Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

# Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology

## Including Texts by Edmund Husserl

Edited by
Leonard Lawlor
with Bettina Bergo

Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy

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Foreword

# *Verflechtung:* The Triple Significance of Merleau-Ponty's Course Notes on Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry"

Leonard Lawlor

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Course Notes[1] on Edmund Husserl's fragment "The Origin of Geometry" are significant for three reasons. First, thanks to these notes, we can see precisely how Merleau-Ponty was conceiving, at the end of his life, the relation between Husserl and Martin Heidegger. In fact, the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" complement his Course Notes for "La philosophie aujourd'hui," which have been published in *Notes de cours, 1959–1961.*[2] The two courses should be read together, because while "La philosophie aujourd'hui" presents consecutive studies of Husserl and Heidegger—indeed, this course is important because it demonstrates that Merleau-Ponty at the end of his life had a profound understanding of Heidegger[3]—the shorter Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" list and explain what Merleau-Ponty calls the "convergences" between Husserl and Heidegger. Most generally, Merleau-Ponty sees a convergence between Heidegger's idea of the advent of being and Husserl's idea of the genesis of sense, but the most important convergence for Merleau-Ponty is that both the later Husserl and Heidegger make language inaugural; in effect, both determine language as the *Ab-grund.* This convergence on the question of language leads us to the second reason why these Course Notes are significant. They allow us to see the outlines of Merleau-Ponty's final philosophy.

The Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" present perhaps as clearly as possible Merleau-Ponty's idea of Being (if we favor Heidegger's terminology) or his idea of *Stiftung,* or "institution" (if we favor Husserl's terminology). And while the 1956–58 courses on nature provide a more extensive presentation of Merleau-Ponty's final ontology of nature than this small set of notes, we can still say that the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" complement the investigations found in *La nature,*[4] since these Course Notes deepen Merleau-Ponty's analysis of language and history. But more important, one can say that the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" complement or perhaps even complete the famous incomplete fourth chapter of *The Visible and the Invisible.* Toward the end of this chapter, Merleau-Ponty says, "We touch here the most difficult point, that is, the bond between the flesh and the idea. . . ."[5] The Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" precisely concern this bond, or "chiasm." In the Course Notes, borrowing from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty calls the chiasm "Verflechtung" (BN 25), which is translated into French as *entrelacement* or *enchevêtrement,* and into English as "interweaving" or "entanglement." In "The Origin of Geometry," Husserl says, "Thus humans as humans, fellow humans, world—the world of which humans, of which we always talk and can talk—and, on the other hand, language, are inseparably interwoven [*verflochten*]" (*HUA* 370). Commenting on this passage, Merleau-Ponty says, "True Husserlian thought: man, world, language are interwoven, *verflochten.* A thick identity exists there, which truly contains difference" (BN 25). This thought, that there is an interweaving between man, world, and language, is the guiding thought for Merleau-Ponty's final philosophy. But it is also the guiding thought for the first philosophy of Jacques Derrida, which brings us to the third reason for the significance of these notes.[6]

Derrida's introduction to his French translation of "The Origin of Geometry," of course, appeared in 1962, about two years after the completion of Merleau-Ponty's course.[7] And in *La voix et le phénomène,* Derrida also takes up this Husserlian word, *Verflechtung.*[8] But what is most important here is that, in the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry," Merleau-Ponty, like Derrida in his introduction, takes up the role of documentation that Husserl recognizes in the institution of ideal objects. For Merleau-Ponty, the *Verflechtung* exists between man, world, and writing. Thus, because Merleau-Ponty recognizes the irreducible role of writing, we can establish, with more authority than ever before,[9] a comparison between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. Indeed, this comparison will consist in a kind of continuity between Merleau-Ponty's thought and that of Derrida. And as we shall see, the continuity consists in a certain concept of necessity. This concept of necessity, a double necessity, shall

allow us to speculate a bit about the ultimate direction of Merleau-Ponty's thought. Perhaps, like the later Derrida, Merleau-Ponty too would have been moving in the direction of an ethics.

So in this foreword, I will present three interrelated reasons for the significance of Merleau-Ponty's Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry": the convergences, the outline of Merleau-Ponty's final philosophy (*Verflechtung*), and the comparison between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida.

## The Convergences Between Husserl and Heidegger

The convergences that Merleau-Ponty sees between Husserl and Heidegger[10] are disclosed by the method he uses to interpret Husserl (and historical texts of philosophy in general) both here in the Course Notes and in the famous essay on Husserl, "The Philosopher and His Shadow." In both "The Philosopher and His Shadow" and in the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty rejects two alternative methods of interpretation.[11] In fact, these methods are so opposite that together they form a dilemma (*S* 202/16). On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty rejects what he calls an "objective" history of philosophy (*S* 201/159).[12] Merleau-Ponty calls this method "objective," because it presupposes that the reader stay "outside" of the work, "uninterested" (BN 3, 22). Thus, this objective, outside, disinterested method of reading is a "literal appropriation," and, according to Merleau-Ponty in "The Philosopher and His Shadow," if we adopt it, we "mutilate" the philosopher in that which he has given us to think (*S* 201/159). Indeed, the objective method even "disguises" what there is to think in a great philosopher (BN 3). The other method that Merleau-Ponty rejects is, of course, the subjective counterpart to the objective method, that is, a "meditation that is disguised as a dialogue" (*S* 201/159). Here, we might pretend that there is a question and response taking place between me and the thinker, but in fact I alone make the questions and provide the responses. Since this method is subjective, it inevitably distorts the meaning of the work. For Merleau-Ponty, what unites these two methods is that they both "want the meaning of a work to be entirely *positive* and susceptible in principle to being put in the form of an inventory which delimits what is there in the work and what is not there" (*S* 202/159–60; my emphasis). In other words, both methods presuppose what Merleau-Ponty in the Course Notes calls "philosophical immanence." That is, the "objective method" presupposes a Descartes "who is the absolute possessor of all of his thoughts" as if his thoughts were a collection of ideas or representations (BN 3), while the subjective

method presupposes a "me" or an ego who (like the Descartes) is the absolute possessor of all of his thoughts. The positivistic presupposition of these methods implies that thought lacks nothing and therefore both methods are "closed in upon [themselves and do] not open onto a world to be understood" (BN 2).

In contrast, Merleau-Ponty's method of reading historical works of philosophy seeks a "milieu," a medium or middle, or even a limit between these two alternatives (*S* 202/159). In "The Philosopher and His Shadow" as well as in the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty provides two descriptions of this milieu. On the one hand—and of course the title "the philosopher and his shadow" comes from this first description—Merleau-Ponty speaks of the perceived world. In the perceived world we have not only things but also "the reflections, the shadows, the levels, the horizons between the things" (*S* 202/160; BN 2). The second description of this milieu is "the perception of others": "I borrow myself from others; I make others from my own thoughts. This is no failure to perceive others . . . they are there across our thought and, like different selves of our own, occupying a region which belongs to no one else but them" (*S* 201/159). It is clear, as early as the *Phenomenology of Perception,* where Merleau-Ponty describes the perception of things as a "subject-object *dialogue,*"[13] that the perception of others, dialogue, is more crucial than the perception of the world. And indeed, in "The Philosopher and His Shadow," Merleau-Ponty describes the milieu that defines his own method of interpreting historical works of philosophy as a dialogue, that is, as the milieu "where the philosopher of which we are speaking and the philosopher who is speaking are *present together*" (*S* 202/159; my emphasis).

Because of the *positivistic* presupposition which supports the rejected objective and subjective methods of interpretation, we know that the *present* mentioned in this quote must include a non-present, a *negation,* in a word, a *lack.* Indeed, for the later Merleau-Ponty, all erroneous conceptions of history, evolution, or genesis, whether they be philosophies of causality or philosophies of consciousness, whether they be realism or intellectualism, derive from the positivistic presupposition. In contrast, if there is a lack, there is openness and transcendence. The lack manifests itself on the side of "the philosopher of which we are speaking" when Merleau-Ponty says in "The Philosopher and His Shadow" that "When Husserl comes to the end of his life, there is an unthought in Husserl that is really his and that nevertheless opens onto something else" (*S* 202/160). The antecedent clause—"when Husserl comes to the end of his life [*quand Husserl termine sa vie*]"—implies that Husserl must die, that is, his presence must be lacking, in order to open his thought onto what remains unthought. In the Course Notes, when Merleau-Ponty

says that "this phenomenology . . . is concentrated in the *person* of the philosopher" (BN 2; my emphasis), we must hear the ambiguity of this word "personne," meaning both "someone" and "no one." On the side of "the philosopher who is speaking," the lack manifests itself when Merleau-Ponty says in the Course Notes that "true philosophical radicalism inevitably has an *impassioned* [*passionnelle*] atmosphere" (BN 2). Here Merleau-Ponty is referring to the fact that the interpreter is always interested and is not a disinterested spectator; he or she is passionate about the questions being asked. But we must hear this word "passionnelle" in its connection to passivity, as if the interest I have in the questions being posed to me by a historical work has been received passively. And if *my* interest comes to me passively, then my interest is not really mine; it is as if I am dispossessed and not really present to myself. We might even say that I am silent to myself, in a condition that is prior to already made linguistic forms, prior to all presuppositions, a condition of silence therefore that makes my passions radical (BN 2).[14] The philosopher of which we are speaking and the philosopher who is speaking are therefore "present together," as Merleau-Ponty says, but in a strange sense of the present; we are not really present to one another and yet are present together. Indeed, according to Merleau-Ponty, we are so together that it is impossible to decide what belongs to one or the other. This kind of present or dialogue does not result in the dilemma between an objective interpretation and a subjective interpretation. Because of the lack on the side of the philosopher of which we are speaking—in a word, his or her death (we shall return to the question of death in the section below entitled "Writing and Responsibility: Survival")—there are no *objects* of thought. And because of the lack on the side of the philosopher who is speaking—in a word, his or her passivity—there is no *subjective* arbitrariness (*S* 202/160). What there is on both sides are shadows and reflections. As Merleau-Ponty says in "The Philosopher and His Shadow," "to think is not to possess the objects of thought" (*S* 202/160; cf. BN 13). Therefore, for Merleau-Ponty, what unifies the perception of the world and the perception of others is that the horizons of the things and the others are not things but also are not nothing; they are the "somethings" that "alone delimit the fields of possible variation in the same thing and the same world" (*S* 202/160). And because the "somethings" delimit the fields of possible or inactual variation, Merleau-Ponty, following Husserl himself, can call his method of interpreting historical works of philosophy "a poetizing of the history of philosophy" (BN 3).[15] "Poetizing" here does not mean that the interpretation is false. The interpretation is creative and therefore a "profound truth" (BN 43) insofar as the interpretation actualizes the inactual possibilities. And the actualization is not

an "objectification" of the inactual, but rather provides, as Merleau-Ponty says in the Course Notes, a "gesture" for it (BN 44). This poetizing is indirect language, a silent speaking, which in turn philosophy "thematizes" (BN 44).

Now while Merleau-Ponty's phrase "the poetizing of the history of philosophy" comes from an appendix to *The Crisis of European Sciences,* we know of course that Husserl is speaking of such things as *Dichtung* in the 1930s because of Heidegger's influence. We also know that Merleau-Ponty's use of the word "unthought" in the Course Notes and in "The Philosopher and His Shadow" refers explicitly to Heidegger.[16] For Merleau-Ponty, the "convergences" between Husserl and Heidegger occur between what remains unthought in Husserl's and Heidegger's thinking. In the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry," there are three such convergences (BN 35, 37). The first and most general is that Husserl's idea of the genesis of sense (*Stiftung*) converges with Heidegger's idea of the *Ereignis* of Being (cf. BN 33). We can see this same convergence in the Course Notes for "La philosophie aujourd'hui"; at the end of his discussion of Heidegger there, Merleau-Ponty says that the philosophic sense of his course on nature consists in "the advent of being," and adds between parentheses "cf. Husserl *Ineinander* and *Einfühlung*" (*NC* 59–61, 148). Husserl's idea of the genesis of sense converges with Heidegger's idea of the advent of Being because Husserl does not define the genesis of sense as what Merleau-Ponty calls a "horizontal history," meaning a succession of causal events (*NC* 59–61, 86). Thus Merleau-Ponty can say that the relation between origin and its sedimentation in Husserl is "vertical," "vertical history" (*VI* 276/223). It is Heidegger who provides Merleau-Ponty with the idea of vertical Being, when he speaks of the ground as an *Abgrund,* an "abyss," in the essay "Language" (BN 25). Verticality brings us to the second convergence between Husserl and Heidegger. For Merleau-Ponty, we must understand the Husserlian genesis of sense as "universal dimensionality"; Merleau-Ponty also takes the idea of dimensionality from Heidegger, in particular, from his essay " . . . Poetically Man Dwells . . ." (*NC* 59–61, 112; cf. *VI* 280/227, *VI* 319/265). But "universal dimensionality," for Merleau-Ponty, must be understood as "simultaneity" or as "the Being of the present," or even as the being of the living present. In other words, even though universal dimensionality comes from Heidegger, it must be understood through Husserl. In fact, in the course on "The Origin of Geometry," Merleau-Ponty's favorite Husserlian quote is, surprisingly, not the one from paragraph 16 of *Cartesian Meditations*—"the beginning . . . is . . . mute experience which must be brought to the pure expression of its own sense"—but is rather this quote from "The Origin of Geometry": "from a historical perspective,

what is in itself the first thing is our present."[17] Despite appearances, and we have already anticipated this in the discussion of Merleau-Ponty's interpretation method, his attempt to make universal dimensionality converge with the present does not imply that he is relapsing into some sort of "metaphysics of presence." This present "designates a presence that is richer than what is visible of it" (BN 14), a "deep present," a present that includes the past, and therefore that includes, simultaneously, what is *not* present, that is, the present includes simultaneously some sort of negation or lack (BN 3). The deep present is not therefore a positive foundation; as Merleau-Ponty says in the Course Notes, again, this nonpresence is not the past of causal events, it is not horizontal history; rather it is what Merleau-Ponty calls a "past in general" (BN 8). The past in general for Merleau-Ponty, the depth of the present, is an *Abgrund*. The *Abgrund* brings us to the third and last convergence that Merleau-Ponty sees between Husserl and Heidegger. This convergence is the most important for determining Merleau-Ponty's final philosophy: for the later Husserl, the Husserl of "The Origin of Geometry," according to Merleau-Ponty, "language is inaugurating" (BN 33). For Merleau-Ponty, when Husserl sees that language is simultaneous with ideality (BN 37), this simultaneity means that "speech speaks" (BN 33). Language is the *Abgrund*. This idea of originary language allows Merleau-Ponty to overthrow consciousness (*VI* 292/238) or, as Ricoeur would say, "to dispossess consciousness."[18]

It is, of course, well known that Merleau-Ponty says that he needs to bring the result of the *Phenomenology of Perception* to ontological explicitation (*VI* 237/183). In order for Merleau-Ponty to do this, that is, to ontologize phenomenology, he must follow Husserl's phenomenology "all the way up to what is impossible in [phenomenology]" (BN 37); he must follow Husserl up to *the limit of phenomenology*. For Merleau-Ponty, what is impossible in phenomenology, what is at the limit of phenomenology, is a certain concept of negativity that is not the mere "counter-concept," as Heidegger says in "What Is Metaphysics?" to Being;[19] this negativity is language as the *Abgrund* (BN 36). Nevertheless, even while Merleau-Ponty is clearly becoming more and more Heideggerian at the end of his life, he never abandons a certain Husserlianism (BN 37, marginal note).[20] And so, in the Course Notes Merleau-Ponty says:

> The discovery of operative intentionality has never led Husserl to abandon the ϕ [philosophy] of *Bewußtsein,* of constitution, of intentional analytic. Are we going to say therefore that Husserl *refuses* to make the passage to ontology in Heidegger's sense? to the problematic of negativity? Naivety: what's at stake is not the recognition of an error—but the mutation of concepts. It is certain that *Bewußtsein* no longer means the same thing

> when it is Heraclitus' soul.[21] Concepts for a philosopher are only nets for catching sense. Now certainly Husserl recognized that this concept of consciousness could still lure more sense. cf. Fink: does not give up the transcendental intersubjectivity found in *Cartesian Meditations*. But in order that it be transcendental subjectivity truly the *Ineinander* of subjectivities is necessary. Therefore the *Ur-Ich* before the *Selbstung*. (BN 37; Merleau-Ponty's underlining)

Therefore, in his final philosophy, Merleau-Ponty himself is following Husserl in the "mutation" of the concept of consciousness (see *VI* 252/198). The later Merleau-Ponty is always aiming at the limit (or the milieu) between Husserlian "rationalism" and Heideggerian "irrationalism" (BN 3).[22] The movement toward the limit between rationalism and irrationalism consists in overthrowing consciousness toward a "speech speaks," while not going as far as a "mysticism of language" (BN 37, fourth addendum). Therefore, in order not to fall into this mysticism, in order not to fall into irrationalism, Merleau-Ponty always remains close to the Husserlian concept of transcendental intersubjectivity; he always remains close to the experience of the other.

## *Verflechtung:* The Interweaving

We come now to the second reason why the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" are significant. In light of the convergences we have just considered, these Course Notes allow us to see clearly, perhaps as clearly as possible, the outline of Merleau-Ponty's final philosophy: the chiasm *Verflechtung,* or interweaving, of the visible and the invisible. We were, of course, already very close to the chiasm when we were discussing his method of reading historical works of philosophy, which seeks to circumscribe an unthought (BN 3). In the Course Notes, as in "The Philosopher and His Shadow" (*S* 208/165), Merleau-Ponty calls this method an "archeology"; he says,

> The theme of $\varphi$ [philosophy] is the horizon of horizons. Deepening of the initial definitions of $\varphi$ as *strenge Wissenschaft.* In particular, the initial definitions of the *Eidos:* the *Eidos* is from now on the *Auslegung* of a horizon; eidetic variation seeks the invariant "as the essence constantly implied in the flowing, vital horizon" (HUA 383). Does philosophy explain this Wesen? Its theme is a *verborgene Vernunft in der Geschichte* (Fink), a *universale Teleologie der Vernunft,* but which can be grasped only

> in filigree, as a secret or hidden connection. Therefore *Wesen* does not engulf the horizon. It is the formulation of its structure as horizon of culture. . . . But this "structural" or concrete *a priori* is neither a Kantian category nor even a Hegelian idea; it is the *allgemeinen Sinnesboden* (HUA 380) = the sense finally, far from being an idea, is a ground <*sol*>. φ seeks in the archeology of the ground [*sol*], in the depth and not in the height (the ideas). (BN 44; cf. *S* 228/181)[23]

Merleau-Ponty's entire final philosophy is concentrated in this comment. Merleau-Ponty is orienting his entire philosophy toward the depth, in the ground, the visible, and not, as he says, in the heights, in the ideas, in the invisible. He is prioritizing the soil (*le sol*), what above we were calling the "depth" of the present or the "past in general."[24] Although Merleau-Ponty is prioritizing archeology over teleology, that is, over Husserl's universal teleology of reason mentioned at the end of "The Origin of Geometry" (*HUA* 386), this prioritization does not exclude the *telos*. Verticality also includes a horizon or a future, since the depth also includes sense, essence, an invariant, or a structure. Thus, this comment implies that we have two inseparable, interwoven axes or dimensions, a doubling consisting in a vertical depth and a horizontal distance. Because of the concept of interweaving at work here, we will not be able to proceed in a progressive way (cf. BN 2), but only in a circular way, where "to go in one direction is truly to go in the other" (BN 26).

Because Merleau-Ponty directs himself toward the soil, toward the *arche*, we must start at the end of his Course Notes, where he provides a commentary on Husserl's *Umsturz* fragment, which is frequently called "The Earth Does Not Move." For Husserl, in "The Earth Does Not Move," the earth is the preobjective and pre-Copernican earth; and since it is preobjective, it is relative, for Husserl, to subjectivity, to, as Merleau-Ponty says, "the idealist *Sinngebung*" (BN 47) of the absolute constituting ego. And yet, what Merleau-Ponty sees in "The Earth Does Not Move" is that Husserl's analysis "concerns the whole ontology: everywhere a new type of being is unconcealed" (BN 46). The Husserlian earth is equivalent to what Heidegger calls Being, and the earth understood as Being brings about, for Merleau-Ponty, a clarification of the notion of the "possible" (BN 44). From the famous preface to the *Phenomenology of Perception* on, Merleau-Ponty has always tried to root all abstract concepts in factuality. So here, in the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty roots all possibilities in the one unique earth, which implies that possibilities are not empty, ideal, or logical possibilities. As Merleau-Ponty says frequently in the later writings, possibilities are not nothing since they are of the earth; they are, as we have already said, "something." Thus Merleau-Ponty calls

these possibilities "possibilities in actuality" (BN 22). Even though these possibilities are rooted in actuality, they are still inactual or negative (invisible); they are something and yet they lack something. So, Merleau-Ponty says, now transforming the soil of the earth into the abyss of the ocean, "Noah's ark was floating on the waters, i.e., what is outside of it, nothing that has a form (*Geformte*), similarly, the earth-body-ego dimension is floating upon the infinity of thought, which, in contrast to the water, assures every possibility of Being" (BN 45). These possibilities are un-formed, "nothing that has a form," *gestaltlos* (BN 32). Thus they must be understood as nonpositive; this kind of negativity, the lack of form, determines for Merleau-Ponty the sense of inactuality or virtuality. Moreover, when Merleau-Ponty speaks of *Vorhabe,* "prepossession" (BN 8), he is referring to possibilities not yet possessed as a form. Actualization for Merleau-Ponty is always, as he said in the *Phenomenology of Perception,* a "mise en forme" (*PHP* 220/189, for example). Even though these possibilities are unformed, they are still, for Merleau-Ponty, thought; in fact, as he says, they consist in "the infinity of thought." Thus borrowing from Heidegger, he calls these unformed thoughts "Denkmöglichkeiten" (BN 47). Importantly, this characterization of the terrestrial possibilities implies that Merleau-Ponty is not conceiving them as matter;[25] for Merleau-Ponty, the earth itself presupposes language, the horizon. We shall return to this point below, but now let us circle back to the vertical (the visible).

