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SO

Turning Pro: Professional Qualifications and the Global University, edited by Stefano Harney and Randy Martin. Stanley Aronowitz kicks off this latest installment of the academic labor saga as tracked by the journal with a critique of schooling that teaches kids to live to work. Christopher Newfield undoes the facile opposition between education and commerce to strategize a politics of nonmarket value. Gutting the business-school curriculum in obeisance to the market is treated by Tony Tinker as a precipitate of Enron-style market failure, while Silvia Federici and George Caffentzis expose the complicity of neoliberal academics in the assault on the African university's force in national development. Fred Moten and Stefano Harney examine the subversive effects of the professionalized university's exclusions via the constitution of an undercommons. Also in this issue, Sara Ahmed provides a reevaluation of the work that emotions do.

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TEXT

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Introduction

Randy Martin

Education as an end in itself is the clarion call of the liberal arts. The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake must hold some appeal for anyone who takes teaching seriously both as an intrinsic good and as contributing to the sort of well-roundedness said to prepare citizens for democratic participation.[1] Yet what persistently places the in-itself/for-itself claim at risk is the presence of commodity labor, either as the ends of education or as its means. It is worth remembering that the arguments for autonomy that provided the foundational idea of the Western university in the nineteenth century were made against the subordination of learning to labor, either as apprenticeship in a guild or as an occupational response to religious calling. Today, as the market appears to have stolen education's innocence in the form of the preponderance of professional training, it is tempting to see what might look like a one-hundred-year interregnum of the liberal arts as a golden age and not a historical aberration. During this time, the liberal ideal was already challenged by the model of the research university, where education was to serve the advancement of knowledge as a kind of global mastery; the multiversity, a conglomerate of interests whose chief practitioners, after University of California President Clark Kerr, were administrators; and the corporate university, whose intellectual properties were meant to fetch a good price.[2]

When one moves from ideals to demographics, it is hard to argue for a return to the glory days of, say, 1869, when, for example, in the United States, 563 institutions graduated fewer than 10,000 baccalaureates, at a ratio of nearly eight privileged men to every woman, and where proportionately, men were more than twice as likely to earn a degree. By 2001, over 15 million students were enrolled in more than 4,000 U.S. institutions of higher education, over half of whom were women, and a million and a quarter bachelor's degrees were awarded.[3] As professional services came to define the job market, the very character of the degree shifted. In 1970, bachelor's degrees in the liberal arts were still approaching half of the total (at 46 percent). Thirty years later, the number had fallen to 35 percent. Degrees in business increased the most (from 114,729 to 265,746 between 1970 and 2000), and those in education suffered the greatest decline (from 176,307 to 105,556). Literature, mathematics, physical sci-

Social Text 79, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press.

ence, social science, and history all graduate fewer students than they did thirty years ago (although the social sciences and history have recouped much of the lost ground).[4] MBAs comprise nearly a quarter of the master's degrees awarded, and more professional degrees (MDs, JDs, etc.) are granted than PhDs. Even the growth in doctorates—which has reached a plateau in the past decade—reflects the preponderance of PhDs with professional applications such as education (which at the doctoral level has fluctuated but was still higher in 2000 than it was in 1970), engineering, psychology, and the life sciences, which are the fields in which the greatest number of degrees are awarded.[5] Whatever the (re)turn to professionalism means in higher education, these few figures indicate that it is here to stay.

Like any good nostalgia, the warmth toward a university free of the market invents a past to claim a normative present. The activation of academic labor, closely intertwined with a labor and disciplinary crisis in the humanities, imagined a past where securing a job was unproblematic and a curriculum that was given as a received tradition. At issue is not simply the accuracy of these histories, but the scope of political desire unleashed by academic labor movements. To the extent that they are framed within the craft ambitions of job security, they aspire to a model of professional autonomy and control over the labor market that is already behind us. To insist that academic labor movements are about the production of knowledge for others, to recast the modernist values of autonomous spheres, is to rethink the politics of professionalization as a grounds for using expert knowledge to transcend the limitations of specialized interest. We are in an ironic situation where the remnants of the self-organized proletariat in the form of trade unions are treated as a special interest. If professional education is now doing to labor what industrialization did over a century ago, the more general interest in the activisms of the university and the professions will need to be rethought. Against the claims of self-privilege, movements that make explicit the political efficacy of professional labor and knowledge will need to aim their sights at the possibilities for redirecting the governing ideas of the era. This special dossier of *Social Text* is meant to turn our attention to the lessons of professional education, at once as an epistemological formulation, a way for education to set labor in motion, and a global model of socioeconomic development.

Proprietary schools, which have flourished in the past two decades under the sign of privatization of social goods, reaching over eight hundred by 2001, would seem to embody the ultimate negation of liberal arts in favor of fullest commodification.[6] The dean of neoliberal studies, Milton Friedman, prefers to parse the distinction between for-profits and nonprofits as taxpaying and tax-exempt, which translates into 40 percent of

revenues for proprietaries having to be set aside for taxes and 50 percent of costs for public universities covered through tax subsidies.[7] This distinction is meant to award the prize of rationality to the profiteers—whatever needs don't make it into the calculus are outside market reason. Since profits derive solely from tuition revenue, lean administrators do no fundraising and answer to their investors. Employees are not stakeholders in governance but literally stockholders whose retirements are tied to their own job performances. The dean of DeVry University, Richard S. Ruch, is more forthright about the limits to faculty governance than most of his counterparts at nonprofits are willing to be. "In my experience, the management strategy of the for-profits is to allow enough shared governance to appease regional accreditation visiting teams and keep the faculty from unionizing."[8] But at root, these educational "companies are managed conservatively according to tried-and-true methods of supervision."[9] Tenure is out, and the "curriculum is managed centrally by professional curriculum specialists," leaving faculty as the "delivery people."[10]

The profit-taking epiphany for John Sperling, the founder of the notorious University of Phoenix—which now claims to enroll 200,000 students—comes from being voted out of office in a faculty union he himself had organized. "That experience cured me of my socialist sentiments in favor of nonprofits. I correctly perceived that the only sure way to maintain and enjoy the fruits of my labor was to create a venture I could control."[11] Democracy had cured him of socialism, trade unionism had made him proprietary, and the delivery people yielded him a company with a market value in the billions. As a business, Phoenix and its ilk have common enough motives. Their strategy has been to expand the reach of education to those older than twenty-five, who now comprise half of the students in higher education. The business model has been not to prepare or protect or warehouse workers-to-be but to embed education in the labor force as labor's own medium of circulation. Education is to be the downsizable professional's constant companion, a way to anticipate imminent departure through perpetual retooling. This becomes apparent with respect to adult education. The last available figures are for 1999, when over 86 million adults were enrolled in some kind of course. Total enrollment in nondegree classes and programs had increased over 10 million from just four years earlier (1995).[12]

Adult education had its start after World War I as a civic rather than vocational project meant to heal the rift between expert and lay knowledge and combat communist appeals at home and abroad.[13] Today, clearly it is the reverse. Adult education is not a substitute for college work; rather, participation rates increase with educational attainment (with the exception of the doctorate), starting with just under 15 percent for those with

Education is to be the downsizable professional's constant companion, a way to anticipate imminent departure through perpetual retooling.

an eighth-grade education or less and reaching nearly three-quarters of those with professional degrees.[14] Professionals maintain competence and a monopoly over expertise through licensure programs.[15] One could also argue that adult education is not simply a supplement to college, but the medium through which professional labor maintains its mobility. Professionals are not simply credentialed (or recredentialed) through education, but professionalized education is the means through which careers are managed in the face of a full range of disruptions, from downsizing of managerial jobs to implosions of industries. Education, in this light, is the material of occupational self-management, making the paeans to lifelong learning a necessary palliative to the insecurities of the professional world and the mounting infidelities of its labor market. No small wonder that distance-learning models have failed as a substitute for traditional college-age students but have enjoyed some success among salaried professionals already oriented toward disciplining their domestic time and space with the attentions and distractions of the monitored workplace.[16] The for-profits have another interest in distance learning: it is seen as an instrument of deregulation that would replace regional accreditation entities, which support nonprofits public and private, with a national authority capable of funneling federal student aid directly into profit-making coffers.[17] So much for the tax-benefit arguments.

A century ago, professional education in such fields as medicine, law, and social work was formed as an autonomous entity in a tussle with proprietary versions of licensing and training. Flexner's axioms for monopolizing access to professional jobs by dint of command over expert knowledge were that it be intellectual, learned, practical, technical, self-organized, and altruistic.[18] Today, we could say that the reassertion of the proprietary school is not simply a return of the repressed but a full realization of the encounter between professionalization and proletarianization. While professionals are increasingly dispossessed of self-sufficiency in bringing their expertise to market, the model of self-management, derived from a professional ethos and assertion, now comes to characterize labor itself. The lives of both students and faculty are retooled along these lines. Above all, professional education celebrates the wisdom of the marketplace in setting the terms of this articulation. At the same time, the practical and instrumental orientation of professionalism speaks to the full subsumption of knowledge to production where cultural skepticism about the disinterestedness of technical reason meets self-doubt that furthering expertise can still be an end in itself.

In politics this dizzy situation gives us Bushes and Schwarzeneggers. In the professions themselves, it can simply mean business. But business, like politics, leaves a tale of betrayal that more and more have been trained

to understand. For those reared on the altruism of professional self-interest—be true to your disciplinary expertise and reap the rewards of labor monopoly—it's now Faust or famine. The particular competences, the power of expert specificities, are substituted for the generic logic of the market—do what is best for the bottom line. Now the physicians running a hospital need to know what the accountants advising an energy conglomerate need to know. This is not a problem reducible to educational reform, but it is one that becomes legible in the study of professional education.

Professional socialization is not confined to higher education, but could be taken as the means and ends of educational rationality. Jeff Schmidt, noting that only 5 percent of professors consider themselves as leftists outside the liberal-conservative mainstream, argues that professional qualification entails not simply technical knowledge but an "attitude toward working within an assigned political and ideological framework," for which standardized tests such as the Graduate Record Examination or the Law School Admission Test both measure and train students.[19] The hidden curriculum that promotes such obedience accounts for the timidity of highly educated employees. But after such Bushian legislative initiatives as the Leave No Child Behind Act,[20] testing is not reserved for entrance to advanced study but is also the road that leads to it. For that half of the secondary-school population that will not be attending college, those students are nonetheless invited to view their futures according to a professional yardstick, even as they may offer resistance or some fabulist counterlegislation like Leave This Child Alone.

For that half of the secondary-school population that will not be attending college, those students are nonetheless invited to view their futures according to a professional yardstick, even as they may offer resistance or some fabulist counterlegislation like Leave This Child Alone.

The celebration of standardization in the curriculum would seem to speak more to the industrialization of the professional strata than to the orientation of all students toward the norms of autonomous expertise. Test prep brings the future into the present, a never-ending anticipation of judgment day that norms behavior toward the mean. Surely this is a rearguard action against any claims for due consideration based upon historical discrimination, as all are subjected to the same standard that aligns aptitude and attitude. Sorting can now proceed on the merits of individual competence subject to measurable standards. A clever scheme this, to affirm social divisions while banishing the language that would allow us to speak of them.

The generalization of these educational protocols also allows the minority professional strata to speak for the multitudes and may hint at how public opinion is mobilized toward narrowly interested tax policies and social disinvestment. But it also suggests that there is public appeal behind what once would have been dubbed special interests but now stand for all those capable of having one. In short, professional education has

now become attached to a much larger social base where the accomplishments of professional society are akin to the wealth of the nation. Whether dubious premise or false promise, the associated professional also offers a voice of opportunity to address the gap between the lost mythos of free pursuit of self-development and the capacity to evaluate what fruits still need to be borne by the sticky preparations of educational socialization.

Stanley Aronowitz's contribution to this dossier offers a fulsome account of the appropriation of educational promise to schooling, which aims to teach students to learn to live to work. His historical insights about the very different educational projects associated with the labor movement provide a counterpoint to the present demands that laboring be only the ends of stratified instruction. For this to happen, teachers would need to reclaim their professional grounds as intellectual labor and reassert their organizational means to make a political intervention. The relation between professional self-concept and political project is taken up by Christopher Newfield in his refashioning of the self-fulfilling prophecy that the humanities purposes have been eclipsed by neoliberal ideology. If commerce has always been part of education, better strategies for negotiating that already contested and permeable ground need to be found. Newfield reads new university ideologies to show how the imperatives of intellectual property for monopoly capitalism can be countered with the creation of a knowledge commons for human development.

A case study of this abdication to putative market dicta can be found in Tony Tinker's treatment of business schools' gutting of accounting curriculum to satisfy demands for more efficient training. The result was to precipitate the market failure made famous by the likes of Enron and WorldCom, whose auditors lacked the practical competencies needed to save their clients from their own malfeasance. This is also a study of how ideas promulgated by professional academics have tangible worldly effects, a cautionary tale indeed to those who would dismiss the efficacy of such knowledge. It is important to retain the internal difference attendant upon professional education even within business education.

While professionalization has been said to produce a new global elite and the professional courses of study may enjoy some national variation, the pleasure is not equally shared.[21] If the liberal arts produced area studies as a Cold War educational front, the professional school model followed within a decade with a generous Ford Foundation grant in 1967, which convened a conference with participants from fifty-two nations aimed at internationalizing the American model.[22] Today those endeavors have merged nicely with privatized online educational initiatives such as Universitas 21, the partnership between publishing giant Thomson and seventeen research universities in ten countries to create an MBA program

aimed at attracting students in China and other Asian Pacific nations.[23] The contribution here of Silvia Federici and George Caffentzis looks at the struggle taking place within the postindependence African university against the formation of professional elites trained to do the bidding of neoliberal structural adjustment policies. Run by expatriate internationalizing academics, a new cluster of programs aims to downgrade the projects for national development organized through university departments. Federici and Caffentzis's analysis shows how ever-popular scholarly exchange and study abroad programs are implicated in this version of globalization.

The ambition of labor relations in higher education is to make everyone a manager. It is the conviction of many private universities that beyond the formal sanctions of the Yeshiva decision, which found tenured faculty to be managerial employees, institutional governance will inoculate them from further unionization. *Social Text* has, over several issues, monitored the fate of these claims and explored how managerialist protocols are precipitates for labor activity whether in the case of graduate student workers or of "casualized" part-time faculty whose ranks have swelled with increased enrollments. To this would need to be added the study of the new casualization of full-time faculty positions in the form of proliferating nontenure appointments intended to secure managerial rights without a permanent place at the table. If testing brings the educated masses into the professional fold regardless of their occupational trajectory, evaluation and review are the cognates for academic professionals. Whether or not professors teach to the test, their teaching will be measured and made tangible through a matrix of course evaluations, reappointment reviews, merit appraisals, post-tenure tests, and merit exercises. Test culture and its appeals to normalization continue. Much deserved attention has been paid to the notion of affective labor, which has both professional and informal expression. While not on the topic of professional education, Sara Ahmed's rethinking of emotional work also appears in this issue as a counterpoint, although her discussion of how bodily and social spaces are aligned through economies of hate and fear stands on its own. Nonetheless, academic work is not only affective labor, for self-planned professionals must adopt the outlooks of the institutional mission as their own.

More than a presentation of self, mission control is an affiliation of faith that *your U is you*. By this reckoning all are called upon to be in the midst of management, to think of themselves as advancing a corporate interest, and to articulate their needs and contributions in terms of this larger social good. Gone are the days when the value of education or of expertise can be taken for granted. The skepticism of metanarratives is pervasive, but it takes the form of suspicion toward the utility of particu-

lar expertise. Each is called upon to justify its place, all are in a position to judge. This does not expunge professional expertise, but sets it in motion, denies it fixity, allows for its further institutionalization. Just as more people reside in the medium of education, there is more professional labor and more institutional location in which it operates. Professional labor must produce more than exchange value: it needs to provide the proof of its worth.

So education is not exactly an end in itself. And the liberal arts have, in many respects, turned pro. Yet that does not evacuate its public project. Rather, the nature of that project and the terms of its intervention cannot be given by the fact of institutional location within the university or by the immanent truth of pursuing knowledge as such. Professionalization forces articulation upon its politics. Legitimation for educational endeavors must be found in some worldly purpose or authority. Once it seemed that the professional mandate meant that market demands could provide sufficient external justification for further education. But subordination to the market opened up the risk of market failure and verified that if winner-take-all were to be treated as the voice of reason, its speech could quickly be reduced to babble. In practice, such schemas dictate that losing is the more common experience than winning, and the losers may have far more insight into the whole process than the winners ever did. While no one subjected to professional standards may be left unmeasured or unjudged, many are left behind. The disjunction between the assimilation of a general ethos and mass expulsion from the winner's circle must itself be managed. This vast domain of exclusion produced by the insistence upon assimilation is what Fred Moten and Stefano Harney refer to as the Undercommons. What the machine spits out is far greater than what it wants to digest. Unlike the quaky voice of the market whose winning ways are only discernible after the fact, the voices of critique and subversion make quite a din. The anxieties expressed by the conservators of the university that those minor keys at the margins may threaten to overwhelm them speaks less to the disingenuousness of those who hold institutional strings than to the potency of ideas that express nonmarket externalities to grasp the world as such.

The essays gathered here provide a critique of professionalization from the perspective of critically engaged professional knowledge and, on that basis, offer a prospect of comparative activisms to emerge from turning pro. A braiding of Deweyan traditions of democratic education and labor activism among teaching professionals informs Stanley Aronowitz's call to retain utopian possibilities against the larger assault of technocratic instrumentalism. Christopher Newfield is asking humanists to treat themselves as professional specialists with an entrepreneurial interest

in challenging the unspoken universalism of nostalgic humanism. Organizations of critical professionals that draw upon their expertise and the imprimatur of university-based associations to critique complicity in market-driven destructiveness are vital to the advocacy positions in the articles by Tony Tinker and by Silvia Federici and George Caffentzis. As an accountant, Tinker is no less critical of the limits to that educational obsequiousness to the market than toward business schools, but he recognizes the need to leverage his own position in a more public-interest-based political front. Hence his affiliation with the Association for Integrity in Accounting, a group with links to Ralph Nader's Citizen Works. The Committee for Academic Freedom in Africa, of which Federici and Caffentzis are members, has promulgated a code of professional academic ethics in the form of targeted solidarity that draws upon specific multilateral relations among institutions, faculty, and funding agencies. Finally, Moten and Harney treat the Undercommons as a source of activism that embraces the whole range of disciplinary and postdisciplinary formations to grow from the struggles over what counts as knowledge. Together these activisms point beyond a straightforward narrative of normalization, assimilation, and control to a renewed sense of how the university—now not only porous but in continuous circulation with its world—can matter to the larger prospect of refashioning public understanding. Paradoxically, the professionals' founding claim to have risen above politics has only ushered in the proliferation of the political. It is not enough to say that the professions have become dispirited (Weber's argument from the turn of the prior century) or that—their ennobling purpose lost—they lie in ruins. People's professions could take out franchises from the popular science movement. Sorting out the politics we can live by—one informed by what knowledge is for, how it affiliates, where it applies, what world it would create—will, of necessity, become the new professional creed.

Notes

1. With respect to the privileged citizen-subject entitled to participation, the universalist aspirations of the liberal arts help naturalize a particular national identity. See, for example, Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society, 1780–1950* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, *Culture and the State* (New York: Routledge, 1998); Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).

2. The relevant texts here are John Henry Newman's *Idea of the University*, originally published in 1852; Abraham Flexner's formulation of research-based professional education, *Medical Education in the United States and Canada* (Boston: Updyke, Merrymount Press, 1910); Clark Kerr's *Uses of the University*, 4th ed. (1963; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Sheila Slaugh-

ter and Larry Leslie's *Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

3. Data on Degree-Granting Postsecondary Enrollment, Table 171, "Historical Summary of Faculty, Students, Degrees, and Finances in Degree-Granting Institutions: 1869–70 to 1999–2000," *Digest of Education Statistics, 2002* (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics), 205.

4. The numbers for professional and liberal arts degrees are based on my own aggregation of categories in Table 252, "Bachelor's Degrees Conferred by Degree-Granting Institutions, by Discipline Division: 1970–71 to 2000–2001," *Digest of Education Statistics, 2002*, 304.

5. Table 254, "Doctor's Degrees Conferred by Degree-Granting Institutions, by Discipline Division: 1970–71 to 2000–2001," *Digest of Education Statistics, 2002*, 306.

6. "College Enrollment Trends," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 20 August 2003, 2.

7. Figures from the confessional of a dean at DeVry University, in *Higher Ed, Inc.: The Rise of the For-Profit University*, by Richard S. Ruch (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 11. The account that follows is based upon Ruch's description of DeVry.

8. Ibid., 14.

9. Ibid., 15.

10. Ibid., 112, 118.

11. John Sperling, *Rebel with a Cause: The Entrepreneur Who Created the University of Phoenix and the For-Profit Revolution in Higher Education* (New York: John Wiley, 2000), 2.

12. Table 360, "Participation in adult education during the previous 12 months by adults 17 years old and older, by selected characteristics of participants: 1991, 1995, and 1999," *Digest of Education Statistics, 2002*, 404.

13. See Harold W. Stubblefield, *Towards a History of Adult Education in America: The Search for a Unifying Principle* (London: Croom Helm, 1988); and Harold W. Stubblefield and Patrick Keane, *Adult Education in the American Experience: From the Colonial Period to the Present* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994) for historical accounts of this shift.

14. Table 360, *Digest*.

15. This is the reckoning of those who run such programs. See, for example, the book edited by the former dean of the extension program at the University of California, Berkeley, Milton R. Stern, *Power and Conflict in Continuing Professional Education* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1983).

16. The American Association of University Professors journal, *Academe*, published several useful articles in 2002 tracking the precipitous rise and fall of distance learning between 1998 and 2002. The closing of initiatives was reported in the section "Nota Bene," 2, 6–7.

17. This rationale for advancing distance education is laid out by Sperling himself in John Sperling and Robert W. Tucker, *For-Profit Higher Education: Developing a World Class Workforce* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997), 70–77.

18. For overviews of this history, see William J. McGlothlin, *The Professional Schools* (New York: Center for Applied Research in Education, 1964), which provides the Flexnerian code; Solomon Hoberman and Sidney Mailick, eds., *Professional Education in the United States: Experiential Learning, Issues, and Prospects*

(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); and Sinclair Goodlad, ed., *Education for the Professions* (Surrey, U.K.: Society for Research into Higher Education, 1984) for curricular and institutional developments.

19. Jeff Schmidt, *Disciplined Minds: A Critical Look at Salaried Professionals and the Soul-Battering System That Shapes Their Lives* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 16.

20. Passed in 2001, and at the time considered by George W. Bush the "cornerstone" of his administration, the watchword of the law is accountability. Testing is its means. "Under the act's accountability provisions, states must describe how they will close the achievement gap and make sure all students, including those who are disadvantaged, achieve academic proficiency. They must produce annual state and school district report cards that inform parents and communities about state and school progress. Schools that do not make progress must provide supplemental services, such as free tutoring or after-school assistance; take corrective actions; and, if still not making adequate yearly progress after five years, make dramatic changes to the way the school is run." U.S. Department of Education Web site, "Overview: No Child Left Behind," www.ed.gov/nclb/accountability/schools/edpicks.jhtml (accessed October 2003).

21. See Harold Perkin, *The Third Revolution: Professional Elites in the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 1996).

22. For documentation of these meetings and the thinking they produced, see *Internationalizing the U.S. Professional School* (New York: Education and World Affairs, 1969).

23. Florence Olsen, "Universitas 21 and Thomson Open Online M.B.A. Program," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 26 September 2003, A48.

Against Schooling

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CLASS

Stanley Aronowitz

> The crisis in American education, on the one hand, announces the bankruptcy of progressive education and, on the other hand, presents a problem of immense difficulty because it has arisen under the conditions and in response to the demands of a mass society.
>
> —Hannah Arendt, "Crisis in Education"

At the dawn of the new century no American institution is invested with a greater role to bring the young and their parents into the modernist regime than public schools. The common school is charged with the task of preparing children and youth for their dual responsibilities to the social order: citizenship and, more important, learning to labor. On the one hand, in the older curriculum on the road to citizenship in a democratic, secular society, schools are supposed to transmit the jewels of the Enlightenment, especially literature and science. On the other, students are to be prepared for the work world by means of a loose but definite stress on the redemptive value of work, the importance of family, and, of course, the imperative of love and loyalty to one's country. As to the Enlightenment's concept of citizenship, students are, at least putatively, encouraged to engage in independent, critical thinking.

But the socializing functions of schooling play to the opposite idea: children of the working and professional and middle classes are to be molded to the industrial and technological imperatives of contemporary society. Students learn science and mathematics not as a discourse of liberation from myth and religious superstition but as a series of algorithms, the mastery of which are presumed to improve the student's logical capacities, or with no aim other than fulfilling academic requirements. In most places the social studies do not emphasize the choices between authoritarian and democratic forms of social organization, or democratic values, particularly criticism and renewal, but offer instead bits of information that have little significance for the conduct of life. Perhaps the teaching and learning of world literature where some students are inspired by the power of the story to, in John Dewey's terms, "reconstruct" experience is a partial exception to the rule that for most students school is endured rather than experienced as a series of exciting explorations of self and society.[1]

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The corporate factory, which includes sites of goods and symbolic production alike, is perhaps the nation's most authoritarian institution.

In the wake of these awesome tasks, fiscal exigency and a changing mission have combined to leave public education in the United States in a chronic state of crisis. For some the main issue is whether schools are failing to transmit the general intellectual culture, even to the most able students. What is at stake in this critique is the fate of America as a global model of civilization, particularly the condition of its democratic institutions and the citizens who are, in the final analysis, responsible for maintaining them. Of course, we may contend that the "global model" is fulfilled by the relentless anti-intellectual bias of schools and by a ruthless regime of the virtual expulsion of the most rebellious students, especially by secondary schools. Hannah Arendt goes so far as to ask whether we "love the world" and our children enough to devise an educational system capable of transmitting to them the salient cultural traditions. Other critics complain that schools are failing to fulfill the promise of equal opportunity for good jobs for working-class students, whether black, Latino, or white. Schools unwittingly reinforce the class bias of schooling by ignoring its content. The two positions, with respect both to their goals and to their implied educational philosophies, may not necessarily be contradictory, but their simultaneous enunciation produces, with exceptions to be discussed below, considerable tension for the American workplace, which has virtually no room for dissent. Individual or collective initiative is not sanctioned by management. The corporate factory, which includes sites of goods and symbolic production alike, is perhaps the nation's most authoritarian institution. But any reasonable concept of democratic citizenship requires an individual who is able to discern knowledge from propaganda, is competent to choose among conflicting claims and programs, and is capable of actively participating in the affairs of the polity. Yet the political system offers few opportunities, beyond the ritual of voting, for active citizen participation.[2]

Even identifying the problem of why and how schools fail has proven to be controversial. For those who define mass education as a form of training for the contemporary workplace, the problem can be traced to the crisis of authority, particularly school authority. That some of the same educational analysts favor a curriculum that stresses critical thinking for a small number of students in a restricted number of sites is consistent with the dominant trends of schooling since the turn of the twenty-first century. In the quest to restore authority, conservative educational policy has forcefully caused schools to abandon, both rhetorically and practically, the so-called child-centered curriculum and pedagogy in favor of measures that not only hold students accountable for passing standardized tests and for a definite quantity of school knowledge—on penalty of being left back from promotion or expelled—but also impose performance-based criteria

on administrators and teachers. For example, in New York City the schools chancellor has issued "report cards" to principals and has threatened to fire those whose schools do not meet standards established by high-stakes tests. These tests are the antithesis of critical thought. Their precise object is to evaluate the student's ability to imbibe and regurgitate information and to solve problems according to prescribed algorithms.

On the other side, the progressives—who misread John Dewey's educational philosophy to mean that the past need not be studied too seriously—have offered little resistance to the gradual vocationalizing and dumbing down of the mass education curriculum. In fact, historically they were advocates of making the curriculum less formal, reducing requirements, and, on the basis of a degraded argument that children learn best by "doing," promoting practical, work-oriented programs for high-school students. Curricular deformalization was often justified on interdisciplinary criteria, which resulted in watering down course content and de-emphasizing writing. Most American high-school students, in the affluent as well as the "inner-city" districts, may write short papers that amount to book reviews and autobiographical essays, but most graduate without ever having to perform research and write a paper of considerable length. Moreover, since the late 1960s, in an attempt to make the study of history more "relevant" to students' lives, students have not been required to memorize dates; they may learn the narratives but are often unable to place them in a specific chronological context. Similarly, economics has been eliminated in many schools or is taught as a "unit" of a general social studies course. And if philosophy is taught at all, it is construed in terms of "values clarification," a kind of ethics in which students are assisted to discover and examine their own values.

That after more than a century of universal schooling the relationship between education and class has once more been thrust to the forefront is just one more signal of the crisis in American education. The educational Left, never strong on promoting intellectual knowledge as a substantive demand, clings to one of the crucial precepts of progressive educational philosophy: under the sign of egalitarianism, the idea that class deficits can be overcome by equalizing access to school opportunities without questioning what those opportunities have to do with genuine education. The access question has dominated higher education debates since the early 1970s; even conservatives who favor vouchers and other forms of public funding for private and parochial schools have justified privatizing instruction on access grounds.

The structure of schooling already embodies the class system of society, and, for this reason, the access debate misfires. To gain entrance into schools always entails placement into that system. "Equality of Opportu-

nity" for class mobility is the system's tacit recognition that inequality is normative. In the system of mass education, schools are no longer constituted to transmit the Enlightenment intellectual traditions or the fundamental prerequisites of participatory citizenship, even for a substantial minority. While the acquisition of credentials conferred by schools remains an important prerequisite for many occupations, the conflation of schooling with education is mistaken. Schooling is surely a source of training both by its disciplinary regime and by its credentialing system. But schools do not transmit a "love for the world" or "for our children," as Arendt suggests; contrary to their democratic pretensions, they teach conformity to the social, cultural, and occupational hierarchy. In our contemporary world they are not constituted to foster independent thought, let alone encourage independent action. School knowledge is not the only source of education for students, perhaps not even the most important source. Young people learn, for ill as well as good, from popular culture (especially music), from parents, and, perhaps most important, from their peers. Schools are the stand-in for "society," the aggregation of individuals who, by contract or by coercion, are subject to governing authorities in return for which they may be admitted into the world albeit on the basis of different degrees of reward. To the extent that popular culture, parents, and peers signify solidarity and embody common dreams, they are the worlds of quasi communities that exert more influence on their members.

Access to What?

In the main, the critique of education has been directed to the question of access and its entailments, particularly the idea that greater access presumably opens up the gates to higher learning or to better jobs. Generally speaking, critical education analysis focuses on the degree to which schools are willing and able to open their doors to working-class students, coded in many cities as "black, Asian, and Latino" students, because through the mechanisms of differential access, schools are viewed as, perhaps, the principal reproductive institutions of economically and technologically advanced capitalist societies. With some exceptions, most critics of schooling have paid scant attention to school authority, the conditions for the accumulation of social capital—the intricate network of personal relations that articulate with occupational access—and to cultural capital, the accumulation of the signs, if not the substance, of the kinds of knowledge that are markers of distinction.[3]

The progressives assume that the heart of the class question is whether schooling provides working-class kids equality of opportunity to

acquire legitimate knowledge and marketable academic credentials. They have adduced overwhelming evidence that contradicts schooling's reigning doctrine: that despite class, race, or gender hierarchies in the economic and political system, public education provides every individual with the tools to overcome conditions of birth. In reality only about a quarter of people of working-class origin attain professional, technical, and managerial careers through the credentialing system. Many more obtain general diplomas, but as the saying goes, a high-school diploma and $2 gets you a ride on the New York subway. The professional and technical credential implies that students have mastered specialized knowledge and acquired a set of skills associated with the speciality. They find occupational niches, but not at the top of their respective domains. Typically graduating from third-tier, nonresearch colleges and universities, they have not acquired knowledge connected with substantial intellectual work: theory, extensive writing, and independent research. Students leaving these institutions find jobs as line supervisors, computer technicians, teachers, nurses, social workers, and other niches in the social service professions.

