have to suffice.

3.11 The Unjust Steward. My analysis of this parable disagrees with Via's in the distribution of the narrative over these three terms:

	for Crossan	*for Via*
beginning	16:1-2	16:1-2
middle	16:3-4	16:3-7
end	16:5-7	16:8a

I would insist on the elimination of 16:8a from the original story because it is unlikely, as I argued before. I do not mean that it is psychologically unlikely in terms of external world and I agree with Via that: "It is art that gives us the world and not the world which we use to judge the credibility of art" (§4.26). I mean that the master of 16:2 is rather unlikely to be the master of 16:8a. That is, within the closed and economic world of

the parable I find 16:8a unlikely. My understanding of the parable is that a lazy steward is being fired for not getting enough return for his master (note 16:2), so he mounts a Robin Hood public relations campaign and thereby makes some positive future possibilities out of his past incompetence. I think, in other words, that the real key to the Unjust Steward is 16:2 and the steward's cleverness is in masking incompetence (from the master's point of view) as generosity (from the debtor's point of view). Of course these latter will feel pity and even responsibility for him after they learn he is fired.

We can note in passing how well Luke 16:1-7 as a "swindler" (or trickster) tale fits into the structure proposed for such stories by Heda Jason (1968). Her materials are from "Africa (Basuto), Amerindian (Kutenai), India (Ceylon), Yemen (Jewish), and Yugoslavia (songs) (1). She gives the "basic move," or higher-level organization of "functions" (in Propp's usage), as follows (7):

Role axis ⟶ (Dupe / Rascal)

Narrative-time axis ↓

Dupe	Rascal
1. (a) a situation evolves which enables Rascal to play a trick on Dupe;	
(b) Dupe reveals his foolishness so that Rascal can utilize it;	
	2. Rascal plans a trick;
	3. Rascal plays a trick;
4. Dupe reacts as Rascal wished him to do;	
5. Dupe has lost;	5. Rascal has won.

She also notes that, "function-slots 2 and 5 are sometimes missing" (16), and that, "whole tales consisting of one swindler-tale move only are rare" (17). In the light of

this analysis: (i) Luke 16:1-7 is a one move swindler tale; (ii) with function-slots 4 and 5 unused; (iii) and the other function-slots filled in standard manner: 1a=16:1; 1b=16:2, 2=16:3-4; 3=16:5-7. Once again the crucial importance of 16:2 is clear: Dupe (the master) reveals his foolishness so Rascal (the steward) can utilize it; he lets him set up his own dismissal account!

3.12 The Wicked Husbandmen. This is the least defensible part of Via's paper: his §4.27 has already been completely undermined by the earlier 3.1. One cannot have it both ways: either one maintains the "story" and "discourse" distinction consistently or one abandons it as an analytical distinction. Via admits: "It is true that [Mark] 12:9a belongs to the discourse and not to the story, but it is required by the *narrative*" (§4.27). Three objections.

(1) Compare the available texts concerning this distinction of story and discourse:

	Mark	Matthew	Luke	Gos Thom
story	12:1-8	21:33-39	20:9-15a	93:1-15
discourse	12:9	21:40-41	20:15b-16	---

In the synoptic tradition the discourse continues the story while Gos Thom 93:1-15 concludes the story and the only addition is the standard, "Whoever has ears let him hear" in 93:16, which has nothing specifically to do with this story itself. In other words, we do have in Gos Thom 93:1-15 a parable version which is pure story.

(2) I would deny quite flatly that the *narrative* demands the punishment theme as its completion. In fact, precisely the opposite is true. The possibility of such a punitive expedition renders the preceding story ludicrous and to the degree that the synoptics attempt to increase the evil of the tenants by multiplying murders (as part of the allegorizing process) they also render the postponed punishment more and more absurd. I think Luke saw this centuries ago and pruned the whole story back to more

artistic credibility.

(3) I would insist on the importance of the Thomas version and *most especially on the presence there of 93:4-9* for any further analysis of this parable. The Story is to be interpreted as a smart if very evil decision in a critical situation, like the Unjust Steward, *OR* as a terribly foolish action by the owner, like the Rich Fool. I more and more tend to prefer the latter conclusion.

3.13 The Vineyard Workers. I would reiterate my arguments for considering Matt 20:15 as a Matthean addition, and I do understand the idiomatic use of ὀφθαλμός πονηρός. I would want us to ask ourselves how long we intend to be misled by this (added) verse into talking of the *goodness* of the master's action. The very easy way to end this story and give a magnificent example of goodness and generosity over justice and exactitude would be, for example, *to give all alike three denarii* (see note 7 above). The story could easily have ended with the master giving everyone alike far more than he had promised any of them. But the present story is an example of a master who violates expectations (though not justice) and not an example of a master who practices goodness.

And, by the same token, how long do we intend to see the master in the Unmerciful Servant of Matt 18:21-34 as a model of mercy? To make him such the story should have ended, for example with the master calling in the two servants and himself paying the second servant's debt to the former before forgiving the first one this failure in generosity and dismissing them both. To take these parables as models, respectively, of goodness and mercy can only be a result of what Baudelaire called "l'hérésie de l'enseignement" on the part of the critic but such a conclusion must also serve to indict Jesus of acute incompetence as a maker of parables.