As is well known, "The Earth Does Not Move" describes kinesthesia, the experience of my own body moving. Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty stresses that my experience of my own body is an experience of "inner movement." I do not experience my moving, my "Ich gehe," as a "progressive movement" from place A to place B; rather, I experience it as a kind of moving in place because, no matter how much I displace my body, my body always remains the center of my movement. Thus, because of this inner movement, my body is a carnal body and not merely an objective *Körper* ("body"). Carnal bodies, therefore, for Merleau-Ponty, are "of the same type" as the earth (BN 45). When I move, this moving is no more in objective movement than the earth's rest is in objective rest. Merleau-Ponty also stresses that there is already a kind of *Einfühlung* ("empathy") here with other bodies found on the surface of the earth; when I say that a body such as a stone on the ground is in rest, it correlates to a "change of appearance" of the kinesthesia; therefore it is a kinesthetic rest and not objective rest. This *Einfühlung* anticipates the *Einfühlung* with other animate beings and humans (BN 45). Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty describes "the access to others" first in terms of an identity of "the universe of *Körper*" (BN 45). The identity of bodies

happens because the others are both *Körper* and *Leib* ("flesh"). Since the others consist in *Körper,* they have to do with the same bodies as I do; since they consist in *Leib,* the others transform me into a *Körper* just as I transform them into a *Körper* (BN 45). But Merleau-Ponty insists, while still following Husserl in "The Earth Does Not Move," that "the identity goes farther" than the identity of *Körper* (BN 45). There is an identification among the "they," as Merleau-Ponty says (*les "ils"*), because their *Leib* as well as their *Körper* is the same for each and for the others. In other words, as Merleau-Ponty says, there is an identity through "the same body-world structure" (BN 45). Merleau-Ponty concludes that this identity is to be taken "very generally: my corporeality is communicable—participatable, dimension—through my corporeality I can 'verstehen' other bodies and in this way I can put my experience into relation with theirs" (BN 45). Even though it is precisely the identity of having the same universe of bodies on the earth that allows for this *Einfühlung,* which in turn allows for communication and understanding among humans—in other words, even though having the same world allows for the very idea of humanity, that is, for the horizon of humanity—this same world actually presupposes the horizon of humanity. As Merleau-Ponty says, "the others are already implicated in my experience of the Earth: through them, my horizon is enlarged to the size of the earth" (BN 45).

Circling back to the horizontal dimension, we must shift from Merleau-Ponty's commentary on "The Earth Does Not Move" piece to his commentary on "The Origin of Geometry." As is well known, in "The Origin of Geometry," Husserl is attempting to describe how an ideal object is instituted. This institution happens through language. But in order to clarify the role of language, Husserl speaks of "the horizon of humanity" (*HUA* 369). According to Merleau-Ponty, a spatial horizon is not an aggregate of things, but rather "their typic, their style, a prior space in which they can be afterward" (BN 22). Similarly, therefore, the horizon of humanity is prior to the thesis of any humans or human communities, prior to any specific *Einfühlung;* it is the typic or style of being human that makes *Einfühlung* possible (BN 22). Merleau-Ponty stresses that, since the horizon is not an aggregate of *Einfühlungen,* it is humanity, *Mitmenscheit,* in the double sense of the substantive: "It is humanity as extensional concept and humanity as historic idea" (BN 22). In fact, and this is crucial, Merleau-Ponty says that the horizon is "between the two" senses, in the middle of the doubling, at the limit. Consequently, for Merleau-Ponty, there is a "paradox of the horizon" (BN 22). Humans including me have their individual interests which "blindly" intend the horizon; these interests again are the passions we were discussing earlier in Merleau-Ponty's method of reading historical texts. When my individual interests function

blindly, "we only have," according to Merleau-Ponty, "*Mit-menscheit:* lateral relation to the others by means of reference to the same world" (BN 22; Merleau-Ponty's underlining). Although Merleau-Ponty does not say this, we could say that, when my interests function "blindly," I desire with an "Eros of the eye"[26] the same bodies on the face of the earth as others desire them, and thus I am laterally related to others in reference to this same desirable world. In contrast, when I insert myself into the "whole" (*l'ensemble*) of my co-humans, then I have the idea of humanity, in which case my interests no longer function "blindly." In fact, according to Merleau-Ponty, I become a "disinterested spectator"; I become mind and no longer eye. The paradox is that, when I coexist with other humans through my interests, then I am not one of them because the interests are *mine;* as Merleau-Ponty says, alluding to Malraux, "I am the incomparable monster" (BN 22). In other words, when I am *one* human who is functioning as an interested human, I do not truly know myself as humanity. Again, I am not truly human. And yet, when I know myself as humanity and become the disinterested spectator of the idea of humanity, then here too I am no longer a human since I am not related to others laterally. At both poles of the paradox, at the pole of brute existence and at the pole of ideas, I am no longer human; only in the milieu or at the limit am I human for Merleau-Ponty. He describes the paradox this way: "Paradox of the horizon: when it engulfs me truly (interests), it does not engulf me truly (monster). When it does not engulf me truly since I conceive it and me in it (I escape), then I autoposit myself in it. Antihumanistic humanism" (BN 22). While one could, of course, characterize Merleau-Ponty's final philosophy with this phrase, "antihumanistic humanism," what is important about the "paradox of the horizon" is that it provides the logic of Merleau-Ponty's concept of interweaving. If I fall into the depth of brute existence, of the wild or savage, I am merely passive (following my interests and passions) and cannot actively create anything. Yet, if I ascend to the heights of the ideas, I am merely active (being a disinterested spectator) and cannot be impassioned. The paradox implies that I must be both passive and active, must simultaneously create and repeat, at once falling and ascending. Because the paradox necessitates a simultaneous descent and ascent, Merleau-Ponty quotes repeatedly in the Course Notes (BN 25, 36, 44) Heidegger's comment, from *On the Way to Language,* in reference to the sentence "language speaks": "We fall upward, to a height." If language speaks and not me, in other words, if I *respond* to language in the sense both of listening passively and silently and then in the sense of speaking actively and creatively, I fall down into passions of humanity (really into nature) and simultaneously upward into the idea of humanity. Therefore, with the sentence "language speaks," we

are at the literal center of Merleau-Ponty's conception of the chiasm of the visible and the invisible, at the center of what Heidegger had called the advent of Being and of what Husserl had called *Stiftung*. In "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," Merleau-Ponty describes *Stiftung* in the following way:

> Husserl has used the fine word *Stiftung*—foundation or establishment—to designate first of all the unlimited fecundity of each present which, precisely, because it is singular and passes, can never stop having been and thus being universally; but above all to designate that fecundity of the products of a culture which continue to have value after their appearance and which open a field of investigations in which they perpetually come to life again [*où ils revivent perpétuellement*]. It is thus that the world as soon as he has seen it, his first attempt at painting, and the whole past of painting all deliver up a *tradition* to the painter—*that is,* Husserl remarks, *the power to forget origins* and to give to the past not a survival [*une survie*], which is the hypocritical form of forgetfulness, but a new life, which is the noble form of memory. (*S* 73–74/59; Merleau-Ponty's italics)

For Merleau-Ponty, this noble form of memory or this nonhypocritical form of survival, which makes cultural products "relive," only occurs through language, in fact, as we shall see now, only through writing.

## Writing and Responsibility: Survival

Because of the usual ways we characterize the thought of Merleau-Ponty and the thought of Derrida—Merleau-Ponty as the philosopher of speech and Derrida as the philosopher of writing—it is surprising to see a continuity between them. But this difference (writing/speech) is not what is decisive between Derrida and Merleau-Ponty. When Merleau-Ponty investigates "The Origin of Geometry" in these Course Notes, he too takes up what Derrida had made famous in his introduction to "The Origin of Geometry": the role of writing in the institution of ideal objects. What is decisive is that both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida see that writing is necessary and that it necessitates; they both create a certain concept of necessity. This concept of necessity allows us to establish a continuity between the thought of Merleau-Ponty and that of Derrida, which is the third reason why the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" are significant.

Because of Derrida's introduction, everyone knows that Husserl, in "The Origin of Geometry," discusses documentation and thus "writing-

down" (*Niederschrift*); "writing-down" is the last step in the original institution of geometrical ideal objects. If we can speak of steps here, there are two prior steps: internal subjective iteration, and then linguistic expression in the community of the inventor. Finally, there is documentation; this is what Husserl says in "The Origin of Geometry":

> Now we must note that the objectivity of the ideal structure has not yet been fully constituted through such actual transferring of what has been originally produced in one to others who originally reproduce it. What is lacking is the *persisting existence* of the "ideal objects" even during periods in which the inventor and his fellows are no longer wakefully so connected or even are no longer alive. What is lacking is their continuing-to-be even when no one has realized them in self-evidence. The important function of written, documenting linguistic expression is that it makes communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address; it is, so to speak, communication become virtual. (*HUA* 37)

Both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida recognize that this comment means that writing is *necessary* in order for an ideal object to be fully constituted, in other words, to be what it is (BN 13; cf. *PHP* 206/177; *LOG* 86/89); Derrida in the introduction in fact calls it an "eidetic necessity" (*LOG* 17 n. 1/36). Thus, for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, "the written"—Merleau-Ponty uses the word "l'écrit" (BN 12), or "writing," while Derrida uses the word "l'écriture" (*LOG* 84/87)—is not a mere "substitute" for or a "degradation" of the sense (BN 13); it is not merely "congealed speech" (BN 43); it is not mere transmission or communication (BN 13, 43); nor is the writing-down mere "abbreviations," "codification," "signs," or "clothing" (BN 40; *LOG* 86/89). It is not a "defect" (BN 40), nor is it merely a "worldly and mnemotechnical aid" (*LOG* 86/89). The passage quoted above—and I think this is crucial—implies all of these negative characterizations of writing because in it Husserl says "something is lacking" (*es fehlt*); the necessity of writing down comes from this lack in the "ideal structure"; the lack—here is the necessity—*needs* to be filled in.

Husserl points to this need of filling in when, in "The Origin of Geometry," he says that "the writing-down effects a transformation of the original mode of being of the sense-structure" (*HUA* 371). Most obviously, and of course both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida note this in their texts, the transformation of the ontological status of the sense-structure means that writing endows the sense-structure with the characteristic of being "non-spatio-temporal" (*LOG* 88/90) or "supratemporal" (BN 11); this supratemporality or omnitemporality is the persisting existence mentioned above, "their continuing-to-be even when no one has

realized them in self-evidence." Prior to the achievement of omnitemporality, the sense-structure is too subjective (or transient) and not objective enough (or permanent). Merleau-Ponty, for example, calls the sense-structure an "intra-psychic event" (BN 29). However, just as prior to the transformation, the sense-structure is too subjective, after the transformation, when the sense-structure has achieved omnitemporality, it is too objective. As Merleau-Ponty says, it becomes a "monument" (BN 43), or, as Derrida says, it becomes a "lapidary inscription" (*LOG* 85/88). But the transformation of the ontological status of the sense-structure into omnitemporality does not mean, for Husserl, of course, that the sense-structure, now ideal object, exists outside of time; as Derrida says, quoting Husserl's *Experience and Judgment,* "'supratemporality implies omnitemporality,' and the latter itself [is] only 'a mode of temporality'" (*LOG* 165/148). So, when writing effects a transformation of the ontological mode of the sense-structure, it also makes the ideal object "sensible" and "public," as Merleau-Ponty says (BN 40, 43); it comes "into the world" (BN 40); or, as Derrida says, it is "incarnated," "localized and temporalized" (*LOG* 86/89). So, as both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida see, the necessity of writing down must be "double" (BN 14)—this is Merleau-Ponty's word, sounding like Derrida—or "ambiguous"—this is Derrida's word, sounding like Merleau-Ponty (*LOG* 84/87).

The paradox of horizon, which is the very structure of interweaving, already implied this double necessity of writing: sense lacks objectivity (the "incomparable monster"), which produces a need to go beyond subjective experience, and sense lacks subjectivity (the disinterested spectator), which produces a need to go beyond ideal objectivity. But in Merleau-Ponty's Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry," there is one image that crystallizes this double necessity. When Merleau-Ponty speaks of the written, he calls it a "grimoire," a book of spells or incantations (BN 40, 43). There is one obvious reason why Merleau-Ponty appeals to this image: at least since the time of the *Phenomenology of Perception,* he had been referring to perception as a "magical" relation (*PHP* 207/178). So here, in the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty uses the word *grimoire* in order to intend a prescientific and therefore noncausal relation of institution by the written. Again, institution in Merleau-Ponty is not "horizontal history"; instead, *Urstiftung,* as Husserl himself says in "The Origin of Geometry," is "spiritual becoming" (BN 25; *HUA* 366). In fact, Merleau-Ponty entitles a section of his Course Notes "The General Problem of Spiritual Mutation" (see BN 2; cf. BN 46). The institution of ideal objects is, for Merleau-Ponty, this very problem of spiritual mutation. So the book understood as a *grimoire* obviously is supposed to make us think of the "conjuring up" of spirits. In addition to this image of the *grimoire,*

Merleau-Ponty in the Course Notes (but also in other texts from this period such as "The Philosopher and His Shadow" [*S* 227/180]) makes use of an idea from Valéry, that the author, the actual person such as a Camus—Camus is Merleau-Ponty's own example (BN 2)—is "the impostor of the writer" (BN 40, 4). Unlike the author, that is, the actual person Camus, the writer, Merleau-Ponty is implying, is at the level of the written as providing virtual idealities or virtual possibilities (possibilities in the sense of "possibilities in actuality" as we discussed above). So the conjuring up of spirits thanks to the incantations found in the book of spells does not bring back Camus the author but Camus the writer. In fact, the image of the *grimoire* implies that the author named "Camus" must die. The written for Merleau-Ponty, therefore, implies the necessity of death.

There is also one image in Derrida that crystallizes this necessity, and it will allow us to understand more fully this necessity of death. This is the image of "the silence of prehistoric arcana and buried civilizations, the entombment of lost intentions and guarded secrets, the illegibility of lapidary inscription" (*LOG* 85/88). This image of "the entombment of lost intentions" "unseals" what Derrida here calls "the transcendental sense of death."[27] We can understand this phrase, "the transcendental sense of death," only in light of Husserl's definition of the transcendental as being different from empirical or psychological subjectivity; Derrida realizes that, if the transcendental is not and cannot be restricted to actual subjects, then its institution requires the, in principle (the "en droit"), death of every actual subject (*LOG* 85/88). In "The Origin of Geometry," according to Derrida, we see that writing is the "agency" that implements this necessary death; writing is the agency that "unites" death, as Derrida says, "to the absolute of an intentional right"; without the agency of writing and therefore the death of the actual author, there would be no virtual *communication,* that is, there would be no ego common to us all, no communal ego. And yet, writing is also the agency that makes this communication fail, when writing becomes sterile iteration: this failure, we can say, is the very death of the *logos* (cf. *LOG* 165/149). So writing also requires the life of actual subjects to make the *logos* be *virtual* communication, that is, to make the common ego be individuated in each of us. In other words, the *logos,* for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, would not live unless the author died; there would be no omnitemporality of sense without this liberation from the spatiotemporal conditions of institution; there would be no communication. On the other hand, the *logos* would itself die unless there were humans to reactivate it; there would be no temporality of sense without this localization and temporalization of sense in the world; there would be no virtuality.

Of course, throughout his writings Derrida constantly talks about death, while Merleau-Ponty almost never mentions it. Yet, in these Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty mentions death in the context of Husserl's well-known comment that it is impossible to reactivate everything. This is what Merleau-Ponty says: "Is there coincidence with the totality of the *Urstiftung,* if the tradition is always forgetfulness? . . . Wouldn't coincidence be the death of the *logos* since forgetfulness makes tradition fruitful?" (BN 9). Merleau-Ponty is suggesting here that the very life of the *logos* depends on the factual author being dead *and* on someone being alive here and now. So the *logos* itself, for Merleau-Ponty in the Course Notes and for Derrida in his introduction, is a type of sur-vival; indeed, the double necessity of the lack of persisting existence is focused in this word "sur-vival." What this double necessity necessitates, what it commands, is that sense survive: sense must go beyond or over, "sur," life—that is, it must die—and sense must be superlife, "sur" again, that is, it must go beyond or over death.

Since this prefix "sur" means death, it points to a very specific form of negativity, which we have already discussed above. We recall that, for the later Merleau-Ponty, inspired by Heidegger, negativity cannot be the "counter-concept" of Being, since, if it were, if it were what Heidegger calls in "What Is Metaphysics?" a "nullity," negativity would be dependent on a prior negation between being and nothingness. Instead, for Heidegger, the nothing nothings; the nothing is the origin of negation. Negation originates in the nothing insofar as it is an experience, the experience of anxiety, and, obviously, given what we know about division two of *Being and Time,* we are still talking of death. Yet, since this experience of the nothing is an experience, we must say, as we saw above, that the nothing is actually a sort of something, an *Etwas,* as Heidegger says.[28] Thus, for Heidegger, the nothing is internal to Being; in fact, without this experience of anxiety we would, for Heidegger, have no access to the Being of beings.

While Merleau-Ponty adopts this Heideggerian concept of nothing or negativity, he interprets it in a Husserlian way.[29] In the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry," and in *The Visible and the Invisible,* Merleau-Ponty defines this negativity as *Nichturpräsentierbarkeit,* "originary nonpresentability" (BN 12, 44, 45; *VI* 292/238–39). Merleau-Ponty's "originary nonpresentability" is referring to an essential aspect of intersubjective experience described in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation: that I can never have the interior life of another present for me. In the Course Notes, taking up what we see in "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," Merleau-Ponty adds to this essential aspect of intersubjective experience; for Merleau-Ponty, the nonpresentability of the other to me is a kind

of muteness, and this muteness does not mean that the other is not speaking because he or she is dumb. There is always, for Merleau-Ponty, a background of language, the ready-made or spoken language, within which the muteness lies. And so, in the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty says, "before language, a 'mute' experience and an experience that calls from itself for its 'expression,' but a 'pure' expression, i.e., foundation and not product of language. Therefore a *Vor-sprache,* a down-side or 'other side' of language, an *Ur-sprung* of language" (BN 29). Here I think it is important to recall what we saw above, that Merleau-Ponty had defined expression in the *Phenomenology of Perception* in terms of the phrase "mettre en forme" (*PHP* 220/189, for example). The Merleau-Pontian silence therefore is a thought, *Denkmöglichkeit,* but one which is "gestaltlos," as Merleau-Ponty says in the Course Notes (BN 32), "formless," and as formless, it is not nothing but rather something that needs—"that calls from itself"—expression.

With this formless content in mind, let us now turn to Derrida. As in Merleau-Ponty's later writings, in Derrida's introduction to his translation of "The Origin of Geometry," there is a continuous theme of negativity (*LOG* 17 n. 1/17); the prefix "non" appears countless times (*LOG* 112/109, for example). In the introduction, there are only fleeting references to Heidegger and no reference to any specific Heidegger work, so we can conclude that in 1962 Derrida has not read Heidegger profoundly; in fact, his concern with negativity in the introduction seems to be inspired by Hegel (cf. *LOG* 58 n. 1/67 n. 62). We can see the connection to Hegel clearly in Derrida's 1964 essay "Violence and Metaphysics," where Derrida claims that it is impossible to conceive alterity without negativity.[30] Thus, a certain concept of negativity will continue to be important for Derrida, and eventually, very quickly, it will be associated with Heidegger's nothing. For instance, in the introduction to *Voice and Phenomenon,* echoing Heidegger, Derrida uses the word "rien" as a substantive, saying "this nothing which distinguishes the parallels," for example (*VP* 12/12). This substantive use of *rien* implies that, here in Derrida, as we saw in Merleau-Ponty, we do not have a pure nothingness, a nullity.

Nevertheless, in his introduction to "The Origin of Geometry," Derrida, *unlike Merleau-Ponty,* determines the lack of persisting existence which necessitates survival, and thus determines this negativity, when he analyzes Husserl's discussion of idealization in "The Origin of Geometry" (*HUA* 375). What is important for Derrida is that, in "The Origin of Geometry," Husserl says that "The peculiar sort of self-evidence belonging to such idealizations will concern us later." Husserl, of course, never returns to it. So, for Derrida, the question is: Is there any evidence for

such idealizations? The idealization of which Husserl is speaking is the breakthrough of a sense toward an "indefinite iteration," "a passage to the limit," "an Idea in the Kantian sense" (*LOG* 147/135). But as soon as we understand that an Idea in the Kantian sense means infinity, we know that the sense cannot be given in an intuition or be given in evidence (*LOG* 147/134–35, 152/139). Intuition or evidence, being given in person, is always finite. So, for Derrida, this evidence, if we can still call it that, is formal; or perhaps better, this experience is the experience of formality. We can have evidence only of the form of infinity, but not of its content; we have no evidence of infinity itself (*LOG* 152–53/139). In other words, what is lacking and what then brings about a need for survival in Derrida is not formless content (as in Merleau-Ponty) but rather contentless form. In Derrida, the need for survival comes from a formalization without content. What we have is a finite form which needs indefinitely to become fulfilled.

Now, in his introduction, Derrida speaks of the Idea in the Kantian sense as having "its own original presence" (*LOG* 152/139); but we know that, by the time of *Voice and Phenomenon,* this "original presence" will be called "nonpresence" (*VP* 5/6, 71/63). It is especially clear in *Voice and Phenomenon* that this Derridean "nonpresence" derives from the experience of the other, since Derrida claims that Husserl's "solitary life of the soul" in the First Investigation anticipates "the sphere of ownness" in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation; thus Derrida's "nonpresence" resembles Merleau-Ponty's *Nichturpräsentierbarkeit,* insofar as both concepts derive from the essential aspect of the experience of the other, that the other's interior life is not directly present to me, but only appresented to me. Yet what Derrida is implying in both the introduction and in *Voice and Phenomenon* is that, when I have an appresentation of the other, what I have is the form of the other and not its content; this lack of content is what makes the other "other" for Derrida, and it also keeps the form of the other indefinitely open *to* fulfillment.

What we have seen so far in this comparison of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida is that, on the basis of what Husserl says in "The Origin of Geometry" about the institution of ideal objects requiring writing because the sense structure "lacks" "persisting existence," both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida assert a double necessity: the necessity of going beyond subjective experience in order to be objective, and the necessity of going beyond ideal objectivity in order to be available to subjective experience. By focusing on the crystallizing images of the *grimoire* in Merleau-Ponty and the entombment of lost intentions in Derrida, we were able to see that this double necessity implies a certain concept of sur-vival, beyond life, that is, death; and beyond death, that is, life.

Then we focused only on the first side of this concept of survival. Going beyond life implies a negativity. Here, in the discussion of negativity, we first discovered a similarity: Merleau-Ponty's "originary nonpresentability" looks to be the same as Derrida's "nonpresence"—and then we discovered a difference—perhaps *the* difference between Derrida and Merleau-Ponty:[31] for Merleau-Ponty, the negativity of writing is a formless content, while for Derrida, the negativity of writing is a contentless form. Nevertheless, we are still able to see the exact point of continuity between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida since, for both, the negativity of writing, that the author must die, is, as Merleau-Ponty says, "a call to reiteration" (BN 38) and, as Derrida says, "a first posting [*un premier envoi*]" (*LOG* 36/50). In other words, the negativity of writing implies that writing is always, for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, defined by the dative case: it is a sending *to*. But, with the dative, we turn now to the other side of the necessity, that the object must become subjective.

