STUDY PROBLEMS IN META-TECHNOLOGY   (revised, May 24, 1980)

[There is an explanation of meta-technology starting on Page 5.]

1. At the level of the language used to describe perceptions, expound a paradigm of determination of an objectivity by reciprocal subjectivities-- which "breaks the framework of objectivity."*

2. Expound a paradigm of determination of an objectivity by reciprocal subjectivities as in Problem 1--but this time give a paradigm which does not depend on deceit and delusion, and which energizes the subjects rather than crippling them.

3. Characterize the consequence-relationships in descriptions of logically impossible world-states in dreams.

4. Generalize Subjective Propositional Vibration by characterizing an entire assortment of procedures involving interaction of awareness with objectivity--interaction between objectivity and undisplaced, unreduced subjectivity--such that the interaction can be controllable by volition of the subject and can also be out of his or her control. All procedures must be specified to be carried out in the first instance by "the subject."

5. Formulate an SPV sentence specifically to be read in a logically impossible world-state (e.g. a dreamed world-state), so that there is a second-order breaking of the framework of objectivity.
        OR
6. Devise a system of SPV sentences in which Necker cubes are replaced by logically impossible world-states as SPV notations.

7. Assume that physical science has devised a brain-monitoring machine which continuously registers the total physical state of the brain up to quantum fluctuations and which also registers all mentation (whatever that means--see Problem 1); and which can output this data in all modes up to induction of the registered mentation in another mind by induction of the physical substrate of that mentation in another brain (whatever that means). Devise a thought-experiment in which the subject being monitored reads SPV propositions, and his mentation is fed back to him or interchanged with another subject reading SPV propositions. Contrive a second-order breaking of the framework of objectivity (which explicitly discredits the neurophysiological ontology of "intelligence").

*"Breaking the framework" is a catch-phrase of mine which I do not like to define explicitly; but it means some such thing as "a proximate, tangible phenomenon which cannot be assimilated in the ontology of natural science and logicism." (Contradictions with experiential content, interactions of objectivity with undisplaced, unreduced subjectivity, and changes in the evaluational processing of experience all break the framework.)

8. It has been said that the reason why Jesus Christ was able to attract a mass following as a spiritual leader is because of the literally hundreds or thousands of miracles that he performed, as reported in the New Testament. What is the contemporary scientific view of this claim? What is the meta-technological view of this claim? Historicists should not overlook the issue of how "genuine facts" which constitute history are to be obtained. Is the "evidence" for the deeds of Julius Caesar as good as the "evidence" for the deeds of Jesus? (And again in regard to the historical record, were Descartes and Leibnitz successful opportunists who forced into oblivion far greater thinkers among their contemporaries?)

9. Expound a framework-breaking paradigm which is a synthesis of sex and "mathematics" (knowledge of formal-structural processes). Do not waste time on puerile answers such as kinship networks or partner permutations. The performing arts of India are also not sufficient.

10. Give a concrete example of a language whose (potential) vocabulary is uncountably infinite even though the number of words actually selected and used is finite.

11. Specify a transformation that abolishes its specification. Then, in two different and incommensurate realms, specify a transformation which virtually abolishes or massively undermines the entire language of which the specification is a text. (Hint: try a thought-experiment in cosmology and a thought-experiment in intersensory discorrelation. Does the cosmological example create any epistemological problems for physics?)

12. Expound an experiment in intersensory discorrelation of the subject's volition, in which the discorrelation is defined and experienced in the frame of reference of replicable subjectivity (as counterposed to the "instrumentalist physicalism" of science), but the commands of the will are monitored in efferent neural channels by neurophysiological instruments. Devise interchanges between the two frames of reference which break the framework of objectivity. The interchanges may be complicated by choosing the subject as the observer of the read-out of the instruments monitoring the commands of his will; and by contriving the specified discorrelation to affect the procedures of human utilization of the scientific instruments (cf. Bridgman's operational definitions).

13. When instrumental cognition (e.g. scientific technology) is turned so that we ourselves are within its scope, it converts us into Things-not-capable-of-insight conceived as bundles-of-qualities, into Things-which-are-unable-to-encounter-each-other in the way in which the Self encounters "its world": into walking lumps of lard. Modern Western civilization is unique in the degree to which it has attempted to make instrumental cognition autonomous—to counterpose it to subjectivity, myth, faith, superstition, etc.—and to intensify this theoretically astute pragmatism as if it were the whole of cognition and the highest good to which we can aspire. The resulting strains on the collective world-view are obvious insofar as they take the form of the proliferation of occultist tendencies. But there is no reason to suppose that any of these tendencies can achieve sovereignty in

the intellectual institutions as long as they have to compete with scientific technology on the present basis. And the Nazi attempt to sugar-coat materialistic technology with the myth of "blood and land"—the feature which attracted Heidegger to Nazism, as he continued to acknowledge after 1945—was defeated by the "rationalist" Allies in ten years. Is the domination of scientific technology producing any strains in the collective world-view other than those which only have regressive, destructive, soon-suppressed consequences? If so, what are they?

