ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF INTERNAL TIME (1893–1917)

EDMUND HUSSERL

COLLECTED WORKS

EDITOR: RUDOLF BERNET

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VOLUME IV	On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)

TRANSLATIONS
PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF
THE HUSSERL-ARCHIVES (LEUVEN)

EDMUND HUSSERL

ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF INTERNAL TIME (1893–1917)

TRANSLATED BY

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SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

CIP

Husserl, Edmund. 1859–1938.
[Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. English]
On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893–1917) / Edmund Husserl; translated by John Barnett Brough.
p. cm. — (Collected works; v. 4)
Translation of: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7923-1536-0 ISBN 978-94-011-3718-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-3718-8

1. Time. 2. Time perception. I. Brough, John B. II. Title.
III. Series: Husserl, Edmund, 1859–1938. Works. English. 1980; v. 4.
B3279.H93Z8413 1990
115—dc20 90-41892

ISBN 978-0-7923-1536-0

Printed on acid free paper

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Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1991
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1991
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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

What follows is a translation of Volume X in the *Husserliana* series, the critical edition of the works of Edmund Husserl.[1] Volume X was published in 1966. Its editor, Rudolf Boehm, provided the title: *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)*. Some of the texts included in Volume X were published during Husserl's lifetime, but the majority were not. Given the fact that the materials assembled in Volume X do not constitute a single and previously published Husserlian work, some acquaintance with their history and chronology is indispensable to understanding them. These introductory remarks are intended to provide the outlines of such an acquaintance, together with a brief account of the main themes that appear in the texts.

The Status of the Texts

In 1928, Husserl's "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins" appeared in the *Jahrbuch für Philoso-*

[1] Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)* [On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893–1917)], herausgegeben von Rudolf Boehm, *Husserliana X* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). The references in Roman numerals that occur in parentheses in this Introduction are to Rudolf Boehm's "Editor's Introduction" to *Husserliana X*. References in Arabic numerals, unless otherwise noted, will be to this translation. Corresponding page numbers of *Husserliana X* will be found in the margins of the translation. The translation includes Parts A and B of *Husserliana X*, with Boehm's notes. It does not include Boehm's "Introduction," the main points of which are summarized here, or his "Textkritischer Anhang."

phie und phänomenologische Forschung.[2] Martin Heidegger was credited as the editor of the work, for which he wrote a brief prefatory note. The publication of 1928 had two parts: "The Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time from the Year 1905," which was considerably longer than the second part, the "Addenda and Supplements to the Analysis of Time-consciousness from the Years 1905–1910." The complete text of the work published in 1928 appears as "Part A" of *Husserliana X* and therefore as "Part A" of this translation.

At first glance, the status of the text of 1928 could hardly be more straightforward: it is evidently a work edited by Heidegger and consisting of two parts, the first and more substantial of which dates from 1905, while the second is formed from supplementary texts written from 1905 to 1910. But as Rudolf Boehm has shown in the Editor's Introduction to *Husserliana X*, the situation is considerably more complicated than that, and the complications are fraught with philosophical consequences.

Towards the end of his prefatory note to the edition of 1928, Heidegger mentions, almost as an afterthought, that Husserl's assistant Edith Stein had inserted the chapter and paragraph divisions when she transcribed Husserl's stenographic lecture manuscripts (XXV). The reader is left with the impression that the organization and character of the work as published are altogether Husserl's and that neither the contributions of Edith Stein nor the emendations of Heidegger as editor went beyond the cosmetic. This, in fact, was true in Heidegger's case – his editing consisted in introducing only the slightest of changes – but it could hardly be further from the truth as far as Edith Stein's role was concerned. Indeed, by virtue of her work on the text, she may rightly be called its true, and deeply involved, editor.

When Edith Stein was Husserl's assistant at Freiburg from 1916 to 1918, one of her tasks was to begin to assemble and prepare Husserl's numerous lecture manuscripts, notes, and sketches for possible publication (XIX, XX). In at least some

[2] Edmund Husserl, "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins" [Lectures on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time], herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger, *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung IX* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1928).

instances, she seems to have had a fair amount of freedom in deciding which Husserlian texts to include in a given draft and how to organize them. On occasion, when Husserl lacked the time or inclination, she may even have undertaken revisions of some of the texts herself (XIX, XX). In July of 1917, Stein wrote to Roman Ingarden that she had come across a bundle of manuscripts on "time-consciousness" (XX). She takes note of the importance of the theme in terms of Husserl's own thought and the thought of others, such as Bergson, but also says of the manuscripts themselves that their "external state is pretty dismal: scraps of note paper from 1903 on" (XX). She is enthusiastic about her discovery nonetheless, and expresses a strong desire to stitch the scraps together into a form that might lead eventually to publication.

What precisely did the bundle of manuscripts on time that (as Husserl later put it) "presented itself to Fräulein Stein" (XVIII) in 1917 contain? A portion of it consisted of lecture material from 1905. In the winter semester of 1904–05, Husserl presented a four-part course, "Important Points from the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge," at Göttingen. The concluding part of the course, "On the Phenomenology of Time," was delivered in February 1905 (XIV, XVII, note 3). Husserl's notes for this final part, which were neither as complete nor as coherently organized as the notes for the first three parts, were included among the manuscripts that Stein found in 1917. From 1905 into at least 1911, Husserl would occasionally remove old sheets from the lecture notes in the bundle and substitute new ones. Sometimes he would simply add an entirely new sketch (XVIII). These substitutions and additions came to form a substantial part of the bundle of manuscripts. The raw material available to Edith Stein for her draft, then, included matter written for the 1905 lectures (as well as some earlier notes, going back to 1901 or so, that were used to some extent in the lectures) and sheets and sketches written after 1905 until as late as 1911. She also apparently had available some material from 1917, perhaps supplied by Husserl when he learned about her project (Husserl also wrote one page specifically for the draft she eventually produced).[3]

[3] See Rudolf Boehm's "Textkritischer Anhang" to *Husserliana X*, pp. 389–91, 422.

At the beginning of August 1917, Stein wrote to Ingarden that she had been working on the time-notes – "beautiful things, but not yet fully matured" – for the past month (XXI). By this point she already seems to have finished a first draft or "working-out" [*Ausarbeitung*] of the chronologically disparate materials she had found. In putting together the draft, Stein did not use all of the manuscripts, whether from the lectures of 1905 or from earlier or later sketches, that were present in the bundle. Those she did use she assembled in an order quite different from the one in which Husserl had left them. As Boehm states: "the arrangement, sequence, and interconnection of the texts ... are completely changed" (XXIII). That she then managed to get Husserl actively interested in her project is clear from a letter written to Ingarden early in September of 1917 reporting that she and the "master" had "worked zealously on time" for three days in Bernau (XXI). There is also evidence that Husserl compared Stein's draft with his own manuscripts (XXVII–XXVIII), although that does not decide the question whether Husserl appreciated the extent to which Stein's draft conformed or failed to conform to his own course of development and chief concerns during this period.

One can reasonably assume that Edith Stein hoped that the draft she put together in 1917, with – at least in the later stages of the project – Husserl's cooperation, would move rapidly towards publication. But it was not until ten years later, long after she had ceased to be involved in "the master's" work, that Husserl sought to have it published. The occasion for Husserl's decision is worth recounting. According to Heidegger's recollection, as reported to Boehm, while Husserl and Heidegger were spending their spring holidays in the Black Forest in 1926, Heidegger showed Husserl the manuscript of *Sein und Zeit,* which was almost complete at the time. It was this that prompted Husserl to propose to Heidegger that the latter undertake the publication of Husserl's investigations of time-consciousness, which meant the draft Edith Stein had prepared in 1917 (XXIV). Heidegger agreed, stipulating, however, that he could not get underway with the task until *Sein und Zeit* had appeared, and even then could do no more than give Stein's manuscript a careful reading. While the comments in his prefatory note indicate that Heidegger certainly

knew that Stein had worked on the materials he was publishing in 1928, Husserl apparently did not tell him how extensive her involvement had been, that it was she who had really put the manuscript together.

The publication in 1928 of Stein's draft of 1917 furnished the controlling text for the understanding of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness for the next forty years (indeed, until the present, in the case of the many writers who do not use Boehm's critical edition). It might seem that this would make no difference philosophically. Even if the draft that was eventually published was originally put together by Stein on her own initiative, Husserl himself seems to have worked on it with her; and it was Husserl who instigated its publication a decade later. Furthermore, Husserl refers to it without qualification as one of his works (XXVII). True, it is now clear from Boehm's research that the first part of the publication of 1928, supposedly lectures from 1905, includes, without announcing the fact and in chronological disorder, texts from as early as 1901 and as late as 1917, with the majority coming from 1907–1911 (XXIII). But that by itself would not be philosophically significant, assuming Husserl's thought underwent no important changes throughout the first decade or so of the century.

In fact, however, Husserl's thinking did undergo significant evolution during this period, especially in relation to time. The 1928 edition, scrambling texts from different years, effectively masks this development. Furthermore, the difficulty is not simply that the changes fail to emerge – a failing that might prove distressing chiefly to the archaeologist of Husserl's thought – but that the organization of the text of 1928 can make Husserl's thinking about time appear to be incoherent. For the evolution in question is not simply the gradual unfolding of a single position, but the movement from one position, through its criticism, to a new position incompatible with the first. To the degree that the edition of 1928 permits such incompatible standpoints to exist side by side in the text, Husserl's thought comes across to the careful reader as refusing to settle into a stable and coherent pattern. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that many passages in the 1928 edition have been lifted from larger sketches, with the result that the broader issues from which they come do

not appear and that what does appear is shorn of the context of its meaning. Furthermore, changes in terminology that signal important transformations in Husserl's thought have been obscured in the text of 1928. Such difficulties apparently stem from Edith Stein's desire to put her selections from the lectures of 1905 into a form compatible with the results Husserl had reached from about 1909 to 1911. To accomplish this, she inserted later texts next to earlier ones and substituted, particularly in texts before 1909, terms that first appeared or were used commonly only after that date (XXXVIII, note 3).[4] A key example of the latter would be the frequent substitution of the term "retention" for "primary memory," "fresh memory," or just "memory" in selections from the 1905 lecture manuscripts, even though the term does not appear in Husserl's original notes for the lectures. Although Husserl will eventually come to use "retention" and "primary memory" as synonyms, "retention" itself does not appear with its "official" meaning until 1909, when its introduction, along with that of "primal impression" and "protention," signals the arrival of a new interpretation of the constitution of time-consciousness, including the constitution of what Husserl had been calling "primary memory." The substitution of "retention" in texts in which the term did not originally occur therefore erases a key trace of Husserl's philosophical evolution.

All of this was revealed by Rudolf Boehm's careful study of the origins and chronological sequence of the text published in 1928, particularly of its first part. Boehm specifies or suggests dates in *Husserliana X* for each of the components of the first part so that a picture of Husserl's developing thought can begin to emerge.

Still, given the way in which Edith Stein organized her draft and the fact that she frequently used fragments of much longer texts, knowledge of the date and even the source of each passage in the 1928 edition will not render it fully comprehensible in a philosophical sense. For that, the complete version of texts from which Stein excerpted parts, combined with other texts that she

[4] Since Stein's original handwritten manuscript has not been located, it is impossible to determine precisely which changes in terminology were introduced by Stein and which might have been inserted by Husserl. See Boehm's "Textkritischer Anhang" to *Husserliana X*, p. 391.

did not use at all or may not have known about, arranged in chronological sequence, would be needed; and that is what Boehm supplied in "Part B" of *Husserliana X*, "Supplementary Texts Setting Forth the Development of the Problem." The texts in question, all of which are translated here, come from the years 1893 to 1911. They are arranged chronologically and related where appropriate to the edition of 1928. Within the chronological sequence, Boehm puts the texts into five groups reflecting stages in the evolution of Husserl's thought.[5] While the supplementary texts in "Part B" do not constitute a distinct "work," they are indispensable to the understanding of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness. As Rudolf Bernet has observed, on their basis one can reach conclusions – indeed, fundamental philosophical conclusions as well as conclusions about the course of Husserl's development – that one simply cannot reach on the basis of what was published in 1928.[6] But these texts forming "Part B" of *Husserliana X* should also be read together with "Part A," Boehm's annotated version of the 1928 edition, since the two parts shed much light on one another, and therefore on Husserl's understanding of the phenomena of time and the consciousness of time. *Husserliana X* first made this reading

[5] Based on new research in the Husserl-Archives at Leuven and on new study of the originals, Rudolf Bernet in his editor's "Introduction" to the republication of "Part B" by Felix Meiner (1985) has proposed changes in the dating of several texts. He argues, for example, that the date of No. 39 should be shifted from 1906–1907 to 1909 (before September) and that Nos. 49–50 should not be dated before September of 1909. Taking into account all of his proposed changes, Bernet suggests that the material in "Part B" be arranged into four rather than five groups:

Group 1 (1900–1901): Nos. 1–17.

Group 2 (1904–1905): Nos. 18–35 (Nos. 36–38: 1917 rather than approximately 1905).

Group 3 (Winter Semester 1906/07 – end of August 1909): Nos. 39–47, Nos. 51 and 52.

Group 4 (Beginning of September 1909 to the end of 1911): Nos. 48–50, Nos. 53 and 54.

See the "Einleitung" to Edmund Husserl, *Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)*, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Rudolf Bernet (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985), XVIII–XIX.

Since Bernet makes a strong case, on the basis of his new investigations and discoveries in the Husserl-Archives, for his revised chronology, I will accept it in my discussion of the development of Husserl's thought that follows in this introduction. In the translation of the supplementary texts themselves, I have preserved Boehm's groupings and his suggested dates in the interest of fidelity to the critical edition; the reader may find it useful to keep in mind Bernet's alternative arrangement as presented above, however.

[6] *Ibid.*, LXX.

possible, and it is hoped that this translation will open up the same possibility for English-speaking readers.

Some Themes from Husserl's Phenomenology of Time, Temporal Objects, and the Consciousness of Time

Three remarks Husserl makes in these texts are particularly striking. First, he calls time-consciousness a "wonder" (290), "rich in mystery" (286), thereby signalling the pull it exerts on the philosopher's proclivity to reflect. Second, he writes that the analysis of time is "the most difficult of all phenomenological problems" (286), warning the philosopher who chooses to indulge his proclivity that hard labour awaits him. And finally, he says that the key themes in the phenomenology of time-consciousness "are extremely important matters, perhaps the most important in the whole of phenomenology" (346), affirming that this is no passing wonder and that the philosopher who invests effort in exploring it will not do so in vain.

What will one find if one follows Husserl's efforts to "lift the veil a little" (286) from the wonder of time-consciousness? Essentially, a complex example of intentional analysis. For time-consciousness exemplifies – and in fundamental ways makes possible – what Husserl took to be the universal structure of conscious life, intentionality. Consciousness is always consciousness of something; if one chooses to speak of consciousness in terms of "acts," then every act of consciousness must be said to "intend" an object. One hears a tune; one sees a house; one remembers a wedding; one thinks of the Pythagorean theorem. The phenomenologist seeks to describe and finally to reach the essence of intentionality in its myriad forms and dimensions. The consciousness of time represents one of those forms, but one that rightly claims a special position. For time and the consciousness of time, Husserl maintains, enter into every conscious experience, whether the experience is straightforwardly a form of temporal awareness, such as memory or expectation, or whether it seems to have nothing directly to do with time, such as judgment or desire or aesthetic experience. Time is everywhere in the intentional life of consciousness. True, time and the consciousness of time are

parasitic in the sense that they are incapable of independent existence apart from other experiences; but it is equally true, and of much greater significance, that they play a founding role, as essential as it is universal, in every kind and instance of experience. This surely helps explain why Husserl called time-consciousness a wonder, and why he thought it was perhaps the most important matter in phenomenology.

If intentionality universally characterizes conscious life, and if time-consciousness is a necessary condition of *all* forms of intentionality (including, as Husserl will eventually argue, itself), then in confronting the problem of time the phenomenologist will find a phenomenon of formidable complexity. This means that an adequate phenomenology of time-consciousness will have to follow many levels of temporal constitution (18), all connected and offering severally and in their relations an abundance of wonders and conundrums. Specifically, Husserl will consider the appearing time of the objects and events that we intend in the world, such as houses or bottles seen, violin concerti heard in symphony halls, or trains thundering into stations. This is the most familiar level of time, the time of "external" or "transcendent" temporal objects. Husserl will devote even more attention to the "immanent" or "internal" time of the intending acts and contents of consciousness through which the transcendent temporal objects appear. Finally, in later texts – those written after 1908 – Husserl focuses on the deepest level of time-consciousness, what he calls the "absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness" (77). Both wonder and scandal (390), the absolute flow constitutes the internal time of the intending acts and, through them, the transcendent time of external objects. In that sense, the flow is the universal condition of every intending act and intended object. But, as we shall see shortly – and this is its scandalous aspect – it also constitutes itself, that is, brings itself to appearance; and if that is the case, then it is indeed true that no level of conscious life escapes the touch of time-consciousness, not even time-consciousness itself.

I. *The Place of the Phenomenological Reduction in Husserl's Early Writings on Time-Consciousness*

Before inspecting the levels of time and temporal awareness more closely, we should inquire briefly into the presence – and sometimes the absence – of the "phenomenological reduction" in these texts. The reduction is Husserl's way of disengaging the proper object of philosophical inquiry. It is also the step by which the phenomenologist enters into the properly philosophical attitude. Indeed, attitude and object of reflection are correlated in phenomenology, representing in the very activity of philosophy itself an instance of the relationship between intending act and intended object that the phenomenologist seeks to investigate. While Husserl explicitly discusses and deploys the reduction in mature and elaborated form in works such as the *Ideas* and *Cartesian Meditations,* the writings translated here present no such neat picture. This is partly because the texts do not form a single and systematic presentation, but it is also because they originated during precisely the period in which Husserl conceived the idea of the reduction and struggled to bring it to maturity. This circumstance affords a certain advantage, however, for these early writings on time-consciousness let us watch the growth of Husserl's sense of the reduction, and therefore of the philosophical enterprise, particularly as it applies to time. One can isolate at least four stages in this development.

The first is represented by a sketch written around 1893 (No. 1 of the supplementary texts in "Part B"). The reduction is certainly not explicitly present in this sketch, and a claim for its implicit presence could be justified only on the basis of the descriptive approach Husserl often takes. On the other hand, there are elements that reflect the standpoint of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), that is to say, a standpoint tinged with psychology. Thus Husserl will inquire in the sketch into the psychological genesis of our experience of temporally extended objects such as melodies. Confusion throughout the sketch between the factual and the causal, on the one hand, and the essential, on the other, indicates that Husserl has not yet clearly sorted out what is properly philosophical from what is psychological.

The second phase coincides with texts written around the time of the publication of the *Logical Investigations* (1900–01).[7] Psychological questions are overtly suppressed in these texts, with the emphasis placed on describing the acts and act-components through which temporal objects are intended. There is no extended discussion of the method Husserl will employ in his analysis.

This discussion first occurs in 1904 (No. 19) and 1905, particularly in notes written for the lectures of 1905. The reduction announces itself in these texts in a form that is direct and forceful, yet immature in comparison with statements that will be made only three or four years later. In the lectures of 1905, for example, Husserl is quite clear about what he will *not* be concerned with: questions about the empirical genesis of experiences of time, about experiences as psychic states of psycho-physical subjects governed by natural laws (9), about "whether the estimations of temporal intervals correspond to the objectively real temporal intervals or how they deviate from them" (4), and so on. His concern, he says, is not to gather data and draw conclusions about the factual dimensions of time-consciousness but to bring "its essential constitution to light. . ." (10). Now it is in the context of this effort to set aside every element of empirical and psychological investigation in order to focus on the essential that Husserl makes statements that, from the standpoint of more mature formulations of the reduction, can be misleading. In 1905, for example, he writes: "One cannot discover the least thing about objective time through phenomenological analysis" (6). What is disconcerting about this assertion is that it suggests that the phenomenologist is concerned with only one side of the intentional experience: with the act and its components and not with the object intended. Husserl does in fact say during this period that it is experience that interests him, which might be taken to suggest that he means experience to the exclusion of the object of experience. He also explicitly focuses on the sensory data – say, the datum red – that he thinks are immanent to consciousness, rather than on the qualities perceived in the world on their basis, such as the red

[7] Following Bernet, Nos. 2 through 17 of the supplementary texts. Bernet, XVIII.

facade of a brick building. Rudolf Bernet observes that this exclusion or suspension of objective time results from Husserl's efforts to escape the toils of psychology and establish a "pure" phenomenology.[8] No doubt it also reflects a desire to establish an indubitable basis for his investigations, which at this point he thinks can be accomplished only by focusing exclusively on what is immanent to consciousness.

But perhaps one should not make too much of such assertions; for even in these early texts, Husserl, in fact and sometimes in statement, admits the side of the intended object and its objective time into his discussions. Thus he writes that he is interested in appearing time "as appearing" (5) and in "experiences with respect to their objective sense and descriptive content" (9), and that he will focus on the intended temporal reality only insofar as it is "reality meant, objectivated, intuited, or conceptually thought" (9). The difficulty with the texts from this period, then, is less that they are wrong than that they are sometimes muddled: the key aspects of the reduction are taking shape but have not yet crystallized.

By 1909, however, the muddles clear up and the reduction emerges in a clear and coherent form. While Husserl will still occasionally say that objective time is lost following the reduction (351), he is now quite clear about what the loss means. What falls to "the proscription of the phenomenological reduction" (350) are the techniques and instruments – clocks, chronometers, and so on – that natural science employs in determining time. Phenomenology's approach to time, in other words, is not that of empirical science. But that does not mean that the temporal object intended in a time-constituting act and the "objective" time in which that object appears cannot and should not be described in a complete phenomenology of time-consciousness. The only restriction imposed by the reduction is that the intended object and its time be described just and only as they appear through the act. Indeed, this restriction applies to each level Husserl will eventually consider: the object, the act intending it, and even the absolute flow of time-constituting consciousness that intends the act must all be taken just as they

[8] Bernet, XX.

present themselves to the phenomenologist; considerations and procedures imported from the physical sciences and psychology, inferences of whatever kind and from whatever source extending beyond the appearing intentional life, are to be set out of play.

If Husserl sorted out his method and the full range of what he will analyze in the phenomenology of time-consciousness by the end of the first decade of the century, he simultaneously became aware that the very subject of his investigation might render the whole undertaking impossible – in fact, might jeopardize the very possibility of phenomenology as such. The phenomenologist wants to uncover the essential structures of consciousness understood as intentional. The reduction is supposed to make the intentional life available to the phenomenologist as an infinite field of work. "*But,*" Husserl writes around 1909, "*all experiences flow away. Consciousness is a perpetual Heraclitean flux*; what has just been given sinks into the abyss of the phenomenological past and then is gone forever. . . . Do we therefore actually have an infinite field? Do we not rather always have only a point that, in arriving, immediately escapes again?" (360) Time's unceasing flow seems to cut the ground from under philosophical reflection on time or on anything else. But perhaps one could "*retreat to what is truly given, the absolute now* and the ever new nows," and carry on phenomenological reflection there (353). But the moment it is fixed, the now is gone (353). In that sense, not even the now is available to reflection. Absolute scepticism seems to be inevitable.

Thanks to the consciousness of time, however, it is not. What the flow of time takes away, Husserl argues, the consciousness of time restores. It is true that each point that appears to me as now slips immediately into the past. It is equally true that this ineluctable flow can never be brought to a halt. But it is also the case that I can be conscious of what is just past, of what has just been now, and that what is preserved in this consciousness is my safe and sure possession. It is there as slipping away, but it *is* there, available to me as something on which I can reflect. The consciousness of the immediate past that lets me escape the snare of the now, Husserl calls (after 1909) "retention." Retention gives what is just past, a portion of the earlier stream of consciousness, "*absolutely*" (364); it provides something

extended towards which my reflective glance can be directed. "We therefore owe it to retention that consciousness can be made into an object" (123). The field for phenomenological investigation is secured through the consciousness of time. And since time-consciousness itself is a fundamental feature of the field to be investigated, the reduction that opens it up may be said to find the condition of its own possibility in the very thing it investigates.

But what else does the phenomenology of time-consciousness reveal?

II. *The Temporal Object and Its Modes of Appearance*

Husserl's analysis of time may strike the reader as quite formal, which it is in comparison with certain anthropological or existential accounts of time. Husserl seeks to uncover the essential or *a priori* structures of temporal experience as such. That his findings have a formal character should come as no surprise, then. Their formalism, however, implies neither an artificial abstraction from experience nor an oversimplification of what time involves. Indeed, as anyone who has studied it will attest, *Husserliana X* supplies evidence in abundance that Husserl never unduly simplifies the issue: He recognizes that there can be no single and concise definition of time, that the problem of time breaks down into many problems – interrelated, to be sure, but each demanding careful consideration in its own right. Furthermore, his formalism should not be construed to suggest that time and the consciousness of time could exist or even be considered adequately as pure forms apart from objects and the experience of objects. Husserl does think that time itself is a form, and ultimately his analyses of time and our awareness of it are formal because time is a formal structure. But the form of time is "only a form of individual *objects*" (308). "A phenomenological analysis of time," therefore, "cannot clarify the constitution of time without considering the constitution of temporal objects" (24).

Time does not exhaust the objects that fall "within" it, of course. There is more to the symphony I am now hearing than the fact that it appears to me as in part now and as in part past

and future. The symphony, like the concert hall and the program notes I experience simultaneously with it, has its own intrinsic structure that may be able to manifest itself only in time but that nonetheless cannot be accounted for solely in temporal terms. Temporal objects, that is to say, can be quite different from one another in respects other than time. When Husserl looks at time-consciousness he is concerned with the temporal features that temporal objects have in common, not with the extratemporal features or aspects that may distinguish them.

Husserl approaches the issue of the temporal object from several perspectives. Notable among them is that he comes to describe both "transcendent" and "immanent" temporal objects. The hawk soaring over the field in front of me would be an example of the former: the hawk is something seen or intended by me, but nevertheless transcendent to my consciousness. The act of seeing the hawk would be an example of the latter: intending acts are immanent to consciousness. "On both sides, that is, both in the immanent and in the transcendent spheres of reality," Husserl writes, "*time* is *the irreducible form of individual realities* in their described modes" (284).

Among the cardinal features Husserl isolates as possessed by all temporal objects, perhaps the most prominent is duration. Husserl discusses it in the earliest and in the latest sketches translated here. Any experienced temporal object, whether something relatively constant such as a house, or an event that involves continuous change such as the departure of a ship or the *perception* of its departure, presents itself as enduring. The duration of the object, its temporal extension, is the object's time. Husserl can therefore say of duration what he said of time: that it is the form of individual objects (118).

Concreteness and individuality also characterize temporal objects. To endure is to possess the form of time, and that is to become concrete. The temporal object will have a *specific* duration in which it will change or remain constant. And while in the case of some transcendent objects – a house I observe for a few minutes, for example – I may not experience the end of *its* duration (as opposed to the end of the duration of my immanent act of seeing it), it nonetheless presents itself as the kind of thing that could indeed come to an end. Furthermore, as we shall see in

more detail shortly, the temporal object is individual by virtue of possessing a particular temporal location (117). The object in its concrete duration does not float free with respect to time: it not only has the form of time but is in the form of time as anchored to a particular place. By contrast, ideal objects, such as judgments or values, are not temporal objects because they do not, strictly speaking, endure in time; nor are they experienced as capable of changing or of coming to be or of ceasing to be in time. They also do not occupy a definite temporal location. They are neither concrete nor individual in the sense in which temporal objects are. Still, ideal objects are recognized against the background of time and in contrast to temporal objects, for I experience them precisely as *timeless* (103). The Pythagorean theorem is not tied to this moment or that in the way in which my act of thinking it is, which is why my act of thinking the theorem is an immanent temporal object while the theorem thought is not a temporal object at all (101).

A. *The "Now" as Temporal Mode of Appearance*

The temporal objects we have been describing present themselves in temporal modes of appearance: as now, past, and future (218). I am aware of an object as enduring and as individual and concrete only to the extent that it appears to me in these modes.

Among the modes of temporal appearance, the now has a certain privileged status (37). One of the senses in which it is privileged is as a point of orientation. Like the "here" from which I look out into the world and around which I orient my perceptual space, the now supplies the point of reference for temporal experience. It is in relation to the now that things and events appear as past or future. Another side of the now's role shows itself in the fact that I am conscious of a past object or event as something that *was once now;* similarly, I am conscious of whatever is in the future as something that will be now.

There are ways in which the "privilege" the now enjoys should not be understood, even if Husserl's language may occasionally invite us to try them. To cite one instance, the now

should not be identified with a part of the temporal object – with the tone forming part of a melody, for example. To say that the tone is now is not to identify it with the now but to say that it *appears* as now. The now is precisely a mode of appearance or "running-off mode" (49, 375) for an object, not the object itself (388). In that respect, it may be compared to a spatial perspective, which is one's view of the house *from* the front, say, but not the front of the house itself. It is precisely because object and mode are not identical that one can speak of the same object presenting itself in different modes. One can intend the same tone successively as future, as now, and as past, which would be impossible if the tone were simply identified with the now. Of course, one might claim that, as time flows, actual nows become past nows. Husserl himself sometimes speaks of an "actually present now" becoming a "past now" while remaining "the same now" (68). This makes sense if one is really talking about the *tone* as it flows away rather than the now, which is what Husserl is usually doing in expressions such as these. Taken strictly, "past now" is at best an odd expression: as Husserl says in a different context, "past" and "now" exclude one another (330). The now as mode of appearance does not really become past; rather, what "was a now" (72), that is, what did appear as now, becomes past, that is, now appears as past.

To say that the now is a mode of appearance is to point again to time's "formal" status: The now is not a thing capable of independent existence; I am always conscious of it as the form of something. And even as form or mode of appearance, the now does not exist by itself: It is always accompanied by the modes "past" and "future", which join the now to form the temporal fringe (37) or horizon in which every temporal object is given. If it is true that past and future are oriented with respect to the now, it is equally true that the now is a dependent part of a larger whole that it forms with past and future. The now "is a relative concept and refers to a past, just as 'past' refers to the 'now'" (70).

That now, past, and future are interdependent moments of the temporal horizon does not mean that they somehow merge into indistinction. "We have the evidence that 'past' refers to 'now' and that past and now exclude one another" (330). Thanks to

the fact that now, past, and future are modes of appearance distinct from what appears in them, and thanks to the fact that as modes of appearance they are distinct but inseparable from one another, an identical temporal object can appear: "Identically the same thing can indeed be now and past at once, but only by enduring between the past and the now" (330). Husserl stresses the connection between now, past, and future not simply because one is in fact always aware of more than just what is now; his point is also that if one's awareness were restricted to the now, one would have no experience of time and temporality at all, not even of what is now as now. Husserl is interested in giving a careful description of one's experience of time, but he also wants to give an account of the essential necessities embedded in that experience.

It should be clear that Husserl would agree with William James, whose work on time he greatly appreciated, when James wrote that "the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back..."[9]. The immediately experienced present is extended; it forms what James called the "specious present" and what Husserl at one point refers to as the "rough" now (42). Within this rough now we distinguish a "finer" now from degrees of the immediate past and future surrounding it as fringes (172). This now, Husserl suggests, can be cut further and further, approaching a limit; but he also acknowledges that the now thus conceived is something abstract, something ideal (51). This means both that we never experience a completely unextended now and that we never experience a now in isolation. In fact, the effort to contract the now through abstraction to a pure point reveals both that the now always expands into extension and that it is therefore never without its halo. "... Even this ideal now is not something *toto coelo* different from the not-now but is continuously mediated with it" (42). The now may be the cutting edge of time, but it is the edge of something: "A now is always and essentially a border-point of an extent of time" (72).

To say that the now is on the cutting edge of time suggests

[9] William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.), p. 609.

another sense in which Husserl says that the now is privileged. "The now-moment," he writes, "is characterized above all as the new" (63). The now is the running-off mode in which what is new in my experience makes its appearance, whether new objects or fresh phases of old objects or new phases of the acts intending them. In this sense, the now is the "generative point" (26) of conscious life, "constantly filled in some way" (27). I may cease hearing a particular melody, I may no longer experience any of its phases as now; but as long as I am conscious, there will always be something new experienced as now to replace it. In fact, it is the new ceaselessly welling up in the now that "pushes aside" (65) what had been now and new, letting it gain a new mode of appearance, that of the past.

In presenting new points of the object, the now also presents new time-points. Husserl views time as a continuity of such time-points or places (74). "Each actually present now creates a new time-point because it creates. . . a new object-point. . ." (68). The now is not a particular position in time any more than it is a particular object in time. It is the mode of appearance of both, and of both together: of object-in-position. When a particular tone appears to me as now, it also appears at a particular place in time, a place that it will preserve ever after. If it were never to appear as now, it would never have that place or any other place in time. In that sense, the now is the "source-point of all temporal positions" (74).

Earlier we observed that temporal objects appear to us as individual objects. The notion of temporal positions helps to explain the phenomenon of their individuation, for an object is individuated by appearing at a particular temporal location. To the extent that this first happens in the now, Husserl writes that the now is "a continuous moment of individuation" (68). To be sure, the new object, emergent in its new time-point in the now, will immediately sink back into the past. But as it sinks back, it will continue to appear to me in constantly changing modes of the past as the same object at the same point in time. Once wedded by appearing in the now, object and time-point remain forever inseparable; the object will never lose its individuality as something that occurred at this rather than at that point in time.

B. *The Oneness of Time*

The inseparability of an object-point and its time-point should not be taken to suggest that there are as many individual times as there are objects. There is only "one time," Husserl writes, "in which the temporality of the thing lies, into which its duration is inserted..." (124). At least three senses of the oneness of time can be distinguished in the texts.

In the first sense, Husserl thinks of time – "objective" time – as a linear extent formed of successive temporal positions. Every temporal object we experience will find a place on this line. It is with respect to time understood in this linear, objective sense that one appropriately speaks of "before" and "after" (rather than "past" and "future") – as when one says that the overture was played before the first act and after the lights in the theater had been dimmed. Time in this sense supplies one of the objective conditions for the consciousness of succession. Objects can be experienced as succeeding one another only if they occupy different temporal positions in one and the same time. Once it has been experienced, the relation of before and after will remain fixed, although in its fixed identity it will slip further and further away from the actually present now. Thus the overture's position on the line of time in relation to the first act and to whatever preceded it will not change, although its mode of temporal appearance – the mode of the past in which it presents itself – will do nothing but change. "Time is fixed, and yet time flows" (67). Furthermore, the fixed time appears through the flowing time: it is "in the flow of time, in the continuous sinking down into the past, [that the] nonflowing, absolutely fixed, identical, objective time becomes constituted" (67).

The second sense in which time is one concerns the individual time-point. Each time-point is a unity – one might say a unitary form – that may accommodate many different objects or object-points. *Many* objects may occupy *one* temporal position. "The actually present now is *one* now and constitutes *one* temporal position, however many objectivities are separately constituted in it..." (74). If the first sense of time's oneness is the ground of objective temporal succession, this sense is the ground of simultaneity. To be simultaneous means first to be given in the same

now [*Gleich-Jetzigkeit* (120)] and then ever after to enjoy the same time [*Gleichzeitigkeit* (120)].

That a single time-point can play host to many objects does not diminish its individuating role. Indeed, it enhances it, explaining the possibility of such familiar experiences as recalling what one was doing at the same time another event took place. The time-point thus emerges as the *common* form of individuation of whatever happens to occur within it (73). It is true, although Husserl does not emphasize it, that as common form of individuation the time-point does not account for the differences among the various objects simultaneously occupying it. What it does account for is their temporal location, and that is precisely the same for all of them. Something more – *what* the objects specifically are, their "matter" (70) – is required for full individuation.

Finally, these two senses of the oneness of time come together in the complementarity of simultaneity and succession: "Simultaneity is nothing without temporal succession, and temporal succession is nothing without simultaneity. . ." (386).

The third sense of the unity of time involves the two kinds of temporal objects, the immanent and the transcendent. Husserl, of course, does not want to collapse these two dimensions. The act of hearing the violin tone in the concert hall and the violin tone itself remain on their distinct, if intentionally related, levels. But Husserl also does not want to multiply times. Despite his use of such phrases as "internal time" and "immanent time," he finally seems to resist the notion that there is one time for acts immanent to consciousness and another time for the objects intended through those acts. The time of the perceived object is the same as the time of the immanent act perceiving it (74).

III. *The Consciousness of Time*

We have been looking at one of the levels on which Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness moves – the level of the intended temporal object and its time. Husserl also investigates the consciousness that intends or, in more technical language, "constitutes" (333) the temporal object.

It is no easy task to develop a coherent picture of Husserl's understanding of the time-constituting consciousness. While his account of the appearing temporal object remains fairly constant over the years, occasionally undergoing expansion or refinement but not fundamental change, the situation is quite different in the case of the consciousness that intends the object. Here significant development, or better, upheaval, occurred, which the texts – particularly the text of the 1928 edition – present in tangled and often obscure form. Still, with the chronological information supplied by *Husserliana X*, it is possible to achieve a reasonably accurate outline of the development and principal features of Husserl's understanding of the consciousness of time during the first decade of the century.

Husserl's investigations in the earlier part of the decade focus on the *perception* of temporal objects.[10] This focus commonly takes the form of a reflection on the perception of what Husserl often calls a "sensation-content," a notion derived from an explanation of the constitution of perception in the *Logical Investigations*. According to this account, an object – a violin tone, for example – is perceived when a sensory content immanent to consciousness, a sensation-tone, is "animated" by an appropriate "apprehension" or "intention." The immanent content, considered in itself, is neutral as far as reference to any particular object is concerned. Thanks solely to the moment of apprehension, in this case the "violin-tone" apprehension, does it gain reference to a transcendent object. If one were to perform a kind of reduction and set aside the moment of apprehension, then reference to the violin tone transcendent to consciousness would be set aside as well, and one would be left with only the tone-content immanent to consciousness. Husserl makes this move – an immature form of the reduction, as we indicated earlier – presumably because he wants to avoid questions about the existence or nonexistence of perception's transcendent object. Concentration on a content supposedly immanent to consciousness will let him avoid such questions. But since the content in our example is itself a "tone" (even if not an external violin tone), a phenomenological account of the experience or "imma-

[10] Bernet, XXI.

nent perception" of it should furnish valid conclusions about perception as such. It does not seem too farfetched to claim that the immanent sensation-content in the lectures of 1905 and in texts leading up to them is, for descriptive purposes, really just the perceptual object stripped bare of whatever garments of transcendence the animating intention may have draped over it. Later in the decade, Husserl will explicitly include the appearing transcendent object in his phenomenology of time-consciousness.

A. *Reaction to the Theories of Brentano and Meinong*

From about 1901 through 1905, Husserl's analyses of perception as a form of time-consciousness were shaped in crucial ways by his reaction to the views of Meinong and Brentano. The basic conclusions Husserl reached during this period will continue to play important roles when his focus shifts from perception to a deeper and more universal level of time-consciousness.

Behind his discussion of Brentano and Meinong is Husserl's contention that the perception of a temporal object "is itself a temporal object and as such has its phases" (235). A melody, for example, runs off phase by phase, but so does the act that intends it. Among the names Husserl gives to the individual phase of the extended act are "momentary perception" (234), "momentary time-consciousness" (237), and "cross section" [*Querschnitt*] (239). Despite the many changes and variations it will undergo, this theme of the role and nature of the phase of time-consciousness will abide at the center of Husserl's concerns.

Of the phases that make up the extended perception of a melody, only one will be "actual" at any moment. Others will be past or future in relation to the phase that is actual. Now how is it possible to perceive a temporally extended melody, consisting of many successive tones, through a single perceptual phase that enjoys its moment of actuality and then is gone? Meinong's reply, as Husserl presents it, is that short of the very last phase of the perceptual act, there simply is no perception of the temporally extended object. Each successive phase of the perception is conscious exclusively of a single now-phase of the object inten-

tionally correlated with it. Thus when the third tone composing the melody and the third phase of the act – the phase intending the third tone – make their joint appearance, one perceives the tone in question as now but perceives nothing else – no elapsed tones, no tones yet to come. But this means that one will not perceive the melody, for a melody is a temporally extended object, only one of whose phases will be now while the others will be past or future. "... The extended object, since it is not a partial now, cannot be perceived in a now-perception, which gives precisely a partial now" (233).

Meinong, of course, does not want to deny that we perceive temporally extended objects. We do hear melodies, not just instantaneous tonal pulsations. According to Meinong, however, the consciousness of the temporally extended object occurs only with the last phase of the perception, and then through a special act. Since the successive individual phases of the perception are now-perceptions that perceive only the now-phases of the object, "there must be an act that embraces, beyond the now, the whole temporal object" (234). This overlapping act must occur at the end of the series of now-perceptions, since only then will the object have run its course and all of its phases be available to be gathered together in the appropriate order of succession.

The difficulty with Meinong's position is that the elapsed phases of the object will not be accessible. The momentary phases of the perception have been conscious of now-phases of the object and *only* of now-phases. Since they did not reach out beyond the now and preserve elapsed phases of the melody as it ran its course, the special overlapping act that supposedly makes its entrance at the end will have nothing there to overlap. No perception of a temporally extended object could occur. And even if by some miracle it did, Meinong's account would hardly fit our experience that we are conscious of a *temporally extended portion* of the melodic whole in *each* phase of our hearing of the melody, not just at the end. Our awareness of the melody as stretched out in time is there throughout the perception; it does not suddenly explode upon us at the concluding moment of a series of punctual now-perceptions.

The lessons to be learned from the difficulties inherent in Meinong's position is that if we are to perceive enduring or

succeeding objects, then consciousness in each of its phases "must reach out beyond the now" (234): "not only the final act but every momentary act must be overlapping" (234). Franz Brentano appreciated this necessity.

Specifically, Brentano realized that each phase of an act must intend, in addition to the now-phase, phases of the object that have elapsed and phases that have not yet actually appeared. Such preservation of past phases and anticipation of future phases would not alone suffice to bring a temporally extended object to presentation, however. If the elapsed tones of a melody were simply preserved in the present as they had originally appeared, one would hear a "disharmonious tangle of sound" (11), not a *succession* of tones. In fact, preservation in this unqualified sense would just be another version of momentary now-perception: it would perceive everything as now, even the past phases of the object. One would be conscious of simultaneity, not of duration or succession – or more accurately, not even of simultaneity, since the consciousness of simultaneity and the consciousness of succession are inseparable.

What is required in addition to preservation and anticipation is *modification*. The elapsed phases of the object must be preserved, but with the appropriate modifications of the past. Thus if I experience a sequence of tones A B C, my consciousness of C as now will be accompanied by a consciousness of B as just past in relation to C and of A as just past in relation to B. An ordered succession will appear rather than an instantaneous tonal porridge. To the extent that this is Brentano's position, Husserl agrees with it fully. His criticisms focus on Brentano's account of how this consciousness of time that reaches out beyond the now becomes constituted.

Brentano claims that the requisite preservation and modification come about through the process of "original association," which Husserl describes as follows: "In conformity with an 'invariable law,' new representations are joined continuously to the perceptual representation by means of 'original association.' Each of these new representations reproduces the content of the preceding ones, *appending* the (continuous) moment of the past as it does so" (176).

In terms of our experience of the tonal sequence A B C, the

process of original association would involve something like the following. Through the first perceptual representation, I am conscious of tone A as now. In the next moment, I have a perceptual representation of tone B as now. When this occurs, A and the perceptual representation of A are past – past in the sense that they have elapsed, are finished, and have departed irrevocably from the now. This means that if I am to be conscious of them as past – and I must be conscious of them as past if I am to become aware of the melodic succession – then a new representation that reproduces A and appends the appropriate moment of the past must appear along with the perceptual representation of B as now. The same process will occur again at the next moment when C is perceived as now: new representations will appear reproducing A and B in their appropriate modes of the past relative to C. Expectations in the form of representations of future phases of the object would be produced at each moment as well.

In comparison with Meinong's account, Brentano's theory has the virtues of affirming that each phase of consciousness intends more than just the now and of attempting to explain how this occurs. But Husserl argues that Brentano's attempt is not successful: original association fails to explain, on the one hand, how the *perception* of a temporal object is possible, and, on the other hand, how *any* consciousness, whether perceptual or not, of a temporally extended object is possible.

As for the first point, Husserl observes that on Brentano's theory only the now-phase of the object is actually *perceived.* Consciousness of past and future phases of the object does accompany the perception of its now-phase, but this is not perceptual consciousness. Brentano assumes, as did Meinong, that perception is restricted to what is immediately present, to the now in the narrowest sense. Phantasy – the imagination – must supply the representations of past and future phases of the object. The empiricist tenor of "original association" is no coincidence, therefore. When the perceptual representation of the now passes away, a "phantasy-representation... enriched by the temporal character" (13), a kind of copy or reproduction of the original endowed with a modified temporal character, takes its place. Thus while "phantasy... proves to be productive in a peculiar

way here" (12), what it produces is not perception but memory and expectation. The difficulty with this position is not so much the claim that memories attend my now-perception but the *kind* of memory Brentano has in view. Specifically, he means memory in the ordinary sense – what Husserl will often call secondary memory – as when I recall a melody I heard yesterday, running through it again from beginning to end. This sort of memory is re-presentational. It does not *present* the past as it flows away but *re*-presents it all over again. It stands opposed to perception understood as presentation. There is another kind of memory, what Husserl at this time calls "fresh" or "primary" memory, that is an ingredient of the perceptual act itself and through which we may be said to perceive the elapsed phases of the object. This kind of memory is altogether different from the memory produced by phantasy. "Even if he may refuse to speak of the perception of something temporal (with the exception of the now-point as the limit between past and future), the difference that underlies our talk about the perceiving of a succession and the remembering of a succession perceived in the past... surely cannot be denied and must somehow be clarified" (17). Although Husserl says that Brentano cannot possibly have overlooked the difference between these radically different kinds of consciousness, the fact remains that his contention that "the original intuition of time is already a creation of phantasy" (17) makes it impossible for him to explain it. If the theory were correct, there indeed would be no *perception* of a temporal object: I would not really hear a melody or see a train speed past.

The distinction between primary and secondary memory is a theme Husserl will refine and return to again and again throughout his investigations of time-consciousness. Some of the ways in which he develops it will be discussed later in this Introduction.

Husserl's second argument is intended to show that Brentano's account would actually make the consciousness of temporal objects impossible (whether the consciousness is perceptual or not is irrelevant). According to Brentano, the way in which we are aware of past or future phases of an object is through memorial or expectational representations generated by phantasy *in the now* and attached to the perceptual representation. The memorial and

expectational representations are therefore co-present with the now-perception. They must be, for Brentano assumes that what is past, precisely because it is past, is no longer available to consciousness. One can be aware only of what is actually present or now. If one is to be conscious of the elapsed tone, then, this must occur on the basis of a present surrogate. The memorial representation fulfills that role. It is not itself the past content but furnishes a present replica endowed with the temporal determination "past" (177). In experiencing the new surrogate tone-content with its new temporal content "past," one supposedly wins a consciousness of the past, and therefore of succession. Thus, in hearing the series of tones, one first perceives A as now; then, in the next moment, after the original A is gone, phantasy generates a new A with the determination "past." Now this new A with the moment of the past is something present – just as much "now" as B, the phase one is actually perceiving. "But," Husserl writes, "if the *complex* of the two moments A and *past* exists now, then A also exists now; and at the same time A is supposed to be past, therefore not to exist now" (177). This is an obvious contradiction (19). With Brentano's theory of original association, trading exclusively as it does in present contents, "I still have not acquired a consciousness of 'A past'" (178). But this means that "the question of how time-consciousness is possible and how it is to be understood remains unanswered" (20).

B. *Husserl's Account of the Constitution of Time-Consciousness*

In contrast to Meinong, Husserl holds that "each perceptual phase has intentional reference to an extended section of the temporal object and not merely to a now-point" (239). This means that each phase of the perceptual act is intentionally directed towards past phases of the object, towards its present or "now" phase, and towards future phases. Time-consciousness is born in this triple intentionality that makes up each phase. In contrast to Brentano, however, Husserl argues that the intentionality is perceptual in each of its three moments. We do perceive enduring objects and objects in succession. The momentary phase

of perception, therefore, is not an amalgam of now-perception, on the one hand, and memories and expectations, on the other.

Husserl's position depends on the distinction that Brentano failed to appreciate between two different kinds of memory (or, in the direction of the future, two different kinds of expectation). Husserl began to investigate the distinction at the turn of the century (cf. No. 10), and it remained a vital and evolving theme over the next decade.

Neither kind of memory can be understood apart from perception, and primary memory, particularly, cannot be understood apart from now-perception. The now-perception is not an independent act: it is simply a dependent moment of the threefold intentionality belonging to a perceptual phase, which itself is only a dependent part of a larger temporal whole, the extended perceptual act. But like the now that it intends, the perception of the now has a certain privileged status; it presents a phase of the object as now in the narrower sense, as there itself and now present, "in person." It is the moment of origin, since in it one first experiences the presence of the new – a new part of the melody, a new moment of the enduring landscape, and so on.

But consciousness will flow on. What was experienced in one perceptual phase as now will be perceived in the next phase as just past. In the earliest texts translated here, Husserl calls this perception of the past, understood as one moment of the triple intentionality of the perceptual phase, "fresh memory" (169). Somewhat later, he will usually refer to it as "primary memory," and later still – following a significant turn in his thought – as "retention." Just as now-perception is the original consciousness of the now, primary memory is the original consciousness of the past: "only in primary memory do we *see* what is past, only in it does the past become constituted – and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively" (43; cf. 339). If perception is the act in which all origin lies, then primary memory is perception (43). In primary memory what has elapsed is "still present... as just past" (219), in the sense that "*its being-past* is something now, something present itself" (219). This does not mean that primary memory preserves what is past *as* now; that is precisely what it does not do. It rather presents the past as past. It is the immediate consciousness of "just-having-been" (169).

Primary memory has its counterpart in "primary expectation" (41) (or later, "protention"), the third moment of the intentionality of the perceptual phase. Primary expectation or protention is the immediate awareness of the future attending all of my experiences. But can we actually be said to *perceive* the future in protention as we can be said to perceive the past in primary memory? Husserl occasionally suggests that we can – he ranges the "perception of the future" along with the "perception of the now" and the "perception of the immediate past" at one point (180) – but he more often speaks of protention's openness. He writes, for example, that it is essential to the perception of a temporal object "that there be an intention directed towards what is to come, even if not towards continuations involving the same temporal object" (240). Primary expectation thus differs from the other two intentional moments in the sense that its object, as future, is not yet determined. Still, as a mode of consciousness, it joins primary memory as "perceptual" as opposed to ordinary or secondary expectation. Probably because of its openness, Husserl devotes less discussion to protention or primary expectation than to the other modes of original time-consciousness. In the ensuing remarks I will follow Husserl's practice and focus chiefly on primary memory.

How does primary memory differ from memory in the customary sense, from what Husserl calls "secondary memory" or just "memory" or "recollection"?

An obvious difference is that primary memory is not itself an act. It is a dependent moment of the triple intentionality belonging to a non-self-sufficient phase of an independent act. Secondary memory, on the other hand, is itself an independent act with its own successive phases.

But what particularly distinguishes the two is the different ways in which they intend their objects. The intentionality proper to primary memory *presents* the past; the intentionality proper to secondary memory *re-presents* it (101). Primary memory, that is, gives the past originally; recollection gives it once again (328). In this respect, secondary memory is a "richer" form of consciousness than primary memory. Primary memory is consciousness of its object in only one way: as elapsing. It has no freedom to interfere with the ineluctable process of passing away, no freedom

to review again what has gone by; it can only passively look at what is past as it moves further and further away from the actually present now. Secondary memory, on the other hand, while it does not perceive the past, does re-present it. Thus it intends the elapsed object as if it were running off again. It will re-present a past phase as now (64) and then as just past, and it can speed the process up or slow it down or repeat parts of it at will, none of which primary memory can do. There is, then, a "'freedom' of reproduction" (49) denied to primary memory.

On the other hand, secondary memory assumes that a sense of the past has already been established in primary memory, which is the "primitive" or "first form" of the constitution of the past – just as its counterpart, primary expectation or protention, is presupposed by ordinary expectation as the primitive form of the establishment of the future (338). Secondary memory and expectation then elaborate and solidify what the more primitive forms first make available. This also accounts for the key sense in which this kind of memory is "secondary." It is not secondary because it perceives "something further past" (185) in comparison with primary memory, although the name "fresh" memory might suggest that that is the case ("fresh" memory holding on to the past until it becomes "stale," at which point it would be the proper object of ordinary memory). In fact, Husserl will often say that one can recall in secondary memory what one still retains in primary memory (378), in which case there would be no temporal differentiation between their respective objects. (Something on this order effectively occurs in reflection.) Ordinary memory is rather "secondary" because it depends on the prior and primitive constitution of the past, which occurs in the form of memory rightly called "primary." Only when the past has first been constituted presentatively can it be re-presented in recollection.

Furthermore, to say that ordinary memory has the capacity to re-present or run through again an entire temporal object still does not overcome the fact that it is not perceptual or impressional consciousness. It therefore does not *present* the object; it gives it "as if seen through a veil" (50), "as if" it were engendering itself anew (371), as "*quasi*-present" (301). The way in which its object appears confirms again that recollection can never shed its dependence on an original experience of the past.

That ordinary memory intends its object "through a veil" might be taken to suggest that Husserl embraces an image theory of memory. Certain sketches from early in the decade hint strongly that he did (Nos. 9, 10, 15, all probably written around 1901), although he never offered a developed version of such a theory. By 1904 or 1905, however, he comes to argue vigorously against the image theory, and there can be no question that he explicitly rejects it from that time on. The theory, Husserl observes, imposes a present image between the act of remembering and the remembered object. Consciousness of the past would therefore be indirect, that is, through an intermediary image. A model for such consciousness would be historical painting, exemplified in a picture of the storming of the Bastille (190), which represents a particular event in time. However, what I am aware of as given "itself" in pictorial consciousness is the painting, not the event. In memory, on the other hand, it is precisely the *past* event that I directly intend, not something present and merely similar or in some other way related to it. I am conscious of the past object itself, as past, in memory. Secondary memory, accordingly, is representation "through identity" and not "through mere pictorial similarity" (190). The object of the memory and what immediately appears to consciousness in the memory are identical.

Husserl also implies that the image theory suffers from a logical difficulty. Much as Brentano's theory of original association, which worked exclusively with present contents, thereby cutting off access to the past, raised the question how we could ever get the idea of the past in the first place (19), so the image theory, which proscribes direct experience of anything that is not present, renders inexplicable the sense of the past we obviously enjoy. In later texts (e.g., No. 47), Husserl will find other difficulties with the theory.

Husserl's rejection of the image theory lets him avoid another mistaken way of thinking about the distinction between primary and secondary memory. The two are not distinct because the former intends the past object "itself" while the latter does not. "... In [secondary] memory too the object itself appears" (191), just as it does in primary memory. The difference lies rather in the fact that primary memory *presents* the past while secondary

memory *re-presents* it. In accomplishing this, secondary memory shows itself not just to be "something on the order of a poor imitation of perception or a weaker echo of it, but precisely a fundamentally new mode of consciousness. . ." (*Husserliana XI*, 325).

1. *The Schematic Interpretation of the Constitution of Time-Consciousness*

From about 1901 to 1908, Husserl explained the constitution of the triple intentionality belonging to each perceptual phase by means of the "schema," mentioned earlier, according to which reference to an object in a certain mode of appearance is established through the "animation" of contents immanent to consciousness by "apprehensions" or "act-characters." The schema originally comes from the *Logical Investigations,* although time is not directly an issue in that work and the schema is not applied to the constitution of time-consciousness there. The schematic interpretation assumes, it will be recalled, that the immanent contents, considered in themselves apart from any apprehensions that might animate them, are neutral as far as reference to a particular object is concerned. Thus a pink content does not by itself appear as or refer to either the color of a department store mannequin's painted wooden face or the blush on the cheek of a living human being. That reference is determined by the apprehension, which, depending on whether it is the apprehension of a mannequin or of a person, will animate the neutral content in one direction or the other.[11] The content is simply the neutral bearer of the intentional ray.

It was apparently in connection with his criticism of Brentano's theory that Husserl determined to apply the schema to the consciousness of time. Brentano attempted to explain the difference between my awareness of a tone as now and my awareness of the same tone as past on the basis of a change in content. We have seen that that solution failed, however, since a new content A, replacing the old one that had elapsed, would not suffice

[11] See Edmund Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Hamburg: Claassen Verlag, 1964), pp. 99–100, for this example.

to make me conscious of A as past (178). Husserl therefore asks, at the end of an early text criticizing Brentano, where the phenomenological difference might lie, if not in the content: "*In the mode of apprehension, in the mode of consciousness?*" (178).

His affirmative response to this question receives a precise and elaborate development by the time of the lectures of 1905, in which the schematic interpretation of the constitution of time-consciousness dominates. The essential features of the interpretation may be described as follows.

The immanent sensory contents are taken to be neutral with respect to temporal determinations. A tone-content, considered in itself, is neither now, nor past, nor future. It becomes the bearer of temporal characteristics only through special time-constituting apprehensions. In each perceptual phase or cross-section of the perceptual act, therefore, one will find a set of immanent contents corresponding to whatever phases of the object are intended. In addition, one will find the time-constituting apprehensions that will animate the contents in the appropriate temporal ways. "... An act claiming to give a temporal object itself must contain in itself 'apprehensions of the now,' 'apprehensions of the past,' and so on; specifically, as originally constituting apprehensions" (41). In the example of the perception of a sequence of tones, when the second tone, B, is intended as now, the perceptual phase will embrace a content or "sensation" (239) animated by an "apprehension of the now" (237), thereby constituting the now-perception of B. The primary memory of the first tone, A, as just past will be constituted by the animation of an A-content (which is said by Husserl at one point to be "gradually shaded" in comparison with the sensation-content [241]) by an "apprehension of the past" (240). Finally, the primary expectation of what is to come will be constituted by the "apprehension of the future," although in this case the status of the content of apprehension is left rather vague by Husserl (240). In this way, the triple intentionality belonging to each perceptual phase – now-perception, primary memory, and primary expectation – is constituted; and, correlatively, the extended temporal object with its present, past, and future phases is perceived.

Obviously, the individual perceptual phase will become quite cluttered on the schematic interpretation. If it is to intend an

extended portion of a temporal object, the phase must embrace a continuum of contents and a continuum of time-constituting apprehensions, in addition to the nontemporal apprehensions that constitute the object as an object of this kind or that (as a mannequin, say, or a human being). Since the full perception is a continuum of its phases, and since each phase includes a continuum of temporal apprehensions and a continuum of apprehension-contents, Husserl describes the perception in texts from around 1905 as a "continuum of these continua" (239).

a. *The Opening-up of a New Dimension of Time-Consciousness*

The schematic interpretation was intended to explain the perception of a temporal object such as a melody or even a single enduring tone. But as we have seen, Husserl was well aware that the perceptual act itself is a temporal object. As he wrote in 1905: "It belongs to the essence of the perception of a temporal object that it is a temporal object itself. Under all circumstances it has a temporal extension" (239). While Husserl acknowledges even in early texts that the act of perception is a temporal object and that we are conscious of it as such, he makes no effort to address the nature of that awareness until later in the decade, when he introduces the notion of the "absolute consciousness"[12] in order to explain it.

We know that a perception or any other act, or a tone understood as a sensory content, is immanent to consciousness. The *awareness* of the perception or of the content as an immanent temporal object will therefore belong to an even "deeper" level of immanence – a foundational or "absolute" level beyond which one cannot go. It is this dimension, understood as the consciousness of immanent temporal objects, that Husserl broaches and begins to explore in No. 39. Husserl has not yet weaned himself from the perceptual model of consciousness in

[12] In *Husserliana X*, the absolute consciousness first appears in No. 39, which Bernet dates to 1909. Bernet notes, however, that the theme appears in texts (not included in *Husserliana X*) from as early as 1906/07 (cf. *Husserliana XXIV*, §§ 42ff.), Bernet, XXXV.

this text, a fact made plain by his announcement that he will describe the "perception of something really immanent" (282), that is, of an immanent tonal content. This formulation – which Husserl will shortly abandon – implies that the ordinary perceptual act embraces a double perception. The transcendent perception of a violin tone in the concert hall will be attended by an immanent perception of a tone-content in consciousness that serves as the bearer of the violin-tone apprehension. Furthermore, the immanent perception, just as the transcendent perception, is described in No. 39 as being constituted through the schema (292–93). The contents and apprehensions that constitute the perception of the immanent temporal object are not identical with the object itself: "Immanence of the identical temporal object, the sound, must surely be distinguished from the immanence of the adumbrations of the sound and from the apprehensions of these adumbrations, which make up the consciousness of the givenness of the sound" (283). What is significant about this position is that it involves the introduction of a distinction *within* consciousness between two levels of immanence, related to one another as what constitutes is related to what is constituted. The constituting level is the time-consciousness of the immanent temporal object. It is this level that Husserl calls "absolute": "*Immanent* can signify the antithesis of *transcendent,* and then the temporal thing, the sound, is immanent; but it can also signify what exists in the sense of the absolute consciousness, and then the sound is not immanent" (294). While the immanent tone is "constituted in the absolute consciousness," it is not "given as a *component of the absolute consciousness*" (294). Presumably, however, the contents and special time-constituting apprehensions through which one perceives the immanent temporal object *would* be constituents of the absolute consciousness.

b. *Criticism and Abandonment of the Schematic Interpretation*

In the light of the later development of his thought, Husserl's account of the absolute consciousness as a species of perception constituted through the animation of contents by temporal apprehensions is immature. In fact, it is followed rapidly by the

criticism and abandonment of the schema as way of interpreting time-consciousness. It is worth noting that this fundamental change in Husserl's thought does not directly emerge in the text of the 1928 edition, which embraces both the schematic interpretation and the interpretation Husserl developed following its rejection – one of the reasons why the 1928 edition is not always internally coherent and needs the supplementary texts supplied in *Husserliana X*.

In sketch No. 48, which probably dates from 1909 (following Bernet), Husserl provides a brief account of how the schematic interpretation, his "*Repräsentationstheorie,*" is supposed to account for time-consciousness, but then observes that "such an interpretation might be quite untenable" (331). In the next sketch, No. 49, he decides that it is indeed untenable, chiefly on the basis of an argument that echoes a key criticism he had lodged against Brentano several years earlier.

Brentano had found the locus of time-consciousness in a change in content; in texts prior to 1909, Husserl locates it instead in the special time-constituting apprehensions stipulated in the schematic interpretation. Those apprehensions, however, bring about the awareness of time and the temporal object only by animating contents immanent to consciousness. Now Husserl observed that Brentano's contents that were supposed to make us aware of past and future phases of the temporal object were themselves now or present. As present contents, Husserl charged, they were incapable of presenting, or appearing as, past or future contents. They were simply "now," and nothing could overcome that fact. In No. 49, Husserl subjects his schematic interpretation to the same criticism. The contents to be animated by the apprehensions as past are in fact all present in the actual momentary phase of consciousness. True, they are supposed to be neutral with respect to time; but if they in fact exist in the actual phase of consciousness, as they must if they are to be available to apprehension, they will not be neutral: they will be now. Indeed, the whole continuum of contents (and the continuum of apprehensions as well) contained in the actual momentary phase of consciousness will be now. Husserl therefore asks: "... Can a series of *coexistent* primary contents ever bring a *succession* to intuition? Can a series of simultaneous red-contents

ever bring a duration of a red, of a tone c, and the like, to intuition? Is that possible as a *matter of principle?*" (335). Husserl replies that it is not. The primary contents in the now "*are not able to switch their temporal function:* the now cannot stand before me as not-now, the not-now cannot stand before me as now" (334). The temporal apprehensions would be powerless to change the temporal character of the contents locked into the now. The schematic interpretation renders incomprehensible the very awareness of objects extended in time that it was supposed to explain.

2. *Husserl's Mature Conception of Time-Consciousness*

The rejection of the schematic interpretation heralds the maturing of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness, which occurs in sketches from late 1909 through 1911. It is during this period that Husserl for the first time sorts out clearly the different levels of time-consciousness, the different intentional correlates corresponding to them, and the place of perception in the larger scheme of temporal awareness.

Above all, particularly in text No. 54 (1911) and the corresponding sections of the 1928 edition (§§ 35–39), Husserl refines the conception of an absolute consciousness he first advanced, tentatively and rather clumsily, in No. 39. For example, he erases any ambiguity about whether he really does claim to find an absolute level within consciousness by distinguishing unequivocally between "the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness" (77; cf. 79, 382) and the immanent temporal objects it constitutes, such as acts or sensory contents.

He also provides an account of the nature and structure of the awareness that characterizes the absolute flow. In a sense, much of what Husserl said about the perceptual process in his discussion of Meinong's theory five years earlier now gets pushed down to the level of the absolute consciousness, while perception itself is left behind on the level of the immanent temporal objects that the flow constitutes. Thus, just as perception as an extended temporal object was said to have its phases, only one of which would be actual at a given moment, Husserl now understands the

absolute flow to have phases as well, only one of which, again, will be actual, while the others will have elapsed or be yet to come. And just as Husserl argued that each momentary phase of the perceptual act has a threefold intentionality made up of now-perception, primary memory, and primary expectation, so he now claims that each actual phase of the absolute flow has its own triple intentionality.

It is at this point, however, that fundamental differences from the earlier position, focused on perception, start to assert themselves. At about the same time that his view of the absolute consciousness matures, Husserl introduces a new set of terms for the three intentional moments belonging to the actual phase of consciousness. He comes to speak (usually) of "primal impression" or "primal sensation" rather than "now-perception," of "retention" rather than "fresh" or "primary memory," and of "protention" rather than "primary expectation."[13] But these are no longer taken to be names for moments belonging to a *perceptual* act; they are rather moments of the ultimate level of consciousness through which one is aware of the perceptual act – and of any other act or content – as an immanent temporal object. Perception now becomes simply one more act of consciousness constituted, along with memory, expectation, judgment, phantasy, and so on, as an immanent temporal object through the absolute flow.

Primal impression, retention, and protention do have in common with the "really immanent perception" of No. 39 that they intend *immanent* temporal objects; but they do not do so as forms of perception: they are instead modes of "impressional" consciousness. Husserl certainly used the term "impression" before 1909, but after that date it regularly comes to mean the generic form of consciousness that belongs to each actual phase of the absolute flow. Retention, primal impression, and protention are its species, so to speak. Unlike perception or memory or reflection, which thematize their objects (I see the flying bird, I reflect on my act of seeing it), impressional consciousness might

[13] "Retention," for example, is first used in the sense of the immediate consciousness of the past in the summer of 1909 (in No. 51, which Bernet dates to May-June 1909; Boehm finds its first appearance in No. 50 [333], but Bernet thinks that No. 50 was in fact written *after* No. 51. Bernet, 191, note).

best be described as the nonthematizing awareness of what is immanent to consciousness, such as an act or content in its temporal extension. It is the implicit self-consciousness that always attends my conscious life. Husserl frequently calls the immanent act or content an "experience" [*Erlebnis*] (e.g., 301). In the case of perception, a transcendent object – the bird, for example – is perceived through the act. The act itself, the "*Erlebnis,*" is not perceived; and yet I am aware of it: it is "experienced" [*erlebt*] or "intended" [*bewusst*], Husserl says (301). Similarly, in an act of secondary memory I recall thematically a past object or event; I do not recall my present act of remembering, nor do I "perceive" it (unless I institute a specific reflective act directed towards it). I do, however, "experience" or "intend" the act as the mental content I am presently living through. This experiencing of the act as an immanent object extended in immanent time is precisely the accomplishment of the absolute consciousness – an accomplishment that the absolute flow brings about through the retention, primal impression, and protention that make up each of its phases.

Husserl's rejection of the schema as a way of accounting for the constitution of time-consciousness means that these three intentional moments will not be understood as going about their constitutive business by means of apprehensions animating contents really inhabiting each phase of the absolute flow. There are no contents on the level of the absolute consciousness. All contents have been expelled from it and deposited on the level of the immanent temporal objects that the flow constitutes. Each of the flow's phases is purely and simply consciousness of the immanent object in immanent time. Retention, therefore, is not constituted by a memorial apprehension animating a content somehow present in the actual phase of the absolute flow (324). Retention just is the direct and immediate consciousness of what is past as it elapses: It "really contains consciousness of the past of the tone" (324) and nothing else. As pure – or, perhaps better, "sheer" – intentionality, the momentary phase is no longer bloated with apprehension- and content-continua. It therefore escapes the objection that it now really contains what it is supposed to be conscious of as past or future. On Husserl's mature reading, the absolute flow in each of its phases "con-

tains" nothing but the impressional consciousness of the past, present, and future phases of the immanent temporal objects it constitutes.

a. *The Double Intentionality of the Absolute Flow*

And yet this is not quite a complete picture of the time-constituting achievement of the absolute consciousness. Husserl admits that he is employing metaphor (382) when he calls the absolute consciousness a "flow." But the metaphor is useful because it conveys, as we have seen, the fact that the absolute consciousness has phases, one of which will be actual while others will have passed away and others will be yet to come. Husserl thinks that we are aware of the absolute flow in its flowing character. In fact, he argues that the flow – particularly through its retentional moment – possesses a "*double* intentionality" (390; 80) by which it constitutes at once its own unity and appearance as a flow and the unity and appearance of the immanent object as something extended in immanent time (390; 84).

It is worth noting that in No. 54 (1911), the final sketch included in *Husserliana X* and the primary text in which retention's double intentionality is discussed, Husserl says that retention "re-presents" [*vergegenwärtigt*] what had previously been intended in a primal sensation in the mode of the now, although not "in the manner in which a recollection would" (387). He also refers to retention as "reproduction" (390–91 ff). Husserl normally reserves "*Vergegenwärtigung*," "*Reproduktion*," and the terms derived from them for secondary memory, expectation, and various forms of phantasy, all of which are acts constituted in the impressional flow of the absolute consciousness. "*Vergegenwärtigung*," in other words, would seem to be related to retention as what is constituted and secondary is related to what is constituting and primary. Why would Husserl use the term in the case of retention, then?

Perhaps because he first arrived at the view that secondary memory possesses a double intentionality and then later discov-

ered the same intentional pattern in retention.[14] By 1904 or 1905,[15] Husserl had worked out his position that every memory is intentionally aware not only of a past object but also of the past perception of the object. His point is that in secondary memory I remember what is past as having been present. Since perception constitutes the present, this means that I remember what is past as having been perceived (59); and therefore an intentional reference to the past perception is built into the memory. Furthermore, it is by recalling the perception in which the object was given in a specific way – from a particular perspective, for example – that I can again have the object just as it was originally given. Once Husserl had worked out the view that it is by remembering the past perception that one is able to recall the past object of the perception, he may well have found the same pattern at work in the retentional memory that belongs to the absolute flow.

Following this pattern, then, each of the flow's phases may be said to possess the three intentional moments of primal impression, retention, and protention, with primal impression understood as the immediate consciousness of the now-phase of the immanent object. The retentional moment, however, is not directly conscious of the elapsed phases of the *object*. Rather, it is directly aware of the just elapsed phase of the absolute *flow*; retention, Husserl writes, is "an expression used to designate the intentional relation... of phase of consciousness to phase of consciousness," and these phases are not themselves temporal objects (346). On the other hand, since the elapsed phase of the flow did originally intend a phase of an object as now through its moment of primal impression, in retaining the just elapsed phase of the flow retention also retains the just elapsed phase of the object correlated with it. Furthermore, since the retained phase of the flow itself possessed a retentional consciousness, that retentional consciousness is preserved as well – and, through it, the still earlier phase of the flow that it retained, together with the phase of the object correlated with it, and so on until retention

[14] Both Robert Sokolowski and Rudolf Bernet point to this possibility. Robert Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 152–153. Bernet, L.

[15] In No. 18, dated 1904/05 following Bernet. Bernet, XVIII.

ceases. Thus retention may always be described as "retention of retention" (86).

Husserl calls the retentional consciousness that intends the elapsed phases of the absolute *consciousness* the "horizontal intentionality" [*Längsintentionalität*] of the flow (391; 85). The consciousness of the elapsed phases of the immanent *object* that the horizontal intentionality makes possible Husserl calls the flow's "transverse intentionality" [*Querintentionalität*] (392; 86). Through the first, the self-appearance of the flow becomes constituted; through the second, the appearance of the immanent temporal object, the act of perception, of memory, of judgment, and so on. If the constituted act happens to be the consciousness of a transcendent temporal object, then the awareness of the transcendent object in its temporal modes is constituted as well. The two intentionalities of retention are two sides of a single consciousness and work hand-in-glove (392–93). It is by bringing itself to appearance that the flow experiences the immanent object. "There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once" (84). Thus while it is possible to distinguish the two directions in the flow's intentionality, it is impossible to separate them.

The double intentionality of the absolute flow also enables Husserl to account for a phenomenon to which he alluded in 1905, in connection with Meinong's theory of perception, but did not explain. In the text in question, Husserl wrote that as the perceptual act unfolds, a "fusion" of its "overlapping" phases must occur (234). He insists on an intimate relation between perceptual phases because he takes it as evident "that the consciousness of... time itself ⟨requires⟩ time" (198). This is what Meinong denied, arguing in effect that it is simply an irrelevant fact that consciousness is temporally extended: its temporal extension has nothing to do with its capacity to bring the temporal object to presence, which for Meinong, one will recall, depends exclusively on the momentary and unextended act that allegedly supervenes at the end of the sequence of momentary now-perceptions. Husserl argues to the contrary that the perception of temporal extension requires a temporally extended consciousness, which in turn implies a fusion of the phases of the

perceiving act. Husserl's schematic interpretation offered no explanation of this fusion; in fact, it implicitly denied that a genuine relation among phases existed at all: the elapsed phases of consciousness were preserved and related to the present phase only in the sense that in the present phase there magically appeared a replication of the contents of the now-vanished prior phases. It was the notion of the absolute flow with its double intentionality that finally enabled Husserl to explain how each phase of consciousness was intentionally related to the phases preceding and following it, and through them to the phases of the temporal object. Through its double intentionality, the flow as a succession of phases is at once the consciousness of its own succession and of the succession of its objects.

b. *Language and the Flow*

We spoke above of the absolute flow as if it were extended in time. Strictly speaking, Husserl cautions, this is not true, or at least not true without qualification. The temporal objects constituted in immanent time by the flow's double intentionality, as well as the transcendent temporal objects that might be correlated with them, are rightly the subjects of temporal predicates. But the absolute flow itself is a dimension of consciousness distinct from the level of time and temporal objects, whether immanent or transcendent. For it, therefore, and for everything that goes on within it, "we have no names" (382). It is as if our temporal vocabulary has been exhausted by the time we reach the absolute flow. We are therefore forced to borrow terms we use on the higher levels or to resort to metaphors, as exemplified in the use of the term "flow" itself (382). But there are deeper reasons why ordinary temporal terms are not appropriate here: the flow, unlike temporal objects, does not begin or end, does not flow faster or slower, and never changes in any other respect (381). It is, one might say, "automatic": it simply flows, and always at the same rate. It does have a phase that is actually "present" and other phases that have elapsed and are yet to come; in that respect, it is certainly a "*quasi*-temporal" flow (393). But to apply temporal terms to it without caution and qualification is to

invite a confusion of the flow with what it constitutes, with what is temporal in a fundamentally different sense (381).

Husserl's conception of the absolute time-constituting flow, as he admitted, is a most difficult matter. It is also controversial. This is not the place to explore its more disputatious aspects, but it might be useful to note that the flow, at least as it appears in the texts here, is not "absolute" in any "metaphysical" or "mystical" sense. It is rather absolute in the sense that it is the founding level of time-consciousness: it is ultimate in that it explains the constitution of immanent temporal objects and, through them, the consciousness of transcendent temporal objects. It is also supposed to account for its own constitution without having to appeal to a deeper level of consciousness (392–93). Furthermore, while Husserl does distinguish the absolute flow as a dimension of consciousness from the level of constituted immanent objects, itself a dimension of consciousness, he clearly does not think that the flow could exist or present itself independently of the immanent objects it constitutes. It is, in the strictest sense, distinct but inseparable from them.

Although we cannot explore it here, what Husserl says about time-consciousness, and particularly about the absolute flow, illuminates in vital ways some of the key themes in his phenomenology. An adequate understanding of Husserl's conception of the Ego, for example, depends on a grasp of what he says about the consciousness of time on all levels. Equally, the analysis of the absolute flow sheds light on what Husserl means when he writes in the *Cartesian Meditations* that "the form that makes all other syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing *consciousness of internal time*" (*Husserliana I*, § 18); or what he might mean when, in the course of his brief discussion of the consciousness of time in the *Ideas,* he refers cryptically to "what is ultimately and truly absolute" (*Husserliana III*, 1, § 81). And finally, the sketches on time translated here are important in assessing Husserl's relationship to current arguments surrounding the issue of presence. The abiding virtue of these texts, however, is that what they have to say about time and the consciousness of time will remain vital long after our contemporary debates have faded into history.

* * *

It was noted earlier that the texts collected in *Husserliana X* and translated here do not form a complete and coherent work. Many of them are simply notes never intended for publication. As such, they frequently contain incomplete sentences and abrupt transitions; occasionally they seem to break off in midstream. These characteristics have been preserved in the translation in order to convey as faithfully as possible the nature and condition of the original. Generally, the translation tends to be literal: the work is technical and often difficult, and a close adherence to the German text seemed the best course to pursue.

Whenever possible, I have followed Dorion Cairns's *Guide for Translating Husserl* in selecting English equivalents for key German terms. There are a few cases, however, in which I use translations that vary more or less from those suggested by Cairns. I have rendered "*Erlebnis*," for example, as "[an or the] experience." The term, which refers to occurrences immanent to consciousness such as acts or sensory contents, appears with great frequency in *Husserliana X*; its translation as "experience" is both economical and clear in context. "*Erfahrung*," which occurs infrequently, is translated as "empirical experience" where appropriate; at other times it is translated simply as "experience," usually with the German term in square brackets following the English. The verb "*erleben*" is translated by "(to) experience" and the past participle "*erlebt*" by "experienced." "*Bewusst*," which is often used as a synonym for "*erlebt*," is usually translated by "intended." "*Objekt*" and "*Gegenstand*" are both translated by "object," with the German included in brackets in the few cases in which the sense demands it. "*Vorstellung*" is almost always translated as "representation" to distinguish it from "*Gegenwärtigung*," which is always translated as "presentation." The only exception is in the case of No. 18, as explained in the footnote on page 184. "*Repräsentation*," depending on the context, is translated as "re-presentation" or "representation"; when the latter translation is used, the German is placed in square brackets whenever that seems necessary to avoid confusion. Finally, "*Vergegenwärtigung*" is translated without exception as "re-presentation."

I have compared my translation of the first part – the text originally published in 1928 – with James Churchill's English

translation of the 1928 edition and with Henri Dussort's translation of the same text into French. I have also consulted Alfredo Marini's Italian translation of the whole of *Husserliana X*. All of these sources proved of great help. I am especially grateful to Rudolf Bernet, who originally asked me to translate *Husserliana X* and who then patiently encouraged me to see it through; to Mr. R. Philip Buckley and Mrs. I. Lombaerts of the Husserl-Archives at Leuven who went over the text with a fine comb; and to Thomas Prufer, Robert Sokolowski, and Barbara Stowasser, who spent hours helping me with difficult passages. I particularly want to thank Dede Brough for her assistance in every aspect of the project. I am also grateful to the National Endownment for the Humanities for a research fellowship that enabled me to spend the year 1981 studying Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness. This translation is dedicated to my mother, to Dede, and to John, Suzy, and Karen, all of whom were unfailingly patient and supportive in what must have seemed to them to have been an endless, if not infinite, task.

A

LECTURES ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF INTERNAL TIME

THE LECTURES ON THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF INTERNAL TIME FROM THE YEAR 1905[1]

Introduction[2]

The analysis of time-consciousness is an ancient burden for descriptive psychology and epistemology. The first person who sensed profoundly the enormous difficulties inherent in this analysis, and who struggled with them almost to despair, was Augustine. Even today, anyone occupied with the problem of time must still study Chapters 14-28 of Book XI of the *Confessiones* thoroughly. For in these matters our modern age, so proud of its knowledge, has failed to surpass or even to match the splendid achievement of this great thinker who grappled so earnestly with the problem of time. We may still say today with Augustine: *si nemo a me quaerat, scio, si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.*[3]

Naturally, we all know what time is; it is the most familiar thing of all. But as soon as we attempt to give an account of time-consciousness, to put objective time and subjective time-consciousness into the proper relationship and to reach an understanding of how temporal objectivity – and therefore any individual objectivity whatever – can become constituted in the subjective consciousness of time, we get entangled in the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions. Indeed, this [4]

[1] According to the draft prepared by Edith Stein in the summer of 1917 with the mandate and participation of the author and including supplementary and corrective sketches by Husserl from the years 1905–1917 (this was the draft edited by Martin Heidegger in 1928). The editor of the present volume has checked the draft against Husserl's original manuscripts, to the extent that they are available, and has revised it in some places. – Editor's note. ["Editor's note" indicates a note written by Rudolf Boehm from *Husserliana X*. Notes added by the translator will be signalled by "Translator's note."]

[2] The text of this "Introduction," of §§ 1–6 which follow it, and of the first paragraph of § 7, is based on sheets "1"–"15" of the manuscript of the lectures of 1905. – Editor's note.

[3] *Confessiones*, lib. XI, cap. 14. – Editor's note.

happens even when we only attempt to submit the purely subjective time-consciousness, the phenomenological content belonging to the experiences of time, to an analysis.

An exposition of *Brentano's* analysis of time can serve as the point of departure for our investigation. Unfortunately, Brentano never published his analysis, communicating it only in lectures. *Marty* has described it quite briefly in his work on the development of the sense of color, which appeared at the end of the seventies,[4] and *Stumpf* has also devoted a few words to it in his psychology of sound.[5]

§ 1. *The Suspension of Objective Time*

We must still make a few general remarks by way of introduction. We are intent on a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness. Inherent in this, as in any phenomenological analysis, is the complete exclusion of every assumption, stipulation, and conviction with respect to objective time (the complete exclusion of all transcending presuppositions concerning what exists). From the perspective of objectivity, every experience, just as every real being and moment of being, may have its place in the single objective time – and thus too the experience of the perception and representation of time itself. Someone may find it of interest to determine the objective time of an experience, including that of a time-constituting experience. It might also make an interesting investigation to ascertain how the time that is posited as objective in an episode of time-consciousness is related to actual objective time, whether the estimations of temporal intervals correspond to the objectively real temporal intervals or how they deviate from them. But these are not tasks for phenomenology. Just as the actual thing, the actual world, is not a phenomenological datum, neither is world time, the real time,

[4] Anton Marty, *Die Frage nach der geschichtlichen Entwicklung des Farbensinnes* [The question of the historical development of the sense of color] (Wien, 1879), p. 41 ff. – Editor's note.

[5] Carl Stumpf, *Tonpsychologie* [Psychology of sound] II (Leipzig, 1890), p. 277. – Editor's note.

the time of nature in the sense of natural science and even in the sense of psychology as the natural science of the psychic.

Now when we speak of the analysis of time-consciousness, of the temporal character of the objects of perception, memory, and [5] expectation, it may indeed seem as if we were already assuming the flow of objective time and then at bottom studying only the subjective conditions of the possibility of an intuition of time and of a proper cognition of time. What we accept, however, is not the existence of a world time, the existence of a physical duration, and the like, but appearing time, appearing duration, as appearing. These are absolute data that it would be meaningless to doubt. To be sure, we do assume an existing time in this case, but the time we assume is the *immanent time* of the flow of consciousness, not the time of the experienced world. That the consciousness of a tonal process, of a melody I am now hearing, exhibits a succession is something for which I have an evidence that renders meaningless every doubt and denial.

What the suspension of objective time involves will perhaps become clearer still if we work out a parallel with space, since space and time exhibit such significant and much-noted analogies. The consciousness of space – that is, the experience in which the "intuition of space" as perception and phantasy occurs – belongs in the sphere of what is phenomenologically given. If we open our eyes, we see into objective space, which means (as reflective consideration shows) that we have visual sensation-contents that found an appearance of space, an appearance of determinate things arranged in this way and that in space. If we abstract from every interpretation that goes beyond what is given and reduce the perceptual appearance to the given primary contents, the latter yield the continuum of the visual field, which is *quasi*-spatial but obviously not space or a surface in space. Roughly speaking, the continuum of the visual field is a twofold, continuous multiplicity. We do find there relations such as next-to-one-another, one-above-the-other, one-inside-the-other, as well as closed lines completely delimiting a part of the field, etc. But these are not relationships in objective space. It makes no sense at all to say, for example, that a point of the visual field is one meter distant from the corner of this table here, or is next to it, above it, and so on. Just as little does the appearance of the

physical thing have a position in space or spatial relationships of any kind: the house-appearance is not next to the house, above it, one meter away from it, etc. [6]

Now something similar is also true of time. Temporal apprehensions, the experiences in which the temporal in the objective sense appears, are phenomenological data. Again, the moments of experience that specifically found temporal apprehension as the apprehension of time – thus the (perhaps) specifically temporal apprehension-contents (what moderate nativism calls the originally temporal) – are phenomenologically given. But none of that has to do with objective time. One cannot discover the least thing about objective time through phenomenological analysis. The "original temporal field" is obviously not a bit of objective time; the experienced now, taken in itself, is not a point of objective time, and so on. Objective space, objective time, and with them the objective world of actual things and events – these are all transcendencies. But note well that space and actuality are not transcendent in some mystical sense, as things in themselves, but are just phenomenal space, phenomenal spatio-temporal reality, appearing spatial form, appearing temporal form. None of these are experiences. And the ordered connections that are to be found in experiences as genuine immanencies cannot be met with in the empirical, objective order, and do not fit into it.

An investigation of the data of place (taken up by nativism in the psychological attitude), which make up the immanent order of the "field of visual sensation," as well as an investigation of this field itself, would also belong in a fully developed phenomenology of the spatial. The data of place are related to appearing objective places just as the data of quality are related to appearing objective qualities. If we speak of place-signs in the first case, then we would have to speak of quality-signs in the second. The sensed red is a phenomenological datum that, animated by a certain apprehension-function, presents an objective quality; it is not itself a quality. The perceived red, not the sensed red, is a quality in the proper sense, that is, a determination of the appearing thing. The sensed red is called red only equivocally, for red is the name of a real quality. If, with reference to certain occurrences in phenomenology, we speak of a "coinciding" of the one with the other, we must nevertheless

note that it is only through the apprehension that the sensed red receives the value of a moment presenting the quality of a [7] physical thing. Considered in itself, however, the sensed red contains nothing in this regard. Thus the "coinciding" of the presenting and the presented [in this case][6] is not at all the coinciding proper to a consciousness of identity whose correlate is said to be "one and the same."

If we give the name "sensed" to a phenomenological datum that by means of apprehension makes us conscious of something objective as given "in person," which is then said to be objectively perceived, we must likewise distinguish between something temporal that is "sensed" and something temporal that is perceived.[7] The latter refers to objective time. The former, however, is not itself objective time (or position in objective time) but the phenomenological datum through whose empirical apperception the relation to objective time becomes constituted. *Temporal data* – or, if you prefer, temporal signs – are not themselves *tempora*. Objective time belongs in the context of empirically experienced objectivity. The "sensed" temporal data are not merely sensed; they are also ⟨charged⟩[8] with apprehension-characters, and to these in turn belong certain claims and entitlements: to measure against one another the times and temporal relations that appear on the basis of the sensed data, to bring them into this or that objective order, and to distinguish various apparent and actual orders. What becomes constituted here as objectively valid being is finally the one infinite objective time in which all things and events – bodies and their physical qualities, psyches and their psychic states – have their definite temporal positions, which we can determine by means of a chronometer.

[6] Material in square brackets has been added by the translator. – Translator's note.

[7] "Sensed" would then be the indication of a relational concept that in itself would signify nothing about whether what is sensed is sensual – indeed, about whether it is immanent at all in the sense of what is sensual. In other words, it would remain open whether what is sensed is itself already constituted and perhaps entirely different from the sensual. – But this whole distinction is best left aside; not every constitution has the schema: apprehension-content – apprehension.

[8] Material in diamond brackets was added by the editor of *Husserliana X*. – Translator's note.

It may be – we do not have to make a judgment about it here – that these objective determinations ultimately have their basis in the establishment of differences and relations belonging to the temporal data, or even in immediate equivalence to these data. Yet to take some examples, sensed "synchrony" is not simply equivalent to objective simultaneity; sensed equality of temporal intervals, given phenomenologically, is not straightaway [8] objective equality of temporal intervals; and the sensed absolute temporal datum is, again, not immediately the being-experienced of objective time (this is true even of the absolute datum of the now). To grasp a content – specifically, to grasp it with evidence, just as it is experienced – does not yet mean that one has grasped an objectivity in the empirical sense, an objective reality in the sense in which one speaks of objective physical things, events, relationships, of location in objective space and time, of objectively real spatial form and temporal form, and so on.

Let us look at a piece of chalk. We close and open our eyes. We then have two perceptions. We nonetheless say that we see the same chalk twice. Here we have contents separated in time; we even see, phenomenologically, a separation or division in time. But there is no division as far as the object is concerned: it is the same. In the object there is duration; in the phenomenon, alteration. Thus we can also sense, subjectively, a temporal succession where, objectively, we must confirm a coexistence. The experienced content is "objectivated," and at that point the object is constituted in the mode of apprehension from the material of the experienced contents. But the object is not merely the sum or combination of these "contents," which do not enter into it at all. The object is more than content and in a certain sense other than it. The objectivity belongs to "empirical experience," specifically, to the unity of empirical experience, to the nexus of nature governed by empirical laws. Expressed phenomenologically: the objectivity is precisely not constituted in the "primary" contents but in the apprehension-characters and in the laws belonging to the essence of these characters. To grasp this fully and to render it clearly intelligible is precisely the task of the phenomenology of knowledge.

§ 2. *The Question about the "Origin of Time"*

Following these reflections we also understand the difference between the phenomenological (that is to say, the epistemological) and the psychological questions about origins with respect to all the concepts that are constitutive of experience [*Erfahrung*], and thus too with respect to the concept of time. *The epistemological question about the possibility of experience is the question about the essence of experience*; and the clarification of its [9] phenomenological possibility requires going back to the phenomenological data, for what is experienced consists, phenomenologically, of such data. Since experiencing is split by the opposition between "proper" and "nonproper," and since experience proper, which is intuitive and ultimately adequate experience, supplies the standard of valuation for experience, a phenomenology of experience "proper" is especially needed.

The question about the essence of time thus leads back to the question about the "*origin*" *of time*. But this *question of origin* is directed towards the *primitive* formations of time-consciousness, in which the primitive differences of the temporal become constituted intuitively and properly as the original sources of all the evidences relating to time. This question of origin should not be confused with *the question about psychological origin,* with the controversial issue that divides *empiricism and nativism*. The latter concerns the *original material of sensation from which the intuitions of objective space and objective time* arise in the human individual and even in the species. The question about empirical genesis is a matter of indifference as far as we are concerned; what does interest us are experiences [*Erlebnisse*] with respect to their objective sense and descriptive content. The psychological apperception that takes experiences to be psychic states of empirical persons, of *psychophysical subjects*; that establishes connections, whether purely psychic or psychophysical, among these experiences; and that follows the becoming, the taking-shape, and the being-reshaped of psychic experiences *according to natural laws* – this psychological apperception is entirely different from the *phenomenological* apperception. We do not fit experiences into any reality. We are concerned with reality only insofar as it is reality meant, objectivated, intuited, or conceptually

thought. With respect to the problem of time, this means that we are interested in *experiences* of time. That these experiences are themselves fixed in objective time, *that they belong in the world of physical things and psychic subjects,* and that they have their place, their *efficacy,* their empirical being, and their origin in this world does not concern us and we know nothing about it. On the other hand, it does interest us that data "in objective time" are *meant* in these experiences. Precisely this description that the acts in question *mean* this or that "objectivity" – or more exactly, the exhibition of the *a priori* truths that pertain to the different constitutive moments of the objectivity – belongs to the domain of phenomenology. We seek to bring *the a priori of time* to *clarity* by exploring the *consciousness of time,* by bringing its essential constitution to light, and by exhibiting the apprehension-contents and act-characters that pertain – perhaps specifically – to time and to which the *a priori* temporal laws essentially belong. Naturally, I mean by this laws of the following obvious sort: that the fixed temporal order is a two-dimensional infinite series, that two different times can never be simultaneous, that their relation is a nonreciprocal one, that transitivity obtains, that to every time an earlier and a later time belong, and so on. – So much by way of general introduction. [10]

First Section

BRENTANO'S THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF TIME

§ 3. *The Original Associations*

We now want to attempt to gain access to the problems we have raised, doing so in connection with Brentano's theory of the origin of time. Brentano believes that he has found the solution in the original associations, in the "coming into being of the immediate representations of memory, that is, of those representations which, according to an invariable law, attach themselves without any mediation to the actual perceptual representations."[1] When we see, hear, or in any way perceive something, it always happens that what we perceive remains present to us for a time, but not without undergoing modification. Apart from other changes, such as those in intensity and fullness, which occur in more or less noticeable degrees, we must always confirm yet another and distinctly original change: namely, that something remaining in consciousness in this way appears to us as more or less past, as pushed back in time, as it were. When a melody [11] sounds, for example, the individual tone does not utterly disappear with the cessation of the stimulus or of the neural movement it excites. When the new tone is sounding, the preceding tone has not disappeared without leaving a trace. If it had, we would be quite incapable of noticing the relations among the successive tones; in each moment we would have a tone, or perhaps an empty pause in the interval between the sounding of two tones, but never the representation of a melody. On the other hand, the abiding of the tone-representations in consciousness does not settle the matter. If they were to remain unmodified, then instead of a melody we would have a chord of simultaneous tones, or rather a disharmonious tangle of sound, as if we had struck simultaneously all the notes that had previously sounded. Only

[1] Presumably a quotation from a transcript of a lecture by Franz Brentano. – Editor's note.

because that peculiar modification occurs, only because every tone-sensation, after the stimulus that produced it has disappeared, awakens from out of itself a representation that is similar and furnished with a temporal determination, and only because this temporal determination continuously changes, can a melody come to be represented in which the individual tones have their definite places and their definite tempos.