A small number may join their better-educated colleagues in getting no-collar jobs, where "no collar"—Andrew Ross's term—designates occupations that afford considerable work autonomy, such as computer design, which, although salaried, cannot be comfortably folded into the conventional division of manual and intellectual labor. That so-called social mobility was a product of the specific conditions of American economic development at a particular time—the first quarter of the twentieth century—and was due, principally, to the absence of an indigenous peasantry during the country's industrial revolution and the forced confinement of millions of blacks to southern agricultural lands, which is conveniently forgotten or ignored by consensus opinion. Nor were the labor shortages provoked by World War II and the subsequent U.S. dominance of world capitalism until 1973 taken into account by the celebrants of mobility. Economic stagnation has afflicted the U.S. economy for more than three decades, and, despite the high-tech bubble of the 1990s, its position has deteriorated in the world market. Yet the mythology of mobility retains a powerful grip on the popular mind. That schooling makes credentials available to anyone regardless of rank or status forms one of the sturdy pillars of American ideology.[4]

In recent years the constitutional and legal assignment to the states and local communities of responsibility for public education has been undermined by what has been termed the "standards" movement that is today the prevailing national educational policy, enforced not so much by federal law—notwithstanding the Bush administration's No Child Left Behind program—as by political and ideological coercion. At the state

and district levels the invocation to "tough love" has attained widespread support. We are witnessing the abrogation, both in practice and in rhetoric, of the tradition of social promotion whereby students moved through the system without acquiring academic skills. Having proven unable to provide to most working-class kids the necessary educational experiences that qualify them for academic promotion, the standards movement, more than a decade after its installation, reveals its underlying content: it is the latest means of exclusion, whose success depends on placing the onus for failure to achieve academic credentials on the individual rather than the system. Although state departments of education frequently mandate the teaching of certain subjects and have established standards based on high-stakes tests applicable to all districts, everyone knows that districts with working-class majorities provide neither a curriculum and pedagogy, nor facilities that meet these standards, because, among other problems, they are chronically underfunded. The state aid formulas that, since the advent of conservative policy hegemony, reward those districts whose students perform well on high-stakes tests tend to be unequal. Performance-based aid policies mean that school districts where the affluent live get more than their share; they make up for state budget deficits by raising local property taxes and soliciting annual subventions from parents, measures not affordable by even the top layer of wage workers, or low-level salaried employees. The result is overcrowded classrooms, poor facilities, especially libraries, and underpaid, often poorly prepared teachers, an outcome of financially starved education schools in public universities.

Standards presuppose students' prior possession of cultural capital—an acquisition that almost invariably entails having been reared in a professional or otherwise upper-class family. That, in the main, even the most privileged elementary and secondary schools are ill equipped to compensate for home backgrounds in which reading and writing are virtually absent has become a matter of indifference for school authorities. In this era of social Darwinism, poor school performance is likely to be coded as genetic deficit rather than being ascribed to social policy. Of course, the idea that working-class kids, whatever their gender, race, or ethnic backgrounds, were selected by evolution or by God to perform material rather than immaterial labor is not new; this view is as old as class-divided societies. But in an epoch in which the chances of obtaining a good working-class job have sharply declined, most kids face dire consequences if they don't acquire the skills needed in the world of immaterial labor. Not only are 75 percent assigned to working-class jobs, but in the absence of a shrinking pool of unionized industrial jobs, which often pay more than some professions such as teaching and social work, they must accept low-

paying service-sector employment, enter the informal economy, or join the ranks of the chronically unemployed.

The rise of higher education since World War II has been seen by many as a repudiation of academic elitism. Do not the booming higher education enrollments validate the propositions of social mobility and democratic education? Not at all. Rather than constituting a sign of rising qualifications and widening opportunity, burgeoning college and university enrollments signify changing economic and political trends. The scientific and technical nature of our production and service sectors increasingly require qualified and credentialed workers (it would be a mistake to regard them as identical). Students who would have sought good factory jobs in the past now believe, with reason, they need credentials to qualify for a well-paying job. On the other hand, even as politicians and educators decry social promotion, and most high schools with working-class constituencies remain aging vats, mass higher education is, to a great extent, a holding pen: effectively masking unemployment and underemployment. This may account for its rapid expansion over the last thirty-five years of chronic economic stagnation, deindustrialization, and the proliferation of part-time and temporary jobs, largely in the low-paid service sectors. Consequently, working-class students are able, even encouraged, to enter universities and colleges at the bottom of the academic hierarchy—community colleges but also public four-year colleges—thus fulfilling the formal pledge of equal opportunity for class mobility even as most of these institutions suppress the intellectual content that would fulfill the mobility promise. But grade-point averages, which in the standards era depend as much as the Scholastic Aptitude Test on high-stakes testing, measure the acquired knowledge of students and restrict their access to elite institutions of higher learning, the obligatory training grounds for professional and managerial occupations. Since all credentials are not equal, graduating from third- and fourth-tier institutions does not confer on the successful candidate the prerequisites for entering a leading graduate school—the preparatory institution for professional and managerial occupations, or the most desirable entry-level service jobs that require only a bachelor's degree.

Pierre Bourdieu argues that schools reproduce class relations by reinforcing rather than reducing class-based differential access to social and cultural capital, key markers of class affiliation and mobility. Children of the wealthy, professionals, and the intelligentsia, he argues, always already possess these forms of capital. Far from making possible a rich intellectual education, or providing the chance to affiliate with networks of students and faculty who have handles on better jobs, schooling habituates working-

Mass higher education is, to a great extent, a holding pen: effectively masking unemployment and underemployment.

class students, through mechanisms of discipline and punishment, to the bottom rungs of the work world or the academic world by subordinating or expelling them.[5] Poorly prepared for academic work by their primary and secondary schools, and having few alternatives to acquiring some kind of credential, many who stay the course and graduate high school and third- and fourth-tier college inevitably confront a series of severely limited occupational choices—or none at all. Their life chances are just a cut above those who do not complete high school or college. Their school performances seem to validate what common sense has always suspected: given equal opportunity to attain school knowledge, the cream always rises to the top and those stuck at the bottom must be biologically impaired, victimized by the infamous "culture of poverty" or just plain distracted. That most working-class high-school and college students are obliged to hold full- or part-time jobs in order to stay in school fails to temper this judgment, for as is well known, preconceptions usually trump facts.[6] Nor does the fact that the children of the recent 20 million immigrants from Latin America, Russia, and especially Asia speak their native languages at home, in the neighborhood, and to each other in school evoke more than hand-wringing from educational leaders. In this era of tight school budgets, English as a Second Language funds have been cut or eliminated at every level of schooling.

But Paul Willis insists that working-class kids get working-class jobs by means of their refusal to accept the discipline entailed in curricular mastery and by their rebellion against school authority. Challenging the familiar "socialization" thesis—of which Bourdieu's is perhaps the most sophisticated version, according to which working-class kids "fail" because they are culturally deprived or, in the American critical version, are assaulted by the hidden curriculum and school pedagogy that subsumes kids under the prevailing order—Willis recodes kids' failure as refusal of [school] work, which lands them in the world of factory or low-level service work. Willis offers no alternative educational model to schooling: his discovery functions as critique. Indeed, as Willis himself acknowledges, the school remains, in Louis Althusser's famous phrase, the main "ideological state apparatus," but working-class kids are not victims. Implicitly rejecting Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb's notion that school failure is a "hidden injury" of class insofar as working-class kids internalize poor school performance as a sign of personal deficit, he argues that most early school leavers are active agents in the production of their own class position. While students' antipathy to school authority is enacted at the site of the school, its origins are the working-class culture from which they spring. Workers do not like bosses, and kids do not like school bosses, the deans and principals, but often as well the teachers,

whose main job in the urban centers is to keep order. The source of working-class kids' education is not the school but the shop floor, the places where their parents work, the home, and the neighborhood.[7]

In the past half-century the class question has been inflected by race and gender discrimination, and, in the American way, the "race, gender, class" phrase implies that these domains are ontologically distinct, if not entirely separate. Nor have critics theorized the race and gender question as a class issue, but as an attribute of bioidentities. In fact, in the era of identity politics, for many writers class itself stands alongside race and gender as just another identity. Having made the easy, inaccurate judgment that white students—regardless of their class or gender—stand in a qualitatively different relation to school-related opportunities than blacks, class is often suppressed as a sign of exclusion. In privileging issues of access, not only is the curriculum presupposed, in which case Bourdieu's insistence on the concept of cultural capital is ignored, but also the entire question is elided of whether schooling may be conflated with education. Only rarely do writers examine other forms of education. In both the Marxist and liberal traditions, schooling is presumed to remain—over a vast spectrum of spatial and temporal situations—the theater within which life chances are determined.

Education and Immaterial Labor

Education may be defined as the collective and individual reflection on the totality of life experiences: what we learn from peers, parents (and the socially situated cultures of which they are a part), media, and schools. By reflection I mean the transformation of experience into a multitude of concepts that constitute the abstractions we call "knowledge." Which of the forms of learning predominate are always configured historically. The exclusive focus by theorists and researchers on school knowledges—indeed, the implication that school is the principal site of what we mean by education—reflects the degree to which they have, themselves, internalized the equation of education with school knowledge and its preconditions. The key learning is they (we) have been habituated to a specific regime of intellectual labor that entails a high level of self-discipline, the acquisition of the skills of reading and writing, and the career expectations associated with professionalization.

To say this constitutes the self-reflection by intellectuals—in the broadest sense of the term—of their own relation to schooling. In the age of the decline of critical intelligence and the proliferation of technical intelligence, "intellectual" in its current connotation designates immaterial

labor, not traditional intellectual pursuits such as literature, philosophy, and art. Immaterial labor describes those who work not with objects or the administration of things and people, but with ideas, symbols, and signs. Some of the occupations grouped under immaterial labor have an affective dimension. The work demands the complete subordination of brain, emotion, and body to the task while requiring the worker to exercise considerable judgment and imagination in its performance. For example, at sites such as "new economy" private-sector software workplaces; some law firms that deal with questions of intellectual property, public interest, or constitutional and international law; research universities and independent research institutes; and small, innovative design, architectural, and engineering firms, the informality of the labor process, close collaborative relationships among members of task-oriented teams, and the overflow of the space of the shop floor with the spaces of home and play evoke, at times, a high level of exhilaration, even giddiness, among members, and at other times utter exhaustion and burnout because the work invades the dreamwork and prohibits relaxation and genuine attention to partners and children.

To be an immaterial worker means, in the interest of having self-generated work, surrendering much of one's unfettered time. Such workers are obliged to sunder the conventional separation of work and leisure, to adopt the view that time devoted to creative, albeit commodified labor, is actually "free." Or, to be more exact, even play must be engaged in as serious business. For many the golf course, the bar, the weekend at the beach are workplaces, where dreams are shared, plans formulated, and deals are made. Just as time becomes unified around work, so work loses its geographic specificity. As Andrew Ross shows in his pathbreaking ethnography of a New York new economy workplace during and after the dot-com boom, the headiness for the pioneers of this new work world was, tacitly, a function of the halcyon period of the computer software industry when everyone felt the sky was no longer the limit.[8] When the economic crunch descended on thousands of workplaces, people were laid off, and those who remained, as well as those who became unemployed, experienced a heavy dose of market reality.

It may be argued that among elite students and institutions, schooling not only prepares immaterial labor by transmitting a bundle of legitimate knowledges; the diligent, academically successful student internalizes the blur between the classroom, play, and home by spending a great deal of time in the library or ostensibly playing at the computer. Thus the price of the promise of autonomy, a situation intrinsic to professional ideology, if not always its practice in the context of bureaucratic and hierarchical corporate systems, is to accept work as a mode of life; one lives to work,

rather than the reverse. The hopes and expectations of these strata are formed in the process of schooling; indeed, they have most completely assimilated the ideologies linked to school knowledge and to the credentials conferred by the system. Thus whether professional school people, educational researchers, or not, they tend to evaluate people by the criteria to which they, themselves, were subjected. If the child has not fully embraced work as life, he is consigned to the educational nether land. Even the egalitarians (better read *populists*) accept this regime: their object is to afford those for whom work is a necessary evil entry into the social world, where work is the mission.

The Labor and Radical Movements as Educational Sites

The working-class intellectual as a social type precedes and parallels the emergence of universal public education. At the dawn of the public-school movement in the 1830s, the antebellum labor movement, which consisted largely of literate skilled workers, favored six years of schooling in order to transmit to their children the basics of reading and writing, but opposed compulsory attendance in secondary schools. The reasons were bound up with their congenital suspicion of the state, which they believed never exhibited sympathy for the workers' cause. Although opposed to child labor, the early workers' movements were convinced that the substance of education—literature, history, philosophy—should be supplied by the movement itself. Consequently, in both the oral and the written tradition, workers' organizations often constituted an alternate university to that of public schools. The active program of many workers' and radical movements until World War II consisted largely in education through newspapers, literacy classes for immigrants where the reading materials were drawn from labor and socialist classics, and world literature. These were supplemented by lectures offered by independent scholars who toured the country in the employ of lecture organizations commissioned by the unions and radical organizations.[9]

But the shop floor was also a site of education. Skilled workers were usually literate in their own language and in English, and many were voracious readers and writers. Union and radical newspapers often ran poetry and stories written by workers. Socialist-led unions sponsored educational programs; in the era when the union contract was still a rarity, the union was not so much an agency of contract negotiation and enforcement as an educational, political, and social association. In his autobiography, Samuel Gompers, the founding American Federation of Labor president, remembers his fellow cigar makers hiring a "reader" in the 1870s, who sat at the

center of the shop floor and read from literary and historical classics as well as more contemporary works of political and economic analysis such as the writings of Marx and Engels. Reading groups met in the back of a bar, in the union hall, or in the local affiliate of the socialist wing of the nationality federations. Often these groups were ostensibly devoted to preparing immigrants to pass the obligatory language test for citizenship status. But the content of the reading was, in addition to labor and socialist newspapers and magazines, often supplemented by works of fiction by Shakespeare, the great nineteenth-century novelists and poets, and Karl Kautsky. In its anarchist inflection, Peter Kropotkin, Moses Hess, and Michael Bakunin were the required texts.[10]

In New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and other large cities where the Socialist, Anarchist, and Communist movements had considerable membership and a fairly substantial periphery of sympathizers, the parties established adult schools that not only offered courses pertaining to political and ideological knowledge but were vehicles for many working- and middle-class students to gain a general education. Among them, in New York, the socialist-oriented Rand School and the Communist-sponsored Jefferson School (formerly the Workers' School) lasted until the mid-1950s when, because of the decline of a Left intellectual culture among workers as much as the contemporary repressive political environment, they closed. But in their heydays, from the 1920s to the late 1940s, for tens of thousands of working-class people—many of them high-school students and industrial workers—these schools were alternate universities. Many courses concerned history, literature, and philosophy, and, at least at the Jefferson School, students could study art, drama, and music, as could their children. The tradition was revived, briefly, by the 1960s New Left that, in similar sites, sponsored free universities where the term *free* designated not an absence of tuition fees but an ideological and intellectual freedom from either the traditional Left parties or the conventional school system. I participated in organizing New York's Free University and two of its successors. While not affiliated with the labor movement or socialist parties, it successfully attracted more than a thousand mostly young students in each of its semesters and offered a broad range of courses taught by people of divergent intellectual and political orientations, including some free-market libertarians attracted to the school's nonsectarianism.[11]

When I worked in a steel mill in the late 1950s, some of us formed a group that read current literature, labor history, and economics. I discussed books and magazine articles with some of my fellow workers in bars as well as on breaks. Tony Mazzocchi, who was at the same time a worker and union officer of a Long Island local of the Oil, Chemical and

Atomic Workers Union, organized a similar group, and I knew of several other cases in which young workers did the same. Some of these groups evolved into rank-and-file caucuses that eventually contested the leadership of their local unions; others were mainly for the self-edification of the participants and had no particular political goals.

But beyond formal programs, the working-class intellectual, although by no means visible in the United States, has been part of shop-floor culture since the industrializing era. In almost every workplace there is a person or persons to whom other workers turn for information about the law, the union contract, contemporary politics, or, equally important, as a source of general education. These individuals may or may not have been schooled, but, until the late 1950s, they rarely had any college education. For schools were not the primary source of their knowledge. They were, and are, largely self-educated. In my own case, having left Brooklyn College after less than a year, I worked in various industrial production jobs. When I worked the midnight shift, I got off at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast, and spent four hours in the library before going home. Mostly I read American and European history and political economy, particularly the physiocrats, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Maynard Keynes, and Joseph Schumpeter. Marx's *Capital* I read in high school, and owned the three volumes.

My friend Russell Rommele, who worked in a nearby mill, was also an autodidact. His father was a first-generation German American brewery worker, with no particular literary interests. But Russell had read a wide range of historical and philosophical works as a high-school student at Saint Benedict's Prep, a Jesuit institution. The priests singled out Russell for the priesthood and mentored him in theology and social theory. The experience radicalized him, and he decided not to answer the call but to enter the industrial working class instead. Like me, he was active in the union and Newark Democratic Party politics. Working as an educator with a local union in the auto industry recently, I have met several active unionists who are intellectuals. The major difference between them and those of my generation is that they are college graduates, although none of them claim to have acquired their love of learning or their analytic perspective from schools. One is a former member of a radical organization; another learned his politics from participation in a shop-based study of a group/union caucus. In both instances, with the demise of their organizational affiliations, they remain habituated to reading, writing, and union activity.

Beneath the radar screen, union-university collaborations sprang up in the 1980s. I was among those who founded the Center for Worker Education at City College. It is a bachelor's degree program, begun for union members and their families, but expanded to other working people

as well. Worker education meant, in this case, that the emphasis is not on labor studies in the manner of Cornell, UCLA, University of Minnesota's schools of industrial and labor relations, or the Queens College Labor Resource Center. Instead, City College's center offers a liberal arts and professional curriculum as well as a few courses in labor history. While the educational content is often critical, the intention articulates with the recent focus on credentialism of undergraduate institutions. Similar programs have been in operation for two decades in a collaboration between the large New York municipal employees' District Council 37 and the College of New Rochelle, and the Hospital Workers Union's various arrangements with New York–area colleges that offer upgrading, training, and college courses to thousands of its members.

Parents, Neighborhood, Class, Culture

John Locke observes that, consistent with his rejection of innate ideas, even if conceptions of good and evil are present in divine or civil law, morality is constituted by reference to our parents, relatives, and especially the "club" of peers to which we belong:

> He who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives to men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse seems little skilled in the nature or the history of mankind: the greatest part whereof we shall find govern themselves, chiefly, if not solely by this law of *fashion* [emphasis in the original]; and so they do what keeps them in reputation with their company, [with] little regard for the laws of God or the magistrate.[12]

William James puts the matter equally succinctly:

> A man's social self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in the sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind. No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, that that should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof.[13]

That the social worlds of peers and family are the chief referents for the formation of the social self, neither philosopher doubted. Each in his own fashion situates the individual in social context, which provides a "common measure of virtue and vice" (Locke) even as they acknowledge the ultimate choice resides with the individual self. These, and not the

institutions, even those that have the force of law, are the primary sources of authority.

Hannah Arendt argues that education "by its very nature cannot forego either authority or tradition." Nor can it base itself on the presumption that children share an autonomous existence from adults.[14] Yet schooling ignores the reality of the society of kids at the cost of undermining its own authority. The society of kids is in virtually all classes an alternative and oppositional site of knowledge and of moral valuation. We have already seen how working-class kids get working-class jobs by means of their rebellion against school authority. Since refusal and resistance is a hallmark of that moral order, the few who will not obey the invocation to fail, or to perform indifferently in school, often find themselves marginalized or expelled from the society of kids. While they adopt a rationality that can be justified on eminently practical grounds, the long tradition of rejection of academic culture has proven hard to break, even in the wake of evidence that those working-class jobs to which they were oriented no longer exist. For what is at stake in the resistance of adolescents is their perception that the blandishments of the adult world are vastly inferior to the pleasures of their own. In the first place, the new service economy offers few inducements: wages are low, the job is boring, and the future bleak. And since the schools now openly present themselves as a link in the general system of control, it may appear to some students that cooperation is a form of self-deception.

If not invariably, then in many households parents provide to the young a wealth of knowledges: the family mythologies that feature an uncle or aunt, a grandparent or an absent parent. These are the stories, loosely based on some actual event(s) in which family members have distinguished themselves in various ways that (usually) illustrate a moral virtue or defect, the telling of which constitutes a kind of didactic message. Even when not attached to an overt narrative, parable, or myth, the actions of our parents offer many lessons: How do they deal with adversity? How do they address ordinary, everyday problems? What do they learn from their own trials and tribulations and what do they say to us? What are our parents' attitudes toward money, joblessness, and everyday life disruptions such as sudden, acute illness or accidents? What do they learn from the endless conflicts with their parent(s) over issues of sex, money, and household responsibilities?

The relative weight of parental to peer authority is an empirical question that cannot be decided in advance; what both have in common is their location in everyday life. Parents are likely to be more susceptible to the authority of law and of its magistrates and, in a world of increasing uncertainty, will worry that if their children choose badly, they may be left

behind. But the associations with our peers we make in everyday life provide the recognition that we crave, define what is worthy of praise or blame, and confer approbation or disapproval on our decisions. But having made a choice that runs counter to that of "their company" or club, individuals must form or join a new "company" to confer the judgment of virtue on their actions. This company must, of necessity, consist of "peers," the definition of which has proven fungible.

Religion, the law, and, among kids, school authorities face the obstacles erected by the powerful rewards and punishments meted out by the "clubs" to which people are affiliated. At a historical conjunction when—beneath the relentless pressure imposed by capital to transform all labor into wage labor, thereby forcing every adult into the paid labor force—the society of kids increasingly occupies the space of civil society. The neighborhood, once dominated by women and small shopkeepers, has all but disappeared save for the presence of children and youth. As parents toil for endless hours to pay the ever-mounting debts incurred by home ownership, perpetual car and appliance payments, and the costs of health care, kids are increasingly on their own, and this lack of supervision affects their conceptions of education and life.

Some recent studies and teacher observations have discovered a considerable reluctance among black students in elite universities to perform well in school, even among those with professional or managerial family backgrounds. Many seem indifferent to arguments that show that school performance is a central prerequisite to better jobs and higher status in the larger work world. Among the more acute speculations is the conclusion that black students' resistance reflects an anti-intellectual bias and a hesitation, if not refusal, to enter the mainstream corporate world. There are similar attitudes among some relatively affluent white students as well. Although by no means a majority, some students are less enamored by the work world to which they, presumably, have been habituated by school, and especially by the prospect of perpetual work. In the third-tier universities, state and private alike, many students, apparently forced by their parents to enroll, wonder out loud why they are there. Skepticism about schooling still abounds even as they graduate high school and enroll in postsecondary schools in record numbers. According to one colleague of mine who teaches in a third-tier private university in the New York metropolitan area, many of these mostly suburban students "sleepwalk" through their classes, do not participate in class discussions, and are lucky to get a C grade.[15]

In the working-class neighborhoods—white, black, and Latino—the word is out: given the absence of viable alternatives, you must try to obtain that degree, but this defines the limit of loyalty to the enterprise.

Based on testimonies of high-school and community-college teachers, for every student who takes school knowledge seriously there are twenty or more who are timeservers. Most are ill prepared for academic work, and, since the community colleges, four-year state colleges, and "teaching" universities simply lack the resources to provide the means by which such students can improve their school performance, beyond the credential there is little motivation among them to try to get an education.

In some instances, those who break from their club and enter the regime of school knowledge risk being drummed out of a lifetime of relationships with their peers. What has euphemistically been described as "peer pressure" bears, among other moral structures, on the degree to which kids are permitted to cross over the line into the precincts of adult authority. While success in school is not equivalent to squealing on a friend to the cops, or transgressing some sacred moral code of the society of kids, it comes close to committing an act of betrayal. This is comprehensible only if the reader is willing to suspend the prejudice that schooling is tantamount to education and is an unqualified "good," as compared to the presumed evil of school failure, or the decision of the slacker to rebel by refusing to succeed.

To invoke the concept of "class" in either educational debates or any other politically charged discourse generally refers to the white working class. Educational theory and practice treats blacks and Latinos, regardless of their economic positions, as unified categories. That black kids from professional, managerial, and business backgrounds share as much or more with their white counterparts than with working-class blacks is generally ignored by most educational writers, just as in race discourse whites are an undifferentiated racial identity, which refers in slightly different registers to people of African origin and those who migrated from Latin countries of South America and the Caribbean, and are treated as a unified category. The narrowing of the concept of class limits our ability to discern class at all. I want to suggest that, although we must stipulate ethnic, gender, race, and occupational distinction among differentiated strata of wage labor—with the exception of children of salaried professional and technical groups, where the culture of schooling plays a decisive role—class education transcends these distinctions. No doubt there are gradations among the strata that comprise this social formation, but the most privileged professional strata (physicians, attorneys, scientists, professors) and the high-level managers are self-reproducing, not principally through schooling but through social networks. These include private schools, some of which are residential; clubs and associations; and, in suburban public schools, the self-selection of students on the basis of distinctions. Show me a school friendship between the son or daughter of a corporate man-

ager and the child of a janitor or factory worker, and I will show you an anomaly.

Schooling selects a fairly small number of children of the class of wage labor for genuine class mobility. In the first half of the twentieth century, having lost its appeal among middle-class youth, the Catholic Church turned to working-class students as a source of cadre recruitment. In my neighborhood of the East Bronx two close childhood friends, both of Italian background, entered the priesthood. For these sons of construction workers, the Church provided their best chance to escape the hardships and economic uncertainties of manual labor. Another kid became a pharmacist because the local college, Fordham University, offered scholarships. A fourth was among the tiny coterie of students who passed the test for one of the city's special schools, Bronx Science, and became a science teacher. Otherwise, almost everybody else remained a worker or, like my best friend, Kenny, went to prison.

Despite the well-publicized claim that anyone can escape their condition of social and economic birth—a claim reproduced by schools and by the media with numbing regularity—most working-class students, many of whom have some college credits but often do not graduate—end up in low- and middle-level service jobs that do not pay a decent working-class wage. Owing to the steep decline of unionized industrial production jobs, those who enter factories increasingly draw wages substantially below union standards. Those who do graduate find work in computers, although rarely at the professional levels. The relatively low paid become K-12 school teachers and health care professionals, mostly nurses and technicians, or enter the social services field as caseworkers, medical social workers, or nonsupervisory social welfare workers. The question I want to pose is whether these "professional" occupations represent genuine mobility.

During the postwar economic boom that made possible a significant expansion of spending for schools, the social services, and administration of public goods, the public sector workplace became a favored site of black and Latino recruitment, mainly for clerical, maintenance, and entry-level patient care jobs in hospitals and other health care facilities. Within several decades a good number advanced to practical and registered nursing, but not in all sections of the country. As unionization spread to the nonprofit private sector as well as public employment in the 1960s and 1970s, these jobs paid enough to enable many to enjoy what became known as a middle-class living standard, with a measure of job security offered by union security and civil service status. While it is true that "job security" has often been observed in its breach, the traditional deal made by teachers, nurses, and social workers was that they traded higher incomes for job security. But after about 1960, spurred by the resurgent

civil rights movement, these "second-level" professionals—white and black—began to see themselves as workers more than professionals: they formed unions, struck for higher pay and shorter hours, and assumed a very unprofessional adversarial stance toward institutional authority. Contracts stipulated higher salaries, definite hours—a sharp departure from professional ideology—and seniority as a basis for layoffs, like any industrial contract, and demanded substantial vacation and sick leave.

Their assertion of working-class values and social position may have been strategic; indeed, it inspired the largest wave of union organizing since the 1930s. But, together with the entrance of huge numbers of women and blacks into the public and quasi–public sector workforces, it was also a symptom of the proletarianization of the second-tier professions. Several decades later, salaried physicians made a similar discovery; they formed unions and struck against high malpractice insurance costs as much as the onerous conditions imposed on their autonomy by health maintenance organizations and government authorities bent on cost containment, often at the physicians' expense. More to the point, the steep rise of public employees' salaries and benefits posed the question of how to maintain services in times of fiscal austerity, which might be due to economic downturn or to probusiness tax policies. The answer has been that the political and public officials told employees that the temporary respite from the classical trade union trade-off was over. All public employees have suffered a relative deterioration in their salaries and benefits. Since the mid-1970s fiscal crises, begun in New York City, they have experienced layoffs for the first time since the Depression. And their unions have been in a concessionary bargaining mode for decades. In the politically and ideologically repressive environment of the last twenty-five years, the class divide has sharpened. Ironically, in the wake of the attacks by legislatures and business against their hard-won gains in the early 1980s, the teachers unions abandoned their militant class posture and reverted to professionalism and a center-right political strategy.

In the early 1980s, the teachers unions abandoned their militant class posture and reverted to professionalism and a center-right political strategy.

In truth, schools are learning sites, even if only for a handful of intellectual knowledge. For the most part, they transmit the instrumental logic of credentialism, together with their transformation from institutions of discipline to those of control, especially in working-class districts. Even talented, dedicated teachers have difficulty reaching kids and convincing them that the life of the mind may hold unexpected rewards, though the career implications of critical thought are not apparent. The breakdown of the mission of public schools has produced varied forms of disaffection; if school violence has abated in some places, that does not signify the decline of gangs and other "clubs" that represent the autonomous world of youth. The society of

kids is more autonomous because, in contrast to 1960s, official authorities no longer offer hope; instead, in concert with the doctrine of control, they threaten punishment that includes, but is not necessarily associated with, incarceration. The large number of drug busts of young black and Latino men should not be minimized. With over a million blacks, more than 3 percent of the African American population—most of them young (25 percent of young black men)—within the purview of the criminal justice system, the law may be viewed as a more or less concerted effort to counter by force the power of peers. This may be regarded in the context of the failure of schools. Of course, more than three hundred years ago John Locke knew the limits of the magistrates—indeed, of any adult authority—to overcome the power of the society of kids.[16]

Conclusion

What are the requisite changes that would transform schools from credential mills and institutions of control to sites of education that prepare young people to see themselves as active participants in the world? As my analysis implies, the fundamental condition is to abolish high-stakes tests that dominate the curriculum and subordinate teachers to the role of drillmasters and subject students to stringent controls. By this proposal I do not mean to eliminate the need for evaluative tools. The essay is a fine measure of both writing ability and of the student's grasp of literature, social science, and history. While mathematics, science, and language proficiency do require considerable rote learning, the current curriculum and pedagogy in these fields includes neither a historical account of the changes in scientific and mathematical theory nor a metaconceptual explanation of what the disciplines are about. Nor are courses in language at the secondary level ever concerned with etymological issues, comparative cultural study of semantic differences, and other topics that might relieve the boredom of rote learning by providing depth of understanding. The broader understanding of science in the modern world—its relation to technology, war, and medicine, for example—should surely be integrated into the curriculum; some of these issues appear in the textbooks, but teachers rarely discuss them because they are busy preparing students for the high-stakes tests in which knowledge of the social contexts for science, language, and mathematics is not included.

I agree with Hannah Arendt that education "cannot forgo either authority or tradition." But authority must be earned rather than assumed, and the transmission of tradition needs to be critical rather than worshipful. If teachers were allowed to acknowledge student skepticism to incor-

porate kids' knowledge into the curriculum by making what they know the object of rigorous study, especially popular music and television, teachers might be treated with greater respect. But there is no point denying the canon; one of the more egregious conditions of subordination is the failure of schools to expose students to the best exemplars, for people who have no cultural capital are thereby condemned to social and political marginality, let alone deprived of some of the genuine pleasures to be derived from encounters with genuine works of art. When the New York City Board of Education (now the Department of Education) mandates that during every semester high-school English classes read a Shakespeare play, and one or two works of nineteenth-century English literature, but afford little or no access to the best Russian novels of the nineteenth century, no opportunities to examine some of the most influential works of Western or Eastern philosophy, and provide no social and historical context for what is learned, tradition is observed in the breach more than in its practice.

Finally, schools should cut their ties to corporate interests and reconstruct the curriculum along the lines of genuine intellectual endeavor. Nor should schools be seen as career conduits, although this function will be difficult to displace: in an era of high economic anxiety, many kids and their parents worry about the future and seek some practical purchase on it. It will take some convincing that their best leg up is to be educated. It is unlikely in the present environment, but possible in some places.

