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JUNGIAN THOUGHT

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# CONTENTS


## *I. Contemporary Imagination*

Quicksilver in Twilight
A Close Encounter with a Hermetic Eye
Anthony Nugent . . . . . 1

"Don Juan," Trickster, and Hermeneutic Understanding
Michael W. Whan . . . . . 17

## *II. Jungiana*

*Exercitia Spiritualia* of St Ignatius of Loyola
Notes on Lectures
C. G. Jung . . . . . 28

Jung in America, 1924-1925
William McGuire . . . . . 37

The Imitation of Jung
An Exploration of the Meaning of "Jungian"
James Yandell . . . . . 54

## *III. New Papers and Translations*


Politics and Individuation
Mary Ann Mattoon . . . . . 77

Repression, Falsification, and Bedeviling of Germanic Mythology
Margrit Burri
(translated from German by Wolfgang Giegerich) . . . . . 88

On Depressive Delusion
H.-J. Wilke
(translated from German by Lee B. Jennings) . . . . . 105

Defense and Telos in Dreams
Patricia Berry . . . . . 115

Musical Therapy
Tom Moore . . . . . 128

Image and Sound:
An Archetypal Approach to Language
Paul Kugler . . . . . 136


## *IV. Excerpts from Works in Progress*


Further Notes on Images
James Hillman . . . . . 152

The Great's Vigour: A Study of the 34th Hexagram in the *I Ching*, with a Note on Consulting the *I Ching*
Rudolf Ritsema . . . . . 183

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# QUICKSILVER IN TWILIGHT
## A CLOSE ENCOUNTER WITH A HERMETIC EYE

ANTHONY NUGENT
(Syracuse)

To Charlie Hickson and Calvin Parker

Flying saucers have been with us since June 24, 1947, when nine bright discs were seen in the sky near Mount Rainier in the State of Washington, "flying like geese in a diagonal, chainlike line" and "like a saucer would if you skipped it across the water."[1] As a boy of seven in that summer I spent many hours skipping stones across the waters of Lake Washington from our beach on Mercer Island, and from that beach snow-capped Mount Rainier had the appearance of a giant ice-cream cone in the sky, turning from vanilla to strawberry as the sun set over Seattle. Enveloped by the evergreen forests of the Pacific Northwest and reaching above the clouds into the very heavens, Mount Rainier impresses me now as a fitting site for the mythic beginning of the descent of the new Gods called "flying saucers."

But from those lofty heights, as the saucers have rolled into the lowlands of mass culture, the myth has gathered unto itself a thick layer of mossy "isms." The saucers have become designated as "UFOs",[2] a term which reflects in its colorless objectivity the pervasive scientism of our time. Occultists, too, have made their mark on the myth, interpreting UFOs as the heavenly chariots in which the ancient Gods are returning, while spiritualists herald them as the sure sign of the dawning Age of Aquarius. In the face of these attempts to figure UFOs out and to divine their deeper or higher meanings, the phenomenon remains obscure, hovering mythically in a twilight zone between the physical and the psychical, between space-time objects and dream images, between fact and fiction, be-

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tween this world and other worlds. From this twilight zone UFOs present themselves not simply as a phenomenon to be seen, but as a challenge to all our customary ways of seeing. They call for a "revisioning"[3] as they present themselves to our vision. They invite us to be hermeneutical in the radical sense of that term, to find a way of seeing in that twilight between the image and its symbolic-mythic milieu, a way of seeing which sticks to the image while also seeing through and beyond and around it, a way of seeing on the boundary between phenomenology and archetypology.

Since 1947 UFOs have appeared in virtually every corner of the planet, and no longer simply as strange lights in the sky but as spaceships carrying humanoid creatures. My inquiry into UFO-hermeneutics in these pages focuses on the story of Charlie Hickson and Calvin Parker, who were fishing in the Pascagoula River in the State of Mississippi by the light of the full moon on the evening of October 11, 1973, when they had what has come to be called "a close encounter of the third kind."[4] On October 12, 1973, news media picked up the following story from the wire services of United Press International:

10/12/73
Pascagoula, Mississippi
CREATURES

Two shipyard workers who claimed they were hauled aboard a UFO and examined by silvery-skinned creatures with big eyes and pointed ears were checked at a military hospital yesterday and found to be clear of radiation.

Air Force doctors at nearby Keesler Air Force Base examined the men, Charles Hickson, 42, and Calvin Parker, 19, as a precautionary measure after they came and told their weird tale.

Jackson County chief deputy Barney Mathis said the men told him they were fishing from an old pier on the west bank of the Pascagoula River about 7 p.m. Thursday when they noticed a strange craft about two miles away emitting a bluish haze.

They said it moved closed and then appeared to hover about three or four feet above the water, then "three whatever-they-weres came out, either floating or walking, and carried us into the ship," officers quoted Hickson as saying.

"The things had big eyes. They kept us about twenty minutes, photographer us, and then took us back to the pier. The only sound they made was a buzzing-humming sound. They left in a flash."

"These are reliable people," Sheriff Fred Diamond said. "They had no reason to say this if it had not been true. I know something did happen to them."

The sheriff said the "spacecraft" was described as fish-shaped, about ten feet square with an eight foot ceiling. The occupants were said to have pale silvery-gray skin, no hair, long pointed ears and noses with an opening for a mouth and hands "like crab claws."

United Press International[5]

## *The Claw-Men*

It was the image of the "claw-men,"[6] the "silvery-gray-skinned creatures," and the "pointy-eared saucer folk"[7] that captured the attention and imagination of the news media. And it was the image of the creatures that also continued to haunt Charlie Hickson for weeks after his encounter. As he told investigator Ralph Blum:

> "You know at night, I lie in bed and think about them."
>
> "Are you still afraid?"
>
> "No, the fear's gone," Charlie said gravely. "If I can, I think I'd like to get in touch with them. I mean it. Every night when I'm in bed, it's almost a picture comes into my mind. Just the same way every time."
>
> "Are you reliving what happened?"
>
> "No. I'm not in the picture. Just them. They're not doing anything. They're not inside the ship, they're just *there*. All I have to do is close my eyes."[8]

It is not by reliving what happened to him, but through the imprint of an image that Hickson is connected to the event. So let us, too, enter the story through its images, beginning where the text of the UPI press release begins — with the CREATURES.

About 11:00 p.m. on the night of the encounter, Charlie Hickson gave Jackson County sheriff's deputies a description of the three creatures.[9] They were "about five feet tall" with "pale-like" wrinkled skin or covering. Their feet "were more or less just a round-like thing on a leg, if you'd call it a leg," and their hands were "pincher things." Their heads were not attached to their bodies by a neck, but "it looked like it just sit there on a body." Contrary to the press release, Hickson said "there could have been eyes but I didn't see any." He didn't know whether or not they had hair or breathed, but he noticed that "there was something that came straight out more

or less where a nose would be on a human bein's face" and "something on each side of the head that resembled ears, but didn't look like no ears that we know." Below the "nose" there was an opening "like a slit" that Hickson never saw move. Later accounts reported that, according to Hickson,

> They had no eyes. I couldn't tell whether they was made out of metal or out of skin. It was light gray, a little more like metal than an elephant's skin. They had all these wrinkles on 'em. Their feet was round like elephants' feet and it didn't have no toes. They didn't have no hands either. They had these claws.[10]

We are presented with an image of grayness, blurriness, indistinctness, in-between-ness, not this but not that. This grayness and in-betweenness is congruent with the twilight time of the initial encounter — "not long after dark"[11] — and with the twilight time of Hickson's subsequent recall of the image — between waking and sleeping. Sticking with the image means sticking with this grayness rather than trying to blacken it or brighten it. We must be like moon-watchers who follow the moonlight down to the waters where the moon is reflected, rather than following the light back to the sun whose light the moon reflects or out into the blackness of space. We must move from dimness to further dimness. We must follow the image as it leads us into the reflective waters of mythic imagination.

The grayness of the creatures leads us to a first mythic image — the *three Graeae* whom we meet in the Io and Perseus myth-cycles of ancient Greece. Like the three Pascagoula creatures, these three women are humanoid creatures with gray, wrinkled skin who dwell in a twilight zone on the boundaries of the known world. They have no eyes of their own but share a single detachable eye, just as these creatures with eye-less bodies were able to "see" or "photograph" Hickson with a big eye while he was in their spaceship. And like these creatures who emerge from a big UFO-fish, the Graeae were said to be born from the womb of Ceto, whose name means "big fish."[12] In the Io and Perseus myths, the God who seems to be most closely linked to the three Graeae is Hermes. It is he who slays the many-eyed Argus, setting Io free to wander through the alien land

of the three Graeae and to an eventual deliverance from her curse and the birth of a child at the delta of the Nile.[13] And it is the offspring of this birth nine generations later, the hero Perseus, who will again encounter the three Graeae and succeed with the help of Hermes in seizing their single eye.[14]

Hermes is, moreover, like his Roman counterpart Mercurius, a God of the twilight, the "star sacred to Hermes"[15] (the planet Mercury) being the one heavenly body which can be seen only at twilight. Hermes is found on spatial as well as temporal boundaries, represented iconographically as a "herm" (boundary stone).[16] And Hermes is the one God of the twelve Olympians whose function is to move across the boundaries which separate this world from the heavens and from the underworld. As the God who presides over boundaries, Hermes presides over the boundary on the edge of reality where the two fishermen encountered the three creatures. And Hermes is the God hidden in the hermeneutic or way-of-seeing suggested by the Pascagoula images.

We are led to another analogous mythic image from antiquity by considering the position of the planet Mercury on the evening of October 11, 1973 — near the star "Zuben Elgenubi" in the constellation Libra.[17] This Arabic star-name means "the Southern Claw" and refers to an early image borrowed by the Arabs from Ptolemy and the Greeks,[18] the "Claws of the Scorpion," originally a distinct part of the constellation Scorpius. We can trace the scorpion-constellation back to Babylonia where it appears on boundary-stones in the Second Millenium B.C. in the humanoid form of the Scorpion-Man.[19] Mythically as well as iconographically we find these scorpion-men located on boundaries, and like Hermes they are closely associated with twilight and with death. To obtain the plant of life Gilgamesh must first cross the mountain guarded by the scorpion-men that forms a boundary between this world and the Waters of Death:

> When (Gilgamesh) arrived at the mountain range of Mashu which daily keeps watch over sunrise and sunset — whose peaks reach to the vault of heaven and whose breasts reach to the nether world — scorpion-men guard its gate, whose terror is awesome and whose glance was

> death. Their shimmering halo sweeps the mountains that at sunrise and sunset keep watch over the sun. When Gilgamesh beheld them, with fear and terror was darkened his face.[20]

The scorpion-men of Mesopotamia are terrible and frightful, yet they are also helpful, warning Gilgamesh of the danger of crossing the Waters of Death and pointing the way to the boatman who will ferry him across.

Charlie Hickson, too, experienced his abductors as frightful, but he is nevertheless convinced of their benign intentions and even wants to get back in touch with them. Yet the hell-fire-and-damnation preachers of the Bible Belt, inheritors of a Christian apocalyptic tradition which interprets the daemonic as demonic, immediately understood the Pascagoula creatures as agents of the Devil. In his sermon at the Ocean Springs Baptist Church in Pascagoula on October 14, 1973, three days after the event, the Rev. Billy Reddick told his congregation:

> Now we see in Matthew, chapter 7, that the Devil has an innumerable amount of demons. These demons, these seducing spirits, possess animals and men! . . . Now the Bible tells us that Hell is going to be opened! And evil spirits are going to come out in the form of locusts and have the power of scorpions and so forth. Now in considerin' this UFO report that happened here, look with me in Revelations 16 and verse 13: "And I saw three unclean spirits like frogs come out of the mouth of the dragon! And out of the mouth of the beast! And out of the mouth of the false prophets! for they are the spirits of devils!" Did you get that? *For they are the spirits of devils!* . . . And the Bible says, "Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ is of God is a good spirit." Now my friends, these creatures these men Hickson and Parker contacted, they didn't say that, did they? They didn't say Jesus Christ is Lord. no! you know what they said? Bzzzzzzzzzz.[21]

Indeed, Charlie Hickson does tell of seeing "three spirits like frogs" leap amphibiously across the water out of the mouth of a Leviathan-like big fish — yet they do not strike him as demonic. The animals to which he refers in his description of the creatures are elephants and crabs, which lack the loathsome imaginal qualities of the locusts, scorpions, dragons, and other evil beasts of the *Book of Revelation.* The experience of the two fishermen of Pascagoula calls for a revisioning of the dreadful.

The crab, like the frog and the scorpion-man, is a border creature. While their spaceship hovered over a bed of oyster shells on the bank of the river, the crab-clawed creatures scuttled back and forth like crabs across the tidal waters where the muddy Pascagoula River meets Mississippi Sound — like crabs from outer space, descending from that ancient gateway for the descent of souls,[22] the constellation of the Crab. Astrologically, Cancer the Crab is ruled by the moon, and this correspondence between the moon above and the crab below is shown on the Moon-card of the Tarot deck. Between the moon and the crab the card portrays the two dog-constellations below Cancer in the sky, Canis Major and Canis Minor howling at the moon. The two fishermen are like these two dogs, howling with deep, instinctual dread in the face of an extraterrestrial reality.

### *Into the Fish*

From Scorpius and Cancer we now move imaginally into the depths of the third water sign of the Zodiac, Pisces. The UPI release states that the initial contact with the UFO occurred about 7:00 p.m., while subsequent reports state 9:00 p.m.[23] Hickson and Parker were fishing by the light of the moon, which was full that evening at exactly 9:09 p.m. Central Standard Time at right ascension 1:01, declination 11°44′ north.[24] If the 9:00 p.m. estimate of the time of the initial contact and Hickson's twenty minute estimate of the time on board the craft are accurate, the synchronicity of the encounter with the full moon is exact. In any case, the position of the moon at the time was in the middle of the constellation Pisces. A very "Piscean" pattern seems to constellate — full moon in Pisces, two men fishing, and two catfish which the fishermen have just caught and which they take into town as a 'proof' of their adventure.[25]

Into these Piscean waters 'swims' another fish, and from one end

> there seemed a door just appeared, not opened, it appeared. It come out of the spacecraft like you open one of them rubber coin purses you squeeze. And I see these things come out. There was three of 'em.[26]

This "door" made quite an impression on Hickson and Parker. While they were alone in a room, the sheriff's deputies recorded the following conversation:

> Calvin: You see how that damn door come right up?
> Charlie: I don't know how it opened, son. I don't know.
> Calvin: It just laid up and just like that those son' bitches — just like that they come out.
> Charlie: I know. You can't believe it. You can't make people believe it.[27]

If one does not imagine this "spacecraft" according to one's technological fantasies, but in the way it presented itself to the two fishermen — as a big fish — then this "rubber coin purse" opening would be like the fish's mouth, and the three silvery-gray creatures are like three coins spilling out. One is reminded of the advice of Jesus to Peter, who was worried about paying the temple tax:

> Go to the sea and cast a hook, and take the first fish that comes up, and when you open its mouth you will find a shekel; take that and give it to them for you and for me.[28]

Let us follow the image of the fish's mouth.

The coin in the mouth of the fish refers to the ancient Greek custom of placing a coin for Charon, the ferryman of Hades, in the mouth of the corpse, and the fish-corpse equation can be traced back to ancient Egypt. The Egyptians imagined that on its way to its new life as a star, the soul, at death, first becomes a fish in the waters of the twilight underworld called the "Duat,"[29] and so they wrapped the mummy in the shape of a fish, writing the word for "corpse" ("het") with the hieroglyph of their most sacred fish, the oxyrhynchus.[30] A star which preserves a trace of this ancient Egyptian imaginal view is "Fomalhaut," Arabic for "fish's mouth," the brightest star in that black expanse of the night sky between Sagittarius and Orion which was known in antiquity as the Waters—here we find Capricornus (fish-goat), Aquarius (water-pourer), Pisces (two fishes), Cetus (big fish), Eridanus (river), and Piscus Austrinus (southern fish) with its star Fomalhaut. It was after crossing these Waters of Death on his journey along the "road of the sun,"[31] that Gilgamesh finally learned the sacred story of the Great Flood from the Flood-survivor Utnapishtim. If we imagine

the script for the Pascagoula encounter to be written out in this region of the heavens, the fish-spaceship would correspond to the constellation Piscus Austrinus and the fish's mouth would be Fomalhaut.

In an interview in 1959, C. G. Jung refers to this fish's mouth in his discussion of the imminent transition from the Age of Pisces to the Age of Aquarius:

> What comes next? Aquarius, the Water-pourer, the falling of water from one place to another. And the little fish which receives the water from the pitcher of the Water-pourer with Fomalhaut, which means "fish's mouth." In our era the fish is the content; with the Water-pourer, he becomes the container. It's a very strange symbol. I don't dare interpret it. So far as one can tell, it is the image of a great man approaching. One finds, besides, a lot of things about this in the Bible itself: there are more things in the Bible than the theologians can admit.[32]

Since quicksilver has been known from antiquity as "hydrargyrum," silver water, the mercurial, hermetic creatures are like the waters pouring from the Aquarian jug. Alchemically, the mythic image of the "silvery creatures" translates into the image of "creaturely silver," i.e. living silver or quicksilver, which brings us to the God Mercurius, just as the grayness of the creatures took us earlier to his Greek counterpart Hermes. The image of the "little metal men," who are encountered in other UFO stories,[33] is an alchemical image. Like the "homunculus" of Goethe's *Faust* who flies to Greece in an oval spaceship-like hermetic vessel, the metal-men of Pascagoula fly in an egg-shaped vessel.[34] The rubber coin-purse opening is both a fish's mouth and a crack in a hermetic vessel, images suggesting both birth and death. Over the physical waters of the Pascagoula River, Mercurius-Hermes the psycho-pomp sweeps the fishermen into the imaginal waters of his river of silver, guiding them on a soul-deepening death-trip into the belly of the fish.

Like Jonah of old, and like Ishmael in *Moby Dick* when he goes onto the whale-ship "whose open bulwarks were garnished like one continuous jaw, with the long sharp teeth of the sperm whale,"[35] the fishermen are swallowed like two little fish by the big UFO-fish. For Christians, like Charlie and Calvin, who for the nearly 2000 years of the Piscean Age have been eating the flesh of Christ the

Fish, that very Christ now returns to swallow his people, consistent with his warning that "only the sign of Jonah will be given."[36] He returns to end the Piscean Age as he began it — with the abduction of two fishermen. Like their forerunner, the fisherman Peter, Charlie and Calvin too walk for a few moments upon the water. Christ returns, as he promised, upon the clouds with his angels,[37] whom we might imagine to represent the three highest of the angelic ranks — thrones, cherubim, and seraphim — which are "figured," as Pico della Mirandola says, [38] following the nine-fold celestial hierarchy of Dionysius the Areopagite,[39] in the waters above the heavens. And Christ warned, according to the New Testament,[40] that he would come "like a thief in the night." Truly, as Jung says, "there are more things in the Bible than the theologians can admit." And no wonder that Calvin Parker, from the moment he spotted that big fish in the sky, couldn't stop praying: "Jesus! Sweet Jesus! Jesus help me! I'm asking you now, Jesus!"[41]

## *In the Fish*

When Parker was grabbed by the creatures he lost consciousness until he found himself back on the pier. Only Hickson remained conscious throughout the abduction, including his on-board experience. Since Hickson did not see Parker enter the ship, nor see him inside, we wonder whether Parker ever left the pier or not, though in the UPI news story both fishermen are taken on board the craft. In the sheriff's office Hickson reported:

> (My buddy) just passed out on me. And they glided me into that thing. You know, how you just guide somebody. All of us moved like we were floatin' through air. When I got in there, they had me, you know, they just kind of had me there. There were no seats, no chairs, they just moved me around. I couldn't resist them, I just floated — felt no sensation, no pain.[42]

In this weightless state, with every part of his body except his eyes paralyzed, the creatures moved "a big eye the size of a football"[43] all over his body.

Let us remember that the spaceship in which Hickson finds himself is a fish, and so let us imagine that this big eye which examines

him from head to foot is a fish's eye. When Jonah was in the belly of the fish for three days he found that

> the eyes of the fish served as windows, and, besides, there was a diamond, which shone as brilliantly as the sun at midday, so that Jonah could see all things in the sea down to its very bottom.[44]

The alchemists knew of this brightness in the heart of the darkness, the "silver in the lead," and one of their principal images for this reality was the fish's eye.[45] The image of the fish eye means, psychologically, that one finds a brightness in the depths of a depression; strategically, that one finds the solution in the problem; and hermeneutically, that one finds bright ideas at the bottom of a murky sea of obscure images.

Later, Charlie Hickson told investigator Ralph Blum:

> It was real bright in there. I'm a welder. I'm a burner and a fitter. I'm used to bright light, but my eyes bothered me for two or three days.[46]

Just as Jonah's clothes were burned off his body by the intense heat of the diamond, leaving him naked for three days, so Hickson's exposure to the brightness in the fish's belly burned his eyes for three days.

I have previously mentioned the single eye of the three gray women of Greek myth, a single eye that is a third of an eye, like a third eye. The heroic attitude seems invariably hostile toward this kind of seeing, as if it attributed its own singleminded and monomanic focus to an eye of another sort. For the third eye, like an X-ray eye or pineal eye, is required for deeper insight which sees through objects, dissolving them through fantasy into glassy images. Heroes, like Perseus who steals the eye of the three gray women, and Odysseus who blinds the Cyclops, are threatened by a vision that sees right through into their own kind of blindness, inflation.

And why shouldn't our normal, objectivizing vision be impaired when encountered by an extra-terrestial reality? That vision is, after all, only the mode of terrestial seeing that has become normalized during the two-thousand year psychic history of the Fishes. And without the third eye of that other fish in the sky, Piscus Austrinus, which receives its visionary powers from the river of quicksilver

pouring from the jug of Aquarius, we would continue to be caught in a Piscean double-vision of opposites. Seen with that third fish eye, an imagining rather than an objectivizing eye, opposites are joined in a single image. A spaceship from the heavens can be at the same time a fish from the depths, like the dream-image reported to Jung in his essay on "flying saucers":

> Suddenly a flying saucer floated into view, paused at eye-level before us and lay there, clear and shining, in the sunlight. It did not look like a machine but like a deep-sea fish, round and flat, but enormously big.[48]

Claw-men of old with the gray-wrinkled, elephantine skin of the senex appear at the same time as silvery-quick, floating puers. And these things we see, "things seen in the skies," as Jung called them, express the very twilight vision by which we see them. Objects fade into images, the objective fades into the imaginal. Perhaps the Fish, with its big eye detached from the bodies of the humanoid creatures who manipulate it, invites us to see through the Piscean notion of the image as a decayed, duplicated sense impression. Perhaps the Fish speaks of itself, of its own decay and the restoration of its deeper eye in the murky waters of this twilight time.

And yes, the fish does speak to Hickson and Parker. When it approached them it made "a little buzzin' sound — nnnnnn, nnnnnn — just like that, that's all."[49] And inside the fish Hickson spoke to the humanoid creatures and got the same "buzzin' sound out of one of them."[50] The buzzing of these creatures is like the mysterious humming of the Pascagoula River, a sound like a "swarm of bees" as described by local people who hear their river "sing."[51] The "Singing River" is a river and a river-image. Let us follow this image as it manifests itself on the evening of October 11, 1973, near the "City of the Singing River." Where are Hickson and Parker fishing on the river? On the west bank of the east fork of the river, on the island or "delta" formed where the river meets the sea. The river sings to its true love, the sea. The creatures come to hum along, to celebrate the love between the Singing River and Mississippi Sound. The loving is a pouring back and forth, in with the tide and out with the river. We are all fishing in the Pascagoula River. As

we are catching fish the fish are catching us. And what do we see reflected in the flowing mirror, the quicksilver, which is the river?

## *Out of the Fish*

We are led to a deeper, imaginal mode of seeing when we consider Hickson's and Parker's abduction experience in its entirety as an image. After being taken on board the spaceship, the fishermen are returned to the same spot on the pier where they were originally fishing. The image is one of a pouring back and forth, a "circulatio" between the extra-terrestrial fish and the terrestrial pier. In his discussion of the imagery of Aquarius, Jung imagines a one-way pouring, from the celestial jug to the new container of the celestial fish. But this is a northern point of view, since from the Southern Hemisphere the jug of Aquarius lies below the Southern Fish. More importantly, this is a terrestrial point of view, for nothing, including the sky, has any up or down when seen from beyond the Earth's gravitational field. Our categories of space and time become as weightless as the two fishermen when touched by the extra-terrestrial experience. The crux of the image lies simply in being poured — *not* in being poured into the container of a "new age," even the Age of Aquarius.

So how are we not caught in the Aquarian container into which we are precessing?

> And God made the firmament and separated the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament. And it was so. And God called the firmament "Heavens." And there was evening and there was morning a second day.[52]

It is by means of this heavenly barrier that God keeps the physical waters below from joining with the waters of imagination above. Spirit keeps body and soul in a condition of Piscean separation and opposition. But the Aquarian imagery of the Pascagoula event suggests that these waters above do not stay in their assigned place above the heavens. The waters of the imagination take on body. The windows of the heavens are opened. It is flood-time. The constellations, with their astrological determinations of the scheme of world ages, are overcome. In Pascagoula the heavenly Platonic sym-

bol is brought down to earth as a particular, concrete image. An imaginal Aquarian hermeneutic is vomited up from the belly of the old symbolistic Piscean hermeneutic. But this movement into Aquarius is not the precessional movement of the springpoint according to the Platonic progression of temporal eons. It is an imaginal, spatial breakthrough, with the imagery of Aquarius pointing us, by way of a metaphor for a new age, out of ages altogether —

> As above: the last scattered stars
> kneel down in the star-form of the Aquarian age:
> a splash
> on the top of the head,
> on the grass of this earth even the stars love,
> splashes of the
> sacred waters. . . .[53]

One of the peculiar habits of Charlie Hickson is that he never wears a watch, since, as he puts it:

> They'd either lose time or gain time. Or they'd just stop. I even tried these Elgins, these railroad pocket watches, and they won't keep correct time. So I don't tote a watch.[54]

Time, ages, eons, like Charlie Hickson's Elgin, no longer "keep time." We are with Hermes-Mercurius, the God of the twilight who puts all the constellations of Argus the many-eyed sky to sleep with his hermetic wand. And to be in the twilight is to be out of the container. When the big fish which cannot be contained by any of our categories of space and time approaches, it is time to leave these containers back on the dock as so many cans of worms. Let us stay with Hermes and Mercurius — in the pouring, in the twilight, in a space and time in-between.

"Aquarian" is less an age than a watery, flowing, fishy vision. The eye that is seen in Pascagoula brings its own mode of being seen, and we have been jarred out of the old ways of seeing. We have been poured forth like quicksilver whose images revert to the twilight of myths. By means of them we re-vision the events even as we are visioning them. What has been flowing through these pages offers a mode of hermetic understanding by means of mercurial connections, an aquarian hermeneutic.

**Some Friends from Pascagoula**
(1935)

Tell me more of the eagle, Cotton,
And you, black Sly,
Tell me how he descended
Out of the morning sky.
Describe with deepened voice
And noble imagery
His slowly-falling round
Down to the fishy sea.
Here was a sovereign sight,
Fit for a kinky clan.
Tell me again of the point
At which the flight began,
Say how his heavy wings,
Spread on the sun-bronzed air,
Turned tip and tip away,
Down to the sand, the glare
Of the pine trees edging the sand,
Dropping in sovereign rings
Out of his fiery lair.
Speak of the Dazzling wings.[55]

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3 For the use of this term I am indebted to J. Hillman's work, *Re-Visioning Psychology.*
4 The title of the recent Columbia Pictures film directed by S. Spielberg, *Close Encounters of the Third Kind,* comes from the new science of "Ufology." Cf. J. Hynek, *The UFO Experience: A Scientific Inquiry* (New York: Ballantine, 1972).
5 United Press International release as printed in the *San Francisco Chronicle,* Oct. 13, 1973.
6 Title of *Rolling Stone* article, "Claw Men from the Outer Space," by J. Eszterhas, Jan. 17, 1974, p. 27.
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10 Eszterhas, p. 38.
11 Blum, p. 33.
12 Cf. Hesiod, *Theogony,* 270.
13 Cf. Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 790-815.
14 Cf. Pindar, *Pythian Ode* 12:13; Apollodorus, *Library* 2:37.
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16 Cf. N. O. Brown, *Hermes the Thief: The Evolution of a Myth* (New York: Random House, 1947), chap. 2.
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25 Eszterhas, p. 40.
26 Ibid., p. 38.
27 Blum, p. 35-36.
28 *Matthew* 17:27.
29 O. Neugebauer and R. A. Parker, *Egyptian Astronomical Texts* (Providence: Brown Univ. Pr., 1960), vol. 1, p. 75.
30 A. Gardiner, *Egyptian Grammar* (London: Oxford Univ. Pr., 1927), p. 477.
31 Pritchard, p. 89.
32 C. G. Jung, "On the Frontiers of Knowledge: An Interview with C. G. Jung: 1959," interviewer G. Duplain, *Spring 1960,* p. 9.
33 Cf. the Cisco Grove, Calif., case involving three silvery-gray creatures, reported in C. Bowen, *The Humanoids* (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1969), pp. 169-174; cf. cases in J. Vallee, *Passport to Magonia: From Folklore to Flying Saucers* (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1969).
34 Eszterhas, p. 38.
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36 *Matthew* 16:4.
37 *Matthew* 24:30-31.
38 Pico della Mirandola, *De Hominis Dignitate, Heptaplus, De Ento et Uno,* ed., E. Garin (Firenze: Vallecchi Editore, 1942), p. 254.
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43 Eszterhas, p. 38.
44 L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1936), vol. IV, p. 249.
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47 Ginzberg, p. 252.
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# "DON JUAN," TRICKSTER, AND HERMENEUTIC UNDERSTANDING

MICHAEL W. WHAN
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Under the world where Earthmaker lives
there is another world just like it and
of this world he, Trickster, is in charge.

Richard De Mille, *Castaneda's Journey.*

## *Introduction.*

As an anthropology student on a field-trip in Mexico studying medicinal plants, Carlos Castaneda encounters a Yaqui Indian sorcerer, don Juan. Through his relationship with don Juan, Castaneda is introduced to 'non-ordinary' states of reality. His own 'reality' is predicated on commonsense notions and social science rationality. At the end of *The Teachings of Don Juan,* the author attempts what he entitles a "structural analysis" by which he tries to render don Juan's way of knowledge as a rationally accountable set of coherent concepts.

Castaneda's world features an everyday, mundane, secular, sense of reality; whereas the 'non-ordinary' states he experiences are mysterious, sacramental, ecstatic and numinous. He undergoes a series of experiences in which his rationality fails to provide a 'description' which can make these experiences adequately accountable in consensual terms to don Juan. The development of their relationship, however, leads to a 'special consensus' out of which an account is generated which is consonant with sorcery as a way of knowledge.[1]

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*The 'twilight' state of liminality.*

Just before one of Castaneda's meetings with Mescalito, the god of peyote, don Juan says to him that the "twilight is the crack between the worlds." Referring to this poetic image, de Mille writes:

> Twilight may be the crack between the ordinary and nonordinary worlds because it is a time of uncertain perception, when imagination plays a greater part in what we see.[2]

The image of twilight — the transitional period between day and night — brings to mind the characteristics of the transitional phase of ritual known as liminality. Every ritual process has three stages: the first is the separation from the previous social reality; the second is the liminal or transitional stage, a sacred period between the other two stages; and the third is the constituting of a new order and perception of reality.[3]

V. Turner's definition of the liminal period of ritual appears highly apposite to the character and scenarios of don Juan and his world:

> The attributes of liminality or of liminal *personae* ('threshold people') are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between . . .[4]

The personality of don Juan as teacher and trickster, devious and benevolent, simple and complex, as well as the many other paradoxical traits he exemplifies, suggests the elusive and ambiguous quality of the liminal personae. Similarly, Castaneda's inability to apply his 'ordinary' mode of classification to the experiences and visions he undergoes implies their liminal character.

For instance, Silverman[5] has pointed out that Castaneda's inquiry as to whether he 'really' did fly as he had experienced himself doing during a non-ordinary state of reality, already presupposes a literal interpretation of the meaning of 'flight.' The sense in which the answer can be understood is assumed by the ontological terms of the question. Equally, his assumption that these experiences are hallucinogenic implies an order of reality predicated on the idea of hallucinogenic agencies responsible for certain types of experiences. After

one visionary episode Castaneda is relieved when it occurs to him that don Juan may have given him an hallucinogenic substance on some meat without his knowing. However, to call the experiences the result of hallucinogenic agencies is reductionist, confusing an 'efficient cause' with the notion of meaning and interpretative understanding. Where don Juan personifies, Castaneda searches for a depersonified nature, an empirical causality. His classificatory schemes are a means of trying to reconcile 'extra-ordinary' experience with mundane interpretative understanding.

The geography of don Juan's environment also has many liminal features. The particular landscapes are usually out-of-the-way places, bush country, wilderness, off beaten paths and tracks, roads, the outskirts of towns and bus stations. It is in a *border-town* at a bus station that Castaneda first meets don Juan. The values of 'choice,' 'goal,' and 'destination,' however, are not part of the liminal imagery of movement; rather, the emphasis is on being 'betwixt and between.' Don Juan says:

> All paths are the same: they lead nowhere. They are paths going through the bush, or into the bush. In my own life I could have traversed long, long paths, but I am not anywhere.

Liminal geography and temporality is that of "no-place and no-time,"[6] and these landscapes and inscapes belong to the circularity and wandering of the imaginal psyche rather than the linear directions of ego-psychology.

*Stripping away the self.*

Within a liminal context the taken-for-granted self is no longer sustained. In everyday reality the idea of 'having' or 'being' a self, for most people, is a basic and often necessary assumption. This self in Western culture is understood in a literal and personalistic sense. It is this assumption that don Juan questions, telling Castaneda:

> Your problem now is that you're too real. Your endeavours are too real; your moods are too real. Don't take things for granted. You must begin to erase yourself.

Yet despite refutation of a literal self, don Juan shows a great deal

of concern and sensitivity to the 'moods' of nature, and to showing due respect and caution to the archetypal personalities and creatures of the world of 'non-ordinary' reality. He emphasizes the importance of the right kind of *relationship* to archetypal entities. Unlike the predictability of the everyday world where the self and its activities can be largely taken-for-granted, the behaviour of archetypal entities is unpredictable. Don Juan on several occasions remarks to Castaneda how close he has come to death during his encounters.

The psychological condition of the liminal phase is that of anonymity and a generic human bond.[7] Against the emphasis on personal biography don Juan instructs Castaneda on the "erasing of personal history." The feeling values shift from those of kinship to the fellowship of a generic humankindness. This movement away from a personalistic 'know thyself' leads to a sense of being as mysterious, as if shrouded in a 'cloud of unknowing.' Don Juan tells him:

> I have erased my personal history. . . . Nobody knows who I am or what I do. Not even I.

The period of liminality involves a 'stripping away' and de-literalization of the hierarchic order and the idea of self based on it. In terms of the ego and archetype don Juan's instructions can be understood as facilitating a process of 'de-personalizing'[8] where the value shifts away from the ego onto its relationship to and hence acknowledgement of the archetypes. The 'fog' and 'twilight' which precede two of Castaneda's visionary episodes can be seen as serving a kind of Rorshach function, a screen of "uncertain perception" on which archetypal landscapes and entities appear. This, however, seems to require the dispossession of a literal ego which blocks the imaginal and metaphoric psyche. The de-personalization of the ego enables the personification of the psyche. The anonymity of liminality provides the ritual condition for archetypal phenomena.

### *Don Juan: Trickster and Senex.*

Don Juan's use of absurdity, humor and mischievousness suggests

the trickster features of his character, as do the presence of coyote and crow, two animals associated with Trickster in American Indian mythology.[9] As Kerenyi remarks, Trickster is *"the spirit of disorder, the enemy of boundaries."*[10] From the perspective of any orthodoxy it is these values which are seen as characteristics of liminal situations. Don Juan emphasizes the importance of 'disrupting the Routines of Life.'

To make his point, however, don Juan uses humor and wit. For example, in making his point about the disruption of routines, don Juan uses Castaneda's superiority complex to turn the tables on him. He tells him about a magical deer that he tracks down by standing on his head and wailing softly. Castaneda, however, describes don Juan's dialogue with the deer as "sort of dumb." Don Juan replies: "What did you expect? . . . I'm an Indian." The ambiguity here has to do with Castaneda's uncertainty about how to understand don Juan's storytelling. He can, in one sense, interpret the story as the 'wise tale' of a sagacious old man; or, in another sense, he can label it a 'tall story' by an old rascal. For Castaneda, then, the problem is whether to listen to don Juan as the Wise Old Man, or call his bluff as Trickster.

On other occasions the shadow-side of don Juan is alluded to in terms of the dangerous and uncanny "powers" and happenings that figure in his presence. In Western culture the clown has traditionally been associated with the Devil and Chaos — laughter and comic catharsis are anarchic. Jung[11] refers to the caricaturing of religious symbols and ritual that went on in the Church of the Middle Ages. These practices were engaged in by priests and laity alike. The clown's function, protected usually by the peripheral status of humor and the clown's acceptance of the scapegoat role, is often to undermine and disrupt the reified categories of authority and reality. Nevertheless, despite his association with the Devil, his status is basically liminal, beyond both the holy and unholy; he is:

> the *punctum indifferens* who existed in a realm all his own beyond both sides of the drama.[12]

The clown, then, is an intermediary, as is don Juan betwixt and

between 'ordinary' and 'non-ordinary' reality; features they share with the trickster-aspect of Hermes and Mercury who as messengers between men and gods are elusive figures in the interstices of the sacred and profane.

It is the anarchic quality of Trickster which makes him dangerous to the established order. In Jung's discussion of his psychology[13] attention is drawn to the reversal of the hierarchic order which is caused by Trickster psychology. Jung also speaks of him as barely human and with a minimum of consciousness. Low status and status reversal are, however, also intrinsic aspects of liminality: low becomes high, and high becomes low.[14]

Castaneda has to contend with this situation in his encounter with don Juan. His initial conception of his superior social status as "a university student, a man of the sophisticated Western world" and of don Juan as a 'paid' "informant" undergoes a reversal as he becomes an apprentice in sorcery. At first he wished to *learn* about plants, treating this knowledge as 'anthropological data.' But this wish is subverted by don Juan who insists he must *talk* to them. He can no longer theorize in abstract terms about animism, but ironically, must adopt an animistic attitude toward plants. For a 'sophisticated' Western anthropologist this is humiliating:

> I went as far as kneeling in front of the plant but I could not bring myself to speak to it. I felt ridiculous. . . .

However, this humiliation serves to lessen self-importance, and humility is an essential condition of liminality. This enables a state of unknowing and receptivity to be established.

The acceptance of apparent absurdity reduces resistance to the unknown. Castaneda, like Jung, seems initially to 'look down' on the Trickster, accrediting it with low status. However, don Juan's ambiguity makes it too difficult for Castaneda to decide whether he is observing foolishness or wisdom. Castaneda is caught up in the paradox of Trickster's meaninglessness and the meaningfulness of the Wise Old Man,[15] reminding one of William Blake's comment that a fool is made wise through his folly.

In his discussion on "The Phenomenology of the Spirit In Fairy-

tales,"[16] Jung points out that the negative aspect of the Wise Old Man is a trickster-like personality: "an ambiguous elfin character." According to Jung, the "dwarf form" of the spirit archetype implies a "naturalistic vegetation-numen sprung from the underworld." This is significant to the understanding of Castaneda's tales, for don Juan's visionary craft appears to emerge from the trickster-like side of his personality being associated with the use of plants. The creation of psychedelic experience through hallucinogenic plants connects the world of vegetation with the numinous realm: the imaginal 'ground' springs from the underworld where Trickster is in charge. Sorcering visions is thus both craft and craftiness, as when Castaneda suspects don Juan of slipping hallucinogenic substances surreptitiously onto his food.

It is possible to understand the imagery of white hair and wrinkles, and the attitude of kindliness often associated with the Wise Old Man as a tendency to an idealization and quaint personification of wisdom. For example, don Juan is described with hair "white and short" and with "deep wrinkles"; his "eyes seemed to shine with a light of their own." This attractive personification, however, is in marked contrast to the strange appearance of Mescalito: "his eyes were the water . . . sparkling . . . gold and black" and whose "head was pointed like a strawberry; his skin was green, dotted with innumerable warts." The strawberry shape and the greenness suggest the "vegetation-numen" and the warts a dwarfish ugliness. This strawberry shape in particular is in contrast to a reference to the shape of don Juan's head as "round." Here roundness might imply a mandala-like quality, the Wholeness of the wise old Indian as distinct from Trickster who is at odds with himself, and whose body comes apart. In the Trickster Myth of the Winnebago Indians, Trickster's right arm fights his left, he burns his anus and eats his own intestines, and his penis becomes detached from his body. If roundness is the mandala of spiritual art, then Trickster is artful spirit. Mescalito appears 'warts and all.'

Don Juan surrounds his way of knowledge with secrecy, but he reveals this esotericism to Castaneda as "a routine as empty as any other routine" in the final book. The medium of secrecy helps

create the impression of the message of wisdom. As de Mille neatly puts it, though, in another context, he is a "sham-man." For if the secrecy is but an empty routine, there is an implication that the *form* of wisdom is a deception: a cryptic and enigmatic mannerism. The hermenuetic problem is that meaning and wisdom arise from an interpretative understanding which is bedeviled by its solemn inflations that see meaning here, there and everywhere, and by meaninglessness — dread for an existentialist age. The senex-trickster figure contains the ambiguity of wisdom and deception.

*Trickster psychology and the fact/fiction controversy.*

The accounts of Castaneda's experiences with don Juan have been called:

> a lesson in 'lived hermeneutics,' the actual *experience* of interpretation's role in interpreting experience so as to constitute what we know as 'world,' 'reality,' 'meaning.'[17]

The sorcerer's way of knowledge involves the realization that what we call 'world' or 'reality' is a description, fabricated knowledge constituted out of an *interpretative understanding*. In much the same way as don Juan places Castaneda in an untenable metaphysical position, forcing on him the realization that his 'reality' is description, so Castaneda as author presents for the reader the same dilemma. The Western reader is socialized into a belief in the distinction between a genre of fictional literature and one of factuality. But it is precisely such distinctions that are questioned and blurred by the sorcerer's way of knowledge. For instance, in describing what he terms *dreaming,* don Juan says "there is no difference between what you do when you sleep and what you do when you are not sleeping."

Following the publication of Castaneda's accounts there was a controversy as to whether to treat them as factual anthropological reports or as fiction. Castaneda's own academic career involved him in a school of social science known as ethnomethodology. This approach works on the assumption that 'reality' is a social construction sustained by the cooperation or collusion of a society's membership.

It is no longer something 'out there,' but derived from the collectivity. Students of ethnomethodology were sent into their own homes, those of friends, and the institutions of society, but they acted as if they no longer understood taken-for-granted reality. Often this reality would then collapse as it was no longer mutually sustained, and a situation of anomie was created. Ethnomethodologists claim to show how social groups come to constitute what they believe to be 'facts in themselves,' self-evident truths. The distinction between fact and fiction becomes, therefore, hard to maintain.

Ethnomethodology, like the methods of don Juan, displays a kind of Trickster psychology — the *"spirit of disorder, the enemy of boundaries."* As de Mille writes of Castaneda:

> When a Coyote-Ethnographer sees the shadow of a sorcering Crow by the light of his Silvery mind he pounces on it and brings down the Temple of Learning. . . . Coyote Ph.D. is going on his way now, leaving us to pick up the pieces.[18]

By adopting the mask of the Fool ethnomethodology students appeared as incompetent, lacking 'commonsense' and inept at 'reality-testing.' Indeed this approach itself caused distress to the subjects of these experiments, and shows a Trickster psychology through its rather sadistic methodological techniques. But by the students' meaningless behavior the meaningfulness of the everyday world as a description was revealed.

This recognition of "our reality" as "merely one of many descriptions" is, Castaneda tells us, "the basic premise of sorcery." Trickster psychology, then, suggests an archetypal perspective with a special sensitivity to the question of interpretation. Meaning is conceived not as literal but as equivocal, implying a plurality of life-worlds and archetypal perspectives. Psychological realities are therefore phenomenological and imaginal. Theoretical positions are each a particular interpretative understanding, predicated on the rhetoric of a particular archetype. This is what Jung means when he writes:

> We should never forget that in any psychological discussion we are not saying anything *about* the psyche, but that the psyche is always speaking about *itself*.[19]

Understanding is never literal or absolute; it is *interpretative.* But

the revelation of a taken-for-granted reality as one among many possible descriptions renders that reality as at least illusory and at most phenomenal. This task is partly in the domain of Trickster and has partly to do with the wisdom of the Wise Old Man. Interpretation implies a 'sorcerer's' understanding of 'hidden meanings,' and is the art of persuasion: rhetoric.[20] Like the god of sleep, Hypnos, he must first put the other 'to sleep' before what don Juan calls *dreaming* can take place. And the interpretations he produces seem sometimes to be *conjured up.*

It is the liminal condition that is productive of myth, symbol and metaphor, but without interpretation there is no symbol and without symbol no interpretation.[21] Each has recourse to the other. An understanding of understanding as interpretative occurs beyond the threshold of 'ordinary' reality, because it is there that such a reality is no longer literal.