It is therefore a universal law that a continuous series of representations is fastened by nature to every given representation. Each representation belonging to this series reproduces the content of the one preceding, but in such a way that it always affixes the moment of the past to the new representation.

Phantasy thus proves to be productive in a peculiar way here. This is the sole instance in which phantasy creates a truly new moment of representation, namely, the temporal moment. We have therefore discovered the origin of the representation of time in the region of phantasy. Psychologists down to Brentano have struggled in vain to locate the authentic source of this representation. The futility of their quest depended on a confounding – natural, to be sure – of subjective and objective time, which misled the psychological investigators and completely prevented them from seeing the real problem before them. Many believe that the question about the origin of the concept of time does not [12] have to be answered differently from the question about the origin of our concepts of colors, sounds, and the like. Just as we sense a color, so too we sense the duration of the color; like quality and intensity, temporal duration is also an immanent moment of sensation. The external stimulus excites the quality through the form of physical processes, the intensity through its kinetic energy, and the subjectively sensed duration through its continuation. But this is a palpable error. The fact that the stimulus endures still does not mean that the sensation is sensed as enduring; it means only that the sensation also endures. The duration of sensation and the sensation of duration are two very different things. And this is equally true of succession. The succession of sensations and the sensation of succession are not the same.

Naturally we must make precisely the same objection against those who wish to trace the representation of duration and

succession back to the fact of the duration and succession of psychic acts. We are carrying out the refutation specifically with respect to sensations, however.

It is conceivable that our sensations might endure or succeed one another without our knowing anything about it at all, since our representations would carry in themselves no temporal determinateness whatsoever. If we consider the case of a succession, for example, and assume that the sensations disappear along with the stimuli causing them, we would have a succession of sensations without a suspicion of a temporal flow. With the emergence of the new sensation, we would no longer have any memory that the earlier sensations had existed; in each moment we would be conscious only of the sensation just produced and of nothing further. But even the persistence of the sensations already produced would still not furnish us with the representation of succession. If, in the case of a succession of tones, the earlier tones were to be preserved just as they had been while at the same time new tones were to sound again and again, we would have a simultaneous sum of tones in our representation but not a succession of tones. There would be no difference between this case and the case in which all of these tones sounded at once. Or consider another example: If, in the case of a motion, the moving body were held unchanged in consciousness in each of its successive positions, the space traversed by the body would appear to us as continuously filled, but we would not have the [13] representation of a movement. The representation of succession comes about only if the earlier sensation does not persist unchanged in consciousness but is modified in an original manner; that is, only if it is continuously modified from moment to moment. With the shift into phantasy, the sensation receives the continuously changing temporal character; thus from moment to moment the content appears as pushed further and further back. But this modification is no longer a matter of sensation; it is not produced by the stimulus. The stimulus generates the present sensation-content. If the stimulus disappears, the sensation also disappears. But then the sensation itself becomes productive: it produces for itself a phantasy-representation the same or almost the same in content and enriched by the temporal character. This representation in turn awakens a new

one, which is joined to it in continuous fashion, and so on. Brentano calls this continuous annexation of a temporally modified representation to the given representation "original association." As a consequence of his theory, Brentano comes to deny the perception of succession and change. We believe that we hear a melody and therefore that we still hear what is just past, but this is only an illusion proceeding from the vivacity of the original association.

§ 4. *The Acquiring of the Future and Infinite Time*

The intuition of time that arises through original association is not yet an intuition of infinite time. It undergoes further development, and not only with respect to the past: it acquires an entirely new branch through the addition of the future. On the basis of the appearance of momentary memory, phantasy forms the representations of the future in a process similar to that by which, under the appropriate circumstances, we arrive at representations of certain new sorts of colors and sounds by following known relations and forms. In phantasy, we are able to transpose into other registers a melody that we have heard in a definite key and on the basis of a completely determined tonal species. In making such a transposition, it could very well happen that, [14] proceeding from familiar tones, we would come to tones that we have never heard at all. So in a similar way phantasy forms – in expectation – the representation of the future out of the past. It is simply a mistaken view that phantasy is capable of offering nothing new, that it exhausts itself in the repetition of moments that have already been given in perception. Finally, as far as the full temporal representation – the representation of infinite time – is concerned, it is every bit as much a formation of conceptual representation as the infinite number series, infinite space, and the like.

§ 5. *The Modification of Representations through Temporal Characters*

According to Brentano, we must take note of yet another particularly important characteristic of the representations of time. The temporal species of past and future have the peculiarity that they do not determine the elements of the sensuous representations with which they combine, as other supervening modes do, but alter them instead. A louder tone c *is* nevertheless a tone c, and so too is a weaker tone c. On the other hand, *a tone c that was is not a tone c,* a red that was is not a red. Temporal determinations do not determine: they alter essentially, exactly as the determinations "represented," "wished," and the like, do. A thaler represented, a possible thaler, *is* no thaler. Only the determination "now" constitutes an exception. The A that now exists is certainly an actual A. The present does not alter, but on the other hand it does not determine either. If I append the now to the representation of a man, the man acquires no new characteristic thereby, nor is any characteristic designated in him. The fact that perception represents something as now adds nothing to the quality, intensity, and spatial determination of what is represented. According to Brentano, the modifying temporal predicates are irreal; only the determination of the now is real. What is remarkable here is that the irreal temporal determinations can belong in a continuous series along with the only actually real determination, to which the irreal determinations attach themselves in infinitesimal differences. The real now then becomes irreal again and again. If one asks how the real is able to turn into the irreal through the supervention of modifying [15] temporal determinations, no answer other than the following can be given: temporal determinations of every sort are attached in a certain way and as a necessary consequence to every coming into being and passing away that occurs in the present. For it is altogether evident and obvious that everything that is, in consequence of the fact that it is, *will have been;* and that, from the perspective of the future, everything that is, in consequence of the fact that it is, is something that has been.

§ 6. *Criticism*

If we turn now to the criticism of the theory we have presented, we must first ask: What does it do, and what does it intend to do? Obviously it does not move within the realm that we recognized as necessary for a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness: it works with transcendent presuppositions, with existing temporal objects that bring "stimuli" to bear on us and "cause" sensations in us, and the like. It therefore presents itself as a theory of the psychological origin of the representation of time. But it also contains fragments of an epistemological consideration of the conditions of the possibility of a consciousness of objective temporality – a consciousness that itself appears and must be able to appear as temporal. We may add to this the discussions about the peculiarities of temporal predicates, which must stand in relation to psychological and phenomenological predicates – relations which, however, are not pursued further.

Brentano speaks of a law of original association according to which representations of a momentary memory attach themselves to the perceptions of the moment. Brentano obviously means this to be a psychological law governing the new formation of psychic experiences on the basis of given psychic experiences. These experiences are psychic, they are objectivated, they themselves have their time, and what is at issue for Brentano is their genesis and development. All of this belongs in the region of psychology and does not interest us here. However, a phenomenological core does lie hidden in these considerations, and the statements that follow are intended to be restricted to this core alone. Duration, succession, changes *appear*. What is implied in this appearing? In a succession, for example, a "now" appears and, in union with [16] it, a "past." The unity of the consciousness that encompasses intentionally what is present and what is past is a phenomenological datum. Now the question is whether, as Brentano asserts, what is past actually appears in this consciousness in the mode of phantasy.

When Brentano speaks of the acquisition of the future, he distinguishes between the original intuition of time, which according to him is the creation of original association, and the

extended intuition of time, which also derives from phantasy[2] but not from original association. We can also say that the intuition of time stands over against the nonpresentive representation of time, the representation of infinite time, of times and temporal relations that are not realized intuitively. Now it is most extraordinary that in his theory of the intuition of time Brentano does not take into consideration at all the difference between the perception of time and the phantasy of time, a difference that forces itself upon us here and that he cannot possibly have overlooked. Even if he may refuse to speak of the perception of something temporal (with the exception of the now-point as the limit between past and future), the difference that underlies our talk about the perceiving of a succession and the remembering of a succession perceived in the past (or even the mere phantasy of a perception) surely cannot be denied and must somehow be clarified. If the original intuition of time is already a creation of phantasy, then what distinguishes this phantasy of the temporal from the one in which we are conscious of something temporal that belongs to the more remote past – of something, therefore, that does not belong in the sphere of original association and is not combined in one consciousness with the current perception, but that at one time was combined with a perception that is now past? If the re-presentation of a succession experienced yesterday involves the re-presentation of the temporal field originally experienced yesterday, and if the latter already presents itself as a continuum of originally associated phantasies, then we would be dealing with phantasies of phantasies. Here we encounter unresolved difficulties in Brentano's theory, which call into question [17] the accuracy of his analysis of the original consciousness of time.[3] That he could not master these difficulties depends on still other shortcomings beyond those we have indicated.

Brentano does not distinguish between act and content, or, respectively, between act, content of apprehension, and apprehended object. Yet we must make up our minds about which of these accounts it is to which the temporal moment should be charged. If original association fastens a continuous sequence of

[2] "Phantasy" here always encompasses all re-presenting acts and is not used in opposition to positing acts.

[3] For the corresponding positive explanations, cf. § 19, 47ff.

representations to the current perception, and if by this means the temporal moment is produced, then we must ask: What kind of moment is this? Does it belong to the act-character as a difference essentially proper to it, or to the contents of apprehension – say, to the sensuous contents when, for example, we consider colors or tones in their temporal being? Following Brentano's doctrine that representing as such admits of no differentiations, that there is no difference, apart from their primary contents, between representations as representations, the only possibility remaining is that phantasms and more phantasms, qualitatively the same in content although diminishing in fullness and intensity, continuously attach themselves to the primary contents of the perception. Parallel to this process, phantasy adds a new moment, the temporal. These explanations are unsatisfactory in various respects. We find temporal characters, succession and duration, not only in the primary contents but also in the apprehended objects and the apprehending acts. An analysis of time restricted to one stratum is not sufficient; it must rather follow all the strata of constitution.

But let us disregard all transcending interpretations and, focusing on the immanent contents, attempt to confirm the view that the temporal modification must be understood through the supervention of a moment – called the temporal moment – that combines with the other elements of content, with quality, intensity, and so forth. An experienced tone A has just sounded; it is renewed through original association and, as far as its content is concerned, continuously held in consciousness. But that means: A is not past at all (in any event, apart from diminutions in its intensity) but has remained present. The whole difference would consist in the fact that association is supposed to be creative and that it adds a new moment, called "past." This moment shades off and changes continuously, and according to the degree of change, A is more or less past. Thus the past, insofar as it falls within the sphere of the original intuition of time, must at the same time be present. The temporal moment "past" would have to be a present moment of experience in the same sense as the moment red that we are experiencing right now – which is surely an obvious absurdity. [18]

Perhaps someone will object that A itself is indeed past but

that there is a new content in consciousness by virtue of original association: A with the character of the "past." Nonetheless, if a content that is perfectly like A is constantly in consciousness, even with a new moment, then A is precisely not past but enduring. Consequently it is present now and present constantly, and present together with the new moment "past" – past and present at once. – But how in that case do we know that an A existed earlier, that it already existed before the existence of the present A? Where do we get the idea of the past? The being-present of an A in consciousness through the annexation of a new moment, even if we call that new moment the moment of the past, is incapable of explaining the transcending consciousness: A is past. It is not able to furnish the slightest representation of the fact that what I now have in consciousness as A with its new character is identical with something that is not in consciousness now but that did exist. – What, then, are the moments of original association that are now being experienced? Are they perhaps times themselves? In that case, we confront the contradiction: all of these moments are there now, enclosed within the same consciousness of an object; they are therefore simultaneous. And yet the succession of time excludes simultaneity. Are these moments perhaps not the temporal moments themselves but temporal signs instead? But this only provides us with a new word. The consciousness of time is still not analyzed: it remains unexplained how the consciousness of a past becomes constituted on the basis of such signs, or in what sense, in what way, and through which apprehensions these experienced moments function differently from the moments of quality, and function in such a way that the consciousness that is supposed to be now comes to be related to a not-now.

The attempt to treat what is past as something nonreal and [19] nonexistent is also highly questionable. A supervening psychic moment cannot create irreality nor can it dismiss present existence. In fact, the whole domain of original association is a present and real experience. To this domain belongs the entire series of original temporal moments produced by original association, together with the rest of the moments belonging to the temporal object.

We therefore see that an analysis of time-consciousness is

useless that seeks to make the intuitive extent of time intelligible merely by means of new moments shaded off continuously, which are somehow patched or fused onto the moments of content that constitute the object localized in time. Briefly stated: The temporal form is neither a temporal content itself nor a complex of new contents that somehow attach themselves to the temporal content. Now even if Brentano did not fall into the error of reducing, after the fashion of sensualism, all experiences to mere primary contents, and even if he was the first to recognize the radical separation between primary contents and act-characters, his theory of time nonetheless shows that he has just not taken into consideration the theoretically decisive act-characters. The question of how time-consciousness is possible and how it is to be understood remains unanswered.

SECOND SECTION

ANALYSIS OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME

§ 7. *Interpretation of the Grasping of Temporal Objects as Momentary Grasping and as Enduring Act*

An idea that derives from *Herbart,* was taken up by *Lotze,* and that played an important role in the whole following period, works as a driving motive in Brentano's theory: namely, the idea that in order to grasp a succession of representations (a and b, for example), it is necessary that the representations be the absolutely simultaneous objects of a knowing that puts them in relation and that embraces them quite indivisibly in a single and indivisible act.[1] All the representations of a route, of a passage, [20] of a distance – in brief, all the representations that contain a comparison of several elements and express the relation between them – can be conceived only as the products of an act of knowing that embraces its objects timelessly. They would all be impossible if the act of representing were itself entirely dissolved in temporal succession.[2] It appears to be an evident and quite inescapable assumption of this conception that the intuition of an extent of time occurs in a now, in one time-point. It simply appears as a truism that every consciousness aimed at some

[1] "If the representation of the later b in fact only followed the representation of the earlier a, then a change of representations would indeed be on hand, but not yet a representation of this change; a lapse of time would be there, yet this lapse would appear as a lapse of time to no one. In order for this comparison in which b is known *as* later to occur, it is surely again necessary that the two representations a and b be the absolutely simultaneous objects of a knowing that puts them in relation and that embraces them quite indivisibly in a single indivisible act." Hermann Lotze, *Metaphysik. Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie und Psychologie* [Metaphysics. Three books on ontology, cosmology, and psychology] (Leipzig, 1879), p. 294. – Editor's note.

[2] "All the representations of a route, of a distance, of a passage – in brief, all the representations that contain a comparison of several elements and express the relation between them – can be so conceived only as the products of an act of knowing that embraces its objects timelessly; they would all be impossible if the act of representing were itself entirely dissolved in temporal succession. . . ." *ibid.*, p. 295. – Editor's note.

whole, at some plurality of distinguishable moments (hence every consciousness of relation and combination), encompasses its object in an indivisible time-point. Wherever a consciousness is directed towards a whole whose parts are successive, there can be an intuitive consciousness of this whole only if the parts, in the form of representants, come together in the unity of the momentary intuition. W. *Stern* has objected to this "dogma of the momentariness of a whole of consciousness" (as he calls it).[3] There are cases in which apprehension takes place[4] only on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness, that is to say, cases in which the apprehension is extended over a stretch of time (the so-called "presence-time").[5] Thus, for example, a discrete succession can be held together without prejudice to the nonsimultaneity of its members by a bond of consciousness, by a [21] unitary act of apprehension.[6] That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only because the succession of psychic events is united "at once" into a total formation. They are in consciousness successively, but they fall within one and the same total act. We obviously do not have the tones all at once, and we do not hear the melody by virtue of the circumstance that the earlier tones continue to endure while the last tone is heard. The tones rather form a successive unity with a common effect, the apprehension-form.[7] Naturally, the latter is consummated only with

[3] William Stern, "Psychische Präsenzzeit" [Psychic presence-time], *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* XIII (1897), pp. 325–349; the expression "dogma of the momentariness of a whole of consciousness or, in other words, of the necessary isochronism of its members" is found on p. 330 f. of this article. – Cf. also William Stern, *Psychologie der Veränderungsauffassung* [Psychology of the apprehension of change] (Breslau, 1898). – Editor's supplement to the note.

[4] "Cases in which apprehension takes place only on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness." Stern, "Psychische Präsenzzeit" [Psychic presence-time], p. 326. – Editor's note.

[5] "The stretch of time over which such a psychic act is capable of being extended I call its *presence-time* [*Präsenzzeit*]." *Ibid.*, p. 327. – Editor's note.

[6] "But even in the cases in which successive component elements do not first have to be created by means of abstraction but are there from the start (indeed, we already mentioned above the apprehension of polysyllabic words), these elements, in spite of their discrete succession, are also capable of being held together by a unitary bond of consciousness. This bond of consciousness is the resulting act of apprehension." *Ibid.*, p. 329. – Editor's note.

[7] "That four successive sounds . . . present themselves as a distinct melody is possible only because the four psychic events, despite their temporal differences, are united at once into a total formation. The four members are indeed in consciousness side by side, but nevertheless within one and the same apprehension-act, within one presence-time. We do not hear the four

the last tone. There is, accordingly, a[8] perception of unities that succeed one another in time, just as there is a perception of coexisting unities; and since that is the case, there is also a direct apprehension of identity, equality, similarity, and difference. "There is no need for the artificial assumption that the comparison always occurs because the memory image of the first tone exists side by side with the second tone; rather the whole content of consciousness unrolling in the presence-time becomes the foundation equally for the resulting apprehensions of equality and difference."[9]

What[10] stands in the way of a clarification of the problems being debated in these statements and in the whole discussion related to them is the absence of the absolutely necessary distinctions that we have already established in connection with Brentano. It now remains to be asked: How are we to understand the apprehension of transcendent temporal objects that are extended over a duration, continuously filling it in the same way [22]

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tones at once; nor do we have the whole group in consciousness thanks to the fact that while the fourth tone is sounding, 1, 2, and 3 still endure. On the contrary, the four form precisely a successive unity with a common effect, the apprehension-form." *Ibid.*, p. 329 f. – Editor's note.

[8] Reading *eine* for *seine*. – Translator's note.

[9] "Because successive items, precisely likes those that are simultaneous, can also form a unitary act of consciousness within the presence-time, the hard division between the two has become considerably softened; and certain contents of consciousness ordered successively in time can yield apprehension-results that are quite like those produced by contents ordered side by side in time. The appearances of the field of vision [*Blickfeldes*] that can be produced only by moving the eyes are completely homogeneous with those of the field of vision [*Sehfeldes*] that owe their origin to simultaneous impressions. Something similar is confirmed in the sphere of the sense of touch.

"Now there is also a whole series of higher apprehension-forms for the occurrence of which it is a matter of indifference whether successive or simultaneous contents present themselves, provided only that the constituting elements are parts of a unitary act of consciousness. The apprehension of *identity, perfect likeness, similarity, difference* belongs to this series. We are therefore just as capable of directly perceiving the agreement or the difference of two successive tones as we are the agreement or difference of two adjacent colored surfaces. Nor is there any need here for the artificial assumption that the comparison occurs only because the memory image of the first tone exists side by side with the second tone; rather the whole content of consciousness unrolling in the presence-time becomes the foundation equally for the resulting apprehensions of equality and difference." *Ibid.*, p. 337 f. – Editor's note.

[10] The text of the following concluding paragraph of § 7 is based in part on two sheets belonging to the lecture manuscript of 1905 and marked with the numbers "52" and "53." – Editor's note.

(as unchanging things do) or filling it as constantly changing (as in the case, for example, of physical processes, motion, alteration, and the like)? Objects of this kind become constituted in a multiplicity of immanent data and apprehensions, which themselves run off as a succession. Is it possible to unite these successively elapsing representing data in one now-moment? In that case, the entirely new question arises: How, in addition to "temporal objects," immanent and transcendent, does time itself – the duration and succession of objects – become constituted? These different lines of description (indicated only in passing here and requiring still further differentiation) must indeed be kept in mind during the analysis, although all of these questions belong closely together and no one of them can be answered apart from the others. It is certainly evident that the perception of a temporal object itself has temporality, that the perception of duration itself presupposes the duration of perception, that the perception of any temporal form itself has its temporal form. If we disregard all transcendencies, there remains to perception in all of its phenomenological constituents the phenomenological temporality that belongs to its irreducible essence. Since objective temporality always becomes constituted phenomenologically and stands before us in appearance as an objectivity or as a moment of an objectivity only through this constitution, a phenomenological analysis of time cannot clarify [23] the constitution of time without considering the constitution of temporal objects. By *temporal objects in the specific sense* we understand objects that are not only unities in time but that also contain temporal extension in themselves. When a tone sounds, my objectivating apprehension can make the tone itself, which endures and fades away, into an object and yet not make the duration of the tone or the tone in its duration into an object. The latter – the tone in its duration – is a temporal object. The same is true of a melody, of any change whatsoever, but also of any persistence without change, considered as such. Let us take the example of a melody or of a cohesive part of a melody. The matter seems very simple at first: we hear the melody, that is, we perceive it, for hearing is indeed perceiving. However, the first tone sounds, then comes the second tone, then the third, and so on. Must we not say: When the second tone sounds, I hear *it,* but

I no longer hear the first tone, etc.? In truth, then, I do not hear the melody but only the single present tone. That the elapsed part of the melody is something objective for me, I owe – or so one will be inclined to say – to memory; and that I do not presuppose, with the appearance of the currently intended tone, that this is *all,* I owe to anticipatory expectation. But we cannot be content with this explanation, for everything that we have said carries over to the individual tone. Each tone has a temporal extension itself. When it begins to sound, I hear it as now; but while it continues to sound it has an ever new now, and the now that immediately precedes it changes into a past. Therefore at any given time I hear only the actually present phase of the tone, and the objectivity of the whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is in part memory, in smallest punctual part perception, and in further part expectation. This seems to lead back to Brentano's theory. Here, then, a deeper analysis must begin.

§ 8. *Immanent Temporal Objects and Their Modes of Appearance*[11] [24]

We now exclude all transcendent apprehension and positing and take the tone purely as a hyletic datum. It begins and ends; and after it has ended, its whole duration-unity, the unity of the whole process in which it begins and ends, "recedes" into the ever more distant past. In this sinking back, I still "hold onto it," have it in a "retention." And as long as the retention lasts, the tone has its own temporality; it is the same, its duration is the same. I can direct my attention to the way in which it is given. I am conscious of the tone and of the duration it fills in a continuity of "modes," in a "continual flow." And one point, one phase of this flow is called "consciousness of the commencing tone"; and in this phase I am conscious of the first time-point of the tone's duration in the mode of the now. The

[11] The text of §§ 8–10 is based on the text of a sketch dating from November 10–13, 1911, which is completely reproduced in its original form as No. 53 in the supplementary texts below; cf. particularly p. 370, line 8, to p. 378, line 10. – Editor's note.

tone is given; that is, I am conscious of it as now. But I am conscious of it as now "as long as" any one of its phases is intended as now. However, if any temporal phase (corresponding to a time-point of the tone-duration) is an actually present now (with the exception of the initial phase), then I am conscious of a continuity of phases as "immediately past" and of the whole extent of the temporal duration from the beginning-point up to the now-point as elapsed. I am not yet conscious of the remaining extent of the duration, however. When the final point is reached, I am conscious of this point itself as the now-point and of the whole duration as elapsed (or I am conscious of it as elapsed at the beginning-point of the new extent of time, which is no longer a tonal extent). "Throughout" this whole flow of consciousness, one and the same tone is intended as enduring, as now enduring. "Beforehand" (in the event that it was not expected), it is not intended. "Afterwards," it is "still" intended "for a time" in "retention" as having been; it can be held fast and stand or remain fixed in our regard. The whole extent of the tone's duration or "the" tone in its extension then stands before me as something dead, so to speak – something no longer being vitally generated, a formation no longer animated by the generative point of the now but continuously modified and sinking back into "emptiness." The modification of the whole extent, then, is [25] analogous to or essentially identical with the modification that the elapsed part of the duration undergoes in the transition of consciousness to ever new productions during the time that the tone is actually present.

What we have described here is the manner in which the object in immanent time "appears" in a continual flow, the manner in which it is "given." To describe this manner does not mean to describe the appearing temporal duration itself, for it is the same tone with the duration belonging to it that, indeed, was not described but presupposed in the description. The same duration is present duration actually building itself up and then is past, "elapsed" duration, duration that is still intended or that is produced in recollection "as if" it were new. It is the same tone that now sounds of which it is said in the "later" flow of consciousness that it has been, that its duration has elapsed. The points of the temporal duration recede for my consciousness in a

manner analogous to that in which the points of an object stationary in space recede for my consciousness when I remove "myself" from the object. The object keeps its place, just as the tone keeps its time. Each time-point is fixed, but it flies into the distance for consciousness. The distance from the generative now becomes greater and greater. The tone itself is the same, but the tone "in the manner in which" it appears is continually different.

§ 9. *The Consciousness of the Appearances of Immanent Objects*

On closer examination, we can distinguish still other lines of description here. 1. We can make evident statements about the immanent object in itself: that it now endures; that a certain part of the duration has elapsed; that the point of the tone's duration grasped in the now (with its tone-content, of course) continuously sinks back into the past and that an ever new point of the duration enters into the now or is now; that the elapsed duration moves away from the actually present now-point, which is constantly filled in some way, and recedes into the ever more "distant" past, and the like. 2. But we can also talk about the way in which we are "conscious" of all such differences pertaining to the "appearing" of the immanent tone and of its duration-content. We speak of perception in connection with the tone-duration that reaches into the actually present now and say [26] that the tone, the enduring tone, is perceived, and that at any given instant, of the extended duration of the tone, only the point of the duration characterized as now is perceived in the fully proper sense. We say of the elapsed extent that it is intended in retentions; specifically, the parts of the duration or phases of the duration lying closest to the actually present now-point, and which cannot be sharply delimited, are intended with diminishing clarity. The more remote phases – those lying further back in the past – are entirely obscure and emptily intended. And the situation is the same after the whole duration has elapsed: What lies nearest to the actually present now, depending on its distance from it, perhaps has a little clarity; the whole [then] disappears into obscurity, into an empty retentional consciousness, and

finally disappears altogether (if one is permitted to assert that) as soon as retention ceases.[12]

We find in the sphere of clarity a greater distinctness and separation (the more so the closer the sphere lies to the actually present now). But the further we move from the now, the greater the fusion and compression that manifests itself. A reflective penetration of the unity of a many-membered process lets us observe that an articulated part of the process "contracts" as it sinks back into the past – a sort of temporal perspective (within the original temporal appearance) as an analogue of the spatial perspective. In receding into the past, the temporal object contracts and in the process also becomes obscure.

Now it is a matter of investigating more closely what we are able to find and describe here as the phenomenon of time-constituting consciousness, of the consciousness in which temporal objects with their temporal determinations become constituted. We distinguish the enduring, immanent object and the object in its way of appearing, the object intended as actually present or as past. Every temporal being "appears" in some running-off mode that changes continuously, and in this change the "object in its mode of running off" is always and ever a [27] different object. And yet we continue to say that the object and each point of its time and this time itself are one and the same. We will not be able to term this appearance – the "object in its mode of running off" – "consciousness" (any more than we will give the name "consciousness" to the spatial phenomenon, the body in its way of appearing from this side or that, from near or far). The "consciousness," the "experience," is related to its object by means of an appearance in which precisely the "object in its way of appearing" ["*Objekt im Wie*"] stands before us. Obviously we must recognize our references to intentionality as ambiguous, depending on whether we have in view the relation of the appearance to what appears or the relation of consciousness, on the one hand, to "what appears in its way of appearing" and, on the other hand, to what appears *simpliciter*.

[12] It obviously suggests itself to put these modes of appearance and consciousness of temporal objects in parallel to the modes in which a spatial thing appears and is intended in its changing orientation; moreover, it suggests itself to investigate the "temporal orientations" in which spatial things (which are indeed also temporal objects) appear. Nevertheless, we remain for the present within the immanent sphere.

§ 10. *The Continua of the Running-Off Phenomena. The Diagram of Time*

We would prefer to avoid, then, the use of the word "appearances" for the phenomena that constitute immanent temporal objects; for these phenomena are themselves immanent objects and are "appearances" in an entirely different sense. We speak here of the "running-off phenomena," or better still, of the "modes of temporal orientation"; and with respect to the immanent objects themselves, we speak of their "running-off characters" (e.g., now, past). We know that the running-off phenomenon is a continuity of constant changes. This continuity forms an inseparable unity, inseparable into extended sections that could exist by themselves and inseparable into phases that could exist by themselves, into points of the continuity. The parts that we single out by abstraction can exist only in the whole running-off; and this is equally true of the phases, the points that belong to the running-off continuity. We can also say of this continuity, with evidence, that in a certain sense it is immutable; that is, with regard to its form. It is inconceivable that the continuity of phases would contain the same phase-mode twice or even contain it as stretched over an entire component section. Just as each point of time (and each extent of time) differs "individually," so to speak, from every other one and just as no one of them can occur twice, so no running-off mode can occur [28] twice. We will still have to make further distinctions and provide clearer descriptions here, however. First of all, we emphasize that the running-off modes of an immanent temporal object have a beginning, a source-point, so to speak. This is the running-off



AE – The series of now points.

AA′ – Sinking into the past.

EA′ – Continuum of phases (Now-point with horizon of the past).

E→ – The series of nows perhaps filled with other objects.

mode with which the immanent object begins to exist. It is characterized as now. In the steady progression of the running-off modes we then find the remarkable circumstance that each later running-off phase is itself a continuity, a continuity that constantly expands, a continuity of pasts. To the continuity of running-off modes of the object's duration, we contrast the continuity of running-off modes belonging to each point of the duration. This second continuity is obviously included in the first, the continuity of running-off modes of the object's duration. The running-off continuity of an enduring object is therefore a continuum whose phases are the continua of the running-off modes belonging to the different time-points of the duration of the object. If we proceed along the concrete continuity, we move forward in a process of constant modifications; and in this process, the running-off-mode – that is, the running-off continuity of the time-points in question – changes continuously. Since a new now is always entering on the scene, the now changes into a past; and as it does so, the whole running-off continuity of pasts belonging to the preceding point moves "downwards" uniformly into the depths of the past. In our diagram, the continuous series of ordinates illustrates the running-off modes of the enduring object. They grow from A (one point) into a determinate extent, which has the last now as its final point. Then the series of running-off modes that no longer include a now (that is, a now belonging to this duration) begins; the duration is no longer actually present but past, and continuously sinking deeper into the past. The diagram therefore gives a complete picture of the [29] double continuity of running-off modes.

§ 11. *Primal Impression and Retentional Modification*[13]

The "source-point" with which the "production" of the enduring object begins is a primal impression. This consciousness is in a state of constant change: the tone-now present "in

[13] The text of the first paragraph of § 11 is based on the text of a sketch that originated between 1908 and 1909 and is completely reproduced in its original form in the supplementary texts below as No. 50; cf. particularly p. 338, line 24 to p. 340, line 4. – The text of the second paragraph of § 11 is based on sheet "35" of the lecture manuscripts of 1905. – Editor's note.

person" continuously changes (*scil.* consciously, "in" consciousness) into something that has been; an always new tone-now continuously relieves the one that has passed over into modification. But when the consciousness of the tone-now, the primal impression, passes over into retention, this retention itself is a now in turn, something actually existing. While it is actually present itself (but not an actually present tone), it is retention *of* the tone that has been. A ray of meaning can be directed towards the now: towards the retention; but it can also be directed towards what is retentionally intended: towards the past tone. Every actually present now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification. It changes into retention of retention and does so continuously. Accordingly, a fixed continuum of retention arises in such a way that each later point is retention for every earlier point. And each retention is already a continuum. The tone begins and "it" steadily continues. The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been; the *impressional* consciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new *retentional* consciousness. Going along the flow or with it, we have a continuous series of retentions pertaining to the beginning-point. Beyond that, however, each earlier point of this series is adumbrated *in its turn* as a now in the sense of retention. Thus a continuity of retentional modifications attaches itself to each of these retentions, and this continuity itself is again an actually present point that is retentionally adumbrated. This does not lead to a simple infinite regress, since each retention is in itself continuous modification that carries within, so to speak, the heritage of the past in the form of a series of adumbrations. But it is not the case here [30] that in the horizontal direction of the flow each earlier retention is simply replaced by a new one, even if continuously. Rather, each later retention is not only continual modification that has arisen from primal impression; each is also continual modification of all earlier continuous modifications of that same initial point.

Up to now we have taken into consideration principally the perception or original constitution of temporal objects and have attempted to understand analytically the time-consciousness given in them. But consciousness of temporality is not achieved solely in this form. When a temporal object has elapsed, when the actual duration is finished, the consciousness of the now-past

object by no means expires with the object, although it now no longer functions as perceptual consciousness, or said better perhaps, as impressional consciousness. (As before, we have immanent objects in view here, which properly speaking are not constituted in a "perception.") Primary memory, or as we said, retention, continuously attaches itself to the "impression." At bottom, we have already analyzed this consciousness in the case considered earlier. For the continuity of phases that attached itself to the actual "now" was nothing other than such a retention or continuity of retentions. In the case of the perception of a temporal object (whether we take an immanent or transcendent object makes no difference in the present consideration), the perception terminates at any moment in a now-apprehension, in a perception in the sense of a positing-as-now. During the time that a motion is being perceived, a grasping-as-now takes place moment by moment; and in this grasping, the actually present phase of the motion itself becomes constituted. But this now-apprehension is, as it were, the head attached to the comet's tail of retentions relating to the earlier now-points of the motion. However, if perception no longer occurs, if we no longer see the motion, or – if it is a melody that is in question – the melody has run its course and silence has ensued, then the perception's final phase is not followed by a new phase of the perception but simply by a phase of fresh memory, which in its turn is followed by another phase of fresh memory, and so on. Thus a pushing back into the past continually occurs. The same continuous complex incessantly undergoes a modification until it disappears; [31] for a weakening, which finally ends in imperceptibility, goes hand in hand with the modification. The original temporal field is manifestly limited, precisely as in perception's case. Indeed, on the whole, one might dare to assert that the temporal field always has the same extension. It moves, as it were, over the perceived and freshly remembered motion and its objective time in the same way as the visual field moves over objective space.[14,15]

[14] The limitation of the temporal field is not taken into consideration in the diagram. No ending of retention is foreseen there, and *idealiter* a consciousness is probably even possible in which everything remains preserved retentionally.

[15] With respect to the foregoing § 11, cf. Appendix I: Primal Impression and Its Continuum of Modifications, p. 105 ff.

§ 12. *Retention as a Unique Kind of Intentionality*[16]

It still remains for us to discuss in a more precise way what sort of modification it is that we have designated as retentional.

One speaks of the dying-away, the fading, and so on, of the contents of sensation when perception proper passes over into retention. Now it is already clear, following our explanations up to this point, that the retentional "contents" are not at all contents in the original sense. When a tone dies away, it itself is sensed at first with particular fullness (intensity); and then there follows a rapid weakening in intensity. The tone is still there, still sensed, but in mere reverberation. This genuine tone-sensation must be distinguished from the tonal moment in retention. The retentional tone is not a present tone but precisely a tone "primarily remembered" in the now: it is not really on hand in the retentional consciousness. But neither can the tonal moment that belongs to this consciousness be a different tone that is really on hand; it cannot even be a very weak tone equivalent in quality (such as an echo). A present tone can indeed "remind" one of a past tone, exemplify it, pictorialize it; but that already presupposes another representation of the past. The intuition of the past [32] cannot itself be a pictorialization. It is an original consciousness. We cannot deny, of course, that there are echoes. But when we recognize and distinguish them, we can easily confirm that they obviously do not belong to retention as retention but to perception. The reverberation of a violin tone is precisely a feeble present violin tone and is absolutely different from the retention of the loud tone that has just passed. The echoing itself and after-images of any sort left behind by the stronger data of sensation, far from having to be ascribed necessarily to the essence of retention, have nothing at all to do with it.

But it surely does belong to the essence of the intuition of time that in each point of its duration (which we can make into an

[16] The text of §§ 12–13 is based on five sheets of a sketch that originated, according to Husserl's recollection, in "Silvaplana or afterwards" – that is to say, 1909 or later – but that in reality was probably written at the latest in the winter of 1908. This sketch is completely reproduced in its original form in the supplementary texts below as No. 47; cf. particularly p. 323, line 5, to p. 326, line 3, and p. 328, lines 8 to 29. – Editor's note.

object reflectively) it is consciousness *of what has just been* and not merely consciousness of the now-point of the object that appears as enduring. And what has just been is intended in this consciousness in its corresponding continuity, and in each phase it is intended in a determinate "mode of appearance" with the distinctions of "content" and "apprehension." We focus our attention on the whistle that is now sounding: in each point an extension stands before me, and it stands before me in an extension of "appearance."[17] In each phase of this extension, the appearance has its moment of quality and its moment of apprehension. On the other hand, the moment of quality is not a real quality, not a tone that would really exist at present – that is, that could be taken as a now-existing, though immanent, tone-content. The real content of the consciousness of the now possibly contains sensed tones; these sensed tones must then necessarily be characterized in objectivating apprehension as perceived tones, as present tones, but in no way as past. Retentional consciousness really contains consciousness of the past of the tone, primary memory of the tone, and must not be divided into sensed tone and apprehension as memory. Just as a phantasy-tone is not a tone but the phantasy of the tone, or just as tone-phantasy and tone-sensation are essentially different things and not by any chance the same thing only differently interpreted or apprehended, so too the tone primarily remembered in intuition is something *fundamentally and essentially* different from the perceived tone; and correlatively, primary memory (retention) of the tone is something different from sensation of the tone.

§ 13. *The Necessity that an Impression Precede Every Retention. Evidence Pertaining to Retention* [33]

Now does there exist a law according to which primary memory is possible only in continuous annexation to a preceding sensation or perception? A law according to which each retentional phase is conceivable only as a phase; that is, a law

[17] Reading "*der* '*Erscheinung*'" for "*die* '*Erscheinung*'" in conformity with *Husserliana X*, No. 47, p. 312, line 21. – Translator's note.

according to which the retentional phase cannot be expanded into an extent that would be identical in all of its phases? One will say decisively: That is absolutely evident. The empirical psychologist, who is accustomed to treating everything psychic as mere matter of fact, will deny it, of course. He will say: Why should a beginning consciousness that commences with a fresh memory, without having been preceded by a perception, not be conceivable? Perception may in fact be necessary to the production of fresh memory. It may in fact be the case that a human consciousness can have memories, even primary memories, only after it has had perceptions; but the opposite is also conceivable. Over against this, we teach the *a priori* necessity that a corresponding perception, or a corresponding primal impression, precede the retention. Above all, we will have to insist that a phase is conceivable only as a phase, without the possibility of extension. And the now-phase is conceivable only as the limit of a continuity of retentions, just as every retentional phase is itself conceivable only as a point belonging to such a continuum; and this is true of every now of time-consciousness. But then even a completely finished series of retentions would not be conceivable without a corresponding perception preceding it. This implies that the series of retentions that belongs to a now is itself a limit and necessarily undergoes modification; what is remembered "sinks further and further into the past." But not only that – it is necessarily something sunken, something that necessarily permits an evident recollection that traces it back to a now that is given once again.

But then one will say: Can I not have a memory of A, even a primary memory, when in fact A has not even taken place? Certainly. Indeed, I can go even further than that. I can also have a perception of A although A is not occurring in reality at all. [34] And consequently when we have a retention of A (provided that A is a transcendent object), we by no means assert the having of the retention as evidence that A must have preceded it; but we do indeed assert it as evidence that A must have been perceived. Now whether A was heeded primarily or not, it was there "in person" for my consciousness, even if it was unnoticed or noticed only incidentally. But if it is a question of an immanent object, the following obtains: when a succession, a change, or an

alteration of immanent data "appears," it too is absolutely certain. And within a transcendent perception, the immanent succession that belongs to its structure essentially is also absolutely certain.[18] It is *fundamentally wrongheaded* to argue: How, in the now, can I know of a not-now, since I cannot compare the not-now – which, of course, no longer exists – with the now (namely, with the memory image that I have on hand in the now)? As if it belonged to the essence of memory that I take an image on hand in the now for another thing similar to it and that I could and must compare them as I do in the case of pictorial representation. Memory – and this is equally true of retention – is not image-consciousness; it is something totally different. What is remembered, of course, does not now *exist* – otherwise it would not be something that has been but something present; and in memory (retention) it is not given as now, otherwise memory, or retention, would precisely not be memory but perception (or, respectively, primal impression). A comparing of what is no longer perceived but merely intended retentionally with something beyond it makes no sense whatsoever. Just as I see being-now in perception and enduring being in the extended perception as it becomes constituted, so I see the past in memory, insofar as the memory is primary memory. The past is given in primary memory, and givenness of the past is memory.

Now if we again take up the question whether a retentional consciousness is conceivable that would not be the continuation of an impressional consciousness, we must say: Such a consciousness is impossible, for every retention intrinsically refers back to an impression. "Past" and "now" exclude one another. Identically the same thing can indeed be now and past, but only because it has endured between the past and the now.

[18] Cf. also the distinction between the perception of something internal and the perception of something external, § 44, p. 99 ff.

§ 14. *Reproduction of Temporal Objects (Secondary Memory)* [35]

We[19] characterized primary memory or retention as a comet's tail that attaches itself to the perception of the moment. Secondary memory, recollection, must be distinguished absolutely from primary memory or retention. After the primary memory is over with, a new memory of this motion, of that melody, can emerge. We must now clarify in more detail the difference, already indicated, between the two. If retention attaches itself to the actually present perception, whether during its perceptual flow or in continuous union with it after it has completely elapsed, it is natural to say at first (as Brentano did) that the actually present perception becomes constituted as presentation on the basis of sensations and that primary memory becomes constituted as representation [*Repräsentation*], as re-presentation [*Vergegenwärtigung*], on the basis of phantasies. Now just as re-presentations can attach themselves immediately to perceptions, they can also occur independently without being joined to perceptions, and these are secondary memories. But serious objections arise against this view (as we have already pointed out in the criticism of Brentano's theory[20]). Let us consider a case of secondary memory: We recall, say, a melody that we recently heard at a concert. It is obvious in this case that the whole memory-phenomenon has exactly the same constitution, *mutatis mutandis,* as the perception of the melody. Like the perception, it has a privileged point: to the now-point of the perception corresponds a now-point of the memory. We run through the melody in phantasy; we hear, "as it were," first the initial tone, then the second tone, and so on. At any particular time there is always a tone (or tone-phase) in the now-point. The preceding tones, however, are not erased from consciousness. Primary memory of the tones that, as it were, I have just heard and expectation (protention) of the tones that are yet to come fuse with the apprehension of the tone that is now appearing and that, as it were, I am now hearing. The now-point once again has for consciousness a temporal fringe, which is produced in a continu-

[19] The text of the first paragraph of § 14 is based on the text of sheets "37" and "38" of the lecture manuscript of 1905. – Editor's note.

[20] Cf. above, p. 16ff.

ity of memorial apprehensions; and the total memory of the [36] melody consists in a continuum of such continua of temporal fringes and, correlatively, in a continuum of apprehension-continua of the kind described. But when the re-presented melody has finally run its course, a retention attaches itself to this quasi-hearing; what is quasi-heard continues to fade away for a while – a continuity of apprehension is still there, but no longer as heard. Consequently everything is *like* perception and primary memory and yet is not itself perception and primary memory. Of course, we do not actually hear and we have not actually heard when we let a melody run its course tone by tone in memory or phantasy. In the earlier case we said: We do actually hear, the temporal object itself is perceived, the melody itself is the object of perception. And the times, temporal determinations, and temporal relations are equally given and perceived themselves. And again: After the melody has died away, we no longer have it perceived as present, but we do still have it in consciousness. It is not a present melody but one just past. Its being just past is not merely something meant but a given fact, given itself and therefore "perceived." In opposition to this, the temporal present in recollection is a remembered, re-presented present; and the past too is a remembered, re-presented past but not an actually present past, not a perceived past, not a past primarily given and intuited.

On the other hand,[21] the recollection itself is presently and originally constituted recollection and afterwards just past recollection. It itself is built up in a continuum of primal data and retentions and in union with them constitutes (or rather: re-constitutes) an immanent or transcendent enduring objectivity (depending on whether the recollection is directed towards something immanent or towards something transcendent). Retention, on the other hand, produces no enduring objectivities (either originally or reproductively) but only holds in consciousness what has been produced and stamps on it the character of the "just past."[22] [37]

[21] The text of this final paragraph of § 14 as well as the text of § 15 is probably based – according to an indication of Husserl's – on the text of a sketch, which has not been found, "on the *a priori* of memory or of the consciousness of succession from 1917." – Editor's note.

[22] On further differences between retention and reproduction, cf. § 19, p. 47ff.

§ 15. *Reproduction's Modes of Accomplishment*

Now recollection can occur in different forms of accomplishment. Either we execute it in a simple grasping, as when a memory "rises to the surface" and we look at what is remembered in a flash. In this case what is remembered is vague; perhaps the memory brings forward, intuitively, a privileged momentary phase, but it does not repeat its object. Or we execute a memory that actually does reproduce and repeat, a memory in which the temporal object is completely built up afresh in a continuum of re-presentations and in which we perceive it again, as it were – but only "as it were." The whole process is a re-presentational modification of the perceptual process with all of the latter's phases and stages right down to and including the retentions: but everything has the index of reproductive modification.

We also find the simple looking-at or apprehending [occurring] immediately on the basis of retention, as when a melody has elapsed that lies within the unity of a retention and we turn our attention back to (reflect on) a part of it without producing it afresh. This is an act that is possible for everything that has developed in successive steps, even in steps of spontaneity – for example, in the successive steps of the spontaneity of thinking. Certainly objectivities produced by thinking are also constituted successively. It therefore seems that we can say: Objectivities that are built up originally in temporal processes, becoming constituted member by member or phase by phase (as correlates of unitary acts that are continuously and complexly connected), can be grasped in a retrospective viewing as if they were objects complete in one time-point. But then this givenness definitely points back to another and "original" givenness.

The looking-toward or looking-back at what is given retentionally – and the retention itself – is then fulfilled in re-presentation proper: what is given as just having been shows itself to be identical with what is recollected.

Further differences between primary and secondary memory [38] will emerge if we put them in relation to perception.

§ 16. *Perception as Presentation in Distinction from Retention and Recollection*[23]

The use of the word "*perception*" requires, of course, some further elucidation at this point. In the case of the "perception of the melody," we distinguish the tone *given now,* calling it the "perceived" tone, and the tones that are *over with,* calling them "not perceived." On the other hand, we call the *whole melody* a perceived melody, even though only the now-point is perceived. We proceed in this way because the extension of the melody is not only given point by point in the extension of the act of perceiving, but the unity of the retentional consciousness still "holds on to" the elapsed tones themselves in consciousness and progressively brings about the unity of the consciousness that is related to the unitary temporal object, to the melody. An objectivity such as a melody cannot be "perceived" or originally given itself otherwise than in this form. The constituted act[24], built from consciousness of the now and retentional consciousness, is *adequate perception of the temporal object.* This object must include temporal distinctions, and temporal distinctions are constituted precisely in such acts – in primal consciousness, retention, and protention. If the intentional act of meaning is aimed at the melody, at the whole object, then we have nothing but perception. But if it is aimed at the single tone all by itself or at a measure by itself, then we have perception precisely as long as what is meant is perceived and sheer retention as soon as it is past. With respect to objectivity, the measure then no longer appears as "present" but as "past." But the whole melody appears as present as long as it still sounds, as long as tones belonging to it and meant in *one* nexus of apprehension still [39] sound. It is past only after the final tone is gone.

Considering our earlier explanations, we must say that this relativity carries over to the *individual tones.* Each tone becomes constituted in a continuity of tone-data; and at any given time, only one punctual phase is present as now, while the others are attached as a retentional tail. But we can say: A temporal object

[23] The text of §§ 16–17 is based on sheets "38"–"40" of the lecture manuscript of 1905. – Editor's note.

[24] On acts as constituted unities in the original consciousness of time, cf. § 37, p. 79f.

is perceived (or intended impressionally) as long as it is still being generated in continuously emerging new primal impressions.

We have, then, characterized the *past* itself as *perceived.* In point of fact, do we not perceive the passing, are we not directly conscious in the cases described of the just-having-been, of the "just past" in its self-givenness, in the mode of being given itself? Obviously the sense of "perception" obtaining here does not coincide with the earlier one. Further distinctions are needed. If, in the grasping of a temporal object, we distinguish between perceptual and memorial (retentional) consciousness, then to the opposition between perception and primary memory there corresponds on the side of the object the opposition between "now present" and "past." Temporal objects – and this pertains to their essence – spread their matter over an extent of time, and such objects can become constituted only in acts that constitute the very differences belonging to time. But time-constituting acts are – essentially – acts that constitute the present and the past; they have the character of those "perceptions of temporal objects" that we have fully described with respect to their remarkable apprehensional constitution. Temporal objects must become constituted in this way. That implies: an act claiming to give a temporal object itself must contain in itself "apprehensions of the now," "apprehensions of the past," and so on; specifically, as originally constituting apprehensions.

Now if we relate the use of the word "perception" to the differences in givenness with which temporal objects present themselves, the antithesis of perception is the primary memory and the primary expectation (retention and protention) that occur here; in which case, perception and nonperception continuously blend into one another. In the consciousness that belongs to the directly intuitive grasp of a temporal object – of a melody, for example – the measure or tone or part of a tone now being [40] heard is perceived, and what is momentarily intuited as past is not perceived. The apprehensions continuously blend into one another here; they terminate in an apprehension that constitutes the now, but which is only an ideal limit. There is a continuum that ascends towards an ideal limit, just as the continuum of the species red converges towards an ideal pure red. But in our case we do not have individual apprehensions corresponding to indi-

vidual nuances of red that could be given by themselves; instead we always have – and, according to the essence of the matter, can only have – continuities of apprehensions, or rather a single continuum that is continuously modified. If in some way we divide this continuum into two adjoining parts, then the part that includes the now or is capable of constituting it is distinguished from the other part and constitutes the "rough" now; as soon as we divide this rough now further, it in turn immediately breaks down into a finer now and a past, and so on.

Perception here is therefore an act-characteristic that joins together a continuity of act-characteristics and is distinguished by the possession of that ideal limit. A similar continuity without this ideal limit is bare memory. In the ideal sense, then, perception (impression) would be the phase of consciousness that constitutes the pure now, and memory would be every other phase of the continuity. But the now is precisely only an ideal limit, something abstract, which can be nothing by itself. Moreover, it remains to be said that even this ideal now is not something *toto coelo* different from the not-now but is continuously mediated with it. And to this corresponds the continuous transition of perception into primary memory.

§ 17. *Perception as the Act That Gives Something Itself in Opposition to Reproduction*

In addition to the contrast between perception, or the giving of the present itself, [and primary memory],[25] which has its correlate in the given past, there is another opposition: between perception and recollection or secondary memory. In recollection a now "appears" to us, but it "appears" in an entirely different sense than the sense in which the now appears in perception.[26] [41] This now is not "perceived" – that is, given itself – but re-presented. It represents a now that is not given. And so too the running-off of a melody in *recollection* represents a "just past"

[25] Added according to the sense of the original manuscript. Cf. the "Textkritische Anmerkungen" to p. 42, lines 25–28, *Husserliana X*, p. 416. – Translator's Note.

[26] Cf. Appendix II: Re-presentation and Phantasy. – Impression and Imagination, p. 107ff.

but does not *give* it. Even in mere phantasy every individual is extended in time in some way, having its now, its before, and its after; but the now, before, and after are merely imagined, as is the whole object. Here, therefore, *an entirely different concept of perception* is in question. Perception in this case is the act that places something before our eyes as the thing itself, the act that *originally constitutes* the object. Its opposite is *re-presentation* [*Vergegenwärtigung, Re-Präsentation*], understood as the act that does not place an object itself before our eyes but just *re-presents* it; that places it before our eyes in image, as it were, although not exactly in the manner of a genuine image-consciousness. Here we do not say anything at all about a continuous mediation of perception with its opposite. Up to this point, the consciousness of the past – the primary consciousness of the past, that is – was not ⟨called⟩ perception because perception was taken as the act that originally constitutes the now. But the consciousness of the past does not constitute a now; it rather constitutes a "just past," something that has preceded the now intuitively. But if we call perception the *act in which all "origin"* lies, the act that *constitutes originally,* then *primary memory* is *perception.* For only in primary memory do we *see* what is past, only in it does the past become constituted – and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively. The just past, the before in opposition to the now, can be directly seen only in primary memory; it is its essence to bring this new and original past to primary, direct intuition, just as it is the essence of the perception of the now to bring the now directly to intuition. On the other hand, recollection, like phantasy, merely offers us re-presentation; recollection is *as it were* the same consciousness as the act aimed at the now and the act aimed at the past, the acts that create time – *as it were the same,* but nonetheless modified. The phantasied now represents a now but does not give a now itself; the phantasied before and after only represent a before and after, and so on. [42]

§ 18. *The Significance of Recollection for the Constitution of the Consciousness of Duration and Succession*[27]

The constitutive significance of primary and secondary memory presents itself somewhat differently, if, instead of the given-
5 ness of *enduring objectivities,* we consider the givenness of *duration and succession themselves.*

Let us assume that A emerges as primal impression and endures for a while and that, together with the retention of A at a certain stage of development, B enters on the scene and becomes
10 constituted as enduring B. Throughout this whole process, the consciousness is consciousness of the same A "receding into the past"; of the same A in the flow of these manners of givenness; and of the same A with respect to its form of being, "duration," which belongs to the content of its being, and with respect to all
15 the points of this duration. The same is true of B and of the interval between the two durations or their time-points. But in addition something new appears here: *B follows A;* a succession of two enduring data is given with a definite temporal form, an extent of time that encompasses the succession. The *consciousness*
20 *of succession* is consciousness that gives its object originally: it is "perception" of this succession. We now consider the reproductive modification of this perception – specifically, the recollection. I "*repeat*" *the consciousness of this succession;* I re-present it to myself memorially. I "*can*" do this and do it "as often as I
25 choose." *A priori* the re-presentation of an experience lies within the domain of my "*freedom.*" (The "I can" is a practical "I can" and not a "mere idea.") Now what does the re-presentation of the experiential succession look like, and what pertains to its essence? Initially one will say: I re-present to myself first A
30 and then B; if originally I had A – B, I now have (if the index signifies memory) A′ – B′. But this is inadequate, for it would [43] mean that I now have, in the consciousness of a succession of these memories, a memory A′ and "afterwards" a memory B′. But then I would have a "perception" of the succession of these
35 memories and not a memorial consciousness of the succession. I

[27] The text of § 18 – like the text of the final paragraph of § 14 and the text of § 15 – is probably based on the text of a sketch "on the *a priori* of memory or of the consciousness of succession from 1917." – Editor's note.

must therefore set the situation forth by means of (A – B)′. This consciousness does in fact include an A′, B′, but also an –′. The succession, of course, is not a third part, as if the way of writing down the signs one after the other signified the succession. Still, I can write down the law:

$$(A - B)' = A' -' B'$$

in the sense that there is a consciousness of the memory of A and of B on hand, but also a modified consciousness of "B follows A."

Now if we ask about the consciousness that originally gives a succession of enduring objectivities – and, indeed, the succession of the durations themselves – we find that it necessarily requires retention *and* recollection. Retention constitutes the living horizon of the now; in it I have a consciousness of the "just past." But what becomes originally constituted here – say, in holding on to the just heard tone – is only the being-pushed-back of the now-phase or, as the case may be, of the completely constituted duration, which in this completeness no longer becomes constituted and is no longer perceived. I can, however, undertake a reproduction in "coincidence" with this "result" that is being pushed back. Then the past of the duration is given to me, given precisely as the "re-givenness" of the duration *simpliciter*. And we must note: It is only past durations that I can originally intuit in acts that repeat their objects – only past durations that I can actually intuit, identify, and have objectively as the identical object of many acts. I can relive the present, but it cannot be given again. If I return to one and the same succession, as I can at any time, and identify it as the same temporal object, I produce a succession of recollecting experiences in the unity of an overlapping consciousness of succession; therefore:

$$(A - B) - (A - B)' - (A - B)'' \ldots$$

The question is: What does this process of identifying look like? Above all, the succession is a succession of experiences: the first is the original constitution of the succession of A – B; the second is the memory of this succession; then the same again, and so on. [44] The total succession is originally given as presence. I can again have a memory of this succession, and I can again have a memory of such a memory, and so on *in infinitum*. By an eidetic

law, every memory is reiterable not only in the sense that an unrestricted number of levels is possible but also in the sense that this is a sphere of the "I can." Each level is essentially an activity of freedom (which does not exclude obstacles).

What does the first recollection of that succession look like?

$$[(A - B) - (A - B)']'.$$

I can then deduce, in conformity with the earlier law, that $(A - B)'$ and $[(A - B)']'$ are involved in this formula, therefore that a memory of the second level is involved in it – specifically, in succession; and naturally the memory of the succession $(-')$ would be included as well. If I repeat it again, I have still higher modifications of memory and, together with them, the consciousness that I have executed several times and in succession a re-presentation that repeats its object. This is a quite ordinary occurrence. I rap twice on the table. I re-present the succession to myself; then I observe that first I had the succession given perceptually and then remembered it; then I observe that I had just carried out precisely this observing – specifically, as the third member of a series that I can repeat to myself, and so on. All of this is quite commonplace, particularly in the phenomenological method of working.

In the sequence of objects that are perfectly alike (identical in content) and that are given only in succession and not as coexisting, we have a peculiar coinciding in the unity of one consciousness: a successive coinciding. Naturally we are speaking loosely, for the objects are indeed set apart from one another, are intended as forming a succession, and are separated by an extent of time.

And yet: if we have in succession unlike objects with like prominent moments, then "lines of likeness," as it were, run from one to the other, and in the case of similarity, lines of similarity. We have here an interrelatedness that is not constituted in an act of contemplation that relates what it contemplates; we have an interrelatedness that lies *before* all "comparison" and all "thinking" as the presupposition of the intuitions of likeness and difference. Only the similar is truly "comparable"; and "difference" presupposes "coincidence" – that is, that real union of like things interconnected in the transition [from one to another] (or in their coexistence). [45]

§ 19. *The Difference between Retention and Reproduction (Primary and Secondary Memory or Phantasy)*[28]

At this point our position with respect to Brentano's theory that the origin of the apprehension of time lies in the domain of phantasy is definitely decided. Phantasy is consciousness characterized as re-presentation (reproduction). Now there certainly is re-presented time; but it necessarily points back to a time that is given originally, a time not phantasied but presented. Re-presentation is the opposite of the act that gives something originally; no presentation [*Vorstellung*] can "spring" from it. That is, phantasy is not a consciousness that can set forth, as given itself, some objectivity or other, or an essential and possible trait of an objectivity. Not to give the object itself is the very essence of phantasy. Even the concept of phantasy does not arise from phantasy. For if we want to have given to us originally what phantasy is, we certainly must form phantasies; but this of itself does not yet mean that what phantasy is, is given. We must, of course, contemplate the phantasying, perceive it: perception of phantasy is the consciousness that originally gives the object for the formation of the concept of phantasy. In this perception we see what phantasy is; we grasp it in the consciousness of the givenness of the thing itself.

An attentive comparison of the experiences on both sides shows that a strong phenomenological difference exists between re-presenting memory and the primary memory that extends the now-consciousness. Let us say that we hear two or three tones and, during the temporal extension of the act, have a consciousness of the tone just heard. Evidently this consciousness is essentially the same whether a member of the tonal structure that forms the unity of a temporal object is still actually perceived as now or whether this no longer occurs and the formation that has been produced remains intended only in retention. Now let us [46] assume that while the continuous intention aimed at the just-heard tone or tonal process is living, we reproduce it again. I re-present to myself the measure I have just heard and to which

[28] The text of § 19 is based on the text of sheets "42"–"44" of the lecture manuscript of 1905. – Editor's note.

my attention is still directed by inwardly producing it once more. The difference leaps into view. In the re-presentation we once again have the tone or the tonal formation together with its whole temporal extension. The re-presenting act is extended in time in precisely the way in which the earlier perceptual act was extended. It reproduces it; it makes the measure run off tone-phase by tone-phase and interval by interval. In the process, it also reproduces the phase of primary memory we had selected for comparison. Nevertheless, the re-presenting act is not a mere repetition; and the difference obviously does not consist solely in the fact that in the one case we have a reproduction pure and simple and in the other a reproduction of a reproduction. We find, on the contrary, radical differences in content. They come out when we ask what makes up the difference between the sounding of the tone in re-presentation and the residual consciousness of the sounding that we also still retain in phantasy. The reproduced tone, during the "sounding," is a reproduction of the sounding. The consciousness that remains behind after the sounding is reproduced is no longer reproduction of the sounding but of the sounding that just was and is still heard, and this presents itself in an entirely different way from the way in which the sounding presents itself. The phantasms that present the tones obviously do not remain in consciousness, as if each tone were continued in the re-presentation as a datum persisting in its identity. Otherwise an intuitive representation of time, the representation of a temporal object in the re-presentation, could certainly not come about. The reproduced tone passes. Its phantasm does not remain there as identically the same, incessantly undergoing its apprehension; it is instead modified in an original way and is the ground for the re-presenting consciousness of duration, change, succession, and so on.

The modification of consciousness that converts an original now into a *reproduced* now is something entirely different from the modification that converts the now, whether original or [47] reproduced, into the *past*. The latter modification has the character of a continuous adumbration; just as the now is continuously shaded off into the past and the further past, so too the intuitive time-consciousness is continuously shaded off. On the other hand, we never refer to a continuous transition of perception into

phantasy, of impression into reproduction. The latter is a difference between discrete things. Hence we must say: What we call original consciousness, impression, or even perception, is an act that is shaded off continuously. Every concrete perception implies a whole continuum of such shadings. But reproduction, phantasy-consciousness, also requires precisely the same shadings, only reproductively modified. It belongs to the essence of both of these experiences that they must be extended in such a way that a punctual phase can never exist by itself.

Naturally this shading-off of what is given, whether it is given originally or reproductively, concerns (as we have already seen) the apprehension-contents. Perception is based on sensation. Sensation, which functions presentatively for the object, forms a seamless continuum; and the phantasm likewise forms a continuum for the re-presentation of a phantasy-object. Whoever assumes an essential difference between sensations and phantasms naturally may not claim that the apprehension-contents for the just-past phases of time are phantasms; for these contents continuously pass over into the apprehension-contents belonging to the now-moment.

§ 20. *The "Freedom" of Reproduction*[29]

Noteworthy differences emerge between the original and the reproduced running-off belonging to "the process of sinking backwards in time." The original appearing and the flowing-away of the running-off modes in the appearing is something fixed, something of which we are conscious through "affection," at which we can only look (if we happen to achieve the [48] spontaneity of looking). Re-presenting, on the other hand, is something free, a free running through: We can carry out the re-presentation "more quickly" or "more slowly," more distinctly and explicitly or more confusedly, in a single lightning-like

[29] The text of § 20 is based on the text of the last sheet of a sketch from November 10–13, 1911, to which the text of §§ 8–10 also goes back. This sketch is completely reproduced in its original form as No. 53 in the supplementary texts below; cf. particularly p. 379, lines 3–27. – Editor's note.

stroke or in articulated steps, and so on. Moreover, the re-presentation itself is an event belonging to internal consciousness and as such has its actually present now, its running-off modes, etc. And in the same extent of immanent time in which the re-presentation actually occurs, we can accommodate "in freedom" greater or smaller parts of the re-presented event together with its running-off modes, and consequently run through it more swiftly or more slowly. When we do this, the relative running-off modes of the re-presented points of the temporal extent remain unchanged (presupposing that the identifying coincidence continuously occurs). I constantly re-present the same thing – always the same continuity of running-off modes of the temporal extent, always the temporal extent itself in its way of appearing [*im Wie*]. But if I thus return again and again to the same beginning-point and to the same succession of time-points, that beginning-point nevertheless continuously sinks further and further back in time.

§ 21. *Levels of Clarity Pertaining to Reproduction*[30]

Moreover, what is re-presented hovers before me in more or less clear fashion, and the different modes of this obscurity concern the whole object that is re-presented and its modes of consciousness. In the case of the original givenness of a temporal object, we also found that the object at first appears clearly and vitally and then with diminishing clarity passes over into emptiness. These modifications belong to the flow. But while the same modifications certainly occur in the re-presentation of the flow, still other "obscurities" confront us there as well. Specifically, the "clear" (in the first sense) already stands before me as if seen through a veil, obscurely – and, in fact, more or less obscurely, etc. We must therefore not confuse the one sort of obscurity with the other. The specific modes of the re-presentation's vividness [49]

[30] In *Husserliana X* (p. 48, note 1), Rudolf Boehm asserts that § 21 is probably based on the sketch from 1917 that also formed the basis for § 14 (the final paragraph), § 15, and § 18. However, the text of this section seems to be derived from a sketch dating from 1907–1909, which is completely reproduced in its original form as No. 45 in the supplementary texts; cf. particularly p. 309, line 17 to p. 310, line 2. No. 45 also forms the basis for §§ 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29, as Boehm observes. – Translator's note.

and lack of vividness, of its clarity and obscurity, do not belong to what is re-presented, or do not belong to it only by virtue of the specific way in which the particular re-presentation intends its object; they belong to the actual experience of re-presenting.

§ 22. *Evidence of Reproduction*[31]

There also exists a noteworthy difference with respect to the evidence of primary and secondary memory.[32] What I am conscious of retentionally is absolutely certain, as we have seen. Now what about the more distant past? If I remember something I experienced yesterday, then I reproduce the event experienced yesterday, perhaps following all the steps of its succession. I am conscious of a sequence while I am doing this: first one step is reproduced, then, following a determinate order, the second, and so on. But apart from this succession, which evidently belongs to the reproduction insofar as it is a flow of experience, the reproduction brings a past temporal flow to presentation. And it is indeed possible not only that the individual steps of the memorially present event deviate from those of the past event (the steps belonging to the latter did not ensue in the way in which they are now re-presented), but also that the actual order of succession was other than what the memorial order now takes it to have been. Errors are therefore possible here; specifically, errors that derive from reproduction as reproduction and must not be confused with the errors to which the perception of temporal objects (of transcendent objects, that is) is also subject. That this is the case and in what sense it is the case has already been mentioned: If I am originally conscious of a temporal succession, there is no doubt that a temporal succession has taken place and is taking place. But this is not to say that an event – an objective event – actually does occur in the sense in which I apprehend it. The individual apprehensions can be false; that is, they can be apprehensions to which no reality corre-

[31] The text of § 22 is based on that of a sheet presumably written before 1901. The sketch to which it belongs is completely reproduced in its original form as No. 2 in the supplementary texts below; cf. p. 156, line 20, to p. 158, line 12. – Editor's note.

[32] Cf. p. 34ff.

sponds. And then, if the objective intention aimed at what is [50] apprehended is preserved (with respect to its constituting content and its relation to other objects) as it is pushed back in time, the error penetrates the whole temporal apprehension of the appearing process. But if we restrict ourselves to the succession of presenting "contents" or even to the succession of "appearances," an indubitable truth continues to hold: a process has become given and this succession of appearances has occurred, even if the succession of events that appeared to me in them perhaps did not occur.

Now the question is whether this evidence pertaining to time-consciousness can be preserved in reproduction. This is possible only through a coinciding of the reproductive flow with a retentional flow. If I have a succession of two tones c, d, then, while fresh memory lasts, I can repeat this succession, even repeat it adequately in certain respects. I repeat c, d internally, with the consciousness that c occurred first and then d. And while this repeated succession is "still living," I can proceed in the same way again, and so on. Surely, in this way I can go beyond the original field of evidence. We also see here the way in which recollections are fulfilled. If I repeat c, d, this reproductive representation of the succession finds its fulfillment in the still living earlier succession.[33]

§ 23. *Coinciding of the Reproduced Now with a Past. Distinction between Phantasy and Recollection*[34]

After we have differentiated the reproductive from the original consciousness of the past, a further problem arises. When I reproduce a melody I have heard, the phenomenal now of the recollection re-presents a past: In phantasy, in recollection, a [51] tone now sounds. This tone reproduces, let us say, the first tone

[33] The relationship can also be reversed, with the reproduction making intuitive a succession of which I am conscious only in retention.

[34] The text of the first half of § 23 (to p. 53, line 18) is based on the text of sheet "44" of the lecture manuscript of 1905. The text of the second half of the section is based on the text of a sheet belonging to a sketch that presumably originated between 1907 and 1909, and which is completely reproduced in its original form as No. 45 in the supplementary texts; cf. particularly p. 311, line 1, to p. 312, line 7. – Editor's note.

of the melody, which is a past melody. The consciousness of the past given along with the second tone re-presents the "just past" that earlier was given originally, hence a past "just past." Now how does the reproduced now happen to re-present a past? Surely a reproduced now immediately represents precisely a now. How does the reference to something past that can be given originally only in the form of the "just past" come about?

To answer this question, it is necessary that we occupy ourselves with a distinction we have only alluded to up to this point – namely, the distinction between mere phantasy of a temporally extended object and recollection. In mere phantasy no positing of the reproduced now and no coinciding of this now with a past now is given. Recollection, on the other hand, posits what is reproduced and in this positing gives it a position in relation to the actually present now and to the sphere of the original temporal field to which the recollection itself belongs.[35] Only in original time-consciousness can the relation between a reproduced now and a past be brought about. The re-presentational flow is a flow of experiential phases that is structured in precisely the way in which any time-constituting flow is structured, and which is therefore a time-constituting flow itself. All the adumbrations and modifications that constitute the temporal form are found here; and just as the immanent tone becomes constituted in the flow of tone-phases, so the unity of the re-presentation of the tone becomes constituted in the flow of the phases of the re-presentation of the tone. It holds quite universally that we are led back in phenomenological reflection from everything that in the widest sense appears, is represented, thought, and so on, to a flow of constituting phases that undergo an immanent objectivation: specifically, the objectivation [that turns them] into perceptual appearances (external perceptions), memories, expectations, wishes, etc., as unities belonging to internal consciousness. Thus re-presentations of every sort, as flows of experience possessing the universal time-constituting formation, also constitute an immanent object: "an enduring [52] process of re-presentation running off in such and such a way."

[35] Cf. Appendix III: The Nexus-Intentions of Perception and Memory. – The Modes of Time-Consciousness, p. 109ff.

But on the other hand, re-presentations have the peculiar property that in themselves and in all of their experiental phases they are re-presentations *of* . . . in another sense, that they have a second and different sort of intentionality, one proper to them alone and not to all experiences. Now this new intentionality has the peculiarity that, in form, it is a "replica" [*Gegenbild*] of the intentionality that constitutes time; and as it reproduces in each of its elements a moment of a presentational flow and in its elements taken as a whole a whole presentational flow, so it produces a reproductive consciousness of a re-presented immanent object. It therefore constitutes something twofold: first, through its form as a flow of experience it constitutes the re-presentation as an immanent unity; then, since the moments of experience belonging to this flow are reproductive modifications of moments belonging to a parallel flow (which in the ordinary case consists of nonreproductive moments), and since these reproductive modifications involve an intentionality, the flow is joined together to make up a constitutive whole in which I am conscious of an intentional unity: the unity of what is remembered.

§ 24. *Protentions in Recollection*[36]

Now in order to understand the insertion of this constituted unity of experience "memory" into the unitary stream of experience, we must take the following into account: every memory contains expectation-intentions whose fulfillment leads to the present. Every process that constitutes its object originally is animated by protentions that emptily constitute what is coming as coming, that catch it and bring it toward fulfillment. However, the recollective process does not merely renew these protentions memorially. They are not only there in the process of catching what is coming; they have also *caught* it. They have been fulfilled, and we are conscious of this in the recollection. The fulfillment in the recollective consciousness is re-fulfillment (precisely in the modification that belongs to memorial positing). [53]

[36] The text of § 24 is based on the text of a sheet that Husserl wrote in 1917 expressly for the purpose of supplementing the compilation assembled by Edith Stein. – Editor's note.

And if the original protention belonging to the perception of the event was indefinite and left open the possibility of things' being otherwise or not being at all, in the recollection we have an expectation settled in advance that does not leave all of that open, unless in the form of an "unfinished" recollection, which has a different structure from the indefinite original protention. And yet this too is included in the recollection. Thus there are already difficulties of intentional analysis here for the event considered separately, and then in a new way for the expectations that concern the succession of events up to the present: Recollection is not expectation, but it does have a horizon directed towards the future, specifically, towards the future of what is recollected; and this horizon is fixed. As the recollective process advances, this horizon is disclosed in ever new ways and becomes richer and more vital. And in this process the horizon is filled with ever new recollected events. Those that formerly had only been indicated in advance are now *quasi*-present – *quasi* in the mode of the actualizing present.

§ 25. *The Double Intentionality of Recollection*[37]

If, in connection with a temporal object, we distinguish the content with its duration – which can have a different place in the context of "the" time – from its temporal position, then, in the reproduction of an enduring being, we have in addition to the reproduction of the filled duration the intentions that concern its position; and we have them necessarily. A duration cannot even be represented, or better, cannot even be posited, without its being posited in a temporal context, without the presence of intentions aimed at the temporal context. Moreover, it is necessary that these intentions have the form either of intentions aimed at the past or of intentions aimed at the future. To the duality of intentions – to those directed towards the filled dura- [54]

[37] With the exception of the sentence on p. 59 running from lines 1 through 4, the text of §§ 25–26 as well as the text of the first paragraph of § 27 and – as already noted – of the second half of § 23 is based on sketch No. 45 reproduced below in the supplementary texts and dating from the period between 1907 and 1909; cf. particularly p. 314, line 24, to p. 319, line 27. – Editor's note.

tion and to those directed towards the filled duration's place in time – there corresponds a dual fulfillment. The total complex of intentions that makes up the appearance of the past enduring object has its possible fulfillment in the system of appearances that belong to that same enduring object. The intentions aimed at the temporal context are fulfilled by the production of filled connections up to the actual present. Hence we must distinguish within every re-presentation between the reproduction of the consciousness in which the past enduring object was given, that is to say, was perceived or in some way originally constituted, and that which attaches to this reproduction as constitutive of the consciousness "past" or "present" (simultaneous with the actually present now) or "future."

Now is the latter also reproduction? This question can easily mislead us. Naturally the whole is reproduced, not only the then-present of consciousness with its flow but "*implicite*" the whole stream of consciousness up to the living present. That means – and this is a fundamental part of *a priori* phenomenological genesis – that memory flows continuously, since the life of consciousness flows continuously and does not merely piece itself together link by link into a chain. Rather, everything new reacts on the old; the forward-directed intention belonging to the old is fulfilled and determined in this way, and that gives a definite coloring to the reproduction. Thus a retroactive effect, necessary and *a priori,* shows itself here. The new points again to the new, which, in making its appearance, becomes determined and modifies the reproductive possibilities for the old, and so on. Moreover, the retroactive power extends back along the chain, for the reproduced past bears the character *past* and an indeterminate intention aimed at a certain location in time in relation to the now. Thus it is not as if we had a mere chain of "associated" intentions, one bringing to mind another, this one recalling the next (in the flow); rather we have *one* intention that in itself is an intention aimed at the series of possible fulfillments.

But this is a nonintuitive, an "empty" intention. Its object is the objective series of events in time, and this series is the obscure surroundings of what is actually recollected. Does this not universally characterize "surroundings": a unitary intention related to a multitude of interconnected objectivities and coming [55]

to fulfillment in the gradual, separate, and multifarious givenness of those objectivities? This is also the case with the spatial background. And thus each thing in perception has its reverse side as background (for it is not a question of the background of attention but of apprehension). The component "nonpresentive perception," which belongs to every transcendent perception as an essential part, is a "complex" intention that can be fulfilled in connections of a determinate sort, in connections of data. Foreground is nothing without background. The appearing side is nothing without the nonappearing side. So too in the unity of time-consciousness: the reproduced duration is the foreground; the intentions directed towards the insertion [of the duration into time] make conscious a background, a temporal background. And this is continued in a certain fashion in the constitution of the temporality of the enduring object itself with its now, before, and after. We have the analogies: for the spatial thing, its insertion into the surrounding space and spatial world; on the other hand, the spatial thing itself with its foreground and background. For the temporal thing: its insertion into the temporal form and the temporal world; on the other hand, the temporal thing itself and its shifting orientation in relation to the living now.

§ 26. *Differences between Memory and Expectation*

We must also investigate whether memory and expectation stand on the same footing. Intuitive memory offers me the living reproduction of the elapsing duration of an event, and only the intentions that point back at what preceded the event and point ahead up to the living now remain nonintuitive.

In the intuitive representation of a future event, I now have intuitively the reproductive "image" of an event that runs off reproductively. Fastened to this image are indeterminate intentions aimed at the future and at the past, that is, intentions that from the beginning of the event concern its temporal surroundings, which terminate in the living now. To that extent, the intuition belonging to expectation is memorial intuition turned [56] upside down, for in memory's case the intentions aimed at the

now do not "precede" the event but follow after it. As empty intentions directed towards the surroundings, they lie "in the opposite direction." Now what about the way in which the event itself is given? Does it make an essential difference that in memory the content of the event is determined? But memory can also be intuitive and yet not very determinate, since many of its intuitive components do not have the character of actual memory at all. In the case of "perfect" memory, of course, everything down to the smallest detail would be clear and would be characterized as memory. But *idealiter* this is also possible in the case of expectation. In general, expectation leaves much open, and this remaining-open is again a characteristic of the components in question. But as a matter of principle, a prophetic consciousness (a consciousness that passes itself off as prophetic) is conceivable; that is, a consciousness for which every characteristic belonging to the expectation of what is coming to be lies within view: as when, for example, we have a precisely defined plan and, intuitively representing what is planned, accept it, so to speak, lock, stock, and barrel as future reality. Yet in the intuitive anticipation of the future there will also be much that is insignificant, which as stopgap fills out the concrete image but which in many respects can exist otherwise than the image offers it: from the beginning it is characterized as being open.

But there are fundamental differences in the manner of fulfillment. Intentions aimed at the past are necessarily fulfilled by bringing to light the contexts that belong to intuitive reproductions. The reproduction of a past event with respect to its validity (in internal consciousness) admits of completion and of the confirmation of its memorial indeterminacies only by being converted into a reproduction in which each and every component is characterized as reproductive. Here it is a matter of such questions as: Have I actually seen this? Have I actually perceived it? Have I actually had this appearance with precisely this content? At the same time, all of this must be inserted into a nexus of like intuitions extending up to the now. A different question, of course, is the following: Was what appears, real? Expectation, on the other hand, finds its fulfillment in a perception. It belongs to the essence of what is expected that it is something that is going to be perceived. Moreover, it is evident [57]

that when something expected occurs, that is, has become something present, then the state of expectation itself is over with; if what was future has become something present, then what was present has become something relatively past.[38] This is also the case with the intentions aimed at the surroundings. They too are fulfilled through the actuality of an impressional experiencing.

These differences notwithstanding, the intuition belonging to expectation is something just as original and unique as the intuition of the past.

§ 27. *Memory as Consciousness of Having-Been-Perceived*

The following is of the greatest significance for the characterization of the positing reproductions we have been analyzing: not only the reproductive positing of temporal being belongs to their essence, but also a certain relation to internal consciousness. That it is consciousness of having-been-perceived belongs fundamentally to the essence of memory. If I remember an external event intuitively, I have a reproductive intuition of it. And it is a positing reproduction. But this reproduction of something external is necessarily given in consciousness by means of a reproduction of something internal.[39] Since the external event is given in a determinate mode of appearance, an appearing of something external must be reproduced. The appearing of the external, as an experience, is a unity belonging to the consciousness of the internal; and to the consciousness of the internal corresponds the reproduction of the internal. Now there exist two possibilities for the reproduction of an event: the reproduction of what is internal can be a positing reproduction, and therefore the appearance of the event can be posited in the unity of immanent time; or the reproduction of what is external can also be a positing reproduction that posits the temporal event in question in objective time but does not posit the appearance itself as an event belonging to

[38] The preceding sentence (lines 1–4) is taken from a sketch from the period before 1901. The sketch is completely reproduced in its original form as No. 4 in the supplementary texts below; cf. particularly p. 159, line 34, to p. 160, line 1. – Editor's note.

[39] Cf. Appendix XII, p. 130ff.

internal time, and thus also does not posit the time-constituting [58] stream in the unity of the total life-stream.

Therefore[40] memory is not immediately memory of earlier perception. But since the memory of an earlier event includes the reproduction of the appearances in which it came to be given, there also exists at any time the possibility of a memory of the earlier perception of the event (or the possibility of a reflection *in* the memory that makes the earlier perception something given). The whole complex of the earlier consciousness is reproduced, and what is reproduced has the character of reproduction and the character of the past.

Let us make these relationships clear by an example. I remember the illuminated theater – that cannot mean: I remember having perceived the theater. Otherwise the latter would mean: I remember having perceived that I perceived the theater, and so on. I remember the illuminated theater means: "in my interior" I see the illuminated theater as having been. In the now I see the not-now. Perception constitutes the present. In order to have a now stand before me as now, I must perceive. In order to represent a now intuitively, I must bring about a perception "in image," modified re-presentatively. But I must not do it in such a way that I represent the perception; rather I represent the *perceived,* that which appears as present in the perception. Memory therefore does actually imply a reproduction of the earlier perception, but the memory is not in the proper sense a representation of it: the perception is not meant and posited in the memory; what is meant and posited is the perception's object and the object's now, which, in addition, is posited in relation to the actually present now. I remember yesterday's illuminated theater; that is, I bring about a "reproduction" of the perception of the theater. The theater then hovers before me in the representation as something present. I mean this present theater, but in [59] meaning it I apprehend this present as situated in the past in relation to the actual present of the perceptions occurring right now. Naturally it is now evident that the perception of the

[40] The text of the following two paragraphs of § 27 as well as that of the first paragraph of § 28 is based on the text of a sketch from the period around 1901. The sketch is completely reproduced in its original form as No. 18 in the supplementary texts; cf. particularly p. 186, line 26, to p. 189, line 14, as well as p. 189, line 15, to p. 189, line 31. – Editor's note.

theater did exist, that I did perceive the theater. What is remembered appears as having been present, doing so immediately and intuitively; and it appears in this way thanks to the fact that a present that has a distance from the present of the actual now appears intuitively. The latter present becomes constituted in actual perception; the former intuitively appearing present, the intuitive representation of the not-now, becomes constituted in a replica of perception, in a "re-presentation of the earlier perception" in which the theater comes to be given "as if it were now." This re-presentation of the perception of the theater must not be understood to imply that, living in the re-presentation, I mean the act of perceiving; on the contrary, I mean the being-present of the perceived object.

§ 28. *Memory and Image-Consciousness. Memory as Positing Reproduction*

We still need to consider what sort of re-presentation is involved here. What is not in question is a re-presentation by means of a resembling object, as in the case of conscious depiction (paintings, busts, and the like). In contrast to such image-consciousness, reproductions have the character of the re-presentation of something itself. The reproductions are distinguished in turn according to whether they are nonpositing ("mere" phantasies) or positing. And then the temporal characteristics are added to this. Memory is the re-presentation of something itself in the sense of the past. The present memory is a phenomenon wholly analogous to perception. It has the appearance of the object in common with the corresponding perception, except that the appearance has a modified character, in consequence of which the object does not stand before me as present but as having been present.

What is essential[41] to the sort of reproductions called memory

[41] The text of the following two paragraphs of § 28 and the text of § 29 – as already the text of the second half of § 23, of §§ 25–26, as well as the first paragraph of § 27 – are based on sketch No. 45, which is reproduced below in the supplementary texts and dates from the period between 1907 and 1909; cf. particularly p. 319, line 28, to p. 322, line 5. – Editor's note.

and expectation lies in the insertion of the reproduced appearance into the context of the being of internal time, the flowing sequence of my experiences. The positing normally extends also to what is given objectively in the external appearance. But this positing can be annulled, can be contradicted, and yet memory – or, respectively, expectation – will still remain; that is, we will not cease to speak of memory and expectation, even if we designate the earlier perception or the perception to come as merely "supposed." If, from the beginning, it is a question of the reproduction of immanent objects rather than transcendent objects, then the hierarchical structure we have described as pertaining to reproductive intuitions disappears, and the positing of what is reproduced coincides with its insertion into the sequence of experiences, into immanent time. [60]

§ 29. *Memory of the Present*

Yet another type of immediate reproductive intuition of temporal objects must be taken into consideration in the sphere of the intuition of external time and external objectivity (all of our explanations, of course, have been limited to the immediate intuition of temporal objects and have left the mediate, or nonintuitive, expectations and memories out of account).

Whether on the basis of earlier perceptions or according to a description or in some other way, I can also represent to myself something present as now existing without now having it before me "in person." In the first case, I do indeed have a memory, but I give to what is remembered duration up to the actually present now; and for this duration I have no internally remembered "appearances." The "memory image" does serve me, but I do not posit what is remembered as remembered; I do not posit the object of the internal memory in the duration belonging to it. We posit what endures as it presents itself in this appearance, and we posit the appearing now and the ever new now, and so on; but we do not posit it *as* "past."

We know that the "past" in memory's case also does not imply that in the present act of remembering we make a picture [61]

for ourselves of what existed earlier[42] or that we produce other constructions of this sort. On the contrary, we simply posit what appears, what is intuited, which in conformity with its temporality, of course, is intuitable only in temporal modes. And to what thereby appears we give, in the mode of memory by means of the intention aimed at the surroundings of the appearance, a position in relation to the actually present now. Thus, in the case of the re-presentation of something that presently exists but is absent, we must also ask about the intentions directed towards the surroundings of the intuition. And in this case, naturally, these intentions are of an entirely different sort: they have no relation whatsoever to the actually present now through a continuous series of internal appearances that would be posited in their entirety. Of course, this reproductive appearance is not without a context. It is supposed to be something enduring that appears there, something that has been and now is and will be. Thus by some route or other I "can" go and see the thing, still find it; and I can then go back again and in repeated "possible" appearance-series produce the intuition. And had I set out a short time ago and gone there (and this is a prescribed possibility to which possible appearance-series correspond), I would now have this intuition as a perceptual intuition, and so on. Thus the appearance that hovers before me reproductively is indeed not characterized as having existed internally and impressionally, and what appears is not characterized as having been perceived in its temporal duration. But a relation to the *hic et nunc* exists here too, and the appearance also bears a certain positing-character: it belongs in a determinate nexus of appearances (and of appearances that would be "positing," position-taking appearances throughout). And in relation to the latter it has a motivating character: the intentions aimed at the surroundings always furnish a halo of intentions for the "possible" appearances themselves. This is also the case with the intuition of an enduring being that I am now perceiving and that I posit as having existed previously without my having perceived it previously and without my now remembering it, and that I posit as something that will exist in the future.

[42] Reading "*von dem Früheren*" (as in *Husserliana X*, No. 45, p. 309) for "*von dem früheren.*" – Translator's note.

§ 30. *The Preservation of the Objective Intention in the Retentional Modification*[43] [62]

It often happens that while the retention of something just past is still living, a reproductive image of the thing emerges: but naturally an image of the thing as it was given in the now-point. We recapitulate, so to speak, what was just experienced. This internal renewal in re-presentation puts the reproductive now into relation with the now that is still living in fresh memory, and here the consciousness of identity takes place that brings out the identity of the one and[44] the other. (This phenomenon also shows that, in addition to the intuitive part, there belongs to the sphere of primary memory an empty part that extends very much further. While we still have something past in fresh – although empty – memory, an "image" of that something can simultaneously emerge.) It is a universal and fundamentally essential fact that every now, in sinking back into the past, maintains its strict identity. Expressed phenomenologically: The consciousness of the now, which becomes constituted on the basis of material "A," is continuously transmuted into a consciousness of the past while simultaneously an ever new consciousness of the now is built up. During this transmutation, the consciousness undergoing modification preserves its objective intention (and this belongs to the essence of time-consciousness).

Every original temporal field contains the continuous modification with respect to the act-characteristics constituting the field. This modification must not be understood as if, in the series of apprehensions belonging to a phase of the object – that is, the series beginning with the emergence of the apprehensions as now-positing and descending into the last accessible phenomenal past – there took place a continuous modification in the objective intention. On the contrary: the objective intention remains absolutely the same and identical. For all that, however, a phenomenal shading-off does exist, and not only with respect to the apprehension-contents that have their fading-away – a certain

[43] The text of § 30, as – in part – that of the first paragraph of § 31, is based on the text of sheets "44", "45,", "45a," and "45b" of the lecture manuscripts of 1905. – Editor's note.

[44] Following Dussort, reading "*und*" for "*oder.*" – Translator's note.

descent from the highest pinnacle of sensation in the now to the [63]
point of imperceptibility. The now-moment is characterized above all as the new. The now that is just sinking into the past is no longer the new but that which the new has pushed aside. In this being-pushed-aside there lies an alteration. But while what has been pushed aside has lost its characteristic of being now, it remains absolutely unchanged in its objective intention, which is an intention – specifically, an intuitive intention – aimed at individual objectivity. In this respect, therefore, no alteration at all presents itself. But here we must surely consider what "preservation of the objective intention" signifies. The total apprehension of the object contains two components: one of them constitutes the object with regard to its extratemporal determinations; the other produces the temporal position, the being-now, the having-been, and so on. The object as the temporal material, as that which possesses a temporal position and temporal extension, as that which endures or changes, as that which now is and then has been, springs purely from the objectivation of the apprehension-contents; and therefore, in the case of sensuous objects, from the objectivation of sensuous contents. In saying this, we do not lose sight of the fact that these contents are nevertheless temporal objects, that they are produced in a succession as a continuum of primal impressions and retentions, and that these temporal adumbrations of the data of sensation have their significance for the temporal determinations of the objects constituted by their means. But in their property as representants of the qualities of a physical thing as far as the pure "what" of the qualities is concerned, their temporal character plays no role. The data of apprehension that are apprehended nontemporally constitute the object in its specific composition, and where this is preserved we can already speak of an identity. But when we spoke a short time ago about preserving the relation to something objective, that signified that the object remains preserved not only in its specific composition but also as an individual object, and therefore as a temporally determinate object that sinks back in time together with its temporal determination. This sinking-back is an original phenomenological modification of consciousness through which an ever-growing distance forms in relation to the actually present now, which is always being freshly constituted. This growing

distance comes about by virtue of the continuous series of changes leading away from the actual now.

§ 31. *Primal Impression and the Objective Individual Time-Point* [64]

At this point we are seemingly led to an antinomy: the object, in sinking back, constantly changes its place in time; and yet in sinking back it is supposed to preserve its place in time. In truth, the object of the primary memory, which is being pushed back continuously, does not change its place in time at all, but only its distance from the actually present now. And this is the case because the actually present now is taken to be an ever new objective time-point, while the past temporal moment remains what it is. Now this raises the question: How, in the face of the phenomenon of the constant change of time-consciousness, does the consciousness of objective time and, above all, of identical temporal positions come about? This question[45] is very closely connected with the question about the constitution of the objectivity of individual temporal objects and events: all objectivation is accomplished in time-consciousness; without clarification of the identity of the temporal position, there can be no clarification of the identity of an object in time either.

Set forth in more detail, the problem is the following. The now-phases belonging to the perception continuously undergo a modification; they are not preserved simply as they are: they flow away. What we designate as sinking-back in time is constituted in this process. The tone now sounds, and it immediately sinks into the past – it, the same tone, sinks into the past. This concerns the tone in each of its phases and therefore the whole tone as well. Now the sinking into the past appears to be intelligible to some extent by means of our reflections up to this point. But how does it happen that in the face of the tone's sinking into the past, we nevertheless say that a fixed position in time belongs to it, that time-points and temporal durations can be identified in repeated acts, as our analysis of reproductive

[45] From here on, the text of § 31 is based on the text of pages "58" to "61" of the lecture manuscripts of 1905. – Editor's note.

consciousness has shown? The tone and every time-point in the unity of the enduring tone certainly does have its absolutely fixed position in "objective" (even if immanent) time. Time is fixed, and yet time flows. In the flow of time, in the continuous sinking down into the past, a nonflowing, absolutely fixed, identical, objective time becomes constituted. This is the problem.

To start with, let us consider somewhat more closely the [65] situation of the same tone sinking into the past. Why do we speak of the same tone that sinks into the past? The tone is built up in the temporal flow by means of its phases. We know that each phase (say, the phase belonging to an actually present now), subject to the law of continuous modification, must nevertheless appear, so to speak, as objectively the same, as the same tone-point, since an apprehension-continuum presents itself here that is governed by the identity of sense and exists in continuous coincidence. The coincidence concerns the extratemporal material, which is preserved in the flow precisely as the identity of objective sense. This is true for each now-phase. But every new now is precisely new and is characterized as new phenomenologically. Even if the tone continues so utterly unchanged that not the least alteration is apparent to us, hence even if each new now possesses precisely the same apprehension-content with respect to moments of quality, intensity, etc., and carries precisely the same apprehension – even if all of this is the case, an original difference nevertheless presents itself, a difference that belongs to a new dimension. And this difference is a continuous one. Considered phenomenologically, only the now-point is characterized as an actually present now, that is, as new; the preceding now-point appears as having undergone its modification, the point prior to that its further modification, and so on. This continuum of modifications in the apprehension-contents and the apprehensions built on them produces the consciousness of the extension of the tone together with the continual sinking into the past of what is already extended.

But how, in the face of the phenomenon of the continuous change of time-consciousness, does the consciousness of objective time and, above all, the consciousness of identical position in time and extension in time come about? The answer runs as follows: It comes about by virtue of the fact that over against the

flow of the process of being pushed back in time, over against the flow of the modifications of consciousness, the object that appears pushed back remains apperceptively preserved precisely in absolute identity – specifically, the object together with the positing as "this" that it underwent in the now-point. The continuous modification of the apprehension in the continuous flow does not concern the apprehension's "as what," its sense. The modification intends no new object and no new object-phase. It yields no new time-points, but constantly the same object with the same time-points. Each actually present now creates a new [66] time-point because it creates a new object, or rather a new object-point, which is held fast in the flow of modification as one and the same individual object-point. And the continuity in which a new now becomes constituted again and again shows us that it is not a question of "newness" as such but of a continuous moment of individuation in which the temporal position has its origin. The essence of the modifying flow is such that this temporal position stands before me as identical and as necessarily identical. The now as actually present now is the givenness of the present of the temporal position. When the phenomenon recedes into the past, the now receives the characteristic of being a past now; but it remains the same now, except that it stands before me as past in relation to the currently actual and temporally new now.