One could elaborate these options; this is only an outline. In order to come close to their fulfillment at least three things are needed. First, we require a conversation concerning the nature and scope of education and the limits of schooling as an educational site. Along with this, theorists and researchers need to link their knowledge of popular culture, culture in the anthropological sense—that is, everyday life—with the politics of education. Teachers who, by their own education, are intellectuals who respect and want to help children obtain a genuine education regardless of their social class are in the forefront of enabling social change and are entrusted with widening students' possibilities in life. For this we need a new regime of teacher education founded on the idea that the educator must be educated well. It would surely entail abolishing the current curricula of most education schools, if not the schools themselves. Teacher training should be embedded in general education, not in "methods," many of which are useless; instruction should include knowledge other than credential and bring the union/movement/organic intellectuals into classroom. In other words, the classroom should be a window on the world, not a hermetically sealed regime of the imposition of habitus, that is, making the test of academic success equivalent to measuring the degree to which the student

has been inculcated with the habit of subordination to school and pedagogic authority.[17] And we need a movement of parents, students, teachers, and labor armed with a political program to force legislatures to adequately fund schooling at the federal, state, and local levels, and boards of education to deauthorize high-stakes tests that currently drive the curriculum and pedagogy.

To outline a program for the reconstruction of schooling does not imply that the chances for its success are good, especially in the current environment. Indeed, almost all current trends oppose the concept of public education as a school of freedom. But if the principle of critique is hope rather than the most rigorous form of nihilism—the suspension of action pending an upsurge from below—we have an obligation to resist but also to suggest alternatives. These will, inevitably, be attacked as utopian, and, of course, they are. But as many have argued, utopian thought is the condition for change. Without the "impossible," there is little chance for reform.

Notes

1. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (1916; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1964).

2. The literature on the limits of democracy in America is vast. For a searing indictment, see the classic critique: Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966).

3. Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of cultural and social capital are introduced in Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Culture, and Society*, trans. Richard Nice (London: Sage, 1977).

4. Andrew Ross, *No-Collar: The Humane Workplace and Its Hidden Costs* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

5. Bourdieu, *Reproduction.*

6. Aaron V. Cicourel and John I. Kitsuse, *The Educational Decision-Makers* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1963). This is one of the most persuasive studies demonstrating the salience of phenomenological investigations of social life. It is a tacit repudiation of the reliance of much of social science, especially sociology and political science, on what people say rather than what they do.

7. The best analysis of the relation of schools to the lives of working-class kids remains Paul Willis, *Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

8. Ross, *No-Collar.*

9. Paul C. Mishler, *Raising Reds: The Young Pioneers, Radical Summer Camps, and Communist Political Culture in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

10. Samuel Gompers, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor: An Autobiography* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1925).

11. Marvin Gettleman, "No Varsity Teams: New York's Jefferson School of Social Science, 1943-1956," *Science and Society* (fall 2002), 336–59. My reflections on the Free University and other New Left educational projects may be found in Aronowitz, "When the New Left Was New," in *The Sixties without Apology*, ed. Sohnya Sayres, Anders Stephanson, Stanley Aronowitz, and Fredric Jameson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

12. John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Dover, 1958), bk. 1, chap. 28, 478.

13. William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1955), 1, 293.

14. Hannah Arendt, "Crisis in Education," *Between Past and Future* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961).

15. James H. McWhorter, *Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America* (New York: Free Press, 2000).

16. Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness*, 2d ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992); Henry A. Giroux, *The Abandoned Generation: Democracy beyond the Culture of Fear* (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Stephanie Urso Spina, ed., *Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).

17. Bourdieu, *Reproduction*.

Jurassic U

THE STATE OF UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RELATIONS

Christopher Newfield

Concerns about the university's business deals are as old as the university itself, but never have they been as widespread as they are these days. Nearly everyone assumes that the university has entered a new era, and many feel that the university's traditions of public service and academic freedom are threatened. The era's formal starting point was the 1980 passage of the federal Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed universities for the first time to retain title to the inventions of their employees. The intent of the legislation was to give universities financial incentives to patent useful technologies, ones that would then be licensed to an industry partner in exchange for royalties on sales.[1] The act's supporters argued that the profit motive would enhance the search for new knowledge by linking it to market goals, and the claim that the act promoted entrepreneurship helped it prevail over some prominent opposition.[2]

By the year 2000, university-industry relations seemed all-encompassing. Athletes had become human billboards for sporting goods companies while their coaches collected large endorsement fees. Student centers had assumed most of the functions of suburban shopping malls, and a large portion of campus Internet traffic was devoted to consumer uses like downloading music files. Universities marketed themselves as prestige brands to the most affluent demographic and raised tuition rates so consistently that graduates carried credit card debt to rival the ever-increasing size of their student loans. From coast to coast, campus life seemed as much about buying stuff as about learning things. After two decades of marketing tie-ins, fiscal crises, and financial incentives, commerce had moved from the edges to the core of the academic mission.

By the late 1980s, critiques of corporate research funding had begun to arrive from the battlegrounds of academic commerce. The president of Harvard University, Derek C. Bok, wrote that contemporary pressures were endangering the university's social mission.[3] The president of Yale University, A. Bartlett Giamatti, claimed that commercialization placed faculty members at odds with their academic responsibilities. He described a growing tension between "the private, proprietary corporation, whose norms are competition, efficiency, and 'profit maximization,' and whose goals are short-term, and the traditional university, which is nonprofit, and

Social Text 79, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press.

whose goals are intellectual, civic, and long-term."[4] The international dimensions of this tension were described in the landmark study *Academic Capitalism* (1997), whose authors anatomized a long-term pattern in which cutbacks in public funding increased the university's dependence on corporate funding, which in turn encouraged universities to fund areas that corporations would support.[5]

But by the late 1990s, it wasn't clear who still cared. The new economy was in full swing, and the university's main constituency was a professional middle class (PMC) apparently committed to technological and market cures for all economic, social, cultural, physical, and emotional problems. The 1980s authors had assumed that their audience would immediately accept a basic distinction between profit-driven commercialization and knowledge in the public interest. But this was exactly the distinction that the Reagan-Clinton era had undermined. By the late 1990s, most university graduates apparently believed that society's core function was to stimulate economic growth and that as a stimulant, financial incentives worked best. They appeared to assume that the commercialization of the university would lead to the mutual enrichment of both business and the university, that it was one of the synergies that explained the greatness of American capitalism. The pervasive conception of progress through the commercialization of everything was what Louis Althusser might have called the spontaneous philosophy of the PMC.

This was a far cry from the traditional focus of educators, which had been to preserve the university's independence from society's rulers. This had meant no direct control by church or crown or state or elected government or big labor or big business. Independence meant freedom from any ruling ideology, for society's conventional wisdom held back the pursuit of both truth and justice. In the period after World War II, university leaders were most concerned about the impact of the federal government on research. Writing in the midst of the research university's federally sponsored golden age, Clark Kerr, then president of the University of California, lamented that the university's "directions have not been set as much by [its] visions of its destiny as by the external environment, including the federal government, the foundations, the surrounding and sometimes engulfing industry."[6] By the late 1970s, business had become an equal concern. The philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, for example, identified the postmodern with an era in which the intertwined pursuits of truth and emancipation had become increasingly subordinated to economic optimization.[7] The underlying demand of all such analyses was that the university not be subject to a social determinism that would destroy its core functions to create knowledge and serve society: real creation could not be steered by any interest outside the discovery process

itself. The only solution was, in these terms, for society to guarantee the university's intellectual independence even in the midst of its financial dependence. If a society damaged the university's academic freedom by pushing too hard for an economic or ideological contribution, the university, properly speaking, would cease to exist.

The year 2003 brought a new wave of attempts to cope with the university's contradictory position as an independent servant of an ever more commercial society. Various articles and books, including the three here under review, rejected the strong version of the commercialization thesis, including its usually unstated component claims that social progress is the same as economic growth, that knowledge is best propelled by commerce, that universities should be businesses.[8] These three books offer profound criticisms of business's influence. At the same time, they avoid the widespread temptation to set up a dichotomy between the university and commerce, and explore how capitalism not only commodifies and exploits but also advances and transforms, thus following in the tradition of Marx, as well as very different thinkers like Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek. It is much in the favor of these books that they seek a hybridized position in which educational purposes can diverge from commercial purposes without having to define themselves as the *opposite* of commerce.[9] In so doing, these books help consolidate an emerging consensus about realistic university reforms.

At the same time, some shared elements of these authors' philosophical frameworks are flawed, and flawed in ways that limit the potential of their best ideas. The frameworks are damaged less by errors in the individual thinking of these writers than by some bad turns in the recent evolution of PMC culture, including its simultaneously triumphant, fatalistic, and static image of American capitalism. These I will have to treat unkindly before I am finished here.

The Market and Its Failures

The outline of the emerging reform consensus is as follows: American capitalism is here to stay, and in any case it has always been the university's environment. Public support for higher education has been declining for twenty years and shows no sign of stopping. There is therefore no point in expecting a clean break between higher education and the marketplace. To the contrary, universities will need to substitute lost public income with private funds, and this will deepen the university's involvement with business, which, by its very nature, gives money only to receive more money in return. At the same time, the university's core mission is noncommer-

cial and not-for-profit. To pursue its educational mission, the university cannot be a business; in the 1990s, calls to make the university resemble corporations failed to grasp how universities work. Business language and goals have come to have too much influence on the core of the educational mission. Even as the university must work with business, and acknowledge that it can learn much from the best business practices, it must clearly distinguish educational from commercial goals. The university and business are partners that should not fuse, neighbors that need good fences, friends who remember that opposites attract.

To examine this general perspective in action, I'll start with the book with the best title, David L. Kirp's *Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line.*[10] Kirp also offers the best recent survey of market-led changes across the full range of educational settings. The modern university has been compared to a medium-sized city, and Kirp's book is a primer on the staggering variety of functions of the contemporary university. He has chapters on undergraduate admissions, business schools, distance learning, Web-based humanities consortia, university-industry research collaborations, law schools, and much more. In each case, Kirp describes a "business vocabulary [that] reinforces businesslike ways of thinking." Overall, he suggests that business improves some functions while damaging others. In the book's parting shot, he says that universities have made deals that only Faust could love.

One of Kirp's best examples of the Faustian bargain is the response of the Darden Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Virginia to continual cutbacks in state funding. Originally, one educator notes, state universities had a deal with the public: "In return for financial support from the taxpayers, these universities would keep tuition low and provide broad access, train graduate and professional students, promote arts and culture, help solve local problems, and perform ground-breaking research" (131). But across the country, states have reduced their share of public universities' operating expenses by a total of 30 percent over the past twenty years. Those units that can follow the money have done exactly that, and no unit is in a better position to do this than a university's business school.

At Virginia, Darden has responded in various ways. It has increased its tuition base by increasing the size of its classes. It has expanded the resources it devotes to fund-raising. It has fought to reduce its contribution to the overall university infrastructure, which helps increase the gap between the campus's rich and poor units. It has expanded its lucrative executive education program, and at least informally requires most faculty to participate. The business school allows a portion of this instruction to be proprietary, in violation of traditional academic standards of open pub-

lication. Darden faculty also appear to do less research in the first place, as they have shifted some of their professional activity into preparing executive seminars that pay them at much higher rates than do their regular courses.

We could add three other concerns about this arrangement to Kirp's long list: first, customized, pricey corporate seminars are likely to tell their paying customers what they want to hear, casting doubt on the academic freedom of the enterprise and the quality of the knowledge produced. Second, such seminars siphon much of their proprietary material from the public domain, making them vehicles of a dubious privatization of common intellectual property. Finally, executive education allows wealthy businesses and businesspeople to bypass public education altogether, making them less likely to support public education with their tax contributions. We must remember, of course, that few businesspeople pay for continuing education in the hope of hearing flattering propaganda, but this doesn't mitigate the negative effects of the overall system. Suspicions about the product and its apparatus reach a pitch of irony or even tragedy when Kirp cites a letter from the University of Virginia's founder, Thomas Jefferson, complaining as though he were writing today that legislators "do not generally possess information enough to perceive the important truths, that knowledge is power, that knowledge is safety, and that knowledge is happiness" (143). Kirp concludes this chapter with a crucial question: "Can a university maintain the intellectual world that Thomas Jefferson sought to represent in his design of the Lawn—professors and students with diverse academic interests coming together in a single open space to pursue and create knowledge—if learning becomes just another consumer good" (145)?

Eric Gould raises similar questions in his book, *The University in a Corporate Culture*.[11] While Kirp is a public policy professor at a large public university (the University of California at Berkeley) with much experience in educational and community issues, Gould is an English professor with an understandable interest in giving the liberal arts something important to do. He sees corporate culture as a challenge to the university and especially to what he calls democratic liberal education in a sense he traces in large part to John Dewey. Early on, Gould presents the calling card of the reform consensus, namely, treating the current form of capitalism as a determinant fact of life. "The search for important knowledge in technoscience is not going to slow down. University bureaucracies are not going to look less like corporate bureaucracies in the future. Students are not going to cease to search for credentials for the workplace. Neither are they going to have fewer problems financing their education. Discipline-based knowledge in the arts and sciences is not going to become less pro-

Tuition costs have probably done more damage to the university's image than the cultural wars and student protests combined.

fessionalized. The old ideal of a liberal education as something that is pursued for its own sake is most unlikely to have a revival" (x). Gould shows how the capitalist university is increasingly devoted to economic functionality, and at one point he provides a particularly good summary of this functionality's major components:

> Quality management criteria and strategies drawn from the world of business; an emphasis on marketing, visibility, and public image promotion; accounting concerns for contribution margins, and the perennial cost effectiveness of learning; decentralized power structures with incentives for growth and gain-share revenues; the redistribution of labor—in this case away from tenured to part-time and adjunct faculty; the development of sophisticated ancillary products, patents, and services; a vague rhetoric of excellence that replaces specific details of what an education is about, and, of course, research and other financial collaborations with the corporate world. (31)

One of Gould's examples is the tuition spiral, and he offers the best short treatment of the subject that I have read (chap. 3). For most of the twentieth century, universities—especially public universities—tried to minimize tuition costs in order to maximize public access. It was hoped that every qualified person could go to college without regard for ability to pay. Academic attributes trumped financial ones, and the role of financial aid was to bridge the gap between educational cost and student income. In recent decades, the college admissions office has become an important component in the institution's overall financial strategy, where tuition rates, financial aid, and even admissions have become weapons in the competition for the most desirable students.

Gould's crucial point is that this market system does not work properly even on its own terms. Tuition costs have never stopped rising at well above the rate of inflation—growing at about ten times the rate of family income growth between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s—and they have probably done more damage to the university's image than the cultural wars and student protests combined. The damage is especially clear when we consider their impact on student finances: Nellie Mae, the student-loan provider, "found that the average student-loan debt had more than doubled" between 1991 and 1997 (cited in Gould, 54); in addition, the average credit card debt for the class of 2002 was over $3,000 (55). In that year, "thirty-nine percent of students [were] graduating with 'unmanageable levels of student loan debt'" (54); for African American and Hispanic students, the levels are 55 and 58 percent, respectively. To keep things at even this low level of control, four-fifths of all undergraduates work in college, one-third of this group full-time, the

other two-thirds an average of twenty-five hours a week. Additional reports suggest that educational debt levels have reached the point where they are forcing graduates out of public service and into income-maximizing posts in the private sector, regardless of the actual goals or values of the graduates, to say nothing of social needs.[12] As funding levels drop, many states are seeing declines in college participation rates; in 2000, the United States was ranked thirteenth in college participation rates among industrialized nations.[13]

The victims of the university's tuition and admissions strategies include not only students and the public, but the university itself. Department of Education statistics covering the same time frame—the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s—show that a 400 percent increase in charges for tuition, room, and board translated into "a modest 32 percent increase in current-fund expenditures per student" (cited in Gould, 63). What is the source of this enormous gap between the increase in the university's gross income and student expenditures? Apparently, only a fraction went into administrative growth while a bit more went into research. "The major area of expenditure growth was in financial aid (scholarships and fellowships) to students, which increased fivefold in public universities and sevenfold in private universities" (ibid.). Universities have been boosting tuition and also boosting financial aid, resulting in an increasing number of students attending college at a discount. "For every dollar colleges have tacked on to tuition since 1990, they have kept just 46 cents" (62).[14] The combination of high tuition and high financial aid may allow universities to use well-off students to subsidize poorer ones. But the high tuition/high aid model is also used to chase the small pool of highly qualified and affluent students who are given aid on the basis of "merit" rather than "need." "Thus," Gould concludes, "we have the curious situation in which most families—probably three-quarters of those with children attending or seeking to attend college—have to borrow money to send their children to institutions that are in turn struggling to keep their discount levels at 30 percent" (69).

Gould concludes that the ultimate culprit is the market model of unregulated competition for the "best" students and other scarce commodities. "So long as we insist on promoting higher education as a relatively unregulated market system, modeled on the corporate marketplace, the rich will get richer and the poor poorer, a number of schools will die off or reduce their quality, and there will be fewer places for the growing number of students" (77).

Taking Kirp and Gould together, we can draw a remarkable interim conclusion. Commercialization endangers the academic mission of the university *and* it endangers the financial health that commercialization

was supposed to improve. If this is true, then commercialization is in effect a way to exploit and control the university rather than a way to support it.

The Dangers of Financial Interest

This brings us to Derek Bok, president emeritus of a school unlikely to succumb in any Darwinian market struggle, Harvard University, but who is nonetheless as worried an observer as the other two. He begins *Universities in the Marketplace* by noting that commerce was once "largely confined to the periphery of campus life: to athletic programs and, in a few institutions, to correspondence schools and extension programs. Today, opportunities to make money from intellectual work are pursued throughout the university by professors of computer science, biochemistry, corporate finance, and numerous other departments."[15] Bok gives great credit to market forces—at times bending over backward to show his respect—and also claims that there is little hard evidence that financial interests have changed academic standards or the direction of research (60–62). And yet he shares the consensus view that a clear distinction must be made between commercial and educational goals. Education has always been concerned with "helping to develop virtue and build character" and to develop a practical ethics. The reason why Princeton should not put a banner that says "Things Go Better with Coke" on Nassau Hall is that selling goods plainly conflicts with pursuing education: "Such a message would be damaging to students and demoralizing for many members of the faculty who believe that their academic careers and the institution where they work stand for aims and ideals that transcend money" (173).[16]

Bok offers an especially good account of the market's impact on scientific research. While corporate support remains under 10 percent of the total support for academic research, it has a glamour, an intensity, and a potential for personal gain that magnifies its influence. Faculty who have corporate support are more than twice as likely "to be influenced by commercial considerations in choosing their research topics" (61). Business makes its largest profits from proprietary knowledge, meaning knowledge that only the owning firm can legally use and that only that firm may know about in detail. The advantage of this kind of knowledge is that it allows a firm to offer a unique product that lacks competitors, enabling it in turn to dominate or monopolize the product's market. Given the attractions of proprietary knowledge, corporate partners routinely request publication delays and confidentiality with university personnel that can suppress the open circulation of research knowledge (74–75). In addition,

research tools and materials in the biological sciences are the corporate property of individual firms, and these firms have sometimes required researchers to sign secrecy and patent agreements that give the owners of materials "reach-through" rights to any intellectual property created with those materials. Since federal legislation requires university employees to assign title to any inventions over to their (nonprofit) university employer, such transfer agreements can create serious and expensive legal conflicts.

Given the potential returns, universities may come to act much like corporations. Even as they are expected to set an example for their faculty employees and enforce federal law, universities may steer research toward money rather than long-term basic research. In one particularly pointed passage, Bok writes,

> Columbia, Duke, and several other medical schools have formed consortia to bid for contracts from pharmaceutical firms to test new drugs. In many cases, the principal purpose is not to secure opportunities for cutting-edge research, but rather to earn money that can be used for other purposes. Schools that benefit in this way clearly have a financial stake in retaining the business of the companies whose products they test. To that extent, they have an incentive to avoid results that will disappoint their corporate sponsors. Nevertheless, like individual investigators, medical schools seem unwilling to admit that their financial interests could possibly affect the results of research performed within their walls. (71)

Here Bok summarizes the logic of the financial incentives that shape the business of science. Each actor behaves rationally, and usually with good intentions, but the system's alleged invisible hand leads, not necessarily but quite possibly, to misdirected, unnecessary, or even tainted research. As Bok notes rather witheringly,

> scientists with corporate ties naturally deny that financial interests will have any effect on their scientific work. Nevertheless, a number of investigators have shown that researchers reporting on the efficacy of drugs produced by companies in which they have an interest are more likely to report favorable results than scientists without such ties. Other studies have shown that clinical trials funded by drug companies are far less likely than independently funded trials to arrive at unfavorable conclusions. (68)

These studies are not widely known even among academic scientists, nor are they warmly received.[17] But they are now routinely detecting major statistical anomalies in privately funded research.

Bok returns several times to the practices of medical schools, where the potential for abuse may be the most advanced. The American health industry is troubled, to put it mildly, by mediocre public health results

bought at enormous cost compared with other industrialized countries.[18] Medicine lies at the heart of the "social trusteeship" model of professionalism, a tradition stretching back to the Hippocratic oath, but it may be the profession that has been the most completely suffused with commercial factors. The ethical stakes are very high, for in contrast to other commercialized fields like engineering and law, medical faculty work directly with human subjects. Bok mentions perhaps the best-known recent case, that of Jesse Gelsinger, a patient at the University of Pennsylvania who died during a gene therapy trial conducted by an institute whose director had a large and undisclosed financial stake in the company that funded the research (68). Bok shows that this kind of practice reflects the wall-to-wall presence of drug and other health corporations in medical education. "Fortunately," he observes, "universities have not yet allowed companies to tout their products in campus classrooms" (173). *Not yet* is the operative phrase, and once again Bok's overview is worth quoting at length.

> At the periphery of the educational process, however, advertisers wait like predators circling a herd of cattle and occasionally manage to pick off some careless member that strays too far from the group.
>
> The clearest example has occurred in medical schools where large pharmaceutical firms and medical supply companies have become very wealthy at a time when traditional sources of funding for medical education have tended to dry up. These trends have created a vacuum major corporations are all too willing to fill. By now, corporate representatives commonly recommend speakers paid for at company expense and help shape the content and format of continuing education courses by giving ample subsidies that help medical schools operate their programs at a profit. These practices are clearly worrisome. Although the lecturers subsidized by industrial sponsors may be accomplished faculty members and the quality of the programs is often high, speakers paid for by a pharmaceutical firm and selected from an approved company list cannot be assumed to be as objective and disinterested as university instructors ought to be. (173–74)

Commercial considerations can in this way modify the professional judgment of practicing physicians. Bok notes that commerce has also influenced the shape of medical research and scientific knowledge. "Pharmaceutical companies naturally tend to support programs on diseases commonly treated with expensive drugs. Although the presentations may not tout any particular product, they do promote the use of an entire class of drugs. Moreover, subsidized programs seldom emphasize preventative measures and other alternatives to drug treatments. In these ways, the subsidized programs can be slanted not by what they put in, but by what they leave out" (175).

In spite of these serious problems, the economic environment discourages reforms. Though medical schools can always create their own more balanced programs, "subsidized programs tend to win out. This is particularly likely when schools treat continuing medical education as a profit center to finance other faculty activities" (ibid.). Reforms are made even less likely by the philosophical obstinacy of many science faculty and administrators. Even measured criticisms like Bok's, backed by statistical evidence derived from large samples, may be met with blanket assertions that financial incentives could not, and do not, affect the scientific method.

This outmoded objectivism was the real beneficiary of the "science wars" in which this journal was a participant. Alan Sokal and his allies may have believed that they were defending the scientific modalities of the progressive enlightenment. But the more important effect of their success was to discredit the kind of historical and contextual arguments, whether coming from epistemological radicals or from concerned university presidents, that could demonstrate the impact of financial interests on scientific knowledge. These important books by Kirp, Gould, and Bok, along with others, are forced to proceed without the benefit of public respect for qualitative and contextual analysis. They have nonetheless successfully described a wounded if not deceased body and, in the form of financial interests, a smoking gun.

A Detente with Commerce

We now arrive at the larger question of how best to respond to the chronic, escalating crisis in university affairs. These books imply that the best opening move is to focus on major problem areas. Medical schools, business schools, and undergraduate admissions are near the top of the list. A fourth trouble spot is for-profit distance learning, though this is more thoroughly treated by other authors, most critically by David Noble. A fifth is the explosive growth of the adjunct and part-time teaching force, though this is also more thoroughly treated by other authors, notably by many contributors to *Social Text* over the past ten years.

The second move is regulatory, and it is interesting to note that the author with the warmest words for market mechanisms, Derek Bok, also suggests the most direct crackdown on market abuses. He would require researchers to disclose the financial interests that support their work, whether they take the form of the direct industry funding of clinical trials, an equity stake in a company whose product is under scrutiny, or something similar. Financial disclosure policies are becoming more common in

professional journals, and though this trend will probably continue, such policies are resisted by many faculty.

Bok also notes a limitation to the disclosure rule: "Repeated disclosure of financial conflicts may deepen the public's suspicions about the objectivity of academic research and thereby place universities and their scientists and scholars under a cloud" (147). He thus takes the opportunity to suggest something stronger: "Universities should flatly prohibit their scientists from performing research on human subjects if the work is supported by companies in which the researchers have significant financial interests, whether from consulting arrangements, gifts, retainers, or stock-holdings" (145). Reformers will need to bear in mind that such reforms can disadvantage academic scientists, as university researchers earn medium middle-class salaries to do the fundamental creative work on projects that enrich the Bill Gates and Larry Ellisons with whom they might be prohibited from partnering. But any regulations would, in Bok's model, involve a large component of faculty peer review and would require cooperation among a number of universities, perhaps coordinated by a federal agency like the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

These are important suggestions. But at this point we reach the end of these authors' recommendations for direct reform. In fact, all are pessimistic about the possibility of getting reforms to go even this far. Part of the problem is that these authors do not see sufficiently powerful interests pushing such reforms. To the contrary, the effect of these books is to bust from the ranks of reformers the two traditional proponents of the progressive university. First, students cannot be relied on to preserve intellectual goals, since most have learned to be career-building consumers of prestige, access, and functional training. Second, faculty—at least those with influence in science, technology, and medicine—turn out to be not so much champions of scholarly values as eager, even arrogant commercializers, constantly pressuring administrators and staff to bend the rules that protect the university's interests. The faculty most affected by reforms have consistently opposed them: to use one of Bok's examples, the NIH diluted its new disclosure rules in 1989 when faculty strenuously objected, and few major research universities have successfully pushed prohibitions of financial interests in human subject research through their academic senates. The situation is complicated by the fact that such regulations can conflict with researchers' academic freedom (and with a right to privacy concerning their personal financial affairs). Reforms also increase faculty members' obligations to the university as their main employer, which may have the ironic effect of making the university more like a high-tech corporation. All three authors have good reason to assume that no simple faculty consensus will emerge in favor of reforms. Pressure for reform will

most likely divide a campus's faculty between those with market potential and those without.[19]

In the absence of an established reform constituency, Kirp, Gould, and Bok fall back on a conceptual solution, which is to draw a foundational contrast between commercial and academic values. They call on us to be aware of commercialization and, without rejecting commerce categorically or blindly denying its public benefits, to support the educational mission. This makes a good deal of sense, of course, and virtually everyone in education agrees that education is special, including, in my experience, the nonacademic university staff members who actually promote and manage industry partnerships.[20] Something similar goes for many industry participants, who look to the university for types of collaboration and invention that they can't find in their product-oriented corporate labs. The general concept of university-industry difference is a centerpiece of the reform consensus I've been discussing, and it works on both sides of the university-industry relationship.

But can we indeed define the university's goals through this contrast between education and commerce? Can we say that educational activities must be protected from commerce because they are always damaged by it? These books make a clear answer harder than ever. Kirp, for example, has a fascinating chapter on Dickinson College, whose new president starts to remake this liberal arts college by hiring an "enrollment manager" with the power to trespass on faculty terrain like the curriculum if it damages the financial picture, and by hiring a marketing consultant, who redefines the college's image with whatever he finds out from focus groups. But in fact these commercial barbarians decide that the college's values are Freedom + Guidance = [Personal] Growth, which could best be expressed in the slogan Reflecting America, Engaging the World. Though possessed of dubious literary sensibility, the new regime decides to reforge "the link between liberal learning and the world outside Carlisle," to start programs to send their students all over the country and the world, and to develop "citizen-leaders" by "crossing borders" and becoming more representative of the U.S. population (56–59). The least one can say is that the marketing pros ended up sounding a lot like a multicultural version of the godfather of progressive education theory, John Dewey, for they appear to reject the classical bourgeois contrast between liberal and practical knowledge, and to have set the college on a more progressive liberal arts trajectory than it had pursued before.

Kirp also has a pair of chapters on New York University and its apparently successful efforts, as one professor puts it, to "spend [its] way into high society."[21] Kirp shows that these advocates of the "star search" strategy have plenty of stars to be crass about. He also observes that the

bulk purchases of stars means the great exploitation of adjuncts: "Twenty-seven hundred adjuncts, almost the same in number as the tenure-ladder faculty, teach 70 percent of the undergraduate classes, a figure considerably higher than at comparable universities" (69). Undergraduates recruited to study with stars are subjected to a bait and switch in which their actual instructors turn out to be usually dedicated but always overworked "permatemps," as their counterparts came to be known under eerily similar circumstances at Microsoft.

NYU's administrators and trustees are primarily responsible for this situation, but so are its humanist faculty. The stars of the philosophy department, for example, implemented this system in which term after term much of their traditional undergraduate teaching is done by relatively powerless students and lecturers. Here the senior faculty sound like an oblivious academic gentry, far more concerned with their institutional feuds than with the exploitation of younger philosophers in their own departments. They seem consumed by a self-interest so narrow as to endanger the continuation of their own profession. The humanists in the chapter on the University of Chicago are similarly dogmatic and disappointing.

While "academia" falters, "commerce" glitters. The dean of the NYU law school is the author of something called "A Commercialist Manifesto," whose slogan is, "We are a business, deal with it. . . . Go to the market and create greatness" (cited in Kirp, 98). These are words that he has lived by, and at previous jobs, Kirp reports, this dean ended a free law clinic's pro bono policies and tried to name a large state's leading public law school after a successful trial lawyer in exchange for $10 million. And yet, for Kirp, this dean's effect on NYU is largely positive. "An entrepreneurship that defies the conventions of legal education," he notes, "isn't necessarily antithetical to academic excellence" (109). The dean himself comes off as a liberal humanist. We don't care only about our ranking, he says, for we try to "create a niche outside the hierarchy, as the place where you do cool things" (ibid.). My goal, he says, is "making the world a better place through law. This capacity to look for ideas, to find contingently right answers—that's what the money goes to support." We might note the additional irony that Kirp has no stories of abusive labor practices at NYU's law school. The field closer to the market is on the surface farther from academic labor exploitation. For the humanities, the case is the reverse, with an apparently corrosive effect on the social intelligence of its faculty.

We don't need to take all of these statements at face value in order to identify our problem. Commercial and educational goals are not simple opposites. They overlap and are often functionally intertwined. This is not

a new issue: as Gould observes, even at their origin in antiquity the liberal arts "were emphasized not so much to nurture curiosity and imaginative thinking as to promote enlightened service to the state" (148). Capitalism, as I noted at the start, is a dynamic process that depends as much on invention as on coercive power. As the market came to loom as large as the state, the university became a place of refuge from capitalist determinism *and* the place that continuously blends capitalism and education, and that in the process reproduces the latest form of capitalism through a common interest in the latest breakthrough. There is certainly no invisible hand that transforms self-interest into the common good, but two alternative statements—self-interest never advances the common good, and the absence of financial self-interest does advance the common good—are also untrue. Commerce, these books suggest, may be a crucial progressive ally for higher education and may even produce knowledge, practices, and relationships that lead beyond capitalist economic and social relations as they currently exist.