3.2 Normalcy and Abnormalcy. Terms such as these were used repeatedly in my analysis of the Servant theme

and the obvious question has been raised about their frames of reference. Normal and abnormal by whose standards or expectations? How can I term Group A the normal world which is challenged by Group B as its opposing abnormality? One can imagine two immediate possibilities. Normalcy/Abnormalcy is defined according to violations of (i) societal expectations or (ii) systemic expectations. One can ignore the possibility of "natural" expectations and include them in the first category, in honor of Heidegger's "Das 'Natürliche' ist immer geschichtlich."

3.21 Societal expectations are probably being broken by Group B. Rabbinic stories might admit that servants should not work *for* reward or even expect reward but they presumed some correlation of good servant/reward and bad servant/punishment (see especially Weiser:114-117).

This raises a very important point and connects to the earlier discussion (2 above) on tragic and comic plot movements. Aristotle, for example, had postulated that the tragic or comic movement must take place according to probability and necessity. At which point some comments of Peter Madsen (297, 298, 299) are very pertinent:

> If we maintain that "probability" is attached to the "common view," the criterion--which is part of many of the definitions--becomes a relative one. This would be particularly clear in the determination of the relation between episodic and coherent *mythos*: What is an improbable plot within one framework of norms may be probable enough within another.
>
> If it is accepted that the determination of the coherence of a *mythos* depends on the system of norms to which it is related, the analysis of *mythos* must be considered as having *two aspects*: the analyst is in search of a framework or frameworks of norms underlying the *mythos* and on this basis looks for the coherence of events put forward in it.
>
> The two basic concepts of the coherence and probability of the plot are attached to the concept of a common or general view, so that the imitative aspect points inwards towards the conscious mental life rather than outwards towards reality...the coherence of a work depends, among other things, on the context in which it is seen or placed.

In so far as a genre reflects/establishes world and context one can by story attack them both. The stories in Group B are a challenge to the world postulated by the genre of master/servant stories among Jesus' rabbinical contemporaries.

One might also suspect that Group A would be considered normal for much wider areas of master/servant stories especially if these are placed within the "basic model" from quite "disparate cultures" postulated by Heda Jason /11/. But, for now, I am more interested in the second understanding of this abnormal/normal dichotomy.

3.22 Systemic expectations are also undermined by this opposition of Group A and Group B. But why put it this way? Why say Group B undermines Group A, and not vice versa? Obviously, my article has set it up this way, but is there any legitimate reason for this way of putting it?

Group A all unite to form one parable in exactly the same sense as Propp claimed for all his Russian fairy stories. This does not mean, of course, that all the dramatis personae or all the situations fit into one story but that, "all functions fit into one consecutive story" (25) or, "all belong to a single axis" (64) /12/. This was already indicated by the table given in §4.2 of my article on the Servant Parables. This sequential homogeneity of the functions (command, departure, etc.) renders Group A a unity in a way *which is not true for or present in Group B*. This Group B is only clearly unified as opposed to Group A. What can be said of all the parables in Group B is that they *do not fit into Group A and neither do they form a single parable for themselves*. Because of this I would conclude that within the system of Jesus' Servant parables one can say: the system itself establishes Group A as normalcy and Group B as the challenge to this normalcy. Since I think both groups come from Jesus (principle of dissimilarity applied to form) it is not

sufficient to say that Group B opposes the generic expectations of his society. The dialectic of the Groups is more profound than this and must be pursued into the next section.

3.3 Synchrony and Diachrony. Why, then, would Jesus wish to create such an intra-systemic dialectic or contradiction? Once again, there are two immediate possibilities: diachronic substitution or synchronic subordination.

3.31 Diachronic substitution is a pedantic way of saying that Jesus changed his mind. The juxtaposition of the Groups would then be interpreted as indicative of successive phases in Jesus' thought and/or technique. One can certainly find interesting parallels to this proposed interpretation in mythic systems forced to undergo severe social strain. There is a fascinating parallel to my Group A/Group B contrast recorded from Javanese drama where plots of "Type 1" (proletariat-elite marriage negated) and "Type 2" (proletariate-elite marriage affirmed) are simultaneously present, in 1962-63, but whose juxtaposition represents the arrival of modernity in Java and its challenge to the older social system (Peacock:139-168). A similar tension between myths using similar functional elements but pointing in opposite directions has been noted in a comparison of two Ge-Timbira myths where the earlier one concerning the acquisition of fire is adapted to deal with the origin of the white man. And one is not surprised in comparing this myth and anti-myth that the latter "is full of contraditions as a narrative" (see Da Matta:288). But lacking any other evidence that Group A and B represent different and successive phases of Jesus' teaching, the latter negating the former, one must look elsewhere for a better explanation. This brings up the second alternative.

3.22 Synchronic subordination means that any parable of Group A and/or B could have been told at any time by

Jesus but that their systemic juxtaposition represents the subordintaion of Group A to Group B within the totality. To explain this fully would require an account of how I understand the parabolic system of Jesus as a whole. I have tried to do this, summarily and on one page, as an appendix to this paper. I find the generative matrix in the paradigmatic parables of the Treasure (expecially), the Pearl, and the Great Fish, which furnish the sub-genres of Advent, Reversal, and Action. My present point is that in the simultaneous modalities of Advent, Reversal, and Action, the second is subordinate to the first and the third to the second. This means that Jesus will tell parables of Action which invite and demand commitment to God in Kingdom (=Group A) while warning just as simultaneously, by the parables of Reversal, that any such activity is to a God whose ways are not our ways (=Group B). I find this to be Jesus' language for what Paul articulated as salvation by faith (so Group B) while being still quite able to decide what he considered to be right and wrong (so Group A). Professor Wilder, of course, touched on this with his comment: "Is there anything contradictory between Groups I and II if we keep in mind the hidden relation of law and grace, righteousness and mercy?" The answer is: no contradiction whatsoever. Bu that, as Paul failed to convince Peter at Antioch, is the whole question. And Shakespeare saw the problem long ago in noting that there are statements in the New Testament such as,"'Come, little one,'" and, "'It is as hard to come as for a camel to thread the postern of a needle's eye,'" which contradict one another and "do set the word itself against the word" (*Richard II*, V, 5).