In the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty indeed defines speech in terms of the dative, as "speaking to" (BN 40). He defines speech in this way because he is trying to understand language that is not "ready-made" but language "in the making." Here, of course, Merleau-Ponty, is utilizing a distinction that he developed in earlier works (to which I alluded above): the well-known distinction between "speaking speech" and "spoken speech" (*PHP* 229/197; *S* 56/44–45).[32] In fact, he uses these exact terms in the Course Notes (BN 29).[33] While spoken speech is "ready-made" language—a language someone *has spoken*—speaking speech is language in the making (BN 38, 30, 29, 25), a language I *am speaking* (BN 25). Therefore, speaking speech is a *praxis;* as Merleau-Ponty says, "Speech is a *praxis:* the only way to understand speech is to speak (to speak to . . . or be interpellated by . . . )" (BN 38). This being interpellated by—someone is interrogating "to" me—needs a response. Merleau-Ponty defines the response to interpellation in terms of what Husserl calls *Nachverstehen* ("reunderstanding") in "The Origin of Geometry" (*HUA* 371; BN 12; cf. *PHP* 208 n. 2/179 n. 2). In the dative relation of hearing—when someone is questioning "to" me—I always encounter the *Nichturpräsentierbarkeit* of the other. Because *Nachverstehen* encounters the limit of that which cannot be reanimated—the negativity of death—*Nachverstehen* is, for Merleau-Ponty, first a kind of passivity (BN 36). In the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty says that geometrical ideality "calls me to" *Nachverstehen* (BN 15, 38). Thus, in order to hear this call, I must be quiet; obviously, if someone is interrogating (to) me, I must listen. So the passivity of *Nachverstehen* must be conceived as mute or silent. But again, this muteness does not, for Merleau-Ponty, mean a lack of language; it

does not mean that I am dumb. In fact, I have the ready-made forms of spoken speech available to me.

Yet it is precisely this specific silence of expression that makes *Nachverstehen* active. Precisely because *Nachverstehen* encounters the limit of nonpresentability—precisely because it is passive—it *must* be active. In *Nach-verstehen,* there is an activity of repeating—the *Nach*—that keeps hearing from being mere "association" or "receptivity" (BN 30, 36); *Nachverstehen* works with passivity, Merleau-Ponty says. This working with passivity makes *Nachverstehen,* for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of *Deckung, recouvrement,* coincidence (BN 37). But here, "coincidence" does not mean that all of a sudden I have access to your thoughts. Instead, when I listen and understand your question, *again, Nach,* what I am doing is actualizing virtualities: ideality, as Merleau-Ponty says, "appears at the edge of speech" (BN 31, 12). In other words,

> [Husserl places] openness to others and openness to ideality into the law of the praxical-perceptive, i.e., it consists in turning the others into the other side of my world and in turning ideality into the *Etwas* <"something"> upon which these two sides are articulated, the pivot of the "speaking to . . ." a pivot, that is, to an invisible through which the visible holds. The vertical Being as the being of *praxis,* as the correlate of Speech. (BN 12; Merleau-Ponty's underlining)

This comment means that, when someone is interrogating (to) me, he or she is expressing an ideality in the ready-made forms of spoken speech. But, since I do not have access to the soul of the other—his or her soul is not-presentable, even, so to speak, dead—then the expressed ideality is separated from this person. It is at the "pivot"—Merleau-Ponty also uses the word "hinge" (BN 12, 13)[34] and "jointure" (BN 43)—between us. Thus, when I listen and then respond, I repeat the ideality. But also, since I have only the ideality and not its "soul," I must create an other "side" of the ideality. The silence of my listening must be put into a form and this form will be derived from the ready-made forms. But when I put my silence into the linguistic form, this insertion recreates the sense. For Merleau-Ponty, *Nachverstehen* is *Nacherzeugung* ("reproduction"). In other words, with Merleau-Ponty, every time I understand again, I institute again; in effect, every reunderstanding is a recommencement; every reunderstanding is another beginning.

In the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes what Husserl calls "Nachverstehen" from what he calls "reactivation"; reactivation, for Merleau-Ponty, aims at reactivating everything (BN 13, 12, 44). This comment

means that reactivation aims at being entirely active; it does not work with the passivity. The passivity that defines *Nachverstehen* is why Merleau-Ponty says that *Nachverstehen* is not a *survol,* or "survey" (BN 30). We know this word *survol* from *The Visible and the Invisible;* to survey (*survoler*) is to soar over and thereby dominate (*VI* 109/177), and in *The Visible and the Invisible,* Merleau-Ponty even defines *survoler* as "reactivating all the sedimented thoughts" (*VI* 150/112). But if *Nachverstehen* is not *une pensée en survol,* then we know that it is what Merleau-Ponty as early as the *Phenomenology of Perception* and as late as *The Visible and the Invisible* calls "originary faith." The word "faith" does not occur in Merleau-Ponty's Notes on "The Origin of Geometry," but it seems to me that *Nachverstehen* substitutes for it. Indeed, in the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty speaks of a "knowledge of nonknowledge" which suggests faith (BN 8, 11, 14). For Merleau-Ponty, when I respond to the interpellation, or, better, to the interrogation, I must have faith in the one who is speaking to me; I do not know what the person is asking of me, since I cannot soar over his or her thoughts; he or she is a ghostly presence. But I must also have faith in myself; I do not know what I am going to say, since it lies in silence, formless; I am a ghostly self-presence. This ghostly self-presence, faith, places me exactly in the middle, in the limit between the incomparable monster and the disinterested spectator.

This language of ghosts, of course, refers to Derrida, but it seems legitimate to introduce it into Merleau-Ponty, because Derrida develops the concept of specter in conjunction with a concept of faith. Retrospectively, we can see that Derrida's early writings were going in the direction of faith even though they do not contain a theme of faith. It is possible to see now that, in the introduction to *L'Origine de la géométrie,* when Derrida is speaking of the "strange presence" of the Idea in the Kantian sense, this strange presence implies a kind of ghostly presence and thus calls for faith. Moreover, at the conclusion of *Voice and Phenomenon,* when Derrida speaks of a "'beyond' absolute knowledge" (*VP* 115/102), we now know that this "beyond absolute knowledge" is a kind of faith. Most basically, as in Merleau-Ponty, faith in Derrida is a dative relation. As we have already noted, in both the introduction and *Voice and Phenomenon,* Derrida emphasizes the dative relation: in Husserl, language or the *logos* or form, as Derrida says, is always "relation to the object" (*VP* 110/98; *LOG* 153/139). Thus, as in Merleau-Ponty—and we are still on the second side of the necessity, making the object subjective—in Derrida the *logos* interrogates (to) me and "demands" a response (cf. *LOG* 162/146).

One of the most remarkable things about Derrida's introduction is that it contains an explicit theme of responsibility. Given the necessity of death, we know that responsibility in Derrida must be defined by

"bringing the sense to life" (*LOG* 100–1/99). But as soon as we recognize that responsibility is a kind of conjuring up of ghosts, then we have to see that responsibility is a kind of faith. When I hear a word or read a text, this *logos* always indicates a nonpresence, which eliminates the possibility of absolute knowledge; as in Merleau-Ponty, responsibility in Derrida is not *une pensée en survol.* But while responsibility is a kind of faith in the other that I have resurrected, responsibility is also a kind of faith in myself. I must be the one who can do this; as Derrida says, "I restore [the sense's] *dependence* in regard to my own act and reproduce it in me" (*LOG* 100–1/99; my emphasis). I am the one selected, on whom the sense depends. The dependence of sense on me is why Derrida in the last section of the introduction defines responsibility in the following way: "To make oneself responsible is to concern oneself [*se charger*] with a heard speech; it is to take upon oneself the exchange of sense in order to stand guard over its progression" (*LOG* 166/149). Most generally, however, in the introduction, Derrida defines responsibility as "fulfillment" (*LOG* 11/31). Clearly, this word means the completion, even the ending of the sense in presence. But since the sense is always infinite as an Idea in the Kantian sense, my response which fulfills the question asked to me does not and cannot ever completely fulfill it. The sense is always necessarily open to an indefinite number of fulfillments, completions, or ends. I must always fulfill this request over and over again. I have coined a word in order to speak about this structure in Derrida that faith always amounts to doing the end over an indefinite number of times: while Merleau-Ponty's faith is always a "recommencement" (BN 38), Derrida's faith is always a "refinition."[35]

Both the discourse of the end that we find in Derrida (eschatology) *and* the discourse of beginning (archeology) that we find in Merleau-Ponty, of course, derive from Heidegger. Indeed, for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, the limit of Husserlian phenomenology lies in Heideggerian ontology. For both, this limit is the Heideggerian conception of negativity. If the limit of phenomenology, for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, lies in Heidegger's negativity, then we must say that what is most important in Heidegger for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida is Heidegger's remembrance of the question of Being. In Heidegger's famous introduction to *Being and Time,* Heidegger defines Being itself as a question: the question of being is the being of the question. Heidegger, of course, did not have in mind the kind of question that one finds in school, where the teacher, knowing the answer in advance, relinquishes the student of any responsibility for thinking. A genuine question, by contrast, is one whose answer we do not know; it is a question for which there is no response. This lack of an answer is why a question, a question's

openness, can account for the universality of Being. Yet a genuine question also demands a response; a question must be a quest for an answer. This demand for an answer is why a question, the question's closure, can account for the determination of being. It is this conception of a question, as at once open and closed, at once irresponsible and responsible, that is the guiding idea for Merleau-Ponty's final philosophy; without Heidegger's conception of Being as a question, we would not have Merleau-Ponty's conception of Being as interrogation. But the Being of the question is also the guiding idea for all of Derrida's texts from the 1960s; for example, "Violence and Metaphysics" begins by speaking of "a community of the question."[36] At this point, in the 1960s, the continuity between Derrida and Merleau-Ponty is remarkable. Yet already in "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida has the means for eliminating this confusion: when he speaks of the community of the question, Derrida also speaks of an "injunction" of the question.[37] This injunction implies that a command precedes the question. Eventually, because of this prior command, Derrida, in his 1987 *De l'esprit,* will question Heidegger's priority of the question. For Derrida, in this work, prior to the question of Being is the command of a promise; it is a deathbed promise: "Promise me that you will survive!"[38] The response to this command is faith, faith in the one making me promise and faith in me, the one who must keep the promise sometime in the future. It seems to me that even here, when Derrida departs from the Heideggerian question for the promise, Merleau-Ponty's spirit survives in him. Because Merleau-Ponty takes up the theme of writing in his Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry," we can perhaps predict that Merleau-Ponty, following the logic of death that writing implies, would have eventually transformed the question into the promise; this prediction seems especially reliable if we recall that Merleau-Ponty ends his 1952 candidacy abstract for the Collège de France by speaking of the establishment of an ethics.[39]

## Notes

1. When reference is made to these Course Notes, the page number refers to the Bibliothèque Nationale page numbering, that is, to the page numbers in parentheses designated "BN" in the Course Notes presented here. References to Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry" are made with the abbreviation *HUA* and the page number of *Husserliana VI,* which have been inserted into the David Carr translation reproduced below in part 2, chapter 5 of this volume.

2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours, 1959–1961,* edited by Stéphanie Ménasé (Paris: Gallimard, 1996). Hereafter abbreviated as *NC.*

3. See Françoise Dastur, "La lecture merleau-pontienne de Heidegger dans les notes du *Visible et l'invisible* et le cours de 1958–59," in *Chiasmi International* 2.

4. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *La nature, notes, cours du Collège de France,* edited by Dominique Séglard (Paris: Seuil, 1995), p. 275: "Cette dimension [c'est à dire, l'Etre brut, sauvage, vertical, présent] sera à preciser, en particulier par approfondissement du langage et de l'histoire, dans les années suivantes." The Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" occur "in the following years."

5. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 195; English translation by Alphonso Lingis as *The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 149. Hereafter abbreviated as *VI,* with reference first to the original French, and then to the English translation.

6. The third part of this introduction is based on my essay "The Legacy of Husserl's 'The Origin of Geometry': The Limits of Phenomenology in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida," in *Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Husserl,* edited by Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer, forthcoming 2002).

7. Edmund Husserl, *L'Origine de la géométrie,* translated with an introduction by Jacques Derrida, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974 [1962]); English translation by John P. Leavey as *Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989 [1978]). Hereafter abbreviated as *LOG,* with reference first to the original French, and then to the English translation.

8. Jacques Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983 [1967]), p. 20; English translation by David B. Allison as *Speech and Phenomena* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 20. Hereafter abbreviated as *VP,* with reference first to the original French, then to the English translation.

9. Cf. my "Eliminating Some Confusion: The Relation of Being and Writing in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida," in *Ecart and Différance: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing,* edited by M. C. Dillon (New Jersey: Humanities, 1997), pp. 71–93, and see all of the essays in this volume. The present foreword in a way supersedes my previous essay, insofar as it better understands both Merleau-Ponty's and Derrida's thought. But this foreword does not overturn the insight that guided my earlier essay, that is, that there is a profound difference between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida indicated by the choice of primary themes (Being versus writing). The Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" have allowed us to find the continuity between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida (the experience of intersubjectivity) and specify more rigorously the difference (a formless content in Merleau-Ponty and contentless form in Derrida).

10. For another discussion of the convergences, see also Franck Robert's "Présentation," in *Merleau-Ponty: Notes de cours sur L'Origine de la géométrie de Husserl,* edited by Franck Robert (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1998), pp. 8–9. For an analysis of these Course Notes, see also Franck Robert, "Fondement et fondation," in *Chiasmi International* 2, pp. 351–72.

11. In fact, the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry" can be seen as a sort of continuation of Merleau-Ponty's famous later essay on Husserl, "The

Philosopher and His Shadow" (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Le philosophe et son ombre," in *Signes* [Paris: Gallimard, 1960], pp. 201–28; English translation by Richard C. McCleary as "The Philosopher and His Shadow," in *Signs* [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964], pp. 159–81). Hereafter abbreviated as *S*, with reference first to the original French, then to the English translation. "The Philosopher and His Shadow" begins in effect with a quote from "The Origin of Geometry": "Tradition is the forgetfulness of origins" (*S* 201/159). Also, in "The Philosopher and His Shadow," Merleau-Ponty quotes the same passage from Heidegger's *The Principle of Reason* (*S* 202, 160), that the greater the work accomplished by a thinker the greater the un-thought. See BN 3 of Notes.

12. Merleau-Ponty's reference is to Martial Gueroult's study of Descartes.

13. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. 154; English translation by Colin Smith and revised by Forrest Williams as *Phenomenology of Perception* (New Jersey: Humanities, 1981), p. 132. Hereafter abbreviated as *PHP*, with reference first to the original French, then to the English translation.

14. It is at this point of a prior condition of silence and passions (cf. BN 26, 33) that one could develop a Merleau-Pontian philosophy of desire. See, for example, Renaud Barbaras, *Le désir et la distance* (Paris: Vrin, 1999). See also Jenny Slatman, "The Psychoanalysis of Nature and the Nature of Psychoanalysis," in *Chiasmi International* 2, pp. 207–22.

15. This quote is an allusion to "Appendix IX" of Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology:* "Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection. The Reflection [Must Be] Historical. How is History Required?" At the end of this fragment Husserl speaks of a "*Dichtung* of the history of philosophy." (See p. 394 of David Carr's English translation of this work [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970].)

16. It is in this context that Merleau-Ponty quotes Heidegger's *Der Satz vom Grund* in both the Course Notes and in "The Philosopher and His Shadow": "The greater the work of a thinker—which in no way coincides with the breadth and number of writings—the richer is what is unthought in this work, which means, that which emerges in and through this work as having not yet been thought" (BN 2; *S* 202/160). See Martin Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason,* translated by Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 71. Here Merleau-Ponty provides Heidegger's German text (*Der Satz vom Grund* [Pfullingen: Neske, 1957], pp. 123–24): "Je grosser das Denkwerk eines Denkers ist, das sich keineswegs mit dem Umfang und der Anzahl seiner Schriften deckt, um so reicher ist das in diesem Denkwerk Ungedachte, d.h. jenes, was erst und allein durch dieses Denkwerk als das Noch-nicht Gedachte heraufkommt." Merleau-Ponty translates this comment into French as follows: "Quand il s'agit de penser, plus grand est l'ouvrage fait, qui ne coincide nullement avec l'étendue et le nombre des écrits. Plus riche est dans cet ouvrage, l'impensé, c'est-à-dire ce qui à travers cet ouvrage et par lui seul vient vers nous comme jamais encore pensé."

17. See the Resumé of the Course on "The Origin of Geometry" in chapter 1 of this volume, first paragraph.

18. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy,* translated by Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 439. The discussion of the Freudian archeology in this book is entirely based on Merleau-Ponty's understanding of psychoanalysis; see pp. 376, 382, 395, 417–18, 417 n. 99, and 418 n. 100.

19. Martin Heidegger, "Was ist Metaphysik?" in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967), pp. 105, 115–16; English translation and overall editing by David F. Krell as "What Is Metaphysics?" in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 95, 105.

20. In the marginal note, Merleau-Ponty says, "And one must not say: let's go straight to Heidegger."

21. This comment on Heraclitus alludes to Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences,* p. 170 (paragraph 49). See also Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours, 1959–1961,* p. 84.

22. Here Merleau-Ponty says, "Difficulty of maintaining this position, sidetracked toward rationalism [or] irrationalism."

23. For other uses of the word "archeology" in Merleau-Ponty, see his "Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis: Preface to Hesnard's *L'Oeuvre de Freud,*" in *Merleau-Ponty and Psychology,* edited by Keith Hoeller (New Jersey: Humanities, 1982), p. 71; and "Five Notes on Claude Simon," in *Texts and Dialogues,* edited by Hugh J. Silverman and James Barry, Jr. (New Jersey: Humanities, 1991), p. 142. My thanks to Ted Toadvine for these references. It is clear from Merleau-Ponty's "Preface to Hesnard" (p. 71 speaks of phenomenology at "its limits") and from the references to the Freudian concept of *Verneinung* in the Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry," that the limit of phenomenology is not just Heideggerian ontology but also psychoanalysis. Perhaps when Merleau-Ponty uses the word "archeology" he is referring to Freudian psychoanalysis. According to Bernhard Waldenfels, however, the word "archeology" entered French phenomenology through Fink; see Bernhard Waldenfels, *Phänomenologie in Frankreich* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), pp. 41–42.

24. This soil or ground would also be what Merleau-Ponty calls "nature." This connection to nature is why Merleau-Ponty analyzes "The Earth Does Not Move" in *La nature, notes, cours de Collège de France,* but not "The Origin of Geometry." See *La nature,* pp. 110–13. For more on Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of nature, see Fred Evans, "Chaosmos and Merleau-Ponty's View of Nature," in *Chiasmi International* 2, pp. 63–82.

25. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Résumés de cours: Collège de France, 1952–1960* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 112; English translation by John Wild, James Edie, and John O'Neill in *In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 148.

26. This is Jacques Lacan's expression. See Jacques Lacan, "Maurice Merleau-Ponty," in *Les Temps moderne* (1961), p. 253; English translation by Wilfred Ver Eecke and Dirk de Schutter as "Merleau-Ponty: In Memoriam," in *Merleau-Ponty and Psychology,* p. 80.

27. See Paola Marrati-Guénoun's excellent *La trace et le genèse: Derrida lecture de Husserl et Heidegger* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), p. 48, for a very illuminating discussion of this difficult concept in the early Derrida. See also my review of her book in *Husserl Studies* 16, no. 1, (1999).

28. See Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours, 1959–1961,* p. 102, where Merleau-Ponty alludes to Heidegger's discussion of the *Etwas* in *The Principle of Reason.*

29. It is here in the concept of negativity that Merleau-Ponty connects Heidegger to Bergson (*NC* 103, 114–15); it seems to me that this connection may be the most original thing Merleau-Ponty ever did. If this were our project, we could, in light of this connection between Bergson and Heidegger, establish a different Merleau-Ponty than the one we are establishing now; we could establish a Merleau-Ponty who goes not in the direction of Derrida, but in the direction of Deleuze.

30. Jacques Derrida, "Violence et métaphysique," in his *L'Écriture et la différence* (Paris: Seuil, 1967), p. 175; English translation by Alan Bass as "Violence and Metaphysics," in *Writing and Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 119.

31. This difference probably accounts for Derrida's criticism of Merleau-Ponty in section 8 of his introduction (*LOG* 116–17/111–12). Derrida sees that Merleau-Ponty conceives essence in relation to fact and that a fact for Merleau-Ponty is a formless content. But in Merleau-Ponty, we must conceive an essence in relation to "mettre en forme"; essence is *Wesen* in the verbal sense, as Heidegger says. Nevertheless, one would have to say that Derrida is more formalistic than Merleau-Ponty.

32. See also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *La prose du monde* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 17; English translation by John O'Neill as *The Prose of the World* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 10.

33. Merleau-Ponty also uses some other terms: "spoken speech" is also called "ready-made language" (BN 29, 30, 38), "secondary language" (BN 30), or "ontic or empirical speech" (BN 31), and "speaking speech" is also called "operative language" (BN 36), "full or originary speech" (BN 30), or "ontological language" (BN 29).

34. See also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Notes de lecture et commentaires sur *Théorie du champ de la conscience* de Aron Gurwitsch," in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale,* no. 3 (1997), p. 329, where Merleau-Ponty also defines essence as "charnière."

35. I first used the word "refinition" in "Phenomenology and Bergsonism: The Beginnings of Post-Modernism," in *Confluences: Phenomenology and Postmodernity, Environment, Race, Gender* (Pittsburgh: Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, 2000), p. 63.

36. Derrida, *L'Écriture et la différence,* p. 118; *Writing and Difference,* p. 80.

37. Ibid., p. 119; p. 80.

38. Jacques Derrida, *De l'esprit* (Paris: Galilee, 1987), pp. 36, 87, 59; English translation by Geoff Bennington and Rachel Bowlby as *Of Spirit* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 17, 56, 35.

39. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Un inédit de Maurice Merleau-Ponty," in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale,* no. 4 (1962), p. 409; English translation by Arleen B. Dallery as "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of His Work," in *The Primacy of Perception,* edited by James Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 11.

# Editor's Note

The Course Notes by Maurice Merleau-Ponty presented here in an English translation are based on 55 sheets he composed for a course offered at the Collège de France in 1959 and 1960. The sheets were preserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale, box 7, envelope 5, with the title "Husserl aux limites de la phénoménologie. Cours de 1960." They were originally published by Presses Universitaires de France in 1998 with the title *Merleau-Ponty: Notes de cours sur L'Origine de la géométrie de Husserl* suivi de *Recherches sur la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty,* under the direction de R. Barbaras; the notes were transcribed and edited by Franck Robert.

The translation of the Course Notes presented in part 1, chapter 2 of this volume is based on a revised French version by Dominique Darmaillacq of Robert's original transcription. So the English translation offered here differs in significant ways from the version originally published in France in 1998. A resumé, or summary, of Merleau-Ponty's course appeared in *Résumés de cours: Collège de France, 1952–1960* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968). A revised version of John O'Neill's English translation of this summary is provided in part 1, chapter 1 of this volume and serves to introduce the Course Notes. O'Neill's translation originally appeared in Merleau-Ponty's *In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988).

In the Course Notes, the boldface numbers in parentheses represent the numbering of the sheets by the Bibliothèque Nationale, and I have prefixed these with "BN." The boldface numbers in quotation marks represent Merleau-Ponty's numbering of the sheets, and I have prefixed these with "MP."