The objectivation of the temporal object therefore rests on the following moments: the content of sensation that belongs to the different actually present now-points of the object can remain absolutely unchanged in quality, yet still not possess true identity in this identity of content, however far it may extend. The same sensation now and in a different now possesses a difference – specifically, a phenomenological difference – that corresponds to the absolute temporal position; this difference is the primal source of the individuality of the "this," and thereby of the absolute temporal position. Each phase of the modification has "essentially" the same qualitative content and the same temporal moment, although modified; and it has them in itself in such a way that, by their means, the subsequent apprehension of identity is made possible. This applies to the side of sensation or, correlatively, to the side of the apprehensional basis. The differ-

ent moments support different sides of apprehension, of objectivation proper. One side of objectivation finds its basis purely in the qualitative content of the material of sensation: this yields the temporal material – the tone, for example. This material is maintained as identical in the flow of the modification of the past. A second side of objectivation derives from the apprehension of the representants of the temporal positions. This apprehension too is continuously maintained in the flow of modification.

To summarize: The tone-point in its absolute individuality is held fast in its matter and in its temporal position, and it is the latter that first constitutes individuality. Add to this, finally, the [67] apprehension that belongs essentially to the modification and that, while holding on to the extended objectivity with its immanent absolute time, lets the continuous process of being pushed back into the past appear. In our example of the tone, therefore, each now-point of the ever new sounding and fading-away has its material of sensation and its objectivating apprehension. The tone stands before me as the sound of a violin string that has been struck. If we again disregard the objectivating apprehension and look purely at the material of sensation, then, as far as its matter is concerned, it is constantly tone c, its tonal quality and timbre unchanged, its intensity perhaps fluctuating, and so forth. This content, understood purely as content of sensation underlying the objectivating apperception, is extended – that is to say, each now has its content of sensation, and each different now has an individually different content, even if the content is exactly the same materially. Absolutely the same c now and later is perfectly alike as far as sensation is concerned, but the c now is individually different from the c later.

What "individual" means here is the original temporal form of sensation, or, as I can also put it, the temporal form of original sensation, here of the sensation belonging to the current now-point and only to this. But the now-point itself must, in strictness, be defined through original sensation, so that the proposition asserted has to be taken only as an indication of what is supposed to be meant. The impression, as opposed to the phantasm, is distinguished by the character of originalness.[46]

[46] On impression and phantasm, cf. Appendix II, p. 107ff.

Now within the impression we have to call special attention to the primal impression, over against which there stands the continuum of modifications in primary memorial consciousness. The primal impression is something absolutely unmodified, the primal source of all further consciousness and being. Primal impression has as its content that which the word "now" signifies, insofar as it is taken in the strictest sense. Each new now is the content of a new primal impression. Ever new primal impressions continuously flash forth with ever new matter, now the same, now changing. What distinguishes primal impression from primal impression is the individualizing moment of the impression of the original temporal position, which is something [68] fundamentally different from the quality and other material moments of the content of sensation. The moment of the original temporal position is naturally nothing by itself; the individuation is nothing in addition to what has individuation. The whole now-point, the whole original impression, undergoes the modification of the past; and only by means of this modification have we exhausted the complete concept of the now, since it is a relative concept and refers to a "past," just as "past" refers to the "now." This modification also touches the sensation above all, without nullifying its universal impressional character. It modifies the total content of the primal impression both with respect to its matter and with respect to its temporal position, but it modifies precisely in the sense in which a phantasy-modification does; that is to say, modifying through and through and yet not altering the intentional essence (the total content).

Thus the matter is the same matter, the temporal position the same temporal position, only the mode of givenness has changed: it is givenness of the past. The objectivating apprehension, then, bases itself on this material of sensation. Even if we look purely at the contents of sensation (disregarding the transcendent apperceptions which may perhaps be based on them), we carry out an apperception: the "temporal flow," the duration, then lies within our view as a kind of objectivity. Objectivity presupposes consciousness of unity, consciousness of identity. Here we apprehend the content of every primal sensation as it-itself. The primal impression gives a tone-point-individual, and this individual is identically the same in the flow of the modification of the past:

the apperception relative to this point abides in continuous coincidence in the modification of the past, and the identity of the individual is *eo ipso* identity of temporal position. The continuous welling-up of ever new primal impressions, apprehended as individual points, again and again yields new and different temporal positions. The continuity yields a continuity of temporal positions. In the flow of the modification of the past, therefore, a continuous portion of time filled with sound stands before me, but in such a way that only one of its points is given through primal impression and that from there on the temporal positions continuously appear in different degrees of modification, receding into the past.

Every perceived time is perceived as a past that terminates in the present. And the present is a limit. Every apprehension, however transcendent it may be, is bound by this law. If we perceive a flight of birds or a troop of cavalry at the gallop and the like, we find in the substratum of sensation the described differences: ever new primal sensations carrying with them the characteristic that determines their temporal position and gives rise to their individuation; and, on the other side, we find the same modes in the apprehension. It is precisely in this way that something objective itself – the flight of birds – appears as primally given in the now-point but as fully given in a continuum of the past that terminates in the now and continually terminates in an ever new now, while what has continuously preceded recedes ever further into the continuum of the past. The appearing event constantly possesses the identical absolute temporal value. As its elapsed portion is pushed further and further back into the past, the event is pushed into the past together with its absolute temporal positions, and accordingly with its entire temporal extent: that is, the same event with the same absolute temporal extension continually appears (as long as it appears at all) as identically the same, except that the form of its givenness is different. On the other hand, in the living source-point of being, in the now, ever new primal being simultaneously wells up, in relation to which the distance of the event's time-points from the actually present now continuously expands; and consequently the appearance of sinking backwards, of moving away, grows up. [69]

§ 32. *The Role of Reproduction in the Constitution of the One Objective Time*[47]

With the preservation of the individuality of the time-points as they sink back into the past, however, we still do not have the consciousness of a unitary, homogeneous, objective time. In the bringing about of this consciousness, reproductive memory (intuitive memory as well as memory in the form of empty intentions) plays an important role. By virtue of a reproductive memory, [70] every point that has been pushed back in time can be made – and made repeatedly – the zero-point of a temporal intuition. The earlier temporal field, in which what is presently pushed back was a now, is reproduced; and the reproduced now is identified with the time-point still living in fresh memory: the individual intention is the same.[48] The reproduced temporal field extends further than the actually present field. If we take a point of the past in this field, the reproduction, in partially coinciding with the temporal field in which this point was the now, yields a further regress into the past, and so on. This process must evidently be conceived as capable of being continued without limit, although in practice the actual memory will soon fail. It is evident that each time-point has its before and after, and that the points and extended sections that are before cannot be compressed in the fashion of an approach to a mathematical limit, such as the limit of intensity. If there were a limit, a now would correspond to it which nothing had preceded, and that is evidently impossible.[49] A now is always and essentially a border-point of an extent of time. And it is evident that this whole extent must sink backwards and that, as it does so, its whole magnitude and complete individuality are preserved. Of course, phantasy and reproduction do not make possible an extension of the intuition of time in the sense that the extent of temporal shadings really given in the simultaneous consciousness would be increased. One will perhaps ask in this respect how, in these temporal fields succeeding one another,

[47] The text of § 32 as well as that of the first two lines of § 33 is based on the text of sheets "46"–"47" of the lecture manuscripts of 1905. – Editor's note.

[48] Cf. Appendix IV: Recollection and the Constitution of Temporal Objects and Objective Time, p. 113ff.

[49] Cf. p. 41f.

the one objective time with its one fixed order comes about. The continuous coinciding of the temporal fields, which in truth is not a mere ordering of temporal fields in temporal succession, offers the answer. The coinciding parts are individually identified during their intuitive and continuous regression into the past. Let us assume that we proceed back into the past from any actually experienced time-point – that is, from any time-point originally given in the temporal field of perception or from some time-point that reproduces a remote past – and that we move, as it were, along a fixed chain of connected objectivities that are identified over and over again. Now how is the linear order established here [71] according to which any extent of time whatsoever, even one that is reproduced without continuity with the actually present temporal field, must be part of a single chain continuing up to the actually present now? Even every arbitrarily phantasied time is subject to the requirement that it must exist as an extent within the one and only objective time if one is going to be able to think of it as actual time (that is, as the time of some temporal object).

§ 33. *Some A Priori Temporal Laws*[50]

Obviously, this *a priori* requirement is grounded in the validity of the fundamental temporal evidences that can be immediately grasped and that become evident on the basis of the intuitions of the data of the temporal positions.

If, to begin with, we compare two primal sensations – or rather, correlatively, two primal data – both actually appearing in one consciousness as primal data, as now, then they are distinguished from one another by their matter. They are, however, simultaneous: they have identically the same absolute position in time; they are both now; and in the same now they necessarily have the same value as far as their temporal position is concerned.[51] They have the same form of individuation; they both become constituted in impressions belonging to the same

[50] With the exception of the first two lines, the text of § 33 is based on the text of sheets "61"–"62" of the lecture manuscripts of 1905. – Editor's note.

[51] On the constitution of simultaneity, cf. § 38, p. 80ff., and Appendix VII, p. 119ff.

impressional level. They are modified in this identity, and they continually preserve the identity in the modification of the past. A primal datum and a modified datum of different or equivalent content necessarily have different positions in time. And two modified data have either the same or different temporal positions: the same, if they spring from the same now-point; different, if they spring from different now-points. The actually present now is *one* now and constitutes *one* temporal position, however many objectivities are separately constituted in it: they all have the same temporal present and preserve their simultaneity in flowing off. That the temporal positions have intervals, that these are magnitudes, and the like, can be seen with evidence here; so too can further truths, such as the law of transitivity or the law that if a is earlier than b, then b is later than a. It belongs to time's *a priori* essence that it is a continuity of temporal positions, sometimes filled with identical and sometimes with changing objectivities, and that the homogeneity of absolute time becomes constituted indefeasibly in the flow of the modifications of the past and in the continuous welling-up of a now, of the generative time-point, of the source-point of all temporal positions whatsoever. [72]

Furthermore, it belongs to the *a priori* essence of the situation that sensation, apprehension, the taking of a position – all of these – take part in the *same* temporal flow and that the objectivated absolute time is necessarily identically the same as the time that belongs to sensation and apprehension. The preobjectivated time belonging to sensation necessarily founds the unique possibility of an objectivation of temporal positions, which corresponds to the modification of sensation and to the degree of this modification. To the objectivated time-point in which, for example, bells begin to ring, there corresponds the time-point of the matching sensation. In the beginning-phase, the sensation has the same time; that is, if it is subsequently made into an object, then it necessarily keeps the temporal position that coincides with the corresponding temporal position of the ringing of the bells. So too the time of the perception and the time of the perceived are identically the same.[52] The perceptual act sinks backwards in

[52] Cf. Appendix V: Simultaneity of Perception and the Perceived, p. 114ff.

time just as what is perceived in its appearance does, and in reflection identically the same temporal position must be given to each phase of the perception as is given to what is perceived.

THE LEVELS OF CONSTITUTION PERTAINING TO TIME AND TEMPORAL OBJECTS

§ 34. *Differentiation of the Levels of Constitution*[1,2]

Now that we have studied time-consciousness – starting from its most obvious phenomena – in some of its principal dimensions and in its various strata, it would be good to establish and run through systematically for once the different levels of constitution in their essential structure.

We found:

1. the things of empirical experience in objective time (in connection with which we would have to distinguish still different levels of empirical being, which up to this point have not been taken into consideration: the experienced physical thing belonging to the individual subject, the intersubjectively identical thing, the thing of physics);

2. the constituting multiplicities of appearance belonging to different levels, the immanent unities in pre-empirical time;

3. the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness.

§ 35. *Differences between Constituted Unities and the Constituting Flow*[3]

Now to begin with, this absolute consciousness that lies before *all* constitution should be discussed somewhat more closely. Its peculiarity stands out distinctly in contrast to the constituted unities belonging to the most different levels:[4]

[1] The text of § 34 conforms somewhat to the text of sketch No. 40, from the years 1907 to 1909, which is reproduced in the supplementary texts; cf. p. 297ff. – Editor's note.

[2] To this and to the following sections, compare Appendix VI: The Grasping of the Absolute Flow. – Perception in a Fourfold Sense, p. 116ff.

[3] Cf. p. 117ff.

[4] The text of §§ 35–39 from this point on is based on the text of a sketch that probably did not originate before the end of 1911. The sketch is completely reproduced in its original form

1. Each individual object (each unity, whether immanent or transcendent, constituted in the stream) endures, and necessarily [74] endures – that is, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process. Conversely: what exists in time continuously exists in time and is the unity belonging to the process that carries with it inseparably the unity of what endures in the process as it unfolds. The unity of the tone that endures throughout the process lies in the tonal process; and conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point.

2. Individual or concrete being is necessarily changing or unchanging; the process is a process of change or of rest, the enduring object itself a changing object or one at rest. Moreover, every change has its rate or acceleration of change (to use an image) with respect to the same duration. As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be carried over into a change.

Now if we consider the *constituting* phenomena in comparison with the phenomena just discussed, we find a *flow,* and each phase of this flow is a *continuity of adumbrations.* But as a matter of principle, no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession; and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous "change"; and this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither "faster" nor "slower." If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is therefore nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration.

(to the extent that it has been preserved) as No. 54 in the supplementary texts; cf. p. 379ff. and the references to these sections to be found there. – Editor's note.

§ 36. *The Time-Constituting Flow as Absolute Subjectivity*

Time-constituting phenomena, therefore, are evidently objectivities fundamentally different from those constituted in time. They are neither individual objects nor individual processes, and [75] the predicates of such objects or processes cannot be meaningfully ascribed to them. Hence it also can make no sense to say of them (and to say with the same signification) that they exist in the now and did exist previously, that they succeed one another in time or are simultaneous with one another, and so on. But no doubt we can and must say: A certain continuity of appearance – that is, a continuity that is a phase of the time-constituting flow – *belongs* to a now, namely, to the now that it *constitutes*; and to a before, namely, as that which is constitutive (we cannot say "was") of the before. But is not the flow a succession, does it not have a now, an actually present phase, and a continuity of pasts of which I am now conscious in retentions? We can say nothing other than the following: This flow is something we speak of *in conformity with what is constituted,* but it is not "something in objective time." It is *absolute subjectivity* and has the absolute properties of something to be designated *metaphorically* as "flow"; of something that originates in a point of actuality, in a primal source-point, "the now," and so on. In the actuality-experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation. For all of this, we lack names.

§ 37. *Appearances of Transcendent Objects as Constituted Unities*

We must note, in addition, that when we speak of the "perceptual act" and say that it is the point of genuine perceiving to which a continuous series of "retentions" is attached, we have not described thereby any unities in immanent time, but just moments of the flow. That is, the *appearance* – say, the appearance of a house – is a temporal being, a being that endures, changes, and so on, just as much as the immanent tone, which is not an appearance. But the house-appearance is not the percep-

tual consciousness and retentional consciousness. The latter can be understood only as time-constituting consciousness, as moments of the flow. In the same way, the memorial appearance (or the remembered immanent object, perhaps the remembered immanent primary content) must be distinguished from the memorial consciousness with its memorial retentions. Everywhere [76] we have to distinguish: *consciousness* (flow), *appearance* (immanent object [*Objekt*]), transcendent *object* [*Gegenstand*] (when the immanent object is not a primary content). Not all consciousness refers to something in "objective" (that is, transcendent) time, to objective individuality, as the consciousness that belongs to external perception does, for example. In every consciousness we find an "immanent content." In the case of contents that are called "appearances," this immanent content is either the appearance of something individual (of something in external time) or the appearance of something not in time. In judging, for example, I have the appearance "judgment," namely, as a unity in immanent time; and *in this unity* the judgment in the logical sense "appears."[5] The judging always has the character of the flow. Consequently, what we called "act" or "intentional experience" in the *Logical Investigations* is in every instance a flow in which a unity becomes constituted in immanent time (the judgment, the wish, etc.), a unity that has its immanent duration and that may progress more or less rapidly. These unities, which become constituted in the absolute stream, exist in immanent time, which is *one;* and in this time the unities can be simultaneous or have durations of equal length (or perhaps have the same duration, that is, in the case of two immanent objects that endure simultaneously). Moreover, the unities have a certain determinability with respect to before and after.

§ 38. *The Unity of the Flow of Consciousness and the Constitution of Simultaneity and Succession*[6]

We have already occupied ourselves with the constitution of such immanent objects, with their growth from ever new primal

[5] "Appearance" is used here in the expanded sense.

[6] Cf. Appendix VII: Constitution of Simultaneity, p. 119f.

sensations and modifications.[7] Now in reflection we find a single flow that breaks down into many flows, but this multitude nevertheless has a kind of unity that permits and requires us to speak of *one* flow. We find many flows because many series of primal sensations begin and end. But we find a connecting form because the law of the transformation of the now into the no-longer – and, in the other direction, of the not-yet into the [77] now – applies to each of them, but not merely to each of them taken separately; there rather exists something like a common form of the now, a universal and perfect likeness in the mode of flowing. Several, many primal sensations occur "at once." And when any one of them elapses, the multitude elapses "conjointly" and in absolutely the same mode with absolutely the same gradations and in absolutely the same tempo: except that, in general, one ceases while another still has its not-yet before it – that is to say, its new primal sensations that further prolong the duration of what is intended in it. Or described more adequately: The many primal sensations flow away and from the beginning have at their disposal the same running-off modes, except that the series of primal sensations constitutive of the enduring immanent objects are variously prolonged, corresponding to the varying durations of the immanent objects. They do not all make use of the formal possibilities in the same way. Immanent time is constituted as *one* for all immanent objects and processes. Correlatively, the time-consciousness of what is immanent is an all-inclusive unity. The "being-together" [*Zusammen*], the "being-all-at-once" [*Zugleich*] of actually present primal sensations is all-embracing; all-embracing too is the "before," the "having-gone-before" of all the immediately preceding primal sensations, the steady transmutation of each ensemble of primal sensations into such a before. This before is a continuity, and each of its points is a homogeneous, identical running-off form for the entire ensemble. The *whole* "being-together" of primal sensations is subject to the law according to which it changes into a steady continuum of modes of consciousness, of modes of having elapsed, and according to which in the same continuity an ever new being-together of primal sensations arises

[7] Cf. § 11, p. 30ff.

originally, in order in its turn to pass continuously over into the condition of having elapsed. What is a being-together as an ensemble of primal sensations remains a being-together in the mode of having elapsed. Primal sensations have their continuous "succession" in the sense of a continuous running-off, and primal sensations have their being-together, their "being-all-at-once." Actual primal sensations exist all at once; in the succession, however, one sensation or group of sensations existing together is actual primal sensation, while the others have elapsed. But what does that mean? One can say nothing further here than "look": a primal sensation or a group of primal sensations that has an immanent now as object of consciousness [78] (a tone-now, in the same now a color, and so on) continuously changes into modes of the consciousness of the before, in which the immanent object is intended as past; and "all at once," together with these, an ever new primal sensation emerges, an ever new now is established, and thereby an ever new tone-now, form-now, etc., is intended. In a group of primal sensations, primal sensation is distinguished from primal sensation by means of content; only the now is the same. The consciousness, in its form as primal sensation-consciousness, is identical.

But "together" with the primal sensation-consciousness there exist continuous series of modes pertaining to the flowing-away of "earlier" primal sensations, of earlier now-consciousness. *This* being-together is a being-together of modes of consciousness continuously *modified* with respect to form, while the being-together or primal sensations is a being-together of modes purely *identical in form*. We can extract a point in the continuity of running-off modes, and we then find in this point too a being-together of running-off modes perfectly alike in form; or rather, we find an identical running-off mode. One must make an essential distinction between these two ensembles. One is the site for the constitution of simultaneity, the other the site for the constitution of temporal succession – although it is also the case that simultaneity is nothing without temporal succession and temporal succession is nothing without simultaneity, and consequently simultaneity and temporal succession must become constituted correlatively and inseparably. We can differentiate terminologically between the retentional being-all-at-once of fluxions

[*fluxionalem Vor-Zugleich*] and the impressional being-all-at-once of fluxions [*impressionalem Zugleich von Fluxionen*]. We cannot call the one or the other being-all-at-once a being simultaneous. We can no longer speak of a time that belongs to the ultimate constituting consciousness. The simultaneity of a color and of a tone, for example – their being in an "actually present now" – originally becomes constituted with the primal sensations that introduce the retentional process. But the primal sensations are not themselves simultaneous, and we can no more call the phases of the retentional being-all-at-once of fluxions simultaneous phases of consciousness than we can call the succession of consciousness a temporal succession.

We know what this retentional being-all-at-once is from our earlier analyses: the continuum of phases that attach themselves to a primal sensation, each of which is retentional consciousness of the earlier now ("original memory" of it). Here we must note: When the primal sensation recedes and is continuously modified, we not only have in general an experience that is a modification of the earlier experience, but we are also able to turn our glance in it in such a way that we "see," so to speak, the earlier nonmodified experience in the modified experience. When a tonal succession runs off (not too rapidly), we are not only able to "look at" the first tone, after it has elapsed, as a tone that is "still present" although no longer sensed, but we can also take heed of the fact that the mode of consciousness that this tone just now possesses is a "memory" of the primal sensation's mode of consciousness in which it was given as now. But then we must differentiate sharply between the consciousness of the past (the retentional consciousness as well as the consciousness that re-presents something "again") in which an immanent temporal object is intended as immediately past, and the retention or (depending on whether the original flow of the modification of sensation or its re-presentation is in question) the recollective "reproduction" of the earlier primal sensation. And this we must do for every other fluxion. [79]

If any phase of the duration of an immanent object is a now-phase and therefore intended in primal sensation, then, in the retentional being-all-at-once, retentions that are continuously joined to one another are united with this primal sensation. These

retentions are characterized in themselves as modifications of the primal sensations that belong to all of the rest of the points of the constituted duration; that is, to those that have elapsed in time. Each of these retentions has a determinate mode to which distance in time from the now-point corresponds. Each is the consciousness of the past of the corresponding earlier now-point and gives it in the mode of the immediate past that corresponds to its position in the elapsed duration.

§ 39. *The Double Intentionality of Retention and the Constitution of the Flow of Consciousness*[8] [80]

The duality in the intentionality of retention gives us a clue to the solution of the difficulty concerning how it is possible to be aware of a unity belonging to the ultimate constituting flow of consciousness. Without doubt a difficulty does present itself here: If a self-contained flow (one that belongs to an enduring process or object) has elapsed, I can nevertheless look back on it; it forms, so it seems, a unity in memory. Hence the flow of consciousness obviously becomes constituted in consciousness as a unity too. The unity of a tone-duration, for example, becomes constituted in the flow, but the flow itself becomes constituted in turn as the unity of the consciousness of the tone-duration. And must we then not also go on to say that this unity becomes constituted in an altogether analogous way and is every bit as much a constituted temporal series, and that one must therefore surely speak of a temporal now, before, and after?

In the light of our latest explanations, we can give the following answer: There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once. As shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does. And this can be made intelligible on the basis of the flow's essential constitution. Our regard can be directed, in the one case, *through* the phases that

[8] Cf. Appendix VIII: The Double Intentionality of the Stream of Consciousness, p. 120ff.

"coincide" in the continuous progression of the flow and that function as intentionalities of the tone. But our regard can also be aimed *at* the flow, at a section of the flow, at the passage of the flowing consciousness from the beginning of the tone to its end. Every adumbration of consciousness of the species "retention" possesses a double intentionality: one serves for the constitution of the immanent object, of the tone; it is this intentionality that we call "primary memory" of the (just sensed) tone, or more precisely, just retention of the tone. The other intentionality is constitutive of the unity of this primary memory in the flow; namely, retention, because it is a still-being-conscious, a consciousness that holds back – because it is, precisely, retention – is also retention of the elapsed tone-retention: [81] in its process of being continuously adumbrated in the flow, it is continuous retention of the continuously preceding phases. If we fix our regard on some one phase of the flow of consciousness (a phase in which there appears a tone-now and an extent of the tone-duration in the mode of the just-having-elapsed), then this phase comprehends a continuity of retentions united in the retentional being-all-at-once. This continuity is retention of the total momentary continuity of the continuously preceding phases of the flow. (In its initial member it is new primal sensation; in the member that then follows next in the continuity – in the first phase of adumbration – it is immediate retention of the preceding primal sensation; in the next momentary phase, it is retention of the retention of the primal sensation preceding the one above, and so on.) Now if we allow the flow to flow on, we then have the flow-continuum running off, which causes the continuity we have just described to be modified retentionally; and in this process, each new continuity of phases existing together in one moment is retention in relation to the total continuity belonging to the being-all-at-once in the preceding phase. Thus there extends throughout the flow a horizontal intentionality[9] that, in the course of the flow, continuously coincides with itself. In the absolute passing-on, in the flowing process, the first primal

[9] *Längsintentionalität*, which Churchill translates as "longitudinal intentionality." I use "horizontal" because I take the intentionality in this case to be the flow's intending of itself in its flowing; this intentionality, in other words, may be said to run lengthwise along the flow, which the term "horizontal" is intended to suggest. – Translator's note.

impression becomes changed into a retention of itself, this retention becomes changed into a retention of this retention, and so on. But together with the first retention there is a new "now," a new primal sensation, and the latter is combined continuously with the former in one moment in such a way that the second phase of the flow is primal sensation of the new now and retention of the earlier now; the third phase is again new primal sensation together with retention of the second primal sensation and retention of the retention of the first; and so on. We must also take into account here that the retention of a retention has intentionality not only in relation to what is immediately retained but also in relation to what, in the retaining, is retained of the second degree, and ultimately in relation to the primal datum, which is objectivated throughout the process. The situation is analogous to the re-presentation of an appearance of a physical thing, which possesses intentionality not only in relation to the thing-appearance but also in relation to the appearing thing; or better still, it is analogous to the memory [of a memory][10] of A, which makes us conscious not only of the memory but also of the [82] A as what is remembered in the memory.

We believe, therefore, that the unity of the flow itself becomes constituted in the flow of consciousness as a one-dimensional *quasi*-temporal order by virtue of the continuity of retentional modifications and by virtue of the circumstance that these modifications are, continuously, retentions of the retentions that have continuously preceded them. If I direct my interest towards the tone, if I immerse myself attentively in the "transverse intentionality"[11] (in the primal sensation as sensation of the actually present tone-now, in the retentional modifications as primary memories of the series of elapsed tone-points and as continually experiencing the unity in the flow of retentional

[10] Supplied according to the parallel text in *Husserliana X*, No. 54, p. 380, lines 10–11. – Translator's note.

[11] *Querintentionalität*. Here I follow Churchill's translation. I interpret the flow's intentionality in this case to be directed towards the immanent object enduring or running off in immanent time (and towards a transcendent object if the immanent object is an act of the appropriate kind). I take the immanent object to be on a different level from the absolute flow that intends or constitutes it; the intentionality directed towards the immanent temporal object may, therefore, be said to cut across the direction of the flow. See the "Translator's Introduction," III. B. 2. a. – Translator's note.

modifications of the primal sensations and of the retentions that are already on hand), then the enduring tone stands before me, constantly expanding in its duration. If I focus on the "horizontal intentionality" and on what is becoming constituted in it, I turn my reflective regard away from the tone (which has endured for such and such a length of time) towards what is new in the way of primal sensation at one point in the retentional being-all-at-once and towards what is retained "all at once" with this new primal sensation in a continuous series. What is retained is the past consciousness in its series of phases (first of all, its preceding phase). And then, in the continuous flowing-on of consciousness, I grasp the retained series of the elapsed consciousness together with the limit of the actual primal sensation and the continuous being-pushed-back of this series, along with the new addition of retentions and primal sensations.

Here we can ask: Can I find and apprehend in one glance the whole retentional consciousness, included in a retentional being-all-at-once, of the past course of consciousness? Obviously, the process necessary in this case is the following: I must first grasp the retentional being-all-at-once itself, and this is continuously modified; indeed, it is what it is only in the flow. Now the flow, inasmuch as it modifies this retentional being-all-at-once, coincides with itself intentionally, constituting a unity in the flow. And what is one and identical receives and maintains a continuous mode of being-pushed-back; something new is always being added "in front" in order to flow away immediately in its turn, together with what is connected with it in that moment. Throughout this process my look can remain fixed on the momentary being-all-at-once that sinks into the past, but the constitution of the retentional unity reaches beyond this, always adding something new. My look can be turned towards that in this process, [83] and I am always conscious of it in the flow as constituted unity.

Consequently, *two* inseparably united *intentionalities,* requiring one another like two sides of one and the same thing, are interwoven with each other in the one, unique flow of consciousness. By virtue of one of the intentionalities, immanent time becomes constituted – an objective time, a genuine time in which there is duration and the alteration of what endures. In the other

intentionality, it is the *quasi*-temporal arrangement of the phases of the flow that becomes constituted – of the flow that always and necessarily possesses the flowing "now"-point, the phase of actuality, and the series of phases that have preceded the phase of actuality or that will follow it (those that are not yet actual). This prephenomenal, preimmanent temporality becomes constituted intentionally as the form of the time-constituting consciousness and in it itself. The flow of the consciousness that constitutes immanent time not only *exists* but is so remarkably and yet intelligibly fashioned that a self-appearance of the flow necessarily exists in it, and therefore the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself.[12] The constituting and the constituted coincide, and yet naturally they cannot coincide in every respect. The phases of the flow of consciousness in which phases of the same flow of consciousness become constituted phenomenally cannot be identical with these constituted phases, nor are they. What is brought to appearance in the actual momentary phase of the flow of consciousness – specifically, in its series of retentional moments – are the past phases of the flow of consciousness.

§ 40. *The Constituted Immanent Contents*[13]

Now let us shift to the stratum of the immanent "contents" whose constitution is the achievement of the absolute flow of consciousness, and let us consider them somewhat more closely. These immanent contents are experiences in the customary sense: [84] the data of sensation, even if unheeded (for example, a red, a blue, and the like); further, the appearances (appearance of a house, of one's surroundings, etc.), whether or not one pays attention to them and to their "objects"; then the "acts" of asserting, wishing, willing, and so on, and the reproductive modifications corresponding to them (phantasies, memories). All

[12] Cf. Appendix IX: Primal Consciousness and the Possibility of Reflection, p. 122ff.

[13] The manuscript on which the text of § 40 is based could not be found. – Editor's note.

of these are contents of consciousness, contents of the primal consciousness that constitutes temporal objects and that in this sense is not itself content or object in phenomenological time.

Immanent contents are what they are only as far as, during their "actual" duration, they point ahead to the future and point back to the past. But in this pointing back and forth something else remains to be distinguished: In each primal phase that originally constitutes the immanent content we have retentions of the preceding phases and protentions of the coming phases of precisely this content, and these protentions are fulfilled just as long as this content endures. These "determinate" retentions and protentions have an obscure horizon; in flowing away, they turn into indeterminate retentions and protentions related to the past and future course of the stream. It is through the indeterminate retentions and protentions that the actually present content is inserted into the unity of the stream. We then have to distinguish the retentions and protentions from the recollections and expectations, which are not numbered among the phases constituting the immanent content but instead re-present past or future immanent contents. The contents endure; they have their time; they are individual objectivities that are unities of change or constancy.

§ 41. *Evidence Pertaining to Immanent Contents. Change and Constancy*[14]

If one speaks of the evident givenness of an immanent content, then of course the evidence cannot signify indubitable certainty respecting the being of the tone at a single point in time; I would consider an evidence so conceived (as it would still be taken for granted by Brentano, for example) to be a fiction. If it belongs to [85] the essence of a content given in perception that it is temporally extended, then the indubitability that pertains to perception can signify nothing other than indubitability with respect to temporally extended being.[15] And this means in turn: All questions

[14] The text of § 41 is based on the text of sheets "47"–"49" of the lecture manuscripts of 1905. – Editor's note.

[15] On the perception of the internal, cf. § 44, p. 99ff.

directed towards individual existence can find their answer only in a return to perception, which gives us individual existence in the strictest sense. To the extent that what is not perception remains blended with perception itself, to that extent there is still something questionable in it. Now if it is a matter of immanent contents and not of empirical realities, then enduring and changing, coexisting and succeeding can be realized fully and completely in perceptions, and often enough actually are realized. This happens in perceptions that are purely intuitive and that constitute in the strictest sense the enduring or changing contents as enduring or changing – perceptions that contain in themselves nothing more that could possibly be questioned. In all our inquiries into origins we are led back to such perceptions, but they themselves exclude any further inquiry into origins. It is clear that the much-discussed evidence pertaining to the perception of the internal, the evidence of the *cogitatio*, would lose all significance and sense if we were to exclude temporal extension from the sphere of evidence and true givenness.

Now let us consider this evidential consciousness of duration and let us analyze this consciousness itself. If the tone c (specifically, not merely the quality c but the tone-content as a whole, which is supposed to remain absolutely unchanged) is continuously perceived and given as enduring, the c is extended over a section of the immediate temporal field; that is to say, a different tone does not make its appearance in each now but always and continuously the same tone. That the same tone constantly appears – this continuity of identity – is an internal characteristic of consciousness. The temporal positions are not separated from one another by means of self-differentiating acts; the unity of the perception here is an unbroken unity without any internal differences interrupting it. On the other hand, there do exist [86] differences inasmuch as each time-point is individually distinct from every other one – but precisely *distinct* and not *separated.* The perfect likeness of temporal material in which no differentiations can be made, together with the continuity of modification of the time-positing consciousness, essentially found the blending into unity of the uninterrupted extension of c; and in this way a concrete unity grows up for the first time. Tone c is a concrete individual only as extended in time. The concrete alone is given at

a particular time, and it is obviously processes of intellectual analysis that make possible explanations such as those just attempted. The unbroken unity of c, which is what is given at first, turns out to be a divisible unity, a blending of moments that can be distinguished ideally and that perhaps can be found within the unity – for example, by means of a simultaneous succession through which parts are distinguishable in the duration running off parallel to it and in relation to which comparison and identification can then take place.

In other respects, we are already operating to some extent with idealizing fictions in such descriptions. It is a fiction that the tone endures as absolutely unchanged. A greater or lesser fluctuation will always occur in some moments, and thus the continuous unity at one moment will be connected with the differentiation belonging to another moment, providing the unity with an indirect partition. The break in qualitative identity, the leap from one quality to another within the same genus of quality at a temporal position, yields a new experience, the experience of variation; and here it is evident that a discontinuity is not possible in every time-point belonging to an extent of time. Discontinuity presupposes continuity, whether in the form of unchanging duration or of continuous change. As for the latter, the continuous change, the phases of the consciousness of change also blend into one another without a break – therefore in the manner of the consciousness of unity and the consciousness of identity – just as they do in the case of unchanging duration. But the unity does not show itself to be an undifferentiated unity. As the continuous synthesis progresses, what first blends without differentiation exhibits divergence, which becomes greater and greater; and thus equality and difference mingle, and a continuity in which there is an increase in differentiation is given with the [87] growing extension. While it is individually preserved, the original now-intention appears in ever new simultaneous consciousness posited together with intentions that, the further they stand in time from the original now-intention, cause an ever-increasing differentiation, a disparity, to emerge. What at first coincides and then almost coincides grows further and further apart; the old and the new no longer appear as in essence entirely the same but as increasingly different and alien, despite their having a genus in

common. Thus does the consciousness of "what gradually changes," of increasing disparity in the flow of continuous identification, grow up.

In the case of unchanging duration, we have a continuous consciousness of unity that, as it advances, constantly remains consciousness of a homogeneous unity. The coinciding continues throughout the whole series of continuously advancing intentions, and the pervasive unity constantly remains the unity of coincidence; it allows no consciousness of "being otherwise," of becoming estranged, of disparity, to arise. In the consciousness of change, coinciding also occurs; and, in a certain way, it too runs throughout the whole temporal extension. But as far as what is universal in the coinciding is concerned, there emerges, simultaneously and increasingly, a deviation falling on the side of difference. The manner in which the material of the change is distributed in the temporal extent determines the consciousness of swift or slow change, of the speed and acceleration of the change. But in every case – and not only in the case of continuous change – the consciousness of otherness, of differentness, presupposes a unity. Something enduring must be there in the variation and in the change as well, something that makes up the identity of that which changes or that which undergoes a variation. Of course, this points back to essential forms of the consciousness of an individual. If the quality of the tone remains unchanged and its intensity or timbre changes, we say that the *same* tone varies in timbre or changes with respect to intensity. If nothing remains unchanged in the entire phenomenon, if it changes "in all its determinations," there will still be enough there to produce unity: precisely that absence of differentiation with which neighbouring phases blend into one another, thereby producing the [88] consciousness of unity. The type and form of the whole remain generically the same. The similar passes over into the similar within a manifold of similarity; and conversely: the similar is that which can belong to a unity of continuous transition, or is everything that is at a distance – just as what is the same is that which can be the ground for the unity of an unchanging duration (rest), or is that which is not at a distance. So it is wherever we speak of change and variation. A consciousness of unity must underlie them.

§ 42. *Impression and Reproduction*[16]

We must remark in other respects that if we pursue the constitution of, say, memorial contents rather than the constitution of impressional contents in their duration, we cannot speak of primal impressions that correspond to the now-point of those contents. At the head here stand primal memories (as absolute phases), not something that has been deposited "from without," "alien to consciousness," not something that has arisen in primal generation, but rather something that has risen to the surface – or, as we could even say (at least in the case of memory), something that has risen to the surface once again. This moment, although not an impression itself, is nevertheless like an impression in not being a product of spontaneity but, in a certain sense, something receptive. One could also speak here of passive reception and distinguish the passive receiving that gathers in the new, the alien, the original, from the passive receiving that only brings back, re-presents.

Every constituted experience is either impression or reproduction; as reproduction it is either a *re*-presentation or not. In every case it is itself something (immanently) present. But to every present and presenting consciousness there corresponds the ideal possibility of a re-presentation *of* this consciousness that corresponds to it precisely. To the impressional perceiving corresponds the possibility of a re-presentation of it; to the impressional wishing, a re-presentation of it; and so on. This re-presenting [89] also concerns every sensuous content of sensation. To the sensed red there corresponds a phantasm-red, a re-presentational consciousness of the impressional red. In this case there corresponds to the sensing (that is, to the perceiving of hyletic data) a re-presentation of the sensing. But every re-presenting itself is, in turn, present through an impressional consciousness. In a certain sense, therefore, all experiences are intended through impressions or are impressed. But among such experiences are those that present themselves as reproductions, as re-presenting modifica-

[16] The manuscripts for the text of §§ 42–45 – the sections that conclude the first part – could not be found. It is probably a question of sketches produced after 1911. – Editor's note. [Rudolf Bernet has since located the original manuscripts for §§ 42–45; they bear the date: "21.2.1910." – Translator's note.]

tions of impressions; and to every consciousness there corresponds such a modification (we do not understand re-presenting here as also an attentive act of meaning). Perceiving is the consciousness of an object. As consciousness, it is also an impression, something immanently present. To this immanently present something, to the perceiving of an A, corresponds the reproductive modification: re-presentation of the perceiving, perceiving in phantasy or in memory. But such a "perception in phantasy" is at the same time the phantasy of the perceived object. In perception, an object – let us say a physical thing or physical event – stands before us as present. The perception is not only present itself, therefore; it is also a making-present: in it something present – the physical thing, the event – stands before us. Similarly, a re-presentational modification of perception is also a re-presentation of the perceived object: the object, the physical thing, is phantasied, remembered, expected.

All impressions, primary contents as well as experiences that are "consciousness of . . . ," become constituted in original consciousness. For experiences divide into these two fundamental classes of experience: experiences in the one class are acts, are "consciousness of . . . ," are experiences that "refer to something"; experiences in the other class are not. The sensed color does not refer to something[17]; just as little do the contents of phantasy – for example, a phantasm red as a red hovering before us (even if unnoticed). But the phantasy-consciousness *of* red [90] surely does refer to something: all primitive re-presentations do. We therefore find impressions that are re-presentations of impressional consciousness: as impressional consciousness is the consciousness of what is immanent, so too impressional re-presentation is the re-presentation of what is immanent.

The impression (in the narrower sense, in opposition to re-presentation) must be taken as primary consciousness that has no further consciousness behind it in which it would be intended; on the other hand, re-presentation, even the most primitive

[17] Inasmuch as one has the right to designate the primal consciousness itself – the flow that constitutes immanent time and the experiences belonging to it – as act, or the right to divide it according to unities and acts, one could and indeed one would have to say: a primal act or nexus of primal acts constitutes unities that are themselves either acts or not. But this gives rise to difficulties.

re-presentation of something immanent, is already secondary consciousness. It presupposes primary consciousness in which it is intended impressionally.

§ 43. *Constitution of Physical-Thing Appearances and of Physical Things. Constituted Apprehensions and Primal Apprehensions*

Let us consider such a primary consciousness; for example, the perception of this copper ashtray. The ashtray stands before us in the perception as enduring physical being. Reflection permits us to distinguish: the perception itself (the perceptual apprehension taken concretely in union with the data of apprehension: the perceptual appearance in the mode of certainty, say) and that which is perceived (which must be described in evident judgments based on perception). What is perceived is also something meant; the act of meaning "lives" in the act of perceiving. As reflection shows, the perceptual apprehension in its mode is itself something constituted in immanent time, standing before us in the unity of its presence, although it is not something meant. It is constituted through the multiplicity of now-phases and retentions. The contents of apprehension as well as the apprehension-intentions to which the mode of certainty belongs are constituted in this way. The contents of sensation become constituted as unities in sensuous impressions; the apprehensions become constituted in other impressions – act-impressions – which are combined with the sensuous impressions. The perception as a constituted phenomenon is, for its part, perception of the physical thing.

The physical-thing appearance, the physical-thing apprehension, becomes constituted as enduring phenomenon, unchanged or changing, in the primary consciousness of time. And in the [91] unity of this change, a new unity is "intended": the unity of the unchanged or changing physical thing, unchanged or changing in its time, in its duration. In the same impressional consciousness in which the perception becomes constituted, the perceived also becomes constituted, and precisely by its means. It belongs to the essence of a consciousness having this structure to be at once a consciousness of a unity of the immanent sort and a conscious-

ness of a unity of the transcendent sort. And it belongs to its essence that an intending regard can be directed now towards the sensuous sensation, now towards the appearance, now towards the object. *Mutatis mutandis* this is true of all "acts." In every case it belongs to their essence to have intentionality of a transcendent sort and to be able to have it only by means of something constituted as immanent, by means of "apprehensions." And in every case this grounds the possibility of setting the immanent, the apprehension with the immanent content, in relation to the transcendent. And this setting-in-relation again gives rise to an "act," an act of a higher level.

Here we must note: In perception a complex of sensation-contents, which are themselves unities constituted in the original temporal flow, undergo unity of apprehension. And the unitary apprehension itself is again a constituted unity in the first sense. The immanent unities are not intended in their constitution in the same way as that which appears is intended in the appearance of something transcendent, as that which is perceived is intended in the perception of something transcendent. On the other hand, they must surely have some commonness of essence. For the impression of something immanent is a presenting, just as perceiving is a presenting: in the one case, we have the presenting of something immanent; in the other, the presenting of something transcendent "through" appearances. Thus while the appearances of something transcendent are unities constituted in the consciousness of something internal, other unities in turn are supposed to be constituted "in" these unities: the appearing objects.

The immanent unities, as we saw, become constituted in the flow of the multiplicities of temporal adumbrations. We have there: the manifold modified primal contents that are characterized as retentional modifications of the primal content in the character of the now; following the flow of consciousness in its [92]
horizontal direction, these retentional modifications belong to each temporal point of the immanent content. And these primal contents are bearers of primal apprehensions that, in their flowing interconnection, constitute the temporal unity of the immanent content as it recedes into the past. The "contents" in the case of the perceptual appearance are precisely these complete

appearances as temporal unities. Hence the perceptual apprehension is also constituted in such a multiplicity of adumbrations, which becomes united through the unity of the temporal apprehension. We therefore have to understand apprehension here in two senses: there is the apprehension that is constituted as something immanent; and there is the apprehension that belongs to the constitution of something immanent, to the phases of the original flow itself – the primal apprehension, which is no longer constituted. Now in the immanent flowing-off of appearances, in the continuous succession of apprehensions in phenomenological time that we call perceptions, a temporal unity becomes constituted. This happens because the continuity of apprehensions yields not only the unity of changing appearances (such as, for example, the series of aspects obtained in the process of rotating a physical thing, which appear as aspects of the same thing) but also the unity of the appearances of an enduring or changing physical thing.

Immanent time becomes objectivated into a time of the objects constituted in the immanent appearances thanks to the fact that an identical physical reality, which in all of its phases constantly presents itself in multiplicities of adumbrations, appears in the multiplicity of adumbrations of the sensation-contents understood as unities belonging to phenomenological time and, correlatively, in the multiplicity of adumbrations of the apprehensions of these contents in phenomenological time.[18] The physical thing becomes constituted in the flowing-off of its appearances, which are themselves constituted as immanent unities in the flow of original impressions; and the one necessarily becomes constituted along with the other. The appearing physical thing becomes constituted because unities of sensation and unitary apprehensions become constituted in the original flow; and therefore the consciousness of something, the exhibition – or more precisely, [93] the presentation – of something, and in the continuous succession the exhibition of the same thing, constantly becomes constituted. The flows of exhibition possess a flowing character and interconnectedness such that what appears in them is dispersed in multiplicities of presentational adumbrations in exactly the way

[18] Cf. Appendix X: Objectivation of Time and of Something Physical in Time, p. 124ff.

in which a content of sensation is dispersed in the adumbrations of sensation. For just that reason, the multiplicity of apprehensions is characterized as a presenting multiplicity, precisely as the immanent impressions are.

One sees right away that if the primally present sensuous data, over and above the primal presentations and the primal retentions and primal protentions that essentially belong together with the primal presentations, continuously bear apprehension-characters pertaining to the constitution of physical things in space, then the phenomenological time to which the data of sensation and the physical-thing apprehensions belong must coincide point for point with the spatial time of the physical things. With each filled point of phenomenological time, a point of filled objective time presents itself (by virtue of the contents of sensation and their apprehensions, which lie in phenomenological time).

Here, in the vertical series of the diagram, we have not only the all-inclusive vertical coincidence that belongs to the constitution of phenomenological time (according to which the primal datum E_2 and the retentional modification O' and E_1' are united in one moment); the retentional adumbrations – belonging to each vertical series – of the physical-thing apprehensions, as apprehensions of a physical thing, also stand in all-inclusive



coincidence. There are two coincidings here. The series of physical-thing apprehensions coincides not only because it co-constitutes a continuous succession but also because it constitutes the same physical thing. The former is a coincidence of essential likeness that makes connecting possible; the latter is a coincidence of identity, since we are conscious of something enduringly [94] identical in the continuous identification that belongs to the succession. Naturally there also belongs to the coincidence the

continuous and successive identification from vertical series to vertical series that occurs with the fulfilling of the protentions, which then also have a sense pertaining to objective space.

We have already pointed to the analogy in the constitution of immanent and transcendent unities: Just as the "adumbrations of sensation" (the primal data of presentation for unities of sensation in phenomenological time) have their law, their essential character in the primal succession, and just as they constitute the unity of sensation by means of the modification reproduced in the diagram, so we find a similar situation in the case of the adumbrations of physical things – that is, of "appearances" – which now function as primal data of the primal succession. By virtue of the retentions, etc., that ground time, the primal succession of appearance-moments constitutes the (changing or unchanging) appearance as a unity in phenomenological time. But in addition: Those appearances from among the multiplicity of appearances that belong to the same unchanged physical thing have an ontic essence (the essence of that which appears) that is entirely the same – just as the momentary data belonging to an unchanged red are of entirely the same essence. The series belonging to the change of the physical thing as well as the series belonging to the change of the red are governed by a fixed law. Hence two things are intentionally constituted together: the appearance and that which appears, with the latter appearing as unchanged or as changing in different appearances.

Now the question naturally arises: What kind of properties do the appearances of physical things that are appearances of the same thing possess? This is the question about the constitution of the spatial thing, which therefore presupposes the constitution of time.

§ 44. *Perception of the Internal and Perception of the External*[19]

Now, however, we are going to talk about an enduring perception, doing so both in connection with the perception of a

[19] Cf. Appendix XI: Adequate and Inadequate Perception, p. 127ff., and Appendix XII: Internal Consciousness and the Grasping of Experiences, p. 130ff.

physical thing and in connection with the perception of something immanent. In the case of the perception of a physical thing, we also include in perception the continuous perceptual appear- [95] ance, the continuity of now-appearances of the physical thing apart from retentional and protentional interweavings. The physical-thing appearance, the "thing in its orientation," in its determinate presentation, and so on, is something enduring, just as much as the thing that appears, taken simply, is something enduring. Even the plain surface that merely appears is something that endures and changes in this duration. In strictness, I ought not say "the thing in its orientation" but instead: the process of the physical-thing appearance, which endures when the orientation remains unchanged and which, in the opposite case, is a continuous flow of changing appearances, but within one duration.

In the case of the perception of an immanent object, we can also gather together in its continuity what is immanent in the now-point: but then this is the duration of the object itself. The object precisely does not appear in the sense in which the object appears in the perception of something external. Thus "perception" in the case of the consciousness of an external object can denote the external appearance as an immanent object, in which case perception and perceived are obviously distinct; on the other hand, if we are talking about the perception of something internal and if in this case as well perception and perceived are supposed to remain distinct, then what is immanent, that is, precisely the object itself, cannot be understood under perception. If we are talking about the perception of something internal, we can only understand by this: either 1) the internal consciousness of the unitary immanent object, consciousness that is on hand even without our turning towards the object, namely, as the consciousness that constitutes what is in time; or 2) the consciousness of something internal together with our turning towards it. Here it is easy to see that the turning-towards, the grasping, is an immanent process possessing its immanent duration that coincides with the duration of the immanent tone while we are turned towards it.

In the case of external objects, we therefore have:

1. the appearance of something external;

2. the constituting consciousness in which the appearance of something external becomes constituted as something immanent;

3. the turning-towards, which can just as well be a turning towards the appearance and its components as towards what appears. Only the latter comes into question when we refer to the perception of something external.

An analogous reflection can be carried out with respect to [96] memory, except that memory has, as memory, its own peculiar intentionality – namely, that of re-presentation. Memory has its unity as a process in internal consciousness and has its position and duration in the unity of immanent time. This is true whether it is memory of something immanent or of something transcendent. And every memory (when we disregard the turning-towards) is at the same time memory of something immanent. Thus while the consciousness of the immanent tone as original consciousness of the internal can have no immanent temporality, the re-presentational consciousness of the immanent tone (which in a suitably altered sense is the re-presentational consciousness of the internal consciousness of the tone) is an immanent object belonging to immanent temporality.

§ 45. *Constitution of Nontemporal Transcendencies*

We must note further that every consciousness in the unitary sense (as a constituted immanent unity) is at the same time necessarily also the unity of the consciousness of something objective to which it "refers." But not every consciousness is itself the consciousness of time; that is to say, consciousness of something temporal, consciousness constituting an intentional time. Thus a judging consciousness of a mathematical state of affairs is an impression, but the mathematical state of affairs that "stands before me" as a unity and in its unity is not something temporal; judging is not presenting (nor is it re-presenting).[20] Accordingly, we can say that a thing, an event, a temporal being

[20] Cf. Appendix XIII: Constitution of Spontaneous Unities as Objects in Immanent Time. – Judgment as Temporal Formation and Absolute Time-constituting Consciousness, p. 133ff.

is represented in phantasy, that it appears in the manner peculiar to phantasy, to memory, to expectation, or to retention, just as we can say that it appears as present, that it is perceived. On the other hand, we cannot say that a mathematical state of affairs appears as present or as re-presented. The judging can endure for a longer or shorter time; it has its extension in subjective time and can be present or re-presented. But what is judged is not long or short, abiding or fleeting. And this is also true of what is [97] quasi-judged in the re-presentation of a judgment. What is re-presented is the judgment, not what is judged. If one says that one "merely thinks" of a state of affairs, that does not signify that the state of affairs is re-presented; it signifies instead that it stands before one in the character of neutrality-modification rather than in the character of belief. But the doxic modalities do not at all coincide with the modalities of being-present or not-being-present, although they do intersect with them. In the case of an individual state of affairs we can still speak – loosely – of temporal characteristics, since the affair that is articulated logically and analytically and apprehended synthetically in the state of affairs can be present perceptually or re-presented in phantasy. But that makes no sense for a nontemporal state of affairs, for one that says nothing at all about anything temporal. To phantasize in a mathematical judgment does not mean to bring the mathematical state of affairs to a phantasy-representation, as if it were something that could be exhibited presentationally or re-presentationally.

Appearance in the strict sense of presentation belongs solely to the sphere of original presentation and its modifications; and it pertains to the constitution of what appears – or better, to the genuine givenness of individual being – that it is given in the form of a continuity of appearances understood as presentations. That states of affairs can also "merely appear" and require legitimation in genuine givenness is obvious. Nor does it change anything about what has been said that states of affairs ("facts of nature") grounded on individual appearances (appearances of nature) become given on the basis of underlying data of appearance and therefore, in a similar manner, in infinities of "presentations." Notwithstanding that, we must say: the "presentation" (appearance) of the state of affairs is presentation, not in the genuine

sense, but in a derived sense. The state of affairs, properly speaking, is not something temporal either; it exists *for* a specific time but is not itself something in time as a thing or an event is. Time-consciousness and presentation do not pertain to the state of affairs as a state of affairs but to the affair that belongs to it.

The same is true of all other founded acts and their correlates. A value has no place in time. A temporal object may be beautiful, [98] pleasant, useful, and so on, and these it may be for a definite period of time. But the beauty, the pleasantness, etc., have no place in nature and in time. They are not things that appear in presentations or re-presentations.

ADDENDA AND SUPPLEMENTS TO THE ANALYSIS OF TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS FROM THE YEARS 1905-1910[1,2]

Appendix I: *Primal Impression and Its Continuum of Modifications*[3]

Every primal impression is characterized as primal impression, and every modification is characterized as modification. Furthermore, every modification is continuous modification. The latter, indeed, is what distinguishes this sort of modification from phantasy-modification and pictorial modification. Each of these temporal modifications is a non-self-sufficient limit in a continuum. And this continuum has the character of a "rectilinear" multiplicity limited on one side. It has a beginning in primal impression and proceeds as modification in one direction. Pairs of points on this continuum having a certain distance from one another constitute temporal phases of the object that, on the objective side, have an equivalent distance from one another.

When we speak of "modification," we first of all have in view the change according to which the primal impression continuously "dies away." However, each modification can obviously be regarded in the same sense as modification of any preceding modification whatsoever. If we select any one phase of the continuum, we can say that it dies away; and we can say the same thing about every further phase. This, indeed, is inherent in the essence of this and of any such (one-sidedly directed) continuum. The situation is precisely the same as it is in the

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[1] According to the draft put together by Edith Stein in the summer of 1917 with the mandate and co-operation of the author and edited by Martin Heidegger in 1928. – Editor's note.

[2] When Rudolf Boehm edited these texts for *Husserliana X* in 1966, he found the original manuscript for only one of the appendices, Appendix X (see *Husserliana X,* Note 1, p. 99). Since then, Rudolf Bernet has traced manuscripts – some of them Husserl's original manuscripts and some derived from Edith Stein's "*Ausarbeitung*" – for all of the appendices except Appendix IX. These discoveries have enabled Bernet to assign dates to the following appendices: Appendix I–1916; Appendix III–1909–1910 (according to information supplied by the editor of *Husserliana XXIII*); Appendix IV–1916; Appendix VII–1916; Appendix XI–1907; Appendix XII–1911–12; Appendix XIII–1911. – Translator's note.

[3] To § 11, p. 30ff. Rudolf Bernet has discovered that Appendix I and Appendix VII are parts of the same manuscript, which Edith Stein divided. The text in its original form can be reconstructed from the following pages in *Husserliana X:* p. 115, lines 13–22; p. 99, line 6, to p. 101, line 19; p. 115, line 23, to p. 116, line 21. – Translator's note.

case of the continuum of intensities spreading out from 0. The process of being augmented is the modification that every intensity undergoes here. Each intensity [100] is in itself what it is, and each new intensity is precisely a new intensity. But in relation to any already given intensity, every intensity later in the series can be regarded as the result of an operation. If b is the intensification of a, then c is the intensification of an intensification in relation to a. In virtue of the continuity, each point is not simply intensification in relation to a preceding point but intensification of intensification of intensification, and so on *in infinitum* and infinitesimally. An infinity of interpenetrating modifications. Only in this case there is no beginning-point that can be taken as an intensity itself. The beginning here is the zero-point. It is inherent in the essence of every linear continuum that, starting from any point whatsoever, we can think of every other point as continuously produced from it; and every continuous production is a production by means of continuous iteration. We can indeed divide each interval *in infinitum* and, in the case of each division, think of the later point of the division as produced mediately through the earlier points; and thus any point whatsoever is finally produced through a division of infinitely many intensifications (each of which is the same infinitely small intensification). Now this is also true in the case of temporal modification – or rather, while the use of the word "production" is a metaphor in the case of other continua, here it is used authentically. The time-constituting continuum is a flow of continuous production of modifications of modifications. The modifications in the sense of iterations proceed from the actually present now, the actual primal impression i; but they go forwards continuously and are not only modifications in relation to i but also, in succession, modifications of one another in the order in which they flow away. This is what characterizes continuous production. Modification continuously generates ever new modification. The primal impression is the absolute beginning of this production, the primal source, that from which everything else is continuously produced. But it itself is not produced; it does not arise as something produced but through *genesis spontanea;* it is primal generation. It does not spring from anything (it has no seed); it is primal creation. If it is said: A new now continuously forms on the now that becomes modified into a not-now, or a source quite suddenly engenders it or originates it, these are metaphors. It can only be said: Consciousness is nothing without impression. When something endures, then a passes over into xa′, xa′ into yx′a″, and so on. But the production for which consciousness is responsible only reaches from a to a′, from xa′ to x′a″; the a, x, y, on the other hand, is nothing produced by consciousness. It is what is primally produced – the "new," that which has come into being alien to consciousness, that which has been received, as opposed to what has been produced through consciousness's own spontaneity. The peculiarity of this spontaneity of consciousness, however, is that it creates nothing "new" but only brings what has been primally generated to growth, to development. Of course, what from an empirical point of view we call becoming or production refers to objectivity, and that lies somewhere else altogether. Here it is a question of the spontaneity of consciousness; or put more carefully: of a primal spontaneity of consciousness.

Now depending on whether it is a question of the primal source for the [101]

respective now of the constituted content or of the spontaneous productions of consciousness in which the identity of this now is maintained on into the past, the moment of origin is either primal impression or primal memory, primal phantasy, and so on. If we follow the series of strata, each moment of origin belonging to a stratum is the primal source of spontaneous productions that run throughout the further strata in their continuous modifications and that represent this moment of origin in these strata (that is, the moment of origin that belongs uniquely and alone to the stratum we first had in view). Furthermore, each moment of origin is a phase of a continuous series of moments of origin that blend into one another throughout a succession of strata. Or each moment of origin helps to constitute a concrete duration, and it belongs to the constitution of a concrete duration that an actually present now corresponds to each of its points. The now, for its part, requires its own moment of origin for its constitution. These moments are continuously united in the succession; they "pass over into one another continuously." The transition is mediated "qualitatively" and also temporally: the *quasi*-temporal character is a continuous character.

Appendix II: *Re-presentation and Phantasy. – Impression and Imagination*[4]

"Re-presentation" in the widest sense and "phantasy" in the widest sense, in the sense they have in common – although not entirely unambiguous – discourse, are not the same. To begin with, there are nonintuitive memories and other nonintuitive re-presentations, and no one will call these phantasies. On the other hand, we do indeed say in the case of an intuitive re-presentation that what is remembered hovers before us "in phantasy" (or at least we can say something of the sort), but we do not call the memory itself a phantasy. Furthermore, re-presentation can be a re-presentation of something itself, or it can be a pictorializing (analogical) re-presentation. In the latter case, we will say that what is re-presented hovers before us "in the form of a phantasy image" or is pictorialized in phantasy-appearance. The phantasy image is then a matter of phantasy; that which transcends the phantasy image, the relation to what is depicted, is no longer a matter of phantasy. We will not be able to characterize what is depicted itself as appearing in phantasy, as if two phantasies, one built on top of the other, presented themselves here. Whenever we talk about phantasy – about the phantasy of an object, that is – it is commonly understood that the object appears in an appearance; specifically, in a re-presenting appearance, not in a presenting one. What does this imply? What is "appearance" here? An object can be intuited, and it can be represented "symbolically" (through signs); finally, it can be emptily represented. Intuition (and empty representation as well) [102] is simple, immediate representation of the object; a symbolic representation is a founded representation – empty – mediated through a simple representation. An intuitive representation brings the object to appearance; an empty representation does not. To begin with, we can separate *simple* representations into simple

[4] To § 17, p. 42f.

intuitive representations and simple empty representations. But an empty representation can also be a *symbolic* representation that not only emptily represents the object but represents it "through" signs or images. In the latter case, the object is pictorialized, made intuitable in an image, but not intuitively represented "itself." Every intuitive re-presentation of something objective represents *in the manner peculiar to phantasy*. It "contains" a *phantasy-appearance* of the object. Moreover, the re-presentation here can have the character of *actuality* or of the *absence of actuality*;[5] and its mode of certainty (the mode of position-taking) can be any of the following: certitude, deeming possible, uncertain presumption, doubt, etc. Furthermore, it is a matter of indifference whether the re-presentation apprehends its object as something past or as something existing now (in the case of expectation, however, we already have a symbolic consciousness if the expectation intuitively illustrates what is expected). Everywhere the "mere phantasy-appearance" remains as the common core. Of course, the problem is to make clear how this core is wrapped up, so to speak, in all the other elements, how further apprehensions are combined with the core apprehension. – We also find an appearance in all presentations that are purely and simply intuitive; and an appearance – a perceptual appearance now, not a phantasy-appearance – underlies the presentations that make something intuitable symbolically. We therefore distinguish perceptual appearances and phantasy-appearances. The latter contain "phantasms" (re-presentational modifications of sensations) as their apprehension-material; the former contain sensations.

Now how is the phantasy-appearance a modification (a re-presenting modification) of the corresponding perceptual appearance? Naturally the answer does not lie in the direction of the qualitative modes, of the modalities of position-taking, which indeed are left out of account. In fact, we have a modification irrespective of the possible alteration of these modes. The phantasms correspond to the sensations, but the apprehensions (and the complete appearances) – irrespective of their modality – are also modified on both sides and in the same respect. Even if the apprehension and the complete appearance were to require a qualitative mode, this would still have nothing to do with that "imaginative" modification we are talking about here.

Let us call the perceptual appearance, independently of the mode of "position-taking," *apparency* [*Apparenz*], and more distinctly, *perceptive* apparency when it occurs in a perception (mode of belief) and *illusory* apparency when it occurs in an illusion. On the other hand, we must also distinguish between *impressional* apparency (sensation-apparency) and *imaginative* apparency; the latter, for its part, can be the content of a memory, of an illusion in memory, and the like. Hence the distinction between impression and imagination touches the apparency understood as the identical core of all intuitive acts, and this distinction conditions the distinction between presentation and re-presentation for the whole phenomenon. Furthermore, it is evident that this distinction between impression and imagination concerns not only the sphere of "external sense" but also that of internal sense. In other words, all the modal characters with which the apparency [103]

[5] "Actuality" and "absence of actuality" here signify the same thing as "positionality" and "neutrality" in the sense of the *Ideen*.

can be combined and all the correlative ontic characters (the character of being "actual" in the sense of factually existing, of having existed, of coming to be, that is, of being about to occur; the character of illusion; the character of representing now-being; and so on) are also subject to the division into impression and imagination; and this is also true of wishing, willing, etc. But here in the province of "internal sense" we must distinguish between sensation and apparency as well, just as we must in the province of external sense; and in the case of an apparency we must again distinguish between the apparency itself and its modal characters. Thus, for example, I believe this or that. The belief is actually present belief; it is impression. A phantasm "belief" corresponds to it. The belief in itself or the belief-sensation must be distinguished from the believing in the apprehension understood as my state or condition, my judging. There I have perceptual consciousness of myself and of my judging; and in this apprehension we have to distinguish between the internal apparency and the modality of believing, which posits being (my believing) and fits it into existing reality.

The separation between "believing" and the "apprehension" of "believing" suffices without our having to take the latter as psychological apperception that puts the immanent in connection with the actual world.

Every "consciousness," therefore, has either the character of "sensation" or the character of "phantasm." Every consciousness, every "sensation" in the widest sense, is precisely something "perceptible" and "representable"; for example, something that can be remembered, something that can be experienced in every way. But again and again we have consciousness that has its possible counterpart in the phantasm.

Appendix III: *The Nexus-Intentions of Perception and Memory. – The Modes of Time-Consciousness*[6]

Let us now consider the consciousness "memory." As unmodified consciousness, it is "sensation" or – what signifies the same thing – impression. Or more distinctly: it may contain phantasms, but it itself is not a phantasy-modification [104] of another consciousness as corresponding sensation. An appearance,[7] however, is contained in this memory. I remember an event: the imaginary appearance of the event, which appears with a background of appearance to which I myself belong, is contained in the memory. This appearance as a whole has the character of an imaginative appearance, but also possesses a mode of belief that characterizes memory. We can then posit the memory itself in phantasy. We can have memory in phantasy and even in memory: I live in a memory, and the memory emerges "that I have remembered such and such"; or I phantasy that I have a memory. In the latter case, we do indeed find the modality of memory converted into a corresponding phantasm; but the material of the memory, the memory-appearance, is not itself modified further, any more than the phantasms contained

[6] To § 23, p. 52ff.

[7] "Appearance" will be used to translate "*Apparenz*" wherever it occurs in this appendix. – Translator's note.

in it have been modified further. There is no phantasm of the second degree. And the whole memory-appearance that makes up memory's material is a phantasm and also undergoes no further modification.

If, to go further, I then have a memory of a memory, a "modified" memory emerges in the nexus of a memorial process, that is, in the nexus of a consciousness in which imaginary appearances are present and run off in the qualitative mode of memory. Here we must say essentially the same thing that we said before. The simple memory is replaced by "memory of memory"; that is, I have a memorial phantasm in the qualitative mode of memory (going along with the whole memorial process). But the memorial phantasm has the character of a memory of . . . , grounded on an imaginary appearance, and this appearance is identically the same in the cases of simple memory and of memory of memory. If one says that what is characteristic of memory as opposed to all that makes up its content is that an apprehension is present in it that gives it a relation to the actually present perceptual reality, there is by all means something correct in the assertion; but this changes nothing about what has been said. We must then distinguish between content and mode of belief in the case of this apprehension itself. The apprehension, of course, is different in the case of the simple memory I am having now, say, and in the case of the memory of memory that relates the remembered memory to a remembered now as the point of actual presence. But the main point here is that the appearances (which we take altogether intuitively, precisely as appearances) can undergo no modification. And the same will be true of the content of the memorial apprehensions that give the appearances a relation to the now – apprehensions that, naturally, will not be fully intuitive.

But this relation to the actually present now, which is characteristic of memory and distinguishes it from "mere phantasy," must not be taken as something [105] externally attached. It has an obvious analogue in the relation of every perception to an actual here. Furthermore, just as every memory points to an infinite nexus of memories (to an anteriority), so every perception points back to an infinite nexus of perceptions (a multiple infinity). (The "here" is nevertheless not perceptible, that is, not given itself in the memory.) Now we can also take a perception purely by itself, removed from its nexus. But even if the nexus is not really there as the connection of the perception with further perceptions, it nevertheless lies "potentially" in the intention. That is, if we take the full perception at any moment, it always still has connections in the sense that there belongs to it a complex of determinate or indeterminate intentions, a complex that leads further and, in being realized, is fulfilled in further perceptions. These nexus-intentions cannot be cut away. As far as the single sensation is concerned, it is in fact nothing single. That is to say, primary contents are at all times bearers of rays of apprehension, and they do not occur without such rays, however indeterminate the latter may be. This is also true in the case of memory. It possesses its "nexus" in itself; that is, as memory it has its form, which we describe as intentional moments directed forwards and backwards. Without such moments it cannot exist. Their fulfillment requires series of memories that empty into the actually present now. It is impossible to treat the memory as if it were something by itself, separating it from the intentions that connect it with other memories.

The memory "by itself" already has these intentions; no "mere phantasy" can be drawn from it. Now suppose one were to say: Memory is, after all, memory of an earlier now, a *quasi*-perception that brings a temporal flow to consciousness. And suppose one were to continue on and ask: If that is what memory is, why should one not be able to hold on to the phenomenon as a whole and cut away, on both sides, the intentions proper to memory? One would then have to answer this question as follows. The perception itself, the "original" act, not only has its spatial nexus but also its temporal nexus. Every perception has its retentional and protentional halo. The modification of perception must also contain – in modified fashion – this double halo; and what distinguishes "mere phantasy" from memory is that in memory's case this entire intentional complex has the character of actuality, while in the case of mere phantasy it is characterized by the absence of actuality.

Every sensation has its intentions that lead from the now to a new now, and so on: the intention aimed at the future and, on the other side, the intention aimed at the past. As far as memory is concerned, it too has its memorial intentions aimed at the future. These intentions are completely determined inasmuch as their fulfillment (provided that it is entirely at our disposal) runs in a determinate direction and is completely determined in content, while in the case of perception [106] the intentions aimed at the future are generally undetermined with regard to matter and become determined only through further actual perception. (The only thing determined is that something or other will come.)

As far as the intentions aimed at the past are concerned, they are completely determined in the perception but reversed, so to speak. There exists a determinate connection between the current perception and the chain of memories, but in such a way that the memorial intentions (as unilaterally directed) terminate in the perception. Now obviously these memories are merely possibilities; only the exceptional one, or a few of them, are actually cogiven with the perception. On the other hand, it is certainly the case that the perception is endowed with corresponding intentions aimed at the past, but these are empty intentions matching those memories or nexuses of memory discussed above. Both the empty just past, which is oriented towards the actually present now, and – as one is surely permitted to say – vague, empty intentions that concern what belongs to the further past are all directed towards the now. These intentions are actualized or come to fulfillment by our being transported in one leap, as it were, back into the past by memory, and then by our intuitively re-presenting the past to ourselves once again in its progression up to the now. We can say: The present is always born from the past, a determinate present from a determinate past, of course. Or better: A determinate flow runs its course again and again; the actually present now sinks away and passes over into a new now, and so on. Even if there may be a necessity of an *a priori* kind involved here, an "association" nevertheless conditions it; that is, the nexus of the past is determined by experience, and it is further determined by experience "that something or other will come." But then we are led from this secondary level (from the complex of intentions belonging to the experience of time) to the original level, and this consists in nothing other than the transition from the current now to the new now.

It belongs to the essence of perception not only that it has in view a punctual now and not only that it releases from its view something that has just been, while "still intending" it in the original mode of the "just-having-been," but also that it passes over from now to now and, in anticipation, goes to meet the new now. The waking consciousness, the waking life, is a living-towards, a living that goes from the now towards the new now. I am not merely and not primarily thinking of attention here; it would rather seem to me that, independently of attention (in the narrower and in the wider sense), an original intention proceeds from now to now, combining with the sometimes undetermined and sometimes more or less determined experiential intentions deriving from the past. These intentions, to be sure, predelineate the lines of the combination. But the regard from the now towards the new now, this transition, is something original that first paves the way for future experiential intentions. I said that this belongs to the essence of [107] perception; I would do better to say that it belongs to the essence of impression. It is certainly true of every "primary content," of every sensation. "Phantasm" and memorial content signify the corresponding modification of this consciousness, a "quasi-consciousness." And if it is supposed to be a genuine memory, an inserting into the past pertains to this quasi-consciousness. The memorial modification consists in the fact that the whole original consciousness of the moment in question, taken fully and completely, receives and maintains its modification. It therefore consists in the fact that the temporal intentions in whose nexus the impressional regard belongs, taken as a whole, receive and maintain their modification – and thus the entire intentional nexus in which that original impression was inserted and which gives the impression its character.

We regard sensing as the original consciousness of time; in it an immanent unity such as color or tone, an immanent unity such as a wish or pleasure, and so on, becomes constituted. Phantasying is the modification of this time-consciousness; it is re-presentation, and in it re-presented color, re-presented wish, etc., become constituted. But re-presentation can be memory, expectation, or also "mere phantasy": hence we cannot talk about *one* modification. Sensation is presenting time-consciousness. Re-presentation is also sensing, [in the sense that] it is present and becomes constituted as a unity in the presenting time-consciousness. Only the differences between the presentation of the now and the presentation of the just now, which together belong to the concrete presentational consciousness, come into consideration as modes of presenting time-consciousness. We must also take into consideration the difference between presentation, which possesses in itself its now-presentation phase, and self-sufficient retention, which does indeed have a relation to the actually present now but does not itself contain a point of now-presentation: for example, the consciousness of a tone that has just died away. Consequently, we have as essential modes of time-consciousness: 1. "sensation" as presentation [*Gegenwärtigung*] (making originally present [*Präsentation*]), and the retention and protention that are combined with it essentially but that also attain to self-sufficiency (the original sphere in the wider sense); 2. the positing re-presentation (memory), the re-presentation of something coexisting with what is present [*Mitvergegenwärtigung*], and re-presentation (expectation); 3. phantasy re-presentation as pure phantasy, in which all the same modes occur in phantasy-consciousness.

Appendix IV: *Recollection and the Constitution of Temporal Objects and Objective Time*[8]

I can "repeat" the perception of a temporal object, but what becomes constituted in the succession of these perceptions is the consciousness of the succession of two temporal objects that are perfectly alike. Only in recollection can I repeatedly have an identical temporal object, and I can also confirm in [108] memory that what was earlier perceived is the same as what is subsequently remembered. This happens in simple memory – "I have perceived that" – and in recollection of the second degree – "I have remembered that." Thus can the temporal object become the identical object of repeated experiencing acts. If the object is given once, it can be given again, considered again, and identified in different acts, which then form a succession; and this can be done as often as one pleases.

Recollection is not simply the being-conscious once again of the object; rather, just as the perception of a temporal object carries with it its temporal horizon, so too the recollection repeats the consciousness of this horizon. Two recollections can be memories of like temporal objects – of two tones that are perfectly alike, for example. But they are recollections of the same temporal object when not merely the duration-content but the temporal horizon is the same, when therefore the two recollections fully and completely repeat one another with regard to intentional content, irrespective of differences in clarity or obscurity, gappiness, and so forth. The identity of temporal objects is therefore a constitutional unity produced in certain possible identifying coincidences of recollections. Temporal objectivity is produced in the subjective temporal flow, and it is essential to temporal objectivity that it be identifiable in recollections and as such be the subject of identical predicates.

Actually present time is oriented – constantly oriented in the flow and constantly oriented from a new now. The time in recollection, of course, is also given as oriented in each moment of the memory; but each point presents an objective time-point that can be identified again and again, and the extent of time is made up out of nothing but objective points and is itself identifiable again and again. What is the identical object here? The series of primal impressions and continuous modifications, a series of similarities that produces the coinciding formations of series of likeness or difference, producing them within a universal likeness, however: this series gives the original consciousness of unity. In such a series of modifications, we necessarily become conscious of a unity: the enduring tone (continuously the same or continuously changing); and then, in a different focusing of one's regard, we become conscious of the duration in which the tone is one and in which it changes or does not change. And the tone continues to endure: its duration "becomes greater"; and it "ceases," is over with: its whole duration has elapsed and recedes further and further into the past. Thus the tone is given here, let us say, as continually unchanged in its duration. But this tone, unchanged in its duration as far as its content is concerned, undergoes a transformation that does not involve the content but the entire mode of givenness

[8] To § 32, p. 72ff.

of the "content in its duration." If we restrict ourselves to the phenomena, we have quite different unity-formations: continual transformation of the mode of [109] givenness; but throughout the lines of transformation that correspond to each point of the duration, we have a unity: *the* tone-point. Without prejudice to this identity, however, the tone-point is always and unceasingly different; namely, in the mode of its depth in time. On the other hand, the continuity of the temporal flow gives a unity: the unity of the one changing or unchanging content, the unity of the temporal object. It is this unity that recedes into the past. Yet with this unity we still do not have full temporal objectivity.

The possibility of identification belongs to the constituting of time: I can execute a memory (a recollection) of what has gone before again and again, continually producing "anew" each temporal part with its filling and then grasping the same thing – the same duration with the same content, the same object – in the succession of re-productions I now have. The object is a unity of consciousness that can show itself as the same in repeated acts (hence in temporal succession); it is something identical in the intention and something identifiable in any number of acts of consciousness – more precisely, something perceivable or perceivable once again in any number of perceptions. I can convince myself "at any time" of the identical "it is." Thus I can empirically experience a process in time for the first time, and I can experience it again and grasp its identity in repeated re-experiencings. I can return to it again and again in my thinking, and I can legitimate this thinking by re-experiencing the process originally. And in this way objective time first becomes constituted; and first of all the objective time of what is just past, in relation to which the process of empirical experience in which the duration is produced, as well as every retention of the whole duration, are mere "adumbrations." I have an original schema: a flow with its content. But I have in addition an original multiplicity of the "I can": I can shift back to any position in the flow and produce it "once again." As in the case of the constitution of objective spatiality, here too we have an optimum. The image of duration in the simple looking-back is unclear. In clear re-production I have the "thing itself"; and the clearer the re-production, the more complete it is.

Appendix V: *Simultaneity of Perception and the Perceived*[9]

By what right can one say that perception and what is perceived are simultaneous? With respect to objective time – in the naïve attitude – this is not correct, for it is possible that in the perception's time-point the perceived object no longer exists at all (a star); from this standpoint one will even have to say that the time-points of the perception and the perceived always diverge.

Let us take – now in the phenomenological attitude – the appearing objective [110] time in which a transcendent object endures. In this case, the duration of the perception does not synchronize with the duration of the perceived object: we say that the object already existed before the perception and will continue to exist after the perception has run its course. But one can say that the perceived object is

[9] To § 33, p. 74.

the correlate of a possible continuous perception that follows it from the beginning to the end of its duration. A phase of the perception then corresponds to each phase of the object's duration. But that is still not to say that the point at which the object's duration begins and the point at which the perception begins must coincide, that consequently the time-points of the phases corresponding to one another must be identical. We must take into account in this respect that the data of sensation, which play their role in the constitution of a transcendent object, are themselves unities constituted in a temporal flow. At the moment when the apprehension commences, the perception begins; before that moment we cannot speak of perception. The apprehension is the "animation" of the datum of sensation. It remains to be asked, however, whether the apprehension begins simultaneously with the datum of sensation or whether the datum must not be constituted – even if only for an extremely brief period of time – before the animating apprehension can commence. It seems that the latter is what occurs. In that case, in the moment in which the apprehension begins, a part of the datum of sensation has already elapsed and is preserved only in retention. The apprehension then animates not only the phase of primal sensation actual at the moment but the entire datum of sensation, including that portion of it that has elapsed. But that implies that the apprehension posits the object in the condition or quality corresponding to the running-off of the sensation for the entire duration of the sensation's running-off, thus too for the segment of time that precedes the perceptual apprehension itself. A difference in time therefore exists between the beginning-point of the perception and the beginning-point of the object. By clarifying the "external conditions" to which the occurrence of a datum of sensation is subject, one can perhaps make the naturalistic assertion mentioned above – about the nonsimultaneity of the perception and the perceived – a matter of insight as well.

Now let us exclude transcendent objects and ask how matters stand with respect to the simultaneity of perception and the perceived in the immanent sphere. If we take perception here as the act of reflection in which immanent unities come to be given, then this act presupposes that something is already constituted – and preserved in retention – on which it can look back: in this instance, therefore, the perception follows after what is perceived and is not simultaneous with it. But – as we have seen – reflection and retention presuppose the impressional "internal consciousness" of the immanent datum in question in its original constitution; and this consciousness is united concretely with the currently intended primal impressions and is inseparable from them:[10] if we wish to designate "internal consciousness" too as "perception," then here we truly have strict simultaneity of perception and what is perceived. [111]

[10] On "internal consciousness," cf. Appendix XII, p. 130ff.

Appendix VI: *The Grasping of the Absolute Flow. – Perception in a Fourfold Sense*[11]

The objects in question here are temporal objects that must become constituted. The sensuous core (the appearance without apprehension) "now" exists and has just been existing and existed still earlier, and so on. In this now there is also the retention of the past now belonging to all of the stages of the duration now being intended. Each past now retentionally shelters in itself all earlier stages. A bird just now flies through the sunlit garden. I seize a phase and find in it the retentional consciousness of the past adumbrations of the temporal position, and in each new now I find the same thing. But the temporal trail that belongs to each phase is itself something that sinks backward in time and has its adumbration. The whole content belonging to each now sinks into the past, but this sinking is not a process that would be reproduced *in infinitum*. The bird changes its place; it flies. In each new position the reverberation of the earlier appearances adheres to the bird (that is, to its appearance). While the bird continues to fly, however, each phase of this reverberation fades away; and thus there belongs to each succeeding phase a series of "echoes." We do not have a simple series of successive phases (say, each actually present now, together with one phase); on the contrary, in each individual phase of the succession we have a series of phases.

Every temporal appearance, after phenomenological reduction, dissolves into such a flow. But I cannot perceive in turn the consciousness itself into which all of this is dissolved. For this new percept would again be something temporal that points back to a constituting consciousness of a similar sort, and so *in infinitum*. Hence the question arises: How do I come to know about the constituting flow?[12]

According to the explanations we have given up to now, the levels of the description (and of the constitution) of temporal objects are the following. We have:

1. The perception of empirical objects in the ordinary sense: there they stand, etc.
2. In phenomenological reflection, I take the object as a phenomenon; I am directed towards the perception, towards the appearance and what appears in their correlation. The actual physical thing exists in actual space, endures and changes in actual time, and so on. The physical thing appearing in perception has [112] an appearing space and an appearing time. And the appearances themselves and all the formations of consciousness have, in turn, their time, namely, their now and their temporal extension in the form of the now-before: the subjective time.

Here we must note: The object of perception appears in "subjective time," the object of memory in a remembered subjective time, the object of phantasy in a phantasied subjective time, the object of expectation in an expected subjective time. Perception, memory, expectation, phantasy, judgment, will, feeling – in short, everything that is the object of reflection appears in the same subjective time, specifically, in the same subjective time in which the objects of perception appear.

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[11] To §§ 34ff., p. 77ff.

[12] Cf. § 40, p. 88f.

3. Subjective time becomes constituted in the absolute timeless consciousness, which is not an object. Now let us consider how this absolute consciousness comes to be given. We have a tone-appearance; we focus our attention on the appearance as appearance. Like the violin tone (thought of as something physical), the appearance of the tone has its duration; and in this duration it changes or remains constant. I can focus my attention on one phase or another of this appearance: appearance here is the immanent tone or the immanent tonal movement, apart from its "signifying." But this is not the ultimate consciousness. This immanent tone becomes "constituted"; namely, together with the tone-now of the moment we also continuously have tone-adumbrations, and in these adumbrations the extent of tone-pasts that belong to this now presents itself. We can focus our attention in some measure on this series. In the case of a melody, for example, we can bring a moment to a halt, so to speak, and find in it the memorial adumbrations of the preceding tones. Obviously the same thing also applies to each individual tone. We then have the immanent tone-now and the immanent tone-pasts in their succession or continuity. But, in addition, we are supposed to have the following continuity: perception of the now and memory of the past; and this whole continuity is itself supposed to be a now. In point of fact: Living in the consciousness of the object, I look back into the past from the now-point. On the other hand, I can take the whole consciousness of the object as a now and say: now. I seize the moment and take the whole consciousness as a being-together, as a being-all-at-once. I am now hearing a prolonged whistling. It is like an extended line. I have halted at each moment and from there the line extends. The view from this moment comprehends an entire line, and the consciousness of the line is apprehended as simultaneous with the now-point of the whistling. I therefore have perception in several senses:[13]

1. I have perception of the steam whistle or, rather, of the whistling of the whistle.

2. I have perception of the tone-content itself that endures and of the [113] tone-process in its duration, without regard to its insertion into nature.

3. I have perception of the tone-now and at the same time heedfulness of the tone-just-having-been combined with it.

4. I have perception of the consciousness of time in the now: I focus my attention on the now-appearing of the whistling – or, in other words, of a tone – and on the now-appearing of a whistling that extends for some distance into the past (a now-phase of the whistling and a continuity of adumbrations appear to me in this now).

What kind of difficulties are there with respect to the last of these perceptions? Naturally I have time-consciousness without its being an object itself. And if I do make it into an object, it itself has a temporal position in turn; and if I follow it from moment to moment, it has a temporal extension. There is no doubt that such perception does exist. As a look that seizes its object can focus on the flow of tone-phases, so it can focus on the continuity of tone-phases in the now of the appearing in which the physical object presents itself, and again on the continuity of changes belonging to this momentary continuity. And the time of this

[13] Cf. § 17, p. 42f., and § 18, p. 44ff.

"change" is the same as the time of the object. If it is a question of an unchanging tone, for example, then the subjective temporal duration of the immanent tone is identical with the temporal extension of the continuity of change belonging to the appearance.

But is there not something very peculiar here? Can one speak in the strict sense of change in a situation in which, after all, constancy, duration filled out without change, is inconceivable? No possible constancy can be attributed to the continuous flow of appearance-phases.

There is no duration in the original flow.[14] For duration is the form of something enduring, of an enduring being, of something identical in the temporal sequence that functions as its duration. In the case of processes such as a thunderstorm, the motion of a shooting star, and so on, we have to do with unitary complexes of changes in enduring objects. Objective time is a form of "persisting" objects, of their changes and of other processes involved in them. "Process" is therefore a concept presupposing persistence. But persistence is unity that becomes constituted in the flow, and it pertains to the essence of the flow that no persistence can exist in it. Phases of experience and continuous series of phases exist in the flow. But such a phase is nothing that persists, any more than a continuous series of such phases is. To be sure, in a way it is also an objectivity. I can direct my regard towards a phase that stands out in the flow or towards an extended section of the flow, and I can identify it in repeated re-presentation, return to the same section again and again, and say: this section of the flow. And so too for the entire flow, which in the proper way I can identify [114] as this one flow. But this identity is not the unity of something that persists and it can never be such a unity. It belongs to the essence of persistence that what persists can persist as either changing or unchanging. Every change *idealiter* can pass over into a condition of constancy, every motion into rest and every rest into motion, and every qualitative change into a condition of qualitative constancy. The duration is then filled with "the same" phases.

As a matter of principle, however, no concrete part of the flow can make its appearance as nonflow. The flow is not a contingent flow, as an objective flow is. The change of its phases can never cease and turn into a continuance of phases always remaining the same. But does not the flow also possess, in a certain manner, something abiding, even if no concrete part of the flow can be converted into a nonflow? What abides, above all, is the formal structure of the flow, the form of the flow. That is to say, the flowing is not only flowing throughout, but each phase has one and the same form. This constant form is always filled anew by "content," but the content is certainly not something introduced into the form from without. On the contrary, it is determined through the form of regularity – only in such a way that this regularity does not alone determine the concretum. The form consists in this, that a now becomes constituted by means of an impression and that a trail of retentions and a horizon of protentions are attached to the impression. But this abiding form supports the consciousness of constant change, which is a primal fact: the consciousness of the change of impression into retention while a fresh impression continuously makes its appearance; or, with

[14] On the following, cf. particularly § 36, p. 76f.

respect to the "what" of the impression, the consciousness of the change of this what as it is modified from being something still intended as "now" into something that has the character of "just having been."

With this conception we therefore come – as we have already suggested – to the question about the time-consciousness in which the time of the time-consciousness of the tone-appearances becomes constituted.

If I live in the appearing of the tone, the tone stands before me, and it has its duration or its alteration. If I focus my attention on the appearing of the tone, then this appearing stands before me and has its temporal extension, its duration or alteration. The appearing of the tone can therefore signify various things here. It can also signify the focusing of my attention on the continuity of adumbrations – now, just now, and so on. Now the stream (the absolute flow) in its turn is supposed to be objective and to have its time. Here again a consciousness constituting this objectivity and a consciousness constituting this time would be necessary. On principle we could reflect again, and so *in infinitum*. Can the infinite regress here be shown to be innocuous?

1. The tone endures, becomes constituted in a continuity of phases.

2. While or as long as the tone endures, there belongs to each point of the duration a series of adumbrations running from the now in question on into the [115] blurry past. We therefore have a continuous consciousness, each point of which is a steady continuum. But this continuum in its turn is a temporal series on which we can direct our attention. The drama therefore starts all over again. If we fix any point of this sequence, it seems that there must belong to it a consciousness of the past that refers to the series of past sequences, and so on.

Now even if reflection is not pursued *in infinitum* and even if no reflection at all is necessary, that which makes possible this reflection – and, so it seems, makes it possible at least on principle *in infinitum* – must nevertheless be given. And there lies the problem.

Appendix VII: *Constitution of Simultaneity*[15]

"A" – a tone, for example – becomes constituted in a time-point belonging to a specific phase from among the phases forming its duration by means of a primal impression α, on which follows such and such a modification together with the primal generation of new impressions (new now-moments). Let b be a simultaneous immanent unity, a color, say, and let it be fixed in view as a point "simultaneous" with the tone-point mentioned above. The primal impression β corresponds to b, the color, in the process of constitution. Now what do α and β have in common? What brings it about that they constitute simultaneity and that two modifications α' and β' constitute a having-been-simultaneous?

Multiple primal impressions, primal phantasms, etc. – in short, multiple original moments (we can also say: primal moments of internal consciousness) – can belong to one stratum of internal consciousness. All of the original moments belonging to one stratum have the same character of consciousness, which is

[15] To § 38, p. 80ff.

essentially constitutive of the respective "now": the now is the same for all of the constituted contents. This common character constitutes simultaneity, the "same-nowness" ["*Gleich-Jetzigkeit*"].

By virtue of the original spontaneity of internal consciousness, each primal moment is the source-point for a continuity of productions, and this continuity is of one and the same form. The manner of production, of primal temporal modification, is the same for all primal moments; one and the same law governs throughout all the modifications. This law reads: The continuous producing that belongs to internal consciousness has the form of a one-dimensional "rectilinear" multiplicity; all primal moments within one stratum undergo the same modification (they produce the same moments of the past). Therefore the modifications of two primal moments belonging to the same stratum, modifications that have the same distance from their corresponding primal moments, belong to one and the same stratum; or, the modifications belonging to one stratum again and again produce out of themselves only modifications that belong to one and the same [116] stratum. The production always proceeds at the same speed.

Within each stratum, the different points of the continuous series are at a different distance from the primal moment. This distance on the part of any point is identical with the distance the same point has from its primal moment in the earlier stratum. The constituting primal field of time-consciousness is a continuous extension consisting of a primal moment and a determinate series of reiterated modifications – reiterated modifications with regard to form, not content. As far as form is concerned, the determinations pertaining to these modifications are always and ever the same in all primal fields (in their succession). Each primal moment is precisely a primal moment (now-consciousness); each past, consciousness of the past; and the degree of being past is something determined: a firmly determined formal character corresponds to it in the primally constituting consciousness.

In the succession of strata, moments with "contents" that are perfectly alike, that is, moments whose internal make-up is perfectly alike, can come onto the scene over and over again as primal moments. These primal moments belonging to different strata and possessing internal contents that are entirely alike are individually distinct.

Appendix VIII: *The Double Intentionality of the Stream of Consciousness*[16]

We have a double intentionality in the stream of consciousness. Either we consider the content of the flow together with its flow-form: then we are looking at the primal-experience series, which is a series of intentional experiences, consciousness of.... Or we direct our regard to the intentional unities, to what is intended as something unitary in the streaming on of the flow: then an objectivity stands before us in objective time, the temporal field proper as opposed to the temporal field of the stream of experience.

[16] To § 39, p. 84ff.

The stream of experience with its phases and extents is itself a unity identifiable through memory together with the directing of one's regard towards what flows: impressions and retentions; the emerging, changing in conformity with law, and disappearing or becoming obscure. This unity becomes constituted originally through the fact of the flow itself; that is to say, it is the flow's proper essence not only simply to exist but to be a unity of experience and to be given in internal consciousness, in which a ray of attention can extend towards it. (This ray is not itself an object of attention. It enriches but does not alter the stream to be considered; it rather "fixes" it and makes it objective.) The attentive perception of this unity is an intentional experience with variable content; and a memory can be directed towards what has passed away and can modify it repeatedly, compare it with what is like it, etc. That this identification is possible, that an object is [117] constituted here, depends on the structure of the experiences: namely, that each phase of the stream changes into retention "of . . . ," that the latter in turn changes in the same way, and so on. Without that process, a content would be inconceivable as experience; without it, as a matter of principle, experience would not and could not be given as a unity to the subject and consequently would be nothing. The flowing consists in the passing of each phase of the original field (thus of a linear continuum) over into a retentional modification of the same, only just past, phase. And so it continues.

In the case of the second intentionality, I do not follow the flow of fields, the flow of the form "now (original)-retentional modification of different degrees" as a unitary sequence of change. Instead, I direct my attention to what is intended in each field and in each phase that the field as a linear continuum possesses. Each phase is an intentional experience. In the case of the foregoing objectification, the constituting experiences were the acts of internal consciousness whose objects are precisely the "phenomena" of time-constituting consciousness. The latter are therefore intentional experiences themselves; their objects are the time-points and temporal durations with their respective objective fillings. While the absolute temporal flow flows, the intentional phases are displaced, but in such a way that they constitute unities in an interrelated manner; they pass over into one another precisely as phenomena of one thing, which is adumbrated in the flowing phenomena in such a way that we have "objects in their ways of appearing" ["*Gegenstände im Wie*"] and in ever new ways of appearing. The form of the way of appearing is the orientation: the now, the just past, the future. With regard to the objects, then, we can once again speak of the flow in which the now changes into the past, and so on. And this is necessarily prescribed *a priori* by the structure of the experience-flow as the flow of intentional experiences.