Don Juan, Trickster, Coyote, Crow are archetypal entities which make possible a specifically hermeneutic understanding. They belong to marginality; active in borderline and peripheral situations they are liminal personae. Castaneda's accounts as "a lesson in 'lived hermeneutics,'" represent an archetypal encounter with a don Juan who reminds one of Hermes, "God of borders and hermeneutics, of connections between sorts of worlds."[22] Don Juan tricks Castaneda out of his epistemology, and puts him in the liminal but untenable position betwixt and between worlds. For as don Juan tells him:

> Only if one pits two views against each other can one weasel between them to arrive at the real world.

Castaneda's accounts offer a literature of fascination and enchantment for the reader: the basis for a psychedelic cult told with the authentification and authority of an anthropological field report. However, this literal reading of the sorcerer's magical world is repudiated within the story itself. The author addresses himself *to the reader* through don Juan, speaking against a literal interpretation of the sorcerer's description.

Throughout Castaneda's long and arduous apprenticeship, don Juan's strategy is to show him the sorcerer's world without letting

him "get hooked by it." Towards the end he tells Castaneda that the world is "a view, regardless of whether that view belongs to an ordinary man or to a sorcerer." The Indian sorcerer of psychedelic visions reveals an iconoclastic attitude toward his own esoteric teachings, his concerns being not occult literality but epistemology and hermenuetics.

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15 *CW9,* 458.
16 *CW 9, i.*
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# *EXERCITIA SPIRITUALIA* OF ST. IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA

## *Notes on Lectures*

C. G. JUNG

(1939)

The text which follows continues the material begun in *Spring 1977*, where it is introduced with a full prefatory note. Of that note, we repeat here only our thanks to the Curatorium of the C. G. Jung-Institut, Zürich, holders of Copyright.—*Eds.*

## LECTURE XI

(7th July, 1939)

As I told you in the last lecture, Ignatius dictated his biography to his pupil Gonzales, so the visions are written in the third person. I read you an extract containing the vision of a snake covered in shining eyes. In a further passage Gonzales reports:

> He experienced above all a deep devotion to the Holy Trinity. Day by day he offered prayers to the three persons separately. But as he prayed to the Trinity he noticed that he was really offering fourfold prayers to a threefold God; he was, however, hardly, or not at all, disturbed by this idea.

We see a slight doubt arising here; he would hardly have mentioned the fact that he was not disturbed, had he not felt that such a fact should really have disturbed him.

Gonzales continues:

> One day, however, as he recited the offices of the Most Blessed Virgin on the steps of the monastery, his spirit was uplifted and he saw the Most Holy Trinity in the form of a clavichord with three keys, and this called forth so many tears and sighs that he could no longer restrain himself. And on the same day, when he took part in the procession which started from the church in question, he was unable to contain his tears till breakfast time, and at table he could speak of nothing but the Most Holy Trinity, and in doing so he made use of many and the most varied parallels and images and experienced great pleasure and much comfort.

The clavichord at once suggests the Trinity to Ignatius. This seems

arbitrary and dogmatic to us, but it was the nearest and most natural explanation of anything threefold in those days.

> On a certain day, as he was attending Holy Mass in the oftimes mentioned church, he saw, with his inner eye, during the elevation of the Host, a kind of white radiance descending from above. Although after such a long time he could not remember it precisely and was no longer able to describe it, yet he saw clearly that the subject was as follows: the manner of our Lord Jesus' presence in the Most Holy Sacrament.

He simply saw a white light and interpreted it as the presence of Christ in the sacrament. This was a problem which was enormously important to the whole Middle Ages; they were always puzzling over the manner in which the bread and wine were transformed into the *actual* body and blood of Christ. So Ignatius naturally fitted the white light which he saw into the dogma.

> While praying he saw the humanity of Christ with his inner eye, often and long.

Another medieval problem was how Christ's actual body was made, how it could be the dwelling place of God and yet be subject to the weaknesses of mortality. The dogma claimed Christ as very God and very man, but this was difficult to reconcile with reason, so Ignatius' "inner eye" was much occupied with the humanity of Christ.

> The form, which he believed he saw, was like a white body, neither big nor small. He was unable, however, to distinguish any separate members. He saw this in Manresa, repeatedly, and if he were to say twenty or forty times, he would not like to say that he lied. He also saw it once when he was in Jerusalem, and then once again near Padua when on his travels.

He saw a luminosity, but there were no limbs; it could not be termed a human shape.

> He also saw the Most Blessed Virgin Mary in the same manner, without being able to discern any separate members. Through these visions, at this time, he was strengthened in his faith to such an extraordinary degree, that he often thought to himself that he was resolved to die for her, because of the visions which he had seen, even if no documents had existed concerning these mysteries of faith.

It is a psychological fact that his faith was strengthened by this vision, and this must be taken seriously. Visions can have this quality;

they can make a strong and direct impression. Ignatius was not strengthened in his faith by the interpretation but by the vision itself. Gonzales reports further:

> When this illumination had lasted long enough, he knelt down before the cross which was at this spot, to return thanks. The same vision then appeared to him again, which had so often appeared to him before, without his having been able to understand its meaning: the same above mentioned glorious, beautiful Something with the many shining eyes, which so often swam before his sight.

We have already met the motif of many shining eyes in the vision of the snake.

> In the presence of the cross, however, he had no difficulty in perceiving that the thing was not as richly coloured as at other times, and in this way, and with the strong assent of his will, he recognized clearly that it was a wicked spirit. Therefore, from then onwards, and as often as it still appeared to him over a long period of time, he would chase it away with the stick which he was in the habit of carrying.

The vision, which impressed Ignatius so favourably at first, changed its face for him because it was not so beautiful in colour, and he was suddenly convinced that it was a wicked spirit and must be chased away by his will. There is no evidence that it was particularly good before and particularly bad later. It was a vision and visions can have both qualities. The only fact is that he interprets this vision as coming from the Devil. That means that this vision awakened a doubt. This thing, which impressed him so deeply, could also come from the Devil, and he used his will more and more to decide whether his visions were good or bad. Visions are spontaneous phenomena which spring from the unconcious and are amoral. A moral standpoint is introduced by consciousness; it is impressed by a certain atmosphere and declares the visions to be good or bad.

Ignatius had a different kind of vision when he was on board a pilgrim ship. He took no money with him on this voyage for travelling expenses except his trust in God. In other words, he lived on alms.

> During all this time the Lord often appeared to him, bringing him great comfort and courage. He believed he saw a round thing, as of gold, which floated large before his eyes.

He saw a golden ball or sphere. Christ is not identified with such a symbol in the Christian dogma.

> He now had this faculty [to find God] more than ever before in his whole life: as often as he wished and at any fixed time he was able to find God and he also again saw visions, especially those mentioned above in which he saw Christ as a sun; this often occurred to him when he was speaking of important matters, and he always interpreted this circumstance as a sanction.

There are often spontaneous manifestations from the unconscious in critical situations. Sometimes such a manifestation appeared to Ignatius as a golden ball and sometimes as the sun. The latter is a perfectly good analogy to Christ; the Church even identifies him with the sun. The passage in Malachi (IV. 2), "But unto you that fear my name shall the Sun of righteousness arise with healing in his wings," is interpreted as a prophecy of Christ.

It is the undogmatic character of these visions that assures us of their authenticity. They are visions which other people could have, and are not confined to saints. They are called forth by critical situations. The insane and neurotic also see such things frequently, because the lack of equilibrium in their nervous system easily involves them in conflict and panic. It is just such situations that produce these phenomena. They have a redeeming character and sometimes appear as concretized enlightenment. The result is often a conviction that God has sent special help or guidance. Psychologically this means that certain typical moments of human life call forth spontaneous manifestations from the unconscious which have a redeeming effect. The interpretation given to such phenomena is a matter of individual taste and *Weltanschauung*.

Ignatius can interpret a golden ball as Christ without offending our sense of fitness, but such interpretations are often grotesque and in bad taste. As an example, I draw your attention to the first vision of Swedenborg (1688-1772), the Swedish mystic. He was in London when he was about 56 or 57 years old, and one evening after a good dinner he saw the floor of the room covered in creeping worms. A figure in a red robe stood in the corner of the room and said to him: "Don't eat so much." This vision made an enormous impres-

sion on him and he decided the figure must be the Lord God. This interpretation is really in bad taste, for we should say that the worms represented his digestive system, his intestines, and the figure his better self asking him to be reasonable and not eat so much.

If one studies visions carefully, one can be pretty sure which are authentic. I will now give you an example of a later vision of Ignatius' which is not authentic. When he already had a good many pupils, he decided to go to Rome, and he felt very uncertain whether the Pope would look favourably on his wish to found a new order. On the way to Rome he had a vision. He saw God himself charging his Son, who was bearing the cross, to protect the "Society of Jesus" and heard a voice which was apparently the voice of Christ, saying: "I will be favourable to you in Rome." If this vision were really as he reports, it is in accordance with dogmatic expectation, but I am inclined to believe that it is, on account of this, less authentic than the previous visions. He must have learned how to project his own thoughts. If you practise this art, there are certain thoughts which you can project at suitable moments. Mohammed seems to have been able to do this. His visions fitted the situation and corresponded to his own wishes. The complex vision, which Ignatius had on the way to Rome, is a projected and concretized fantasy of the thing he was hoping and wishing. This is only possible when someone has had a great deal of practice in manipulating his unconscious. The visions are spontaneous and simple at first, and then they are remodelled to fit the dogma; and, gradually through constant practice, it becomes possible to project dogmatic thoughts which have little or nothing to do with the unconscious. The more complex a vision is, the more doubtful its authenticity. I do not deny that such visions are experienced, of course; but they are not elementary visions such as we meet all over the world, in which, for instance, the soul is described as a sphere. The earlier visions of Ignatius belonged in this category, but the one on the way to Rome does not. We find these elementary visions in every spiritualistic séance where there is a reasonably reliable medium, and in dreams. The foundation is the same all over the world, but the interpretation differs enormously. One must discriminate carefully between the elementary

vision, and the time and place where it occurred and was interpreted. The sphere has naturally the meaning of a totality. Ignatius saw his own totality and this had a redeeming effect. Such an experience produces an inner feeling of security because one has become one with one's own doubt. The sphere is a symbol for united opposites.

To return to the biography of Ignatius: from Manresa he went to Barcelona and, in 1523, he made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. He took no money with him but begged his way. He was only a few days in Jerusalem, because his zeal had offended some fanatical Turks, and the Franciscan monks, who resided in Jerusalem, threatened Ignatius with excommunication if he remained. He returned to Barcelona, where he realized that his education as an officer was very insufficient for his present need. He began to learn Latin, but was held up by the verb *amare.* Each time he began to conjugate this verb he fell into a condition of being in love with God, which was not very helpful to his Latin. But in time he overcame this difficulty, and went on to study philosophy. During these studies he already talked with people he met and began the original form of the exercises. This led to some trouble with the Inquisition, which was no joke in those days. There were trials in Alcala and Salamanca. The people, largely women, with whom he had practised the exercises had to give evidence. Bernhard Hegardt says:

> One of the women who were implicated gave the following information before the examining judge on May 10th, 1527. She had begged Ignatius to teach her how she could serve God. And Inigo had answered her that during a month she should speak with him frequently and that during this month she should confess and partake of the sacrament every eight days. He added that the first time she would feel happy, without knowing why, that the second week she would be sad, but that he trusted in God that she would derive great benefit. . . . He said also that he would explain to her the exercise of the three spiritual powers. He also showed her the merit that may be acquired through temptation; he spoke of the venial sin and how it can develop into a mortal sin; and of the ten commandments and of the circumstances governing mortal sins, and of the five senses. . . . He told her that if she entered the service of God the temptations of the evil one would plague her. He taught her self-examination which she should practice twice a day, once after the mid-day meal and the second time after the evening meal, when she should kneel down and say: 'My God, my Father, my Creator! I thank Thee

> and praise Thee for all the manifold favours which Thou hast shown me, and which I hope Thou wilt still show me.'

This last prayer is typical of the Western attitude. We thank God for favours received and make this a reason for demanding more. We do not notice this because it sounds well, and we are used to the familiar words of our prayers. But, as a matter of fact, religion in the West largely consists of shameless demands for what we want. It reminds one of a rather broad Basel story about an Alsatian market woman. She stopped at a chapel on her way to the Basel market and prayed to the Virgin for good sales, "so that I can buy greens, bread, and perhaps a little meat." Then she heard the Christ Child say: "And anything else?" And she replied: "Hold your tongue boy, I am talking to your Mother!" This story is fifty years old, but the whole psychology of begging God and the Saints for favours belongs to primitive psychology in any time. The Saints were metaphorically beaten in the Middle Ages if they failed to produce the right weather.

In 1528 Ignatius went to Paris where he remained for some time. This was partly to escape from a situation which had become impossible and partly in order to study theology more thoroughly than was possible in Spain. He travelled on foot, begging his way, leading a donkey laden with his books. Bernhard Hegardt says:

> During the first period — 1528-29 — he appears to have continued the practice of his priestly office and the apportioning of the Exercises practically in the same way as in Alcala and Salamanca, that is to say in the form of prayer meetings and conventicles. This time again he ran into trouble, and when several young men, who belonged to his circle, gave away all their possessions in order to beg for their daily bread, Ignatius was blamed with having confused their minds through sorcery, so that he again fell into the hands of the Inquisition. Ignatius, who learnt of the accusation during a journey, sought out the great inquisitor Dr. Matthaus Orfi, immediately on his return to Paris, and, thanks to his personal charm, he succeeded in clearing up the matter almost at once.

He had learned now how to deal with the Inquisition and was always able to get out of his difficulties with it. Till about 1530 he lived mainly as a "directeur de conscience." Then a change seems to have taken place, and he devoted himself more to his studies. He still saw a few people; but his experience had taught him to choose

them very carefully, to avoid uneducated people, and to limit his activity to a few men of education and intelligence. And even with these he was very reserved. During these years he met the people who were to become vitally important to the destiny of the Jesuit Order. In 1533 he began again with the exercises, and a fellow student, Peter Faber, had the most extraordinary success with them. As if touched by a magic wand, Faber found himself freed from his carnal appetites, temptations, and the weaknesses of his nature. Ignatius had similar experiences with a few other people, such as Xavier and Diego Lainez.

Bit by bit he began to lay the foundation of the Society of Jesus with these fellow workers. It was a very small conventicle at first; Ignatius had learned to distrust crowds. He returned to Spain and made arrangements to meet his fellow workers at Venice in order to undertake a journey to the Holy Land. But, while they were in Venice, the Turkish war broke out and made the voyage impossible. It was in Venice that the idea of founding a monastic order was first broached, and Ignatius decided to go to Rome to obtain the Pope's consent. It was on this journey that he had the vision of which I have already spoken. After considerable difficulties in Rome, he succeeded in 1540 in winning the consent of the Pope, Paul III, who founded the order of the Jesuits with a Papal Bull. Ignatius had now reached his goal and became the first General of the Jesuits. It is characteristic of the man that he immediately went to the kitchen and did the work of a kitchen boy in order to prove to himself that his high post had not engendered pride. He died in Rome in 1556 while still General of the Jesuit Order.

I have now given you a brief outline of the life of Ignatius and must postpone the discussion of the exercises themselves till next Semester, but I would like to make a few general remarks. Ignatius broke entirely with the earlier meditations of the Devoti. These latter, though founded on a different dogma, are nearly related to meditation in the East. The goal of the Devoti was to submerge themselves in God, to reach inner peace, to cut themselves off from

the world, to practise the *sich lassen** and detachment** of Eckehart. But Ignatius militarized meditation; it became exercises to be carried through in a strictly prescribed time. New ideas come in, such as the doctrine of the Elect; and the mystical content, all-important for the Devoti, was abandoned, except for a few mystical ideas which were allowed as a method for enticing the will into the right path. The path of the Devoti led inwards, that of Ignatius outwards: deeds, battle, enterprise, attacks on the world, the right use of the will were the goal. Mysticism was dissolved in method. Some of the content of the exercises originated in Arabian mysticism, but we will speak of this in the next Semester.

*To leave themselves, to leave the ego. Discussed in *E.T.H. Notes 1938-39,* III, 128 f.

**Ibid. pp. 129-131.

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# JUNG IN AMERICA, 1924-1925

WILLIAM McGUIRE
(Princeton)

"On my next trip to the United States," we read in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections,* "I went with a group of American friends to visit the Indians of New Mexico, the city-building Pueblos."[1]

In his other published works, including the *Letters,* Jung supplied no details of that American trip, in 1924-25,[2] other than sporadic references[3] to visiting the Taos Pueblo and conversing about supernal matters with a chief or chieftain named Ochwiay Biano (Mountain Lake). He finally dealt with Mountain Lake and Taos at some length in the well-known account in his memoirs.[4]

Jung "travelled among the Pueblo Indians of Arizona and New Mexico in 1924-25," stated Jolande Jacobi in a biographical sketch she appended to *The Psychology of C. G. Jung* (orig. 1939); and Gerhard Adler's chronology in *C. G. Jung: Letters,* Vol. 1 (1973) also gives those dates. Owing perhaps to the biennial implication of "1924-25," the notion has prevailed that Jung spent a considerable length of time among the Pueblos.[5] In her biographical memoir (1976),[6] Barbara Hannah has helped to set the record straight, drawing on information that she obtained from her friend the late Fowler McCormick. She tells us that Jung met McCormick and George Porter in Chicago between Christmas 1924 and New Year's, went by train to Santa Fe, New Mexico, where Jaime de Angulo joined them, and then to Taos, where Jung "made great friends with a chief of the Taos Pueblos"; afterward, to the Grand Canyon, in northwest Arizona; to New Orleans, since Jung also wanted some contact with American Negroes, "a great number of whom were working at that time in the forests near New Orleans"; and finally, to New York, where he gave a talk in the house of Kristine Mann.

I should like to present a few additional findings, some corrective, and comment on some aspects of this phase of Jung's bi-

ography, which has an unexpected range of personal associations. Undoubtedly further information and other corrections will come to light some day, when Jung's family letters, diaries, and other private papers are made available, and when more comprehensive research is pursued in newspapers, letters of persons involved with Jung, and other papers and records that may be discovered — the sort of patient and dogged exploration that will be required when Jung's eventual Jonesian biographer sets to work.

Some logistic details of Jung's trip have, indeed, been supplied from Jung's diary and letters home, through the kindness of his son, Franz. The 1924 diary gives the date of departure from Küsnacht for the United States as Wednesday, December 10. Jung went by train from Zürich to the North Sea port of Bremen, where on the 13th he boarded the North-German Lloyd steamer *Columbus*. The ship, delayed one day by severe winter storms, docked in New York, covered with ice, on December 22.[7] The next day Jung wrote to his wife: "Today we are in New York. It's cold. Porter, Fowler McCormick, and Mrs. Wickes met me. I'm here till Wednesday the 24th, then Chicago."

Chicago could be reached from New York by overnight train in eighteen hours, and evidently Jung, McCormick, and Porter celebrated Christmas Eve in a Pullman car. Writing home from Chicago on December 27, Jung reported: "I'm staying with G. F. Porter. On Monday the 30th, I leave for the Grand Canyon, and from there I go to the Zuñis and the Pueblos." In Chicago, Jung's acquaintance included not only Porter (of whom more hereafter) and Fowler McCormick, but Fowler's divorced parents, Edith Rockefeller McCormick and Harold F. McCormick, and Jung undoubtedly paid his respects to them as well. The relationship that he sustained for more than fifty years with various members of the McCormick family was an important strand of his life story.[8]

The train of choice from Chicago to the Southwest was the Santa Fe Railway's "California Limited," which left Dearborn Station nightly at 8:00. Sleepers for the Grand Canyon were switched off the main line at Williams, Arizona, and reached the Canyon at 7:00 the morning of the third day out,[9] which for Jung and his com-

panions would have been New Year's Day, 1925. Even on New Year's Day, there were obligations to be met. The following letter was typewritten on the stationery of El Tovar, a Fred Harvey hotel at Grand Canyon National Park. The letterhead features a panoramic view of the Canyon with the hotel perched on its southern rim.[10]

January 1, 1925

Dr. William A. White
St. Elizabeth's Hospital,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Sir:

Dr. Jung and I arrived here this morning and were met by some friends of his from California. We are planning a few days with the Indians and the Negroes in the South and he will arrive in Washington the morning of January 12th to spend only one day.

The notice of his coming was so short and his movements, since he landed ten days ago, so rapid and his plans so uncertain, that I have not written previously.

He hopes greatly to see you in Washington and perhaps knowing ahead, you can arrange a time. Unfortunately he can have but one day there as he sails from New York January 14th. If you want to communicate with him, a telegram in my care at 38 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, will be forwarded. We are racing along and our plans indefinite.

All best wishes to Mrs. White and yourself for the New Year.

Very sincerely yours,
George F. Porter

Barbara Hannah has given some particulars from Fowler McCormick's recollections: "they all went to see the famous Grand Canyon and rode down into the Canyon on mules . . . The scenery, both from the edge of the Canyon and inside the huge abyss, made a strong impression on Jung"—though he never mentioned the Grand Canyon in anything that he published. There is a shred, however, in a letter that Jung wrote to Frances G. Wickes on the same day, on a sheet of El Tovar writing paper with still another view of the Canyon on its letterhead:[11]

My dear Mrs. Wickes,

There are so many things worthwhile that I am rather late in returning to New York. My ship leaves Jan. 14th. (La France) I arrive in

NY. only Jan. 12th late in the evening or perhaps Jan. 13th in the early morning. Thus I am unfortunately unable to stop at your house. The situation will be rather crowded, as certain people from Chicago will come for . . . [illegible] to New York. But I do want to see you once more before I leave. I also want to give your friends a chance to see me. I propose we meet after dinner at 8 o'clock for an analytical colloquium.

Letters reach me c/o George F. Porter, University Club, 5th Ave., N.Y. I am so sorry, that I could not work out a different plan. But I have at least the satisfaction, that I am able to carry through a remarkable program.

I *saw* the Canyon. But I say nothing about it.

With very best wishes for a happy New Year . . .

The "friends from California" who met Jung at El Tovar (Franz Jung has again supplied the facts) were Professor Chauncey Goodrich, of the department of English at the University of California in Berkeley, and his wife, the former Henriette de Saussure Blanding.[12] The Goodriches were longstanding friends of Jung, and Professor Goodrich's sister, Elizabeth G. Whitney, M.D., had pioneered Jungian analysis in the San Francisco Bay area.[13] Her husband, James Whitney, M.D., also became an analytical psychologist, and their son, James Goodrich Whitney (1917-1967), was the first Jungian analyst trained in San Francisco. Evidently Jaime de Angulo, of Berkeley at that time, also joined Jung at the Grand Canyon. What Fowler McCormick wrote me about the expedition, in a letter of August 11, 1972, is inconclusive: "Our party spent three or four days over New Years at the Grand Canyon, and from there Jung and I set off alone to take a journey in the land of the 'endless horizon,' that part of the Southwest lying between New Mexico and Eastern Texas." He mentioned neither Porter, the Goodriches, de Angulo, or the visit to Taos. But all that had occurred thirty-seven years before.

The next exhibit consists of two brief items in the *Taos Valley News,* a weekly published in Taos, New Mexico; its bound volumes are to be found in the State Library of New Mexico, at Santa Fe. The issue of the *News* was dated Saturday, January 10, 1925. Thus, Jung had visited Taos on Monday the 5th and possibly Tuesday the 6th.

*Illustrious Visitors to Taos*

Dr. Carl Jung, world famed psychologist and contemporary of Freud, in company with Fowler McCormick, son of the famous harvester machinery magnate and grandson of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. visited Taos Monday of this week. The party is touring the United States and came up from Santa Fe to see the ancient village. While here they registered at the Columbian Hotel.

*Visits Taos Again*

James Angelo, Professor of anthropology in Berkeley University, Calif. visited Taos, and attended the Buffalo Dance at the pueblo, Tuesday. Mr. Angelo has been a frequent visitor to Taos, this time accompanying Dr. Jung and Mr. McCormick. The gentlemen are traveling across the country in a Chevrolet.

We may speculate that the Jung party, having visited the Grand Canyon *first,* motored to Santa Fe between Friday, January 2, and Sunday, January 4 — rather good time for nearly 600 miles over second- and third-rate roads in a Chevrolet. Near Gallup, New Mexico, the highway crossed a corner of the Navajo reservation, but there would not have been much time for a visit. The Zuñi Pueblo lay about thirty miles south of Gallup, on a poor road, but there is no evidence that Jung carried out his plan to visit it — not a reference to Zuñi in the *Collected Works.* The trip across country could also have been made by railway, from Williams to Lamy, N.M., and the Chevrolet acquired in Santa Fe. From there to Taos was another sixty-four miles to the north.[14]

As for "Professor James Angelo, of Berkeley University," he was certainly Jaime de Angulo (1887-1950), the authority on American Indian languages: Spanish by birth, he had an M.D. from Johns Hopkins, where he met and married Cary Fink, later Cary F. Baynes. According to a biographical notice by an anthropologist, D. L. Olmsted,[15] who had never known de Angulo but is a student of his work, he taught at Berkeley in summer 1920 and did field work and research among California Indians. After a divorce in 1922, Cary de Angulo went to Zürich to study with Jung and Jaime joined a linguistic survey in Mexico. In 1923, he married Lucy Freeland, a philologist, and they went to Europe. During a stay of several weeks

in Zürich, de Angulo had several hours with Jung. In early 1924, back in California, Jaime met Antonio Luhan, of the Taos Pueblo, and his Amer. wife Mable Dodge Luhan, while the Luhans were staying at Mill Valley, north of San Francisco, and later that year Mabel Luhan invited Jaime to Taos, where he came to know D. H. Lawrence. According to Olmstead, de Angulo introduced Jung to the Luhans in Taos, but the Luhans were actually in the East all that winter.[16] D. H. and Frieda Lawrence had left Taos in October 1924 for Mexico and did not return until April 1925.[17] Jung's own recollections, many years later, were uncertain. In a 1960 letter to Eugene Rolfe, who had wondered whether Lawrence was a "soul naturally Jungian," a spontaneous generator of Jungian symbols, Jung wrote, "Lawrence must have known of me through Mrs. . ., his American lady friend who has married a Pueblo and has a house in Taos, where he had lived for a while. His name was Antonio Mirabal (or his brother's name?). I knew him, but I cannot recall *her* name.... She was certainly acquainted with my ideas."[18] Shortly afterward, when Rolfe went to see Jung at Küsnacht, they resumed the subject of Mrs. Luhan, and Jung remarked, "I have stayed at her house in Taos."

One may ask: who introduced Jung to Antonio Mirabal (not to be confused with Antonio Luhan)? This was the "Spanish" name of Ochwiay Biano, "Mountain Lake," as Jung always called him. There is an idea that it was Frances G. Wickes. This idea may be based on something that M. Esther Harding wrote in her obituary notice of Mrs. Wickes: "She was well acquainted with the Navajo Indians. Indeed it was she who introduced Jung to the Indian Wiseman Mountain Lake.... Mountain Lake died in 1965 and sent a message of farewell to Frances not long before 'he went to his Father.' "[19] The poet Muriel Rukeyser, who is at work on a biographical study of Mrs. Wickes, told me that Frances Wickes had met Tony Mirabal on a visit to Taos earlier than 1925, possibly through Mabel Luhan, whom she knew, and she may have written or told Jung about him. In any case, Dr. Harding's obituary notice is not without error: Mirabal was not a Navajo, and he did not die until 1975 (according to information I received from Taos). The

Tony Mirabal who died was evidently the man whom Jung had met; he was a respected tribal leader of the Pueblo. But, according to Elsie Clews Parsons' study of the Taos Pueblo, there were *two* cousins named Antonio Mirabal, one more and one less respected in their community; the Indian name of the former is translated "Mountain," and of the latter is translated "Mountain Lake."[20] I have not as yet been able to unravel this puzzle.

Jung apparently kept in touch with his Pueblo friend — we have, at any rate, Jung's letter to him of Oct. 21, 1932, in reply to a letter from Mountain Lake.[21] And Frances Wickes wrote Jung on July 3, 1935, while she was visiting in Flagstaff, Arizona: "I saw Mountain Lake last summer. Your picture was over his fireplace. He talked much of you. He has done a grand thing for his people and won back the Blue Lake."[22] Blue Lake, high above Taos Pueblo, the source of the Taos River and the most sacred shrine of the Pueblo religion, had been part of more than 100,000 acres of tribal land taken, by decree of President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906, as part of the Kit Carson National Forest. The Indians' continual struggle produced in 1933 a rather diluted act giving them the use of the land, but the land and Blue Lake were not unconditionally returned to the Taos Pueblo until July 1971, when President Nixon signed a bill that had been enacted by Congress. Muriel Rukeyser told me that both Mrs. Wickes and Jung gave their support to the Taos Pueblo in their struggle for Blue Lake.

The second news item from the *Taos Valley News,* above, states that James Angelo (Jaime de Angulo) attended the Buffalo Dance at the pueblo on Tuesday, Jan. 6. Jung must have attended with him, for he wrote in 1928: "In the buffalo dances of the Taos Pueblo Indians the dancers represent both the hunters and the game."[23] And in 1952: "I observed that the dance-step of the Pueblo Indians consisted in a persistent, vigorous pounding of the earth with the heels."[24]

Barbara Hannah writes that Fowler McCormick told her the party "also paid a short visit to some more primitive Indians, who lived in caves and small houses in the Canyon de los Frijoles" near the pueblo of San Ildefonso, lying between Taos and Sante Fe. In

any event, by January 9 (three days and some 1500 miles after the Buffalo Dance) Jung reached New Orleans, evidently still traveling with Porter and McCormick (by rail?). The next letter (on Jung's Küsnacht letterhead), read together with the one he had written to Mrs. Wickes on New Year's Day, shows how tightly planned his entire trip was:[25]

New Orleans
9th of Jan. 1925

My dear Mrs. Wickes,

Concerning Lay I am not able to give a definite answer. I am not informed about the amount of work that is waiting for me — I am sure, that there is no chance at all until May anyhow.

Concerning our meeting I want to give a chance to the people who are *truly interested* in my psychology. I am not yet sure, whether I shall not be too tired to give a regular lecture. Therefore let us have an informal meeting, where people can ask questions. Perhaps I shall be able to talk about dreams.

It is a most unfortunate thing, that it is impossible for me to stay with you. I should have liked nothing better. But there is so much to do, that I better stay in the hotel.

I arrive Jan. 13th in the early morning from Washington. During the morning there will be business. From 1½ o'clock on I am at your disposition. Letters reach me: c/o George F. Porter University Club 5th Ave. N.Y.

Best regards from Mr. G. Porter.

Cordially yours,
C. G. Jung

Please tell Mrs. Zinno, that I am staying in the Hotel.

Beyond what Barbara Hannah recalls from Fowler McCormick — that Jung "wanted some contact with American Negroes, a great number of whom were working at that time in the forests near New Orleans" — I can supply an additional fragment from McCormick's letter of August 11, 1972: "Jung had wanted to see the American Negro in a natural outdoor habitat instead of a large city. I happened to know of a place near New Orleans where Negroes were cutting trees to make forest products and living a natural life in the open. I am sorry to say that I do not feel that Jung's opinion of the Negro was advanced materially by our visit."

Between New Orleans and Washington, the next recorded stop, there is the tantalizing possibility of a stop in Chattanooga. In

*Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (N.Y. ed., p. 272), during his account of his trip to East Africa later that year, Jung tells of dreaming of an American Negro who had been his barber in Chattanooga, Tennessee, twelve years before. That would have been in 1913, but we have no record of Jung's going South on his trip that year, or of traveling beyond Washington, D.C., on his 1912 trip. *Memories* contains a few errors of dating, and "twelve years" could have been a slip for "twelve months." In 1925, there was a through train from New Orleans to Washington via Chattanooga. But what would impel Jung to get out there, on his tight schedule, and have his hair cut — and curled? (Still, Jung did not write up *all* his travels. His spring 1933 cruise with Professor Fierz to Rhodes, Cyprus, Alexandria, and Palestine has been documented so far only by a postcard to Mary Foote.[26] There is a hint of a youthful trip southward in one of the Association Studies, 1904: apparently Jung had smoked Manila cigarillos in a "Spanish colony."[27])

Jung evidently spent Monday, January 12th, in Washington and went on to New York by sleeper, a convenient option in those days. We have a glimpse of his day in Washington, from a letter he wrote as he sailed back to Europe:[28]

Bord S.S. "France"
Le 17 Janv. 1925

Dear Dr. Jelliffe,

As you probably have heard from Dr. White of my flying trip through America I want to express to you my deep regrets, that I have not been able to call on you while I was in New York. I spent only two days in New York and they were simply overcrowded with unavoidable obligations. Thus I found no chance to see you. As Washington was by far less strenuous I could see White at least. My time was unfortunately quite short as the trip was rather unforeseen ....

Smith Ely Jelliffe, M.D. (1866-1945), of New York, a close friend and associate of William Alanson White, had known Jung since 1907, when he and White met him at the First International Congress for Psychiatry, at Amsterdam. In 1908, White and Jelliffe started the Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, in which Jung's *Psychology of Dementia Praecox* was published (1909); in 1913, they founded the *Psychoanalytic Review,* which published

Jung's lectures on "The Theory of Psychoanalysis." Jelliffe had been instrumental in arranging the lectures the previous year at Fordham University, New York City, where he was professor.[29] For many years, Jelliffe carried on a correspondence with both Jung and Freud. In a letter to Freud on June 8, 1926, Jelliffe wrote, "Visiting Jung in 1924, I was amazed to learn how narrow his vision was for the general situation and how one-sided he had developed his interests. I felt he had really ceased to be a physician. . . ."[30] Despite that impression a few months earlier, Jelliffe replied to Jung as follows:[31]

February 20, 1925

Dear Dr. Jung:

It was a great pleasure for me to receive your letter of January 17th as well as a great disappointment in not seeing you in person. But life is so full of both aspects of reality that would we have all the nice things that we want we certainly would not survive and as for the crushing things they would soon demolish us too. This latter reflection comes in my telling you of a very deep personal loss which has come to me through the death of my younger son.[32] He was 24 years old, had gone through his University with considerable distinction, not only in physical field of athletics, but in his scholarship as well and was going ahead with a great deal of individual value in medicine. We are all very unhappy about it but have to face it. I was glad therefore in a double sense to get your letter as I have always appreciated your friendship and hope that I might retain it. . . .

Jung's answer:[33]

228 Seestrasse
Küsnacht-Zürich
15.3.1925

My dear Dr. Jelliffe,

Your letter with its sad news has remembered me again of the regrettable fact that I was unable to see you when I was in New York. I did not know that you experienced such a cruel loss as the death of your son in the meantime. Let me express you my deepest sympathy and condolence.

Death has been at work recently. It has been a great shock to me to learn about the sudden death of Medill McCormick. I had seen him in good health on my way through Washington, but death seems to be more cruel when it takes away the young man, who is yet but a promise. . . .

Thus we have a little more light on Jung's day in Washington:

a call on Senator Joseph Medill McCormick (1877-1925), cousin of Fowler McCormick. McCormick, one of the bitterest opponents of the League of Nations (in conformity with the policies of his family's newspaper, the Chicago *Tribune),* died Feb. 25, 1925, of a heart attack in Washington. His widow was accompanied from Chicago to Washington on the train by an old friend of the family, George F. Porter.[34]

As he had promised Frances Wickes, Jung was in New York on January 13. We have Esther Harding's brief account of the "analytical colloquium" that took place, as Jung had proposed when he wrote to Mrs. Wickes from the Grand Canyon:

New York, 13 January [1925]

> Dr. Jung gave a talk to a group at Dr. Mann's apartment on 59th Street. He spoke on racial psychology and said many interesting things about the ancestors, how they seem to be in the land. As evidence of this, he spoke about the morphological changes in the skulls of people here in the U.S.A. and in Australia.
>
> He said that in America there is a certain lack of reverence, a certain ruthlessness. The ancestors are not considered here, their values not respected. He spoke of the "single-mindedness" of Americans, which would be impossible to Europeans because of all the many considerations to which they must pay due regard. The American disregards these completely, is, indeed, utterly unconscious of them.[35]

Who else attended Jung's talk? What actually occurred? The letter that Jung wrote to Mrs. Wickes after he got home suggests that the affair was in some sense extraordinary:[36]

Küsnacht Febr. 10th 1925.

> My dear Mrs. Wickes,
>
> I can confirm your ideas concerning our New York experiences. Things had to be as they were and you really did most bravely and admirably, what you could and should do under such extraordinary conditions. I felt it like a ceremonial for the Dead. Thus the golden thread has not been injured, the contrary, it has shown itself in the fact, that the performance of a very dangerous rite has been possible without bad effects. I think your attitude has been perfectly splendid, in as much as courage is concerned. As to other realisations I don't know yet. But I must say, when I feel toward West, I get no bad feeling from you....

Twenty-three days after his arrival, Jung departed from New York at 9 a.m. on January 14, 1925. We have the evidence of a

news item in the *New York Times* (January 15, 1925, p. 21):

> Dr. C. G. Jung, formerly a student of Sigmund Freud, and later head of the Zürich Psychiatric Clinic, sailed from New York yesterday on the *France,* after having spent an unannounced visit in this country.
>
> It was at Dr. Jung's school in Zürich that Edith Rockefeller McCormick, daughter of John D. Rockefeller and former wife of Harold F. McCormick, studied psychoanalysis several years ago. Friends of Dr. Jung said that he had been here about a month and that he had kept his identity from becoming public because he wanted a rest.

*

Anything a McCormick, particularly a Rockefeller McCormick, did caught the reportorial eye. In March 1925, Fowler McCormick began working as a day laborer in the Milwaukee plant of his family's International Harvester Company. He was starting on the ground floor in order to learn the business to which he would fall heir, and this program had been suggested to him by Mrs. James A. Stillman, the mother of his friend James A. Stillman, Jr. When she visited him in Milwaukee on March 25, the *New York Times* took note, adding that he was "one of the best swingers of the 200-pound pig-iron ingots in the plant." This industrial apprenticeship lasted about four months. The Milwaukee *Journal* carried a page-one story on July 18, 1925, announcing that "shortly after August 1 the young millionaire will sail for Africa with an expedition headed by Dr. Carl G. Jung. The party will include a group of British scientists." The *Journal* went on to state that "Dr. Jung, a disciple of Freud, is called the father of psychoanalysis. When he visited America last January, Mr. McCormick accompanied him on a trip through New Mexico, Arizona, and other southwestern states. They spent much time studying early pueblo civilization and the ruins of the cliff dwellers. Dr. Jung wrote a book on the results of his discoveries."

"'I look forward to my trip to Africa with the keenest expectations,' said Mr. McCormick. 'There is much to be learned by studying the so-called lower races. I feel sure that the scientific knowledge gained will more than recompense us for the hardships we may have to endure.'" In the event, Fowler McCormick withdrew from the

African expedition at the last moment. On *his* advice, Mrs. Stillman went to Europe and worked analytically with Jung and with H. G. Baynes. "My life was smashed like broken crockery," Mrs. Stillman said in an interview later. "Then Baynes and Jung took me in hand and taught me the real meaning of life." In June 1931, "Fifi" Stillman was divorced from her husband and married to Fowler McCormick.[37]

*

The name of George F. Porter runs through the documents of this American visit of Jung's, and it is a name quite unknown today. Barbara Hannah mentions him briefly. "The second member of the party was George Porter who had often been to Zürich and whom Jung valued highly. When he died some years later, Jung was much distressed and said that if he had only known about George Porter's difficulties he would have gone to America at once to do all he could to help him."[38] It was Porter, indeed, who had invited Jung, financed the whole trip, and made all the arrangements.[39]

George French Porter was born in 1881, scion of a prominent Chicago family. His father had built the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad and Dearborn Station. Young Porter (Yale, 1903) was a businessman, an art collector, a philanthropist, a leading supporter of Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party in 1912. During the World War he was a captain in the Army. Before 1925, he had traveled to Zürich to consult Jung, and he was also at various times a patient of Dr. William Alanson White in Washington. ("Melancholia," the Chicago *Tribune* said.) Several years before Jung's visit, Porter had fallen in love with a young Frenchwoman, Mima de Manziarly, who was a student at the University of Wisconsin, in Madison. Her mother, Mme. Irma de Manziarly, in Paris, was a leading member of the Theosophical Society and, since 1920, had been a close friend of Krishnamurti; she had brought Mima, two younger daughters, and a son into the Theosophical movement. In autumn 1924, Mima left the Middle West and George Porter for India, to join her family at the Theosophical world center, at Adyar (near Madras), where in November others including Annie Besant

and Krishnamurti arrived. Early in 1925, Mme. de Manziarly and her daughters went up to the hill station of Ootacamund with Krishnamurti's brother Nitya, who was ill with tuberculosis. (Later, Krishnamurti took Nitya back to their house at Ojai, California, where Nitya died on Nov. 13, 1925.)[40] George Porter followed Mima to India during the spring of 1925, and in due course he cabled the Chicago *Tribune* the news of their marriage, at Ootacamund on June 3. The Porters made a leisurely return journey to the United States, stopping in Zürich to see Jung. After they had settled down in Chicago, Porter wrote to William Alanson White:[41]

December 16, 1925

Dear Dr. White:

My wife and I got home from Europe in early October....

We saw Dr. Jung in Zurich in July and a little later in England. He was preparing for his trip to Africa, where he now is. He expected to return to Zurich about the middle of February or the 1st of March.

Those closest to him agree in feeling strongly that he is at the end of one period of his development, and that about his future there is uncertainty. I understand that he did not give any definite assurance that he would take up the work with his patients again on his return, but of this I am not positive.

Some of us in America feel that there is a chance that, if invited on a worthwhile mission, he would come again to America. We want him to have this opportunity.

The University of Chicago stands ready to invite him to give a series of lectures there at almost any date agreeable to him. Friends in the East are making inquiries at some of the big eastern centers.

Would you care to consider inviting him to lecture at St. Elizabeth's? My thought is to have these invitations awaiting him on his return from Africa — that this may be the moment to strike when the iron is hottest.

I realize there may be many complications, and I am considering this letter and anything you may write as confidential....

Dr. White replied, in part:[42]

December 18th, 1925

My dear Mr. Porter:

. . . In re Dr. Jung, I do not know just exactly what you mean by his being at the end of one period of his development, except of course, as you state it in that very general way. I shall of course be very glad to have him come to Saint Elizabeths and talk to our Staff, but as you realize the Hospital has no funds with which to reimburse him for such an enterprise. Aside from that matter, you may be sure that we will be

very glad to have him and if you will consider that an invitation you may so use it.

We are getting on here very nicely and will be very very glad indeed to see you when you come on. In the meantime please accept our very best wishes for the holiday season....

Jung never gave the proposed lectures. And, indeed, he did not return to the United States until fall 1936, when he attended the Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Sciences and later gave a seminar at Bailey Island, Maine.

Mrs. Porter, with her sister Yolande, opened a Theosophical book shop, called "Aquarius," in Chicago, and during September 1926 the Porters and Yolande were involved with a convention of Theosophists in Chicago, attended by Mrs. Besant and Krishnamurti. On the way to a meeting, George Porter suffered a neck injury in an auto accident, and he went for treatment to the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, and also to Dr. White in Washington. In February 1927, he and his wife made plans for a trip to Zürich so that he could consult Jung. But on February 24, Porter put a bullet into his head. The *Tribune* gave the tragedy a banner headline on its front page and published the text of Porter's suicide notes to his wife and to their close friend Ruth Hanna McCormick, widow of Senator McCormick.[43] He left most of his estate to his widow and large bequests to Yale, the University of Chicago, the Chicago Art Institute, etc. "Dr. Carl Jung, famous psycho-analyst of Switzerland, of whom Mr. Porter spoke as 'my dear friend,' was given a personal bequest of $20,000."[44] Mrs. Porter later built a house at Ojai, where she has lived ever since,[45] though she drifted away from Krishnamurti and from the Theosophical movement. She is a trustee, and Yolande de Manziarly is librarian and teacher of music, at a pioneering educational institution, the World University in Ojai.

1 *Memories, Dreams, Reflections,* New York ed., p. 247.
2 Jung's previous visit to the U.S. had been in March and April 1913. See *The Freud/Jung Letters,* 350 J.
3 "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man" (1928), *CW 10,* 184; "On Psychic Energy" (1928), *CW 8,* 86; "Commentary on 'The Secret of the Golden Flower'" (1929), *CW 13,* 31; "The Complications of American Psychology" (1930), *CW 10,* 978; "Archaic Man" (1931), *CW 10,* 125, 132; "Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology" (1931), *CW 8,* 669; "Brother Klaus" (1933), *CW 11,* 474; "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious" (1934), *CW 9, i,* 48;

"Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy" (1935), *CW 12,* 171; "The Tavistock Lectures" (1935), *CW 18,* 16, 271; "Psychological Typology" (1936), *CW 6,* 963; "The Symbolic Life" (1939), *CW 18,* 629, 688; "After the Catastrophe" (1945), *CW 10,* 431; *Symbols of Transformation* (orig. of the revision, where these passages first appeared, 1952), 480, 501, n. 34; "Symbols and the Interpretation of Dreams" (1961), *CW 18,* 567.