All notes for the Course Notes are marked either "marginal note" (Merleau-Ponty's marginal comments); "crossed out" (Merleau-Ponty's revisions of his Course Notes); "translator's note" (my explanations and additions); or "editor's note" (notes made by the French editor, Franck Robert). I have placed certain mundane details of the course in the notes.

In general, I have tried to be faithful to Franck Robert's presentation of the Course Notes. I have maintained Merleau-Ponty's capitalizations (or lack thereof), his use of parentheses and brackets, and his

punctuation (or lack thereof). Most of the special typography used in the Course Notes, such as underlines (used for emphasis), dashes (—), parentheses, back slashes (/), arrows (⇒), equal signs (=), plus signs (+), and Greek letters, are those of Merleau-Ponty. At times, Franck Robert has inserted square brackets in order to indicate comments or blocs of text that Merleau-Ponty revised. I have also followed some of the other conventions utilized by Robert: {?} to indicate an illegible word or phrase; and {some word, for example, "creation," followed by a "?"} to indicate an attempted deciphering of Merleau-Ponty's handwriting.

At times, however, I have made minor changes in the text in order to meet standard English usage. German and other non-English words have been italicized. Parenthetical translations of Merleau-Ponty's frequent quotations from the German are sometimes provided in pointed brackets within the Course Notes. (Parenthetical translations in the notes for the Course Notes are likewise placed within pointed brackets.) I have also included a glossary of German terms in this volume, to which I refer the reader when no English translation of a German word or phrase appears. I have inserted the English translation of a German term only at its first occurrence; moreover, where context seems to make the German comprehensible or where Merleau-Ponty provides a translation of the term in his commentary, I have not rendered it. I have translated *sens* (and *Sinn*) as "sense," *signification* (and *Bedeutung*) as "meaning," and *écart* as "divergence."

Concerning Merleau-Ponty's frequent citation of Husserl's German, I have used David Carr's English translation of "The Origin of Geometry," which originally appeared as "Appendix 6" in Carr's translation of Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). With regard to Merleau-Ponty's frequent citations of Heidegger's German, for translations of these I have used Albert Hofstadter's translation of Heidegger's essay "Language," found in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). I have also consulted Jacques Derrida's 1962 French translation of "The Origin of Geometry" (*L'Origine de la géométrie* [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France]); where it seems that Derrida's French translation differs significantly from Carr's English translation, I have reproduced Derrida's translation.

In order to help the reader understand Merleau-Ponty's Course Notes, we have included three fragments written by Edmund Husserl—"The Origin of Geometry"; "Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, Does Not Move"; and "The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World That Is Outside the Flesh"—in part 2, comprising the second half of this volume.

Husserl's essay "The Origin of Geometry" was written in 1936 and was edited and published (beginning with the third paragraph) by Eugen Fink in the *Revue internationale de philosophie* 1, no. 2 (1939), under the title "Der Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem." The essay appears in volume 6 of Husserl's collected works, *Husserliana,* as a supplement to Biemel's edition of Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,* on pp. 365–86. The essay's first paragraphs suggest that it was meant for inclusion in *The Crisis.* Notes for "The Origin of Geometry" are those of Husserl.

At times, Merleau-Ponty refers to both Fink's and Biemel's versions of "The Origin of Geometry"; I have provided the page numbers of Fink's *Revue internationale de philosophie* version whenever I could. In Merleau-Ponty's Course Notes, I have used the prefix "*HUA*" to designate both Merleau-Ponty's and my own references to the *Husserliana* version of "The Origin of Geometry."

The Husserl fragment entitled "Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, Does Not Move," was written between May 7 and 9, 1934. The following descriptive comment was written on the envelope: "Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre in der gewöhnlichen weltanschaulichen Interpretation. Die Ur-Arche Erde bewegt sich nicht. Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Köperlichkeit der Räumlichkeit der Natur im ersten naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne. Alles notwendiges Anfangsuntersuchungen." (English translation: "Overthrow of the Copernican theory in the usual interpretation of a world view. The originary ark, earth, does not move. Foundational investigations of the phenomenological origin of corporeality of the spatiality pertaining to Nature in the first sense of the natural sciences. Of necessity all are initial investigations.") The original German version of this fragment was published in 1940 by Marvin Farber in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl* (Greenwood, 1968). The English translation of the fragment by Fred Kersten originally appeared in Edmund Husserl, *Husserl: Shorter Works* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1978), and has been revised for inclusion in this volume. According to one of Merleau-Ponty's notes in his resumé for this course, he had access to an unpublished version of the "Foundational Investigations," which Aron Gurwitsch had made available to him. This note seems to explain Merleau-Ponty's insertion of page numbers after some of his quotes from the "Foundational Investigations"; apparently they refer to this unpublished version. I have designated these page numbers "Gurwitsch" in order to distinguish them from page numbers of the Farber publication of "Foundational Investigations," which I have designated by the prefix "Farber."

Husserl's fragment "Die Welt der Lebendigen Gegenwart und die Konstitution der Ausserlichen Umwelt" ("The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World That Is Outside the Flesh") first appeared in 1946 in vol. 6, no. 3 of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* pp. 323–43. It was presented by Alfred Schütz, who introduced the fragment with the following comments: "The following pages are based upon an authorized typewritten transcription of an original manuscript of Edmund Husserl which shows the following introductory remark: D 12 IV: Datierung: keine; (offenbar auch 1931.)—Das Originalmanuskript besteht aus 19 Stenogrammblaettern; es ist eigentlich ein Doppelmaunskript, aber von Husserl als zusammengehorig in einen Umschlag gelegt, der die Aufschrift tragt: '(1) Die konkrete Gegenwart als Einheit der Konfiguration der Wahrnehmungsgegebenheiten, die 'erste' Welt; (2) Konstitution der Anderen, des Leibes als erstes Objekt der ausserleiblichen Umwelt'." Schütz goes on to say that he gave the fragment this title due to these indications. The English translation presented here has been completed specifically for this volume by Bettina Bergo.

For the revision and translation of the last two Husserl fragments—"Foundational Investigations . . . the Earth Does Not Move" and "The World of the Living Present"—we have consulted the French translations contained in Edmund Husserl's *La terre ne se meut pas,* translated by D. Franck, D. Pradelle, and J.-F. Lavigne (Paris: Minuit, 1989). Thomas Nenon has also provided some insightful help in the revision of "Foundational Investigations" and in the translation of "The World of the Living Present." We have also taken advantage of some helpful suggestions from Anthony Steinbock for these revisions and, indeed, for the entire volume; we are particularly grateful for his generosity. Whenever possible, for all three texts—"The Origin of Geometry," "Foundational Investigations," and "The World of the Living Present"—we have tried to provide the page number of the published German editions in the English translations included here in square brackets. Selected words and phrases from Husserl's original German have been inserted into the text by the translator within pointed brackets.

Finally, I would like to thank Bettina Bergo for adding her essay to this volume; it provides an essential interpretation of the relation between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. I would also like to thank Karin Fry, who compiled the index and proofread the final draft.

# Abbreviations

Works cited frequently have been identified by the following abbreviations:

| | |
|---|---|
| BN | Bibliothèque Nationale numbering of the 55 sheets of Merleau-Ponty's Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry." |
| *HUA* | Edmund Husserl, "Der Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem," edited by Eugen Fink, in Edmund Husserl, *Husserliana VI,* "Beilage III," pp. 365–86. |
| *LOG* | Edmund Husserl, *L'Origine de la géométrie,* translated and with an introduction by Jacques Derrida (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974 [1962]); English translation by John P. Leavey as *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989 [1978]). |
| "MP" | Merleau-Ponty's own numbering of his 55 sheets of Course Notes for "The Origin of Geometry." |
| *NC* | Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours, 1959–1961,* edited by Stéphanie Ménasé (Paris: Gallimard, 1996). |
| *PHP* | Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945); English translation by Colin Smith and revised by Forrest Williams as *Phenomenology of Perception* (New Jersey: Humanities, 1981). |
| *S* | Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Le philosophe et son ombre," in *Signes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), pp. 201–28; English translation by Richard C. McCleary as "The Philosopher and His Shadow," in *Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 159–81. |
| *VI* | Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964); English translation by Alphonso Lingis as *The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). |

*VP* Jacques Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983 [1967]); English translation by David B. Allison as *Speech and Phenomena* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

# HUSSERL AT THE LIMITS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

PART 1

# HUSSERL AT THE LIMITS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

1

# Resumé of the Course: Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology

Translated by John O'Neill and
revised by Leonard Lawlor

Since we still lack a complete edition of Husserl's *Nachlass,* the following discussion can hardly pretend to be "objective" in the sense of saying just what was said or directly implied by Husserl in the whole context of his writings. But even when everything of Husserl is published, are we right to assume that the "objective" method would restore to us "the thought" of Husserl? Such an assumption would only be plausible if Husserl's thought, or that of any other philosopher, were simply a system of neatly defined concepts, of arguments responding to perennial problems, and of conclusions which permanently solve the problems. But what if the meditation changes the sense of the concepts it employs and even the sense of the problems; what if its conclusions are merely the results of a progression which was transformed into a "work" by the interruption—an interruption which is always premature—of a life's work? Then we could not define a philosopher's thought solely in terms of what he had achieved; we would have to take account of what until the very end his thought was trying to think. Naturally, words, which delimit and circumscribe it, must attest to this unthought. But then these words must be understood through their lateral implications as much as through their manifest or frontal meaning. We need what Husserl called a "poetry of the history of philosophy," which is participation in an operative thought, which in the case of a contemporary thinker would not be so risky, and perhaps be the only mode of objectivity in treating one who has written: "Das historisch an sich Erste ist unsere Gegenwart" <"from a historical perspective, what is in itself the first thing is our present">.[1]

Why not start listening to the texts right now? Even though the complete edition of Husserl's texts will validate this "listening" as being merely an interpretation, it will not dispense with it. The attempt to take account of the rumors and discussion which always arise around a posthumous message is imposed on us, because there are some who fear or wish to see Husserl "deviate" into the path of irrationalism that they believe Heidegger took. The best remedy here is contact with the texts, two of them in particular.

The first text to be considered is "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem." It is because ideality and historicity have a common source that it is not by chance that there is an unfinished history of geometry which remains open, while at the same time there is a corpus of geometry which forms a system (*Totalsinn*) in which the early steps seem to have been canceled insofar as they were partial or contingent developments. To discover that common source, one has to locate, however, a third dimension between the series of events and intemporal sense, the third dimension of depth history or the genesis of ideality. Both the early stages of geometry as well as all its later advances contain a certain surplus of sense over and beyond their manifest or literal sense such as it is lived each time by the geometer. The stages open up a field; they establish themes which the creator sees only as an outline pointing toward the future (*Urstiftung*), but which, when *handed over* (*tradiert*) to succeeding generations along with the first acquisitions, become useful through a sort of second creation (*Nachstiftung*). In this second creation new spaces of thought are opened up until, once the development has run its course and has ended up in a last re-creation (*Endstiftung*), a mutation in knowledge intervenes, often by returning to the sources or to the lateral paths neglected by the mainstream, and by a new interpretation of the whole. The movement, the *Beweglichkeit* of geometry is unified with its ideal sense only because the ideal sense is the sense of a field, a sense of initiation or a sense of openness which involves continuous production and reproduction. The main effect of every ideation, which is dated and signed, is to make its literal repetition superfluous, to launch culture toward a future, to achieve forgetfulness, to be overcome, to outline a futural, geometrical horizon, and to circumscribe a coherent domain. Reciprocally, it is essential for any ideal whole to be born; it is offered to us with a wake of historicity. Even if we knew nothing about those who founded geometry, we would at least know that there had been such individuals; geometry is never a natural phenomenon like stones and mountains. It exists only in a "space of humanity"; it consists in spiritual being, and spiritual being is being that has become (*geistig geworden*) and which will become. Spiritual being exists

solely for a thought resolved to think actively, determined to go on, to plunge itself still further into the invisible universe of irreal creations. Ideality is historicity because it rests upon acts and because "the only way to grasp an idea is to produce it." The idea is impalpable and invisible because it has been *made*. The historicity of an idea is not the fact of its inclusion in a series of events with a unique temporal location, in the psyche of a particular human living at a certain place and time. The historicity of an idea is the positing, through the living human, of a task which is not uniquely his, but one that echoes back to earlier foundations. The living human summons up the whole past and the whole future of culture as its witness. And to evoke this whole history, he has no need of documents: history has its point of insertion in him, in the hinge between his sensible or natural being and his active and productive being. He has only to think in order to know that thought is made, that it is culture and history.

How are we to understand this reverberation of the past and this prepossession (*Vorhabe*) of a future of thought in the present thought? In a sense, geometry and each geometrical truth exists only once, no matter how often it is thought by geometers. But if there was a pure and detached ideality, how would it descend into the "space of consciousness" of the one who discovers it, how would it come to birth in a psyche? And if, in contrast, we start, as we must, from its birth in us, how are we to pass from there to ideal being, beyond any existing or possible psyche? We can respond only by referring back to the implications of experience. A meaning emerges from a "space of consciousness" when it has been *said*. It is in virtue of being *Sinn von Reden* that it is there "for everyone," for every real or possible interlocutor. But language is "interwoven" (*verflochten*) with our horizon of the world and of humanity. Language is borne by our relation to the world and to others, and language also bears and makes our relation to the world and to others. It is through language that our horizon is open and endless (*endlos*). Because we know that "everything has a name," each thing exists and has a way of being for us. The thought of geometry inherits this tradition of language. But language makes a meaning available for everyone only insofar as it makes the things of the world "public." Now geometry is not merely a property of such a real psyche, even though everyone recognizes that it is such a property. We have still not therefore given a complete account of ideal being.

Neither have we exhausted the powers of speech. Already within my space of consciousness, there is a sort of message from me to me: I can be sure today of thinking the same thought that I thought yesterday because the wake which it leaves is or could be retraced exactly by a new act of productive thought, which is the only genuine accomplishment of

my remembered thought. I think in this near past, or rather yesterday's thought passes into today's thought: there is an encroachment of the passive upon the active which is reciprocal. Speech passes from one space of consciousness to another by the same phenomenon of encroachment or propagation. As a speaking and active subject I encroach upon the other who is listening, as the understanding and passive subject I allow the other to encroach upon me. Within myself, in the exercise of language, I experience activity each time as the other side of passivity. And it is thus that ideality "makes its entrance" (*Eintritt*). No more in my relationship to myself than in my relationship to others is there any question of survey or of pure ideality. There is, however, the overlapping of a passivity by an activity: that is how I think within the other person and how I talk with myself. Speech is not a product of my active thought, standing in a secondary relation to it. It is my practice, my operation, my "*Funktion,*" my destiny. Every spiritual production is a response and an appeal, a coproduction.

But ideal being subsists outside of all actual communication, when the speaking subjects are asleep or when they are no longer alive; and ideal being seems to preexist speech, since there are humans yet to be born who later will form valid ideas, and since these ideas are nevertheless valid right now. However, this does not place ideal being outside of speech, but merely obliges us to introduce an essential mutation in speech, namely, the appearance of the written. As "virtual" communication, the speaking of *x* to *x,* which is carried by no living subject and which belongs in principle to everyone, the written evokes a total speech, metamorphoses definitively the sense of spoken words into ideal being, and moreover transforms human sociability. Now the pure sense of the written which sublimates the solidity of things and then communicates that solidity to thought is also a petrified, sedimented, latent, or dormant sense, as long as no living spirit comes along to awaken it. At the moment that one comes across the total sense, one comes across also forgetfulness and absence. Living sense extends far beyond our explicit thoughts, but it is only open and endless; it is not infinite. The sedimentation which makes it possible for us to go further is also responsible for us being threatened by hollow thoughts and for the sense of origins becoming emptied out. The true cannot be defined outside of the possibility of the false.

We have now reached Husserl's last meditations on my relation to myself and to others, of which we can get a glance, while waiting for the publication of the manuscripts, from a fine study by Eugen Fink.[2] Passivity and activity, the spontaneous "Ego" and sensible time, cannot still be external to one another, since I function as a thinker identical

through time and since intersubjectivity is also in play. There is thus a sort of "simultaneity" of the one and the other, an *Urgegenwart* which has no locus between the before and after, an *Ur-Ich* prior to the plurality of monads which cannot be said to be singular either, because it precedes both unity and plurality—true "negativity," "diremption," a being prior to the distinction between essence and existence. These words, says Fink, stake out the new dimension of *Lebenstiefe* which opens up in the writings of Husserl's later period. But for Husserl this speculative vocabulary is only an aid to description, a means of figuratively expressing the operation of the transcendental life which he always sought to grasp upon the fact, analytically. His philosophy is not congealed in "results," or "points of view." "Even Husserl's last philosophy is in no way a gathered harvest, an acquired domain of cultivated spirit, a house in which one can conveniently set up housekeeping. Everything is open, all its paths lead out into the open."[3] To come back to the problem of ideality, Husserl's analyses foreshadow Heidegger's thoughts on "the speaking of speech."[4]

The notions of openness and horizon, employed in the fragment on the origin of geometry at the level of superstructures and ideality, are to be found also with regard to the "base" in a text from 1934, *Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre*.[5] For the Copernican human, the world contains only "bodies" (*Körper*). Through meditation we must again learn of a mode of being the idea of which we have lost, the being of the "ground" (*Boden*), and that of the Earth first of all—the earth where we live, that which is this side of rest and movement, being the ground from which all rest and all movement break away, which is not made out of *Körper*, being the "source" from which they are drawn through division, being the source which has no "place," being that which surrounds all places, which bears all beings above nothingness, as Noah's Ark preserved the living creatures from the Flood. There is a kinship between the being of the earth and that of my living body (*Leib*); I cannot exactly say about my living body that it moves since my living body is always at the same distance away from me. This kinship extends to others, who appear to me as "other bodies," to animals whom I understand as variants of my corporeality, and finally even to terrestrial bodies themselves since I introduce them into the society of living bodies by saying, for example, that a stone "flies." To the degree that I adopt the Copernican constitution of the world, I leave my starting situation; I pretend to be an absolute observer, forgetting my terrestrial roots which nevertheless nourish everything else, and I come to consider the world as the pure object of an infinite thought before which there are only objects which can be substituted for one another. But such an idealization cannot provide its own foundation, and the sciences of infinity are experiencing a crisis. The type of being

which our experience of the ground and the body reveals to us is no curiosity of external perception but has a philosophical meaning. Our implantation envelops a view of space and temporality, a view of natural causation, of our "territory." It envelops an *Urhistorie* which binds all real or possible societies insofar as they all inhabit the same "earthly" space, in the broadest sense, and finally it contains a philosophy of the world as *Offenheit der Umwelt*, in opposition to the "represented" infinite of the classical sciences of Nature.

## Notes

1. Translators' note. See p. *HUA* 382 of Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry," the text of which is provided in this volume in part 2, chapter 3.

2. Eugen Fink, "Die Spätphilosophie Husserls in der Freiburger Zeit," in *Edmund Husserl, 1859–1959, Phaenomenologica* IV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 99–115.

3. Ibid., pp. 113–14.

4. Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfulligen: Neske, 1958), pp. 12–13. Translator's note. English translation by Albert Hofstadter as "Language" in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 190–92. Merleau-Ponty quotes this passage at length in the Course Notes below; see chapter 2.

5. Unpublished. We have this from communication in 1939 with Professor Aron Gurwitsch, one of Husserl's students. Translators' note. See the foreword in this volume.

2

# Course Notes: Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology

Translated by Leonard Lawlor

**(BN 2) "MP 1"**

Introduction

Burning issue: the old Husserlians (sixty years). (Husserl is teaching or writing from 1900 to 1938.)

(A study by Delbos on the *Logical Investigations.*)[1]

the Husserlians of the second generation (fifty years): Fink, Husserl's assistant—writing only in Husserl's margin (Sixth Cartesian Meditation)[2]—then, in contrast, considering phenomenology from the outside (*Problèmes actuels de la phénoménologie,*[3] archive material).

the Husserlians of the third generation (forty years): Suzanne Bachelard: study on *Formal and Transcendental Logic,*[4] which stands apart from recent texts.

Usually, this sort of restlessness settles down after the death of the philosopher, but now Heidegger is maintaining it. This restlessness is characteristic of every cultural creation—and especially of philosophical (i.e., enveloping) creations—but here there's something extra.

1. The General Problem of Spiritual Mutation.

The writer's law—not understood by a part of the public. Before a new work, the public: "We don't get our fill." I.e., what's essential is not said. The public has not yet learned this language, does not live this language

as one that they speak. Something is missing, as in "the man I love"[5]—don't understand the new dimensionality, which is considered as what explicates and as what is to be explicated—Irremediable: if one seeks to be didactical, to define everything, one is understood even less: held up over the details of the definitions,—the new thought is not visible in relief. Therefore, demands for clarification, conversations, commentary. illusion that the sense is in the life of the one who writes.

then, before the finished work, in order to explicate: I liked your earlier book better—having learned this language, they don't want changes in vocabulary, and even less do they want changes in syntax. Inevitable also: for the author this language was a relation to the world, a "mother" tongue, for the reader it is a learned foreign language, one world in the world, something of "culture." The pure reader does not see the necessity for a reorganization.

Spiritual life is this inevitable author-reader discordance. The work is underestimated since they want the author, and overestimated since they reduce him to what he *has done:* Camus saying to a journalist: my work is in front of me. They ask to see the author and they don't listen to him. They ask him to clarify what he wrote twenty years ago, and they do not believe him if he says something different. Recourse: to say that he is finished, elderly, etc.

2. Still More Acute in Relation to Husserl

because Husserl looks to express the *Erleben* <"experiencing">, to make silence speak, to say the not-said. (radicalism—no presuppositions.) Wanting to say what we experience naturally, which is hidden, he cannot proceed progressively. He will make that be seen by setting himself up there, operatively.

This is what he means when he speaks of phenomenology as the Alps or as the Himalayas: phenomenology is there; it has {a} solid, physical existence; what is needed is only to find the way into it.

Repugnance to enclose phenomenology in publications that are always "preparatory." *Formal and Transcendental Logic* is a preface—*Cartesian Meditations* is an occasional piece.[6] His work is a trace of his monologue.

For him, speaking and writing is not a codification of an available piece of evidence. Speaking and writing make it exist. For he writes incessantly (stenography), but *Forschung Manuskript* <"work in progress">.

Therefore a strange situation: his thought {of} the thing itself is not published, because his thought was aiming at making silence speak, at saying

what is not-said, at exploring language beyond its usual destination which lies (Mallarmé)[7] in saying what is obvious, the familiar.

requirement of apodicticity

of taking the life which overflows us into account

of rendering familiar what is the opposite of the familiar.

therefore the maximum divergence between the signifier and the signified, and the acuteness of the interpretative problems and of spiritual generativity.

**(BN 3)**

—The Husserl-Heidegger Problem (Beaufret's thesis)[8]

Although neither of them say so, Husserl's final ϕ <"philosophy"> sometimes converges with that of Heidegger: Husserl never says so because he was shocked by Heidegger's more rapid advance, darting by his master, abandoning the ϕ <"philosophy"> of consciousness and the φ <"phenomenological"> reduction (but is this a true abandonment?),

—Heidegger, because undoubtedly he does not see the convergence: the law of the Parmenides–Socrates patricide; with one's master, one also learns how to do something other than what they do, something other which is the same thing; cf. painters.