Retention is a peculiar modification of the perceptual consciousness, which is primal impression in the original time-constituting consciousness and immanent (adequate) perception with respect to the temporal objects – at least when they are immanent, such as an enduring tone in the tonal field or even a color datum in the visual field. If P(t) is the perception of a sensed tone, grasping it as an enduring tone, then P(t) changes into a continuity of retentions $R_{p(t)}$. But P(t) is also given as an experience in internal consciousness. If P(t) changes into $R_{p(t)}$, then precisely the internal consciousness of $R_{p(t)}$ necessarily changes in internal consciousness. For here indeed being and being-internally-intended coincide. But

then the internal consciousness of P(t) also changes into the retentional modification of this internal consciousness, and this retentional modification itself is intended internally. Thus it is that the just-having-perceived is intended.

When a tone-perception passes over into its corresponding retentions (the consciousness of the tone that just was), a consciousness of the perceiving that [118] just was is found there (in internal consciousness, as experience), and both coincide; I cannot have one without the other. Put differently, both necessarily belong together: the change of a perception of an object into a retentional modification of this perception and the change of the act of perceiving into a retentional modification of the act of perceiving. Thus we necessarily have two kinds of retentional modifications given with every perception that is not perception of internal consciousness. Internal consciousness is a flow. If experiences that are not "internal perceptions" are to be possible in this flow, two kinds of retentional series must be given. Therefore, in addition to the constitution of the flow as a unity through retentions of the "internal," a series of retentions of the "external" must also be given. The latter series constitutes objective time (a constituted immanence, external to the first but nonetheless immanent). Here we must note that the consciousness of the internal does not have as its correlate immanent data that endure (such as a tonal datum, or enduring joys and sorrows, or enduring processes called judgments) but the phases constituting these unities.

Appendix IX: *Primal Consciousness and the Possibility of Reflection*[17]

Retention is not a modification in which impressional data are really preserved, only in modified form: on the contrary, it is an intentionality – indeed, an intentionality with a specific character of its own. When a primal datum, a new phase, emerges, the preceding phase does not vanish but is "kept in grip" (that is to say, precisely "retained"); and thanks to this retention, a looking-back at what has elapsed is possible. The retention itself is not a looking-back that makes the elapsed phase into an object: while I have the elapsed phase in my grip, I live through the present phase, take it – thanks to retention – "in addition" to the elapsed phase; and I am directed towards what is coming (in a protention).

But since I keep the elapsed phase in my grip, I can direct my regard to it in a new act that we call reflection (immanent perception) or recollection, depending on whether the elapsed experiencing is still being generated in new primal data and is therefore an impression, or on whether it has already elapsed as a whole and "is receding into the past." These acts stand to retention in the relation of fulfillment. Retention itself is not an "act" (that is, an immanent duration-unity constituted in a series of retentional phases) but a momentary consciousness of the elapsed phase and at the same time a foundation for the retentional consciousness of the next phase. Each phase, by being retentionally conscious of the preceding phase, includes in itself the entire series of elapsed retentions in the form of a chain of mediate intentions: it is precisely in this way that duration-

[17] To § 39, particularly p. 84ff., and § 40, p. 88f.

unities, which are reproduced by the vertical series of the time-diagram and which [119] are the objects of retrospective acts, become constituted. In these acts, the series of constituting phases comes to be given along with the constituted unity (e.g., the unchanging tone continuously preserved in retention). We therefore owe it to retention that consciousness can be made into an object.

We can now pose the question: What about the beginning-phase of an experience that is in the process of becoming constituted? Does it also come to be given only on the basis of retention, and would it be "unconscious" if no retention were to follow it? We must say in response to this question: The beginning-phase can become an object only *after* it has elapsed in the indicated way, by means of retention and reflection (or reproduction). But if it were intended *only* by retention, then what confers on it the label "now" would remain incomprehensible. At most, it could be distinguished negatively from its modifications as that one phase that does not make us retentionally conscious of any preceding phase; but the beginning-phase is by all means characterized in consciousness in quite positive fashion. It is just nonsense to talk about an "unconscious" content that would only subsequently become conscious. Consciousness is necessarily *consciousness* in each of its phases. Just as the retentional phase is conscious of the preceding phase without making it into an object, so too the primal datum is already intended – specifically, in the original form of the "now" – without its being something objective. It is precisely this primal consciousness that passes over into retentional modification – which is then retention of the primal consciousness itself and of the datum originally intended in it, since the two are inseparably united. If the primal consciousness were not on hand, no retention would even be conceivable: retention of an unconscious content is impossible. Moreover, the primal consciousness is not something inferred on the basis of reasoning; it is rather something that can be seen as a constituting phase in reflection on the constituted experiencing, exactly like the retentions. But we must not misunderstand this primal consciousness, this primal apprehension or whatever one wants to call it, to be an apprehending act. Apart from the fact that this would be an evidently false description of the situation, it would entangle us in irresolvable difficulties. If one says that every content comes to consciousness only by means of an act of apprehension directed towards it, then the question immediately arises about the consciousness in which this act of apprehension, which is surely a content itself, becomes conscious, and an infinite regress is unavoidable. But if every "content" is "primally conscious"[18] in itself and necessarily, the question about a further giving consciousness becomes meaningless.

Furthermore, every act of apprehension is itself a constituted immanent duration-unity. While it is being built up, that which it is supposed to make into an object is long since past and would no longer be accessible to it at all – if we did not already presuppose the whole play of primal consciousness and retentions. But since primal consciousness and retentions are there, the possibility exists, in [120] reflection, of looking at the constituted experience *and* at the constituting phases,

[18] "*Urbewusst*" in *Husserliana X*; "*unbewusst*" in the publication of 1928. The original manuscript for this appendix has not been located. – Translator's note.

and even of grasping the distinction that obtains, for example, between the original flow as it was intended in the primal consciousness and its retentional modification. All the objections that have been raised against the method of reflection are explained on the basis of ignorance of the essential constitution of consciousness.

Appendix X: *Objectivation of Time and of Something Physical in Time*[19]

The following are parallel problems: the constitution of the one all-inclusive space,[20] which is co-perceived in every particular perception inasmuch as the perceived physical thing, as far as its body is concerned, appears as lying in that space; and the constitution of the one time in which the temporality of the thing lies, into which its duration is inserted as well as the duration of all the physical things and events that belong to the thing's environment. The I is also inserted into this same time, and not only the I's body but also its "psychic experiences." The time belonging to anything physical is the time of that thing. And yet we have only one time: not only in the sense that things are arranged next to one another in a single linear extension, but also in the sense that different things or events appear as simultaneous; they do not have parallel equivalent times but one time, numerically one time. The situation here is not the same as it is in the case of multiple spatial fillings in which visual and tactile fillings coincide. We rather have separate, noncoinciding physical things and events, which nevertheless exist and endure in an identical extent of time.

The givenness of the physical thing takes place as a process in phenomenological temporality; the entire flow of motivating sensations of motion (K) and of "images" (i) motivated by them is temporally extended. The images motivated in the transition from K_0 to K_1 flow off in the form $i_0 - i_1$ and coincide in time with the K's. Like every filled temporal flow, this one too has its temporal form. And it can be a changing temporal form: the flow of K's and with it the flow of i's can ensue more swiftly or more slowly and do so in the most diverse ways at the same or different speeds, depending on how the temporal filling is spread out in the extent of time and whether it fills this or that partial extent with greater or lesser "thickness." Furthermore, the running-off of K and the succession of images connected with it can be reversed, and again in changing temporal form. The temporal forms of the consciousness of givenness conform to this. [121]

In a certain sense, all of this is irrelevant with respect to the appearing object standing before us as given; irrelevant too is the greater or lesser extension of the kinesthetic flow of images or the greater or lesser flow of possible appearances

[19] The text of Appendix X is based on a few sheets from the manuscript of the lecture course entitled *Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Kritik der Vernunft* [Important points from the phenomenology and criticism of reason], which Husserl delivered in the summer term of 1907 at the University of Göttingen. In question are the so-called "Lectures on the Thing" ["*Dingsvorlesung*"], the introduction to which has been published in Volume II of this edition under the title *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* [The idea of phenomenology]. – Editor's note.

[20] To § 43, p. 95 ff.

from the ideal total multiplicity of appearances. I say irrelevant because the same thing – say, the thing at rest and unchanging in content – continually stands before me, always spreading its filling of thing-content in the same temporal form, everywhere in uniform thickness. And yet the temporality of the flow does have something to say with respect to objectivation: something temporal does indeed appear; temporality belongs essentially to the appearing object – in our case, temporality in the form of the duration of an unchanging physical thing at rest. One will then say: The objectivation of time must have its "presenting" content in the phenomenon, and where else than in its phenomenological temporality? More precisely, what will naturally come into question is the appearance in the narrower sense, the appearance that stands under the motivating circumstances of the moment. And just as in this appearance the image presents the objective place by means of its quality of place, the objective figure and magnitude by means of its *quasi*-figure and *quasi*-magnitude, and furthermore the objective coloration by means of its *quasi*-coloration, so it presents objective temporality by means of its temporality. The image is an image in the flow of the continuity of images. To each image-phase in this flow there corresponds the appearing objective temporal phase of the thing, or, more precisely, of the side of the object that presents itself in this image. The pre-empirical temporal position of the image is the presentation of the objective temporal position; the pre-empirical temporal extension in the running-off of the continuum of images is the presentation of the objective temporal extension of the physical thing and therefore of its duration. All of this is evident.

Inspected more closely, of course, this "presentation" of objective time is essentially different from the presentation of the physical thing existing in objective time, enduring in it as an identical thing in time and filling the time in the manner of duration. If, for the sake of simplicity, we take within the narrower sphere of "clearest seeing" a continuity of images that are perfectly alike and thus equally rich, then a bundle of intentional rays extends throughout the images, which are flowing off in *quasi*-temporality, in such a way that they are posited in univocal correspondence. The points lying on the same intentional ray present one and the same object-point by means of their contents. Here, therefore, a unity-positing consciousness extends throughout the pre-empirical temporal continuity. A flow of contents, strung along the intentional ray, presents the same point of the physical thing phase by phase. Each image-point also has its position in pre-empirical time. A consciousness of unity, however, does not extend in turn throughout the successive temporal positions, objectivating them as identical unity: the sequence of image-points spreading itself out in this continuity of temporal positions presents the same point of the physical thing, but the series of temporal positions does not present an identical time-point belonging to the same point of the physical thing. On the contrary, it again presents a temporal series. [122] And the single image-point has the same temporal position as all other coexistent image-points. The whole image has a temporal position, and each different image has a different temporal position. Each different temporal position in the pre-empirical image-flow presents a different objective temporal position. Otherwise, a physical thing, which as a physical thing has its duration, a filled objective temporal series, would not even appear.

The consciousness of unity spreading out in the pre-empirical temporal flow posits unity in the temporal flow of presenting images precisely by making each image into a presenting image, by positing givenness in it, and by positing – with each new image – givenness of "the same." But what is given in each phase is given and posited as a now with such and such a content; in the transition to the next phase it is held in consciousness in its now. Thus the new phase, and every new phase, is given with its now held in consciousness. In the continuous transition, therefore, the phases are posited in unity in such a way that each phase in the objectivation keeps its now; and the series of now-points (as objective time-points) is filled with a content that is continuously one and identical. When phase a is actually present, it has the character of the actually present now. But phase follows on phase in the temporal flow, and as soon as we have the new actually present phase, the phases that were just "now" have changed their character as actually present phases. Temporal objectivation is brought about in this flow of alterations because the positing of the identical a at a determinate time-point continuously occurs in the flow of the phenomenological alteration that a undergoes as it sinks back. If each image with its now has been objectivated just as it is in itself, the elapsing flow of images appears in the objectivating consciousness as a flow of changing sensuous contents: the unity of this multiplicity would be the unity that "lies" in it and could be drawn from it.

But in the objectivation of a physical thing, the image-content in the sense of the unity of kinesthetic motivation is apprehended transcendently in such and such a way. Hence the image-content is not taken simply as it is but as presentation, as bearer of an intentional bundle characterized in such and such a way and constantly being fulfilled in the mode of pure coincidence. This intentionality extends throughout the image-contents, while each now-moment belonging to the corresponding image undergoes the same objectivation at a time-point that it would undergo even without the objectivation of a physical thing. Thus an objective temporal series becomes constituted everywhere in the same way. But the series of appearances in whose flow objective temporality becomes constituted is different, as far as its matter is concerned, depending on whether it is the temporality of a physical thing or the temporality of a nonphysical thing that becomes constituted – for example, depending on whether objective time becomes constituted in the duration or alteration of an immanent tone or, on the other hand, in the duration or alteration of a physical thing. Both appearance-series have a common element, a common form, that makes up the character of temporal objectivation as objectivation of time. But in the one case, the appearances are appearances of something immanent; in the other case, they [123] are appearances of something physical. Just as the identity of the tone in the flow of tone-phases, each of which has its temporal individuation, is a unity in the continuity of phases – an identity of the tone existing in all phases and consequently enduring – so the identity of the physical thing in the flow of appearances is the identity of the thing appearing in all the appearances in the mode of itself-givenness and now-givenness, of the thing appearing in an ever new now, and consequently of the thing appearing as enduring.

Here we must emphasize that in the perception of something transcendent the phases of the earlier appearance are not simply preserved retentionally, which is

what happens in the case of every succession of appearances, or at least happens within certain limits. The perceptual appearance actually present in the now-point at any given time does not end along with that which it makes given as actually present, with the reality posited as now by the perception. [But] it is not as if the preceding appearances, living on in retention, are merely preserved as appearances of what has been. The (primary) memorial consciousness of the earlier phases is, to be sure, memorial consciousness, but with respect to the earlier perception. What was earlier perceived is not only present now as something perceived earlier but is taken over into the now and posited as still presently existing. Not only is that which is just now being perceived in the strict sense posited as now, but also and at the same time that which was given previously. During the flow of perception proper, not only what is actually seen is posited as enduring being in the flow of its appearances but also what has been seen. And so too with respect to the future: What is coming to be perceived in the expectation of the further phases of perception proper is also posited as now; it exists now and it endures and fills the same time. – Precisely the same thing is true of everything unseen but visible: that is, everything that in a possible flowing-off of K could be perceived as belonging to it.

What occurs in the latter case is merely a broadening of the temporal objectivation we have been discussing. Throughout this discussion we have restricted ourselves to what is constantly seen and to what, in the course of being seen, continually presents itself in different ways. Everything seen can also be unseen and yet remain visible. Every perceptual flow permits, essentially, a broadening that finally transforms what is perceived into something not perceived. But just as the temporal positing, in identifying the visual thing that appears there "completely" in the change of its complete appearances, co-objectivates each temporal position belonging to the appearance-phases and gives it the signification of an objective temporal position in such a way that something objectively enduring displays itself in the series of appearances: so too and in similar fashion temporal positing takes place with respect to the totality of appearances that bring one and the same objectivity to presentation in an incomplete manner – indeed, in a manner that is perpetually incomplete.

Appendix XI: *Adequate and Inadequate Perception*[21] [124]

Adequate perception, understood as purely immanent and adequate givenness of an object, can be taken in two senses, one of which possesses a close analogy with external perception while the other does not. In the immanent hearing of a tone, my apprehension can aim in two directions: in one instance, towards what is sensed in the temporal flow; in the other, towards what is becoming constituted in this flow and yet is immanent.

1. Whether the tone fluctuates in quality or intensity, or whether it stands before me as enduring in an altogether unchanging internal determinacy – in either case I find a flow, and only in this flow can such an individual objectivity

[21] To § 44, p. 99ff.

be given to me. The tone begins as a tonal now, and ever new nows continuously ensue. Each now has its content, and I can direct my regard towards this content just as it is. Thus I can swim in the stream of this flow, following it with my contemplative glance; I can also focus my attention not only on the content of the moment but on the whole extension – which here signifies the flow – together with its concrete filling or in abstraction from it. This flow is not the flow of objective time that I determine by means of clock or chronoscope; it is not the world time that I fix in relation to earth and sun. For that time falls to the phenomenological reduction. We rather call this flow pre-empirical or phenomenological time. It offers the original representants for the representation of the predicates belonging to objective time, or, to speak analogically: the time-sensations. In the case of the perception we have described, we therefore focus our attention on the temporal content of the moment in its temporal extension and in the given way in which it fills out this extension, or we focus our attention on the temporal content *in abstracto* or the temporal extension *in abstracto:* in any case, on what is really given, on what really inheres as a moment in the perception. This is one of the two directions my apprehension can take.

2. But on the other hand: If the tone, let us say the tone c, endures, our perceptual act of meaning can be directed towards the tone c that endures there – that is, towards the object, tone c, which is one and the same object in the temporal flow and is always the same in all phases of the flow. And again, if the tone should change on the side of intensity or even change in its quality – fluctuating, for example – then in this way of speaking a perceptual direction having in view something identical that changes, something that remains the same while its quality and intensity change, is already decided. This is a different object, then, from the one we discussed previously. There the object was the temporal flow of the sounding of the tone; here the object is what is identical in the flow of time.

The temporal flow of the sounding is time, filled-out concrete time; but this flow has no time, is not in time. The tone, however, is in time; it endures, it [125] changes. As something identical in change, it is "substantially" one. But just as the time is pre-empirical, phenomenological time, so the substance we are talking about here is pre-empirical, prephenomenal substance. This substance is something identical, the "bearer" of what changes or of what abides – of abiding quality and of varying intensity, say, or of continuously changing quality and abruptly changing intensity, and so on. In speaking of "substance," our regard is directed towards what is identical as opposed to the temporal content that is now the same and now different, varying from phase to phase of the temporal flow. It is what is identical that unites all of the time-phases of the flow through the unity of a common essence, through the unity, therefore, of what is generically common, which, however, is not taken by itself and exhibited in its universality in an eidetic abstraction. What is identical is the essence in its individuation, which is continuously preserved in common throughout the flow. In the seeing of the substance, we do not undertake an abstraction from the flow of contents given in the seeing and direct our regard towards what is generic; on the contrary, we keep in view the flow of what fills time and single out intuitively something identical that is in the flow and remains bound to it.

The substance is what is identical in the full, concrete flow. If we single out by

abstraction a non-self-sufficient moment – the intensity of a tone, for example – an identification of the same sort occurs here as well; we say that the intensity persists or changes. These identities are phenomenological accidents. The tone, the phenomenological "thing," has different "properties," and each of these is again something identical in its persistence and in its change. A property is, so to speak, a non-self-sufficient ray of the substantial unity, an aspect of the substance, a non-self-sufficient moment of its unity; but it itself is something unitary in the same sense. Substance and accident in this pre-empirical sense are phenomenological data: they are data in possible perceptions, specifically, in adequate perceptions. These perceptions, as I said, are similar to perceptions of something external. In fact, external perceptions are also perceptions of things or accidents of things, and the character of these perceptions is analogous to the character of the perceptions of immanent phenomenological substance.[22] When we perceive a house, this object has its temporal extension, and this belongs to its essence (and therefore to the essence of the sense of the perception); it appears as enduring without changing, as something identical in this duration, as abiding in the temporal extension. If we take something changing in external perception, a bird in flight or a flame, its light varying in intensity, the same holds true. The external thing has its phenomenal time and appears as something identical in this time, that is, as something identical in motion and in change. But all of these [126] perceptions are inadequate, of course; the time with its filling is not given adequately, cannot be brought to light as sensation. And the identity of the physical thing and of its properties also cannot be realized adequately, unlike the identity of the tone in its sounding, in the flux of its fading-away and reviviscence, and the like. But it is evident that, at bottom, the same identification or substantialization that is adequately given or effected in immanence is present in external perception as an inadequate identification brought about on the basis of transcendent apperceptions. It is also clear that every analysis of the sense of thing and property, of substance and accident, must first go back to the immanent-phenomenological field and there bring to light the essence of phenomenological substance and phenomenological accident, just as every clarification of the essence of time leads back to pre-empirical time.

We have, accordingly, become acquainted with important types of adequate and inadequate perception. With respect to the terms "internal" and "external" perception, it is now apparent that they excite certain doubts. Namely, following what has been pointed out, we must note that the title "internal perception" has a double significance. It signifies two essentially different things: that is, in the one case, the perception of a component immanent to the perception; in the other case, the perception of something seen that is immanent but not a concrete part [of the perception]. If we compare the two types of adequate perception, they have in common that adequate givenness of their objects takes place in both of them; everything that is nonpresentive, all transcendent interpretation, is excluded. But only in the first sort of perception is the object a real constituent of the perceptual phenomenon. The temporal flow of the sounding is there in the perceptual

[22] Substance naturally not understood in this case as real substance, the bearer of real properties, but merely as the identical substrate of the phantom perception.

phenomenon along with all of its components; it makes it up. Every phase, every component of this flow, is a part of the phenomenon. On the other hand, that which is identical in the temporal flow, the phenomenological substance and its properties, that which abides or changes, is indeed something that can be seen adequately in the second sort of perception but must not be designated as a real moment or part of it.

Appendix XII: *Internal Consciousness and the Grasping of Experiences*[23]

Every act is consciousness of something, but there is also consciousness of every act. Every experience is "sensed," is immanently "perceived" (internal consciousness), although naturally not posited, meant (to perceive here does not mean to grasp something and to be turned towards it in an act of meaning). Every act can be reproduced; to every "internal" consciousness of the act – the internal consciousness taken as perceiving – there belongs a possible reproductive consciousness, a possible recollection, for example. To be sure, this seems to lead back to an infinite regress. For is not the consciousness of something internal, the perceiving of the act (of judging, of perceiving something external, of rejoicing, and so forth), again an act and therefore itself something internally perceived, and so on? On the contrary, we must say: Every "experience" in the strict sense is internally perceived. But the perceiving of the internal is not an "experience" in the same sense. It is not itself again internally perceived. Every experience our regard can reach presents itself as an experience that endures, that flows away, and that changes in such and such a way. And it is not the regard that has the experience as the object of its meaning that makes the experience be what it presents itself as being; the regard only looks at the experience. [127]

This present, now-existing, enduring experience, as we can discover by altering our regard, is already a "unity of internal consciousness," of the consciousness of time; and this is precisely a perceptual consciousness. "Perceiving" here is nothing other than the time-constituting consciousness with its phases of flowing retentions and protentions. Behind this perceiving there does not stand another perceiving, as if this flow itself were again a unity in a flow. What we call experience, what we call the act of judging, of joy, of the perceiving of something external, even the act of looking at an act (which is a positing act of meaning) – all of these are unities of time-consciousness and are therefore perceived [*Wahrgenommenheiten*]. And to each such unity a modification corresponds. More precisely: a reproducing corresponds to the original constitution of time, to the perceiving; and something re-presented corresponds to what is perceived.

Thus we now posit side by side the original act and its re-presentation. The situation is then the following: Let A be any act intended in internal consciousness (any act that has become constituted in it). If P_i is the internal consciousness, we then have $P_i(A)$. Of A we have a re-presentation, $R_i(A)$; but this in turn is something internally intended, which therefore gives us $P_i[R_i(A)]$.

[23] To § 44, p. 99ff.

Consequently, within internal consciousness and all of its "experiences," we have two sorts of occurrences corresponding to one another, A and $R_i(A)$.

The entire phenomenology I had in view in the *Logical Investigations* was a phenomenology of experiences in the sense of data of internal consciousness; and this, in any event, is a closed field.

Now the A can be something different: a sensuous content, for example – say, sensed red. Sensation here is nothing other than the internal consciousness of the content of sensation. The sensation red (understood as the sensing of red) is therefore P_i (red), and the phantasm of red is R_i(red) – which, however, has its factual existence in consciousness in the form: $P_i[R_i(red)]$. Thus it is understood why I could identify sensing and the content of sensation in the *Logical Investigations*. If I moved within the boundaries of internal consciousness, then naturally there was no sensing there but only something sensed. It was then [128] correct as well to contrast acts (intentional experiences belonging to internal consciousness) and nonacts. The latter were precisely the totality of "primary" or sensuous contents. Concerning the "phantasms," however, it was naturally false to say of them (within the boundaries of internal consciousness) that they were "experiences," for experience signified a datum of internal consciousness, something internally perceived. We then have to distinguish the re-presented contents, the phantasied sense-contents, for example, and the re-presentations of them, the R_i(s); the latter are intentional experiences belonging within the boundaries of internal consciousness.

Now let us consider the case in which A is an "external" perception. It is, of course, a unity belonging to internal consciousness. And in internal consciousness there is a re-presentation of it just as there is of every experience. Thus P_e(o) as $P_i[P_e(o)]$ has its $R_i[P_e(o)]$. Now it belongs to perception's essence as perception that a parallel re-presentation corresponds to it; that is to say, an act that re-presents the same thing that the perception perceives. "Reproduction" is the re-presentation of the internal consciousness; it stands in opposition to the original running-off, to the impression. The re-presentation of a physical event must not be called reproduction, then. The natural event is not produced once again. It is remembered; it stands before consciousness in the character of what is re-presented.

Now let us consider the remarkable relationship between the two re-presentations to be compared here – re-presentations that obviously differ from one another intrinsically.

1. $R_i(P_e)$ or, as we can now also write, $Rep(P_e)$ (the internal reproduction of the external perception) stands over against P_e;

2. R_e (the re-presentation of the external object e) stands over against P_e.

Now there exists an essential law according to which $Rep(P_e) = R_e$. The re-presentation of a house, for example, and the reproduction of the perception of this house show the same phenomenon.

Moreover, we can now say: The act of meaning that is "objectivating" in the specific sense can have

1. the character of "reflection on the internal," of "perception of the internal," understood as a positing act of meaning on the basis of what is "internally intended." The act of meaning can become immersed in the

consciousness, can take the internal consciousness as its substrate. Then, to the extent possible, all the objectivities on hand *implicite* in the internal consciousness as consciousness of the internal come to be given; they become "objects." In this way, sensations, understood as sensuous contents, become objects; and so too, on the other side, do all the acts constituted as unities in internal consciousness – all the *cogitationes,* the intentional experiences belonging to internal consciousness.

2. In internal consciousness, therefore, we also have "intentional experiences," since perceptions, judgments, feelings, desires, and the like, are there. These unities can function as substrates. Instead of positing and objectifying them in "internal reflection" – that is, in internal perception understood as an act of meaning – an act of meaning immerses itself in their intentionality and thus "draws" from them the objects intended in them *implicite* and makes those objects into intended objects in the strict sense of objectivating positing. The act functioning as a substrate in this process can be an act that re-presents something emptily. Naturally, the memory of a joy, of a wish, and so forth, can emerge; and an act of meaning can be directed towards what was joyful, what was wished as wished, without a living representation holding sway in the act. [129]

We must therefore distinguish: the prephenomenal being of experiences, their being before we have turned towards them in reflection, and their being as phenomena. When we turn towards the experience attentively and grasp it, it takes on a new mode of being; it becomes "differentiated," "singled out." And this differentiating is precisely nothing other than the grasping [of the experience]; and the differentiatedness is nothing other than being-grasped, being the object of our turning-towards. Yet the matter must not be conceived as if the difference consisted merely in the fact that the same experience is just combined at some point with our turning towards it, combined with a new experience which is a being-directed-towards the experience already on hand, and thus that a mere complication occurs. When turning-towards takes place, we certainly distinguish, with evidence, between the object of the turning-towards (the experience A) and the turning-towards itself. And certainly we say with reason that previously we were turned towards another object, that we then brought about the turning towards A, and that A "was there" already before we turned towards it. But for the present it must be noted that our speaking of the same experience is very ambiguous, and (where it finds its legitimate application) we can by no means conclude from it without further consideration that nothing has changed phenomenologically in the way in which this "same" experience appears to our experiencing.

Let us consider this more closely. The turning-towards – which, as we say, reaches now in this and now in that direction – is also something grasped in a new turning-towards and in that way originally becomes objective (in original taking-cognizance of it). Consequently, the setting-in-relation of the object of our turning-towards and our turning towards it, together with the original taking-cognizance of this relation, is a new phenomenon, just as the setting-in-relation of the turning-towards to the object before we have turned towards it, along with the cognizance that the turning-towards supervenes on an object that is originally free of our being turned towards it, is a new phenomenon.

We understand right away what it means to be turned towards an object – say,

towards this paper, and specifically towards a corner of the paper that is particularly emphasized. The distinction between what is specifically noticed and what is not noticed about the object is something totally different from the distinction on the "subjective side," that is, from the paying-attention itself in its steps. The object is given in an attentional mode, and if occasion should arise, we [130] can even direct our attention to the change of these modes: precisely to what we have just described – that now this or now that in the object becomes objective in a singular way; that what now predominates was already there before it came to predominate; that everything that predominates has a background, an environment in that sphere of the totality of objects, and so on. It belongs to the essence of this object that it is not self-sufficient, that it cannot exist without "its" mode of presentation, that is, without the ideal possibility of making this mode into an object and of shifting from the mode back to the object again; and it belongs to the essence of "one and the same object" of which I am conscious in a series of modes of presentation that my regard can be directed towards precisely this series, and so on.

These reflections are brought about in the unity of one time-consciousness; what is newly grasped – so it is said – was already there, belonged as background to what was grasped earlier, etc. Each "change of attention" signifies a continuity of intentions; and, on the other side, there is implicit in this continuity a unity, a constituted unity capable of being grasped: the unity of the same thing that presents itself solely in different changes of attention and of which, at any given time, different moments or parts "stand in the light" and are the objects of "attention."

What then is attention other than the running-off of differences of such modes of "consciousness as such" and the circumstance that such perceived moments come together to make a unity in the form of "the same," which now has this mode of attention and now that one? What does it mean, then, to reflect on the moment "turning-towards . . ."? At one time the modes of attention run off "naïvely": in their running-off, I am turned towards the object appearing in them; at another time an objectifying glance is directed towards the series of modes themselves. I can run through them repeatedly in memory, and this series, as a series, has its unity.

Appendix XIII: *Constitution of Spontaneous Unities as Objects in Immanent Time. – Judgment as Temporal Formation and Absolute Time-constituting Consciousness*[24]

If we have a judgment (e.g., $2 \times 2 = 4$), then what is meant, as meant, is a *nontemporal idea;* the same thing can be meant in an absolutely identical sense in countless acts of judgment, and this same thing that is meant can be true or false. Let us take the latter as the "proposition," and let us consider the "judgment" as the correlate of the proposition. Will one therefore say: the act of judgment? Precisely the consciousness in which it is meant that $2 \times 2 = 4$? No. Let us

[24] To § 45, p. 101ff.

consider: Instead of being turned towards what is supposed as supposed, I direct my regard towards the judging, towards the process in which it becomes given to me that $2 \times 2 = 4$. A process occurs. I begin by forming the subject-thought 2×2 [131] and I bring this formation to an end, and this thought serves as the antecedent and grounding positing for the subsequent and grounded positing: "is equal to 4." Thus there occurs a spontaneous forming that begins, continues, and ends. What I form there, however, is not the logical proposition: the logical proposition is what is meant in this forming. What is "formed" is not what is meant. On the contrary, first of all "2×2" is formed in spontaneity; and then, on that basis, "$2 \times 2 = 4$" is formed. The "consciousness" of 2×2 and, finally, the consciousness of $2 \times 2 = 4$ have been completed spontaneously (formed in the spontaneous process of forming). If this produced formation is complete, then it is already over with as an event; it immediately sinks backwards into the past.

The formation produced here is obviously not the process of formation (otherwise the image of forming would certainly be wrongly employed). I can also focus my attention on the continuously advancing consciousness and on the unity of the advancing process (just as in the case of perceiving a melody I can focus my attention on the continuous consciousness, on the continuous running-off of the "phenomena," and not on the running-off of the tones themselves). But this process is not the phenomenon that is complete when the process ends and in which precisely "$2 \times 2 = 4$" is meant. Likewise the process of consciousness constituting the appearance of a gesture is certainly not the appearance itself in which the gesture appears. In our case, the meaning – for example, $2 \times 2 = 4$, the explicit "predication" in which, so to speak, the "it is thus" appears – corresponds to the appearance. Not the phases of the process of consciousness but the appearance-phases becoming constituted in them belong in the unity of the appearance of the gesture. In this way too the components of predication, the subject-member, the predicate-member, and the like, become constituted in the process of the judging consciousness (in the "flow" of this consciousness). And after it has become constituted, the subject-member of the judgment – the judgment understood as the unitary judicial meaning – belongs to the judicial meaning, although the consciousness of the subject-member continues to be unceasingly modified (just as the appearance of the beginning-phase, which is constantly found in the mode of sinking backwards, belongs to the appearance of a motion, but not the formations of consciousness in which the phase in sinking backwards becomes constituted as a perpetual phase of the motion).

Consequently, we will have to say that two very different things should be distinguished:

1. the flow of consciousness,
2. what becomes constituted in the flow;

and again with respect to this second aspect:

a) the judgment as the "appearance" or act of meaning of $2 \times 2 = 4$, which becomes constituted and which is a process of becoming, and

b) that which there becomes, the judgment that at the end stands before me as something that has been formed, as something that has become: the finished predication.

The judgment here is accordingly the immanent unity of an event in immanent

time, a process (not a flow of consciousness but an event that becomes constituted in the flow of consciousness) that begins and ends and, with its ending, is also past – just as the motion is past in the moment in which it has been completed. Of [132] course, while it is always conceivable in the case of an appearance of a sensuously perceived becoming that the becoming passes over into stable being or that motion in any of its phases passes over into rest, here rest is altogether inconceivable.

But this still does not exhaust all the distinctions. Something new emerges with every act of spontaneity; in each moment of its flow, the act functions, so to speak, as primal sensation that undergoes its adumbration in conformity with the fundamental law of consciousness. The spontaneity that works in steps in the flow of consciousness constitutes a temporal object – specifically, an object that becomes, a process: on principle, only a process and not an enduring object. And this process sinks backwards into the past. We must consider the following here: If I begin with the positing of a this, the spontaneous grasping-at and seizing is a moment that stands before me as a moment in immanent time that will immediately sink into the past. For the formation of the whole unity of the judgmental process in immanent time, however, there occurs a holding-in-consciousness [*Festhaltung*] of what sinks into the past. The primal positing of the this (the "catching," as Lipps says) continuously passes over into the consciousness that holds on to the this, and this holding-in-consciousness is not the preserving of the primal positing, which, of course, does undergo its modification in immanent time; it is rather a form that is combined with this consciousness. And what is remarkable here is that in this continuous phenomenon not only does the sinking back into the past of the initial phase become constituted, but also the continuously preserved and ongoing this-consciousness constitutes the this as something enduringly posited. This means that beginning and continuing make up a continuity of spontaneity essentially grounded in a process of subsiding in time. This process makes the initial phase and the preservation-phases continuously following it sink down in the flow of time; and in doing this, the process makes what these phases carry along with them as underlying representations (intuitions, empty representations) and representational modifications sink down in the flow of time as well. The act begins, but continues in a changed mode as act (as spontaneity); and then a new act begins, the act of predicate-positing, for example, which carries on this whole spontaneous flow. If the formation does not advance, the result is not the new spontaneity of predicate-positing arising originally in its own manner. Rather, this positing takes place on a ground: in the same phase of immanent time in which the predicate-positing makes its appearance, positing of the subject is indeed actually brought about in the form of a spontaneity that holds on to what was posited, doing so in the modified form that that spontaneity possesses in contrast to the originally arising subject-positing. The original predicate-positing is built on this positing of the subject; it forms a unity with it, the unity of the total judgment: as the existing phase of the temporal process, as a moment in time in which the judgment is actually "complete." This moment sinks into the past, but I do not immediately cease to judge. That is, an extent of judicative holding-in-consciousness is continuously attached, here as elsewhere, to the final moment completing the event; and the

judgment, understood as something formed in such and such a way in time, thereby acquires a further extension. Or again I may tie new and higher judgment-formations to this extended judgment, build them on it, and so forth. [133]

Consequently, as an immanent object in the consciousness of internal time, judgment is the unity of a process, a continuous unity of continual "positing" (judgment-positing, naturally) in which two or more producing moments, originally positing moments, occur. This process comes to an end in an extent without such moments, in an extent that is consciousness of the process in a "noncreative" ["*zuständlicher*"] way; this consciousness is belief in that which has come to consciousness in an "original" way through the producing act-moments. Judgment (predication) is possible only in such a process, and this certainly implies that retention is necessary for the possibility of judgment.

The way in which a spontaneous unity such as a predicative judgment becomes constituted as an object in immanent time is distinguished sharply from the way in which a sensuous process, a continuous succession, becomes constituted. They are distinct because, in the latter case, the "original," which is the primal source-point for the always freshly filled temporal moment, is either a plain phase of primal sensation (its correlate the primary content in the now) or a phase of primal sensation formed by means of an apprehension into a phase of primal appearance. The original in the case of judgment, however, is spontaneity of positing that has as its basis some material of affection. In this respect, therefore, the structure is already more complex.

Furthermore, a double originality emerges here. What "originally" constitutes the judgment understood as temporal formation is the continuity of "positing," which in this respect constantly gives something originally. The moments of the continuous judgment belonging to the time-points of the judgment as temporal formation become constituted, then, in time-consciousness with its retentions. But we have to distinguish the moments of the genuinely productive positing belonging to the effective spontaneity from the continuous moments of the spontaneity that holds something in consciousness, the spontaneity that goes on preserving what has been produced. This is a distinction in the constituted temporal formation in which the source-points are distinguished, and naturally also a distinction in the constituting time-consciousness in which the original phases break down into two kinds: the creative and the noncreative.

If, following what we have said, we may take the idea of judgment, understood as temporal formation in distinction from the absolute time-constituting consciousness, to have been clarified (and with it the corresponding distinctions found in other spontaneous acts), then it must be said that this judgment is an act of meaning, an analogue of the immanent objective appearance in which, for example, an external spatio-temporal being appears. What is meant appears, as it were, in the meaning: in the meaning (the temporal formation) "$2 \times 2 = 4$," the propositional affair-complex, syntactically formed in such and such a way, appears. But this propositional affair-complex is not a thing, not a being in objective time, neither an immanent nor a transcendent being. It is something enduringly meant but not itself something enduring; the meaning of it begins, but it itself does not begin, any more than it ceases. According to its essence, it can be intended, or given, in different ways: it can be articulated and then intended in a [134]

determinately structured spontaneity, which as an immanent temporal formation can flow "more swiftly" or less swiftly; but it can also be intended in a noncreative way, and so on.

Spontaneous temporal formations, like all immanent objects, have their counterpart in reproductive modifications of them. The judgment-phantasy, like any phantasy, is itself a temporal formation. The original moments for its constitution are the "original" phantasies, as opposed to the modifications that immediately attach themselves to it according to the fundamental law of consciousness – that is, the retentional modifications. When phantasy becomes constituted as an immanent object, the immanent *quasi*-object, the unity of what is immanently phantasied in the immanent *quasi*-time of phantasy, also becomes constituted by virtue of the intentionality peculiar to phantasy, intentionality that has the character of a neutralized re-presentation. And when phantasy is a re-presenting modification of an appearance, there becomes constituted in addition the unity of a phantasied transcendent object – the unity of a phantasied spatio-temporal object, let us say, or the unity of a phantasied state-of-affairs: of a state of affairs that is *quasi*-given in a *quasi*-perceptual judgment or *quasi*-thought in a phantasy-judging of another sort.

SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS SETTING FORTH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM

⟨I [137]
ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ESSENTIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN "FRESH" MEMORY AND "FULL" RECOLLECTION AND ABOUT THE CHANGE IN CONTENT AND DIFFERENCES IN APPREHENSION IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME⟩[1]

⟨*No. 1.*⟩ *How Does the Unity of a Process of Change That Continues for an Extended Period of Time Come to Be Represented?* ⟨*Intuition and Re-presentation*⟩[2]

How does the unity of a process of change that continues for an extended period of time, a unity that comes to pass or develops in succession – the unity of a melody, for example – come to be represented? Only quite small parts of temporal successions and extensions can be surveyed in *one* glance, in one momentary act of intuiting; and so too only quite small parts of a melody can be intuited in any one moment.

A melody is also not a sum of distinct intuitions, insofar as the sequences or separate developments of the tonal forms belonging to it flow away in *one* (temporally enduring) act. Even if particular acts correspond to the individual tones and formations, an act must be there that, by overlapping the particular acts, encompasses the unity of the contents, so far as the unity is a content that is noticed in each moment. While this act endures, its unity remains preserved, even if the content – and, along with it, the act as well in certain respects – varies and changes from

[1] From about 1893 to about 1901. – Editor's note. (The reader may wish to consult the "Translator's Introduction," p. XVII, note 5, for the alternative dating and arrangement of the texts in Part B proposed by Rudolf Bernet. – Translator's note.)

[2] According to Husserl: "An old effort from the time before the essay in the *Monatsheften*, about 1893." Husserl published "Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik" [Psychological studies on elementary logic] in the *Philosophischen Monatsheften* XXX (1894), pp. 159–191. – Editor's note.

moment to moment. Hand in hand with the temporal expansion goes a temporal contraction by virtue of which a part of what was intuited earlier in the act changes or else vanishes, while, on [138] the other side, something new is emerging. Intuition in the narrower sense is therefore different from moment to moment, and only a part of the melody with its tonal formations present in a certain stage of development is actual.

Let us imagine that a familiar melody now begins to run off. It commences with a characteristic tonal form, which is intuitive and clearly set off from the noisy or otherwise tonal "background"; another tonal form is built on it, and in this way forms evolve from forms universally. But in comparison with the old that is held in consciousness, the new does not enjoy permanence in this process. The tone or tonal structure with which the melody begins remains only a brief time t in consciousness, irrespective of the changes in content (the process of being pushed back in time and the [attendant] weakening) it undergoes. In the temporal order of the content, the last part in each moment prevails with respect to clarity and fullness; and this holds universally for what is later, for what is proximate to the now, as opposed to what is earlier. If t is traversed, the beginning disappears; and from then on, ever new parts of what follows disappear. By virtue of the indistinctness of the vanishing parts, however, this would not be particularly noticeable, especially since the interest is fixed on what is more vital, newer, and is directed forwards throughout. The tonal forms therefore weaken and gradually disappear without the change involved attracting attention; one notices only the gain and not the loss. To be sure, an enduring acquisition is also associated with the latter. The whole preceding development, insofar as it was followed with undivided interest, has its influence on the esthetic character, and therefore on the feeling-character, of what is actually present. The result is, so to speak, held in consciousness, although that which established it is gone as far intuition is concerned. If the melody comes to an end, then we have a boundary characterized precisely as a boundary: the consciousness of completion. The manner of the ending, like the period of a sentence, leaves me nothing new to expect or demand. A word half-written out, an incomplete protasis or even a part of a sentence, a single word

(that does not function through expressive emphasis as a complete sentence) excite an expectation that they do not satisfy, just as when we sit down to lunch and nothing further comes after the soup. A tonal movement that commences but does not completely elapse possesses the character of something unconsummated, of something lacking. We "feel ourselves drawn along further," the movement presses towards continuation, or however we may be inclined to express it. In any case, the presently intuited content bears a unique character, a *quasi*-quality, to which the thoughts can be associated by virtue of which we bring *explicite* to consciousness the fact that new tonal forms would (or would not) have to follow – forms that, in a typical way, would be related to those just intuited or would develop from them. What *Kerry* and *Lipps* called the continuation-drive is pertinent here, although it is not the same. The custom of the representing or of the doing, which develops in uniform paths, urges some steps or engenders the "consciousness" of a possible continuation, which, however, is not represented. The moving-forward in a uniform direction, in a progression, order, and harmony in material interconnections, produces precisely the appropriate "sensations"; and dispositions are established that, associated with those contents that point ahead, make possible elaboration and amplification, and the knowledge that such is possible. [139]

Now we ask: How do we know, when we come to the end, that something has, after all, gone before, that what is present last of all is not the entire melody? If perception or phantasy or both refuse to continue the melody that has begun, how do we know that something really should follow, that something is missing from the entirety of the melody?

If the melody runs off smoothly in perception or phantasy, then the continuous appearance of new tonal forms, recognized as belonging to the melody, gives us the knowledge that the melody has certainly not yet come to its end. If the perception breaks off, then the further development may be completed in phantasy; and since what phantasy offers to us is sensed merely as an imperfect substitute, we reach the realization that we express, for example, in the proposition: The performer has broken off in the middle. Often such further spinning out in phantasy does not occur, and yet we are nevertheless able to

judge in this way. Perhaps some few beats enter quite indistinctly into consciousness, perhaps not even this – now how, in spite of that, do we know and say that the playing has been interrupted long before the end? What the judgment then mediates is a [140] feeling of deficiency, of dissatisfaction, of a more or less vivid suppression, possibly together with the feeling of surprise, of being astonished, and of disappointed expectation. It is the same if we ourselves interrupt the melody during its actual production in perception or during mere imagining – only in this case, the feeling of surprise, of being astonished, which otherwise would probably occur, escapes.

Up to this point we have assumed the case of familiar melodies; the situation is analogous in the case of unfamiliar ones. Our musical experience no doubt lets us understand what is and what is not a completed melodic whole. It is similarity that guides us.

The feelings discussed above therefore impress on what is momentarily intuited the character of incompleteness, of gappiness or halfness; and in this way what is momentarily intuited serves as a nonpresentive representation, as the representant of what is whole and complete. The psychological genesis of such representations [*Repräsentationen*] is no different from that of certain others, and here as elsewhere its achievement is clear.

If we want to explain these representations, the orderly connection of the intuitions that constitute the well-ordered and materially determined intuitional course of the melody will help us. We follow forwards and backwards along the continuous chain. We allow the melody to develop further in phantasy, and we reach back to the tonal forms belonging to the past. A simple reversion, a striding-backwards from tone to tone, is certainly not possible. The individual tones interested us during the actual production of the melody only as fundaments for the tonal forms based on them; and the composition of these forms, which are enveloped and entwined in one another, brought the unity of mutual ordering to the whole of the melody. Thus, even with a regard directed backwards, we are able to apprehend, or better, produce anew, only relatively independent parts or forms that single themselves out as units; we are thus able to return, not to the chain of individual tones, but to the chain of tone-formations

that we met in the original experience. This is the most complete explication possible in the case of well-known melodies, melodies that are freely available to our phantasy. Of course, the explication can also be more or less fragmentary or quite imprecise, and it must be so where the memory is deficient or the given fragment really does not belong to any melody you have ever heard and the judgment that it is a part of a melody is passed solely on the basis of certain indications. All these explications occur in the case of reflection voluntarily or involuntarily; and they are able to occur then because those affective features that cling to the actually given surrogates and make them into representations stand to the explanatory processes in dispositional – that is, experiential – connection. [141]

To give to the term intuition a *narrower* and a *wider* signification seems to me to be unavoidable. Intuition in the narrower sense is the immanent and primary content of a momentary representing, or better, noticing; intuition in the wider sense is the content of a unitary continuing noticing. If, during the latter, the content remains unchanged, then, supposing that the temporal dilation is not heeded, there is no difference between the continuing noticing and the momentary intuition of the content. The situation is altogether different if the content continuously changes or if, instead of the one content, a constantly varying manifold enters into the unitary act of intuiting. We then have a connected flow of momentary intuitions encompassed by the one enduring noticing. There are essential distinctions here, depending on whether the content changes continuously or discretely; in the latter case, the fact that particular acts of perceiving may render prominent the individual parts does not interrupt the unitary character of the total intuition, supposing only that the whole flow of acts takes place within an overlapping act. Moreover, even where discrete changes of content occur, continuous changes are always there as well – the natural variations of content through temporal displacement and dilation. Ideally we can dissect the unitary act of enduring intuition into momentary acts and thus speak of a continuous flow of intuition, no matter how the content might change. However, it is better to understand by the flow of intuition the succession of discrete acts of noticing in which the manifold variations of content are con-

tained – acts that all flow within the continuous act of noticing.

If one were to allow only what is momentarily intuitive to be valid as intuition, one would deviate far too much from the [142] ordinary usage of the term. We have an intuition of a spatial object when we view it from all sides. The object, as it is conceived as objectively existing, is an assumed, nonpresentively represented total intuition that apprehends in itself all that is new offered by the intuitions received from various sides. We bring the object to intuition for ourselves by intuiting everything that can be intuited in it, by viewing "it" from all sides, therefore. For each part and feature of the thing, there is a standpoint from which we can "best" apprehend it. That is, in the continuum of alterations that each moment of the intuition undergoes when the standpoint is varied, there is, in the given case, a phase in which the moment most satisfies our interest. The corresponding standpoint is the "normal" one; and the moment forms a part or, as determination of the whole, a feature in the ideal synthesis of the object. All other phases serve as indices for the normal one.

To bring any object or objective unity to intuition, therefore, means to bring to intuition *successively,* in a totality satisfying to our interest, components (parts or features) from the ideal unification of components to whose mental synthesis the object owes its unity.

An object is unintuitable in this sense if its constituents are not or cannot be made intuitable (⟨are⟩ unintuitable). At this point, to be sure, the psychologist will probably distinguish real from supposed intuition. I cannot acquire an intuition of the route from Berlin to Rome, not even in the form of a flow of intuition, *scil.* within one act. But I can surely intuit individual, isolated parts of the route and the unity of sufficiently short adjoining parts. Thus it is universally true that what is spatial is, relatively, intuitable only in small degree and is particularly not intuitable in the narrower sense of intuition. Indeed, in the case of a modestly complicated figure, one comprehensible in a single glance, the momentary intuition to be won under the most favorable circumstances does not actually contain all the parts and relations that we mean to intuit in such an intuition, or actually contain them just as they are meant. The representation – for the most part [143] unclear – that we have when we consider the figure from some

one viewpoint is not what we intend by the "intuition of the figure." Strictly speaking, it serves us only as a basis for the creation of the objective unity in which ideally all parts and moments, such as we acquire them with the most favorable choice of viewpoint, which changes for each moment, are contained. The alleged momentary intuition of the object as it really is, is therefore reduced to a flow of intuition in which we assure ourselves of the different sides, parts, and relations in their most complete phases of variation, i.e., those most satisfying to our predominant interests.

It will now be our task to study with more precision these flows of intuition and the processes of formation resting on them from which the representations of objective or physical unities result.

What offers itself to our analysis as given next is the physical thing. We must therefore proceed from it. Even if we perceive it, we have no intuition of a physical thing in the strong sense of the word; there is no momentary act that would grasp in itself, all together and as actually present, the manifold parts, properties, and connections of which the physical thing objectively consists, no momentary intuition that would observe and apprehend them all at the same time. If perception takes place in a momentary act, then this manifold is mere intention; and this stipulates that we say here as in similar cases: We do not have a true intuition of what is intended but a mere re-presentation of it (in the sense of a mere "representation," namely, a nonpresentive representation). It is the same in the case of a phantasy representation, whose nonpresentive character is a more mediate one since it refers directly back to the corresponding perception. But all re-presentation rests on intuition. We acquire the intuitions in which the objective unity of the physical thing is grounded when we see it or touch it. Let us restrict ourselves chiefly to seeing. If the seeing is to furnish us with a full intuition of the visible object as visible, then it requires a certain flow of intuition, which we must now consider. It will be useful for this purpose to distinguish the following:

I. those flows of intuition that are possible without moving the head or the rest of the body and that depend only on the movement of the eye or even only on the movement of the [144]

internal regard of noticing and paying attention;

II. those flows of intuition that make their appearance when, additionally, movements of the head and of the rest of the body occur.

In speaking here of the movement of the eye as well as of the movement of the head and of the rest of the body, we have taken into consideration "circumstances" of seeing that, coming from objective knowledge, do not seem to belong in a purely descriptive and elementary psychology. These expressions, however, are supposed to serve only as convenient and scarcely avoidable signs for the subjective experiences that at all times underlie the mentioned objective knowledge and through it first undergo their interpretation. We are not concerned with this interpretation, however. A child who has not objectivated his body and in this sense has not yet become acquainted with it nevertheless can and will possess the psychic experiences that very much later he interprets judgmentally as the raising and lowering of the eyes or of the head, as walking around the object, and the like. To each determinate position and movement of the body, head, and eyes corresponds a wholly determinate psychic content that confronts the analysis first of all as a unitary whole or as a constituent of such a whole, however complex it may be and from however many sensation-components it may have arisen (which, as we know, are accessible to analysis). Depending on the circumstances, the individual content (e.g., the movement of the eyes) confronts us as a segregated unity; or it remains fused with other simultaneously given experiences into an unanalyzed unity, which, however, is noticed for itself as a unity; or the whole remains unnoticed, but without forfeiting the effects we will consider and to which the individual components make their definite contribution.

We wish to designate these concomitant circumstances of seeing simply as the subjective circumstances "C."

Now let us begin with I) above. With the head and the rest of the body unmoved, the regard turns towards an object, perhaps the ink-well standing before us. As soon as the seeing begins, a play of changes in content and of acts of noticing that survey them severally also begins. These acts run off within an overlapping noticing but are not held in consciousness by it. One's [145]

regard wanders, one says, over the object; and now this, now that part comes into the focus of one's view, and thus at the same time into the mental focal point of one's noticing. But that is an unpsychological way of speaking. Subjectively, nothing further presents itself than a temporal-contentual continuum of intuitions in which individual parts are separately distinguished, while the mediating parts that fill out the swiftly flowing transition to the former are not in the habit of being separately noticed. By virtue of the continuity in the change of the primarily noticed content, we are able to speak simply of a change in content; and therein lies already the similarity of the individual momentary phases articulated among themselves. Thus I focus first, say, on one corner of the ink-well; then my glance flows hastily over the edge and fixes another corner. The entire content has changed. Beginning-phase and end-phase are conspicuous in the change, but we do not especially focus our attention on the characteristic change of content in the transition. If corner A was primarily noticed a short while ago and in some way thrown into relief – although not detached – from the unitarily observed total impression, and if it was previously distinct in the characteristic manner of what is fixed-upon in my seeing, then all of that no longer holds, whereas what we just said of A does presently hold of corner B. A is now above all a more dependent, more indistinct moment, and finally perhaps even a moment no longer set off from the new and (with respect to content) strongly altered total intuition, which is connected with the earlier intuition through the phenomena of transition belonging to the change that has made its appearance (obviously a phenomenon of movement). In company with the roaming of one's regard, then, change marches upon change. Before the regard shifts from one part of the intuition to another and modifies it in the described way, we observe – supposing the process ensues slowly enough – that, of the "indirectly seen" parts of the total content, one is rendered prominent (is noticed); and then we sense a striving, which we do not hesitate to characterize as a striving after distinctness. The indirectly seen object appears to us burdened with a certain deficiency, which only seems to be removed when the inevitable redirection of one's regard and the process of becoming distinct given with it ensue (assuming that counteracting moments, such as the will not to

change the regard, are absent). And so we are able to say that [146] there inheres in each of the indirectly seen and analyzable parts of the intuition a certain intention that is actually sensed in the event of analysis and, as a stimulus, induces that movement of the regard that draws after itself the satisfaction of the intention, or – to express it in purely psychological terms – that in the normal case inevitably results in the corresponding process of becoming distinct. The content rendered distinct, however, is a different content that is merely similar to the indistinct one, yet more satisfying to our interest through the greater fullness of its intention, sharpness of outline, and the like. If we deliberately keep our regard fixed, then the intention of the partial content observed at the side will often manifest its influence in the sense that a phantasm of the corresponding distinct content flashes forth, but without achieving a continuing existence. Other intentions that belong to the partial contents of what is intuited and also to what is directly seen, and which could find fulfillment only through an altered bodily position, we wish to leave aside for the present.

It will now be necessary to distinguish two components, which can also be really separated, in the alterations in content that we have considered:

1) the changes in content produced by variation in the circumstances C, which we called movement of the regard;

2) the alterations that occur by means of differences in the act of noticing and in the act of paying attention.

In the ordinary case, the fixed point – therefore the focal point in the narrowest sense of the word – is at the same time the primarily noticed point; it is often also an object of attention, but not always. Let us consider what kind of changes are connected with noticing and paying attention. Between the two I make the distinction established by *Marty-Stumpf*. Not every noticing is combined with paying attention. Paying attention is a kind of being-anxious about the content, to which there clings a certain intention that strives after satisfaction. Noticing is representing in the strict sense of the word: the simple surveying of a content, the-being-turned-towards-it-simply. If a content is present to us, then we notice it. Whether noticing is a special act or not is something we do not wish to dispute about at this point. Now

there exist here very striking differences in content. Our total [147]
consciousness offers in each moment a multiplicity in unity. A completely unanalyzed unity cannot be noticed. At least a partial content is always noticed for itself and set off from the "background" of the rest of the content of consciousness. We are able to be turned wholly towards one content, but it is never altogether isolated; the background attaches to it as "*fringe.*" And we are able to become conscious of the total content of consciousness only insofar as we emphasize some one part or a few. But the emphasizing is a change in content. Depending on whether we emphasize this or that, the total impression varies. But often we are immediately turned towards a plurality; even then, at any instant a member is there set off from the rest by our being turned towards it "primarily," while the remaining members are noticed secondarily and the background, as it were, tertiarily. But these are not distinctions in the act, in any case not that alone. While I am focusing my attention on this pipe, I suddenly notice the ink-well at the side, then perhaps in addition the knife lying close by, and the like; or I hear at the same time the rumbling of the carriage. The distinctions between what I have in the "focal point" of my noticing and what I do not are quite similar to the distinctions between what is seen that I fix with my vision and what is seen that I do not fix with my vision, and likewise between what is reflected in the yellow spot and what is presented through the peripheral parts of the retina. These are once again distinctions in clarity and distinctness. Every plurality that we simultaneously notice presupposes a succession of noticing, and only in this temporal connection can something be noticed "incidentally." Moreover, there also exist differences in the degree of distinctness and indistinctness in the case of what is incidentally noticed, as internal observation teaches. We have the capacity to convert each incidentally noticed thing, at least for a moment, into something noticed primarily, therefore into something distinct. Again it is the case that the change of content that takes place when something distinct becomes indistinct or vice versa is a continuous one that transforms the similar into the similar. The characteristic sensation of transition also occurs here.

In the normal case of seeing, distinctness in the sense of what

is primarily noticed is also distinctness in the sense of what is fixed upon with our vision. But it can also happen that we fix one [148] point while primarily noticing a point at the side. The customary union can therefore be voluntarily dissolved. What we previously said about the indirectly seen is also valid for what is indistinct in the sense of what is noticed incidentally. It has a certain intention, a certain lack, which presses towards elimination; and by virtue of this, what is incidentally noticed has a re-presentative function and, through that function, a dispositional relation to the corresponding primarily noticed content.

Following the discussion of the two components that contribute to the flow of intuition or to the change of intuition, we still must emphasize a few further points. *The flow of intuition is a temporal flow.* Yet the temporal moment plays no role at all in this case; it is eliminated. Through the special circumstances of the situation, it does not come into consideration at all. Since now this part, now that part of the momentarily given total intuition shines forth with distinctness, resulting in an appropriate change in the whole intuition, it happens time and again that the old intuition with the part distinguished in it returns. The stages of the flow of intuition therefore flow over into one another cyclically but without any firm cycle, without any definite order. Depending on the random stimuli of the content and the random direction of interest, the flow time and again assumes different sequences. Choice can also be a determining factor by singling out at will this or that moment from the moments that are indirectly seen and noticed for themselves and that stand in competition. And the paths of change formerly followed, which are easily unified, can be repeated or modified at will. With every return of equivalent circumstances, the equivalent intuition appears and is recognized as such and as a reproduction; and every return of equivalent paths of change (or sequences of change in circumstances) also gives rise to equivalent and recognized flows of intuition along with the recognized distinctions. A linguistic mediation is not required for these acts of recognizing; such recognizing, however, does supply the presupposition for our judgment that what is given in the flow of intuition is an object identical with itself.

Whatever subjective "standpoint" we may assume, recogniz- [149]

ing always occurs; and no matter how we vary the standpoint, we find nothing absolutely new but only something made distinct – specifically, something made distinct within fixed boundaries. With the exception of the making-distinct of the relevant part, the total impression certainly undergoes no fundamental change of the kind that would lead to something new; and in the event that it does undergo change, it is only the sort of change already intended and indicated in advance, in the earlier impression. Whatever standpoint we assume, by maintaining the same external circumstances of seeing we are able to analyze out from the total impression the various parts that point ahead to and intend the corresponding distinct parts. Thus fulfillment of the intention takes place step by step – and with it identification – only so far as the intending representation flows into union with the intended intuition. Identification therefore takes place step by step, for identification indeed signifies nothing other than the experience of recognition when an intending representation flows over into its intended intuition. Only where a flow of intuition again and again offers something new does unity give way to a plurality made up of as many different elements as there are new things separately apprehended. But when we always find "the same" again, we have objectively just one thing. It is always the same since we always move within the same intimately related group of intuitions, within which a quite familiar transition leads from member to member, from what is known to what is known, and does so in such a way that the total content that we have in each moment already contains in itself the intention aimed at all the content of the further moments. Consequently, the transition to any member of the group whatever offers a fulfillment of a part of the intention directed towards it.

In a certain sense, a melody is also an objective unity. But in this case the temporal succession belongs essentially to the unity's content. Only in a determinate temporal flow does the continuous recognizing and the continuous satisfaction of the intention occur. Also missing here is the similarity of each part of the intuition noticed for itself with every other part; missing as well is the identity of intention that lets each part appear as a representant of the whole. The melody is one, but it is not something known identically in all the partial apprehensions. Each partial

apprehension apprehends just one part of the melody. The [150]
situation is wholly different in our case. Each partial apprehension apprehends the thing, but from a particular "standpoint." And that follows precisely from the fact that every member of the intuition-series, that is, each settled and distinct state of alteration in the chain, can include in itself the intention of any other state whatsoever and can give rise to its revival and identification by chance and by choice. It is therefore given as identically the same in each stage, not subjectively, but objectively – that is, in the intention and the judgment. The subjective element is taken into account through the fact that the judgment is made from a particular standpoint.

If we therefore have the series A⌒B⌒C⌒D . . . , where the letters signify the distinct moments of actual momentary intuition, then, if A is distinctly apprehended, B, C, D will come before us either indistinctly or, fused into unity with the background of the total intuition, as not thrown into relief at all. In the case of a suitable direction of interest, however, B, C . . . does become separately noticed, not as that which is made distinct but perhaps as B′ C′ . . . , yet with the intention directed towards B C . . . , which it respectively signifies, at which it aims. And does the objective thing therefore comprehend in itself A B C . . . , each in its full distinctness and without a determinate order of transition, in the mode of a sum? Because we speak of a sum, it might appear as if each thing were a mere multitude. However, the thing is certainly not lacking in relations and connections, which we also apprehend in the transition. These too belong to the objective unity, and they produce the judgments of relation through which we recognize the members of the sum of absolute moments as mutually united. The connections are able to give the contents a certain order, but they do not give a predetermined order to the intuitional flow; it remains arbitrary in its forms. In compliance with all of this, we bring the objective unity of the thing to full consciousness by rendering prominent, in an optional series of judgments, the individual absolute moments and relations that we find in the contents of the aggregate of momentary intuitions, and by referring to the whole that is *represented* through the total content of the moment and by recognizing this whole as belonging to that total content.

The objective unity is therefore a unity through judgment, not through bare intuition, although it is a unity on the ground of intuition.

But then the following question arises. Since certain accom- [151]
panying circumstances are also connected with the partial contents of the moment, how does it happen that the former do not fuse together with the latter into the unity of the thing but instead appear opposed to it as something merely subjective set over against the objective? From the point of view of descriptive psychology, we can first of all simply note a difference between the two: The circumstances are indeed phenomena of consciousness, but they are not objects of primary noticing. We directly notice exclusively the emphasized components of the content and, joined to them, the rest of the content of the momentary noticing united with the emphasized components and supporting them, with a certain emphasis on individual moments. As unobserved moments, the circumstances are fused to the contents in a particular way – *James* would say as "*fringes*" – and come forward for the first time in psychological analysis as unreal accompaniments. Matters therefore stand with them just as they do with the fleeting transition-sensations, which are complex phenomena consisting of the movement of the content – consisting, that is, of the phenomenon of the content's alteration that occurs with the conversion of A into A′ and of B′ into B. These transition-sensations [and similarly the fringes] consist further of the phenomenon of the change in objective circumstances (the sensation of movement, the sensation of convergence, the sensation of accommodation, etc.). And finally, they consist of the phenomenon of the change in noticing itself. These fringes contribute essentially to the consciousness of identity; but they do not belong to the "content," do not belong to the thing, to which only what is primarily noticed and intended belongs.[3]

[3] We have already observed that the preceding sketch, according to Husserl's note, was written in "about 1893." One might compare this sketch with § 3 above (pp. 11–14), the text of which is based almost completely on two sheets arranged by Husserl in his lectures on time from 1905 but taken, according to Husserl's own statement, from the manuscript of the "Lectures on Psychology" delivered in the winter term of 1894/95 in Halle. – Editor's note.

⟨*No. 2.*⟩ *Evidence Pertaining to the Perception of Time, to Memory, etc.*[4]

To *perceive* a *temporal flow* means to perceive a present existent A together with a just past B objectively connected with A and a C belonging to the further past, etc.; it means to [152] perceive A and, in the process of being pushed back, to experience B as next past, and so on. And this whole succession is perceived; it is a *present* process, since we are looking at the objective unity and perceiving it. We perceive the *melody*. This involves a succession of perceptions:

1) relating to the individual tones in the moment in which they are present (these are perceptions of present tones);

2) relating to the *temporal relations* also "experienced" along with the sequentially given tones. These relations are experienced because altered contents, which originate in the past tones, are apprehended in the mode of the past; and this apprehension belongs intuitively to these alterations in content. Where we bestow the predicate *past* here, or apprehend as past, there what is past is indeed actually past.[5]

What about the case of the *more distant past*? If I remember something I experienced yesterday, I have a phantasy-representation of yesterday's experienced event. I may reproduce in this representation the whole event consisting of various successive steps. In doing this, I have an apprehension of temporality. First one step is reproduced, then in definite sequence the second, and so on.

But while the "representations" *actually have* their own temporal relationship, they also claim to *depict representationally* the one temporally flowing event. The temporal relationship actually experienced or otherwise intended here is the re-presentation [*Repräsentation*] for the past relation, which is not being experienced now. And yet it is quite possible that the individual

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[4] The major part of this sketch is reproduced, with changes, in § 22, p. 51f.; specifically, the text below, running from p. 156, line 20, to p. 158, line 12, is reproduced in the text printed above beginning on p. 51, line 9, and ending on p. 52, line 23. – Editor's note.

[5] Husserl later added at this point in the manuscript: "(= *original consciousness* of the temporal, of what endures, of what changes, of duration itself, change, process, succession)." – Editor's note.

representations deviate from the event's individual steps (these did not occur as the individual representation has recalled them). And while the succession of representations is encompassed by a representational unity that intends the actually past event as having ensued in the manner and in the order in which the representations seek to mirror it, it is also possible that the actual [153] order of succession was other than the intending order now takes it to have been. *Here, therefore, errors are possible.*

But errors are also possible in certain respects in the intuition of a temporal succession. If I "*experience*" a *temporal succession,* there is no doubt that a temporal succession has taken place and is taking place. But that is *not* to say that an event actually does occur *in the sense in which* I apprehend it. The individual representations may be false apprehensions; that is, apprehensions to which no reality corresponds. And if, in the process of being pushed back in time, the objective intention belonging to the representations actually remains preserved (with respect to its constituting content and its relation as regards content to other objects), the error penetrates the whole temporal apprehension, the apprehension of the appearing event. But if this error is corrected or if we restrict ourselves to the succession of *presenting* "*contents*" or even to the succession of *appearances,* then *a truth* – specifically, a *temporal* truth – is always preserved: a process has certainly taken place; at least it is evident that this succession of appearances occurred, although perhaps not the succession of events that appeared to me in them.[6]

Cannot the certainty belonging to the "experience" continue to be preserved, even if the experience is unable to last any longer? The sphere of *intuitive* temporality, as is well known, is very limited indeed.

If I experience the succession of two tones C D, then, *while fresh memory lasts,*[7] I can repeat the succession depictively, even repeat it adequately in certain respects, by means of a pair of

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[6] Husserl later made the following marginal note: "Most simply, one first takes a tone that endures for some time, and during the duration I have the evidence that this is a tone, etc." – Editor's note.

[7] Husserl added subsequently: "While I can still exercise retention [*Retention*], holding-on [*Festhaltung*]." For the concept of "retention" introduced here, cf. p. 218, note 26. – Editor's note.

representations (C) (D). I repeat C D internally and, in so doing, judge that tone C has occurred first and then tone D. While this repeated succession is "still living," I can proceed in the same way again, and so on. Surely in such fashion I can *go beyond the* [154]
original field.

We also see here the way *in which the representations of the past are fulfilled.* If I designate C as earlier than D, then I have a conceptual representation that becomes fulfilled in the intuition of the past; and if I repeat C-D, then this pictorial representation (itself a succession that represents another succession very similar to it in content) finds its fulfillment in the *still living* earlier succession.

The situation in the case of the *future* is different from that of the past. I cannot obtain an intuition of the fact that A will occur in the future. But the expectation can nevertheless become fulfilled by A's occurring in fact. The earlier present is then past in comparison with the present belonging to A. –

What characterizes the experience of *duration*? A endures; the A belonging to each individual moment of the duration is the identical A, not a separate one. As the time-points are continuously united, so the A is continuously the same. *We are conscious* of the *continuous identity* in time. We are conscious of it in such a way that the continuous alteration of A, which attaches itself to the always present A, is not only continuously *united* with the latter but also finds its *fulfillment* in it. The past A is continuously *the same* as the present A. The A is a *continuously identical content.*

⟨*No. 3. Adequate Expectation*⟩

Halloo! Is it true that there is no *adequate expectation*? But I know with evidence that a memory must attach itself to my perception, do I not? Except, of course, if I should suddenly die? But does the dissolution of the I, of this trifling, easily forgotten I, signify that the content does not sink into the past? And does that not indicate in turn the necessity of a memory? Or only the possibility of a memory? But surely these are melancholy possibilities.

⟨*No. 4.*⟩ *Meditation.* ⟨*Perception, Memory, and Expectation*⟩ [155]

Memory. For example, I have an altogether fresh memory: one stroke of the hour has just died away and a new one sounds; the past stroke ⟨is⟩ still in consciousness as fading away. I repeat it; a new memorial representation [arises]. I repeat it several times; therefore several memories [arise] (which themselves are characterized as temporally distinct), all directed towards the same past event. The past event exists only once; the acts are several. Identification of the past being in a plurality of acts.

Repetition of a *perception* or repeated perception of the same object from different sides. Identification of the continuously present being, the same object enduring throughout all these perceptions. Possibly the durations are not joined to one another – gaps. Continued existence during these gaps.

The object endures. It has remained unchanged along with all of its determinations.

Experience of duration: perception and memory, the remembered object the same in content: *dilation* of the appearance, continuously.

Experience of change: perception and, in continuous connection with it, memory: the remembered object not the same with respect to all of its determinations, but in the continuous transition from act to act always the same in part (the determinations either individually the same, that is, enduring continuously, or changing).

Intuition of the identity of something individual in the flow of time.

Expectation: suspense, phantasy-representation. The suspense is broken in the course of experience in such a way that the object expected becomes present and what was present at the beginning of the expectation has become past. Reflection on fulfilled expectations shows us the expected as existing later, the state of expectation and the perceptions simultaneous with it as existing earlier. But is that merely empirical? It is *evident* that when something expected occurs, that is, has become something present, the state of expectation in which it was expected has itself passed away. It is *evident* that when what was future has become something present, what was present has become something

relatively past.[8] The representation belonging to the fulfilled [156] expectation necessarily "includes" the representation that the expectation itself is past.

The representation of something future is the representation of a being in relation to which what now exists is something past. The pictorial representation of something future is accompanied hand in hand by:

1) the representation that it actually exists,

2) the representation that what now exists (actually does exist now, or is represented as now in relation to the future) is past.

Does the present perception – for example, of these surroundings of mine – take on the character of memory when I represent tomorrow to myself? No. But the representation of tomorrow is such that I can *judge* that what is now perceived will be past or that the present perception will be the object of a memory. I can represent the now to myself as past. I do not thereby remember it, but I do represent it as remembered and judge that a memory might convey it.

⟨*No. 5. Enduring Perception as Simple Act*⟩[9]

Is an enduring perception eo ipso a composite perception? Let us take the simplest cases: the perception of a tone that persists unchanged or of a simple color that remains unchanged; and on the other hand, the perception of a tone uniformly dying away or of a color continuously changing in time. In the strict sense, composition in the content as well as composition in the act surely exists in these cases. And yet in the first example we will naturally speak of a simple, though enduring, tone, just as we will speak of a simple, though enduring, perceptual act; likewise in the second example we will speak of a simple change of a simple tone into another tone, and there too we will speak of a simple act. To be sure, a concrete part of the simple tone extended in time falls to the share of each point of time, of each smaller part

[8] The preceding sentences from p. 159, line 34 ("It is *evident*") to this point are found again – only slightly altered – in § 26, p. 59, lines 1–4. – Editor's note.

[9] Husserl later asserted an approximate date for this sketch in a note: "1898–1900." – Editor's note.

of time. In spite of the talk about the tone's being identically the same, only enduring, the individual parts of the tone are not identical. Had the tone begun later, this would have had no influence, as far as content is concerned, on the being of the remaining portion of the temporal extension of the tone. Were the tone to cease earlier, every earlier part would remain what it is. And in any case, each part of the tone is something independent. The identity in the duration rather concerns only the conceptual content, the genus and species; what is identically the same is the defining element. [157]

The situation is the same in the case of uniform change. The change is conceptually the same in each succeeding part of time, and this is true again for the corresponding continuous acts of perception and apprehension. Each enduring perception of the uniform content can be temporally divided, and to each temporal division corresponds a part of the perception. And just as the temporal part of the tone is tone, so the temporal part of the perception is perception. Moreover, the perception in this case not only endures objectively but in addition preserves the character of duration phenomenally, which by no means leaves it entirely unchanged.

If we nevertheless call the perception simple, we do so because we do not take into account this sort of compositeness to which everything that flows away in time is obviously subject. We therefore intend to accept as simple each act in which we can ascertain no diversity other than that which arises through temporal division.

A composite act is articulated into acts. A certain diversity, which is more than that of the divisions of a duration, belongs to the concept of articulation. (One might be tempted to say that ⟨it belongs to the concept of articulation⟩ that in a composite act a plurality of qualitatively different act-characters is combined into a unity; or, in the case of act-characters that are completely alike qualitatively, the plurality is combined into a unity only when the act-characters that are alike are separated by those that are different.)

⟨*No. 6. Brentano and the Question about the Evidence of Memory*⟩ [158]

In his lectures, *Brentano* treats the question about the evidence of memory. He observes, for example, that everyone admits that not every memory is evident – to cite one case, the less clear memory is not evident. Hence at what degree of clarity does evidence become operative? – He also emphasizes that one talks here about greater and lesser degrees of clarity; but one cannot speak of the more or less evident, which would be absurd. Again: If God were to bring us forth immediately just as we *now* are, we would indeed possess all of our memories; for these are certainly consequences of the arrangement. But in that case memory would deceive us. There is no guarantee that something actually did take place as we believe it did in memory.

⟨*No. 7*⟩ *Intuition, Evidence of Being-Past – Mere Representation of Being-Past.* ⟨*Apparent Necessity of Assuming a Change of Content in Primary Memory*⟩

To what extent, on the one hand, is an earlier experience characterized as past in memory; and to what extent, on the other hand, is its being-past *not evident?* To what extent do I have no intuition that the experience actually is past? Here, obviously, we must make the distinction between *representation* of the past and *experience* of the past. I represent the past event as past and also believe in the being-past of the event, but I do not *experience* its passing and its being-just-past – I do not intuit these. A melody I recall may also run its course in memory. But the running-off is here only re-presentative [*repräsentativ*]. The melody is not actually running off now, and I do not even have an intuition of a running-off that has already occurred. In memory, the running-off that appears is re-presentative; in intuition, it is not re-presentative.

In the perception of a flow, I simultaneously have an intuition of the past. We speak of the *perception* of an event, of a change, of a process of becoming in those cases in which being-past is experienced in a certain way along with a present being; specifi-

cally, in such a way that what is experienced and given is wholly embraced by the unity of what pertains to the object,[10] that is, by [159] the unity of the object extending ⟨throughout⟩ the entire alteration. When an event runs off, the representations of the individual phases are pictorial representations; but the unity belonging to these phases is itself experienced, "present." In each moment, the unity of what is just now present and perceived, together with what is given in the continuity of memory, is a present unity of experience. And in this unity of experience we grasp the "being" of the past. The representation belonging to each phase has the character of an intuition of what has just been, or, more precisely, the character of an intuition that the event has just been. The representation has a certain connective determinateness; the representation has a specific character that we designate precisely ⟨as⟩ the character of being-past on the part of the object. In this interconnection, the temporal character is experienced and an object is represented. And this happens in such a way that the representation is permeated (in the experience) with this temporal character; that is, the representation possesses experience of the being-past of the object.

We must make the following distinctions, however.

a) If the representation is an inadequate one, then it is just as capable of deceiving as the perceptual representation is.

b) If the perception was adequate, then the being-past is actual. So it is with respect to one's own experiences. The elapsing of a content that I experience and that I take simply as it shows itself in my representation is indubitable.

Can the elapsing content in the process of passing away be remembered exactly as it was? The surviving memory image, if it were to repeat the content with absolute faithfulness, would indeed have that very content in itself. Would the content therefore be present, and would it at the same time serve in the act of fresh memory as the representant of the past content that is equivalent to it? But the same content that *now* exists cannot simultaneously pass away and persist, namely, as the representant of itself. When the content passes away, the perception of the

[10] Later marginal note by Husserl: "*Stern* also says something similar (according to *Meinong*?)"; cf. No. 29, p. 223ff. – Editor's note.

content is, of course, immediately followed by the memory of the content.[11]

We must therefore assume a change of content. But, say, on [160] the model of blue coming into existence from red, with the blue then becoming the representant of the red? Or does another red come from the red? Would d ⟨have come into existence⟩ out of c? No. We will not assume that, and experience contradicts it. The remembered content is "the same" as – though the image of – the perceived content. Is it a change of content that is perhaps *sui generis?* We therefore have:

1) the consciousness of re-presentation,

2) the changed content as representant of the original content and, at the same time, the interval of the change as the measure for the temporality. The temporality itself as form of pictorial consciousness.

⟨No. 8.⟩ Adequation by Means of Similarity. – Representation of an Object and Representation of the Perception of the Object. ⟨What Is Still Given in Consciousness in "Faded" Fashion [Functioning] by Means of Similarity as Pictorial Representant of What Was Previously Perceived⟩

Is it not the task of the psychological theory of time, under the presupposition of the objective time in which psychic experiences flow, to explain the origin of the subjective representation of time?

Adequation by Means of Similarity

Therefore depiction through similarity. In the process of being pushed back in time, the appearance certainly changes: at the beginning of the second tone of a melody, the first is "still" in

[11] The remembered content does indeed bear a different time-determination, but the whole concrete act of remembering bears the time-determination now; and it is now along with all of its component parts. Therefore the remembered content and the past now would at the same time be present; specifically, in the sense of the actually present now. Or should we say that an act of intuiting can exist with the time-determination t and that what is adequately intuited and given in it can have the time-determination t_1?

consciousness; but it is no longer present itself, as that which it was. It is still in consciousness only in "faded" fashion. The latter would be an adequate representant by means of similarity.

Suppose that the contents of phantasy are in fact different from the contents of sensation, but in such a way that the difference is an ultimate one; an abstract moment of phantasy would correspond to each abstract moment of sensation, and the corresponding moments would be similar to one another. Similarity leaves open the possibility of continuous transition, and this possibility is certainly asserted too. On the other hand, every other similarity is grounded either on the form or on the [161] contents, the contents belonging to the same genus, just as the forms. Here the similarity would be related to all possible contents and forms, as far as they are sensible. But that would be no difficulty. There would be a primitive similarity that would link together all the elementary sensations and all the phantasy-elements corresponding to them.

Representation of an Object and Representation of the Perception of the Object

If I represent A, do I thereby also represent *implicite* that I am perceiving A? Surely to represent A and to represent the perception of A (the experience of perception) are two very different things. Yet is not the one in a certain sense given with the other? If I represent a lion, then in my phantasy it is as if the lion were standing there facing me in the surroundings that belong to it or that are represented along with it. The intending turning-towards aims at the represented lion, but I am "co-represented" and so are the lion's surroundings. Am I also co-represented as perceiving the lion in its surroundings? This too is incidentally co-represented. The intending turning-towards can therefore be directed towards all of these matters. If we call the *turning-towards* "representation," then, of course, only the lion is represented.

But in what way is it given *implicite* that I am representing the lion? Obviously in that I am turned towards the lion, or else that it stands facing me, that it is seen by me (I have directed my eyes

towards it), and so on. But for this it is not necessary that I "*reflect*" on the act of perception. *What is the difference here?* It is one thing to heed the lion and something very different to heed the appearance of the lion – specifically, the perceptual appearance of the lion – and again something different to heed the perception, the act of meaning that a lion is present to me in such and such a mode of appearance. Therefore "reflecting" means only the *act of heeding*. However, in that other mode of *mere apprehension* – but not of attentive heeding – not only the lion but also the perceiving of the lion is represented. And this is no doubt a necessity. To represent an object, and to represent it as present [162] itself (and consequently, of course, also as existing), "amounts to the same thing." To represent an object in phantasy is to have present an appearance charged with the character of re-presentation [*Repräsentation*]. By virtue of this character, the appearing object is not taken as present but as re-presented; the appearance merely re-presents it. But just as the object appearing in the strict sense, the image-object, functions as image for the intended object, so there exists *a priori* the possibility of also apprehending the presently given appearance as an image for the other appearance in which the depicted object was present; the object's appearing thus and so is an image for the object's actually facing me in such a way.

⟨*No. 9*⟩ *Disputation.*[12]⟨*The Presentness of Memory, the Being-Past of What is Remembered*⟩

I *now* have memory images (phantasy images) of our drawing room. The image of the small oriental table rises to the surface. The appearance endures for a while, disappears, reemerges, vanishes again. "My regard" turns to other objects, to the small jade table, to the picture by Van Dyck, to the picture by Gainsbor-

[12] Husserl *later* added the date "1904" to the sheet reproduced here, which he had entitled "Disputation." There appears to be no doubt that the sketch is of much older date. Husserl's introduction of the year "1904" probably indicates either that he simply looked over the sketch again at that time and decided to preserve it or that the sketch is to be understood merely in the sense of an association – specifically, with the material for the lectures of the winter term of 1904/1905. – Editor's note.

ough, to the piano, to the green-covered arm chair with its pattern, to the sofa, to the relief, then perhaps to the relief on the opposite wall, to the little chest, etc. Each of these things endures for a while (duration of the present), quite as if I were actually seeing them. Hence we have the succession of memorial intuitions, each enduring for a time, changing, etc.; we have duration, change, and so on, all in the experience belonging to the now.

a) There can be memories in the strict sense, and individual memories have this character clearly stamped on them.

b) There can be phantasy-representations of something that [163] *exists* "in the room." In question are objects that continuously exist in the room. The room with its furnishings ⟨is⟩ an enduring object (objectively enduring, whether or not it is perceived and remembered, or represented in phantasy), and I now represent it intuitively. –

A) Do I *now* experience the colors, forms, and so forth?

B) I now experience the memory; the colors are not now being sensed, are not given colors, are not directly seen, and are not actual colors themselves; they are rather "representations" of actual colors. This holds true of the colors of the objects (and, of course, of the objects themselves), but also of the subjective colors. They are "not actual"; I do not sense them now. They are representations of colors.

A) But in that case are not color-contents there in the present memory, whether I term them representations or not?

B) What does "there" mean? The memory is present; it is now perceived whenever I speak of it in this way and directly assert its presence. The color, however, is not present; it is merely re-presented in the present memory.

A) But this fluctuating hue and configuration, this entire fluctuating phenomenon, is nevertheless given in the "re-presentation," that is, precisely in the memory; the hue, and so on, are moments in the memory.

B) Granted, but the colors – not only the colors of the object but also those belonging to the "appearance," which earlier was the perceptual appearance – are merely re-presented.

A) Quite correct. I do not now have this never-repeatable appearance, the perceptual appearance. Rather, in most cases at least, I have in fluctuating and changing fashion a multiplicity of

"appearances"; that is, changing phenomena, all of which correspond to the determinate perceptual appearance, to the house as seen from here and there. And that is true of every perceptual appearance. Therefore the fluctuating phantasies have a re-presentative relation first of all to the fixed aspects, to the object's ways of appearing in the perception – for example, the fluctuating hues, etc., have a re-presentative relation to the determinate color adumbration of the corresponding perceptual appearance and mediately to the color of the object. The phantasy-appearance re-presents the perceptual appearance and mediately the object. To be sure, the object does indeed appear in [164] the phantasy-appearance, but imperfectly. It would appear "perfectly" in a perceptual appearance. Would we then have "clear" consciousness? But what if we have a clear phantasy-representation? Even if for only a short time? Well, then it re-presents through identity: and I certainly do not suppose that the appearance itself exists here and now. We always arrive at a conflict with perception. The perception is not alone in possessing the like appearance and the *belief*-consciousness. The clear memory also has both. But they are different in the two cases. The appearance and the belief-consciousness in perception have the character of the here and now, of the it-itself; in memory they have the character of the not-now, of conflict in some way with the now. The now belongs essentially to perception; the not-now belongs essentially to "representation." The perception of the representation yields the following: the representation now exists, and therefore such and such a fluctuating appearance with such and such a fluctuating color-moment, etc., now exists. But the appearance that "hovers before us" there, or in which the object hovers before us from such and such a side, does not exist now; and the I that had it, the I that had been related to it and that is also now remembered, does not exist now either, although it is personally the same as the present I.

⟨*No. 10.*⟩ *Old and First Observation That an Essential Difference Exists between Original Consciousness of the Past and Recollection*

I recall a person, an event. I recall a tone. But I also "remember" a tone "primarily."

a) The tone is "renewed" in phantasy ("re-presented," reproduced).

b) The tone has just faded away but does not appear in the mode of a phantasm, of a "reproduction." Nevertheless, I have "just heard" it; I *still* have a "consciousness" of it. The intention directed towards it still continues without the continuity of the act of meaning having to be interrupted.

This is surely an essential difference!

a) In memorial consciousness grounded on a phantasy-appearance, the "image" hovers before me just as the object does in perception. Or: In perception, the object itself stands [165] before me; in phantasy, I see it "as it were," and then I apprehend it as the image of something that has been. For example, I have the emerging tone-image and I apprehend it as the tone or as the melody that my little daughter played "just now" or "shortly before" on the piano.

b) In the next moment, this "image" is past; the tone has lasted for its appointed time (the phantasy-tone, and not only that, but the phantasm of the tone as well); the melody has run its course in phantasy, and accordingly the phantasy-melody-appearance is also past. But then I have the consciousness of the just-had having of this appearance. And precisely in this way: I hear the melody itself playing. I hear the tone itself that has just sounded. And then it is past, but I am still directed towards it; it is not yet out of my act of meaning: I still have it firmly in the consciousness that belongs to "immediate memory." But this is not a phantasm, and one should not state that it is. I meet with phantasy-representations and phantasms only through "reproduction" understood as recollection, as new appearance, not as the continuation of perception (sensation) lasting as long as the "fresh memory" lasts.

"*Fresh memory*": the consciousness of just-having-been, of just-having-experienced – more precisely, of just-having-per-

ceived – immediately following on the perception.

Recollection: renewal of the perceived in phantasy as a new appearance in contrast to ⟨what was previously perceived and "freshly remembered"⟩. The intention that is a continuation of the intention that belonged to the perception and that continues to endure while the sensation-contents are no longer being experienced (in any case, no longer being experienced in the same manner) is identified with the image-intention of the newly emerging phantasy-representation, and not merely with respect to aspects of the object: The "appearance" revives and is re-presented. This process of identification can be repeated, and the identity of the intention can be preserved throughout these identifications and can always ignite new recollections.

Rhythm in the filling of the same, or "essentially" the same, intention.

⟨*No. 11.*⟩ *Do the Momentary Phases of Perception Referring to the Elapsed Parts of the Temporal Object Have the Character of Imagination?*[13] [166]

Do the momentary phases of perception referring to the elapsed parts of the temporal object have the character of *imagination?*

At first this seems to be self-evident. A not-now is certainly represented in the now. Is not the representation of the not-now an image, as it were, of the now?

This is a *cardinal point.*

Reproductive memory also represents an object, a not-now in the now. How is this representation related to the representation that belongs to primary memory?

Primary memory does not transplant me and does not make me "experience" once again "in image."

On both sides, in perception and in reproductive memory, we first have clear intuition, then fading-away, etc. In the fading-

[13] Husserl noted in the margin to this sketch that it offers "essentially nothing new in relation to the lectures" on time-consciousness from February of 1905. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this remark that we are dealing with a sketch written only after these lectures. – Editor's note.

away we do not, properly speaking, have phantasies (reproductions).

It is common to both primary and reproductive memory that what is represented is "not there itself now." But primary memory ⟨is⟩ an original act; it constitutes the being-past of A primarily in the primarily original time, just as perception (the boundary of primary memory) constitutes the time: being-now.

In strictness, we do not have to oppose primary and secondary memory but perception – or rather perception *in concreto* (with the grasping of the now and the grasping of the past, the one inseparable from the other) – and reproductive memory, which is a modification: the reproduction of the now and the reproduction of the past.

We therefore have to take note of the following:

1) the original modification that concerns every experience, that modifies everything impressional into something reproductive;

2) the modification consisting in the original association of the contents of the temporal material; [167]

3) the fact that the whole phenomenon of secondary (reproductive) memory is the modification of a phenomenon of perception (of a complete perception);

4) and the fact that there belongs to the essence of every modified experience (in the sense of the adumbration of "original association") the possibility of the consciousness of a reproduction (phantasy) or of a phantasy-representation, and the possibility of a temporal representation.

⟨*No. 12. The Evidence of Time-Consciousness*⟩

I perceive a measure, a melody. I perceive it step by step, tone by tone. Assuming that no direct interruptions occur, I hear and perceive continuously. Accordingly, there exists an enduring, temporally extended act of perceiving.

What do I perceive? The first tone sounds. I hear this tone. But I do not merely hear its quality in a timeless point. The tone *endures* and in the course of its duration swells in intensity in this way or that, and so on. And then the second tone follows. I

continue to hear, and I now hear it. The consciousness of the preceding tone is not erased, however. I can surely observe, "see," that I still keep my intention directed towards the first tone while the second is "actually sounding," is "actually" being perceived. And so it continues. In the case of a given experience – in the case of familiar melodies, for example, or of melodies that are perhaps repeated – we frequently have *intuitive expectations* as well. Each new tone then fulfills this forwards-directed intention. We have *determinate* expectations in these cases. But we are not and we cannot be entirely without apprehension directed forwards. *The temporal fringe also has a future.*

Therefore the perceiving of a melody is in fact a temporally extended, gradually and continuously unfolding act, which is constantly an act of perceiving. This act possesses an ever new "now"-point. And in this now, something becomes objective as now (the tone heard now), while at the same time some one member of the melody is objective as just past and others are [168] objective as still further past; and perhaps also something or other is objective ⟨as⟩ "future."

Moreover, the *now* is as little a fictitious mathematical time-point as the "previous tone," as the first or second tone before the now or after it. Each now rather has its perceptible extension, which is something that can be confirmed. (It would be possible, of course, for the extensions of the objects in their temporal locations to appear as nonextended, namely, without sufficient breadth to permit of further division. The indivisible in this instance is an ideal limit, however, just as the indivisible spatial point is.)

If we hear only a single enduring tone, then we hear ⟨it⟩ continuously. As a rule, the tone fluctuates, or "simultaneous" successions bestow divisions on it, such that parts belonging to the now, even if obscurely contrasted and loosely delimited, are distinguished from the just past and from the future, which we expect in advance.

We therefore find an act of perceiving that is temporally extended, that perceives now A, then B, then C. And this act has perceived first the A in the privileged mode of the now, then the B in this privileged mode, in the course of which A is pushed into

the background and assumes the status of what is "just before," fulfilling an expectation or filling out an altogether indefinite empty intention aimed at the future; then C has the privilege of being now, B the character of being just before [C], and A[14] the character of being "immediately before B," and so on.

What we establish in the individual case is valid universally and essentially. We see universally and with evidence that meaning and appearance are extended in the indicated order and manner over the temporal field, that they form a unity of continuity. We grasp this evidence through reflection.

I can certainly often enough produce perceptions that are quite alike, repeating the melody or the visual event, and in so doing focus my attention on the appearance itself and the meaning. The essential interconnection between perception of the thing itself and perception of the appearance is thereby universally grasped.

What is "given" to perception is necessarily something temporally *extended,* not something with the character of a mere point in time. That is evident. Yet to the *essence* of perception, as far as its temporal character is concerned, there does belong the necessary *privilege of a "now" and a gradual gradation* towards the now, a kind of relation of ascent and intensification in the [169] direction of the zero-point; and in the opposite direction, a blurring into indistinctness, which, however, does not essentially appear as such.