The reform consensus thus leads toward a case-by-case evaluation of how education gets and spends money. It resembles most current university policy in seeking not to eliminate conflicts between educational and financial interests but to manage them. The reform consensus could be labeled a kind of pro-education pragmatism: pragmatic in a willingness to engage open-mindedly with the commercial environment, and pro-education in demanding education's power of self-regulation. The university in this framework seeks a cooperative self-determination, partnering with industry on the basis of mutual recognition and the negotiation of ongoing differences.

Overestimating Capitalism

It is at this point, however, that the limits of the reform consensus become apparent. It should not be rejected, as I've said, because of its acceptance of hybrids of capitalist and noncapitalist structures—because, that is, it fails to be clearly pro- or anticapitalist. This hybridity is the consensus position's major strength. If academics want higher education to keep its relative autonomy from industry, we will need not a more thorough shunning of capitalism but a more systematic and unflinching engagement with it, including with our own capitalist interests. If industry managers want to preserve their golden goose, not to mention a healthy society, they need to acknowledge the noncapitalist academic activities that create so much value for them.

But the reform consensus does have two major weaknesses. It over-

states the internal coherence of capitalism itself, and it understates the strengths of the university and of the kinds of noneconomic acts and interests that go on inside and outside its gates. As part of this underestimation of the noneconomic, the consensus tends to sideline the humanities, even though these fields serve as the academic representatives of the public life that transcends economic notions of development.

On the first matter, the vision of the capitalist train roaring down the tracks, its invincible momentum has been greatly exaggerated. The triumphs of the 1990s' Anglo-American model coincided with many reversals and significant intellectual disarray. One dimension of the trouble can be called the crisis of global development. I can only scratch the surface here, but we should bear in mind the remarkable fact that in a period in which the United States restored its preeminence in the world economy and spread its version of capitalism far and wide, much of the world economy got worse. This is particularly true in regions where the United States has had the most influence: the fiscal and human disasters of Russia and Argentina are the disasters of model neoliberal pupils, ones whose governments willingly sold public assets to private investors, slashed public services, and dismantled many elements of political sovereignty in the name of economic interdependence.[22] Although even the briefest demonstration is beyond my scope here, we can see a disturbing pattern in which American-style policies produce social deterioration as the price of capital investment. The most successful industrializing countries have been those in Asia whose governments manage their economies in at least partial defiance of the "Washington consensus."[23] The social failures of market success have produced serious rifts between kindred agents of neoliberal thought, instanced by the widely publicized conflict between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and other rifts within the transatlantic policy world, where the relative harmony of the Clinton era has crumbled during the era of Bush II.[24]

Market policies have had a similar effect in industrialized countries like the United States. Long-term growth rates have never returned to the levels of the 1945–75 "golden age" when the United States enjoyed a one-time economic supremacy over its war-battered rivals and a "big government" enthusiasm for social investment.[25] During the 1990s, by contrast, income and wealth inequality have soared: American tax and income policy in effect intensified the new economy boom by allowing it to take place almost entirely in the top fifth of the population measured by income.[26] Some portion of this growth comes from the steady lengthening of the work year for Americans, and some comes from a reduced share of the national product going to labor, among other factors that cannot be attributed to market efficiencies.[27] There have been no attempts at a com-

prehensive public explanation of the end of the boom or of ongoing wage stagnation and work insecurity, or at adjusting the model to respond to known failures, or at reversing deterioration in public goods such as educational and medical care. We are left with unexplained contradictions between different elements of the overall picture. It is clear that unregulated markets are not the most effective engine of social or even economic development, but market determinism has become a way to avoid difficult questions about developmental failure.

The books by Kirp, Gould, and Bok are part of an American culture that has not yet experienced a general public debate about the weaknesses of its reigning form of economics. Though these authors would not turn education over to the market, the market in their accounts remains whole and unchallenged, something that must be evaded or restricted rather than changed. Even Gould, who shows how market competition has damaged its own agents, does not call for the rigorous demystification that would lead to the *conceptual* independence of educational goals from market forces. We can readily imagine this stronger remedy, in which markets would provide supply and demand information—as a neutral technical service provider—rather than serve as the ordering principle of the overall economy and society. We can imagine that the university would be seen as a social partner that would define, affect, and sometimes control markets. At the moment, such developments would cut against the recent intellectual evolution of the social class the university creates and rests upon, the professional-managerial class (PMC).[28] Though this group harbored many dissidents from the general trend, its large majority has deserted its progressive tradition, and a main result has been to concede the sovereignty of commerce over the social sphere.

Without a revitalization of economic thought, the university will be compelled to respond to a more powerful business world largely through adaptation. The reform consensus can sustain reform only if it disputes the political economy that excludes noneconomic activity. The consensus will need to describe systematically the ways that the university is not, at bottom, a market institution, even if it works with those that are.

Underestimating the Unprofitable

Here we encounter the second weakness of the reform consensus. It has difficulty imagining *progressive* historical agency outside market activity and inside *non*-market spaces, including PMC spaces like the university. To the contrary, the PMC has spent much of the past thirty years producing almost entirely negative images of agency "from below": the Stal-

inist proletariat; the uncompetitive blue-collar workforce; the culturally unfit underclass; the racial "disuniters"; the legions of foreign fanatics tethered to the "olive tree" and refusing modernity itself.[29] In the late 1970s the PMC abandoned industrial workers, inventing the economic knowledges that proved them obsolete. Ironically, as the PMC was denying progressive agency to nonmanagerial and nontechnical workers, it was denying its own nonmarket agency as well. When the main emblem of personal development was once again the making of money, few were left to defend the autonomy of social development from economic goals. The members of the PMC who stuck with the social trusteeship professions—social work, teaching, nursing, and the like—were rewarded with financial decline. Those professionals who moved closer to the market—attorneys, engineers, physicians—experienced the most lucrative years in the history of their fields.[30] Social and personal development were for losers, economically speaking. The PMC's economism required the abandonment of its own labor traditions, rooted as they had been in an understanding of the social value of intellectual effort that doesn't pay.

Even specifically economic value depends in fact on uneconomic work. In an article published in 1959, the economist Richard R. Nelson argued that profit incentives could never support all of the scientific research that had social value. A for-profit firm would undertake research only if its returns could be expected to exceed its costs. This meant that a given firm would readily support applied research, where the basic principles were known, the problem was clearly defined, and a successful application was likely. Such calculations did not apply to basic research, Nelson observed, for basic research is by definition that in which "the degree of uncertainty about the results of specific research projects increases, and the goals become less clearly defined."[31] If a firm could not calculate with meaningful certainty that research returns would be greater than research costs, it had no rational reason to undertake the work.

Nelson's central insight was that the uncertainty of basic research is proportional to its potential future value. This is because the largest long-term value comes from breakthrough discoveries that affect knowledge well beyond the boundaries of a particular application.[32] These discoveries are by their nature unforeseen, and their degree of uncertainty is nearly total. The most important basic research is thus the riskiest research, and also the least "rational" to pursue, and hence the least likely to be pursued by a prudent firm: rational calculation will tell firms to avoid undertaking the expensive, risky research that produces the greatest long-term social gain, gains that mostly go to other people and other firms. Nelson, though clearly an advocate of what he calls "our enterprise economy," pointed out

that in fact private gain can *decrease* social gain.[33] On the other hand, the pursuit of the public good can increase both public and market value.

In cases like Nelson's, PMC culture understands the general benefit of exactly that work that the market does not value. When this culture devalues nonmarket activity, it makes an economic as well as an ethical error. The reform consensus I have been discussing values nonmarket activity in an abstract and ethical way. It does not make nonmarket activity coeval with, or in fact prior to, market enterprise in the concrete and everyday making of the world.

Another symptom of this undervaluation of nonmarket activity is the nearly total absence of humanities research from these books. Bok does not mention humanities disciplines. Gould belongs to one of them, but discusses the humanities more as a Deweyan framework for general education than as a body of positive knowledge. Kirp discusses the NYU philosophers who receive star salaries and a group of classicists who hope to "build the market" for their work through a Web consortium. But these examples are not encouraging, and his own view is probably the one that emerges in an aside, where he refers to English professors who "know in a thousand ways that in many schools they have become bit players, and who also know how to get their own back in gothic tales and novels of manners" (219). There is apparently general agreement that the liberal arts fields have entered a permanent twilight.

What makes this twilight seem so inevitable? The most important source is not any intrinsic obsolescence of the fields themselves, but a middle-class economic determinism that says that insofar as the humanities are disfavored by economic forces—the speeding freight train—then they will die. The economic verdict on the liberal arts has certainly been negative. The academic humanities form a paradigm of the collapse of a social trusteeship profession, in which life for each succeeding generation is worse than the one before. The job market for its PhDs began to have openings for only a fraction of qualified degree holders nearly thirty-five years ago, and it has never improved.[34] Fields like English now employ the highest percentage of temporary employees in any academic specialty. The steady decline in interest among university presses in publishing literary criticism suggests the accelerating replacement of humanities research by a service-relationship paradigm, in which the vast majority of literature faculty—perhaps three-quarters—will teach basic thinking and writing skills on an adjunct, piecework, and untenured basis.[35] These dismal facts have an origin, however, and it is not "the market" in an abstract sense but the countless decisions made by administrators and legislators and citizens guided, in a classical circular logic, by a limited market definition of

the economic. The outcome of the story—accelerating technosciences, derailed social and cultural study—is predetermined by the cultural bias that affects most of us who tell it. This doesn't make a change of course any easier, but it should give us an interest in systematically dismantling the self-fulfilling prophecy of the death of nonmarket fields.

Of course, I didn't expect Kirp, Gould, and Bok to discuss non-PMC or anticapitalist models of sustainable development. But I am sorry they didn't say more about nonmarket forms of development as formulated in the American university. The humanities and social sciences are thriving intellectually, and much of their progress involves specifying the enormous role of cultural, psychological, and social forces in the construction of local and global systems. If any view must be called obsolete, it is the economic and technological determinism that ignores most of the spectrum of inputs into human advancement that come from entire populations. Suffice to say that the vision of the world as a marketplace is not only flawed, but it is only one of a number of complex and interlocking visions. Strengthening the university's social position will require a clearer and more public sense of the enormous contributions of nonmarket activity to an ostensibly all-market society.

Post-Jurassic Possibilities

It is worth pointing out these two complementary weaknesses in the consensus framework because they impair the power of many of its best ideas. An example is Bok's understanding of eliminating financial interest from certain kinds of research. If the nonmarket purposes of research are not fully established, and rational-choice market models are still assumed, then such regulations will be bitterly resisted as unfair restrictions on both intellectual and economic liberty.

But bringing together such purposes can on the other hand help strengthen the framework. The first, Bok's, is the regulation of new kinds of academic marketing. A second comes from Gould, who makes several excellent suggestions by using familiar humanistic terms such as critical thinking and democratic education. Their common element can be called teaching for participation, teaching the skills—including the psychological ones—that enable participation in the ongoing creation and reformation of society. I would shift Gould's point somewhat and also make it less temperately. The most important single impact of college on the individual is on the individual's sense of his or her capacity to participate, which depends on his or her sense of agency in the world. Higher education is at bottom education for freedom, for freedom of expression and creation, for the

emancipation of the individual to find his or her own direction. It is at the same time education in the principle of emancipation as expressed to and for others in that person's lifetime of work.[36] Even if we define the university's function instrumentally, as the development of "human capital," such development requires the power of self-direction: the development of human capital means the *emancipation* of human capital. In more familiar terms, we can call this the emancipation of labor. Marxists, capitalists, technologists, abolitionists, decolonizers, and liberators of all kinds are supposed to agree that the purpose of economic development is the labor-saving device broadly conceived. The more controversial point is that the labor-saving device frees labor to decide for itself what it will do. This is the university's ethical and economic foundation. The academic humanism on which Gould draws can and should be pushed to advance its vision of the emancipation of labor.

A third ingredient is what Kirp calls the university's gift economy, or, in other terms, its commons. Here we encounter one of the most crucial failures of neoliberal economic theory, which has been unable to accept that the commons is the source of the most significant new economic value or to figure out how to protect it. Economic theory has instead focused on privatizing the kind of shared public resources the commons represents on the grounds that only the promise of private gain spurs productivity. Research on innovation continues to suggest both the futility of using market signals to guide innovation and the ways innovation depends on public information, free access, and unrestricted collaborative interaction. Innovation requires that the individual be able to act independently of the desires of vested interests. Innovation requires being able to change what was previously embedded. Innovation means having enough authority to need no other authority. Innovation means being able to act "without the permission of anyone else."[37]

The defense of the commons will not depend on getting the right ratio of state to market, but on advancing the commons as an alternative to both. As Lawrence Lessig writes, "The issue for us will not be which system of exclusive control—the government or the market—should govern a given resource. The question for us comes before: not whether the market or the state but, for any given resource, whether that resource should be *controlled* or *free*."[38] Human development depends on enormous amounts of free resources. The core of the market's failure is the failure to deliver a commons that enables the shared use of free resources for every kind of development that its participants imagine.

It is at this point that we should remember the problem of financial interests, which, as I've said, are not intrinsically but may in practice be opposed to educational goals. Current university policy is to manage rather

Change will depend on facing the Jurassic Question: does our economic modernity contain primordial elements that keep it from moving ahead?

than eliminate conflicts of interest. This management should be systematically redesigned around the principle of maximizing the commons. Financial interests should be evaluated on the basis of whether they contribute to the knowledge commons or not. Revenues that are returned to research, royalties that support departments and labs and institutions—this kind of ultimately for-profit activity can be seen favoring that commons rather than damaging it. A version of this principle operates in most university formulas for royalty distribution: half may go to the inventor(s), a third to the university, and the rest to the lab or department in which the work was done. The principle of the commons may in some cases reduce or eliminate the personal return while supporting the institutional royalties. It would be interesting to know whether this arrangement would reduce the skew toward positive results in trials of a sponsor's product. The principle of the commons would not reward the proprietary research that uses collaborative work in part funded by the public to create a product monopoly. It would, on the other hand, distribute royalties to private as well as public sponsors according to their contribution to the final product. Firms that bring capital and labor to the arduous and sometimes lengthy process of product development would be rewarded, but proportionately to their investment. Though the language of the commons can serve as a veil for the privatizing of collaboratively created intellectual property, this shouldn't discourage us from the careful empirical work of discriminating among different probable economic outcomes.[39] The real battle is not about whether the university will produce commercial or noncommercial knowledge as such, but whether its knowledge will favor, roughly speaking, the commons or monopoly.

Kirp, Gould, and Bok offer at least three excellent ideas for improving the university—regulating financial interests, affirming the value of participation and emancipation, and developing the knowledge commons. I will conclude, however, by invoking the overall framework again. Real change will depend on facing what I think of as the Jurassic Question: does our economic modernity contain primordial elements that keep it from moving ahead? There is, after all, something ancient about reigning economic theory, derived as it is from the terms merchants used to critique the Crown in the 1700s. There is something unaccountably barbaric about economic modernization in most parts of the world, something insane about the conjunction of advanced technology and endless violence in the international order. I also wonder, as part of all this, whether there isn't something Jurassic about our technology, about the spirit of our technology, about our relationship to it.[40] I'm thinking in particular about our tendency to separate technology from the social and cultural systems in which it exists. Bruno Latour argued that the unreality of this mod-

ernist separation means that "we have never been modern." I would ask in a compatible vein whether the university has for too long been aligning itself with Jurassic techniques that have kept us premodern. The Jurassic appears in those forms of modernity that, like the neoliberal market ideal, claim to have rendered obsolete political and cultural modes of thought and action. It is the attempt to supersede the *old* social world that resists scientific knowledge—to go beyond the bygone arts of government, history, or psychology—that makes real modernity impossible, makes it Jurassic. I have emphasized the need to develop a framework that includes non-market life because I think that the university will be Jurassic unless it embraces *all* of the generative forces of society—including those taking political and cultural forms—rather than primarily the high-tech section that seems most advanced to us today.

Everybody has a big role to play. The humanities fields have a role in describing how a commons actually works—how it is created by informal knowledge and constant sociability and unquantifiable experience and everything we know as art and vision and passion, and obsessive attention to getting things right. The professions have a role to play in maintaining their traditions of intellectual rigor, codification, public presence, and peer review while recovering the craft traditions that hold market outcomes to professional standards. The university, across all its disciplines, has a role to play in maintaining its commitment to truth in a world of knowledge for hire, and in honoring the dissenters, heretics, radicals, eccentrics, and troublemakers who have long practiced human development for all.

Notes

1. Prior to the passage of the Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980, as Bayh-Dole is formally known, title to all inventions produced by federally funded research was held automatically by the government.

2. One of the major participants in the discussions, Richard C. Atkinson, president emeritus of the University of California, describes the motive behind changing the patent law. "It was clear to us in the late seventies that the process of transforming ideas into applications was not working as well as it should. We assembled a number of working groups at NSF [the National Science Foundation] to see what could be done to improve matters. A particularly thorny issue was the federal policy requiring that patents generated from government-supported research at universities reside with the government. This was a clear impediment to transfer. What is the incentive to move ideas into the marketplace if government reaps the rewards? But could the federal government actually give up intellectual property rights? No one knew for sure, but we began to draft legislation in the late seventies. By 1982, Congress had passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which transferred patent rights to universities" (Atkinson, "Visions and Values:

The Research University in Transition," in *The University of California's Relationships with Industry in Research and Technology Transfer*, proceedings of the president's retreat, University of California, Los Angeles, 1997, 20). On the other side, Ralph Nader testified before Congress in 1984 that easier corporate access to university research would damage academic and democratic values. "The corporate model concentrates power, restricts the production and application of knowledge, and increases uniform behavior, self-censorship and when needed—outright suppression" (cited in Leonard Minsky, "Dead Souls: The Aftermath of Bayh-Dole," *Campus, Inc.: Corporate Power in the Ivory Tower* [Amherst, Mass.: Prometheus, 2000], 97). Similar thoughts came from Admiral Hyman Rickover, spearhead of the nuclear navy and veteran of decades of industry contracting, here speaking in 1982: "In 1980 the Congress reversed this long-standing government policy by giving universities and small business title to inventions developed at government expense. I testified against that because I recognized what would happen and it has happened. Now patent lobbyists are pressing Congress to extend that giveaway practice to large contractors. This would generate more business for patent lawyers, but, in the process, will promote even greater concentration of economic power in the hands of the large corporations which already get the lion's share of the government's research and development budget" (cited in Minsky, "Dead Souls," 96).

3. Derek C. Bok, *Beyond the Ivory Tower: Social Responsibilities of the Modern University* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

4. A. Bartlett Giamatti, *A Free and Ordered Space: The Real World of the University* (New York: Norton, 1988), 41. As for entrepreneurial faculty, Giamatti wrote, "I doubt that a faculty member can ordinarily devote the time and energy the university requires and also pursue a substantial involvement in any such outside company. Such involvement necessarily demands great concentration and commitment, particularly at the outset or if business goes badly. . . . The burden of maintaining a teaching program and two separate research programs, where the results of one research program are to be widely disseminated and the results of the other may be required to be kept secret in the pursuit of economic success, is more than even the most responsible faculty member can be expected to bear" (264–65).

5. Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, *Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 7–8.

6. Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 122. "The basic reality, for the university," he wrote, "is the widespread recognition that new knowledge is the most important factor in economic and social growth. We are just now perceiving that the university's invisible product, knowledge, may be the most powerful single element in our culture, affecting the rise and fall of professions and even of social classes, of regions and even of nations" (v–vi). Kerr claimed that liberal knowledge had been eclipsed by German industrial research even as John Henry Newman was renewing Humboldt's call for knowledge for its own sake in 1852. In other words, the entire run of the research university was devoted to society's technological improvement. Kerr was relying on the pioneering research of the Princeton economist Fritz Machlup in *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962). Machlup estimated that by the late 1950s "the production, distribution, and consumption of 'knowledge' in all its forms"

accounted for "twenty-nine percent of gross national product. . . . and 'knowledge production' is growing at about twice the rate of the rest of the economy" (Kerr, *Uses of the University*, 88). These arguments would become better known in such venues as Alvin Toffler's *Future Shock* (1970) and Daniel Bell's *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Economic Forecasting* (1973).

7. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). Recent statements about business's threat to the university include Eyal Press and Jennifer Washburn, "The Kept University," *Atlantic Monthly*, March 2000; Stanley Aronowitz, *The Knowledge Factory: Dismantling the Corporate University and Creating True Higher Learning* (Boston: Beacon, 2000); Henry A. Giroux and Kostas Myrsiades, eds., *Beyond the Corporate University: Culture and Pedagogy in the New Millennium* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); David F. Noble, *Digital Diploma Mills: The Automation of Higher Education* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002); Benjamin Johnson, Patrick Kavanagh, and Kevin Mattson, ed., *Steal This University: The Rise of the Corporate University and the Academic Labor Movement* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

In another genre, some of the conservative critics of the liberal university spoke not only for traditional canons and values but for the free play of intellect. The most thoughtful and influential example is Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). Bloom's work was a kind of Maginot line, aiming all of its guns at liberal humanists and supposed ultrademocrats and none at the business-minded attacks on the sort of "useless" knowledge Bloom lived for.

8. Other recent books include my *Ivy and Industry: Business and the Making of the American University, 1880–1980* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003); and Sheldon Krimsky, *Science in the Private Interest: Has the Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research?* (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), which reached me too late to be included in this review.

9. An example of this mistaken binary opposition is the one David Harvey attributes to Balzac: "He demonstrates the utter emptiness of values based on the monetary calculus, the fictions of the fictitious forms of capital such as credit and interest that drive the realities of social relations and urban processes, the constant speculation on the desires of others that wreaks such destructive consequences" (Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity* [New York: Routledge, 2003], 57). A contemporary critique of the capitalist knowledge society cannot accurately or effectively proceed on the basis of the dichotomies creation/destruction, human/inhuman, presence/absence, life/death, in which capitalism is a self-consistent entity representing the pure form of the lesser half of these pairs. I mention this because Balzacian critique is a frequent default position among academics who dislike business influence but who lack knowledge about the elaborate negotiations involved in university-industry relations and about the very mixed composition of the university itself. Balzac offers the classic bourgeois critique of the bourgeoisie, the "biting the hand that feeds you" that does not expect or in most cases even desire meaningful change.

10. David L. Kirp, *Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

11. Eric Gould, *The University in a Corporate Culture* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003).

12. See, for example, Jonathan D. Glater, "Young Lawyers, Swamped by

Student Debts, Flee Public Jobs," *International Herald-Tribune*, 13 September 2003: "Law students, the study found, are now leaving school with an average debt of $77,300—more than twice what they borrowed just 10 years ago. Since 1985, tuition at law schools has tripled and in some cases quadrupled; in the same period, public interest salaries have not even doubled. The story is harsher if inflation is taken into account. According to the National Association for Law Placement, the earnings of lawyers in private practice have risen by 70 percent since 1985—starting lawyers at many big New York firms now make $125,000—while those of public interest lawyers have increased 12.5 percent and of government lawyers just 3.5 percent."

13. Alice Gomstyn, "Nation Faces a College-Access Crisis, Education-Policy Group Warns," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 2 October 2003, chronicle.com/prm/daily/2003/10/2003100203n.htm. On U.S. participation rates, see one of the reports that Gomstyn cites, *Closing the College Participation Gap*, Center for Community College Policy, www.communitycollegepolicy.org/html/top.asp?page=/html/Issues/Issue.asp?issueID=1.

14. These statistics (p. 62) do not square with those just cited from p. 63. The overall financial picture would be clearer if the various studies used more stable terms of comparison.

15. Derek C. Bok, *Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 3.

16. Bok writes, "If this [example] seems far-fetched, consider the [Coca-Cola] company's effort to organize Coke in Education Day at high schools, complete with a prize for the best plan for marketing Coke-sponsored discount cards, lectures on economics by Coca-Cola officials, technical assistance to home economics students baking Coca-Cola cakes, not to mention help for chemistry classes analyzing Coca-Cola's sugar content, and even an aerial photograph of the entire student body holding up the letters C-O-K-E" (172).

17. In addition to the studies cited by Bok, especially chap. 4, nn. 27 and 28, see Mildred K. Cho and Lisa A. Bero, "The Quality of Drug Studies," Symposium Proceedings, *Annals of Internal Medicine* 124 (March 1996): 485–89; more recently, see J. D. Bekelman, Y. Li, and C. P. Gross, "Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review," *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)* 19 (21 May 2003): 2502–3. Journalistic interest has begun to grow. See Neil Munro, "Doctor Who?" *Washington Monthly* (November 2002); and David Willman, "Stealth Merger: Drug Companies and Government Medical Research," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 December 2003, A1, A32–A35.

18. There are various troubling indicators. The *World Health Report 2000* found that the United States spends a higher portion of its gross domestic product on health than any other country but ranks 37 out of 191 countries in terms of performance (the report is available at the World Health Organization's Web site, www.who.int/whr/2002/en/). Similarly, the United States has abnormally high rates of people without medical insurance compared with other wealthy nations—over 15 percent in 2001 and ranging from 8 percent in Minnesota to over 24 percent in Texas (Robert Pear, "Big Increase Seen in People Lacking Health Insurance," *New York Times*, 30 September 2003).

19. Bok advocates full faculty participation in shared governance of the overall university and rejects claims that faculty participation means managerial inefficiency (e.g., 192). And yet when Bok finally allows himself to express exaspera-

tion, it is directed at faculty, and particularly at faculty entrepreneurs: "When campus authorities let values erode, their moral authority shrinks. Faculty members become less mindful of their responsibilities, less collegial in their relationships, less inclined to take on tasks beyond the minimum required. Individual professors are emboldened to pursue private ventures at a cost to the common enterprise. Inequities and inequalities grow more pronounced, and weaker groups feel impelled to organize collectively to protect themselves. As internal norms give way, formal rules are required to ensure that the work of the institution gets done. If the university will not act, out of fear of offending the faculty, the government will eventually intervene to protect legitimate interests. Bit by bit, therefore, commercialization threatens to change the character of the university in ways that limit its freedom, sap its effectiveness, and lower its standing in the society" (207). Commercialization specifically threatens the university when it weakens the faculty's commitment to the commons, a point to which I return below.

20. These authors neglect staff such as licensing officers, who form an important and particularly informed potential constituency for reform.

21. As this journal is edited at New York University, I should note that my comments here are entirely my own and are informed neither by firsthand knowledge nor by consultation with any NYU personnel.

22. After five years of economic recovery, Russia's gross domestic product is still only 70 percent of what it had been at the end of the Soviet period (Andrew Jack and Stefan Wagstyl, "In 1998 Russia Was Nearly Bankrupt," *Financial Times*, 18 August 2003, 13). By 2002, Argentina's economic collapse caused it to suffer from a 53 percent poverty rate and an official unemployment rate of 22 percent (Hector Tobar, "The Good Life Is No More for Argentina," *Los Angeles Times*, 18 February 2003). To save the model, commentators generally blame Argentina's crisis on its own excess spending. But Dean Baker reports, "Excluding interest payments, Argentina's spending, measured as a share of GDP, remained constant from 1994 until its economic collapse in 2001. Its crisis resulted from higher interest rates, which were in turn largely attributable to crises elsewhere in the developing world. The government also lost a large amount of revenue when it partially privatized its Social Security system in 1994. Had it not privatized its system, Argentina would have had a balanced budget in 2001" (Baker, "Economic Reporting Review," Center for Economic and Policy Research, www.cepr.net/Economic_Reporting_Review/July_28_03.htm [accessed 12 October 2003]).

23. "In the U.S. sphere, Mexico has done very poorly—either in spite of, or because of, its expanding ties to NAFTA partners—with per capita GDP growth averaging less than 1.0 percent a year over the last decade. This is very slow by historical standards, e.g., compared to Mexico's 3.9 percent annual per capita GDP growth from 1960 to 1980" (Baker, "Economic Reporting Review," Center for Economic and Policy Research, www.cepr.net/Economic_Reporting_Review/July_22_02.htm [accessed 22 July 2002]). On the other hand, Malaysia's defiance probably helped its recovery. On 1 September 1998, in response to ongoing instability in capital flows, the Bank Negara of Malaysia issued a document entitled "Measures to Regain Monetary Independence," describing various capital controls that the government would impose (downloaded at www.bnm.gov.my/pa/1998/0901.htm; accessed 2 September 1998). Growth rates in 1996, the last year before the financial crunch in Asia, were as follows: Singapore, 7.0 percent; China, 9.7 percent; South Korea, 7.1 percent; Thailand, 6.7 percent; Malaysia, 8.4 per-

cent; Philippines, 4.8 percent; United States, 2.4 percent. For a brief statement of global trends in income inequality, see Giovanni Arigghi, "Lineages of Empire," in *Debating Empire*, ed. Gopal Balakrisnnan (London: Verson, 2003): 32–33.

24. For a discussion of the divisions within the Washington consensus by one of the participants at the World Bank, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: Norton, 2002).

25. "Comparisons of net domestic product (NDP), the Commerce Department's measure of usable output," show the nineties with a 2.78 percent average annual growth rate, which "is virtually identical to the 2.74 percent rate of the eighties, and well below the 4.36 and 3.13 percent growth rates of the sixties and seventies, respectively" (Baker, "Economic Reporting Review," Center for Economic and Policy Research, www.cepr.net/Economic_Reporting_Review/dec_3_01.htm [accessed 3 December 2003]).

26. For example, a study done for the *New York Times* by the sociologist Andrew Beveridge found that the 1990s saw a "decline in the average income of families in the middle, the ever-changing group comprising the 60 percent of all people who at any given time fall in the center of the income spectrum" (Janny Scott, "In '90s Economy, Middle Class Stayed Put, Analysis Suggests," *New York Times*, 31 August 2001). The Census Bureau's Historical Income Tables are available at www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/histinctb.html. Longtime income observer Doug Henwood reports, "Inequality of family incomes in 1998, as measured by the Gini index . . . was at its highest ever since the Census Bureau started publishing annual figures in 1947" (Henwood, "Boom for Whom," *Left Business Observer* 93 [2000]). This and similar reports (issues 61, 65, 66, 69, 80, and 86) suggest that only the top quintile by income advanced significantly in the 1990s; the other four-fifths stayed where they were or declined. See also Robert Greenstein and Isaac Shapiro, "The New Definitive CBO Data on Income Trends," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, www.cbpp.org/9-23-03tax.htm (accessed 23 September 2003).

27. Between 1973 and 1996, the American work year increased 19 percent while Germany's fell 19 percent, France's fell 23 percent, and even Japan's fell 8 percent. Larger increases were experienced in Thailand (13 percent), Singapore (37 percent), and South Korea (38 percent) (Nicholas Crafts, IMF Staff Papers, June 1999, cited in Doug Henwood, "Work Effort," *Left Business Observer* 91 [1999]: 1). Another comparative finding: "When compared with workers in Western Europe, the average American will work 350 hours more per year, the equivalent of nine extra weeks. Furthermore, a study by the International Labor Organization reports that in 2000, the average U.S. worker put in 199 more hours than in 1973" (Mark Engler, "You May Justifiably Want to Take Friday Off," *Newsday*, 22 October 2003). A survey based on major world cities suggests that in 2003 Americans worked between 1,800 and 2,000 hours a year, Mexicans and Pakistanis about 2,300, Germans and most northern Europeans between 1,600 and 1,700 ("Paresse, je vous aime" ["Idleness, I Love You"], *Le Point*, 12 September 2003, 81, based on a UBS Bank study, "Prix et salaries" ["Prices and Salaries"], 2003). Such numbers are controversial, but they suggest that Americans now have a work year somewhere between that of the global North and South.

28. Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich, "The Professional-Managerial Class," in *Between Labor and Capital*, ed. Pat Walker (Boston: South End, 1979), 5–45. I use PMC for both *professional-managerial class* and Barbara Ehrenreich's revised term, *professional middle class*.

29. On the latter dichotomy, see Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000). For a similar, influential reading, see Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). For the paperback edition, Lewis's subtitle was changed to a good summary of his thesis: *The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East.*

30. On the split in the professional cadres, see Steven Brint, *In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of Professionals in Politics and Public Life* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). Robert Reich naturalized this split in *The Work of Nations* (New York: Vintage, 1991). The economic consequences were described in Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, *The Winner-Take-All Society: Why the Few at the Top Get So Much More Than the Rest of Us* (New York: Penguin, 1996).