This problem gets aggravated in public opinion, in the choir, in the students—i.e., when it is seen from the outside, and according to the appearance of empirical persons.

There's the legend of Heidegger acting against Husserl at the beginning of the Third Reich.

—In fact, in *Being and Time,* Heidegger acknowledges his debt, did nothing against Husserl (who had been able to move to Belgrade)—What is true is that Husserl was half Jewish and Heidegger was the National Socialist rector for one year.

Can this discordance over positions taken up be extended to the philosophies? This would be to say that Heidegger's φ <"philosophy"> is everything in the 1933 episode, while that of Husserl has nothing to say about this episode. It would make everything depend on the decision of the moment, as with right-wing and left-wing Hegelians. Husserl and Heidegger have this in common: the first acknowledges a crisis of rationality, while the second is not an irrationalist. The history of φ <"philosophy"> intersects with political history and is not parallel. Manicheism concerning action but non-Manicheism concerning philosophy.

—Even while putting the Husserl–Heidegger antagonism off to the side.

This φ "phenomenology">, which is always preparatory even though we speak of it as something done, is concentrated in the person of the philosopher.[9]

Fink's work with Husserl—to see (and expand) all of philosophy through phenomenology. After Husserl's death and maturity, Fink discovers phenomenology in its youthfulness.

This means that true philosophical radicalism inevitably has an impassioned atmosphere. Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason: Je größer der Denkwerk eines Denkers ist, das sich keinesweg mit dem Umfang und der Anzahl seiner Schriften deckt, um so reicher ist das in diesem Denkwerk umgedachte, d.h. jenes, was erst und allein durch dieses Denkwerk als das Noch-nicht Gedachte heraufkommt* <"The greater the work of a thinker—which in no way coincides with the breadth and number of writings—the richer is what is unthought in this work, which means, that which emerges in and through this work as having not yet been thought.">[10]

[To think: to encircle an *ungedachte* <"unthought">. Open and not "unhappy" thought. Difficulty of maintaining this position, side-tracked toward rationalism

irrationalism.]

—Therefore the problem of the history of philosophy.

a thought is not <u>some</u> <u>ideas</u>. It is the <u>circumscription</u> <u>of</u> <u>an</u> <u>unthought</u>. Therefore how to restitute it?

Cf. the lived or perceived universe: not only made out of things but also out of reflections, shadows, levels, horizons, which are not nothing, which are *between* the things and delimit their variations in one sole world.

Similarly, the work: latent articulation between things said.

Since they are latent, an objective method of reading and of internal critique is not sufficient. Such a method will even disguise the relief of words which make sense only through divergence.

Gueroult's method[11] presupposes philosophical immanence, presupposes a Descartes who is the absolute possessor of all of his thoughts, and of φ <"philosophy"> closed in upon itself, not open onto a world to be understood and through which alone we can understand it.

[Therefore, understanding Husserl's last φ <"philosophy"> also in relation to our problems. I.e., by contact with his speech as total *Stiftung* <"institution">,[12] with its articulations.]

—So, this year's course:

I am not proposing a coherent interpretation of Husserl's whole work and I have never done that. I am saying only that his work contains something other than the first Husserl. In order to show this, recourse to the texts. History of contact and history of the outside (objectivity)—and of the inside (Descartes commented on by Descartes). The unthought can appear only through contact. History of ϕ <"philosophy"> as "the poetizing of the history of φ <"philosophy">" (Husserl).[13] *Das historisch an sich Erste ist unsere Gegenwart* <"from a historical perspective, what is in itself the first thing is our present">:[14] *an sich* and not only for us. For all of what is is for us, and this isle is not to be considered as enclosing us: "deep" present

**(BN 4) "MP 2"**

that communicates with every "vertical" thought. [i.e., in presence of the world].

The method that we are extolling is already one of Husserl's final thoughts. Circle: we presuppose his final thoughts and they presuppose this method. Therefore, this will not be an objective interpretation of Husserl as opposed to other interpretations. We are saying not that Husserl *was* that, but that Husserl was not only what they say, was also an other, bearer of an unthought.

—All the same, it is necessary to indicate the central problem implied by the texts that we want to let speak:

ϕ <"Phenomenology"> = apodicticity, universal reflection investigation, not only on thought, but on lived experience. Phenomenological idealism, ϕ <"philosophy"> of consciousness: truly transcendental, constitution as the system of acts and of attitudes.

Exactly this leads description to the place where consciousness is apperceived as connected to body-world-truth-language-history, man. Can one constitute that, envelop it, in the system of apperception? How can one found on acts that which is "vor aller Theorie" <"before all theory">, the "pretheoretical," the *Vorgegeben* <"the pregiven">? Does reflection rediscover the source from which it descends? Being eidetical, isn't reflection always different from production? Cf. Valéry calling the author the impostor of the writer.[15] No matter what, Husserl has the sense of the distinction between the passive and the active. φ <"Phenomenology"> is constructed by *Erzeugung* <"production">. How would it unveil the *Ursprung* <"origin"> of passivity?

But that is not a failure, not a return to psychologism-historicism. Husserl speaks of interweaving, of the transgression of *Ineinander* <"in one another">. That is not a mixture of immanence and causality. It is the discovery of the third dimension, that of φ <"philosophy">, that of Being—the living present as the connection of the present and past of an invisible, therefore as nonenveloping unity of this "consciousness" and likewise nonenveloping unity of history, a sort of identity at a distance, vertical.

—Difficulty.

This is presented in the last texts, which are often fragmented and repetitious, *Wiederholungen, Uberholungen, Anfangsuntersuchungen* <"repetitions, revisions, beginnings of investigations">: hardly appropriate for textual explication.

It's necessary therefore to choose texts that are relatively complete and, when needed, comment by means of the others.

Thus, the grouping.

1. In order to introduce us to this relation with the new Being, *Tiefenleben* <"life of depths">, it is necessary to excavate below ideal identity, *Bedeutung* <"meaning">, Platonism, essence as given unity of the individual, of the world, and of history.

*Ursprung der Geometrie.*[16]

2. Showing that this critique of ideality (ideality as what, inaccessible directly, founds the *Nachvollzug* <"reoperation"> and communication) extends to every analysis of the world: unconcealment of the *Offenheit der Umwelt* <"openness of the surrounding world"> in opposition to the infinity of objects.[17]

*Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre.*[18]

(cf. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.*

beginning with the unpublished *Notizen zur Raumkonstitution:* the *Erdboden* <the "earth-ground">.

3. Showing the extension of the theory of constitution.

(of the body and of others)

*Die Welt der lebendigen Gegenwart und die Konstitution der außerlicher Umwelt.* Schütz *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.* March 1946.

These three central texts are to be commented upon by means of shorter unpublished texts.

**(BN 5) "MP 3"**

Thought that encircles an *Ungedachte.* (Difficulty of keeping this equilibrium.

Fall into rationalism or irrationalism.[19]

Sometimes, Husserl himself returns to rationalism as if <u>the</u> transcendental subjectivity was existing in the singular, beyond the plurality of humans and the world, and not a fine-grain unity in the *Tiefenleben* ("Philosophy of depths").

*Ursprung,* however, is one of the texts that goes the farthest (1936) in the direction indicated.

**(BN 6) "MP 4"**

*Die Frage nach der Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historische Problem.*

1. *Husserliana VI,* p. 365, the first two paragraphs. Depth-history in geometry and in philosophy. "The interest that propels us"—"can naturally not yet be seen at the beginning."

2. pp. *HUA* 365–366, the next two paragraphs.

"The interrogation of the emergence of geometry . . ."

**(BN 8) "MP 5"**

*Ursprung der Geometrie*

*Commentary.*

1. *Husserliana VI,* p. 365, first two paragraphs.

a. [*Das <u>Interesse</u> < , das uns in dieser Schrift*> *<u>bewegt</u>* <"The interest which propels us in this work">. Every thought is <u>interested</u> (not *uninteressiert*), i.e., an elucidation of a *Vorhabe* <"prepossession"> which motivates—that it must equal in evidence. It is ideal *praxis* (construction)—Galileo = a constructed Galileo—object—(cf. Valery, Leonardo)[20]—Galileo + what he founded = Galileo for us, taken up, or rather common terrain, *füreinander* <"for one another">.] What is at issue is not the consideration of ready-made geometry [but geometry in the making],[21] but as well what is not at issue is the consideration of geometry in the thought of Galileo and in the thought {of his} successors when they were working as pure geometers or working on its applications. Geometry in the making the lived thoughts of geometers doing applied <u>or</u> <u>even</u> <u>pure</u> geometry. That would be psychological history.

What is at issue is to reach the "originary" sense, the emerging or arising sense of the geometry that we are receiving—and which is not merely an event of the past, which continues to work in its development and in its present, which makes the geometry from geometry, which makes its unity.

—Therefore, in geometry there is something other than the lived thoughts of Galileo and others—taken up or realized again by others—there is a "sense" which is larger, "deeper," on to which their thought opens, a field which is intended right off, but not enveloped by their thought, and which is still present in the whole history of geometry, which makes the geometry out of geometry, i.e., one sole theory unified in all its parts.

[Intersection of all the thoughts, including ours, upon which the object, ready-made geometry, rests.]

b. The emergence of the sense, this depth-dimension of geometry[22] and of physics, which did not happen within one or several heads, is the model (*exemplarische*) for thinking universal history, which is always the openness of fields [that of ϕ and of the ϕ] <"that of philosophy and of the philosopher">], the model for thinking the history of philosophy.[23]

(1) Because philosophy is universal and radical reiteration and extension of *Wissen* <"knowledge">. And because one is going therefore to rediscover in philosophy as in all *Wissen* this supra-personal operation of the openness of a field [= ϕ <"philosophy"> has a history, is in history. (2) Better: because philosophy is nothing other than the unconcealment of the depth dimension of all other activities: the consciousness of the problem: how can a meaning emerge which is not enclosed in the thoughts of one or several men? [= ϕ <"philosophy"> is the thought of history. (3) The more profoundly it is the thought of history through participation, historicity, it is the historical grasping itself, the inside of history, its root—Is its history and all history returning to itself—Is the question of its possibility.]. Radicalism itself has a history, i.e., is distributed into separate endeavors. Radicalism is to be reconquered upon the plurality of philosophies, like the sense of geometry upon the psychology of geometers. How to rediscover the emerging sense of philosophy? By expanding our thoughts, our lived situation of the philosopher through those of the ancients, and those of the ancients by ours.[24] This reciprocal contestation unveils the common field of which philosophies (as works and as "thoughts") are only sections. Identity of "self-understanding" and "understanding the past," lateral universality by conquest of the depth dimension:[25] I find everything in me (this is not empirical history) and

everything outside of me (I cannot understand myself without going outside of myself). There is no contradiction between reflection as enveloping the past and the past as enveloping my present, because we are communicating through the *Tiefendimension* <"depth-dimension">. According to the depth-dimension, we are in the past and the past lives in us [in the fundamental characteristics that it had truly].

c. Therefore, it is necessary to unconceal a history which is really history, reference to the other. We are moments of the open field—and which is not an external, causal relation, which is grasped from a necessity—which is *Sinngenesis,* sense in genesis, [emerging once and for all]. Obviously, that is going to require a total remanipulation of the distinctions between fact and essence, real and ideal.[26]

This is where the problem of ideality located at the first level of this text comes in. There has to be an ideality which has need of time.

2. pp. *HUA* 365–366, next two paragraphs.

—Investigation of the *ursprünglichster Sinn* <"most original sense">—sense of emergence—which was conditioning[27] the first propositions, which was opening their ontological space, which is preideal.

It's like a terrain and a ground which supports them:[28] *da war* and *noch da ist* <"was there" and "still is there">,[29] supporting the whole development. It is *Urstiftung* <"primal institution"> calling forth *Nachstiftung* and *Endstiftung* <"reinstitution and final institution">.

—However, this sense had to appear in history. It is not an observed fact. In the geometry which results from it, this sense is read as a necessity. It belongs to its essence. Is it therefore ideal history? Is it the genesis of sense or the sense of genesis?

—Displacement of the alternative.

What is at issue is really an explication of the necessary sense, *sinngemäß* <"in accord with the sense"> (and *wesengemäßig* <"as essentially">) (both terms are from p. *HUA* 366).

but yet, what is grasped there is not intemporal. The investigation does not contain already its result. The sense upon which we reflect is not a positive quiddity. The reflection is not simple analysis. It is the interrogation of a *tradition,* i.e., of what is given as constructed by man, as "spiritual," not natural, being, as engendered and therefore as born. In our very present, we discover a layer of spiritual being, i.e., of historical being,

delimiting a "space of humanity," and geometry is offered as belonging to it. I.e., geometry is offered as connected to a past in general, to men who as such are not known by us. But this nonknowledge is a knowledge.[30] The essence of tradition lies in being not immediately graspable in a static essence. In front of our reflection, geometry and its tradition become a hollow; they open a dimension. What is solely at issue is to question all of that, all these intentional references; in principle, they are not included in an actual and simultaneous essence. Going beyond the

**(BN 9)**

alternative, history or philosophy, through the introduction of a familiarity of all human activity with all human activity, through the introduction of a potential *Wissen* / pretraced possibilities / of everything created by man,[31] of all culture, which is not explicit knowledge, intellectual possession, but which is nonignorance, knowledge of ignorance / presence in me of the past as past / and which assures the communication between me and history, because the tradition is forgetful of origins, relation to an origin which is not possessed by the present, and which works in us and provokes geometry in advance, precisely because it is not possessed by thought. What I have in my presence in order to understand the past is a tradition, that is, a fullness made out of a certain emptiness (out of a certain "forgetfulness"), a circumscribed negativity, which therefore makes a reference to the outside.[32] Going beyond the alternative through noncausal historicity alone, not a mode of existence into which the essence falls, but historicity as openness, as *Ineinander* of the present and of the past, intentional historicity, i.e., reference to. . . . Intentional historicity is the reciprocity of the openness of the field realized at an earlier time, the outcome of this field in me.

[The *Fortstiftung-Nachstiftung* relation = the solution of the present-past problem, me-others, me-my future: *Vollzug-Nachvollzug:* unity as sides of one thing.]

—Question: in this penetration which turns ideality precisely into the very place of history (ideality is what is engendered in a history),[33] we still need to know whether Husserl is mistaken to maintain intemporal formulas: *unbedingte Allgemeingültigkeit* <"unconditioned general validity"> (p. *HUA* 366).[34] Is there coincidence with the totality of the *Urstiftung,* if the tradition is always forgotten? We shall see it to raise the question. Wouldn't coincidence be the death of the *logos* since forgetfulness makes tradition fruitful?

**(BN 11)**

*Ursprung der Geometrie*

P. *HUA* 365. Ready-made geometry and the sense-origin of geometry: *Sinnesursprung*.[35] That will be the object of our investigation.

In connection with the *Selbstbesinnung* <"self-reflection"> about the present situation of $\varphi$ and about the philosophy.

Our investigation, historical *Tiefenprobleme* <"depth-problems">—and, moreover, foreign to ordinary history.

P. *HUA* 366. Investigation of the most originary sense and of the tradition as connection of present-past and future.

The sense in which geometry had to appear, accessible even without knowing anything of its creators and of their propositions.

*Rückfrage* <"regressive-inquiry"> toward the buried beginnings insofar as *urstiftende*, such as they had to be *necessarily*.

—These beginnings will be generalities but ones that can be particularized, ones that express preformed possibilities.

—Tradition: *Kulturwelt* <"world of culture">. This world, however, is not causally tradition. According to its inner sense, tradition is a human production. The nonknowledge of the factual origin is knowledge of this active human origin.

—Continuation: creations made by past humans who form the new on the basis of materials.

—These superficial features permit a depth *Befragung* <"interrogation">.

P. *HUA* 367. Geometry: an acquisition enlarging itself in new acts and new acquisitions. Reunited to a prior acquisition and therefore to a reiterated acquisition. Its past continues to live in its present, and continues in its present to open a future. Open chain of researchers, *leistenden Subjectivität*. This ontological sense <*sens d'être; Seinsinn*> is *connected* to the fact that geometry has been a historical *creation*, a *Vorhabe* (*Urstiftung-Nachstiftung*). The becoming of geometry involves the integration of the ontological sense of the premises to what follows. Therefore its total sense is not exhausted in the foundational act. It is necessary that there was a *primitive Sinnbildung* of which geometry is the realization. Is it necessary to say the evident "realization"? Was what has been created *Selbst da* <"there in person">?[36]

Problem: in this originary act, geometry is only a moment of personal life.

p. *HUA* 368. But it is something else: ideal objectivity, supratemporal, accessible to everyone and {to} all times.

That is also true of literature. These productions do not exist like the plurality of physical objects. Each of them is unique. This is a fact of every *Bedeutung,* i.e., of everything that exists as something said. The expressions are in the world, space, and time. Not the ideal beings.

Language is made out of ideal beings: the word "lion" exists only once in German. But, what geometry expresses is a secondary layer of ideality beyond the former.

p. *HUA* 369. Our problem: how does this former layer acquire the ideality beyond the conscious space of its *Erfinder* <"inventor">? Through language. But how can language be this ability?

Relation between *Sprache* <"language"> as a function of humanity and of the *Welt* <"world"> as the horizon of human *Dasein* <"existence">. We have the horizon of the world and of humans as "our others." Through language, this horizon is an *offen endlos* <"open unlimited">. Thereby also, it involves a norm around which every given utterance oscillates; through language finally every thing is nameable, sayable, objective.

p. *HUA* 370. Objective Being implies speaking man. Language is correlative to the objective world. Men, world and *Sprache* are interwoven.

Return to the question: how does expression objectify geometry?

Since the expression is instituted, the psyche of the creator is "objective," "erfahrbar" <"experienceable">, and "nameable." But there is an intersubjective Being as *ideal Gegenständlichkeit* <"ideal objectivity"> which is entirely different from the *psychisch-Reales* <"real psychic object">.[37] Where does it come from?

There was an *Erzeugung* ("production") which has passed away, but which, by passing away, by becoming passivity, never becomes nothing, which on the contrary offers it for this reason as an activity of *Wiedererinnerung* <"recollection">, which is going to be the experience of *Deckung* <"coincidence"> is going to be between what is remembered and what was produced with the evidence of the *Erzeugung* (it is not the issue of an experience enclosed in a positive present and which would not be able to join up with the *Erzeugung* which was: the latter is *quasi neu und aktiv durchlebt* <"lived through in a quasi-new and quasi-active way">;[38] it is what is renewed (*die Erneute*). The activity of *Wiedererinnerung* is the realization, production of what was originarily produced; the originary character of the reproduction is not a screen between me and the originary character of the production: the originary character of the reproduction derives from it.

**(BN 12)**

It is precisely nothing other than the identity-consciousness of what was produced and of what is quasi-produced. The originary character of memory is nothing other than the originary character of the experience of the *Erzeugung* which it intends simply affected with the index of quasi- or of re-. The quasi-itself is "urstiftet" through the former *Erzeugung* insofar as it is something which "passes away" and is recuperable. However, this still makes only a unity on the basis of the subject and its possibilities and not a unity of *Objektivität.* [This analysis of the relation between my activity of remembering and my former activity of *Erzeugung*

1. is applied to a former experience which was an *Erzeugung* and is not applied, for example, to an originary passivity, a perception. There is a relationship among all activities; the activity *stiftet* a possibility of reactivation.

2. presupposes, as the foundation of the recognition of an activity by an activity, the recognition of retention as a perception which distances itself, the *endlos* <"unlimited"> layer.

3. Both assume finally that the perception is, not an act, and not a positive *Erlebnis,* but a certain lack . . . of . . . : only on this condition can retention keep perception as a verticality, without what is retained being interposed between me and the perception which just passed.

4. The recognition of *Erzeugung* by the *Erzeugung* of memory is not yet a recognition of the ideal object itself precisely because it is still attached to the synthesis of subjective time.]

p. *HUA* 371. The subjective synthesis [it bears also on what has been produced, but only insofar as my product] is overcome by the advent of the *Sprachgemeinschaft* <"community of language">. This encloses a *Mitvollzug* <"cooperation">, an active *Nachverstehen* <"reunderstanding">, a *present co-Erzeugung* of the *Erzeugung* which was present originally in the single subject. In *Wiedererinnerung,* there was indeed this experience of an *Erzeugung* which is the same which was [that's how the memory of an *Erzeugung* differs from the memory of a perception, which was not actual in the memory, was only the retention of retention of retention, etc., so that in this case the identity between what was perceived and what was remembered was not based on an actual production but, on the contrary, on the fact that what was perceived had been pulled away from me; insofar as what was perceived is past, once and for all, it confirms itself as the common endpoint of perception and of memory]. But there is more of it; in the case where *Einfühlung* <"empathy"> and the *Sprachgemeinschaft*

are given, there was in the *Wiedererinnerung* not only consciousness of two "*gleiche*" *Erzeugungen* <two "similar" productions>, but yet the experience of a spiritual *Gebilde* <"structure"> which is numerically one in the two *Erzeugungen*.

[Why does the *Sprachgemeinschaft* provide that? Why does the reciprocal linguistic *Verstehen* <"understanding">[39] provide that? Could we not say that it presupposes the spiritual *Gebilde*?]

Certainly Husserl is not looking to explain ideality through language: this would be a renunciation of phenomenology. What he means is that ideality is neither first nor second in relation to the linguistic *Verstehen,* that ideality emerges in linguistic understanding, that it is not reduced to it as to a positive content. But he also means that ideality does not dominate linguistic understanding as a higher possibility. Ideality is at the hinge of the connection between me and others. It functions in this connection; it is operative, effective there. It is realized in and through this connection. That means: in the connection, there is not two positive terms, ideality and relation with others, for then it would have to be the case that the one explained the other. If you like, there is a positivity of the relation with others which is like a relief, and an ideality which is its reverse side, which oozes "at the edge of words,"—or there is a positivity of the ideality and a relation with others which is its reverse side, which transforms the other into an *alter ego,* into a subject of the *Erzeugung* like me. These two versions of the phenomenon are only one, for neither of the two terms is the positive or the negative of the other. They are realized in interweaving: while I open myself to the other I make myself capable of ideality and while I open myself to ideality, I make myself capable of joining back up with the other in the *Erzeugung*. (The difference of the interpersonal *Nachvollzug* is that here the field extends to the *Nichturpräsentierbar* <"originary nonpresentable">: the life of others. It extends to the non-being non-me, to a quasi-being quasi-me being). Husserl's solution consists in placing openness to others and openness to ideality into the law of the praxical-perceptive, i.e., it consists in turning the others into the other side of my world and in turning ideality into the *Etwas* <"something"> upon which these two sides are articulated, the pivot of the "speaking to . . ." a pivot, that is, an invisible through which the visible holds. The vertical Being as the being of *praxis*, as the correlate of Speech.]

The second role of language: after having been in this way the *praxis* of ideality as speech, as speaking to, language is also the possibility of the permanence of the ideal outside of all conversation, and even when

the interlocutors are dead, and even when it has not yet been lived in evidence by anyone (*obschon niemand sie in Evidenz verwicklicht hat*).[40]

It is communication become virtual.