14. To learn, as in Anti-Mathematics, that a system of pure truth is actually a hoax induced by societal brainwashing—or less polemically, a morass of contradictions regulated by social control of orthodoxy, social control of language, etc.—is in a way uncanny like the waterfall illusion: mathematics begins to "swim." To express all this in a single word we might say that mathematics is (covertly!) embedded knowledge. But whatever uncanniness Anti-Mathematics succeeds in associating with mathematics derives from the exposé of deceits and frauds; whereas the waterfall illusion, as a perception, is just what it is. Can there be a paradigm of embedded knowledge which is uncanny apart from an exposé of willfully occluded deceits? (Trial solution: Common sense—the conceptual medium of ordinary apprehension of the world and ordinary social interaction—has to be openly paradoxical to perform its functions. So exploit the paradoxes of common sense; try my "Paradigm 1.")

15. Develop an arithmetic of 1=2 etc. supported by a realm of anomalous, uncanny perceptions. (Hint: I already have two different solutions, both of which are related to intensensory discorrelation phenomena.) (Concession to Hennix: Develop an arithmetic of 1+1=3, 1+2=3, 2+2=5, 1+3=4, 2+3=7, ..., to be continued by according with some laws of standard arithmetic and violating others. Use Yessenin-Volpin's "logical" methods. It is not enough to obtain this arithmetic by a mere nonstandard interpretation of the nonlogical constants.)

16. What is the meta-technological view (evaluation) of telepathy? What is the meta-technological view of reincarnation? What is the meta-technological view of astral projection? What is the meta-technological view of the notion that individual human lives are directed by fate?

17. It is generally accepted that physical technology (engineering) depends on the truth of the mathematics it utilizes. If so, then elucidate the "verso" (underside) of this relationship. Establish linkages such that if a mathematical theorem is shown to be inconsistent, then all physical structures built with its help will collapse immediately. Then, by using Failure Theorems about the quantification of nature (from Zeno's paradoxes to the physical implications of Riemann's Rearrangement Theorem, Dedekind's definition of continuity, the Hausdorff-Banach-Tarski paradox, and beyond), define a physics such that the state of reality explicitly and tangibly varies according to the mathematics through which one notices (apprehends) it. It is not enough to solve this problem at the level of poetry; if it were, then "Representation of the Memory of an Energy Cube Organism" would be a solution. No, I am asking for methods which can render nuclear attacks inoperative, etc. This is by far the most ambitious problem in cross-potentiating primitive meta-technology with natural science, and I do not expect a solution in my lifetime or without a massive commitment of resources to R&D.

18. Could an individual who possessed powerful technological knowledge ever plausibly fear for his personal safety? (What happened to Archimedes?)

19. On television, I have repeatedly seen baseball player Dave Concepcion cross himself before batting and then get a hit. What would Hume's view of this linkage be? (Answer: that it is of equal status with any imputation of causality such as flipping a light-switch and having the light go on.) What is the contemporary scientific view of this linkage? (Answer: Concepcion is a proficient baseball player—plus the power of suggestion.) What is the meta-technological view of this linkage?

20. In a 1931 paper, Carnap posed the problem of whether a god could give us knowledge that we cannot obtain by ourselves because of the insufficiency of our faculties. For Carnap, the test of such a transfer of knowledge seems to be whether we could check the information after it was told to us (Carnap's example was a proof of Fermat's Conjecture). Carnap also gave as an example the case of a sighted person who teaches a blind person physics. Expose the fallacies in this latter example. Give several meta-technological perspectives on the problem posed by Carnap. What if the superior "information" is not commensurate with people's conceptualization of reality and compartmentalization of human faculties, and if it derives its meaning from experiences which people do not want to have? What are the difficulties in developing an ennobling cultural vehicle which channels energy of the body, emotional profundity, and exaltation and can directly confront people impaired by scientific objectification with their lacks?

Explanations

"Meta-technology" most definitely is a technology, an instrumental modality intended to overmaster and supersede scientific technology. (The word "philosophy" is reserved for pedantic, passive interpretations of the world; and as such my work cannot be philosophy.) Meta-technology is a technology whose field of action is the "determination of reality." It merges two achievements into one: it returns us to our whole humanness without mystification (without hearsay or the appeal to a realm of Things which do not exist except as chimeras); and in doing so it gives us ascendancy over scientific technology and manipulative power over "the world." The reason why no meta-technological procedures were invented in past cultures is that for these procedures to be invented, credulity toward phantom thing-worlds as an outlet for subjectivity and humanness (the "supernatural") has to be scorned; and at the same time there has to be a counter-attack on scientific objectification (the lump-of-lard world-view) which honors science's demand for tangible effectiveness.

One of the features of history which most bemuses me is that during the first few thousand years of civilization, people devoted massive amounts of energy to a technology which simply does not work (not by the baldly technocratic criteria which we understand): so-called magic or occultism. Why did ancient peoples not dismiss this rubbish and get down to the job of devising a technology which does work—a job at which an intelligent fifteen-year-old ought to be able to make a creditable beginning? A serious answer to this question would be quite complicated, but I wish to give a one-sided answer to drive home a lesson. Were the ancients just stupid? Of course not. Archimedes, for example, made a very creditable beginning at establishing an efficient technology ... but he was casually murdered by an invading foot soldier. The ancients did not achieve a comprehensive technology which works because they did not want a technology which works. (And they did not want the disruption of their world-view, their social hierarchy, etc. which would accompany an efficient technology.)