4 Subtitled "Extract from an Unpublished MS." when published in 1961.

5 e.g., "1924-25, field study of the Pueblo Indians," in Gerhard Wehr, *Portrait of Jung: An Illustrated Biography* (New York, 1971; orig. 1969), p. 169.

6 *Jung, His Life and Work, A Biographical Memoir* (New York, 1976), pp. 158 ff.

7 New York *Herald-Tribune,* Dec. 23, 1924, p. 9.

8 For Jung's first meeting with H. F. McCormick, in 1909, see *The Freud/Jung Letters,* 150 F, 151 J. In March 1910, Jung made a hurried trip to the U.S. expressly to treat him, in Chicago; ibid., p. 301.

9 *Official Guide of the Railways . . . of the United States . . . ,* 1925.

10 Typewritten letter, in the papers of William Alanson White, M.D., National Archives, Washington, D.C. (I am indebted to Arcangelo D'Amore, M.D., for bringing this correspondence to my attention.) White (1870-1937), who had met Jung in Europe in 1907, allowed him to analyze Negro patients at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, of which he was superintendent, in 1912. See *The Freud/Jung Letters,* pp. 513 and 516, n. 3.

11 Handwritten letter, courtesy of the Frances Gillispie Wickes Estate and of Mr. Franz Jung. Incidentally, Jung and Frances Wickes had first met in Zürich in winter 1923, according to her book *The Inner World of Childhood* (rev. ed., New York, 1966), p. xi.

12 See Jung's letter to her, 20 May 1940, in *Letters,* ed. G. Adler, Vol. 1 (1973). Her son, Chauncey S. Goodrich, professor of Chinese at the University of California in Santa Barbara, also has Jungian interests.

13 L. Eliot, "Concerning Jung's Influence in California," in Michael Fordham, ed., *Contact with Jung* (London, 1963), p. 208.

14 *Rand McNally Auto Road Atlas of the United States* (Chicago), 1926 ed.

15 "Introduction: Life of Jaime de Angulo," in Olmsted's *Achumawi Dictionary* (Berkeley, 1965), 1-4. De Angulo was a scholar not only of Achumawi but of at least ten other Indian languages.

16 M. D. Luhan, *Lorenzo in Taos* (New York, 1932), pp. 138 and 141-145 (de Angulo, at Mill Valley, talked to Mabel about the collective unconscious, the anima, the *I Ching);* 271, 277-281 (Mabel was working that winter with her psychoanalyst, A. A. Brill, in New York City).

17 H. T. Moore, *The Intelligent Heart: The Story of D. H. Lawrence* (rev. ed., New York, 1964), pp. 413, 419.

18 From a letter of Dec. 7, 1960, in Rolfe's unpublished MS., *Encounter with Jung,* and, together with the quotation in the next sentence, quoted with Mr. Rolfe's kind permission.

19 *Journal of Analytical Psychology* XIII:1 (Jan. 1968), p. 68.

20 E. C. Parsons, *Taos Pueblo* (General Series in Anthropology, 2; Menasha, Wisc., 1936), p. 29 and passim.

21 *Letters,* ed. G. Adler, Vol. 1.

22 Handwritten letter, unpublished, courtesy of the Wickes Estate and Franz Jung.

23 "On Psychic Energy," *CW 8,* 86.

24 *Symbols of Transformation, CW 5,* 480.

25 Handwritten letter, courtesy of the Wickes Estate and Franz Jung. Two persons whom Jung names can be identified with fair certainty. Lay is probably Wilfred Lay (1872-1955), teacher and writer on psychology, who learned Chinese in order to read the *I Ching.* See Jung's letter to him, Apr. 20, 1946, in *Letters,* Vol. 1. Mrs. Zinno is surely Henri Fink Zinno, Cary F. Baynes' sister, who lived in Zürich during the 1920's and 1930's and attended Jung's Seminars.

26 *Letters,* 2 (1975), xxxiii.

27 *CW 2,* 174.

28 Handwritten letter in the Jelliffe papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Published by courtesy of Franz Jung.
29 See N. D. C. Lewis' chapter of Jelliffe in *Psychoanalytic Pioneers* (New York, 1966), edited by F. Alexander, S. Eisenstein, and M. Grotjahn, pp. 224-233. Incidentally, Jelliffe was Mable Dodge's psychoanalyst before A. A. Brill took her over.
30 I am indebted to Arcangelo D'Amore, M.D., for access to a copy of this letter.
31 Carbon copy of typewritten letter in the Jelliffe papers, Library of Congress. This and the foregoing quotation published by courtesy of Carel Goldschmidt, Trustee for the Smith Ely Jelliffe Estate.
32 William L. Jelliffe, who died Jan. 21, 1925, in New York of an accidental pistol-shot wound. A graduate of Yale 1923, he was then a medical student at Columbia. (*New York Times*, Jan. 22, 1925, p. 1.)
33 Handwritten letter in the Jelliffe papers, Library of Congress. Published by courtesy of Franz Jung.
34 *New York Times,* Feb. 26, 1925, p. 1. Twenty years later, on Sept. 24, 1945, Jung wrote to an American friend: "It is now 35 years [sic] since I was once in the Senate in Washington with the late Medill McCormick. There on the steps of the Capitol I told him that the U.S. were on the march to the domination of the Pacific and to the Imperium Americanum." (Published by courtesy of Franz Jung.) The "35 years" has to be a slip; McCormick did not enter the Senate until 1919, and during the two previous years was in the House.
35 First published in *Quadrant* (New York), Winter 1975 and reprinted in W. McGuire and R. F. C. Hull, eds., *C. G. Jung Speaking* (Princeton, 1977), pp. 30-31. Kristine Mann, M.D. (1873-1945), was a founder of the Analytical Psychology Club of New York and of its library, now named in memory of her. See *Letters,* ed. Adler, Vol. 1, p. 357.
36 Handwritten letter, courtesy of the Wickes Estate and Franz Jung.
37 *New York Times,* Mar. 26, 1925, p. 25; June 6 and 7, 1931, both p. 1. Ironically, when McCormick (Princeton 1921) died in 1973, the *Princeton Alumni Weekly* (Feb. 20, 1973, p. 16) added its bit of error to the chronicle of Jung's travels: "McCormick's special interest was in study with Dr. Carl Jung, the Swiss psychoanalyst, with whom he made a trip to Africa to study the problems of the black man, following a year's study among American Blacks."
38 Hannah, p. 158.
39 Private communication from Mrs. George F. Porter, May 19, 1976.
40 M. Lutyens, *Krishnamurti: The Awakening Years* (London, 1975), pp. 111, 196-8, 219.
41 Typewritten letter, in the White papers, National Archives (see above, n. 10). Quoted with Mrs. Porter's kind permission.
42 Carbon copy of typewritten letter in the White papers.
43 Chicago *Tribune,* Feb. 24, 1927, p. 1 (I am indebted to Mrs. Linda Peterson and to Dr. Richard S. Peterson, formerly of the Newberry Library, for research on George F. Porter and Fowler McCormick.)
44 New York *Herald-Tribune,* March 4, 1927, p. 4. According to Mr. Franz Jung (private communication), the bequest proved to be mining stock of slight value.
45 Lutyens, p. 243.

# THE IMITATION OF JUNG
## AN EXPLORATION OF THE MEANING OF "JUNGIAN"

JAMES YANDELL
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What "Jungian" means can be troublesome for those who identify themselves professionally and publicly with Jung's psychology. People who seek "Jungian analysis" may have a fairly specific commodity in mind. They often come with rather definite expectations of the analyst, of the therapeutic procedures to be followed, of areas of inquiry that are proper and not proper, and of the benefits to ensue. For their part, they are ready to conform to their image of a good Jungian patient — that is, to focus on intrapsychic processes and to feel inferior when they can't remember their dreams. They may read Jungian books and attempt to exemplify the generalizations on the pages, setting aside their own experience as an unworthy aberration. It is as if the script for the analytic drama already exists, and it remains merely for analyst and patient to play out their parts. In the context of such a model, both actors may experience their individuality as an intrusive distraction from the faithful performance of the prescribed drama, and anxiously wonder, "Am I doing what I'm *supposed* to do? Is this what is *supposed* to be happening?" The idea that perhaps there isn't any "supposed to," if it comes up, is likely to produce more anxiety and disappointment than relief; one wants to feel the security of knowing he is on the right path. When developing realities do not match the preconceived script, the patient may feel cheated — the assumed

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contract has been violated — and the analyst may wonder where he failed.

The meaning of "Jungian" becomes a problem in other contexts also. Audiences at a Jungian lecture are likely to have come for the purpose of receiving Jung's thought, condensed and made understandable. The speaker is primarily an instrument, a means to this end, and only incidentally someone of interest in his own right. In relation to such audiences, public education committees must decide which speakers and subjects they may appropriately present to the world in the name of Jung — or in the name of a C. G. Jung Institute — and which not.

An eclectically trained young psychotherapist considering application to an analytic training center may ask himself questions like, "Do I really want to become a Jungian?" with its corollary, "What degree of conformity and orthodoxy will be required of me, and how will that relate to my own individual and professional development?" A newly credentialed analyst is likely to feel uneasy, wondering, "Am I the real thing, or an impostor? Am I Jungian enough for my membership to be legitimate? If my elders really knew how I think and work, would they still have made me an analyst?"

In many areas, then, the definition of "Jungian" becomes an issue. Our individual definitions often exist at the level of relatively unconscious assumptions. They may burst into consciousness in the form of outraged reactions when something is presented as Jungian and it is clear to us that it is nothing of the sort, or when a subject that we would consider an essential part of the Jungian foundation has casually been left out of the training curriculum.

As long as Jung was alive, he was not only the model but the final arbiter of what was Jungian. He might not have been very interested in such questions, but his presence at least set a limit to the possibility of definition by others. However, with Jung gone, survived by his writings and his followers, one can caricature two opposite possibilities in the evolution of analytical psychology. The conservative trend would be to close the frontiers, turn the *Collected Works* into a body of dogma, and build a fortress-church of Jung to be defended against deviation and heresy. The opposite direction

might be to invoke the spirit of Jung as authority for all deep and 'far-out' exploration, so that one can say about his current interest, "This represents the natural extension of Jung's work, and if he were alive today he would undoubtedly be as fascinated as I am by ...." Neither of these meanings of "Jungian" seems acceptable. The first is chillingly narrow, and the second so wide-open as to be meaningless. As always, neither pole gives us the solution, but the extremes do define the dimension of conflict.

All the formulations I have presented above contain an implicit opposition between being "a Jungian" and being one's self. From this point of view, there exists a body of Jungian thought and practice, and one is "Jungian" to the extent that he identifies with it, internalizes it, and adheres to it. His individual uniqueness and his impulse to develop in his own natural direction are subordinated to the value of making himself an effective instrument for the learning and application of Jung's psychology. One goes to a scientific or professional school, after all, not to realize and fulfill himself but to acquire the knowledge of his field and become a competent practitioner of it. But although this kind of view makes sense in many areas of human activity, it leads us into a very strange position when applied to being a Jungian. If there is one highest value in Jung's teaching, it is the value placed on becoming oneself. In this sense, the whole of Jung's life and work constitutes an affirmation and demonstration of the individuation process. And do we now really mean to propose that being a Jungian requires subordination of one's own process to Jung's? We would then be using Jung as an authority to affirm the opposite of his own deepest value.

On the other hand, does being a Jungian mean merely being oneself and doing one's 'own thing'? There are many people in the world doing that who perhaps have never heard of Jung. They are not Jungians in any conventional sense. But are they in some other sense? Perhaps those self-realizing individuals are the truest Jungians, and we gathered here in our community are their inferiors, collective and conformist. Perhaps the very idea of a Jungian community is a contradiction in terms — as Nikita Khruschev used to say, like fried snowballs. There is ample evidence that Jung himself

could never decide whether a Jungian collective was possible or desirable, and that he carried his ambivalence about it to his death. Jung is reported to have exclaimed, "Thank God I'm Jung, and not a Jungian!" We are accustomed to laugh at this, but it carries a serious message: Jung could not have been a Jungian; he was too independent and original. If we, on the other hand, *are* capable of being Jungians, what does that say about us?

## *Jung as a Freudian*

In our exploration of what it means to us to be Jungians, it can be useful to look at Jung's experience during the period of his life — 1906 to 1913 — in which he was a Freudian, or at least a psychoanalyst. The polarization that has developed since 1913 has obscured the extent to which Jung and Freud were allies and collaborators. The two men had few face-to-face conversations, and their interaction took place almost entirely through correspondence. Thus the publication of their letters[1] has given us remarkably complete access to the relationship. The letters can profitably be studied from various perspectives, but most relevant for us is what it was like for Jung to affiliate himself with Freud.

From this perspective, two major questions run through the letters. The first is the nature of the relationship: to what extent is it symmetrical, a partnership of equals, scientific collaborators, friends; and to what extent is it asymmetrical, an association of father and son, king and prince, leader and disciple, teacher and pupil? The second and corollary question is: to what extent can the relationship accommodate their differences in background and personality, taste and values, philosophic orientation, and scientific opinion—in short, the individuality of the two men? These questions, implicit in the earliest letters, are sharpened and forced into explicitness through the interaction over time. It is on these issues that the relationship finally breaks.

Freud was Jung's senior by nineteen years, already established as the founder and leader of psychoanalysis when in 1900 he first came to the attention of the twenty-five-year-old Jung, who had just com-

pleted his medical studies and begun his psychiatric career as assistant physician at the Burghölzli. In their early relationship, beginning in 1906, Freud was in Jung's eyes an original genius, and a worthy leader and collaborator in the new world of depth psychology. But he was also a father toward whom Jung could feel admiration, allegiance, and identification — elements painfully lacking in his relationship to his own father.

Some of Jung's early letters are almost embarrassing in their adulation. He refers to "my unconditional devotion to the defence and propagation of your ideas, as well as my equally unconditional veneration of your personality . . ." (39J, 19 Aug. 1907).[2] Jung was himself alarmed at the strength of his feeling for Freud and was fearful of its being reciprocated. After they had been corresponding for a year, Freud was already complaining of the infrequency of Jung's letters relative to his own eagerness for communication — a grievance that was to continue throughout the years of their writing. At this point, Jung seeks to explain to Freud his "laziness in writing":

> One reason is my work load, which hardly gives me a breather even in the evenings; the other is to be found in the realm of affect, in what you have termed my "self-preservation complex"....Actually — and I confess this to you with a struggle — I have a boundless admiration for you both as a man and a researcher, and I bear you no conscious grudge. So the self-preservation complex does not come from there; it is rather that my veneration for you has something of the character of a "religious" crush. Though it does not really bother me, I still feel it is disgusting and ridiculous because of its undeniable erotic undertone. This abominable feeling comes from the fact that as a boy I was the victim of a sexual assault by a man I once worshiped. . . .
>
> This feeling, which I still have not quite got rid of, hampers me considerably. Another manifestation of it is that I find psychological insight makes relations with colleagues who have a strong transference to me downright disgusting. *I therefore fear your confidence.* I also fear the same reaction from you when I speak of my intimate affairs. Consequently, I skirt round such things as much as possible, for, to my feeling at any rate, every intimate relationship turns out after a while to be sentimental and banal or exhibitionistic. . . .
>
> I think I owe you this explanation. I would rather not have said it (49J, 28 Oct. 1907).

In many of his letters Jung can be seen struggling with this conflict over intimacy, trying to find the right distance that will allow him to enjoy the satisfactions of affection and collaboration without feeling overwhelmed either by the homosexual implication or by the power of Freud's age, position, and authority. At one point Jung sees the father-son model as guaranteeing mutual affection, harmony, and freedom from conflict and competition, and he implores Freud

> to let me enjoy your friendship not as one between equals but as that of father and son. This distance appears to me fitting and natural. Moreover it alone, so it seems to me, strikes a note that would prevent misunderstandings and enable two hard-headed people to exist alongside one another in an easy and unstrained relationship (72J, 20 Feb. 1908).

However, only a year later, after one of their rare meetings (the one in Vienna where the 'spookery' occurred in the form of noises from the bookcase) Jung wrote a rather unfeeling letter containing the statement:

> The last evening with you has, most happily, freed me inwardly from the oppressive sense of your paternal authority. My unconscious celebrated this impression with a great dream which has preoccupied me for some days and which I have just finished analysing. [He does not share the dream with Freud.] I hope I am now rid of all unnecessary encumbrances... (138J, 2 April 1909).

Understandably, Freud was deeply hurt by this, and responded:

> It is strange that on the very same evening when I formally adopted you as eldest son and anointed you . . . as my successor and crown prince, you should have divested me of my paternal dignity, which divesting seems to have given you as much pleasure as I, on the contrary, derived from the investiture of your person . . . (139F, 16 April 1909).

Jung made many references to his "father-complex." By February 1910, Jung was habitually guilty over not writing more often. In this letter he complains of over-work and then says:

> Otherwise I am in good shape and still have resistances to writing you at the right time. . . . The reason for the resistance is my father-complex, my inability to come up to expectations (one's own work is garbage, says the devil) . . . (180J, 20 Feb. 1910).

This convoluted formulation of Jung's "father-complex" is curious and important. The "inability to come up to expectations" expresses

Jung's ambivalence over the honor and the restrictive burden of being cast as Freud's crown prince and heir, the executive leader of the psychoanalytic movement and thus also Freud's instrument and agent. But it also expresses Jung's own anxiety over achievement, half-projected onto Freud as the judging father. The parenthesis "one's own work is garbage, says the devil" presents in a succinct aphorism the insight that excessive self-criticism, paralyzing if taken at face value and succumbed to, must be recognized as a temptation by the inner enemy and withstood as such.

The letters of this period derive from Jung's conflicted evaluation of his own developing work and emerging individuality. On the one hand, he wished to retain Freud's favor and his eminence in the psychoanalytic movement. On the other, as he ventured more deeply into religion and mythology, he experienced vast new visions and conceptions that both excited and frightened him. As he struggled toward his own identity, his own ideas, and his own expression, he anticipated that Freud would disparage and reject his discoveries. To some extent, this was realistic. In his attitude toward people other than Jung, Freud had shown a capacity to be dogmatic and intolerant of individual deviation. But there had been little of this in the correspondence; on the contrary, when Jung risked sharing his emerging ideas with Freud, Freud consistently approved and encouraged his explorations.

Yet despite Freud's patient friendliness, it seemed necessary for Jung to experience him as the oppressive, tyrannical father and to insist that he disapproved even when he didn't. Jung's casting of Freud in the role of the oppressor was largely projection, a by-product of Jung's own guilt, anxiety, and confusion over his emerging individuality.

Emma Jung came to share her husband's view, though reluctantly. In November 1911 she wrote to Freud without Jung's knowledge because of her uneasiness over the distance that she saw developing betwen the two men. She sought to gain Freud's acceptance for the necessity of Jung's self-realization:

> You may imagine how overjoyed and honoured I am by the confidence you have in Carl, but it almost seems to me as though you were some-

> times giving too much — do you not see in him the follower and fulfiller more than you need? Doesn't one often give much because one wants to keep much? . . . And do not think of Carl with a father's feeling: "He will grow, but I must dwindle," but rather as one human being thinks of another, who like you has his own law to fulfill (6 Nov. 1911, p. 456).

Here she joins in her husband's emphasis on Freud's attitude as the key to their relationship, and in effect asks Freud's permission for Jung to be himself.

Only a week later she saw things differently. Jung had published Part I of *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* and Emma was disturbed that during a visit by Freud it had not even been discussed; she found this avoidance ominous. Jung was now at work on Part II, which was to be much more divergent from Freud's thought. And he was feeling dread at the prospect of Freud's disapproval, so much so that at times he simply could not work on it. In this context, Emma again wrote to Freud:

> After I had thought so long before writing to you and had, so I believed, fully understood my own motives, the unconscious has now played another trick on me. . . . I must confess that I have missed the mark. . . . Lately Carl has been analysing his attitude to his work and has discovered some resistances to it. I had connected these misgivings about Part II with his constant worry over what you would say about it, etc. It seemed out of the question that he could have resistances to his own work; but now it appears that this fear of your opinion was only a pretext for not going on with the self-analysis which this work in fact means. I realize that I have thus projected something from my immediate neighborhood into distant Vienna and am vexed that it is always the nearest thing that one sees worst (14 Nov. 1911, p. 462).

Here, at least, Emma suggests that the apprehension over Freud's disapproval had been a red herring, a screen for the deeper problem of Carl's anxiety over following his own path and living out his own fate through creative and original work.

Jung apparently did not share Emma's insight, however, and continued to define the issue between him and Freud as one of conformity, submission, and deviation. In a letter in March 1912 he invoked support from Nietzsche for a new and powerful formulation of discipleship that is of great interest to us here. Again Jung is justifying his not having written:

I have not kept up a lively correspondence during these last weeks because I wanted if possible to write *no letters at all,* simply in order to gain time for my work and not in order to give *you* a demonstration of ostentatious neglect. Or can it be that you mistrust me? Experience has shown how groundless this is. Of course I have opinions which are not yours about the ultimate truths of psychoanalysis — though even this is not certain, for one cannot discuss everything under the sun by letter — but you won't, I suppose, take umbrage on that account. I am ready at any time to adapt my opinions to the judgment of someone who knows better, and always have been. I would never have sided with you in the first place had not heresy run in my blood. Since I have no professorial ambitions I can afford to admit mistakes. Let Zarathustra speak for me:

"One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil.
And why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels?
You respect me; but how if one day your respect should tumble?

Take care that a falling statue does not strike you dead!

You had not yet sought yourselves when you found me.
Thus do all believers —.
Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves;
and only when you have all denied me will I return to you."

This is what you have taught me through psychoanalysis. As one who is truly your follower, I must be stout-hearted, not least towards you.
With kindest regards,

Most sincerely yours, JUNG
(303J, 3 March 1912)

Jung has here introduced a whole new dimension to discipleship, one that we will see developed more fully later in his discussions of the imitation of Christ. While he professes himself always ready to "adapt my opinions to the judgment of someone who knows better," he places deviation at the very foundation of his association with Freud: "I would never have sided with you in the first place had not heresy run in my blood."

He then proceeds, by implication, into a radically new definition of true discipleship. The master Zarathustra scorns those who remain nothing but pupils; they are warned that they may be destroyed by the weight of their own submissiveness. In "You had not yet sought yourselves when you found me," there is the suggestion that veneration of the master is an escape from the burden of individua-

tion — one clings to the master to avoid having to seek oneself. Zarathustra's prescription for genuine disciples is "lose me and find yourselves"; only this apparent rejection will be rewarded by the return of the master. A paraphrase might be: "Do not remain forever a child! Grow up and demonstrate your manhood by rebellion!" Or: "If you meet the Buddha on the road, kill him!"

Jung thus turns the conventional, first-level meaning of being a follower upside down. Through Zarathustra, he proclaims virtuous obedience to be contemptible cowardice, and apparent rebellion to be true emulation of the master. And to top it off, he gives Freud the credit for this inversion.

Joseph Wheelwright, in speaking about the letters, has expressed the view that Freud seems to feel genuine affection for Jung, while Jung's expressions, whether of adulation or of anger, have more the quality of transference reactions to a projected figure. Jung's outbursts seem out of proportion to the provocations. Freud, while dogmatic and rigid in his identification with the sexual theory of libido, and sometimes patronizing, is surprisingly calm and forbearing in responding to Jung's growing belligerence. Yet it appears that Jung felt increasingly that the price of preserving the relationship would have to be his acceptance of a permanently inferior position, and the sacrifice of his autonomy and freedom of thought. Conversely, the price of becoming himself would be to lose Freud and to lose his status in the psychoanalytic world.

Looking back, it does seem that the major determinant of the course of their relationship was Freud's attitude toward Jung *as Jung experienced it.* The emphasis must be placed, not on what Jung thought of Freud's ideas, but on what Freud thought of Jung's *(Letters,* I, p. 154). Even when acknowledging his debt to Freud, he shows resentment over Freud's view of him (*Letters,* II, p. 359), and even on occasion denies his psychoanalytic background *(Letters,* I, p. 122f). We can conclude from this survey of Jung's psychoanalytic years that he was a poor follower, unable to accept the authority of a superior who did not value his needs and sensitivities and to remain content in a subordinate status.

Even if Freud had been able to treat him as an equal, it is doubtful that Jung could have sustained the relationship of collaborator. It was necessary for him to go the way he did — separation, isolation, and ultimately a position of centrality and dominance in his own world. He himself was a natural leader though he later showed himself to be ambivalent over having followers. As he could not endure being a Freudian, he never could have made it as a Jungian.

## *The Queer Old Man in the Cave*

I want now to tell you a brief story. It is an instructional story, invented to make a point.

> There was once a queer old man who lived in a cave, where he had sought refuge from the noise of the villages. He was reputed to be a sorcerer, and therefore he had disciples who hoped to learn the art of sorcery from him. But he himself was not thinking of any such thing. He was only seeking to know what it was that he did not know, but which, he felt certain, was always happening. After meditating for a very long time on that which is beyond meditation, he saw no other way of escape from his predicament than to take a piece of red chalk and draw all kinds of diagrams on the walls of his cave, in order to find out what that which he did not know might look like. After many attempts he hit on the circle. "That's right," he felt, "and now for a quadrangle inside it!"—which made it better still. His disciples were curious; but all they could make out was that the old man was up to something, and they would have given anything to know what he was doing. But when they asked him: "What are you doing there?" he made no reply. Then they discovered the diagrams on the wall and said: "That's it!"—and they all imitated the diagrams. But in so doing they turned the whole process upside down, without noticing it: they anticipated the result in the hope of making the process repeat itself which had led to that result. This is how it happened then and how it still happens today.

The story is one that Jung made up. It appears in the essay "Concerning Rebirth" *(CW9, i,* 233) which was developed from a talk Jung gave at the Eranos Conference of 1939. In the essay a number of alternative means of psychological transformation are described, and then follows the account of the old man in the cave. In the context of the essay, the story is offered to illustrate how such a collective religious device as a mandala could have come into exis-

tence. First, it emerges out of the unconscious of an individual as the product of his need and struggle to formulate what it is that he does not know but is always happening. Then it is picked up by his followers who did not themselves have his experience. If we extend the implication, it is then codified, collectivized, and integrated into the established culture of the group. It finally becomes a device used systematically, as an object of meditation, for the purpose of inducing transformation.

However, the story of the old man in the cave does not make the point that Jung consciously intended, judging his intent from the context and from his later reference to this "fairy story" as a "parable on the mandala" *(Letters,* I, p. 311). Although it would not be difficult to devise a story demonstrating how the diligent practice of meditation or other spiritual discipline can produce beneficial psychological change, Jung's example seems to make just the opposite point.

Let's return to the story. The central figure is the old man, who is in a deeply introverted state. He has "sought refuge from the noise of the villages" and has adopted a hermit's existence, withdrawn into a cave. Here he is doing nothing very grand. The key sentence is, "He was only seeking to know what it was that he did not know, but which, he felt certain, was always happening." He has a sense of things going on, "always happening," in the unconscious, and his effort is to know that which he does not know, to make the unconscious conscious. Not in any final way, it would seem; rather, this is an ongoing, endless process.

It occurs to him as a desperate last resort ("he saw no other way of escape from his predicament") to scribble pictures. The intent is "to find out what that which he did not know might look like"—if he can't know the unknowable in any rational or verbal way, perhaps he can at least get an image of it. The circle comes to him, not instantly but with difficulty, "after many attempts." He immediately knows he has something, and how to proceed. " 'That's right,' he felt, 'and now for a quadrangle inside it!'—which made it better still." He has found at least a partial solution to his predicament. There is excitement, pleasurable relief, and even contentment in this

outcome to the old man's long and arduous grouping. The whole process strikes one as necessary, courageous, admirable, and valid.

But what of the so-called disciples? The validity of their process is a very different matter. Their presence in the first place is based on unworthy motives and on a misunderstanding of who the old man is and what he is doing. "He was reputed to be a sorcerer, and therefore he had disciples who hoped to learn the art of sorcery from him." These people are just fundamentally wrong-headed. They want to practice magic, and hope to use the old man as a source from which to learn tricks and acquire devilish power. The most generous thing the story can find to say about them is that they are curious.

When the old man has his breakthrough they misunderstand this as completely as they have misunderstood his previous activities. "Then they discovered the diagrams on the wall and said: 'That's it!' " The "it" is presumably the key to the sorcery they have been waiting to learn. What they do in their eagerness to gain the power for themselves is predictable: "and they all imitated the diagrams." That is, they do not go find themselves a cave, meditate on that which is beyond meditation, get connected with their own "always happening," and come up with their own pictures. Rather, they simply take over the old man's ready-made, as an attempted short-cut to enlightenment and magical power.

Jung concludes the story: "But in so doing [in imitating the diagrams] they turned the whole process upside down without noticing it: they anticipated the result in the hope of making the process repeat itself which had led to that result. This is how it happened then and how it still happens today." This is a different "it." Coming at the end, capping the story, this "it" seems to refer to the entire sequence of origination by a creative individual and misguided superficial copying by his followers. Jung calls the substitution of the copied result for the genuine creative process "upside down," and says it is done "in the hope of" replicating the process, implying that it is not successful. The copying of the diagrams by these would-be magicians is itself a piece of imitative magic of a naive and primitive kind.

If we disregard the setting of the story and Jung's apparent conscious intentions, what does the story itself convey? It presents a striking contrast between two kinds of people and processes. The old man displays great integrity and dedication to his own business. He accepts the task of coming to terms with his own "always happening" and trying to give it form and consciousness. He does not seek followers. When he achieves something, there is no doubt that it is valid and earned — he has 'paid his dues.'

In contrast, the disciples are models of non-integrity. They have no character or qualities of their own, except for greed and stupidity. They are collective, undistinguished as individuals. They have no respect for what the old man is actually doing, but impose their own wishful fantasy on his activities. Rather than tend to their own inner business as he tends to his, they violate themselves by focusing all their attention on him and aping his products. What they finally get from him is the most superficial thing possible — the byproduct of a process which is still closed to them. The joke is on them in a way they never could understand: there really is nothing to copy — nothing except the old man's process of "seeking to know what it was that he did not know, but which, he felt certain, was always happening." And they were not about to emulate that.

If the story contains a lesson, it would seem to be the emptiness and futility of this kind of misguided imitation. How are we to understand this discrepancy between what Jung intended to say — and from the reference in the subsequent letter believed he had said — and the direct impact of the story? Each of us can make his own interpretation. Mine is that Jung's underlying disdain for carbon-copy discipleship broke through and eclipsed his conscious objective. In truth, he was not a believer in the possibility of technical transformation. In an effort to be comprehensive in his treatment of various means of transformation, he tried to pay lip-service to the technical-imitative route, but his attempt did not work. He not only did not do it justice; he unwittingly produced a caricature that ridicules those who would betray and falsify their own process by copying another's.

There might even be some bitterness in the final sentence: "This is how it happened then and how it still happens today." But Jung was even more scathing toward disciples in a much earlier passage:

> But besides the possibility of becoming a prophet, there is another alluring joy, subtler and apparently more legitimate: the joy of becoming a prophet's disciple. . . . The disciple is unworthy; modestly he sits at the Master's feet and guards against having ideas of his own. Mental laziness becomes a virtue; one can at least bask in the sun of a semi-divine being. He can enjoy the archaism and infantilism of his unconscious fantasies without loss to himself, for all responsibility is laid at the Master's door. Through his deification of the Master, the disciple, apparently without noticing it, waxes in stature; moreover, does he not possess the great truth — not his own discovery, of course, but received straight from the Master's hands? Naturally the disciples always stick together, not out of love, but for the very understandable purpose of effortlessly confirming their own convictions by engendering an air of collective agreement *(CW7* 263).

So much for the disciples. But what about the Master? Has he not brought about the very condition that he condemns? An answer to this appears in the same essay containing the story of the old man. Jung's own values become more explicit: Nature itself forces the Master to become Master.

> There are natural transformation processes which simply happen to us, whether we like it or not, and whether we know it or not. [This is the sort of process in which the old man in the cave is engaged, unlike his followers.] These processes develop considerable psychic effects, which would be sufficient in themselves to make any thoughtful person ask himself what really happened to him. Like the old man in our fairy tale, he, too, will draw mandalas and seek shelter in their protective circle; in the perplexity and anguish of his self-chosen prison, which he had deemed a refuge, he is transformed into a being akin to the gods *(CW9, i,* 234).

From this lyrical, almost ecstatic affirmation of the old man's vocation there seems no question that this is where Jung's heart is. We can also safely conclude that he is writing about himself. At one level, the old man in the cave is Jung. He had gone through his own withdrawal from "the noise of the villages," his own effort to know what it was that he did not know but which is always happening, his own meditation on that which is beyond meditation,

and his own connection with symbols that healed and transformed. By the age of sixty-four, when the story was written, he also had gone through his own experience of being made an object of adulation and imitation by people who misunderstood his activities and misused his works. If the old man in the cave is Jung, who are the disciples? Let's hope they are not us.

## *Imitatio Christi*

Next to the Bible, the most widely read book in the Christian world is *The Imitation of Christ.* It is thought to have been written by a German monk called Thomas of Kempen, or Thomas a Kempis, and completed about 1427. The book has gone through literally thousands of editions and translations. It is a spiritual guide instructing the faithful in the practice of the simpler virtues like humility, piety, charity, and obedience.

*Imitatio Christi* was not merely the title of Thomas' book; it was a concept or principle, a criterion of proper Christian living. The book derived from this idea and was one expression of it; in turn, the book's popularity further promoted the idea and contributed to its universal acceptance. I am not adequate to the task of an historical presentation of this development, but it is my understanding that in the centuries following Thomas, no Christian could deny that this principle of *imitatio* was the best possible guide to his own life and spiritual development. The only question was, what did it mean? And about this there was considerable disagreement.

Differences in interpretation of the principle had to do with the form and level at which imitation was to be practiced. Did it mean, for example, wearing a beard, robe, and sandals? That would be the most shallow kind of imitation, a mere copying of surfaces. Did it mean meditating on the teachings of Jesus, and applying them to one's own life? Did it mean, in some sense, getting crucified? Or did it mean being as authentic in one's own living and dying as Christ was in his? These and other views competed and conflicted with one another, and still do. They apply not only to the imitation of Christ, but to the manner in which we emulate anyone whom we

consider a worthy model for ourselves and with whom we identify. These questions are involved in all relationships between charismatic leaders and their students, followers, or disciples. My chief purpose here is to explore their application to Jung and Jungians.

Jung referred to *imitatio Christi* repeatedly. His use of the idea turned its conventional meaning upside down. In place of the traditional advocacy of pious obedience and submission, Jung invoked the principle to denounce and ridicule superficial imitation as an escape from the burden of individuation. In 1932, in his essay "Psychotherapists or the Clergy," Jung wrote

> We Protestants must sooner or later face this question: Are we to understand the "imitation of Christ" in the sense that we should copy his life and, if I may use the expression, ape his stigmata; or in the deeper sense that we are to live our own proper lives as truly as he lived his in its individual uniqueness? It is no easy matter to live a life that is modelled on Christ's, but it is unspeakably harder to live one's own life, as truly as Christ lived his *(CW11,* 522).

Edward Edinger has commented on this statement of Jung's in his *Ego and Archetype:*

> Psychologically understood, the cross can be seen as Christ's destiny, his unique life pattern to be fulfilled. To take up one's own cross would mean to accept and consciously realize one's own particular brand of wholeness. The attempt to imitate Christ literally and specifically is a concretistic mistake in the understanding of a symbol. Seen symbolically, Christ's life will be a paradigm to be understood in the context of one's own unique reality and not as something to be slavishly imitated.[3]

Here one might 'misquote' Edinger and propose that "the attempt to imitate" *Jung* "literally and specifically is a concretistic mistake in the understanding of a symbol. Seen symbolically," *Jung's* "life will be a paradigm to be understood in the context of one's own reality and not as something to be slavishly imitated." My purpose in substituting "Jung" for "Christ" in Edinger's statement is not blasphemous — it is not intended to elevate Jung to divine status. It is rather to raise the question: when are imitation and discipleship "a concretistic mistake in the understanding of a symbol," and when are they not?

Twenty years after the passage quoted by Edinger, in 1952, at the age of 77, Jung was still invoking *imitatio Christi* in the same

sense, only more vehemently. A minister in Basel had written Jung and enclosed a sermon. He wrote a long, vigorous reply:

> Christ forces man into the impossible conflict. He took himself with exemplary seriousness and lived his life to the bitter end, regardless of human convention and in opposition to his own lawful tradition, as the worst heretic in the eyes of the Jews and a madman in the eyes of his family. But we? We imitate Christ and hope he will deliver us from our own fate. Like little lambs we follow the shepherd, naturally to good pastures. No talk at all of uniting our Above and Below! On the contrary, Christ and *his* cross deliver us from our conflict, which we simply leave alone. We are Pharisees, faithful to law and tradition, we flee heresy and are mindful only of the *imitatio Christi* but not of our own reality which is laid upon us, the union of opposites in ourselves, preferring to believe that Christ has already achieved this for us. Instead of bearing ourselves, i.e., our own cross, ourselves, we load Christ with our unresolved conflicts. We "place ourselves under *his* cross," but by golly not under our own. Anyone who does this is a heretic, self-redeemer, "psychoanalyst" and God knows what. The cross of Christ was *borne by himself* and was *his*. To put oneself under somebody else's cross, which has already been carried by him, is certainly easier than to carry your own cross amid the mockery and contempt of the world. That way you remain nicely ensconced in tradition and are praised as devout. This is well-organized Pharisaism and highly un-Christian. Whoever imitates Christ and has the cheek to want to take Christ's cross on himself when he can't even carry his own has in my view not yet learnt the ABC of the Christian message.
>
> Have your congregation understood that they must close their ears to the traditional teachings and go through the darknesses of their own souls and set aside everything in order to become that which every individual bears in himself as his individual task, and that no one can take this burden from him? We continually pray that "this cup may pass from us" and not harm us. Even Christ did so, but without success. Yet we use Christ to secure this success for ourselves. For all these reasons theology wants to know nothing of psychology, because through it we could discover our own cross. But we only want to talk of Christ's cross, and how splendidly his crucifixion has smoothed the way for us and solved our conflicts. We might also discover, among other things, that in every feature Christ's life is a prototype of individuation and hence cannot be imitated: *one can only live one's own life totally in the same way with all the consequences this entails.* This is hard and must therefore be prevented. How this is done is shown among other things by the following example. A devout professor of theology (i.e., a lamb of Christ) once publicly rebuked me for having said "in flagrant contradiction to the word of the Lord" that it is unethical to "*remain*" a

> child. The "Christian" ought to remain sitting on his father's knee and leave the odious task of individuation to dear little Jesus. Thus naively, but with unconscious design, the meaning of the gospel is subverted, and instead of catechizing ourselves on the meaning of Christ's life we prefer, in *ostensible* agreement with the word of the Lord, to remain infantile and not responsible for ourselves *(Letters,* II, p. 76).

It is provocative again to substitute "Jung" for "Christ." We are left with this thought: *Jung's* "life is a prototype of individuation and hence cannot be imitated: *one can only live one's own life totally in the same way with all the consequences this entails.*"

## *Jung and Jungians*

There is no shortage of evidence, written or anecdotal, indicating Jung's opposition to his ideas being turned into dogma and used as the basis for a movement or church. We are all familiar with his exclamation, "Thank God I am Jung and not a Jungian!" The following, written in 1946, is also frequently quoted:

> I can only hope and wish that no one becomes "Jungian." I stand for no doctrine, but describe facts and put forward certain views which I hold worthy of discussion. I criticize Freudian psychology for a certain narrowness and bias, and the Freudians for a certain rigid, sectarian spirit of intolerance and fanaticism. I proclaim no cut-and-dried doctrine and I abhor "blind adherents." I leave everyone free to deal with the facts in his own way, since I also claim this freedom for myself . . . . (*Letters,* I, p. 405).

A similar perspective is provided by Laurens van der Post:

> He did not like the idea of having disciples or blind followers, or even a school, and in his old age agreed most reluctantly to the establishment of the C. G. Jung Institute in Zürich for studies relevant to his own approach to psychology. Indeed, I remember him telling me that the Institute would be lucky if it did not outlive its creative uses within a generation.
>
> Above all, he had a profound horror of "isms," and the adjective "Jungian," which could so easily be a doorstep to "Jungianism," was ruled out in his own discipline of psychology. "I do not want anybody to be a Jungian," he told me. "I want people above all to be themselves. As for 'isms,' they are the viruses of our day, and responsible for greater disasters than any medieval plague or pest has ever been. Should I be found one day only to have created another 'ism,' then I will have failed in all I tried to do."[4]

Perhaps Jung's reluctance has been overstated. Certainly he had had his period of solitary groping in his own depths, his period of being the queer old man in the cave. But for the most part he behaved like a man who felt that he was making important discoveries that deserved to be studied and pursued by others. He is not known to have been self-effacing in discussion, or overly tolerant toward those who disagreed with him. On the contrary, if one were going to be around Jung for any length of time, I gather that it was much safer to be a "Jungian" than not.

On occasion Jung could even put in a good word for imitation, especially in regard to the education of the young. In a 1933 letter suggesting that it really wouldn't do people any harm to try to understand his books, he wrote:

> Moreover it is a law of fate that where there are teachers there must also be students. All learning was originally imitation and it is not always indolence on the part of the student if he renounces his individuality and effaces himself in favour of the *verbum magistri.* Were it not for these followers the voice of the teacher would be too weak to be heard above the hubbub of the crowd. Therefore many must repeat the bare word even though this repetition is not a new birth sprung from the heart. . . . To be a student in this sense is not a stigma, and no one has ever become a teacher without having been a student first.
>
> (*Letters,* I, p. 116 f.)

I have included this quotation, so different from most of the others, to represent both Jung's wholeness and practicality. Although as a therapist his highest value was the fostering of self-realization, as a teacher he could sometimes want the world to shut up and listen. So it should really be no surprise to find Jung writing to Father Victor White in 1947 (*Letters,* I, p. 481 f.), asking him to join the list of founding Patrons of the Institute of Analytical Psychology in Zürich which was "meant to carry on the work."

Although we may find in Jung support for whatever view we want to take of imitation, certainly the preponderance is in favor of individual integrity and authenticity. Or, to state it another way, he welcomed followers and collaborators, but despised imitators. A Berkeley psychoanalyst tells a story on himself that is pertinent. He was working with a difficult patient, an hysterical, manipulative

woman. One day she arrived late for her hour, rushed in breathlessly, and said, "I'm parked down on the street in an expired meter zone, and I don't have any change. Do you have a quarter?" The analyst reports that the first thought that came into his head was, "What would Fenichel do?"' Fenichel had been his analyst.

The story points up the extent to which our individual analysts remain models and authorities for us in our work. We have all worked with our invisible supervisors and our analysts looking over our shoulders, advising, approving, and criticizing. The modeling goes back through the generations; this psychoanalyst speculates that in a comparable dilemma Fenichel would have been thinking, "What would Freud do?"

In Doug Boyd's book *Swami* there is an illuminating account of the Indian conception of the guru-disciple relationship, which has relevance for us. Boyd is talking with Swami Kaivalyananda:

> "What is this word 'guru'?" I asked. "What is the meaning and the function of the guru?"
>
> He began with the words I had hoped to hear. He said, "Guru is the self within". . . . I hoped that the original meaning of the word — the ancient meaning, the meaning that was intended when the word was first formed — was the meaning that still prevailed in India in spite of the efforts of so many businessmen from India to misuse it in the West . . . .
>
> Swami Kaivalyananda continued: "Guru and discipleship, this is very ancient. Guru is the personification of truth for the disciple and therefore one who can confer realization of this truth upon a fitting disciple. A fitting disciple is one who has achieved the proper discipline and who has that particular relationship to this guru. Only a rare person can be called a guru, and only by his personal disciples, only by those few particular individuals with whom he has that intimate traditional relationship. No one is a guru for people in general. Even a true guru cannot be a guru for others who are not his intimate disciples. But in the true sense, beyond appearances, guru is yourself. Guru is your higher self appearing to be manifested in a different body." Swami Kaivalyananda pointed his finger at me and said very slowly, *"He is you."*[5]

This formulation of the role of the master is exotic yet familiar. We would say that one of the functions of the analyst or other important outer figure is to carry temporarily the projection of the patient's latent wisdom, maturity, and wholeness until the patient

can experience this more directly within. The way one realizes his potential is first to project it outward and there engage with it, admire it, submit to it, struggle and rebel against it, and come to terms with it. Only out of that process is he prepared for the recognition, "He is you." If the projection continues indefinitely as the veneration of an outer figure, then the process is incomplete and arrested. What should have been a means to an end has become an end in itself. Instead of enlightenment and liberation we have the bondage of an unresolved transference.