APPENDIX

PARADIGM PARABLES: Advent + Reversal + Action

Parables of Advent	Parables of Reversal	Parables of Action		
		Type 1	Type 2	Type 3
Sower Mustard Seed Lost Coin Lost Sheep Leaven (Budding Fig Tree)	Good Samaritan Pharisee & Publican Rich Man & Lazarus Prodigal Son Great Supper Places at Table	Treasure Pearl Great Fish Friend at Midnight Unjust Judge Wheat and Darnel Reaper Way to Judgement Thief Tower Builder Campaign Planner Barren Fig Tree Sword	Rich Fool Wedding Garment Jar	Bridesmaids

The Servant Parables

(Group B)	*(Group A)*		
Unmerciful Servant Evil Tenants Unjust Steward Vineyard Workers (Servant's Reward)	Doorkeeper	Throne Claimant	Overseer Talents

NOTES

/1/ For the terms "advent, reversal, action" (="revelation, revolution, resolution") see J. D. Crossan, "Parable as Religious and Poetic Experience." *JR* 53 (1973) 330-358, and also, in greater detail, *In Parables*. New York: Harper & Row, Nov. 1973 . Note also the terms "mystery, inversion, power" used by R. W. Funk, "Beyond Criticism in Search of Literacy: The Parable of the Leaven." *Int* 25 (1971) 149-170.

/2/ The paradigm parables show the code of the entire parabolic system of Jesus at its most obvious. They are images in which the unexpected (future as advent) overturns one's life (past as reversal) and endows one with new existence (present in action).

/3/ Parables of Advent are images of concealment and mystery, of gift and surprise, of discovery and joy. Parables of Reversal are images of polar reversal and of "world" shattering in which last

becomes first and first last. Parables of Action are images of successful (Type 1) or unsuccessful (Type 2) or both (Type 3) reactions to situations of challenge or crisis.

/4/ The Servant Parables are a special case. Group A evinces all three types just noted. But the presence of Group B indicates that *parables of action are subject to those of reversal just as these are subject to ones of advent*, which is, I take it, Jesus' way of expressing the later Pauline theology of faith.

NOTES

/1/ Should the conclusions of E. Güttgemanns (50-73) apply to both the historical and the synoptic kerygma without any distinctions in texts themselves?

/2/ (1966b:180). See also his 1966a and 1970 (249-270) for an analysis of the folktale "La Quête de la Peur." For fuller bibliographical data see Harari.

/3/ As A.-J. Greimas (1966b:180) already noted: "Le modèle actantiel mythique .... semble posséder, en raison de sa simplicité, et pour l'analyse des manifestations mythiques seulement, une certaine valeur opérationelle."

/4/ (1968). The study "is dedicated to the study of *fairy* tales ... those tales classified by Aarne under numbers 300-749" (19). In the Aarne-Thompson index these are described as: "Ordinary Folk Tales: A. Tales of Magic."

/5/ (1966b:184): "l'absence d'un ou de plusieurs des actants. Les considérations théoriques ne permettent d'envisager qu'avec beaucoup de scepticisme une telle possibilité."

/6/ Thompson discusses "Supernatural Adversaries" and "Supernatural Helpers" and he concludes, "For the whole area of Europe and the Near East it seems to be a well established characteristic of the folktale that in such conflicts good shall eventually triumph and wickedness receive a fitting punishment" (130).

/7/ (20). In other words, one must imagine also a "contre-texte." See the comment of Halliday (302-303): "a text is meaningful not only in virtue of what it is but also in virtue of what it might have been. The most relevant exponent of the 'might have been' of a work of literature is another work of literature."

/8/ Note, for example, Pharisee, publican, Temple in Luke 18:10; or (maybe) the name Lazarus in Luke 16:20, both of which I would argue are also parables become examples. But even in Luke 19:12,14-15a,27 (debris of the Throne Claimant parable) there are no overt historical references.

/9/ (137). At this point he is discussing Northrop Frye. For his own much more developed typology see p. 166.

/10/ There may be a still deeper difference between my understanding of the historical Jesus' parables and that of Professor Via. I would state it here simply as a thesis: (i) it is the *structure* of Jesus' parabolic system which is a metaphor for the *structure* of the Kingdom of

God, and (ii) this is to be read ontologically and not morally. (Example: to read the individual parables morally is like seeing Kafka's *The Trial* as an example story against corrupt police methods).

/11/ Heda Jason (1967). Her basic model is as follows (9):

	Subject	Action	Object
function A	Donor	puts Hero to test	Hero
function B	Hero	responds to test (positively/negatively)	Donor
function C	Donor	rewards/punishes Hero respectively	Hero

Her examples are Amerindian, Russian, Australian, and Yemenite-Jewish. For a very good summary of the problem of structural units and their establishment see Waugh.