If we are in the C-now, then B is characterized as the immediately preceding point (which is no longer now) and A as the point that immediately precedes B. Hence B does not have the character of the now and in this position *cannot* have it. *Now* and *before* evidently and essentially exclude one another. Furthermore, we have as evident the possibility of a memory in which B is characterized as now and C as "not yet," in the course of which B is induced and is meant with evidence as the same B. It is evident that what thus appears as the just past B can also be meant in the phantasy-memory as identical to the B represented in the now. It is evident that what is "no longer"

[14] Reading "A" for "C." – Translator's note.

was a now.[15] It is further evident that what now is will be something that "no longer" is: The expectation of the "not yet" connected with the "now" is fulfilled; and identically the same thing, which in the course of this fulfillment is characterized as *no longer,* fulfills the intention aimed at the aforesaid "no longer." In this way, the object can endure. As far as what it was is concerned, it is no longer. But at the same time it is present as completely the same as what it was; it is continuously and identically the same. –

That all reality lies in the indivisible now-point, that in phenomenology everything ought to be reduced to this point – these are sheer *fictions* and lead to absurdities. In phenomenology we do not have to do with objective time but with the data of adequate perception. This requires us to consider perceptions, with their appearing now, past, and future, as *given.* Reduced, they yield the evident now, past, and future, as well as evident possibilities of phantasy, of reproductive memory, of reproductive expectation (not of the immediate future of the temporal field – what is immediately future in the temporal field is not the same as the more distant future, which is the object of phantasy-expectation), and of the evident interconnections conditioned by these. –

The evidence of time-consciousness: As far as the unbroken continuity extends, thus far does the evidence extend. But this [170] does not include the ultimate specific differences. Where there is continuous similarity, there is no differentiation possible within narrower ranges. But [differentiation is possible] on the generic level. Evident are the identities, differences, etc., based on points of relation that are evident as far as their identity with themselves is concerned. Such relation-points do not presuppose determination; they are absolute.

[15] If I repeat the perception, then I have B once again and as actually present now. But then the now appears as mere repetition, and the B in the now appears as image of the earlier B (the tone).

⟨*No. 13.*⟩ *Perception of Something Temporal and Perception of Temporality*[16]

To be the presentation or the positing of something itself is part of the idea of perception.

Something objective stands "there itself." Can this objectivity itself be apprehended more generally as the temporal objectivity itself? Therefore as what is present itself in the sense of the now?

And does the now refer to a just past, or do we rather have to distinguish the abstract now-point from the full now?[17]

Opposition of belief and nonbelief (mere representation);

opposition of meaning in the specific sense and nonmeaning (the question whether the former is identical with attention);

opposition of *perception* (unmodified appearance) and *imagination;*

opposition of now, past – future. Temporal indeterminateness.[18]

Regarding the perception of something temporal and the perception of temporality itself, the distinction is obviously a question of differences in the act of meaning. For everything is there as far as the appearance is concerned, and it is the job of the act of meaning to intend selectively what is "there."

[16] According to his annotation, Husserl "transcribed and reflected on" the text of this sketch "in Silvaplana," that is, in August of 1909; but it is quite obviously a question of the transcription of a much older sketch. – Editor's note.

[17] 1) Perception is consciousness of the present. 2) Consciousness of the present is not always consciousness of individual being; perception, however, is consciousness – specifically, giving consciousness – of individually enduring being: given individual duration is present itself [in perception].

[18] All of this is essentially a reproduction following an old sheet.

⟨*No. 14.*⟩ *Whether the Intuitive Modification by Virtue of Which Immediate Memory Comes into Being out of Perception Can Be Understood as a Mere Change in the Presenting Content. (Brentano may serve simply as an example here)*[19] [171]

According to *Brentano,* the "process of being pushed back in time" consists essentially in a change in content. In conformity with an "invariable law," new representations are joined continuously to the perceptual representation by means of "original association." Each of these new representations reproduces the content of the preceding ones, *appending* the (continuous) moment of the past as it does so. (It is said – in *Marty's* lectures[20] – that there may occur additional changes, in degrees more or less noticeable, involving intensity and fullness.) Since according to Brentano the act-character of the presenting admits of no differentiation, everything comes back to a change in the content: temporal change is only a quite peculiar change in content.

Can the phenomenological sinking-back in time be described by means of a mere *change in content,* or, to be more precise about it, by means of the supervention of a temporal "characteristic," of a new content?

Let A be just past. Is A then renewed through original association – or what amounts to the same thing by virtue of A's continuity, is A *continuously preserved?* In other words, has A remained on hand, even if in a weakened state, and does the whole difference consist in the fact that a new moment has emerged, the moment of the past?

Or perhaps the situation is the following. A is there with the now-moment. Does the latter constantly change while A continues to be preserved (expressed objectively: even after the disappearance of the external stimuli, if it is a question of perception)? The tone I hear exists as long as I hear ⟨it⟩. But when I no

[19] Husserl observes regarding this sketch: "Vidi: good: Silvaplana 1909." Without any doubt, what is involved is the date of a fresh inspection of the sheets, not the date of their composition. – Editor's note.

[20] Husserl possessed a transcript of the lectures on "Genetic Psychology" in the form in which Anton Marty presented them in the summer semester of 1889 in Prague; he is probably referring to these lectures here. – Editor's note.

longer hear it, is it the case that it indeed does not exist – and yet is nonetheless there, only with the determination *past? Brentano* says that *past* is a modifying predicate; what is past, as past, is [172] something that does not exist. Consequently, he surely does not intend to say that what is past is something existing, only with a different moment. The experienced content (we intend to abstract from all transcendence) nonetheless does exist, and in the sense of the interpretation we are considering, exists as merely furnished with a new moment. It even *presently* exists, and in this present existence it only has a new moment.

Consequently, do I not presently experience the past A? In that case we would have:

1) first of all the objective fact of the perception of A: A is there, specifically with the now as its temporal determination;

2) then the fact of the memory: A is there with the temporal determination of the *past*.

In the first case, A is intuited as now, i.e., *as* charged with the now-moment; in the second, A is intuited as ⟨charged⟩ with the temporal determination *past*.

Now if – as we want to presuppose – A is an immanent, really experienced content, we would have in the case of 2) the possibility of making the evident judgment: A now exists together with the temporal determination *past*. But if the *complex* of the two moments *A* and *past* exists now, then A also exists now; and at the same time A is supposed to be past, therefore not to exist now.

Originally we had A_{n_1} (where n_1 signifies the now-moment of A in which A was perceived); subsequently, when A has become past, we would have $(A_{p_1})_{n_2}$, where p_1 is the modified n_1.

But according to Brentano, one really cannot speak of the now-moment as a moment in its own right. Let us assume, then, that it is not a separate moment. We would then have A, followed by A_p (p = past). The absence of an index signifies the now. But A_p as a whole is again without an index. A has the temporal index p, but A_p itself, taken as a whole, is once again something present (something to be grasped through perception). But where a complex is given, why should we not be able to take a part ⟨of the complex⟩ as given by itself, separately, and perceive it as such? And would that not be the same A as before?

And in that case would A not be present – and at the same time past?

It seems clear that the relationship between the "perception," which is connected with the now, and that intuitive "memory" that follows immediately after the perception cannot be explained through the coming and going of new primary contents. If we [173] restrict ourselves to adequately given contents, which at the same time are apperceived as temporal objects, then the difference in experience between the A that now exists and the A that did exist cannot lie in *moments of content* that attach themselves to A. But obviously the difference cannot lie in the *mere modification of A itself* either. By now perceiving A and afterwards perceiving an A altered in content (the precise character of the alteration does not matter), I still have not acquired a consciousness of "A past." Where, then, is the phenomenological difference supposed to lie? *In the mode of apprehension, in the mode of consciousness?*

⟨*No. 15.*⟩ *Time and Memory.* ⟨*Perception of the Now, Memorial Perception and Phantasy-Memory. Transferring of the Differences into the Mode of Apperception*⟩[21]

My interpretation is the following.

Memory is *customarily pictorial apperception,* just as expectation is.

Perception is the apperception through which the object appears as there itself and now present. Adequate perception presents the object itself; the meaning is not mere meaning. Inadequate perception implies pictorial and symbolic elements.

Perception in the customary sense is perception of the *now.*

The memory of something further past is *symbolic memory* if, for example, it is merely verbal memory. It is *phantasy-memory* if it is memory grounded on a phantasy-representation. It then stands on a level with the intuitive now-positing of something that is not perceived. For example, I now represent the street in phantasy: the image emerges and I apprehend it as the represen-

[21] This sketch, contained in a notebook of Husserl's written in the style of a journal, is dated precisely to the day by Husserl himself: "December 20, 1901." – Editor's note.

tation, in phantasy, of the street – that is, of the street as now existing.

Now there are also other situations in the case of memory. There is a memorial perception in which the past object is given itself, as past. The same sensuous content is apprehended as past [174] in relation to what is present in some perception or other.[22] The object may appear as exactly the same, only modified, but the modification does not touch the sensuous content and therefore does not touch that which constitutes the object as far as its matter is concerned.

I am inclined to transfer this difference into the mode of apperception.[23] In what did the objectivity consist? The unity of the world – now = the unity belonging to a total perception, which embraces all that is now in the manner of a perception of the now. That signifies the possibility of a total now-perception. Naturally, what does not accommodate itself to the unity of this total perception cannot now exist. Hence what would be perceived as now can nevertheless not exist now if it should happen to be excluded by other now-perceptions; that is, if it should turn out to be incompatible with them in one perception. We will at least have to say that every *adequate* now-perception posits an absolute now; and, within the group of adequate perceptions, there only exists the possible difference that some component group $\alpha_1 \ldots \mu_1$ can be united into a single now-perception, just as another group $\alpha_2 \ldots \mu_2$ can be united [in a different now-perception], while *in general* the members of different groups are incompatible. When an individual member does belong to different groups, it endures. The different groups themselves form the temporal succession; the nows form a continuous sequence. How does that happen?

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[22] Husserl noted the name *Brown* in the margin at this point; presumably he is referring to Thomas Brown (1778–1829), *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind,* 13th edition (Edinburgh: 1842), 260ff. – Editor's note.

[23] On the authority of this precisely dated sketch, Husserl – in opposition to *Brentano* (cf. No. 14, p. 176ff.) – has already shifted "this difference into the mode of apperception" by the end of 1901 at the latest. This fact offers one of the decisive criteria for the chronological arrangement of the sketches reproduced here. It is certainly possible to assume that the date of origin of almost all of the reproduced sketches from No. 2 on is very close to the year 1901. – Editor's note.

All adequate now-perceptions can be united, but not into one and the same adequate now-perception. What does that mean? It means that if $\alpha_1 \ldots \alpha_\mu$ [followed by] $\alpha_2 \ldots \alpha_\mu$ are adequate perceptions of $a_1 \ldots a_\mu$ [followed by] $a_2 \ldots a_\mu$, then in general one adequate now-perception that would simultaneously apprehend $a_1 \ldots a_2$ is not possible.

On the other hand, there is necessarily a memorial perception, a temporal perception, that now perceives a_2 and, in relation to a_2, perceives a_1 as "immediately past." [175]

Or: Perception is something universal in contrast to perception of the now, perception of the immediate past, and perception of the future. The now-perceptions belonging to different stages cannot be united into a collective now-perception, but in relation to each now-group there is a unity of memorial and expectational groups in which a different now-stage corresponds to each group. Or rather each group *is* a different now-stage. For *now* is something relative. It is relative to stages.

God's infinite consciousness embraces all time "at once." This infinite consciousness is nontemporal.

To each time-point corresponds the group belonging to the now of that time-point. These groups are ordered – ordered by the continuous mode of apperception. For him ⟨for God⟩ there is no past, present, and future. But ⟨even⟩ for him there is a past, present, and future relative to each point. Time is the form of the infinite consciousness, as infinite adequate perceptual series. From the position of a determinate now, $a \overset{n}{\text{——}} b$, a is past; in relation to a, n is future, just as b is.

The divine consciousness is the ideal correlate of objective time and of the objective world and world-evolution.

Subjective consciousness: In the now-consciousness, which is itself an act that now exists in the flow of subjective experiences (expressed objectively: which therefore can be perceived in a possible now-perception), we naturally cannot be conscious of the past now as now. But the *past* is perceived in the form of an *adequate memory:* this is an act that exists *now* but in its new mode of apperception adequately perceives the past object and its state or condition.

Now, objectively, one could say the following. At least for a very short time, the earlier now-consciousness endures and does

not change, or does not change noticeably. New now-consciousnesses follow on this, each with a different now, and we term the ultimate member of this series, the one actually intended at the moment, "now," while what was just now we now call "past." A one-sided relationship exists among these nows; our apprehension tends always in the direction containing the actual culminating-point of the series of nows, and we grasp everything in relation to this ultimate point. Every now, however, turns into its [176] past, since there follows on the perceiving of the now a new perceiving of the now of different form, and the earlier now is then no longer the culminating point. The past act of perceiving is thereby transformed into an inadequate act, [then] into a merely pictorial act, and finally into something indeterminately symbolic.

But can we assume infinitely many modes of apperception?

Is not the apperception of the now something that renews itself again and again in the same way? And is not the apperception of the immediate past a certain modification of the mode of apperception that changes in the form of a continuous series and then, when we go back into the past, is always ordered in a single series, indirectly and symbolically, by means of relations perfectly alike in form?

Let us assume that we continually have the same concrete part of the actually experienced relational form filled with different material content – the same extension, such as we have in the case of space, our idea of which develops with the help of small original experiences of space. The finite – the infinite visual field.

The point of most distinct seeing: the now, etc.[24] Well, that may be so. But the point of distinct seeing is really not a point but a small field; and the point "now" is also a small field, and this alone comes into question. Within this field there are different modes of apperception, and this differentness makes up the form. As consciousness advances, the original temporal field belonging to the adequate perception of time is filled over and over again; and the new now currently emerging turns the

[24] In the case of space, this point is *surrounded* by a space; in time's case, the now is the border of a given time rather than its center.

still-living now of the earlier moment into the past by virtue of the form of relation, the configurational form.

⟨*No. 16. What Can Be Given as Present in One Perception*⟩

Spatial presence – temporal presence; spatial absence – temporal absence: these pairs are contrasted with one another by *Liebmann* in *Gedanken und Thatsachen,* I, 351.[25] One would have to distinguish the following here:

1) that which is not now spatially present but which does [177] exist; that which is simultaneous with what is perceived, although not perceived itself.

Should we proceed further [and distinguish]: that which can be given as present in *one* perception (in one perceiving consciousness)? That is, that which is compossible with what is being perceived? That would imply: Everything compossible = everything real relating to the present now-point. But what is compossible? What is compatible, in one perception, with what is perceived? Not everything compossible in the wider sense is compossible in the sense in question here. We therefore say with greater accuracy and completeness: "compossible in one perception" (likewise in one consciousness). What is universally compossible is really excluded. By what? By experience. What does "by experience" mean?

1) Perception;

2) memory;

3) statements about both;

4) the connection between present perceptions and earlier perceptions, connections derived from experience (experiential motivation) pertaining to future probability;

5) statements of others and their agreement with my experiences and experiential statements.

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[25] Husserl refers to Otto Liebmann, *Gedanken und Thatsachen. Philosophische Abhandlungen, Aphorismen und Studien* [Thoughts and facts. Philosophical essays, aphorisms, and studies], Volumes I and II (Strassburg, 1899 and 1904). Volume I contains a discussion about "The consciousness of time. A paradox" (pp. 346–375). – Editor's note.

⟨*No. 17. The Problem of the Consciousness of Modification*⟩

When A has faded away, surely I do not merely have, in a point belonging to the phenomenological field of time, a phantasy image of A with a certain "modification," that is, ⟨with the⟩ temporal character $\dot{\underline{A}}$. Am I not also conscious of A's continuous sinking-backwards in time? And does not A always have a continuous *temporal extension* for me?

Construction: A sounds. After A is past, $\dot{\underline{A}}$ is there, and an ever "smaller" $\dot{\underline{A}}$ is continuously appended. In the place of smallness let us adopt indices, which we will record here only in the form of integers. The indices are continuous numbers:

$A_0\ A_1\ A_2 \ldots A_n \ldots$ [178]
A_0 is past. A_1 now exists in its place.
A_1 is past. A_2 now exists in its place.
... ...

But have I than at any time experienced merely a moment having the character of a point in time? In the now, "something characterized as past"?

We would therefore have a temporal *punctum* here. But is the process of being pushed back supposed to be pushed back itself? What might that mean? A_0 is modified into A_1. An A_δ remains as a residue of A_0, an A_ε ⟨of⟩ A_δ, up to A_1. How can there still be room here for the consciousness of the modifications? One could assume that when A_δ follows on A_0, and A_ε on A_δ, that this is not simply a process of being severed, one cutting off the other, but that the continuum $A_0 \ldots A_\delta \ldots A_1$ remains simultaneously in consciousness. But A_0 is nevertheless past, and by degrees each further moment of the continuum is also past. This assumption is therefore out of the question. Should we say that the consciousness of A is always a now, that it endures and undergoes its dilation in the manner of duration? I have an enduring consciousness of A and a consciousness that I am continually related to the same A. A_δ follows without interruption on A_0. Identification occurs, which then persists continuously. Furthermore: A_0, as far as sensation and perception are concerned, is past. But the phantasms and phantasy-representations are preserved in con-

sciousness; therefore A_δ remains for a while, even after $A_{\delta'}$ has already made its appearance, and so on.

Hence, what exists simultaneously is not A_0 [. . . A_1] ⟨but⟩ A_δ . . . $A_{\delta'}$ . . . A_1. But if A_δ (or any phase) endures, are we not conscious of a process of enduring? Or is that not already just accepted here? In time-point 1, I not only have A_1 but also everything down to A_δ. If, however, I were also conscious of A's enduring, I would need new series; and so it would go *in infinitum.*

⟨*No. 18.*⟩ *The Character of Memory. – Representation*[26] *through Identity: What Is That Supposed to Mean?*[27]

The character of memory (as character of consciousness) is related to and grounded on a *resurrected appearance,* and it is precisely by means of this appearance that the object appears as [179] past.

Psychic acts are indeed always grounded on appearances in this way, but it is the appearing *objects* that then receive the *determination* of the "*consciousness*" in question. For example, the wish "is related to" – that is, has as its "foundation" – a presentation, but what is wished is what is presented. Likewise, it

[26] *Repräsentation.* In almost all cases throughout this translation I have rendered "*Vorstellung*" as "representation" (preserving "presentation" for the translation of "*Gegenwärtigung*"). "*Repräsentation*" I have translated as either "representation" or "re-presentation," depending on the context. "*Vergegenwärtigung*" I have invariably translated as "re-presentation." In the present sketch, all three of these terms are used frequently, sometimes even appearing together in a single sentence. In the German, this poses no difficulty. In English, however, the text could easily become repetitive and confusing. I will therefore observe, with a single exception (noted in the text), the following translations in this section (reverting to the pattern noted above in subsequent sections): for "*Vorstellung*": "presentation" (rather than the usual "representation"); for "*Repräsentation*": "representation"; for "*Vergegenwärtigung*": "re-presentation." The verbal and adjectival forms of the three terms will be translated according to the same pattern. (When "presentation" is used to translate "*Gegenwärtigung*" in this section, the German will be put in square brackets.) – Translator's note.

[27] Husserl seems to have included a part of this sketch in the original draft of the lectures on time from February of 1905. A smaller part of the sketch is found – more or less modified – in § 27, p. 60f., and perhaps also in § 28, p. 61. See the more precise references on the following pages. – Editor's note.

is the object of the respective founding presentation that is satisfying, valuable, pleasant, disagreeable, etc.

The situation is similar in the case of the consciousness of *time*. The object of the perceptual presentation is present (now): the perceptual appearance is the foundation of a perceptual consciousness, that is, of the perceptual positing, ⟨or, in other words, of the⟩ sort of consciousness that posits what appears as *present*.[28] The object of a memorial presentation is past: memory is a sort of positing ⟨or⟩ consciousness[29] that – perhaps – has as a foundation an appearance that is altogether like the perceptual appearance but that bestows on the object the character of the past.

Now what determines the difference between the *original* consciousness of time, in which the past is experienced in relation to the now, and the *reproductive* consciousness of time? In other words, what distinguishes the time-consciousness in the "perception" of an event or duration[30] from the time-consciousness in a memory of something further past?

Should we say: In the latter case, the case of memory in the customary sense, an appearance is given – or, more precisely, a duration or event is given in an enduring appearance or in a changing succession of appearances – in such a way that this whole "present" temporality is the *representant,* the *image,* for a past temporality? In some fashion, depiction ⟨or in any case⟩ representation certainly does occur. But there is no pictorial consciousness in the genuine sense (as in the case of melodies).[31] [180] That is, I do not take the melody *now* running off in my *present* memorial consciousness as *something different* from the remembered melody; on the contrary, I remember the latter *in* the former. Or more precisely: It is not as if we were dealing with a

[28] Perception, however, is equivocal: temporal presentation [*Gegenwärtigung*] and exhibition of the thing itself [*Selbstdarstellung*]!

[29] Just as perception and perceptual apprehension must be distinguished, so must memory and memorial apprehension. Memorial apprehension can exist without *positing* memory (memorial *judgment,* memory that means something in thematic and assertive fashion [*meinende Erinnerung*]).

[30] Here perception is exhibition of the thing itself.

[31] If this were a case of pictorial consciousness, there would even be a double pictoriality. For if what appears in *fresh* memory is already given pictorially, then what appears in the later *recollection* is *doubly* depicted: pictorial presentation, which refers to the object by means of pictorial presentation!

photograph in which something serves as the representant for something else similar to it but nonetheless different in content. I look at the little figure appearing there and think of something similar to it in certain respects and different from it in others; something present or appearing as present thus serves as the representant for something *not* present. The "memory image," however, does *not* appear as present, although it is present.

Or should we perhaps say that there are no essential differences here?[32] In any case, the present appearance with its present temporal relations "re-presents" to me the earlier appearance and its temporal relations, without my apprehending the present appearance as it could immediately appear, that is, as present. And at the same time, this whole [re-presented] temporality receives and maintains[33] a position of being pushed back in relation to the actual present, although the degree to which it is pushed back is indefinite. Thus representative consciousness of time and representative consciousness of the object exist here. In the case of the perception of an event or duration, on the other hand, the time-consciousness is not representative but original.

Although they are not constitutive of the object, the original temporal predicates are not arbitrary, of course. They do belong to the object. An appearance as foundation of an original time-consciousness of the now or of the past evidently amounts to the following: "The object now exists, or did exist" (it is now existing or was existing). –

Now what about the question whether memory is the same as memory of an earlier perception? According to our interpretation, the *original* consciousness of time is a *continuously modifiable consciousness* of a determinate character (with determinate temporal modes) only *on the basis of an appearance.*

But then it must be noticed that along with the memory of an [181]
earlier event, in which a reproduction of the earlier appearance is present, the possibility of a memory of the earlier perception of the event is naturally given as well, since we have not only the reproduction of the earlier appearance but also the reproduction

[32] That would scarcely do. But the distinction between representation by means of depiction and representation by means of identity might help.

[33] "*Erhält*" added according to the manuscripts. Changes made "according to the manuscripts" are based on information supplied by Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archives, Leuven. – Translator's note.

of the entire earlier perception. Thus there is the possibility of taking as the basis for one's memorial consciousness not only the appearance of the event but also the appearance of the perception. Put more clearly: The earlier consciousness is reproduced in its entirety, and what is reproduced also has the character of reproduction, of representation, and the character of the past.[34]

The evidence that I must have perceived A if I have a *true* memory of A can only proceed from the fact that appearance and temporal positing are essentially the same, and therefore that the appearance that functions pictorially is also the pictorial positing of time. To that extent, presentation of an object and presentation of an existing object are equivalent.[35] Now if a memorial consciousness is based on a pictorial appearance, a positing in the past is thereby immediately and necessarily brought about. For original consciousness and its object necessarily have the same temporality. It is evident that perception and its object are simultaneous. This is equally true of the remembered perception (the appearance, for which the present appearance is the representant) and its object.

I remember the illuminated theater – ⟨that⟩ cannot mean: I remember having perceived the theater.[36] Otherwise the latter would mean: I remember having perceived that I perceived the theater. I remember A; I remember my perception of A; I remember my perception of the perception of the perception of A.

I remember the illuminated theater = "in my interior" I see the illuminated theater as having been. In the now I see the now-now. Remembering is intuitive believing; what is "believed" [182] is not the being-now but the having-been. – In perceiving, the object stands over against me as now existing (in the present now). In remembering, the object is *also* presented as *present itself,* but in an earlier now. Should we say: Remembering too is an act of perceiving, but over against the actually present now it

[34] Compare the passage running from line 26, p. 186 to this point, to § 27, p. 60, lines 3–11. – Editor's note.

[35] These remarks do not adequately clarify the relation between appearance and positing.

[36] Compare the text from this sentence on until line 14, p. 189 to the text of § 27, p. 60, line 12, to p. 61, line 13. – Editor's note.

has a modification, a "past," and the temporal determination intuited in the memory is other than the temporal determination belonging to the act of memory –?

However: If I were wholly to forget the present – supposing that were completely possible – then I would have an act of perceiving. Perceiving and perceived have the same now. "I am standing in front of the illuminated theater." It exists now, it is present, and so too is the perception. This would no longer be a memory but a (hallucinatory) perception of the past, yet not as past! But memory is not merely perception of the past. Otherwise the perceiving of the past would be present. But the perceiving of the past is past, and the past is by no means actually taken to be present itself; the past itself only hovers before us, and that is precisely all that it does. Memory is a present act. I am conscious of the actual present through my perceptions, which are simultaneous with it. An image, the intuitive *presentation* of something present itself, *re*-presents, *represents* this thing itself.

Perception constitutes the present. In order to *experience* a now as now, so that something that now exists stands before me in an evident manner, I must *perceive.* In order to *present* a now *intuitively,* I must bring about a perception "in image," representatively and as modified, but not in such a way that I present the perception; rather I present *the perceived* (as perceived), that which appears as present in the perception. Memory, therefore, does indeed imply a "presentation" – namely, a "pictorial representation" of the past perception; but the memory is not in the proper sense an image or representation of the past perception, that is to say, not an objectivation [*Vorstellung*] *of it.* The past perception is not what is meant in the memory; what is presented and meant and posited in it in the proper sense is the object of this "perception" and the object's now, which, in addition, is [183] posited in relation to the actually present now. I remember yesterday's illuminated theater – that is, I bring about a "reproduction" of the perception of the theater. The theater then hovers before me in the presentation as something present that I mean in image. But in meaning it, I apprehend this present as situated in the past in relation to the actual present of the perceptions occurring right now. Naturally it is now evident that the perception of the theater *did exist,* that I did perceive the

theater. What is remembered appears as having been present, doing so immediately and intuitively; and it appears in this way thanks to the fact that a present that has a distance from the present of the actual now appears intuitively and pictorially. The latter present becomes constituted in actual perception; the former intuitively appearing present – the intuitive presentation of the not-now, of the past now in the now – becomes constituted in a replica of perception (in a "re-presentation of the earlier perception"). In this way, a pictorial presentation of the theater existing "now" is brought about; and this is accomplished in a modified act, in a re-presentation of the perception of the theater. This re-presentation, however, is not supposed to be an objectivation of the perception; that is, living in it, I do not mean the perception but the being-present of the object.

But a difficulty remains.[37] What sort of thing is this peculiar "re-presentation of the perception"? If I contrast perception and mere presentation, then it is a question of *belief* or non-*belief* [*Nicht-belief*]. In the "perceptual *presentation,*" however, the object still appears as present and there itself. In the *phantasy*-presentation it[38] appears as merely re-presented. We must distinguish between: *image-presentation* that consciously presents the object pictorially – by means of *analogy,* by means of pictorial objects such as paintings, busts, images of phantasy, after-portrayals, but not with the consciousness of the thing itself – and phantasy-presentation as re-presentation of the thing itself, but not by means of images (memories). And then again there are distinctions pertaining to *time.* Perceptual presentation ⟨is⟩ the re-presentation of something itself in the sense of the now; memorial presentation ⟨is⟩ the re-presentation of something [184] itself in the sense of the past; and there is also memorial presentation with indeterminate temporality.

Is that replica of perception, that re-presentation, not perhaps a *mere perceptual presentation?* A now appears in it intuitively (but a now also appears intuitively in hallucination), and this "intuitively appearing now" becomes the foundation of a repre-

[37] Compare the passage running from this point to line 31, to § 28, p. 61, lines 19–33. – Editor's note.

[38] Reading "*es*" for "*er*" according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

sentative consciousness; or more precisely, it represents a certain now, which is the object of belief. But would that not be exactly like the situation in which a picture re-presents an original to me? The painting furnishes a perceptual presentation, but what is now is the representant of something that is not now. Of course, not every painting represents a time, but think of paintings of historical events: the execution of Charles II, the storming of the Bastille, and the like. Yet these are not memories. To be sure, we do have pictorial representation in such paintings; the perceptual presentation furnishes an analogue, something given in consciousness as a picture. But in memory this is not the case. "The illuminated theater" – that does not pretend to be a more or less analogous picture. What is meant is not something similar to the theater, not something similar to what there appears; what is meant is *the appearing thing itself,* the appearing theater, the theater appearing in the character of the now. Does the representation take place through identity rather than by means of mere pictorial similarity?

Representation through Identity: What Is That Supposed to Mean?[39]

Representation through identity: What is that supposed to mean? The object I now possess re-presentationally is the same [as the object I earlier perceived]. The illuminated theater is the same: Berlin's Palace itself now hovers before me. The appearing object itself is meant, just as it appears, only the object is not present *now,* not truly there itself; it is *re*-presented.

In the case of the theater: It is the theater itself that hovers before me, not a mere image – that is, not a fundamentally different object only similar to the object itself, to the theater. But it is one thing to present intuitively the theater itself and to posit [185] it as actual while one "is not actually seeing" it and does not actually have it as present itself, and another thing to remember yesterday's illumination of the theater,[40] to remember the theater

[39] The following part of the sketch was presumably written a little later than the preceding part. – Editor's note.

[40] a) Without positing-as-actual: phantasy; b) with positing-as-actual: memory; but without consciousness of time or consideration of time.

at such and such a point in time, just as it was seen at that time, the day before yesterday [sic]. Here what matters is time; this is memory in the narrower sense. Naturally, an objective temporal order is not in question here; the "past" and the re-presenting grasp of the [past] time just as it "was sensed in the perception that was contemporaneous with that time" suffice. The identity of the object can hold irrespective of time. The same object itself can be meant in many memories. Each of the memories has its time, however, and the object can be meant in this time as the object of this time. How is this object to be characterized phenomenologically? An "appearance" belongs to each of the presentational acts here. It constitutes the object. And this object can be meant exclusively. The appearance does not completely determine the presentation, however. The distinction between perception, memory, and mere phantasy belongs to the character in which the presentation clothes the object, to the mode of apprehension. Perception gives the now; memory gives the past. If I focus my attention on the object as perceived, that is, on the object as possessing the character of the now, then I have the object meant in its temporal determinacy. If I focus my attention merely on the object, disregarding its temporal determination, the latter is nevertheless somehow there but not meant, and the object is taken as the identical object that can be given in different times. *Belief* nevertheless posits it as existing.

The object can serve as a pictorialization, but so can the temporal determination.

Now what about memory? Is pictorial consciousness involved in it?

One could say: In perception the object is given as present itself and not merely as re-presented. In memory too the object itself appears (so far as it is not analogized indirectly by means of an image). But it is given precisely as "appearance" of the object (appearance in a somewhat different sense), as re-presentation; [186] representation does occur, but through identity. Now what about the temporal moment? The now that belongs to this appearance was given in a perception. This now is also "represented"; it too is included in the representation through identity. Thus there corresponds to the whole perception a certain modification – the "representation through identity," the "re-presentation,"

"reproduction of the perception" – which, however, is not presentation of the perception in the sense of an objectivation of it. Should we say then: there is a presentation of the perception in this case, and the presentation of an object identical with the perception's object is grounded on it? But surely that will not do. What does presentation of the perception mean? It would be a representation through identity (just like every other intuitive presentation – say, that of the theater); to it would correspond (and it would be the modification of) a perception of perception. This would involve needless complication and a pushing-back of the problem. Thus to every perception there corresponds a certain modification: the transmutation of the perception into an intuitive presentation of something itself. But not only the now belongs to what is presented itself; the present, duration, succession, and so on, belong to it as well.

But how do I know about the transmutation of the original perception into a "modification"? By comparing the memory (as this modification) with an actually present perception? Fine. But then what about the knowledge that by re-presenting a now, by presenting something that was present (and by doing so intuitively and not merely indirectly and pictorially), memory presents something that has been perceived? If I have confidence in the memory, then I am certain that the memory is the re-presentation of an earlier perception.

⟨II [187]
THE SUSPENSION OF OBJECTIVE TIME, THE TEMPORAL OBJECT, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF OBJECTIVATION AND ITS APORIAE⟩[1]

⟨*No. 19. The Complete Exclusion of All Suppositions with Respect to Objective Time*⟩[2]

The first step in a phenomenological analysis of the experiences of time is the complete exclusion of all suppositions with respect to objective time. Objectively speaking, it may be that every experience has its time, its position in objective time. We can consider how the ordering of these experiences in objective time is to be judged – for example, the ordering of a perceptual act in relation to the content and object of the perception, the ordering of the memorial experience and what is remembered, and so on. But the place for this is not in phenomenology, except that we do have to describe these phenomena of judging-in-such-and-such a way, of appearing-as-this-or-that, and then state as something phenomenologically given and therefore evident that such and such relationships in objective time are intended, are situated in the intention belonging to whatever temporal meanings are in question. The situation here is similar to what we would find in a phenomenology of the experiences of space. The new-born child, who knows no objective space, will nonetheless have a filled visual field (at least most assume this to be the case). Can one ask about the location of this visual field in objective space? Does the visual field have the character of a plain surface occupying its place in objective space? And let us [188]

[1] The sketches among those reproduced here that were dated by Husserl himself originated – according to him – entirely in the year 1904 or in the first two months of 1905. Only a few of the undated sketches might be older, and hardly any could be of later date. – Editor's note.

[2] 1904.

take our own visual field. If we open our eyes, "we see into objective space." The apprehension of the sensed visual contents produces a spatial appearance of such and such a content of apprehension (of such and such a sense), and a changing apprehension of the same content may yield a very different intuition of space. But if we reduce to the "visual field," if we exclude everything that transcends sensing from the moments of apprehension and from the sense [*Sinn*], then something results that is no longer a plain surface, no longer a field in objective space. I am of the opinion that this reduction is possible with evidence and that it is also possible to grasp with evidence the "broad" relationships in this reduced "spatiality": relationships of "next to one another," "in one another," and so on. In time's case as well we will have to take into consideration only what is given phenomenologically, therefore the apprehension of time (the apprehension that constitutes objective time) and what is actually given in time – that is, not objective time but what is adequately given in the intuition of time or can be reduced from it. Just as one emphatically does not ask [in the phenomenology of space] about what is "originally spatial," about the material out of which the intuition of objective space comes into being *genetically* (the controversy between empiricism and nativism and the genetic question about origins does not concern the phenomenologist at all), so one does not ask [in the phenomenology of time] about "the original" from which the "intuition" of objective "time" arises.

The phenomenological task is rather:

1) to describe the given naïve and scientific consciousness of time according to its *sense* (time is taken by us to be what? temporal relationships present themselves as what? and what sorts of relationships are meaningfully intended in the sense belonging to the representation of time, to the intuition of time?): therefore the phenomenological task is to analyze the meaning, the "material," the "content" of the representation of time – specifically, as far as its essential types are concerned and naturally not with respect to each individual case that might be cited;

2) to describe the given *real content,* along with the distinctions involving *sensuous contents* and *apprehension-contents.* But

that requires:

3) the exhibition of the particular cases in which "adequate intuition of time" is perhaps given; the exhibition of that which is *quasi*-temporal (duration, succession, and the like), which is not [189] interpreted transcendently and "objectively" as reaching out beyond itself and which asserts nothing with regard to an "objective time." On the contrary, the *quasi*-temporal is interpreted immanently, that is, taken simply and just as it is, and makes up the proper material that, as content of apprehension, underlies the interpretation that constitutes objective time. How the material arose does not concern us.

In the case of space, of course, that which can be given adequately, that to which what exists in objective space is reduced for intuition – the configurations of the "spatial sensation," of the "place signs" – cannot be characterized as spatial. The "original" experiences of place are not places in the geometrical sense or in the naïve sense of what exists in objective space. The situation is similar in the case of what is temporal, the "temporal signs." Whatever else they may be, phenomenologically they are what can be seen and what is actually given; and they are not in objective time. In objective time there is no now, no past, etc. Yet it must be noted that these expressions can be meant, on the one hand, subjectively, ⟨signifying⟩ the relation between experiencing subject and objective time, and, on the other hand, phenomenologically, under abstraction from objective time as such and from the objective subject as such, just as in the case of space.

⟨*No. 20. Perception of Succession Presupposes Succession of Perception*⟩[3]

The representing of a relation presupposes the representing of the foundations [of the relation]; the intuitive representing of a relation presupposes the intuitive representing of its foundations; the perceiving of a relation presupposes the perceiving of its foundations.

[3] Vacation, 1904.

The foundations must come to consciousness in the same consciousness in which the relation "comes to consciousness." Does "in the same consciousness" here signify "in the same momentary consciousness," in the same time-point, even mathematical time-point? If not in the same mathematical time-point, then in an extent of time (whether "small" or "large" makes no difference in principle; small and large, of course, are relative notions). [190]

Does "in the same time-point" (in the same consciousness) mean in the same extent of time in such a way that relation (and implication) are simultaneous with the foundations for each extent of time, however small, and for each mathematical time-point in the extent in question?

Naturally, if the relation is not genuinely represented, there is also no need for the genuine representation of its foundations. Our question concerns the "intuition" of relations and, above all, the cases in which we so intuit relations that we are permitted to say, and to say with evidence: *They are* (they exist). Must the foundations always also be intuited in the same time-point (in each one) in which the relation is *thus* intuited, and must they be intuited in the same way?

Now what about the relation of succession, of distance in time?

One act of consciousness: I see A and then B, and find that B is after A and A was before B. Naturally, as long as B is not yet given, I cannot see the interval. Thus the relation can be seen only in the time-point belonging to B. But then, by hypothesis, A is past.

Must A *still* be represented intuitively at that time? Certainly. How otherwise is the relation supposed to become intuitive?[4] But what is the situation with respect to perception? Does the perception of the relation presuppose the perception of the relation's foundations? "I perceive" that tone B exists after tone A. In what does the relation consist? Does it exist between two tones, both of which are perceived? Is that possible? The

[4] The form – the becoming-intuitive in the most general evidence – is surely grounded by the foundations! Therefore the "being" of the relation presupposes the being of its foundations: the being-given of the relation presupposes the being-given of its foundations. But!

perceiving-together, *one* act of perceiving that perceives both, would cause both to appear as given in the same now – *nota bene,* provided that by "perceiving" we understand the grasping of something as present = the grasping of something given as *now.* But then they would be simultaneous.

The perception of a succession therefore presupposes that the points of the relation that the perception unites are not both "perceived" (perception understood in the sense of the perception of the *now*) *in the relating act* (more precisely, in the completed experience of the perception of the succession). On the other hand, it certainly does presuppose that both are perceived successively: The perception of succession presupposes the succession of perceptions.[5] [191]

Where does this evidence come from? According to its sense, perception of succession implies not only the belief that B is present itself (is there now, not merely meant in the perceptual act but precisely there itself), but also the belief that the A that preceded B was present itself and was perceived – but not just anywhere and at any time, and not by just anyone. On the contrary, *I* mean that I have perceived A – specifically, *before* B; and not only that: I mean that I have perceived A-before-B. And it is inherent in this situation that I perceived A in one consciousness and that, while I still had A in arrested intention in primary memory, I perceived B, and then, in this unitary consciousness that united B and the primary memory of A, grasped the temporal relationship of A and B.[6]

But is the conviction that I perceived A not already included in the fresh memory? Fresh memory does indeed signify "direct" consciousness – consciousness that grasps the thing itself – of the

[5] But there is still more. The perception of succession, like the perception of any other relation, presupposes the perception of the foundations [of the relation]. The foundations, however, are not A – B but the A that was and the B that now is. Succession is a temporal relationship. Perception has a double significance: Here it has the sense of grasping something itself. The having-been must be capable of being grasped itself and must be grasped itself when I actually perceive a succession.

[6] But more precisely: I do not merely mean; I perceive succession as succession, and consequently I must not somehow simply mean that I have perceived A; or what alone comes into question here, I must not merely mean that A has just been there itself. On the contrary, I must immediately "perceive" that. The "fresh memory" in this act must have the character of a perception of the "just-having-been."

having-been-present (more precisely, of the *just*-having-been-present: the "just" pointing to a certain intuitive temporal position).

Now I can *reproduce* the temporal flow I have just perceived, the succession I have just seen, either by repeating a completely similar succession in perception or by reproducing it in memory, in which case I can acquire a memorial representation of the succession in the customary sense, an image-memory. While I am still conscious of the succession – that is, while I hold fast to its [192] intention (in fresh memory) – I *repeat* the "perception" of A, etc. Likewise in the case of memory: I represent to myself that I am perceiving, and so on; and the preceding intention is fulfilled, is identified in the perception or memory that furnishes the new perception. Here I see again that such an intention can find fulfillment only in a *process* in which the perception of A stands as the first thing – that is, A, which comes first, necessarily presupposes perception as that which fulfills the intention – and this is then followed by the preservation of the intention and the appearance of B. I see with evidence that *that final state is possible only as a final state,* that *any state or condition that intuits time* is possible only as *extended,* and that *the intuiting of a time-point* is possible only *within a nexus.* I see with evidence that the consciousness of a time itself ⟨requires⟩ time; the consciousness of a duration, duration; and the consciousness of a succession, succession.

⟨*No. 21. Recognizing on the Basis of the Repeated Re-presentation of the Same Succession*⟩[7]

I hear the ticking of the pocket watch: tick – tick – tick – . . .

What do I find here? What do I intend to grasp in this case? There is an objective apprehension; I ask: What kind of information does the analysis and faithful description of the sense of this apprehension yield to me?[8] I do not ask: What happened in "objective reality"? I do not ask about actual occurrences in objective time – that is, in the case we are considering, about

[7] 1904.

[8] Reading "*mir*" for "*mit.*" – Translator's note.

actual occurrences in an individual consciousness with its conscious processes that run off in an objective time and that I might want to determine according to their objective relations in objective time. I rather interrogate the *experience of objective apprehension, asking what* the something objective is that the experience apprehends and asking which objectivities and relationships among them the experience means to grasp and represent in its apprehension.

The answer runs as follows.

The first tick, T_1, appears as *present itself* – specifically, as now (n_1); *then* T_2 appears in the same way, then T_3, and so on. Consequently, T_2 also appears as there-itself, as now; but its now [193] is a *new* now = n_2. "While" T_2 appears as now, T_1 "no longer" appears as now but as "immediately past." T_1 appears as past in relation to the now of T_2; its now (n_1) no longer signifies "present" but, instead, "having been present." While T_1 is being perceived, however, T_2 does not appear at all. While T_2 is being perceived (as "now" existing), T_1 is not also being perceived, if "perceived" means "to appear as now present." Rather it appears as *just now having been perceived* (in n_1).

(1) T_1 appears as past, as "lying back in time" in relation to T_2;

(2) and together with this, the following is given with evidence (even if, perhaps, it can be grasped ⟨only⟩ by means of reflection): The perception of T_1 is a perception that has been; it lies back in time in relation to the perception of T_2. Moreover, the perception of T_2 is assigned to the same now as the perceived T_2, and so on. This arrangement continues to hold for the remaining members of the series. T_3 appears as present (n_3); "during" this appearance, T_2 appears as lying back in time. But the whole relationship of T_2 and T_1 also appears as lying back with respect to the relationship of T_3 and T_2, and the following series organizes itself: T_1, past in relation to T_2, past in relation to T_3; and this relationship presents itself as a *relation of augmentation.*

I find that this process *does not continue ad infinitum.* When new Ts are perceived, the other Ts are still *intuited* simultaneously, but not just any number of them. Even if the clock appears to be ticking constantly, even if I say that I continuously

perceive it as ticking, the unity of the intuition in which the Ts that are actually past jointly appear does not extend very far. While new Ts come onto the scene, past Ts "disappear" from *intuition,* although I "*know*" that others have preceded those that are there: "for a fairly long period of time." This bit of objective description may suffice. It could be carried still further.

Now let us consider the experiences insofar as our inspection of what is phenomenologically given acquaints us with them. *What is the scope of immediate evidence* (or *givenness*) *here?* [194]

1) First of all, with respect to each individual T, we have, as phenomenologically given, the "appearing-as-ticking." An experienced content of sensation is apprehended as ticking.

2) Furthermore, we grasp with evidence a *succession of appearances.* Perceiving, we grasp T_1 as now present. Then, still perceiving, we grasp T_2 as now; and together with T_2, T_1 also appears in the same consciousness – specifically, in the same *intuitive consciousness*[9] – as *immediately past.* We have the evidence that it is *one* consciousness that perceives T_2 as present now (n_2) and *in the same now* sees the having-been of T_1. The seeing of T_1 has a character similar to that of the seeing of T_2; and reflection instructs us *with evidence* that just as T_1 appears as past, so the *act* belonging to T_1, if we look at it, appears as past *perception.*

To be sure, we recognize this on the basis of the repeated re-presentation of one and the same succession. If we *represent* a succession to ourselves (in phantasy, in image) and focus our attention on the acts that make up this representing, we find the representation of the perception of T_2 in n_2 and, united with it, the representation of the perception of T_1 in n_1. And the following holds true of these represented perceptions: In relation to the perception of T_2, the perception of T_1 appears as a past perception; that is to say, an act that stands before me as the "past" perception of T_1 is united with the act that belongs to the represented "perception of T_2."

[9] Husserl later noted in the margin at this point: "(Here is a difficulty)." – Editor's note.

Later Memory

Another example: *I remember* how the local train entered the station first and then, immediately after it, the express train. I have in this example: the appearance of arriving train A, then the appearance of arriving train B. Both occurrences are mediated by other events (the interval between them is short) that may not interest me more closely.

1) If I live entirely in the events, I have the following: "The train roars up." A shrill whistle sounds. "Göttingen!" (shouts [195] the conductor). . . . One comes after the other. Each phase has its "now": now the roaring (in its succeeding phases); now the whistle, rising and fading away; now the conductor's shout, and so on.

2) I live in the consciousness of the object, but I can also focus my attention on the subjective moment, on the appearance, on the "experiences." And in that event, these acts and their contents are seen to have the same temporal succession as the objects. I then have appearances of perceptions: first of the perception of the locomotive roaring up, then of the perception of the people alighting from the train, and so forth.

3) Finally, I can focus my attention on the acts in which ⟨I⟩ now find all of this; and all of these acts are "present" and have a time-determination entirely different from the time-determination of the acts we have mentioned up to now. Acts of memory are present in this way.

The event – "the train roars up."

Consciousness of the event; appearance of it; *perception* of it.

The present memory of the event: I recall that the train came roaring up. The memory occurs now – the train thundering in occurred then. Present re-presentation of the earlier consciousness, specifically, as my consciousness: I had the perception at that time.

⟨*No. 22.*⟩ *Is (or How Is) Adequate Memory Possible?*[10]

Every memory demands fulfillment; and it can find it only in a perception in which what is remembered would again become present, but in such a way that it would then pass over into "fresh" memory, and so on right up to the perception of the present now. More clearly: I would once again have to experience in a continuous act of perceiving and in a continuous consciousness of the temporal flow the entire content of the time from then until now; or rather, experience it adequately – that is, in the adequate consciousness of time.

But here again we must pose the question: How does one know this? How does one know about this fulfillment, which is certainly never possible? This much I can say quite reliably: [196] Memory always points to further experiences. The nonintuitive memory points to the intuitive memory that fulfills it; and the intuitive memory contains, *qua* time, still unfulfilled intentions in the direction of the future. These are fulfilled by "re-presenting" intuitively the further flow of time up to the *actually present* now.

If a temporal flow corresponding to the memory, if the earlier event, the being that earlier endured, etc., is "renewed" – that is, if a new event, which is nonetheless perfectly like an earlier event in content and in all of its temporal relations – makes its appearance in perception, we then say: Precisely the same thing is recurring as was present earlier; I am now seeing "exactly the same thing" I had seen earlier. But one thing is missing: the identity that pertains to individuality. The temporal context is new. The present perception follows something entirely different from what the earlier perception followed – subjectively, as act, and objectively, with respect to the perceived content.

Anything perceived is – necessarily – something that follows [something else], just as anything perceived has something that follows it, again necessarily. Each memory also has intentions that point back to memories of the more distant past: or, there are intentions that find temporal fulfillment in *it*. If everything were to be renewed, then all time would have to become real once

[10] Monologue, summer vacation, 1904.

again . . . . But that is impossible. And how does memory become fulfilled in the process of being carried forward towards the now? That too is not so easy, old boy! Now present is the "presence-time"[11] [*Präsenzzeit*], which changes in content from moment to moment. During that time, the intuitive memory runs off until it approaches the most recent (though still no longer present) past, which is recalled and becomes intuitive last of all; and this is followed by what the presence-time (a certain presence-time) currently offers. But, once again, is this possible? Memory takes time, does it not, and can the time of the flow of memories overtake the actually present time? A is now perceived, B is appended to A . . . . Let memory M begin at B. I then have

$$A \frown B \frown \begin{matrix} M_1 \frown M_2 \ldots \\ C \frown D \ldots \end{matrix}$$ [12]

When M_κ, say, has arrived at A (represents A), something new has always made its appearance in the meantime; M_π would then have to begin in order to represent $M_1 M_2 \ldots$, and we would never come to an end. Memories of memories would arise, and then again memories of the memories of the memories, and so on. It is clear, therefore, that an actual reproduction of the entire flow of consciousness up to an actually present now is impossible. Interesting. Not true. But nothing like difficulties. [197]

But even if I cannot revive the total content of consciousness, can I not perhaps pursue a line selected from the broad stream of time and succeeding perceptions? Consider an example drawn from "external" perception. I follow what I have perceived step by step up to the now, and here surely continuity exists. Of course, this presupposes that the memory can overtake the perception; that is to say, therefore, that an event, which is equal as far as time is concerned to the just experienced temporal interval A − B, or to whatever temporal interval has actually been lived through, can once again be intuited in a memory whose temporal magnitude is smaller. A certain objectivation of time is presupposed there. I must already be able to say that the one

[11] The quotation of this concept of Stern's leads us to suspect that the present sketch could be dated more precisely as having been written at the earliest in September of 1904; cf. No. 29, p. 224, note 33, and p. 225, note 34. – Editor's note.

[12] Changed according to the manuscript. – Translator's note.

time is equal to or is perhaps only a part of the other. Well good, if we suppose that there are temporal magnitudes and that objectivation is justified (I do continually estimate such magnitudes subjectively). The objective temporal magnitude of the memory would then have to be smaller than the temporal magnitude of what is remembered. But all of the *relationships* could still be preserved in that case. That would be possible. An absolutely complete image is therefore not possible, though one complete as far as content and relationships are concerned is. It is not altogether beyond question whether this is really anything more than a fiction. Consider, for example, the memory of a melody. Can I abbreviate it temporally if I really want to represent it exactly? Is not the whole impression changed if I sing the melody to myself more rapidly? Can I represent it intuitively in its tempo (therefore not as faster), and yet – expressed in absolute temporal terms – represent it more quickly? One could indeed say: If I speed it up in thought, then I represent it as speeding. To represent rapidly a melody running off in slow tempo does not mean to represent a fast melody. But is that actually possible in intuition, in the mode of complete depiction?

⟨*No. 23.*⟩ *The Unity of Time and Its Infinity* [198]

The first impressional memory.

The recollection that coincides with and identifies itself with an impressional memory.

The modified ⟨consciousness⟩ of the now (the primary impressional consciousness of the past) and the reproduced and represented now.

We must distinguish: the now that has sunk into the past (which as a rule is not meant, not noticed, although it can be noticed) and the reproduced now that is immediately associated with the now that has sunk into the past. The reproduced now "begins again," runs off again, but in "phantasy" (in "reproduction"), doing so in such a way that it has 1) the character of memory and 2) the character of identity with what has sunk into the past but is still held in consciousness.

It belongs to the essence of the phenomenological situation that every "past" can be converted reproductively into a reproductive "now," which in turn *has* a past itself. And that is the phenomenological foundation of all temporal laws.

But can there not be an ultimate now that has no past behind it? It is evident that no time-point is the first. Does that merely mean that to every now an earlier now can belong, in keeping with an ideal possibility? But then *de facto* an empty time could exist.

⟨*No. 24.*⟩ *Perception of an Individual (Temporal) Object.* ⟨*Do We Find in One Phase of the Perception of Something Temporal the Perceptual Appearances of the Earlier Phases?*⟩[13]

The earlier perceptions do not immediately disappear. New perceptions are appended with new "nows," and in this way the earlier perception appears as having been pushed back into the past and as being continuously pushed further and further back. The new now always stands in the foreground of attention and furnishes the point of reference with respect to which temporal relationships are judged. Everything just past is seen from the standpoint of the now.

Thus do we experience a particular process, an event. A melody runs off. That is an event. But the flow of consciousness [199] itself is a process as well: we can "perceive" the flow itself, we can focus our attention on its phases changing from moment to moment.

Let us assume that the melody A B C D runs off.

Hence A appears first (perception). Then B appears; it is now (actually now), while A no longer appears as actually now but as faded away (its now pushed back), etc.

1. A
2. A′ B
3. A″ B′ C
4. A‴ B″ C′ D

How do I know that? 1, 2, 3, 4 – these are four successive

[13] September 1904.

phases of consciousness. What has been recorded here is the *appearing* of objective temporality – the appearing of A, of B following after A in succession, and so on. The expressions for these four time-points of consciousness are the following: 1) A is now; 2) B is now and A is just past; and so on for the other points. Objectivities of a temporal sort correspond to these expressions. And experiences in which these objectivities appear also correspond to them.

Let us restrict ourselves to what is objective (disregarding the experiences). What does the *memory* look like in which we re-present this process to ourselves, by means of which we *know* about it?

We have called to mind, say, the first measures of the melody, sung them to ourselves and then re-presented them repeatedly in memory. In the memory, then, we obviously have the same process, except that we have "phantasied" that A is being perceived, etc. In the reproductive representation we have the succession of the perceptions of A B . . . ; or we have the measures, perhaps in repeated perception of what was sung. In this connection, we have focused our attention on individual steps and sought to investigate what can be said about them.

No phase can be arrested and held. It can only be generated anew again and again.

A cross section of the time-consciousness that is being adumbrated (or, correlatively, of the temporal objectivity) is nothing that can be reproduced by itself, nothing that can be continuously represented (reproduced) by itself. Only an extended section of the process – specifically, an extent that again runs off as process – can become the object of intuition in phantasy. A phase ⟨can⟩ be singled out intuitively only in flight, namely, in the elapsing process, on its ground. [200]

Now how do matters stand when we reproduce a temporal flow, when we phantasy a temporal flow? Do we find in one phase of the phantasying the phantasy-representations of the preceding phases?

But we can also ask precisely the same question in the case of the perception of an (individual) temporal object: Do we find in one phase [of the perception] of something temporal the perceptual appearances of the earlier phases?

In both cases, only one answer seems possible: Nothing of the sort can be found.

One will say to begin with: Certainly in very many cases nothing of the sort can be found. Indeed, in many cases – those involving a quick tempo, for example – one is uncertain; and the more one considers the matter, the more doubtful one becomes.

One will first take the side of actual perception or of phantasy. But considered more closely: At the appearance of the new tone, do we still perceive the old one? Naturally a consciousness of the unity of the whole measure, which extends over several tones, is on hand. And naturally if these tones are perceived unitarily, the whole measure is perceived. But we must say with respect to the unity of consciousness that belongs to the measure: It is a unitary consciousness that builds itself up step by step in the act of perceiving and that grows in content as the perception advances. It is completed in the final step. The consciousness that as unitary belongs to the last step can exist and must have arisen, according to its essence, only as building itself up in this way. It is what it is only by holding on to, or on the ground of, the intentions that belong to the earlier steps. Furthermore, as little as the final stone makes up the building – it only completes it – just as little does the final phase of the perception make up the total perception of the measure, of the melody. In the strict sense, the last phase is not the perception of the measure but precisely its completion, and it is not something self-sufficient. A perception, however, is something self-sufficient; it is a concrete experience. The comparison with the building is inadequate, since each stone remains [201] preserved in the completed building. Otherwise with perception. The perception of the measure is a temporal unity – specifically, a unity that is temporally distributed. The perception of the earlier phases is contained in it, but precisely in the manner in which something is preserved in a temporally extended unity. Etc.

〈No. 25.〉 Adequate Memory. Earlier Perception. – Perception of the Past. Attempt (Aporia). 〈Why Is Fresh Memory Not Simply the Original Perception Continuing to Endure?〉[14]

Adequate Memory. Earlier Perception

I now have an adequate memory – that is to say, an intuition of what was previously perceived. I am aware of the identity of these two temporally separated acts; *how?*

Well, I temporally order the things in question by means of the phases of the memory (we pretend that we have a direct, intuitive apprehension of time). I therefore intuit the temporal order of the things in question, their original temporal order. (I adjust the indirect representation of time to this order.)

I also order the acts temporally; and there I find that in seeing a thing existing as present itself, I say that it now exists and that the perception has the same now. In the memory, I perceive: the having-been-present-itself. But the act of intuiting something as having been present itself exists now, is present itself by virtue of the perception of the memory.

Therefore I have A-having-been-present (a past present); [and I have] the act of grasping what has been present as presently existing in the past present.

The memory of A; the now-existing present.

Hence in memory we stand in the now; in the object of [202] memory we stand in the past now. We also stand in the past now in the earlier act that grasped the now of the past object.

. . .[15]

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[14] No. 25, No. 26, and No. 27 are sketches from a series of sheets that Husserl very likely put together in 1904; he himself dated the last of the reproduced sheets preserved from this series "1904" – see No. 27, p. 218, note 27. This circumstance alone, of course, does not exclude an earlier origin for sketches belonging to one sheet or another. The sketches are reproduced here in the order given them by Husserl. On the first of the preserved sheets, reproduced here in No. 25, Husserl noted (probably later, that is, after 1904): "The following sheets to be scrutinized for aporiae, but only for them." – Editor's note.

[15] The text breaks off here. Husserl later crossed out the text running from "Well, I order the events in question . . ." on and furnished it with the marginal comment: "gaps" [*Lücke*]. – Editor's note.

Perception of the Past. Attempt (Aporia) [16]

Why is fresh memory not simply original perception continuously preserved?

What distinguishes the original perception from the later perception, from the perception that is present? Well, perception begins as a now. Each later perception has a different now. That is, the perceptual character *differentiates itself,* and a now corresponds to each difference. Each now is thus pushed back, and the new now is privileged, furnishing the reference point for the apprehension of the whole.

How do we know, then, that we have an *enduring* consciousness of the earlier now? *Consciousness of duration:* The content is continuously perceived, although this is to put the matter too generally; rather, the perception continuously assumes a new character while the perception with the old character is still preserved. A better formulation is therefore the following: New perceptions arise continuously while the old remain preserved.

In *this* sense, of course, we have no consciousness of the duration of the earlier now; but we do have, in the perceptual reflection on it, duration-consciousness of the continuing existence of the perception, and can have it at any time.

We must therefore investigate expressly whether or not perception takes place simply and exclusively as perception or whether it is absolutely necessary to assume re-presentation or even image-consciousness . . . .

But at this point the following *problem*[17] arises. I say that the perception with its now has continued. (Objectively speaking:) Is there *evidence* for this? Would it not be possible that I now have [203] the consciousness that A existed (in the mode of immediate memory) when in truth A did not exist at all (there was no prior perception), or that I now have "fresh memory" and yet had no perception previously?

Now one could say: "I have the evidence that I have had the perception of A" is identically the same as: I have the primary

[16] Husserl's later marginal note: "Indeed, the contradictions pertaining to all experience [*Erfahrung*] of something internal!" – Editor's note.

[17] Cf. the almost literal resumption of the discussion of this problem in No. 43, p. 305f. – Editor's note.

memory. But the memory is perception of A with the now of that time; that the perception itself belongs to that time and that it has the character of that now – how is that to be explained?

Or rather put it this way: The present memory is precisely a now; that is, I grasp as now the act ⟨of grasping⟩ what was at that time: it is precisely now that I perceive the act. But is this act supposed to be the abiding past perception? With its now? Surely that is not possible, since in that case the past perception would exist in the now and all the earlier perceptions would be simultaneous (the whole memorial series is in fact one now). *That removes the aporia, therefore.*[18]

The earlier perception "appears" in the memory. The earlier perception itself does not abide, but a "memory" conforms to it and this memory is a replica of the earlier perception.

Is the memory perhaps an image-representation of the perception? But in such a way that the memory represents the remembered content *as* the object of the perception depicted by it? The memorial representation would then have two objects: 1) the earlier perception, 2) the earlier perception's object. But does this hypothesis have anything to be said for it? –

This is simpler: mere conversion of the perception into a corresponding memory-(image-)representation. But where do I get the connection that the memory of A is equivalent to the consciousness that I perceived A earlier? If we suppose that every perception is simultaneously perceived "in internal consciousness," then this perception of the perception would also have to [204] conform to the law of all perception; therefore not only the perception would be converted into memory but also the internal consciousness. But then this ⟨memory⟩ of the internal consciousness would be subject to the same law in turn, and we would therefore have infinite complications (which is also an objection against the possibility of *Brentano's* conception of internal consciousness!). Or must one say that although memory primarily recalls the remembered object, it is "incidentally" memory of the earlier perception?[19]

[18] Husserl subsequently put a question mark at the end of this sentence and wrote in addition: "no." He inserted the remaining part of the sketch in brackets and referred it to the sketch reproduced in No. 26. – Editor's note.

[19] The following text is also a later addition of Husserl's, yet obviously introduced earlier than what is recorded in note 18 above. – Editor's note.

Certainly internal perception grasps "itself incidentally" and its object primarily. The perception is then followed by memory as modification. The self-grasping in perception turns into the remembering of this same "self," i.e., of the perception; and at the same time the perception of the *content* turns into the memory of the content. This would have to answer *Brentano* and would actually help him nicely.

⟨*No. 26*⟩ *On the Hypothesis: That Perceptions Include the "Temporal Determination" Actually Now, Which, However, Continually Changes, and That Primary Memory Has the Significance of the Abiding of These Perceptions*[20]

If we hear the succession a b c . . . m, the perceptions of a b . . . , the *earlier* perceptions, would still be in consciousness when m is perceived. In time-point t_m we would have, all at once, $P_a(a)\, P_b(b) \ldots P_m(m)$; hence we would perceive a b . . . m at the same time. They would therefore appear *as simultaneous.*

But one could reply to this:

What does it mean to perceive a b . . . m *at the same time?* It means that one perception has so embraced the line formed by a b . . . m that it bestows on them the same now-character; it therefore means a perception which – if it distributes its now as π – can be formulated as $P_\pi(a)$, $P_\pi(b)$, . . . , all of which have the same π. But that is not the case here. We do indeed have the perceptions $P_a\, P_b \ldots P_m$ at the same time – that is, a perception is possible that, in the mode $P_\pi\,(P_a \ldots P_m)$, bestows on the perceptions the same time (namely, its time π). But each of the [205] perceptions assigns a different time; the a b . . . m *appear* together but as at different times: the m as now, the l as before m, the b as still earlier, and so forth. Each has a different present, and the earlier present is called "past" in relation to the later one.

"I am now perceiving a" means: I have a perception in which the perceived a stands before me as now; as "now" – that is, as the ultimate member (the principal member) of the living temporal series. Consequently, "I am now perceiving" does not mean

[20] Cf. No. 25, p. 208, note 14 and p. 210, note 18. – Editor's note.

the same as "I have a perception of the earlier ultimate members, or I have a perception of something that is not now, of an a that has still other members following after it."

Again, one will object:

Does the perception of a endure? Then surely a must also endure; to perceive a continuously means to perceive a as enduring.

How is the perception of a supposed to endure while a is disappearing and then is gone?

Answer as follows: "The perception of a endures" can mean that the experience of perception is continuously preserved (without essential change in content).

But to perceive a continuously normally means that a endures and in this duration is present; that is, that a continuously appears as now, in the principal time-point, while at the same time earlier nows have remained in consciousness. The perception of a continues from time-point t: as long as the perception endures, a appears as existing in time t. Sometimes new perceptions, each with a new t and always the perception of the content a, continually attach themselves to the perception of a. If these "t"s extend into the actually present now, into the remarkable point of climax of the temporal series, then we have an enduring perception that at the same time is the perception of duration. If that is not the case, if the "t"s extend merely from $t_0 - t_1$ and not into the actually present now, we then have, on the basis of the abiding perceptions, an actually present consciousness of the just past enduring perception.

Perception of an enduring a does not occur in an enduring perception (in the sense of a perception that remains unchanged) but in a continually changing perception, which, as continually changing, constantly generates a new now, a now that is always the ultimate point of the actually present time. Since the now in [206] the strict sense is a moving point, the perception of what now exists is something changing, even if what is perceived remains "constant."[21]

If we relate the word "perception" to an act that grasps

[21] The entire preceding paragraph is underlined in the manuscript and marked twice for emphasis in the margin. – Editor's note.

something now present – "now" understood in the sense of the climax-point of the actual temporal series – then "the perception of a endures" means: The same object is continually in the now; it just was now and still is now. And "the perception ceases" means: The object is now no longer. While the perception has ceased inasmuch as the a is no longer the object of a now-perception, the earlier perception nevertheless remains in consciousness with its "now." But the now is no longer the ultimate point, and the change that it undergoes depends on the perpetual movement of the now, which always remains the reference point for the apprehension of time.

Now what about the equation: fresh memory = just having perceived, in the case of the hypothesis of abiding perception?

I now have $P_t(a)$. That yields: a *did exist* at time t and I perceive that. Yes, but the "surviving" perception is nevertheless there *now;* it itself is something existing now. On the other hand, it is supposed to have "survived"; in a certain sense, it is supposed to have "endured." Does that fall into consciousness? Certainly. But in what way? That is the question. The P_t is pushed back by the emergence of ever new temporal elements, of ever new perceptions and successions and durations, etc. "It" is pushed back, [but] it continues to be intended: If I compare P_t with the perception P_{t_1} of a duration that follows the duration perceived in P_t (first a is perceived as enduring, then b), I find that the "memory" of a and of its enduring throughout t is continually on hand during the duration of b (we are moving within primary intuitive time). What does that mean: "the memory" of the duration of a? Does it mean that the perception of $a_{t_0 - t_1}$ is continuously on hand in consciousness and that we are continuously conscious of $a_{t_0 - t_1}$ while b runs off? How are we to understand that?

Does this suffice: I am still conscious of $P_{t_0 - t_1}$ (the perception of a in its temporal extension, or rather a itself appearing to us in its temporal extension) while I am continually perceiving new contents? That is to say: a is seen as having been, as having endured for such and such a length of time in comparison with b and c . . . . But P(a) is simultaneous with P(b) P(c). Or rather: P(a) is extended throughout this whole time, and the appropriate parts of this extended P are simultaneous with the corresponding [207]

parts of the perceptions of b and c. What does that mean – "is extended"? ⟨The perception⟩ itself certainly has a duration and can be perceived in its duration. But this duration is not the duration of a; it confers no new time on a. It confers time and duration only on P(a).

How do we come to know that we have perceived? Where does the right to say such a thing later come from? How do I know that "a little while ago" the t was a now, the supreme temporal determination?

Should we not rather describe it as follows?

The temporal determination "now," the first and unmodified time, is a peculiar character connected with the real content (the material of time) in an indescribable way, such that this content, thanks to this character, possesses time, is "now," whereas it makes no sense to say of the character itself that it has time.

Just as anything real has its time, so the concrete perception of a has its time; specifically, a_t is given in a perception P_t that has the same original temporal now. But is the temporal not something on which I can focus my attention, something that can be perceived? And, as a given "moment," as a character, is it not also something that has time? If I consider the contents of the visual field in the now, they all exist at the same time, are all now. But each content does not have its own individual now-moment; on the contrary, the total consciousness has one and the same now, absolutely identical, and this now is definitely not a moment that admits of any conceivable multiplication. This is altogether different from the case of color moments, which are present in repeated instances and are only specifically identical. The now is not a species. And if – stepping into the psychological sphere – I speak of the now-consciousness of this man and the now-consciousness of that man, I do so with reference to a possible co-consciousness, which again has only one identical now. Each consciousness does not have *its* now. That is utterly [208] inconceivable. Each consciousness is something concrete and, from case to case, something different. That each consciousness has its time means precisely that each act, each experience, is a possible object of perception and exists, when it does exist, in its now: with respect to a possible consciousness. But this consciousness is so permeated by the now that it confers the same now on

all of its "content,"; and everything simultaneous has, in the widest sense, the same now.[22]

In a_t, the t belongs directly to the a. Now what is peculiar to this situation is that a new t attaches itself, in an appropriate manner, to each moment of consciousness. The a_t remains ("for a time") in consciousness, but consciousness is always a new consciousness, a consciousness that continually undergoes temporal change – that is, a consciousness that continuously confers a new now, a new t. But the new t is not conferred in such a way that it would sever the t from the a_t. Rather a_t continuously takes on ever new "t"s, and each new t is related to the preceding formation just as the original t is related to a. Accordingly:

$$a_t\,(a_t)_{t_1} \quad ((a_t)_{t_1})_{t_2} \ldots$$

But the symbolism is poor, since this is a process of continuous modification. Something on this order might be better, then:

$$a_{t\text{——}t_1},$$

where, however, each ideal step between t and t_1 represents a t that is the t of the whole preceding process. –

Thus this also concerns the perception itself, the apprehension – everything that is real in the way of intentional experiences and their continua. If I reflect on the perception, I now find, in t, the perception of the perceptual process in question. Or rather, since perception signifies grasping-as-now, I find, grasped as now, the process in which the first member is the perception of a_t and the next member, continuously following on the first, is the perception of $a_{t-t'}$, and so on. The a does not exist now: that means that a is not given in the direct and simple presentation of time. The a did exist in a now, the a was present: it has a modified now. It has a now, but this "'a' now" is continuously perceived in progressively different nows; and in each new now the continuity of "t'"s annexed to the original t . . . is co-given. [209] $A_{t_0-t_1}$ is perceived in the normal sense; and what is grasped itself as pertaining to the perception of a_{t_0} as well as the continuity of acts of grasping something itself (in which, furthermore, $a_{t_0-t_1}$ . . .

[22] The foregoing paragraph, from the second sentence on ("But is the temporal not something . . ."), is placed between square brackets in the manuscript. – Editor's note.

is given) are perceived in reflection. "I perceived a before the time $t_1 - t_0$"; "a was just present in time t_0"; and "up until now I continuously had the 'direct memory' of a – a remained constantly 'intended,' the perceptual appearance was continuously preserved in consciousness without my constantly perceiving the a (as enduring)."

But does a difficulty now arise?

Each phase of that continuity is, after all, a real experience. If one says that such a phase is an abstraction, then we take each concrete temporal part, $t_0 - t'$, and so on. Now each such part also undergoes the process of being pushed back in time. Do we not arrive at an infinite regress?

Let us take the concrete part $a_{t_0 - t'}$. The consciousness of this part (the fresh memory of it) is an experience; it has its time: the time t'. Then it is pushed back. But that yields nothing new.

$$(a_{t_0 - t'})_{t' - t_1} = a_{t_0 - t_1}$$

These are indeed exactly the instances of being pushed back that we have included in our schema.

⟨*No. 27. Attempt at a Survey: the Fundamental Temporal Distinctions. There-itself and Objectivation*⟩[23]

The consciousness of time[24] does not originate from phantasy in the sense of pictorial consciousness, but purely from perception. The perceptual consciousness is modified, however, and is shaded off within a genus. This consciousness is consciousness of the present in which something "present itself" stands before me. It is then shaded off into the just-having-been-present, and this occurs continuously. The mode of perception is shaded off and [210] yields the real consciousness of time. The mode of phantasy is

[23] The last of the three sheets arranged together by Husserl and reproduced here bears the date "1904"; see below p. 218, note 27, and compare above No. 25, p. 208, note 14. – Editor's note.

[24] In the manuscript, the following sentence – which was later crossed out, however – precedes the reproduced text; "But is this correct? No, it is not." What this question and denial refer to is uncertain, since a sheet, lost or removed by Husserl, appears to be missing between the text just reproduced in No. 26 and the text of the sketch included here in No. 27. – Editor's note.

shaded off in parallel fashion and yields the phantasy-consciousness of time.

The continuity of time: the continuity of shadings of the mode of apprehension. Nonpresentive consciousness of time: parts of a perceived melody that elapsed a somewhat longer time ago. But this is not symbolic consciousness: symbolic consciousness proceeds from the sign to the signified; the sign points ahead. The actually present time-consciousness has, in addition, a fringe; it points back. The apprehensions [are] still "obscurely," potentially, on hand, fused into a single "background." –[25]

1) The succession of tones A B . . . , or the succession of temporal phases within each tone – within A, for example. Also the succession of measures in the melody.

2) The succession:

a) of the sensations A B C . . . (or in A, of the parts);

b) of the perceptions of A, of B . . . , of the tones or also of the measures. –

3) The succession of the momentary phases of the perception of the *sequence* A⌒B⌒. . . .



The momentary phases are ideal limits. Taken concretely, they are stripes that have a certain "thickness."

These are temporal successions that all of us can perceive. The last of these successions we perceive in a continuous flow; we reflect on the flow of the perception. To be sure, in order to be able to judge, compare, and distinguish, we must look back at the continua, "return" to the old parts. That requires "repetition" and identification, which are also needed in the following case:

4) The order of the temporal signs within one momentary phase: the order in the simultaneous unity of one phase. [211]

[25] Husserl later crossed out the entire second paragraph of the sketch; he simultaneously made several underlinings in the first paragraph, however. – Editor's note.

This presupposes, of course, repeated re-presentation of the same phase under conditions of continual retention[26] and identification.

Now[27] what about sensation and phantasma, perception and memory/phantasy? Is some distinction of a new dimension required in the case of sensuous contents?

The new dimension, I daresay, is only temporality, the more or less determinate temporality with the distinctions of the now and not-now, of the there and not-there.

We will have to distinguish phenomenologically:

1) The fundamental distinction between the there-itself and the not-there-itself. The not-there-itself can then be apprehended as past or future, and as objectively present simultaneously with the now (the objective now). Thus the not-there-itself is given its place in the temporal sequence. Furthermore, ⟨the not-there-itself can⟩ also ⟨be apprehended⟩ as temporally indeterminate, as not oriented with respect to objective time – as comprising a time, but not one that would permit it to have a place in the sequence of objective time. Even the centaur endures and moves about, carrying its temporal stages with itself; but in what part of objective time does it belong? In none. How does the centaur stand in relation to the subjective now, the just past, and the future just about to come? It does not stand in relation to these at all.

2) The fundamental *temporal* distinctions: now, past (future). *How is the now related to the there-itself*? What is actually present now is there itself. And what is there itself individually is actually present now. The intuitive there-itself and the intuitive now (the adequately given now) coincide.

The now taken universally is therefore = there-itself + the objectivation: "simultaneous therewith." [212]

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[26] Here the term "retention" first makes its appearance, and on a sheet that is not expressly dated, although its origin in the year 1904 is likely; compare p. 208, note 14, and p. 216, note 23, and note 27 below. The term next occurs in sketch No. 28, p. 216. Yet it is questionable whether the term is already being used in these cases in the sense in which it will later serve for the concept of primary memory. Even this first use of the term subsides – it is absent from the original draft of the lectures on time from 1905 – only to undergo a renewed introduction later, around 1908/9; see No. 50, p. 345. – Editor's note.

[27] The sheet expressly dated "1904" by Husserl begins at this point; cf. No. 25, p. 208, note 14, and No. 27, p. 216, note 23. – Editor's note.

Synopsis:

Distinctions on the level of what is immediately intuited:
1) there-itself;
2) not-there-itself;
a) past (evident past);
b) imagined, not oriented to the now, except perhaps as a not-now.

Distinctions on the level of what is represented nonpresentively and indirectly:
a′) the more distant past;
b′) the past represented on the authority of indirect reports, pictures, etc.;
c′) the now represented nonpresentively (my wife is now travelling back from Halle) – that which is simultaneous with the now but which is not itself seen as now;
d′) the future.

What about the not-now?

Fresh memory: The just past is surely something not-now since we distinguish it from the now, from what still exists and still endures. The event exists now; the representation of the event does not exist now. But the perceived phase of the event exists now; the just elapsed phase of the event does not exist now, etc. The event is there-itself: perception of the event (objectively now: that which is simultaneous with the perceived event). The event is not present itself: it is merely represented, it is remembered (it was), etc.

α) The event has "just" been present itself; it is still in immediate (fresh) memory. The (just heard) tone C is still present in the form of memory; I know that it has just faded away because I still have it in this memory. Although no longer present itself, it is still present to me, but only as just past.[28]

The event is not there-itself; it itself is something not-now. *Its being-past* is something now, something present itself, *something perceived.* [213]

[28] The *intention,* the act of meaning this tone, endures, and endures longer than the sounding tone. The tone is no longer there: no perception. But "it" is "still meant."

β) If I recall the event in a *re-presentative* memory, it is also not there-itself; it itself is again something not-now and *its being-past* is something now. But *that* it is this is not something present itself, not something perceived. The past is grasped *at* [*an*genommen]. It is not meant in merely symbolic fashion, not merely stated; on the contrary, it is intuited – and yet not *truly* grasped [*wahr*genommen].[29]

Does not perception of the past A include perception of A? Certainly not in the way in which the perception of the red A includes the perception of A. To perceive the being-past of A means precisely to be conscious of: the perception of A passing over into the fresh memory of A. The appearance endures (strictly speaking, it is modified along the lines of such similarity as is allowed in this case; it fades away). But the now becomes changed into the not-now. The appearance borne by the consciousness of the not-now represents the perceptual appearance; the not-itself represents the itself. The not-itself is almost still itself and has a mode, a determination, that leads continuously over into the "itself," the now. This determination is experienced, just as its distance from the now is experienced.

⟨*No. 28.*⟩ *The Identity of the Tone, of the Temporal Object, and of Each Phase of the Temporal Object in the Flow of Time-Consciousness*

The momentary phases of perception steadily "sink"; they continuously undergo modification. They are not simply preserved; on the contrary, they change constantly. Some point of [214] the temporal object sinks steadily back in time, which means, in the first place, that the presenting content is continuously modi-

[29] Can one at least say: The not-now is perceived, but the past is not perceived? No.* I do not believe so. I remember, I know, that C appears to me as past; but nothing appears to me here as present itself, except perhaps that C is not in the now, or, as I can also say, not in the perceptual field: hence the conflict. But the perception of the past, the perception of a being belonging to C – of an indeterminate or of a temporally determinate being – does not yet lie in this.

* This "no" is crossed out in the manuscript. It appears that the text of the note from "I do not believe so" on was written simultaneously with this crossing out of the "no," in which case the text was designed to replace this "no." – Editor's note.

fied (it is therefore always and again something different) and that at the same time the apprehension changes. But why then do we possess the same object-point, which merely sinks back in time, becoming further and further past?

Answer: We must distinguish the following:

1) The sensation-content belonging to the *object*-moment ([at] time-point now),

2) its continuous temporal modification;

and we must make this distinction for each moment. In the temporal succession, the sensation-content is sometimes the same, sometimes different.

3) The apprehension, the objectivation:

A) the objectivation that finds its content purely in the sensation-content belonging to the moment; the objectivation that in the same way belongs to each modified apprehension-content pertaining to the past moments; both understood as objectivations that yield the *temporal material;*

B) the objectivation that gives rise to temporality, to *existence in time* – such as being-now and having-been.

The A-⟨objectivation⟩ is constantly the same as it sinks back in time. More precisely: it is the same with respect to that which it "holds fast," with respect to that which still remains its content of apprehension in spite of the modification the content undergoes; as for the rest, it contains the character of indeterminacy. The A-objectivation therefore constantly means the same thing and is a continuous consciousness of the same. But this same thing recedes further and further into the past, its temporal character changing incessantly.

But the object does not constantly change its time; on the contrary, it keeps its time. But something new is always making its appearance – the future turns into the now, the now into the past, and so on. Change in the degree to which something is past is not change of location in objective time but change of the relative distance to the changing now. The now turns into the past, etc.

The identity in the continuity of the apprehensions of time gives the objective time-point, the identical temporal object. The moments are identified, but so too are extended sections. The

material of the now-moment is apprehended as *a*. As it sinks back in time, it continues to be apprehended as *a*. The material of [215] each further now-moment following after the first one is apprehended in similar fashion – as *a' a''*. The continuous succession of *a a' a''* . . . is experienced in a unity of consciousness by means of simultaneity, by means of temporal modification and simultaneization. Then the succession *a a' a''*, together with its temporal relations, sinks into the past. The temporal materials with their temporal positions give the unity of the temporal object (or of an extended portion of the temporal object). This object as a whole recedes further and further into the past while each of its points is intended as identically the same. But the temporal differences and distances among the points are also the same, for not only the materials remain the same but also the objects as a whole (the object-points). The temporal form is co-objectivated, and if a⌒b sinks into the past, the interval [between them] is the same, since a is identically the same and b is identically the same. Whether that suffices (as grounding) or not, the consciousness of the object is, in any case, the consciousness of something identical within the original seeing of time: each point and each extent, which is originally modified by being pushed back, is taken as identical. Naturally, the apprehension of the object is of such a character that it constitutes individual objectivity in this way. If the temporal extent is run through several times by means of repetition and retention,[30] the identity among the different phases of the temporal object is brought about by comparison.

Identification of a temporal object: first of all, of a simple succession of tones.

A B C are perceived; that is, they run off perceptually. *After* they have elapsed, we can reproduce them. A reproductive memory repeats the running-off in the manner peculiar to phantasy; we represent it: *the same* running-off. We not only represent the same running-off, we also identify it with the primary memory still on hand; and we can make that identification again and again. The reproduction does indeed present itself

[30] Cf. No. 27, p. 218, note 26. – Editor's note.

as the representation of what was earlier perceived. We do not have two different things in the representation – reproduction and object – but only one. Even in the case of identification it [216] seems at first as if we had only one thing. But with more precise consideration of the situation, we note that we have primary consciousness of a temporal succession. If I repeat c g e three times, singing it the first time, then reproducing it, and then reproducing it again, I experience primarily a succession of three phenomena – perception, reproduction, and new reproduction. I note how the reproduction is identified with the primary memory (it is as if I traversed the same part of a line three times with my eyes), and this is precisely consciousness of the identity of meaning. Moreover, the repeating, reproducing acts succeed one another in time and are found in this succession. The coincidence of identity runs throughout them all, and with them (voluntary) *retention* – specifically, reproductive retention – is brought about. The primary memory is also preserved along with the identification and is identified with respect to its objective content as continually the same. Of course, every *statement* – e.g., that B follows A – presupposes this reproductive retention if it is to be evident. Even if B is still sounding (it is, of course, not complete as the objective B as long as it has not come to an end), I must be able to return to A so that I can say "after A."

Or the statement "B after A" is achieved only in the moment in which B is complete, therefore in the moment in which memory alone is still possible. The statement refers to the object, to the state of affairs; and the state of affairs must first exist before I can express it fittingly, or in a way that suitably takes its measure.

⟨*No. 29.*⟩ *Meinong's Distinction between Distributed and Undistributed Objects*[31, 32]

a) The tone as tone, the color as color.
b) A melody, a change in color (also the persistence of a color,

[31] Husserl seems to have included and arranged the sketches reproduced in Numbers 29 through 33 in the original draft of his lectures on time from February of 1905; at the same time it is a question of sheets from this original lecture manuscript that remained entirely

a tone sounding continuously). Objects (Meinong calls them objects of representation, but why?) whose nature requires extension in time in order to unfold, as opposed to objects whose characteristic it is to be found compressed into a single time- [217]
point, into a cross-cut of time, as it were. (A place, a sound, a color. Representing, judging, desiring – objects that are already characterized, so to speak, as punctual facts over against one another.)

The reason: In the case of objects belonging to the one group, temporal extension is constitutive; in the case of objects belonging to the other group, it is not.

Meinong, p. 248: "The core of the distinction" does not lie in "whether the object occupies an extent of time or not" (for it always does that) but in whether and how it is distributed in time. Even rest is an instance of temporal distribution – a tone sounding continuously, a color enduring without changing. But the color "as color" lacks distribution in time.[33]

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unused in Edith Stein's compilation – a fact surely made understandable by the character of the sketches involved. On the more precise dating of these sketches, see note 32 below.

In particular, No. 29 reproduces the text of original sheets "27" through "31" from the lecture manuscripts; No. 30, the text of sheet "32"; No. 31, the text of sheet "34"; No. 32, the text of sheet "36"; No. 33, the text of sheet "33."

Sheets "16" through "26," which originally preceded those reproduced here, have not been preserved and were not used in Stein's compilation. Sheet "35" has been preserved, the major part of its text reproduced, in slightly changed form, in the second paragraph of § 11 (p. 31 f.). The text of the sheets preserved from "37" on is reproduced, in part, from the beginning of § 14 (p. 37) on. – Editor's note.

[32] The sketch reproduced in No. 29 is dated by Husserl, on the second sheet, "7. I. 05." This second sheet was certainly originally the first: the sheet that precedes it, and which is also reproduced first here, may have been appended later in order to introduce the theme somewhat more clearly. Hence the repetitions. – The context suggests that sketches No. 30 through No. 33 were written around the same time, therefore immediately before the beginning of the lectures on time themselves. – Editor's note.

[33] Husserl refers to A. Meinong, "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung" [On objects of higher order and their relationship to internal perception], *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* XXI (1899): pp. 182–272. The passage in question, on p. 248, reads: "The core of the opposition to which we refer should not be sought in whether the object occupies an extent of time or not, for it always occupies an extent of time, but in whether and how the object is *distributed* in this extent of time. The color as color, the tone as tone, lacks such distribution: it belongs in a definitive way to the melody, to the change in color. But even if one speaks of a tone sounding continuously, of a color remaining unchanged, these too are instances of temporal distribution, just as certainly as not only motion but also rest represent instances of temporal distribution. In this sense, I contrast in what follows temporally *undistributed* objects to objects or facts that are temporally *distributed* or spread in time . . . ."

Stern[34] distinguishes between "momentary" and temporally [218]
extended acts of consciousness. Those acts ⟨are⟩ momentary that, apart from whatever duration they may have, are complete in each moment. That is to say, momentary acts contain isochronously all of the elements that are germane – in other words, all of the elements necessary to the production of the apprehension – in such a way that no integrating factor is given in the temporal extension.[35] (But how, if the "apprehension" is also directed towards the temporal determinations?)

Criticism

If we proceed from the differentiation of objects into concrete and abstract (self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient), then some

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In Husserl's copy of the journal, which has been preserved, Meinong's article is supplied with numerous marginal notes, underlinings, etc., from Husserl's hand. In particular, Husserl noted in the margin at the beginning of the third section ("Über das Vorstellen und Wahrnehmen des zeitlich Verteilten" [On the representing and perceiving of what is temporally distributed], p. 243), which is the section in question above all here: "Read, September 1904." In fact, implicit references to Meinong's article can be assumed in Husserl's sketches reproduced here at least from No. 22 (p. 202ff.) on. – Editor's note.

[34] Much speaks for the fact that the works of William *Stern* were first brought to Husserl's attention by *Meinong*, who argued with Stern in the article "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung" [On objects of higher order] (*Ibid.*, particularly p. 245ff.). Thus Husserl notes in the margin on p. 266 of Meinong's article: "In Stern's case, as far as I can see, it is not a question of this but of the distinction between primary and secondary ⟨memory⟩." One should also compare the note Husserl made in the margin to No. 7, which is reproduced in note 10 on p. 163: "*Stern* also says something similar (according to *Meinong?*)." – Editor's note.

[35] L. W. Stern, "Psychische Präsenzzeit" [Psychic presence-time], *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* XIII (1897), pp. 325–349. According to the passage in question on p. 326: "... in addition to momentary acts of consciousness, we must consider temporally extended acts of consciousness, understood as self-sufficient psychic unities." In note 1 to this text, Stern explains: "The expression, '*momentary* whole of consciousness,' is not supposed to refer so much to contents that in fact last for only a moment (the existence of which is highly questionable), but quite universally to contents that, apart from whatever duration they may have, are complete in each moment; that is to say, to contents that include isochronously all of the elements that are germane – in other words, all of the elements necessary to the production of the apprehension – in such a way that no integrating factor is given in the temporal extension. The moment here is also an abstraction, but a permissible one. *Meinong* says on one occasion (*this journal*, VI, p. 448): 'There are objects of representation of which it is characteristic to require extension in time in order to unfold; on the other hand, there are objects that are characterized by being found already compressed into a single point of time.'" For this reference to Meinong, cf. p. 219, note 3. – Editor's note.

temporal determinations or other belong to every concrete (or better: individual) object but not to every abstract object. We can certainly abstract from the temporal determinations, doing so in such a way that the abstract objects, such as red, place, or color, include nothing in the way of temporal determination following the abstraction. Thus the division into objects that include temporality and those that do not naturally intersects with the division of objects into self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient. [219] Every individual object has its time and is either a temporal whole or belongs to such a whole. But not every object includes time within itself.

The distinction between temporally distributed and undistributed objects[36] – the undistributed objects are then precisely mere abstracta.

Temporal distribution is missing from the tone as tone, from the color as color. A melody is temporally extended. In the essay on "*Analyse*" [Analysis], VI,[37] the distinction is characterized as a distinction "between objects of representation or even actualities whose nature requires extension in time in order to unfold, as opposed to objects whose characteristic it is to be found compressed into a single time-point, into a cross-cut of time, as it were (without, of course, prejudicing in any way the combination of this slice with a temporal extension)" (p. 247).[38] Mentioned as examples of the latter group on p. 78 of the essay on "Analyse"

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[36] The part of the sketch that Husserl dated "7. I. 05" begins at this point – cf. p. 224, note 32. – Editor's note.

[37] Husserl refers to A. Meinong, "Beiträge zur Theorie der psychischen Analyse" [Contributions to the theory of psychic analysis], *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* VI (1893), pp. 340–385 and pp. 417–455. Since Husserl possessed an off-print of this essay (which he received, according to a note in his own handwriting on the cover, on 14. II. 1894), and since Meinong refers in various places in the essay (as he also does occasionally in the article "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung" [On objects of higher order]) to Husserl's *Philosophie der Arithmetik* [Philosophy of Arithmetic], Bd. I (Halle a. d. S., 1891), and since Husserl himself refers to this book several times in his notes in the margins of Meinong's article, we can assume that he took notice of the article quite early; that is, already around 1894. – Editor's note.

[38] "There are objects of representation of which it is characteristic to require extension in time in order to unfold; on the other hand, there are objects that are characterized by being found already compressed into a single time-point." A. Meinong, "Beiträge zur Theorie der psychischen Analyse" [Contributions to the theory of psychic analysis], p. 447f. Husserl's citation conforms to the wording to be found in Meinong's article "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung" [On objects of higher order], p. 247; the citation is accurate, with only the

[Analysis] are: a place, a sound, a color.[39] Further on, ⟨Meinong says⟩ "that representing, judging, feeling, and desiring also are already characterized, so to speak, as punctual facts over against one another and at the same time make up a complete disjunc- [220]
tion."[40] The reason: "in the case of objects belonging to the one group, temporal extension ⟨is⟩ constitutive; in the case of objects belonging to the other group, it is not" (p. 79).[41]

Compare to this *Stern,* "Psychische Präsenzzeit" [Psychic presence-time], p. 326 (XVIII, cf. the note as well). Stern, with Meinong in view, distinguishes: "momentary" and "temporally extended acts of consciousness." Momentary acts of consciousness ⟨are⟩ "acts that, apart from whatever duration they may have, are complete in each moment. That is to say, momentary acts contain isochronously all the elements that are germane – in other words, all of the elements necessary to the production of the apprehension – in such a way that no integrating factor is given in the temporal extension."[42] But how, if the "apprehension" (the act of meaning) is also directed towards the temporal determinations?! –

These distinctions do not appear to me to be satisfactory.[43]

If one proceeds from the separation of objects into concrete and abstract (self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient), then some temporal determinations or other belong constitutively to every

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brackets at the end inserted by Husserl. Moreover, Husserl notes in the margin: "In the essay on 'Analyse' [Analysis]: of which it is 'characteristic' to require extension in time . . .," and further: "On p. 262, rest is called a temporally distributed unchanging object"; this again refers to the article "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung" [On objects of higher order], in which (on p. 262) Meinong speaks "of a temporally distributed unchanging object such as rest." – Editor's note.

[39] Meinong, "Beiträge zur Theorie der psychischen Analyse" [Contributions to the theory of psychic analysis], p. 448; Husserl's statement that these examples are given on "p. 78" of Meinong's essay refers to the separate pagination of the off-print mentioned in note 7 above. – Editor's note.

[40] *Ibid.,* p. 448. – Editor's note.

[41] *Ibid.,* p. 449. – Editor's note. Husserl's citing of "79" refers to the separate pagination of the off-print. – Husserl appended the following marginal note – latter crossed out – to the reproduced statement of the "reason": "This alone is essential, and it is nothing exceptional either. Consequently, it simply seems that those in the one group are temporal objects and the others are abstracta, consisting merely of temporal materials. – Editor's note.

[42] See p. 225, note 35. – Editor's note.

[43] It is possible that this sentence is supposed to be related only to Meinong's distinctions, since Husserl has separated the foregoing paragraph, which concerns Stern, by lines drawn with a blue pencil. – Editor's note.

concrete object but not to every abstract object. We can indeed abstract from the temporal determinations, doing so in such a way that we preserve abstracta, such as red, place, or color, which include nothing in the way of temporal determination. Thus the separation into objects that include moments of temporality and those that do not intersects with the separation of objects into self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient.

A) Each object has its time; it (its occurrence) is either a temporal whole or belongs to such a whole. But not every object includes the temporal in itself.[44]

B) Add to this the following differentiation of temporally extended objects (taken together with their time): [221]

a) There are objects whose temporal partition, however it may be undertaken, again and again yields objects that have all of their constitutive determinations in common with the former, with the exception of temporal extension: red, a house, a color, etc. We can even say that there are objects that spread over their time in such a way that the same temporal fillings correspond again and again to different temporal parts.

b) There are objects that spread over their temporal extension in such a way that in general different temporal fillings correspond to different temporal parts.

Even our concept-formations are governed by these distinctions.

We can also speak of objects that fill their time with constantly identical material and of temporal objects that fill it with changing material.

The division of temporal objects (to whose constitutive content temporal extension also belongs) into rests and motions, into constancies and changes.