31. Richard R. Nelson, "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research," *Journal of Political Economy* 67 (1959): 300. See the similar argument in Kenneth J. Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," in *The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors: A Conference of the Universities–National Bureau Committee for Economic Research and the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), 609–24. Arrow concludes, "We expect a free enterprise economy to underinvest in invention and research (as compared with an ideal) because it is risky, because the product can be appropriated only to a limited extent, and because of increasing returns in use. This underinvestment will be greater for more basic research. Further, to the extent that a firm succeeds in engrossing the economic value of its inventive activity, there will be an underutilization of that information as compared with an ideal allocation" (619).

32. In Nelson's terms, "Applied research is relatively unlikely to result in significant breakthroughs in scientific knowledge save by accident, for, if significant breakthroughs are needed before a particular problem can be solved, the expected costs of achieving this breakthrough by a direct research effort are likely to be extremely high; hence applied research on the problem will not be undertaken, and invention will not be attempted. It is basic research, not applied research, from which significant advances have usually resulted" ("Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research," 301).

33. Again in Nelson's terms, "The incentives generated in a profit economy for firms to keep research findings secret produce results that are, in a static sense, economically inefficient" ("Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research," 306). The paragraphs on Nelson are drawn from my *Ivy and Industry*, chap. 8.

34. See David Laurence, "The 1999 MLA Survey of Staffing in English and Foreign Language Departments," *Profession 2001* (New York: Modern Languages Association, 2001): 211–24.

35. For additional evidence of defensive retrenchment, see Stephen Greenblatt, "A Letter to MLA Members," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 2 July 2002, chronicle.com/jobs/2002/07/2002070202c.htm.

36. An especially good, concise description of the interplay among truth, emancipation, and determinism in the modern history of knowledge is Lyotard, *Postmodern Condition.*

37. Lawrence Lessig, *The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World* (New York: Random House, 2001), 40. This book is a particularly forceful defense of the commons from *within* market thought, modified as noted

below. Similar (and similarly compelling) arguments for nonmarket activity appear in a book that draws on a different (Marxist) intellectual and political tradition, André Gorz, *L'immatériel: Connaissance, valeur, et capital* (*The Intangible: Knowledge, Value, and Capital*) (Paris: Galilée, 2003). For influential discussions by management consultants of the gap between market signals and technological innovation, see Clayton M. Christensen, *The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997); and Geoffrey Moore, *Living on the Fault Line: Managing for Shareholder Value in Any Economy* (New York: Harper Business, 2002).

38. Lessig, *Future of Ideas*, 12. Lessig clearly understands that markets are also control systems and cannot be contrasted with "regulation." This is a rare insight within the PMC as I have described it here.

39. For an ambiguous case, see the discussion of the Microelectronics Advanced Research Corporation in California in chap. 11 of Kirp's *Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line*. This empirical work is already part of the writing of research agreements and a vast array of other documents, generally performed in university offices of technology licensing, offices that are not well understood by either faculty or the public.

40. The phrase comes from David Wilson's Museum of Jurassic Technology (www.mjt.org/). The best account of the museum is Lawrence Weschler, *Mr. Wilson's Cabinet of Wonder* (New York: Vintage, 1996).

"The End of Business Schools?"

MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE

Tony Tinker

The recessionary malaise that now pervades the senior capitalist economies is manifest in lower rates of capital accumulation and profitability. A first-order consequence is intensified intercountry and interfirm conflict and competition (e.g., within the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement, and between the European Community and the United States regarding steel quotas and genetically modified foods). A second-order consequence is the end of the honeymoon between corporate gurus and the banking, finance, investor, and regulatory communities. Excessive executive compensation and corrupt management practices are now seen as integral to the accumulation crisis. Finally, blame is being laid at the doors of cultural institutions of education and research that helped reproduce the speculative ideology that inspired the high-tech bubble economy of the 1990s.

In keeping with the turbulent times, the cultural reproduction processes for MBAs and accountants are now in a state of flux. Typical of the challenge to the business school's education-for-speculation is a recent article in the *Financial Times* (*FT*).[1] The author advises that "business schools do not need to do a great deal more to help prevent future Enrons, they need to stop doing a lot of what they are currently doing. . . . faculty need to own up to their own role in creating Enrons" (Ghoshal 2003).

Readers are reminded that the indictment extends beyond education, to many of the research "pioneers" of the last decade who contributed to the buccaneering rapacity of the 1990s:[2]

- agency theory, developed by Michael C. Jensen (Harvard University) and William H. Meckling (University of Rochester), who offered "analytic" support favoring market over state regulation, to curb management (agents) when they violated their fiduciary trust to their principals (investors et al.);
- transaction cost theory, provided by Oliver Williamson (University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford University) and Alfred Chandler (Harvard), who contended that large monopolies of the twentieth century were, and are, "transaction cost" efficient governance regimes (thus rendering anti-monopoly regulations superfluous); and
- strategy theory, formulated by Michael Porter (Harvard), who reasserted the identity of rapacious self-interest and the public good.

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Added to these criticisms is a widely cited article by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Christina T. Fong (2002) calling for a "complete re-think" of business education and its institutional approach. Here we examine the elliptical arguments of these two authors, not merely to expose their faulty logic but also to draw attention to the kind of ideological reconfigurations now under way, so that the latter can be effectively combated.

The Pfeffer and Fong Analysis

Few would dispute Pfeffer and Fong's opening proposition that "at first blush, business schools are the success story of late twentieth-century education" (2002, 1). Between 1955–56 and 1997–98, the number of MBA degrees awarded in the United States rose from 3,200 to 102,171 (Zimmerman 2001, 3). At the undergraduate level, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business International (AACSB, the leading U.S. accreditation agency for business schools) reports that between 1967–68 and 1997–98, degrees awarded increased from 79,074 to 233,119 (AACSB International 2001). As a proportion of all degrees awarded by U.S. universities in 1967–68, business degrees constituted 12.5 percent of all undergraduate degrees, 10 percent of all master's degrees, and 1.9 percent of all doctorates. By 1997–98, these proportions had risen to 19.6 percent, 23.7 percent, and 2.8 percent, respectively.

In 2002, AACSB International reported the membership profile (AACSB 2002) delineated in table 1. Of the members, 427 were accredited business schools: 403 in North America (393 in the United States, 8 in Canada, and 2 in Mexico), 14 in Europe, 4 in Asia, 2 in the Middle East, 2 in Central America, 1 in South America, and 1 in Australia.

Colleges and universities typically obtain accreditation for both graduate and undergraduate degrees; see table 2. A further breakdown of the data reveals that accounting ("the language of business"; the calculus for capital accumulation and thus market survival) commands the lion's share of this market. Between 1971–72 and 1993–94, the total number of accounting degrees awarded rose from 26,000 to 60,620 (AICPA 1995). Importantly, for the subsequent analysis, the number of students that proceeded, after graduation, to take the CPA examination fell from 143,572 in 1990 to less than 130,000 in 2002. Other management fields are also showing signs of market saturation: hence the alarm bell sounded by Pfeffer and Fong. They note that

> although business schools and business education have been commercial successes, there are substantial questions about the relevance of their educational product and doubts about their effects on both the careers of their

Table 1. AACSB Membership Profile

U.S. educational institutions	654
Educational institutions outside the United States	211
Corporate, government, and nonprofit institutions	48
Total AACSB membership	**913**

Table 2. AACSB Undergraduate and Graduate Accreditation

AACSB Accredited Students	No.	Percentage
Undergraduate accredited only	31	7
Graduate accredited only	34	8
Both undergraduate and graduate accreditation	362	85
Total accredited programs	**427**	**100**

> graduates, and on management practice. These concerns [are] coupled with the rise of many competitors including consulting and training companies, e-learning and company in-house programs, as well as the fact that according to Robert Hamada, ex-dean of the University of Chicago business school, the MBA industry is overbuilt. (Pfeffer and Fong 2002, 2)

There is nothing original in Pfeffer and Fong's lament. Nearly twenty years ago, Richard Whitley noted that "the recent backlash against analytical techniques and overly *academic* conceptions of managerial expertise has led to some agonizing about business school curricula and priorities" (Whitley 1985; Hayes and Abernathy 1980, my emphasis).

Assuming for the moment that the market saturation for university-based business degrees does indeed constitute "a problem," two other aspects of the Pfeffer and Fong quotation deserve closer scrutiny: first, the nature of the "competitive institutions" to which they refer (in-house corporate training, postexperience courses, professional education providers, online commercial educational providers, etc.); and second, the sources of the "resistance to change" that impede universities in responding to this market challenge. On both points there is a serious equivocation in Pfeffer and Fong's analysis.

Commodifying the MBA

What Pfeffer and Fong misconstrue as the source of the problem is the threat posed by "competitive institutions"; they fail to understand that this

Form of Production and Exchange
C > C'
C > M > C'
M > C > M'
M > C > . . . P . . . C' > M'

Figure 1. Contradictions in the development of commodity relations and capital accumulation

was merely one phase in the competitive struggle of commodity production (Aronowitz 1988, 2000). Competitive institutions derive their significance from their relationship to the underlying market processes that they affect and to which they give effect. Pfeffer and Fong selectively focus on educational institutions that were merely one manifestation of a broader social context of emerging capitalist relations of (educational) production. These processes give rise to irreducible contradictions that, in Pfeffer and Fong, remain unexamined and therefore ambiguous.

Emergent capitalist relations in education (with their attendant contradictions) are incipient forms of commodity production. Concretely, in a precapitalist social order, craft skill, ideological training, and cultural acclimation are produced mainly for self-consumption. Production for exchange with other communities initially occurs only sporadically—with surplus production. But as the forces of production increase, surpluses become a regular feature, and with them, production for exchange. As a result, competitive markets begin to emerge, whereby production processing falls under the discipline of economy and competition. This evolution is represented in figure 1.

The equation $C > C$ represents a social economy mainly devoted to fulfilling basic needs, where one producer exchanges her product directly with that from another. Here, exchange occurs infrequently, and surpluses appear only occasionally. In the second and third (mercantilist) forms, a universal commodity equivalent (e.g., money, M) appears that facilitates specialization and increases productivity (and eventually surplus production). This augurs the competitive discipline of markets, where the surpluses from different producer societies meet in a marketplace. Competition begins to radically reconstruct production, and thus all spheres of life and work. In the figure, the last phase represents the (mature) case of capital accumulation, where labor itself (including educational labor) is assimilated into commodity production. Hence, educational wage labor (C) is acquired for a wage (M), and absorbed into a production process (P) to

produce an educational product (C', e.g., MBAs) that is finally exchanged for M' (course fees) (Marx 1977, 205).

Each phase in the figure 1 formulation is a process of unity-in-difference, or an interpenetration-of-opposites. Thus the movement from, say, that of mercantilism (from $M > C > M'$) admits both stability and instability: an equilibrium as a mode of production (e.g., mercantilism), yet a disequilibrium state insofar as it embodies the seeds of its own self-transformation. Hence merchants were gradually forced, by competition, to begin reorganizing labor processes to reduce costs (Dobb 1963; Hunt 1986; Pollard 1965; Zerzan and Zerzan 1979). The instabilities are typically overlooked by conventional analysis,[3] including that of Pfeffer and Fong.[4] As the subsequent discussion highlights, unstable equilibria are the general rule, not an exceptional case, in the analysis of educational commodity production (Kornai 1979). Failure to make such distinctions results in a befuddled analysis.

Ambiguities in Evaluating the Educational Product

For Pfeffer and Fong, the criterion for evaluating business schools and their products resides in market prowess. The salaries of newly minted MBAs, and the pitiable impact of academic writings on business practice, are taken as de facto evidence of the failure of business education. Yet, midway through this analysis, the authors abandon this mark-to-market verdict for humanistic educational values, infused with the nostalgia of traditional, Gramscian intellectuals.[5] No consideration is given to the possibility that the market imperative expressed in their first argument might be antithetical to the liberal, humanistic ideals in the second.

When writing in their "for-market" voice, Pfeffer and Fong quote Paul Lawrence (1992, 140) approvingly, who, in decrying business school research for its lamentable contribution to practice, attributes this to too much "theory orientation rather than a problem orientation." Similarly, they cite Karl Weick (1989, 516), who finds "too much stress on theory validation, and not on usefulness," and Donald Hambrick (1994, 13), who blames the "incestuous closed loop" of academia (that frustrates innovation). Finally, Pfeffer and Fong settle on an institutional theory of inertia (Meyer and Rowan 1977) for their main explanation of "resistance (market) change" (Pfeffer and Fong 2002, 15). The entire discussion is couched in a market judgment: that "the end is nigh" (for business schools) because they fail to meet the market test, vis-à-vis increments in MBA salaries and penetration of business practice by academic writings.

Given the subordination to the market imperative, it is ironic that,

The now-defunct Arthur Andersen University in Chicago was an institutional reminder of the growing importance of firm-specific skills (capital) that have limited transferability compared with the general skills imparted in a traditional MBA.

elsewhere in this text, the market verdict is suspended in an attempt to salvage college education from the onslaught of "competing institutions" (Pfeffer and Fong 2002, 16). If markets putatively deliver a better *social good*, why grieve the demise of college education? According to a survival-of-the-fittest market ideology, it is better to relinquish the field to institutions that, according to the market's own determination, are better able to provide the services.

A second deficiency afflicts Pfeffer and Fong's institutional-centric proposals: the failure to fully investigate the character of competing institutions in order to decipher the exact reason for their success. Such an analysis would be a precondition for an effective counterattack by conventional university providers. Figure 1 contains the basic ingredients of such an analysis. The unfolding accumulation process directs attention to an array of pertinent educational developments that are offhandedly dismissed by Pfeffer and Fong. For instance, the competition from low-cost distance learning providers is dismissed by conveniently elitist arguments: "The internet is only an innovation in delivery, not in content" (Pfeffer and Fong 2002, 6; Tinker and Feknous 2001, 2003). Similarly, the now-defunct Arthur Andersen University in Chicago was an institutional reminder of the growing importance of firm-specific skills (capital) that have limited transferability compared with the general skills imparted in a traditional MBA.

In addition to distance learning and corporate providers of firm-specific capital, figure 1 also anticipates other developments not envisaged in Pfeffer and Fong's institutional-centric approach. Geographical innovations also augment capital accumulation in education. The AACSB has declared that "International" is now central to its new mission and is a required part of its new name. In 1999 it announced that "accreditation now circles the globe," with the addition of twelve Latin American, European, and Asian institutions to a pilot study launched in 1996 (AACSB 1999b). The growth of in-house MBAs, tailored to the specific needs of a particular employer (often with the aid of faculty rented from a local college), is a further instance of an institutional innovation for developing firm-specific capital.

Institutional expansion, and its consequential conditioning of the educational production process, is also evident in the growth of corporate and college alliances (ibid.) and the expansion of business school endowments that, for the fiscal year ending in 2001, totaled $69 million (AACSB 1999a). These endowments typically come with strings attached. An academic department, or a professorial chair, may be named in honor of the benefactor, but this is usually accompanied by a condition of nonrenewal, unless the chair incumbent, department, or a school achieves the ego-

gratifying status of "star" recognition in the rankings of *Business Week* or *U.S. News & World Report*. In a manner lauded by Pfeffer and Fong, this pressure invariably turns "inwards," to restructure the educational production process itself, purging it of any affinities with "the arts and sciences" and securing a closer alignment with "the competitive environment" (Pfeffer and Fong 2002, 16).

Ambiguities in Evaluating the Educational Process

Pfeffer and Fong's indictment of the educational processes of business schools parallels their case against the MBA product of business schools. They see the problem as stemming from the uncritical adoption of traditional practices of mainstream academia and the quest for

> academic respectability and legitimacy on their campuses by becoming social science departments, or perhaps, applied social science departments. In the process of achieving academic legitimacy, business schools took on the traditions and ways of mainstream academia. . . . Quantitative, statistical analyses gained prominence, as did the study of the science of decision-making. In both their teaching and research activities, business schools enthusiastically seized on and applied a scientific paradigm that applies criteria of precision, control, and testable models. (Bailey and Ford 1996, quoted in Pfeffer and Fong 2002, 2)

For Pfeffer and Fong, the source of the problem lies at the very origins of the American business school:

> In the 1950s, the Gordon and Howell report (1959) "described American business education as a collection of trade schools lacking a strong scientific foundation" (Zimmerman, 2001, 2). The Gordon and Howell report and funding from the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Council (Pierson, 1959) started business schools on their continuing trajectory to achieve academic respectability and legitimacy. (Pfeffer and Fong 2002, 2)

Emulating other academic social science departments has, for Pfeffer and Fong, produced a new set of problems: a curricula too preoccupied with analytics, insufficient emphasis on problem finding as contrasted with problem solving and implementation, and inadequate integration across the various functional areas. Pfeffer and Fong would have business schools move out of the groves of academe and closer to the practice of management. Thus business schools have been ensnared by the university with *analysis* and insufficient attention to *integration, leadership*, and *interpersonal skills* as referred to in the recent work of Mintzberg, Gosling, and

Lampel. And to stress the unreal MBA product of today's business school education, they cite Howard Leavitt (1989, 29) characterizing MBA graduates as "critters with lopsided brains, icy hearts and shrunken souls."[6]

Yet once again Pfeffer and Fong are not quite ready to give up the ghost of university education and hand over the job to those noncollege "competitors" whose products, they readily acknowledge, have gained the market's blessing. In this elliptical line of argument, they retreat to the solace of traditional university values and reject those competitors who "for the most part, are not necessarily playing by the same rules because they don't operate in the same normative environment with the same history as most business schools." Completing the somersault, Pfeffer and Fong now celebrate "the research capabilities, and particularly the rigorous thinking and theoretical grounding that characterizes business school scholars and their research . . . [that actually offers] an advantage over the casual empiricism and hyping of the latest fad that characterizes much, although not all, of the research that comes out of nonacademic sources" (2002, 13). Pfeffer and Fong exit this contradictory conundrum by turning to professional schools as a source of inspiration (e.g., medicine, law, accounting): "All that is required is for business schools to model themselves more closely on their other professional school counterparts and less on the arts and science departments" (ibid., 16).

Unfortunately, no evidential basis is provided to support this recommendation. Indeed, what evidence there is, is somewhat out of kilter with this rosy view of professional education (Abbott 1988; Freidson 1986; Johnson 1972; Lindblom 1982, 1984; Strick 1978; Tigar and Levy 1977).[7] Professional associations are exclusionary and discriminatory—striving to achieve double closure, whereby membership is sealed off from the pressures of external labor markets (Parkin 1979). They seek to establish a monopolistic right to legislate over a particular domain (Bauman 1987). Professions are therefore regimes of power, ones that—through the educational apparatus—often perpetuate illiberal and unprogressive views. As such, they hardly provide the unblemished exemplar for business school teaching that Pfeffer and Fong would have us believe. Rather, as Ackroyd (1996, 608) notes, "professionalism is under attack almost everywhere."

Business schools need look no further than their own backyards for an admonitory lesson in professional education: accountancy. Here Pfeffer and Fong have available perhaps the most dramatic instance of a market test (or more precisely, a market failure) in the form of WorldCom, Global Crossing, Enron et al., all of which we may, in part, lay at the door of professional accountancy education. The widely discussed conflicts of interest that beset the large accountancy firms did not stop at those between audit and management advisory services, but reached into the educational

processes themselves. The first step for recruitment into management consulting involved the large firms hiring audit-lite MBAs from Ivy League schools. Notwithstanding the fact that this "talent" had only one accounting course (and no audit courses) in its MBA life, these students were—and still are—considered perfect raw material by the large firms, because of their potential as suave, socially polished ambassadors for management consulting. Students from "lesser" colleges, who undergo four to five years of intensive, full-time training in an accredited accounting program, are invariably treated as second-class citizens by Big Four recruiters. They lack the social finesse and privilege of their Ivy League counterparts. Pfeffer and Fong acknowledge this in noting that MBA success has more to do with selecting the "right stuff" than with competence or ability (but they completely miss the larger point):

> It is not education in business but selectivity that is being assessed. . . . graduate business programs may be as much networking, screening, or recruiting services as educational institutions. . . . it is a prescreened pool. . . . the curriculum taught at business schools is irrelevant, and that the utility of a business school degree is to provide a pedigree rather than learning. (Pfeffer and Fong 2002, 5)

While we concur with Pfeffer and Fong that the educational system is fundamentally "broke," the accounting example leads to a diametrically opposed assessment of causes and the remedies. Arthur Andersen was the most spectacular accounting-induced failure that we have ever witnessed, and the roots of this failure lay at the doorstep of the "professional" educational institutions of accountancy. The first port of call for recruiters from the erstwhile Big 5 was not the plodding four or five accredited accounting programs that drill students through 132 to 150 approved course credits, 30 to 40 of which are specifically devoted to auditing and accounting. Instead, the elite firms begin hiring at the prestige graduate schools of accountancy and MBA programs, where three course credits of accounting are not uncommon. This flash exposure to auditing and accounting made sense to those who had no intention of auditing for the long-term, but who were destined for bigger killings in consulting. Auditing at firms like Enron was merely a brief stopover: a finishing school makeover to polish credentials for consultancy. The latter promised salaries of $130,000 plus, an $80,000 premium over that made by the plodders. The audit-lite MBAs would score off-the-chart on Pfeffer and Fong's market salary test. Yet it is those MBAs, and the *professional* education system that produces them, that we have to thank for the blight of capital markets. It is now commonplace for commentators on the worldwide

Auditing at firms like Enron was merely a brief stopover: a finishing school makeover to polish credentials for consultancy. The latter promised salaries of $130,000 plus, an $80,000 premium over that made by the plodders.

recession to blame lax auditing for the mistrust of audited financial statements. Few professions can lay claim to such a dubious distinction.[8]

Implications

A perennial problem with conventional writing in business education is that it is typically conducted by insiders, who have undisclosed oxen to gore. The corollary is that certain issues are always off-the-table and not subject to debate. Hence, most "debates" about the future of MBAs and business schools are conducted in an atmosphere of ambiguity. Although such debates may be motivated, in the first instance, by public outrage at the rapacious, self-indulgent culture of many corporate boardrooms—inculcated by *the best* MBA training—commentators like Pfeffer and Fong invariably shrink from pondering the social antecedents of such problems and turn instead to rearranging the institutional deck chairs (in their case, lauding the professional school model as a solution). Yet, because it was the market that helped instigate the problem, this solution will not last. This is especially true when Pfeffer and Fong's proposals are put to the test.

Professional accountancy, with its special experience of course content and allegiances with practice, make it an excellent prototype for testing Pfeffer and Fong's viewpoint regarding MBA education. Yet a closer examination of the record from this professional accountancy quarter is hardly reassuring because the ravages of market assimilation and commodification are now under way in this quarter. As a result of pressure from large accounting firms, accredited professional accountancy programs are now being "upgraded" into five-year master's degrees, where a comprehensive undergraduate accounting training now stands shoulder to shoulder with tracks for students with markedly weaker backgrounds (e.g., students with nonaccounting, nonbusiness, undergraduate degrees). This is a convergence toward the discredited, audit-lite MBA programs that gave us Enron, WorldCom, and other accounting-inspired instabilities.

Pfeffer and Fong construe the problem with MBA education as a tilt too far toward science and arts, and away from the needs of the market. Yet their remedy—the organization of professional schools of business like that of other fields—begs more questions than it answers. The marketplace measures of success that Pfeffer and Fong deploy to bolster their analysis now seem singularly inappropriate after Waste Management, WorldCom, Vivendi, and Enron. High executive compensation can no longer be treated as synonymous with merit. In the public eye, MBAs and accountants have earned their compensation by looting corporate treasuries at the

expense of stockholders, employees, and other social constituencies. What Pfeffer and Fong treat as a hallmark of achievement has become a stigma of failure.

Embracing a professional school model for business education would only exacerbate the problem. A romantic notion of "professional" schools does not withstand close scrutiny, as can be seen from the record of accountancy. Far from providing a sanctuary, professional schools of accountancy have, in recent years, become the vehicle for furthering the accumulation pursuits of accounting firms and their corporate clients. This, arguably, has helped trigger a rolling depression that now threatens the livelihood of millions who are bound together in a global economy. Intensifying the commodification of business education with the professional school model will only create more instabilities.

Notes

1. The *FT*'s perspective is taken seriously because its business school ranking is used extensively in the corporate and higher education communities. The reputational benefits that accrue to a college from a high *FT* rating include a boost in its enrollments in the lucrative MBA and management education markets, larger professorial salaries and college resources, and greater student employment prospects and salary on graduation (Ghoshal 2003).

2. Responses to ethical and social criticism have ranged from denial to familiar calls for reform. Typical of the former, in the wake of Enron andWorldCom, are suggestions from financial economists that the "silver lining" of these institutional implosions was that they showed a healthy market capable of "cleaning house," or alternatively, these meltdowns presented a business opportunity for a (market-inspired) insurance system (Ronen and Yaari 2001). Even in a Bush era, some of these suggestions went down like a lead balloon.

3. The same oversight is prevalent in equilibrium analysis in neoclassical economics, which stresses equilibrium rather than disequilibrium throughout its analysis (Dobb 1937; Kornia 1979).

4. The neglect of second-order effects and unintended consequences and a penchant for premature closure are symptomatic of this failing.

5. Almost the entire weight of their first line of argument rests on demonstrating that an MBA gives a student little salary or other employment advantage over non-MBAs (Pfeffer and Fong 2002, 3–4) and that academic research may help a school's prestige, but it has little impact on the practice of management (9–12).

6. Pfeffer and Fong never attempt to reconcile these humanistic aspirations for MBAs with the market efficiency tests that they apply to education. The issue is treated as nonproblematic. Not to be outdone, Ian Mitroff has recently suggested that, like police officers, MBA wannabes should be subject to a "social pathology" test before gaining admission to a program. Like Leavitt, Mitroff's perspective is socially atomistic: pathological attitudes emanate from individuals, not from the social circumstances in which they function.

7. The cautionary experiences reach across medicine (Illich 1971, 1976; Illich et al. 1977), law (Larson 1977; Tigar and Levy 1977), and education (Dale 1976; Freire 1972; Greer 1976).

8. This is not to say that accredited university training is free of problems. Small accounting firms control the content of many state-accredited programs, and they invariably restrict the syllabus to serve their own commercial interests, especially any material that might confer benefits on their larger competitors (Tinker 2000). Thus, even though over 95 percent of students find employment in corporate and government positions after graduation, they usually face course offerings that are often confined to the needs of small accounting firms, and have minimal exposure to courses relevant for nonprofessional practice (e.g., management accounting; see Mason 1994).

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Globalization and Professionalization in Africa

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Although it is often claimed that Africa has "fallen off the globalization map" in the 1990s, the globalization process has had more dramatic consequences for the African continent than for any other region on the planet. African nations have been among the first targets of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have imposed on indebted countries across the South. African nations have also been subjected to systematic "disinvestment," which has reduced them to their former colonial role as producers of raw materials and labor power for the international economy.

These developments have torn African societies apart. The dismantling of local industries, the privatization of economic assets, and the defunding of the public sector have stripped Africans across the continent of their most basic means of subsistence, leading to an unprecedented increase in unemployment, poverty, migration, and social conflict. The situation has also profoundly altered the schooling process. In the aftermath of adjustment and economic disinvestment, there has been an attempt to replace the educational and professionalization systems that had been constructed in postindependence Africa with a technocratic system of professional formation aimed at producing political and economic elites aligned with the interests of international capital and the goals of structural adjustment. This program so far has not succeeded, given the tremendous resistance to it from students and faculty across Africa. Nevertheless, it has already irreversibly transformed the "social contract" that had prevailed between the new generations of Africans and the state, in which education and professionalization played a crucial role. It has also made African societies more vulnerable to the "recolonization" drive at the core of globalization and the neoliberal agenda. Not least, it has undermined the production and distribution of knowledge in Africa, making it increasingly difficult for African intellectuals and professionals to carry on their work and participate in the global exchange of ideas.

Thus much is at stake in a discussion of the present state of professionalization in Africa, and not for Africans alone. In recognition of this fact, our article concludes with a code of ethics that expresses our solidarity with our African colleagues and also pertains to our own struggle

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against the "enclosure of knowledge" and the construction of professionalization as a means of social exclusion and elite formation.

African Professionalization in the 1960s and 1970s

The application of structural adjustment to education and professional training is a pervasive feature in contemporary Africa and can best be described as a reversal of the educational policies that the African states had adopted in the postindependence period. Creating a large cadre of "organic" intellectuals in charge of making Africa politically and economically independent had been one of the first priorities of the new African governments, which had to cope with the lack of educational systems, the flight of colonial "experts" (e.g., medical doctors, engineers, bankers, teachers), and the demands of a new generation of young people whose expectations had been shaped by the anticolonial struggle. In this context, education and professionalization were unambiguously seen as tools of "nation building," and the launching of new educational programs and institutions was justified in the name of the nationalistic slogans of the day.

Exemplary of this rhetoric are the imperatives agreed upon by the participants in a conference sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1962 on the development of higher education in Africa. In defining the postcolonial mandate concerning education, the conference made "development" the drumbeat to which the university should dance and insisted that African universities should "maintain adherence and loyalty to world academic standards." The conference's concluding document, based on the consensus of the leading figures in African higher education, also recommended that national labor needs should determine the courses offered and the students' distribution among them, and that African governments should give priority to scientific and technological training (UNESCO 1963, 49). But it stressed above all that the role of higher education in the social, cultural, and economic development of Africa must be:

> To ensure the unification of Africa:
> - To encourage elucidation of and appreciation for African culture and heritage and to dispel misconceptions of Africa, through research and teaching of African studies;
> - To develop completely the human resources for meeting manpower needs;
> - To train the "whole man" for nation building;
> - To evolve over the years a truly African pattern of higher learning dedicated to Africa and its people yet promoting a bond of kinship to the larger human society. (ibid., 3)

In other words, it was recognized that "national development" required the instrumentalizing of professionalization for specific economic and technical ends; and school authorities were urged both to give students incentives to take technical courses and to increase the number and value of the scholarships "awarded for scientific and technical subjects" (59). Nevertheless, the terms in which this mandate was expressed—*development, nation building, unification of Africa, human resources, the whole man*—also presumed that education should enable Africa to overcome the legacy of colonialism, and stand in stark contrast with the rhetoric of the structural adjustment era (Kamer 2002).

The same is true of the assumption made by the conference participants that the onus of financing education on an individual or institutional level should be carried by the state, and that students should be integral to national planning. Education, professional formation, and students themselves were highly valorized in postindependence Africa. After the traumatic flight of European professional and technical personnel at the end of colonialism, university students were seen as crucial to an "import substitution" process that could save the nation from an embarrassing and costly dependence on the resources of the former colonial powers (Federici 2000).

Given this mandate, students developed a strong sense of self-importance and high expectations—guaranteed upward mobility, high-level employment, participation in their countries' political and economic life—that were often satirized by contemporary intellectuals. "How can they all be future leaders? And who will do the work?" the narrator asked in Mwangi Ruheni's novel *The Future Leaders*, after the commencement speaker of the 1958 Makerere University graduating class made one more preening speech (quoted in Sicherman 1995, 31). But this kind of satire also points to the existence of a unique relation between students and the state in postcolonial Africa, a sort of new "social contract," in which education was upheld as the primary means for personal and national advancement.

The formation of a new generation of professionals and the construction of new full-blown educational systems was one of the main tasks of the postindependence African state and one of its main achievements. Certainly, the educational programs that were put in place tended to create a new elite and generally operated according to developmental and educational paradigms modeled on those imported by the colonizers. For a while, even the bulk of the teaching staff continued to come from Europe and North America. But the creation of African educational systems must be reckoned as an important accomplishment, since, despite all their limitations, they assumed an African future not dominated by the colonial framework.

For African students the hope of having a role in national development was dashed in the 1980s when the World Bank demanded that the finances of African universities be restructured to require university students and their families to pay for the costs of education. Coupled with the downsizing of the public sector--the main source of employment for new graduates—"cost sharing" was the first sign of a systemic change in the institutional plans for African education. It was soon evident, however, that the goal of educational "rationalization" was not only to make university education more "cost effective" but to drastically reduce the number of university students and even the number of university institutions, which World Bank planners considered excessive, given Africa's prospective role in the global economy. As the argument went, in an early phase of educational structural adjustment in the mid-1980s, the proliferation of higher education institutions in the postcolonial period had created an imbalance at the expense of primary education that had to be redressed, especially in the face of Africa's economic crisis. But the policies that the World Bank has prescribed and the initiatives it has undertaken have made it clear that the boosting of primary education has been nothing more than a fig leaf intended to give the proposed university reforms a more democratic facade.