/12/ (1968). See also Propp (1965). It would be very interesting to compare these twenty possibilities of transformation with the ten "laws of transformation" for the parables proposed by Jeremias.

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A RESPONSE TO CROSSAN, FUNK, AND PETERSEN

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0. This is a response to the articles of Crossan (1974) and Petersen which appear in this issue, and the response of Funk.

1.1 One thing which seems to distinguish Crossan's (§0.1) concerns from mine (at least in my paper "Parable and Example Story") is that I have no interest at all in even the Persona of the historical Jesus. By implication I suppose I am interested in Jesus' authorial self since I have dealt with stories attributed to him, but even that was more or less marginal to my discussion. Moreover, Jesus' Persona (at least in the Jungian sense) is *not* the same as his authorial self, as Crossan suggests by the parallelism of his sentence. The authorial self is, on one side, more subjective, fragile, and changing than the Persona, and, in another sense, more objective. And I doubt that Jesus' Persona is any more available to critical investigation than his personality.

1.2 Again, I was not interested, nor need I be, in Jesus' original parabolic system but rather was interested in the stories which appear in the Gospels in relation to a generic system. Therefore, there was no reason for me to distinguish Jesus' synchrony from that of the Synoptics (see Crossan §0.2). Crossan made a choice about where he wanted to go and so did I. They were different choices. Mine is similar to that of Starobinski in his article on Mark. He chose to ignore events which do not figure in the narrative itself and to concern himself with all of the elements in the narrative as homogeneous givens (332).

1.3 If there is a conflict between traditio-critical logic and structural logic (Crossan §1.1), one will have to decide for one or the other. If one has come to the conclusion that history, including the history of tradition, is ontologically and epistemologically secondary to a logic residing in a linguistic matrix of meaning, then one will choose structural logic over traditio-critical logic.

1.4 If structuralism were a monolithic, rule-bound methodology, I would still insist on bending or breaking the rules if the demands of the text under consideration required it. However, I do not see structuralism to be so monolithic and rule-ridden as Crossan (§1.3) apparently takes it to be. Roland Barthes has noted Greimas' reminder that the *actantiel* model must be used with flexibility (1971:36). This brings me to my next point.

If a given actant is not fulfilled in a separate character, then it is a matter of critical judgment whether the actant has been fused with another in a single character or whether it is absent. If the character does not have the attributes of both actants, then one could legitimately doubt whether the actant in question is present at all. Moreover, since the *actantiel* semantic micro-universe is borrowed from syntax and is an analogue of the sentence, there is no reason why any narrative must have all six actants. One can have a quite adequate sentence with only two "actants," a subject and an object. A sentence does not have to have six actants to be complete and neither does a story (Greimas: 173-174). One can use Greimas against Greimas.

1.5 It is true that I ignore the Jewishness of the traveller in my diagram (see Crossan §1.41), but it is taken account of in the discussion. Attention to the spatial code *would* enrich a full structural analysis of the text, but that was beyond my purpose.

Crossan's (§1.5) making the priest and levite a

second subject, in addition to the Samaritan, is an improvement over my *actantiel* scheme. But if the priest and levite are not opponents, is prejudice (Crossan §1.43)? It is true that prejudice can--could--oppose the Samaritan's action if we were talking about a "real" Samaritan. But in this particular story there is not the remotest hint that this fictitious Samaritan is opposed by prejudice. He is said to be compassionate, and every action he performs exemplifies his compassion. The critical judgment that prejudice is the opponent is a function of the relationship of the story to the audience and to the interpretive tradition. It is not a legitimate inference from the story itself. One of the extraordinary features of the *story* is the presence of a non-prejudiced Samaritan. This shocks the probable prejudice of the Jewish *audience*. If the priest and levite are not the opponent and if prejudice is not, I would now suggest that the actant opponent is missing.

1.6 Crossan (§1.42) argues that the helper and opponent actants represent the mythological supernatural forces of good and evil and therefore must be capable of efficient causality. On the basis of this he denies that the oil, wine, innkeeper, and donkey fulfill the actant helper. But in view of the principle of transformation I deny his contention. If Lévi-Strauss can argue that a myth about wind and rain (anti-fire) is really a myth about fire (through the transformation of something into its opposite) (Lévi-Strauss: 137-138) then it is not too much to claim that an active helper has been transformed into an "instrument" which a Subject uses to help him carry out his project. In fact this is precisely what we would expect when we move from the magic world of the fairy tale to the realistic world of the parable of Jesus. As to the distinction between situational element and actant, it is a matter of judgment as to whether a given item belongs to one or the other of these categories or to both. In the parable of The Sower it might be argued that the good

earth, the road, the rocky soil, the thorns, the birds, and the sun, or at least some of these, are a part of the "initial situation," but Louis Marin finds a place for all of them in his *actantiel* model. And while the initial situation is to be distinguished from functions (or actants), some or all of the characters who fulfill functions are introduced in the initial situation (Propp: 85-86, 119-121). Thus an element's connection with the initial situation does not exclude its connection with any actant or function.