[i.e., the preexistence of the true in relation to the utterance (and not only the survival of the true in relation to the utterance) is founded on the written and language. So that

**(BN 13)**

all of this and in particular the preexistence of the true is something other than the subjective pretension of language or the dogmatic statement of an absolute foundation of language—which is in question—the realm, the new stratum of human *Gemeinschaft* <"community">, which is opened by language, must be neither inaccessible nor truly given. It must be the reverse of solipsistic Being, that is, at once its negation and its support, that is again, the speaking consciousness must be neither enveloping nor enveloped by the relation to language. And finally we must conceive the speaking consciousness as divergence and not as something positive.]

Language is virtual communication, the preexistence and permanence of ideality, because what is expressed changes its *Seinmodus* <"ontic mode"> in it: the words, the texts exist objectively in the fashion of physical things, and, in this permanent existence, they convey their sense as an activity which has fallen into obscurity but which is reawoken and which can again be transformed into activity. The conveyed sense is "forgotten," "sedimented," and "reactivatable" (the sense to come appears also as "buried," "hidden," i.e., as clear over there) insofar as humans are *sprechende Wesen* <"speaking beings"> and insofar as the world can be spoken.

[The[41] physical existence of written signs is not substituted for the ideal existence of the true. Husserl means that the passage of sense into the written modifies its ontic sense—insofar as it is expressed sense, it is (even for the "I" who expresses it) different from what it was before—the expression is not a means of transmission alone. It changes the *Erzeugung;* it is the *Erzeugung* stabilized, preserved insofar as the *Erzeugung* is lost as *Erzeugung,* overcome as *Erzeugung* insofar as it has become available, for example, for other productions. Sedimentation is this availability. It participates in the thought; it is not a degradation. Precisely insofar as thought is an *Erzeugung*, an overcoming of passive life, an entry into an invisible realm, it can exist only as sedimented (this is Husserl's *Was heisst denken?*)[42] and the sedimentation is its realization as thought. Husserl

emphasizes that thought is sedimented and that, in relation to it, reactivation is only a possibility, that the *Nachverstehen* and *Mitverstehen* are not, cannot be reactivation. P. *HUA* 372 (note 4): the synthesis here is not for me the actualization of the whole path that has been followed, but rather the possession of pivots, hinges, matrixes of possibilities, negative equivalents or traces of positive acts, things forgotten that are fruitful, that is, operative negations. For Husserl, thought is of itself temporal.]

p. *HUA* 372. Therefore, the possibility of a quasi-passive-receptive thought, and the seduction of language which supplants *ursprünglich anschauliche* life [to[43] show that language *must* supplant the originally intuitive life, that otherwise thought would remain a captive—that, at "higher" structures, thought does not go from the *ursprünglich anschauliche Leben, das in Aktivitäten auf dem Grunde sinnlicher Erfahrung seine ursprünglich evidenten Gebilde schafft,*[44] that there are shortcuts, that the universe of thought, like that of perception, is lacunary and baroque in itself, that there is a lateral evidence, between the acts, and not only a progressive and frontal evidence, and all of this follows because to think is not having but not having.]

Husserl: one can protect oneself against the lack of comprehension in what is said. This is the rule used in teaching and learning. [But[45] the difficulty is that the sedimentation is not only mechanical repetition, is not only in the transition to words: sedimentation is made of thought; it exists in every thought]. p. *HUA* 373. Scientists are those who pronounce the *Ziel der Reaktivierbarkeit.*[46] But (p. *HUA* 373 n. 5), the goal is an infinite Idea.

Sedimentation is necessary, because science is a "propagative process." It's nearly the "reproduction" (*Fortpflanzung*)[47] in the biological sense, through *Sinnstiftung* (Fink, p. 371),[48] through the institution of a "tradition of sense." There is sense, and particularly fruitful sense, sense capable of founding always and founding always new acquisitions, only through sedimentation, trace [here[49] push Husserl: *Stiftung* is not enveloping thought, but open thought, not the intended and *Vorhabe* of an actual center, but intended "off-center" which will be rectified, not the positing of an end, but the positing of a style, not a frontal grasp but a lateral divergence, algae brought back from the depths.]

Impossibility of total reactivation. And yet, the whole sense of what precedes "passes into" what follows. But that results in the fact that no advance can be reactivated by itself. [It[50] also results in the fact that they are wholly in each, total parts, and that we can think starting from the last.]

p. *HUA* 374:[51] The evidence of each proposition is isolable only in the theories which classify, not in the sciences where idealities create idealities. No reactivation within developed geometry.

This is where the danger of *Sinnentleerung* <"the process of sense being emptied out"> and the task of phenomenology comes in.

| | |
|---|---|
| Then a clarification | about this "history," |
| | about the philosophy that results from it (teleology, etc.). |

**(BN 14) "MP 6"**

Pp. *HUA* 365–366.

Commentary (new version)

Investigation of the *Ursprung*, of the emergence, therefore a historical investigation, and which nevertheless is not information about propositions, demonstrations, etc., actual statements.

It is an investigation of the sense of emergence in which the geometry was born,—enveloping in relation to these statements (*in welchem*), opening their ontological preideal space.

This sense which is broader than the statements, their terrain or their soil, is also what supports the actual geometry that comes later.

It is the sense in which geometry came into the world. "Was there" and "is there"—*da war, da ist*—designates a presence that is richer than what is visible of it. Cf. someone is there, i.e., with all of what that implies, not only his body, but his entire being, in flesh and blood. Likewise, geometry—presence of openness calling forth what follows and what is to come—unity of its external manifestations in a life (*lebendige Fortarbeit* <"living forward development">), subterranean communication across time = *Urstiftung, Nachstiftung, Endstiftung,*[52] *Vorhabe* and taking up which re-creates. Operative past, operative present according to . . . Therefore, against the alternative: the past makes the present or the present makes the past (Aron). The alternative exists only for objectivism, which does not see the presents in their dimension of openness.

But we are applying this to our very investigation of the *ursprünglich*. It looks for the originary neither in the thoughts of the geometers nor in their works.[53] The investigation therefore looks for the originary in a certain idea that we have of what these beginnings had to be necessarily:

"in dem sie erstmalig <in der Geschichte> aufgetreten ist—aufgetreten sein *mußte*" (p. *HUA* 366) <"in which it appeared in history for the first time—in which it had to appear">.[54] But then is it ideal history? Is it sense that we are giving to the genesis of geometry, and, in reality, a present or ideal construction? No, as we said earlier. Therefore there has to be an investigation of sense or of essence which no longer reverts to an atemporal ideality which would dominate genesis and engulf it, an investigation which would be the unconcealment of sense, of a *Sinngenesis*.

I have in my possession a sense of geometry which has to be explained, a "source of sense" which is not its empirical history, which endows the advances of the investigation with its necessity (p. *HUA* 366: *wesenmäßig, Sinngemäß*)—what is at issue is an emergence such that it was not able not to be) and which, however, supports itself on the landmark[55] of inherited geometry and its oldest forms (Euclid). Through historical *Besinnung,* we rediscover the living current of internal sense, what it had necessarily to be in its becoming.

What is this sense which is undivided between us and the past?

I know[56] that geometry is not natural like a rock or a mountain.

Geometry consists in "spiritual" being, *geistig geworden* <"arisen spiritually"> (p. *HUA* 366),[57] engendered by human activity, belonging to "our human space" (*in unserem Menschheitsraume,* p. *HUA* 366). I know this because it is a trace:[58] Friday's footprint <*la trace de pas de Vendredi*>.[59]

I discover a message—and I do that without knowing from whom it came. To be the message of X to X is therefore an internal characteristic, essential characteristic, of geometry. Moreover, that we do not know the empirical origin is the assurance of a human origin, of a human community, of a pretertemporal humanity, precisely attested to by the fact that the temporal, empirical origin has become obscure. Not knowing who is a knowledge that someone . . . : i.e., someone passes beyond his apparent limit, has the dimension.[60] cf. *Verneinung.*[61] Recognition of the spiritual by the spiritual:[62] what I reposit by means of *Leistung* (accomplishment) on the basis of traces has been posited through *Leistung.* The operation has its world, its *Weltlichkeit* <"worldhood">, its reference to the open community. The forgetfulness of the empirical origin (of history in the empirical sense) depends just on the fact that what was created had the possibility of surviving in a way different from something which was past. It had the possibility of inhabiting all minds, of enduring without using it up, of being History. This forgetfulness of origins by means of what survives in the present is traditionality, *Tradierung,* the handing over of . . . to. . . .

Tradition is forgetfulness of origins as empirical origins in order to be an eternal origin.

I know this because geometry is given to me as something which does not have the massive solidity of natural being, as a certain lack or hollow, a reference to human operations, an essential fragility, a circumscribed negativity, in short, an openness (for me toward a past and a future of investigation, for the inventors a past of nature and a future of science). I remake this openness by conceiving the advances of construction which lead from the natural world to the *fertig* <"ready-made"> ideality. This conception is not a psychological anthropological definition of geometry through its bearers: it is an internal, transcendental humanity. It is the philosophic energy found in all humanity, which I discover in irreality, in the characteristic emptiness, the precariousness of what has been freely created. In this irreality we are *Ineinander.* We are human precisely insofar as we always intend a singularity across the thickness of our lives, insofar as we are grouped around this unique interior where there is no one, which is latent, veiled, and escapes from us always leaving behind in our hands truths which are like traces of its absence.[63]

The work of depth-history therefore consists in interrogating tradition, i.e., in remaking the path which has led from the natural world to this superstructure, the path which is not only in the past which has unfolded but also is in us. I am assured of this precisely through geometrical irreality: so that this non-being is "handed over" (*tradiert*) to me,

**(BN 15)**

so that it calls me to *Nachstiftung*. The path which leads there has to be in principle something which can be made. Engaging myself with it, I notice that (1) all of that is invented, that it had to have an *erstes Erweben* <"first acquisition"> on the basis of a *primitivere Sinnbildung* (p. *HUA* 367), a *Leisten* <"accomplishing"> with a *Vorhabe* and *gelingender Ausfuhrung* <"successful execution"> (p. *HUA* 367).[64]

(2) that (a) in principle, this *Erwerb* gets renewed into other acquisitions, (b) into which, however, it passes complete and thus in a series.

a. Everything acquired is a *Totalprämisse* <"total premise"> (p. *HUA* 367) for the series. The ontic sense of one thing acquired itself receives the ontic sense of the premises, i.e., no matter what the accumulation, it is always in what is created,

b. and yet, what is created earlier passes into the series. This successive accumulation erases behind itself its traces and make a *Totalsinn*—

> the geometry. Therefore, the reconstitution of this history without dates insofar as it is repeatable by me. Although geometry and the whole cultural world is *aus Tradition da* <"exists through tradition">[65] (has a presence which emerges from a foundational act) (p. *HUA* 366), the arising for them is not merely a causal mode of becoming (*Als das sind sie nicht nur kausal geworden*) <"have arisen as such not merely causally"> (p. *HUA* 366), but a spiritual mode of becoming (*geistig geworden*). This mode of becoming is essential to ideality insofar as it is as something which has become, been created, been given birth to, and I know that in myself and I apply it to geometry insofar as I take it up. Ideality is what is engendered in a history that I can repeat. Identity of ideal being—to have a past, historicity—to have a past that I can revive.

Questions that arise.

1. After this analysis which refuses to separate ideality from history, one understands that Husserl maintains an essentialist vocabulary: *Sinngemäß*, etc. He does not become historicist-empiricist. He should not, however, have maintained intemporal formulations like *unbedingte Allgemeingültichkeit* <"unconditioned general validity">. How would the grasping of the emergence be an absolute coincidence if the tradition is always forgotten? Can we recuperate the totality of the *Urstiftung*? If forgetfulness (= the overcoming) constitutes the life of the tradition, is my reconstruction 2[66]—possible—1—necessary, and, consequently, is intellectual communion ever complete?[67]

2. At the other end, at the *Urstiftung*, could there be a complete intellectual possession of what was created? Was the *Erwirkte* <"what has been realized"> *originaliter als es sebst da* <"there, *originaliter*, as itself"> (p. *HUA* 367). This question is raised explicitly (the other question, which is raised implicitly, will come up again).[68]

We have explicated up to about the first half of p. *HUA* 366 and, in the commentary, we have made use of the second half and the first half of p. *HUA* 367 particularly to ask some questions:

1. Geometry, geometry as ideal object.

It is the integral of a series of cumulative advances, of a *Beweglichkeit* <"mobility"> with the geometrical horizon. At each moment, it remakes its unity, contracts itself into its present, and it can do this only by renouncing the reactivation of the total premise.

Moreover: it no longer needs to reactivate it. At each age, science is given as complete in its present. It seeks to reinvent conceptualization which is sufficient.

This, however, is not true: the *Allgemeingültigkeit* is not unconditioned. It is valid for everyone now. It will subsist in later science only as sublimated into new conceptualization.

Therefore science does not make a hole in historical time.

But this is not relativism:

Science has a futural horizon (i.e., is not apodictic evidence) in which in principle what it calls true now will be recollected—overcome and conserved—conserved without its *Einseitigkeit* <"one-sidedness">, as a moment of a totality—conserved in its last sense and in its truth. But this future itself will have a future, so that it will not itself be the truth and will not overcome absolutely. Reciprocally, the present will never be absolutely overcome. This present-future relation which can be transposed into the present-past relation (the present was a future and the past was present). This relation means that the *Urstiftung* is never truly overcome; it was a *Vorhabe*. Double movement: the past recuperated by the present and contracted in it, but also the present anticipated by the past which remains operative in the present. The idea of tradition is this double movement: being other in order to be the same, forgetting in order to conserve, producing in order to receive, looking ahead in order to receive the entire force of the past.

This is not therefore a relativism or an historicism; instead, it is the idea that every present contains everything, is absolute: everything is true and not everything is false.

1. The past is as true as the present if we take account of its horizon. We can even say that there is *Sinnentleerung,* that the futural horizon is made precisely from this surplus which was forgotten over the course and yet was intended from the beginning. Everything was in the past.

2. The present is as true as the future: I really know that the future will change it.

**(BN 16) "MP 7"**

But as long as the future is not there in order to change my present into a negative, my present consists in the positive. It is not yet *Einseitig*. It is pure idealization which will get its date only afterward. The gain is a

loss (*Sinnentleerung*, forgetfulness), but also the forgetfulness is fruitful. It alone allows something to be kept.

Therefore this is not a relativism or an historicism because of the notion of horizon.

But this is not a φ <"philosophy"> of absolute knowledge because of the same notion of horizon: Husserl does not say that there is conservation and overcoming, which are truly the same thing, negation which saves the negated, because the thing negates itself, absolute knowledge. Through the horizon, there is still a double circulation of the past toward the future and the future toward the past.[69]

Hence, the question that needs to be clarified: the crisis of European science is due to *Sinnentleerung*. The immediate remedy is historical *Besinnung* in order to reawaken the *Urstiftung* and all of its horizons. To unveil the *Lebenswelt* <"life-world">, the being of the horizon. To take up contact with what in us understands the *Urstiftung*, with the interior of the history which bears the ideality—but can we still do this? Isn't total reactivation in principle impossible?

2. Question which is symmetrical to the last:

This: to what extent can we reawaken the *Urstiftung*, to what extent can we say that the *Urstiftung* was enveloping the present? To what extent was it communicating internally with it?

The *Urstiftung* has been the fact of certain men, the fact of insular consciousnesses—do these consciousnesses hit upon an ideal, intemporal being? Just like reactivation, was the *Vorhabe* possible?

If we found them right off on ideal, intemporal Being, we ignore the question, which consists in the connection of one present to another. If we renounce ideal, intemporal being, we also ignore the question since what's left behind is nothing more than disjointed psychic facts and not a body of truths, the geometry. We have to pass through this strait.

Husserl devotes himself first to the second question.[70]

**(BN 19) "MP 8"**

3. Commentary.

1—Since the sense of emergence is only a *Vorhabe*, how does it emerge from the space of personal consciousness? From the *Urstiftung*, there has to be something which founds its universal validity, its ideality.

2—At first glance, contrast of the ideal objectivity of geometrical beings
that of the *Gebilde* of literary culture.
the being of technological objects.
of monuments.

the first exist only once and are not multiplied by the acts of expression, the second adhere to their linguistic body, are not authentically and directly accessible for everyone. They require participation in language. The universality is "inauthentic" or "indirect."

The third exist in as many exemplars as we would like, are "reproduced," and they "are used," while the works in the first sense and even in the second are not used. Here the sense has truly become corporeal.

Indirect, direct access.

—Does Husserl want to return to his earlier ideas on ideal existence?

The proof that he does not: he is considering integrating science to literature, the *Bedeutung* to the *Sinn von Reden* <"sense of discourse">.[71]

Language is not only the bearer of ideality, the causal condition of existence for a *Wesen* which belongs to another order. It is essential[72] to the *Bedeutung* to appear in a word. Spiritual becoming is there in the word, what defines spiritual being (thus the idea is not only *kausal geworden,* but it is thus *geistig geworden*. Phenomenology of genesis.

We[73] could add: and reciprocally, must one say that a great work exists in several exemplars? Are there several Aeschyluses, several Shakespeares? And all the same isn't there a *Wesen* of Rome which is accessible only in Rome, but which turns Rome into something other than an object-like place: a source of sense?

And finally, doesn't science involve the infrastructures of language—sedimentation, *opinio communis?* In one sole mind, there is not the co-presence of every science in the state of being evident.

—For the moment, Husserl maintains the phenomenology of layers. There are the sensible exteriorizations and there is the ideal object which inhabits them. The first are in the real world, the ideal object is in the ideal. Through the sensible characteristics, the ideal object descends into the real world, into the exemplars. But the acts of expression have two layers: ideal sense and sensible incarnation, which does not compromise the ideal sense.

We still have to find out how Speech has two layers. NB: they are not juxtaposed there. Speech is *Doppelschichtig* <"two-layered"> = it is one single phenomenon with two levels. It is not sufficient to distinguish layers; one has to understand why and how they are unified. But it is already significant that, in order to understand ideality and its temporal attachment, Husserl turns toward *Sprache*—Janus, speech (*Rede*) and thing in the world. The ideal being precisely refers to the incarnation, to the existence within the world. Mediating *Sprache.*

3. Writing.

But careful: what is not at issue is the explanation of ideal being through ontic *Sprache*. Language is itself ideal objectivity. The word "lion" exists only once in German. Therefore, the claimed linguistic incarnation is the telescoping of an ideal sense in an ideal sense. [cf. *The Logical Investigations:* the philosophy of language founds it in pure grammar, essences.]

However,[74] the *Aussage* <"assertion"> cannot be an ideal object at the same time as what it says. There is the operative *Aussage* which cannot be an ideal object and for which alone the ideal theme, that about which we speak, is posited. [The[75] fact that idealization is always extensible, but always partial, shows that what is not at issue is to make the ideal rest on a causal layer. It also shows, however, that the ideal can never be detached; it does not absorb the order of the operation into itself. The operation is not only a sub-product of the essence. What is the operation? And therefore what is the essence, the ideal?

4. [considering[76] the ideal sense not once it is made, in the propositions, but at its birth], it is clear that it exists in fact through the transportation of *Sprache,* or across *Sprache. Sprache* makes the sense descend into the real world and sets it up at the same time in ideal being.

[Husserl:[77] reflection as torn apart by two contradictory movements. It unveils simultaneously "deep" layers, the role of operative language—and ideal implications, the presuppositions of ideal being.—Going back into the self and emerging out of the self.—In the same movement, the *Sprache* is referred to intemporal, ideal Being and realizes a spatio-temporalization. Is this contradictory?

The emergence of ideality is reintegrated to the arising of language.[78]

We know that the first is historicity-ideality.

The second invites us to understand the simultaneous setting up of what is said

in the ideal

in the real world.

How is that possible? We are going to describe the *fungierende*, operative language as supporting the ideality and descending into the sensible world. In its *Ursprung*, it is both. The dimension of *Ursprung* is verticality. The *Ursprung* must be operative ideality, but this requires clarification of the two terms.

Speech as *Funktion*.

World as horizon. [Speech is not an act of man.]

Only after these clarifications will we be able to understand how the spatiotemporal individual and the ideal being communicate through an ideal speech that traverses man.[79]

**(BN 20) "MP 9"**

Clarification of *Sprache* before studying its idealizing function.

**(BN 22) "MP 9 addendum"**

Commentary for p. *HUA* 369.

1. Humanity is given through a horizon not through acts.

We have humanity.

= familiarity, dimensionality.

There is nothing but things and persons. There are dimensions or horizons. A spatial horizon is not an aggregate of things but their typic, their style, a prior space in which they can be afterward.

The horizon of humanity = prior to the thesis of such or such humans, such or such communities, such or such *Einfühlung*.

The horizon is open: it opens upon . . . an absence of the same type.[80]

Therefore determinate indetermination (and not aggregate of things or of external beings.

Therefore the horizon is between me and other individuals. It is not object.

It is a prior possibility (*kann*)[81] of *Einfühlung*. It is a possibility which, reciprocally, is founded on *Einfühlung*. The phenomenological *a priori* is not an endogenous construction. It is the principal validity of the fact of *Einfühlung*. Horizon *a priori:* not an endogenous condition of possibility,

but possibility as *Möglichkeit an Wirklichkeit* <"possibility in actuality">, here the promise of *Einfühlungen*.

2. We are in the horizon no less than the others. There is no subject-object relation.

*Mitmenschen, Mitmenschheit:* cohumanity, being with. . . .

This means reciprocity by belonging to the same world "lateral *mitsein*" (Sartre). Therefore we do not survey. We are not the world's consciousness; we are conscious of the world.

We are in humanity; we are of it:[82] in the horizon, there is no subject and object. We are there like others; we are, like the others, drawn out of this horizonal being, divergences or variants in relation to it.

3. Horizon and ideality.

Not being the aggregate of *Einfühlungen,* the horizon, therefore, is humanity: *Mitmenscheit,*[83] double sense of the abstract substantive. It is humanity as extensional concept and humanity as historic idea.

The horizon is between the two, foundation of ideality, is universal kernel.

4. Horizon = interest—

> and fact of the *uninteressierte Zuschauer* <"disinterested spectator">.

Interests: the horizon is what the prospective interests intend.[84]

moreover: as long as my interests function blindly, we only have *Mitmenscheit:* lateral relation to the others by means of reference to the same world.

In contrast, when I insert myself into the whole of my cohumans, then I have *die Menscheit uberhaupt* <"humanity in general">, which is not only the humanity of companionship.[85]

Therefore, either I coexist with other humans through my interests, and then I am not one of them (I am the "incomparable monster"),[86]

or I count myself among the number of humans, and then I have humanity *uberhaupt* (undoubtedly: the idea of *Menscheit*),

When I am a human [—functioning as human], I do not know myself truly as such.