What is at stake, instead, is a radical revisioning of the goals of higher education as defined in the postcolonial period. The first objective is to downgrade, if not dismantle, the African higher education systems insofar as they are the carriers of a national project of economic development. The second is to create a number of professionalization programs often run by an expatriate personnel in charge of training a body of African adjusters steeped in the neoliberal philosophy that the World Bank has promoted and ready to accept the diminished role Africa is to play in the global economy. Combined, these two objectives amount to a recolonization of African education, matching the takeover of African economies by international organizations and investors during the 1980s and 1990s.

Accordingly, one of the first conditions that the World Bank has imposed on African governments, in the name of the debt crisis and adjustment, has been the defunding of higher education at all levels. Consequently, within a few years from the implementation of the first adjustment programs, subsidies to students (for food, lodging, educational materials) were reduced or terminated; academic wages were frozen at the very time when repeated currency devaluations sent the prices of most items sky-high; academic grants for research and travel were eliminated; and investment in the universities' infrastructures (buildings, laboratories, class-

rooms, student hostels, faculty offices, and above all the university libraries) was also drastically cut.

It is by now well known that as a result of these measures the higher education system in most African countries has virtually collapsed, physically and culturally. Academic facilities have been allowed to rot. Teaching time has been drastically reduced, and for students studying has become a feat, as the increased cost of education has led to a dramatic deterioration of their living conditions and cut their access to educational materials. African universities have also experienced a faculty flight of unprecedented proportions, because of the collapse of academic wages, whose purchasing power on average has dropped by 50 percent or more.

Unable to feed their families even on a professor's salary, scholars have been forced to either supplement teaching with consultancy work in the private sector or change profession or, whenever possible, migrate, usually to Europe or North America. According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, some 27,000 African intellectuals and professionals emigrated to developed countries between 1960 and 1975. But between 1985 and 1990, the beginning of the structural adjustment era, the number jumped to 60,000 and has averaged 20,000 annually ever since (Africa Recovery 2000). The forces pushing this intellectual diaspora are now so strong that African governments are no longer trying to stop it and are even arguing, desperately and paradoxically, that the "brain drain" might have a positive impact on their economy (Zeleza and Veney 2002).

The migration of the faculty to the private sector or to foreign institutions has been matched by that of thousands of former or prospective students, many of whom have traveled to Europe or the United States where they can now be found working in factories and car-washing outfits, or have been recruited to fight in the many civil wars that the dissolution of African societies has produced. Such has been the impact of structural adjustment on access to education that in an early analysis of this phenomenon, we at the Committee for Academic Freedom in Africa spoke of "academic exterminism," arguing that in a context in which university enrollment rates did not exceed 1 percent (having risen from zero in the colonial era) any increase in the cost of university education and any reduction in state support for it threatened its very existence (Caffentzis 2000a).

In reality, the collapse in university enrollment that we had anticipated has not occurred, in part because the universities have opened their doors to any students who can pay the new fees, and because of the stiff resistance students and teachers have mounted against the "rationalization" program. The prolonged strikes, demonstrations, and university occupa-

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tions that (beginning in the mid-1980s) African students and teachers have organized have not blocked the restructuring of higher education (Federici and Caffentzis 2000) but have often limited its effects and produced something of a stalemate. On the one side, the university-student population has continued to grow through the 1980s and 1990s (see table 1), so that gross enrollment rates have increased (see table 2), as has total enrollment (see table 3), though at a slower rate than the 1960s and 1970s. (Exceptions to this trend are Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, where the university systems have all but shut down because of civil war.)

On the other side, between 1980 and 1995 there has been on average a 68 percent decline in the percentage of GNP per capita publicly invested in the higher education of each university student. This means that in the African universities of the 1990s an increased number of students have met a reduced level of resources and support, leading to a decline in the quality of education and the value of the degrees acquired through it.

The Africa Capacity Building Foundation and "Homegrown" Structural Adjustment

In response to widespread criticism of their retrenchment plan for African universities and the strenuous opposition mounted by African students and academicians, World Bank planners, over the years, have offered substitute schemes presumably meant to revitalize educational possibilities and the professionalization process. These have included the concession of sectorial loans to specific universities for the financing of select technical programs or library acquisitions. One of the latest devices has been the introduction, in several institutions, of "online education"—connecting African institutions to programs in the United States—the ideal fit (World Bank planners argue) for a region starved of cash and unable to sustain an autonomous educational system.

A prerequisite for participation in these programs is invariably the willingness of African institutions to commercialize education. Thus, in the Nigerian University System Innovation Project designed by the World Bank, a university can obtain the supply of books, journals, and equipment bought with the loan funds only if its departments can show a decisive increase in revenue from nongovernment sources (ASUU 2000, 36). In other words, university departments must "corporatize" themselves and show their functionality to the needs of the "private sector." It goes without saying that the project favors professional and technical departments with direct contacts in the national and international corporate circuits.

But these provisions have failed to pacify the campuses, which have

Table 1. Growth of University-Student Population

Years	Average Annual Percentage Growth
1965–70	9.0
1970–80	10.5
1980–85	7.2
1985–90	5.5
1990–95	7.2

Source: UNESCO 1999, Table II.S.2

Table 2. Gross Enrollment Rates

Year	Percentage of enrollment of eligible students
1960	—
1970	0.8
1980	1.7
1990	3.0
1995	3.7
1997	3.9

Source: UNESCO 1999, Table II.S.5

Table 3. Total Enrollment

Year	In Thousands
1970	199
1980	562
1990	1,362
1995	1,920
1997	2,177

Source: UNESCO 1999, Table II.S.3

remained one of the main centers of the opposition to structural adjustment (despite the support for it by government-appointed university administrators). Students, academicians, and professionals well recognize the vacuousness of the substitutes introduced and, despite the harsh measures African governments have used to silence them, have continued to denounce structural adjustment in and out of the universities as nothing

less than a form of recolonization. In response, the rhetoric in which educational reform is wrapped is increasingly that of "ownership" and "homegrown" solutions. For the World Bank, professionalization is now training in identifying with or "owning" the financial interests of international capital.

This task is the raison d'être of the Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), officially launched in 1991, allegedly after "a brainstorming session in Kenya" between the World Bank staff and African policy makers, economic managers, and academics convened there to discuss Africa's development problem. We are told that at this meeting "sub-Saharan Africa's limited capacity for policy analysis and economic management was identified as a primary contributing factor to the inability to adjust to the economic dislocations of the 1970s. It was emphasized that Africa needed to build the necessary capacity in order to develop" (ACBF 2003).

The authors of the report do not mention that by 1988 many African campuses (in Kenya as well) had already exploded in anti–World Bank/IMF demonstrations and riots (Federici and Caffentzis 2000, 118–24). One of the largest confrontations occurred on the Nigerian campuses in April of that year, when students protesting the World Bank SAP-inspired increase in gasoline prices joined with workers off campus to create a state of near insurrection. In addition, the World Bank's staffers had been sending in reports complaining that SAPs could not be carried out, in the absence of structural adjusters in the governments and universities of the countries that agreed to the reform. Typical was the complaint filed by Robert Klitgaard, a World Bank representative in Equatorial Guinea, in the late 1980s, who recognized that he had to teach the government officials responsible for the implementation of SAP what the SAP policy they had accepted was all about (Klitgaard 1990). Klitgaard had also discovered a great amount of data manipulation in the reports he had received from SAP-monitoring government agencies. Clearly, quoting then U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's dictum "There Is No Alternative" was not enough!

It is in this context that World Bank officials have begun to define the goals of education and professionalization in Africa as the creation of an interfacing class of African structural adjusters. This goal is made quite clear in the introduction by World Bank Vice President for Africa Edward V. K. Jaycox's contribution to the ACBF's founding document, *The African Capacity Building Initiative: Toward Improved Policy Analysis and Development Management in Sub-Saharan Africa* (World Bank 1991), prepared by two World Bank executives, Dustin Wai and Gerard T. Rice:

> Many different approaches have been taken to the development challenge in Sub-Saharan Africa. These approaches have all failed to support on a sustainable basis one essential dimension: indigenous African capacities—skills, knowledge, and institutions. . . . Despite the achievements in education and training in Africa in the past 30 years, most countries still do not have a critical mass of top-flight policy analysts and managers who can help pilot their economies through the storms and turbulence that must be faced daily. (ibid., iii)

What are the "piloting" skills "Africa needs," and its academics and intellectuals refuse to learn, after thirty years of efforts? The missing knowledge (the only one deemed worth of reckoning) is that which neoliberal economists and policy analysts would need to introduce SAPs in Africa. "Capacity building," in other words, amounts to developing competent structural adjusters disinterested in such concepts as national development, autarky, import substitution, and nation building, which had been considered central for the success of the postcolonial professionalization project. Such concepts—and the educational and cultural capital associated with them—by now are seen as deadwood, and even an ideological impediment to Africa's recovery. Hence, the ACBF's most basic assumption: Africans, however highly educated and politically sophisticated, have no "capacity" and must now be trained from the outside. Thus, along with the adjustment of Africa's higher education systems, a steady transference has occurred whereby, while many African academicians have been forced to leave their campuses, professional training has been placed in the hands of international nongovernmental organizations, such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations (among others).

With respect to these "donor initiatives," the ACBF sees its role as that of a coordinator. Its declared objective now is to build and manage regional institutes of "excellence" and teaching centers, consolidating or replacing the universities and departments eliminated by SAPs, and functioning as a transmission belt between African governments and the World Bank and IMF headquarters in Washington. In the Bank's own words, the ACBF is to "build African cadres of excellence," and we can be sure that African universities will have little choice in the matter, for refusal to comply will result in the loss of funding by the Bank or any other outside source. The recolonization project that underlines this initiative has been so evident and noted that the World Bank has been forced to put a new face to these reforms, boosting, for instance, its efforts to recruit personnel of African descent for the planned professionalization programs.

Moreover, after urging African governments for years to relinquish their role as economic planners, the Bank has rediscovered the importance of state institutions for "sustainable development" (World Bank 1997). It

has also increased the funding for ACBF. Initially, barely $100 million was committed to its implementation—surely a drop in the bucket given the size of the African continent. In Nigerian monetary terms it came to no more than 10 billion naira, while the entire 1999 education budget of Nigeria (the largest country in Africa by far) was 28 billion naira (African Research Bulletin 1999, 13817). Not surprisingly, between 1992 and 1996, the ACBF could only support twenty-six projects in twenty African countries that, by 1999, had increased to thirty-one active projects in twenty-one countries. Things changed, however, after 1999, the year of the Seattle protests and the coming-of-age of the antiglobalization movement, which took the World Bank as one leg of the institutional tripod (along with the IMF and the World Trade Organization [WTO]) of the global economy to be abolished. The combination of demonstrations by "Jubilee 2000 Africa" across the continent and the spread of civil wars in formerly adjusted African countries created a crisis for the World Bank that made the success of the ACBF even more imperative.

Accordingly, in 1999, the Bank launched yet another initiative: the Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa (PACT), claiming that "unlike previous programs [e.g., the ACBF?] which were externally conceived, PACT is an African initiative." Which Africans were calling for it? By its own admission, the World Bank recognized that these were none other than "the African Governors of the World Bank"! As for PACT's mandate, it is practically a carbon copy of the ACBF's; in fact, it is to be administered through the ACBF, though it wishes to have a broader scope, proposing to include all the branches of government as well as the private sectors, civil society, and the academic world:

> [PACT] is meant to strengthen human and institutional capacities in sub-Saharan Africa, spur economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve living standards. The initiative is expected to bolster capacity in the public and private sectors and civil society by ensuring better financial and development management, improved legislative, juridical and regulatory frameworks, and strengthened communications and institution-building. (World Bank 1999)

The invention of gimmicks and shadow plays seems to have no end in World Bank headquarters. But the shell game played with the creation of PACT has injected new funds into the ACBF and expanded its operations. Within one year after PACT's launch, the number of projects in the ACBF's portfolio increased to sixty, organized according to the categories of "Core Public Sector Interventions," "Interface Projects," and "Strategy Interventions." Presently, the ACBF is funding projects in thirty-two countries. It is useful to examine some of these projects to better understand the ACBF's notion of professionalization. Consider the $2 million grant in

the Strategy Interventions category awarded to the Nigerian National Assembly to create a Policy Analysis and Research Unit (PARU). The ACBF's money is to fund: "(1) institutional development; (2) policy research and analysis; (3) training; (4) consultative forums; (5) documentation and dissemination; and (6) networking" (ACBF 2003).

The ACBF does not point out that many of the most important legislative decisions the National Assembly must make concern the World Bank itself. For example, should the Nigerian government pay back its large debt at the rates and schedule the World Bank demands, especially since much of this debt was accumulated by a corrupt military government? Is this an odious debt? We can be sure that these are the kinds of questions the World Bank hopes assembly members will resolve in its favor after it has increased their professional capacity. Could we call such a grant an open bribe to the assembly members who are going to be "turned pro" by PARU?

A typical Interface Project is the $1.5 million grant disbursed to support a National Economic Council (NEC) in Malawi, which is to do a set of jobs World Bank representatives like Robert Klitgaard had done previously in an amateurish way. The NEC is to provide "professional advice and technical support" to the government on "economic reform" (i.e., structural adjustment); to "promote and improve Private-Public sector dialogue"; to coordinate economic management between the Ministry of Finance, the Reserve Bank, and donor agencies; and to "strengthen the capacity of the executive and legislative branches of government to make effective and timely decisions on economic reform" (ACBF 2003). Thus the NEC will become the face of "economic reform" in Malawi, foregrounding African "experts" instead of the World Bank planners who periodically arrive and depart behind the scenes.

Finally, an example of a Core Public Sector Intervention project is the $1.1 million grant to São Tomé and Príncipe for training activities. Specifically, the grant is intended to finance: "(1) degree training at the Masters' level for civil servants in the various ministries; (2) study tours and (3) the organization of seminars and workshops within São Tomé" (ACBF 2003). It is a modest project also meant to ensure that the personnel in the country's finance ministries acquire the skills needed to implement structural adjustment, but it well illustrates the strategy inherent to the ACBF. To present itself as a high-powered academic organization capable of dispensing valuable knowledge to willing participants, ACBF must establish a "flexible" relation to the existing academic systems officially responsible for training professionals. It can "link" with an economics department, if the latter accepts its ideological requirements, but it can just as easily "delink."

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The international economic crisis of the early 2000s has created an even greater sense of urgency among African adjusters and their patrons. This has led to a circling of the wagons in the African "capacity building" project. The IMF (generally playing "hard cop" in the negotiations with African governments) has by now started its own Africa Capacity Building Initiative and joined ACBF in 2002. The IMF is to provide "regional technical assistance centers" to groom "a team of resident experts supplemented by short-term specialists in the core areas of the IMF's expertise, including macroeconomic policy, monetary and exchange rate policies, financial sector policies, tax policy and revenue administration, public expenditure management, and macroeconomic statistics" (IMF 2002).

If we combine the dozens of relatively inexpensive ACBF grants with the projected IMF centers, we can see how the capacity-building project of "indigenizing" structural adjustment is expected to work. Under the rubrics of study tours, networking, and seminars, the structural adjustment catechism is being taught to thousands of legislators, civil servants, university students, NGO personnel, and local businesspeople. Since the ACBF projects are aimed at training staff in government ministries, national assemblies, and academic institutes and departments, they do not require a mass appeal. On the contrary, ACBF's professional logic is to convince and reward the few to capture the many for it.

Social Consequences of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment of Professionalization

The impact of the World Bank's structural adjustment policy and capacity-building efforts on the African education and professionalization systems can be seen on many levels. The most obvious is the curricular one. What knowledge the World Bank wants African professionals to acquire is revealed by the courses posted on the African Virtual University (AVU) Web site, which the Bank founded in 1997 as part of its capacity-building initiative. Teachers from the World Bank's staff or from North American universities offer courses on the Web site that African university students with access to the Internet can register for. Besides information technology courses, French and English courses, and remedial courses in basic mathematics, chemistry, and physics, the other categories of courses offered are the Career Series (which include courses like "How to Manage Your Career"), the Entrepreneurship Series (whose only course is "Starting and Planning Your Business"), Journalism (which includes "Economics and Business Journalism"), and the Trade Series (whose only course is

"Export Management"). The titles of the seminars that have so far been offered include: "Precision Management: Working Smarter Not Harder," "Powerful People Skills: Management Problems of the Technical Professional," "How to Criticize and Discipline through Positive Management for Managers and Supervisors," and "How to Eliminate, Reduce (Or at Least Cope with) Frustration in the Workplace" (AVU 2003).

Apart from the intellectual poverty of this fare, what is striking about this curriculum is the courses it lacks. No African languages are taught at the AVU. Obviously, the AVU assumes that African professionals will be dealing only with individuals, companies, and agencies coming from Western Europe or North America, not with Africans (except perhaps fellow members of the ACBF's "invisible college"). Export management is stressed, evidently expressing the World Bank's determination to discourage African businesspeople from relying on local markets for their products and giving the impression that any problem in the managing of imports is a nugatory one. There are no history, philosophy, or social science courses (basic or advanced), which means that professionals are not expected to put the questions posed by their business or government careers into a wider ethical and political perspective. The students' main job, paraphrasing some of the seminar titles, is to do "creative problem solving" and "communicate with confidence, enthusiasm and authority" in order to "convert that negative stuff into positive."

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In sum, the professionals produced by such a curriculum must think their management concepts and goals in English or French (the colonial languages of Africa), sell their country's labor and commodities on the world market, and communicate positively to their countrymen and women about the "negative stuff" of structural adjustment or, even better, convert it into a positive thing.

The second level at which the impact of ACBF is felt is a structural one. The World Bank's adjustment of professional formation in Africa has produced a two-tier educational system. The higher tier consists of projects and programs subsidized by international "donors" (like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, and other NGOs), often overseen by the ACBF, and destined to do research and mediation work subcontracted by international corporations or local companies. This tier is composed of special sections of academic departments or quasi-independent institutes linked to foreign institutions or NGOs and therefore receiving extra funding, as well as computers, air conditioners, stationery, and new books and journals. Students and faculty members attached to this tier are paid extra stipends, often worth many times their regular salaries (though quite modest by U.S. or European standards). As they operate in a special academic space, outside the usual university regulations, they continue to work even

when the rest of the university is shut down because of student or faculty strikes. Such an environment communicates to students that willingness to place one's professional expertise at the service of foreign corporations and NGOs will indeed be well rewarded.

On the lower tier are the regular university departments, not "under the link," dependent on shrinking government budgets, faced by a plethora of shortages and equipment breakdowns, and teaching impoverished students, often eating one meal a day or sleeping six or seven in one dorm room, and only able to access archaic books or purchase out-of-date lecture notes. The regular universities are often shut down for long periods because of strikes, riots, or police intervention on the campuses. "Unlinked" teachers are underpaid and often have to take other positions off campus (e.g., consultant, taxi driver, chicken farmer). Though life on this tier might stimulate the development of a critical perspective on structural adjustment, it is also one that generates much disruption and despair among students and teachers.

The structural gap between these two tiers of professional training is becoming increasingly dramatic on a personal level. Graduates from the lower tier are finding that their professional degrees are not recognized internationally, and when they emigrate, they are forced to take the lowest paid, most hazardous jobs, while those on the first tier have access to the latest knowledge in the field and can be credentialized by U.S. or European academic institutions. But this division is not simply a matter of differences in career opportunities or "cultural imperialism."

The subjection of education and professional formation in Africa to the control of international agencies and the technocratic orientation that has been imposed on it have also undermined Africans' capacity to resist the theft of the continent's natural resources. This subjection has made it possible for global corporations and international financial agencies, like the World Bank, to present themselves, in the eyes of the world, as the centers best equipped and, consequently, best entitled to protect, preserve, and control the cultural and natural wealth of the continent, whatever form that may take, from agricultural seeds, to "cultural property" (like archaeological sites), to pharmaceutical substances to be discovered through exploration of Africa's forests (World Bank 1992; Caffentzis 2000b).

This is especially true of Africa's medical, agricultural, and biological knowledge. The ability of gene-hunting global corporations to carry on "bioprospecting" or appropriate crucial genetic material, often the product of centuries of experimentation by African farmers, relies, above all, on the dismantling of African educational and cultural institutions, as well as on the impoverishment of African countries, which now have to sell

their birthrights to qualify for structural adjustment loans (Tripp 1993). The weakening of the universities makes it difficult to enforce laws that would protect Africa's knowledge, "traditional" or otherwise. Thus, at the same time that the dynamism of African knowledge is being recognized and the importance of "local," "situated" knowledge is given a new epistemological stature (Guyer 1996; Braidotti et al. 1994; Harding 1986), structural adjustment conditionalities have forced African governments to recognize the "intellectual property rights" of global corporations to the knowledge Africans have produced. Without autonomous universities and an independent set of African scientists and lawyers, the necessary institutional support for the protection of "local" knowledge is irremediably compromised.

The structural adjustment of professional schools and departments also makes it possible for global corporations to reduce their costs for research and production by making available to them a rich pool of cheap intellectual labor, as well as cheap research facilities in African professional and technical institutions. Once the potential of African universities for interfering in the appropriation of local knowledge has been preempted, select universities' departments or institutes can be allowed to survive, with the injection of short-term, task-oriented funds, to pay for the personnel who are to help with bioprospecting work, or who are to provide a liaison with local communities to give a corporation's project the veneer of indigenous input.

Much gene hunting and gene plundering is now conducted in this fashion, with only those segments of African universities being revitalized that can be used as intellectual plantations, where workers are expected to survive on short-term contract work in projects issuing from First World "donor" agencies, governments, and corporations themselves, who reap immense profits and prestige by "looting" the medical and agricultural knowledge of the African people.

The larger consequences of the adjusted professional formation system are thus more devastating than they might appear at first. Though the number of university and professional students has not been reduced, the regular university systems have been gutted, defunded, devalued, devitalized, and depoliticized. Conditions of living for students, faculty, and university nonacademic staff have degenerated while the dominant research agenda and cultural paradigms are again being set in Europe and North America. This has pushed many academicians into professional capitulation or total alienation from professionalization. Figuratively speaking, they find themselves either on the path of statesmen like Thabo Mbeki or Olusegun Obasanjo and other indigenous adjusters, who are now busy giving the World Bank's mandated policies a local, "homegrown" facade;

or on the path of the wild, gun-toting youth who provide the manpower for Africa's civil wars, a clear product of two decades of educational adjustment and the expulsion of pauperized students from the African schooling system.

Professional Resistance

These are not the only figures contemporary African history has produced who are relevant to the fate of professionalization in the region. Another is illustrated by the incident that occurred at Bayero University in Kano (Nigeria) on 19 October 2000. The incident was occasioned by the arrival from the United States of William Saint, one of the architects of the World Bank's structural adjustment of African universities. Saint had come to BUK to "explain" to "stakeholders" how the contested World Bank loan to Nigerian universities should be used (Saint 1992). The Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), the national university teachers' union, one of the largest on the continent, had campaigned for years against the loan and the project it was intended to support, the Nigerian Universities System Innovation Project (NUSIP) (ASUU 2000). Not accidentally, then, a wall of professors and students, from BUK and other universities of northern Nigeria, rose to stop Saint as he was entering the meeting, noting that he was not "a stakeholder in the Nigerian University System" and had no reason to be there (Ikyur 2000).

ASUU's opposition to Saint's presence at BUK exemplifies the resistance from Nigerian teachers and students to their government's capitulation to the World Bank and demonstrates their concept of professional formation and responsibility. In particular, academicians have protested the erosion of Nigeria's sovereignty as a result of its acceptance of adjustment loans (ASUU 2000, 18–21). As ASUU has argued in a document critical of NUSIP:

> The World Bank has no constitutional basis for making policies for the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Unless the World Bank is claiming sovereignty over Nigeria. . . . The 1999 [Nigerian] constitution does not recognize the World Bank either as a citizen, or as an organ of government exercising executive, legislative or judicial functions. Yet, the NUSIP is intended to achieve policy objectives [at variance with the Constitution and other Nigerian laws]. (ASUU 2000, 13)

Responsible professionalism, in continuity with the traditions of the anticolonial struggle, is still very much alive, then, in Africa, despite the persecution to which academic unions like ASUU have been subjected.

ASUU has often been banned, and its leaders have been hunted, arrested, and terrorized, but it has survived (Jega 2000). And it is not the only African professional organization upholding the flag of pan-Africanism against the World Bank's neoliberal and colonial vision of Africa's future. Many faculty unions, student associations, and professional organizations throughout Africa have refused to abandon the anticolonial project. Though financial and institutional power is in the hands of the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, and their local agents, most African teachers and students refuse to "own" SAPs and are struggling to take control of their education and economic and political future.

Along with other members of the Committee for Academic Freedom in Africa, we urge academics in North America to support this struggle and endorse the following Code of Professional Academic Ethics, which speaks to our potential role as officers of the "empire." In particular, we ask professional academics in North America to boycott the efforts by the World Bank (and similar agencies) to recruit academicians from our own institutions to assist it in the structural adjustment of African universities. It seems to us that boycotting this effort is a necessary step both to express our solidarity with our African colleagues and to redefine the globalization process in ways that do not undermine the possibility of African self-determination.

We are North American university teachers and we publicly declare our adherence to the following principles of academic ethics in our work in Africa:

- We will never, under any circumstance, work (as researchers, with a study abroad program, or in any other capacity) in an African university where students or the faculty are on strike or which has been shut down by students' or teachers' strikes and protests against police repression and structural adjustment cut backs.
- We will never take a position at or cooperate with the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, or any other organization whose policy is to expropriate Africans from the means of the production and distribution of knowledge and to devalue African people's contribution to world culture.
- We will never take advantage of the immiseration in which African colleagues and students have been reduced, and appropriate the educational facilities and resources from which African colleagues and students have been de facto excluded because of lack of means. Knowledge acquired under such conditions would be antagonistic to the spirit of multiculturalism and scholarly solidarity.
- We will consult with colleagues and activists in the countries where we carry on research, so as to ensure that our research answers the needs of the people it studies, and is shaped with the cooperation of people whose lives will be affected by it, rather than being dictated by funding agencies' agendas.

We ask professional academics in North America to boycott the efforts by the World Bank (and similar agencies) to recruit academicians from our own institutions to assist it in the structural adjustment of African universities.

To become a signatory of the Code of Ethics please write to the Committee for Academic Freedom in Africa, c/o Department of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, P.O. Box 9300, Portland, Maine 04104-9300 or contact the committee by e-mail at caffentz@usm.maine.edu.

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The University and the Undercommons

SEVEN THESES

Fred Moten and Stefano Harney

Philosophy thus traditionally practices a critique of knowledge which is simultaneously a denegation of knowledge (i.e., of the class struggle). Its position can be described as an *irony* with regard to knowledge, which it puts into question without ever touching its foundations. The questioning of knowledge in philosophy always ends in its restoration: a movement great philosophers consistently expose in each other.
—Jacques Rancière, *On the Shores of Politics*

I am a black man number one, because I am against what they have done and are still doing to us; and number two, I have something to say about the new society to be built because I have a tremendous part in that which they have sought to discredit.
—C. L. R. James, *C. L. R. James: His Life and Work*

The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today Is a Criminal One

"To the university I'll steal, and there I'll steal," to borrow from Pistol at the end of *Henry V*, as he would surely borrow from us. This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment. In the face of these conditions one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university.

Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it

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is unwelcome. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong.

What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say teaching, one would be performing the work of the university. Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the *Universitas*. But it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters. The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization.

But it is teaching that brings us in. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university. Kant interestingly calls such a stage "self-incurred minority." He tries to contrast it with having the "determination and courage to use one's intelligence without being guided by another." "Have the courage to use your own intelligence." *But what would it mean if teaching or rather what we might call "the beyond of teaching" is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance?* And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from $beyond_2$ (that which is beyond "the beyond of teaching"), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority? Certainly, the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste. But their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment. The waste lives for those moments

beyond$_2$ teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase—unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this?

Perhaps the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must. But even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the *Undercommons*—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act. And it is at the same time, the only possible act.

In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond$_2$ of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it's about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood.

Fredric Jameson reminds the university of its dependence on "Enlightenment-type critiques and demystification of belief and committed ideology, in order to clear the ground for unobstructed planning and 'development.'"[1] This is the weakness of the university, the lapse in its homeland security. It needs labor power for this "enlightenment-type critique," but, somehow, labor always escapes.

The premature subjects of the Undercommons took the call seriously, or had to be serious about the call. They were not clear about planning, too mystical, too full of belief. And yet this labor force cannot reproduce itself,

Able to see themselves properly as obstacles to society, or perhaps, with lifelong learning, students will return having successfully diagnosed themselves as the problem.

it must be reproduced. The university works for the day when it will be able to rid itself, like capital in general, of the trouble of labor. It will then be able to reproduce a labor force that understands itself as not only unnecessary but dangerous to the development of capitalism. Much pedagogy and scholarship is already dedicated in this direction. Students must come to see themselves as the problem, which, counter to the complaining of restorationist critics of the university, is precisely what it means to be a customer, to take on the burden of realization and always necessarily be inadequate to it. Later, these students will be able to see themselves properly as obstacles to society, or perhaps, with lifelong learning, students will return having successfully diagnosed themselves as the problem.

Still, the dream of an undifferentiated labor that knows itself as superfluous is interrupted precisely by the labor of clearing away the burning roadblocks of ideology. While it is better that this police function be in the hands of the few, it still raises labor as difference, labor as the development of other labor, and therefore labor as a source of wealth. And although the enlightenment-type critique, as we suggest below, informs on, kisses the cheek of, any autonomous development as a result of this difference in labor, there is a break in the wall here, a shallow place in the river, a place to land under the rocks. The university still needs this clandestine labor to prepare this undifferentiated labor force, whose increasing specialization and managerialist tendencies, again contra the restorationists, represent precisely the successful integration of the division of labor with the universe of exchange that commands restorationist loyalty.

Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its development, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited unwittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa-expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding escape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the

university, force the university to consider them a problem, a danger? The Undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful communities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The Undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.

There Is No Distinction between the American University and Professionalization

But surely if one can write something on the surface of the university, if one can write for instance in the university about *singularities*—those events that refuse either the abstract or individual category of the bourgeois subject—one cannot say that there is no space in the university itself? Surely there is some space here for a theory, a conference, a book, a school of thought? Surely the university also makes thought possible? Is not the purpose of the university as *Universitas*, as liberal arts, to make the commons, make the public, make the nation of democratic citizenry? Is it not therefore important to protect this *Universitas*, whatever its impurities, from professionalization in the university? But we would ask what is already not possible in this talk in the hallways, among the buildings, in rooms of the university about possibility? How is the thought of the outside, as Gayatri Spivak means it, already not possible in this complaint?

The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condition of possibility of production of knowledge in the university—the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal paraorganization, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.

Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the

prophetic organization of the Undercommons—to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its foundation, as without touching one's own condition of possibility, without admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the Undercommons. This always negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and professionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the university. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowledge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.

But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unregulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind—it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite—by which critical education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negligence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.

A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not progress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the *Universitas*, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the Undercommons.