1.7 It is questionable whether comedy, romance, tragedy, and irony reveal four basic patterns (see Crossan §2.33). It would appear more likely in light of Northrop Frye's analysis that romance and satire are qualifications of comedy and tragedy. There are romantic comedies and tragedies, and ironic tragedies and comedies (Frye: 171-238). In some of Jesus' parables it is true that one does find both rising and falling plots, but at least in the eight fully developed parables one is clearly dominant and the other is absorbed in it organically. In The Wedding Feast where the assimilation is not so smooth and organic there are also other concomitant distinctions from the eight narrative parables. Some of Jesus' parables present ironies but the irony is simply one element in a basic comic or tragic pattern. With regard to romance I call attention to the insightful position of Scholes and Kellogg who point out that in the history of western narrative development, four basic types emerged from the mythic-epic tradition: (1) the historical empirical; (2) the mimetic empirical; (3) the romantic fictional; (4) the didactic fictional. In the romantic fictional, or romance, we are given a wholly ideal world which has almost no relationship to the real one (Scholes and Kellogg: 12-14, 99). Thus even if romance *were* a category parallel to tragedy and comedy, in view of the parables' highly realistic characters and images, one would hardly say that any of the parables is a romance.

1.8 Yes, I do think that we must go on telling one another seriously, that The Good Samaritan (Crossan's Story 4) (§1.61) is an invitation to charity. It is too bad that Jesus did not always rise to the same high level of artistic achievement or linguistic effectiveness. I still maintain this because Crossan has presented no counter argument to my claim that in order for a story to be a parable--or to belong to the genre narrative parable of Jesus--in order for it to overturn worlds or have an existential-ontological dimension this meaning must be based on the following: a metaphoric tenor (Kingdom of God) must be identical with an *actantiel* ordainer who is *distinct* from the *actantiel* subject and is related to the subject as superior to inferior. This is the necessary structural basis for the theme that the everyday world is transected by a new dimension and overturned. And it is this structural base which appears in the eight narrative parables. We cannot have that theme if the ordainer and subject are identical as they still are in Crossan's *actantiel* model of the Good Samaritan. Nor has Crossan presented a counter argument to my claim that the literal meaning and alleged metaphorical meaning of the other example stories create so little semantic tension that they cannot be called metaphors at all.

In order to clarify that the parable itself--and not the parable in relation to something else, the audience or the context--is a metaphor, it is necessary to identify the metaphoric tenor (authority figure) and the metaphoric vehicle (the servant-son figure) as both being within the story. And if the parable is to be taken as a parable of the kingdom of God (a new picture of human existence transected by the divine) then the ontological difference between God and man must be supported by the structural distinction between the king-father (ordainer) and the servant-son (subject). Or to speak more inductively, that is the way it in fact is in the eight narrative parables. If this emphasis on the significance of

particular characters is seen as a vestige of allegorizing (see Funk §8), then that is because the parables contain allegorical features. It is, after all, no secret that any narrative text may manifest characteristics from more than one literary type. I have argued (13-15, 24-25) and would still argue that while Jesus' eight narrative parables are *parables* and function as such, some or all of them still have allegorical elements. Interpretation must take account of what is in the text, not just of what the critic would like to be there.


1.9 I do not see how Crossan can draw the inference (note 10) that I read parables morally while he reads them ontologically. I agree that the parables should be read ontologically, and I think it is clear from my book that I read them that way. Thus I omitted from my book a discussion of The Good Samaritan and the other example stories: *because* they can only be read morally or are not genuine metaphors, as the case may be, and are not parables.

1.10 Crossan (§2.35) rests his case to a large extent on the oppositional texteme normalcy accepted/ normalcy rejected and sees this opposition to generate two groups of parables which represent two worlds. In my discussion of Crossan's "The Servant Parables of Jesus" I have given my reasons for thinking that this opposition does not exist in Jesus' parables. Therefore, my final conclusion is that the only strong reason for holding The Good Samaritan and its companions to be parables, and not example stories, is the wish that it were so.

2.1 Funk's accusation (§2) that I force all of the parables to be comic *or* tragic is puzzling because in the passages which he cites I am making precisely the same point that he makes--that in some parables there are both comic and tragic elements though one or the other may be more pronounced. I perhaps go further than he does in seeing the subdominant motif finally absorbed in the dominant.

2.2 The binary opposition tragic/comic does not coincide with the opposition subject receives object/ subject does not receive object (see Funk §4). Yes, there can be a tragic plot in which the subject receives the object: a deceived subject seeks a destructive object and receives it--disaster. Yes, there can be a comic plot in which the subject does not receive the object: a foolish subject seeks a destructive object but is prevented from obtaining it--rescue.

2.3 No, the binary opposition (3) subject receives object/subject does not receive object is not subordinated to only one branch of the opposition (4) subject desires to possess object/subject desires to communicate object (see Funk §4). Both sides of opposition (3) can be combined with both sides of opposition (4).



Structure (c) is as logically possible as the others. That it does not appear as a performance text among Jesus' parables does not mean that it does not belong to the competence represented in my texteme analysis, nor does its absence create a flaw in the logic of the scheme.

2.4 Nor is it true at the theoretical level that (Funk §4) my opposition (8) is subordinated to only the first side of opposition (7). We would hardly expect to see opposition (8) combined with the second side of opposition (7) in Jesus' parables, but that is for historical,

not for structural, reasons. One can well imagine a novel in which the subject and ordainer are identical, but if the novel presupposes a multi-leveled personality theory (Freud, Jung, Transactional Analysis--parent, adult, child in each personality) then that one character who combines subject and ordainer may well be related to himself in his *Eigenwelt* as superior to inferior or as equal to equal. The fact that one would not expect to find such a story in the first century is no argument at all against its theoretical structural possibility; therefore, there is no flaw in my ordering of the textemes in question on the same level. Not one of Funk's arguments against my textematic scheme has any substance. His faulty judgments result to a large extent from his failure to observe the distinction between available performance texts and competence texts that are potential and implicit in the structural system.