When I know myself as a human, I am no longer a human. I am the *uninteressierter Zuschauer.*[87]

Paradox of the horizon: when it engulfs me truly (interests), it does not engulf me truly (monster). When it does not engulf me truly since I conceive it and me in it (I escape), then I autoposit myself in it. Antihumanistic humanism. The horizon of humanity in the horizon of the world.[88]

Great importance of the notion of horizon around which all of that pivots.

The engulfed-engulfing horizon, knowledge and being, essence and existence of humanity.[89]

**[(BN 24) "MP 10 addendum"**[90]

Commentary.

The horizon of humanity understands language (it *gehort* <"belongs"> to this horizon), language understands the openness to the horizon (the horizon depends on language, has a hole cut into it by language).

⇒ *endlos.*

The ability[91] to *aussprechen* <"to express"> is the actual existence of humanity.

Objective being (the spoken world) is founded on this ability to *aussprechen.* The things are founded as expressible (idealizable) by this *Aussprechen-Können* <"ability to express">.

(now it is open and Husserl has said that the ability to *aussprechen* assumes the *Welt* is one part of it.)

But the objective world is eminently the world for us.

But the horizon is eminently this objective world.

At the end: circularity (which is the most correct expression of the point where Husserl is involved in the phenomenological "correlation." For the Speaking-speakable correlation is not that of the noesis-noema).

The centrifugal-constituting determination is circularity. The *Beziehen* <"connection"> is reciprocal.

*Verflochten* <"interwoven">.]

**(BN 25) "MP 10 addendum"**

Commentary for pp. *HUA* 369–370.

Language-humanity-world relation.

Summary: language is what is essential in the horizon of humanity, the horizon to which language gives its "openness" and the horizon which it renders *endlos.*

It is in language that the human *Umwelt* becomes objective, because it is "nameable."

It is language which is the correlative of the *Universum der Objekte.*

*Sprache, Mensch, Welt* are "interwoven," "interlaced."

*Verflochten* (p. *HUA* 370).

{I. The interlacing (*Verflechtung*).}

The analysis seems to involve a double movement:

Language belongs to the horizon of humanity (*gehört zu dem Menschheitshorizont*) (p. *HUA* 369).

Humanity is grasped (*bewußt als*) as a community of language.

Question: do we understand language through the human horizon or do we understand the human horizon through language?

Probably: there is no choice.

Is it the case that one of the relations is based in existence?
the other is based in essence?

The first, for example, existential belonging (cf. *Ideas II,* we belong <*gehört*> to the same world).

The second essential belonging (reflexively we discover language as the invariant of the human horizon)

or inversely:

The first as essential belonging (by reflecting on language, we discover the *Welt* there as invariant and the humanity which participates in it).

The second as existential belonging (humanity constantly depends on language).

The very fact that language and humanity can both be first and second and based in essence and based in existence shows that what is at issue is not this cleavage.[92]

This is all the more the case since Husserl said earlier that ideality was not *kausal geworden,* but *geistig geworden.* Therefore humanity and language which carries humanity must as well not entertain relations of causal genesis.

Something confirms it in what follows: the language-humanity whole,

Husserl says, bears the *Welt* as *Universum der Objekte*. Now in the preceding paragraph they said to us that the human horizon was participating in the *Welt:* therefore it is simultaneously contained in the *Welt* (as *Lebenswelt*) and containing the *Welt* (as *Universum der Objekte*).

We have therefore the impression of reversible relations (perhaps not in the same sense)—which are not unidirectional.

Humanity-language and the whole of its relation with the *Welt* are absolute neither first nor second. Intentionality is not unidirectional.

Let us try to see what that means for what Husserl says concretely of each of the two relations.

II. Language and humanity.

Language is why the horizon of humanity can be an *offen endlos.*

Why? Because of its "far-reaching inscriptions" *Weitreichende Dokumentierungen {als möglich Mitteilungen der Menschheitshorizont ein offen endloser sein, wie er es für Menschen immer ist}* <"far-reaching documentations, as possible communications, that the horizon of humanity can be an open and endless one, as it always is for men"> (p. *HUA* 369).[93]

i.e., without language, in silence, we would have a closed *Umwelt.* We would have biological or anthropological *Einfühlung* in the sense of a natural species which would be man, in the sense of an exterior generativity-generality—we would not have the requirement of inscription, [which is why everything has a truth, an "inscription"].

The result of eidetic variation lies there: the essence of language opened as an invariant through the hypothesis of nonlanguage.[94]—but this method of invariant means that we bring to light not a property of language, which would be analytically contained in it, but a nonlogical possibility, an ability or a power which *inhabits it.*[95]

*Aussprechen-Können* <"ability-to-express">, which emerges with language. [Therefore, the openness realized by language is its operation, not an analytic property.]

Cf. Heidegger. *Unterwegs zur Sprache.*[96]

"Die Sprache erörten heißt, nicht so sehr sie, sondern uns an den Ort ihres Wesens bringen: Versammlung in das Ereignis.

Der Sprache selbst und nur ihr möchten wir nach-denken. Die Sprache

selbst ist: die Sprache und nichts außerdem. Die Sprache ist die Sprache. Der logisch geschulte, alles durchrechnende und darum meist hochfahrende Verstand nennt diesen Satz eine nichtssagende Tautologie. Zweimal nur das Gleiche sagen: Sprache ist Sprache, wie soll dies uns weiterbringen? Wir wollen jedoch nicht weiterkommen. Wir möchten nur erst einmal eigens dorthin gelangen, wo uns schon aufhalten.

Darum bedenken wir: Wis steht es mit der Sprache selbst? Darum fragen wir: Wie west die Sprache als Sprache? Wir antworten: *die Sprache spricht.* {Ist dies Ernst eine Antwort? Vermutlich schon; dann nämlich, wenn ans Licht kommt, was sprechen heißt.}

Der Sprache nachdenken verlangt somit, daß wir auf das Sprechen der Sprache eingehen, um bei der Sprache, d.h. in *ihrem* Sprechen, nicht in unserem, den Aufenthalt zu nehmen. Nur so gelangen wir in den Bereich, innerhalb dessen es glückt oder auch mißglückt, daß aus ihm die Sprache un ihr Wesen zuspricht. {Der Sprache überlassen wir das Sprechen. Wir möchten die Sprache weder aus anderem, das nicht die selber ist, begründen, noch möchten wir anderes durch die Sprache erklären.

Am 10. August 1784 schreib Hamann an Herder (*Hamanns Schriften,* Ed. Roth VII, S.151F.):

> Wenn ich so beredt wäre wie Demosthenese, so würde ich doch nicht mehr als ein einziges Wort dreymal wiederholen müssen:}[97] Vernunft ist Sprache, *logos*. An diesem Markknochen nage ich und werde mich zu Tode darüber nagen. Noch bleibt es immer finster über dieser Tiefe für mich; ich warte noch immer auf einen apokalptiscen Engel mit einem Schlüssel zu diesem Abgrund.

Für Hamann besteht dieser Abgrund darin, daß die Vernunft Sprache ist. {Hamann kommt auf die Sprache zurück bei dem Versuch, zu sagen, was die Vernunft sei. Der Blick auf diese fällt in die Tiefe eines Abgrundes.} Besteht dieser nur darin, daß die Vernunft in der Sprache beruht, oder ist gar die Sprache selbst der Abgrund? {Vom Abgrund sprechen wir dort, wo es vom Grund weggeht und uns ein Grund fehlt, insofern wir nach dem Grunde suchen un darauf ausgehen, auf einem Grund zu kommen. Indes} fragen wir jetzt nicht, was die Vernunft sei, sondern denken sogleich der Sprache nach und nehmen dabei als leitenden Wink den selsamen Satz: Sprache ist Sprache. Der Satz bringt uns nicht zu anderem, worin die Sprache gründet. {Er sagt auch nicht darüber, ob die Sprache selbst ein Grund für anderes sei. Der Satz: Sprache ist Sprache,

läßt uns über einen Abgrund schweben, solange wir bei dem aushalten, war er sagt.

Die Sprache ist: Sprache. Die Sprache spricht.} Wenn wir uns in den Abgrund, den dieser Satz nennt, fallen lassen, stürzen wir nicht ins Leere weg. Wir fallen in die Höhe. Deren Hoheit öffnet eine Tiefe. Beide durchmessen eine Ortschaft, in der wir heimisch werden möchten, um den Aufenhalt für das Wesen des Menschen zu finden."

[*Wesen*: place or abyss or openness through which *Sprache* passes.]

III. Language and objective being (*Welt* as *Universum der Objekte*).

Speech as original intentionality—but earlier acts such as these were called nonobjectifying and subordinated—now here, on the contrary, the positing of objects is founded on this speaking power: the *objektive Welt* is in advance a world of humans, i.e., it is nameable, expressible. In advance (*von vorherein*, p. *HUA* 370) does not mean that the objective world is eminently human and that man is eminently speaking,[98] since Husserl says, "Ihr objektives Sein setzt Menschen als Menschen ihrer allgemeinen Sprache voraus" <"Its objective being presupposes men, understood as men with a common language," p. *HUA* 370>. In a sense, language is first,[99] nonfounded, *Abgrund*, that is, openness, fall toward the height. Language becomes the subjective correlate of the *Universum der Objekte* as *Ausdrückbar* <"expressible">. It is a *Funktion* (*fungierende*, operative) *und geübtes Vermögen*, practiced capacity, cf. earlier: language is made of idealities, but not when we are speaking. Being made of idealities is retrospective. There is therefore an operative language which makes man and objective being.

[Language makes | man but not as made language, as operative language.
| objective being,

but not as made language, as operative language.]

we[100] take account of that precisely with which reflection endows unreflective language as unreflective. Is it necessary to say that circularity[101] has been substituted for the unidirectional noesis-noema relation (on the basis of the central man-nameable, speaking-expressible relation)?

Circularity a dangerous word.[102] Circularity of Heraclitus, yes: to go in one direction is truly to go in the other. A thick identity exists there, which truly contains difference. True Husserlian thought: man, world, language are interwoven, *verflochten*. What does that mean: man, language, world (lived world, and objectified, idealized world) given in one

package—in *Beziehungseinheit* <"relational unity"> (p. *HUA* 370): the references (*Beziehung*) relations which are in principle linear, form a unity, are "simultaneous" (*Ideen II*). That means: disorder cannot be overcome through a survey which is the source, one sees, of the priority given to the unidirectional. The most radical consciousness is that of an explosion or an emergence of ideality—of man and of the open, human horizon—in the thickness of *fungierende* language, which itself presupposes obviously a relation to a sensible *Lebenswelt* and to sensible, primordial consciousness, which also enter into the *Beziehungseinheit.*

**(BN 27) "MP 11"**

Commentary on three fragments from pp. *HUA* 370–371:[103] "gehört." To be understood as "whirlwind," as "hollow"—therefore neither as passive nor as active.[104]

*Durchlebt en quasi* <"lived through in a quasi-">, cf. Proust: the body, the sensible as existential, as organ of a perception of the past.

The only way to renew, to remember a production, is by producing. Need to study here the difference between passive reproduction and the reproduction found in *Erzeugung.*

The *Erzeugung* is what will always be given as "producing," the passive past is given as "sensing."

**(BN 28)**

Commentary. pp. *HUA* 370–371. "MP 13"

Summary of the three fragments

A/In the horizon of the world, of humanity, and of speech, in which the creation of geometry is done, the internal construction of geometry is immediately nameable, intersubjective thing, just as everything that is psychical. But this still does not make it have ideal being, which is born across the psychical but is different from it.

B/[105]

Is this ideal being already attained on the inside of the geometer himself? There is an overcoming of the psychical-real in him because the production of a construction is not merely retained as a dated event which will never be as if it had not been, and can be remembered as lived. The production has a particularity [connected to what the remembered was the production of]; the remembering here gives way to a [second, authentic

(not the *quasi*)] creation with evidence of the identity of the formerly created and of the re-created. Passive time is not surveyed, but it involves an internal attachment between the formerly created and the re-created. A special type of telescoping of these special events in which creations consist; they are not a series of *nacheinander* <"one after another">. But that, in order to overcome the frame of passive, psychical events, does not overcome the frame of the abilities of a subject, and it does not provide ideal being.

C/the self-relation in *Erzeugung* is exemplary for understanding ideality, provided that we apply it to the self-others experience[106] and to speech.[107]

As in the remembering of an active production, there is an actual renewal[108] of this production; likewise there is reunderstanding of productions of others, their re-creation by me when he tells them to me, and that occurs with the consciousness of the identity of the production here and the product there: product and production which are no longer here and there *gleiches* <"similar"> but *das eine allgemeinsame* <"the one common to all" (p. *HUA* 371)>. [As production through an ego which exists beyond the given world and as reproduction, ideal being is posited, as {*Wiederholung*?} of the production by the production, as complete reactivation.]

**(BN 29) "MP 14"**

A/Immense amount of work already accomplished by language before science.

["exact" ideality.]

Everything is already nameable, public, even "interiority," even the "psychical," even "man": these are already things since we are speaking of them. Already everything pell-mell is "reales Ding in der Welt der Dinge überhaupt" <"real thing in the world of things in general," p. *HUA* 370>. Husserl[109] takes [language seriously, gives it an ontological function, makes that a leaf[110] of Being is carried to it, precisely because he is not enclosed (Wittgenstein) (the British) in the immanence of language, conceived as a thing, but follows its implications of sense: they unconceal.

1. before language, a "mute" experience and an experience which calls from itself for its "expression," but a "pure" expression, i.e., foundation and not product of language. Therefore a *Vor-sprache,* a down-side or "other side" of language, an *Ur-sprung* of language.

2. after language, through it, constitution of a universe of the nameable, of *Dinge überhaupt,* of objectivity, coextensive with the *Welt.*]

[Husserl: this is neither a positivism of language—this positivism does not really think language through, nor a positivism of meta-linguistics, which would be a return to the immediate data.

It is the thought of the intentionality which is proper to language, interrogation of language, the *epochē* of language, the suspension (limit of eidetic variation) revealing only the operation, *a contrario*. We do not see the operation, since it operates. We see what would be missing without it; we circumscribe it as what makes speech be a "speaking of" . . . and not be the conscious having of the idealities implied in speech.

This speech truly dimension or *Eröffnung* <"disclosure"> of an immense leaf <*feuillet*> of Being and across it the very Being speaking in us ("pure" expression).]

Question: what exactly is missing from the nameable in order to be ideality, since it public and intersubjective? Communication goes farther in order to found ideality. Why not immediately? Here, only ready-made, instituted language, language as a given dimension, is considered. The intrapsychic *constructum* is nameable, therefore public and transmitted between humans. But even then it is said as an intrapsychic event. Now ideality is something more. It breaks through across the *psyche;* it is not objective-psychical. [Ideality is not spoken speech, but it will be speaking speech, the fact of a *sprechendes Wesen*.]

B/Intrapsychic ideality, as the *Vermöglichkeit* <"capacity"> of a subject.

In *Erzeugung* (*Bilden* of culture, creation), there is an overcoming of the psychical-individual-momentary *Selbstdasein* event of meaning. This point which is outside of passive time, however, is carried through time: *einströmen* <"to flow">.

Nevertheless (1) as an event of my life, this point outside of passive time does not become nothing; there is an actless retention. The telescoping of retentions founds remembering (*Zeitbewußtsein* <"time-consciousness">).

but, there is a "shriveling up"—"temporal perspective." The retained [itself] is no longer remembered. It is no longer there *Selbst*. And, moreover, it is set up in an objective order and it is me who moves myself; it is no longer someone else who distances himself. In order to understand that, which seems to overcome the retention of a factual present, the *Zeit Punkt* <"time point"> must have been "once and for all," an *Urstiftung,* hence derive

⇒ the perspective, the passage to the horizon, the forgetfulness.

⇒ the remembering.[111]

Therefore, each present is dimensional, generality of the present,

**(BN 30) "MP 15"**

generality also of the past (and not sum of individual events, but essence-memories).

*Feldcharakter der Zeit* <"characteristic of a field of time">, theme, according to Fink, of Husserl meditations on time from the second period (1917–1918). Finally, in the last period, reconnects passive temporality to that of acts and of the Ego; they are[112] *eine Gegenwärtigkeit* <"present"> through the life of the Ego therefore the unity of passive time (the remembering is an act) is reconnected, at the same time as the life of the Ego is itself an *Ur-Gegenwart* <"originary present">, which is not <u>between</u> the past and the future), a simultaneity with itself, therefore a notion that is still temporal. The chiasm (this dialectic) would be clarified only through the thematization of the negativity of the *Lebenstiefe*.

2. Here there is no allusion to these meditations. We are not posing the problem of the unity of passive time by retention, and we are not limited to indicating the <u>difference</u> between the temporalization[113] of creations or constructions; the *constructum* as such places its unity on top of that of passive time. Sketch of a ⇒ passage: by remembering the past act of thought as an event, I remember also the meaning that it was bearing which the <u>*quasi neu durchlebt wird*</u>.[114] Then dialectic: insofar as it is an *Erzeugung*, the intentional object of my remembering, of its place, gives way to a renewed production, this time actual, with a consciousness that it is the same, not the same event of consciousness through simple "resemblance," but the same *constructum*. A sort of *Einfühlung* of me with me, lateral overcoming of time, lateral because the unity of the old production and the actual one is not through surveying but through "coincidence."

[*Deckung:* the identification of one *Erzeugung* and of its wake. Neither simple passivity nor simple activity therefore, neither association nor survey, but coupling—cf. evocation of the passive as sensi<u>ble</u>, *Empfind<u>lich</u>* through the "I can" of the body (Proust). "Corps de l'esprit" (Valéry).]

C/Question: why this brief sketch of the passage beyond of the internal event without going out of the possibilities of the subject?

Is it simply a formal analogy of problems?[115] This would be hardly phenomenological.

No, in reality, what is at issue is the same problem, temporalization as ontogenesis.[116]

The self-relation and the relation to others are variants of *Zeitigung,* two types of "simultaneity." And the problem of language,[117] of knowing how we understand what the other is saying, is also indiscernible from the problem of *Zeitigung,* [as Between-time is not more difficult than that of the body of my Mind].

Earlier,[118] language as a system, ready-made or habitual language or language as a factual atmosphere was not sufficient in order to found, with the nameable, ideality. Why can *Einfühlung* and *Sprachgemeinschaft* do it? Because active, operative speech (and not the atmosphere of the nameable, but the *selbstgegeben* <"self-given"> operation of speech) gives birth at a distance to a co-*Erzeugung* of the same just as passive memory gives birth to a new *Durchleben* of the old act, but as a present act.[119]

That is the fact of man as *sprechende Wesen* (p. *HUA* 371).[120]

Originary or full speech and secondary speech.

[Present speech: again for me, *Fortpflanzung.*]

**(BN 31) "MP 16"**

Question: does ideality found *Einfühlung*—language or the reverse? No word implies derivation or anything causal (Reference to first marginal note).[121]

There is the "appearance" (*Eintritt*) of ideality at the edge of speech, but which is "understandable" only through the practice of speech.

Truly, the question no longer arises: for the speech which founds ideality is no longer empirical, ontic speech; it is the speech, invocation of others, just as remembering an old act of thought is a call for a transtemporal meaning.

[*Verflechtung* . . . entanglement. (Reference to second marginal note.)[122]

The problem of causality would be clearly overcome only

1. If Husserl specified that it is placed in the world of presence, of the *Gegenwart,* which by definition is not accessible to a retrospective and distant [-positivist] reflection, but accessible only to open interrogation.

2. which would mean that he places ideality in the order of the negative.

Cf. Heidegger.

[Taken positively, ideality is a myth: there is no *Erzeugung* which is a total reactivation. We are in the truth; we are not making it—taken positively, ideality is cause or effect.

Read Fink.][123]

**(BN 32) "MP 16 first addendum"**

Fink, *Die Spätphilosophie Husserls in die Freiburger Zeit in Edmund Husserl* (*Phaenomenologica* IV)[124]

1859–1959.

*Ur-Ich.*

*Lebenstiefe* before the *Selbsthafte Individuation.*

*Gestaltloser Grund.*

*Selbstung* of absolute being.

*Riss, Negativität.*

*Nunc stans.*

*Ursein.*

*Füllen alles Seins.*

But (1) Plurality of subjects, transcendental intersubjectivity of the *Cartesian Meditations* is not abandoned. What is at issue is the thought of the *Ineinander.*

2. The method consists in *analysierende Reflexion:* transcendental consciousness grasped upon the fact. No speculative ϕ <"philosophy">. The concepts of absolute metaphysics are *Verlegenheitsbegriffe—ominosen Begriffe.*[125]

Therefore all of this: what we call the "wall of Being" before individuation, because in effect as soon as there is transcendental intersubjectivity, what is is not only viewpoints of each, added up, but their articulation, their *Ineinander,* their alternating cohesion, their alternation which is a cohesion. *Füreinander,* and not only the one for the other in general = the two viewpoints as alternates but the two viewpoints together. Therefore, we speak of absolute being ("Ursein," *absolutes Sein*). But where we do not set ourselves up = fissure, negativity, *gestaltlos* = which in principle does not involve installation = which is openness.

**(BN 33)**

Heidegger.[126]

1. ORT-EREIGNIS. *Erörtern . . . Ort.*

The place of *Wesen* (in the active sense of *Wesen*).

To be gathered into the *Ereignis:* the event, the appropriation

= speech has a place to which it must go = investigation of coincidence; it is we who move ourselves.

More exactly (for it is not outside) = we gather ourselves into the appropriation of Speech, in the speech that we have, not into the one that we know objectively.

More profoundly, it is rather the appropriation of us by speech.

2. SELBST and TAUTOLOGY

*Nach-denken der Sprache.*

The very term of Husserl (noematic reflection, i.e., going toward that on which one reflects, not toward "consciousness").

*Der Sprache selbst:* that means: nothing other, no reduction, no explication, not even analysis.

It is not the issue of the logical *Selbst,* tautology, identity—

And it is not the issue of the understanding, which wants to pass to something else.

What is at issue is to remain in our sojourn.

3. WESEN. *Wie west die Sprache als Sprache?*

*Wesen* in the verbal sense: *ester:*[127] to unfold a certain *Sosein* (velvet) (the high school)[128]

essence and existence overcome.

What is language's way of Beyng <*ester*>?[129]

Speech speaks. Its *Wesen,* speech *zuspricht* it.

What is at issue is to enter into Speech in order to grasp its speaking—and not ours.

Speech is neither the explanation nor what is explained.

4. ABGRUND. Hamann discovers that the incarnation of reason in the *logos* is the abyss. For Heidegger, it is language itself which is the *Abgrund:* it does not start from the positivity of reason in order to find a lacuna. Language itself is a nonfoundation <*nonfond*> (nonfounded, nonfounding), i.e., it is fundamental precisely because it is neither founding nor founded.

It is exactly an absolute emptiness, which means that it is not the search for a bottom <*fond*> of a precipice, a lack.

"We fall toward the height"—cf. T. de Chardin—it is natural for the world to produce superior forms = not to start from nothing to conceive Being (which is then necessary Being). To start from Being as pregiven—likewise here the abyss is not to be conceived as a lack of Being, but as more than Being.

The height opens a depth (*deren Hoheit öffnet eine Tiefe*).