I have heard several Jungian analysts describe dreams of Jung's death that occurred not in relation to Jung's actual age or death, but at critical points in their own development. The death of Jung in their dreams marked their coming of age in their work, their achievement of independence. In this sense it is necessary for all of us that Jung die in order that we may be born and become ourselves. It is necessary that we cease to be Jungians in a submissive or imitative sense if we are to become worthy Jungians in the authentic sense. Otherwise, to use Edinger's phrase, we remain caught in "a concretistic mistake in the understanding of a symbol."

We could do worse than repeat Jung's citation of Zarathustra to Freud, who labeled it Jung's "Declaration of Independence." As a principle it proved to be incompatible with the continuation of their relationship. As I have said, I believe this incompatibility was more in Jung's mind than in Freud's. Be that as it may, what if we now hold Jung to the principle he asserted to Freud? I think he would be honored.

A Hasidic story tells of a rabbi who was reproached for not being more orthodox and replied, "In the next world I will not be asked why in this life I was not Moses, but rather why I was not myself." There are many schools one can attend, many books one can read, many teachers one can learn from. But there is only one self that one can become; for this there is no substitute.

Basho, a 17th century poet of Japan, summed up the paradox of the journey which is at the same time common and uniquely individual:

> I do not seek to follow in the footsteps of the men of old;
> I seek the things they sought.[6]

1 William McGuire, ed., *The Freud/Jung Letters* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1974).
2 Parenthetical references containing F or J refer to *The Freud/Jung Letters.* Parenthetical references to *Letters* refer to C. G. Jung, *Letters,* G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.), Princeton Univ. Press. Vol. I (1973), Vol. II (1975).
3 Edward F. Edinger, *Ego and Archetype* (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1973), p. 135.
4 Laurens van der Post, *Jung and the Story of Our Time* (New York: Pantheon, 1975), p. 4.
5 Doug Boyd, *Swami* (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 202 f.
6 Richard Lewis, *The Way of Silence: The Prose and Poetry of Basho* (New York: The Dial Press, 1970), p. 82.


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# POLITICS AND INDIVIDUATION

MARY ANN MATTOON
(Minneapolis)

Political activity seems so incongruous to some of my fellow Jungians that they have asked me how my interest in politics fits in with my major interest, Analytical Psychology. There are many parallels between the phenomena of the individual psyche and the societal-political realm. These parallels are written into our language. "Depression": do you think first of an emotional state or an economic condition? Whichever occurs to you first, the other probably follows close behind. "Inflation": psychological, or economic? "Integration": psychological, or social-political? All are conditions of the individual psyche and, also, of the body politic. Apparently, political phenomena are reflections of the archetypal dimension of the psyche, just as many other phenomena are usually considered to be outside the realm of psychology. For example, in his essay "Psychic Energy"[1] Jung demonstrated that physical phenomena and psychic phenomena have many common characteristics.

But Jungians do not become physicists in response to their awareness that the field has significance for Analytical Psychology. Why, then, is it important for us to be active in politics? The primary reason is that politics embodies the use of power, and Jung considered the desire for power to be an instinct. If an instinct is not made conscious and integrated, that is, channeled into constructive expression, it is almost certain to be repressed. Repressed contents tend to burst forth in destructive form. A repressed desire for power may express itself in a grab for control of a person or a group, solely

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for the satisfaction of having power. The social consequences of such repression can be seen in organizations, such as church bodies and Jungian groups, where hostilities prevent the resolution of policy issues. The individual consequences of such repression include poisoned personal relations and a blocking of the individuation process. The psychic poison resulting from repression can be avoided by open acknowledgement of the power instinct and by expressing it in consciously recognized political channels.

A secondary reason for Jungians to be politically active is that the psychological development of others — toward wholeness or toward fragmentation — is affected profoundly by political decisions. Why and how this effect occurs is described in a later section of this paper.

In perusing the Jungian literature to ascertain to what degree my interest in politics was shared, I began to realize why it appeared to be idiosyncratic among Jungians. Very little has been published on politics, and what does exist is almost a negation of my thesis. Most Jungian writing on topics of political import elaborated Jung's oft-quoted statement from the Cold War era: that the avoidance of a Third World War depends on how many individuals can bear within themselves the tension of opposites. This statement seems to minimize and even deny the importance of political action.

There have been exceptions, however. James Whitney spoke often on political and social issues. Regrettably, he published only once and then not in a specifically Jungian publication; "Psychology of the Negro-White Revolution" appeared in *Inward Light.*[2] A major idea in Whitney's paper is that the basic problem in racial prejudice is one of projection, of the shadow of whites on the darker races, and of self-proclaimed "liberal" whites on their fellows who are hostile toward blacks (or Negroes, as they were called prior to the late 1960s). Van der Post expressed similar ideas in "Race Prejudice as Self-Rejection," which also was published in *Inward Light* (Spring 1965). Eleanor Bertine, in *Jung's Contribution to Our Time,* especially in the essay entitled "Men and Bombs,"[3] discussed, among other questions, the impact of war — a violent struggle for political

power — on individuals and their development. H. G. Baynes, in *Germany Possessed,* described and examined the collective shadow projection that can occur when democracy — political participation by a preponderance of the citizens of a nation — is overcome by a totalitarian rule such as National Socialism. Additional exceptions are Thayer Greene's "America's Loss of Innocence"[4] and James Yandell's "The Adversary Game."[5]

The paucity of precedents caused me to wonder why so many of my colleagues do not share my interest in politics. Life experiences point, for me, to the necessity of concern with the political world, and life experiences are the stuff of Analytical Psychology. We have lived through what are called now the Black Revolution and the Women's Revolution, and we have seen their impact on the lives of virtually all blacks and women and on many white males. We have lived through the Vietnam Era and experienced the disruption of our society over a political issue. Those of us who are middle-aged or older lived through the Second World War when governmental — that is, political — decisions eclipsed all other concerns. And many of us lived through the Great Depression and experienced uncertainty of economic and even physical survival. All these events are political, or are treated politically. It is governments that drop bombs, arrest protesters, send men — and, in some countries, women — to war, close banks arbitrarily, administer relief funds, and legislate on civil rights. Governments are political institutions.

But even in a non-governmental sense we are all involved in politics. Politics is the exercise of power, and power operates wherever human beings attempt to get along together: in families, schools, churches, businesses, professional organizations, and Analytical Psychology Clubs.

The events and forces I have mentioned are contemporary expressions of the underlying archetypal reality of the relation between psyche and polis — the soul and the city — which were inseparable in the Greek and Roman worlds. The 'opposition' between God and Caesar, like all pairs of opposites, is a tension that must be maintained in order to produce a totality.

Despite all these facts, Jung said that the avoidance of war, and presumably of lesser forms of intergroup and interpersonal conflict, depends on individuals' bearing the tension of opposites, and not, evidently, on political activity. He modified this view by occasional comments in the *Collected Works.* For example, in *Civilization in Transition,* he wrote, "As [the psychotherapist] has a responsibility towards his patients, he cannot afford to withdraw to the peaceful island of undisturbed scientific work, but must constantly descend into the arena of world events."[6] In this arena Jung opposed totalitarianism in all its forms, and favored social-political orders that provided individual freedom. Moreover, he engaged in political activity: he founded an Analytical Psychology Club, held offices in professional organizations, edited journals, served in the Swiss army, and commented on issues of the day.

Nevertheless, Marie-Louise von Franz, one of Jung's foremost interpreters, in her foreword to V. W. Odajnyk's *Jung and Politics,* served as spokesperson for many of her analyst colleagues when she wrote, "To a great extent all political dissension and conflicts are exteriorizations of inner conflicts that each human being should resolve within himself."[7] Perhaps the view expressed by von Franz is prevalent because Jung considered participation in the collective as a necessary evil, rather than as a necessity for wholeness. He said, according to Barbara Hannah, that we live "only on the fringe of collectivism and avoid the mainstream of events as much as possible. I am very conscious indeed that in this we are one-sided."[8]

Odajnyk concluded — and I agree with him — that Jung had a "politically unadapted shadow side" that made him vulnerable to accusations of being an "anti-Semite and a Nazi."[9] Thus, I am supporting a view that was only embryonic in Jung's thought: that the political dimension is a necessary part of our individuation because it is an essential part of the human being. It is essential because it is a derivative of our social nature, which, in turn, is necessary for the survival of the species. It is essential, also, because it is a major arena in which the power shadow expresses itself, and the power shadow cannot be avoided except, temporarily, by repression.

### *Effect of Political Structures on the Individual Psyche*

Just how is the individual psyche affected by political structures, events, and forces? I have mentioned already the shadow projections reflected in race prejudice. According to Jungian theory and experience, projections are functions of the projector and, to a lesser degree, of the projectee, and affect the psyches of both. These projections influence political decisions and are enhanced by institutionalized attitudes, such as segregation. For example, school segregation is infuriating to blacks, according to my understanding, not only because of the differential in quality of education between white and black schools, but also because it implies that black children are not good enough to go to school with white children. This nonverbal message by segregated schools can be silenced only by desegregation, a political decision.

Poverty is another condition of life in which politics affects individual psyches. Poverty can be so debilitating, psychically (as well as physically) that the psychic development of many individuals is prevented. In the daily news reports of what the current administration is or is not doing about economic problems, such as unemployment, inflation, and social security, we see that poverty, as an economic problem, is addressed in this country, currently and during most of this century, politically.

A direct influence of economics on psychological development is through the presence or absence of mental illness. Brenner showed that "instabilities in the national economy have been the single most important source of fluctuation in mental-hospital admission rates."[10] That is, when people feel themselves to be in danger of poverty, they are more likely to become mentally ill.

Jungians are very much aware of the power of the unconscious, personal and collective, to influence attitudes and behavior. We are much less aware, it seems to me, of how profoundly even people who are relatively well-developed psychologically can be affected in attitudes and behavior by the social environment. In one experiment, for example, "normal" (i.e., not psychotic) subjects were asked to judge the length of a line. After hearing the unanimous false judgment of others, over half of the subjects changed their

correct judgments to incorrect ones. Thus, they acted contrary to their perceptions.[11] In another experiment, subjects administered what they believed were painful electric shocks to other persons because they were told that participation in the experiment contributed to science.[12]

Those experiments, strictly speaking, did not involve political structures, but examples of political structures that functioned similarly are not hard to find. In Nazi Germany, Hitler aroused, first, hysteria that probably would not have been characteristic of many of the individuals who succumbed to it. Then, through his Gestapo and other quasimilitary organizations, he provoked fear, which produced behavior that was against the ethics and religion of many of the participants: persecution and mass-murder of Jews, conception of children without regard to family structures and relationships, and denial of responsibility for the policies and actions of government. In 1935, Sinclair Lewis published *It Can't Happen Here,* a novel based on the insight that the citizens of Nazi Germany were not necessarily unique in their capacity to fool themselves when the political structures required inhumane behavior for physical or economic survival.

A high school teacher, Ron Jones, described a "learning experiment [that] ended . . . as a nightmare." In response to student skepticism that the citizens of Nazi Germany were people like themselves, Jones led the class step by step in one hour a day for only five days from discipline, to unquestioning obedience, to betrayal of nonconformers, to mass responses to a fictional leader. Jones's explanation was that the students "bargained their freedom for the comfort of discipline."[13] Whatever their motives, the students, in a context of political manipulation, acted out the behavior they had been condemning. Thus a quasipolitical structure changed the attitudes and behavior of people, that is, changed them psychologically. I repeat my refrain: political structure can affect the individual psyche.

The hypothesis suggested by Lewis and demonstrated by Jones, that nonpsychotic people are capable of totalitarian behavior, is supported by a study conducted shortly after the end of World War II.

When Rorschach tests were administered to Nazi leaders awaiting trial, the results showed that they were not madmen; rather, they were psychologically normal people whose attitudes and behavior were distorted by political forces.

There have been, and probably are, a few saints and martyrs who were able to maintain their principles and perceptions in the face of what Hitler called "the big lie," but it seems to me evident that psychological development for most of us, at least in its early stages, is enhanced by, if not totally dependent on, a large degree of economic security and political freedom. Both of these conditions depend on political structures and events.

### *The Shadow: Individual and Political*

An important part of the individuation process is the work of coming to terms with the shadow, personal and collective. Collective manifestations of the shadow are evident in a now-classic book, *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens* (1931). The major impact of the book on me is its delineation of situations in which people, honest in their private dealings, were corrupted by political and economic structures. Steffens chided the reformers of the time for asking repeatedly, "*Who* did it?" The correct question, as he saw it, was "*What* did it?" Political and economic structures formed environments in which evil deeds were done by whichever official or leader was in a position to do them. I do not mean to say that all politicians are alike; they vary widely in integrity, commitment, and wisdom. Steffens' insight implies that the shadow side cannot be destroyed. It can be hidden or even repressed, but if it is hidden it reappears eventually, untransformed.

We take for granted the necessity of consciousness of all aspects of the personality, and we know that this consciousness is gained through relationships with other people: parents, children, spouses, friends, enemies. But many of us stay out of the arena in which the power shadow operates, and hence fail to become conscious of that aspect of our personalities. There are power problems in personal relationships, of course, especially in the family. But the power

shadow that inhabits the political arena has an added dimension; it is much larger and less personal. Without consciousness of this shadow, a person cannot individuate. And consciousness depends on concrete experience.

As individuals, we may not be interested in political power — at least in the sense of governmental or party office — but others are interested, and if we are not to be damaged or destroyed by political power, we must bring some consciousness to the use of power. I believe it was the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr who said that democracy is *possible* because of the goodness of men, and that democracy is *necessary* because of the sinfulness of man. If we substitute "dark side" for "sinfulness" the result is awareness like Steffens'. The willingness of citizens of a democracy to cooperate with their chosen leaders makes democracy possible. But power corrupts; thus democracy is necessary so that no one group can consistently impose its will on the rest of the population.

In addition to the dark side of government, there is a dark side to intergroup relations. Whitney and Van der Post discussed it in relation to race relations but it is projected also from almost any group onto another group that is considered different: respectable middle-class people onto political dissidents, religious sects, and those with a counterculture life style, and vice versa; heterosexuals onto homosexuals, and vice versa; men onto women, and vice versa, and so on.

My illustrations have been almost exclusively experiences from the political world in the sense of the individuals, groups, and forces operative in our specifically political institutions, that is, governments. Virtually all of what I have said, however, applies to all institutions because any institution wields power over individuals, and its leaders can and do wield power. So do the other members, if only by cooperating or not cooperating with their fellow members and leaders. When I mentioned to a few colleagues and friends my interest in the relation of politics to Jungian psychology, each responded with, "Oh yes, I've been trying to understand what was going on in such-and-such an organization." Each had been experiencing, evidently, the shadow side of a well-intentioned organization.

These organizations varied from small, local groups to national professional bodies.

### *Complexes Regarding Politics*

But not only political forces have a shadow side. Politics can become an individual complex that is a part of a person's shadow. Many people can become highly emotional over political opinions. I have wondered about this phenomenon for a long time, and the only explanation I could find seemed idiosyncratic to me. My family, particularly my father, was deeply involved in political activity and held a particular point of view so intensely that it constituted an absolute. A large part of my psychological and religious liberation, therefore, was the struggle to find my own political point of view and to stand for it. I have found few other people, however, with a like background and, hence, such a reason for emotionality about politics. Yet the emotionality is there in nearly everyone who has an interest in the political world. One plausible hypothesis is that there is an archetypal core to the problem of one's primary political allegiance. It may be that the Republican Party reflects the father archetype: maintenance of structure, order, the economic "rationality" that spending must not exceed income. Conversely, the Democratic Party may reflect the mother archetype: nurturing and caring for the weak and helpless. As with all archetypal phenomena, each has a negative side: justice without mercy, and nurturing to the point of maintaining dependence. It is conceivable that avoidance of participation in politics is motivated partly by fear of these archetypes. Individuation, however, requires dealing consciously with archetypal forces.

### *How Political Activity Enhances Individuation*

It seems clear that there are many psychological parallels between individual life and the political arena. The remaining question is, how can political activity enhance individuation? Some Jungians say that it cannot, that it actually precludes individuation, because such activity requires over-reliance upon the persona. But the persona is

an archetypal necessity, a normal part of the psyche, which can function in relation to the political world, as to other aspects of our life, without rigidity or exaggeration.

When the persona is not rigid, political activity can contribute to individuation through the consciousness, expression, and integration of a basic human need. Jung called power an instinct. Other psychologists call it a "need to participate in one's own destiny" or, more briefly, "affectance motivation." This basic need must be taken into account in order for individuation to proceed. Except for the few persons who have a vocation to monastic solitude, wholeness includes the integration of one's relation to the power structures of the political world.

Wholeness includes recognition of the archetypal bases of all human relations. A Jungian colleague of mine, who has a deep inner life, expressed his equally deep social concern with the question, "How can I indivduate when my neighbor is starving?" The question was rhetorical, reflecting his view that the responsibility of human beings for each other's welfare is essential to the wholeness of all of us. I agree with this view, and I hypothesize that the mutual responsibility is based on an underlying interconnection among all of us. This interconnection, in Jungian terms, is an archetypal reality.

But when we talk about reality, why stress politics as necessary in individuation? Why not needlework? Gymnastics? Parapsychology? I suppose that the answer is the degree of necessity involved. I can live without doing needlework or gymnastics (although probably not without physical exercise), and parapsychological experiences may never happen to me. But I probably cannot live on a continent with hundreds of millions of people and in a world with billions of people, and no organized governments and other institutions. This fact brings me again to awareness of the fundamental necessity, hence the instinctual basis of social-political organizations, a basis that is reflected in the organizations that even lower species than humans have.[14]

As in all factors in the individuation process, the political world is not an 'either-or' matter. I am not suggesting that anyone ignore

his/her dreams in order to run for precinct chairperson or to become a member of the policy-making board of a professional organization. I am recommending a broad view of psychic reality that does not exclude what we call the outer for the sake of what we call the inner. I am hypothesizing that a point of view that excludes the power drive or sex drive is as one-sided as a view that includes only one or the other of them — views often ascribed to the Adlerians or the Freudians.

My recommendation of political activity is to correct the highly individualistic, inwardly oriented stance characteristic of many Jungians, a stance that dangerously ignores the power shadow. A person who shares my view is Peter Marin, whose conversation with a man 'into' mysticism was quoted by columnist Ellen Goodman. Marin wrote, "He was telling me about his sense of another reality. 'I know there is something outside of me,' he said. 'I can feel it. I know it is there. But what is it?' " Marin said he replied, "It may not be a mystery. Perhaps it is the world."

1 *CW8,* 1-130.
2 A publication of the Friends Conference on Religion and Psychology.
3 First published in *Spring 1946.*
4 *Psychological Perspectives,* 7, ii (1976).
5 A talk delivered as part of a 1969 weekend workshop on "Jung and the Unconscious: Contemporary Perspectives."
6 *CW10,* 177.
7 V. W. Odajnyk, *Jung and Politics* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1976), foreword by M-L. von Franz, p. ix.
8 B. Hannah, *Jung: His Life and World* (New York: Putnam's, 1976), p. 290.
9 Odajnyk, p. 108.
10 M. H. Brenner, *Mental Illness and the Economy* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Pr., 1973), p. ix.
11 S. E. Asch, *Social Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1952).
12 L. Milgren, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority," *Human Relations,* 18 (1965), 57-76.
13 R. Jones, "The Third Wave: Nazism in a High School," *Psychology Today,* July 1976, pp. 14-16.
14 See for example, K. Lorenz, *On Aggression* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), Ch. 8.

# REPRESSION, FALSIFICATION, AND BEDEVILING OF GERMANIC MYTHOLOGY

MARGRIT BURRI
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Familiarity of the educated public with Germanic mythology is much scantier than knowledge of Greek and Roman mythology — and this even north of the Alps, on "Germanic soil," and among peoples of predominantly Germanic stock. Our educational system does not do much to advance an acquaintance with the images and stories that once contained the lives of our ancestors. Similarly, in the realm of scholarly studies of mythology, classical, Near Eastern, or Indian studies outshine Germanic mythology. Moreover, it seems that what many Jungians have learned and know about the Germanic Gods is based on one single book, M. Ninck's *Wodan und germanischer Schicksalsglaube,*[1] whereas Jungian knowledge of the Greek Gods comes from a variety of sources and commentators. Germanic mythology, which by virtue of our geographical and historical background is closest to us, is the stepchild of our mythological studies.

The reason for this neglect dates back a long time. Even after the decline of the Roman Empire, Latin remained the foremost language in Europe, the language of the Church, of scholarship, and of political deeds. In the Middle Ages, to know how to read did not merely mean having the skill of deciphering written messages; it automatically also meant to know Latin. Latin remained *the* language of higher education until well into the 19th century. The vernacular languages by contrast were looked down upon and could only slowly

This article was condensed for *Spring* from a study in progress. The author received her Ph.D. from the University of Zürich for her thesis: "Archaic and Newer Traits in the (Old-Icelandic) *Laxdoela Saga.*" She has been a student of the C. G. Jung Institute, Zürich, for the last eight years and lectured there on "The Problem of Evil in Germanic Mythology." Dr. Wolfgang Giegerich was helpful in discussing these problems and giving the paper its present English form.

and with difficulties achieve recognition as possible media of literary or scientific endeavors. So it was only natural for scholars interested in mythology to turn to Greek and Roman, rather than to Germanic myths, especially if the fascination that emanated from the art and architecture of classical antiquity and of its "Renaissance" is also taken into account.

This classical background continues to affect Jungian psychology through Jung, who not only read Latin and Greek fluently, but also in a more personal and passionate way was inspired by Friedrich Creuzer during the time after his break with Freud. In 1803, Creuzer, professor of classics in Heidelberg, had published an illustrated work[2] in many volumes in which he reported on the mythologies "of the Southern and Eastern" peoples. Thus Jung's interest in mythology was aroused by Southern and Eastern tales, not by Germanic ones. Germanic mythology continued to remain behind a thorn hedge of little-known languages, rune stones, and petroglyphs.

Of course, this preference for Latin and classical antiquity and the corresponding disregard for the vernacular requires an explanation. With the Christianization and Romanization of the Germanic nations, a value judgment was simultaneously introduced: "Rome," in its double meaning as the center of Christianity and of the classical world, was taken as a model and standard, as superior and better. "Rome" became the symbol for "the treasure hard to attain," a continuous goal of longing and striving — for the German emperors of the Middle Ages (Holy Roman Empire) as well as for the man of letters of the 18th and 19th centuries (*Bildungsreise,* educational journey). One tried to see and to interpret oneself in terms of this imaginal Rome. And even when Greece entered the field of vision and began to inspire people, it was seen through "Roman" spectacles. The superimposition of Roman (classical and Christian) civilization upon the Germanic culture tended to place a taboo on everything Germanic, which more and more had to carry the stigma of such pejorative designations as "barbaric," "pagan," "inferior," "wild," "dangerous." Small wonder that Germanic mythology had to remain more or less unknown. Small wonder also that in modern times, when the hold of Christianity on European man began to

weaken, people turned to the distant East instead of going in search of their own ancestral roots (Ludwig Klages, Hermann Hesse; Western followers of Buddhism and Transcendental Meditation; the fascination of many Jungians with Carlos Castaneda, etc.).

*Fernweh* can be legitimate, but much of this flair for Eastern religions gives the impression of having the character of avoidance, of turning away from one's own (inferior, barbaric) roots rather than that of an authentic longing for distant realms. If, e.g., Hesse describes as the deepest source of his creative life his life-long wish to be a magician with the power *to conceal himself,* we may legitimately wonder whether he did not try to do just that by going on his Journey to the East. At any rate, our pagan Germanic background was and still is being left behind, unacknowledged and unattended to, with only a few exceptions.

These exceptions, however, are remarkable and should not be forgotten. To name only a few: Johann Gottfried Herder, although he had gone through the classical training of a theologian (clergyman), was soon interested in Old-Norse mythology, which he got to know in translations; already in 1765 he wrote how much to be preferred was this Nordic mythology to that of Greece. The brothers Wilhelm and Jacob Grimm are still today well-known for their early collections of fairy tales. In 1835 their *German Mythology* appeared. They are the first of a noteworthy line of scholars. The first translation of the *Edda* in alliteration was done by Ettmüller (Zürich, 1837). Since then, well-founded studies on Old-Germanic mythology, poetry, and religion have continued to appear.

But in general the picture of Germanic mythology has been distorted. It would not be fair to put the blame for this distortion on the various authors; rather, we have to understand the falsification as an almost natural consequence of the situation in which Germanic mythology is to be found: surrounded by taboos and viewed by a consciousness inevitably informed by classical and Christian perspectives. Could we even expect to be able to see Germanic mythology without a strong bias after more than 1500 years of Roman influence?

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The distortion of Germanic mythology even applies to a certain degree to Ninck's above-mentioned monograph on Wotan. I now point to a few limitations of Ninck's work, which is nonetheless a valuable book already hailed by Jung as a "really magnificent portrait of the German archetype Wotan" (*CW 10*, 393). But inasmuch as Ninck's study has become more or less the only source for a knowledge of Germanic mythology among many Jungians, it becomes necessary to call attention to its limitations.

Ninck perhaps puts undue emphasis on the ecstatic element in Wotan's nature, although the berserker is rarely mentioned in the mythological sources and in the sagas. Of course the ecstatic element does belong to Wotan, as does the ritual transformation into the berserker. But we must be careful not to foster the Christian denunciation of Wotan and his followers, for which denunciation the term berserker has been a standard requisite.

Secondly, it must be questioned whether or not a mythology can be adequately portrayed through a monographic representation of a single God or archetype, indeed whether the very purpose of describing this one God can be achieved if this God is singled out from the network of his variegated and intrinsic interactions and interrelations with the other Gods of the same mythology, such as Freyr, Thyr, Loki, Baldr, Frigg, Freya, and so on. Mythology is polytheistic.[3] Wotan (Odin) has never been the undisputed highest God; Thor (Donar) has always remained his peer.

The omission of Wotan's relationships to other Gods becomes most consequential in the case of Loki, this most enigmatic figure of Germanic mythology. Ninck mentions Loki only in a few sentences, and in these Loki is characterized only in negative terms — as the God with the infernal brood (Midgard Serpent, Fenris-wolf, Hel), as the destructive principle that opposes Wotan everywhere. This characterization is one-sided to the point of distortion. In the myths Loki is opponent *and* helper of the Gods, as well as trickster and culture hero. It is Loki who in moments of emergency comes up with remedial measures and (e.g., in the Thiazi and the otter's ransom myths) procures food for himself and his companions, Odin and Hönir. And in our century, the same Loki, this representative of

the "function of reality," is being branded the destructive principle!

Loki is by no means a minor, unimportant God; he is linked to other Gods in many different ways and through many myths. For instance, he is connected with Odin in blood brotherhood. Their relationship is underlined by the fact that Loki is the mother of Odin's magic horse Sleipnir. This fact reveals a completely different aspect of his personality: Loki as female animal. On one occasion, the playful, curious Loki flew on an expedition in Frigg's (Odin's wife's) falcon dress. He was captured by a giant. When the giant looked into the eyes of the apparent falcon, he suspected that it might be a human; only later on did Loki reveal his identity. Falcon-human-God: we are reminded of Jung's description of the trickster: "He is a forerunner of the saviour, and, like him, God, man, and animal at once" (*CW 9 i*, 472).

To be sure, Odin and Loki fight on opposite sides in Ragnarök, and both perish. (Loki had become an enemy of the Aesir when he had caused Baldr to be killed.) But as several scholars have pointed out, Baldr is, according to the statements of the myths, "the son fit for the sacrifice," and it is Odin himself who ultimately stands behind this entire development. Therefore, the final struggle is not a linear, causal result of Loki's "guilt." Rather, the entire chain of events belongs to, and is constellated by, an extremely stable mythological pattern,[4] whose parallel we find in the Christian myth of the sacrifice of the Son of God. Loki is the one who moves things forward. The same task is given to the person representing him in the "blot," the sacrificial cult, as Kerényi points out with reference to Grönbech. Thus it is precisely through Loki that Germanic mythology proves its comprehensive psychic truth. Loki may not be left out.

Another important aspect that Ninck gives little attention to is the fight of the older chthonic deities, the Vanir, with the more recent Aesir whom the Germans had brought along as their Gods into the regions occupied by them. Unlike the Vanir, the newer Gods were not tied to the soil, just as the Germans wandered with their herds and private landowning was unknown to them. This conflict and its resolution between the older Vanir and the newer Aesir is

of great mythological-historical significance. We will briefly return to it later.

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Whereas Ninck's study became known only to those relatively few people who have a decided interest in Germanic mythology (and read German), the influence of Richard Wagner's portrayal of the Germanic is world-wide. Its effect has been all the greater because Wagner's picture of Germanic mythology is carried and supported by his music, which speaks immediately to his audience and reaches the deeper layers of the collective unconscious the world over. This music, as Nietzsche showed, is the music of an absolutized feeling torn off from everything else. Nietzsche spoke of the loss of the ability to let an extreme feeling go. In other words, this music is created by the desire to drown oneself in emotion, to give oneself over to it totally and to dissolve in it.

This very same desire is also the *spiritus rector* that informed Wagner's 'adaptation' of Germanic myths — adaptation, because there is sufficient evidence to show that Wagner deliberately deviated from the content of the tales as transmitted in the ancient sources, while at the same time falling back on the long-forgotten poetic form of *Stabreim* (alliteration, such as, "with kith and kin"). For end-rhyme, taken over from late Latin verse, actually does not sit well with Germanic languages. Thus, by utilizing the original Germanic poetic device of *Stabreim,* Wagner probably could hope to cause a deep unconscious sense of form to resonate in his audience; the stylistic form also served the overall purpose of sinking one into oblivion by transposing him into a rapture of feeling through art. It is therefore not surprising that Wagner was fired by Schopenhauer's partly Buddhist-inspired philosophy, which provided for him the metaphysical confirmation of his art.

At a number of places in *Der Ring des Nibelungen* Wagner deviates from his sources. Rather than retelling the ancient myth, he makes his own myth. But perhaps we should not say *his* own, for Wagner certainly is the exponent of his age. He had the creative power to express authentically what had become a collective psychic

reality and what is an indispensable aspect of 'modern' consciousness at large: a split-off *absolutized feeling* that also dominates today's psychotherapy ("peak experience," etc.). One such deviation is the basic motif that takes shape in *Rheingold:* the incompatibility of love and power (gold). The Eddic poems know of no such confrontation. This split is decidedly modern.

Wagner's myth culminates in an All-Father Wotan who, chased by feelings of guilt, strives to find a Redeemer-Son. Siegmund and Siegfried fail, and Brünnhilde finds redemption in an all-consuming fire that will also destroy Walhalla and the Gods. The *Ring* ends in a catastrophe. *This most consequential distortion of Germanic mythology has found its consolidation, if not immortalization, in Wagner's work.* From then on, Germanic myths had to bear the stigma of being the mythology that aims for total self-destruction, for an inescapable doom. The name *Götterdämmerung* in this gloomy sense has been made universally familiar by Wagner.[5] Part of this gloomy conception is that self-destruction is affirmed, even longed for *(Todessehnsucht).* As Wagner himself puts it: Wotan rises to tragic heights by willing his extinction.

This may be modern, Schopenhauerian philosophy, but it is not Germanic myth. Neither the longing for deliverance from oneself, nor the tragic mode of this deliverance are Germanic ideas. This longing derives from a (late) *Christian* mentality for which, however, the Christian myth itself is not extreme and emotional enough, so that it does not grant redemption any more. For the 19th century, religion had, even in theology, become identified with a subjective feeling-state (cf. Schleiermacher). And in order to see the *Germanic* Ragnarök in the proper perspective, we must leave it in its original context where the end of the world is not an eschatological event in a Christian sense, but is followed by the rise of a new earth. In Germanic mythology, writes M.-L. von Franz,[6] "a new world will suddenly blossom out of the depths. In the grass the gods will find the golden tablets of the wisdom of the past, and Baldr and some of the other resurrected gods will live in the new world." Also, in the *Eddas,* the 'final' destruction is not the consequence of guilt and not the longed-for deliverance from it. (Here again, Christian motifs

are intruding into Wagner's Germanic world.) Rather, the Aesir are in the hands of fate and know that the final struggle awaits them. Even though the feud with the giants is stirred up anew by the Gods' breaking a contract, this fate has nothing to do with "sin," with a "Fall" in a Christian sense.[7]

The fact that Jung in *Symbols of Transformation* analyzed in detail the relationships between Wotan, Brünnhilde, Siegmund, Siegfried, and Hagen on the basis of Wagner's *Ring* certainly helped to boost the esteem for Wagner in the eyes of many readers and to promote a Wagnerian interpretation of Germanic mythology among the Jungians. This despite the fact that Jung expressly declared that it had not been his intention to put forth mythological hypotheses. "For that purpose I would certainly not have chosen Longfellow's *Hiawatha,* any more than I would have used Wagner's *Siegfried* had I wished to analyse the cycle of *The Younger Edda*" (*CW 5*, xxix). Jung saw very clearly that the Eddic Siegfried and Wagner's Siegfried were altogether different. And as to Jung's estimation of Wagner's music, the following quotation from "After the Catastrophe" (*CW 10*, 432) gives unmistakable evidence. "What could they not have learned from the suet-and-syrup of Wagner!" Jung saw through to the unleashed subjectivistic emotionalism and its historical consequences.

The contamination of Germanic mythology by Wagnerianism continues. Thus Lynn Snook lectures at the C. G. Jung Institute, Zürich, in 1977/78 on: "Wotan, the tragedy of a God eternally burdening himself with guilt. The establishment of Walhalla, the otherworldly idol of male aggressive self-denial, brings about the betrayal of the Goddess of love and the suicidal destruction of these Gods."[8] Donington,[9] also discussing Wagner's *Ring* from a Jungian point of view, realizes that the *Ring* represents Wagner's *fantasy* of Germanic mythology and even considers the possibility of himself having made a myth about a myth with his discussion of the same tales.[10] Thus his interpretation of the *Götterdämmerung* differs from Snook's idea of "suicidal destruction." Donington states,

> Wagner, when under the influence of Buddhist thought as transmitted by Schopenhauer, explained the fire in which Brunnhilde is now about

> to immolate herself as the gateway to redemption in the sense of freedom from rebirth.

He continues,

> I doubt if Wagner knew what Buddhist thought really expresses under the symbol of annihilation. I do know that none of Wagner's images in the *Ring,* whatever his reason may have had to say about it, actually points to annihilation as our own Western thought conceives it. One after another points to rebirth in the sense of transformation. What Wagner called redemption is what I have here called transformation.[11]

But for Donington, too, the end of it all is the grand finale of the universal fire with which Wagner's *Ring* closes.

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Another distortion of the Germanic world is connected with the name of Nietzsche. Of course, it is important to realize that Nietzsche, as poet-philosopher, had no antiquarian interest in the ancient Germans and their actual, historical reality. What he says about the "blond beast" is not intended as a 'representation of the 'real' German; it is at most about an imaginal German and must be strictly taken as a philosophical idea serving philosophical purposes. Nevertheless, what Nietzsche said has been claimed — abused — by many for their own understanding of the actual German and thus contributed to the falsification in the eyes of the general public. Elements of this distorted view are the Nietzschean ideas of the "strong, healthy barbarian," of the "high-spirited desire to hurt," of the "beast of prey," of the "lusts of cruelty." If such is applied to the ancient Germans, the negative picture of the raging berserker is recreated. The sagas paint a different picture, the picture of people who were "tough, but not cruel, not indulging to hurt, not craving destruction" (A. Heusler).[12]

The distortion of the Germanic culminates in Hitler and in the general defamation of Germanic mythology which resulted as a reaction to him. Both Wagner and Nietzsche were used by Hitler — the way he understood them — to give aesthetic and intellectual support to his *Deutsche* ideology. In Wagner's biography and writings Hitler found nourishment for his intense anti-Semitism, for the

Romantic glorification of drive and *Blut und Boden.* From Wagner he got confirmation for his theatrical relation to the world, for his needing the spectacular and mass effects. Hitler's declaration of loyalty to everything Germanic has done most to discredit Germanic mythology. It would hardly have needed the idea of *verbrannte Erde* and the literal acting out of a *Götterdämmerung* in an orgy of destruction, to which Hitler tried to give a Wagnerian, theatrical touch. Hitler and what he stands for seem to confirm the opinion of all those who blame the Nazi disaster on Germanic mythology. Germanic mythology itself is thus seen as sick, and its Gods have become demonized. We may call this the bedeviling of Germanic mythology, a bedeviling which has been acted out and lived by Hitler and is continued in the condemnation, on account of Hitler's demonic features, of this mythology.

A more recent example from among the Jungians of a demonized view of the Germanic Gods is to be found in Laurens van der Post's *Jung and the Story of our Time.*[13] Van der Post states, "German mythology was the only mythology that I knew in which the gods were themselves overthrown by the forces of darkness."[14] "Motivated by a logic of a mythology which demanded so dark and tragic a fulfillment as did the Teutonic one, I was convinced that he (Hitler) would be compelled to conduct the war in a manner that would make defeat inevitable."[15] *What appears to be an interpretation of "Hitler" in terms of Germanic mythology in reality is an interpretation of Germanic mythology in terms of "Hitler."* Van der Post's archetypal shadow projection on the Rhine river is especially obvious. "It was as if the Rhine had its source in the darkness of European history."[16]

> I myself having once sailed down the Rhine to the sea understood as never before its role in Teutonic mythology together with the prophetic associations of Wagner's equinoxial music, which Jung himself, insofar as he allowed himself music, preferred.[17]

Van der Post does not seem to realize that the Rhine rises in Switzerland and, moreover, that the English (Anglo-Saxons and Normans/Norsemen) belong to the same Germanic family of nations and share its mythology. But the Germanic influence also extended to

many other parts of Europe (through the Franks to France, the Lombards to northern Italy, the Visigoths to Spain, the Normans to Sicily) and in modern times to North America.

Of course there is a case history for this bedeviling of Germanic Gods, i.e., for the interpretation of a God in terms of "Hitler," a history that dates back far beyond Wagner's *Götterdämmerung* and Nietzsche's blond beast. In medieval times Wotan took on the features of the devil, appearing in the frightening Wild Chase of evil ghosts, just as the devil took the shape of Wotan. And what is "Hitler" for modern man if not *his* (secularized) form of experiencing the Devil, the Antichrist, as the seducer of men and the spirit of evil leading to death and destruction? It was only because the Devil informed the consciousness of medieval and modern man that such phenomena as the berserker also took on the meaning of utterly blind, destructive fury. The word demonic itself only received its negative cast because the demons were looked at with a Christian "evil eye."[18]

But this bedeviled Wotan is not the God as he once was, just as the berserker was not what we today imagine him to have been. In many areas of the German-speaking world Wotan lived on in certain rural areas and retained his original nature well into the 16th century and beyond, sometimes also being absorbed by certain saints, legendary figures, or emperors (Barbarossa). Thus, Niklaus von Flüe (1417 to 1487) was frequently visited in his dreams and visions by persons who clearly resembled Germanic Gods, above all Wotan, who did not have demonic, destructive features.[19] According to Hildegard Buder,[20] Wotan also quite frequently appears in the dreams of modern patients as a benevolent and understanding helper wanting to introduce the dreamer into a masculine kind of closeness to nature characterized by an intuitive wisdom. There is usually nothing frightening about him; he rather inspires immediate confidence.

Thus if Jung (*CW 10*, 373ff.) sees behind the Nazi movement and Hitler the influence of Wotan and the breath of Wotan's wind, we must be careful not to use this illuminating insight as an argument against Germanic mythology. The diabolic, destructive character of Hitler cannot be blamed on Wotan himself: the God who

had seized Hitler was not simply Wotan. He, to be sure, as the God of storms also had a potential elementary wildness, without, however, being diabolic. Wotan seen through Christian spectacles was thus interpreted, indeed experienced, as devilish. The contamination of pagan Germanic mythology by Christianity seems to have brought about a change of the *Urphänomen* Wotan himself, so that a demonized Wotan could become an authentic psychic reality. The only opening left by and in a Christian consciousness for the epiphany of a pagan God was through the Antichrist, the Devil. He is the one vulnerable spot in the monotheistic armor of the Christian mind. Wotan, in order to make himself manifest, *had to* slip into the guise of the Devil. The revelation of the true Wotan is hidden, distorted, and yet present in this diabolic manifestation.

Seen in this light, Kledzik's theory about the psychological origin of Hitler's anti-Semitism seems to have much in its favor.[21] Kledzik interprets the apparition in Vienna of a Jew in a caftan and with black curly hair that released Hitler's wild anti-Semitism, as an image that in reality belongs to Wotan. The Jews had had to carry the archetypal shadow of the Christians from medieval times: the Jews represented the visible Antichrist. But who is the *real* shadow of the northern European Christian, who the real opponent of the Christian God? Or: who *is* this Antichrist really? Is it not the repressed Gods of our ancestors, above all Wotan, together with all of pagan polytheism?[22] Jung (*CW 10*, 374) had already pointed out the connection between anti-Semitism and the reawakened Wotan and had in this connection referred to the projection of Wotan on the Eternal Jew.

Wotan, Devil, Antichrist, Jew — these are the names for the shadow in our culture. And we should add one more: Witch. If we remember the important role of woman as seeress and bearer of divine wisdom in Germanic religion, we know who or what was persecuted in the witches: the visionary gifts and the intuitive knowledge of nature given by the ancient Gods. And just as popular tradition occasionally had preserved a more original, benevolent picture of Wotan, so the late Middle Ages produced those lays of Tannhäuser[23] in the mountain court of Venus and of his greening

staff, which represent a marked if only passing counterpoint to the suppression of woman, sensual love, and nature inherent in Christian thinking and practiced in the persecution of witches.

It is a fateful distortion of causality to blame Germanic mythology for the emergence of National-Socialism. The metaphor of *Ragnarök, Götterdämmerung* precedes the appearance of a new world. When images of Gods become dim *(verdämmern)* new paths have to be found which lead us to new springs. Jung has shown us such ways. And then, walking them, we find to our joy and surprise that *Gods* had been waiting there for us to welcome them.

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Where has our discussion of the repression, falsification, and bedeviling of Germanic mythology taken us? To the insight, it seems, that the Germanic Gods, especially Wotan, do not appear to us alone and 'pure,' but in contamination with others. Perhaps it is impossible for us today to conceive of Wotan as he once was — although I believe a hard core of their *Urnatur* can still be discerned. For as we are living in a Christianized and Romanized culture, Christian and classical images automatically and necessarily intrude upon our vision. Indeed, the *Urphänomen* of a God itself may have undergone a certain change of nature as a consequence of being forced to "live" under the altered conditions of, at least on the surface, a Christianized world. So at least it appeared to be in the case of Wotan who is — today — not a 'simple' God, but a cluster of Gods, a cluster however that normally does not reveal its composite nature.

In Nietzsche this contamination can be demonstrated rather easily. As Jung (*CW 10*, 375f.) has shown, Nietzsche's original experience was one of Wotan. But Nietzsche does not mention Wotan; he speaks of Dionysos.[24] Now it would probably be a serious oversimplification to say that Nietzsche actually meant Wotan and not Dionysos — even if we admit that the Greek Gods may frequently have provided an acceptable place for many Germans where they could vicariously rediscover images resembling their own ancestral Gods stirring in their souls, Gods whom they could not approach

directly because of the taboos as well as disrupted tradition. (This would explain the traditional German preference for Greek, as opposed to Roman, civilization, the "tyranny of Greece over Germany," as a book title phrases it.) If we look at Nietzsche's work we can also discern, in addition to Wotanic elements, features that can be authentically considered Dionysian. But Wotan and Dionysos are not the only ones; a third person plays an important role for Nietzsche: the Antichrist. Germanic, Greek, and Christian aspects intermingle and produce a many-faceted image, which, as a center of psychic energy, may even attract and absorb additional images: Pan, Mars, Trickster, Blond Beast, Jew, Hitler, etc. If, as Jung says, instincts, can reinforce each other, then these images, as instincts, also reinforce one another into a most powerful concentration of energy, when they are being merged into one. Could Hitler be understood as the "symptom" of this undifferentiated cluster of images, as the victim of its unleashed force?

If so, "Hitler" would be an eminent problem for our psychology. In "Hitler" we could see, in tremendous magnification and in the grossest pathological form, the psychological complications of Romanized and Christianized Northern man, out of whose soul was born much of what we call "psychology" in the sense of a field of study.

Jung knew of these complications. He realized that Roman civilization had merely been superimposed on adventurous, restless peoples, too young for any kind of conservatism or domestication (*CW 11*, 82). Jung saw the problems caused by Christianity.

> My problem is to wrestle with the big monster of the historical past, the great snakes of the centuries, the burden of the human mind, the problem of Christianity. It would be so much simpler if I knew nothing: but I know too much, through my ancestors and my own education. Other people are not worried by such problems, they do not care about the historical burdens Christianity has heaped upon us.[25]

And above all, Jung also knew how important it is

> to connect the life of the past that still exists in us with the life of the present, which threatens to slip away from it. If this link-up does not take place, a kind of rootless consciousness comes into being no longer oriented to the past, a consciousness which succumbs helplessly to all

> manners of suggestions and, in practice, is susceptible to psychic epidemics (*CW 9 i*, 267).