2.5 The Wedding Feast is in my judgment a kind of semi-parable; therefore, I would not expect it to have as strong sequential causality as the eight narrative parables. But it does have both psychological and sequential causality, apart from the last sentence (Funk §5). The king sent his troops because he was angry (psychological), but he was angry because the invited potential guests made light of his invitation (sequential). One can have causality without the word "because." A signification may be expressed without being manifestly lexicalized (Greimas: 24, 38-39).

3.1 Petersen has asserted that the genre question must be decided before the questions of textemic and *actantiel* analysis can be approached. But he also seems to agree with his quotation of Todorov that genre is a structural entity arrived at inductively from texts. If that is true one cannot postpone *actantiel* and textemic analysis until after the genre question is decided. Rather these types of analysis are among the means of arriving at the genre. Rather than regarding genre (inductive) and

type (deductive) as two separate magnitudes I have regarded genre as a two-faced magnitude being both deductive and inductive, depending on the vantage point from which it is approached. That genre has the deductive side as well is supported by Güttgemanns (1971:228-229; 1972:6-7, 13-14) and Chomsky (1965:16, 24, 28, 30, 51-53, 117, 118; 1966:33-34). If a genre, on one of its sides, is a generative matrix rooted in the deep structures of the human mind, then it is not enough to say that genres are shared cultural media.

3.2 Even if Jesus' narrative parables did comprise a genre, that would not mean that Jesus was speaking in a private idiolect which only a structural analyst could understand. Anyone can understand a story, at some level, which has a beginning, middle, and end. The genre barrier is also reduced if one accepts genres as universal generative structures.

However, I agree with Petersen that the term genre is too broad a term to use of Jesus' eight narrative parables. A genre cannot be defined from eight short narratives by one person. At the same time I think that I have demonstrated empirically that these eight parables are formally quite distinct from the alleged example stories.

I will accept at least provisionally, the term "type" (or set) to designate Jesus' narrative parables, and I do think that this gets me off the hook because I do not accept either of Petersen's arguments against my generative stemma.

(1) With regard to the question of where the speaker stands in relation to the generic system, my position *is* that--as Petersen "mockingly" put it--the deep and generic structures exist in Jesus' head. A speaker does not merely utter a *parole*. The *langue* also speaks through him. (Petersen apparently does not like paradox or dialectic.) As suggested by Robert Spivey's introductory

article to *Interpretation's* issue on structuralism--the uninvited guest in linguistic productivity is the human mind (145).

(2) As for genres as shared cultural media, I think that I can show--although I will not here--that the death-resurrection motif in pre-literary Greek myth and ritual, popular Greek drama, Aristophanes' comedies, Hosea, Deuteronomy, certain Pauline texts, the Gospel of Mark, and several stories by Flannery O'Connor have common structural characteristics--the kind of evidence which Todorov says is necessary to establish genres. Surely no one would want to claim that the producers or transmitters of the above named items shared common cultural media. If then these items can be shown inductively to have enough common structural characteristics to comprise a genre, it must be because the genre as a generative matrix gave birth to them in the first place.

3.3 The difference between Petersen and myself can be seen clearly in his statement that genres are fundamentally syntagms. I would hold that they are a grid of intersecting syntagms and paradigms.

3.4 To distinguish genre and type as two different objects belonging to two different systems is to reify the subject and object sides of the same phenomenon. I would maintain that genre is a single phenomenon unifying subject and object. As object it is constructed from performance texts, but as subject it "throws off" texts.

3.5 Propp is clearly concerned to define the structure of the folktale as a class or type (genre) (5-7, 11, 19, 22-23, 25, 65, 89, 103, 105-106) and his approach is fundamentally syntagmatic. The defining characteristic of the folktale as such is that it has some thirty-one "functions" (an action defined with regard to its significance for the course of action) always in the same order or sequence (Propp: 22-25). Any given story will probably not have all of the functions, but there are only thirty-

one different functions in the whole corpus of folktales, and all of these fit into one consecutive story. Although an individual story will lack some of the functions, the latter *always occur in the same order*.

To illustrate the system and to keep things simple I will let three stories represent all of the individual stories and use capital letters to symbolize the functions. The syntagms of the three individual stories may be represented as:

(1) A B D E H I K L O

(2) A B C F G L M N

(3) A C D H J M O

These three may then be collapsed into one "grand" syntagm which represents *the* folktale genre or type as such:

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O

But suppose a folktale is discovered which has a different sequence and which will, therefore, not fit into the grand syntagm. Such a story may be represented as

A B G D E F J I K N

Now one could say that this is not a folktale because it does not fit the syntagmatic order. But Propp after having said that the order of functions never changes admits that there *are* real folktales with a different order. Then he tries to avoid the contradiction by claiming that these "disordered" tales present "not a new, but rather an inverted sequence" (36, 107). I must confess that this is a distinction too fine for me to grasp. Or to put it more bluntly, this is a tortuous argument intended to paper over the contradiction in his system, an argument convincing to no one. Thus we see that Propp's exclusively syntagmatic generic system cannot account for the tale phenomena to be organized. There is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the system. And this is not just a weakness in Propp's particular approach. It is a weakness in any definition of genres solely by syntagmatic functions--unless one could

presuppose that all of the stories of a given genre will have their functions in the same order, and we have seen that that cannot be presupposed.