The *Universitas* is always a state/State strategy. Perhaps it's surprising to say professionalization—that which reproduces the professions—is a state strategy. Certainly, critical academic professionals tend to be regarded today as harmless intellectuals, malleable, perhaps capable of some modest intervention in the so-called public sphere, like Bruce Robbins's cowboy professionals in *Secular Vocations*. But to see how this underestimates

the presence of the state we can turn to a bad reading of Derrida's consideration of Hegel's 1822 report to the Prussian Minister of Education. Derrida notices the way that Hegel rivals the state in his ambition for education, wanting to put into place a progressive pedagogy of philosophy designed to support Hegel's worldview, to unfold as encyclopedic. This ambition both mirrors the state's ambition, because it, too, wants to control education and to impose a worldview, and threatens it, because Hegel's State exceeds and thus localizes the Prussian state, exposing its pretense to the encyclopedic. Derrida draws the following lesson from his reading: the *Universitas*, as he generalizes the university (but specifies it, too, as properly intellectual and not professional), always has the impulse of State, or enlightenment, and the impulse of state, or its specific conditions of production and reproduction. Both have the ambition to be, as Derrida says, onto- and auto-encyclopedic. It follows that to be either for the *Universitas* or against it presents problems. To be for the *Universitas* is to support this onto- and auto-encyclopedic project of the State as enlightenment, or enlightenment as totality, to use an old-fashioned word. To be too much against the *Universitas,* however, creates the danger of specific elements in the state taking steps to rid itself of the contradiction of the onto- and auto-encyclopedic project of the *Universitas* and replacing it with some other form of social reproduction, the anti-enlightenment—the position, for instance, of New Labour in Britain and of the states of New York and California with their "teaching institutions." But a bad reading of Derrida will also yield our question again: what is lost in this undecidability? What is the price of refusing to be either for the *Universitas* or for professionalization, to be critical of both, and who pays that price? Who makes it possible to reach the aporia of this reading? Who works in the premature excess of totality, in the not ready of negligence?

The mode of professionalization that is the American university is precisely dedicated to promoting this consensual choice: an antifoundational critique of the University or a foundational critique of the university. Taken as choices, or hedged as bets, one tempered with the other, they are nonetheless always negligent. Professionalization is built on this choice. It rolls out into ethics and efficiency, responsibility and science, and numerous other choices, all built upon the theft, the conquest, the negligence of the outcast mass intellectuality of the Undercommons.

It is therefore unwise to think of professionalization as a narrowing and better to think of it as a circling, a circling of war wagons around the last camp of indigenous women and children. Think about the way the American doctor or lawyer regard themselves as educated, enclosed in the circle of the state's encyclopedia, though they may know nothing of philosophy or history. What would be outside this act of the conquest circle,

what kind of ghostly labored world escapes in the circling act, an act like a kind of broken phenomenology where the brackets never come back off and what is experienced as knowledge is the absolute horizon of knowledge whose name is banned by the banishment of the absolute. It is simply a horizon that does not bother to make itself possible. No wonder that whatever their origins or possibilities, it is theories of pragmatism in the United States and critical realism in Britain that command the loyalty of critical intellectuals. Never having to confront the foundation, never having to confront antifoundation out of faith in the unconfrontable foundation, critical intellectuals can float in the middle range. These loyalties banish dialectics with its inconvenient interest in pushing the material and abstract, the table and its brain, as far as it can, unprofessional behavior at its most obvious.

Professionalization Is the Privatization of the Social Individual through Negligence

Surely professionalization brings with it the benefits of competence. It may be the onto- and auto-encyclopedic circle of the university particular to the American state, but is it not possible to recuperate something from this knowledge for practical advances? Or, indeed, is it not possible to embark on critical projects within its terrain, projects that would turn its competencies to more radical ends? No, we would say, it is not. And saying so we prepare to part company with American critical academics, to become unreliable, to be disloyal to the public sphere, to be obstructive and shiftless, dumb with insolence in the face of the call to critical thinking.

Let us, as an example, act disloyally to the field of public administration and especially in masters of public administration programs, including related programs in public health, environmental management, nonprofit and arts management, and the large menu of human services courses, certificates, diplomas, and degrees that underpin this disciplinary cluster. It is difficult not to sense that these programs exist against themselves, that they despise themselves. (Although later one can see that as with all professionalization, it is the underlying negligence that unsettles the surface of labor power.) The average lecture, in the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at NYU for instance, may be more antistatist, more skeptical of government, more modest in its social policy goals than the average lecture in the avowedly neoclassical economics or new right political science departments at that same university. It would not be much different at Syracuse University, or a dozen other prominent public

administration schools. One might say that skepticism is an important part of higher education, but this particular skepticism is not founded on close study of the object in question. In fact, there is no state theory in public administration programs in the United States. Instead, the state is regarded as the proverbial devil we know. And whether it is understood in public administration as a necessary evil, or as a good that is nonetheless of limited usefulness and availability, it is always entirely knowable as an object. Therefore it is not so much that these programs are set against themselves. It is rather that they are set against some students, and particularly those who come to public administration with a sense of what Derrida has called a duty beyond duty, or a passion.

There is no state theory in public administration programs in the United States. Instead, the state is regarded as the proverbial devil we know.

To be skeptical of what one already knows is of course an absurd position. If one is skeptical of an object then one is already in the position of not knowing that object, and if one claims to know the object, one cannot also claim to be skeptical of that object, which amounts to being skeptical of one's own claim. But this is the position of professionalization, and it is this position that confronts that student, however rare, who comes to public administration with a passion. Any attempt at passion, at stepping out of this skeptical of the known into an inadequate confrontation with what exceeds it and oneself, must be suppressed by this professionalization. This is not merely a matter of administering the world, but of administering away the world (and with it prophecy). Any other disposition is not only unprofessional but incompetent, unethical, and irresponsible, bordering on the criminal. Again the discipline of public administration is particularly, though not uniquely, instructive, both in its pedagogy and in its scholarship, and offers the chance to be disloyal, to smash and grab what it locks up.

Public administration holds to the idea both in the lecture hall and the professional journal that its categories are knowable. The state, the economy, and civil society may change size or shape, labor may enter or exit, and ethical consideration may vary, but these objects are both positivistic and normative, standing in discrete, spatial arrangement each to the other. Professionalization begins by accepting these categories precisely so competence can be invoked, a competence that at the same time guards its own foundation (like Michael Dukakis riding around in a tank phantasmatically patrolling his empty neighborhood). This responsibility for the preservation of objects becomes precisely that Weberian site-specific ethics that has the effect, as Theodor Adorno recognized, of naturalizing the production of capitalist sites. To question them thus becomes not only incompetent and unethical but the enactment of a security breach.

For instance, if one wanted to explore the possibility that public administration might best be defined as the labor of the relentless privati-

zation of capitalist society, one could gain a number of unprofessional insights. It would help explain the inadequacy of the three major strains in public administration scholarship in the United States. The public ethos strain represented by projects like refounding public administration, and the journal *Administration and Society*; the public competence strain represented in the debate between public administration and the new public management, and the journal *Public Administration Review*; and the critical strain represented by PAT-Net, the Public Administration Theory Network, and its journal *Administrative Theory and Praxis*. If public administration is the competence to confront the socialization thrown up continuously by capitalism and to take as much of that socialization as possible and reduce it either to something called the public or something called the private, then immediately all three scholarly positions become invalid. It is not possible to speak of a labor that is dedicated to the reproduction of social dispossession as having an ethical dimension. It is not possible to decide the efficiency or scope of such labor after the fact of its expenditure in this operation by looking at it once it has reproduced something called the public or something called the private. And it is not possible to be critical and at the same time to accept uncritically the foundation of public administrationist thought in these spheres of the public and private, and to deny the labor that goes on behind the backs of these categories, in the Undercommons, of, for instance, the republic of women who run Brooklyn.

But this is an unprofessional example. It does preserve the rules and respect the terms of the debate, enter the speech community, by knowing and dwelling in its (unapproachable) foundational objects. It is also an incompetent example. It does not allow itself to be measured, applied, and improved, except to be found wanting. And it is an unethical example. Suggesting the utter dominance of one category over another—is this not fascism or communism? Finally, it is a passionate example full of prophecy not proof, a bad example of a weak argument making no attempt to defend itself, given over to some kind of sacrifice of the professional community emanating from the Undercommons. Such is the negligent opinion of professional public administration scholars.

What, further, is the connection then between this professionalization as the onto- and auto-encyclopedia of the American state and the spread of professionalization beyond the university or perhaps the spread of the university beyond the university, and with the colonies of the Undercommons? A certain riot into which professionalization stumbles—when the care of the social is confronted with its reaction, enforced negligence—a riot erupts and the professional looks absurd, like a recruiting booth at a carnival, professional services, personal professional services, turning pro

to pay for university. It is at this riotous moment that professionalization shows its desperate business, nothing less than to convert the social individual. Except perhaps, something more, the ultimate goal of counterinsurgency everywhere: to turn the insurgents into state agents.

Critical Academics Are the Professionals Par Excellence

The critical academic questions the university, questions the state, questions art, politics, culture. But in the Undercommons it is "no questions asked." It is unconditional—the door swings open for refuge even though it may let in police agents and destruction. The questions are superfluous in the Undercommons. If you don't know, why ask? The only question left on the surface is what can it mean to be critical when the professional defines himself or herself as one who is critical of negligence, while negligence defines professionalization? Would it not mean that to be critical of the university would make one the professional par excellence, more negligent than any other? To distance oneself professionally through critique, is this not the most active consent to privatize the social individual? The Undercommons might by contrast be understood as wary of critique, weary of it, and at the same time dedicated to the collectivity of its future, the collectivity that may come to be its future. The Undercommons in some ways tries to escape from critique and its degradation as university-consciousness and self-consciousness about university-consciousness, retreating, as Adrian Piper says, into the external world.

This maroon community, if it exists, therefore also seeks to escape the fiat of the ends of man. The sovereign's army of academic antihumanism will pursue this negative community into the Undercommons, seeking to conscript it, needing to conscript it. But as seductive as this critique may be, as provoked as it may be, in the Undercommons they know it is not love. Between the fiat of the ends and the ethics of new beginnings, the Undercommons abides, and some find comfort in this. Comfort for the emigrants from conscription, not to be ready for humanity and who must endure the return of humanity nonetheless, as it may be endured by those who will or must endure it, as certainly those of the Undercommons endure it, always in the break, always the supplement of the General Intellect and its source. When the critical academic who lives by fiat (of others) gets no answer, no commitment, from the Undercommons, well then certainly the conclusion will come: they are not practical, not serious about change, not rigorous, not productive.

Meanwhile, that critical academic in the university, in the circle of the American state, questions the university. He claims to be critical of the

negligence of the university. But is he not the most accomplished professional in his studied negligence? If the labor upon labor, the labor among labor of the unprofessionals in the university sparks revolt, retreat, release, does the labor of the critical academic not involve a mockery of this first labor, a performance that is finally in its lack of concern for what it parodies, negligent? Does the questioning of the critical academic not become a pacification? Or, to put it plainly, does the critical academic not teach how to deny precisely what one produces with others, and is this not the lesson the professions return to the university to learn again and again? Is the critical academic then not dedicated to what Michael E. Brown phrased the impoverishment, the immiseration, of society's cooperative prospects? This is the professional course of action. This enlightenment-type charade is utterly negligent in its critique, a negligence that disavows the possibility of a thought of outside, a nonplace called the Undercommons—the nonplace that must be thought outside to be sensed inside, from whom the enlightenment-type charade has stolen everything for its game.

But if the critical academic is merely a professional, why spend so much time on him? Why not just steal his books one morning and give them to deregistered students in a closed-down and beery student bar, where the seminar on burrowing and borrowing takes place. Yet we must speak of these critical academics because negligence it turns out is a major crime of state.

Incarceration Is the Privatization of the Social Individual through War

If one were to insist the opposite of professionalization is that fugitive impulse to rely on the Undercommons for protection, to rely on the honor, and to insist on the honor of the fugitive community; if one were to insist the opposite of professionalization is that criminal impulse to steal from professions, from the university, with neither apologies nor malice, to steal the Enlightenment for others, to steal oneself with a certain blue music, a certain tragic optimism, to steal away with mass intellectuality; if one were to do this, would this not be to place criminality and negligence against each other? Would it not place professionalization, would it not place the university, against honor? And what then could be said for criminality?

Perhaps then it needs to be said that the crack dealer, terrorist, and political prisoner share a commitment to war, and society responds in kind with wars on crime, terror, drugs, communism. But "this war on the

commitment to war" crusades as a war against the asocial, that is, those who live "without a concern for sociality." Yet it cannot be such a thing. After all, it is professionalization itself that is devoted to the asocial, the university itself that reproduces the knowledge of how to neglect sociality in its very concern for what it calls asociality. No, this war against the commitment to war responds to this commitment to war as the threat that it is—not mere negligence or careless destruction but a commitment against the idea of society itself, that is, against what Foucault called the Conquest, the unspoken war that founded, and with the force of law, refounds society. Not asocial but against social, this is the commitment to war, and this is what disturbs and at the same time forms the Undercommons against the university.

Is this not the way to understand incarceration in the United States today? And understanding it, can we not say that it is precisely the fear that the criminal will arise to challenge the negligent that leads to the need in the context of the American state and its particularly violent *Universitas* circle to concentrate always on Conquest denial?

The slogan on the Left, then, *universities, not jails*, marks a choice that may not be possible.

The University Is the Site of the Social Reproduction of Conquest Denial

Here one comes face to face with the roots of professional and critical commitment to negligence, to the depths of the impulse to deny the thought of the internal outside among critical intellectuals, and the necessity for professionals to question without question. Whatever else they do, critical intellectuals who have found space in the university are always already performing the denial of the new society when they deny the Undercommons, when they find that space on the surface of the university, and when they join the Conquest denial by improving that space. Before they criticize the aesthetic and the Aesthetic, the state and the State, history and History, they have already practiced the operation of denying what makes these categories possible in the underlabor of their social being as critical academics.

The slogan on the Left, then, *universities, not jails*, marks a choice that may not be possible. In other words, perhaps more universities promote more jails. Perhaps it is necessary finally to see that the university contains incarceration as the product of its negligence. Perhaps there is another relation between the University and the Prison—beyond simple opposition or family resemblance—that the Undercommons reserves as the object and inhabitation of another abolitionism.

What might appear as the professionalization of the American university, our starting point, now might better be understood as a certain intensification of method in the *Universitas*, a tightening of the circle. Professionalization cannot take over the American university—it *is* the critical approach of the university, its *Universitas*. And indeed, it appears now that this state with its peculiar violent hegemony must deny what Foucault called in his 1975–76 lectures the race war.

War on the commitment to war breaks open the memory of the Conquest. The new American studies should do this, too, if it is to be not just a people's history of the same country but movement against the possibility of a country, or any other; not just property justly distributed on the border but property unknown. And there are other spaces situated between the *Universitas* and the Undercommons, spaces that are characterized precisely by not having space. Thus the fire aimed at black studies by everyone from William Bennett to Henry Louis Gates Jr., and the proliferation of Centers without affiliation to the memory of the Conquest, to its living guardianship, to the protection of its honor, to the nights of labor, in the Undercommons.

The university, then, is not the opposite of the prison, since they are both involved in their way with the reduction and command of the social individual. And indeed, under the circumstances, more universities and fewer prisons would, it has to be concluded, mean the memory of the war was being further lost, and living unconquered, conquered labor abandoned to its lowdown fate. Instead, the Undercommons takes the prison as a secret about the Conquest, but a secret, as Sara Ahmed says, whose growing secrecy is its power, its ability to keep a distance between it and its revelation, a secret that calls into being the prophetic, a secret held in common, organized as secret, calling into being the prophetic organization.

The Undercommons of the University Is a Nonplace of Abolition

Ruth Wilson Gilmore: "Racism is the state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group differentiated vulnerabilities to premature (social, civil and/or corporeal) death."[2] What is the difference between this and slavery? What is, so to speak, the object of abolition?

Not so much the abolition of prisons but the abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society. The object of abolition then would have a resemblance to communism that would be, to return to Spivak, uncanny.

The uncanny that disturbs the critical going on above it, the professional going on without it, the uncanny that one can sense in prophecy, the strangely known moment, the gathering content, of a cadence, and the uncanny that one can sense in cooperation, the secret once called solidarity. The uncanny feeling we are left with is that something else is there in the Undercommons. It is the prophetic organization that works for the red and black abolition!

Notes

This article is dedicated to our mentor, Martin L. Kilson.

1. Fredric Jameson, *Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic* (London: Verso, 1990), 43.

2. Ruth W. Gilmore, "Profiling Alienated Labor" (Paper presented at the Mellon-Sawyer Seminar on Redress in Social Thought, Law and Literature, University of California Humanities Research Institute, Irvine, California, 24 February 2003).

Affective Economies

Sara Ahmed

> The depths of Love are rooted and very deep in a real white nationalist's soul and spirit, no form of "hate" could even begin to compare. At least not a hate motivated by ungrounded reasoning. It is not hate that makes the average white man look upon a mixed race couple with a scowl on his face and loathing in his heart. It is not hate that makes the white housewife throw down the daily jewspaper in repulsion and anger after reading of yet another child molester or rapist sentenced by corrupt courts to a couple of short years in prison or on parole. It is not hate that makes the white workingman curse about the latest boatload of aliens dumped on our shores to be given job preference over the white citizen who built this land. It is not hate that brings rage into the heart of a white Christian farmer when he reads of billions loaned or given away as "aid" to foreigners when he can't get the smallest break from an unmerciful government to save his failing farm. No, it's not hate. It is love.[1]
>
> —Aryan Nations Web site

How do emotions work to align some subjects with some others and against other others? How do emotions move between bodies? In this essay, I argue that emotions play a crucial role in the "surfacing" of individual and collective bodies through the way in which emotions circulate between bodies and signs. Such an argument clearly challenges any assumption that emotions are a private matter, that they simply belong to individuals, or even that they come from within and *then* move outward toward others. It suggests that emotions are not simply "within" or "without" but that they create the very effect of the surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds.

For instance, in the above narrative on the Aryan Nations Web site, the role of emotions, in particular of hate and love, is crucial to the delineation of the bodies of individual subjects and the body of the nation. Here a subject (the white nationalist, the average white man, the white housewife, the white working man, the white citizen, and the white Christian farmer) is presented as endangered by imagined others whose proximity threatens not only to take something away from the subject (jobs, security, wealth), but to take the place of the subject. In other words, the presence of these others is imagined as a threat to the object of love. The narrative involves a rewriting of history, in which the labor of others

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They threaten to violate the pure bodies; such bodies can only be imagined as pure by the perpetual restaging of this fantasy of violation.

(migrants, slaves) is concealed in a fantasy that it is the white subject who "built this land."[2] The white subjects claim the place of hosts ("our shores") at the same time as they claim the position of the victim, as the ones who are damaged by an "unmerciful government." The narrative hence suggests that it is love for the nation that makes the white Aryans hate those whom they recognize as strangers, as the ones who are taking away the nation and the role of the Aryans in its history, as well as their future.

We might note as well that the reading of others as hateful aligns the imagined subject with rights and the imagined nation with ground. This alignment is affected by the representation of both the rights of the subject and the grounds of the nation as already under threat. *It is the emotional reading of hate that works to bind the imagined white subject and nation together.* The average white man feels "fear and loathing"; the white housewife, "repulsion and anger"; the white workingman, "curses"; the white Christian farmer, "rage." The passion of these negative attachments to others is redefined simultaneously as a positive attachment to the imagined subjects brought together through the repetition of the signifier, "white." It is the love of white, or those recognizable as white, that supposedly explains this shared "communal" visceral response of hate. *Together we hate, and this hate is what makes us together.*

This narrative is far from extraordinary. Indeed, what it shows us is the production of the ordinary. The ordinary is here fantastic. The ordinary white subject is a fantasy that comes into being through the mobilization of hate, as a passionate attachment tied closely to love. The emotion of hate works to animate the ordinary subject, to bring that fantasy to life, precisely by constituting the ordinary as in crisis, and the ordinary person as the real victim. The ordinary becomes that which is already under threat by imagined others whose proximity becomes a crime against person as well as place. The ordinary or normative subject is reproduced as the injured party: the one "hurt" or even damaged by the "invasion" of others. The bodies of others are hence transformed into "the hated" through a discourse of pain. They are assumed to "cause" injury to the ordinary white subject, such that their proximity is read as the origin of bad feeling: indeed, the implication here is that the white subject's good feelings (love, care, loyalty) are being "taken" away by the abuse of such feelings by others.

So who is hated in such a narrative of injury? Clearly, hate is distributed across various figures (in this case, the mixed-racial couple, the child molester, the rapist, aliens, and foreigners). These figures come to embody the threat of loss: lost jobs, lost money, lost land. They signify the danger of impurity, or the mixing or taking of blood. They threaten to violate the pure bodies; such bodies can only be imagined as pure by the perpetual restaging of this fantasy of violation. Note the work that is being done

through this metonymic slide: mixed-race couplings and immigration become readable as (like) forms of rape or molestation: an invasion of the body of the nation, represented here as the vulnerable and damaged bodies of the white woman and child. The slide between figures constructs a relation of resemblance between the figures: what makes them alike may be their "unlikeness" from "us." Within the narrative, hate cannot be found in one figure, but works to create the very outline of different figures or objects of hate, a creation that crucially aligns the figures together and constitutes them as a "common" threat. Importantly, then, hate does not reside in a given subject or object. Hate is economic; it circulates between signifiers in relationships of difference and displacement.

In such affective economies, emotions *do things*, and they align individuals with communities—or bodily space with social space—through the very intensity of their attachments. Rather than seeing emotions as psychological dispositions, we need to consider how they work, in concrete and particular ways, to mediate the relationship between the psychic and the social, and between the individual and the collective. In particular, I will show how emotions work by sticking figures together (adherence), a sticking that creates the very effect of a collective (coherence), with reference to the figures of the asylum seeker and the international terrorist. My economic model of emotions suggests that while emotions do not positively reside in a subject or figure, they still work to bind subjects together. Indeed, to put it more strongly, the nonresidence of emotions is what makes them "binding."

Economies of Hate

Everyday language certainly constructs emotions as a form of positive residence. So I might say I "have a feeling." Or I might describe a film as "being sad." In such ways of speaking, emotions become property; something that belongs to a subject or object, which can take the form of a characteristic or quality. I want to challenge the idea that I have an emotion, or that something or somebody makes me feel a certain way. I am interested in the way emotions *involve* subjects and objects, but without residing positively within them. Indeed, emotions may only seem like a form of residence as an effect of a certain history, a history that may operate by concealing its own traces. Clearly, such an approach borrows from psychoanalysis, which is also a theory of the subject as lacking positive residence, a lack of being most commonly articulated as "the unconscious." In his essay on the unconscious, Freud introduces the notion of unconscious emotions, where an affective impulse is perceived but mis-

construed, and which becomes attached to another idea.[3] What is repressed from consciousness is not the feeling as such, but the idea to which the feeling may have been first (but provisionally) connected. Psychoanalysis allows us to see that emotionality involves movements or associations whereby "feelings" take us across different levels of signification, not all of which can be admitted in the present. This is what I would call the rippling effect of emotions; they move sideways (through "sticky" associations between signs, figures, and objects) as well as backward (repression always leaves its trace in the present—hence "what sticks" is also bound up with the "absent presence" of historicity). In the opening quotation, we can see precisely how hate "slides" sideways between figures, as well as backward, by reopening past associations that allow some bodies to be read as the cause of "our hate," or as "being" hateful.

Indeed, insofar as psychoanalysis is a theory of the subject as lacking in the present, then it offers a theory of emotion as economy, *as involving relationships of difference and displacement without positive value.* That is, emotions work as a form of capital: affect does not reside positively in the sign or commodity, but is produced only as an effect of its circulation. I am using "the economic" to suggest that emotions circulate and are distributed across a social as well as psychic field. I am borrowing from the Marxian critique of the logic of capital. In *Capital,* Marx discusses how the movement of commodities and money, in the formula *M-C-M* (money to commodity to money), creates surplus value.[4] That is, through circulation and exchange *M* acquires more value. Or as he puts it, "The value originally advanced, therefore, not only remains intact while in circulation, but increases its magnitude, adds to itself a surplus-value or is valorised. *And this movement converts it into capital.*"[5] I am identifying a similar logic: the movement between signs converts into affect. Marx links value with affect through the figures of the capitalist and the miser: "This boundless drive for enrichment, this passionate chase after value, is common to the capitalist, and the miser."[6] Passion drives the accumulation of capital: the capitalist is not interested in the use value of commodities, but in the "appropriation of ever more wealth."[7] What I am offering is a theory of passion not as the drive to accumulate (whether it be value, power, or meaning), but as that which is accumulated over time. Affect does not reside in an object or sign, but is an affect of the circulation between objects and signs (= the accumulation of affective value over time). Some signs, that is, increase in affective value as an effect of the movement between signs: the more they circulate, the more affective they become, and the more they appear to "contain" affect. Another way to theorize this process would be to describe "feelings" via an analogy with "commodity fetishism": feelings

appear in objects, or indeed *as* objects with a life of their own, only by the concealment of how they are shaped by histories, including histories of production (labor and labor time), as well as circulation or exchange.

Of course, such an argument about affect as an economy does not respect the important Marxian distinction between use value and exchange value and hence relies on a limited analogy. In some ways, my approach may have more in common with a psychoanalytic emphasis on difference and displacement as the form or language of the unconscious, described above. Where my approach involves a departure from psychoanalysis is precisely in my refusal to identify this economy as a psychic one (although neither is it *not* a psychic one), that is, to return these relationships of difference and displacement to the signifier of "the subject." This "return" is not only clear in Freud's work, but also in Lacan's positing of "the subject" as the proper scene of absence and loss.[8] As Laplanche and Pontalis argue, if Lacan defines "the subject" as "the locus of the signifier," then it is in "a theory of the subject that the locus of the signifier settles."[9] This constitution of the subject as "settlement," even if what settles is lacking in presence, means that the suspended contexts of the signifier are delimited by the contours of the subject. In contrast, my account of hate as an affective economy shows that emotions do not positively inhabit any-body as well as any-thing, meaning that "the subject" is simply one nodal point in the economy, rather than its origin and destination. This is extremely important: it suggests that the sideways and backward movement of emotions such as hate is not contained within the contours of a subject. The unconscious is hence not the unconscious of a subject, but the failure of presence—or the failure to be present—that constitutes the relationality of subjects and objects (a relationality that works through the circulation of signs). Given this, affective economies need to be seen as social and material, as well as psychic. Indeed, if the movement of affect is crucial to the very making of a difference between "in here" and "out there," then the psychic and the social cannot be installed as proper objects. Instead, materialization, which Judith Butler describes as "the effect of boundary, fixity and surface,"[10] involves a process of intensification. In other words, the accumulation of affective value shapes the surfaces of bodies and worlds.

We could hence ask how the circulation of signs of affect shapes the materialization of collective bodies, for example the "body of the nation." We have already seen how hate slides across different figures and constitutes them as a "common threat" in what we can call "hate speech." But the slippery work of emotion cannot allow us to presume any opposition between extremist discourses and the "ordinary" work of reproducing the

How can we tell the difference between a bogus and a genuine asylum seeker? According to the logic of this discourse, it is always possible that we might not be able to tell the difference, and that they may pass into our community.

nation. We can take as an example the speeches on asylum seekers by the previous leader of the British Conservative Party, William Hague. Between April and June 2000, other speeches were in circulation that became "stuck" to the "asylum seekers" speech through this temporal proximity, but also through the repetition with a difference, of some *sticky words* and language. In the case of the asylum speeches, Hague's narrative is somewhat predictable. Words like *flood* and *swamped* are used, which create associations between asylum and the loss of control, as well as *dirt* and *sewage*, and hence work by mobilizing fear, or the anxiety of being "overwhelmed" by the actual or potential proximity of others. These words have recently been repeated by the current British Home Secretary, David Blunkett, who used the word *swamped* to describe the effect that children of asylum seekers would have if they were taught by local schools. When criticized, he replaced the word *swamped* with *overwhelmed*. The assumption here is that *overwhelmed* resolves the implication of *swamped*, but as we can see, it still evokes the sensation of being overtaken or taken over by others. It constructs the nation as if it was a subject, one who "could not cope" with the presence of others. Here words generate effects: they create impressions of others as those who have invaded the space of the nation, threatening its existence.

Typically, Hague in the earlier speeches differentiates between those others who are welcome and those who are not by differentiating between genuine and bogus asylum seekers. Partly, this enables the national subject to imagine its own generosity in welcoming some others. The nation is hospitable, as it allows those genuine ones to stay. And yet at the same time, it constructs some others as already hateful (as bogus) in order to define the limits or the conditions of this hospitality. The construction of the bogus asylum seeker as a figure of hate also involves a narrative of uncertainty and crisis, but an uncertainty and crisis that *make that figure do more work*. How can we tell the difference between a bogus and a genuine asylum seeker? According to the logic of this discourse, it is always possible that we might not be able to tell the difference, and that they may pass into our community. Passing functions here as a technology, which relates physical movement with identity formation: to pass through a space requires passing as a particular kind of subject, one whose difference is unmarked and unremarkable.[11] The double possibility of passing commands the nation's Right and will to keep looking for signs of difference and justifies violent forms of intrusion into the bodies of others.

Indeed, the possibility that we might not be able to tell the difference swiftly converts into the possibility that any of those incoming bodies may be bogus. In advance of their arrival, they are hence read as the cause of an injury to the national body. Now how does the presentation of asylum

as injury work through the proximity between figures of hate? The figure of the bogus asylum seeker may evoke the figure of the "bogeyman," a figure who stalks the nation and haunts its capacity to secure its borders. The bogeyman could be anywhere and anyone, as a ghostlike figure in the present, who gives us nightmares about the future, as an anticipated future of injury. We see "him" again and again. Such figures of hate circulate, and indeed accumulate affective value, precisely because they do not have a fixed referent. So the figure of the bogus asylum seeker is detached from particular bodies: any incoming bodies could be bogus, such that their "endless" arrival is anticipated as the scene of "our injury."[12] *The impossibility of reducing hate to a particular body allows hate to circulate in an economic sense, working to differentiate some others from other others, a differentiation that is never "over," as it awaits for others who have not yet arrived.* Such a discourse of "waiting for the bogus" justifies the repetition of violence against the bodies of others.

Hague's speeches also produced certain effects through temporal proximity to another speech about Tony Martin, a man sentenced to life imprisonment for murdering a sixteen-year-old boy who had attempted to burgle his house in a rural area of England. One sentence of Hague's circulates powerfully. Hague argued (without reference to Martin or asylum seekers) that the law is "more interested in the rights of criminals than the rights of people who are burgled." Such a sentence evokes a history that is not declared (here "what sticks" may also be what resists literalization), and, in doing so, it positions Martin as the victim and not as a criminal. The victim of the murder is now the criminal: the crime that did not happen because of the murder (the burglary) takes the place of the murder as the true crime, and as the real injustice. This reversal of the victim-criminal relationship becomes an implicit defense of the right to kill those who unlawfully enter one's property.

The detachment of the sentence allows two cases to get stuck together: burglary and asylum, which both now become matters of the right to defense. The figure of the asylum seeker hence gets aligned with the figure of the burglar. The alignment does important work: it suggests that the asylum seeker is "stealing" something from the nation. The "characteristics" of one figure get displaced or transferred onto the other. Or we could say that it is through the association between the figures that they acquire "a life of their own," as if they contained affective quality. The burglar became a foreigner, and the asylum seeker becomes a criminal. At the same time, the body of the murderer (who is renamed as the victim)[13] becomes the body of the nation, the one whose property and well-being is under threat by the forced proximity of the other. As such, the alignment of figures works as a narrative of defense: the nation/national

subject must defend itself against "invasion" by others. Such a defensive narrative is not explicitly articulated, but rather works through the "movement" between figures. The circulation does its work: it produces a differentiation between "us" and "them," whereby "they" are constituted as the cause or the justification of "our" feeling of hate. Indeed, we can see how attachment involves a sliding between pain and hate: there is a perceived injury in which the other's (burglar/bogus) proximity is felt as the violence of negation against both the body of the individual (here, the farmer) and the body of the nation.

We can see that the affectivity of hate is what makes it difficult to pin down, to locate in a body, object, or figure. This difficulty is what makes emotions such as hate work the way that they do; *it is not the impossibility of hate as such, but the mode of its operation, whereby it surfaces in the world made up of other bodies*. In other words, it is the failure of emotions to be located in a body, object, or figures that allows emotions to (re)produce or generate the effects that they do.