By referring to Wotan as "the German archetype" (*CW 10*, 393), Jung indicated where the roots of Germanic man are to be sought. It will not do for us to turn to the East. "Though we can learn a lot from Indian thought, it can never express the past that is stored up in us" (*CW 9 ii*, 271). But Jung, even though he wrote his essay on Wotan, probably still did not pay enough attention to the deepest, most neglected and most repressed layer of the soul of transalpine man, that layer which awaits the reawakening of the slumbering Germanic Gods. As was pointed out earlier, Jung was first inspired by classical mythology (Creuzer), and his major interest later on, alchemy, held him in the neo-Platonic tradition. In addition, it was Christianity whose problems occupied him in a very personal way, as we just heard. And despite his clear knowledge that before Christianity "there was for most western peoples a considerably longer period of polytheism and polydemonism," he nevertheless emphasized, "The premise we start from is and remains Christianity . . ." (*CW 9 ii*, 271). Jung never actually got to those ancestral roots that, as he well knew, lie rather untouched beneath our Christian and classical past. Even the Celtic Merlin, who fascinated him and in whose shape Wotan accompanied Celts and Germans into Christianity, happened not to become a subject of study for him since he did not want to interfere with Emma Jung's Grail research.

But Jung did not only know about our Germanic roots; he probably also was very close to them experientially — or rather they to him. For how should we understand that Jung never succeeded in going to Rome, prevented by fits of fainting? How, if not a protest of the neglected North against the overpowering, classical, Mediterranean South, and of the Germanic Gods against Christianity, of Wotan versus the Crucified (to modify Nietzsche).

It is time to lift the repression that keeps the Germanic Gods in the unconscious and us in unconsciousness about their claims on us. But in opening ourselves and our psychology to Germanic mythology, we must guard against simplifications and against any over-

reaction. To be sure, we *are* Northerners, and Wotan *is* "the German archetype"; but our Christian and classical past is just as inalienable as part of our personality. What is needed is not merely that we get acquainted with Germanic myth, but that we, when doing so, remember the demands of the non-Germanic images and ideas on us, and slowly begin *to take apart the elements of the undifferentiated cluster* we spoke of: distinction, discrimination. Germanic mythology alone could trap us into a mere reversing of the previous one-sidedness. The study of this mythology must be accompanied by a constant awareness of our Roman-Christian 'bias.'

That is, we have to acknowledge and accept the deep split in our soul, the one between North and South (Rome). Our goal will be to prepare the ground for a reconciliation between Wotan and Christ, to mention these two only. A prototype for such a reconciliation may be the one from Germanic mythology itself, as described by Snorri,[26] who, writing at a time when Iceland accepted Christianity, probably knew that transition from one religion to another required a peace not on the human, but on the highest level, a peace between the two parties of Gods themselves, if there should not remain an ever-open wound. *Within* Germanic mythology the older Gods, the Vanir, and the newer Aesir did make such a peace, but between Germanic and Christian mythology there has not been a reconciliation to the present day — except for Snorri's own attempt in his *Prose* (or *Younger) Edda.*

So that there may be a true peace, there must however first be an open conflict. What our history has seen so far was either a decision for one side and the suppression or repression of the other (usually 'pro-Rome' and against the Germanic roots, but occasionally also the reverse, such as Luther's break with Rome) or, by some of the greatest minds, too early and too easy attempts at synthesis (Leibniz, Hegel). Germanic mythology involves us and our psychology in the task of deep shadow integration, a decisive act of therapy.

(Translated from German by Wolfgang Giegerich.)

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2 G. F. Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker,* 2. Aufl., 1835.

3 J. Hillman, "Psychology: Monotheistic or Polytheistic," *Spring 1971;* J. de Vries, *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte* II, p. 357; W. F. Otto, *Theophania,* Nachdruck 1975, Frankfurt a/Main.

4 On the stability of myth in function, type and form see the works of Eliade and Dumézil, quoted by H. Fromm, "Lemminkainen und Baldr," *Festschrift für Friedrich von der Leyens, 1963,* C. H. Beck, München, p. 287.

5 *The New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology,* 10th impression, London/New York.

6 M. -L. von Franz, *Creation Myths,* Spring Publ., 1972, p. 220.

7 A. Heusler, *Thule, Vol. II,* p. 37 Diederichs, 3rd impression, 1972.

8 From the Program of Lectures, Winter 1977/78, of the C. G. Jung Institute Zürich (translated).

9 R. Donington, *Wagner's Ring and its Symbols: The Music and the Myth,* London, 1963.

10 Ibid., p. 15.

11 Ibid., p. 260f.

12 A. Heusler, "Die Herrenethik in der isländischen Saga," *Germanentum,* 1921, p. 67.

13 L. van der Post, *Jung and the Story of our Time,* London, 1976.

14 Ibid., p. 21.

15 Ibid., p. 23.

16 Ibid., p. 67.

17 Ibid., p. 67. On the unlikelihood of Jung's alleged preference for Wagner, see the statement from *CW 10,* 432 quoted above.

18 On demons and the demonic, cf. J. Hillman, "The Pandaemonium of Images. C. G. Jung's Contribution to *Know Thyself," The New Lugano Review* (III/3-4), 1977.

19 M.-L. von Franz, *Die Visionen des Niklaus von Flüe,* Zürich, 1959, p. 7, quoted Jung: Es ist sympathisch, dass der einzige schweizerische Mystiker von Gottes Gnaden unorthodoxe Urvisionen hatte und unbeirrten Auges in die Tiefen jener göttlichen Seele blicken durfte, welche alle, durch Dogmatik getrennten Konfessionen der Menschheit noch in *einem* symbolischen Archetypus vereinigt enthält.

20 H. Buder, "Bilder der Reifung im Traum," Stuttgart, 1977 (privately circulated).

21 R. B. Kledzik, *Assimilation to the Archetype of Wotan,* Diploma Thesis, C. G. Jung Institute, Zürich, 1969.

22 In this connection one might ask, what happens to Christ in the countries where *he* is systematically repressed?

23 A. Ammann, *Tannhäuser im Venusberg,* Diploma Thesis, C. G. Jung Institute, Zürich, 1963.

24 J. Hillman, "Dionysus in Jung's Writings," *Spring 1972.*

25 C. G. Jung, *The Tavistock Lectures,* 1935, *CW 18.*

26 The Icelandic "Allthing" voted in 1000 for the acceptance of the Christian faith, but the pagan Gods might still be worshipped. No foreign missionaries were allowed. Bishop Saemund (1056-1133) who had studied in Paris, began the collecting and writing down of the old lays of the Gods and heroes. Ari, the priest (1067-1148), continued this work. It was crowned by the layman Snorri Sturlson (1179-1241), Scaldic poet, historian of the Norwegian kings, influential politician, author of the *Prose-Edda* "that the old myths should not be forgotten."

# ON DEPRESSIVE DELUSION

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The syndromes of mental disorder differ widely in the reactions which their delusional content arouses in the persons around them. If the syndromes are ranked according to these counter-transference reactions, then paranoid delusions come off best. Because delusion and reality are often so difficult to distinguish, these patients tend to be tolerated by their environment. Acute hallucinatory schizophrenic conditions, by virtue of the rich variety and peculiarity of their delusional content, have always held a fascination for the therapist, and as a result they have inspired an extensive literature.

Not so the "affective psychoses," whose depressive delusions show a quite different pattern. Their stereotyped themes of guilt, worthlessness, impoverishment, hopelessness, and sometimes apocalyptic doom have aroused much less diagnostic and therapeutic interest. This is clearly not in keeping with the respective prevalence of these syndromes. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates the incidence of depressive illnesses at no less than three to five percent of the population.[1]

In terms of counter-transference, it is likely that the affective aspect of these depressive disorders calls forth corresponding affective reactions on the part of therapists. The "affect" in question seems, in general, to consist in a kind of disinterest, frequently expressed as therapeutic resignation accompanied by a tendency to invoke the timeworn endogeny hypothesis. This renders the depressive less suitable as an object of scientific study than the paranoid or schizo-

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phrenic, for the simple reason that the affect involved itself inhibits the research motivation.

## *Historical Background*

"Melancholy" is one of the few terms carried over from the ancient pathology of humors. It designates a bodily condition, the surplus of black gall, held to be responsible for various physical and mental illnesses ranging from epilepsy to melancholy as we now conceive of it. It might seem strange that the motor discharges of the epileptic should have been attributed to the same principle as the oppressive gloom of the depressive, but this becomes clearer if we consider that the Greek word for gall also means anger, as is still evident in the term "choleric." It is almost as if ancient medicine had here grasped the latent destructive tendency of the depressive. Black gall in moderate admixture is an acknowledged constituent of the sound mind and body, but it has also been recognized always as a substance charged with destructive energy and quite capable of causing death. Thus, Sophocles uses the term *melancholos* to describe the toxic blood of the Lernaean Hydra, used by Heracles to poison his arrowheads. The centaur Nessus succumbed to its venom, as did Heracles himself.

The ancient physicians responded to this pathogenic principle in kind by treating it severely. Celsus (30 A.D.) mentions chains, chastisement, and shock treatment. In the Middle Ages, standard treatment included trepanation, the ever-popular bloodletting, and application of red-hot irons to the head until the bare bone was exposed.[2] Aggressive treatment has continued unabated down to our own time, as witnessed by electroshock therapy and the recent technique of sleep deprivation.[3] Even the 2,000-year-old standard treatment of purging with hellebore root *(Helleborus niger)* implies a tendency to fight fire with fire, at least in the pharmaceutical imaginings of the ancients. The *actual* pharmaceutical effect of the herb is to induce tarry stools through inflammation of the intestinal mucous membranes — clear proof to the ancients that black gall was being eliminated.

These examples demonstrate quite clearly the virulence attributed to melancholic disorders, as well as their emotional impact upon patient, therapist, and fellow-man alike. A havoc-wreaking pathogenic principle provokes correspondingly aggressive therapy, and the result is an emotionally tinged rejection of the patient by his therapist. The continued existence of this pattern is borne out by some modern critiques of psychiatry.[4]

The modern nomenclature "affective psychosis" is merely a contemporary rephrasing of the older idea of emotional threat. In analytical psychology, affect and emotion are a direct expression of the energetic charging of pathogenic complexes[5] and of unconscious energetic processes. Jung often stressed the dangerous nature of these processes and the considerable risk of unconscious contamination *(unbewusste Infektion)* inherent in them.[6]

It is my contention that the epidemic spread of depressive mental contents can be historically documented.[7] In the medieval religious movements and sects, the feeling that the end of the world was near attained epidemic proportions, helped along by the threat of plague and the pressure of bad social conditions; the concrete manifestation was the flagellant processions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. These were condemned by church, state, and society alike and sometimes even came under the scrutiny of the Inquisition, though their ideas were actually quite in keeping with the Christian thought of the time. The flagellants saw in the profligacy of the world, and of the clergy, a sign of the approaching end, to be met with self-castigation. These apocalyptic fears, however, carried with them great hopes of salvation, as manifested in widespread chiliastic speculations, or, on the secular level, in the common expectation that the emperor Frederick Barbarossa would somehow return. Such hopes of salvation and bliss are often hard to detect in the depressive patient, even though their presence is to a large extent responsible for the magnitude of depressive suffering.

Despite the considerable historical distance, parallels between these old apocalyptic concepts and those of our depressive patients can be drawn. Similar dynamics can be observed. There are references throughout history not only to the ominous, destructive as-

pects of depressive disorders, but also to their positive side. Thus, Aristotle considers melancholy an attribute of distinguished minds, a companion to the hero's calling. The positive aspect remains effective in Western thought, from the medieval clergy's special attention to melancholy to the broad popular development of the concept in the Romantic period, with its intellectualization of melancholy as a kind of *Weltschmerz* to which geniuses are prone. We should not overlook the creative and prospective potential always assigned to this seemingly destructive clinical picture. Thus, the modern philosopher Romano Guardini, in his essay on melancholy, builds his argument not only on the ancient and medieval traditions but finds parallels also in such modern figures as the melancholic philosopher Sören Kierkegaard.[8]

## *Depressive Delusion*

Although recently there has been some discussion in psychiatric literature about the historically changing forms of clinical pictures and their accompanying delusions,[9] the content of depressive delusion has remained surprisingly constant. The lamentations of a world-weary man recorded in an Egyptian papyrus shortly before 2,000 B.C. are quite similar to those of our present-day patients.[10]

H. K. Fierz[11] has urged us to 'keep our eyes and ears open' in order to get a clear picture of the event being confronted by the psychiatric patient. This admonition is particularly apt in the case of depressive delusions, since they lack the color and expressiveness of other types of delusion and, being by nature gray, monotonous, and unprepossessing, they are peculiarly susceptible to being overlooked or not being taken seriously. Fierz[12] and W. Alex[13] have shown that psychotherapy can have surprisingly positive results even in depressive psychoses.

One reason that depressive phenomena are easily overlooked may be that, in addition to being for the most part quite unimpressive, the actual delusional *content* is rather sparse. The pathological manifestations of affective psychoses are most evident as changes of affect. That is to say, the emotional values are more often altered

than the ideational content. What we encounter most frequently is a delusional *mood,* a somber, disconsolate tainting of the patient's view of the world. However, it is often evident that the treatment of depressive delusion is strongly affected by counter-transference. The therapist's defenses are easily projected onto the patient whose very real troubles then tend to be misunderstood as resistance.[14] As in the historic precedents, we find aggressive and destructive counter-transference reactions even in present-day analytical therapy, the more so the more severely depressed the patient is. Instead of emotionally going along with the patient in his depression, as Hillman suggests,[15] the therapist, unable to bear his own *therapeutic helplessness,* may seek to break down the patient's protective wall of silence. At the same time, the patient often perceives the therapist's undertone of fear and aggression more clearly than he himself does. Such aggressive counter-transference especially hinders one's cognizance of the depressive dynamics and of the delusional phenomena in their prospective or salutary aspect.

## *Case Material*

*I.* Galen,[16] born in 131 A.D. in Pergamum, tells of a patient who suffered from the delusion that Atlas, weary of the weight of the world, was about to shake off his burden and thus destroy not only the patient himself but all the rest of humanity. However absurd and 'crazy' this notion may have appeared to the people of the time, it nevertheless served to illustrate the burden that the patient felt to be weighing upon him, or descending upon him, threatening to destroy his world.

Seen in historical perspective, this idea may be taken as prophetic, reflecting the great upheavals that were then in the offing. One is tempted to equate Atlas' burden not only with the ancient world, but with the whole ancient world-view, which was beginning to crumble. The sociocultural ramifications of delusion are especially evident here. We may assume, taking the prospective point of view, that Galen's patient was struggling toward the kind of reorientation achieved by the patient of the Egyptian papyrus through his dialogue

with Ba,[17] stepping out of the severe ritual framework of his culture to face it as an individual. The collapse of old cults and ways of thinking is not only a destructive event; it also provides an opportunity for new creative possibilities and a new orientation of consciousness.

*II.* A woman in her mid-forties with the diagnosis of endogenous depression had spent several months of each year, over a period of five years, under psychiatric care in a clinic. Her somber world was portrayed to the therapist in black and bitter terms calling to mind the old meaning of "melancholy." Her seemingly abrupt mood changes were clearly of a delusional nature. Her laments of loneliness and isolation finally culminated in the distinct feeling that she had been "born alone." Several sessions later, apropos of her unstable relationship with a strongly mother-dependent partner, she complained that if she were to lose her lover, too, there would be nobody left "to hold her hand at the grave."

"Born alone" is a contradiction in terms, since the idea of birth presupposes someone giving birth as well as someone being born. One must revert to early myths of creation and the origin of man to find analogies to this idea of solitary birth. Only the primeval Gods gave birth through self-impregnation, their progeny being identical with themselves. The Egyptian scarab is a symbol of the "self-born" and is regarded as the creator of the Gods.[18] The patient's idea that someone should hold her hand at the grave is an obvious variation on the idea of sickbed or death-bed hand-holding. The grave, of course, lies beyond death, and in Christian terms it is only Christ who offers His hand in salvation there; the only ancient analogy is Hermes, Guide of Souls. If one pursues both analogies, one can clearly glimpse alongside all evident pathology the creative and transforming aspect of death — "dying" carries with it the idea of "becoming." And indeed, the patient's depressive self-reproaches soon changed unexpectedly into reproaches directed against the therapist, and the dissatisfaction with the analytical situation became the motive force for further change and for an emergence from the phase of stagnated lamentation.

## *Summary and Discussion*

Depressive delusion is a specific manifestation of depressive illness. In keeping with the nature of this illness, it appears predominantly in the form of delusional mood and only relatively rarely as specific delusional content. The delusional mood carries the patient into his own deep, dark places — areas that as a rule he has long repressed and has, indeed, fearfully avoided.

Often this obscure region of the soul is devoid of words and images at first. To find its key we must depart from psychopathology and seek clarification in the historical approach, with an eye to the positive potential of melancholy and its role as a normal constituent of existence. Guardini,[19] in his role as Christian philosopher, speaks of an "urge toward shelter and quietude, the inner gravitation of the soul toward the great Center, a surge toward inwardness and depth." In terms of analytical psychology, the goal formulated here is that of individuation. In view of the impaired prior development and neurotic thought-patterns of most depressives, this tendency toward individuation is highly perilous and may even be fatal; the self is constellated predominantly in negative and destructive images. Often, it is only at the end of a dark pathway that we are able to see that the patient, in his distraught traversing of precipices and sloughs, has been trying to find a firm footing all along.[20] If he succeeds in reaching this firm ground, the experience usually acquires a religious dimension, as Guardini foresees when he defines melancholy as the unrest of man in the proximity of the eternal.[21] When the delusional mood coagulates into an image, especially one so much at variance with external reality as to be termed a proper delusion, then considerable progress has been made. The soul has hit upon a vehicle whereby to convey a true picture of its condition, usually with clearly archetypal components. The nonverbal, nonvisual darkness of the mutistic depressive condition is lifted, and the depression, heretofore merely 'lived out,' is formulated into an experience that commands the full attention of the therapist. The destructive, hopeless, and somber material that now comes to light requires his sympathy and participation,

so that the latent creative and constructive possibilities may gradually come into their own.

The frequently reported increase of depressive illness in Western civilization points to its increasing significance as the reflection of a collective malady. The rough outlines of this problem can be easily recognized. There is a general tendency to repress depressive experience as an evocation of the dark side of life (death, destruction, disease). Foremost in the collective consciousness is the belief in technological progress, combined with untrammeled optimism as to world-betterment and attended all too often by hypomanic self-aggrandizement. The ideology of affluence and the confidence in a forthcoming general happiness are best understood as the outward projection of unconscious paradise fantasies.[22] Depressive experience, by shifting the emphasis, can help to restore the proper perspective; thus, it may even be regarded as a wholesome element. For the ancients, "melancholia" was a necessary component of the *mens sana in corpore sano,* and in medieval times pictorial and other admonitions toward *memento mori* served as ample reminders of the dark side of life. In our day, an increasing tendency to question technological progress can be noted. It seems quite possible that the incidence of depressive illness will diminish when the collective consciousness admits of more latitude for depressive thoughts, and for posing questions in general.

Freud commented thus in 1916[23] on the delusional self-reproach of the depressive: "He must, in some way, be right, and he must be describing something that actually is as he imagines it to be." If we are prepared to regard all depressive phenomena as serious statements about a hidden reality, if we can even see depression itself as a reality-principle, then, if we are very patient, we may succeed in introducing some light into its darkness.

Many points have only been hinted at here. But the analyst who is experienced in the treatment of depressive patients and aware of the broader context will easily be able to fill in the missing links: the connections between therapeutic helplessness and masochistic triumph, between depression as a reality-principle and hope,

which is often an illusionary principle too easily applied to patients such as these.

*

The history of therapy shows that melancholy has always been thought to harbor a highly aggressive and destructive pathological principle, and this has long been combatted with draconian methods, which today are abetted by the analyst's own counter-transference aggression. Thus, the prospective aspect of what is going on in depression cannot be uncovered without the therapist having to endure his therapeutic helplessness and integrating his aggressive counter-transference.

Interpreting depression (its dynamics and its content) in the light of ancient concepts of melancholy enables us to view it as an essential constituent of existence, as a component of psychic reality. In terms of individuation, its "heaviness of spirit" *(Schwermut)* may help the mind to acquire a necessary substance and depth. Depression leads to realms of the soul where the question of meaning and the religious dimension of experience are of vital importance.

(Translated from German by Lee B. Jennings.)

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3 B. Pflug and R. Tölle, "Therapie endogener Depressionen durch Schlafentzug," *Nervenarzt* 42 (1971), 117.

4 P. Lomas, "Taboo and Illness," *Brit. J. Med. Psych.* 42 (1969), 33.

5 *CW 8,* 18-19.

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13 W. Alex, "Depression in Women," *Professional Report of the 16th Annual Joint Conference of Jungian Analysts of Northern and Southern California,* 1968.

14 H. -J. Wilke, "Die Bedeutung des Widerstandskonzeptes für die Behandlung Depressiver," *Zeitschrift für analyt. Psychol.* 7, p. 286.

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16 Starobinski, p. 28.

17 See note 10.

18 Lomas, pp. 32 ff., p. 256 f.

19 Guardini, pp. 43 ff.

20 E. Neumann, *Ursprungsgeschichte des Bewusstseins* (Zürich: Rascher, 1949), p. 93.

21 Guardini, p. 52.

22 H.-J. Wilke, "Neurosentheoretische Überlegungen zur Struktur und Dynamik depressiver Erkrankungen," *Zeitschrift für analyt. Psychol.* 5, p. 81.

23 S. Freud, *Gesammelte Werke* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1963), X, 432.


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# DEFENSE AND TELOS IN DREAMS

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Whenever I call something in therapy a "defense," I am at the same time setting up something else as my therapeutic goal. A defense is only such because it defends against this implied goal. For example, if I view my patient as defensively isolated from his surroundings, I am implying interaction with these surroundings as my goal. If I see him as cut off, I am implying connection; if unadapted, then adaptation. Defenses make sense only in terms of some therapeutic goal or value.

So to regard defenses in dreams, I must also posit some goal within the dream against which the defense defends. I suggest this goal to be what Jung called the dream's telos, the dream's finalistic or purposive aspect, the direction in which it points, that for the sake of which the dream exists.

## *Internal Telos*

Jung distinguished this telos or finalistic perspective from Freud's causal, more reductive approach. Freud saw a variety of images appearing as disguises for a central idea to which they could then be reduced, whereas Jung insisted that distinct images are reducible neither to a central idea nor to something known. An image was 'more than' anything that could be said about it. For Jung, images opened out, i.e., had telos or purpose beyond themselves.

Jung's finalistic perspective is valuable not only for individual images, but also for the dream as a whole. That is to say, the dream itself intends something of psychic value; the dream itself has telos, purpose, that for the sake of which it exists.

To spot this telos within a dream, we must not reduce the dream. One way in which this reduction might occur is by placing the dream's purpose outside the dream. With the telos so displaced we

then find ourselves in the curious position of interpreting the dream in terms of a "cause" that doesn't appear in the dream at all. The dream then loses value by being reduced and explained as the result of something outside itself. It is required to fit into larger assumptions and serve a telos beyond the dream that has given the dreaming its value.

Let's say I dream I am having a banquet. If I place the purpose outside the dream I may say something like, "Yes, I dream I am having a banquet and that's because in real life I'm starving." The dream compensates and fulfills the larger assumption of balancing my conscious poverty with inner riches. This interpretation both reduces the dream's precise image to a general abstraction (compensation or balance) and places the reason for the dream's existence, its telos, outside the dream. Thus the dream has been robbed of its inherent purpose.

Also, the dream's meaning would then depend upon theoretical attitudes and factual events outside the dream — in this case upon the fact that I am starving and upon the theory of compensation. As these attitudes and events change from day to day and analyst to analyst (according to schools of interpretation), the value of a dream is subject to external vicissitudes. So we get competing interpretations of radically differing positions. Dream interpretation becomes an activity of the "realm of opinion" and the dream becomes arbitrary, subjective, dependent upon the external values to which it is related.

An interpretation of the same dream, telos intact, might go rather, "Yes, I dream I am having a banquet, because in some part of myself — no matter how miserable my life seems to me — I am nevertheless having a banquet. If this is surprising to me, then I have been missing something."

My intent in this paper is to view the dream as valuable in itself and irreducible to any other factor. I will consider the dream's purpose to be within the dream, and will take this purposive movement to be the dream's telos. With this value in mind we will eventually have a way of seeing what blocks, stops, or defends

against it. But first we need another principle, and for this let us turn to a rule of thumb formulated by the late John Layard.

*Layard's Rule*

*Nothing in the dream is wrong, except perhaps the dream ego.* Layard's statement gives primary value to the unconscious. All figures and events in the dream, as products of deeper psychic layers, are as they must be. They are genuine psychic expressions. But the dream ego, that by which the dreamer experiences himself, most closely reflects his conscious attitudes. This "I," like consciousness itself, tends to be one-sided and generally blind to deeper considerations, movements, and values. Thus the problems and conflicts in dreams cannot be blamed on one or another psychic figure — which is merely 'doing its thing.' Rather the dream ego's biases and attitudes must be examined for their role in the conflict.

*The Telos Perspective*

The Jungian consensus would surely see certain dreams from the perspective I am proposing. For instance, should a dream ego shoot a crowned snake or turn his/her back on a starving child, we would all agree that the dreamer (represented by the dream ego) is unaware of the deeper value of snake or child, and is thus behaving in ill-accord with the dream's purpose. Our agreement is possible because we have learned from our training the symbolic value of these particular images.

But let us pursue this example into deeper ambiguity — let's say the snake is not crowned, that it appears out of the sewer, or in mother's sewing basket, that its color is ugly, murky black, and that it is advancing on the dreamer to swallow him/her.

Here analytical attitudes will begin to divide. Some of us, siding with the dream ego, will view the snake as a threat to be avoided or confronted. Others, backed with amplification concerning the night-sea-journey, will view the same dream as evidence of an important process to be endured.

Possibly everyone at this point, however, would justify his/her

view by placing the dream telos outside the dream. If the analyst's penchant is for strong, achieving egos and the analysand (a male) is seen as rather weak in this regard, then the analyst will emphasize the compensatory virtues of snake-battling, standing one's ground, resisting the seduction of being swallowed. The dream would be seen as compensating the life situation of a dreamer who is weak, mother-bound and passive. Because he is passive, the dream shows that he is in danger of being swallowed. The psyche's intention or telos is to awaken him from that passivity by showing the ugliness of the situation to which he must not succumb. This interpretation of the dream's purpose depends upon our view of the dreamer and upon our general attitude that battling and standing one's ground is better than being swallowed into something unknown.

Although another analyst might view the situation quite differently, nonetheless his/her view would be, just as the first, based upon an external telos. Here I am imagining an analyst who does not him/herself fear "being swallowed," and whose sympathies lie much more in exploring rather than battling snakes, mothers, the unconscious. This analyst would be more likely to view the analysand as capable of benefiting from the night-sea-journey (as well as other in-depth psychic experiences). For this analyst the dream would be compensating the dreamer's one-sided, only conscious, life-involved attitudes, by initiating him into something much deeper.

In either case, whatever the analyst's proclivity and however he/she uses the idea of compensation, the telos of the dream will have been placed outside the dream, and the dream interpreted from the analyst's suppositions concerning the dreamer, the dreamer's situation, and psychic life in general.

*Compensation*

Both of the above analysts used an idea of compensation to justify their interpretations. This is possible because compensation can be stretched to cover whatever we wish it to cover.[1] But in either case the explanation by compensation signals that the dream is serving an external purpose. When we focus upon the dream itself — work-

ing merely with what is there — reference to compensation becomes unnecessary. It is only when we cannot imagine from and with the dream that we find ourselves speaking of compensation. When an image or dream appears opaque, we tend to leave it and turn to something more general and conceptually familiar. To face the imagistic reality of a swallowing snake, to explore precisely the way this image works in the dream, to feel the anxiety it creates, is difficult. Far easier to postulate about the dreamer whom the dream must be compensating, and about whom we already have ideas.

When we take the dream itself as a reality, as its own context and its own best expression, we find we must dig much more deeply into it. We cannot excuse our imaginative inadequacies by opining about the dreamer's life involvements and personal 'hang-ups,' replacing the dream's reality with what we think the dreamer should be doing about himself, his eros development, his inferior function, his authority problem. Without the idea of compensation ruling us, we may even discover that we have no strong view at all about crowned snakes or ugly snakes, and can quite simply take the images of the dream as they come.

Although I seem to be focussing upon analytical bias, that is not my main concern. Of course we all have theoretical positions and make suppositions about the patient. Neither am I primarily concerned with getting to the "objective" truth of the dream in any absolute sense. But I am attempting to stress the dream itself as prior to anything we can suppose about it. By returning to the dream I hope to clear the way so that we may discern the dream's own telos.

### *The Dream as "Just-So"*

Because Layard formulated his maxim by emphasizing the dream as "right," we might be led into a too-easy manner of dividing up dream situations. However, telos is not a matter of saying "this is right and this wrong," but merely "this is the way it is in this particular psychic situation." The dream is just-so. It's neither right nor wrong.

As illustration let's take the following dream fragment: "I am

wearing a green sweater, but my mother suggests I wear a red one." That my mother prefers red tells me something about my mother, tells me how she wishes to clothe my upper body in this situation; that I wear green tells me of my ego preference, the attitude I tend to wear. The whole image tells me that my green attitude is worn when her red preference is pronounced. It is not a matter here of choosing one color over another, but of becoming aware of the quality of these two preferences and their interplay as constructs in my psyche.

In an earlier article,[2] I suggested "when-then" as a way of viewing this interlinking among images and parts of images. This means that when one thing occurs (my green), another happens as well (my mother's red). Each is a condition for the other. The when-then viewing of images shows them to be psychic patterns, constructs — each part of which constellates the other.

The Layard maxim adds an emphasis or value to this way of viewing by implying that it may be more valuable to explore the mother's red than to reaffirm my own green attitude. As mother's red is furthest from my ego attitudes, my habitual and most conscious way of being, mother's red (as more unknown) is what I most need to become aware of. Finalistically, it leads my awareness further into unknowns, hence deeper.

*Individuation*

What we are calling telos might also be regarded as the individuation of the dream. Even in this rather innocuous example, realization of my mother's red leads my psyche beyond the conscious boundaries it has set for itself. My awareness becomes deeper and more differentiated. Viewed in this quite specific manner, individuation becomes an actuality by being imaged in a particular. This is not to speak of individuation as an overall generalization, an abstraction concerned with unions of opposites. But rather we find ourselves focussed upon precise moments as they appear in each dream. This focus brings individuation into the actuality of particular moments.

To regard individuation as a value in every dream gives most

credit to the psyche as it actually appears. Moreover, the Layard maxim implies that the tensions and conflicts that appear in dreams (as in life) are necessary, even essential. The psyche is deeply complicated, and its tensions are the means by which it moves. The ego-alien others who give trouble to the dream ego, sometimes torturingly, are at the same time making possible the individuating movement. The tension is the grist by which the psyche works, the manner in which it enlarges and differentiates itself. This is an individuation without banners, but it is nevertheless true to the unique personality in all its limitations and particular conflicts. In fact, the shape of these limitations and conflicts *is* the unique. Individuating *is* wrestling with the psyche's telos — even when this telos runs counter to the ego's natural perspectives and normal behaviors.

*Image Value*

When we examine images within the dream context, we find we cannot regard any image *per se* as necessarily more important than another, or more likely to carry the dream telos.

To return to the crowned-snake image, let's pretend the dream went like this:

> There's a crowned snake for which I am the guardian. My job is to bring it rats to eat. Suddenly one of the rats attacks and bites me.

Here the crowned snake, although perhaps still a numinous image, is not the carrier of the dream's purpose. Of the two images, rat and snake, the snake is closest to ego consciousness (that which the ego guards); but the rat, less symbolically numinous, traditionally a pest, a "traitor," is here functioning as the dream's telos. Crowned snake, as most ego-syntonic, is also most allied with ego defenses; whereas rat as ego-alien carries the dream's telos. The ego-defense mechanism involves feeding rats to the crowned snake. Now what might this look like?

Might it be that the dreamer rids himself of his rats — his lowly, scavenger sense of the shadows and the desolated, his instinctual survivors — by giving them over to a majestic, magical, shamanistic

aspect of his personality that is more highly valued? As such, this ingesting (rat into snake) is a transformation, and a valuable psychic process. But here the emphasis is quite the contrary. The rat instinct rebels, demanding recognition in its own terms — which evidently are not to be crowned snake terms! No longer may rat be simply given over to, and swallowed up by, crowned snake. The defensiveness of this ingestive movement has become apparent through the counter-movement of the rat's bite. The rat's attack is upon the dreamer's body. So for the dreamer to be in touch with rat is also perhaps to be in touch with body, the means through which the rat has reached him. And vice versa, to be in touch with body is to be aware of the realm of the rat — its sense of shadow and its sense of survival.

Our main point here is that images must be within a context to tell us anything concerning telos and defense. Within the larger dream context images show interconnections and interactions, so that we can then recognize telos as that which is more ego-alien and defense as that which is more ego-syntonic. Ego is not threatened by what defends its attitudes and modes of perception, but rather by what challenges and disturbs.

*Feeling and Defense*

We have seen that a numinous image, like the crowned snake, need not carry the dream telos. Nor can we necessarily decide upon this telos with our 'feeling.' Often what feels most right or most important feels so because it is closest to our ego attitudes. Feeling can be as much the ego's statement as can thinking or any other mode of apperception.

Feeling is particularly difficult to disentangle, however, because feeling *feels* so personal, so right: feelings are intimately involved with the ego's sense of value and emotional truth — qualities not easily set aside for what sometimes seems an inhuman, unfeeling telos. For example, a man dreamt that he had to be given a transfusion of blood from a sick woman. This image feels revolting to our sense of health and our ego expectations concerning treatment and cure.

It feels humanly, medically wrong. To take infected blood into one's veins is somehow just too much.

There are indeed many dream images that make us feel appalled or angry or ill. Yet the dream telos does sometimes lead into these. So to follow the dream we have to admit that the psychic value may lie just where our feelings most rebel. To work with the Layard maxim means that we may not take our first level, only-natural feelings too literally. In fact, these very feelings — shared by the ego in the dream, and by both the dreamer and the analyst in the session — may be precisely where the defense against the dream telos is now hiding.

So the Layard maxim requires a certain delicacy, because we all hold our feelings dear and do not want to suspect them. The act of bringing home the value of a repulsive or cruel dream telos, against our natural feelings, requires a more subtle feeling attunement and empathy, than in those instances that pose no threat. To side against our first and natural feeling requires a differentiation of feeling so as to feel the value of what the psyche values.

## *Defense and Telos*

Freud viewed symptoms as compromise solutions. He meant that symptoms act as safeguards, giving a partial expression to unconscious contents thereby assuring their continued repression. Imagined physically, this mechanism is like letting some steam from a pot escape so that the pot doesn't blow its cover entirely. In other words, repression is maintained by relieving some of its pressure in the form of symptoms.

Symptoms are defenses. So, for our purposes, let us hypothesize that *a defense expresses something of the unconscious content from which it would defend itself.* As I put it elsewhere,[3] like not only cures like but like also *defends* against like.

Further, defenses are most effective the more closely they simulate the enemy (from which they would defend themselves). This implies that if taken far enough, a defense could become indistinguishable from its enemy. By simulating ever more closely, the defense

becomes more like that content from which it is, with increasing effectiveness, defending itself.

Let's say I have a cold that simulates my unconscious sense of being 'in the cold,' uncared for. My symptom both expresses the unconscious content (being cold and unloved) and defends me from having to recognize that feeling directly. Yet the worse my cold becomes, the more apparent to me that I do in fact need more care. Thus my symptom has led me to the unconscious content from which it had been partly defending me.

Or, to take another example, by placating my mother with simulated love, I defend myself against my deeper love for her; but the more I simulate, with little attentions and gestures, the closer I also come to the content of the love. Or again, let's say I have somatic symptoms that express my feeling of sickness; the more I somaticize in this manner, the closer I come to being actually sick.

By stressing the content of the defense, we have been moving from a Freudian to a more Jungian attitude. We have said that the defense expresses that content from which it would defend itself. Now to take the Jungian leap: each content has telos. If a defense expresses unconscious contents (Freud), and if unconscious contents are purposeful (Jung), then, as our title suggested, "defense and telos in dreams" have an inherent relation; in fact the defense is one face of the dream's purpose, and necessary to the dream's just-so nature. *The defense is as purposeful as the telos itself.*

The problem is of course that defenses also unfortunately block. However, a defense resists not only because it is a defense and that is what defenses do, but it resists also because it has a hidden value to protect. It, too, expresses the dream's telos. So a defense does two apparently contrary things: it both carries telos and blocks the realization of that telos. It both expresses and defends.

### *Interpenetration of Telos and Defense*

Our perspective on the relationship of defense and telos has by no means provided us with a formula for easy cure. How can we work with a defense that is itself a protector of psychic values? How can

we dismantle a defense without at the same time simplifying the purpose of the dream, of which the defense is an integral part? Simply to analyze the defense away would be to destroy the psychic value that it carries.

Also, we have lost the original handles on our inquiry. The two distinctions, telos on the one hand and defense on the other, have now become ambiguously mixed. We can no longer claim with the same assurance that telos-and-only-telos is represented in one part of the dream and defense-and-only-defense in another. As much as we would like to say, for instance, that one dream figure was clearly helpful and another defensive, now we must add helpful for what and to whom? Defensive in terms of what? For each figure is going to be in some sense both, and we have relinquished any perspective outside the dream from which to judge. Although we may make initial distinctions between telos and defense, these distinctions are only in order to appreciate finally their deeper interpenetration.

Let us put our perspective to practice. The following two images appeared in a man's dream. "I see a hanging, naked, dead woman .... I put on a red dress ...."

*Á la* John Layard, we can start off by saying that the dead, hanging, naked woman is the dream's telos. But we must go further; otherwise we would divide telos from defense, and simply condemn the ego for the wrongness of its red dress. So we go on to say: the first image shows the psychic state (hanging, naked, dead woman) perceived by the dream ego. The second image (I put on a red dress) describes what the dream ego does. When he sees the dead, naked woman, he defends himself by putting on a red dress. His reaction is his resistance against a particularly horrifying image. But still, why this particular defense? The defense involves a "putting on" from the outside, donning an "appearance," which is feminine (a woman's dress), red (an extraverted vibrant color, of visibility, fire, blood, passion). Is the defense like hysteria, implying acting-out, ostentatiousness? Is he in the "habit" of living a manic life in defense against the sense of a dead soul?

Let's assume this to be the nature of the defense, but now for what purpose? Presumably to avoid something that would be more

painful or difficult to realize. For this dreamer it is apparently easier to move into the demonstrative show of feminine red clothes, than it is to feel the fact of his hanging, dead, unclothed woman. Yet it is a neurotic circle. To reverse the image, it is also *when* he puts on red dresses that his woman is *then* hung-up and naked.

Freud would say that this defense works because it gives partial expression to unconscious forces, therefore compromising the need to change. But Jung would ask what content the symptom (of putting on the red dress) is trying to express. What is its purpose? Its existence cannot be completely negative, 'nothing-but' defensive. The dream ego's dressing must also be intending a purpose, pointing toward something.

Most obviously what this defense seems to point toward is woman. And it does so vividly — with red. Yet also, that from which the dreamer would escape is woman (in the form of a dead, naked, hanging one). So we see that, on a deeper level, *the telos of the defense and the telos of the dream are secretly intertwined.*

*Likening*

We have viewed the donning of woman's clothes as an attempt to simulate woman. The ego's natural mode of defense has been to liken himself flamboyantly, apotropaically to that which he fears, thus dispelling its death-like threat. His response has been on the level of appearance (as was Hercules') by wearing woman's clothes. Yet wearing is also bearing, carrying, habituating, giving a style to, fashioning, finding a mode for, taking on with one's body — not just covering as a persona.

We need not let the dreamer's "likening" end here as an hysterical put-on. Therapeutically we can deepen the defensive response mimetically through the likeness it has already formed to woman. By wearing woman's clothes, the dreamer has taken on something woman-like. Were he to take on more womanliness in other ways, the content need be lived no longer defensively and superficially. That is to say, the more the dreamer can recognize the value of the content woman, the more blood he can give to it, the less hung-up

and burdensome it will become as a dead concept drying in the air. Then the defense can be relieved of having to be the sole mode of enacting the value of woman.

But in order to relieve the defense carrying the woman-content, we must return to the original image that his ego fears: dead, naked and hanging. Is her telos perhaps her very immobility, hanging gravity, weight, verticality, her unclothed state, her exposure to the air, her suspension (suspended animation), a sense of tragedy of a psychic reality to be lived with? The image sobers, makes grim. When in touch with her, red appearances become pale; put-ons become showy dressing; emotionalized acting-outs show up as pseudo; dramatic expressions appear as mere coverings. In the face of her stark immobility, this image that won't go away, extraverted enactments may slow into ritual and gain the weight of body. Then, "becoming more feminine," "integrating the anima" may move from a defensive act of show, the counterpart of a conceptual idea, to a living reality of feeling.

Our model has allowed us to discover a telos in the dream ego's defense. Recognition of the purpose in the defense frees it of the values it has had to protect. But in order for a defense to be so freed, it must first be dismantled with a critical eye to its pathological structure, its too-easy way and secondary gains. Assuredly the defense, invented by Freud, deserves a Freudian treatment. It needs severe reduction and to be brought home as an ego-defense mechanism. But the dream is more than the ego's defense; it is also the psyche's purpose. And this purposefulness may be discovered in even the ego's pathology. For the ego's pathology is inherently in sympathy with the psyche's individuation.

1 Cf. "On the Nature of Dreams," *CW 8,* 546, where Jung discusses how compensation may oppose, vary upon, or agree with the conscious attitude.

2 See my "An Approach to the Dream," *Spring 1974,* p. 63.

3 See my "Demeter/Persephone and Neurosis," *Spring 1975,* p. 189.

# MUSICAL THERAPY

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Although the use of earphones, stereophonic sound systems, massive record collections, and peripatetic tape recorders may give the impression that music therapy is a recent phenomenon, that is not the case. The connection between music and the soul has been noticed and exploited for centuries. Plato warned against the use of certain musical modes or scales, medieval church authorities proscribed "pounding the organ" during certain ascetic seasons of the liturgical year, Congreve claimed that music could "soothe the savage breast," and an odd Platonist of the Italian Renaissance, Marsilio Ficino, practiced music therapy with instruments and voice. It is no secret that there is psychological value in music. What is less widely known, perhaps, is that there are musical values in psyche.

What I wish to propose is musical therapy as distinct from music therapy. The latter is a matter of recordings, instruments and sound. At its lowest level it is "musak" in the service of psychotherapy. At its best it is a recognition of the value to soul of the art of music in all its variety. By musical therapy, on the other hand, I mean a music of the soul that may be altogether silent — no violins, no singing, no audible vibrations. The movements of the soul, its various elemental factors, its scales and tunings, melodies and harmonies — these make a music which is re-presented in performed and recorded music, but in itself is "audible" only to an "inner ear" that is tuned to the fundamentals and overtones of the soul.

This notion, too, is nothing new. During the period of the Middle

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Ages and Renaissance it was called *musica humana.* In the sixth century Boethius made a significant distinction among the kinds of music. He divided music into three parts: *musica instrumentalis,* the music we hear with our ears; *musica mundana,* music made by the movements of nature — the circlings of planets and the rhythms of seasons; and *musica humana,* the music created from the counterpoint of virtues, moods, and feelings experienced within the person himself. *Musica humana,* or musical therapy, is a way of imagining the soul, and its chief merit is that it pictures the soul in movement and describes it in metaphors other than visual. We will consider how a psychotherapist might develop a "good ear" as distinct from gaining in-sight into psyche, but first we must explore the musical fundamentals of the soul.

## *Harmony*

"Harmony" as the word is commonly used is of little use to a polytheistic archetypal psychology. Harmony in the usual sense derives from a fantasy of wholeness. To harmonize one's life would be to bring all the bits and pieces together in the service of some overarching egoistic intent. Indeed, in ordinary music, harmony for the most part is a system of arranging all the tones of a composition as functions of a single tonic or "key" tone. Thus, in Mozart's G Minor Symphony each note in the first movement can be analyzed as a function of the note "G." "G" is the ego of the piece, setting it in motion, structuring its every moment, and making the final cadence final.

But there is an older meaning for the word "harmony" in music theory, one which reflects the polycentric nature of soul. In Pythagorean music theory, one creates harmony by constructing a scale, by tempering and tuning. Without temperament and without a scale music is impossible. Before the music can begin, the infinite possible tones within the reach of an octave have to be reduced to a definite number, to a few clearly distinguished tones. According to legend, when Pythagoras was measuring his single-stringed instrument or clanging some anvils, he discovered the remarkable phenomenon that the purest intervals of a scale correspond to the

simplest mathematical proportions of the measured string. The ratio 2:1 produces an octave, a relationship in which the two tones sound almost identical. 3:2 produces a fifth, the next purest sound, and 4:3 the fourth, the inversion of the fifth. With these simple proportions we have the foundation of Western music.[1] For Pythagoras the discovery was astounding. He believed that he had found the secret structure for the entire universe: all things built on number in simple proportion, demonstrated aurally in the inescapable "harmony" of the musical scale.