I make this additional observation with respect to A) above: Our interest and our concept-formation can be directed towards the temporal determinations of objects or towards their temporal materials – that is, towards their material determinations. If we determine objects by means of concepts that include no time-concepts as constitutive elements, the temporal remains indeter-

[44] Compare the previously reproduced text of the preceding sheet to the text running from p. 226, line 12 to this point (cf. p. 224, note 32). – Editor's note.

minate in the logical representation of the determination. Since any nontemporal material (=A) can fill any extent of time whatsoever, these objects belong to the constancies as soon as we calculate a time for them, however indefinite. They are therefore "adequately characterized" without time. In contrast to this characterization stand determinations of another sort, which draw temporal determinations along with them.

Meinong formulates the following question: "*Can* or indeed must the representation of a distributed object itself be a distributed fact?"[45] This does not appear to be a very fortunate elucidation of the concepts. We must first consider thoughtfully what he means, and yet it is a simple matter. To begin with, Meinong speaks as if he were simply contrasting *temporal objects* [222] to *timeless objects* (that is, here, to temporal materials abstracted from time). In truth, what is at stake is the distinction between objects that have the character of "*constancies*" and those that have the character of *changes.*[46] The former are materially the same in every time-point: hence temporal distribution and temporal predicates (with the exception of the universal predicate that they all have their time) are not required for their characterization. But the case is otherwise for the latter: they need time for their characterization. The problem then is: Does the representation of distributed objects, in however small a part of its duration, have the character that belongs to constancies?

Or much more simply and clearly: Is the representation (the perception, the intuition) of *change* necessarily a *change,* is the representation of a process itself a process, the representation of a development itself a process of development? Or can something changing be intuited in an experience that is unchanging and at rest? But there is also the question: Is the intuition of a *constancy* itself a *constancy,* or is it a *change?* Or can it only be a constancy, or can it be sometimes the one and ⟨sometimes⟩ the other?

It seems to me that one of Meinong's later, more restricted formulations is again not correct. Possibly admissible is the

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[45] Meinong, "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung" [On objects of higher order], p. 248. The emphasis is Husserl's. – Editor's note.

[46] A) The differentiation between temporal objects and the materials that belong to the time-points but are abstracted from time and are therefore timeless.

B) The differentiation between constancies and changes.

question: "Must a succession of content correspond to the succession belonging to the object?"[47] But the following is not a good formulation: "Is time required in order to represent something temporally extended?" (p. 248/49).[48] The latter is surely beyond question. Of course time is required, and necessarily required. But the question is whether the representation – specifically, the intuitive representation – of something temporally extended has the character of a *change* (the character of a *process*). And that is also the sense of Meinong's occasional [223] question about whether we can represent an "extension" in one time-point.[49] That is to say, if the representation has the character of a constancy, then in each moment it is intrinsically and identically the same; and if its quality is to represent the temporal extension, then it preserves this character however one may expand the time – its time – or contract it to a point.

The situation is somewhat better with the first of the two formulations: "Must a succession of content correspond to the succession belonging to the object?" Here, naturally, we are confronted with the character of change that belongs to the representation, since "content" in this instance is certainly meant as something truly immanent to the representation (as something really co-constituting it). And if we extend this question to the contents of the apprehension, it is in fact more precisely apposite than the universal one. We must indeed ask: What is the situation with respect to the *presentants* of the moments of succession presented in the perception of change? Do these presentants exist successively or simultaneously in the representation? Is the representation itself, therefore – at least in this respect – change or constancy? And we must ask the same question about the perception of a constancy. Do the presentants corresponding to each time-point of the constancy (to each point

[47] Meinong, "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung" [On objects of higher order], p. 248. – Husserl later appended the following note to this quotation: "Content = phenomenological content." – Editor's note.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 249. – Editor's note.

[49] Husserl later crossed out his original reference, "somewhere in the '*Analyse*' [Analysis]), " which followed the words, "... Meinong's occasional question." In the form Husserl gives it, the question is probably not in fact traceable in Meinong. One might compare, however, his "Beiträge zur Theorie der psychischen Analyse" [Contributions to the theory of psychic analysis], p. 64 ff. – Editor's note.

of the extent of time during which the constancy does not materially change) exist in the intuition simultaneously or successively?

Meinong, "Gegenstände höherer Ordnung" [Objects of higher order], p. 249: we perceive a motion – say, a ball moves. We distinguish the time of the motion from the time of the representation of the motion (from the time of its perception or of any other intuitive representation of it). (Meinong speaks of the "time of the object" and the "time of the content.") The perception of the motion, however, unfolds in such a way that we follow with our eye point by point the motion and that which moves. Sensations and perceptions correspond to the moving ball's temporal positions, and when the last of these sensations is past, the observer has ceased to see the movement. Accordingly, [224] the time of the representation of the motion appears to run parallel with the time of the motion, the one seeming to coincide with the other (p. 249).[50]

(The sense of Meinong's further presentation, which is not very clear, is probably this: The time of the motion is supposed to be identical with the time of the perception of the motion; specifically, under the apprehension that the positions[51] of what is moving are perceived one after another, point by point.)

But if a determinate position of what moves is perceived in each point of the motion's time, this does not mean that the time of the motion is the time of the perceptual representation of the entire motion. The motion's time is the sum of time-points for the perception of each individual position of what moves, but it is still not on that account the time of the perception of the motion – that is, of the entire motion or even of some part of it, however small, and therefore of any motion at all.

This one sentence renders superfluous Meinong's long-winded

[50] "To all appearances, therefore, the time of the content runs completely parallel to the time of the object here; the compression of the time of the content to a point seems to be excluded. The parallelism extends so far in this case that the time of the object and the time of the representation seem to coincide almost exactly. Of course, that this is not true in every instance is something empirical inquiry teaches us in the case of the waking subject, and even more clearly in the case of the dreaming subject..." Meinong, *loc. cit.*, p. 249. – Editor's note.

[51] Reading "*die Zustände*" for "*der Zustände.*" – Translator's note.

exposition, which in an obscure way finally arrives at the same position[52].

For our part, we make – and make more clearly – some necessary distinctions. We distinguish:

1) the time of the motion of the ball (the objective time of the objective event, which is the object of perception);

2) the time of the perception. But that has two senses:

a) The perceiving of the motion requires the perceiving of the ball's continuously changing positions (the perceiving of the continuous phases of what is moving) and is completed when the last phase is reached. If we call this continuous process the [225] perceiving of the motion of the ball, then the time of the object (the time of the motion) coincides with the time of the perception of the motion (at least approximately); in any case, the time of the perception is an extent of time. We call this perception extensive perception.

b) The perception of the motion is completed in the final point of the motion of the perception, in the final point of the extension mentioned above. If we give the name "perception of the motion" $A\frown B$ to that momentary consciousness in which or with which the object $A\frown B$ is completely intended for the first time, to that finished state that has its intentional correlate in this object, then "perception of the motion" is the *final point* of perception in the preceding sense. It is temporally *un*extended; it represents one time-point. Here, of course, we run into the same idealizing fiction as we do in the case of the mathematical time-point.

In any event, we will say that this consciousness of the completed motion is possible only in the perception of motion in the first sense; accordingly, the intuitive representation of a motion is also possible only in a continuous act that endures in time, that in each of its phases represents a phase of the motion,

[52] "If it is a question ... of an actually unitary object with successive parts, then successive representing can grasp only the parts but not the whole, which means that we can assert universally: distributed objects of higher order can be represented only by means of undistributed contents; the temporally different determinate inferiora must be given to the act of representing all at once, even if, of course, they are not given *as* simultaneous." Meinong, *loc. cit.*, p. 251f. – Editor's note.

and that nevertheless has the motion in its entirety as an intentional object only in the final point of its own change.[53]

The intuitive consciousness of a change necessarily takes place in a change of consciousness.[54]

Surely with that statement we are already going beyond Meinong.

Indeed, what is the justification for designating that momentary consciousness that makes up the final phase of the extended perception as perception of the motion? The consciousness in which I achieve the last tone of the melody may at the same time intentionally apprehend an extended section of the melody and [226] perhaps the entire melody, but can *this consciousness* be called the perception of the melody? It is perception of the last tone, and even perception of only a phase of the last tone, but not perception of the melody. –[55]

At bottom, *Meinong* himself only shows the following: The perception of a motion, of an extended part of a motion, however small (and finally of the entire motion), is perception of this whole changing object (and the object is always a whole). It does not consist of the momentary now-perceptions that continuously succeed one another and that at each instant yield their nows but not the extended temporal object. Naturally, the extended object, since it is not a partial now, cannot be perceived in a now-perception, which gives precisely a partial now. It is evident that to perceive the extended object ⟨means⟩ to perceive each point of this extension; and since evidently perception and what is perceived are phenomenally simultaneous (it is not a question of objective simultaneity), it follows that the perception of a temporal object must be a temporal object and that both coincide as far as their phenomenal extension is concerned.

But *Meinong* really wants to infer something quite different.

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[53] Later Husserl appended to this the following: "*In* this point? In this point the perception of the whole motion is completed, but that does not mean that this abstract point is the perception of the motion. This perception is precisely a successive whole." Cf. five lines further in the text the paragraph beginning "Indeed . . . ." – Editor's note.

[54] Husserl originally continued at this point with the following sentence, which he later placed between square brackets: "An evidence is involved in the "necessarily,' and involved in it too are the principal point and the principal difficulty." – Editor's note.

[55] The whole paragraph from "Indeed . . ." on was probably added to the text somewhat later than the writing of the marginal comment recorded in note 53 above. – Editor's note.

He believes that he can conclude that since the perception of the temporal object does not consist of the continuous sequence of momentary perceptions (=momentary now-perceptions), inasmuch as each of these gives only its now, there must be an act that embraces, beyond the now, the whole temporal object. The object is completed for perception in the final point: hence this act must occur at that point and, encompassing the whole object, must make up the perception of the object. Distributed objects, therefore, are represented only by means of undistributed "contents" (which is probably supposed to mean: by means of acts with representing contents that are given momentarily and simultaneously). But this is true or false depending on how one understands it, and false as Meinong seems to understand it. Certainly consciousness must reach out beyond the now. It must do this in each momentary act. But the momentary act is not the [227] perception of the temporal object; on the contrary, it is an abstractum. In order for the perception of the temporal object to be possible, not only the final act but every momentary act must be overlapping; the perception, which itself is extended, *distributed,* consists in the fusion of these overlapping acts. None of these acts is entitled to be called perception[56].

Meinong believes that he has shown as a result of his account that the successive representing is only the grasping of parts and not of the whole, and thus that it can be asserted universally that distributed objects of a higher order (melodies, motions . . .) can be represented only by means of undistributed[57] contents.

But is this actually proven? Is the perception the final phase, and is the latter a mathematical point? If it is, then that would mean that this perception, if it is supposed to be the perception of motion, is either impossible or conceivable only as extension. One point by itself is indeed nothing. The question then is: Is the final phase conceivable only as the final phase? And in that case is it not the whole act of successive perception that must in truth be called the "perception of motion"? The perception is then a distributed object itself, and what Meinong stresses is merely a

[56] The text running from p. 233, line 19 ("It does not consist . . .") to this point is a later insertion by Husserl. – Editor's note.

[57] Reading "indistribuierter" for "*in* distribuierter," according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

mathematical abstraction. Or can one perhaps say: As soon as the perception has come into being in the final phase, it is enduring being – it could continue for awhile unchanged? But do we still have the perception of motion when the motion is past? And would that not mean that we could have the perception of motion even without motion? For every enduring being (every constancy) can exist by itself no matter how it has come into being; "can" – that is to say, it is conceivable as something existing by itself. But in point of fact, it is *evident* (if it is anything at all) that *the final phase* is conceivable and possible *only as final phase* and that *each temporal phase* is conceivable and possible *only as temporal phase*. And so the opposite of Meinong's assertion follows.

Hence the objection against Meinong: If the perception of motion were an undistributed act, just as color and place are undistributed, it would be implied that the perception could exist not only as a phase but also as something enduring. Undistributed objects are temporal materials and can fill any temporal extent whatever. But that is nonsense. [228]

⟨*No. 30. Three Kinds of Phases*⟩[58]

For the sake of clarity, we must sharply distinguish *three kinds of phases*.

1) Momentary intuition or intuitional phase: the phases of the intuition of the temporal object. The intuition is itself a temporal object and as such has its phases. Take the perception of a melody, for example: perception of the first tone, perception of the first two tones in succession as the first concrete part of the melody, perception of the first melodic pause, etc.

2) The moment of the object, the temporal phase of the object: Within each phase in the preceding sense – hence, if we extract a point from the extension of the intuition, within this point – there "appears" a certain temporal formation, the

[58] The sketch comes from a sheet that Husserl obviously arranged, with the designation "32," in the original notes for the lectures on time from 1905; cf. p. 223, note 31. – Editor's note.

respective concrete part of the melody; and this has its phases. These are appearing phases, not phases of the appearance (of the intuition as experience).

3) The objective phases in 2), which are intended simultaneously in one moment inasmuch as the unity of apprehension in this moment embraces them all, appear in their continuous multiplicity precisely in the unity of apprehension; and this unity has a corresponding multiplicity of apprehension-moments. These moments are the simultaneous phases of the apprehension belonging to the moment in question: apprehension-moments in the momentary intuition correspond to the moments of the object. Or also: apprehension-phases in the intuitional phase – corresponding to the temporal phases of the object.

Then, of course, we also have to distinguish: the phases of the representants in the intuitional phase, and the phases of the apprehension-characters and other act-characters.

Now we have to say with regard to 1): The intuitional phases blend into one another continuously, but this continuity is given only in a reflexive perception that objectivates the identifying [229] flow. This leads back to a comment with regard to 3):

We have to distinguish the unity of apprehension in the apprehension-phase (in the single apprehension-phase) from the unity of all apprehension-phases within the momentary intuition (the intuitional phase).

If I perceive a melody (one that falls as a whole into "perception"), then, in any phase of the perception, ⟨I⟩ have the melody "up until then" as my object; and in the final phase [of the perception] of the melody, I have the whole melody as my object. In this final perceptual phase, each phase of the object (each tone) is separately apprehended, represented as something distinct in a moment of apprehension. Likewise, if I see in succession a man and then a dog, the "man" is separately apprehended and the "dog" is too – that is, *both* belong to the consciousness of succession in the final momentary intuition. Each such implicit apprehension is an apprehension-unity. But these apprehensions join together to make up the momentary consciousness of time.

I say "momentary consciousness of time," for we must again distinguish: the intuition of the temporal object, the intuition of

the melody, its perception, which extends from the sounding of the first tone to the sounding of the last –

1) therefore the temporally extended, full, concrete consciousness of time, the complete perception or intuition of time;

2) the momentary time-consciousness, a phase of 1). –

Now in what does the momentary consist? And how are the momentary ⟨phases of time-consciousness⟩ connected? In the momentary consciousness of time, the apprehension-phases possess the unity that belongs to the act-continuity: the moment of the act-form is differentiated and continuously shaded off. The act-forms coincide and yet withdraw from one another (unity of infinitesimal similarity is, to be sure, not always such a unity: color series presuppose temporal or spatial continuity). Or rather they do not coincide, but they do have affinity. They "approach" one another, they agree with one another at a distance, etc. The categorial moment of time corresponds to the act-form; it is the act-forming of the "object," of the temporal content. But is this moment itself time? Surely that is impossible.

⟨*No. 31.*⟩ *Diagram.* ⟨*Apprehension of the Now and Extensive Perception*⟩[59] [230]

Let us consider the succession of tones A B C, each tone enduring for its appointed time and bordering continuously on its neighbours. All three are perceived in their *succession* in the unity of one perception. In this perception we have a concrete, temporally extended consciousness of each tone, and not only of each tone but also of the tonal structure they form together. Each tone is intended not only in the now-point but throughout the entire time of the extended perception. This implies that the apprehension of A does not begin in the initial moment of A and, after enduring without change, cease in the final moment of A; rather the apprehension of A only ceases to be the apprehension

[59] The sketch comes from a sheet that Husserl obviously included, with the designation "34", in the original notes for the lectures on time from 1905; cf. p. 223, note 31. The sheet designated "33" is reproduced below in No. 33, p. 239ff. – Editor's note.



of A as now. When the apprehension of A loses this character, A "sinks" into the past. So too in the cases of B and C. X X′ is the line of objective time. Only one point on the line is real at each moment. We indicate the sinking back into the past by means of the ordinates – for example, by laying out on the ordinate erected in A the temporal distance A has covered while flowing away. The diagonal lines give a picture of the contents of the original temporal field. Each diagonal line contains the temporal gradations of content with respect to the terminal point on the line. All the points on the line are, of course, simultaneous.

⟨*No. 32.*⟩ *Continua*[60] [231]

1) The continuum belonging to the extensive perception of a temporal object (of a motion, for example), embracing all of the phases of the act of perceiving – phases in which the perceiving of the motion is gradually accomplished and finally completed.

2) The continuum that belongs to the temporal extent of the perceived temporal object, composing its temporal extension;

a) the continuum belonging to the temporal extent of the whole temporal object, as it appears at the conclusion of the perception,

b) the continuum so far as it appears during one phase of the perception.

[60] The sketch belongs to a sheet that Husserl obviously included, with the designation "36," in the original notes for the lectures on time from 1905; cf. p. 223, note 31. – Editor's note.

3) The continuum belonging to the apprehension that takes place in one moment of the perception and that constitutes – unitarily, momentarily, and simultaneously – a corresponding part of the temporal object.

This continuum is different for each moment.

4) The continuum of apprehension-contents for each of the momentary apprehensions, both with respect to what appears in them as now and ⟨with respect to⟩ what appears in them as just past.

5) The continuum of apprehension-contents as well as the continuity of apprehension-characters and apprehension-forms that ⟨pertain⟩ to a specific phase of the object throughout the course of the entire extensive perception.

Thus every perception breaks down into cross sections [*Querschnitte*]. In each cross section [there is] a continuity of sensuous contents terminating in a sensation and a continuity of characters ⟨of apprehension⟩ terminating in the perception of the now. The unity of the total perception is then a continuum of these continua, which (according to their momentary phases) follow on one another continuously, phase by phase, thereby constituting the unitary consciousness of the whole temporal object.

⟨*No. 33.*⟩ *Results of the Stern–Meinong Discussion*[61] [232]

1) It belongs to the essence of the perception of a temporal object that it is a temporal object itself. Under all circumstances it has a temporal extension.

2) It belongs to the essence of such a perception that it has the character of a changing object. Even the perception of an unchanging object possesses in itself the character of change.

3) Each perceptual phase has intentional reference to an extended section of the temporal object and not merely to a now-point necessarily given in it and simultaneous with it.

[61] The sketch belongs to a sheet that Husserl obviously arranged, with the designation "33," in the original notes for the lectures on time from 1905; cf. p. 223, note 31, as well as p. 237, note 59. – Editor's note.

4) This reference encompasses in a *determinate* way the portion of the temporal object that has elapsed up to now; often it also encompasses, in a more or less determinate way, the immediately adjoining future part of the temporal object. The latter is not essential, however. But it is by all means essential that there be an intention directed towards what is to come, even if not towards continuations involving the same temporal object.

5) We must distinguish between the parts of the temporal object that still fall into intuition in a given momentary phase of the perception and those that do not. To the former correspond continuous apprehension-contents as well as apprehension-characters; to the latter correspond empty apprehension-intentions.

6) The perception is related to the temporal object in a double continuity, in a continuity on two levels. We distinguish:

a) the continuum of perceptual phases,

b) the continuum of intuitive apprehensions within a phase. This continuum terminates in an apprehension of the now, which is the transit point for the apprehensions of the past and the apprehensions of the future. We call each such continuum the *intuitive continuum of a cross section* [*Querschnittkontinuum*]. A vague continuum of empty intentions, related to the parts of the [233] temporal object that are no longer intuitive, attaches itself to the continuity of the intuitive continua belonging to the cross sections.

7) Accordingly, the perception is *a continuum of continua*. If we follow any apprehension-content onward from the first perceptual phase – which necessarily has the character of a perception of the now – then the content runs throughout the continuity of continua belonging to the cross sections. Specifically:

a) throughout at least a part of this continuity, it is a continual *now*. The apprehension-content is a continual presentant belonging to a perception of the now; so far as the *content* as presentant is in question, the perception has the character of a perception of something that endures without changing or of something that changes.

b) The apprehension-content assumes the character of a phantasm, or in any event, of something that is no longer to be characterized as sensation.

But we must note the following here. Since each perceptual phase intuitively represents the extent of the temporal object belonging to the past, the tone that lasts for a second, for example, is not merely perceived in the mode of the now in each cross section of the perception of the second and does not have merely its momentary presentants in this cross section. The tone appears *intuitively* as temporally extended through the co-extension of the apprehension-content, which at only one point has the character of sensation and, in being continuously shaded off, has a modified character for the rest of the points.[62] Only in the beginning-phase of the perception of the tone is this co-extension missing; in each further cross section of the perception it is there, and it grows from cross section to cross section until the final cross section of the perception of the tone. In the case of each of these cross sections, an ascending continuum, terminating in a sensation, is always given in the sensuous continuum pertaining to the tone. If the melody advances, the tone ceases to be *sensed* or perceived. Hence, in each further cross section, as long as the tone still belongs to the cross section's intentional content, the tone is indeed still represented in the form of an extension, but of an extension without a boundary provided by sensation. What has been pointed out about the apprehension-contents is also true [234] of the *apprehensions:* to the sensation corresponds the perceptual consciousness as consciousness of the now. To the gradually shaded apprehension-contents correspond the different levels of the apprehensions within a phase; and in the union of these different levels, which is an intentional union, the original past becomes constituted – constituted as continuously connected to the perceived now. What we mean, of course, is the consciousness of the past with regard to the temporal object that has run off up to the now.

The temporal object becomes constituted in a continuously unfolding act in such a way that, moment by moment, a now of the temporal object is perceived as the object's present point while at the same time a consciousness of the past is connected at each moment with the consciousness of the present point, allow-

[62] Husserl later added to this the following comment: "Why that? That is not essential." – Editor's note.

ing the portion of the temporal object that has elapsed up to now to appear as just past. Apprehension-contents are there at each moment: sensations for the now and phantasms for what is past, to the extent that the past was actually intuitive. Thus far does the original temporal field extend.

⟨*No. 34. On the Problem of the Consciousness of a Succession*⟩[63]

1) I perceive A, then B, then C.

2) I perceive B – specifically, as coming after A; I perceive C as coming after B, and B as coming after A; I perceive C as precisely in the now, B as just having been, and A as having been before B.

3) I remember B (just as it was in the now; I transplant myself into the now that belonged to B); and I remember that when B was now, A was just past.

4) The B that was "now" is the same as the B_1 that appeared in the characterization of the just-past in the original extent of time; identification of the re-presentation (of the "reproduced perception") with B's being-pushed-back in time – which, however, is itself only re-presented, together with the original extent of time. [235]

5) The consciousness of A endures throughout the entire extent of time up to C. At C, the momentary consciousness possesses an extension with the form:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \bar{\bar{A}} & \bar{B} & C \\ \hline t_0 & t_1 & t_2 \end{array}$$

But "A," the consciousness of A, has the character of a temporal extension, of something sinking backwards from the now into the past, so that in time t_1 it has the character of the past $t_1 - t_0$; and in time t_2, the character of the past $t_2 - t_0$. It is not the case that A

[63] This sketch is from a double sheet that Husserl employed as a wrapper for the majority of the sheets not used by Edith Stein in her compilation of the lectures on time; the sketch can be indirectly dated, by means of matter printed on the reverse side, as coming at the earliest from February 15, 1905. It might therefore be a question of one of the very last sketches prepared for the lectures on time from February of 1905. – Editor's note.

is there in time-point t_2 simply with the character "t_0," and that B is there with the character "t_1," that is, with the corresponding times themselves. Rather:

1) We must note that the character of A is a changing one. At first A has the character of the now, then the character of the past – specifically, β; namely, it has that character when B is now, and the β designates a certain distance from B. Then, pretending that they are at equal temporal intervals – as we choose to do here – C has the character of the now, B the character of β, and A the character of 2β.

2) Furthermore, we are aware of this continuous change, of this continuous sinking-backwards. Hence

a) the apprehensions continuously change while A passes over into B and B into C.

b) That means: the apprehension of A does not cease in the moment A; rather, A "sinks," and apprehension is joined continuously to apprehension.



X X′ ⟨is⟩ the line of objective time, the line of actually present nows. At any moment only one point ⟨on this line⟩ is real [*real*]. The diagonal lines give the structures of the contents belonging to the original temporal field for each point.[1]

[1] At equal temporal intervals.

A_B belongs to A at the time when B is now, that is, when B is [236] [situated] on line X X′ [in the diagram]. If no now-content was present in the interval between A and B, there nevertheless belongs to each now-point between A and B – let us say, to now-point α – an A_α. But if α is a now-content, then it too sinks, and at the same rate, so that all the points belonging to the lines running parallel to X X′ are not simultaneous, while the points

lying along the diagonals are simultaneous. They express the indicated momentary consciousness with respect to its temporal character. Of the points along the parallels, only one of them at a time is ever in consciousness, just as only one of the points along X X′ is in consciousness at a time.

3) A, (B, A_B), (C, B_C, A_C) . . .[64] are successive stages of consciousness, successive momentary intuitions. Are we also conscious of this succession? Whether or not that would require an infinite regress poses a difficulty, of course. Indeed, we surely do not have a momentary consciousness of these stages of consciousness. We rather have them in succession and only in succession – as when I hum three notes, for example. In the final stage of consciousness I have, precisely, only the final stage of consciousness. How do I distinguish these stages, how do I compare them? How do I know of their continuous succession? I repeat A; I repeat A B and contemplate (A_B B); finally, I repeat the whole and contemplate (A_C B_C C). I identify A with A_C, in which case, while A is running it course, B C is already occurring in expectation.

[64] Husserl observes in the margin: "It would have been better to have written this in the reverse order, in which case it would be read from right to left, or to have written it from above to below!" Husserl might have meant by this reversal the following way of writing the series: A, (A_B, B), (A_C, B_C, C). – Editor's note.

⟨III⟩ [237]
SEEFELDER MANUSCRIPTS ON INDIVIDUATION[1]

⟨*No. 35.*⟩ *The Unity of the Thing in Time as Something Identical in Change or Constancy*[2]

Of what do I have evidence in phenomenological perception, and by what means do I have an indirect and transcendent knowledge with regard to this perception? I see a beer bottle that is brown, and I restrict myself to the brown in its extension, "just as it is actually given." I exclude everything that is merely meant and not given in the phenomenon. Here is a beer bottle and it is such and such. I distinguish the appearances of the beer bottle; I make them into objects. I discover the interconnection of these appearances; I meet with the consciousness of identity that runs throughout them. I find that I express this consciousness of identity in these terms: The beer bottle always appears; it appears as continually the same and as constantly determined in the same way. And in this process of appearing there are different appearances. The appearances are not the beer bottle that appears in them. They are different; the bottle is the same. The appearances are themselves objects. *An* appearance is something continuously identical. It endures "for a time." Such and such [238]

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[1] All of the sketches reproduced here are taken from a bundle of sheets assembled by Husserl himself with the following inscription: "Seefeld manuscripts and older manuscripts on individuation. Seefeld, 1905. Individuation. (Historical note: I already find the concept and correct use of 'phenomenological reduction' in the Seefeld sheets of 1905)." Only the single "older" sketch included in the bundle (from "Halle" – that is, before 1900) is not reproduced here. Sketch No. 35 is precisely and expressly dated "Seefeld, summer vacation 1905." The following sketches – No. 36 through No. 38 – were written later, probably around 1909 at the latest, however; cf. the next note. – Editor's note.

[2] Husserl plainly dated this sketch "Seefeld, summer vacation 1905." He also made the following remark about it: "Pfänder–Daubert perplexities." The sketch therefore obviously originated in a discussion with A. Pfänder and J. Daubert during the summer vacation at Seefeld in 1905. On Johannes Daubert, see H. Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* (Den Haag, 1960), I: p. 171. – Editor's note.

parts and moments, held in memory, must be distinguished in this enduring appearance. They again are objects; each is one and the same throughout its duration. This duration appears throughout the duration of the memory; the moment appears as having been continually identical. And so on.

What, then, is the evidence that belongs to the perception of something "internal," to adequate perception, supposed to be? Evidence is a matter of "judgment." The perception of something *transcendent* – the perception of the beer bottle – can "deceive." That its object exists, and exists in this way, can be "doubted." Perhaps the beer bottle is "other than it appears"; perhaps it does not exist "at all." What does this mean? It means that the perception includes intentions that are still unfulfilled and that it can either undergo fulfillment or "closer determination," or "contradiction" and "disappointment." It undergoes fulfillment, etc., in this or that "respect." The perception of something *immanent* includes nothing that can be characterized as "mere intention." Its "consciousness of the object" is perpetually fulfilled; its consciousness of identity is a pure consciousness, not consciousness characterized by intention and adventitious fulfillment. I grasp everything in the This of the phenomenon in the mode of fulfillment – "This brown changes."[3]

Perception – Phenomenological Perception

I perceive – *this brown content. It* is *something that endures.* It is constantly the same. It covers a certain phenomenological extension. I saw it yesterday; I remember it today. It has lasted until today. Transcendence! Of course, I should not bring in today and yesterday.[4] Let us restrict ourselves to what is

[3] Viewed superficially as it appears in the manuscript, the preceding text, separated by a dash in the manuscript, *follows* the text that it precedes here in this edition; specifically, it is placed after p. 239, line 24 – the location at which, however, according to an indication of Husserl's, the text that is reproduced here is supposed to be attached. The whole sketch therefore begins – thus superficially seen – with the heading: "Perception – Phenomenological Perception." Yet in reality Husserl may subsequently have, first, already placed the text running from this heading to p. 239, line 24 in the position it occupies here and then still later, on a second occasion, have also added (in the preceding direction) the text reproduced above at the beginning of the section. – Editor's note.

[4] But take note! Can I not at present remember the brown, just as it was given, through phenomenological reduction of the perception of the bottle?

given – phenomenologically given – in the perception: the brown "now" seen in its duration, *the* brown. *It* endures. *It* continually covers *the same extension.* Now this brown *itself* changes: *it* becomes darker, *its* extension changes – *the* extension that it covers. [239]

What is the source of my absolute certainty that ⟨in⟩ *every phase of the duration identically* the same brown is *actually* given – if I now understand by brown the species (the infima species)? And what is the source of my absolute certainty that "the same" extension is actually given? *Is there such an absolute certainty?* What is *the* brown? Is it the species? No. Is it the individual, and is the individual a particular, a single case of the infima species brown? But that concerns only the momentary phase. The brown as single phase of the duration does not endure; it is merely a phase. We have many individual phases. Each is something different. The many do not endure; on the contrary, one thing – *the* brown – endures. *The* brown endures, and I distinguish phases within its duration. This is an abstraction; in the strict sense I distinguish extended sections, *partial durations.* The brown endures in each of these extended sections, and it endures throughout them all. And the brown that there endures covers an extension, and this same brown is extended throughout all the parts of the extension. Separated extensions have "the same" brown; that is to say, in this case, browns that are perfectly alike. Separated durations have a like brown, a brown that belongs to the same identical species. *The* brown is not the infima species; it is also not, so to speak, the mathematically exact single case of the infima species – the individual moment, absolutely speaking.[5]

And yet it is the individual moment. In the first place, it is something individual: it is a *this,* has its absolute individuality, is meant as an individual and not as something universal. It is, we presuppose, a perceived *this* and has its now, without this fact – that it is now – being meant, of course.

In the second place, it is not an individual possessing brownness that is meant; rather, this *brown* is meant, and it is not even the brown [as] belonging to this object, the brown that an

[5] Husserl noted in the margin of the sheet that begins here: "Looked at in 1909"; the remark probably extends to the following sheets of the sketch as well. – Editor's note.

individual thing has, that is meant. At least, the brown certainly does not have to be meant as belonging to the object, any more than when I intend this pleasurable sensation I must intend [240] myself and must intend the pleasurable sensation as mine. Therefore I mean this individual brown, the particular case of the species, and – to emphasize this again – not this brown *as* a particular case of the species, as if this relation to the "universal object" were realized.

The particular case of the species, this brown, is that which is identical in the act of meaning that the *appearance of the brown* underlies. The appearance of the brown shows the *duration of the brown*; it is an extended appearance in which an extended object stands before me. And the meaning does not aim at the duration but at the brown that endures and is identical in the duration, i.e., at the brown that *is meant in unity and self-identity*. "Reflection" shows that it is meant in this way. If we "dissect" the temporal duration or if we dissect the phenomenon or appearance in its temporal aspect, we then see concrete parts that are themselves appearances of the same kind as the whole; and on the basis of this diversity (plurality), we see the perfect likeness of the objects differentiated by the analysis: This brown and *that* one are "the same" – namely, perfectly alike. But if we reflect on the unity of the appearance, we see the identity; there exists a genuine consciousness of identity (a categorial consciousness) in which the brown stands before me as that which is continuously and identically meant, as that which is meant in unity and self-identity.

In the one case, we have the *continuous consciousness of unity,* a consciousness that gives unity: *uninterrupted unity,* identity in the continuity of time, something identical in the continuous flow of time.

In the other case, we have a consciousness that is broken up, divided into pieces. In the separation of the parts we have a plurality of unities. Each unity is a unity in the foregoing sense relative to the temporal continuity of each part. But these are distinct unities that do not join together to make up the unity of a whole. Instead, because these unities rest on the unity of *continuous* appearance and on the unity of a continuous consciousness of unity, the identical unity in differences is again

produced. Since they belong to different extents of time, the brown of this and the brown of that part of the duration are different. But since they fill one extent of time continuously, there [241] is *one* object that "endures"; it is one and the same thing that runs throughout this whole extent of time.[6]

Perhaps we must distinguish the following.

We can understand the *continuously appearing brown* as the extended brown, the brown that is spread out and that is constantly one brown, which "extends" throughout time but which is different from phase to phase. That is to say, the *brown-extension* is a unity divided with respect to time, and every part is a different part. The brown-extension is not the duration of an object; it does not endure. Rather, it is something identical that endures, something that stretches, as identical, throughout the temporal extension, which is constantly covered with one brown. The *pervasive consciousness of unity or identity* must not be confused with the *entirely different* consciousness of a *whole made up of moments that continuously fall into sequence with one another in time.* Living in the consciousness of identity, we constantly have *one* thing in the steady continuum, in the continuous flow of the temporal extension. *The object* [of the consciousness of identity] *is not the extension but what is extended.* Evidently we can then always make the extension itself into an object, divide it, and distinguish its parts. The continuity of brown moments, as continuity, is penetrated throughout by the unity of something identical.

Continuity and Unity

This identity lives in the whole continuity; every consciousness of continuity[7] is the consciousness of a unity, and here we must

[6] Concerning the foregoing, Husserl noted in the margin: "Cf. Hume, *Treatise,* Lipps, 267f." He is referring here to David Hume's *Traktat über die menschliche Natur* [*A Treatise of Human Nature*], Part I: "Über den Verstand" ["Of the Understanding"], translation revised and provided with an index by Theodor Lipps (Hamburg and Leipzig: 1895), p. 267f. Husserl's copy of this edition has been preserved and shows numerous marginal notes, underlinings, etc., in his hand. In particular, in the paragraph on p. 268 in which Hume speaks of the "principle of individuation," the following marginal note by Husserl is to be found: "My lectures and investigations concerning time!" – Editor's note.

[7] This is precisely the continuity of something identical (of a being) in temporal extension; "qualitative continuity" – the steady gradation of color-moments, etc. – is not what is meant.

always separate that which is unitary and continues from the unity understood as the entirety of the continuum itself. The [242] latter consciousness of continuity is a consciousness of time (yet not consciousness of an "objective" time). We have to distinguish two cases of this consciousness of time: the consciousness of *constancy,* of the duration in which something identical stands before us as something unchanging, the phases belonging to the continuous consciousness of the unity not differentiated at all, except temporally; and the consciousness of *change,* in which that which is continually unitary and identical changes.

The brown *is continually preserved;* it endures. Here the unity is meant in the steady flow of brown-moments – that which in the case of the apprehension of a brown object makes up the unity of the identical *trait* brown: The object has the determination brown; it is abidingly brown.

The brown changes (from one nuance of brown into another). It is constantly brown; it is something identical in the temporally extended continuity of brown moments; it is (in ideative abstraction) identically and constantly the *species brown* as *species,* but the species is not meant. No ideating abstraction is carried out. There is a *moment* that "itself" changes, and changes again and again; an identity runs throughout the temporal continuity. The color of the object changes; the color is something identical as an individual, but something that changes, "itself," in quality.

So it is in the case of simple moments in the province of phenomenology. The perception of extension and the perception of differentiations (I differentiate the continuous extension into parts, into pluralities), the perception of things that are perfectly alike, and so on, are *based on* the perception of a continuous unity (identity) in constancy and change. The perception of a "*moment*": *brown* – and the "perception" of something unitary, *the bringing-about of the consciousness of unity;* the moment brown given – and then identified in repeated memories.

Then the case of *complexes.* Surely we had better say: What has already been explained applies in the case of the ultimate differences (metaphysical parts). *The spatial extension endures, changes. The tone* endures, changes, and so on, in its *intensity,* in its *timbre.* If we move to the *concrete wholes,* then the identity of the *whole,* grounded in the identity of the species of the total [243]

character, newly emerges here. To be considered: objects of a higher level: *The melody does not change;* it *endures* for such and such a length of time – it endures during the time that it "unrolls," during the time that new tones continually make their appearance. What makes up the "repetition" of *the* melody ("the same" here means "specifically the same")? –

Concerning the above, I can say: The *brown* endures – the brown changes; it endures, remaining unchanged qualitatively, as "brown" – it changes "qualitatively," in its essence as brown; it changes with regard to its extension – or it remains unchanged with regard to its "extension" (it remains unchanging in quality but changes in its extension; it changes not only as brown but also in its extension). And analogously here.

On the other hand, can one say: The *extension,* understood as spatial extension, remains unchanged or changes in the same sense? Must one not say in connection with extension: The extension *of the quality, of anything extended,* remains the same or changes? Are there not distinctions and difficulties here? –[8]

Continuity and Unity

We have to distinguish:

1) *Temporal continuity,* understood as the *continuum of time-points* (of time-points as points of time).

2) The continuity *in time,* understood as the unity of the *time-content* – unity as continuous unity and as "*real unity.*" The temporal contents "continuously" fill the extent of time; and while they do this, the identity of something real connects them – the identity of what extends throughout the temporal duration as that which is unitary, which changes or endures without changing in this time (*abides* in constancy or change).

3) *The continuum of a "continuous" change.* The time-continuum is filled by a continuum of *"continuously" self-differentiating moments* in which the ultimate differences of a species are individuated. The continuous change of a color: The differences [244]

[8] Concerning the foregoing, Husserl remarked in the margin: "Realization of this suggestion in the supplement"; he later corrected "in the supplement" to read "in other sheets." What next follows has, again, the heading "Continuity and Unity," which is reproduced here. – Editor's note.

in color vary steadily, and the differentiation of the color-moments "coincides" with the differentiation of time.

A "qualitative" continuum can become the object of a genuine consciousness of continuity only in a temporal extension. Then, in this temporal extension, something identical is grasped or capable of being grasped – something that "changes," and changes "continuously," without a "break." The break, the discontinuity, ruptures the unity; but the unity can also be produced and maintained by means of a different, coinciding moment – for example, the spatial continuity coinciding with a color-continuity. If *the color-continuity* undergoes a break, then the extension is *divided* but nevertheless remains a unity.

Extension of a "Spatial" and Qualitative Continuum over a Time-Continuum

The *time-continuum* is not "*something real.*" Time, as time, is nothing that endures or changes; a series of temporal differences is not again in time and includes nothing identical that extends throughout the series (the universal, "time," is something different). But everything that extends throughout time is real; the *temporal content* that fills time "continuously" and, in doing so, establishes identity in this continuity is *real. The identical is the real.* The real endures or changes, and "is determined" as possessing such and such a character – a in the time-moment t, a' in t'. It endures without changing when the determination in the extent of time $t_0 - t_1$ continues to be identically constituted in the infima species; it changes when the determination varies, shades off continuously, or is subject to a number of discrete breaks. In the latter case, must the identity be preserved through other determinations –?[9]

[9] Here there follows this sentence, which was later crossed out: "The question now is how far this carries us in the analysis of 'empirical' reality." Apparently at the moment he crossed it out, Husserl made the following note beneath the sentence: "The concept of the 'real' understood as the concept of the identical thing that endures. 'Enduring' here often means not changing, and duration often means the same thing as constancy." – Editor's note.

Personal Identity; Identity of the Same Thing, That Which Is Identical in Change [245]

Socrates. Is the *individual* a *quality* that remains identical in change? That would be nonsense, of course: for every quality, infinitely many bearers are conceivable.

The individual is *not discoverable* in intuitive representation; complex of qualities, *continuously* changing, but in the *continuity* of change we "confirm" identity. (The confirming is naturally not the finding of a *content.*) *One and the same thing* changes; where we perceive continuous change, there we suppose the identity of something changing – of the object, not of the quality. The quality is not identically the same: red changes into orange, but orange is not identical with red. *Only the Aristotelian genus remains identically the same.* The object that earlier was red is now orange; the object is the same. Is what is identical perhaps something abstract? Is the complex form of the object, the Aristotelian genus (in a certain amplification) identically the same for the changed as for the original form? But one will not be satisfied with that: *The thing is the same.*

Dependency of changes in different things. Causality. If a_α changes into a_β, then $b_{\alpha'}$ must change into $b_{\beta'}$.

That Which Is Identical in Temporality, in the Continuity of the Temporal Flow; That Which Is Identical in the Sense of Individual or, What Amounts to the Same Thing, Temporal Being. That Which Subsists (Abides) in Time. That Which Subsists Phenomenologically in Phenomenological "Time," That Which Is at Rest Phenomenologically and That Which Is Changing Phenomenologically. (The "Immanent") [10]

This – this color, this colored extension, this unity of color and extension – endures, changes.

Reflection: I "find" temporal continuity, duration, in which I can distinguish flowing "parts." Not a strict partition, I find [246] "color" and I find it *again and again.* The color endures. The genus color or the generic complex (color-extension) – the specific in the different extensions of the duration – ⟨is⟩ "always the

[10] Husserl specifically characterizes the investigation that follows this heading – to page 257, line 8 – as "the fundamental Seefeld consideration"; he refers to the double sheet on which it is written as the "principal sheet" of the sketch. – Editor's note.

same." The color (or the color-extension) is "temporally extended" and divisible as far as its temporal extension is concerned. That is:

1) the *color as that which fills time.* On the other hand:

2) the *color that endures,* that extends throughout the time, that is something identical in the temporal continuity of color, something identical extending throughout the continuity: The *individual,* determined generically as color, is the same throughout or in the extension of the duration. *The individual* endures; it is that which subsists throughout the continuous temporal filling, subsisting in it continuously. Or it is determined as spatial color-extension and has "*at any time*" color-determination and determination with respect to spatial extension; and it has the ultimate determination: in each extent of time and in each phase of time the same differentia of color and of extension. Phase – that is merely a limiting case: Extents of time, however small, are also specifically alike *in content,* whether with respect to their common genus or their differentia (that is to say, durations and the parts of a duration are similar to the whole: "specifically" like it). Irrespective of the order of temporal parts and of that extension which we call temporal and which can have different degrees ("size"), we always have things that are perfectly alike – in the case of constancy.

Change and Alteration. (Sudden Transition)

The *filling* in the temporal continuity. The concrete continuity: the filling *with* the temporal extension.[11] The continuity of content. The content *in concreto* permits a *comparison* of larger and smaller *temporal extensions.* Over against this is what makes up the *content* of the extension.[12] "The same" content – for example, the same continuity "red-green" – is capable of being extended over different extents of time.

We hold on to the extent of time, or we disregard the gradual distinctions that belong to the temporal extension of the content. [247] We carry out *other lines of comparison* and abstraction.

[11] "With": Can one not equally well say "in" the temporal extension? Everything is only figurative.

[12] This would, no doubt, have to be worked out in the case of duration.

a) *Constancy*. In constancy's case, no matter how many "divisions" of the duration are undertaken, these contents are perfectly alike again and again, without differences other than those of temporal position (order) and temporal "size." In the continuity of time-consciousness, we constantly find self-sameness, which is determined as being without differentiation, determined in perfect likeness – pure *likeness with respect to the "quality"* (of the total being that fills time).

b) *Change*. In the case of change, on the other hand, we find (when the color changes) *diversity in that which fills time*– irrespective of the degree of temporal extension and the temporal order. But we also find *identity* as the self-sameness of *what* "changes." This What remains within the higher genus "color," which establishes something in common that is determined in different ways. No matter how many divisions occur, each part, considered by itself, has its unity; and all of these unities (substrates) are of the same genus color, as is the total substrate grounded in them, while, on the other hand, the infima species of the partial unities are different. If we go to the limit, we have punctual divisions and punctual differences that no longer permit division within themselves and no longer permit the distinguishing of different species in the various parts.

(Color here must not be taken as the higher genus for *different species of color-quality* in the usual sense {understood as pure qualities, pure red, pure hue}, but rather for the *unity of what fills time*. We abstract from the magnitude of the temporal extension, from the distinctions in the degree of magnitude that differing temporal extension or division within temporal extension produces: there remains left over for us the *temporal filling* as unity {as somehow temporally extended}. Time also exists here, but the time in its magnitude is not what matters in this case. The situation is similar to that of the "coloring" of a spatial extension.)

If we divide the fillings according to their temporal extension, then, in the case of continuous change, we find again and again an equality as far as the universal genus is concerned – we always find coloring; on the other hand, we find diversity – we again and again find a different ⟨coloring⟩. But not merely the universal that there is always coloring – that would even be true in the case [248]

of a "sudden transition in color"; there rather exists a *qualitative continuity* – there is no sudden transition in any part.[13]

Still, a sameness does exist: Fillings, however they may be separated in time, show a similarity, and within the similarity show relations of comparison that need not go hand in hand with temporal relations of comparison; they also show relations of order. This would require further description.

In the case of a varying *rate of change,* unequal extents of time are "changed proportionately" in quality; these unequal temporal extents differ in quality but nevertheless have an identity. Equal division in this continuity is different from equal division in the temporal continuity, although a division in the one continuity always takes place together with a division in the other.

Sudden transitions:

1) sudden transitions between two durations;

2) sudden transitions between two continuous changes that do not join together to form the unity of one *continuous* change;

3) sudden transitions from a constancy to a continuous change or vice versa.

Swiftness and slowness of the continuous gradation in quality. The slower the gradation in quality, the greater the similarity to a qualitative constancy (an unchanging quality); qualitative constancy is the limiting case of continuous gradation in quality.

Towards the Clarification of the Distinction between Substrate and Filling[14]

If we reflect on the temporal extent and if we consider it as a whole, as a form across which the content spreads itself, then the filling spreading itself is nothing other than the *continuum of*

[13] Husserl subsequently made the following annotation: "Missing here is the definition (clarification) of the concept of 'sudden transition' [*Sprung*]." This note might have been introduced even later than the lines about "sudden transitions" that follow – lines, to be sure, that themselves possibly represent a later addition to the text. – Editor's note.

[14] The paragraph following this heading was added later by Husserl in the margin of the preceding text. – Editor's note.

substrates that belong to the temporal parts set off in the flowing and, ultimately, to the temporal moments. Thus we also have to say: Momentary substrates (which are the limit of extensions of substrates), when they fulfill the conditions of a certain continuity of contents (therefore substrate-continuity) within a continuous temporal succession, constitute *one* substrate, which is not itself the continuum of these momentary-substrates but extends throughout them and in this way *lasts* for that extent of time. [249]

The "Species Belonging to Time" (a) – *the Species Belonging to That Which Fills Time* (b)

Phenomenologically:

Concerning b), I find *several moments* that I call "*white*" in my field of vision; they have something specifically in common. The visual field – we assume here that our eye remains at rest – ⟨is⟩ a phenomenological duration-unity. It is "seized" as an unchanging unity in the consciousness of unity. On or in it I find *a white* and then find *a white again*. Each is apprehended at a different "time" within the extent of the duration but is not meant along with this time; instead, both are meant as duration-*unities*. Now the duration does not matter; both whites are "specifically identical": unity in identification. Each is individually different: this is a different white from that one. Each has a different "place" in the field of vision: each part of the field of vision is different, and these parts have a certain ordered connection. I can say that a part "shifts *its* place" in the field of vision. There, in the visual field, the part has, in addition to its color, its "*shape,*" which again is something that can be apprehended specifically. This is an identity in change. Real change: In the alteration the same unity again and again has a different "location." But also change that is not real: I can *think* of a unity, consisting of shape and color, as now here, as now there (but in this case the individuality is no longer the same).

The temporal duration remains freely variable here. The white endures for a longer or shorter time; it changes, more swiftly or more slowly, in a greater or smaller extent of time.

Concerning a) and b): *Temporal extension* is a *determination of what is extended,* of what "fills" time. What is identical in time is

the *individual.* The universal common to different individuals is the species, the internal (constitutive) determination of the individual, that which this individual can have in common with others: *independently of time.* [250]

The individual is indeed that which is identical in time and is therefore the unity that the temporal filling grounds independently of temporal extension. What is constitutive of the individual is therefore inherent in *what is identical in the temporal filling,* and consequently there emerges the concept of the *species belonging to the constitutive determinations* that different individuals can have in common in the same or in different extents of time. Therefore:

α) what is identical *in* time, what is continuously identical in the temporal flow;

β) what is identical in *species* is what is identical in the *specification* that posits "what is common" to different individuals.

Concerning b). But what about the *temporal determinations* that are nevertheless *universalities?* Identification can concern the *content* of two individuals; this gives the constitutive species (real species). But it can also concern the individuals with respect to their "*temporal form,*" their temporal extension; both of them can fill *the same* extent of time – they are simultaneous.

The extent of time is not there twice, whereas what fills that same extent of time can be there twice, as perfectly alike (specifically identical) in the two cases. Of course, since time does not belong to their constitutive content, the individuals do not "coalesce" when they are simultaneous. The extent of time is something abstract. It is necessarily the temporal extent of some individuality or other. But it is not an individual moment and it is not something to be duplicated, not something to be specified. *It is not individual.* Individuality is *in* it, and necessarily in it. Assume that a single extent of time taken *in abstracto* (which, of course, presupposes an individuality that fills it and from which it is abstracted) is filled by a single instance of the species color, and that by virtue of being so filled, *individuates* this species – well, the *extent of time does not constitute individuality* in this way. For several individual cases of color can fill the *same* extent of time.

The identity proper to the extent of time is *an identical moment belonging to a plurality of individuals,* but not something specific multiplied in the individuals (all of which fill this same time). The [251] consciousness of plurality is excluded here.

Time can be specified as follows, therefore: different extents of time can be *equal* and *unequal* in the identical unity of one encompassing extent of time – genus: temporal magnitude, temporal extent; species of the temporal magnitudes. The temporal extensions of individuals and of moments constitutive of individuals also possess species with regard to *duration* and *change:* speed, acceleration, and so on. We can take and specify in unity the *temporal filling together with* its time.

Spatial Species

What about "*space*"? The *sensuous quality* can be *given repeatedly* in the unity of a phenomenological – pre-empirical – extension. But the *part of space* can be given only once. The ultimate specific difference of the sensuous quality can be duplicated; but the place, the extension that a quality fills, cannot be duplicated. The extension is *something never repeatable* and yet something *abstract.* How is one sensuous quality distinguished from another completely equivalent to it in species, when both belong to the same concrete extended unity that endures without changing? By means of the parts of the extension, by means of the "*places.*" They are spatially different. But the parts of the extension, or the places, are not distinguished by means of the colors, which are indeed the same! The place can never be overlayed at one and the same time by two (*visual* or *tactile*) qualities belonging to the same genus – whether by two *equivalent* or by two *different* qualities. If the species of the quality is determined and if the place is determined, then (for the time being, within the unity of an encompassing enduring spatial concretion) the *concrete individual part* is determined.

The place "makes" the infima species of quality into an individual quality. The place is the *determination that determines individually.*

Two individuals can exist within the same *duration;* place and quality (spatial form and spatial filling) belong to their constitu-

tive content. But two *places* within one and the same duration belong to one "*space.*" In lieu of "place," the following would be a better way of putting it: Two *never-repeatable extensions* belong to a single never-repeatable extension that embraces them [252] as parts; specifically, as exclusive parts, if the individuals are separated.[15]

Such never-repeatable extensions are always extensions *of something*; taken *in abstracto*, they are the *ultimate forms of what is incapable of being repeated*, single cases that cannot be multiplied in a duration. These never-repeatable extensions (spatial individuals, as it were) can be compared, specified; the *spatial species* grow up: the genera extension, magnitude, figure, etc.

The Spatial Individual

There is, in addition, an identification that elevates the identity of the individual above the *absolute place*. The *spatial individual* is *that which remains identical while the place varies,* that which is identical in the change of place (change, no matter what the temporal change). If the spatial filling is preserved in its identity (in its species) and if it *moves* while what is specific in the filled spatial form (shape) is preserved, then the spatial individual is the same. We can also *disregard* the spatial filling – that which is identical, therefore, in the change of place. The constitutive content is: specific shape and specific qualities. The individual is that which is always determined as specifically the same and that which changes its absolute location. There is, of course, no qualitative individual; the possibility of the spatial individual depends on the peculiarities of space and time.[16]

If I disregard the filling content, then ⟨the⟩ spatial individual is a *fixed* spatial thing or "geometric" body. If I retain the *filling* content, then I have a fixed body = what is identical in the change of place.[17]

There is no space in the *tonal field.* Two tones, identical in species, can occur only at different times. In a given time there is

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[15] I say "never-repeatable" extensions here – that is, *individual* extensions, extensions of (possible?) determinate single individuals, or the lowest possible abstracta of extension.

[16] Compare *Kant's* space and time arguments!

[17] The last paragraph was added later to the foregoing. – Editor's note.

only one tone with the same specific determination. Here there is *simultaneity* only of *what is different,* and even that is transformed into a unity, into a fusion. Tones do not constitute [253] sensuous physical things; they are only *awakened* by these and are only *indirectly included* in them and in the space in which they are "propagated." –

As far as possible, we have tried to proceed phenomenologically up to this point. (Of course, everything is in need of checking in this respect.) Are temporality and spatiality, provided they are understood phenomenologically and not empirically – that is, not as transcendent temporality and spatiality – actually complete principles of individuation? How is the step from the phenomenological to the empirical to be taken? And above all: How is the individuality of the *Ego* and of "its" phenomena – of its sensuous appearances and of its psychic experiences in the narrower sense – related to phenomenological individuality? It is difficult, of course, to say what makes up the phenomenological content of the "Ego" here.

⟨*No. 36. On the*⟩ *Seefeld Reflection.* ⟨*The Typical, the Mathematical, and the Unity of the Temporal Object*⟩[18]

I perceive this brown; I carry out phenomenological reduction, therefore take the pure datum of sensation just as it is given phenomenologically, as "now" *enduring. It* – this *brown* – endures: it abides without changing; it always has the same extension throughout its duration. It changes: it – this brown – changes in quality, in brightness (it becomes darker); its extension changes – *the* extension that it fills, that it covers.

We presuppose that what is in question here is a *perception.* To what extent are absolute certainties inherent in it – that is, in the *phenomenological* perception? If the perception is one in which I find the brown enduring without changing, do I have and can I have absolute certainty that the brown is unchanged in quality, brightness, extension – in all of these moments or in one

[18] The very circumstance that this sketch is superscribed by Husserl himself with the words "Seefeld Reflection" and that the superscription was not added at a later date indicates in any event that the sketch was written later than No. 35. – Editor's note.

of them – or that the extension is constantly the same unchanging extension?

In perception we have the perceived, just as it is perceived, [254] given with evidence. That the perceived does not change or, on the other hand (in the contrary case), that it is something changing – that from phase to phase or from duration-part to duration-part it is one or the other – presupposes division and comparison. We will be able to say that the *type* "constancy" and the *type* "change" can be grasped before the division – specifically, by means of the comparison of similar cases – and that the one type becomes separated from the other in evidence.

It belongs to the type (to the essence of the type) "constancy" that "any" division has the result that the parts distinguished are themselves once again of the type "constancy" and are therefore "the same" as far as their content is concerned; or it has the result – when the temporal parts are selected so that each part is equivalent to the others (and every duration can be divided into equal parts) – that the filled parts are merely repetitions in relation to one another. It belongs to the type "change" that unlike concreta correspond to equal temporal parts. *How* unlike, and which types of unlikeness are possible here, would still have to be considered *a priori.*

I speak of the *type* "constancy" and of the *type* "change." If I remain in the order of the typical, then I will have to speak of the type "same duration," of the type "difference of temporal objects in the same duration" or "the same duration with different fillings of the duration"; on the other hand, I will have to speak of the type "the same duration with the same fillings of the duration" or "equivalent temporal objects, equivalent with regard to duration and filling." Then in the case of difference I will have to say: Temporal objects that endure for the same amount of time or fill the same duration are different; they are the same with respect to their extension but different with respect to the qualitative filling of this ("spatial") extension. They are perfectly alike with respect to quality in the narrower sense but changing with respect to their intensity (brightness, etc.).

These would be *typical* occurrences above all. Therefore we would not speak of a temporal division *in infinitum* here but say

only that division is a typical occurrence and that to this occurrence belong the types: division in terms of what is the same and division in terms of what is different.

However, [let us examine] beforehand the cases of comparison of several temporal objects and the corresponding typical forms of unity.

In the typical relationship "longer-shorter" (or the relationship in which one thing is relatively long and the other relatively short: in their being-together), we always find two temporal objects with respect to duration. Or: Before two "temporal magnitudes" given undividedly in the unity of one perception are put into relation, there belongs to them a typical sensuous unity, the unity which is the foundation of the difference of the "temporal magnitudes" and to which the relationships "a longer than b" and "b shorter than a" belong. There belongs to this type of sensuous unity a gradation that brings it near and continuously allows it to pass over into the unity-type "equality understood as equality of temporal magnitudes." Obviously these occurrences are then passed on to the parts, resulting from a division, that belong to some temporal extent or other. [255]

The following stands in essential connection with the typical occurrence of division: Every temporal object has a duration, as they say. But in the type that is duration we have a distinction between the expanding, flowing durations and the momentary durations; and we have this distinction before the attempts at division. This is, as it were, a qualitative distinction in the total-type. Correlatively expressed: the expanding or flowing duration – the momentary duration, the lightning-like.

Of course, relations and relational occurrences, or types of founding forms of sensuous unity, are involved here as well. An expanding duration can expand for a longer time or shorter time, or two expanding durations can expand for the same length of time. They have equal temporal durations. All of the extensions that form a group of equivalent extensions have the same temporal magnitude or extent (the same difference in extent for all). On the other hand, momentary durations, moments, have no temporal magnitude, no extension, although, for all that, we do find gradual distinctions in their case as well. Even here we speak, as we do universally in cases of augmentation, of "magnitude,"

of greater or smaller. Even here, with our conceptual classes formed, we are able to think of the same "magnitude." But we cannot speak of stretches, of extensions.

Divisibility belongs to the essence of phenomenological extensions, stretches. Yet one cannot say that, with division, extended sections must always break down again into extended sections; [in this process] we finally come to *moments*. Every extended section can be divided into a greater or smaller number of [256] moments, depending on whether the moments are greater or smaller. On the other hand, a gradation of moments leads over into extended sections. Small stretches do still present themselves as extensions but are closely connected with moments, and the gradation that allows the separation of greater and shorter moments leads over – in the direction of the expansion of the moment – into small stretches. Finally, we still have to treat the *quasi*-qualitative distinction between the long and the short outside a comparison or combination of what they have in common as sensuous moments, at least in the case of extensions. Moments surely are classified as "short" here, but we must ask to what extent a hidden intentionality plays a part in the comparison.

Now, how does the typical lead us over into the *sphere of ideas,* into the pure limit-concepts of a mathematical sort: the mathematical point, mathematical lengths or straight lines, division *in infinitum?* Humean problems.

But let us return to the Seefeld problems.

The brown – what is it really? Is it the species? Then we would have to ask: How is the "species" related to the mathematical and typical occurrences making their appearance here? Obviously the concept presupposes the same process of mathematization; exactly and logically understood, it is a mathematical limit-concept. We do indeed distinguish between what is the same in type, by which we mean total equality of type, and equality of type in different "respects"; we then acquire, as limit-concepts, the exact equalities and the exact universal or essence, the concrete or abstract universal or essence – all understood exactly and logically. For *logic* is the sphere of the ideal and not of the merely typical. But we reduce *these ideas* again in the mathematical attitude. That is to say, concrete parts correspond to the

temporal division; specifically, concreta that have or are a mathematical extent of time and a mathematical extent that is filled. And the mathematization here stands in contrast to what is exactly the same in temporal form and what is exactly the same in temporal filling. The division *in infinitum* leads to indivisible points of time as limits, and these points have "no magnitude"; they are mathematically indivisible as magnitudes (they are just points) and have their magnitude in this punctuality. The punctual filling belongs to these points as corresponding limit-concept – that is to say, as the species of what fills a point; and this punctual residuum of the concretum breaks down, as every [257] extended concretum does, into its abstract "moments," into the different species of color, intensity, extension, or whatever else may come into consideration in connection with the contents in question.

Now if we have these mathematizations already behind us and if we apprehend the given sensuous data along with such ideal concepts, then we have to say: *The brown* is not the species, either the punctual species that belongs to the points of an extent of time (the points of the duration) or the species of the concrete duration-filling, which is apprehended in mathematization as the continuous fusion of the punctual series in their order conforming to the points of the duration. *The brown* is not the concrete *individual* either. The brown as punctual phase of the duration does not endure, and the continuum of brown-moments in the continuum of time-points does not endure; the temporal extent is rather filled out in a definite order with the punctual fillings: precisely point by point. The temporal extent is not properly called *duration* with respect to these fillings. *The brown* endures and is extended throughout this time and in its duration is continually *the same* – throughout all points and throughout all fillings of these points, which as temporally different are themselves different. Ideally, I can divide the temporal extent, the time of the enduring, and each part then has its fillings; but not only that: each part has its color (its brown) that endures throughout the part, throughout the part's temporal extent, which says again that the same thing, the same color, exists throughout all the filling contents.

Moreover, depending on the circumstances, the *brown* may be

something that "itself" changes; or it may be something that does not change, something that remains constantly the same. The identity of which we have spoken is therefore not the identity of the species that perhaps connects all the parts and points of the duration. That concerns the case of constancy. But even in the case of constancy, we certainly must see that we find, opposed to the identity of the species as something different from it, the identity of what endures; what endures "remains the same" in all points of time, that is, extends throughout different but, with respect to the species, identical fillings. But we must also see that in the case of change, that which "itself" changes is one and the same throughout the entire change; it is the one objective something, the one "color," the one brown that [258] changes and in changing is something different in each point of time. But that seems to be a contradiction. What we call the one brown, namely, the one something that is changing, is here precisely not the brown filling of the time-point but something that presents itself in the brown filling, so to speak – something identical that is the same in ever new fillings and is what it is only as existing in such ordered temporal fillings.

The brown, one could say, is the one and self-identical something that "appears" in the continuous and manifold brown-"appearances" (in the fillings of the time-phases) and that, as "unity of appearance," also runs throughout the concrete parts of the filled duration. We have a continuous consciousness of unity whose correlate is an unbroken unity, an identity in the continuity of time, something identical in the continuous flow of time and in the continuous flow of what fills time. In another case, we have an interrupted consciousness in the separation of the concrete parts of time or of the parts of the filled time. In the case of such an interrupted consciousness, we have a plurality of similar unities, which, however, do not join together in the manner of a sum to make up the unity of a whole. Rather, because this division concerns a unity – namely, cuts up the unity's filled extent of time – it brings out the unities belonging to this temporal extent, unities *in* which the total unity exists in a certain way.

The brown of this and the brown of that part of the extent of time are different, since they belong to different extents of time;

but since they continuously fill one extent of time in a certain way, it is "*one* object" that endures, one and the same thing that *lasts* throughout this entire extent of time.

I said, "fill in a certain way." Namely, in one sense we have a filling for each point of time and for each extent of time; and what fills the extent of time is the continuous sum of what fills the points of time belonging to this extent and also the sum of what fills the partial extensions belonging to any disjunctive division. In the other sense, we call that which endures and only manifests itself or appears in the filling, that which continues to exist (*lasts*) throughout the multiplicity of filling and also appears as filling time, as continuously existing in time, as precisely *lasting* in time – that, we say, is what we call the unity of the temporal object.

Or we also distinguish: [259]

1) the *temporal object,* that which endures, that which exists in time and continuously lasts throughout time;

2) the temporal filling that *spreads* itself out, the *spread of brown* understood as the unity that is cut into little pieces according to time such that each piece is different from the others.

The spread of brown does not *endure.* It is an extent of time that is continuously filled up, covered over, with brown. But something identical – the temporal object – shows itself throughout such a spread of time.

Correlatively, the continuous consciousness of unity or identity, which we have as the consciousness that "something endures" (a color, a sound endures), must be distinguished from the consciousness of a *whole* made up of moments continuously arranged next to one another in time. Both belong together, are inseparably united, but it requires different directions of regard in order to grasp thematically the unity or the whole. The temporal object is that which spreads itself out, not the spread; or it is that which *persists* in time.

What belongs to the possibility of the constitution of such an abiding object (of *something real in time*)? A continuum of time-fillings; more clearly: What we find necessary to unity in our example is that the brown does not pass over into another brown discontinuously, or certainly not into a blue, etc. If it did, there would no longer be any transition on hand at all.

⟨*No. 37.*⟩ *The Temporal Object*

I have a *phenomenon* "*brown,*" or, let us say, a sensuous *datum* taken in full concreteness. It *persists* (*endures* in the sense of *something persisting*); it is a unity belonging to a constancy or a change. It persists, unchanged with respect to its quality, intensity, extension (*quasi*-spatial); or it changes with respect to its quality, intensity, extension.

Can one also say: *The quality* – or the intensity, the extension – *persists* –? *One says:* The quality remains unchanged, then it changes, etc. The magnitude and shape (the spatial corporeality) remains unchanged or changes.

If I focus my attention on the quality, I grasp its identity with [260] itself in change or constancy. I carry out no "*ideating* abstraction"; I do not grasp the pure essence but the individual unity that runs throughout this temporal continuity of quality. Is this the case for each of the moments? If I focus my attention on the extension, on the spatial corporeality, it may, for example, remain unchanged and then become deformed, etc. Likewise, I focus my attention on the intensity and speak similarly about it. On the other hand, the moments do not stand on the same footing; they are moments in the total unity that continuously endures.

This concrete tone-datum is given (constituted) as enduring. *It* remains unchanged; and "implicit in remaining unchanged" is the fact that it does not change *with respect to* all of its moments, and again implicit in this is the fact that each of these moments is in itself something that persists, but *not something self-sufficient*.

The concrete unity is the substrate, the principal substrate; it bears in itself the "property"-substrates. Its being, which is to be abiding, "*is*" in the properties whose being is again to be abiding, but to be abiding in the manner of properties that only exist as properties of something. The something, however, is a unity that is the unity of all properties; it is not a combination of objects but a multiplicity in the being of the abiding substrate, which exists precisely *in* the persisting properties. Thus the persisting of the property assumes a particular sense by virtue of its non-self-sufficiency. This non-self-sufficiency, on the other hand, is

surely not non-self-sufficiency in (so to speak) an external sense, according to which some law requires for the being of one thing the being of another thing belonging to some correlative genus or species. The non-self-sufficiency that concrete individuals have in connection with other concrete ⟨individuals⟩ is entirely different from the non-self-sufficiency of properties. Properties are substrate-objects, but they are productions of a substrate that lives and moves in them, so to speak, and is what it is only in them.

But now, in addition, we take note of essential differences in the sequence of steps in the successive grounding of the moments that appear here as summarized under the title "properties."

In the example of the "tone-datum" as a substrate-unity, we distinguish the *duration,* which is not a property in the true sense (the duration itself does not endure, does not persist), from the [261] properties that, in conformity with their essences, do endure, or from the whole *essence proper to* the abiding object. What does this distinction between object and proper essence signify?

Honestly speaking, either it is a merely verbal distinction, that is, the object itself *is* identically the same as what is here called its proper essence; namely, the proper essence is what persists in the duration. Or it signifies the fusion of the essences of the properties (the fused whole) and accordingly expresses the "object," the temporal object as unity of its properties. Or it expresses the *eidetic* essence that many temporal objects can have identically in common and that becomes singularized in them. The particular individual being (the singularization of the εἶδος) is the temporal object itself. It itself is that which persists; and it persists precisely in the manner mentioned above – that is, in such a way that components can be distinguished in it, components that are therefore abiding. And since they are joined together (but not combined; they do remain differentiated) to make up the unity of something that persists, this persisting something, the concrete individual temporal object, exists *in* the abiding properties; it is spread out in them and yet in its being transcends each of them. And conversely: The properties are not only necessarily combined in the individual temporal object, but they also exist because the temporal object exists – exists in them as having such and such properties.

But let us return to the tone-datum.

It exists in its tonal quality, intensity, timbre, etc. – but these properties are not on an equal footing. We say that the quality – c, for example – is more or less intensive; we say that c has a certain intensity, and perhaps a varying one. But we do not say that the intensity has a quality, and perhaps a varying quality. (If one quality steadily passes over into another quality, then the intensity may remain constantly the same. But we do not say and we do not see that an abiding intensity is variously qualified, as we do see, conversely, that an abiding quality assumes different intensities or changes in *its* intensity.) The situation is the same in the case of timbre and other determinations, which ⟨are⟩ always ⟨related to⟩ the quality understood as fundamental property. The latter is only determined more closely in such determinations [262] without thereby having to undergo changes itself (namely, as quality).

If we take as another example a color-datum, then something similar is true of the quality "color," and more precisely, of the quality "red" and the like. But what about the spatial (or *quasi*-spatial) *extension?* Obviously spatial extension is again in a different position. ⟨The space⟩ individualizes that which is extended in the extension.

The color-datum is extended, just as it has a color-quality with intensity, etc. The extension belongs as a "property" to the color-datum (as an abiding datum), but it does not belong to the quality in the way in which an intensity belongs to the quality, etc. The characters grouping themselves around the quality as *its* determinations present a relatively concrete unity, which as a whole "extends," spreads, communicates itself, stretches, expands over the extension. Each part has its particular quality and therefore its particular intensity as well, etc.; and the whole extension has *one quality (a unity of qualification)* to which the *unity of a total intensity* and of a total property in every other qualitative respect belongs. –

How does the continuity become a theme? How, running through the continuity itself, can I regard it thematically? I run through a process in memory – the sequence of changes in an object, for example – but I hold each phase, each continuum of phases, the whole continuity belonging to the succession, firmly

in my grip. And thus in each moment I have in my grip, simultaneously and in "coexistence," a continuum; only in each now there is something different – namely, the old together with the new extensions. If I am finished, I have the whole in my grip in the now and I have it as my theme. Even if I had not made the process of change into a theme, I can reflect in memory and direct myself towards it and cause the process to be produced again memorially in a productive recollection; in doing this, I obtain a continuous series of coexistence-continua, which, in growing continuously, make the theme come into being again originally. To be sure, I do not have the continuous succession (meant concretely), the process, given simultaneously in one point of time and in one extent of time as an extended present, as I do in the case of spatial extension (of a filled extension). But I do have given, extended in a present, the continuum of pasts as pasts; and I have it given in the way in which something of that [263] sort can be given. A certain analogy with a ⟨co⟩existing continuity (a spatial continuity) is available, since the continuum of pasts too ⟨is⟩ meant, and meant in a certain originality, in the now and in an extent of time – continuously meant throughout them (in a certain sense, persistently meant throughout them). Conversely, a continuum and any sort of plurality or change can be given in "explicit" form only by being run through, and therefore can only be given successively. The grasping of a single particular, the putting-in-relation, the taking-together, and so on, are carried out in succession on the ground of inexplicit coexistence.

The unity of the continuous succession of temporal contents; the unity of the *temporal succession of the phases* of the temporal object; the temporal succession itself as *form* of the being of the temporal object; the being of the temporal object is a being-in-succession of "object-points," which form a continuum by virtue of this continuous form of being –:

What do we mean by "*phases*"? The unity of the object as an abiding object is the unity of a continuous form, and we can focus our attention on the unity and on the parts of this form. Corresponding to the parts, we find non-self-sufficient objects that are the unities belonging to the continuous form's partial forms in such a way that the object of the total duration exists *in*

these parts and, in its own way, is composed of them. The continuous succession of these component unities is a succession in which objects are combined. The *unity* of the object belonging to the total duration, however, is not only the unity of a combination; it is also a unity that extends throughout the unbroken continuity (fusion) of phases, exists in each phase and draws sustenance from each phase, enriching the content of its being. But the unity itself ⟨is⟩ not the bare continuous succession of phases (and of concrete parts that are being built up from phases or that can be picked out from the continuous whole by means of division). If I run through time following the objective content, I have an objective continuity. The unity of the temporal object extends throughout this continuity, but the continuity is not the theme. If I live in the stream of time, the objective continuity (the process) does flow on, but it is not the theme. The unity of the temporal object and the objective continuity exist inseparably.

Hence the extension of spatial concepts to temporality: the [264] apprehension of time in the image of a line, of a duration in the image of a section of a line, together with which the one-dimensional order in time also finds its pictorialization. Conversely, in the case of a series in coexistence, we speak of a succession of points – of a continuous succession of colors, of shades of color: temporal concepts carrying over into coexistence, therefore.

A *temporal series* has *unity* in itself if what runs off in temporal succession fulfills certain conditions; if [for example] what runs off in succession shows a certain continuity in content and has the mode of continuous transition that, fixed in a constantly enduring regard, possesses the analogy with the continuum of coexistence that we discussed above. The unity is the unity of the identical substrate for this continuum, understood as *process*.

Verbatim from the Seefeld sheet:

In one case, we have a continuous consciousness of *unity;* and it yields (the substrate as) *unbroken* and, properly speaking, even indivisible unity, something identical in the continuity of time:

that which is identical in the continuous flow of time. In the other case (the case of the division of the enduring brown's temporal extension), we have a consciousness that is broken up, divided into pieces; and with the separation of the parts, we have a *plurality* of *unities* in the foregoing sense. These unities are not added up or taken together to form the unity of the enduring substrate brown, the unity of the brown that belongs to the total extension.[19] We rather have these two very different things: on the one hand, in an undivided running-through, the consciousness of unbroken unity; on the other hand, division and the consciousness of multiple unities corresponding to the divisions. If we annul the division again, so to speak, we acquire the substrate of the total extension; and since the total extension is divided and the bringing-about of the ordered succession of apprehensions of the partial unities essentially "coincides" with the bringing-about of the unbroken consciousness, the total substrate also coincides with the partial substrates, but not in such a way that it is divided into pieces with them. Living in the continuous running-through, [265] living continuously in the enduring consciousness, I have in each moment what endures. And in each moment what endures *is* identical with the substrate belonging to the corresponding part, but in no moment is it the sum of elapsed substrates. The brown of this and the brown of that part of the duration in question are different substrates; but since they continuously fill *one* extent of time, it is *one* substrate, *one* enduring something that runs throughout this extent of time and its substrates.

"The pervasive consciousness of identity must not be confused with the entirely different consciousness of a *whole* made up of moments that continuously fall into sequence with one another in time (or without division: the consciousness of a continuous flow). Living in the consciousness of identity, we constantly have *one* thing in the continuous flow of the filled time. The temporal object is not the extension, the *flow,* but *that which* is extended. But evidently we can make the extension itself into an object, divide it and differentiate it. The continuity of the brown-

[19] Compare the preceding, from the heading "Verbatim from the Seefelder sheet" on, with No. 35, p. 248, lines 28–37. Husserl has placed what follows above in square brackets, which end after "substrates" on line 22. – Editor's note.

extension with its brown-moments is *permeated throughout* by the unity of the identical substrate."[20]

⟨*No. 38.*⟩ *Objection to This Whole Seefeld Way of Considering Things*

A *color* appears and endures. It does not change for a time; then it changes. A tone sounds for a time. It remains unchanged for awhile; then it changes – it becomes another tone, changes into a second tone or steadily changes into ever new tones. It would be better to say in this case that tone c constantly remains tone c, and then it changes into a peculiarly *sliding* phenomenon, into a flow of quality; and if occasion should arise, it can change into a new sliding tone-phenomenon – say, into h.

Let us look at the typical occurrences here somewhat more closely. All temporal extents continuously filled with *tonal* content furnish us with *concreta*[21] that have a universal community of type; we call these concreta *tonal phenomena.* All extents [266] continuously filled with tonal content – extents that in the partitioning of time into equal temporal parts are equivalent in the sense of mere "*repetition,*" as further analysis shows – have in common a typical essence of a particular sort that yields an original equality prior to analysis. Each such individual concretum we call *the same tone,* a tone-individual *of the same material essence;* and two such tones are said to be *identical in content.* At most, then, they are *distinguished* by their *location* and by their temporal magnitude (or temporal duration). Two individual concrete tones of the same duration signify tones of the same concrete essence; they are different merely ⟨in their⟩ temporal positions. (Yet we may also say, if the occasion should arise, that two tones are mere repetitions of the same tone, only at a different location *and* with a different temporal duration.)

In the content, however, the *quality in the specific sense* is isolated from the other moments of content. In ordinary lan-

[20] Compare the preceding paragraph, which Husserl put in quotation marks, with No. 35, p. 249, lines 16–26. – Editor's note.

[21] It is probably better if I proceed from examples, from so-called tones that are taken in full concreteness; sensuous concreta – e.g., tonal concreta and concrete tonal individuals.

guage, the same tone, apart from determinations of temporal magnitude and location, is not the same in concrete content (that is, in the indicated abstraction from those temporal determinations that remain variable). We rather speak of the same tone – the same tone, only repeated – in connection with a plurality of tones in cases in which we merely mean that one is loud or louder and another soft or softer, or that one has the timbre of the violin and another the timbre of the flute.[22]

In such cases, an identical essence makes its appearance in the content as determining or as that which makes up the *quale* in the distinguishing sense. From different points of view, however, the *quale* has varying determining parts. The *quale* only becomes concrete through the fixing of these parts while it remains identical during their change.

This *quale* has its genus (the genus: tone quality, color quality). But it becomes separated further; or rather, the whole presentation comes to vacillate. Does not what was stated above refer to the cases in which division again and again yields equal concrete parts? Can one acquire a concept of *quale* otherwise?

If we proceed from the type of extensions that are continually [267] qualified in the same way, they are reduced mathematically to continua of time-points of the same quality; and quality is a punctual concept. What is extended does not have a quality but a qualification – a coloration, a tonality built up out of punctual qualities; or the concretum is a unity fused from quality-points, or, rather, from time-points with their "concrete" temporal filling.

The *qualification* in the wider sense of quality (not the *quale* in the specific sense) is *isotropic* – point by point constantly the same – or *anisotropic*. If we start from any "place," any moment or concrete part of the filled temporal extent, and run through the neighbouring moments and concrete parts, then everything flows away in the sense of coincidence, of equivalence; or it does not continually flow away in this sense. If I begin with tone c, which is continuously the same for an extent of time – that is, the same in its concrete essence and even in its species of quality –

[22] We therefore have the same tone: a) when the full concrete essence is identical (the location different); b) when the "content" is the same and only the temporal duration is different; c) when the distinguishing essence, which here means the quality, is identical.

then tone c "itself changes; as the tone advances, the species is no longer the same but different, and different again and again. *The tone c* changes – it remains the same. It endures; it lasts. The quality remains the same; I experience "the same" in the unbroken coinciding in quality.[23] –

The individual object: It has its *own concrete essence,* which is "built up" from "constitutive" moments, from properties, or which becomes separated "by abstraction" into such moments or properties. It "*has*" its concrete essence; it itself is the individuation of this essence. A place in time, a *location,* belongs to it; and a *duration* belongs to it too, and in conformity with the duration, a continuous *succession* of the object's essence: a process belongs to it. It exists as a unity of something that is in the process of going forward; it exists as enduring.

Every object has its content and form; or it *is* the content, but only as content of the form.

Now how does the old theory of *self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient contents* stand in relation to all these statements about constitutive contents, properties, etc.? Does it make sense [268] beyond the sphere of the *essence* proper, that is, beyond the sphere of the individual essence? *Location* is surely not a non-self-sufficient content (as if it were an "objective moment" in the proper sense). On the other hand, do we not have different universal time-determinations along with genus and species? At present, everything remains unclear here. This must be one of our next themes! –

Can one think of objects as built up from moments? As if a combination of fusion of moments would be non-self-sufficient until a final moment joins those already there.

Must we proceed according to this schema in which ultimately each such "final" moment would be individualizing, or is it not rather a false schema?

Self-sufficient is that which can exist by itself, independently of anything else: without being completed or supplemented by some

[23] Husserl later added the following remark to this text: "To the Seefeld sheet: Objects of a higher level – a melody does *not* change; it endures for such and such a length of time; it endures while it *unfolds,* as ever new tones continually make their appearance." See No. 35, p. 250, lines 3–6. – Editor's note.

other thing. To what extent is that a meaningful way of representing things?

Is temporal duration a moment about which I can ask whether it can or cannot exist by itself?

And what about place and spatial extension, understood as form over against content?

Concept of "*form.*"

⟨IV. [269]
ON THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SCHEMA: APPREHENSION-CONTENT – APPREHENSION⟩[1]

⟨*No. 39.*⟩ *Time in Perception*[2]

We direct our attention to some important points common to both *presenting* and *nonpresenting* perception (to the perception of something really immanent, as we have hitherto understood it), and to the variations that then arise from the differing nature of these perceptions. Perception, whether presenting or not, aims at an object "in person," and this object is *something individual.* We can add – at least with respect to the types of perception we have distinguished – that the individual object is always a *unity, a unity over against a multiplicity.* But at first hearing, this is obscure. We prefer to say: The individual, which it is the function of perception to bring to presentation "in person," is a *temporal unity.*

The individual is necessarily either an individual "thing" or an individual "process." The individual is a thing, a thing that *endures* and *fills out* the temporal duration, *its* duration, with its [270] thing-content; and sometimes it fills it out in the manner of

[1] Beginning of 1907 to the beginning of 1909. – Editor's note.

[2] This sketch, titled by Husserl himself, was taken by the editor from the manuscript of the lectures Husserl gave at Göttingen University in the winter term 1906/07 under the title *Einführung in die Logik und Erkenntniskritik* [Introduction to logic and epistemology]. The first part of the lecture manuscript is in the Husserl-Archives under the catalogue numbers F I 25, F I 16 (in the first part), and F I 10; as for the second part, some pages are in F I 17 and further pages are in F I 7. Without making any essential changes in it, Husserl has obviously carried this second part over to the manuscript of the lectures he gave in the summer term of 1909 as the *Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis* [Introduction to the phenomenology of cognition] (F I 18, F I 17, and F I 7).

The section reproduced here comes from this second part of the lectures from the winter term of 1906/07. This part was first delivered at the beginning of 1907 and then repeated in 1909. In what follows, we record in footnotes the corrections and additions introduced here and there into the manuscript when the lectures were repeated in 1909. – Editor's note.

something changing and sometimes in the manner of something unchanging, of something at rest. Or the individual is a process, of which we again say – although in a markedly different sense – that it endures and in the duration is itself either constant or changing. We are considering the perceived as perceived in terms of these essential *temporal occurrences,* without which the perceived is inconceivable as a perceived individual.

For example: The thing is a unity; it endures, and endures as a unity in its temporal duration. We must differentiate the manifold phases in the temporal duration; each phase is a phase of the temporal existence of the thing. But *the thing* is not the plurality of phases, nor is it the continuity of phases; rather, it is *one and the same* thing that is precisely the same *throughout* its time, the same in *every phase.* The thing may remain *unchanged* throughout its duration; it may confer on each point of time, as the point's filling, a content that is perfectly like the content it bestows on every other point of time. But the thing is not the same merely in the sense of perfect likeness; on the contrary, *it,* the one *identical* thing, is always the same. This is also true in the case of change: since it changes over and over again, the one identical thing does *not* remain the same *qualitatively;* and yet it is *the same* thing. *One and the same thing* is apprehended – which, however *changes.*

Thus unity as opposed to multiplicity here signifies this *identity* to be grasped in the perception of the individual, an identity that we designate quite universally as the identity of the *thing* over against the continuous temporal multiplicity of the phases of the thing. Now this *continuity* can also be heeded, meant, and in this sense apprehended. It is a unity in a sense different from the thing; it is the unity of the continuity of phases. More precisely, it is the *thing's duration or change,* the concretely filled time itself throughout which the thing, as that which is identical in all phases, is extended, or in which it *lies* in its own way and from whose givenness it must evidently be drawn. On this side, obviously, lies what we call the *unity of the process,* by which we do not mean the *state of affairs that* the thing is at rest or is changing. The unity of the thing *to* which something happens, which is at rest or which changes in this or that form of change, belongs to the unity of the process. Given

the breadth with which the word *thing* is used here (we shall talk about that later), we do not need to distinguish the single thing and the complex of connected things. Even such a complex is something identical and unitary in time, collectively a "thing." [271]

But how far can we properly extend the use of the word "*thing*" and thus too the use of "*process,*" as well as the use of "*time,*" "*duration,*" "*rest,*" "*change*"? We have expressly said that we are talking not only about presenting but also about nonpresenting perceptions, not only about perceptions of something transcendent but also about adequate perceptions of something immanent – in short, about every kind of perception whose object is individual and unitary. Thus we are not just talking about thing-objects in the ordinary sense of natural objects. If we pass over to the more specific consideration of the situation in the case of the perception of something really immanent in which an individual, but not a natural object, comes to be given adequately, then not only will the more universal reference to thing-unity and temporal multiplicity be justified, but we will also soon realize that the *opposition of unity and multiplicity* gets *a new sense* that will lead us back to a deeper-lying stratum of occurrences belonging to the constituting consciousness.

Each cogitatio that we look at in reflection and that we take just as it becomes *absolutely given itself,* in the manner required by reduced Cartesian evidence, is given to us in real immanence. For example, *external perception* and the complex of presenting physical contents within it – the sensation-color, the sensation-sound, the sensation-roughness, and so on – are *given* to us *in this way* in phenomenological analysis, to the extent that we carry out such analysis in reflection. Let us take a tone-content as an example. We let the tone of the violin be heard. We do not, however, live in the hearing of the violin tone. We rather look at the *appearing-of-the-tone;* and in the appearing, we look at the tone as physical content just as it is in itself and under abstraction from *what* appears with it and stands before us in the manner appropriate to the external perception of a physical thing, understood as the product generated by running the bow across the strings of the violin in the realm of spatial reality. In other words, we abstract from that which the tone presents and take it *as sensation-tone.* If we do that, obviously we must say: In [272]

the perception of something really immanent in which this tone becomes given to us, the tone is a *unity in the flow of its time-phases*. The tone endures, and now it stands before me as unchanging in content and now as changing: e.g., its intensity fluctuates, it swells up and dies away again, or its so-called quality, its timbre, etc., change.

The tone, understood as this temporal unity, is an *adequately* given object. We can also say that it is an immanently given object, and in fact we have in it an example of what we call a *thing* in a more universal sense. It is a thing-datum in the immanent sphere – that is, given precisely as something enduring in time and in its duration given as *something identical* in time, whether it changes or remains constant. As something identical in time, it has its properties, the properties of quality, timbre, and intensity, which, for their part, remain constantly the same in the thing or which change continuously or discretely while it remains the same. Even the *properties* are unities in time, analogous in that respect to the very thing that has the properties. The *intensity* of the tone, let us say, endures, now swelling up and now fading away again; [then] it continues for a time without changing, and the like. The *tone* in its full concretion, standing out against its background as something self-contained, is the thing. The intensity, however, is the *intensity of the tone*. It *too* is a temporal unity, something identical in the continuity of its time-phases; but it is precisely the intensity *of the tone*. It is something non-self-sufficient, something *in* the tone, grasped in the adequate perception of the property as belonging to the tone. Unities that are of the kind these "properties" are have the characteristic that they evidently can exist, in a way specific to them, only in something else that precisely "has" them and that, for its part, is in itself or independent and not possessed in this specific sense by anything else. Of course, the property here, like the thing, is *something immanent* and distinct from what we call property in the sphere of nature and in the sphere of transcendence as a whole. But the words "thing" and "property" designate a common element on both sides – the descriptions given are mutually appropriate: Natural things just as immanent things are temporal unities that have properties but are not [273] themselves properties, and the properties are temporal unities

that point back to unities *in* which they exist, by which they are possessed. Again, the *perceptions* of the thing and of its properties are essentially connected. We will be tempted to say: *The same* perception presents itself, and at one time our attention is directed towards the identical thing, at another time towards this or that property of the thing. That is correct insofar as the properties are and remain unitary while our attention is focused on the thing; and conversely, the thing continually stands before me as a unity while our attention is focused on this or that unitary property. Perception [*Wahrnehmung*] in the full sense includes *heedfulness of* . . . , therefore more than mere perception [*Perzeption*], which can be connected with other attentional modes. (The word for perception = "*Wahrnehmung*" = "*Wahr*"-*nehmung* = "truly" grasping.)

Just as thing and property are mutually given, so the *unity of process* is also given in connection with both of them; unity of process is unity *of* the really filled time. But *eo ipso* there exists in the really filled time a *thing* that endures in it, and endures in it with its constituting *properties*. It is said of the *process itself* that it *endures* and changes. But the process has a duration in a sense *different* from the sense in which the thing-unity has a duration. The process is *filled duration,* but the thing is something *identical in each point of the duration,* in each phase of the filling. And if one says of the process that it ⟨too⟩ certainly exists in each point, then the being-in-a-point here is something essentially different from the being of the *thing* in this point. Each point contributes to the process, builds it up; but a point contributes nothing to the thing. On the contrary, the thing – the thing of this moment – is in the point wholly and completely. The process too is an identity, and we even say that the process remains continually the same with respect to its form, that it does not change. And we say that it does change, that it alters in its formation, becoming slower and then faster again. The process is also a unity and has its properties. But all of this is true in a sense essentially different from the sense in which it is true of the thing with its constitutive thing-properties. Connected with what we have said is the fact that evidently not all predicables of a thing can be treated alike; constitutive thing-properties and the determinations of the thing relating to its mode of change, to the form [274]

and the running-off of its change, are essentially different, for example.

On both sides – that is, both in the immanent and in the transcendent spheres of reality – *time* is *the irreducible form of individual realities* in their described modes. We apprehend the moment of temporality along *with* the perceived reality; and consequently we must say: When something[3] is now or when the duration is now, if the duration is the duration of something *immanently given,* then the temporal moment itself is immanently given; or again, it is transcendently given as the temporal mode of something transcendent. On the other hand, "*the time*" evidently seems to be in a certain sense *a single time:* two realities, two things, properties, processes, considered with respect to corresponding temporal modes, can be identical as far as time is concerned.

As an example: The perception of something real is itself something real, and their times coincide. The now of the perception is identically the same as the now of the perceived; the duration of the perception is identical with the duration of the perceived, and so forth. If the perceived is *something transcendent, then,* even if it is not really [*reell*] given, it *appears* in precisely the same now in which the perception, which does become really given itself, exists. If we reflect and if we grasp the perception as something that has just been, then what was perceived in it appears in the same time-point of the past. If what is perceived is *something immanent* and consequently also something given as far as its existence is concerned, then the two real individuals *coincide*: the perception and the perceived (e.g., the sensation-tone) in their – also adequately given – temporal mode, in their duration and in the points of this duration. *The time is not double there;* simultaneity is *identity* of time, although the temporal moment comes to givenness along with something real.

Without being able to indicate in more detail all the difficult analyses required in the directions suggested to this point, we turn to a particularly important consideration. Let us carry out the following reflection while restricting ourselves to purely immanent physical data.

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[3] Reading "*etwas*" for "*etwa.*" – Translator's note.

The *physical tone-content* stands before me in the reduced [275]
phenomenological perception as an *immanent "thing"*; it is the unity belonging to a flowing multiplicity of tone-phases. This tone-thing – and this belongs to the essence of being a thing as such – has a temporal form and time-filling content. The temporal form ⟨is⟩ a continuity of time-points, each of which has its filling. The filling content of the object is spread over the temporal duration, which is the object's duration. The tone endures; it is now, and now again and again. Again and again the now is a new now, and in the new now the tone no longer exists simultaneously in the old now; rather, it *did exist* in the old now. This leads us to a new continuity – *not* to the continuity of tone-phases or time-points that makes up the *duration* of the object but to the *continuity of the temporal adumbrations* of the tone. Let us look at the tone-now (which, of course, is again and again a new one). The now is the *limit* of a continuity of tone-pasts. Here, obviously, a focusing of regard is possible in which we do not look at the tone-phases – which have been and which preserve the identity of their places in time, along with their individual identity, as they recede further and further into the past in relation to the ever new now – but look instead at the *"phenomenon" of their givenness.*[4] What does that mean? Well, we must obviously distinguish *what is really immanent* in each now-moment of the tone-*perception* from *what appears in it objectively*. The tone in its duration is immanently given in the perception of the tone, and this tone-perception is itself something that endures. Each now of the perception of the tone grasps a phase of the tone; specifically, the phase belonging to the actual now in question. But not merely that. A *continuity of elapsed tone-phases is intended in the same now*. These elapsed tone-phases are *not* perceived in the relevant now-point of the perception *in the way* in which the tone-phase that stands before us as *now* in that point is perceived. They are *still* intended, they still *appear,* but in a *modified* way. The elapsed now with its filling does not remain an actually present now but presents itself in the new actually present now in a certain *adumbration*; and each such [276]
adumbration acts, so to speak, as a substitute in the actually

[4] With respect to the foregoing, Husserl noted in the margin: "consciousness of time." – Editor's note.

present now for what has been. It makes up a *really immanent content* in the respective actually present now-point of the perception of the tone; and that holds true of the entire continuity of elapsed and still vitally intended tone-phases. Thus if we direct our regard to the tone-perceiving in the actually present now, we find a continuity of temporal adumbrations of the tone terminating in a *border-phase* that *does not merely adumbrate* the now of the tone but apprehends it *absolutely, itself.* And if the actually present now-point then moves forward, a new tone-now is apprehended absolutely; and what was *just* given in this way is represented by an adumbration. But the whole continuity of earlier adumbrations is in turn subjected once again to adumbrations. The total real content belonging to the now of the perception *along with* all of the adumbrations really contained in it "*sinks into the past*"; and thus each phase, each adumbration, is adumbrated anew, and so on.