If, on the other hand, one takes the approach that the generating and governing factor in a genre is a logic or a meaning system which allows sequential variability, the problem created by Propp's approach is solved. One will use a paradigmatic-syntagmatic system, and the meaning and definition of the genre will reside as much in the logical and semantic relations in the paradigms as in the order in the syntagms. There is no problem, then, if stories manifest different sequences. In diagramming the generic system the functions of a story may be freely re-arranged to fit into the proper paradigms. Thus there can be no conflict between the single story and the system. When a story is being considered in itself individually it can be viewed in its own sequential form. When it is viewed in relation to the genre, it can be re-arranged to fit the logic of the genre by placing each function in its logically proper paradigm. This is superior to the open contradiction in Propp's approach, a contradiction caused by the fact that his approach is purely syntagmatic and the genre is defined by the invariability of the order of functions.

In a paradigmatic-syntagmatic approach the four stories symbolized above would naturally and without any forcing appear as follows:

(1) A B D E H I K L O
(2) A B C F G L M N
(3) A C D H J M O
(4) A B D E F G I J K N

paradigm ↑

syntagm →

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A BASIC BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR PARABLES RESEARCH

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This bibliography has two distinct sections. The first contains articles using traditiocritical methodology. It is restricted, save for some special cases, to works within the last twenty years. The second one concerns itself with structuralist theory and practice and their application to parables research. This was kept separate to enable the listing of general preparatory and introductory works in this method.

Where abstracts are known they are given from *New Testament Abstracts* by year, volume, and abstract number, not page.

The numbering system used here is intended to make reference easy and expansion possible without changing the present listing. For this reason chronological rather than alphabetical sequence is used.

Abbreviations for standard biblical periodicals are those used in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*. Those for other periodicals are given at the end of the bibliography.

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See 1.402.

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See 1.406; 1.407; 1.410.

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NOTES.

The preceding bibliography was restricted almost exclusively to the period covered since *NTA* 1 (1956-7). For works before that time see (1) *Elencus Bibliographicus Biblicus*; (2) B. M. Metzger, *Index to Periodical Literature on Christ and the Gospels*. NTTS 6. Leiden: Brill, 1966; (3) B. M. Metzger, *Index of Articles on the New Testament and the Early Church Published in Festschriften*. SBLMS 5. SBL, 1951; and its *Supplement*. SBL, 1955.

The following correlations between this bibliography and the next one should be noted:

1.300. See 2.902.
1.400. See 2.906; 2.908; 2.909; 2.910; 2.913; 2.914.
1.550. See 2.901.
1.560. See 1.331; 2.912; 2.913; 2.914.
1.630. See 2.903.
1.700. See 2.904.
1.740. See 2.905.
1.790. See 2.907.
1.880. See 2.911

2. Structuralist Bibliography for Parables Research.

This bibliography can serve three separate purposes. (1) Sections 2.000-2.799 are a basic bibliography for structuralist theory, method, and practice. It is confined, however, to the oral or written *word* for the most part. For drama, see E. Souriau, *Les deux cent mille situations dramatiques*. Paris: Flammarion, 1950. For art, see J. Burnham, *The Structure of Art*. New York: Braziller, 1971. For cinema, see the excellent article and bibliography by J. G. Hanhardt & C. H. Harpole, "Linguistics, Structuralism, and Semiology," in *Film Comment*, May 1973, pp. 52-59. (2) Section 2.800 is basic for structuralism as applied to the Bible. (3) Section 2.900 gives specific structuralist works on the parables themselves. This section could, of course, be integrated into the earlier bibliography as the correlations above have indicated.

2.000. Bibliography.

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2.005. *LingBib* 1 (1970) 11-15; 3 (1971) 18-20; 4/5 (1971)

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See 2.33.; 2.510 (for 2.120); 2.650 (for 2.130).

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2.200. Semiotics and Linguistics.
[This section has been kept to a basic minimum]

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2.300. Oral and Written Literature.

[This section is extremely important for structuralist biblical analysis. It probably should be subdivided more fully and more adequately than is done here. But the present state of discussion and pace of development make all such divisions somewhat problematic. For example, many works cut across the distinction of oral and written literature, or across differences between myth, folktale, and modern novel. So sections 2.300 - 2.699 cover a very wide swath indeed]

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2.331. A. I. Nikiforov, "On the Morphological Study of Folklore," *LingBib* 27/28 (1973) 25-35 [=1927].

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APPENDIX I. Abbreviations in the Structuralist Bibliography.

AmAnthro	*American Anthropology*
CahInstScEcApp	*Cahiers de l'Institut de science économique appliquée*
Comm	*Communications*
CAnthro	*Current Anthropology*
FF	Folklore Fellows
FoundLang	*Foundations of Language*
IntJSlavLingPoetics	*International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics*
JAesArtCrit	*Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*
JAmFolk	*Journal of American Folklore*
JFolkInst	*Journal of the Folklore Institute*
JLing	*Journal of Linguistics*
LangStyle	*Language and Style*
LingBib	*Linguistica Biblica*
Ling	*Linguistics*
MidFolk	*Midwest Folklore*
MLN	*Modern Language Notes*
NewLitHist	*New Literary History*
OrLitt	*Orbis Litterarum*
RevMetaphysics	*Review of Metaphysics*
Sem	*Semiotica*
SFolkQ	*Southern Folklore Quarterly*
SwJAnthro	*Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*
WestFolk	*Western Folklore*

APPENDIX II. Basic Reading Lists for Structuralism.