"All things" built on number included the cosmos and the soul, and it is from this Pythagorean fantasy that we get the idea of human and cosmic music. But what is especially significant for us is the fact that harmony in this context means multiplicity. To harmonize is to distinguish, divide, measure out. Music begins by making clear distinctions among the fundamental elements, the tones of the scale. It is also significant that this "harmonizing" takes place before the making of melodies. "Before" is to be understood as both temporal and structural. Before a composer writes he must know the characteristics of the distinct notes of the scale; before a performer plays he must tune his instrument so as to play the proper tones in their due proportions. In the music itself, all the melodies consist of imaginative variations on scale-tones and on the peculiar properties of their interrelationships.

Here, then, we arrive at the first principle of musical therapy. It is essential to develop a theory and an ear for the fundamental elements which lie at the root of the flow of human experience. Once again, we do not have to devise new metaphors to maintain the basic musical analogy, for a centuries-old tradition points to the correspondence between the seven tones of the diatonic scale and the seven planets with their specific deities. As Robert Fludd's (1574-1637) marvelous charts and diagrams show,[2] the seven tones of the scale are to music what the seven planetary Gods and Goddesses are to the cosmos and to the soul. The psychotherapist as *musicus,* as musician, must have an ear for the temperament and harmony which resonate deep within the melodic (personal) events of life. To become familiar with the Gods of polytheistic mythology, to dis-

tinguish them carefully, is essentially to discover the scale or scale-tones out of which experience is composed.

## *Temperament*

These Pythagorean analogies were developed in a remarkable way by Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499). Ficino engaged in both music and musical therapy. Most of his work aimed at training the imagination and memory in various ways in order first to distinguish the elemental factors in experience and then to set about keeping as much variety in life as possible. A healthy soul, he said, is one which is most like the sky — filled with many distinct, moving forms.

One method Ficino developed for forming a musical imagination involved sorting out ordinary music according to character corresponding to the various planetary Gods. Certain kinds of music would be Venusian in character, others solar, lunar, and the rest. When a person knew himself to be lacking in the qualities or benefits of a particular deity, listening to appropriate music might bring to that person the peculiar power or *spiritus* of that God.[3] With Ficino we get a rather sophisticated picture. Certain music conveying the character of particular deities is used in order to constellate within the person qualities of all these deities, establishing a psychological scale or temperament. Indeed, one of Ficino's favorite words is "tempering." Health is achieved by tempering one's soul as the zodiac is tempered. *Musica instrumentalis* is a method for tempering, whereas the elements of the soul are themselves the tones tempered.

We run into a problem with Ficino's notion of tempering, however. Can we simply take a look at ourselves or someone else, diagnose a lunar deficiency, play a lunar tune, and get back into temperament? It sounds too easy, and it seems excessively ego-centered. A solution may be found in the subtleties and paradoxes of Ficino's argument.

In addition to music, Ficino recommends dozens of ways for keeping the imagination alert. He advises such things as properly colored clothing, taking walks in selected environments, using herbs and spices with care, painting astrological pictures on the bedroom ceiling, or making mechanical working models of the universe. He

wants to make the entire environment a constant reminder (an art of memory) of the diversity and the strengths and weaknesses of the soul. Furthermore, his method is indirect. Listening to or playing lunar music will not automatically quicken lunar consciousness in the soul, but it will keep one's imagination awake so that when a lunar movement stirs, one can consciously recognize and cooperate with that movement. Ficino goes a little further, however, suggesting that our involvement with the world, when it is imaginative, actually graces our psychological life with a variety of spirit, or, to maintain the musical analogy, with resonance and tone.

Therefore, in the process of tempering, the ego works not as a senex king reigning with full control and purpose, but more in the manner of an artist. It is an aesthetic ego, at once attempting to create an expressive and deeply resonant life, and yet recognizing the necessity for cooperation and receptivity in the presence of transpersonal movements and factors beyond ego's resources. Ficino's own experience with Saturn makes the point. Saturn was prominent in his horoscope and in his life. He knew that he could not change this dominant, although he advised others suffering a similar problem to expose themselves to Venusian and Jovial objects as a partial antidote. Finally, the only way he could suggest to deal with Saturn was to get into his sphere without reserve. On the other hand, a favorite story Ficino liked to relate was the Judgment of Paris. He would point out the problems which arise when one consciously chooses one God above others. His universal rule: when faced with a choice, as was Paris, honor *all* the Gods.

### *Dissonance*

Once we get away from the notions that harmony is vertical or concerned with uniting diverse elements, that it is functional or basically monocentric, and that it is consonant or a pleasing blend of sounds, then we have room for dissonance. In monotheistic contexts, *musica humana* often involves an attempt to eradicate discord. Clement of Alexandria, for example, describes God as the New Orpheus who with his song "composed the entire creation into

melodious order, and tuned into concert the discord of the elements."[4] Ficino, on the other hand, pictures the world as an harmonic edifice where all parts are composed as a "lyre which produces concord complete with dissonances and consonances."[5] Dissonance has a place in this concord. Music without dissonance, if there is such a thing, is bland. Even the extremely cautious conservative music of the High Renaissance has some dissonance at almost every point.

Musical therapy, therefore, does not imply any harmonizing of life as avoidance of dissonance. Stability, evenness, calm, order, control, happiness and peace — these are not the goals of musical therapy. Dissonance has a place and even an energizing function. In music, sound dissonance creates climax and provides expressiveness, it gives bite and spice to an otherwise unsavory mixture of tones. For centuries one of the most dissonant intervals was the tritone or diminished fifth, sometimes called *diabolus in musica,* the devil in music. So in *musica humana* dissonance may be devilish and shadowy, but it also lends interest and motion. Just what is considered dissonant in music has changed over the centuries. In the Middle Ages the interval of the third was heard in many places as unstable and dissonant; today it is the epitome of consonance. So, too, for the music of the soul, dissonance is to an extent a matter of time and taste. What is shadow for some is sunlight for others. What is important, then, is not to define or exemplify psychological dissonance, but rather to sense its quality of instability and pungency, and to grant its place in the entire composition of the soul.

## *Overtones*

Robert Fludd was another in the line of original and highly imaginative thinkers of the Renaissance, a line which included such image-minded people as Cusa, Ficino, Pico, and Bruno. Fludd illustrated his writings with many intricate charts, many of which include images of *musica humana.*[6] For example, his "Temple of Music" pictures Pythagorean scales, Pythagoras' anvils, and three sets of organ pipes symbolizing the three kinds of music. Another chart is of special interest: "On the Internal Numbers and Harmony of Man." This diagram shows explicitly that the soul consists of three

octaves: the material octave, the mediating octave *(Anima Media)*, and the spiritual octave. In the chart the human body lies at the base of the three octaves, described as the vessels of all of them. Within the material octave Fludd places the four elements: earth, air, fire, and water. In the mediating octave are the seven planets, the fixed stars, and the prime mover. In the highest octave, the diapason of spirit, are the nine ranks of angels.

It is a phenomenon of acoustics that a tone, called the fundamental, produces overtones when it sounds. For example, when a string is struck or plucked it vibrates in its entire length, producing the fundamental tone. At the same time, it also vibrates in halves, thirds, quarters, and so on, producing the fainter sound of the upper partials or overtones. Usually one does not consciously hear these overtones as separate tones, but with a little training anyone can hear the first few. Add to this the fact that octaves sound as identical tones, only higher or lower, and we have an effective aural image for the psychological and spiritual depth or resonance contained in ordinary (body) events. Body is then the vessel of psyche and spirit as in Fludd's chart, as the fundamental and obvious "tone," while spirit and psyche are overtones.

Following Fludd (who, by the way, was well aware of Ficino's work), we arrive at an image of the musical therapist. This is a person who has an ear for the psychological overtones in events, represented especially by the planetary Gods, the archetypal images behind events; and he has an ear for the spiritual overtones, the angelic, connecting, analogical, rather subtle and volatile links between body and soul. Drawing on the other imagery we have discussed, we can describe the musical therapist as one who perceives the tuning of the soul, distinguishing its tonality — the basic spheres or tones which constitute its own deep-seated scale. He appreciates consonance and dissonance as desirable ingredients of the soul's music, and he has an aesthetic attitude toward the function of ego. He evaluates the patterns and movements of the soul as to whether they are "fitting"[7] and appropriate rather than natural, moral, or normal.

For the musical therapist a personal life is not a story but a melody, expressive and moving, or a composition of many melodies in harmony and counterpoint. Long or short, massively orchestrated or played with simplicity, behind the tunes sound the pre-compositional, archetypal modes and scales. This is the human music giving life tone and resonance. With *musica humana* in mind, Shakespeare's famous lines concerning music take on added significance:

> The man that hath no music in himself,
> Nor is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,
> Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils;
> The motions of his spirit are dull as night.
>
> (*Merchant of Venice,* V.i. 83-86)

1 For a thorough treatment of Pythagorean music theory, see Richard L. Crocker, "Pythagorean Mathematics and Music," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* 22, ii (1963), 189-98; 22, iii (1964), 325-36. For a general historical view of Pythagorean musical imagery in literature and religion, see: John Hollander, *The Untuning of the Sky* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1961) and Kathi Meyer-Baer, *Music of the Spheres and the Dance of Death* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1970).

2 Reproductions of Fludd's charts may be found in the following: Frances Yates, *Theatre of the World* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1969); Peter J. Ammann, "The Musical Theory and Philosophy of Robert Fludd," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes,* 30 (1967), 198-227; and in Hollander and Meyer-Baer.

3 For a more extensive discussion of Ficino's music theory, see D.P. Walker, "Ficino's *Spiritus* and Music," *Annales Musicologiques,* 1 (1953), 131-50.

4 Clement of Alexandria, *The Exhortation to the Greeks,* trans. G.W. Butterworth (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard Univ. Pr., 1919), p. 11.

5 Quoted in André Chastel, *Marsile Ficin et L'art* (Geneva: Droz, 1954), p. 57.

6 See Ammann.

7 Stanley R. Hopper introduced the word "fitting" in an ethical and psychological context in his lectures on "aisthesis."

# IMAGE AND SOUND: AN ARCHETYPAL APPROACH TO LANGUAGE

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> A new angelology of words is needed so that we may once again have faith in them. Without the inherence of the angel in the word — and angel means originally "emissary," "message-bearer" — how can we utter anything but personal opinions, things made up in our subjective minds? How can anything of worth and soul be conveyed from one psyche to another, as in a conversation, a letter, or a book, if archetypal significances are not carried in the depths of our words?[1]

The major move of archetypal psychology is that it places itself in a poetic tradition and essays a psychology of the imagination, a psychology which originates neither in cerebral physiology, ego psychology, nor behavioral analysis, but in the workings of the poetic imagination. Archetypal psychology assumes a poetic and mythological basis of mind.[2] In developing an "image-focused therapy"[3] founded upon the primacy of the imagination we approach the dream as "a statement in words, a linguistic image."[4] To approach the dream text archetypally is to envision the mythic image absorbed in the verbal structures, to see imaginally through the dream's linguistics. In doing so, we return the linguistic components of the dream text to their imaginal background in an attempt to expose the "archetypal significances . . . in the depth of our words." But before entering into an archetypal study of the dream's linguistics it is necessary first to review Jung's early research in psycholinguistics.

This paper is part of a longer study initiated by a grant in 1973-74 for sleep-dream research in relation with the word association experiment. Paul Kugler teaches at the State University of New York at Buffalo where he is also completing his Doctoral Dissertation. He is a Diploma Candidate at the C. G. Jung Institute, Zürich.

## *1. The Burgholzli Psycholinguistic Research*

Jung's interest in language and its relation to psychopathology and the formation of fantasies can be traced back to his early research with the Word Association Experiment at the Burgholzli Klinik. Under the aegis of his chief, Eugen Bleuler, and in collaboration with Franz Riklin, Jung designed an experiment to investigate the connection between word association, disturbance of attention, dreams, and psychopathology.[5] Jung discovered that apparently 'faulty' associations, responses conflicting with the 'meaning' of the stimulus word which Wundt had earlier interpreted as 'mistaken' and therefore neglected, were of particular value in understanding the unconscious fantasies disturbing the patient. The 'faulty' associations which previously had only been approached from the outside as phonetic responses resulting from "muscular stimulation" Jung now studied from the inside in terms of affectivity and inner psychic feeling-tone. The experiments verified Freud's findings in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* and indicated the existence of an unknown psychic factor, a complex, lying outside of consciousness and exerting an extraordinary influence on the formation of dreams, symptoms, and linguistic associations.[6] The complex Jung describes as an "autonomous group of associations" connected by a common feeling-tone at the core of which is a psychic image.[7]

Jung's research drew heavily on the results of earlier association experiments carried out by Kraepelin and Aschaffenburg in Heidelberg. To test the effect of tiredness and muscular stimulation on associations Aschaffenburg created a state of intense fatigue in his subjects and in the process administered a series of association tests. One quite remarkable phenomenon appeared in the subjects' associations: *with an increase in fatigue there was a marked decrease in the number of semantic associations with an increase in the phonetic variety.* The more tired the subject became the less his associations were influenced by the *meaning* of the stimulus-word, the semantic aspect, and the more he tended to associate words according to a similarity in *sound,* the phonetic pattern. A semantic association to "bloom," for example, would be "flower," while a phonetic asso-

ciation to "bloom" would be "bloomers" or "blood." The semantic association is governed by the meaning of the word, while a phonetic association is according to the sound pattern. Aschaffenburg theorized that the weakening of semantic associations with increased fatigue and the greater tendency to sound associations was the result of "motor agitation."[8]

In Zürich, however, Jung and Riklin's systematic research into the associations of normal subjects[9] led to a different conclusion concerning the cause of phonetic associations. The Burgholzli research indicated that the tendency to shift the mode of association from meaning to sound, from semantic to phonetic consideration, was not so much the result of being physically tired but rather a *lack of attention.* Jung writes:

> When a longish series of associations, say two hundred is given to a subject, he will, without really being tired, soon find the process boring, and then he will not pay so much attention as at the beginning. For this reason we have separated the first hundred from the second in our classifications and have found that in all cases where the subject had become bored there is a clear decrease in the internal [semantic] associations and a proportionate increase in external sound associations. This observation made us think that the cause of sound associations is not so much muscular stimulation, which is absent in normal boredom, but a lack of *attention.* . . . Furthermore, we found an increase in the proportion of sound associations with subjects whose ability to concentrate had been weakened by a recent affect, with psychotics. . . . *It can therefore be said that the more the attention of the patient decreases, the more the external and sound associations increase* [Jung's italics].[10]

The experiments with the Word Association Test indicated that "under normal conditions sound associations are continually opposed by inhibition . . . there will always be a certain tendency to surpress the sounds." However, "with increasing distraction the reaction will be more and more influenced by sound, *till finally only a sound will be associated* [my italics]."[11] In a further attempt to test Aschaffenburg's hypothesis that the weakening of semantic associations and the consequent tendency to phonetic associations are the results of bodily fatigue and motor agitation, Jung administered a series of association experiments to a subject immediately upon awakening. In describing the experiment Jung writes:

This subject, after mental work at night, is very drowsy in the morning and it is difficult to arouse him fully. These reactions were carried out while he was in bed and had just partially awakened. He had been previously informed that the experiment was to come off. The two experiments were carried out on two different days, at an interval of about a week. . . . The clang-reactions [phonetic associations] are extremely numerous, especially the rhymes. . . . In these experiments fatigue is quite excluded: it is only a question of a lowering of active attention, corresponding with the associative termination of the state of sleep. *It is known that during sleep attention is completely obliterated. Were we to succeed in producing reactions in a sleeping person (not somnambulistic sleep) clang-reactions would certainly be the exclusive results* [my italics].[12]

Jung goes on to suggest that the associative process in dreams must be entirely based upon phonetics, that the "subconscious association process takes place through *similarities of image and sound* [Jung's italics]."[13]

In recognizing the fundamental role of image and sound in the formation of dreams and unconscious fantasies Jung provides us with an extraordinary lead into the poetic basis of mind and an astonishing insight into the relation between phonetics and the imagination: sound and image. It is even more astonishing that Jung's contributions to psycholinguistics have been thoroughly overlooked. Perhaps the reason for this neglect has been the scientistic way in which his association experiment work has been taken by his followers, who were more concerned with putting Jungian psychology on an empirical (measurable and somatic) base than with reading for the deeper implications of what Jung had discovered.[14] Jung's association work, which took place seventy years ago, offers insight for the most contemporary thinking in linguistics,[15] because it suggests a fundamental law of imagination, that its mode of operation is sonorous, acoustic, phonetic, that there is an innate connection between logos and image, between word and fantasy, that words are fantasies in sound!

The Burgholzli research with the word association experiment resulted in two major contributions to psycholinguistic theory: (1) a person's speech consists of complexes, "autonomous groups of associations" at the core of which is a psychic image, and (2) the un-

conscious process of association is directed by phonetic consideration. Our psychic complexes structure not only our dreams and symptoms but also our personal speech. The morning process of writing down a dream involves the translation of a psychic image into a verbal structure, a phonetic script. *Through words our fantasies move from image to sound.*

Can these findings pertaining to personal speech habits be applied collectively to language as a whole? Does our language contain "autonomous groups of associations" connected phonetically and rooted in an archetypal image?

## *2. Dreams and Language*

In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud reports this dream by a woman patient:

> She was descending from a height over some strangely constructed palisades or fences. . . . She was holding a big branch in her hand; actually it was like a tree, covered with *red blossoms,* branching and spreading out. There was an idea of their being *cherry blossoms;* but they looked like double *camellias*. . . . When she got down, the lower *blossoms* were already a good deal faded. . . . A young man (a stranger) was standing in the garden; she went up to him to ask how branches of that kind could be transplanted into her own garden. He embraces her; whereupon she struggled and asked him what he was thinking of whether he thought people could embrace her like that. He said there was no harm; it was allowed.[16]

The above dream is described by Freud as biographical and the red blossoms and faded flowers are interpreted as an unmistakable allusion to sexual innocence and the fear of violation. Freud explains that the

> blossoming branch (cf. "des Mädchens Blüten," "The Maiden's Blossoms" in Goethe's poem "Der Mädchens Verrat") represented both sexual innocence and its contrary. And the same dream which expressed her joy at having succeeded in passing through life immaculately gave one glimpses at certain points (e.g. in the fading blossoms) of the contrary train of ideas — of her having been guilty of various sins against sexual purity.[17]

The significance of the interpretation is in Freud's realization of the fundamental association between violation and the red faded flowers.

In 1914 Freud added a short section to chapter six of *The Interpretation of Dreams* entitled "The Question of Symbolism in Dreams of Normal Persons." There he analyzes the following dream fragment which further illustrates the tendency in dreams to associate the loss of virginity with images of flowers. The dream was presented by a somewhat prudish and reserved woman who was engaged to be married but had indefinitely postponed the wedding ceremony.

> I arrange the center of a table with *flowers* for a *birthday*.[18]

When Freud asked what flowers they had been, her reply was: "Expensive flowers; one has to pay for them. . . . Lilies of the valley, violets and pinks or carnations."[19] The woman was then encouraged to give her associations to "violets." Much to Freud's surprise the dreamer gave as her association the word "violate." "The dream had made use of the great chance similarity between the words 'violet' and 'violate' . . . in order to express 'in the language of flowers' the dreamer's thoughts on the violence of defloration. . . . A pretty instance of the 'verbal bridges' crossed by the paths leading to the unconscious."[20] Here Freud recognizes, not only the dreamer's association of the fear of violation with images of flowers, but also the tendency of the unconscious to construct images according to phonetic consideration.

The following dream of a female student was reported by Thass-Thienemann:

> She went with her boyfriend to the junior prom. The boyfriend brought her a *carnation.* She was very pleased and in high spirits. She wore a beautiful white evening dress. They entered the ballroom exuberantly. They went in together. They attracted everyone's attention but to her great embarrassment she first perceived some *blood* dripping from her *carnation.* The *flowers* were *bleeding.* She left the *ballroom* in great embarrasment. She awoke with palpitations.[21]

Here the woman's penetration anxiety and self-conscious virginity ("beautiful white evening dress") is again expressed through the image of flowers. To the physiognomic perception, there must be something alike, an invariant or syncretic fantasy, which in the above dreams connects the disparate meanings of sexual violation

and flowers. Freud's assumption that the image of flowers has acquired the symbolic meaning of violation may sound strange at first, but upon closer inspection of the pertinent verbal forms one will find that the association is familiar to us, for instance, in calling the loss of virginity "de-floration" or "de-flowering"; the Latin "deflorationem" means, in fact, "plucking of flowers." Neither is it odd for Shakespeare to write: "the pale and maiden blossom became bleeding."[22] It could be objected that this is just figurative speech, but that is exactly the point. Language is always figurative, symbolic, and it remains a futile endeavor to try to separate the 'true' lexical sense from the figurative or metaphorical one. As to the metaphorical meaning, it would be a very poor explanation to state that "flowers" look like "female genitals"; therefore, they have been so called. We must admit that "flowers" and "female genitals" have very little in common on the level of object realities about which we are conscious, but if one looks into the archetypal implications of both ideas, one will discover a hidden association between "flowers" and the "violation" of "female genitals" in the evidence of language. In doing so we shall find first of all that one idea, "violation," is related to another one, "flower," through an archetypal image, a syncretic fantasy, which is alike in both. For this reason the word denoting "flower" does not stand alone; it is not an isolated phenomenon, but is connected by phonetic associations with other words. It belongs to a *complex of associations which all phonetically refer to the same archetypal fantasy.* The language of the unconscious, as Jung demonstrated through his experiments with the Word Association Test, is a system of manifold cross-references: one word represents only a very small part of the complicated association complex; therefore it can never properly be understood in itself, but only in the context of the affiliated words making up the linguistic complex as a whole.

### *3. Linguistic Complex and the Defloration Fantasy*

The Burgholzli research indicated that the unconscious associative process takes place through similarities of image and sound; there-

fore when different aspects of the same archetypal image are realized in language they tend to seek similar sound patterns and form a complex of phonetically affiliated words. Thus on a deep level (unconscious) there is a meaning-relation between phonetically associated words; however the connection is not via the literal lexical meaning, or syntactic relations, or common origin, but through the underlying archetypal image. The relation between the phonetic associations is imagistic, not lexical, syntactic, or etymological.[23] They are affiliated by a complex which is an acoustic-image.

Keeping in mind this network of unconscious associations, we shall try to unveil the archetypal image at the core of this linguistic complex. How is it that the dream image moved from carnation to blood?[24] This curious imagistic sequence becomes less mysterious if we take into consideration the other English words that have developed from the same phonemic pattern as carnation. Such words are "carnal," "reincarnation," and "carnage." But how can all these words be brought into a consistent unity? As object realities they have nothing in common, except that they *use the same phonemic pattern;* but if they are properly translated into their underlying archetypal image, we shall understand the interrelatedness of the meaning (semantic aspect), too. A "carnation" is a flower; "reincarnation" means a rebirth of the soul; "carnage" implies bloodshed; and "carnal" is an adjective meaning "in or of the flesh, sexual." The semantic aspect of this phonetic complex of associations circles around an image of rebirth connected with flowers, sexuality, defloration, and bloodshed.

The idea of defloration is often conceived in connection with fantasies of violence. The intrinsic connection between violence and the loss of virginity becomes more apparent through an amplification of the words associated phonetically to "violence." Such words are "violent," "violate," and "violet" (ref. second dream). The phonetic association among these words is again in accordance with the unconscious associations of their semantic aspects. "Violate" means "to rape"; "violent" implies a show of physical or emotional force; "violet" is a bluish-purple flower. It is significant that we have again developed the same complex of associations centering

on a fantasy of defloration, flowers, and rape from an entirely different root.

This preliminary amplification of the linguistic complex will take a more concrete shape as the German, French, and Hungarian counter-parts are brought into the picture. In German "Blut" is a singular meaning "blood"; the grammatically plural form is "Blueten," "blossom"; and the verb "bluten," means "to bleed." In French "viol" means "rape"; "violette" is a bluish-purple flower, a violet; and "violer" means "to violate." The same complex of associations also exists in non-Indo-European languages. In Hungarian, for example, "vér" means "blood," "véres," is "bloody," and "verág" denotes "bloom, flower."[25]

The obvious coherence of the phonetic patterns in each of the above linguistic complexes does *not* imply that the words in each complex necessarily must have a common origin. The connection between the German "Blut" and "Blueten" or the English "blood" and "bloom" is not etymological. The *Oxford English Dictionary* notes: " 'blood' is doubtfully referred to the verbal root *blō,* 'blow, bloom,' which suits the form but is less certain as to the meaning."[26] Their coherence may have evolved in a secondary way through convergent development. However, their common origin, their etymology, is not the important point, but rather their belonging to a linguistic complex of *phonetically* associated words.[27]

Already in 1908 Adolf Eberschweiler, at Jung's request, conducted an experiment into the linguistic components of associations[28] "which disclosed the remarkable fact that during an association experiment the intrapsychic association is influenced by *phonetic* consideration."[29] The experiments demonstrated that "the tendency to form a meaningful (semantic) association, which derives from the stimulus-word, inhibits sound association."[30] With increasing unconsciousness, however, "the reaction will be more and more influenced by sound, till finally only a sound is associated."[31]

Our phonetic approach to the image also extends to myth. Myths, as oral tellings, build their tales according to the archetypal patterns carried in the sounds of words.[32] The history of verse reveals that the great poets have tuned their perceptual systems to the archetypal

structures of sound and image, opening themselves to the angels inherent in language. The Homeric poet responsible for the composition of the "Hymn to Demeter" beautifully weaves the invariant complex of associations we have been examining into the defloration fantasy of the "Rape of Persephone."[33] Demeter's daughter, Persephone, has wandered off to the remote Nysian plain, where she is busy playing and picking roses, violets, and other flowers with the daughters of Okeanos. Gaia lures Persephone on in her search for flowers by presenting a strange and wonderful flower, never before seen. Astonished by the flower's beauty, she stretches out both hands to pick the delightful narcissus when suddenly the Earth violently opens and Hades drives his horses out of the gaping Earth, lifts the girl into his chariot, and takes his ravished bride back to his subterranean realm to consummate their marriage.

### *4. Invariant Structures of Sound-Meaning: Archetypal Linguistics*

If, as word association experiments indicate, unconscious associations are ultimately phonetic, how do we account for the interconnection of the meaningful (semantic) aspects of the sound-associated words? Here we do not follow Jung and Eberschweiler, whose views, as quoted above, imply an inverse proportion between sound and meaning — that is, the more phonetic, the less semantic. Rather, we are asking how it is possible that phonetic associations are indeed also meaningful, as witnessed in the "flower" complex we have been elaborating.

Linguistics has traditionally attempted to resolve the problem by resorting to causal explanations, e.g. "blending of two words," or to linear developmental reconstructions reflected in endless etymological treatises. But revisioning linguistics imaginally would offer an acausal approach to the traditional problem of the relation between phonetics and semantics, an approach which would envision the mythic image absorbed in the verbal structures. An image-oriented linguistics would attempt to see through the surface structure of phonetically associated words for the underlying deep structure, the archetypal image, which connects the disparate semantic aspects.

Thass-Thienemann, grappling with the thorny linguistic question of the multi-semantic aspect of a phonetic pattern concludes: "There is always *one* central idea reflected in all and each meaning. If there are five different meanings . . . they mirror, in five varieties, the one common center . . . the five meanings might be independent from, yet related to, one another through the common center which is mostly an emotionally loaded concept."[34] Through the word association experiments Jung arrived at a similar conclusion concerning the nuclear element responsible for the formation of an unconscious "autonomous group of associations." The test revealed that the complex of associations "is held together by a particular *emotional tone,*"[35] "a feeling-toned group of associations" at the core of which is an archetypal image.

We have seen that the different meanings (e.g. "flower," "rebirth," "bloodshed," and "sexual") which belong to the same sound pattern ("carn") are related imagistically, not lexically, syntactically, or etymologically. *On a deep level (unconscious) the meaning-relation between the complex of phonetically associated words is via the archetypal image.* In *Symbols of Transformation* Jung presents several extensive etymological analyses of archetypal themes[36] and concludes that "In considering the etymology . . . we have to take into account not only the migration of the root words, but the autochthonous revival of certain primordial images."[37] Of particular interest to Jung was the tendency for words whose meanings are related to the same archetypal image to seek similar sounds, phonetic patterns, even though etymologically distinct. For example, Jung writes:

> The phonetic connection between G. "Mar," F. "mere," and the various words for "sea" (Lat. "mare," G. "Mare," F. "mer") is certainly remarkable, though etymologically accidental. May it perhaps point back to the great primordial image of the mother who was once our only world and later became the symbol of the whole world?[38]

In a further amplification of the terms closely associated to Prometheus, Jung concludes:

> The line from "pramantha" to Prometheus does not go via the word, but more probably through the idea or image, so that Prometheus may in

> the end have the same meaning as "pramantha." Only, it would be an archetypal parallel and not a case of linguistic transmission.[39]

The problem of so many different meanings belonging to one phonetic pattern strikes at the heart of linguistics. Some linguists have argued that sound patterns are phonetically descriptive of their respective semantic aspects: the sound depicts the meaning. I am not presenting here another thesis in support of the theory that the sound expresses the meaning, i.e., the onomatopoeia or Bow-wow theory. Rather, we are dealing with the more fundamental phenomenon of *invariant verbal structures which remain unchanged over transformations.*[40] Charles Boer and Peter Kugler define invariance as the "information which remains unchanged in a structure over transformations of space-time."[41] Working from J. J. Gibson's ecological theory of perception based upon the human organism's evolved capacity to perceive invariants in the environment, Boer and Kugler emphasize the fundamental connection between archetype and invariant.

> *An archetype is an invariant relationship.* These invariants or archetypes carry with them what Gibson calls affordances. One of these affordances which an archetype carries is what an archetypalist would mean by a God. . . . The property of these invariants becomes formalized in language as a myth.[42]

The occurrence of the same complex of associations in the above examples is significant, not for the particular words or sounds involved, but for the fact that *each complex of phonetic associations represents a transformation of the same invariant relationship of meanings (semantic aspects).*[43] It is the *relationship* of the associations that remains constant, and "once we pick up these critical relationships, their meaning become explicit and no longer tacit."[44]

When James Gibson's ecological theory of perception is applied to language "the perceptual systems simply attune themselves to the invariant structure afforded by the language itself."[45] It is the invariant relationship of the associations in each phonetic complex that remains constant and is thus perceived, tacitly, in the waking state. However, "the more the attention of the patient decreases, the more the external and sound associations increase,"—the more

explicit the archetypal image-meaning becomes. By this I mean that phonetic associations are precisely where the archetypal presents itself. If we follow Gibson, the deeper inner meanings are immediately given in the surface external sound associations. To discover the archetypal significances in the depth of our language, we need but tune in to the invariance of the phonetic pattern, the sound, as does the patient in his spontaneous associations.

In his 1976 Eranos Lecture, James Hillman noted that the collective unconscious is perceived through environmental physiognomy, on the face or surface of things. The archetypal world is presented directly through the *imago mundi,* which can be heard as well as seen. The imagination is perceived not only physiognomically, but acoustically as well. As Wittgenstein said, phenomena "show themselves"—if we tune in.

The development of a sensitivity by the entire perceptual system to invariant archetypal information is *tuning,* referred to by Gibson as the "education of attention." Perhaps the reason dreamers, poets and madmen display such an uncanny sense of the depths of the imagination is that their perceptual systems — like those of the oral tellers of myths — are tuned to the invariant archetypal structures of sound and image. They truly perceive the world of angels, the world of words.

1 J. Hillman, *Re-Visioning Psychology,* New York: Harper and Row, 1975, p. 9.
2 Ibid. Also see Hillman's 1973 Eranos Lecture "The Dream and the Underworld."
3 Berry and Hillman, "Archetypal Therapeutics," an unpublished paper presented at the First International Seminar on Archetypal Psychology, University of Dallas, January 1977.
4 Ibid.
5 C. Jung, *Experimental Researches,* trans. L. Stein, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1973. Jung & Riklin, "The Associations of Normal Subjects," pp. 3-196.
6 Ibid., "Association, Dream, and Hysterical Symptom," §858-660.
7 Ibid., "Psychopathological Significance of the Experiment," §891-93.
8 G. Aschaffenburg, "Experimentelle Studien über Associationen," in Kraepelin, *Psychol. Arb.,* 1 (1896), 209-99; 2(1899, 1-83; 4(1904), 235-375.
9 Jung, *Experimental Researches,* Jung & Riklin, "Associations of Normal Subjects," pp. 3-196.
10 Ibid., "Psychopathological Significance of the Experiment," pp. 414-15.
11 Ibid., "The Associations of Normal Subjects," p. 171.
12 Jung, *Studies in Word Association,* trans. M. D. Eder, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 66.
13 Jung, *Experimental Researches,* p. 176.
14 The major contribution to Jung's theory of complexes and its relation to the Word Association Test is C. A. Meier's work *Die Empirie des Unbewussten,* the initial volume of his projected *Lehrbuch der Komplexen Psychologie.* Meier,

however, limits his work to quantitative and mechanical methods for empirically verifying Jung's findings rather than reading for the deeper implications in Jung's "theoria." A less empirical approach to the Word Association Test is presented in John Hill's short article, "Individuation and the Association Experiment" *(Spring 1975),* where he tries to see more imaginally into the archetypal aspects of Jung's association experiment.

15 In November 1977 at the University of Pennsylvania, Prof. A. M. Davis, the distinguished Oxford philologist, concluded her lecture on analogic change (in the diachronic description of language) with the suggestion to treat certain change processes as motivated by rules (rules of language change) that "operate on the surface levels besides the deeper *systematic* rules in the given language." Analogic change (one word changes its phonetic form, not meaning, in analogy to another otherwise unrelated word) shows that there are links between morphemes that are purely phonetic and have forced the change. Thus, such words are linked, not semantically, but phonetically. For the native speaker, however, there was some motivation to see a connection between two words which in turn led him to utter them in the same or similar way.

16 S. Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams,* trans. J. Strachey, New York: Avon Books, 1972, pp. 383-84. The original German dream text reads: "Sie steigt von hoch herab über eigentümliche Geländer oder Zäune. . . . Dabei trägt sie einen grassen Ast in der Hand; eigentlich wie einen Baum, der dick mit roten Blüten besetzt ist, verzweigt und ausgebreitet. Dabei ist die Idee Kirschblüten, sie sehen aber auch aus wie gefüllte Kamelien . . . Wie sie unten anlangt, sind die unteren Blüten schon ziemlich abgefallen . . . Im Garten steht ein junger Mann (von ihr bekannter Persönlichkeit, ein Fremder), auf den sie zugeht, um ihn zu fragen, wie man solche Aste in ihren eigenen Garten umsetzen könne. Er umfängt sie, worauf sie sich sträubt und ihn fragt, was ihm einfällt, ob man sie denn so umfangen darf. Er sagt, das ist kein Unrecht, das ist erlaubt." *Die Traumdeutung, über den Traum,* London: Imago Pub. Co., 1942, pp. 353-54.

17 *Interpretation of Dreams,* p. 354.

18 Ibid., p. 409. This dream and the associations appear in English in the original German text. See *Die Traumdeutung, über den Traum,* p. 379.

19 Ibid., p. 409.

20 Ibid., p. 410.

21 Thass-Thienemann, *The Interpretation of Language,* Vol. I, New York: Jason-Aronson, Inc., 1973, p. 179.

22 Ibid., p. 179.

23 For a discussion of the function of the unconscious based upon a linguistic model, essentially syntactic, see Jacques Lacan's *The Language of the Self.* An etymological approach is naively presented by Ernst Jones in *On The Nightmare* (Part III "The Mare and the Mara: A Psycho-Analytical Contribution to Etymology") and more intelligently discussed by Thass-Thienemann in his two volume work *The Interpretation of Language.* Both approaches, however, are extremely reductive and guilty of forcing the sounds and images found in language and dreams to refer to correspondences in nature. They commit the naturalistic fallacy. A more imagistic approach to the relation between etymology and mythology is presented by the philologist Wilhelm Roscher in his book *Pan and the Nightmare* (Spring Pub., 1972).

24 Both Freud and Thass-Thienemann question the curious images connecting sexuality, carnation, and flowers. Freud suggests that the latent dream wish of sexual intercourse is partially repressed by the superego and transformed through the dream-work into the image of flowers. An alternative explanation is presented by Thass-Thienemann who suggests that the link between flowers, blood, and sexuality "was once a natural association in an age which knew nothing about the categorical separation of man, animals, and plants but perceived all organic life, in whatever form it may appear, as essentially one. The flowers are the procreative organs of the plant, they are bleeding like the women," pp. 180-81. Both theories are causally reductive and commit the naturalistic fallacy

of reducing the imagination to the natural world. Freud causally reduces the flower elements of the linguistic complex according to the laws of sublimation and displacement to their underlying sexual components. The reduction of the associations back to an age prior to the categorical separation of man and nature is equally unsatisfactory. Neither explanation does justice to the living imaginal quality of the linguistic complex today. The image-complex is a total structure, not reducible to one or another of its elements found in nature.

25 *The Interpretation of Language,* Vol. I, p. 182.

26 Ibid., p. 181.

27 Jung's research indicated that with increasing unconsciousness the associations will be "more and more influenced by sound, till finally only a sound is associated." On an unconscious level the associations are according to phonetic similarities in the *living language* (synchronic) not historical similarities as reflected in etymology.

28 Adolf Eberschweiler, "Untersuchungen über die sprachliche Komponente der Association," in *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie* (Berlin), 65 (1908), pp. 240-71.

29 Jung, *Symbols of Transformation,* New York: Pantheon Books, 1956, p. 15n.

30 *Experimental Researches,* p. 171. Jung and Riklin point out that "If, by further lowering of attention, we remove the linguistic mechanisms, which in most cases still possess some meaning, the sound reactions come to the fore; these represent the lowest level of linguistic reaction and therefore remain constantly below the threshold of consciousness in everyday life," p. 138.

31 Ibid., 171.

32 For a clinical example of the intra-psychic tendency to build personal myths, obsessions, according to phonetic patterns, see Freud's case history of the "Rat Man": "Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis" (1909). The "Rat Man's" obsessions follow linguistically established lines of phonetic associations: "ratten" (rats), "raten" (installments), "spielratte" (gambling), "heiraten" (marry), and "rathaus" (counciling room).

33 See Charles Boer's marvelous translation of "The Homeric Hymn to Demeter" in *The Homeric Hymns,* Chicago: Swallow Press, 1970. For an extensive archetypal analysis of the mythological rape of the bride, cf. Kerényi, "Kore," in Jung & Kerényi, *Science of Mythology,* pp. 170 ff; and Patricia Berry, "The Rape of Demeter/Persephone and Neurosis," *Spring 1975,* Zürich, 1975, pp. 186-98.

34 Thass-Thienemann, *Interpretation of Language,* Vol I, p. 83.

35 Jung, *Experimental Researches,* p. 418.

36 Jung, *Symbols of Transformations,* New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1956, p. 147 & 251.

37 Ibid., p. 147.

38 Ibid., p. 251.

39 Ibid., p. 147.

40 For a cogent discussion of the process of transformation see Jung's *Symbols of Transformation,* "The Transformation of the Libido," pp. 142-70, and *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche,* "On Psychic Energy," pp. 2-66, where Jung begins to develop a structuralist theory of archetypal invariance based upon "pure relations" and their transformations.

41 Charles Boer and Peter Kugler, "Archetypal Psychology is Mythical Realism," in *Spring 1977,* p. 134.

42 Ibid., p. 148.

43 In *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* (1912) Jung describes the structural relationships in the unconscious as archetypal images which govern symbolic transformations according to the principle of equivalence. Jung's shift from a causal-mechanistic view of the psyche based upon the primacy of substance to an energic-finalistic standpoint founded upon "pure relations" became a major theoretical conflict with Freud and greatly contributed to their ultimate theoretical split. For Jung, the causal-mechanistic perspective always viewed energy as

attached to substance; "From the energic standpoint, on the other hand, substance is nothing more than the expression or sign of an energic system" (*CW 8*, "On Psychic Energy," p. 22). The energic-finalistic approach places the emphasis upon *relationships rather than upon objects* (the substances expressing the "pure relations"). The structural view allows for different qualitative substitutions into the system, whereas the *functions* represented by the *relationships between the substances* remain more or less constant. The shift from a system based upon the quality of substances to one concerned quantitatively with "pure relations" which remain constant over transformations marks the beginning of Archetypal Psychology. In 1955 when Jung revised the earlier English edition of *The Psychology of the Unconscious* (1961) he emphasized this aspect of analytical psychology by renaming the text *Symbols of Transformation.*

44 Boer & Kugler, "Archetypal Psychology is Mythical Realism," p. 148.

45 Ibid., p. 146.

# FURTHER NOTES ON IMAGES

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Last year's installment of this inquiry (*Spring 1977*, pp. 62-88, hereafter referred to by page numbers in square brackets) laid out by means of a few examples some ways of contrasting images with symbols, of working with images and examining dreams as images, and ended with a demonstration of the value of that perplexing word 'archetypal.' This year we shall fill in a bit more of the same ground, and we shall also offer some gadgetry useful in handling dreams as images.

So, what follows are miscellaneous excerpts from a work in progress that do not cohere into the continuity of an article. However, I do want to begin by picking up where I left off last year so as to deliver on a promise about why interpretations that "click" are wrong.

## *Radical Relativism and the Click*

An Icelandic proverb says: "Every dream comes true in the way it is interpreted." This states several curious things about dreams and their interpretations. One: dreams come true. Two: dreams come true because of interpretations. Three: there are many truths since there are many interpretations. So the maxim takes us into the heart of radical relativism. Anything goes. There is a God behind whatever happens. All analogies drawn from an image are equally valid. Nothing objective to hold to; no 'true' truth because there are many truths. Ultimately, nothing presented in an image or stated about an image is better or worse than anything else. The imagistic approach is not only relativist; it is cynical and nihilist.

The Icelandic proverb is important because it says that what we do with dreams comes true somehow, somewhere, and unless we can work out the difference between a right interpretation and wrong ones, wrong things will come true.

*Protestor:* "You seem at last to be holding out hope for practical guidelines so that we can tell when we are making a good or right interpretation. Until now, each time I have pressed you for clear-cut indications, you have danced out of my corner, demonstrating less what to do than your own fancy footwork."

Maybe that footwork demonstrates the tactical way to answer general kinds of questions. It exhibits two main principles: *parry strategic questions with a tactical operation* and *stick to the image.* You know, it's not altogether what we say in this inquiry but equally how we behave that shows our methods. So, in regard to the radical relativism of interpretation, let's operate with a dream. Berry has already given us an excellent occasion. Her paper *(Spring 1974,* pp. 58-79) opens with a woman patient's short dream:

> I was lying on a bed in a room, alone apparently, but with the feeling of turmoil around me. A middle-aged woman enters and hands me a key. Later, a man enters, helps me out of bed and leads me upstairs to an unknown room.

Then follow seven different interpretations of it, any of which could be convincing, valid perspectives — radical relativism. However, Berry's concern is not with the right-or-wrong of these interpretations. She is concerned more with the suppositions of the interpreter than with the accuracy of the interpretation. She is interested in the insight afforded the interpreter by recognizing which particular line he or she takes for approaching the dream.

*Protestor:* "What about the patient who had the dream?"

We have to see our suppositions about the dream in order to see the patient who is in the dream. The patient doesn't exist independent of the dream or of our suppositions about it.

*Protestor:* "The patient can correct your suppositions. I know when an interpretation is right because it clicks."

We'll come to that "click" in a moment. But first let's make clear what Berry's paper did. It made us realize that even a simple dream has polysemous (many-meaning) possibilities which show in the seven different interpretations.

*Protestor:* "Even if all seven are right, surely some are closer to the truth, or better analogies, or more right than others."

*Right, closer to the truth, better* — this begs the question. Let me show you what I mean: Let's say that the dream of the woman is the beginning of an Icelandic fairytale. The woman dreamer sets off upon seven different paths, one after another, coming to seven different modes of the dream coming true. The "right interpretation" would then be the one which leads the woman furthest in accordance with whatever goals she wants to "come true" in her life. If her goal, say, is spiritual development by means of introversion, then the right interpretation is the one which says that by facing inner turmoil in seclusion she receives aid from her inner femininity and is led to a higher level by her inner guiding-spirit (animus) (Interpretation #5). But if we imagine the patient's goal to be feeling relationship, then the right interpretation is the one which says that when the patient is cut off and isolated, she is in turmoil, passive to what happens, and easily led into upper stories by an unknown (unconscious) animus (Interpretation #2).

*Protestor:* "I couldn't agree more! It's what I've always believed: we can only interpret a dream in relation to the context of the patient's life. We have to know the patient and what the problem is before we can say a word about the dream. Interpretation #5 makes sense only for a patient for whom #2 would be definitely wrong, and vice versa."