I do not at all intend to offer this analysis as a final one; it cannot be our task here to solve the most difficult of all phenomenological problems, the problem of the analysis of time. What matters to me here is only to lift the veil a little from this world of time-consciousness, so rich in mystery, that up until now has been hidden from us. And I want[5] to emphasize particularly the new sense of *unity as opposed to multiplicity,* with which a number of senses of the perception of something immanent, of adequate perception, and even of *representation* as opposed to the absolute presentation of something itself, are connected. After the foregoing you will easily understand what follows.

We had as an example a sensation-tone becoming modified in this way and that in intensity, quality, and timbre, and swelling up or fading away, and the like. A perception of something immanent, a perception that excluded[6] the components of the apprehension of what is transcendent, grasped[7] this sensation-tone itself, "in person," as a temporal unity, as the unity of the enduring tone swelling up and fading away. The *multiplicity* here is the *temporal* multiplicity of tone-phases, which in their unity

[5] Reading "*will*" for "*möchte,*" according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

[6] "*Ausschaltete,*" according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

[7] "*Erfasste,*" according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

can also be made objective – indeed, perceptually so – as a process. But this latter perception is again distinct from an obviously [277] *quite different sort of "perception of the immanent"*; namely, from the perception *directed* towards the *flow of the adumbrations of the tone,* that is, towards the flow of adumbrations in which the identical tone "presents" itself and in which, in each now of the perception, the tone is represented in an always new way in its now and, as far as its elapsed duration is concerned, represented by means of a continuity of fading modifications. Obviously, an entirely different perception is in question here: not the perception of the tone-phases in their continuity, hence of the tonal *process,* but the perception of the continuity that *presents* the tonal process, that *represents* it. If we reflect on the perception of the unitary tone or even on the perception of the tonal process, and if we seize the perception's now and that which *really* belongs to it in this now, we find this perception as a *continuity;* and we specifically find a continuity with respect to the *physical contents* that inhabit it and are subjected to the *continuity of apprehensions:* the now-phase of the tone-sensation and a flow of faded contents [*Abklängen*] in which, in this same now of the perception, the elapsed being, the tone's being that was and that did endure, is continuously adumbrated. The adumbration obviously stands before me in the character of adumbration, in the character of a *presentation* – that is to say, the physical content in the modifications proper to it has a continuous consciousness-characteristic of the kind we call apprehension, which characterizes the presentation precisely as presentation.[8]

[8] ⟨Addition from the summer term, 1909:⟩ Earlier we occasionally used the expression *phansiological* [*phansiologisch*] in order to be able to emphasize sharply, within phenomenological analysis, the distinction between that which is a matter of the *cogitatio* and ⟨that which⟩ is a matter of the cogitated as cogitated, which certainly must also be described in an evident manner. We have retained the expression *cogitatio* on the model of the Cartesian meditation. We call an investigation "phansiological" that explores the *cogitatio* with respect to its *real* [*reellen*] composition. It becomes apparent, however, that the *cogitatio* turns into a *unity* in this reflective perception, since evident unity-data are to be grasped and described here, as when we take the perception, the memory, and the judgment as unities and talk about the appearance (the perceptual or memorial appearance, for example), about the characters of positing, of attention, etc., in the fashion of something unitary. On the other hand, these unities are unities of multiplicity, that is, unities that necessarily point back to

Let us *recapitulate.*[9] Proceeding from the example of a tone [278] adequately given in the perception of what is really immanent, we have established that this tone is an individual unity – a unity because it stands before me as an enduring tone that is one and the same throughout the duration. Throughout the duration: hence in all of the distinguishable parts of the duration and in all of the phases of the duration that can be distinguished by abstraction. The phases here are filled phases; and what fills them is the tone-content, the tone by means of its content, which is different from phase to phase. The tone-content, however, is not the *identical tone itself,* not the identical something of which we say that it endures and in its duration is sometimes at rest and sometimes changing again. This identical something is nothing without content; it is what it is with its content. What is identical is not merely inserted into the content, as if it could be extracted again and thought of by itself. The identity of the *thing* – the tone – *runs throughout* all of the phases and all of the content brought out in the continuity of phases; the tone is conceivable as this identical thing only as extending throughout this continuity, as enduring in it, as something self-identical that is at rest and then changes again.

We saw that various other – analogous – unities stand in essential relations here: The unity of the tone was a thing-unity from which we distinguished the unities belonging to it, which we called the properties of the thing; relations among things could be mentioned here as well. We also emphasized the unities that are called processes.

Every perception posits unities of this sort, and forms and types of perception also strictly correspond to the fundamental

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multiplicities belonging to the ultimate temporal flow in which they are necessarily presented and in which they are adumbrated in the flow of phansiological time. The absolute to which all phenomenological analysis leads back lies here, in this flow. We speak of the *absolute flow of phansiological time* and say that all unities become constituted in it.

All these objectivities are in a certain sense merely *intentional* objectivities of the ⟨indicated⟩ kind. They are unities and are built up, as it were, from unities; and all unities in this sense – temporal unities, real [*reale*] unities – are in a sense merely intentional unities. Now to each such unity there corresponds *a priori* – that is, essentially – a constituting flow of consciousness.

[9] Husserl noted in the margin that what is in question here is a recapitulation of the reflection "from 87 on" – that is, from precisely that location, marked in the manuscript, with which the reproduction of the present sketch (No. 39, p. 279) begins. – Editor's note.

forms of these unities. These types of perception are connected by an eidetic law; we can shift from one to another. Along with the givenness of one objectivity, other objectivities are co-given; and [279] these can be grasped in an appropriate turning of perception, in an appropriate shift from one type of perception to another. Now that is true whether the unities are immanent, adequately given unities or whether they are transcendent unities – therefore external things, external properties, natural processes in the ordinary sense, and the like.

If we shift from an ordinary external perception to an immanental perception of its sensation-content, this is a transition whose possibility is grounded *a priori* in the essence of the external perception. For example, we perceive an approaching stagecoach and focus our attention on the noise of the coach rumbling towards us or on the sound of the postilion's horn, while abstracting from everything they signify transcendently. We then say of these contents that they are immanent objects; the process of rumbling towards us, the sound of the postilion's horn are adequate data here. *What does immanence signify in this case?* Does it signify that the object is not outside but *in consciousness* and that consciousness is, as it were, a bag into which the unitary immanent object is stuck? Naturally, we have to heed what phenomenological reduction teaches us. In external perception the sound of the postilion's horn is a transcendent reality; in the essentially altered focus of immanental perception it is nothing transcendent but something immanent, and inherent in this – as an initial look seems to show – is indeed a real [*reales*] containing of the object in the perception. However, as the observations at the conclusion of the last lecture (which we are now in the process of continuing) indicate, we need to be very careful here.

The external perception of the sound is not sound; *moreover,* it is not, in other respects, an undifferentiated,[10] empty gazing at the sound. That is quite obvious in the case of external perception. In the case of the perception of something immanent, in which the sound as mere physical content is the object and is adequately given as that, the temptation is greater to look at the

[10] "*Unterschiedloses,*" added according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

situation in this way and to interpret the perceiving as an apprehending or having, without differentiation, of the content that now really [*reell*] inheres in it. But if we carry out a new step of reflection, a step grounded as an ideal possibility in the essence of the perception – that is, if we shift from the perception of the [280] immanent sound to the *perception of this perception* – then the *wonder of time-consciousness* discloses itself. The perception of the sound in the perception's ever new now is not a mere *having* of the sound, even of the sound in the now-phase. On the contrary, we find in each now, in addition to the actual physical content, an *adumbration;* or better: we find a unique sound-adumbration that terminates in the actually sensed sound-now. If we focus reflectively on what is presently given in the actually present now with respect to the sound of the postilion's horn or the rumbling of the coach, and if we reflect on it just as it is given, then we note the *trail of memory* that *extends* the now-point of the sound or of the rumbling. This reflection makes it evident that the *immanent thing* could not be given in its unity at all if the perceptual consciousness did not also encompass, along with the point of actually present sensation, the continuity of fading phases that pertain to the sensations belonging to earlier nows. The past would be nothing for the consciousness belonging to the now if it were not represented[11] in the now; and the now would not be now – that is, for the perceiving consciousness pertaining to the moment in question – if it did not stand before me *in that consciousness* as the *limit of a past being*. The past being *must* be represented[12] in this now as past, and this is accomplished through the continuity of adumbrations[13] that in one direction terminates in the sensation-point and in the other direction becomes blurred and indeterminate. But obviously this continuity of adumbrations[14] is not a continuity of *sensation-points*. The

[11] Husserl later – in 1909 at the latest – replaced the term "represented" [*repräsentiert*] with "re-presented" [*vergegenwärtigte*]. – Editor's note.

[12] Husserl later replaced "represented" [*repräsentieren*] with "re-presented" [*vergegenwärtigen*]; he marked the preceding sentence from "if it were not represented" through "*limit of a past being*" as questionable. – Editor's note.

[13] Husserl later changed "continuity of adumbrations" [*Abschattungskontinuität*] to "retentional continuity" [*retentionale Kontinuität*]. – Editor's note.

[14] "*Abschattungskontinuität.*" Husserl later crossed out the "*Abschattungs-*" ["of adumbrations"]. – Editor's note.

sensation-phase corresponding to the now-phase of the sound is the sole sensation-phase belonging to this now. The past sensations are not kept in store as sensations. Only reverberations of past sensations, unique modifications[15] that essentially alter the [281] impressional character of the sound-datum are present as a united continuity in the now. And again each phase in this continuity is different in character from every other phase; the continuity does indeed stand before me as a continuity – as a series of fadings, a series of adumbrations.[16] In the truest sense, this continuity is really immanent in each moment of the perception, while if we follow its phases from now-point to now-point, nowhere at all in the perception do we find *the* sound, the *phenomenological thing;* indeed, in the proper sense we do not even find the corresponding now-phases of the sound.[17] The latter becomes clear if we heed the fact that the perception of the identical sound obviously does not simply dissolve itself into the flowing succession – adumbrated itself – of adumbration-series that terminate, in each new now, in a new sensation-content. It is not simply the case that in its beginning and first now the perception is merely sensation-content, that this sensation-content then immediately begins to be adumbrated and that at the same time a new sensation-content continuously makes its appearance, which in its turn immediately passes over into adumbration. It does not even suffice to say that in the course of this flow each *adumbration* is adumbrated further, that this newly arisen adumbration is adumbrated in turn, etc. Again connected with this is the fact that each adumbration-continuity belonging to any one now, taken as a whole,[18] undergoes adumbration as a unit; and even the whole process can be regarded as the *adumbration of adumbration-continua* that undergo continuous expansion by means of new sensation-points, which are then immediately transmuted into the form of adumbration-phases. *All of this is insufficient.* This complicated flow of continua undergoing modification is, in

[15] Following the word "modifications" [*Modifikationen*] Husserl later inserted "representational, or, more precisely, retentional modifications" [*Vergegenwärtigungsmodifikationen, näher retentionale*]. – Editor's note.

[16] Husserl later crossed out "a series of fadings, a series of adumbrations" [*Abklingungsreihe, Abschattungsreihe*]. – Editor's note.

[17] Reading "*des Tones,*" according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

[18] Reading "*als Ganzes,*" according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

itself, still not *perception* of *the* enduring *sound* that swells up and dies away in this way and that. The latter – the *unitary* objectivity – stands before me in perception; the bewildering multiplicity does not. The postilion's horn sounds. The sound endures, swells [282] up, and so on. The consciousness of the sound is the consciousness of *it* in its *temporal duration,* and accordingly it stands before me as an *ongoing present over against a continuity of pasts,* which are the *sound's* own pasts. It is obviously inherent in this situation that together with the actual present-point of the sound, *pasts,* that is, the former present-points of the same sound – specifically, *as* points of the *same sound* – are also always *intentionally encompassed* in the consciousness of the existing tone. Each time-point belonging to this presently co-apprehended past of the sound steadily recedes in relation to the always fresh present-point, but in receding it *continues to be intended* in its individual unity; it constantly stands before us as the same time-point. If the actually present sound-now goes over into the past and if it sinks further and further back, then, so to speak, it is still constantly taken by the perceiving consciousness as the same sound-now, as the same sound-phase, only precisely as retreating further and further in relation to the always new now.

In this way, then, the enduring object is a temporal unity and its duration a continuity of the object's time-points, which are themselves unities – namely, unities over against the flow of the perception. The unity of each thing-phase appears here in contrast to the multiplicity of adumbrations that belong essentially to this thing-phase and without which the consciousness of one and the same thing-phase would not be possible. If we start from the present-point of the sound and if we let it recede into the past, a *continuum of adumbrations of the sound-sensation*[19] *corresponds to its intentional identity.* The perceptual consciousness, however, perceives (speaking abstractly) the identical sound-phase, not these adumbrations.[20] The adumbration-continuum[21] therefore has the character of a continuum of representations[22]

[19] "... [*V*]*on tonalen Empfindungsabschattungen*" – later changed to "... *von tonalen Empfindungsretentionen*" ["... of retentions of the sound-sensation"]. – Editor's note.

[20] Husserl later crossed out "adumbrations" [*Abschattungen*]. – Editor's note.

[21] Husserl later crossed out "adumbration-" [*Abschattungs-*]. – Editor's note.

[22] Husserl later replaced "representations" [*Repräsentationen*] with "re-presentations" [*Vergegenwärtigungen*]. – Editor's note.

for the intentional unity of the time-point and, correlatively, for the intentional unity of the parallel phase of the object, the sound. A "*unity of consciousness*" in a specific sense – we can [283] also say a *unity of apprehension* – grasps the identical and unitary temporal phase precisely in this continuity of adumbrations.[23] That was expressed *in abstracto,* of course. We had singled out the multiplicity that belonged to one of the object's time-points. But the whole duration is precisely the continuous unity of these points; it is therefore the *unity of the apprehension* that, on the basis of the whole complication of adumbration-series, grasps the *whole duration* and, in another mode of apprehension, the *unitary object that there endures.*

The series of adumbrations of each past now of the sound – the series on hand in each moment of the perception – serves as representation[24] for the series of past sound-phases up to the sound-now. Throughout the continuous alteration of these representations[25] in the *flow* of the perception, the unity of apprehension is preserved in such a way that it always runs continuously throughout the lines of modifications that, at any given moment in the flowing-off of the perception, correspond to the same sound-point.[26] –

Here we see what a marvellous thing the apparently simplest perception – the perception of an immanent sound – is. And at the same time, we see that this immanence of the identical temporal object, the sound, must surely be distinguished from the immanence of the adumbrations of the sound and the apprehensions of these adumbrations,[27] which make up the consciousness

[23] Husserl later crossed out "of adumbrations" [*Abschattungs-*]. – Editor's note.

[24] Husserl later changed "representation" [*Repräsentation*] to "retentional re-presentation" [*retentionale Vergegenwärtigung*]. – Editor's note.

[25] Husserl later crossed out "representations" [*Repräsentationen*]. – Editor's note.

[26] Later – probably in 1909 at the latest – Husserl made the following annotation to the foregoing:

"Representation [*Repräsentation*], apprehension [*Auffassung*] – these are not suitable terms here. It is, after all, not a question of presentation but of retention. It is indeed emphasized at 95 ⟨i.e., p. 290, line 3, to p. 292, line 8⟩ that these are not sensations (therefore not by any chance weaker sensations, 'fading away,' as the unfortunate image puts it). 'Apprehension' – that will probably be unavoidable. The original apprehension in the now undergoes retentional modifications itself, but these modifications achieve unity." – Editor's note.

[27] Husserl later crossed out "adumbrations . . . and the apprehension of these adumbrations" [*-Abschattungen und der Auffassungen dieser Abschattungen*]. – Editor's note.

of the givenness of the sound. What is given as unity, and, as we presuppose here, given adequately as individual and consequently temporal being, is not really and immanently given in the final and absolute sense – that is to say, not given as *a component of* [284] *the absolute consciousness. Immanent* can signify the antithesis of *transcendent,* and then the temporal thing, the sound, is immanent; but it can also signify what exists in the sense of the absolute consciousness, and then the sound is not immanent.

We can also amplify this in the following way: *Whatever is perceived, whatever is given itself*[28] *as an individual object, is given as the unity of an absolute multiplicity that is not given.*[29] It belongs to the essence of this unity as a temporal unity that it "*becomes constituted*" in the absolute consciousness. Specifically, with respect to adequately given unities such as the sound-unity we have been discussing, we recognize the marvelous fact that the existence of such a unity is not conceivable without its being a constituted unity of a certain kind; namely, one that points back to a certain uniquely formed and interconnected *flow of consciousness.* If this flow of consciousness exists, then the unitary temporal object *exists.* And if the object is there, then there must exist an absolute flow of consciousness of this content in which the object is a unitary datum or on the basis of which it can be given as a unity. The *esse* of the immanent sound-thing in a certain sense dissolves into its *percipi.* This *percipi* is not itself a thing and has a different mode of being, but the one is given *a priori* with the other. The *percipi,* in the sense of that *flow of consciousness* and of the unity-perception given as a possibility with it, "creates" the thing, since the absolute being of this flow of consciousness is the possible having and apprehending of the sound, a possibility without which the sound would be nothing. The object itself is what it is only as the intentional object of adequate perception, or more precisely, as the object of a certain flow of absolute consciousness that makes such adequate perception possible. –

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[28] Husserl later replaced "whatever is given itself" [*was immer selbstgegeben ist*] with "whatever is grasped as given itself" [*was immer als selbstgegeben erfasst ist*]. – Editor's note.

[29] Husserl later replaced "*not given*" [*nicht gegebenen*] with "*not grasped*" [*nicht erfassten*]. – Editor's note.

The essential relation of the immanent object to a consciousness that gives it demands at this point the solution of the problem of this givenness; that is to say, we must carefully study the multiplicities of consciousness and their unities in which the [285] object "becomes constituted," in which it stands before us intentionally as adequately given and without which it would be nothing.[30]

But now, before we go further, we must discuss certain *difficulties* that perhaps have already forced themselves upon you. The individual sound, this temporal unity, is given in a uniquely structured adequate perception. Let us go back to this perception and study, if only roughly, the manner in which the immanent unity becomes constituted intentionally in the multiplicity of absolute consciousness that belongs to such a perception. If we study the *perception* of the sound in this way, the perception *itself* comes to be given to us in a reflective perception of the second level; and in this reflective perception, the perception of the sound is the object – an individual, temporal object, which is again something given immanently. What is true of the unity of the sound is also true of the unity of the perception of the sound. Hence to this whole duration-unity, considered with respect to all of its unitary[31] time-points, there again corresponds a constituting flow of multiplicities that belong to the absolute consciousness, specifically, in the form of the perception of the second level. But reflection on this perception of the second level makes it too stand before me as a temporal object that cannot exist without a constituting flow of multiplicities, which again is a temporal flow itself and constitutes a temporal unity, and so *in infinitum*.

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[30] One can ask, of course, whether it must not be said flatly that the being of such an object is being in adequate *perception* and not merely in possible adequate perception. My thought is this: If the multiplicity of adumbrations exists in the absolute consciousness, then for that very reason there does not need to be a corresponding immanent apprehension* that for the first time sets forth the immanent object. In the case of the perception of something external, for example, are the immanent sensations actually objectivated as immanent objects? Irrespective of whether they are intended [*gemeinte*] objects in the sense of objects singled out and meant.

* Husserl later amended the word "apprehension" [*Auffassung*] to read "grasping" [*Erfassung*]; he later wrote a question mark over almost all of the remaining text of the note. – Editor's note.

[31] Reading "*einheitlichen*" for "*inhaltlichen,*" according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

We must say the following about this. If we speak of the perception of the sound, then here as everywhere else we must distinguish between this perception as absolute consciousness and the *objectivated* perception – more precisely, the perception as *object* of the perception reflecting on it. If we reflect, we grasp the perception not only as now but also as evidently having been. But [286] while it now stands before us as a perception that is noticed and that specifically has the status of an object, the past part of this perception does not stand before us as something noticed. Furthermore, if we focus our attention reflectively on the perception of the sound, we find the adumbration-series and the apprehensions of these series as belonging to the essence of the givenness of the sound. If we focus our attention on this reflective perception of the second level that we are now in the process of carrying out, then, of course, the corresponding is true of it. But naturally we do not find the apprehensions that belong to the reflective perception in the perception of the lower level; on the contrary, these apprehensions are carried out only on the higher level.

A deeper analysis of the situation[32] here is surely of great difficulty. It will have to be made clear in any such analysis *that being constantly adumbrated belongs to the essence of the absolute consciousness*, and that inherent in the essence of this consciousness is the ideal *possibility* of perceptual apprehensions that, so to speak, draw from this absolute flow of adumbrations the temporal unity as an immanent-intentional unity, or that constitute it in the flow. This is grounded in the essence of all absolute consciousness, and consequently also in the essence of every positing of unity that may be brought about, of every perception that may be performed. They too are adumbrated, and here too there is grounded in this absolute flow of adumbrations the ideal possibility of new apprehensions that draw from these multiplicities of adumbrations the unities belonging to them and being adumbrated in them; and these are the absolute perceptions of the second level. The same thing applies in the case of these perceptions, etc. The absolute consciousness lies, so to speak,

[32] Reading "*Sachlage*" for "*Sachlagen,*" according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

before all positing of unity, that is, before all objectivation. Unity is unity of objectivation, and objectivation is precisely objectivating but not objectivated. All nonobjectivated objectivation belongs in the sphere of the absolute consciousness.

⟨*No. 40.*⟩ *Levels of Objectivity*[33]

1. The flow of "consciousness."

2. The pre-empirical "time" with past, "now," later; and that which "exists" pre-empirically, that which endures and [287] changes (the tone as "content of consciousness").

3. The levels of empirical being, of the being of empirical experience, what is given and thought in empirical experience, the being that we call real actuality. The real, becoming constituted in the prereal.

A) The thing of perception and of prelogical empirical experience, the unity belonging to empirical intuitions yet prior to "thinking" – to logical or prelogical thinking – on the level of objectivation; in particular, we abstract from the constitution of the empirical Ego understood as the person, and consequently from "other persons" as well. The thing is therefore not yet the identical thing of the intersubjective world with that world's possibility of communication, and it is not yet the thing of science. Properly speaking, we would have the following dualities:

1) intuitive – logical;

2) consciousness before social and cultural objectivation – communicative consciousness and individual consciousness after social and cultural objectivation.

If we therefore ask how far the level of the thing-objectivation extends (or what sense a "thing" that is becoming constituted receives) when we restrict ourselves to the solitary consciousness and do not yet bring into play the objectivation of persons, of the Ego and other Egos, we then have ⟨the following questions⟩:

[33] According to a note in Edith Stein's handwriting on the sheet for this sketch, she "made use of" it in the editing of § 34, p. 77. – Editor's note.

a) What does the purely intuitive thing-objectivation include? and

b) what does the logical (experiental-logical) thing-objectivation include? –,

insofar as this can be brought about without a community of communicating members. (In what respect or to what extent can science be built up as something that does not involve communication?)

B) Supervention of empathy in physical things taken as bodies. Body and psyche (mind). My own Ego – the other Ego. The *commercium* of mental things, of human beings, of persons, or in other words, of psyches, through their bodies. Constitution of identical things, of the one identical world with one space and one time, as an identical world in which communication occurs, as one nature, the nature of the one natural science. –

To the *one* time belong *physical things* (bodies) and bodily processes, including the processes of animate organisms, and on the other side, *mental processes,* psychic stirrings.

Thus there exists a temporal relationship between appearance and what appears; specifically, if we follow the intuition, then *in* [288] *every case of perception the appearance and what appears* always *appear as simultaneous.* (On the other hand, memory and what is remembered appear as *not* simultaneous. A perceptual image-representation and what is represented again appear as simultaneous. But what is represented, understood as something represented in an image, once again does not exist here and now – hence, properly speaking, only the representation and the image-object, not the *subject* of the image, appear as simultaneous. Expectation and what is expected, of course, do not appear as simultaneous.)

Problem: Is this simultaneity something original, something essential in a primal sense, or did it first arise from the objectivation of mental things and psyches? Does this objectivation presuppose that simultaneity, or is the reverse the case?

This simultaneity "appears," but in general, of course, it does not "truly" exist at all. The star I now see has perhaps not existed for thousands of years (naturally, the same sort of thing is true in the case of nonpresentive appearance: the blow of the hammer I hear). Does it belong essentially to the absolute

consciousness that "appearance," or, to put it more adequately (since we cannot properly speak of appearance here), that the immanent apprehension and what is apprehended exist together in the identical present now? The identical immanent tone that is in the process of becoming constituted is simultaneous with the act constituting it. Flow of the apprehension and identification and continuity of the constituted tone-now.

⟨*No. 41.*⟩ *Appearance and Time. – Experiencing and Experience. Consciousness as the Experiencing in Which the Experiences Belonging to Consciousness Are Experienced in the Plural*

Appearance and Time

In my first years at Göttingen, the concept of appearance created some difficulties for me. A concept of appearance seemed to delineate itself that "appeared to exclude every temporal character"; namely: I can say in a certain sense that I have the same appearance in perception, in a corresponding memory, and in a pure phantasy. The house appears to me from precisely the same side, in the same colors, etc.; moreover, it appears to me from the same place and therefore in the same adumbrations of [289] the colors, in the same adumbrations of the forms, etc. – *the same appearance, "except" that in the one instance it is perceptual appearance, in the other imaginative appearance,* etc. However, is the distinction here not like the distinction between the same house, only at one time perceived, at another time imagined, and so on?

If we make the appearance into an object, we do in fact have in the one case an actually present perceptual appearance as object and in the other case an imagined appearance, which, of course, is the same appearance, only imagined. Just as there are not two kinds of houses, perceived houses and imagined or remembered houses, so there are not two kinds of appearances; *appearance is eo ipso perceptual appearance,* and imaginative appearance is the imagination *of* an appearance. *The memorial appearance is memory of an appearance.*

Now, of course, one will say: In memory we remember the

house or we remember such and such occurrences, but we do not at the same time remember the corresponding appearances.

The answer to this, naturally, runs as follows: It is a question of what one calls perception and of what one calls phantasy-representation, memory. The concepts must be given different directions here: It is not the case that we are "*directed*" towards both, towards the house and the house-appearance. But both are in a certain sense there. If we classify this *being-directed-towards* with the acts, or if we understand by perception as act or memory as act precisely this being-directed-towards – well, then we need a special word for the bare appearance and its imaginative or memorial modification.

The following, of course, is something we must now study more closely: To remember the house is to have a memorial appearance but not to make this appearance into an object, not to be directed towards the appearance, to *mean* it in the strict sense.

The problem here is:

1) We have a fundamental modification that converts appearance (unmodified appearance) into modified appearance (phantasy). What distinguishes the *act of meaning* then belongs in another dimension; it is a founded distinction.

2) What is the difference between mere phantasy and memory, and what is the relationship between fresh memory, which is a [290] component of "perception," and recollection?

Experiencing [Erleben] and Experience [Erlebnis]. Consciousness as the Experiencing in Which the Experiences Belonging to Consciousness Are Experienced in the Plural

Experiencing as the unity[34] of the *flow* in which the original phansiological time becomes constituted along with the constitution of *experiences* as *unities* in phansiological time.

Every *experience,* as a unity, therefore belongs in the order of constituted unities. Each such unity can be made into the object of a perception that aims at something immanent – a perception that is then in its turn a unitary experience belonging in the order

[34] Not unity in the constituted sense.

of constituted unities. Moreover, the *flow* in which a unity becomes constituted can also be apprehended in an intuitive regard, be *seized* in a reflection (for which the same then holds, that is, the act of seizing is once again a unity, etc.).

By being made into the object of a *perception aimed at what is immanent,* an experience stands before me as something *present itself,* as something *given absolutely,* as a now; and this now also possesses its now proper, which has its before and its after. This belongs to the constitution of time.

But among *experiences* there are also those that are parallel to perceptions, since in them something also "stands before me" in an *analogous way,* only not as present itself but as *quasi-present.* According to an ideal possibility, there corresponds to each perception a phantasy-representation and a memory too (if we distinguish memory from phantasy), as well as an expectation. There also corresponds to every perception of something immanent a phantasy of something immanent. Furthermore, just as there corresponds to the perception of what is immanent an experience that is said to turn into the perception of something immanent "through a glance directed towards it," so a modified experience corresponds to the phantasy of something immanent.

We now distinguish experiences into those that are original and those that are not original. Every consciousness of something [291] present itself is original, whether it is a consciousness that can be converted into an act of perceiving only through an intending regard or whether it is already an act of perceiving.

Or every experience[35] is "consciousness," and consciousness is consciousness *of*.... But every experience is *itself experienced* [*erlebt*], and *to that extent* also "intended" [*bewusst*]. *This* being-intended [*Bewusst-sein*] is consciousness of the experience and is either primary, *original* consciousness – namely, consciousness of the experience itself as the *present* experience; or it is secondary consciousness – that is, it is indeed the experience of a present experience, but the present experience is an experience that is the consciousness of something that is not present itself.

[35] *Erlebnis.* Husserl later placed a question mark next to the final syllable "*-nis*" [of "*Erlebnis*"] and simultaneously noted in the margin: "On the contrary, the flow of time" ["*Dagegen Zeitfluss*"]. – Editor's note.

This secondary consciousness is a *re*-presenting consciousness – specifically, re-presenting an experience; and this experience can in turn be the consciousness of something, perhaps of something that is *quasi*-present, e.g., a house.

A fundamental modification belongs to every experience according to which it becomes a "phantasma," the phantasma of experience, the phantasma of consciousness. But the re-presentation can be "actual" re-presentation, having the character of memory (or the genuine re-presentational character of whatever sort); or it can have the character of mere phantasy.

Hence we would have: original experiences (sensations) – nonoriginal experiences: mere phantasms – memories; correspondingly: the perception of something immanent – the representation of something immanent in mere phantasy – the representation of something immanent in memory; then experiences of something transient[36]. Every perception of something transient presupposes sensations that undergo original apprehension; every representation of something transient in phantasy presupposes phantasms that undergo phantasy-apprehension; every memory of something transient presupposes memories that undergo memorial apprehension.

Reconsideration: [292]

Flow [*Fluss*] of flows[37] (fluxions?) – constitution of unities in "immanent" time, of the contents of the absolute consciousness: of sensed contents – a color-adumbration, a "tone"; of the

[36] In the course on the *Einführung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie* [Introduction to logic and epistemology] given in the winter term of 1906/1907 (cf. above, p. 279, n. 2), Husserl introduced the concept of the "transient" [*transient*] with the following definition: "We call perceptions whose essence it is really to include what is perceived and, consequently, really to be united with it, 'perceptions of what is really immanent.' The adequate perceptions we have gotten to know in various examples as perceptions of *cogitationes* are therefore also perceptions of what is really immanent. Perceptions that do not really include their objects in the indicated sense we call 'perceptions of the transient.' If it belongs to their essence to be able to apprehend their objects only inadequately and transiently, then we call them 'perceptions of something transcendent.'" – Editor's note.

Husserl therefore uses "transient" [*transient*] in contrast to "immanent" and not in the more familiar sense of passing away in time or ceasing to exist. – Translator's note.

[37] "*Fluentien.*" "Fluent," a noun now obsolete in English, means a current of water. – Translator's note.

sensed appearances of things – the appearance of a house, the appearance of a physical thing; of "acts" in the proper sense (as occurrences that are sensed) – the "turning of my regard towards something" and the act of meaning; joy (over weather that has again turned beautiful), wish, predication, etc.

All of these [are constituted] as unities in immanent time and [are] unities "whether one takes heed of them or not." The total consciousness constitutes a total unity: that is, the total consciousness is *consciousness* through and through, through and through a *flow of flows,* and each such flow pertains to a unity. These unities are therefore the *contents of consciousness in the primary sense,* experiences understood as occurrences that are experienced (which are unities) or intended (sensed). Now among these we find a particular group: the *apperceptions;* and among the latter we find physical-thing apprehensions, or better, appearances of physical things.

The physical-thing appearances are intended; they are contents, unities in immanent time. But they in turn constitute unities of an essentially new kind. That is, appearances, running off in certain multiplicities of appearance belonging to them, make up a consciousness of unity in the second sense. They are not consciousness in the original sense but already something constituted. Hence if we call appearances and the multiplicities of appearance "consciousness," then in strictness we must go back to the *primal consciousness* [*Urbewusstsein*] that constitutes them and designate it *as constituting*. Then we would have to say: This primal consciousness constitutes unities on the second level. Or we do not call appearances "consciousness" and we do not call multiplicities of appearance "interconnections of consciousness," but just "apperceptions of . . . ," "appearances of . . . ."

This is essential: According to an ideal possibility, every content can be transformed into a content that is meant and posited as a this. Every content can be made into something given: the positing of it in an act of meaning is the giving of the content. The *act of meaning,* understood as content, is once again not consciousness in the original sense but a flow belonging to this consciousness. The process of meaning is an "act" (an act is already a unity), and this is consciousness in a new sense. [293]

Every appearing object (every unity belonging to the second

level) can be meant and posited. We can look at it; we can posit it as *this* object (an ideal possibility). It then becomes the object of a consciousness in the second sense.

If we call this positing-as-this, which occurs in looking at the object, "act," then the appearance itself is not an act.

To the unities experienced in consciousness, the intended unities, there belongs the fundamental distinction between those that are original, or impressions, and those that are reproductive (reproductions, phantasms). In connection with the latter we have to explore memories and mere phantasms. There are further modifications here as well: the empty unities experienced in consciousness – empty memories, empty phantasms. Appearances are complexes of full and empty unities experienced in consciousness and as such constitute new unities.

The *gradus ad Parnassum*. Symbolic representations as higher apperceptions. In contrast to simple unmodified appearances, therefore, apperception is a broader concept. The symbol (image or object) depicting, analogizing, or signifying another object.

Synthesis.

The Parnassus, alas, is still in the mist.

⟨*No. 42*⟩ *Evidence*

Every experienced content belongs to a continuity of content (a continuity formed by the fading phases of a content). This continuity can be apprehended as an individual (temporal) objectivity – specifically, as a continuity of the phases of an enduring object.

I would make the following classification:

1) The continuity of the contents themselves (whether or not apprehensions enter on the scene). Now one will say: The contents themselves endure, and as they endure, change or do not change. But in this connection we must not confuse: the contents in the sense of things in immanent time, of individual objects in time – and the contents belonging to the ultimate temporal flow, which do not endure and are not temporal objects but are precisely the ultimate flow of consciousness. The *original* modification that everywhere ⟨changes⟩ now-contents (which, appre-

hended, "turn into" now-phases) into adumbrations that, [294] according to their essence, are presentations of what is not now.

2) The continuity of apprehension-characters.

Time-consciousness as the form of the objectivation of something individual, as the form of every possible appearance. Here again we have to distinguish: appearances pure and simple (impressional appearances) – and their reproductive modifications. The consciousness of time is therefore either impressional or reproductive.

Hence we have fundamentally different distinctions:

1) The ultimate distinction with respect to what is *original* (impression and reproduction).

2) The distinctions that belong to the form of appearance (there we move, to start with, in the impressional sphere; in the reproductive sphere, "everything reappears," "only modified").

⟨*No. 43.*⟩ *Problem*

I now say: "I have just perceived A, A has just been, and I have seen this myself." Would it not be possible that I now have this primary memory when in fact A did not even exist, when in fact no perception of A at all preceded my primary memory? How does "fresh" memory guarantee that a now-perception preceded it? –[38]

It appears from the analyses of time that the way in which I earlier discussed "evidence" was vague. I often used "evidence" in a sense equivalent to the givenness of something itself. But surely we must distinguish: evidence as insight that belongs to judgment, ⟨to the⟩ judgment that ⟨something⟩ is there itself that exists and that is given again ⟨as⟩ that – and, on the other hand, the being-given itself.

I mean something, and what I mean is given itself precisely as that which is meant and in precisely the way in which it is meant.

[38] This first paragraph of the sketch takes up again almost literally an older sketch of the "problem"; see above, No. 25, p. 209. – Editor's note.

Evidence = being given = being given in the manner of "immanence," "being adequately given." Now starting from prejudices well known to everyone, one will say to oneself here: How can I have evidence of *duration?* Of just-having-been? Evidence pertaining to that which "fresh memory" presents? Compare this [295] with the problem above.

To be sure, evidence is not evidence belonging to "internal perception" taken in the way in which *Brentano* takes it: as the perception of a punctual now. *Every* identification, distinction, every judgment, presupposes succession, presupposes extended perception, an extended grasping of the true. This is surely an insight rooted in an eidetic law. The relating of evidence to the now-point must be a fiction. The evidence of the *cogitatio* is without doubt already the evidence of something enduring, as enduring.

⟨*No. 44.*⟩ *The Temporal Form of Consciousness*

The following is of distinctive importance here:

1) The difference between sensations and phantasms, in the sense of the division, extending to all phenomena, between "impression" and reproduction.

2) The continuous dying-away that concerns both the impressions and the reproductions.

Every phenomenon has its comet's tail, or every phenomenon is a continuity of phases with a principal phase of which we say that it dies away. Every phenomenon "comes into being," "endures, changes" – objectively speaking. But, on the other hand, everything is in change (in a new sense). The coming into being of a phenomenon in objective apprehension is the emerging of something new; the enduring of the phenomenon is a process of change, since a comet's tail of dying phases "of the same content" is given along with what remains the same, and so on.

Thus in the sphere of phenomena in the absolute sense (in the sphere of phansiological multiplicities, of experiences before objectivation) there are only changes, an endless flow.

If it is said that impressions – but equally reproductions – die

away, it must be noted that the series of reproductions together with their respective "dyings-away" constantly is and remains a unity of reproduction, and that it belongs to the essence of every reproduction that it can be apprehended as representation of . . . (possibly memory of . . . : when it is the latter is something we must consider more precisely). Now this can be misinterpreted. But we must distinguish the reproduction itself and the reproductive *representation,* just as we must distinguish the impression itself and the impressional representation = the perceptual repre- [296] sentation.

3) The dying-away of sensations cannot yield phantasms. The dying-away of phantasms yields phantasms again and again, but phantasms modified in a definite mode, just as the dying-away of impressions yields impressions again and again, but impressions modified in a temporal mode. *The temporal modification and the modification of an impression into an idea are fundamentally different.* The latter is discrete; the former is continuous.

4) According to 2), a "*becoming*" belongs to the essence of "*phenomenality*" (to the essence of everything absolutely phansiological). This becoming is becoming for us in the modes of coming into being, of passing away, of *enduring* and changing throughout the duration, only by means of the *temporal apprehension.* This *absolute* becoming is the foundation for all temporal apprehension but is not the apprehension itself. *Time* is the *form* of all individual objectivity. Objectivity is not yet given in mere "contents" and in the mere flow of contents. Where consciousness does not bring about a *synthesis,* where, for example, it does not posit by means of an identifying act the identity of something enduring in a duration, there is *no duration either,* but only a flow of contents capable of being characterized determinately. This characterizing takes place in turn through an objectivating of the contents *as contents* and through acts that *constitute* objectivity. *Time* is not the form of the *experiences,* of the "contents" that make up consciousness itself. On the other hand, one must say, of course, that the contents too ⟨have their time⟩, that the flow of consciousness has *its time* and that in the flow everything is temporally ordered.

But certainly we must *distinguish* the following: the order of consciousness that belongs to the essence of consciousness as

such – that is to say, that belongs to the essence of all experiences and complexes of experience – and the temporal order that belongs to the experiences *as objective*. The *temporal form* is not a phansiological form in the ultimate sense, not a form of absolute being, but only a form of "appearances"; that is, only a form of individual *objects*. We must say: It is not an *absolute* but only a *categorial* form. –

The consciousness of *time* is therefore an *objectivating* consciousness. Without identification and differentiation, without the positing of the now, the positing of the past, the positing of the future, etc. [there would be] no enduring, no resting and changing, no being in succession, and so on. That is to say: Without all of this, the absolute "content" remains blind, does not *signify* objective being, duration, etc. And here too belongs the distinction between presentation and re-presentation, confused meaning. *Something* exists in objective *time*. *Something!* That depends on objective apprehension, etc. [297]

⟨*No. 45. The Double Intentionality of the Flows of Consciousness*⟩[39]

The *immanent* temporal object – this immanent tone-content, for example – is what it is only insofar as during its actually present duration it points ahead to a future[40] and points back to a past. The tone that is now the object of consciousness is intended and accomplished in a time-constituting phenomenon[41] in such a way that the ideal possibility is opened up of re-presenting anew the past flow of just this tone, of constituting it again in the mode of re-presentation. And in the same way, a continual "intention" reaches into the future: The actually present portion of the duration again and again adds a new now, and a *protention* adheres to the tone-constituting "appearances" – a protention that is fulfilled as a protention aimed at

[39] As noted below in detail, large parts of this sketch are reproduced in sections 23, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29. – Editor's note.

[40] Reading "*vorweisen*" for "*verweisen*": see F I 6, p. 80a. – Translator's note.

[41] Reading with the manuscripts "*in einem zeitkonstituierenden Phänomenon.*" – Translator's note.

this tone just as long as the tone endures and that is annulled and changes if something new begins in its place.[42] –

The memory of something immanent is itself immanent. The original consciousness of something immanent is not itself immanent, that is to say, not in the sense of a *temporal object* belonging to the consciousness of internal time. Is that not shocking? One would like to say: The re-presentational consciousness is surely "precisely the same" as the presentational consciousness, only "modified." Is it supposed to have an entirely different structure? Is there not a *problem* here?

If I re-present the tone C, it stands before me as past. I hear [298] other sounds "during" the re-presentation, I see my surroundings, etc. The re-presentation stands there as a now, beginning at a point in immanent time – beginning, let us say, with the noise X, which is now being heard, and ending simultaneously with it. It endures, and endures as long as the X, which is an immanent sensuous object. The tone C hovers before me in "more or less clear fashion" as something immanent but re-presented, as something that has been and at the same time is *quasi*-elapsing or has just elapsed; and the different modes of this obscurity concern the whole immanent object that is re-presented and its modes of consciousness.

(It is also true that in the original consciousness of C the tone at first appears vitally, actually, clearly, and then with diminishing clarity passes over into "emptiness." These modifications belong to the *flow*. But while the same modifications certainly occur in the re-presentation of the flow, still *other* "obscurities" occur there as well. Specifically, the "clear" already stands before me as if seen through a veil, obscurely; in fact, more or less obscurely, etc. We must therefore not confuse the one sort of obscurity with the other.)

The specific modes of the re-presentation's vividness or lack of vividness, of its clarity or obscurity, do not belong to what is re-presented, or do not belong to it only by virtue of the specific

[42] Husserl later added the following in the margin at this point: "But there is an essential difference between protention, which leaves open the way in which what is coming may exist and whether or not the duration of the object may cease and when it may cease, and retention, which is bound." – Editor's note.

way in which the particular re-presentation intends its object; they rather belong to the actual experience of re-presenting.

The structure of the re-presentation obviously follows in general precisely the structure of the original presentation. That is, the presentation is the *flow,* described by us, of pure presentational phases; and the flow's intentionality consists in the fact that the phases thus disposed are conscious of one and the same thing – specifically, of something in immanent time. Now the memory of C is again a flow, but a flow of re-presentational phases that are "modifications," "reproductions," of the corresponding presentational phases and in this way are precise "mirrorings" of the presentational phases, as is the whole flow.

Re-presentation's intentionality differs from presentation's intentionality. Inasmuch as the elements and moments of the two flows are different, there is a difference throughout. The presenting flow consist of moments of experience; the re-presenting flow also consists of moments of experience. What does "moment of experience" signify here? At this point we can only indicate that a difference exists between what is re-presented and what is not re-presented (what is original), and that this difference also holds for the flow of consciousness. A flow of consciousness that my reflective regard grasps as original is experience – precisely the original flow of what we call experience and that we further designate, according to the mode of the flow, as now-experience, experience fading away, and so on. The flow of re-presentation is also a flow of experience, but its experiences are re-presenting experiences; that is, each one is re-presentation *of* . . . , while the presentation is not presentation *of* . . . in this sense. The presentation is presenting in relation to an immanent object that becomes constituted in it. But a re-presentational experience re-presents in a double sense: inasmuch as it is re-presentation (reproduction) of a corresponding presentation, and inasmuch as this re-presentation, in the continuum of the re-presentational flow, re-presents an immanent object in a fashion analogous to that in which the presentation presents an immanent object. [299]

Does this mean that we are finished with the matter? We would then have to say:

The[43] re-presentational flow is a flow of experiences that is structured in precisely the way in which any time-constituting flow of experiences is structured, and which is therefore a time-constituting flow itself. All the adumbrations and modifications that constitute the temporal form are ⟨again⟩ found here. And just as the immanent tone (which is not an experience itself) becomes constituted in the *flow* of tone-experiences, so the unity of the re-presentation of the tone, and therefore the unity of the memory of the tone (and in precisely the same way the unity of a tone-phantasy), becomes constituted in the flow of the re-presentational experiences of the tone. It holds quite universally that we are led back in phenomenological reflection from everything that in the widest sense appears, is represented, thought, and so on, to experiences, and that all experiences stand in the time-constituting flow. They therefore undergo an immanent objectivation: specifically, the objectivation [that turns them] into [300] perceptual appearances (external perceptions), memories, expectations, wishes, etc., as unities belonging to internal consciousness. Thus re-presentations of every sort, since they are experiences, flows of experience possessing the universal time-constituting formation, also constitute the immanent object: the "enduring process of re-presentation running off in such and such a way."

But on the other hand, re-presentations have the peculiar property that in themselves and in all of their experiential phases they are re-presentations *of* . . . in another sense, that they have a second and different sort of intentionality, one proper to them and not to all experiences. Now this new intentionality has the property that, in form, it is a "replica" [*Gegenbild*] of the intentionality that constitutes time; and as it reproduces in each of its elements a moment of a presentational flow and, in its elements taken as a whole, a whole presentational flow, so it produces a reproductive consciousness of a re-presented immanent object. It therefore constitutes something twofold. First, through its form as a flow of experience it constitutes the re-presentation as an immanent unity. And since the moments of

[43] The text of the sketch from here to p. 312, line 7, is reproduced with slight variations as the conclusion of § 23, p. 53, line 18, to p. 54, line 20. – Editor's note.

experience belonging to this flow are reproductive modifications of moments belonging to a parallel flow (which in the ordinary case consists of nonreproductive moments), and since these reproductive modifications involve an intentionality, the flow is joined together to make up a constitutive whole in which I am conscious of an intentional unity: the unity of what is remembered.

Of course, in order to clarify the case of the re-presentation of something transient,[44] it would first be necessary to clarify the double intentionality of the flows of consciousness. On the one hand, the unity of an appearance of something external or the unity of the flow of an appearance of something external is constituted in a flow of consciousness. This occurs through the form of the flow. On the other hand, an external object, which is itself a temporal object and whose time is objective time, becomes constituted in the flow. This occurs through the intentionality peculiar to the elements of experience belonging to this flow (by virtue of which every experience that is an appearance, as a moment of experience belonging to the flow, has an external intentionality).

Here, as in the case of re-presentation, the immanent objects constituted in time-constitution are "appearances." In this case, however, they are presenting, not re-presenting, appearances. But [301] this reduces to the fact that in the one instance the appearance-experiences are intentionalities possessing the character of re-presentations, while in the other instance they have the character of original intentionalities.

Now the capital question is: What characterizes such original intentionalities or original "appearances of . . ." (immanencies), which are not only immanent temporalities but also constitute (transient) temporality? Does "simplicity" do it, passivity as opposed to spontaneity? And what about something re-presented, yet posited as now? What about the intentionality of empathy? Must not the simplest transient objectivation belonging to the perception of something external be exhibited in advance? This also leads, then, into the constitution of physical reality together with space and time. –

[44] "Something transient" here is to be understood in opposition to something immanent. See note 37 on p. 302. – Translator's note.

That *every experience* possesses *intentions directed towards its context* is certain, and this belongs to its constitution as a *temporal unity*. But I am in doubt about how this should be understood and whether full clarity prevails here in every respect. An enduring being, and first of all a being that is an experience, necessarily becomes constituted. And to that extent every *living* [*Leben*] is living towards [*Entgegenleben*]. But living is not experience. *Living* is the stream of the constituting consciousness. But does every *experience* point towards what is coming and point back at what has been? It pertains to every experience, e.g., to a wish-experience, that it is intended as now and that in the now an intention is directed towards the not-now, towards what is coming. But these intentions surely belong to the mode of being understood as what exists[45] in time-consciousness, therefore to the living, and not to the existing experience taken in itself. What does belong to *what exists? Succession in time* and the determinateness of succession in time, the necessity: After A follows B, then C – with B belonging between A and C. "Connection" with the living that constitutes the actually present now belongs, then, to the original consciousness of time, to the living: that is to say, every memory contains intentions whose fulfillment leads to the present. There is the objective possibility of setting forth the succession: At that time, that was; then came this, up to the now.

Succession in time: This is not a difference that has its basis in the contents of phantasy, as, for example, a difference in colors, an ordering of colors, is grounded in the appearance of the colors [302] in question. The *reproduction* reproductively gives a now, a just-before, and a just-coming. But the reproduced now is supposed to be a past or a future or a now (a re-presented now); and the reproduction here can be direct intuition in the form of memory and expectation or in the form of the nonretaining and nonexpecting immediate intuition of time, and finally in mediate form.[46] And one of these possibilities *must,* we believe, exist.

[45] Reading "*Seiendes,*" according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

[46] This clause following the semicolon, beginning with "and the reproduction here . . . ," was added later in a marginal note. The note continues as follows: "Cf. later concerning this. With respect to memory and expectation, I have ⟨treated?⟩ everything throughout ⟨as if?⟩ it were something remembered, universalizing it. But this can easily be corrected. – Editor's note.

There is no reproduced now that could be posited and that would not be a reality in the unity of the time to which the actually present now belongs; and this is true of anything whatsoever that is reproduced in time. On the other hand, what is reproduced in time can exist in *any* time except the present. And the temporal position is not something that one could somehow find in this content: as something given. On the other hand, the temporal position can indeed be shown: in memory, for example, I investigate the memory's context. And it is clear that every memory already has a certain "intention" aimed at the position of what is remembered in it, even if the intention is somewhat indefinite; but then this is an indeterminacy that can be determined and that does not ⟨allow⟩ of being brought ⟨to determinacy⟩ arbitrarily. Thus in the case of memory, for example, I am bound to the past and perhaps to the day before yesterday, and so on. We therefore have (above all with respect to memory and expectation):

1) for every reproduction – that is, for every positing reproduction – a *content,* specifically, a stock of intentions that ⟨concern⟩ the reproduced being with regard to its duration;

2) every duration has a content, or in other words, every enduring being has its form in the duration, its content in the filling of the duration – but this same form and filling can have a different temporal[47] position in the context of "the" time.

Now in the reproduction of an enduring being, we have, in addition to the reproduction of the filled duration, the intentions [303] that concern its position; and we *necessarily* have these intentions. A duration cannot even be represented, or in other words, posited, without its being posited in a temporal context, that is, without the presence of *intentions aimed at the context.* Moreover, it is necessary that these intentions (in the cases of memory and expectation, which, however, are only particular cases) have either the form of intentions aimed at the past or the form of intentions aimed at the future. It then belongs to their essence that, posited in union with the consciousness [of the] "now," they are united with this consciousness "in opposite directions."

[47] The text of the sketch from here to page 319, line 27, is reproduced with some changes in § 25, § 26, and in paragraph 1 of § 27, page 59, line 26 to page 60, line 2. – Editor's note.

But this unification is a general and nonpresentive one. It is not a fulfillment.

The intentions under 1), that is, the total complex of intentions that make up the appearance of the past enduring object, have their possible fulfillment in the system of appearances that belong to that same enduring object (to the same duration, filled out with the same determined objective content). But all of these appearances would then necessarily have their intentions, of the sort described in 2), aimed at the duration's context. The intentions directed towards the temporal context extend in an entirely different direction. Here it is a question of the production of filled connections up to the actual present. To that extent, we must by all means distinguish with respect to memory (though not everywhere in the same way):

the reproduction of the consciousness in which the past enduring object was given and therefore perceived; and

that which attaches to this reproduction as constitutive for the consciousness "past" or "present" (simultaneous with the actually present now) and "future."

Now what is the latter? Is it also reproduction? This question can easily mislead us (with the temptation to confuse actuality and impression). Naturally, the whole complex is reproduction. It is not only the then-present of consciousness with its flow that is reproduced, but also "*implicite*" the whole stream of consciousness up to the living present. "*Implicite*" – psychologically that means: Memory flows continuously, since the life of consciousness flows continuously and does not merely piece itself together link by link into a chain. Rather, everything new reacts on the old: the forward-directed intention belonging to the old is fulfilled and determined in this way, and that gives a definite [304] coloring to the reproduction. Thus we have a retroactive effect here. The new points again to the new, which, in making its appearance, becomes determined and modifies the reproductive possibilities for the old, and so on. And the retroactive power extends back along the chain. For the reproduction of something past bears the character *past* and an indeterminate intention aimed at a certain location in time in relation to the now. Thus it is not as if we had a mere chain of "*associated*" intentions, one bringing to mind another, this one recalling the next, and so on

(in the flow); rather we have *one* intention that in itself is an intention aimed at this series of possible fulfillments. But this is a nonintuitive, an "*empty*" intention. Its object is the objective series of events in time, and this series is its "surroundings."

Does this not universally characterize "surroundings": a unitary intention directed towards a multitude of interconnected objectivities and coming to fulfillment in the gradual, separate, and multifarious givenness of those objectivities? This is also the case with spatial "background." And thus each thing in perception has its reverse side as background (for it is not a question of the background of attention but of apprehension). What I described in the lectures[48] ⟨as⟩ nonpresentive perception or co-perception is a "complex" intention that can be fulfilled in connections of a determinate sort, in connections of givenness. Foreground is nothing without background. The appearing side is nothing without the nonappearing side. So too in the unity of time-consciousness: the reproduced duration is the foreground; the intentions directed towards the insertion [of the duration into time] make conscious a background, a temporal background. And this is continued in a certain fashion in the constitution of the temporality of the enduring object itself with its now, before, after. We have the analogies: the insertion of the spatial thing into the surrounding space and spatial world – on the other hand, the spatial thing itself and its foreground and background (at least as phantoms). For the temporal thing: its insertion into the temporal form and temporal world – on the other hand, the [305] temporal thing itself and its shifting orientation in relation to the living now. These analogies, however, must not be taken in a wholly literal way and must not be simply accepted. How far they actually extend as strict analogies must be brought to light by precise investigation.

But it is important to investigate *whether memory and expectation actually can stand on the same footing*. Intuitive memory offers me the living reproduction of the elapsing duration of an event, and only the intentions that point back at what preceded

[48] Presumably, Husserl means the course on the *Einführung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie* [Introduction to logic and epistemology] given in the winter term of 1906/07; cf. above, p. 279, note 2. – Editor's note.

the event and point ahead up to the living now remain nonintuitive. What about the intuitive representation of a future event?

I will "go downstairs later on and enter the dining room[49] . . . ." I "will have supper afterwards." I now possess intuitively the reproductive image of an event; the event runs off reproductively. Fastened to this image are indeterminate intentions aimed at the future and at the past, that is, intentions that from the beginning of the event concern its temporal surroundings, which terminate in the living now. *To that extent,* the intuition belonging to expectation is memorial intuition turned upside down, for in memory's case the intentions aimed at the now do not "precede" the event but follow after it. As coloring of the surroundings, they lie "in the opposite direction."

What about the way in which the event itself is given? Does it make an essential difference that in memory the content of the event is determined? Now memory can be intuitive and yet not very determinate, since many of its intuitive components do not actually have the character of memory at all. In the case of a perfect memory, everything down to the smallest detail would be clear and would be characterized as memory. But *idealiter* the situation could be precisely the same in the case of the expectational intuition. In general, this intuition leaves much open, and this remaining-open is again a characteristic of the components in question.

Pictoriality, Pictures in Memory, Pictures in Expectation [306]

The whole intuition offers, as it were, only a schema of what is to come, really a picture, since in what is intuitively given I see something that is not given to me and that would be given to me if nothing in the "picture" left anything open to me. But does not memory also offer to me, at least in general, a mere *picture* – that is, any memory in which I do indeed have an appearance, but with the consciousness that what has been is itself given in the appearance with respect to certain particular traits, while with respect to others it is merely portrayed? But in

[49] Reading *Speisezimmer* for *Sitzzimmer,* according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

both cases there is the peculiarity that *in principle a perfect representation is possible* – that is to say, a representation that no longer contains any discrepancy between what is given and what is intended, and which therefore no longer contains any difference between the *picture-object* and its *subject*. –

Is not a prophetic consciousness (a consciousness that passes itself off as prophetic) conceivable as a matter of principle, then? And can one say that we do not sometimes *de facto* have a definite plan and, intuitively representing what is planned, actually accept it, so to speak, lock, stock, and barrel as the future reality? Furthermore, in both cases [i.e. in expectation and memory] the part covering the extent of time up to the actual now is indeterminate and can be more or less indeterminate (in the *δύναμις*).

But there are fundamental differences in the manner of fulfillment. Intentions aimed at the past are necessarily fulfilled by bringing to light the contexts that belong to intuitive reproductions. The reproduction of the past event itself with respect to its validity – let us say, with respect to the reproduction itself and its validity (in internal consciousness) – admits of completion and of the confirmation of its memorial indeterminacies only by being converted into a reproduction in which each and every component is characterized as reproductive. Here it is a matter of such questions as: Have I actually seen this? Have I actually perceived it? Have I actually had this appearance with precisely this content? (A different question is the following: Was that a reality, was what appears real?) And this appearance must be inserted into a nexus of like appearances extending up to the now.

On the other hand, [we can say with respect to the] accuracy of expectation: Fulfillment of expectation is fulfillment by a perception. It simply belongs to the essence of what is expected that it is [307] something that is going to be perceived, a perceiving-in-genesis. And so too with the intentions aimed at the surroundings [of what is expected]. Everything there is fulfilled through the actuality of experiencing, of impressional experiencing. All things considered, however, the intuition belonging to expectation is something just as original and unique as the intuition of the past.

We *must certainly note* that among the modes of time-consciousness brought about by reproduction, *memory* and *expectation* make up only a *preeminent group*. Not only the reproductive positing of temporal being belongs to the essence of these reproductive experiences, but also a certain relation to internal consciousness.

That it is consciousness of having-been-perceived belongs primarily and as a fundamental fact to the essence of memory. If I remember an external event intuitively, I have a reproductive intuition of it. And it is a positing reproduction. But this reproduction of something external is necessarily given in consciousness by means of a reproduction of something internal. (Since the external event is given in a determinate mode of appearance, an appearing of something external must be reproduced. The appearing of the external, as an experience, is a unity belonging to the consciousness of the internal; and to the consciousness of the internal corresponds reproduction of the internal.) Now there exist two possibilities here. The reproduction of what is internal can be a positing reproduction; and therefore the appearance of the event can be posited, and posited in the unity of "internal" time. Or the reproduction of what is external can be positing, positing the temporal event in objective time, while the reproduction of what is internal is not positing; and therefore the appearance itself is not posited as an event belonging to internal time, which also means that the corresponding time-constituting stream is not posited in the unity of the total life-stream.

What[50] *is essential to memory and expectation* (to directly intuitive memory and expectation, cf. below) lies in the insertion of the reproduced *appearance* into the context of the being of internal time, the flowing sequence of my experiences. To be sure, the positing normally extends further, to what is given *objectively* [308] in the external appearance. But this positing can be annulled, can be contradicted, and yet memory – or, respectively, expectation – will still remain; that is, we will not cease to speak of memory and expectation as such. Only then we will say: I remember that I

[50] The text of the sketch from here to p. 320, line 22, is reproduced with some variations in paragraph 2 of § 28, p. 61, line 34, to p. 62, line 14. – Editor's note.

"supposedly" perceived this at that time, but it was an illusion. I expect to see such and such (I expected it earlier and believed that it would be a reality; now I know that my seeing will be illusory). But normally "I expect the event – I remember the event" means both: "I will see the event" (and "I will receive notice that it is a reality") – "I have seen the event" (and "I have received notice that it exists").

I now see that a supplement is needed here: *directly intuitive* memories and *directly intuitive* expectations – in contrast to those that are not intuitive or are mediately intuitive, those that are indirectly symbolizing, those resting on indirect knowledge, etc. The directly intuitive acts in this sense are acts *that are organized in the same way*. Directly intuitive perception, directly intuitive memory and expectation of something external all have the same structure; that is, [they all involve] not only the positing of the intuited external something but also the positing of the intuiting, specifically, positing in internal perception, in internal memory, in internal expectation. If, from the beginning, it is a question of the intuition – that is, the *direct* intuition – of something psychic, then the differentiation in the hierarchical series is omitted and we have parity from the beginning.

If we stay[51] with the reproductive intuition of the external, of external temporality and objectivity, we will then have *still other types* of intuition of temporal objects – specifically, other types of immediate intuition. I now represent to myself the Roons, but not as I would in a memory of something previously seen; rather, I represent the Roons as now existing, as it now is. And I represent to myself, intuitively, a former event, but I do not remember the event, although I do take it as actually past: I make myself an intuition of it according to a description. I also [309] do this with respect to the future. I even make myself intuitions of what is present, of what is posited as present, although I may never have seen it. In the first case, I do indeed have memories, but I give to what is remembered duration up to the actually present now; and for this duration I have no internally remembered "appearance." The "memory image" does serve me, but I

[51] The text of the sketch from here to p. 322, line 5, is reproduced with some changes in § 29, p. 62, line 15, to p. 63, line 37. – Editor's note.

do not posit what is remembered (the object of the internal memory in its parallel duration, as it existed objectively at that time). How do I posit here, and what do I posit? Well, in any event, we posit what endures as it presents itself in this appearance, and we posit the appearing now and the ever new now, etc. But we do not posit it as "past."

We know that the "past" in memory's case also does not imply that in the present act of remembering we make a picture for ourselves of what existed earlier or that we produce other constructions of this sort. On the contrary, we simply posit what appears, what is intuited, which in conformity with its temporality is intuitable only in temporal modes, of course. And to what thereby appears we give, in the mode of memory by means of the intention aimed at the surroundings of the appearance, a position in relation to the actually present now. Thus, in the case of the re-presentation of something that presently exists but is absent, we must also ask about the intentions directed towards the surroundings of the intuition. And in this case, naturally, these intentions are of an entirely different sort: they have no relation whatsoever to the now through a continuous series of internal appearances that would be posited in their entirety. Of course, this reproductive appearance is not without a context. It is supposed to be something enduring that appears there, something that has been and now is and will be. Thus by some route or other I "can" go and see the thing, still find it; and I can then go back again and look at it in repeated "possible" appearance-series. And had I set out a short time ago and gone there (this is possible, and to it correspond "possible" appearance-series), I would now have this intuition as a perceptual intuition, and so on. Thus the appearance that hovers before me reproductively is indeed not characterized as having existed internally and impressionally, and what appears is not characterized as having been perceived in its temporal duration. But relation to the *hic et nunc* exists here too, and we can say that the appearance also bears a certain positing-character: it belongs in a determinate nexus of [310] appearances (and of appearances that would be "positing," position-taking appearances throughout). And in relation to the latter it has motivating characters: the intentions aimed at the surroundings involve a halo of intentions for the experiences

themselves. This is also true of the intuition of something past that I have not actually seen in the past (e.g., I am now seeing the house for the first time, and while I am seeing it for the first time, I have the intuition of the house as it was an hour ago), and the same holds of the future. These are all immediate intuitions.

Then *add to this* the pictorializing intuitions, based on appearances, etc. – indirect intuitions, therefore. Here more than ever the positing in time and the positing of what is not remembered or not expected is obviously not a mere positing-character appended to the intuition. Furthermore, empathy, introjection, again have *their* mediacy.

⟨*No. 46. Questionableness of Tracing All Differences Back to the Mode of Apprehension*⟩[52]

Memory in the customary sense stands on an equal footing with expectation, and both stand on an equal footing with phantasy-representation.

Perception in the customary sense or in a certain strict sense is perception of the now. But there is also memorial perception (primary memory). Memory of something further past is either empty memory (which on occasion may be symbolic), or it is phantasy memory. The latter (the intuitive recollection) stands on a level with the intuitive re-presentation of an unperceived *present* (of something "known" to be presently existing) – on a level with the re-presentation of the familiar street running by my house, which I remember. This is therefore the memory of something, but in such a way that this something is posited and stands before me intuitively not as having been but as present (although not perceived).

But memory can also be memorial perception. The past object "given" as past. The past object "appears" intuitively, but not [311] in the strict sense of perception. Earlier I was inclined to assume in this case merely a difference in apprehension and to say that

[52] One might notice the verbal accord of this sketch with the sketch reproduced above in No. 15, especially p. 178f. A glance back at No. 15, however, indicates that the sketch before us here was obviously written at an essentially later date – which in any case follows from its final sentence. – Editor's note.

the same sensuous contents, which function as presentants in perception, here undergo a modified apprehension.

⟨*No. 47. "Content-moments" and "Apprehension-moments" and the Evidence of Fresh Memory*⟩[53]

One[54] speaks of the *dying-away,* the *fading,* etc., of the sensation-representants when perception proper passes over into fresh memory. But according to the preceding investigations, it is clear that the contents that have died away and become faded are no longer sensation-contents at all, and are not "contents" of any sort in the original sense. Admittedly, it is difficult to know what is going on here. What is the word "content" supposed to mean? When a tone dies away, the tone itself is sensed at first with particular fullness (intensity); and then there follows a rapid weakening in intensity: the tone is still there, still sensed, but in mere reverberation. This genuine tone-sensation must be distinguished from the tonal moment in fresh memory. The freshly remembered tone is not a present tone but precisely a tone remembered in the now: it is not really on hand in the memorial consciousness. But neither can the tonal moment that belongs to this consciousness be a different tone that is really on hand; it cannot even be a very weak tone equivalent in quality (such as an echo). A present tone can indeed "remind" one of a past tone, exemplify it, pictorialize it. But that already presupposes another representation of the past. The intuition of the past cannot itself be a pictorialization. It is an original consciousness. We cannot deny that there are echoes. But when we recognize and distinguish them, we can easily confirm that they obviously do not belong to memory as memory but to perception. The reverberation of a violin tone is precisely a feeble present violin tone and in [312]

[53] Husserl later dated this sketch roughly as coming from the "time of Silvaplana or afterwards"; he stayed at Silvaplana in August of 1909. As far as its substantive content is concerned, however, the sketch could hardly have been written later than the winter of 1908. The major part of the sketch is reproduced – with numerous variations – in sections 12 and 13, pp. 33–36; see the more precise references in the following notes. – Editor's note.

[54] From here to p. 326, line 3, the text of the sketch is reproduced, with variations, in §§ 12–13, p. 33, line 5, to p. 35, line 38. – Editor's note.

itself has nothing whatsoever to do with the memory of the loud tone that has just passed. The echoing itself, the afterimages of any sort left behind by the stronger data of sensation (after the cessation of the stimulus, physically speaking), far from having to be attributed necessarily to the essence of memory, have nothing at all to do with it.

But it surely does belong to the essence of the intuition of time that in each point of its duration (which we can make into an object reflectively) it is consciousness of what has just been and not merely consciousness of the now-point of the object that appears as enduring. And what has just been is intended in this consciousness in its corresponding continuity, and in each phase it is intended in a determinate "mode of appearance": with the distinctions of "content" and apprehension. We focus our attention on the whistle that is now sounding: In each point an extension stands before us, and it stands before us in an extension of "appearance." In each phase of this extension, the appearance has its moment of quality and its moment of apprehension. On the other hand, the moment of quality is not a real quality, not a tone that would really exist at present – that is, that could be taken as a now-existing, though immanent, tone-content. The real content of the consciousness of the now contains at most sensed tones, which then must necessarily be characterized as perceived, as present, and in no way as past. Memorial consciousness really contains consciousness of the past of the tone, memory of the tone, intuitive, primary memory of the tone, and must not be divided into "sensed tone" and "apprehension as memory." Just as a phantasy-tone is not a tone but the phantasy of a tone, or just as tone-phantasy and tone-sensation are essentially different things and not by any chance the same thing only differently interpreted or apprehended (or however else one chooses to put it): so too the tone primarily remembered in intuition is something fundamentally and essentially different from the perceived tone; and correlatively, primary memory of the tone is something different from sensation of the tone.

Now does there exist a *law* according to which primary [313] memory is possible *only* in continuous annexation to a preceding sensation or perception? A law according to which each phase of primary memory is conceivable only as a phase; that is, a law

according to which the primary memorial phase cannot be expanded into an extent that would be identical in all of its phases? One will say decisively: That is absolutely evident. The empirical psychologist, who is accustomed to treating everything psychic as mere matter of fact, will deny it, of course. He will say: Why should a beginning consciousness that commences with a fresh memory without having been preceded by a perception not be *conceivable?* Perception may in fact be necessary to the production of fresh memory. It may in fact be the case that human consciousness can have memories, even fresh ones, only after it has had perceptions. But the opposite is also conceivable.

Over against this, we defend the *a priori necessity that a corresponding perception precede the fresh memory.*

Above all, we will have to insist that a phase is conceivable only as a phase, without the possibility of extension. And the now-phase is conceivable only as the limit of a continuity of fresh memory, just as each phase of fresh memory itself is conceivable only as a point belonging to such a continuum. And this is true of every now of time-consciousness. But then even a whole continuous series of fresh memory would not be conceivable without a corresponding perception that precedes it. This implies that the series of fresh memory, which is presently a now, ⟨is⟩ itself a limit and necessarily undergoes modification: what is remembered "sinks further and further into the past without changing its temporality." But not only that: it is necessarily something that has sunk into the past, something that necessarily permits an evident recollection that traces it back to a now that is given once again. This now, as it sinks backwards (that is, as it sinks backwards once again), is reduced in like fashion to this same series.

But then one will say: Can I not have a memory of A, even a fresh memory. when in fact A has not taken place at all? Certainly. Indeed, I can go even further than that. I can also have a perception of A when A has not occurred in reality.

And consequently, when we have a fresh memory of A, we by no means assert the having of the fresh memory as evidence that A must have preceded it; but we do indeed assert it as evidence that A must have been perceived (whether A was heeded [314]

primarily or not: something was there "in person" for my consciousness, even if it was unnoticed or noticed only incidentally).

Of course, in our view, there is *one* evidence that does pertain to fresh memory:[55] the evidence that arises from the reduction to what is immanent, and naturally also from the reduction to the content of the memory of what is immanent in relation to the corresponding content of the perception of what is immanent.

All of the *evidences* of the phenomenological-epistemological sort present here are to be studied most thoroughly. –

Now one could make the following objection: The whole procedure of our phenomenological analysis of time stands under an *empirical supposition.* One could say that we have *assumed* the *flow of objective time* and *then* at bottom merely studied the *conditions of the possibility* of an intuition of time and of a genuine knowledge of time; or that we have simply invented them for ourselves. We have also assumed in advance that the temporal data and temporal arrangements on hand in the intuition of temporal relationships – even in the phenomenological-reflective intuition directed towards the flow of time-consciousness – are *actually encountered beforehand.* Thus we have everywhere *presupposed* the validity of the intuition of time.

Nonetheless, we must consider the following question here: To what extent have we assumed in advance a flow of *objective* time? Well, precisely in the sense in which we have assumed a physical thing in the analysis of the physical thing, or something perceived in the analysis of perception, and so on. We surely have not assumed the truth of a world and of some *world*-time, nor have we assumed the real existence of any physical thing and its duration. But we certainly do accept the appearing duration as it appears, the appearing physical reality as it appears, and so forth. Now these are absolute data, the doubting of which would be meaningless. We have not explored the conditions of the possibility of an actually existing world-time and world assumed in advance and of the knowledge of them; on the contrary, what we have explored are the conditions of the possibility of a world-

[55] Reading "*Erinnerung*" for "*Evidenz.*" – Translator's note.

time as such, of the duration of a physical thing as such, and so [315] on.

Furthermore, it is certainly correct that we have also presupposed an existing time; namely, not the time of the world of empirical experience but the phenomenological (better, phansiological) time, the immanent time in the flow of consciousness: we have presupposed, for example, that the consciousness of this tonal process, of this melody I am now hearing, is actually a succession of intuiting consciousness. This consciousness is not "actually" a succession in the full psychological sense, however; but it is successive in the immanent sense. Now for this immanent succession we claim an evidence that holds good for it as well as for every datum that is purely and simply absolute. And here, we believe, it makes no sense to doubt and to deny. What can be doubted rationally can also, considered fundamentally, be thought of rationally as not existing. From a rational point of view, therefore, it is possible that it would not exist and would be denied. Does that prove true for *every* fresh memory, even for the fresh memory of what is immanent?

I might say: If *one* memory of something immanent can be denied, every such memory can be denied; if *one* is valid, all are valid. The motives for doubt, acceptance, denial are everywhere the same.

It is said that the existence of the *cogitatio* is indubitable. Can that mean: the being-now of the *cogitatio* in the sense of a mathematical point? Is it less evident that a *cogitatio,* according to its essence, necessarily endures for a time than that it exists? And if we have evidence for however small a duration, do we not by that very fact already have evidence for fresh memory? Or should one simply excuse oneself with claims of legitimate probability? Yet one will surely say: If any temporal relationship – of a before b, for example – be said to exist, then it must be possible as a matter of principle to intuit it, to bring it to legitimating givenness. It belongs *a priori* to the sense of every being that a being-given is possible. Now how is this possible being-given supposed to look? Can it be a mediate being-given? Does not the validity of any mediate being-given in some way presuppose the possibility of grasping its temporality? Certainly each individual is necessarily something temporal. What I must

still ground is doubtful as long as it is not grounded. If each fresh memory is doubtful and, as long as it is not grounded, without legitimacy, then it is doubtful whether there has been any grounding whatever as far as the elapsed steps are concerned; and if that can be put in doubt, how can I assert that I have [316] grounded anything at all?

In any case, what can lay claim to a higher legitimacy than the assertion: If[56] a succession, a change, an alteration appears, then the immanent succession, alteration, etc., belonging essentially to the appearance of this succession, etc., is absolutely certain.

It is fundamentally wrongheaded to argue: How, in the now, can I know of a not-now, since I cannot compare the not-now – which, of course, no longer exists – with the now (namely, with the now in the memory image that I have on hand in the now). As if it belonged to the essence of memory that ⟨I⟩ take an image on hand in the now for another thing similar to it, and that I could and must compare them as I do in the case of pictorial representation. *Memory* is not image-consciousness but something totally different. What is remembered, of course, does not now exist, otherwise it would not be something that has been but something present; and in memory it is not given as now, otherwise memory would precisely not be memory but perception. A comparing of what is no longer perceived but merely remembered with something beyond it makes no sense. Just as I see being-now in perception and enduring being in the extended perception as it becomes constituted, so I see the past in memory, insofar as the memory is primary; the past is given in primary memory, and givenness of the past *is* memory (original givenness as primary memory, givenness once again as recollection).

But what is the situation from the standpoint of probability? The grasping of the immanent now, the point at which the now is perceived, would give full evidence of certainty; the certainty would be shaded off in probability corresponding to the memorial continuum. But can I have probability about something of which I cannot possibly have a true intuition? And wherever intuition is possible, would not givenness also be possible? Thus

[56] From here to line 29 the text of the sketch is reproduced with slight variations in § 13, p. 35, line 38, to p. 36, line 23. – Editor's note.

one could attempt to answer. But what about the case of the perception of something external? Of physical things? Givenness is possible here, but adequate givenness? Is not every perceptual [317] positing of something external merely probable? But surely that is not possible. And yet does it make sense to speak of probability where countermotives do not already have their legitimate position against other motives? And does all of this make sense when not even the immanent succession and togetherness could be posited legitimately?

But I think all of these things must be thought through much more rigorously and must be formulated with maximum precision. I am still not entirely satisfied. –

Let a *tone* serve as our example. During the time that we hear the tone, "it is dying away," and time-consciousness confers on it its sinking position in relation to the now of the actual perceptions. In focusing our attention on what is in time, on this or that distinctive phase of the process or on the enduring tone that is changing in such and such a way, we live in memories. But we can also focus our attention on the memories themselves as objects, we can perceive them. And in doing so, we find that they come under the law of time, that they sink in time: that is, the perceptions of the memories continue and stretch out into memories *of* memories; and we can then acquire *one* consciousness of the succession of the original memories.

The following *law* obtains here: *the interval between two phases always remains the same* while they sink back in time. By virtue of the continuous consciousness of identity that firmly grasps the A as the same A and the B as the same B as they sink back, both constantly maintain *the same temporal interval.* –

We everywhere supposed here that what is in time is constituted by a content, really experienced in time-consciousness, that is animated by the temporal representation, by the time-apprehension. The *question* then is: Cannot *the same* content that is now the *presentant in a perception arbitrarily* function as the *representant in a memory?* Or is it an *accident which character* annexes itself – that is, is it a psychic fact determined, let us say, according to merely psychological-empirical laws? The *answer* is: *No. The memory-phase is possible only as a phase;* "primary" memory *can* make its appearance *only* as an *appendix,* as the

continuation of a perceptual consciousness. *How do we know this?* [318]

We have the evidence that "past" refers to "now" and that now and past exclude one another. Identically the same thing can indeed be now and past at once, but only by enduring between the past and the now. We have the evidence that a memory-phase cannot endure and that it can exist only in the nexus of a memorial continuum that emanates from a perception – just as it is an evident law that a perception cannot endure without a memorial continuum attaching itself to it. It is also inherent in this that not every perception can endure: namely, the perception of a time-constituting memory cannot endure. What makes such evidences possible? What does the adequate seeing, which realizes these evident laws, look like?

One final remark: The *direct consciousness of the past* is not only a continuous consciousness, objectively speaking, but also *consciousness of this continuity*. Does this consciousness originate from reflection on the memories, which, in this reflection, are perceived and consequently themselves acquire phases – phases of the second level belonging in each moment to each memory-phase – which are then continuously and unitarily shaded off? Obviously.

⟨*No. 48.*⟩ *The Original Process of Being Pushed Back in Time*

Theme: "Representation" [*Repräsentation*]. Sensuous contents existing in consciousness "present, represent," etc. – briefly, they "are there at some time; and when they are there, they are apprehended in one way or another, depending on the circumstances." –

Let us assume that red appears. And then it is just past. Still intuitive. Can an actually present red continue to be preserved and continue to function as a "representant" there? Can we manage with the theory of representation? If a red were *still* there – actually experienced – in the same sense as the earlier red, then the red would really simply endure, at most fading away, diminishing in fullness, intensity, and the like. And the situation is the same if we take any phase in the original process of being

pushed back in time and ask how the "contents that are fading away" can be representants, assuming that the fading-away is a [319] "change in content."

The difficulty is discussed on the oldest sheets. In any case, there are objections here to my original view, my theory of representation, which operated with experienced *contents* (e.g., sensuous contents) and regarded them as apprehended in one way or another, depending on the circumstances. Everything is merely a matter of differences in apprehension, which would simply attach itself to the content that is experienced and that exists in consciousness, "animating" it. But such an interpretation might be quite untenable, and it is our particular task to create complete clarity here.

⟨*No. 49. Do We Have a Continuum of Primary Contents Simultaneously in the Now-point and, in Addition to This and Simultaneous with It, a Continuum of "Apprehensions"?*⟩

If one takes *perception and re-presentation,* as they are still taken in the old sheets before us here, as *products of apprehension-contents and particular apprehensions,* then the continuity of perceptual apprehension (now-apprehension and the continuum of primary memorial apprehensions) yields the presently enduring object and, in a modified way, the recollected object that once endured in a past present. Now the question immediately arises: As a matter of principle, can a content actually be apprehended in a temporally distinct mode and then *at the same time,* for example, also be apprehended as identically the *same* content in different modes? One and the same content, possessed of the same determinacy, is apprehended at a given time in the mode of the now and at the same time in the mode of the primarily past. Let us consider first of all something more universal.

In the continuum of the perception of an enduring object, there corresponds to each phase[57] of the duration a *content peculiar to that phase.* The object spreads out in time; it is the same object in the duration, but the same enduring object is

[57] Reading "*Phase*" for "*Phasen*". – Translator's note.

temporally extended and can be divided temporally in conformity with this extension, a different temporal part of the object corresponding to each division in time. What is past is past along with all the determinations that fill the time. What fills the time is different from phase to phase; at most, [what fills one phase is] completely like what fills another phase – namely, in the case of constancy. The object is the same. But the object is the unity in [320] the duration of its temporal content, whether the content remains unchanged or whether it changes. Hence *a different representation* must necessarily correspond to each temporal content, to the content of each extent of time and of each point of time. For in the intuition of the duration of the object and, correlatively, of the object in its duration, the continuum of its parts and phases is supposed to be intuited and given unitarily. Intuition of something continuous is necessarily a continuum itself; intuition of a duration itself endures, so to speak: it is extended intuition, and to each phase of the intuited duration there corresponds a phase of intuition as intuition *of* it.

Thus its own "representation," its own partial intuition with "apprehension" and "representing contents," corresponds to each part, to each phase of the intuited enduring objectivity. Double "apprehension" would signify that the times, so to speak, intersect, that a past phase of the object is identical with the present phase. The object is the same in the duration; but the "past object as past," its being-past, is not identical with its being-now.

In substance, what was said is true of every interpretation independently: that is, whether or not we interpret the intuition of time according to the schema "content of apprehension – apprehension." Under all circumstances, we have to acknowledge the *a priori* necessity that the intuition of duration is a continuum from the phansic point of view and that in each phase we have the intuition of a temporal phase of the object. Thus within each phase we have to distinguish in a certain manner the "apprehension," in which the appearing manifests itself, from the immanent content that "represents" the object's content and brings it to appearance. But this concerns *the "appearance" apart from its temporality* – in each phase of the intuition of time, a house (which is there continuously) is brought to appearance,

or a tree or the tone of a violin (for such objects the "appearance" may also have its essential differences in relation to the primary physical realities). In any case, that which subsequently constitutes the temporal difference is an "apprehension" in a *fundamentally different* sense; and yet it is again something [321] essentially inseparable from the apprehension of the object. The object becomes constituted as an object only in the apprehension of time, in the consciousness of time – as an object that endures, that changes or remains unchanged.

Now what is it supposed to mean when I say that the *contents on hand in the actual now, by means of the apprehension they undergo, stand before me as temporal objectivity?* First of all, the now of *consciousness* is set over against the now-point of the *object*. The house stands before me as present, as presently enduring. And the consciousness of the now is itself a now, and the consciousness of the enduring present is itself an enduring present. But I can also say the following: This cup appears continuously. But not only that. The cup-appearance, the presentation of the enduring cup from this particular side and everything that pertains to it – the presentations of the determinations belonging to this side of the cup, the presentation-contents and the act of presenting appropriate to them – appears continuously. This appearing is the appearing of something "immanent." My regard is now turned in a different direction – not towards the cup but towards the presentation of the cup (the cup-appearance). Now *in this case what is the "content"* that undergoes a different "*apprehension*" in time-consciousness? "Sensuous content" and "appearance-consciousness" (the act of presenting), just as in the other case, except that my "regard" is turned in a different direction. The enduring cup continually stands before me as enduring, even though I am "giving my attention" to the enduring appearance of it; and conversely, the enduring appearance is continually there, even if I am paying attention to the cup as cup. This act of paying attention, this act of observing and of meaning, is also something that can be the object of reflection and that has its "temporal position." To the now of the observed cup belongs the now of the act of observing it, and to the immediate past of the observed cup belongs the having-been-observed-in-the-immediate-past, and so on. When reflection

on the observing – an observing of the observing – takes place, this observing of the second degree is also a now and has its position in a temporal nexus, in the temporal field; and all of these temporal fields are necessarily related to one another: the now of the observing is none other than the now of the observed – it presents itself as the same. And the now of the appearance of the cup presents itself in turn as the same as the [322] now of the cup; and the same is true with respect to the points of the past.

It pertains to the essence of the appearance of the cup that endures here, or in other words, that stands before me as enduring, that it has a continuous extension. Specifically, to the now-point of the cup there already belongs a continuum of appearance in which the intuitive not-now comes to momentary intuition. The primary core of appearance in this continuum also has its extension. What kind of extension is that? *Do we have a continuum of primary contents simultaneously in the now-point and, in addition to this and simultaneous with it, a continuum of "apprehensions"?* When, in the now-point on which we are focused, we ascribe a now to the "consciousness" of the objectivity itself, to the consciousness of our cup, then certainly everything that "*really*" (*reell*) belongs to this consciousness exists in it simultaneously – that is to say, exists in it "now."

Now are we *permitted* to say that real component parts exist in this consciousness: an extension of primary contents (namely, of the primary contents corresponding to the phases of the intuitive extent of the cup's duration) – and united with this extension, the extension of apprehensions that effect the presentation of the cup? And is that which brings the temporal extension to consciousness a characteristic of consciousness that undergoes modification, thus something on the order of a higher apprehension or something analogous to apprehension?

First of all, it must be noticed that *the same primary contents can present something different,* can bring different things to appearance by means of different thing-apprehensions. This is *not* true of the continuity that belongs to the "*apprehension*" *of time.* Quite the opposite: The primary contents that spread out in the now *are not able to switch their temporal function:* the now cannot stand before me as not-now, the not-now cannot stand

before me as now. Indeed, if it were otherwise, the whole continuum of contents could be viewed as now and consequently as coexistent, and then again as successive. That is evidently impossible.

But let us examine the matter more closely.

We speak of the primary contents, all of which are united in the now-point and in this point are also united with their apprehensions: on both sides, a continuity that coincides. As a representant, the limit-point in this continuity is supposed to bring the now of the object to intuitive presentation; and the [323] remaining points are supposed to bring the past phases [*Gewesenheitsphasen*] of the object to intuitive presentation in their continuous order. But can a series of *coexistent* primary contents ever bring a *succession* to intuition? Can a series of simultaneous red-contents ever bring a duration of a red, of a tone c, and the like, to intuition? Is that possible as a *matter of principle?*

Let us take an *immanent* enduring objectivity, just as it is everywhere present, even in the case of transient[58] data (in the form of the appearance of them). The selected now-point of the intuition of time – let us say, of the temporal intuition of the enduring tone c – would then contain, simultaneously, a continuity of c-phases. And these phases would *exist* simultaneously; specifically, all of them would be *now*. And so too in the case of the red: we would have, simultaneously, a continuity of red-points – for example, of red-points continuously filling out a surface (in the now-point of their existence). Now if these simultaneous contents were at the same time also apprehensible as *successive,* then both intuition of *co-existence* and intuition of *succession* would be possible on the basis of identical contents. And evidently it would also be possible that the same contents that simultaneously coexist there (and they are always supposed to coexist simultaneously in the consciousness of the now) would at the same time be successive as well, and *that is absurd.* This is true not only of the primary contents but also of the *thing-*

[58] "Transient" here is to be understood in the sense of "transcendent." See note 36, p. 302. – Translator's note.

apprehensions, and consequently of the *appearances taken as a whole.*

In truth, no analysis restricted to the phenomena themselves shows that in a now-point of the consciousness of the object there is present a continuity of appearance with its primary contents and apprehension-characters – present, that is, in such a way that we would be permitted to say that a continuity of *appearance* is *really given* in this now and that this must be understood to mean that the appearance corresponding to the now-point of the object (perceptual appearance in a most narrow sense) has an extension in the form of simultaneity: as if the different phases of the intuition of duration that is occurring in the now in question were all actually really equivalent, and equivalent to that limit-appearance which is the appearance of the objective now.

Perhaps it would be better to exemplify this by means of a melody, a case in which the circumstances must be essentially analogous. The just-past tone, as far as it falls into the present [324] time (into the actually intuitive part of the melody in the now-point we have singled out) is *still intended,* but not in the sense that it is actually being really and immanently "sensed," not in the sense that it is there in the manner of a now-tone. A now-tone, which physically stands before me as now, is necessarily represented by means of a now-tone content that is also characterized as now. The still living tone, the tone "still" standing in the view of the temporal intuition, no longer exists; and what pertains to its appearance is not a "tone-sensation" (an actually present now) but an "echo" of the sensation, a modification that is no longer a primary content in the sense of something actually present (not an immanent tone-now). On the contrary, it is something modified: a consciousness of past sensation. In this consciousness, however, no actual tone can be found, only a tone that has been.

In short, there is a *radical alteration,* an alteration that *can never at any time be described in the way in which* we describe the *changes in sensation* that lead *again to sensations.* According to its essence, sensation is consciousness of the now (or appearance of a duration that includes a now). The continuity is a continuity of alterations of consciousness that definitely must not be viewed as products at all times containing a common component – tone c,

red, and the like – while the change is attributed to new moments, called apprehension. The situation here is precisely the same as it is in the case of the distinction between the red of sensation and the reproductive recollection of red. One must not materialize the contents of consciousness, one must not falsify the modifications of consciousness by transforming them into fundamentally different modifications, etc.

⟨*No. 50.*⟩ *The Modification Proper to Primary Memory*[59]

The tone c begins and endures, changing in intensity in this way and that. The duration ⟨is⟩ continuously filled out with a "tone of varying intensity." A point of tone-content belongs to each point of the duration. But at the same time a *series of* [325] *adumbrations* of the earlier points attaches itself to the *sensation-consciousness* of this point (we take any point at all, except the very first or beginning one); and when we proceed along the duration, there pertains to that initial point a continuous adumbrational series of memories *of it*. For *each* time-point of the duration we have a continuity of consciousness that includes: the phase of consciousness [that is] primal sensation of the now-point of the tone (the tone-content that "*now*" exists in this point, that is "sensed" in it) and the series of memories of the time-point (in which it is continuously intended as further and further "past"). And this series of memories is different for every now and is itself continuously modified.

[59] This sketch can be dated with certainty as having been written between October 15, 1908 and the summer term of 1909. For, on the one hand, Husserl refers in it to the work of Hugo Bergmann, *Untersuchungen zum Problem der Evidenz der inneren Wahrnehmung* [Investigations into the problem of the evidence of internal perception] (Halle a.S., 1908); and he noted on the jacket of his copy of this work, which is preserved in the Husserl-Archives at Leuven: "From the author, 15. X. 08." On the other hand, Husserl introduced from a particular point on in the sketch (see below, p. 345, line 30) – subsequently adding it to the preceding part of the sketch as well – the concept of "retention" in a sense in which it appears as already fixed in his lectures given in the summer term of 1909 (see No. 51, p. 347ff.).

Husserl himself seems to have intended the sheets of this sketch for insertion into the original manuscript of his lectures on time-consciousness from February 1905; a part of the sketch is also reproduced in the first paragraph of § 11, p. 30, line 32, to p. 31, line 33, as noted more precisely below. – Editor's note.

To begin, let us *seize* a now-point (a point of the objective duration that is making its appearance). What does the "*primary*" *memory* of the *initial point,* for example, look like? (The original consciousness of the past.) The term "memory" normally includes an "*act of meaning*" as part of its sense. The act of meaning is directed, let us say, towards precisely this initial point. The act of meaning lives in the memorial phenomenon. But the latter is *something continuous* in the concrete flow of consciousness, and thus the act of meaning lives in the memorial phenomenon in such a way that it is intentionally directed towards the beginning-point throughout this continuous series; and so it is for every point. Now how is this to be understood?

First of all, we have the *primal sensation-consciousness,* the *absolutely original* consciousness in which the actual tone-point stands before us "in person," as present itself, as now.[60] This [326] consciousness is involved in continuous change. The *flow,* which is an absolute datum, consists in this continuous change. And the constitution of something present itself, of something itself in the form "now," presupposes the *continuity*. Primal sensation is something *abstract.*[61] And we want to describe something as an absolute datum to be found in the appearing of the duration in question and for every point of this duration that we can seize.

The change consists in the fact that the tone-now present "in person" is continuously modified[62] (*scil.* consciously: "in" consciousness) into something that has been, and that an always new tone-now continuously relieves the one that has passed over into modification. But when the consciousness of the tone-now, the primal sensation, passes over into retentional[63] memory, this

[60] Later note in the margin of the manuscript: "I say *primal sensation,* which designates the non-self-sufficient phase of originativeness; sensation pure and simple designates the whole time-constituting consciousness in which an immanent sensuous content becomes constituted." – Editor's note.

[61] Both of the preceding sentences were presumably inserted into the manuscript later. – Editor's note.

[62] From here to p. 340, line 4, the text of the sketch is reproduced with some variations in § 11, p. 30, line 32, to p. 31, line 33. – Editor's note.

[63] In each instance here the words "retentional" and "retention" [in German: *retentional, Retention*] were inserted between the lines at some later date by Husserl; cf. below, p. 345, note 76. – Editor's note.

memory itself is a now in turn – namely, it belongs to a new tone-now.[64] That is, the memory is given itself; it is actually present;[65] it is something present "in person." Its essence consists in the fact that while it itself is something actually occurring,[65] something present "in person" and [yet] not itself the tone, it is memory *of* the tone that has been. The act of meaning can be directed towards the now: the "memory." The act of meaning can be directed towards the remembered. But every now of consciousness, ⟨everything⟩ actually present belonging to consciousness,[65] is subject to the law of modification: it changes into primary "memory" of "memory," and does so continuously. That is to say, it is a *fixed continuum of "memory" (retention*[66] *so structured that each later point is memory, retention, for every earlier point.* And each memory is already a continuum; namely, the tone begins and "it" steadily continues. The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been (the [327] sensation-consciousness, the consciousness of the tone-datum, is caught up in a process of flowing and, corresponding to the sequence of the flow, passes over into ever new memorial consciousness). Going along the flow or going with it, we have a continuous series of memories – retentions[66] – pertaining to the beginning-point of the tone. But not only that. Every earlier point of this series is adumbrated in turn as a now in the sense of "memory," and therefore a continuity of memorial adumbrations continuously attaches itself to each such memory. And this continuity is itself again an actually present point,[67] a "now," which is adumbrated memorially. This does not lead to an infinite regress, since each memory is in itself continuous modification that carries within, so to speak, the heritage of the whole preceding development in the form of a series of adumbrations. But here it is not the case that in the horizontal direction of the flow each earlier memory is simply replaced by a new one, even if

[64] ⟨Later marginal note in lead pencil⟩: "But this is not now in the same sense and the two are not temporally of the same sort."