Fear, Bodies, and Objects

I now want to relate my model of emotion as affective economy specifically to fear and the materialization of bodies. Significantly, fear is an emotion that is often characterized as being *about* its object and hence would not seem to work in the economic sense I have defined above. Indeed, fear has often been contrasted with anxiety insofar as fear *has* an object. For example, Stanley Rachman argues that anxiety can be described as the "tense anticipation of a threatening but vague event," or a feeling of "uneasy suspense," while fear is described as an emotional reaction "to a threat that is identifiable."[14]

I want to question this model by suggesting that fear is linked to the "passing by" of the object. We can consider, for instance, that the narrative of asylum seekers "swamping" the nation works as a narrative of fear. Fear works to create a sense of being overwhelmed: rather than being contained in an object, fear is intensified by the impossibility of containment. If the others who are feared "pass by," then the others might pass their way into the community, and could be anywhere and everywhere. Heidegger also suggests that fear is intensified when it ceases to be contained by an object that approaches. He suggests:

> That which is detrimental, as something that threatens us, is not yet within striking distance, but it is coming close. . . . As it draws close, this "it can, and yet it may not" becomes aggravated. We say, "It is fearsome." This

> implies that what is detrimental as coming-close carries with it the patent possibility that it may stay away and pass us by; but instead of lessening or extinguishing our fearing, this enhances it.[15]

Crucially, Heidegger relates fear to that which is not yet in the present, in either the spatial or temporal sense of the here and the now. Fear responds to that which is approaching rather than already here. It is the futurity of fear, which makes it possible that the object of fear, rather than arriving, might pass us by. But the passing by of the object of fear does not mean the overcoming of fear: rather, the possibility of the loss of the object that approaches makes what is fearsome all the more fearsome. If fear has an object, then fear can be contained by the object. When the object of fear threatens to pass by, then fear can no longer be contained by an object. Fear in its very relationship to an object, in the very intensity of its directedness toward that object, is intensified by the loss of its object. We could characterize this absence as about being not quite present rather than, as with anxiety, being nowhere at all. Or anxiety becomes attached to particular objects, which come to life not as the cause of anxiety but as an effect of its travels. In anxiety, one's thoughts often move quickly between different objects, a movement that works to intensify the sense of anxiety. One thinks of more and more "things" to be anxious about; the detachment from one given object allows anxiety to accumulate. In other words, anxiety tends to stick to objects. Given this, anxiety becomes an approach to objects rather than, as with fear, being produced by an object's approach. The slide between fear and anxiety is affected precisely by the "passing by" of the object.

Furthermore, fear's relationship to the potential disappearance of an object is more profound than simply a relationship to the object of fear. In other words, it is not just fear that is at stake in fear. For Freud, fears themselves may function as symptoms, as mechanisms for the defense of the ego against danger. In his essay "Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety," Freud returns to the Little Hans case. Hans had a phobic relationship to horses. Freud argues that this fear is itself a symptom that has been "put in the place" of another fear, one that much more profoundly threatens the ego: the fear of castration.[16] Hans can "manage" his fear of horses through avoidance, in a way that he could not manage his fear of the father. We might remember that in Freud's model of unconscious emotions, the affect itself is not repressed: rather, what is repressed is the idea to which the affect was attached. So the affect of fear is sustained through the displacement between objects.

The displacement between objects works also to link those objects together. Such linkages are not created by fear, but may already be in

place within the social imaginary. In the Freudian model, the movement between objects is intrapsychic, and goes backward; it refers back to the primary fear of castration. Or, to be more specific, the sideways movement between objects (in this case, the horse and the father) is itself explained as determined by a repression of the idea to which the affect was originally attached (the threat of castration).[17] I would suggest that the sideways movement between objects, which works to stick objects together as signs of threat, is shaped by multiple histories. The movement between signs does not have its origin in the psyche, but is a trace of how histories remain alive in the present.

We can consider, for instance, how the language of racism sustains fear through displacement, and how this surfaces through bodies. Take the following quote from Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*:

> My body was given back to me sprawled out. Distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a nigger, it's cold, the nigger is shivering because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid of the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that goes through your bones, the handsome little boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy throws himself into his mother's arms: Mama, the nigger's going to eat me up.[18]

Here, fear is felt as coldness; it makes bodies shiver with a cold that moves from the surface into the depths of the body, as a cold "that goes through your bones." Fear both envelops the bodies that feel it, as well as constructs those bodies as enveloped, as contained by it, as if it comes from outside and moves inward. In the encounter, fear does not bring the bodies together: it is not a shared feeling, but works to differentiate between white and black bodies. The white child misrecognizes the shivering of the black body as rage, and hence as the "grounds" for its fear. In other words, the other is only read as fearsome through a misrecognition, a reading that is returned by the black other through its response of fear, as a fear of the white subject's fear. This is not to say that the fear comes from the white body, as if it is the origin of that fear (and its author). Rather, fear opens up past histories that stick to the present (in the very rehearsal of childhood fantasies about "being eaten up" that "take on" the value of social norms as "truths" about the other) and allow the white body to be constructed as apart from the black body.

We might note here that fear *does something*; it reestablishes distance between bodies whose difference is read off the surface, as a reading that produces the surface (shivering, recoloring). But what is very clear here is that the object of fear remains the black man, who comes to feel the fear

as his own, as threatening his existence. Fear does not come from within the subject, nor does it reside in its object: we are not afraid of others because they are fearsome. Through the circulation of signs of fear, the black other "becomes" fearsome. But doesn't this example show us that fear does get contained by an object, in this case the black man? To some extent this is right: the circulation of signs of fear does lead to containment for some, and movement for others. Here, fear gets contained in a body, which henceforth becomes an object of fear. Indeed, the white child's apparent fear does not lead to containment but an expansion; his embrace of the world is suggested by how he reestablishes himself as being-at-home (the embrace of the mother as a "return home"). It is the black subject, the one who fears the "impact" of the white child's fear, who is crushed by that fear, by being sealed into a body that takes up less space. In other words, fear works to restrict some bodies through the movement or expansion of others.

But this containment is an effect of a movement between signs, as well as bodies. Such movement depends on past histories of association: Negro, animal, bad, mean, ugly. In other words, it is the movement of fear between signs, which allows the object of fear to be generated in the present (the Negro is: an animal, bad, mean, ugly). The movement between signs is what allows others to be attributed with emotional value, in this case, as being fearsome, an attribution that depends on a history that "sticks," and which does not need to be declared. The containment is provisional: insofar as the black man is the object of fear, then he may pass by. Indeed, the physicality of his "passing by" can be associated with the passing of fear between signs: it is the movement that intensifies affect. The black man becomes even more threatening if he passes by: his proximity is imagined then as the possibility of future injury. As such, the economy of fear works to contain the bodies of others, a containment whose "success" relies on its failure, as it must keep open the very grounds of fear. In this sense, fear works as an affective economy, despite how it seems directed toward an object. Fear does not reside in a particular object or sign, and it is this lack of residence that allows fear to slide across signs, and between bodies. This sliding becomes stuck only temporarily, in the very attachment of a sign to a body, whereby a sign sticks to a body by constituting it as the object of fear, a constitution taken on by the body, encircling it with a fear that becomes its own.

The sideways movement of fear (where we have a metonymic and sticky relation between signs) is also a backward movement: objects of fear become substituted for each other over time. This substitution involves the passing by of the objects from which the subject seems to flee. Fear and anxiety create the very effect of "that which I am not," through the

very affect of turning away from an object, which nevertheless threatens as it passes by or is displaced. To this extent, fear does not involve the defense of borders that already exist; rather, fear makes those borders, by establishing objects from which the subject, in fearing, can stand apart, objects that become "the not" from which the subject appears to flee. Through fear not only is the very border between self and other affected, but the relation between the objects feared (rather than simply the relation between the subject and its objects) is shaped by histories that "stick," by making some objects more than others seem fearsome.

Global Economies of Fear

We can think more precisely about the processes through which fear works to secure forms of the collective. My argument is not that there is a psychic economy of fear that then becomes social and collective: rather, the individual subject comes into being through its very alignment with the collective. *It is the very failure of affect to be located in a subject or object that allows it to generate the surfaces of collective bodies.* The complexity of the spatial and bodily politics of fear has perhaps never been so apparent in the global economies of fear since September 11. Fear is, of course, named in the very naming of terrorism: terrorists are immediately identified as agents of extreme fear, that is, those who seek to make others afraid (less mobile or less free to move) as well those who seek to cause death and destruction. As the Australian prime minister, John Howard, put it, bin Laden's "hatred" for the United States and for "a world system built on individual freedom, religious tolerance, democracy, and the international free flow of commerce" means that "he wants to spread fear, create uncertainty and promote instability, hoping that this will cause communities and countries to turn against each other."[19] Howard then reads the acts of terror as attacks not only on the mobility of international capital, but also on the mobility of the bodies of Australians, on their right "to move around the world with ease and freedom and without fear." I would like to offer an alternative reading of what moves and what sticks in fear economies, one that differentiates between forms of mobility as well as different kinds of bodily enclosure, containment, or detainment.

In the first instance, we can examine how the mobility of the bodies of subjects in the West, while presented as threatened, is also defended, along with the implicit defense of the mobility of capital in the global economy (whereby capital is constructed as "clean money" and defined against the "dirty money" of terrorism, which must be frozen or blocked). The most immediate instruction made to subjects and citizens in America, Aus-

tralia, and Britain was "to go about your daily business," "to travel," "to spend or consume," and so on, as a way of refusing to be a victim of terror. Indeed, in the United States, citizens were, in effect, asked not to fear, and the nation was represented as not being afraid, as a way of showing the failure of the terrorist attacks to destroy the nation. As George W. Bush put it, "It is natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror."[20] The nation is constructed as having prevailed through refusing to transform its vulnerability and wounds into fear, a response that would be read, in terms of this narrative, as "determination by terror" rather than self-determination. Bush, then, in an act of self-determination, turns the act of terror into an act of war, which would seek to eliminate the source of fear and transform the world into a place where the mobility of some capital and some bodies becomes the sign of freedom and civilization. This suggests that the affect of terror was not containment, but provided the very grounds for remobilization.

This is not to say, however, that individuals and groups have not experienced fear in response to the events; the affects of fear are clear in, for example, the huge reduction in air travel. However, we need to think about this containment carefully without assuming that fear simply brings people together, or that containment is the only effect of such fear. As I have already noted, following Heidegger, the object of fear may pass by, and this structural possibility is part of the lived experience of fear. While the events did happen and did constitute an object (however much it passed by, a passing by that was already at stake in the living out of the present, given the mediatization of the event *as event*), that fear slid quickly into anxiety, in which what was at stake was not the approach of an object but an approach to an object. The approach to the event—in which it is repeated and transformed into a fetish object—involved forms of alignment, whereby individuals aligned themselves with the nation as being under attack. This, of course, repeats the process of alignment whereby the nation aligned itself with individuals as having been or being attacked.

Now, what is crucial here is not just that this alignment might restrict the mobility of individuals who now feel themselves, in a way that is personal, to be terrorist targets. Rather, given the mediating work of this alignment, experiences of fear became lived as patriotic declarations of love, which allowed home itself to be mobilized as a defense against terror. If subjects stayed at home, then homes became transformed into the symbolic space of the nation through the widespread use of American flags.

This is not to say that the meaning of the flags is necessary to its circulation—as if such flags could only signify national love. Rather, we can consider how the flag is a sticky sign, whereby its stickiness allows it to stick to other "flag signs," which gives the impression of coherence (the nation as "sticking together"). The flag as a sign that has historically signified territorial conquest as well as love for the nation (patriotism) has effects in terms of the display of "withness" (whereby one is "with others" and "against other others"). George Packer, in an article in the *New York Times Magazine*, expressed this well: "As flags bloomed like flowers, I found they tapped emotion as quickly as pictures of the missing. To me, these flags didn't represent flabby complacence, but alertness, grief, resolve, even love. They evoked fellow feeling with Americans, for we had been attacked together."[21] The turning away from the object of fear hence may involve a turning toward home as a "fellow feeling." That "turning toward" involves the repetition or reiteration of signs of "fellowship." That turning could even be understood as compulsory: not to display a flag could be read as a sign of a lack of fellowship, or even as the origin of terror (to paraphrase George W. Bush, if you do not show you are "with us," you would be seen as "against us").[22]

Fear mediated by love as identification with the nation, which comes to adhere as an effect of signs of love, does not necessarily shrink bodies. The turning away from the object of fear here involves a turning toward home. Fear mediated by this form of love (love as identification) does not necessarily shrink bodies, but may even allow them to occupy more space through the identification with the collective body, which stands in for the individual body and moves on its behalf. In other words, the apparent containment of some bodies in the United States functions as a form of mobilization: staying at home allows the mobilization of bodies through the symbolic identification with the nation at war. In George W. Bush's State of the Union Address in 2002 the effect of this identification is clear: "It was as if our entire country looked into a mirror and saw our better selves."[23] Hence, the United States is defined as "caught" by its own reflection in the mirror, a "catching out" that borders on collective narcissism: self-love becomes a national love that legitimates the response to terror as the protection of loved others who are "with me," whereby "withness" is premised on signs of "likeness" and whereby likeness becomes an imperative or a condition of survival.

So if the event of terror—of seeking to cause fear—leads to a defense of the mobility of capital and the mobilization of some bodies (through both the defense of the home as nation and the identification with the nation), then who is contained through terror? Whose vulnerability is at stake? As has been well documented, the events of September 11 have been

used to justify the detention of any bodies suspected of being terrorists. Not only was there immediate detention of suspects in the United States and European countries, but governments in the West have responded to the terror by enacting legislation that increases the governmental rights to detain anybody suspected of being a terrorist. The British Amendment to the Terrorism Act 2000 states that the Secretary of State may issue a certificate if he believes that the person's presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national security or he suspects the person is an international terrorist. Here risk assessment becomes a matter of belief, and suspicion itself becomes the grounds for detention. The extension of the powers of detention is not merely symbolic, nor does it merely relate to the detention of terrorists: given the structural possibility that any body could be a terrorist, what we have reinstituted and extended is the power of detention, as such.

However, the structural possibility that anyone could be a terrorist does not translate into everybody being affected by the extension of the powers of detention in the same way. It is well documented that people have been detained because of very weak links between them and terrorist networks, often involving simple links through names, or workplace, or residence. Aristide R. Zolberg considers this process a form of racial profiling, quoting details reported in the *New Yorker*: "Of the 1,147 people detained in the United States between September 11th and November 2001, some were identified on the basis of circumstantial links with the attack, but many 'were picked up based on tips, or were people of Middle Eastern or South Asian descent who had been stopped for traffic violations or for acting suspiciously.'"[24] As Muneer Ahmad describes, after September 11, there was "an unrelenting, multi-valent assault on the bodies, psyches and rights of Arab, Muslim and South Asian immigrants."[25] Indeed, Leti Volpp suggests that the responses to September 11 facilitated "a new identity category that groups together people who appear 'Middle Eastern, Arab or Muslim.'"[26] The recognition of such groups of people as "could be terrorists" depends on stereotypes already in place, at the same time as it generates a distinct category of "the fearsome" in the present. We can recall precisely the repetition of stereotypes about the black man in the encounter described by Frantz Fanon: this repetition works by generating the other as the object of fear, a fear that is then taken on as its own.

Importantly, the word *terrorist* sticks to some bodies as it reopens past histories of naming, just as it slides into other words in the accounts of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (such as *fundamentalism*, *Islam*, *Arab*, *repressive*, *primitive*). Indeed, the slide of metonymy can function as an implicit argument about the causal relations between terms (such as *Islam* and *ter-*

The politics of fear as well as hate is narrated as a border anxiety: fear speaks the language of "floods" and "swamps," of being invaded by inappropriate others, against whom the nation must defend itself.

rorism) within the making of truths and worlds, but in such a way that it does not require an explicit statement. The work done by metonymy means that it can remake links—it can stick words like *terrorist* and *Islam* together—even when arguments are made that seem to unmake those links. Utterances like "this is not a war against Islam" coexist with descriptions such as "Islamic terrorists," which work to restick the words together and constitute their coincidence as more than simply temporal. The sliding between signs also involves "sticking" signs to bodies: the bodies who "could be terrorists" are the ones who might "look Muslim."

Given that the event became an object that allowed certain forms of violence and detention of others in the name of defense, we need to ask: what role does security play in the affective politics of fear? Importantly, security is bound up with "the not"—what is "not me" or "not us," as Michael Dillon has suggested.[27] Security is not simply about securing a border that already exists, nor is fear simply a fear of what we are not. As I argued in the previous section, anxiety and fear create the very effect of borders, and the very effect of that which "we are not," partly through how we turn away from the other, whom we imagine as the cause of our fear. Borders are constructed and indeed policed in the very feeling that they have already been transgressed: the other has to get too close, in order to be recognized as an object of fear, and in order for the object to be displaced. The transgression of the border is required in order for it to be secured as a border in the first place. This is why the politics of fear as well as hate is narrated as a border anxiety: fear speaks the language of "floods" and "swamps," of being invaded by inappropriate others, against whom the nation must defend itself. We can reflect then on the ontology of insecurity within the constitution of the political: it must be presumed that things are not secure, in and of themselves, in order to justify the imperative to make things secure.

More specifically, it is through announcing a crisis in security that new forms of security, border policing, and surveillance become justified. We only have to think about how narratives of crisis are used within politics to justify a "return" to values and traditions that are perceived to be under threat. It is not simply that these crises exist, and that fears and anxieties come into being as a necessary effect of that existence. Rather, it is the very production of the crisis that is crucial. To declare a crisis is not "to make something out of nothing": such declarations often work with real events, facts, or figures (as we can see, for example, in how the rise in divorce rates is used to announce a crisis in marriage and the family). But the declaration of crisis *reads* that fact/figure/event and transforms it into a fetish object that then acquires a life of its own, in other words, that can become the grounds for declarations of war against that which is read as

the source of the threat. Through designating something as already under threat in the present, that very thing becomes installed as "the truth," which we must fight for in the future, a fight that is retrospectively understood to be a matter of life and death.

Indeed, it is fear of death—of the death of oneself, one's loved ones, one's community, and one's people—that is generated by such narratives to preserve or maintain *that which is*. So I might fear for myself, for us, or on behalf of others. Since September 11, the deaths have become symbolic of that which is under threat not only by terrorists (those who take life), but by all that the possibility of terrorism stands for, a possibility linked by some commentators to internal forms of weakness, such as secularization, multiculturalism, and the decline of social and familial ties. For example, Jerry Falwell in the United States argued, "I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays, and lesbians who are actively trying to make an alternative life style . . . all of them who have tried to secularize America, I point the finger in their face and say 'you helped this happen.'"[28] In the United Kingdom, the British National Party's response to September 11 was to posit Islamicization within the United Kingdom rather than the Taliban in Afghanistan as the threat to the moral future of the nation itself: "They can turn Britain into an Islamic Republic by 2025."[29]

This attribution of the crime of terror to the weakening of religion and community posed by the presence of various others has been, of course, condemned within mainstream politics, although noticeably with less of a "disgust reaction" than how some critics of U.S. foreign policy have been received. However, at the same time, a broader set of assumptions around what would be required to defend the nation and the world (strengthening the will of the community in the face of others) both displaces and reworks the narrative logic. Instead of an internal weakness being posited as responsible for this event, we have an internal strength being posited as responsible for recovery, survival, and moving beyond fear. As George W. Bush put it, "These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong."[30] The response to terror becomes a way to strengthen the bonds of the nation and the global community of free nations: the wound of terror requires "sticking together" (adherence as coherence) and using the values that made America and democracy "strong."

Indeed, the emphasis on security in George W. Bush's State of the Union Address in 2002 includes the transformation of democratic citizenship into policing: "And as government works to secure our homeland, America will continue to depend on the eyes and ears of alert citizens." Citizenship here is translated into a form of Neighborhood Watch; the cit-

izen must "look out for suspicious others."[31] Citizenship works as a way to police the boundaries of neighborhoods. The role of citizens as police is translated as an imperative to love, in which love becomes the foundation of community, as well as the guarantor of our future: "Our country also needs citizens working to rebuild our communities. We need mentors to love children."[32] The definition of values that will allow America to prevail in the face of terror—values that have been named as freedom, love, and compassion—involves the defense of particular institutional and social forms against the danger posed by others. Such values function to define not only ideals that supposedly govern war aims and objectives but democratic norms of behavior and conduct, of what it means to be civil, a civil society, and a legitimate government. To be brought into international civil society—that is, to be not named as a "rogue state" or as part of "the axis of evil"—others must "mimic" these rules of conduct and forms of governance.[33] Henceforth, the emphasis on values, truths, and norms that will allow survival slides easily into the defense of particular social forms or institutions.

We might note here that these social forms become identified as "better" by being defined as open: liberal democracy (and with it a weak model of racial and religious tolerance as well as an apparent liberal support for "feminism") become defined as what is "good" about the United States, in opposition to the closed and fundamentalist politics of the Islamic other. Hence "respect for women" and "religious tolerance" become defined as two of the values that make America and the free world strong. Such an argument allows the war to be narrated as "saving women from religious fundamentalism": this is a familiar narrative, and one that has a long imperial history. As many feminist critics have argued, such a narrative overlooks not only the heterogeneity of other cultures—and the existence of women's resistance, and feminist networks in Islamic worlds, including in Afghanistan—but also the maintenance of gendered as well as other forms of oppression in the United States and the so-called free world.[34] We need to think about the political effects of this hierarchy between open and closed cultures and show how the constitution of open cultures involves the projection of what is closed onto others, and hence the concealment of what is closed and contained "at home."

Furthermore, the fear of degeneration as a mechanism for preserving social forms becomes associated more with some bodies than others. The threat of such others to social forms (which are the materialization of norms) is represented as the threat of turning away from the values that will guarantee survival. These various others come to embody the failure of the norm to take form; it is the proximity of such other bodies that

"causes" the fear that the forms of civilization (the family, the community, the nation, and international civil society) have degenerated. Those who speak out against the "truth" of this world become aligned then with the terrorists as seeking to cause the "ruin" of the world. What is important, then, is that the narratives that seek to preserve the present through working on anxieties of death as the necessary consequence of the demise of social forms also seek to locate that anxiety in some bodies, which then take on fetish qualities as objects of fear. Such bodies engender even more fear, as they cannot be held in place as objects, and threaten to pass by. That is, we may fail to see those forms that have failed to be; it is always possible that we might not be able to tell the difference. The present hence becomes preserved by defending the community against the imagined others, who may take form in ways that cannot be anticipated, a "not-yet-ness" that means the work of defense is never over. Such a defense is generated by anxiety and fear for the future, and justifies the elimination or exclusion of that which fails to materialize in the form of the norm as a struggle for survival. Insofar as we do not know what forms other others may take, those who fail to materialize in the forms that are lived as norms, the policies of continual surveillance of emergent forms is sustained as an ongoing project of survival.

It is here that we can deepen our reflections on the role of the figure of the international terrorist within the economies of fear. Crucially, the narrative that justifies the expansion of the powers to detain others within the nation and the potential expansion of the war itself to other nations relies on the structural possibility that the terrorist "could be" anyone and anywhere. The narrative of the "could be" terrorist, in which the terrorist is the one who "hides in the shadows,"[35] has a double edge. On the one hand, the figure of the terrorist is detached from particular bodies, as a shadowy figure, "an unspecifiable may-come-to-pass."[36] But it is this could-be-ness, this detachment, which also allows the restriction on the mobility of those bodies who are read as associated with terrorism: Islam, Arab, Asian, East. Fear sticks to these bodies (and to the bodies of "rogue states") that "could be" terrorist, where the "could be" opens up the power to detain. Although such fear sticks, it also slides across such bodies; it is the structural possibility that the terrorist may pass us by that justifies the expansion of these forms of intelligence, surveillance, and the rights of detention. Fear works here to expand the mobility of some bodies and contain others precisely insofar as it does not reside positively in any one body. As Samuel Weber puts it, "When *terrorism* is defined as *international* it becomes difficult to locate, situate, personify and identify,"[37] and it is this difficulty that justifies the expansion of the powers of the state.

It is important to recognize that the figure of the international terror-

ist has been mobilized in close proximity to the figure of the asylum seeker. The slide between these two figures does an enormous amount of work: it assumes that those who seek asylum, who flee from terror and persecution, may be bogus insofar as they could be the very agents of terror and persecution. They, like terrorists, are identified as potential burglars: as unlawful intruders into the nation. In Australia, for example, the refusal to allow the boat *Tampa* into its waters (with its cargo of 433 asylum seekers, many of whom were from Afghanistan) was retrospectively justified on the grounds that those on board *could be* linked to Osama bin Laden. The sticking together of the figure of the asylum seeker and the international terrorist, which already evokes other figures (the burglar, the bogeyman), constructs those who are "without home" as sources of "our fear" and as reasons for new forms of border policing, whereby the future is always a threat posed by others who may pass by and pass their way into the community. The slide of metonymy works to generate or make likeness: the asylum seeker is "like" the terrorist, an agent of fear, who may destroy "our home." The slide between figures involves the containment of others, who henceforth become the objects of fear.

The containment of the bodies of others affected by this economy of fear is most chillingly and violently revealed in the literal deaths of those seeking asylum in containers, deaths that remain unmourned by the very nations who embody the hope of a future for those seeking asylum. This is a chilling reminder of what is at stake in the affective economies of fear.

Notes

My thanks to the *Social Text* collective for providing me with such helpful and engaged feedback on an earlier draft of this essay.

1. Aryan Nations, www.uiowa.edu/~policult/politick/smithson/an.htm (accessed 4 January 2001).
2. Thanks to David Eng for this point.
3. Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1964), 15:110.
4. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1976), 1:248.
5. Ibid., 252; emphasis mine.
6. Ibid., 254.
7. Ibid.
8. For an exploration of this argument, see Sara Ahmed, *Differences That Matter: Feminist Theory and Postmodernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 97–98.

9. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bernard Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, trans. David Nicholson-Smith (London: Karnac, 1992), 65.

10. Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 9.

11. There is a long history of work on racial passing that I cannot discuss here. For a summary, see Sara Ahmed, "Passing through Hybridity," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 16 (1999): 87–106.

12. For the British National Party, this model of "*any* body could be bogus" gets translated into "all" are, or "all" might as well be, bogus: "We will abolish the positive discrimination schemes that have made white Britons second-class citizens. We will also clamp down on the flood of asylum seekers, all of whom are either bogus or can find refuge much nearer their home countries." See the British National Party Web site, www.bnp.org.uk/policies.html#immigration (accessed 30 July 2003).

13. Aidan McGurran and Jenny Johnston, "The Homecoming: It's Too Painful: Martin's Sad Return to Farm," *Daily Mirror*, 9 August 2003, 4–5. Tony Martin was released in August 2003 and "his story" was very visible in the popular press in the United Kingdom. Tabloids concentrated very much on Martin as an "ordinary farmer" whose home was ruined. The headline on the front page of the *Mirror* sums it up: "He killed to protect his house . . . but now the memories are too much." The tragedy of the story is not the death of "a teenage burglar" but Martin's loss of home: "This isn't a home any more. It's a shell." Given the sticky attachment between "burglar" and "bogus asylum seeker" and between "home" and "homeland," the tragedy of the story becomes linked to the tragedy that asylum seekers represent in their very presence in the United Kingdom for "ordinary subjects" such as "farmers." In other words, the moral of the story becomes: If we let them in, they will turn the nation into a shell and take the land on which "we have worked."

14. Stanley Rachman, *Anxiety* (Howe, U.K.: Psychology Press, 1998), 2–3. See also William F. Fischer, *Theories of Anxiety* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

15. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: SCM Press, 1962), 180.

16. See Sigmund Freud, "Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey, vol. 20 (London: Hogarth, 1964).

17. Certainly Freud's argument about "unconscious emotions" does rely on a model of origins, or the "true connection" between an idea and a feeling; see "The Unconscious," 110.

18. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (London: Pluto, 1986), 114.

19. John Howard, address to the Australian Defence Association, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, 25 October 2001, www.dfat.gov.au/icat/pm_251001_speech.html (accessed 23 July 2002).

20. George W. Bush, address to a joint session of Congress and the American people, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed 20 September 2001).

21. See George Packer, "Recapturing the Flag," *New York Times Magazine*, 30 September 2001, 15–16. The relationship between grief and love is crucial to this narrative: the community is brought together by how it incorporates the

losses. Judith Butler suggested that public responses to the losses of September 11 work to create a distinction between grievable and ungrievable lives ("Violence, Mourning, Politics," *Feminist Theory* launch, Keynote Address, University College London, London, March 2002). Losses may be publicly mourned if the life that is lost can be recognized as "like me," whereby likeness is determined as proximity to social norms. David Eng also examines the erasure of non-normative losses in public discourses of mourning: "The rhetoric of loss of 'fathers and mothers,' 'sons and daughters,' and 'brothers and sisters' attempts to trace a smooth alignment between the nation-state and the nuclear family, the symbolics of blood relations and nationalist domesticity" ("The Value of Silence," *Theatre Journal* 54 [2002]: 90). For an examination of love and grief in relation to the politics of the nation, see "In the Name of Love" and "Queer Feelings" in my *Cultural Politics of Emotion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming).

22. For Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the United States, displaying the flag might then be read not only as a form of identification with the nation but as an attempt to "cover" any signs of difference, which might be associated with the origin of terror. Muneer Ahmad examines the "swap" between the flag and the veil in "Homeland Insecurities: Racial Violence the Day after September 11," *Social Text*, no. 72 (2002): 110.

23. George W. Bush, State of the Union address 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (accessed 23 July 2002).

24. Aristide R. Zolberg, "Guarding the Gates," in *Understanding September 11*, ed. Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer (New York: New Press, 2002), 296.

25. Ahmad, "Homeland Insecurities," 99.

26. Letti Volpp, "The Citizen and the Terrorist," *UCLA Law Review* 49 (2002): 1575.

27. Michael Dillon, *The Politics of Security* (London: Routledge, 1996), 34. See also Anthony Burke, *In Fear of Security* (Annandale, New South Wales: Pluto).

28. Jerry Falwell made this comment on Pat Robertson's 700 Club on 13 September 2001. He apologized the next day for suggesting that anyone but the terrorists were responsible for the attacks but repeated the message that "the problem" was secularization, caused by the presence of illegitimate others within the nation.

29. British National Party Web site, www.bnp.org.uk (accessed 30 July 2002). Quoted in BNP leaflet "The Truth About Islam," which may be viewed at www.fairuk.org/Anti-Islam%20Supplement.pdf, released November 2001.

30. George W. Bush, Statement by the president in his address to the nation, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (11 September 2001).

31. For an analysis of how Neighborhood Watch involves techniques of knowledge, which work to recognize "strangers" as "bodies out of place," see Sara Ahmed, *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality* (London: Routledge, 2000).

32. George W. Bush, State of the Union address 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (accessed 23 July 2002).

33. We can consider George W. Bush's powerful utterance "you are either with us or against us" as a demand for mimicry. In this narrative, those who are

not "with us" are automatically constructed as against us, whereby "againstness" is aligned with a form of terror or terrorism. That is, anyone who is not "with us" is a terrorist, is a friend of terrorists, or might as well be. To "be with," one must both give one's allegiance to the community, but one also must become lovable to that community—which means recognizable as a form of civil life. We would hence argue that the utterance "you are either with us or against us" may work not as a constative or even as a performative, but as an imperative. To be "with us" is an imperative to "be like us": if others are not to be identified as terrorists or rogue states (an identification that involves the threat of violence, as well as actual violence) they must mimic the forms of civility and supposedly democratic governance that constitute the foundations of this community. We might note here that the root of the word *assimilate* is the Latin for *likeness*. This new international community may be one that is loving, in which the imperative of love is to "make alike": likeness is not the ground of this community, but an effect. If community binds others together through the demand that others become like us, then the narrative of love converts swiftly into hatred for "unlike others."

34. For important feminist critiques of the gendered discourses in the justification of the war on terrorism, see Zilla Eisenstein, "Feminisms in the Aftermath of September 11," *Social Text*, no. 72 (2002): 79–99; and Sunera Thobani, "War and the Politics of Truth-Making," *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 16.3 (2003), 399–414.

35. George W. Bush, comments made by the president in a meeting with his national security team on 12 September, www.whitehouse.gov/response/faq-what.html (accessed 23 July 2002).

36. Brian Massumi, "Everywhere You Want to Be," in *The Politics of Everyday Fear*, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 11.

37. Samuel Weber, "War, Terrorism, and Spectacle" (Paper presented at Lancaster University, December 2001).

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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