But I don't agree. Your conclusion to this demonstration is not at all what I had intended. You are saying that the dream fits into the patient's picture of the problem and her wishes for resolving it. Thus a right interpretation serves the ego personality and its central wishes. A dream comes true when it clicks with these wishes. This language of "coming true" belongs to the wishful world of fairytale, as David Miller exposed in these pages in 1976.

'Right interpretation' belongs in that world too. Let's try instead to see what the dream says — without suppositions about the patient's problem, wishes for resolving it, or interpretations that click so that the dream comes true.

The dream has its dreamer "lying on a bed." What happens, happens to her as a lying-on-a-bed-I — a situation which may stand for supine passivity, horizontality, Yin, etc., but which I feel is best

left in its own words. A key is handed to this bedded "I," and only to this specific I position, by a middle-aged woman. The key, the lying on a bed, and the middle-aged woman are an interconnected image. No lying down, no key; no middle-aged woman, no key. To be a lying down woman on a bed is how to receive a middle-aged woman with a key.

The key is handed (in contrast to given, passed, offered), so that handing is the way she gets a key, and may be a key. However, the key is not what takes her upstairs. She does not go up by being keyed up, but by being helped and led. Between the woman who enters and the man who enters is the key that is in her hands.

The woman enters while the dream-ego is embedded in lying down. Is this the *only* way middle-age can enter her space? When the middle-aged woman enters there is a feeling of turmoil. Turmoil is not in her, but around her; not around in the room, but around her in feeling. This is precisely where the middle-aged woman enters with the key, interconnecting her feeling of being alone and in turmoil with the personification of middle-age. Might we say that the key she is handed is precisely being bedded down inside a feeling of turmoil, for that is where the dream-image places her so that she can receive the middle-aged key woman.

When she is alone, then she is with her feeling. She is with her feeling, even if apparently alone. There is a disjunction between her aloneness and her turmoil, signalled by the word "but." Does she expect something else when alone on a bed rather than turmoil?

Although being led upstairs by a man can be interpreted in many ways from orgasmic climax to paranoid isolation, these are projective suppositions of the interpreter. Partly they may be evoked in the interpreter by the "unknown room" to which the man leads. As interpreter, I must watch out lest I fill her unkown room with furnishings from my own head.

The dream itself says only that lying on a bed leads upstairs, that the room above is unknown (her unknown space is above her lying down space, and to get there she takes steps), that upstairs helps her out of bed, that "out of bed" equals help, and that the dream proceeds from past to present, moving from "was lying" to "helps me

out" and "leads me." We note a hiatus marked by the word "later," so that the distinction between the parts of the image is announced by a temporal adverb, an action in the language of time; the image itself suggests a story with steps.

We also note the curious realization within the dream that when apparently alone she is evidently not alone, that "alone" constellates kinds of reality, for then she is entered by both a woman and a man, even though apparently she is alone.

From this recapitulation of the dream, much in the manner of our demonstrations last year, we see that Berry's alternative interpretations #5 and #2 each apply equally well, or unwell. Instead of envisioning the seven alternatives as differing paths, one of which is right or true, let us take them as seven aspects of the same image. They are each right inasmuch as they analogize with it; but they are each wrong insofar as they leave the dream speech.

If all seven are "images of the image," there is no right path (perspective). There is no need for a click to tell us the way; there is no right key to the dream. The dream is enclosed in its combination of images and we must twirl all the tumblers. Moreover, each bit is inherently related and necessary to all the other bits. *A wrong path into the dream occurs when we take one path only.*

*Protestor:* "So this is how a polytheistic psychology works in practice?"

Yes. Wrongness now means singleness. The constructs of right and wrong imply an either/or world, not the polysemous, polyvalent one of dreams and images. When we realize the inherent multiplicity of meaning in the image itself, we cannot force the dream into any single truth.

When I restate the dream close to its own speech, I have not taken any of the seven paths toward any of the seven goals of her conscious life. Nor have I tried to fit the dream into her or my notions of her context and problem. Yet all of the seven have been implied by the image, even though none of them has been supposed by the interpreter. I have stuck with the image. . . .

*Protestor:* ". . . but not interpreted the dream!"

That is an open question. I believe I have interpreted the dream,

inasmuch as the dream is its own best interpretation. By this I mean: Translation re-locates the dream directly into her life by suppositions about her life. Instead of translating it and supposing it into one or another meaning, I have amplified it by letting it speak in multiple restatements. Restatement serves it best because the image is usually not full enough to our untrained ears that miss undertones and overtones. Restatement also synchronously relates the dream to many parts of that larger image which is her life. So, I am neither taking the dream out of her life, nor opposing it to her life, nor translating it wholly into her life. Rather, my interpretation works at deepening that life by means of its metaphorical analogies with the dream. This may make possible an imagination of life which restores to it its dream.

*Protestor:* "So then there is no right interpretation, and the dream comes true in multiple ways. I understand that this happens because your method does not translate from the speech of the dream (middle-aged, later, upstairs, apparently) into the language of psychology (passivity, isolated, inner femininity, animus). But still, how do you know when to stop? I asked you that last year. Analogizing can go on and on; more and more complexity. Don't we still need a click that indicates when the dream has come home?"

Not at all! The click is a sign of singleness of meaning, and indeed it does stop the analogizing process, ending it with a literalism: "Aha, this is what the dream truly means." But we have to ask: means to whom, to what? And the answer will be to the ego which wants a meaning that it can use for a key. I am suspicious of interpretations that click because they imply an already made mechanism into which the dream fits. A good interpretation does not 'click,' but 'ferments' or 'stains' or 'illumines' or 'wounds.' The only 'clicks' that refer to dream interpretations are those when-then connections which show us where the dream holds itself together and how it inheres in our psychic life. It's the click of the dream with itself, its interlocking necessity, that is important, not the click of it into the patient's mental set.

Besides, if the value of an interpretation is determined wholly by its effect on the patient, then a cheap conversion works as well as a

subtle insight, a magical suggestion is no different from a careful feeling, a demogogic cliché equal to a home truth. Or, as Berry herself has put it:

> It [the click] opens the way to an aspect of psychotherapy little different from charlatanism, syntonic transference neurosis, hysterical suggestion, doctrinal compliance, religious conversion and political brainwashing. For these too "click" and in these too the subject feels himself changed for the better on the basis of insights revealed.

To wrap up this section in a few plain statements. A dream interpretation clicks into a single meaning; if there is no singleness of meaning, there is no click. Analogizing [pp. 86-8] does not come to a stop, for it is a process of deepening the image, and the depth of an image, like that of a psyche, is endless. A well-interpreted dream therefore *goes on being dreamt* in restatement even more fully and vividly than in its original nighttime appearance. Interpretation is an imaginative revisioning which enhances and amplifies the dream. The way in which a dream comes true is the way truths come from the dream — by means of analogizing. If the analogizing process goes on long and deeply, the truths that come are many, are radical, and are always relative to the dream's images.

*Protestor:* "I am not convinced, but I did enjoy watching you parry a strategic question with a tactical operation."

You are not supposed to become convinced. The game of inquiry would be over if the Protestor ceased his protesting.

### *Images and Pictures*

Why do we talk about images as if they were pictures? Is this mix-up just one of easy talk? Is it inherent, like the German word *Bild* which means both an image and a picture, even a painting? A *Bildhauer* (sculptor) is an image-hewer and a *Bildmaler* (painter) is an image-painter. Or is the confusion of images with pictures a residue of sensationist psychology that understands images and even imagination to be left-overs of actual things seen?

In therapy the muddling of image and picture gives trouble: patients think they have to see pictures in their minds in order to have an image. If I ask them for an image of what is going on in a

problem (of family, of sexual relations, of anger), they try to *see* something, and when they don't find anything to see, they say they have no image, no fantasy. The confusion gives trouble to theory too. People accuse imagistic therapy of being mainly visual, hence optical and intellectually distant, hence gutless.

Are images flat, two-dimensional mental things that I look at? Let's turn to dreams to inquire.

When I look at a dream in the morning, recording it for my dream book, it is like a picture. I try to see it as it was, picture it in my mind. I may even squint my eyes, as I try to get the details of the image; very visual.

But when I am in the dream at night it is like a scene; and when I am pervaded by the dream during the day, it is like a mood. Here, the dream is the constant, and whether it becomes a pictured event that I look at depends on my approach to it. An image perceived as a picture can tend to become optical and intellectual and distanced. It there, we here. But imagined as a scene, I can get into it; and when imaged as a mood, it gets into me. This shows again the usefulness of referring to an image as context, mood, and scene [p. 62]; when considered in this light, an image cannot be something only set before my eyeballs, or even before my mind's eye, since it is also something into which I enter and by which I am embraced. Images hold us; we can be in the grip of an image. Indeed they can be gutsy.

So the complaint that imagistic therapy is gutless is the complaint of a consciousness that *pictures* its images and regards them optically. It is a consciousness that hasn't got into the image as a body. Maybe the complaint is a fear of these very guts, and defends itself against the image-body by insisting images are pictures only, only mental things seen, hallucinations, phantasms.

*Protestor:* "Still, we do use the same word in German for both, *Bild;* and in English we use the same verb, 'see' for image and pictures."

But no longer exclusively. The word *image* is nowadays breaking free of optical seeing. People say: "I get the image," "That's not my image," "He's ruined his image." Here, "image" does not refer

to a picture in the sense of a photographic likeness of a person. Rather, "image" is a complex notion of a person imagined by the mind.

But you are on the right track, Protestor, even if you are getting off one station too soon. The similarity goes further than two senses of "see," perception and vision. What makes pictures and images alike is their presentational quality. An image presents itself and pictures do this too; in fact, this is what pictures do best. They fill the field of vision with their presence, drawing us more and more into their space. What makes images like pictures is just this independent presence of the image that seems to stand still, or at least stands me still, before it, as does a picture. So it is not that the image *is* a picture, but that the image is *like* a picture. The analogy has been mistaken for an identity, much as the vision with which one "sees" an image has been mistaken as identical with visual, optical sight.

As the eye watching a picture both concentrates and darts, so the mind confronted with an image starts racing even as it stands still. This double action discloses levels and builds complexities without ever leaving the scene, without ever going beyond the dumb object with which it is presented. Like a picture, an image too has borders. It sticks to itself, inheres within itself. It doesn't lead somewhere else, as does a story. Thus the mind's activity can find nowhere to go but more deeply into the image. Time doesn't enter pictures. When one looks at a painting, it doesn't matter where the artist first put his brush or what he painted last. One can't say his last stroke resolves the picture and was its lysis. All the parts are happening at once. Their "mutual modification," in Coleridge's phrase, is also mutual temporality, synchronous. When a dream is written out as a story, the end comes after the beginning and is its result. But when we take the same dream as an image, then the last sentence can be heard in terms of the first (or any other) and can result in the first (or any other). The connections between the parts of a life, including its end in death, can also be taken as the interrelated images of a larger image, and not only as a story through time. Picasso, who was a painter, understood his life as multiple self-portraits in facing mir-

rors, images of himself that did not narrate a story through time. He said: "I don't develop. I am."

And we might add: I am only within the limits of the image; our possibilities are limited to the dimensions of each particular frame.

Our confusion of image with picture has now been clarified as an analogy between them. And this analogy with pictures may teach us something about how to look at an image. Certainly we learn that there is nowhere else to look but further at or into the image. It holds our attention — and what is attention but a primary definition of consciousness? And our attention is held in the present; so an image makes us present to ourselves, convocates consciousness to be all present and at attention. This implies that attending to images makes for a precise presence of consciousness. (No wonder we get tired so quickly in galleries and museums or in doing active imagination.)

We also learn that the muteness of an image is essential for altering our habitual mind's way of experiencing in language, that is, in stories made up of sentences, strung out in time, based on words, letters, literal. As a picture stops our syntax, so an image stops our clock. People often talk about 'eternal images,' but now we are removing the metaphysics from that idea, returning it to operational experience. The imagistic view eternalizes (see below) in that it moves us out of a temporal way of regarding things. It's not that images are eternal (in an archetypal realm of the Gods); but rather that images, like paintings, have all their parts going on concurrently, simultaneously. There is no before and after, and so the image is always going on, eternally present. So, to get out of time, make images. (Is this why so many painters live so long?)

These similarities in what we do, feel, and think when in the presence of images and pictures make them akin, justifying the German word *Bild* for both. This kinship in response makes me believe it rather a fortunate thing to confuse the two, providing we keep their kinship as analogy, remembering to distinguish between two analogous senses of "seeing." When we look at each dream as a picture of ourselves, it will then be less a message that helps pro-

gram our lives, and more a self-portrait in the frames of whose silent testimony we stand reflecting further and further into our nature.

## *Image-Making*

*Protestor:* "Something fishy is going on in your demonstration. On the one hand you speak about images and pictures. But on the other hand what you are doing is not pictorial and instead is highly verbal. Why all this interest in speech when you have just praised the image for its 'muteness'?"

Take care here, Protestor. Don't get literal about muteness, as dumb, non-verbal simplistics. The muteness of the image, I said, is a necessary realization for altering our habitual way of experiencing in language, our habitual way of telling our dreams. Our usual ways of speech may keep us from hearing what the image is saying. And a main determinant of the volume of an image resides in the multiple implications of its *words.* To get at this volume, this amplification, we have to break through the roles assigned to words by grammar and syntax; we must break the literalism of the parts of speech. For we have been sentenced by our sentences. In grammar and syntax is lodged the fundament of our collective unconsciousness and its non-imaginal singleness of mind. We are unconscious in the very instrument of our consciousness: our speech.

So, to work with images we need more than symbology, more than psychology in its psychodynamic analytical sense, and more than archetypology. We are forced toward the field of those who are specialists in images — the field of aesthetics in its broadest sense, and also in one of its narrowings, the scrutiny of the verbal imagination, poetics.

This move toward aesthetics seems an inevitable consequence of Jung's having based psychic reality upon fantasy-images, a term which he said he took from poetic usage (*CW* 6, 743). His theory of images announced a poetic basis of mind, and active imagination put it in practice, even while Jung went on using scientific and theological language for his explanations. Part of what archetypal psychology is trying to do is follow Jung consequently along lines

he opened but did not pursue himself. One of these lines is poetics: the exploration of image-making in words. Let us inquire into how this is done.

Did you notice last year that the words of the dream [p. 63] that one takes to be symbols, the words one looks up to amplify, are *nouns,* e.g., arrow, cave, swan, leg, or adjectives used as nouns, like numbers and colors. One way of breaking out of the symbolic mode and returning to the freshness of the image would be to modify these symbols so that they could no longer be looked up. We can qualify swan, knee, or arrow, moving them back from general terms to the particularized nouns that appeared in the image: cave-swan, wobbly knee, five arrows. We can stick even more closely to the image by speaking of breasted-arrows, many-angled arrows, for that is how the arrows were actually presented by the dream.

Noun combinations of this sort recall the imaging language we find in American Indian names: Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Black Elk; and also in nicknames: Slim Jim, Big Red, Mac the Knife. The Greeks too spoke of the Gods and Goddesses in this way. Athene or Poseidon require epithets, like grey-eyed Athene, Gorgon-bearing Athene, earth-shaking Poseidon, sea-maned Poseidon. We have to remember that the way our monotheistic consciousness conceives the Gods, as distinct abstractions that can be organized in a dictionary, is not how these figures appear to a polytheistic imagination. The Greeks had no index, not even a mythology book.

We have now made an advance by qualifying the nouns more specifically with adjectives. But still the nouns are the Chief Words *(Hauptwörter),* who carry the burden, and the adjectives are secondary, only ad-jected or thrown onto the nouns.

We may go further still, following Berry *(Spring 1974,* pp. 63-4, 68-9) and the idea of the *reversibility* of the image. If the various parts of an image are reversible, then why not the parts of its speech? Let us imagine a blue arrow in a dream. "The arrow is blue" can also be stated as: the blue is arrow-like; is arrowly, arrowish; is arrowing.

Not only does your arrow — and I am addressing the dreamer — take you into the blue, come from out of the blue, bring the blues,

seem true blue, and so on. But also, in reverse, your blueness comes in arrow shape, straight as an arrow, arrowing sharply. You have an arrowy blueness, and the nature of blue in you, according to this dream, is pointed, swift, shafting, feathered, straight, airborne, flying, aimed. . . .

And to take another example, "black snake" can state both that your snake is black and also that your black is snakey: creepy, hidden, reptilian, ancestral — and whatever other adjectives we need to give a snake quality to black.

Principle: Not only can images be reversed; the act of reversing is a step in making images.

Warning: Reversals sometimes can be helped by *punning*. Puns spin a word into another sense: swan in a cave, a caved swan, a caved-in swan. Similar to puns are elliptical collapses: Your arrow is your oyster — you can open it like a bluepoint. Joyce was the master of this imagistic word-play. But we are mostly not masters, and instead of following Joyce, we follow his daughter's schizzy anima-ish playwords that do not make an image but skitter away from it sideways, an elliptical jump over the shadow, what Jung called Klang-associations, an amusement without body.

These examples — caved-in swan, bluepoint oyster, a-musement — don't make an image or help with the ones we have. Possibly in another context, in another writer's or dreamer's hands, they could be important because they would resonate. But here these puns have worked surrealistically, in keeping with a Dadaistic sense of the image, a startle without soul, the dream world without its underworld sense. There are puns, and puns — some are shafts of illumination in which the play on words unpacks depth and builds intensity. Poesis. But others, such as these, keep us only to the words (not the images) by means of irrelevant associations, such as oysters. These associations then command attention for themselves, so that soon we have left the blue arrow in search of pearls, cabbages, and kings. Words have magic. They can inflate, take us on manic flights, invent worlds to inhabit — all defenses against the image. We protect ourselves from the attractive pull of words by "sticking to the image." By means of this maxim we can test the value of any pun.

Let's look again at what we did with that blue arrow. At first it seemed as if a *blue* arrow was less a symbol and more an image than arrow alone. But actually, by keeping to usual grammar where nouns carry adjectives, the adding of blue to the arrow gave the noun even more weight and substance. We did make a move, but not far enough. For though the arrow got more precisely qualified, it also became more fixed, more substantial. Actually its nominative power increased by virtue of the adjective, blue.

So we reversed the grammar. We freed the noun from its fixity, the arrow from having to be so sharply stuck in its own substantiality. It too can be a qualifier, even present itself in multiple modes — adjective, adverb, or verb (to arrow, is arrowing, arrowed). We dissolved the nominative substance (the arrow as naming a thing) into metaphor (the arrow as a shifting action and many-faceted qualification). Since this verbal action and adjectival qualification always also bears its nominative substance (the noun, arrow), metaphor echoes right in the word itself. It sounds as several parts of speech, playing several roles, at any given moment. We no longer hear it make only one kind of sense.

Another principle: Where the symbolic view tends to *substantiate* (make nouns of) even adjectives and verbs, the imagistic view tends to *dissolve* nouns themselves into qualities and actions. *The chief words in an image do not depend on their grammar.* We are working toward what Rudolf Ritsema has called a syntax of the imaginal: the parts of speech freed from their narrational obligations which link them into time sequences for storytelling.

The imagistic view of words frees them from having to submit to logical reason and operational definition. No word would be restricted to mean only one thing according to its operational usage. Instead, the full extension of any word, all its meanings and all its grammatical possibilities could be brought into any context in which the word appears. Freed from the chains of grammatical usage, words would no longer implicate us in causal readings of dreams. (This caused that, subjects acting upon objects, helped by adverbs and adjectives, prepositions and conjunctions.) We would be able to read a dream as we read a metaphysical or lyric poem, as

an imagistic statement. The words in the dream, like those in a poem, would not be responsible to any semantic principles above and beyond the image, principles which would dictate what words mean and how they must fit together independent of their appearance. Instead of grammar and syntax determining what is meant in the dream, the dream's words would gain their sense from their inherent intelligibility (the angel in the word) and from the help of their friends, the community or context of the image in which the words inhere. And the first move in this dissolution of grammar is letting go of nouns.

If we can effectively let go of our reliance on nouns, we will have taken an important step away from the symbolic perspective. It needs nouns, and turns other parts of speech into them. For example, the adjective *red* must become the nominative, redness, in order for it to be amplified as a universal concept. Red moves from a staining, emotional qualifier to a quality that can stand alone as a symbolic abstraction. Therefore, one can discuss the symbolic meaning of redness apart from any image in which it appears. This conceptual move of adjectives into nouns is also done to verbs. The verb *hunt,* to the symbolic perspective, becomes the general motif of hunting, a concept which we can look up in a dictionary of folklore, primitive art, or in an anthropological cross-index. The symbolic view requires concepts and so it starts with nouns. They are the *Hauptwörter.*

But to the imagistic perspective, nouns themselves lose their exclusively substantive and substantiating function. This function, in fact, is viewed as only one of the many modes in which a word can function, so that each and any word becomes multiple and may be heard as a metaphor. If last year we broke up our usual dream-reading habits by removing punctuation [p. 73], this year we are breaking up another usual habit which identifies words with their grammatical roles. Nouns are not restricted to playing the parts of subjects and objects of actions, bearers of qualifiers, namers of things. An arrow may arrow, be arrowly, arrowize. This de-substantiation aids de-literalizing.

*Protestor:* "I can't see why you have to destroy normal speech in order to deliteralize it. Surely you can make a metaphor just by the

way you *hear* a word. That verb 'hunt,' when used by a scholar in a library who is tracking down an obscure reference, or by an analyst who is on the spoor of a hidden anxiety or a camouflaged meaning, is already metaphorical. No need to talk in terms of their being hunty or huntly searching to build an image or hear a metaphor."

Quite right. It isn't necessary to twist words — if one can hear them resonate. You heard the metaphor to begin with or you could not have transposed into your image of the scholar and the analyst such words from the hunt as tracking, spoor, and camouflage.

Usually, we don't hear and can't build an image. This is especially true with verbs. Some can be looked up as symbols: hunt, dance, steal, pray, plow, bake. These are motifs of folklore and religion. But what about to turn, to swim, to hurry, to look, and hundreds more that commonly appear in dreams? We tend to take them at face value without listening for a metaphorical, deliteralizing echo. Instead of resonating, they fade away as our attention notices 'bigger' words. We need aids that amplify these ordinary verbs.

So, a first step in imaging a verb is to keep it attached to an adverb: *hurry desperately, turn away, quietly leave.* Already an image is forming. Next, if we reverse the verb/adverb roles, we have: to despair hurriedly, to quiet leavingly. We gain insight into the behavior of the dream ego who hurries his desperation, whose mode of quieting is to leave or whose away-moves are in the form of turns. Also, we can gain therapeutic insights from the verb-image as a specific mechanism; "turning," for instance. We would be on the watch in the analytical conversation for the patient's turns of phrase, of topic, of interest, for these would reflect his absenting or manner of avoidance, his being away.

Verbs combined with adverbs, and verbs reversed into adverbs, can't be looked up as symbols. One can study the symbolic meaning of smiling (the smile of the Gods) or combing (the fairytale comb) as universal motifs, but one cannot look up *smiling sheepishly* or *combing languidly.* Just as the living image begins to show, amplification fails utterly. No research into the meanings of smile and sheep can catch the image.

## *Dream-Words: Concepts vs. Images*

*Protestor:* "Let's go back to the arrow and the cave. As you worked up arrow, ringing through its verbal changes, it became clearer that they all could be included under the concept, aggression. So, what is the advantage of speaking of arrowly and arrowing rather than of aggressivity? Why invent words like caving and cavernity instead of saying capacity for depth (or for receptivity, silence, or inner space)? Why replace the standard traits of character psychology with these oddly twisted verbal images?"

First, images evoke, and so they carry more unconsciousness with them. They speak to the unconscious, whereas concepts address the conscious — to use those classical terms. Second, imagistic speech is more therapeutic also because it allows for wider analogies, suggests more implications. One begins to feel arrows and arrowing happening in many ways through one's life.

*Protestor:* "Aggression has many dimensions, too. You may be verbally or sexually aggressive, use aggression in defense, be aggressive especially toward women, etc. A concept like aggression has an additional value: we can collect under its head various instances of it, like aggressive dreams. These would extend way beyond arrow dreams. Your image approach doesn't allow even for comparing two different arrow dreams."

It certainly doesn't. I am not doing science, in the old sense of it. A collection of arrow dreams takes us back to approaching dreams conceptually, back to symbols, back to nouns. You see, I am not attempting a scientific study of "arrow dreams" but inquiring into what your arrow is doing in your dream. What arrows do elsewhere in a sample of arrow dreams is relevant only when it can become a therapeutic analogy. Scientific facts become psychological information only when they have therapeutic bearing. And this they can have only when the facts too have become images. Your question continues to treat the arrow image as a concept.

The difference between images and concepts has been laid out often enough and by better hands. But still, let's listen to the difference between aggression and arrow: He is aggressive *vs.* He comes

on like an arrow. She is so full of aggression *vs.* She has a quiver full of arrows. We hear a further advantage of the image in that it speaks just as the world speaks, concretely, and as dreams speak, sensately. Images bring body and concepts remove body. Aggression, remember, cannot be seen. It presents itself only by means of an image, as clenched fists or teeth, with a sneer, a needle, or a wallop in the balls — or arrowly.

Where arrow particularizes and images, and spreads its significance through resonance, aggression generalizes without serving communication. For what you, Protestor, conceive with "aggression," and the fantasies that the word evokes in your mind, may be quite other than my notions of it. That is why people who talk in concepts must define their terms in order to talk sensibly. Because aggression is second-level, an abstraction from an image, in therapy we have to locate it precisely in an image, even return aggression to its actual usage, the phenomenon as it appears. So why use the concept aggression at all in therapy? Why not just stick to the image from which the concept was derived?

But the most important difference between images and concepts is their mode of signifying. Now I will not be comparing arrow and aggression, but will be making a contrast between two ways of using arrow. As a *concept,* arrow signifies or refers to a thing, a noun — some arrow in your mind, in your bow, or in a sentence. As an *image,* it signifies itself, and its signification emerges less from its ability to refer to an arrow outside the word than from how the word works in its context. The more work we can get the word to do by inventing (*inventio* in classical rhetoric) implications, the more significant the arrow becomes.

This is crucial when working with dreams. When dream-words are regarded as concepts, then they take their significance from what they refer to. If these referents are high-powered words like the symbols we examined last year [baby, pearl, river — 71ff], then these nominal substantives become the focus of our attention. Our attention moves from the dream to the referents, amplifying the meaning of baby, pearl, and river abstracted from the dream. But when dream-words are regarded as images, then a big word is no

more powerful than little words like, "just then," "comes by," "I guess," etc. (Berry's "full democracy of the image"— 1974, p. 64). We saw this in the example of the sister/Chevy/phone dream where we treated the words wholly imagistically [p. 78f]. There the dream-words took their signification from the image, its tension and implications. We did not regard beer or curb as substantial things or as nominatives that name substantial things and refer to them. Instead we explored the inhesion of these words in the image, the chords of response their placing and sounding evoked as analogies with psychological behavior. When we look at dreams as images, then we have to look at the dream's words doubly carefully, because there is nowhere else to look to find their significance.

This distinction between words as concepts and as images is also the basis for the difference between the scientific and the poetic understanding of dreams. In scientific discourse, words gain their significance from what they refer to. Science works in concepts and even its images are used conceptually. And the scientific view reads the words in dreams as descriptions of objective correlatives: the dream text is a secondary elaboration upon a primary process in nature that is invisible or unknowable and only represented by the dream. In contrast, a poetic understanding does not consider the dream as a report or message giving information about something other than, or prior to, the dream. Rather, the dream is like a poem or a painting which is not about anything, not even about the poet or the painter. The painted lemons on the plate must not refer to the lemons on a plate which the painter used as model; the painted lemons can be experienced altogether without reference to those lemons, or any lemons, anywhere. (Nor do they refer to an invisible archetypal essence of lemons — lemonhood, lemonness; they refer neither to physical lemons nor to metaphysical ones.) They may analogize with and evoke all sorts of lemony experiences; but the image transcends such referent evocations — that is, we might buy the painting, not because it so well represents lemons on a plate, but because it speaks so well to and of our soul.

So, too, with the lemon in a dream. The poetic view does not need to posit an objective psyche to which the lemon refers and

from which it is a message. The psyche is there in the lemon, located nowhere else than in the actual presented image. Psyche is image, as Jung said. We stick to the image because the psyche itself sticks there.

Hitherto, like other analysts, I tended to take dream-words conceptually, as referring to psychic contents. A cat in a dream indicated cattyness, animality, instinct, anima, pussy, Bastet, self-reliance, etc. In order to feel the image 'cat' I had to go outside the dream, either to symbolism, or personal associations, or to other dreams. But by playing with the dream-word in its context, running it through analogies, puns, and changes as we did in the examples last year, the particular cat emerges in its own image; and in the echo of the image, the other dreams, the personal associations, and the symbolic cat all reverberate.

Also, like other analysts, I felt somewhat dissatisfied with this conceptual approach to the image, and so continually reminded myself that I didn't really know to what the cat referred since it is a symbol. I remembered Jung said (*CW* 6, 815) that "cat" was not a sign referring to a known thing (Bastet, witch, self-centeredness), but was "the best possible formulation of a relatively unknown thing." Now, however, I can see that this "symbolic view," so essential to my "being a Jungian," *still treats the dream-word as a concept.* Whether the referent is known or unknown, it remains a thing. The symbolic view indeed does require nouns, concepts, substances. Even if we declare them to be unknown, we have not dissolved the conceptualizing move that makes for literalism in the first place and, in the second place, for all the theological, scientific, and metaphysical snarls of analytical psychology's view of dreams.

*Protestor:* "That move which dissolves nouns and which says that dream-words do not mainly refer to anything outside their context is self-destructive. Do you know what you are doing? You are now de-literalizing one of archetypal psychology's own favorite and basic moves, personifying. Your dissolving acid has got out of hand!"

I am doing away, not with personifying, but with the literal notion of these persons as agents in the psyche: complexes, Gods, archetypes — and other figures of speech and imaginative perspec-

tives that are taken literally because they are presented as nouns. Even when these figures are experienced in visions or as voices, and thus as nominative agents, we must remember that we hear them *only in an image,* as an image, and that they are inseparable from their imagistic appearance. Therefore they must be approached in accordance with the image in which they inhere. Otherwise we tend to abstract them from their context, mood, and specificity, turning them into enduring hypostases who give literal messages.

*Protestor:* "So there are no Gods? What about them as premises of your polytheistic psychology?"

Take the Gods too as adjectives and adverbs, as modes of qualifying and styling our perspectives. This is rather like the ancient Greek and Japanese way of speaking about Gods, not as things to which the word "God" refers, but as a sort of adverbial suffix that can be attached to other words, divinizing and sacralizing them. The theological problem in psychology arises when we take our words as concepts that refer to something outside or beyond, to something else signified by the word.

When we use words as tokens that point to real, objective contents which the words signify and gain their meaning from, then dream-words are not worth attention for themselves. They are mere stand-ins for the real actors. Whereas we have been demonstrating that the way the dream is presented *is* the way it is acting, and that it does not gain its meaning from what is not in the dream.

You know, we empty out each dream and the miracle of its presentation when we refer a dream outside itself. Analytical interpretations of dreams into empirical life — our past history, present problems, or future prospects — arise from treating the dream-words as concepts which signify something not in the dream. This analytical signification does not even have to be symbolistic, e.g., swan signifies anima, or Apollo, or death. Just the fact that the dream-swan must be referred to some sort of swan somewhere kills the bird as an image.

Images don't stand for anything. They gain their sense from where, when, and which way they stand. We can get meaning out of the sister/Chevy/phone dream, a significance that analogizes

many ways through my experiences, without those nouns having to refer to my sister, my Chevy, and my phone.

*Protestor:* "You mean they don't refer to the outer things but to inner objects . . . your inner anima, your drive, and your communicating apparatus as internal images?"

No, not that either. An internal object is still a noun, still a thing, even if now placed 'inside.' Internal objects don't differ in their logic from external ones: both entail that images be regarded as derivatives of referents. But an image is not an image *of* an object. It images itself. It imagines; and, in its imagining, whatever objects, wherever they are — lemons on a plate, sister in a Chevy — now become imaginational, parts of the image, as if painted, as if dreamt.

Internal objects are further analogies of the image. These analogies come into awareness only because of the image. Actually, the idea of my internal sister or car comes after the event of the dream, so that the internal object is an idea derived from the image, not the other way around. The concept of an internal object is a theoretical construct used to account for the image, though actually it is a result of the image. Unfortunately, we have all come to believe in these constructs as real things to which the images refer.

*Protestor:* "But you yourself still use 'thing words' — all those hyped-up Neoplatonic terms: Gods, archetypes, daimones. What's the value of doing that?"

You can hear the value. Instead of speaking of sexual attraction, or the eros principle, archetypal psychology may conjure with Aphrodite or the Venusian perspective. As we said last year, this way of speaking in archetypes is a mode of valuing, a way of giving volume, depth, necessity, universality to an experience. But these mythical figures cannot be taken for literal realities. Their actuality is wholly imaginal and any explanation of human behavior that rests on them rests on fantasy. They are by definition metaphors, and their main value is that they keep us in an imagistic perspective, which conceptual language cannot do.

You see, we really do believe in the literal reality of Aggression and Sexual Desire. They are held to account for our behavior, and psychology says they can even be measured. But no one can take

Mars and Venus in this literal way (except perhaps an astrologer). And that's just the beauty of Mars and Venus; they are Gods but do not operate as Gods. A God, after all, is defined not only by what theology says. Operationally, any word becomes a God when it posits itself as a dominating substantive or when we operate with the word as a literalized dominant. Religion isn't going to take over psychology because of Mars and Venus. Religion is already in psychology, in its pantheon of words that do not let us see through them. Aggression is only one of hundreds of these demons; Ego is probably their King and Feeling his Consort. And these verbal Gods are protected by a psychological priesthood which makes its daily obeisance by ritually attributing causal powers to a pantheon of psychological concepts which no one has ever seen and which are held to account for human behavior.

*Protestor:* "Now you are saying that there are no psychic contents whatsoever. Words, just words — and words that do not refer to anything. If Venus isn't a divine person, the arrow not related to arrows I can put in my bowstring, and my sister not even an internal psychic object, then of what is the psyche composed? If the arrow and my sister aren't factors in me that make me do things, factors that persist over time like a complex, how can I work on my arrow problem or my sister problem? How can I relate to it, talk to it in active imagination, watch its process by means of dreams? How can it be transformed?"

Now your fear of the image is finally coming out — but your fear is justified. By deliteralizing symbols, the thingness of psychic contents, we are also deliteralizing their transformation. Our acid is eating into an old tenet of therapeutic faith: transformation of the personality. You have pointed out that psychodynamics depends on symbolized concepts, psychic agents that do things to other things, an entire literalized system of nouns: types, functions, instincts, censors, archetypes, superegos, energies — and symbols. This is metaphysics, cosmology, theology — not psyche. The symbolic, conceptual view goes hand-in-hand with the development fantasy, i.e., the notion that we have inside ourselves fixed things that are subject to transformation. We can then watch the process of trans-

formation by observing the development of these fixed things. The Chevy moves through alchemical stages from black to white to red, indicating a transformation of the symbol of my driving vehicle. So, if there is no Chevy as an inner psychic thing....

*Protestor:* "...there is no alchemy, and no transformation!"

You make me feel like Hume, but unless we see transformation or development *in actu,* we ought not use the word. We interpret dreams by means of the idea of transformation, but only rarely do we see a dream itself saying: "the bug transformed into a little girl," or "I then became the criminal whom the police were chasing." I prefer to speak of transformation only when I can point at its actually happening.

The story of black-to-white-to-red is imposed upon a series of dreams from outside the dreams. It is a scientific hypothesis or a theological tenet of faith, based on symbols. This is the symbolic view of dreams and I have been pointing out its dangers, both this year and last.

But we can still work with the idea of transformation in another way. When we shift the dream-words around, letting them play other parts of speech, transformation takes place right in our ears. A dream is itself transformational because it transforms its own statements through polyvalence of its images. A dream is always deepening and differentiating itself. We do not need to go beyond the dream for a developmental or energetic theory of psychic transformation.

But to release this transformative effect, we must lift the dream-words from the Procrustean bed of syntax and grammar, and allow words a Protean freedom to shape themselves imagistically. We must break free of the notion that a dream is using its words in the referring, indicating, signifying sense. Here, we return to Freud's view that a dream is not a message, but is a self-satisfying narcissistic event. Because the dream's words are not concepts that refer, no dream can be interpretatively translated to other referents. A dream can only be interpretatively re-imagined, as one does with a piece of any other poesis.

This leads to a further thought about soul-making. If an image

does not have to refer beyond itself to gain significance, neither does our therapy that works with and from images. Soul-making needs no external referent. The activity of therapy receives its meaning and value from the activity itself. We go to therapy for the sake of therapy and not for development, adjustment, healing, or individuation — processes to which therapy has been generally referred for its significance- just as the image has been referred to external objects. If psyche is image, then psychological work or soul-making is image work, image-making, poesis, and the goal of therapy cannot be distinguished from the way it is performed.

## *Gadgets*

*Eternalizing.* As is the Mercurial wont, a word slipped into an earlier section that was not adequately introduced. I said that one way "archetypal" implies value is by intimating "eternity."

We don't want to get too almighty with that term; no metaphysics of eternity is intended here. I mean something operational, something we can actually do with an image to increase its volume.

Taking the when/then statement, let us change "when" to "whenever." The sentence at once becomes immensely amplified, right out of a single time and into eternity.

An example from last year [p. 63]: "I turn toward daylight and my knee twists." First let's put this into the when/then construction of the image: "When I turn toward daylight, then my knee twists," or in reverse, "When my knee twists, then I turn toward daylight." Now, let's carry it further by eternalizing: "Whenever I turn toward daylight, then my knee twists," and "Whenever my knee twists, then I turn toward daylight."

This bit of gadgetry, the attachment of an "-ever" suffix, eternalizes a connection that might too easily be passed over. It strengthens the hidden harmony (when/then) by making me feel that a particular connection in a dream is *always* going on in my life, a kind of eternal mechanism. My reaction to twisting my knee, to my weakness and pain and wobbly underpinning, is *ever* to turn to daylight. Whenever I am lame or limp, then I go for daylight. My

eternal turn toward daylight twists my knee, has a self-inflicted wound in it, is at the necessary cost of an unhinged connective joint which may no longer be able to bend (genuflect) or give generative support. That little "-ever" makes one feel that the connection is necessary, unavoidable. If it could be going on always, I will more likely watch for its analogies as habits, thereby spotting my habitual mechanisms in more places (always as all ways). And if a mechanism feels necessary, I may also become more tolerant of its pathological implications, for they too are necessary.

One can go further and eternalize a whole dream. Then we say to the dreamer: "Suppose this were the only dream you *ever* had, ever were to have. Never any other dream than this one." At once the dream is lifted into a cosmological myth: the whole revelation of the psyche and its fate now there in this one dream. Its depth could never be plumbed, and one would give it endless time, intelligence, and love.

Eternalizing is a move of value, not a statement of fact. "Ever" is 'only a metaphor' and does not mean that a dream connection is always and everywhere literally going on. But it might be — and this metaphorical possibility tunes one in to listen for it. Besides, eternalizing adds more substance to the when/then connections, giving them the feeling of being fixed, interlocking mechanisms, a permanent synchronicity in the image stating an unchanging pattern in the soul. It is like saying that this is your eternal dream, so have an extra good look at what's going on here.

*Contrasting.* A dreamer says: "I have no idea in the world why I dreamt of Aunt Ella in a blue blouse. She was one of my Mother's three older sisters. I never met any of them. I like blue. I have two blue blouses but not the same shade as in the dream."

In working with this sort of image and this sort of response to it, I find it useful to start a fantasy of contrasting. Often images that are closed because they are so familiar, or so freakish, block fantasy, so that the fantasy of contrast helps start it up again.

Why does the dream single out Aunt Ella, and not Emma or Aunt Etta? Where is Ella different from her sisters? Then we find

she never married, or lived the longest, or most resembled Mother. Why does the dream bother to dress her precisely in a blue blouse that is unlike the dreamer's own, and yet is not mauve or maroon? Then we find that that blue is a uniform color like at camp or school, or feels comfortable and goes with her eyes, or really belongs to older women. And so on with blouses over against shirts, halters, tops, dresses, etc.

Contrasting differs from *associating,* which edges off into personal reminiscences even in the face of a highly symbolic image like the moon. When I say, "So why the moon in this dream?" the dreamer may *associate* something about blue cheese, an article read yesterday on space-shots, or a feeling of irrational mystery. Then we would have to work on these associations as images, and would have left the actual dream far behind.

Contrasting differs also from *amplifying* which, as we already have discussed, moves away from the image in another direction — toward universal symbolism. In this case, the dreamer might respond to "Why the moon?" with something culled from alchemy, myth, or folklore.

But if we understand the question by means of contrasting, then we ask: "Why the moon and not the sun, not the earth, not a light in the night?" This move, unlike associating and amplifying, keeps us in the speech of images. We hold up *one image against another.* We stay in the genre of the dream, in the imagination. Our move may fetch images from afar, but we do not go astray by switching tracks into either personal associations or symbolic knowledge. Instead, we press the dreamer toward imagining a difference, asking for some specifics inhering in his or her moon image.

Then we get something like this: "It couldn't be the sun because the moon is cool; not the earth because the moon is so far away; not a light in the night because the moon was only a thin crescent." These three easy contrasts have increased the volume of the moon for this dreamer, telling us that his or her dream moon is particularized as a cool, remote, and thin-crescent image. Its particular feeling as an image begins to emerge, and contrasting has helped bring this out.

*Singularizing.* We can bring out particularity in another way. This way is similar to eternalizing, except that we now introduce the word "only" into the when/then construction.

"[*Only*] when you leave the cave, then you twist your knee." Or, "When you leave the cave, then [*only*] you twist your knee." At first this move seems a radical restriction of the dream statement. Indeed the dreamer may twist his knee on many other occasions in many other dreams. But since each dream is unique, then whatever inheres in it is also unique, occurring as such only in this particular image. We can then say quite legitimately that the intraconnection of the dream-image occurs only in the way it is stated by the dream.

The value of singularizing is that it specifies the occasion of that knee twist. We can say to the dreamer: It happens only when you go toward daylight, turn your back on the cave, hurry. Only leave that cave and, bang, your knee twists. Twisting your leg, losing your standpoint, finding your understanding wobbly — whatever that knee twist analogizes with — happens only at that singular instant of turning from cave to brilliance. We have been able to pinpoint a pathologizing instant; the *only* has allowed us to see a singular mechanism at work, allowed an insight into his singularity, individuality.

The restrictive value of "only" is especially helpful when a dreamer becomes contaminated by the symbolic effect of his images. Then they spread universally all through his consciousness. "I'm a mess. There's nothing left for me. My swan is shot down and dead — and with it my hopes for something really beautiful coming out of my work."

Here, we may singularize the dead swan as occurring *only* in the cave within the specific context, scene, and mood of his downward and backward deeper darkness and his reactions to it. The swan may still beat its great wings in his heart in other contexts. It is shot down and dead only in this single image. "Only" here helps keep us to the image, therapeutically preventing the dream from becoming symbolized into a message for his entire life, work, soul. An image is only an image.

*Keeping Images.* We often encourage the patient in analysis to hang in with the trouble, whatever the trouble, wherever it is. This therapeutic prescription derives partly from Freud. He made it a tenet of practice that no essential changes in a person's life — marriage, divorce, job, etc. — be undertaken during the analysis, because such moves would likely be displacements of neurotic conflicts. The prescription can also be derived from Jung's notion of the sealed alchemical vessel in which the psychic process of transformation takes place. One's soul stuff mustn't leak out and mustn't contaminate others.

But from the imagistic point of view, there is another reason for keeping, and a reason that may be less morally prescriptive.

Images so often start off in an opaque, dense condition. Such dreams especially need to be cracked open so as to enjoy their pathology and necessity, feel their essential value, their claim. But another mode of clearing their opacity is by keeping them. Rather than an imagery of walnuts, let's imagine them in terms of wine.

Often I receive a dream in analysis and haven't anything to say to it; there seems nothing I can do with it — or it seems just too hard to crack; I haven't the strength. I leave it behind, skip over it, go to the next. That's the usual move. But instead, I can keep the image (and tell the patient to keep it) around for a while, like standing a bottle of wine upright on the table in plain sight in the middle of my living space, letting it warm to room temperature. And sure enough, a sedimentation occurs; it begins to clear; it loses opacity; its specific quality lightens through the glass. It's ready to be appreciated, its subtleties disclosing themselves without heavy work.

After thirty minutes of waiting and watching the images of a dream, the whole concoction begins to clear. And one has done nothing more than just keep the image present with peripheral vision, an oblique awareness that accords it value without forcing too hard.

There are other ways of keeping images. Alchemy tells us to let matters cool, like keeping a dream in the refrigerator in a steady state, unusable, uncombinable, but letting it look at you every time

you open the door, making you wonder what can be done with it, what it goes with. Or one keeps seedlings that show no specific leafage — are they weeds, vegetables, flowers? — until they sprout of their own *vis naturalis*. Also, there is the backburner, a gentle heat, a slow brewing that encourages a fermentation of a dream throughout other dreams and images, like yeast moving through the whole psyche. Or, one can keep an image as one totes around a baby, over the hip, at the breast, on the back — the image as a weight, a nonverbal demand, that requires tiny attentiveness, little shifts of worry through the day, listening and smelling. Heraclitus says that the souls in the underworld perceive by smell: a subtle mode of sniffing the spirit that is going on in cooking, baby-care, wine, soil, telling us about time and changes.