[65] In every case here the words "actually present," "something actually occurring," and "⟨everything⟩ actually present belonging to consciousness" were inserted later by Husserl between the lines in lead pencil. – Editor's note.

[66] See page 338, note 63. – Editor's note.

[67] The words "an actually present point" were inserted later by Husserl between the lines in lead pencil. – Editor's note.

continuously. Rather, each later memory is not only continual modification that has arisen from primal sensation but also continual modification of all earlier continuous modifications of the same initial point; that is to say, it itself – this point of memory – is a continuum. Must one not rather say: *Consciousness of* a continuum? Consciousness that continuously contains within itself intentionally all earlier memorial consciousness in the modification of the past? But does not really contain it? *Certainly*. But then this consciousness is itself a continuity of consciousness: Each of its phases is consciousness of an earlier memorial phase of the beginning tone. And if we compare two such phases, the later one is related in a certain way to the object of the earlier one. The memory I now have of the tone's initial point is a *unity of memory to which memories of the memories that I just had of the same tone-phase also belong*. And every such remembered memory, taken completely, is a unity that also ⟨includes⟩ the memories of the memories that, related to the same tone-phase, had preceded it. (In view of this, we must always [328] distinguish between memory itself and the memory's meaning.)

Of course, the matter is still much more complicated, since what is true of the tone's beginning-point is also true of every new point of the tone in its duration.

Infinity – in what is it supposed to consist? Cf. *Brentano's* objection according to Hugo *Bergmann,* ⟨p.⟩ 82 (in his work on "internal perception"):[68] A continuum of infinitely many dimensions is said to result when the "internal perception" in each time-point is directed towards what is present and what is past: my internal perception is directed towards what is present and what is past, the past internal perception grasped by it is again directed towards what is present and what is past, etc.[69]

[68] See above, p. 337, note 59. – Editor's note.

[69] The passage in question reads: "For not only my present but also my past internal perception was accordingly directed in part towards what is present, in part towards what is past; and this is also true of the internal perception grasped by the latter as past, and so on in continuous succession. A continuum of infinitely many dimensions certainly appears to result from this. And, furthermore, it seems to follow that our internal perception, if it always embraces a span of time, however small, must encompass our *whole* psychic life." Bergmann makes the following observation about this passage in a footnote: "I heard this objection in the summer of 1906 from Professor *Brentano*." Bergmann, *op. cit.*, p. 82, note 1. – Editor's note.

Infinities and infinitely many times are encased in one another here. The actually present now encloses memorially a continuum of the past. The new now includes this continuity of memory again, and each subsequent new now includes a new memorial continuum, etc.; and this goes on perpetually. We have a continuum of continua, and each attached continuum is different from every other one: The memory of a memory is never identical with a memory pure and simple.

Is that not an *absurdity?* A continuity that includes other continua, even infinitely many continua, is possible. The continuity of rays in a pencil of rays: it is *one* continuum whose points are continua themselves. Here we have a two-dimensional continuum; or, as the case may be, a three-dimensional one.

What about our case? *Do we actually have a continuum of infinitely many dimensions? Do we not rather have a two-dimensional continuum?* What continuously changes? The tone-point (the beginning-point) is sensed. Sensory givenness continuously passes over (following the line of flow) into memorial givenness. Therefore the steady continuum of memories, which only has the peculiarity that every memory is always also memory of past memory. "*Only*" – does the difficulty perhaps lie there? How can *the same* phenomenon be *memory of* t_0 and *memory of the memory* of t_0?[70] In the case of any ordinary *motion,* the "generating" of some phase or other out of the beginning-phase t_0 (as we choose to designate ⟨it⟩ for the sake of simplicity) is at the same time a generating out of every intervening phase whatsoever. This *analogy* shows what we are aiming at. The memorial consciousness that I now have of the beginning point t_0 shows me that point in a certain past (a certain "immediate past"); and this memorial consciousness is necessarily also memory of all earlier primary memories of the point, each of which continually has a different "immediate past." And the object of these memories is always the beginning-point, except that in each one of the memories this point always brings along [329]

[70] ⟨Later marginal note in lead pencil:⟩ "I must distinguish between memory of t_0 and retention of the primal sensation of t_0. This retention continuously becomes converted into new retentions which are retentions of itself. In relation to t_0 they are memories of something sinking further and further into the past."

with itself, memorially, a different relative immediate past, since each memory has its now, which is also a remembered now.

Now does the infinity of infinities not consist in the fact that what really applies to the present memory of t_o applies, memorially and intentionally, to every memory of ⟨this point⟩ that is supposed to be included in the present memory? I do not believe so. One sees this from the diagram, which I might now draw in a more suitable way than in the lectures[71] as follows. We mark out the objective duration with its points on the abscissa OX and draw at some angle or other (the angle is not supposed to have any symbolic significance) a straight line OM. The continuity running in this direction is supposed to indicate the memorial continuity in the following way:

[330]



The ordinate gives the memorial continuum. In t_1, e.g., the final point on the ordinate is the adumbration possessed in t_1 by the initial point of the tone, which begins to sound in t_0. In t_2, the same tone-point has undergone modification into t_2^0, and in the meantime the t_1-point has undergone modification into t_2^1. t_1^0 (the memory which I have ⟨in⟩ t_1 of t_0) has undergone modification into t_2^0. And thus the whole ordinate $t_1 - t_1^0$ has undergone a displacement, i.e., a modification into $t_2^1 - t_2^0$.

[71] Obviously, that is, in the lectures on time from February 1905. – Editor's note.

[331]



The division would be still better if it were worked out beneath the abscissa in order to suggest pictorially something of the sinking down into the past.[72]

The ordinate taken as a whole is a memorial continuum, and each later ordinate contains in itself the memory of every earlier ordinate. Everything that the ordinate contains in the way of points (in the way of memories) exists "simultaneously" (as actually present experience) *in* the time-point of the ordinate. The modification in the M-direction is *universally and essentially* (so to speak) *always the same*. And thus t_3^0 can also be taken as memory of t_2^0, of t_1^0, etc.; and this is true of all of the ordinates. For each of these ordinates is certainly a "*now*" – for example, in t_2 the ordinate is the "sensed" memory of the preceding portion of the tone, and this whole complex passes over in memory into A A'.

But is this correct? Can just any such extent be taken at will as memory of every preceding one? Now I think the following to be the case: We are not able to do that entirely at our pleasure. But if in t_3 I focus on the memory of t_2, in which a tone actually thrust itself upon my attention, there appears to me, together with the memory of this tone and *as* actually "*simultaneous*" *with it, a memory of that which preceded the tone.* In A, therefore, I focus my attention on the past t; and at the same time, in the rest of the memorial continuum with its act of meaning, I take a position such that I regard it as memory *of* $t_2 - t_2^0$. In t_3, I am

[72] This is a note Husserl made in the margin to the diagram. – Editor's note.

normally – or often – directed towards the *whole series of tones* $t_0 - t_3$: I then have the consciousness of precisely this tonal series.

Now the question is whether all of this is correct.

In the memory (specifically, in the "primary" memory, ⟨in the⟩ *retention*[73]) that I have of a portion of a melody or tonal movement, do I *also* have a memory of the memories that belonged to each time-point or individual tone? That is to say, as something that could be distinguished? According to my present description, *no*. The memorial consciousness of the tonal series is, [332] in itself, also memorial consciousness of the memories that had belonged to each tone-now.[74] *De facto:* Can I find these memories as *extra* elements within the memory of the *tonal series* when I am turned towards it? Surely not. And then the *difficulty* arises: *Do I not also have a memory of the motion of the flow,* of the rising up of ever new nows, of the *development* that causes the continuity of *ordinates* to come forth from t_0? *Are we not threatened with an infinite regress here?* In order to be conscious of the succession of tones, I must be conscious of the succession of the memorial continua (of the ordinates). In order to have the *consciousness of the succession of ordinates,* must I not make a second diagram, and so *in infinitum?*

But I would certainly think that it is precisely *the essence of this kind of modification not* to allow this infinite regress to arise. Indeed, that even follows from the diagram. When t_0 passes over into $t_1\, t_2 \ldots$, the very memorial series that we characterize as ordinates [in the diagram] take shape; and *at the same time the ordinates blend.* If, considered objectively, t_0 passes over into t_3 and if, again considered objectively, the contents of the ordinates pass over into one another along the direction of the abscissa, then, in the manner peculiar to consciousness, t_0 passes over into $t_1^0\, t_2^0 \ldots$, followed by $t_1 - t_1^0$ passing over into $t_2^1\, t_2^0$. New ordinates are continually formed there, and the ordinates thus formed traverse this same path of the modification of consciousness. But does that mean anything else than that the *ordinates blend into*

[73] The word "*retention*" was inserted later between the lines. – Editor's note.

[74] ⟨Later marginal note in lead pencil:⟩ "Here memory is taken in two senses: memory of the *objects* – reproduction of the acts."

one another and that here the very blending is nothing other than the blending that pertains to memorial modification? Or better: *The flow of consciousness is indeed a succession itself, but it automatically fulfills the conditions of the possibility of the consciousness of succession.* But a sensation-series, which is not a memory-series, can become given in consciousness as a *temporal succession* only because it *grounds memory-series* in the indicated way. Primary memory must attach itself to the sensation as something new so that the consciousness of the sensation does not vanish, so that the duration of the sensation-content and [333] of temporal objects – perhaps of a change in sensation (real change) – can become constituted. On the other hand, as far as the *flow of memory* is concerned, nothing further needs to be attached to the newly occurring memory since it already *implies in itself the "memory" of the previous memory.* (*Retention.*)[75]

But is this altogether correct? I do acquire perception of the movement of the tone. Now the question is: How, analogously, am I supposed to acquire "*perception*" *of the flow?* Do I ever have perception of the flow? Can I not take a position, phenomenologically, such that I focus my attention on the consciousness, on the succession of tone-nows together with their trains of memory, rather than on the tones? It therefore does seem that we would have to repeat the diagram into infinity. That is inconceivable.

Is it inherently absurd to regard the flow of time as an *objective movement? Certainly!* On the other hand, memory is surely something that itself has *its now,* and the same now as a tone, for example. *No.* There lurks the fundamental mistake. *The flow of the modes of consciousness is not a process; the consciousness of the now is not itself now.* The retention[76] that exists "together" with the consciousness of the now is not "now," is *not simultaneous* with the now, and it would make no sense to say that it is.

The mistake is already made if one characterizes retention in relation to the earlier phases of consciousness as *memory.* Mem-

[75] The word "*retention*" was inserted later between the lines. – Editor's note.

[76] From here on the word "retention" appears in the text of the manuscript itself as originally written. – Editor's note.

ory is an expression that always and only refers to a constituted temporal object. *Retention,* on the other hand, is an expression used to designate the intentional relation (a fundamentally different relation) of phase of consciousness to phase of consciousness; and in this case the phases of consciousness and continuities of consciousness must not be regarded as temporal objects themselves.

Therefore, *sensation* – if by "sensation" we understand *consciousness* (not the immanent enduring red, tone, and so forth, [334] hence not that which is sensed) – and likewise *retention, recollection, perception,* etc., are *nontemporal;* that is to say, *nothing in immanent time.* (The extent to which they can be objectivated in nature, in "objective time," is a separate question.)

These are extremely important matters, perhaps the most important in the whole of phenomenology.

⟨V. [335]
ON THE PRIMARY CONCLUSION OF THE INVESTIGATIONS⟩[1]

⟨*No. 51. The Problem of Time in the Considerations Fundamental to Phenomenology*⟩[2]

By virtue of the intentionality of the *cogitatio,* or as we can also say, of "consciousness," *phenomenology* – which we could equally well designate as the *science of pure consciousness* – *encompasses in a certain sense all that it has carefully excluded; it encompasses all cognition, all of the sciences,* and, with respect to objectivity, *all objectivities*, even the whole of nature. Phenomenology, of course, excludes the *actuality* of nature, the actuality of heaven and earth, of men and beasts, of one's own Ego and the Egos of others; *but it retains, so to speak, their soul, their sense.* Nature, or, in other words, physical things and real events and interconnections, is for us the object of prescientific or scientific cognition, of cognition in its multiform particularizations – as self-perception, perception of other psychic beings, perception of physical things, memory, expectation; then as perceptual and memorial judgment; and then as mediate thinking in its diverse particularizations, and so on. Now all of these are experiences and complexes of experiences that possess both their real and their intentional content and that are studied in these respects after phenomenological reduction. Every objectivity occurs there [336] as intentional, and so does every kind of cognition essentially

[1] From the beginning of 1909 to the end of 1911. – Editor's note.

[2] This sketch has been taken by the editor from the manuscript of the course of lectures Husserl gave in the summer session of 1909 at the University of Göttingen under the title *Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis* [Introduction to the phenomenology of cognition]. The complete manuscript of this course is in the Husserl-Archives at Leuven under the signatures F I 18, F I 17, and F I 7; compare to this p. 279, note 2.

According to Husserl's notes about dates, given below, the section reproduced here was written, or delivered for the first time, in May and June of 1909. – Editor's note.

related to such an objectivity. Things as actualities may have been shelved, but things as phenomena, we could say, belong in phenomenology.

To be sure, this confronts us with an unavoidable *ambiguity in the word phenomenon.* In its first sense, phenomenon (always understood in the sense of phenomenology) signifies the particular real *cogitatio, the real consciousness;* but it also signifies, in its second sense, the *intentional content of consciousness* – that which is perceived, represented, and meant, as it is perceived, represented, and meant in the perception, representation, and act of meaning in question. The second conception of phenomenon corresponds better to the word's proper sense. The φαινόμενον is precisely that which appears and, in an amplified sense, that which is meant, even that which is nonintuitively thought, taken precisely as such without regard to actuality or nonactuality. Thus we say in ordinary life that the rainbow is nothing actual, but merely appearance; or we say that something represented in a stereoscopic image or in a work of art is a mere phenomenon, a mere appearance. *Here, therefore, appearance is what appears as such.* Of course, in ordinary life one will not characterize everything meant, understood simply as meant, as appearance; for example, one will not characterize as appearance something thought but not intuited. Consequently, a quite considerable extension of the term presents itself when, in phenomenology, we include under the title "phenomenon" even what is thought, taken just as something thought.

Now on the other side, linguistic usage has been adopted from psychology to characterize the psychic acts themselves – the perceptions, presentations, judgments, and so on – as psychic phenomena; and accordingly the name "*phenomenon*" also emerges after the phenomenological reduction for the characterization of the *reduced acts themselves.* Appearance therefore signifies in one of its applications the act of appearing (the consciousness in which something appears) and, in its other application, what appears. Where a strict characterization of the phenomenon in the sense of the act itself – understood as the act of *consciousness to which something appears* – is necessary, we will speak of *phansis;* and we will pointedly emphasize every real analysis of consciousness as *phansiological analysis.* I will probably have to [337]

save a separate name for the phenomena in the more original and more natural sense; of course, one could say "phantom" or "phantasma," but this would have its serious disadvantages.

In speaking of phenomenology in my *Logical Investigations,* I always thought of acts, and I understood phenomenology as the science of acts in a purely immanent reflection. Now a science of acts leads automatically not only to real but also to intentional analyses, and therefore to analyses of sense. –

We begin today with the *question* whether, with the considerations of our latest lectures, enough has been done to secure the *universal possibility of a science of pure consciousness. Apparently* we have marked out an *unlimited field of absolute data,* real and ideal, through appropriate interpretation of the Cartesian fundamental evidence; and it appears obvious that this field is susceptible to scientific treatment. *However, the establishment of phenomenological science has its peculiar difficulties,* which natural science does not know. If we have brought to light, as examples in the form of single particulars, some sorts of natural objects or natural occurrences, and if they excite our theoretical interest, we will not ponder for long whether we can explore them scientifically. *We will simply begin.* It is obvious, of course, that after such objects are shown to exist, they are fixed in nature, in the spatio-temporal nexus, *independently of the contingent knowledge of the knowing subject;* and it is obvious that they can be determined as reference points of processes of change governed by natural law. Here, to begin with, we can approach an observation that fixes what it observes. We can then set about tasks of classification, of the ascertainment of empirically universal connections; and then we can likewise undertake tasks of causal analysis in which the functional dependencies of the changes come to light. We will rise to the universal natural laws and by their means achieve causal explanation of individually given and determinate objects; or on the basis of the objects that [338] are given to us, we will determine in advance the not-yet-given objects of the future or fix occurrences that are objectively past but were not given to us.

But what is the situation in the *phenomenological sphere? Here the single consciousness, the act, is not meant as a single psychological particular.* If it were meant in that way, it would be

something that could be fixed objectively and that could be determined once and for all in its identity over against the changing experiences related to it. It would exist as a component of the one spatio-temporal nature. It does, of course, have its relation to a body, which is just as much a physical thing as anything else and has a determinable position in space and time. *Through the relation to the body, the instruments that measure space and time gain applicability to the psychic,* which can then be determined objectively with respect to its temporal position, its temporal duration, and with respect to the moments of its content and their functional dependence on the central nervous system, etc. Here, too, there are possibilities for the predetermination of something psychic that will occur in the future or for the reconstruction of something past. *Every determination finds its objective expression in statements that can be recorded and that can be claimed again and again in the identity of their objective signification.* This laying-claim-to takes place in continually new acts of different psychophysical individuals, but acts and individuals that are accidental in relation to what is asserted objectively, in relation to the identical sense of the objectively valid statement.

But what is the situation when we carry out phenomenological reduction and, suspending nature and all problematic, transcendent positing as well, *withdraw to the absolute datum of the cogitatio*? Does a possibility still remain for objectively valid judgments when we do this? We therefore perform certain acts (*cogitationes*) – acts of perception, memory, expectation, judgment, and the like. We apprehend them purely in their self-givenness; we suspend not only the nature posited in the *cogitatio* but also the natural existence of one's own Ego and of the act as the Ego's state. In doing this, *all of the means of determination belonging to natural science are obviously excluded* – no ruler, no theodolite or cathetometer, no clock, no chromoscope remain for us. *They all fall to the proscription of the phenomenological reduction. What do we have left? The pure cogitatio, the this-there!* This perception, say, and not even as *ours*. The connection to the empirical human Ego – and with it the *relation to space* – has therefore been *lost*. But its *relation to objective time* has been lost as well. ⟨The act of perception, for example,⟩ is [339]

indeed a now; and as something that continually extends from now to ever new now, it endures. And it endures while at the same time changing in one way or another as far as its real components are concerned; and in this process it is directed towards an object, changing in this way and that, as what is meant. *The time that makes its appearance there is not an objective time and not a time that can be determined objectively. This time cannot be measured; there is no clock and no other chronometer for it. Here one can only say: now, before, and further before,* changing or not changing in the duration, etc. When all of the resources of natural science, understood as means of empirical determination, are excluded, how are scientific statements supposed to be established? They should be restricted to what belongs to the *cogitatio* and is given purely itself. *How far, then, does the sphere of what is given-itself extend?* Surely one will not take, as the sphere of his *cogitationes* that are scientifically determinable and available to phenomenological investigation, the *total domain* of the *cogitationes that the Ego in question has had and ever will have.* For can statements that reach that far be made as phenomenological statements at all? While I am actually executing a perception, I can say in reflection: This-there; and I can follow the perception in pure immanence with my intuiting regard just as long as it endures. I can focus my attention *on its real articulations* to the degree that they are distinguished immanently; then I can also focus *on what is meant as meant* and on those of its elements that become prominent in the course of the perception. And I can *give expression* to that. *But is the statement not entirely limited to the actually present phenomenon while it endures? Coming with it and vanishing with it – in any event, immediately losing again the validity to which it lays claim?* The perception endures for its appointed time; phenomenologically speaking, it begins, continues, and *disappears* again – as when, for example (to express it empirically), I *avert my eyes. Past is past.* If my glance reverts to its old position, then there is precisely a new perception. *What is left, then, of the old statement,* which certainly does not speak of this current perception? *Now one will say* that, following the averting of my glance, *a retentional consciousness attaches itself to the perception,* as it does to every elapsed consciousness. Moreover, *in later moments of the stream of*

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consciousness, recollections are able to emerge that refer back to the perception I had earlier, to the judging consciousness, the affective consciousness, the volitional consciousness I accomplished earlier. If these recollections are subjected to phenomenological reduction in the appropriate manner, if therefore in them too no use is made of the actuality of the blossoming tree that I earlier perceived, of my earlier Ego and the nexus of nature belonging to it, *the phenomenological regard then extends over the earlier stream of consciousness,* over the coming and going, the enduring, the changing of the acts, all of which took place earlier. And that is the field of phenomenology.

But then doubts arise. The recollection is an actually present phenomenon that we can apprehend in its "*this-there!*" It refers, say, to an earlier, phenomenologically reduced perception. That it does this determines its intentional content, and we can also apprehend the content *as* what is recollected. It is something given that belongs to the recollection – in fact, something given as absolute. But what about the question *whether what is recollected actually existed?* The question about the *validity* of recollection?

The recollection refers to the earlier perception and *posits* it as actually having existed. This is the way we take it; this is given. [341] But must this *positing* therefore be a valid one? Just as the perception of a being belonging to nature is the positing of nature – but positing that we suspend (namely, we leave its validity undecided in phenomenology), since an enigma presents itself here – so it appears to be necessary to place the *validity of the recollection in our phenomenological brackets, since it too transcends the phenomenon of recollection* and can turn into an enigma for us. *What is true of the recollection* also seems to have to be true *of the consciousness that immediately follows upon the ebbing phenomenon and that we call retention. Consequently, it seems that we are restricted in our phenomenological statements exclusively to the actually present phenomena,* to the phenomena in their *actual presence;* what the statements posit as existing phenomenologically and as determined in such and such a way is present just and only as long as the phenomenon endures. And when the phenomenon is finished, the statement loses the substrate of its validity. *Phenomenologically, therefore, we would not*

even have the right to speak of a *flow of consciousness,* of a running-off of ever new acts. Looking back from a given act, we would be allowed to confirm only *this act of looking backwards;* and we would be permitted to lay claim to what is perceived in the act *only as something meant,* not as something that truly did exist.

All asserting, consequently, is a matter of indifference; we really cling only to the *this-there!,* which at any given time is the sole thing about which we would be permitted to speak. And, of course, our whole reflection up to this point would be affected. We might have carried out the exclusion of nature, but if one *also* requires of us the *exclusion of that transcendence that is inherent in memory and retention, then at the end we find ourselves in the moment in which we began.* It is indeed easy to see that we have presupposed a certain validity belonging to memory and retention. *The tug of doubt leads still further* in other respects. What about the *actually present* phenomenon, about the consciousness that is actually carried out and about the viewing directed at it?

A perception might begin. But already the now is passing over into the not-now and a new now is there. We say that the perception endures. This duration has a *terminus,* the flowing now, and an extent of nows that have been – an *extension into the past, therefore. Thus we have retention throughout. Now does not our thematizing regard, by positing the enduring perception as enduring, transcend what alone is really given, the now, and along with it posit something that is no longer really given:* the continuity of past perceptual nows? *Must we not also exclude that positing and retreat to what is truly given, the absolute now* and the ever new nows? *Of course, with that retreat, all asserting comes to an end as well.* For to what is the perception related when I say that it is directed towards the intentional object that pertains to the flowering object moving now this way and now that way in the breeze? *If we are not able to stay with the unity throughout its duration,* with the unity understood *as unity in change and constancy extending throughout the continuity of just-past nows,* then nothing whatever can be asserted. The act of asserting also flows, of course. How is it supposed to fix the *now* that, in the act of fixing, becomes a new now over and over again? This is not [342]

much less than absolute scepticism, then. Indeed, we can say confidently that it is *absolute scepticism.*

We have obviously taken the wrong path. How do we find our way back to reason and clarity again? To do this, naturally, means to appeal to the *sense of the original lines of inquiry and to the sense of the evidences* that *single out what cannot be questioned.* The *cognition of nature* is problematic. On what grounds? On the grounds that it appeals to immediate positings of nature that in principle and according to their essence do not have the character of *positings that give something itself;* or – what amounts to the same thing – on the grounds that *they leave open as a matter of principle the possibility that the perception of nature, despite its pretension to make nature given, might deceive* us and therefore not truly make *nature* given. This whole line of inquiry [343] would be intrinsically senseless if *cognition itself could not be made absolutely given* and if it were not firm and indubitable that it is cognition of such and such a content, that it is cognition of factual existence in nature – for example, that the perception is precisely perception of the flowering tree, and the like. And this line of inquiry would make no sense if *statements* could not be *made* about this cognition – statements that, unlike statements about nature, would not only be valid but *indubitably valid,* indubitably valid because they just do nothing further than *bring what is absolutely given to absolute expression.* Now the Cartesian evidence helped to *assure* us that these presuppositions *of the inquiry into reason* – which are evidently also the presuppositions *for any inquiry whatsoever – are fulfilled.* If something is a problem for me, then at least it is absolutely certain to me that it is a problem; and from there one proceeds further to the evidence of the *cogitatio* as such and of what is thought within it. *Absolute givenness of something itself is therefore certainly not an empty word.* We have it, even if we exclude all natural existence, even the existence of the empirical Ego, in the phenomenological reduction. *The question will therefore be: How far does it extend?* And here it is *perfectly obvious that the thematizing regard, in being directed, for example, toward the perceptual appearance and what is perceived* as perceived, *immanently apprehends* the latter *in its duration* as something given itself, absolutely; and it is perfectly obvious *that the restriction to the now, which is in*

continuous flux, would be a fiction. That already means that the phases of the just elapsed now, dying away in the apprehension of the duration, have not vanished; and obviously it *must be claimed as something absolutely given itself* that *a retention,* in which *what is just past* in its unity with the now and the always new now comes to absolute itself-givenness, already *inheres in* the perception. If we scan the flowering tree, the tree becomes given in a temporal form. And if we hear a bit of a melody, we do not hear *merely single* tones, even less moments of single tones or [344] mathematical tone-nows, matching the *now-points* that could be abstracted in thought. We rather hear *enduring tones* – specifically, tones combining into a *tone-formation*; and we grasp this whole tone-formation as a formation that is steadily building up and as that which is heard. And in the unitary regard continuously directed towards it, *we grasp the unity of the total perceptual appearance of this tone-formation as something absolutely given itself.* And if *the whole tone-phase is finished, retention still apprehends the just-having-been of the total phase* that has there elapsed; and it still apprehends the total perceptual appearance in the manner of an appearance that *has just been* and that no longer contains moments of actually present perception. The evidence here concerns the *just-having-been* by means of which a relation of the object to the flowing now is co-given; and the object cannot be detached from this now. All of this is found in phenomenological reduction under its continual suspension of present or past natural reality.

If someone says that only the now is given in genuine actuality, we answer: We do not want to fight over genuine actuality or nonactuality here; we only want to acquire *absolute ascertainments, true givenness of things themselves* secured against all reasonable doubt, and these we have. Here, in the unity of the consciousness that gives us something itself, the past pretends to be given itself only as past; the now, only as now. We state this honestly, just as we see it and have it. *There may be a sphere of problems here* – namely, those *directed at the analytic discovery of the kinds and components of such itself-givenness* – but *nothing is problematic here in the sense in which the cognition of nature is problematic.* Certainly *retention,* which is an act now living and an act that can be made to be given itself, transcends itself and

posits something as being – namely, as being past – that does not really inhere in it. But what must be learned here is that within the sphere of the absolute givenness of something itself a transcendent validity emerges that is and must remain undisputed, since it does not merely mean what is really transcendent to it but posits it in an obviously valid way – indeed, in an absolutely valid way – and not, as happens in the case of the perception of something external, in a manner that always leaves open possibilities of invalidity. [345]

To be sure, the situation is not quite so favorable in the case of recollection – as when a memory emerges that does *not* merely seize in the manner of retention what has just been as just having been in its continuity with the continuously flowing present now. In recollection, too, we can practice *phenomenological reduction,* since we suspend the being of nature that enters into the recollection; *but this does not preserve the recollection, universally speaking, from the possibility in principle of deception.* On the other hand, one will also satisfy oneself within the phenomenological reduction that recollection is not always reasonably doubtful, at least not in every respect; namely, it is not reasonably doubtful when, ⟨by means of⟩ a continuous path of memory [leading] from [what is posited in] the recollection up to the now and then from the now [in the opposite direction], through retention, through continuously reviving retention, we again arrive back at what is posited in the recollection. But this is a matter for separate investigation. –[3]

Let us recall the position of our meditations before the Whitsun holidays.[4] The *guiding problem,* which drove beyond the level of the cognition and science of nature, was the "*problem of transcendence,*" and above all the problem of the transcendence *of nature.* Or, to elucidate this careless and misinterpretable expression: The problem was how the cognitive consciousness in its flow of variously formed and interwoven acts of cognition can transcend itself and, in a valid manner, posit and determine an objectivity. In none of its components can this objectivity really

[3] ⟨On the margin:⟩ 5/26/1909. Whitsuntide.

[4] ⟨On the margin:⟩ 6/9/1909. Recapitulation of the course of the lectures to this point. Reiteration.

be found in the cognitive consciousness, and never at any time does it become absolutely and indubitably given itself; and yet according to the sense of the cognition of nature, it is supposed to exist in itself, whether contingently known or not. From there *the problem seemed to expand in an indefinitely general way: How is knowledge of anything existing in itself in a similar sense possible*? How is its claim to objective validity to be understood, and how is it to be protected against the absurd scepticism towards which reflection again and again seems to press? [346]

We saw that the investigations that are supposed to help us in these respects are subject to the *demand of the phenomenological reduction.* This is nothing other than the demand to remain continually mindful here of the motivating problem and of its proper sense, and to substitute for it no other problem of cognition. But inherent in this is the fact that we may presuppose nothing as given in advance, use nothing as premises, allow no method of investigation that is itself afflicted with the problem. *With respect to the cognition of nature,* that means the following: The investigation that concerns the possibility of the cognition of nature in the sense we have just characterized *cannot itself have the character of natural scientific cognition,* cannot itself be a natural scientific investigation. Without seriously being sceptics, we must proceed precisely as if we were sceptical with respect to all natural existence: We may not lay claim to any positing of nature as existent. Physiology, biology, psychology – all natural sciences of whatever sort – are in question in the same way and remain suspended in the same way.

Now the considerations fundamental to Cartesianism offered a beginning. The *cogitatio* is an absolute datum that is not infected with the problem of transcendence. Over against *Descartes's* deviation and in opposition to the theory, attributed to Descartes, of the evidence of internal perception and of its allegedly fundamental significance for epistemology, we asserted: *The absolute givenness of the cogitatio does not imply "cogito, sum"* and also does *not* signify *the existence of the so-called psychic phenomenon in the sense of psychology.* The seeing that belongs to phenomenological reflection – to the reflection that looks at the experience of doubting, of judging, of willing, and the like, and in so doing says, as it were: "*This,*" and that

thereby seeingly apprehends and posits the experience – is *not psychological self-perception.*

It then seemed that with the field of pure cogitationes set free [347] from all positing of empirical existence, whether from the positing of the nature thought about or from the positing of the thinking *ego,* we had *acquired a useful and independent field of research* – a phenomenology, if we call these pure *cogitationes* phenomena. It seemed that we could analyse these phenomena and give adequately descriptive expression to the results of the analysis, that we could classify them accurately, and the like. *In view of this, the sphere of such research immediately seemed be be far broader* than we thought at first. *Real analyses* became separated from *intentional analyses.* It became apparent that not only real components could be exhibited in the *cogitationes* – specifically, as components that could be made absolutely given themselves in the analysis. It belongs to the essence of *cogitationes* that they relate to something "intentionally," that something objective appears in them or ⟨is⟩ "meant" in them in some other way. And *what appears can be described with evidence as it appears,* and *what is meant can be described with evidence as it is meant.* In intentional analysis they can be made absolutely given themselves, even if it is in relation to the *cogitatio.* Perceiving, we can describe what is perceived just as it appears – describe it as that, as what, this perception, as it were, means it to be, describe it as it stands before us in the perception: whatever the situation may be with respect to existence or nonexistence and the possibility of perceptual cognition. And the same thing is true in the case of other *cogitationes. Thus in a certain way self-transcendence belongs to the essence of the cogitationes.* It is always an absolute datum that so-called perceptions of physical things, judgments, and the like mean something with which they themselves are not identical; or that *two kinds of absolute judgments, expressing something given itself, are possible* – one kind positing *the being of the cogitationes with their real components,* the other kind having to do with the *relation of the cogitationes to what is not really immanent in them* and to the *content* of what is not immanent. *Different concepts of what exists seem to branch off here: What exists in the sense of reality or nature* – which, however, we are not permitted [348]

to claim in its reality. [Then there is] *what exists in the sense of consciousness,* that is to say, in the sense of the *cogitatio.* And finally there is what exists in the sense of *what is being cogitated* – for example, *what is being phantasied* in fiction, which, of course, we do not accept as true being but which, on the other hand, we do designate with evidence as that which is phantasied, that which is thought, and which we can *describe* in its content just as it is meant in the fiction.

Considering the recognition of this two-sidedness of the Cartesian evidence (after its appropriate reduction), therefore considering as well the recognition of the *essential two-sidedness* of the absolute data indicated by the title "*pure phenomenon*" or "pure consciousness," it seemed to follow that *phenomenology* had *obtained* an immensely expanded, indeed, *all-embracing milieu.* It appeared to encompass all cognition and all sciences and – with respect to the objective side – all conceivable objectivities, among them objectivities belonging to nature. To be sure, no claim about the actuality of nature was allowed, and no assertions from natural science were permitted to function as premises. On the other hand, *all cogitationes*, and consequently everything to be included under the title cognition, are absolute *data*: all perceptions, representations, memories; *all acts of meaning of whatever kind*; all true and false, evident and nonevident judgments; and together with all of these, of course, also all of the *objectivities* meant, represented, known (perhaps with evidence), understood as intentional objectivities of the cognizing *cogitationes* in question. Along with every *cogitatio*, its sense is given; and it is precisely the sense that determines the *cogitatio's* essential peculiarity of referring to this or that objectivity.

Consequently, *the auspices* seemed *most favorable not only for a phenomenology understood as the immanent analysis of the pure consciousness in its real and intentional aspects, but also for the solution of the leading epistemological problem.* In that case, the following thought offers itself: If the possibility of the cognition of something transcendent is a problem, or if – in the sense of the narrower initial problem – the possibility of the *cognition of nature* is a problem, then within the frame of the phenomenological reduction we must study the various sorts of cognition in which nature comes to be meant, in which it comes to be posited [349]

and determined, sometimes in grounded, sometimes in ungrounded fashion. All problems related to the possibility of cognition must be solved through the exploration of the phenomenological essence of cognition in all respects: in its real composition, in its sense, in its legitimizing grounding or in its being deprived of legitimizing grounds, in its confirmation and refutation. And a different path through the sense of the problem of cognition is not even conceivable. And although I said all problems related to cognition, I mean all problems that are in any way analogous and all enigmas of transcendence that cognition may offer in any sphere.

But then came the turning point. A new meditation taught us that all that we have said up to this point has not adequately prepared the possibility of a phenomenological science, indeed, that difficulties stand in its way that seem to press towards an absolute scepticism.

The cogitationes in their real and intentional composition are supposed to be a field of phenomenology. But what kind of *cogitationes?* Surely those given in Cartesian evidence and phenomenological reduction, and therefore the experiences [found] in the moment of phenomenological reflection. For example, if I doubt and if I am reflectively aware that I am doubting, the being-given of the doubt is absolutely certain. If I perceive, [it is absolutely certain] that I am perceiving. If I will, [it is absolutely certain] that I am willing. *But all experiences flow away. Consciousness is a perpetual Heraclitean flux*; what has just been given sinks into the abyss of the phenomenological past and then is gone forever. Nothing can return and be given in identity a second time. Do we therefore actually have an infinite field? Do we not rather always have only a point that, in arriving, immediately escapes again? The infinite profusion of phenomena the phenomenologist has had, and which indeed all other men do have and have had, does not come into question for us as a datum. We exclude nature, we exclude our own Egos as well as the Egos of others, and we exclude them for the sake of the enigma of transcendence. But must we not be consistent and pursue this enigma everywhere, in all of its analogous formations? What good is it to put so-called *nature* into question with respect to its existence and to leave untouched matters that are [350]

equally questionable? Never at any time is nature something given absolutely. I do not understand how it can be posited, and posited legitimately; furthermore, I do not understand how it can be determined scientifically. In the case of the *cogitatio*, on the other hand, I have something given absolutely *in the moment* in which it is given reflectively: in the case of the *cogitatio* that is *mine*, except that I am going to leave myself out of consideration. Naturally I have no absolute givenness of someone else's *cogitationes*. The other may have it. But of what use is *his* absolute positing if I must necessarily co-exclude it along with his existence. And *then do I go beyond an absolute datum and its positing – its now-positing?* We discussed the problems of *retention and recollection.* Immediate retention, which still retains the just elapsed experience as it recedes – but retains it only in the mode of what is just past – already seemed to be afflicted with the problem of transcendence. The retention certainly no longer possesses the *cogitatio* itself that had existed. Of what good to me, then, is the positing of the *cogitatio* and the possible descriptive judgment, if this judgment is in want of proper objectivity, if it too is drawn into the flow of *cogitationes* and, to the extent that the positing is over with, can no longer take place? Or are we therefore supposed to make only a memorial judgment? But does not retention, by positing "This has just been" rather than "This is," transcend what is given? And then recollection. *Could not all recollection be deceptive?* Could it not assure us, as it were, that something was given earlier when nothing was ever given at all?

These doubts seem to touch even phenomenological perception. Every grasping of an enduring phenomenon also implies retention in company with the grasping of the duration. *Should we therefore say that only the absolute now is something actually given* and free from the problem of transcendence, and that even the least extension into the past – which surely belongs essentially to duration – is problematic? We therefore fall into an *extreme scepticism. Finally, we may not even presume to speak of a flow of* [351] *consciousness,* indeed, to speak of anything at all, since the absolute now nowhere seems capable of being apprehended when we attempt, in abstraction, to leave the flow out of consideration or even to question it.

But if we *suppose* that someone places himself defiantly on the ground of the *Cartesian evidence* and says that there is a genuine Archimedean point that Descartes has established for all time (we may doubt everything except the *being of the cogitatio,* which we grasp reflectively as something given itself), then we would also be able to ask *what he might intend to do with this.* Does he perhaps intend to draw *inferences* from it as Descartes did – inferences that are supposed to lead to the existence of God, of a corporeal and spiritual outside world, of a mathematics and natural science valid for that world, and the like? But is not every inference that leads from what is given to what is not given again burdened with the problem of transcendence? The inference as *cogitatio* may be something given absolutely in reflection, but that what is inferred and not given is actual presents once again the enigma of how consciousness can validly transcend itself. Possibly nothing at all corresponds to what is inferred. If one says that the inference, understood as a *correct and evident inference,* is endowed with a *distinguishing character of necessity* or necessary validity, *with a feeling of absolute certainty that is missing in the case of a fallacious inference,* then naturally we will say: That is precisely the enigma. We obviously do not want to deny the soundness of inferences; we are certainly not dogmatic sceptics. But we are *critical sceptics.* We recognize that an evident inference must somehow be set apart in consciousness from the nonevident; we are even *prepared* to acknowledge most willingly that what is evident is objectively valid and that the character of evidentness guarantees objective validity. *But we do not understand how it does and could do that.* What does nongiven being care about the characters adhering to our inference-experiences? And if, as one says, evidentness is one feeling and the character of falsity in the error that becomes evident another and negative feeling, then we ask whether these feelings could not reverse their functions and how, in that case, we are supposed to be able to [352] assert anything more than that feeling a is there in the one instance and feeling b in the other. But in the one case we say that what is not given but inferred is *actual,* and in the other that it is *not actual.*

Concerning all such questions, problems, doubts, there is really only one position: What is in any way questionable in the direction

of our thinking we must treat as questionable, retaining only what underlies our questioning and deliberating as senseful questioning. Hence *we are not allowed to abandon the Cartesian evidence,* but we must *understand* it *correctly,* apprehend and delimit it correctly. And yet we must not delimit it too narrowly. Cartesian evidence appeals to the absolute givenness of the doubt itself in the doubting, of the perceiving itself in the perceiving, etc. In that way it reminds us of *what is essentially nonproblematic, thereby designating in advance, as far as its form is concerned, the field in which the solving of problems must proceed. The absolute givenness is essentially nonproblematic* precisely in the sense of the problem of *transcendence.* Positing of a factual existent that is not given itself in the absolute sense is enigmatic just because it is not given itself. *If we possess and if we apprehend something itself without going beyond what is truly given itself in our meaning, stating, and judging,* then it makes no sense to doubt. We speak and judge in quite diverse ways, and not simply thoughtlessly but on good grounds. If we demand reasons, if we want to have them exhibited, then is not the *sense of the demand everywhere precisely this: to go back from the act of meaning that is remote from givenness to the act of meaning that exhibits and gives what is meant itself?* We, at least, feel that that is the sense – even in the *sphere of empirical experience,* where we demand a regress from experiential judgments to actual perception or memory. "That is so, I have *seen* it": this cuts the doubt off – except, to be sure, that with closer consideration it becomes apparent that empirical perceiving is not an act that gives something itself *absolutely*; it is, for its part, again an act afflicted with the problem of transcendence. And only for this reason do we have still further [353] investigations. *The cogito is an absolute starting-point, not because it is a matter of our own psychic experiences, but because, as Descartes says, we have clarae et distinctae perceptiones of these cogitationes.* Said again, and said more accurately: it is because what is posited here *is posited in pure itself-givenness. And with this positing, the first ground of investigation is designated insofar as* precisely all the problems of transcendence that pertain to cognition must proceed from the *givenness of cognition itself* and from all that *is absolutely given in cognition itself, whether really given or intentionally given.* But here one must go further

and ask precisely *how far this itself-givenness extends,* and one should obviously not think that what is given itself offers no problems at all. The essential thing is that it is given itself, and that *the problems that the itself-givenness itself poses in its itself-givenness must therefore be solved immanently and only immanently.* In this sense, we have already established that the enduring and just-having-been are given themselves, absolutely, in perception – but also in retention. *Retention, just as much as perception, is an act that gives something absolutely.* And it is a specific undertaking to explore all of the relationships in these acts that fall into the sphere of absolute givenness. And from there one would have to go further. Descartes already asked himself why the evidence of the *cogito* can be absolutely valid and what would be equivalent to it. And he replies: Everything that in the same sense *clare et distincte percipimus.* But he has *not grasped* the *proper sense of these things.* The *perceptio* in question here is the *pure seeing that presses forward towards the absolute "It-itself" of what is meant* or that traces all the formations of *the acts that give something purely itself.* And how large this field is, is something we will see adequately later on.

⟨*No. 52*⟩ *Mere Representations of Processes or of Individual (Enduring) Objects. Evidence Pertaining to Memorial Perception, Evidence Pertaining to the Perception of What Is Present*[5] [354]

But the perception of what is present is, after all, only a *limit* in an enduring perception; or rather, we have to distinguish between the *act of meaning* and the perceptual appearance, which is always a *continuous* appearance. What appears is an entire filled extent of time, and what is meant is something identical that now exists and that is always the same in each new now. On the other hand, I surely do not mean the mere *phase.* I mean the *tone* and not the tone's fleeting now-phase, that mere abstraction incapable of being apprehended.

[5] Sils–Baselgia, end of August 1909.

Thus when I speak of *adequate perception* – what, properly speaking, is in question there? Does it make sense to say that adequate perception means the presentant just as it exists at the time, something really given in the perception?

The tone is adequately perceived. What does that imply? The tone signifies nothing other than itself. But the tone is certainly *unity*.

In every perception of *something external* we have a "sensuous content"; we can look at the perception and find there an *object* such as a tone, a color, etc., which endures or changes. Or rather, we find *several* such contents – a tone-unity, a color-unity, a tactile complex. What gives unity to these? "The consciousness," the unity of the physical-thing apprehension. If we disregard the unifying apprehension, we can take each content by itself; and then it is a pre-empirical thing – again a unity, but, apart from being seized and picked out (and to that extent, delimited), not a unity like the unity of the empirical thing, not an apprehension that thinks things together. Here the unity lies in the content itself. The content itself is *one* content. And the *perception* itself – is it not also a unity? We have many unities here, but woven together into the perceptual unity. In all of this, a physical thing appears, something stands before me – say, a cow ponderously walking past.

Unity of the total appearance (in visual, tactile, and other respects) in all of the alterations of appearance. Therefore *unity*. This unity is given immanently. Every such unity is given immanently. What does "*given immanently*" mean here? [355]

And if I take all of the *flowing moments* in which these unities *become constituted,* one can nevertheless not say that they in turn are unities of precisely that kind. This holds true, for example, of the tone-phases in which the *tone* presents itself as identical – and, indeed, not only of the now-phases but of the phases of the past as well. Thus a phase and a continuity of such phases is not a unity like "the *tone*" or the *color,* which now have this content and now that, which are constantly of one nature and then of another.

We therefore have *perception* – specifically, adequate perception – as apprehension of such unities, free from all "transcendence." We must first determine how that ought to be under-

stood and what is properly inherent in it. And, on the other hand, we have the *seizing* of those *phases*, of those constituting contents that make up the content of the vitally flowing consciousness. This content is also unity in a certain sense: but not unity that is apprehended in the flow as one thing, as something identical throughout the phases of the flow, throughout the flow's continuity. It is rather unity in the sense that I direct my regard towards it and hold on to it as it sinks back in the flow and then identify it again and again in repeated recollection.

Of course, one will say that such a phase is therefore a unity too: It is apprehended as this something. And while I am apprehending it, *it too sinks backwards*; it has *its* echo, its comet's tail of phases, etc., in which it is apprehended and posited in my regard as one and the same. And again I can direct my regard, one might say, towards such a phase; and it in turn flows off as well. Does this continue *in infinitum*? There we encounter a difficulty.

It cannot go on *in infinitum*. Have I not gone as far as I can go when, hearing the ringing of the post horse's bell and focused on one of its phases, I fix my attention firmly on the dying-away of that phase? I cannot focus my attention on the phases of the dying-away in a new series. I can undertake an act of recollection and in it focus (abstractly) on such moments and their flowing-off. That is all. Then I can say again and again in the recollection: "That right there – that is one and the same." This is the most primitive sort of unity.

In the other case, however, I have the unity that lives in and through the flow; and secondly, in reproduction I can establish this unity, as I can any unity, as ⟨the⟩ same. [356]

Now *adequacy* can mean only: The unity is grasped just "as it is," and it is grasped in this way when it is apprehended in a perception that contains in itself no intention still in need of fulfillment. The unity is a closed unity – closed, because it can be given fully and completely in one consciousness. Unities can be closed and unclosed. There can be unities that point beyond themselves and that unfold in ever new acts, and there can be unities for which this is not the case. We have to separate *perceptions* into two groups, then. On the one hand, there are those that aim at *closed unities*. It is inherent in the perceptions of

this first division that they are of one type, that they themselves are closed unities that bring what is perceived in them to complete presentation. On the other hand, there are perceptions – such as perceptions of *physical things* – that can and must be amplified *in infinitum* in order to present the *thing* fully and fittingly, since it belongs to the essence of the physical thing to be freshly determinable *in infinitum*. "*Inadequate*" here signifies that the perception aims at a unity that is *unclosed*; the perception does mean the unity, but the unity is not fully presented. The perception is incomplete.

On the other hand, the perception itself is obviously not *evident*; only the judgment is. And the judgment is not evident if the perception that underlies it is incomplete. But it does have a degree of evidence conforming to the degree of completeness. Evident judgment is judgment governed by givenness; and since such perception produces givenness (is consciousness of givenness) and since only in the context of such perception does being-governed-by-givenness take place, it makes no sense to ask for anything more here than the following: Judging and that which the judgment states (the physical-thing judgment) are legitimated in perception, precisely to the extent that the judgment requires any legitimation.

On the other hand, when the object of judgment is a "self-contained" object rather than a physical thing, the judgment is evident if the perception of the self-contained object is simply there; and since the perception in this instance can contain [357] nothing unfulfilled (since that makes no sense in the case of such objects), it is meaningless to demand more here, etc.

It is wrong even to consider possibilities of closed perception in the case of physical things, just as it would be wrong to look upon "inadequate," unclosed perceptions as possible in the case of such individual unities as "the tone." Admittedly, *the terminology* will have to be improved. In the case of adequate perception, what is meant and posited in the "perceptual act" – specifically, in the mode of perception – is really given in that act.

Rather than "the perception," we can say: "the appearance *in concreto*." And this is itself an immanent datum, and what appears in the immanent perception is the appearance itself.

What appears in the tone-appearance? Well, the tone itself appears.

If we understand by the tone-appearance the *flow* of givenness – givenness of the now and of the modes of having-been – in which the tone stands before me as one and the same (the flow from which it must be taken and in which it must be posited as the one tone), then this *tone-appearing* must be distinguished from the appearing tone.

In the case of the external thing: The *appearance* here is the *unity* (not the *flow*) – possibly the unity-in-change, as when we say that the appearance changes, that there is a continuity of appearance. None of that is the *flow of appearing*.

Let us make the following distinction, then. If we call the *unity* (the individual temporal unity) in which an object "*represents*" – presents – itself "appearance," then we must say that in the case of the external thing we have the unity of an appearance that presents something different from it, since perceptual consciousness is such that, on one side, appearance "can be confirmed" as belonging to it, as unitarily present in it, and yet the object is not the appearance. Only the "perception of something external" possesses appearance in this sense, that is, as distinct from the appearing object. In the case of the perception of something immanent, appearance in this sense is coincident with the object itself.

In the case of the perception of something external, we [358] have:

1) the *appearing (flow),*
2) the *appearances,*
3) the *appearing object.*

"*Adequate* intuition (perception) of the past [is] excluded" – "In memorial perception, the content that presents what is just past can never be identical with what is presented" – is that not *wrong?* With the single exception of "the seizing" of a phase of the flow, the "presenting content" and what is presented cannot be identical *in any perception,* whether in the perceptual phase we call perception of the now or in any other phase. Yet it is questionable whether one should still call this perception and not abstraction.

In terms of my present position, what is the presenting

content? All the terminology, of course, would now have to be transformed. In the case of the perception of something external, is the complex of physical contents, each taken as a *unity*, "presenting"? One can indeed say that. For the unity is "experience" – that is, it is not a unity that is *meant*, but it is certainly a unity that appears (that can be considered repeatedly). We have relationships between this presenting content and the content of the object. But secondly, the flow's now-content (not understood as unity) can be called presenting. Then each perceptual appearance has, on the one hand, a presenting content and, on the other hand, a representing [*repräsentierenden*] content that constitutes the temporal past, duration, etc. The total content called together for presentation (content in the sense of the flow) does not present in the sense in which unity presents unity (one can speak this way in the first sense). And if we then divide the contents into presenting and representing (repristinating[6]), the former cannot be identical with the constituted content of the object, of course, and in this respect has no priority over the latter.

"Adequate intuition of what is past, even of what is most [359] recently past, is excluded in the present" – is adequate intuition of what is present not excluded? Adequate perception, adequate intuition – what does that mean?

A perception is possible in which objects themselves come to be given fully and completely, not pointing beyond themselves and not given through "mere appearances" (by their nature these objects make possible – but also demand – their becoming given themselves). But the presenting content in that case is the now of sensation, obviously not the object, the unity. Unity can present itself only in unity.

The repristinating content is also only a content of the flow. Therefore of what use is it to say: The past cannot come to adequate presentation in the now? In the now, the past cannot stand before us as now. That is obvious. It can only stand before

[6] This term, which occurs three times here and in what follows, is distinctly written out as "*repristinierenden*" the first time it appears; the second time, it is written in abbreviated form as "*reprist.*"; and the third time, it is written in interrupted form as "*reprist . . .*," with three periods following. These forms have accordingly been repeated in the [German] text. – Editor's note. Translator's note: in the first two cases, the translation used is "repristinating"; in the third, "repristination."

us as having been, by means of original repristination. We need to think about what could still be left to consider here.

Does it make sense to demand more from a perception of a process of succession than ⟨it⟩ brings about, taking it just as we find it?

⟨*No. 53.*⟩ *The Intentionality of Internal Consciousness*[7]

We attempt a description: I hear a *tone* – say, a tone that endures for a short time.[8] I exclude all transient interpretation;[9] I take the pure hyletic tone-datum. It begins and ends; and after it has ended, its whole duration-unity, the unity of the whole process in which it begins and ends, "recedes" into the ever more distant past. It preserves its own temporality as long as I can follow it in retention; it is the same, its duration is the same. I can direct my attention to the *way* in which it is given. I am conscious of the tone and of the duration it fills in a continuity of "modes," in a "continual *flow*." And one point, one phase of [360] this flow is called "consciousness of the commencing tone"; and in this phase I am conscious of the first time-point of the tone's duration in the mode of the "now." The tone is given; that is, I am conscious of it as now. But I am conscious of it as now "as long as" some one of its temporal phases is intended as now. However, if any temporal phase, an objective time-point of the tone-duration, is an actually present now (with the exception of the initial phase), then I am conscious of a continuity of time-points as "immediately past" and of the whole extent of the temporal duration from the beginning-point up to the now-point as elapsed. I am not yet conscious of the remaining extent of the duration, however. In the final point, I am conscious of this point itself as the now-point and of the whole duration as elapsed (or I

[7] This sketch, precisely dated by Husserl "November 10–13, 1911," was obviously destined by Husserl himself for inclusion in the original manuscript of the lectures on time from February of 1905. As indicated in detail below, the text of the sketch is reproduced in major part and with some variations in sections 8, 9, 10, and 20. – Editor's note.

[8] At the beginning, the tone is not expected in advance.

[9] From this point to p. 372, line 31, the text of the sketch is reproduced with some variations in § 8 and in the first paragraph of § 9, or from p. 25, line 22, to p. 28, line 3. – Editor's note.

am conscious of it as elapsed at the beginning-point of the new extent of time, which is no longer a tonal extent). "Throughout" this whole "course of consciousness" or flow, one and the same tone is intended as enduring, as now enduring. "Beforehand" (in the event that it was not expected), it is not intended. Afterwards, it is "still" intended "for a time" in "retention" as having been; it can also be held fast and stand or remain fixed in our regard. The whole extent of the tone's duration or "the" tone in its extension then stands before me as something "dead," so to speak – something no longer being vitally generated, a formation no longer animated by the generative point of the now but continuously modified and sinking back into "emptiness." The modification of the whole extent, then, is analogous to or essentially identical with the modification that the elapsed part of the duration undergoes in the transition of consciousness to ever new productions during the time that the tone is actually present.

What do we have to describe here? The way in which something in objective time "appears" in a continual flow, the manner in which it is "given." And to describe this manner does not mean to describe the appearing temporal duration itself, for it is the same tone *with* the duration belonging to it that, indeed, is not described but *presupposed* in the description. The same duration is present duration actually building itself up and [then] is past, "elapsed" duration, duration that is still intended or that is produced in recollection "as if" it were new. It is the *same tone* that now sounds of which it is said in the "later" flow of consciousness that it has been, that its duration has elapsed. The [361] points of the temporal duration recede for my consciousness in a manner analogous to that in which the points of an object stationary in space recede for my consciousness, for my appearing, when "I" remove "myself" from the object. The object keeps its place, just as the tone keeps its time. Each time-point is fixed but flows away into the distance for consciousness. The distance from the generative now becomes greater and greater. The tone itself is the same, but the tone "in the manner in which" it appears is continually different.

On closer examination, we can now make the following distinctions with respect to this "one immanent object, the tone, described with respect to the different ways in which it appears"

(just as we can in the case of a spatial object, described with respect to the different ways in which it appears); namely:

1) I can make descriptively evident statements about the immanent object in itself and about these factors: that it "now" endures; that a certain part of the duration has elapsed; that the point of the tone's duration grasped in the now (with its tone-content, of course) recedes steadily into the past and an ever new point of the duration enters into the now or is now; that the elapsed duration moves away from the actually present now-point, which is constantly filled in some way, and recedes into the ever more "distant" past, and the like.

2) But I can also talk about the parallel *mode of consciousness,* of the way in which all such differences in the "mode of appearance" of the immanent tone and of its duration-content are "intended": We speak of *perception* in connection with the tone-duration that reaches into the actually present now and say that the tone, the enduring tone, is perceived, and that at any given instant, of the extended duration of the tone, only the point of the duration characterized as *now* is perceived in the fully proper sense. We say of the elapsed extent that it is intended in *retentions;* specifically, the "nearest" parts of the duration or phases of the duration – those that lie nearest to the actually present now-point and that cannot be sharply delimited – are intended with diminishing clarity. The more remote phases, those lying further back in the past, are entirely obscure and emptily intended. And the situation is the same after the whole duration has elapsed: What lies nearest to the actually present now, depending on its distance from it, perhaps has a little clarity; the [362] whole [then] disappears into obscurity, into an empty retentional consciousness, and disappears from consciousness entirely (if one is permitted to assert that) when retention no longer occurs.

We can let a tone-duration run off *again and again* in repeated memory; and we can then also describe the mode of memory, the way in which all of the designated occurrences – understood precisely as memorial occurrences – are intended in the memory. But we can also study on this basis the *essence* of the consciousness in which a being necessarily "becomes constituted" in immanent time, specifically with those modes of appearance noted in 1).

It is *one thing* to describe something objective in its objectivity and another thing to describe something objective in the manner [*Wie*] of its "appearance"; and finally, it is something else again to describe the "consciousness" in which something objective, which necessarily appears in some manner, is intended.

Analogy for Spatial Things, for the Appearance of Space, and for the Consciousness of Space[10]

What is the analogue with respect to the *spatial thing?*

1) I can describe it with regard to its own being, with regard to its objective content.

2) But I can also make statements about its *moving away,* and not indeed as "objective" statements. On the contrary, I assert, purely "from the perspective of appearance," that the object (which preserves its place) at one time appears *here,* as quite near, and at another time as further away – it recedes into the distance, it appears from the side, and the like. Also: receding into the distance, it appears to be contracting; coming near, it appears to be expanding. On one occasion, it shows this side; on another, that side.

Here I can describe the "appearances" of the object and the object as it appears in such and such a way *without* reference to the fact that relations of the appearing object to my body and to my sense organs, which do not appear (at least not visually, while I am restricting myself purely to the visual), are combined in [363] parallel fashion with these modes of appearance, as only empirical experience teaches.

3) Finally, I can describe the "consciousness" of the spatial thing: not the appearance of the thing but how the mode of appearance is *given in consciousness* – how the thing is intended in "perception" and how it is intended in "memory" or phantasy; how, when the thing appears from a particular side, we are at the same time conscious of what "does not genuinely appear"; how differences in the modes of ⟨appearance⟩ of the same front side yield differences in consciousness, and so on.

[10] Compare to this p. 28, note 12. – Editor's note.

Spatial things are also temporal things, and thus with respect to *their* temporality modes of appearance and ⟨the possibility of⟩ studying their modes of consciousness also emerge. –

But let us go back into the *immanent* sphere once again. What is it that we are able[11] to find and describe there as phenomena of the time-constituting consciousness, of the consciousness in which temporal objects with their temporal determinations become constituted?

One could also call them "appearances." A little while ago we called the enduring object (or equally the enduring event) *in its mode or way* [*im Wie*] of running off an "appearance." And this "in its mode or way" signified that the object (or the event) now endures or has endured (is now running off or has elapsed), that it appears as actually present or as past: and we say that the same thing that is present runs off and, after running off, is past and further and further past. Every temporal being (if we are conscious of it at all) "appears" in some running-off mode that changes continuously, and in this change the "object in its mode of running off" is always and ever a different object. And yet we continue to say that the object and each point of its time and this time itself are one and the same. We will not be able to term *this* appearance – the "object in its mode of running off" – "consciousness," any more than we will give the name "consciousness" to the spatial phenomenon, to the corporeal appearance understood as the body in its way of appearing "from this side" or "that side," from near or far.

The "*consciousness*," the "experience," is *related to* its object; [364] and it is necessarily related to the object that appears by means of the appearance: The consciousness – this is clear *a priori* – *can* be related to the identical object only *if* it possesses, "immanently," an *appearance* of the object in which precisely the "object in its way of appearing" [*Objekt im Wie*] stands before us. Obviously we must now recognize our references to the "relatedness to the object" and to "intentionality" as *ambiguous:* that is to say, depending on whether we have in view the relation of the "appearance" to what appears or the relation of consciousness,

[11] From this point to p. 377, line 15, the text of the sketch is reproduced with some variations in § 9 and § 10, p. 28, line 13, to p. 30, line 27. – Editor's note.

on the one hand, to "what appears in its way of appearing" (therefore the appearance in the ontic sense) and, on the other hand, to what appears *simpliciter*.

Definition: Let us now distinguish between "*phenomena of consciousness*," time-constituting phenomena, and ⟨on the other side⟩ such phenomena that constitute *objects in immanent time*. We can scarcely use the language of "appearances" for these temporal-objects-in-their-running-off-modes. For it indeed becomes apparent that immanent objects are themselves appearances, and yet appearances in an entirely different sense – in some cases, for example, they are appearances of external objects. The best thing we could do would be to say "*running-off phenomena*"[12] and, with respect to the immanent *objects* themselves, to speak of their "running-off characters" (e.g., now, past). We know that the running-off phenomenon is a continuity of continuous[13] changes. This continuity forms an inseparable unity, indivisible into concrete parts that could exist by themselves and indivisible into phases that could exist by themselves, into points of the continuity. The parts that we single out by abstraction can exist only in the whole running-off, and this is equally true of the phases (the points belonging to the running-off continuity). We can also say of this continuity, with evidence, that in a certain sense it is immutable; that is, with regard to its form. It is inconceivable that the continuity of phases would contain the same phase-mode twice or even contain it as stretched over an entire component section. Just as each point of time and each extent of time differs "individually," so to speak, from every other one, and just as no one of them can occur twice, so no running-off mode can occur twice.

Yet we still have to make further distinctions and apprehend [365] matters more clearly here. First of all, we emphasize that the running-off modes of an immanent temporal object have a *beginning*, a *source-point*, so to speak. This is the running-off mode with which the object begins to exist, and it is characterized as now.

[12] A better term for running-off modes, for modes of temporal orientation.

[13] Reading *steter* for *seiner*, according to the manuscripts. – Translator's note.

The series of nows (ever new life)



Sinking into the past (march of death)

The series of nows perhaps filled with other objects



In the steady progression of the running-off modes we then find the remarkable circumstance that each later running-off phase is itself a continuity, a continuity that constantly expands, a continuity of pasts. To the continuity of running-off modes of the object's duration we contrast the continuity of running-off modes belonging to each point of the duration: the latter continuity is obviously included in the former continuity, the continuity of running-off modes of the object's duration. The running-off continuity of an enduring object is therefore a continuum whose phases are the continua of the running-off modes belonging to the different time-points of the duration of [366] the object. –

If we proceed along, say, the *concrete* continuity, we move forward in a process of constant modifications. And in this process, the running-off mode – that is, the running-off continu-

ity of the time-points in question – changes continuously. Since a new now is always entering on the scene, the now changes into a past; and as it does so, the whole running-off continuity of pasts belonging to the preceding point moves correspondingly and uniformly "downwards" into the depths of the past. In our diagram, the continuous series of ordinates illustrates the running-off modes of the enduring object. They grow from 0 (one point) into a determinate extent, which has the last now as its culminating point. Then begins the series of running-off modes that no longer include a now; the duration is no longer actual duration (the word normally expresses what is common to the running-off modes of the series between A and E), but a past duration, sinking steadily into the past.

The diagram therefore gives a complete picture of the double continuity of running-off modes. –

Now it is a question of describing the *phenomena* of the *constituting consciousness*. The running-off phenomena elapse in the flow of the phenomena of the constituting consciousness, in a unity of consciousness in which the enduring object continuously appears. The object continuously appears, but precisely in the form of a *duration* running its course as the living present, to which the continuity of the appearance of the elapsed duration attaches itself. What does it mean to say that the duration appears, that it runs off in the constituting consciousness –? Just as we can be focused on the running-off phenomena, on the enduring and having-endured of the object, so we can be focused on a further way of appearing [*Wie*], on the way in which the occurring of this running-off appears; the running-off does not simply *exist,* it exists in a *way of appearing*. Not only does the enduring object now endure, and not only does it possess one time-point characterized as now existing and, continuously, the remaining points of the elapsed duration characterized as elapsed pasts; the tone in the now-point also has, in a certain sense, greater clarity than the tone in the rest of the phases of the "momentary" running-off mode belonging to the now. Precisely speaking, the clarity is shaded off and finally passes over into "emptiness," into "obscurity." We[14] find within the sphere of [367]

[14] From here to p. 378, line 10, the text of the sketch is reproduced with slight variations in § 9, p. 28, lines 3 to 12. – Editor's note.

clarity that the closer the sphere lies to the actually present now, the greater the distinctness and separation, and that the further we withdraw from the now, the greater the fusion and compression. A reflective penetration of the unity of a *many-membered* process lets us observe that an articulated part of the process "contracts" as it sinks back into the past; the temporal perspective (within the sphere of the *original* temporal appearance) is an analogue of the spatial perspective. In receding into the past, the temporal object contracts and in the process also becomes obscure.

Now the temporal object – specifically, the filled duration, a process – is intended not only in the *perception* that *originally* constitutes time. That is to say, it is intended not only in this developing process of the flowing-off of the duration and of the sinking-backwards in time in which we are conscious of the objective running-off modes in ever-increasing obscurity and contraction. The object, the process, can also be intended in the mode of *recollection.* Indeed, this can ensue while we are still conscious of the temporal object, while it is still sinking back. And in the "*renewal*" that the *re*-presentation[15] brings about, there can occur the consciousness of the identity of the duration's recollected beginning with that which has become obscure but is still grasped in its process of sinking backwards. Or rather: The recollection necessarily "*coincides*" with the obscure mode, but an attentive regard *can* be directed towards the recollection and underlie the statement expressed in the words: "I am carrying out the recollection of what has just elapsed and is still sinking further back." Just as the re-presented here is not a here, the re-presented now is not a now; it re-presents a *now,* but one that *was* a now – that is to say, it lets us become conscious in a new way of a time-point whose running-off mode is a particular mode of the past. Within a certain range, we can be conscious of a time-point intended in a changing mode of the past in a *two-fold* manner: in the original retention, in the original consciousness of what is sinking backwards; and at the same time in a reproductive mode, understood as re-presentation that re-presents the [368]

[15] Qualitatively, this re-presentation is protodoxa.

earlier original appearing and, together with it, the original sinking-backwards that attaches itself to the original appearing.

The original[16] appearing and the flowing-away of the running-off modes in the appearing is something *fixed,* something of which we are conscious through "*affection,*" something at which we can only *look,* which we can merely *witness* (if we happen to achieve the spontaneity of witnessing). Re-presenting, on the other hand, is something "*free,*"[17] a free running-through; we can carry out the re-presentation "more quickly" or more slowly, more distinctly and explicitly or more confusedly, in a single lightning-like stroke or in articulated steps, and so on.

Moreover, the re-presentation itself is an event belonging to internal consciousness: *if* it occurs, it has its actually present now, its running-off modes, etc. And in the same extent of immanent time in which it actually takes place, we can accommodate "in freedom" greater or smaller parts of the re-presented event together with its running-off modes, and consequently run through the event more swiftly or more slowly.

When we do that, the relative running-off modes of the re-presented points of the temporal extent remain unchanged (presupposing that the identifying coincidence continuously occurs). I always re-present the same thing – always the same continuity of running-off modes of the temporal extent, always the temporal extent itself in its way of appearing. But if I thus return again and again to the same beginning-point and to the same succession of time-points, that beginning-point itself nevertheless continuously sinks further and further back in time.

⟨*No. 54. Consciousness (Flow), Appearance (Immanent Object [Objekt]), and Object [Gegenstand]*⟩[18]

This productive sequence is a generative *consciousness* in which we steadily become aware of a duration by being conscious of the

[16] The text from here to the end of the sketch, line 29, is reproduced with slight variations in § 20, p. 49, line 24, to p. 50, line 16. – Editor's note.

[17] But based on the field of pregivenness.

[18] As noted in detail below, large parts of this sketch are reproduced, with some variations, in §§ 35–39. – Editor's note.

first point of the object as now, then of the next point as now and [369]
of the preceding point as before, etc. And in this process the filled temporal sequence continuously expands. It is in this temporal sequence that what endures appears as an objective temporal series and, at any given moment, appears as a duration in which something unitary endures into the now, into the now that is always freshly filled. It is in this way that the duration of which we are conscious grows longer and longer.

But then someone *in the natural attitude* will find it quite obvious to say: I *now* grasp a tone that is preserved throughout its duration, or I grasp an experience of something internal – say, the experience of the physical-thing appearance and of a pleasure associated with it and extending over its duration. Now in focusing my attention on the *constituting appearances* belonging to the consciousness of what is internal, I grasp them as now existing. I now grasp the consciousness of the now and the whole continuity of the consciousness of what has gone before, and this whole continuity exists *simultaneously*; it belongs to the now, occurs now, and stands before me as just that. And if I trace the *flow* of these continuities, they occur *successively,* and the whole complex fills a duration. Of course, this duration is the same as the duration of what appears internally; the duration of the immanent tone is the same as the duration of the consciousness in which it continuously becomes constituted in its duration.

But the question is *whether it truly and properly makes sense* to say that the *constituting appearances belonging to time-consciousness* (to the consciousness of internal time) *themselves fall into (immanent) time*. Surely the following immediately strikes us:

1) Each[19] individual object endures, and necessarily endures; that is to say, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process. Conversely, what exists in time continuously exists in time and exists as the unity belonging to the process that carries with it inseparably the unity of what endures in the process as it unfolds. I must also formulate the following: If we are conscious of a process in time, this consciousness is

[19] From here to p. 383, line 14, the text of the sketch is reproduced with slight variations in §§ 35–37, p. 78, line 1, to p. 80, line 3. – Editor's note.

conceivable only if something is occurring in the process. The [370] unity of the tone that endures throughout the process lies in the tonal process; and conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point.

2) Individual or concrete being in time is necessarily changing or unchanging (the process is a process of change or of rest, the enduring object itself a changing object or one at rest). Moreover, every change has its rate or acceleration of change (to use an image) with respect to the same duration. As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be led over into a change.

Now if we consider the constituting appearances of the consciousness of internal time, we find the following: They form a flow, and each phase of this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle – and this contradicts 2) – no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession (and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be perpetuated in identity with itself). On the contrary, we necessarily find the flow of continuous "change"; but this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither "faster" nor "slower." But further: Where is the object that changes in this flow? Surely in every process *a priori* something runs its course? But here nothing runs its course. The change is not a change. And therefore it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures, and it is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of a duration.

Therefore it is evident that the time-constituting appearances are objectivities fundamentally different from those constituted in time, that they are neither individual objects nor individual processes, and that the predicates of such objects or processes cannot be meaningfully ascribed to them. Hence it also can make no sense to say of them (and to say with the same signification) that they exist in the now and did exist previously, that they succeed one another in time or are simultaneous with one

another, and so on. But no doubt we can and must say: A certain continuity of appearance – that is, a continuity that is a phase of [371] the time-constituting flow – *belongs* to a now, namely, to the now that it *constitutes;* and to a before, namely, as that which is constitutive (we cannot say "was") of the before.

But is not the flow a succession? Does it not have a now, an actually present phase, and a continuity of pasts of which I am now conscious in retentions? We have no alternative here but to say: This flow is something we speak of *in conformity with what is constituted,* but it is not "something in objective time." It is *absolute subjectivity* and has the absolute properties of something to be designated *metaphorically* as "flow"; the absolute properties of a point of actuality, of the primal source-point "now," etc. In the actuality-experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation. For all of this, we have no names.

We must note, in addition, that when we speak of the "perceptual act" and say that, properly speaking, it is to a point of the genuine perceptual act that a continuous series of "retentions" is attached, we have not described thereby any unities in immanent time, but just moments of the flow. That is, the *appearance* – say, the appearance of the house – is a temporal being, a being that endures, changes, and so on, just as much as the immanent tone, which is not an appearance. But on the other hand, the house-appearance is not the perceptual consciousness and retentional consciousness. The latter can be understood only as time-constituting consciousness, as moments of the flow. In the same way, the memorial appearance (or the remembered immanent object, perhaps the remembered immanent primary content) must be distinguished from the memorial consciousness with its memorial retentions. *Everywhere* we have to distinguish: *consciousness* (flow), *appearance* (immanent object [*Objekt*]), and *object* [*Gegenstand*] (when the immanent object is not ⟨a⟩ primary content).

Not all consciousness refers to something in objective time, to objective individuality, as the consciousness that belongs to external perception does, for example. In every consciousness we find an "immanent content." In the case of contents that are called "*appearances,*" this immanent content is either the appear-

ance *of* something individual (of something in external time) or the appearance of something not in time. In judging, for example, [372] we have the appearance "judgment," namely, as a unity in immanent time; and *in this unity* the judgment in the logical sense "appears," etc. Judging is always flow, and thus what we call an act is in every instance a flow in which a unity becomes constituted in immanent time (the judgment, the wish, etc. – the sort of thing that has its immanent duration and may ⟨progress⟩ more or less "rapidly"). The immanent time here is *one;* that is to say, there is simultaneity in this time and durations of equal length (or the same duration for two phenomena). There is also a certain objective determinability with respect to whether immanent objects are before, after, or "simultaneous." –

A tone c *begins*[20] and endures for such and such a length of time, sometimes remaining constant in intensity, sometimes varying, etc. The tone is a *unity in its temporal duration,* and this temporal duration is filled by the tone-process, by the tone c's running-off in varying intensity. To each point of the duration there belongs a *point of tone-content,* a point of the *tone-process* (in order to clarify this, we undertake the description of the running-off modes of the duration and of its parts and points). We begin with the first point, the *beginning-point.* This point is characterized as now. We call the *consciousness of it primal sensation-consciousness,* without intending to say that two different things – primal sensation-consciousness and tone now – could actually be distinguished here. We leave open the possibility that both may be the same, only characterized from different points of view. The tone-now is the beginning of a tone-duration, and we are successively conscious of each point of this duration as now in the form of a primal sensation. But this occurs in a "*flow*" of consciousness. The primal sensation-consciousness *flows,* which means: If a primal sensation belonging to the flow exists, then, looking at the entire succession, there are – in continuous sequence – primal sensations that do "not yet" exist and others that "no longer" exist; and the primal sensation that actually

[20] With respect to the part of the sketch beginning here and running to about p. 384, line 20, Husserl noted in the margin: "Materially correct but awkward in presentation; it is very important to work this out afresh." – Editor's note.

exists is a limit between two continua – the continua of the "not-yet" and of the "no-longer." And the flowing further implies: "at first," the primal sensation that makes up the beginning-point exists and all of the other points do not yet exist. In "steady succession" there is always a new primal sensation, and each new primal sensation swallows up the earlier one and [373] changes its mode into the mode of the "no-longer." It is then no longer primal sensation but "no-longer-sensation." Primal sensation has, then, an extent of the no-longer and, ahead of itself, an extent of the not-yet up to the final point of the duration. If the final point of the duration is intended in primal sensation, then all of the other points of the duration are intended in the form of the "no-longer"; and the "no-longer" is in fact a form of consciousness just as the "now" is. But the *whole duration* of the tone is something flowing away: There follows on the primal sensation of the end of the tone a primal sensation that is no longer primal sensation of the same enduring tone but of another object, which was perhaps partially simultaneous with the tone – that is, with respect to a portion of its duration – and which continues to endure when the tone no longer exists. –

1) *The one immanent time;*
2) *the single flow of the running-off of time;*
3) *the unity of the time-constituting consciousness.*

In reflection[21] we find a *single flow* that breaks down into many flows; yet the many flows possess a kind of unity that permits us to speak of *one* flow. We find many flows because many series of primal sensations begin and end. But we find a *connecting form* because the law of the transformation of the now into the no-longer – and, in the other direction, of the not-yet into the now – applies to each of them, but not merely to each of them taken separately; there rather exists something like a common form of the now, a universal and perfect likeness in the mode of flowing. Several, many primal sensations occur "at once." And when any one of them elapses, the multitude elapses "conjointly" and in absolutely the same mode with absolutely the

[21] From here to p. 387, line 12, the text of the sketch is reproduced with some variations in § 38, p. 81, line 1, to p. 83, line 12. – Editor's note.

same gradations and in absolutely the same tempo: except that one ceases while another still has its not-yet, its new primal sensations that further prolong the duration of what is intended in it. Or described more adequately: The many primal sensations flow away and from the beginning have at their disposal the same running-off modes, except that the series of primal sensations constitutive of the enduring immanent objects are variously prolonged, corresponding to the varying durations of the imma- [374] nent objects. They do not all make use of the formal possibilities in the same way.

That is the first thing we must describe – and describe much better than we have so far. On the *objective* side, we have to refer to the unities of immanent time for all immanent objects and processes, together with the unity of the flow, belonging essentially to time, of modes of origin and of running-off modes; correlatively, we have to refer to the unity (the all-inclusive unity) of the *consciousness* of the time of what is immanent. And here again we have to refer to the modes: the all-embracing "being-together [*Zusammen*]," "being-all-at-once" [*Zugleich*] of the actually present primal sensations; the all-embracing *before,* the having-gone-before of all the immediately preceding primal sensations, the steady transmutation of each ensemble of primal sensations into a before, such that this before is a continuity, each point of which makes up a homogeneous identical running-off form for the entire ensemble. The *whole "being-together"* of primal sensations is subject to the law according to which it changes into a steady continuum of modes of consciousness, of modes of "having elapsed," and according to which in the same continuity an ever new "being-together" of primal sensations arises originally, in order in its turn to pass continuously over into modes of having elapsed. *What is a being-together as an ensemble of primal sensations remains a being-together in the mode of having elapsed.*

Primal sensations have their continuous succession in the sense of a continuous running-off, and primal sensations have their being-together, their being-all-at-once. Actual primal sensations exist all at once; in the succession, however, one sensation or group of sensations existing together is *actual* primal sensation, while the others have *elapsed.* But what does that mean? One can

say nothing further here than: Look! A primal sensation or a group of primal sensations that has ⟨or have⟩ an immanent now as object of consciousness (a tone-now, in the same now a color, and so on) continuously changes into the before, into modes of the consciousness of the before in which the immanent object is intended as past and as further and further past; and "*all at once,*" together with these, an ever new primal sensation and primal sensation-group emerges, an ever new now is established, and thereby an ever new tone-now, form-now, etc., is intended. [375]

A group of primal sensations exists all at once, together – does the "being-together" imply that they are all actual primal sensations or now-sensations? But being-together does not mean being-together-in-one-now. Primal sensation is the now of consciousness, and primal sensation is distinguished from primal sensation only by means of content: the now is the same – not what now exists objectively but the now of consciousness. The consciousness, in its form as primal sensation-consciousness, is identical.

But "*together*" with the primal sensation-consciousness there exist continuous series of modes pertaining to the flowing-away of "earlier" primal sensations, of earlier now-consciousness. *This* being-together is a being-together of modes of consciousness continuously *modified* with respect to *form,* while the being-together of primal sensations is a being-together of modes that are purely *identical in form.* We can extract a point in the continuity of running-off modes, and we then find in this point too a being-together in the sense of a being-together of running-off modes perfectly alike in form, or, rather, identical in form.

One must make an essential distinction between these two ensembles. One is the site for the constitution of *simultaneity,* the other the site for the constitution of temporal *succession* – although it is also the case that simultaneity is nothing without temporal succession and temporal succession is nothing without simultaneity, and thus, correlatively, constitution of simultaneity and constitution of temporal succession are inseparable. Therefore the two sites essentially belong together after all.

We distinguish terminologically between the following: the *phansic being-all-at-once concerning one moment* [*das phansische Momentan-Zugleich*] and the phansic *being-all-at-once concerning*

temporal extension [*das phansische Zeitstrecken-Zugleich*]. With respect to this awkward mode of expression, we must observe that we obviously do not call the one or the other being-all-at-once a *being-simultaneous*. For most serious reasons we do *not* speak of a *time of consciousness*. We take the primal sensations as consciousness *of* a simultaneity – namely, of the tone, of the color, and of whatever else may exist in one and the same "actually present now" – but we do *not* call the primal sensations themselves simultaneous. And we can no more call the phases of the being-all-at-once that concerns temporal extension [376] simultaneous phases of consciousness than we can call the succession of consciousness a temporal succession.

Let us carry the description further. We speak of the succession of primal sensations, and more precisely of those that belong to an immanent duration-unity "while it endures." We do *not* designate this succession as temporal succession, as we do the succession of the "sensed" phases of the temporal object (the succession of the phases that, in the flowing now, are always freshly designated as now). Together with each primal sensation there exists, all at once and in one moment, various primal sensations of other objects; and even the primal sensation of *one* object can, under the appropriate circumstances, be regarded as a complex whose elements exist all at once in one moment. Along with every primal sensation in the phansic succession of primal sensations we find a phansic being-all-at-once concerning extension, and this is an extension of modes – as the word extension [*Strecke*] indicates, a continuous one-dimensional series (the points of which again shelter in themselves the being-all-at-once concerning one moment). We are studying the nature of the being-all-at-once that concerns extension and we are studying the nature of its phases. Each of these phases has the peculiarity that it is consciousness of the earlier now, "original memory" of it. It does not "re-present" in the manner in which a recollection would; it instead re-presents or holds back [*zurückhält*] what was previously intended in the mode of the now in a primal sensation. It holds it back in the form of a new mode, which continuously issues forth from the primal sensing. In a certain sense, however, it re-presents the earlier time-point intended in the mode of the now by making the primal sensation present [*vorstellig*]. This is

to be understood as follows: When[22] the primal sensation recedes and is continuously modified, we not only have in general an experience that is a *modification* of the earlier experience, but, assuming it exists, we are also able to turn our glance in it in such a way that in what is modified we look, so to speak, at what earlier was *not modified.* When a tonal succession runs off (not too rapidly), we are not only able to look at the first tone after it has elapsed as a tone that is still present although no longer sensed, but we can also take heed of the fact that the mode of consciousness that this tone just now possesses is a "memory" of [377] the primal sensation's mode of consciousness in which it was given as now. If that is correct, then we must certainly make the following sharp distinction:

We call the consciousness of the object in immanent time *memory* insofar as the object is intended as having just been given. Perhaps better still, we call it *consciousness of the past* (with the distinction between the "retentional" consciousness and the consciousness that "re-presents" something "again," the "remembering" consciousness). *On the other hand,* we *never* call the consciousness of the past *of the earlier primal sensation* (now-consciousness) "consciousness of the past." We rather call it the *retention of the earlier primal sensation,* when it is a question of a consciousness in the original flow of the modifications of sensation; otherwise we call it a *reproduction of the earlier sensation.* We must adhere to this distinction consistently.

Thus if any phase of the duration of an immanent object is a now-phase and therefore intended in primal sensation, then, in the being-all-at-once that concerns extension, *retentions* that are continuously joined to one another are united with this primal sensation. These are retentions of the primal sensations that belong to all of the rest of the points of the duration; that is to say, to those that have elapsed in time. Each of these retentions has a determinate mode that corresponds to the distance in time from the now-point. Each is the consciousness of the past of the corresponding earlier now-point and gives it in the mode of the

[22] From here to p. 389, line 2, the text of the sketch is reproduced with some variations in § 38, p. 83, line 17, to p. 84, line 8. – Editor's note.

immediate past that corresponds to its position in the elapsed duration (its ontic temporal running-off mode).[23]

Let us consider the following. I hear a tone. It is now appearing. In the next moment it appears as the same tone – the same in quality and intensity – but as "past" and as receding ever further into the past. Over against this, we speak of the consciousness of the immanent time of this tone: the consciousness of the present tone, the consciousness of the tone that just was and that is sinking further and further back in time. I can focus my attention on these modes of consciousness; I can "see" how the phenomenon of the present tone continuously changes, how an ever new now makes its appearance, how a memory-trail, a comet's tail of "memory," continuously attaches itself to the [378] primary memory and how this continuously changes.

I find a "succession" in this consciousness; I find it to be a "*flow.*" And in this flow I find a phase of the "now"; namely, a phase that makes the tone-now originally conscious: the originally presenting phase. But I find "together" with this phase a continuity of phases that make up the consciousness of what elapsed earlier. And this whole "being-all-at-once" formed from original presentation and the continuity of phases relating to the past makes up the moving moment of the actuality of consciousness that, in unceasing change, constitutes the immanent object.

But then the following difficulty arises. I surely do know of the flow of consciousness *as* flow. I can look at it. I therefore have, in a consciousness that grasps its object, the actuality-phase of the flow and, together with it, a series of memories of the earlier phases. If[24] a self-contained flow (belonging to an enduring process or object) has elapsed, I can look back on it; it forms, so it seems, a unity in memory. Does not the flow of consciousness therefore also become constituted in consciousness as a *unity?* Thus the unity of the tone-duration becomes constituted *in the flow,* but the flow itself becomes constituted in its turn as the unity of the consciousness of the tone-duration. And must we then not also go on to say that this unity becomes constituted in

[23] If there is no error in Husserl's pagination, then a sheet is missing from the sketch at this point. – Editor's note.

[24] From here to p. 393, line 39, the text of the sketch is reproduced with some variations in § 39, p. 84, line 16, to p. 88, line 22. – Editor's note.

an altogether analogous way and is every bit as much a constituted temporal series, and that one must therefore surely speak of a temporal now, before, and after?

I have tried the following *solution* for this difficulty: There is one, unique flow of consciousness (perhaps within an ultimate consciousness) in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once. As shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does and that this is something that can be made intelligible on the basis of the flow's essential constitution. Our regard can be directed, in the one case, *through* the phases that "coincide" in the continuous progression of the flow and that function as intentionalities *of* the [379] tone. But our regard can also go *along* the flow, be aimed at a section of the flow, at the passage of the flowing consciousness from the beginning of the tone to its end. What does the latter imply with respect to constitution? How is it possible? Every adumbration of consciousness of the species "*retention*" has, I answer, a *double* intentionality: one serves for the constitution of the immanent object, of the tone; it is this intentionality that we call "memory" of the (just sensed) tone. The other intentionality is constitutive of the *unity* of this primary memory in the flow; namely, the retention is at once memory of the tone and reproduction of the elapsed tone-sensation – more precisely, of the primal sensation. And still more precisely: In its process of being continuously adumbrated in the flow, it is *continuous reproduction of* the continuously preceding phases. If we fix our regard on some one phase of the flow of consciousness (on a place where there appears a tone-now and an extent of the tone-duration in the mode of the just-having-elapsed), then this phase comprehends a continuity of reproductions united in the momentary being-all-at-once.[25] This continuity is reproduction *of*

[25] *Momentan-Zugleich.* This should almost surely be *Strecken-Zugleich* – see Husserl's marginal comment in note 1, p. 381. In the version of this part of the sketch that appears in § 39, p. 85, line 20, *Vor-Zugleich* is used, which is the substitute for *Strecken-Zugleich* throughout § 39. Hereafter, when *Momentan-Zugleich* has the sense of *Strecken-Zugleich,* it will be rendered by "momentary being-all-at-once" rather than by "the being-all-at-once that concerns one moment," which served to translate *Momentan-Zugleich* when the latter term was being used in its proper sense. – Translator's note.

the total momentary continuity of the continuously preceding phases[26] of the flow. (In its beginning member it is new primal sensation; in the member that then follows next in the continuity – in the first phase of adumbration – it is immediate reproduction of the preceding primal sensation; in the next momentary phase, it is reproduction of the reproduction of the primal sensation preceding the one above, and so on.) Now if we allow the flow to flow on, we then have the flow-continuum running off, which causes the continuity we have just described to be modified reproductively. And in this process, each new continuity of phases existing together in one moment is reproduction in relation to the total continuity belonging to the being-all-at-once in the preceding phase. Thus there extends throughout the flow a *horizontal intentionality* that, in the course of the flow, continuously coincides with itself. In the absolute passing on, in the flowing process, the first primal impression becomes changed into a reproduction of itself, this reproduction becomes changed into a reproduction, and so on. But together with the first reproduction there is a new "now," a new primal sensation; and the latter is combined continuously with the former in one moment in such a way that the second phase of the flow is primal sensation of the new now and reproduction of the earlier now. The third phase [380] ⟨is⟩ therefore once again new primal sensation together with reproduction of the second primal sensation and reproduction of the reproduction of the first, and so on. We must also take into account here that the reproduction of a reproduction has intentionality not only in relation to what is reproduced but also in relation to what – in what is reproduced – is reproduced of the second degree. The situation is analogous to the re-presentation of an appearance of a physical thing, which possesses intentionality not only in relation to the thing-appearance but also in relation to the appearing thing; or better still, it is analogous to a memory of a memory of A, which makes us conscious not only of the memory but also of the A as what is remembered in the memory.

We believe, therefore, that the unity of the flow itself becomes constituted in the flow of consciousness as a one-dimensional

[26] Reading *Phasen* for *Phase* with § 39. – Translator's note.

quasi-temporal order by virtue of the continuity of reproductive modifications and by virtue of the circumstance that these modifications are, continuously, reproductions *of* one another, of the reproductions that have continuously preceded them. If I direct my interest towards the *tone,* hence if I immerse myself attentively in the *transverse intentionality* (in the primal sensation as sensation of the actually present tone-now, in the reproductive adumbrations as primary memories of the series of elapsed tone-points and as continually experiencing the unity in the flow of reproductive modifications of the primal sensations and of the reproductions that are already on hand), then the enduring tone stands before me, constantly expanding in its duration. If I focus on the *horizontal intentionality* and on what is becoming constituted in it, I turn my reflective regard away from the tone (which has endured for such and such a length of time) towards what is new in the way of primal sensation at one point in the momentary being-all-at-once, and towards what is reproduced "all at once" with this new primal sensation in a continuous momentary series. What is reproduced is the past consciousness in its series of phases (first of all, with respect to the phase that immediately preceded it). And then, in the continuous flowing-on of consciousness, I grasp the reproduced series of the elapsed consciousness together with the limit of the actual primal sensation and the continuous being-pushed-back of this series, along with the new addition of what is reproduced and the addition of new primal sensations.

Yet one can ask here: Can I, in one glance into the momentary continuity, possibly find and grasp there all at once, as included in it reproductively, the whole consciousness of the past [381] course of consciousness? Is the necessary process not rather the following: I must first apprehend the momentary being-all-at-once[27] itself, and this is continuously modified in reproduction; indeed, it is what it is only in the flow. Now the flow, inasmuch as it modifies this momentary being-all-at-once, coincides with itself intentionally, constituting [a] unity in the flow.

[27] With respect to this whole paragraph, Husserl later noted in the margin with a lead pencil: "Unfortunately I have everywhere employed the expression *Momentan-Zugleich* precisely for the *Strecken-Zugleich.* Hence this must be corrected everywhere." – Editor's note.

And what is one and identical receives and maintains a continuous mode of being-pushed-back; something new is always being added "in front," in order to flow away immediately in its turn, together with what is connected with it in that moment. Throughout this process my look can remain fixed on the momentary being-all-at-once that sinks into the past; but the constitution of the reproductive unity reaches beyond this, always adding something new. And in this process my look can be turned towards what is new, and I am always conscious of this in the flow as constituted unity.

It therefore seems that everything, however difficult it may be, can actually be understood. Accordingly, two inseparably united intentionalities, requiring one another like two sides of one and the same thing, are interwoven with each other in the one, unique flow of consciousness. By virtue of one of the intentionalities, immanent time becomes constituted – an objective time, a genuine time in which there is duration and the alteration of what endures. In the other intentionality, it is the *quasi*-temporal arrangement of the phases of the *flow* that becomes constituted – of the flow that always and necessarily possesses the flowing "now"-point, the phase of actuality, and the series of phases that have preceded the phase of actuality or that will follow it (those that are not yet actual). This prephenomenal, preimmanent temporality becomes constituted intentionally as the form of the time-constituting consciousness and in it itself.

The flow of the consciousness that constitutes immanent time *not only exists* but is so remarkably and yet intelligibly fashioned that a self-appearance of the flow necessarily exists in it, and therefore the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself. The constituting and the constituted coincide, and yet naturally they cannot coincide in every respect. The phases of the flow of consciousness in which phases of the same flow of [382] consciousness become constituted phenomenally cannot be identical with these constituted phases, and of course they are not. What is brought to appearance in the actual momentary phase of the flow of consciousness – specifically, in its series of reproductive moments – are the past phases of the flow of consciousness.

But now we ask whether we must not say that there is, in addition, an *ultimate consciousness* that controls all consciousness in the flow. In that case, the phase of internal consciousness that is *actual* at any particular moment would be something intended through the ultimate consciousness; and it would be this ultimate consciousness that passes over into the reproductive (retentional) modification, which itself would then be something again intended in the ultimate consciousness. This ultimate intentionality can take up into itself the style of paying attention, and in this way we can become conscious of its content in the manner of the object of attention. We find, moreover, that when we do pay attention to something, something is always already "appearing" – the style of attention always runs through and across an intentionality. But if I direct my regard towards an actual momentary phase of the flow? But we should seriously consider whether we must assume such an ultimate consciousness, which would necessarily be an "unconscious" consciousness; that is to say, as ultimate intentionality it cannot be an object of attention (if paying attention always presupposes intentionality already given in advance), and therefore it can never become conscious in this particular sense. –

The *primal sensation* with which the now of the tone becomes constituted cannot be the now-red[28] itself. The modification of the primal sensation red[11] into retentional reproduction shows that. Only intentionality can be modified into intentionality.

[28] *Sic* in the manuscript. – Editor's note.

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[1] The index is based partially on Ludwig Landgrebe's index that appeared in the 1928 edition (Part A of *Husserliana X* and of this translation) and was reprinted in *Husserliana X*, pp. 476–483, and on the index to Rudolf Bernet's edition of Part B (see p. XVII, note 5, of the "Translator's Introduction"). I am grateful to Professor Bernet for his permission to make use of his index. – Translator's note.

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