The following three list are suggested for those starting to read structuralist theory and practice for the first time. They expand from List A through B to C according to time and interest.

List A: 2.169.

List B (English language only): 2.169; 2.257; 2.511; 2.522; 2.345; 2.602; 2.613; 2.593.

List C (English & Foreign): List B plus the following, 2.211 2.373; 2.375; 2.532; 2.542; 2.564; 2.813; 2.833; 2.878; 2.90

Main Anthologies: 2.313; 2.141; 2.148; 2.150; 2.151; 2.157; 2.595; 2.596.

SEMEIA AND THE STUFF AND STYLE OF SCHOLARSHIP

0. *Semeia* is experimental, we claim, in both form and content. The word "innovative" might have been used had the claim suggested by that term not been slightly immodest. Actually, there are precedents in one form or another for nearly everything *Semeia* aspires to do. Nevertheless, the rubric "experimental" may prompt authors and editors to be more venturesome than they otherwise might have been.

1. Whether *Semeia* proves to be experimental in content only the reader can decide for him- or herself. Direction will have become clear in the first half dozen numbers. The cost of two subscription units is not too dear a price to learn whether *Semeia* will fulfill its promise. Of course, whether *Semeia* is experimental may not be the real question. If *Semeia* does not succeed in opening new doors in biblical study, it will not have served its purpose no matter how experimental it may prove to be.

2.0 The experimental form of this new journal is another matter, and about that something can be said immediately.

2.1 The economic stringencies of the time suggest that a new journal should be duplicated as cheaply as possible. Whether scholars in the biblical field will permit themselves the luxury of additional serious communication in a cheap format is still an open question, despite initial dramatic success with inexpensive books in the SBL publication program. Hot type, letter-press, and justified right are not absolutely essential to sound

scholarship: typescript and ragged right are as easy to read and may actually permit scholars freedoms they had forgotten, such as rapid, almost instant, publication. Yet scholars, like other weightly objects, are bound by inertia. *Semeia* is mildly experimental in luring biblical scholars away from typographical habits of long standing in favor of fresh opportunity in inexpensive dress.

2.20 *Semeia* is also endeavoring to simplify the mechanics of scholarly communication wherever possible.

2.21 One of the scholarly habits that persistently drives the cost of composition up is internal cross referencing. In the normal process the printer provides two sets of proofs, the second of which is in page form to enable the author to put in page references. By numbering every section (or sense paragraph) in articles this extra step can be eliminated: cross references can be inserted in final form virtually as the author writes.

Authors writing for *Semeia* may wish to number their sections as they compose, or the editor may add numbers at the time copy is prepared for the typist. The numbering system is solely for efficiency; it has no ideological overtones.

2.22 *Semeia* also proposes to take the "foot" out of "footnote" and otherwise streamline the system of referencing.

In the first place, it is being proposed that notes be confined to extraneous comments, elaboration, and explanations designed to aid the reader; they should *not* be used to document. Moreover, they should be used sparingly: most statements which do not belong in the body of articles do not belong in articles at all.

The legitimate note will be marked in the text with a number, on the line (to save time and cost in raising the number a half space), set off by slashes, thus: /1/. Notes will be printed at the *end* of each

article, again to save time and cost.

This format will greatly reduce the number, complexity, and mechanics of "footnoting." It is also more economical.

2.23 What, then, of documentation and references?

Each article will be accompanied by a list of "works consulted." This list will make it possible to reference the body of the article in the most efficient way (in the text one need use only the briefest definitive reference, e.g. page or section number only, author and page or section number only, author, year, and page or section number only), in parentheses, in the text itself, without the use of "footnotes."

Further, a list of works consulted will free the author from the onerous habit of citing works merely in order to incorporate them into footnotes. Works consulted is a midway house between a list of references called from footnotes in the old form and a bibliography: it should consist of works referred to, or which form part of the immediate background of the article.

Authors will normally find it convenient to compile a list of works consulted before they begin to work. In this way references can be inserted, in final form, at the time of composition.

2.24 Numbered sections or sense paragraphs, restrictions on and simplification of notes, and the use of a list of works consulted for referencing will greatly enhance the pleasure of scholarly writing simply because these simplified procedures will eliminate much of the busywork. In addition, they are easier on typists.

Instructions for contributors to *Semeia* will be published subsequently. Meanwhile, the practice of these procedures may be observed in the first issues.

2.3 The editors of *Semeia* believe that readers should be able to learn the essential content of essays

with a minimum amount of effort. To that end, it would be helpful if articles were well written. In addition, a concise, exact abstract of 100-150 words is a great boon to the working scholar. The editors are requesting that authors prepare such abstracts to go at the head of their essays. Abstracts should not promise, predict or tantalize; they should deliver in sum what the essay pays out in full account. The preparation of a lucid abstract is the final test of an author's control of his material.

3. *Semeia* is to be published irregularly. A subscription unit consists of three numbers, but the editors do not wish to bind themselves to a specific time period for the appearance of these numbers. Journals ought to appear as slowly or as quickly as suitable material of quality is available. *Semeia* will therefore appear as frequently or as seldom as its authors and readers require. In any case, it will be our policy to publish promptly or not at all.

4. By altering the style of scholarship one does not necessarily modify the stuff of scholarship. Yet as form and content go together, so do the style and stuff. Perhaps it is the latent stuff of *Semeia* that has led to a reconsideration of style.

Robert W. Funk, Editor *pro tem*

18 July 1974

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