I do not think the insight can be stressed too much that people may do without an efficient technology for thousands of years because THEY DO NOT WANT ONE. Since I started proposing the project of meta-technology, I have continually encountered a state of affairs analogous to the historical one to which I have alluded.

The dozens of intellectuals whom I have approached have not defended mathematics and physics as intellectually satisfactory and adequate. On the contrary, when I offer my arguments that logic, mathematics, and physics are fraudulent and crippled (The Bankruptcy of Logic, Anti-Mathematics, The Crisis in Physics), the reaction from the professionals is "We already knew that but we don't care and we are going to try to suppress your exposé." (Incidentally, my academic credentials are in economics, and I already left that field because I found the same attitude there.)

What is more, not a single person has seriously argued that my procedures do not do what I claim for them, or that they cannot be extended to outstrip scientific technology. Nobody has attempted to   expose   the limits of meta-technology in the way I   expose   the limits of physics in "The Crisis in Physics." Nobody is calling me a charlatan. Instead, the reply I keep getting is "Yes it works but we don't want it." (I may give one example,

although it is so minor that I hesitate to mention it. When I formed a group of
people in 1974 to tell each other their dreams, one person quit after the first
meeting because the content of the dreams she had been told began to be echoed
in her own dreams, and it frightened her. She quit not because "Flyntism doesn't
change anything and doesn't make any difference" but because Flyntism did change
something and did make a difference and it frightened her.)

Then, there are the mathematicians who tell me "Of course mathematics is
a hoax but it is the only thing in the world I can do well"; and the physics
student who told me "I just want to make a lot of money." And when I ask post-
hippie science students whether their LSD trips caused them to reconsider their
physicist's conception of reality, they say "Oh, my trips were just an
adolescent fling, and now that I have settled down to making money I don't want
that kind of experience, and once you start thinking about 'reality' you just
sit around and talk about the universe and never get anywhere." (Perhaps I
had better get it on record that I don't use psychedelics, and that my approach
is quite capable of fracturing reality without the use of drugs.)

And is there an implication that they can't acquire familiarity with
my work even as a news item or as entertainment without losing their ability
to do science? If an account of meta-technology is ever published as a news
item, will it incapacitate all scientists?

Then, John Alten dismissed the Study Problems as "Anglo-Saxon philosophy
of the type of Russell and Wittgenstein." He didn't even classify my work in
the correct field of specialization.

In short, it is altogether possible that obsolete scientific technology
will continue to prevail for a thousand or two thousand years because a higher
technology is available but nobody wants it.

Turning to the Study Problems, there are certain requirements on solutions
which evidently need to be stated explicitly. But first, there is a pre-condition.
Indifference to religious, racial, national, sexual, and dynastic loyalties is needed
if one wishes to work with meta-technology or even to understand it. I want
manipulative power over "the world"; but the power I want is no more available
to so-called men of affairs than the ability to invent an atomic bomb is
available to a maharajah.

The requirements are as follows.

1. Every solution must arise from the understanding that the fundamental
   intellectual premises of modern Western civilization are bankrupt. The
   prevailing sciences conceptualize "reality" and compartmentalize human
   faculties in a way which makes it impossible to solve these problems.
2. Every solution must undermine the existing civilization; it must be a path
   out of the prevailing form of life to a new form of life.
3. An implication of (2) is that solutions to the problems must be able to be
   "communicated" successfully. (But note that "communication" itself is at
   issue in these problems.)
4. "Unfair" and off-the-map solutions are not only permitted; they are encouraged.
   After all, the "correct" way to fly to the moon was by flapping one's arms;
   but that is not the way it was done.

These problems could be used in conjunction with a school for adults (as opposed to a school for children). (The only thing which is preventing such a school now is that nobody wants to learn what I have to teach. Even my offers to pay people to become my students have been rejected.) The student would be given a copy of my writings and sent off to solve one or more of these problems. Since the problems are presumably hard (I don't know how hard because I solve them routinely and nobody else has tackled them at all), the student would probably give up after a couple of weeks. He or she would then be ready for the insight provided by being told the most impressive available answer. That is all that there would be to this school. These problems are solvable, but I do not have any mysterious short-cuts for solving them. My time of solution has ranged from six months to ten years. All of the questions require answers which are of the length of an essay at least. For some of the problems, no solution has yet been given; although I'm sure I can come up with something when I get around to working on them. Solutions need not be unique, and sometimes I explicitly request more than one solution.

This proposal would be analogous to setting up a School of Mathematics in 1900 in which the syllabus and homework would just be Hilbert's 23 Problems. Actually, my problems are narrower in relation to the whole of my activities than Hilbert's Problems are in relation to the subject-matter of mathematics.

And my problems are more analogous to Hilbert's 2nd Problem than to his others, insofar as their probable effect is to evoke debates which do not produce a consensus but rather show who has the most profound opinion on the issues in question.