Whatever fantasy we use for keeping — and there are many more which would have other purposes than clearing and differentiating, but rather to do with coagulating or with storing up in reserve — *keeping is for the sake of the image.* It is a way of attending to a *living* thing, like a wine, a dish of food, a sprout, a baby. Its aesthetic inutility in its primary state, that closedness that makes it feel such a bother, is met with the fantasy of the artisan or craftsman. (Plato's God was a craftsman, by the way, not a "creator.") No moral 'should,' here, in regard to the wine. No prescription, but a desire to enjoy the wine when it clears. Attention is paid, credit given, not for the sake of consciousness, the duty of analysis, but because you take delight in watching the behavior of psychic processes, the enjoyment of recognitions and insights as things disclose themselves, which they do if kept as gardeners and cooks, nurses and oenophiles 'keep.' Again, a model of doing and making in regard to psyche.

*The Hiatus in the Image.* Robert Grinnell *(Spring 1970),* in a pathfinding paper, noticed that there is a moment in a dream, a "hiatus which at once divides and unites the two portions of the dream." "The hiatus acts as the fulcrum and the turning point." He understands the hiatus to be where the mystery of the conjunction occurs. It is the arcane substance of the image itself, as well as the

arcane activity at work in and on that substance. It is non-representable, but indicated by a gap. In this gap a great deal is going on, says Grinnell.

There is not only an intended comparison with Jung's notion of the turning point in the dramatic structure of the dream. There is a further analogy with an idea mentioned twice by Freud in his *Interpretation of Dreams* where he refers to the "dream's navel, the spot where it reaches down into the unknown" and from where the image itself seems to emerge "like a mushroom out of its mycelium."

The "navel" suits the hiatus very well. It can be discovered in small, ordinary, and very common words in the very belly of an image. Look particularly to adverbs and conjunctions, some of which we have already drawn attention to: *suddenly, then, until, however, only, nevertheless, later,* and most commonly, *but.* When these occur in the midst of an image they announce a hiatus in the hidden connections which may be signifying a hidden disconnection, a juxtaposition that makes the spark of consciousness leap across empty space.

Whether the disconnection is 'merely' a formulation in the morning by the dreamer's mind which cannot tolerate the juxtapositions of seemingly non-sequential, and thus for him non-sensical, images so that he must turn the tension of the image into a disjunctive break in the written story, or whether the disjunction is 'truly' intrinsic to the image, this we cannot know for sure. But these small words reveal a nodal point, and if explored can mushroom into considerable complexity. They may be of more importance at getting to the root of a problem (Freud's earth image), into the primal lacuna of our consciousness (Grinnell's hiatus image), than are the visible images and connections themselves. For I suspect that in the little hiatus absconding Mercurius hides.

# THE GREAT'S VIGOUR

## A Study of the 34th Hexagram in the *I Ching*

WITH A NOTE ON CONSULTING THE *I CHING*

RUDOLF RITSEMA

(Ascona)

### On Consulting the *I Ching*

One turns to the *I Ching* when one has a problem or a conflict that does not yield to the usual methods of problem-solving. As conceptual thinking shows no way out, the pressure of the conflict builds an impasse. It is at this point that the involuntary movements in handling the yarrow stalks give access to the archetypal realm of the *mundus imaginalis*. The immediate urgency of this moment is given a timeless background. Only the emotional pressure of a vitally and intensely experienced problem arouses this constellating power of the imaginal.

Usually a problem so emotionally charged is experienced initially in terms of exclusive alternatives. One wants either a yes or a no. And yet we cannot expect the images of the hexagram to solve our problem in the same terms that have led us into the deadlock in the first place. The *I Ching* does not serve as an oracle in the simple sense of responding to a dilemma with a direct reply. By not answering as one might like, the *I Ching* does not substitute for our human responsibility in facing our lives and risking ourselves with the unknown. It is a psychological instrument enabling us to become more aware of the deeper currents at work in any given moment.

Our problem may initially sound as follows: "I have to decide either this or that, each of which seems equally necessary or undesirable." Rather than answering the question as it appears at first,

Dedicated to my Aries and Capricorn friends who contributed to shape my account of this hexagram.

we may expect the *I Ching* to place the problem that gave rise to the question into an imaginal perspective. The *I Ching* associates laterally, filling out the imaginal background of the situation. Likewise in formulating our question, we must try to sense the fuller context out of which our question has arisen: the life situation, our material problems, human relations, inner states and psychic images. This broader context will then be at the center of the actual question to the *I Ching*: "How does my present situation, as context of this particular problem, present itself in the imaginal realm?" In the actual question both the "present situation" and the "particular problem" should be specific references.

The hexagram we then receive by casting the *I Ching* may be read as a corresponding image of the particular situation. The imaginal pattern broadens our consciousness and thus allows life energy, hitherto blocked by the initial dilemma, to flow into the specific imaginal background. Consciousness becomes more precisely differentiated, thereby one experiences the problem in a different setting and with different terms than at the beginning.

The hexagram translated below, THE GREAT'S VIGOUR, speaks of course best to that person who has cast the yarrow stalks resulting in this particular constellation. But any of us can read this hexagram benefiting from the imaginal understanding it offers to the entire problem of force in human nature — or what psychology or philosophy have too limitedly referred to as power-drive, will, strong-headedness, motivation, and the like. This hexagram, like others we have offered to the reader in *Spring,* presents in succinct and precise detail subtle shades and opportunities of this situation, a subtlety which might be missed particularly in the time of THE GREAT'S VIGOUR, since this is when the thrust of forward power can lead to blind action and entanglement without distinction, a time of hurting and being hurt.

Since 1972 I have published in *Spring* new renderings of some hexagrams from the *I Ching.* My aim has been to retain for the non-Chinese reader as much as possible of the associative background and the structure of the Chinese text. The sometimes awkward phrasings belong to the particular method of translation I have

worked out for this purpose. For a synthesis of the rules and principles adopted, the reader may refer to *Spring 1976*, pp. 191-94 and *Spring 1977*, pp. 89-90.

In my rendering of hexagram No. 34, following below, I have introduced *the final particle* YEH, *indeed.* It expresses the idea: as a matter of fact, in actual fact, in truth. This Chinese character occurs often at the end of a sentence. In accordance with general usage, I have hitherto omitted from my translations this final particle. Careful comparison of the Chinese text with the version of hexagrams No. 18, 29, 30, 51 and 52 published in previous issues of *Spring* shows that this particle is essential for understanding the structure of the texts. In the Commentary on The Head and in the *b*-texts of the lines, YEH emphasizes the comments. There and in other texts, a word or a sentence followed by YEH is a commenting paraphrase of the preceding statement. YEH rounds off a section of text and commentary belonging together, thus emphasizing the explanatory character of a word or a sentence, without turning it to an exclamation as does the final particle YI!. YEH merely confirms and amplifies the force of a statement.



## Hexagram No. 34, *TA CHUANG, THE GREAT'S VIGOUR*

The *name* of the hexagram TA CHUANG, THE GREAT'S VIGOUR, is one of those binomial units explained in *Spring 1977*, p. 90. The elements of the name are linked in a reversible relation that reads both THE GREAT'S VIGOUR as well as THE VIGOUR'S GREAT. The first element of this binominal unit TA, *the Great,* and its counterpart HSIA, the Small, have the ordinary meaning of great and small ranging from the concrete sense of big and little to all kinds of figurative implications, such as noble and vile, important and petty, etc. In the *I Ching* these two terms are used in a technical sense with very specific meanings. The Great is the guiding line or ruling principle that organizes the numerous and diverging. The Great stands for the aptitude to impose a direction of conduct upon one's impulses and spon-

taneous reactions. It is the faculty that allows one to assume leadership within the vicissitudes of one's life. The term does not imply any specific principles of conduct. It refers rather to the capacity to conduct, to 'lead one's life,' as one says in English. The Great tends to impose a single main theme. The Small stands for the numerous, for the various reactions and impulses provoked by outer events and inner wishes or desires as they push and pull. The Great should be distinguished from the notion of chün tzu, which implies a specific principle for the guidance of life. A chün tzu submits to TE, the application of TAO (the universal law) to conduct in life, whereas the Great can refer to any kind of guiding principle.

This important notion, the Great, occurs in the names of two further hexagrams: No. 26, TA CH'U, THE GREAT'S RESTRAINT (THE RESTRAINT'S GREAT) and No. 28, TA KUO, THE GREAT'S EXCESS (THE EXCESS' GREAT).

The second element CHUANG, *vigour,* embodies the meanings: stout, strong, robust; full-grown, manhood at the age of 30, full and flourishing; to inspirit, to animate; by extension also to cauterize, to wound. The term is used for the eighth moon when the crops are gathered, i.e., a time of fertility and abundance, and also: of cutting. The ideogram shows the graphs for physical strength and for a scholar, suggesting a person of mental strength. The term CHUANG, vigour, occurs in the *I Ching* in a few other instances. In hexagram No. 43, KUAI, PARTING, at the bottom and third line, this notion emphasizes the connection between hexagram No. 34 and its latent hexagram (see below p. 188). In addition we find the notion CHUANG, vigour, applied twice to a horse (No. 36, 6/2; No. 59, 6/1) and once to womanhood (No. 44, The Head). In each of these instances vigour denotes an unrestrained strength, a thrust that belongs with wounding and being wounded.

The name of this hexagram describes the situation in which one's ruling principle is endowed with thrusting strength (THE GREAT'S VIGOUR) and the impetuosity is ruled by the capacity to conduct (THE VIGOUR'S GREAT). It is the climax of the ability to direct and organize one's personality. At the same time it is the ability to

organize and give structure to the unrestrained impulses and their inherent aspect of wounding and being wounded.

This hexagram consists of the *trigrams* CH'IEN, The Force, ☰, below, and CHEN, The Quake, ☳, above.

The *name* of the trigram CH'IEN, The Force, implies: the power or agency of heaven; that which goes without ceasing; enduring, untiring, diligent, firm, stable; a sovereign, a father. The same Chinese character pronounced KAN denotes dry, exhausted, clean and all gone. The ideogram consists of the graphs for the power of nature (sprouting), or the vapors rising from the land, and for sunlight as the action of the yang principle. The Force as the power of heaven provokes both sprouting and exhausting drought.

The *action* of the trigram CH'IEN, The Force, is CHIEN, persisting. It connotes: strong, robust, hearty; persistent, indefatigable; unwearied, as the heavenly bodies in their courses.

The *image* of the trigram CH'IEN, The Force, is T'IEN, Heaven. It is the image of the highest of things, the sky, the firmament, heavens; and by extension, the power above. The ideogram consists of the graph for great, and above it the graph for one, denoting the greatest. It applies to everything above the human world as opposed to TI, Earth, that on which the human world rests.

Within the *family* of trigrams CH'IEN, The Force, is the absolute essence of the masculine. In the eighth Wing of the *I Ching*, the *Shuo Kua*, The Force refers to the father as the ancestor of the yang lines in the six variegated trigrams. These express the notion of NAN, manhood, and NU, womanhood, actualized in the sons and daughters, from CH'ANG, long-lived, i.e., senior, to SHAO, junior.

The trigram CHEN, The Quake, has been discussed at length in the article on hexagram No. 51 (*Spring 1976*, pp. 195-212). In brief the *name* of the trigram means: to shake as thunder does (in Chinese imagery the thunder shakes from below, whereas the lightning comes from above), to quiver, to tremble; to arouse, to move, to awe, to alarm. The ideogram consists of the graphs for shaking or to excite, and for rain, as depicted by the stirring yang line below two watery yin lines.

The *action* of the trigram CHEN, The Quake, is TUNG, stirring

up. This verb connotes: to excite, to move; to affect, to influence, to stir, to remove; to take action, working; to come out as a chicken from the egg or as a leaf from a bud. The ideogram consists of the graphs for great strength and for heavy, an image suggesting the capacity to move weighty things, which implies the image of Thunder, the power of shaking or moving from below.

Thunder, the *image* of the trigram CHEN is represented by the lower yang line that provokes a rising shake from below.

Within the *family* of trigrams, CHEN, The Quake, expresses the notion of CH'ANG NAN, long-lived manhood, i.e., the first son as the eldest one.

The hexagram THE GREAT'S VIGOUR shows below, The Force within, and above, The Quake outside. The stirring and movement into the outer world receive the strongest potential energy from the Force within. The very essence of the masculine, the father, backs the strongest human masculine, the eldest son. The two most masculine trigrams are here in active combination. The same trigrams in reversed position form hexagram No. 25, WU WANG, WITHOUT DISORDER, denoting, rather than movement, a situation without fault.

The nuclear trigrams CH'IEN, The Force, ☰, below, and TUI, The Open, ☱, above, result in the latent hexagram No. 43, KUAI, PARTING.

The *name* of the trigram TUI, The Open, means: to open, to permeate; an opening, a passage, the mouth; to exchange, to barter, to weigh against; satisfied, content(ed), gratified from having enough; straight, direct; to meet, to gather, a place where water gathers. The ideogram consists of the graphs for a man, for mouth and for vapor (damp), thus suggesting the open mouth of a man who speaks, who exchanges thoughts with others.

The *action* of the trigram TUI, The Open, is SHUO, cheering. It embraces the meanings: to stir up one by conversing with him, to talk, to speak; and with a different pronunciation: to urge one, to influence and persuade; and with yet another pronunciation: to delight in, be pleased. The ideogram consists of the graphs for words

and for to exchange, to barter. It suggests that the cheering consists in the exchange of spoken words.

Marsh, the *image* of the trigram TUI, is represented by the single open yin line above two yang lines. It is a water without depth, shallow flat water, all open surface.

Within the *family* of trigrams TUI, The Open, expresses the notion of SHAO NU, junior womanhood, i.e., the third and youngest daughter. She is the light-hearted and whimsical aspect of the feminine trigrams.

The latent hexagram No. 43, KUAI, PARTING, constellates within the unarticulated vigour of the actualized 34th hexagram a potential ability to separate things. Both the actual and the latent hexagram have the trigram CH'IEN, The Force, inside. In the actual hexagram the trigram CHEN, The Quake, converts the inner force into vigourous outward thrust. In the latent hexagram the same inner force expresses itself through the trigram TUI, The Open, with its cheering and its joyous communication through speaking. Thus the latent hexagram reveals a potential differentiation in the expression of inner strength and decision.

Contrasted Definitions:

THE GREAT'S VIGOUR, by-consequence stopping.

RENOUNCING, by-consequence retreating indeed.

Here hexagram No. 34 is contrasted with the preceding No. 33, TUN, RENOUNCING. CHIH, *to stop, stopping,* means: to bring or to come to a standstill. The ideogram shows the image of a foot that has ceased walking. It is the action of the trigram KEN, The Bound, ䷳ . TUI, to retreat, retreating, means: to retire, to recede, to draw back; to decline, to refuse; to withdraw, to yield. TSE, *by-consequence,* denotes the most stringent connection from cause to effect. Its connotations have been listed in *Spring 1972*, p. 94. Here the Contrasted Definitions express a very precise causal connection: THE GREAT'S VIGOUR brings about the end of motion, whereas RENOUNCING results in a movement of withdrawal. The final character YEH, *indeed,* at the end of the second sentence points out that

"RENOUNCING, by-consequence retreating" is a commentary upon the first sentence.

The term "stopping" occurs in the Contrasted Definitions of three different hexagrams: No. 52, KEN, THE BOUND (see *Spring 1977*, p. 91); No. 60, CHIEH, ARTICULATING; as well as here. In the text discussed above, "stopping" is related to the name of the hexagram by the connecting particle "by-consequence." No such particle occurs in the two other hexagrams. There the two terms form a binomial unit, which implies a reversible relation between the name of the hexagram and "stopping." THE BOUND's stopping,' and 'stopping's BOUND' embrace stopping by a boundary as well as the limit of the stopping activity. In contradistinction to the single "stopping" in hexagram No. 52, we find recurrent stopping in hexagram No. 60. Its name, CHIEH, ARTICULATING, denotes the nodes of bamboo, and thereby refers to the recurrent stops, which both separate and join different sections. The binomial unit 'ARTICULATING's stopping,' and 'stopping's ARTICULATING' includes both recurrent stopping at the joints, which articulates sections or intervals, as well as the articulation of stopping into recurrent stops.

The intimate both-way connection between the name of the hexagram and stopping in No. 52 and No. 60 is essentially different from the limiting one-way connection at hexagram No. 34. THE GREAT'S VIGOUR is described as the cause or origin of stopping, to the exclusion of any other link between the two. The stopping as a consequence of THE GREAT'S VIGOUR is explained as an act of renunciation. Compared with the thrust of THE GREAT'S VIGOUR, stopping is retreating.

The Sequence:
Being not possible through completing RENOUNCING.
The antecedent receiving through this THE GREAT'S VIGOUR.

The text of The Sequence links THE GREAT'S VIGOUR to the preceding hexagram TUN, RENOUNCING, by the often-occurring standard formula "Being not possible through completing [the quality or action of the preceding hexagram]." This emphatic statement of the most absolute impossibility has been discussed in *Spring 1977*, p. 92.

The Sequence tells us that THE GREAT'S VIGOUR is constellated because RENOUNCING (with its implication of retreating) can by no means be continued throughout a full cycle of time. The Chinese character KU, *the antecedent,* denotes a causal relation with the emphasis on succession in time. Its meaning has a wide range: cause, reason; purpose, intention; results; old, ancient, of old, formerly. It also embraces: grievance, a difference, quarrel, dissatisfaction, sorrow, death and mourning, which are understood within the context of KU as resulting from ancient causes and former intentions, i.e., the antecedents. KU, the antecedent, occurs in The Sequence of almost all the hexagrams. It points to the preceding hexagram. The occurrence of this notion introduces a causal aspect into the succession of two hexagrams. This causal aspect is usually described in the first line of The Sequence. The sentence "The antecedent receiving through this THE GREAT'S VIGOUR" explains that RENOUNCING, owing to the impossibility of completing, receives THE GREAT'S VIGOUR.

The Image:

Thunder situated above Heaven. THE GREAT'S VIGOUR.
A chün tzu, through no codes whatever, treads nothing.

Here Thunder is situated above Heaven, a true culmination from where no further movement is possible. Already in the Contrasted Definitions we had stopping as the result of this hexagram. The text of The Image insists that no steps be taken.

*Chün tzu* is the ideal of a noble person who strives to conform with destiny. One is a chün tzu in so far as one turns to the oracle in order to organize one's life in accordance with the inner law rather than with ego-intentions. (See *Spring 1972,* pp. 95-6). YI, *through,* should be read as: by means of, by reason of, owing to, on account of. It expresses instrumentality.

The term LI, *codes,* comprises the meanings: usage(s), etiquette, rules, manners, observance, rites, worship, or an act of worship, ceremony. The ideogram consists of the graphs for worship and for a sacrificial vase, thus suggesting that the moral and social codes ruling our acts proceed from an inner attitude similar to that of a man

handling a sacrificial vessel in worship. We find the notion LI, codes, in the titles of the three classical books about the rites, *I-Li, Chou-Li,* and *Li-Chi.* Great similarity in pronunciation of altogether different Chinese ideograms results in identical transcriptions. So the transcription LI does not point to any intrinsic connection between the different ideograms such as LI, codes; LI, The Brilliance; LI, congregating (see *Spring 1973,* p. 157); and LI, Harvest.

The texts of this hexagram have five out of the ten different Chinese terms of negation that are to be found in the *I Ching.* In order to contrast each of them by their respective shades of meaning and intensity, I have grouped all ten negatives at the end of this article in an appendix (*Terms of Negation,* p. 205f.).

The negative *no . . . whatever* is the strongest of the series of simple or plain negatives. Thus the statement eliminates all possible rules or codes that might enjoin one to tread somewhere. In the series of increasing privative negatives, *nothing* is the fourth and penultimate. This strong privative emphasizes that here a chün tzu does not tread at all; he rejects all rules that might induce him to put his foot on anything, or to go anywhere.

The Head:

THE GREAT'S VIGOUR: Harvest's Trial.

Here THE GREAT'S VIGOUR is placed in relation with the last two of the four stages of the time-cycle, which moves through Spring, Growth, Harvest, and Trial, as described with all their connotations in *Spring 1972,* pp. 97-100. LI, *Harvest,* covers the meanings: the reaping and gathering in; the season's yield of natural product, the product of any action or effort, gains, benefit, profit, interest on money; advantageous, useful; and sharp, the edge or point of a knife, acute. The ideogram is traditionally understood to consist of the graphs for a knife and for ripe grain standing in the field, suggesting both the cutting, or reaping, and the profit or crop gathered.

CHEN, *Trial,* covers the meanings: the action or fact of trying or being tried, to separate the good part of a thing from the rest through testing, ordeal, proof; the test-standing, the kernel, the most resistant part of something; undefiled, uncorrupted, pure, virtuous; righteous-

ness and firmness; and to inquire by divination. The ideogram is considered to consist of the graphs for pearl and for to divine, suggesting both the test or ordeal by divination, as well as the precious, undefiled kernel that remains.

Here the two terms form a binomial unit that embraces equally 'Harvest's Trial' and 'Trial's Harvest'. This statement is connected with THE GREAT'S VIGOUR in an unspecified relation indicated by the colon (:) that may be read as: is, results from, brings about, should be, etc. The situation of 'Harvest's Trial' and 'Trial's Harvest' embraces the testing of the crop harvested as well as the earning of the test-standing kernel. THE GREAT'S VIGOUR — corresponds to, is the origin of, is the consequence of — this testing and earning.

> Commentary on The Head:
> THE GREAT'S VIGOUR. The Great connotes vigour indeed.
> Solid through stirring-up. The antecedent's vigour.
> THE GREAT'S VIGOUR: Harvest's Trial.
> The Great connotes correctness indeed.
> Correct's Great and-still possible seeing the motives of Heaven's Earth!

The verb CHE, *to connote,* may be read: to signify in addition, to imply the meaning. *Solid* is the strong and hard quality of the unbroken yang lines as opposed to supple, the flexible, soft nature of the broken yin lines. KU, *the antecedent,* denotes a causal relation with the emphasis on succession in time as explained above, p. 191. Here it refers obviously to the Great as the cause and origin of the vigour.

CHENG, *correct, correctness,* denotes that one is perfectly in accord with the rule of what is right and it implies that one tends to rectify deviations (see *Spring 1973,* pp. 161-62). The binomial unit that equally includes both 'correct's Great' and 'the Great's correctness' emphasizes the capacity to impose a line of conduct as well as the exactness in keeping to the rule. *And-still* is a conjunction that implies a disjunctive aspect. It joins two terms or two statements as a connective, contrasting them slightly. CHIEN, *to see, to be seen,* denotes: perceiving, to appear, manifest. The ideogram shows an

eye above a man and applies to vision and visibility. CH'ING, *motives,* implies: feelings, desires, temper, human passions; and by extension, the true nature, the real circumstances as they proceed from the heart's motives. The ideogram consists of the graphs for heart and for green, the color of vernal coming forth: an image of germinating in mind and heart. The binomial T'IEN TI, *Heaven's Earth,* equally implies 'Earth's Heaven,' describing the realm where the Earth is related to the Heaven, as well as Heaven to Earth, i.e., the human realm in its connection to the extra-human above and below. The importance of this last sentence is emphasized by the final Chinese character YI rendered by an *exclamation mark* (!). The ideogram consists of the graphs for a dart and for done; that is to say that the sense has been fully expressed and the intention is very strong.

The first and fourth sentences comment upon the hexagram's name as appears from the explanatory interjection YEH, indeed. The first sentence explains that the notion of the Great implies potential vigour. In the situation described by THE GREAT'S VIGOUR the virtual vigour has grown out of the Great and leads to a culmination of the Great. The second sentence derives the vigour causally from the structure of the hexagram. The solid quality of the lower, inner trigram's yang lines is actualized by means of the stirring up of the upper, outer trigram. That is how the vigour proceeds from the Great as its antecedent.

The fourth sentence explains the connection of this hexagram with the testing and earning through the correctness that is inherent in the notion of the Great. The last sentence shows that though there is a strong and strict line of conduct, there is simultaneously the possibility of seeing and making visible whatever heavenly agencies and earthly passions move man's heart. It is a matter of making visible and seeing without being involved.

*The Lines:*

Nine at the bottom line:

*a)* THE VIGOUR unto the feet.
Chastising: inauspicious to have conformity.

*b)* THE VIGOUR unto the feet.
One's conformity ends indeed.

The preposition YU, *unto,* denotes a particular aspect of the preposition in, at, on. It expresses the movement toward an aim, toward a destination, or toward a limit in amount or degree. The emphasis of 'unto' is more on the approach than on reaching or actually penetrating. The word *foot* applies to the feet as the foundation of someone or of an object. In the *I Ching* it occurs six times and always applies to the bottom line (see hexagram No. 21, 22, 34, 43, 50 and 52). The verb CHENG, *to chastise,* has the meanings: to chastise refractory states, to reduce, to subjugate; to proceed, to start out as on a punishing expedition. The ideogram consists of the graphs for to go and for correct, thus indicating the undertaking of a rectifying move.

HSIUNG, *inauspicious,* is the divinatory term opposed to propitious. As such it means ill-omen. The ideogram shows a pit with a man in it. This suggests the idea that the situation is ill-omened because man loses, has lost, or is going to lose his freedom to dispose. Instead of surveying the situation and having a variety of ways at one's disposal, one is caught in the situation as in a pit. FU, *conformity,* means that outer presentation conforms with inner nature, that form is true to being; appearance can be trusted as conforming with essence. Therefore it embraces the meanings: sincerely, truly, trust, belief, accordant, confidence; all these derive from the concrete sense of to hatch, to brood on eggs. The ideogram consists of the graph for a bird's claws over the graph for a child, thus suggesting the brooding on the eggs from which offspring issues. The child is a true reproduction of its parents' model; it conforms with the standards of its species. The Chinese verb YU, *to have,* means: to possess, to be in possession of. In the *I Ching* "having" should always be read as a possessive assertion relating to the subject. In this it is very different from the English auxiliary verb to have.

The possessive pronoun CH'I, one's, stresses that the conformity belongs to the subject. Different notions of 'ending' as translated by end, completion, accomplishment, maturity, have been analysed in

*Spring 1971,* pp. 143-52. CH'IUNG, *end, ending,* has the meanings: extremity, brought to the last degree, to exhaust; and by extension, to investigate exhaustively, to examine thoroughly. It is the end where things cease and thus in contradistinction with CHUNG, completion, an ending which implies the beginning of a new time-cycle.

At the bottom line the strength and thrust of THE VIGOUR is directed toward the foundation, the standpoint, the place where one actually stands. It tends to overemphasize one's own standpoint. Where conformity occurs in the *I Ching,* it is generally valued as something that should be achieved. Here we have the exceptional case, where having conformity is said to be inauspicious. If THE VIGOUR of the standpoint thrusts without restraint into one's attitude, words, and deeds, it will be inauspicious. The chastising rectification will or should prevent domination by one's own too-strong convictions. This is a situation where one's outer deeds and actions should not conform to the vigour of one's inner convictions. The identification of inner thrust and outer behaviour comes to an end.

Nine at the second line:

*a)* Trial propitious.

*b)* The second's nine Trial propitious.
Through centering indeed.

At the second, third and fourth lines one of the key terms from The Head is emphasized, *Trial,* the testing by ordeal and the lasting solid kernel that emerges from it. Propitious is the divinatory term for boding well, the opposite of inauspicious (see above p. 195). *Through,* in the sense of by means of, has occurred several times above. CHUNG, *center,* or *centering,* means: the middle, the core of, inner, and that which bends neither to one side nor to the other. It points to the center within the person as well as in any situation. This center, or process of centering, occurs in many places in the *I Ching* and refers always to the point from which one can face the inner and outer vicissitudes of life.

At the second (and fourth) line it is possible to be subjected to Trial. Testing through hardship is boding well. The *b*-text explains

that at this line Trial is propitious on account of its connection with the central inner point of one's personality and one's situation.

Nine at the third line:

*a)* The Small's people avail-of THE VIGOUR.
A chün tzu avails-of absence.
Trial's adversity.
The he goat butts a fence.
Ruining one's horns.

*b)* The Small's people avail-of THE VIGOUR.
A chün tzu absence indeed.

*The Small's people* are those who let their attitude in life be ruled by the Small. The Small is that which makes one incline to be pushed and pulled by outer events and inner wishes, thus it is in contradistinction with the Great as explained above pp. 185f. This binomial unit implies a both-way relationship: 'The Small's people' as well as 'the people's Small.' The image-concept of people acting according to their impulses implies these spontaneous reactions arising in oneself and in others. (Here, the Small's people are like Jung's 'little people' of the complex — being caught in complexes.)

YUNG, *to avail-of, availing,* denotes: to make use of, to employ as an instrument, to use; to take advantage of; to benefit by, to profit by; useful; available; what is needed for use; benefiting, profiting. The ideogram is said to consist of the graphs for to divine and for center, thus suggesting a beneficially effective divination one can avail of. The notion of *chün tzu,* as of someone who strives to conform with his destiny, has been discussed above p. 191. *Absence,* a strong privative that expresses void, is discussed in the appendix on *Terms of Negation,* pp. 205f.

LI, *adversity,* as the grinding hardship that polishes and perfects, is one of the key notions in the *I Ching.* For a full explanation the reader may refer to *Spring 1970,* pp. 114-17. The binomial unit "Trial's adversity" equally embraces 'adversity's Trial.' YANG, *the goat,* is the common term for both sheep and goat. This animal occurs at the third, fifth and top lines of this hexagram. Here and at

the top line the character YANG occurs in combination with TI, the male of this species, denoting the ram or buck. The two characters TI YANG, translated as the *he goat,* denote the animal that embodies both the quality of the ram and of the buck. It is the three-year-old male at the acme of his strength. This term occurs only in the third and top lines of hexagram No. 34. Here at the top of the lower trigram we have in accordance with astrological imagery the young aspect, the Aries. At the top of the upper trigram occurs the older, Capricorn aspect. The Aries represents an essentially violent thrust, the Capricorn more resistant sturdiness. *To butt,* pushing with the horns, is the typical impulse and movement of the ram and of the buck. In the *I Ching* this term occurs only here and at the top line of this hexagram.

LEI, *ruining,* includes the meanings: to break, to turn over, to destroy; debilitated, infirm, meager, emaciated; and by extension, entangled. The *horns* are the very point of strength and thrust of the ram and buck character. FAN, *fence,* means: a hedge, a boundary, a frontier; to protect, to fend off, to enclose. The only places where fence occurs in the *I Ching* are the third, fourth and top lines of this hexagram.

The third line deals with handling THE VIGOUR. It contrasts an Aries-ruled approach, which tends to avail itself of THE VIGOUR, with the way of a chün tzu, who does not employ THE VIGOUR at all. He knows that THE VIGOUR does not belong to him personally and therefore cannot be employed or handled. This is related with the Taoist notion of WU WEI, non-action as the true action (Lao-tzu, *Tao te ching,* The Book of the Way and its Virtue, chap. 29. Best Engl. translation by J.J.L. Duyvendak, London 1954, John Murray). Here we have Trial, as at the second and fourth lines, but this time connected with adversity. The emphasis is on the grinding hardship the ram, or Aries, undergoes when it tries to use THE VIGOUR to break out of his limits. The impulsion to make use of THE VIGOUR brings about the adversity that is the Trial here. This adversity is compared with the impulsive thrust of the ram. One ruins the point of one's strength by running into obstacles, a fence. THE GREAT'S VIGOUR is so intimately connected with fence since it

needs hedging in, and necessarily conflicts with the confining hedge. This grinding Trial of ruining the point of one's vigour opens the way for the voice of the inner law, the chün tzu's refraining from actually making use of THE VIGOUR. The lasting kernel emerging from the adversity, i.e., adversity's Trial, is precisely the restraint of a chün tzu in regard to THE VIGOUR.

Nine at the fourth line:

*a)* Trial propitious.
Repentance vanishing.
Scattering the fence: not ruining.
THE VIGOUR unto THE GREAT: axle-strap of a carriage.

*b)* Scattering the fence: not ruining.
Honoring's going indeed.

HUI, *repentance,* denotes the change of one's mind through dissatisfaction with past action or conduct, or its results. It is more than just regret; active change of attitude is its dominant trait. WANG, *to vanish,* means: lost, gone, no trace left, extinct, forgotten, to go to ruin. The ideogram may be understood as entering obscurity or as a man concealed by a wall, an image of vanishing from the field of vision. To vanish should be distinguished from "disappearing" (below, at the fifth line) where the emphasis is on dying and destroying. CHUEH, *to scatter, scattering,* includes: to disperse, to spread, streams diverging; to cut off; and by extension, to decide, to pass sentence, decidedly. The ideogram consists of the graphs for water and for pulling or stretching different ways. The latter graph (pulling in different ways) is the name of hexagram No. 43, KUAI, PARTING, the latent hexagram discussed above, p. 189. The terms *fence* and *ruining* have already occurred above, at the third line. *Unto,* the preposition denoting the approach, a movement toward something, has been discussed above p. 195. YU, *carriage*, signifies the box or body of a cart, the flat or bottom of a carriage; to contain and bear, to hold, to sustain, a foundation or basis. The *axle-strap* is the band that fastens the containing body of a cart to the mobile apparatus, which consists of axle and wheels.

WANG, *going,* denotes the objective movement of time out of the present into the past. It implies that one let things go so that they are passed by and become past. (This key-notion and its correlative 'coming' have been discussed in *Spring 1972,* pp. 101-02). SHANG, *honor, honoring,* has the meanings: to esteem, to deserve the highest rank, eminent; and, in a concrete sense, to put one thing on top of another. The binomial unit includes both 'honoring's going' as well as 'going's honoring.'

At the fourth line the propitious Trial occurs again: at the second line it corresponds to the inner point from where one can face the vicissitudes of life, whereas at the fourth line it applies to the movement of the situation. Here one moves with the flow of objective time that brings out the test-standing kernel. Dissatisfaction with past action vanishes. A rectifying change of attitude takes place. The hedging in is broken up without damage to oneself. This is in contradistinction with both the third line where the point of one's thrust is destroyed, and the top line where it gets stuck. There is no ram- or buck-thrust. The obstacles are dispersed in the movement of time. The dynamic elements of the fourth line — vanishing, scattering, (movement) unto — proceed from and are part of the objective movement of time from present to past. The core of the dynamism of this hexagram's name is explained here as the thrust of THE VIGOUR toward THE GREAT. The unspecified connection (see p. 193) indicated by a colon (:) means that here this thrust is, results from, brings about, the axle-strap, that is, the ties, which clasps one's holding capacity to one's moving ability. The *b*-text insists upon the break-up of the hedging without damage, since the thrust is directed toward the Great rather than into the outer world. This is commented upon as "honoring's going." The time when one of the two was given a higher rank, when VIGOUR was on top of THE GREAT, is not past. "THE VIGOUR unto THE GREAT" says that the containing and the moving are now connected in mutuality, as by an axle-strap. The reversed form of the binomial unit, "going's honoring," stresses that the highest esteem is given to the objective movement of time, which makes obsolete the inherent hierarchy of the elements in this hexagram's name.

Six at the fifth line:

*a)* Disappearing goat unto lightness.
Without repentance.

*b)* Disappearing goat unto lightness.
Position not appropriate indeed.

SANG, *to disappear,* includes: to lose, to pass into obscurity, forgotten, being destroyed; to die, to mourn. The ideogram consists of the graphs for weep and for dead, thus emphasizing that the kind of disappearance meant here is the radical and total one of death. It is much stronger than the mere vanishing that occurs at the fourth line with respect to repentance. YANG, *the goat,* denotes sheep as well as goat. The corresponding male appears with its ram-nature at the third line and with its buck-nature at the top line. Here it is not a matter of the male aspect with its two particular ways of outward action. Goat stands for the nature of the species itself, for its unwavering straightness. *Unto,* as the movement toward, has been discussed at the bottom line, p. 195.

YI, *lightness, light, lightly,* is the opposite of NAN, hardship, implying heavy, heaviness, hard, difficult, irksome. YI lightness, includes the meanings: easy, not difficult, done without care; remiss, indifferent to, negligent; inattentive; to deal lightly with; at ease. The lightness leads to the subsidiary meaning: transformation, mutation. It is the lightness of things that allows for constant change and metamorphosis; as such it occurs in the name of the *Book of Changes,* where the Chinese character YI, lightness, is now generally transcribed as I. Many editions however transcribe the name *I Ching* as *Yi Ching* or *Yi King.*

*Repentance,* as a change of attitude through dissatisfaction with past action, has been discussed above at the fourth line. For the meaning of the second degree of privative negation, *without,* the reader should refer to the appendix, p. 205.

The Chinese character WEI, *position,* consists of the graphs for a man and for standing, the image of a man in his proper place. It means a place or a seat according to rank, a post, a position, a dignity, to arrange in proper rank; right, proper, correct, established,

arranged. It is also the technical term occurring in the *b*-texts of the lines as 'position appropriate' (yang at uneven, yin at even line) or 'position not appropriate' (yang at even, yin at uneven line). TANG, *appropriate,* has the meanings: what is suitable, opportune, convenient, adequate to, competent; equal or equivalent to; to match, to pawn, to pledge. Wherever 'appropriate' and 'not appropriate' occur, these technical terms are images of the inquirer's situation.

At the fifth line the outward thrust, common to both the ram and the buck, is not actualized. What is left over is their specific unwavering straightness. This now dies away in a movement directed toward lightness in change and transformation. At the fourth line it is the subjective feeling of dissatisfaction with previous conduct that vanishes. Here, at the fifth line, it is an objective process loosening the stubbornness into changeability, which leaves no place for regret or desire to recover the unwavering strength. The simple statement "position not appropriate" in the *b*-text emphasizes the objective aspect in this movement. It is the situation itself that dissolves the stubborn nature into an attitude of both lightly changing and transforming lightness.

Six at the top line:

*a)* The he goat butts a fence.
Not the capacity to retreat, not the capacity to release.
Without direction: Harvest.
Drudgery, by-consequence propitious.

*b)* Not the capacity to retreat, not the capacity to release.
Not ruminating indeed.
Drudgery, by-consequence propitious.
Fault not long-lived indeed.

We have discussed above at the third line the sentence *the he goat butts a fence.* Because he-goat stands for the male of both sheep and goat, we may see the two appearances of this animal in the light of astrological imagery. At the top of the lower trigram we have the young aspect, the Aries-ram, and here, at the top of the upper trigram, the older aspect, the Capricorn-buck. The strength of the

first lies more in the thrust, the second is on the whole more sturdy.

The first and plainest negative *not*, is listed in the appendix, p. 205. The repetition not . . . not . . . is the equivalent of neither . . . nor. . . . NENG, *capacity, capable,* includes the meanings: power, ability, skill, art; competent, talented; duty, function, capability as of a machine. The ideogram is said to represent a mighty animal (like a bear) with hoofs and strong bones, an image of capacious size and great strength in bearing and defence. T'UI, *to retreat,* means: to retire, to recede, to draw back; to decline, to refuse; to withdraw, to yield. SUI, *to release,* embraces: to give loose to, not to oppose or hinder; to follow, to accord with; to spread, to go ahead, to progress, to penetrate, to invade. The ideogram consists of the graphs for going and for following one's wishes, suggesting unimpeded movement.

*Without,* the second degree of privative negation, is explained in the appendix, p. 192. YU, *direction*, denotes: moving through or over the water, a movement toward a place, directed at a specific point. The ideogram is traditionally seen as a man rowing or swimming through the water. It brings a line of orientation and of action amid the unfocussed possibilities of the watery realm. *Harvest* stands for the acuteness that reaps and for the profit gathered (see above, p. 192). The two members of this sentence, "without direction" and "Harvest," are simply juxtaposed. This open relation is indicated by the colon (:) (see above, p. 193 and, for a full explanation of the syntax of the imaginal, *Spring 1976,* pp. 193-94), which implies that it may be read as: being unfocussed — is, brings about, results from — the reaping and gathering.

CHIEN, *drudgery,* means: land that is hard to till, whatever is difficult or toilsome; to inflict hardship; distressing, sorrowful. The ideogram consists of the graphs for clayey earth and for a man turning around to compare himself with others. The image comprises the toilsome labouring and the distressing comparison of one's work with that of others. *By-consequence* states the most stringent connection from cause to effect. Thus the *propitiousness,* the boding well, is said to be a direct result of one's drudgery.

CHIU, *fault,* means: an error, a defect, and thus to blame. The

ideogram consists of the graphs for a man and for different, suggesting someone who is different from what he ought to be.

At the top line we again find the sentence "the he goats butts a fence." Unlike the ruining, ram-like Aries-thrust at the third line, we here have the more persistent Capricorn, capable neither of withdrawing nor of letting go. His strength remains entangled with the obstacles. He can disentangle himself only if his thought and will are not focussed upon any aim or goal. The *b*-text emphasizes that there is not even a meditation in regard to any action. This very impossibility of turning strength into a thrust of action or thought is here the profit. This is experienced as a distressing hardship. The situation bodes well precisely because of this drudgery. It is the drudgery of not being able to move that prevents THE VIGOUR from thrusting and ruining, as at the third line. Here its thrusting into the obstacles does not last long. The drudgery saves the subject from identifying with THE VIGOUR.

*

*The Lines in Résumé:* The hexagram as a whole deals with the problem of impetuous strength. Every line constellates a particular confrontation with THE VIGOUR. The contrasting of each of the images sharpens our insight into the various ways of dealing with the manifestation and dangers of THE VIGOUR. These images of the lines may be summarized as follows:

At the bottom line THE VIGOUR thrusts into one's standpoint. The overemphasis of one's own standpoint needs to become corrected. One has to break up the identification with one's own views, so that the conformity of inner conviction and outer attitude comes to an end.

At the second line THE VIGOUR is not actualized and therefore remains virtual. That it cannot manifest itself is felt as a hardship. But this suffering bodes well, because it keeps THE VIGOUR at the very core of the person or matter under consideration.

At the third line one identifies with THE VIGOUR in an Aries-thrust that ruins the very point of one's strength. Through the

roughness of this ordeal one realizes that THE VIGOUR is not meant to be made use of or handled. Here one is led from impulsively employing the transpersonal strength to not using it, or rather availing oneself of non-action, as a chün tzu does.

At the fourth line THE VIGOUR no longer prevails over, but now belongs to, THE GREAT. One's going along with the objective movement of time, rather than an ego thrust, disperses the limits and obstacles. Here the two elements of the binomial name of the hexagram are truly interrelated at equality, because the emphasis has shifted to the juncture of one's capacity to hold (the Great) and one's ability to move (the vigour). Here the inherent tension of this hexagram is resolved.

At the fifth line even the potential VIGOUR does not suit the situation and dies away. It is not regretted because one is in an objective movement transcending THE VIGOUR into lightness and changeability.

At the top line THE VIGOUR of the sturdy Capricorn, involved with obstacles and limits, entangles itself in total blockage. This is so painful that one soon disentangles from the identification with the obstacles. By renouncing any will-directed thought and action, one frees oneself from the grip of THE VIGOUR.

## *Appendix:* Terms of Negation

Negation in the *I Ching* is expressed by different Chinese characters, which represent subtle but essential shades of meaning. I have listed them below and, as usual in my translations, have applied the system of one-to-one equivalences between Chinese and English terms. Each English negative refers to only one, and always the same, Chinese term, wherever it may occur. Tentatively, I have grouped the terms of negation in three categories.

*a*) Simple or plain negatives of increasing strength.
   1) *Not.* The first simple negative.
   2) *In-no-way.* This is a much stronger negative with the meaning 'not so.'
   3) *No . . . whatever.* This strongest of the series of plain negatives means 'not at all.' The two terms together correspond to one single Chinese character.

*b*) Privative negatives of increasing strength.
   1) *No.* The plain privative expressing the idea of not doing and corresponding also to the prefix un- or dis-.
   2) *Without.* The stronger privative stands for 'destitute of' and corresponds to the suffix -less.

3) *Lacking.* This is the negation of YU, to have. It connotes 'not being in possession of' and as such is more specific than the preceding.

4) *Absence, absent.* This still stronger privative expresses the idea of emptiness or void. It is also the term for net. The ideogram consists of the graphs for net and for lost, an image that explains absence as the meshes, the interstices of a net. Here the net is seen as a systm of interstices, not as a network of threads. The meshes are the absence (of threads). On the size of the meshes, on the "absence" depends the function of the net: to separate the fish one wants from the smaller fish one is willing to let go.

5) *Nothing, nowhere.* This privative eliminates things and places. It means 'not a thing, not a place.'

6) *None.* This negative expresses complete elimination: 'not any (thing or person), by no means.'

*c*) Temporal negative.

*Not-yet.* The Chinese character WEI corresponds to a notion that cannot be expressed in one single word in English: The idea of 'not yet, not now.'

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

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


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


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