The abyss: bi-dimensionality (Being and Nothingness) which measures our "locality." Our locality is openness.

The true nothingness is Being,—Seyn—, which engulfs objective *Sein,* and the *nichtiges Nichts* <"the nothing that nothings">.

Is that still "philosophy"? Is drawing near to speech, speaking, seeing, thinking presently, rediscovering speech, vision, thoughts which are vertical (= abyssal) a "mysticism" without God (Monsieur Teste)? Coincidence?

No: it is not extraphilosophical, coincidence with an unsayable, an external ineffable. All of speculation is necessary in order to discover a sense for this prespeculative Being.

But what we will say about it? Everything that we will say about it will be in principle false. Silence?

There would really be indirect language. The one which would not try to objectify the *Gesagte* <"the said">, but which gives it through gestures = poetry—And we could generalize: history, life, Passions.

But then $\varphi$ <"philosophy"> replaced by art, poetry, life? No, because they speak only silently. $\phi$ <"Philosophy"> as the thematization of this speaking silence.

Relations to Husserl:

Husserl has never stopped speaking of *Bewußtsein* <"consciousness">, never stopped believing in the possibility of an intentional analytic, but converges with Heidegger through

the idea of *Verflechtung,* of the *Ineinander.*
simultaneity (= several ways in).
language as inaugural[130]
Being, operative (*Fungierend* without acts)
The Being of the present ("vertical," the abyss) as universal dimension.
*Tiefensleben* (*Husserliana VI,*[131] last year).[132]
overcoming of act-intentionality.

**(BN 35) "MP 16 second addendum"**[133]

Heidegger.

**(BN 36) "MP 16 third addendum"**

Heidegger Commentary

1. Manner of *denken.*

*Denken* is *nach-denken:* presupposes what it seeks, localizes it, establishes it as a benchmark (*er-örtern*).

Does not submit to our rule (constitution), to our criteria, puts us on a path toward its place—like a perception.

But in this place language is not like an object. It is there as *Ereignis,* i.e., (1) event (2) establishment of a qualification (*Eignung*), of a competence, (3) a taking possession. We are transported to the place where we take possession of language (and especially to the place where it takes possession of us. cf. infra).[134]

*Denken* is to be gathered in this *Ereignis:* we are dispersed outside of it. We set ourselves back up in it. cf. we rediscover the *Urstiftung* of which we are the *Endstiftung.* cf. *Was heißt denken?:* we rediscover a path that the thing has already traversed.

*Denken* is therefore the deepening of our site, i.e., of the *Vorgegeben.* Does not transport us elsewhere—does not bring knowledge: foundation of language or language as foundation of. . . . Explaining or explained—We are what is to be grasped here; we arrive only there where we *are.* Rumination—philosophy. This is Heidegger's equivalent to constitution and intentional analytic: the *Besinnung* rediscovers everything in this apparatus for being . . . everything that we are. However, for Heidegger, *Besinnung* is no longer the explication of acts or of *Auffasungen* <"apprehensions">. But not for Husserl either (constitution through the low, the through "inferior levels," of time, of the body, etc.).

2. Mode of the *Wesen*.

*Wie west die Sprache*? It is not the issue of grasping what responds to the question of *quid*, a *Washeit*.

1—It is not the issue of an inventory of our vocabulary. Husserl already against (British) terminological ϕ ("philosophy").

2—It is not the issue either of essence as a superior positivity (already Husserl: eidetic variation gives an in-variant).

What is at issue is a configuration. cf. *Einführung in die Metaphysik:* the velvet, the high school and its odor: the *Wesen* is a sense of radiation, connected to materials, ingraspable outside of the fact or outside of existence. It is the way in which a whole is produced and reproduced, inseparable from this production. (verbal) *Wesen.*

Therefore we are not to suppose that *Sprache* is first like a thing (a linguistic system) and then has, like a thing, properties.

Its way of Beyng <*ester*> is to speak: *die Sprache spricht*. To take vertical, present, operative language. We know its *Wesen,* therefore not through reduction (= sc.: at the language "meaning"—critical thought which abstains, waits for us to force it. *Epoche* or suspension destined to transform the world in its sense, limit case of variation unconcealing the invariant, suppression unconcealing the pure sense), but on the contrary by entering into it, by following its operation. Husserl himself has seen that abstention unconceals a thesis before all theses, an operation which is emergence (*Ursprung*).

3. Language has us.

To enter into the speaking of speech, not ours. *Denken* gathers up its essence from speaking; it is speech which *zuspricht* thought to us. We let speech speak in us. We do not have language; it has us.

Apparently: passivity. cf. Heidegger letting words speak: *Erörtern-Ereignis.*

However: the words say that only when we think about them. It is Heidegger who speaks in them: proof: before him, we were not thinking about them; we had forgotten them. In *Einführung,* he admits that the sense of words is not an agency behind the words. Therefore this is not simple passivity: reception ("mystic" of language).

It is not the issue of reception, of external Destiny. What is at issue is to recognize the operation in us which is us and which is not ours. cf. Husserl: return to the *Sache selbst,* noematic reflection, the *Vorgegeben:*

reflection is intuition; it is applied to a *Zeitigung* which is not derived from reflection, second (reflection *sich einströmt*). Reflection learns the flux. Likewise here, it learns *Sprechen:* just as there is *Zeitigung* which *zeitigt,* there is a *Sprache* which *spricht.*

It is never some word, some empirical language, some cultural tradition which imprisons us, since never does some space of time enclose us: at the same time as it is enclosing, entailing reflection, time reopens itself (through another present). Likewise, at the same time as it is making us think, language gives us something to think about, is *bedenklich* <"thinkable">[135]—Therefore not an external accident. The *Sprechen* with which we are inhabited is no particular speech: it is the dimension of the *Nennbar,* of the *Aussprechenbar.* It is we who speak at each instant, but there we enter into a play which overcomes us: language is given to us to live—to be; it is a *Geschick* <"destiny">: *Denken* does not envelop speech: it is entangled with it. It is true that one has to think in order to speak, but that does not mean speaking is still a mode of thinking. Speaking moves thinking along once thinking is established. The αυευ <"spoken"> or ουχ <"mode"> do not judge about what speech can do, is not the "that by which."

4. Abyss or openness.

~~*Seyn*~~

Therefore *Denken* is not going to be the mute identification with speech (intuition in Bergson's sense: coincidence)—but rather: auscultation, sounding out, establishing a benchmark.

The speech which speaks in us (*die Sprache spricht*), what does it say about language? that it is without foundation, *Abgrund,* but not in the sense of a lack, of an emptiness into which we fall. Speech finds its support in the place where it goes: in the sense onto which it opens. Speech supports itself on what it sustains: it falls toward the height. Speech is "the house of Being."

Therefore the *nichtiges* nothing, which would be the "emptiness," is not to be considered. The thought which values it is a thought which seeks the *Grund,* Leibnizian, i.e., nihilist. A thought which keeps itself in the *Abgrund* without seeking the *Grund* discovers, thanks to this *Schweben* <"suspension">, that height makes the abyss. The openness (to Being, to sense) makes the emptiness (*die Hoheit öffnet eine Tiefe*). Therefore philosophy of ~~*Seyn*~~ which goes beyond the *nichtiges* nothing and objective being.

Such is the *Ortschaft* where one tests the Beyng <*ester*> of language and man. This is really the *Überstieg* <"crossing over"> or transcendence.

**(BN 37) "MP 16 fourth addendum"**

In passing, we have indicated some convergences with Husserl.

What about convergences with the fourth point <the abyss> and with all of them?

The discovery of operative intentionality has never led Husserl to abandon the ϕ ("philosophy") of *Bewußtsein,* of constitution, of intentional analytic—nor has he ever disavowed the distinction *Tatsache-Eidos* <"fact-essence">.

Are we going to say therefore that Husserl refuses to make the passage to ontology in Heidegger's sense? to the problematic of negativity?

Naivety: what's at stake is not the recognition of an error—but the mutation of concepts.

It is certain that *Bewußtsein* no longer means the same thing when it is Heraclitus' soul.[136] Concepts for a philosopher are only nets for catching sense. Now certainly Husserl recognized that this concept of consciousness could still lure more sense.

cf. Fink: does not give up the transcendental intersubjectivity found in *Cartesian Meditations.* But in order that it be transcendental subjectivity truly the *Ineinander* of subjectivities is necessary. Therefore the *Ur-Ich* before the *Selbstung* <"selfhood">.

Likewise, the fact-essence distinction is overcome toward fundamental *Sein,* the Being which is characterized as "fissure."

Likewise, language stops being founded. Becomes the support of ideality. As the support, does it become founding? Neither: the idea of Simultaneity (for example, the simultaneity of the originary present which is not between present and future). ideality-language, constituting consciousness-language become simultaneous.

It would therefore be wrong to say that Husserl coincides with Heidegger: by continuing beyond every possibility grasped "upon the fact" of constituting-transcendental consciousness, Husserl testifies to ~~*Seyn*~~ as abyss or openness, and to the *Überstieg.* Therefore by turning his back on it. But really they speak of the same thing.[137] And we could say that Heidegger presupposes Husserl, that we do not really understand Heidegger unless we follow what Husserl is attempting all the way up to

what is impossible in it: for, if we take it immediately, we risk making Heidegger's thought descend into the ontic. For example, mysticism of language. Language and history external destiny.

All of this commentary from this idea:

The *Einfühlung* beyond activity and passivity (of consciousness).

experience of their *Deckung,* of their coupling, of *Nachverstehen,* accomplished by the operation of speech—Simultaneity of ideality and[138] speech.

The bi-directional *Fundierung* becomes "simultaneity."

Nevertheless, we have not yet clarified all of what ideality is nor have we made all the powers of speech intervene.⇒

**(BN 38) March 21.**[139]

Preceding Text.

1. We would not account for ideality by having it derive from language as if language were a cause: language taken as given explains that my psyche like all of myself became something public, a thing in the world—but "the geometry" does not consist "in the psychic," in psychic reality, although it is born psychically (*psychisch-entsprungen*).

2. Geometry, like every product of *Erzeugung,* can be grasped only through "production," has its *Selbstdasein* only through the creation of mine. That is, in this emergence, geometry is the complete opposite of objective being. It has only an instantaneous existence there. Passes away and becomes *Vergangensein* <"past being">.

But this *Vergehen,* this "passage" and the past which results from it do not become nothing. They can be awakened, can emerge, passively, that is: something is proposed to the present human as something to remember actively, a whirlwind is offered to him which calls him to quasi *durchleben* again and actively the past *Erleben.* This consists only in the quasi, an intention aimed at an originary production which is no longer actual; but precisely because the production alone would be the pure accomplishment of this intention, the active remembering involves "necessarily" an activity of present production (third term) which "coincides" with it exactly. I begin the ideation again and this present activity weds exactly the whirlwind of passivity and attempt at remembering. Within me precisely because the ideation is creation and is instantaneous; since it is nevertheless an *Erleben,* there is no other way of following memory as far as it can go than

by beginning the ideation again. Ideal being is omnitemporal, because to remember former ideations is to begin them again in the consciousness of rebeginning: i.e., in the consciousness that this present activity is the other side of past activity. The instantaneousness, the *Erzeugung,* which seemed to be obstacles to the permanence of ideal being, are on the contrary what founds it insofar as they are a call to reiteration. Simply, ideal objectivity is not in something before me; it is the lateral connection, the hidden and internal attachment of different ideations which are identified with one another across memory, conjugation of passivity and activity, equivalence of a passivity and an activity, encroachment of one on the other: passivity as mold or negativity of an activity.

This is not yet the solution since we are still within the field of a person: and in effect omnitemporality is persistence across one temporality, not across time (which is itself one ideality) and persistence due to this individual system which is passivity-activity.

But I have learned here a thought through "intentional-encroachment," passivity-activity coupling, which unconceals to me the articulation of the time of my thought and which is going to unveil to me the articulation of this time of mine upon other temporalities, the articulation of me, entirely as active, upon others as passive (I speak), or articulation of me, entirely as passive, upon others as active (I hear others). The retention structure (wake)—remembering (*durchleben en quasi*)—renewal of *Erzeugung* (new, present production, obtainment of the past itself into the present), the communication of the thinking "me" with the instantaneous thinking "me" across the wall of time offers already, within each, the structures characteristic of speech (= activity which traces from the outside, or trace which is retraced through me), and, inversely, the προφοριχος <"uttered"> speech is only an extension of my activity-passivity system. This is why one is spoken and why one thinks in others.

3. Language, not as ready-made (not as a linguistic system, as a given field of the nameable including everything, even my psyche), but rather language as being in the process of being made, in the process of striding, in the process of reactivating the introjection of words in me (from now on, I will be speaking to myself and will no longer content myself with thinking what I am thinking, the words will be between me and me) and the projection of my thought into the words heard, of my activity in these received traces, in short, speech as the encroachment of others upon me (as thought) and of me (as thought) upon others, realizes intertemporal being of the second order. Just as the only way to remember an idea is to begin the ideation over, the only way of yielding to intersubjective

thought is to retrace the trace, to think anew by operating through an activity an exact coincidence with a passivity. As we said earlier, passivity is not subordinated to activity (reflective φ ["philosophy"]). The explanation is sought in the activity-passivity coupling which functions in speech.

Speech is a πραζις <*praxis*>: the only way to understand speech is to speak (to speak to . . . or to be questioned by . . . ). If one wants to understand speech without speaking, one would have nothing more than thought in one space of consciousness. The ultimate, philosophical thought, *theoria,* can here only accompany speech in its operation, can only describe the passivity-activity reversal within the *lebendige Gegenwart* <"living present"> of speech. The highest degree of *theoria* is the recognition of πραζις. It is πραζις that makes possible *das eine allgemeinsame* <"the one common"> through the chiasm of speaking beings: the universal one is in the thickness of their simultaneity.

This is what is going to be emphasized at the end of the text: there is not only active, parallel production, acts of thought which are each for itself *das Ein allgemeinsame.* Ideality is truly an inter-being, a cloth between "thoughts" or production, a field in which the different, factual *Einfühlungen* are the partial realization of one Speech.

Now, when examined, this speech which speaks in our thoughts is supported by the written.

**(BN 39) pp. *HUA* 371–372. "MP Husserl 17"**[140]

**(BN 40) "MP Husserl 18"**

Commentary.

1. Ideal beings still exist only in actual speech—and in the state of *originär Erzeugtes* <"originary products"> in the other and in me—

but they are not in this way intermittent—and they do not only consist in being *originär Erzeugtes.*

They have permanent existence—and it has to be the case that active production not be the only mode of being of ideality: it would not be an object, [the ideality endures]

outside of the moment of *Einfühlung,* as long as we are "awake" to the *Konnex* <"connection">, i.e., through *Sprechen* inserted into other lives and other *Erzeugenen.*

outside of the life of the interlocutors as long as others think such a possible *Konnex* with them (mediately or immediately = no *Konnex* {with Plato?}?

but closer and closer, if)

outside of all interlocutors, when what is at issue is an ideality that no one has ever thought.

Where does it exist then?

In speech as the universal questioning of the world.

Notice: this is saying at what point the ideality is supported by *Einfühlung,* interlaced with it: an actual *Einfühlung* does not substantiate more than itself. The whole weight of the effective presence of a human weighs in when I enter into ideality, the whole extraordinary operation of *Erzeugung* transformed into speech and understood again.

Now, all of what, in the ideality, overcomes this communicative experience is going to be founded on linguistic inscription in the world. And even ideality as a type of being already there before every *Einfühlung* with interlocutors.

2. The written founds the permanence of ideality outside of experiences of *Einfühlung.*

the preexistence of ideality before every experience of

*Einfühlung.*

Through the written, meaning is virtually in the world. The permanence of ideal being rests on that of the world as containing virtualities of *Erzeugung.* The ideal world supported by the sensible world.[141] The written as element of the sensible world is *erfahrbar in Gemeinsamkeit* <"experienceable in common," p. *HUA* 371>. As the element of the world of the nameable, it is *Erzeugbar* [*in Gemeinsamkeit*]:[142] its sensible inter-existence entails also an inter-existence of sense. It is not only permanent like a *grimoire,*[143] it is permanent as meaning, i.e., as element of the sayable and (correlatively) of the Speech of *Sprechendes Wesen:* it is sedimented sense. This is why sedimentation, forgetfulness, is not a defect of ideality: it is constitutive of ideality. (*Tradierung*) (Cultural world: and more: *Immerfort sein* <"continuing to be," p. *HUA* 371> of what has never been given in evidence: prospective movement of the true.

3. ⇒These analyses exhibit an ideal sense which does not consist in an actual *Erzeugung*—virtual which is the sense of Speech beyond spoken words.

At first, language seemed to be the simple occasion of a coproduction reiterated as the passive memory of acts, the occasion of a present activity.

But in order for there to be truly a coproduction, or *Deckung* of the present with the past, there has to be in addition "simultaneity," *Ineinander,* [i.e., the present act overcoming itself toward the acts of yesterday or toward those of others, encountering the acts again in the coupling, i.e., the passage of one thought into another or into *Dokumentierung.* Sedimentation, inactivity, "passive" thought are not only abbreviations or a codification, or "signs"—this is a mode of thought. The written is the *Verwandlung des ursprünglichen Seinsmodus des Sinngebildes* {*in der geometrischen Sphäre der Evidenz des zur Aussprache kommenden geometrischen Gebildes*} <"transformation of the original mode of being of the sense-structure, [e.g.,] within the geometrical sphere of self-evidence, of the geometrical structure which is put into words"> (p. *HUA* 371). creation of shortcuts, of a synthetic, meta-personal evidence. The written and monumental sense. The written, the book as Speech.][144]

There is a "thought" which does not reactivate, which therefore works with the sedimented.

Conclusion: Therefore the possibility of error, but this possibility of error is also possibility of truth: we cannot reactivate everything.[145]

Not only the lack of time, I would add, but because there is a clarity which is proper to the acquired. I do not actualize the *Deckung* with my thought from yesterday before going farther because there is a cohesion of my thought before this passivity-activity *Deckung.* The latter accomplished once and for all in the good sedimentation.

If that is true, then *Einfühlung* is not only *Erzeugung* which is reconstituting. It is the thought-language and me-others interweaving (*Verflechtung*); it is thought always connected through participation to a linguistic system and a cultural universe, not only causally, but because it is sedimentation in itself, i.e., creation of shortcuts and a synthetic evidence.

[The past.

Since the written founds the preexistence of idealities that no one has experienced and conceived with evidence, *Dokumentierung,* therefore—meta-personal sedimentation is also the future anterior, the anticipated warehouse of our present in a present, to come <*à venir*>. It is not only the stratification of the past, its passage away into the inactual, the flux reclosing itself on present evidence and entailing it as *Strömend-stehende* <"permanent flow">.

But also all of that is being done through the future on the basis of our present. But this future is not? Certainly. But we know that it will be. The present is therefore also openness to this future.

The thought which "works with passivities" and which has its evidence there is the thought *Sinnentleerung* (reference to first marginal note)[146]— but it is also the thought which rediscovers the *Lebenswelt,* full ideation, the *Stiftung* of rationality. For, there is not elimination of passivity; I do not reactivate my whole past of thought; and I cannot rethink everything that others make me think. The written (cf. Valéry) is the support of this passive-active, metapersonal thought; it opens the field of this exact Thought, without ever fulfilling it. The written as speaking of—which remains a speaking to, Speech to the singular]

**(BN 41)**[147]

*HUA* 371: ideal identity founded on the identity of the *Erzeugung* in *Sprachgemeinschaft,* on the active *nachverstehen* of others, on the penetration into the consciousness of others (cf. I see through the eyes of others), on the double *Einfühlung: Einfühlung* makes that there is *das Eine* <"the one"> and not *das Gleiche* <"the same">. That makes like an *Immerfort sein* <"continuing to be"> without testimony.

Speech furnishes the universal—and the statement its permanence.

Reactivation is a property of man as a speaking being.

*sprechendes Wesen.* Sedimentation is expression.

*HUA* 372. Pseudo-activity, pseudo-thought, as a fact of speech.

[But then is the principle of universality again in question, since it is *Sprechen*—ambivalence of *Sprechen:* it is universality, truth and error. It is the positive *of* a pure negative (*Erzeugung*) and in this sense it betrays it and founds it simultaneously.

Summary.

*HUA* 372–373.

(: advice: always reactivate)

Quote absolute *Wahrheitserkenntnis* <"knowledge of the truth," p. *HUA* 373 n. 5> is an idea.

*HUA* 373.

But we cannot reactivate all of what, however, conditions what follows.

*HUA* 373–374.

*HUA* 374–375.

Description of the *logical Verdeutlichung* <"explication," p. *HUA* 374>. Question: can *Ursprünglichkeit* hold sway from one to the other of a chain?

No. There is an *Idealisierung*. It has its evidence. But it is the evidence of an *Entschränkung* <"removal of limits," p. *HUA* 375>.

*HUA* 375–376. The *Wahrheitsinn* is forgotten; there is *Sinnentleerung*

*HUA* 376, if we cannot reactivate and that is not guaranteed by logic.

*HUA* 377, dangers of a logicized science p. *HUA* 376.

*HUA* 377, of a logical construction *HUA* 376.

*HUA* 377: The problem of a "theory of knowledge" arises from a vague feeling that the sciences do not have evidence.

*HUA* 377, description of the forgetfulness of *Lebenswelt* in the objects of science.

*HUA* 378, logic, *Sinnentleerung* and *Techniesierung* (and the Fink text p. 375).[148]

*HUA* 378 { . . . } *HUA* 386.[149]

**(BN 42) "MP Husserl 19"**[150]

*The end of the text. Ursprung der Geometrie*

What is essential was seen in the preceding part.

What follows specifies it.

1. Truth as an Idea—as idealization. evidence of the latter, but it is evidence of *Offenheit* (*Entschränkung*). The structures of the ideal and of the construct are still structures of lived experience: horizon and sedimentation—*Sinnbildung* and *Sinnentleerung* and their *Beweglichkeit*. eidetic variation horizon in principle. Science as *praxis*.

2. Critique of logic and the claimed logical *Verdeutlichung:* in no way is that a total reactivation. It is the critical *Techniesierung* of the "theory of knowledge."

3. Therefore universal historicity. The *a priori* of history as universal history. This *a priori* is *Sinnesboden* <"ground of sense">. Historicity of philosophy. The problem of reason: is there a universal *a priori* and a total reactivation? [or a speech within Being]?

1. Truth. It is necessary to reactivate, but this purpose is only relatively *erfülbar* <"fulfillable">. Therefore, "ist objevtive, absolut feststehende Wahrheitserkenntnis eine unendliche Idee" <"objective, absolutely firm knowledge of truth is an infinite idea," p. *HUA* 373 n. 5>.

That does not mean vulgar relativism: "bedenken wir die offenbare Endlichkeit des individuellen wie gemeinschaftlichen Vermögens, die logischen Ketten von Jahrhunderten wirklich in die Einheit eines Vollzuges in unrsprungschte Evidenzketten zu verwandeln, so merken wir, daß das Gesetz eine Idealisierung in sich bringt: nämlich die Entschränkung und in gewisser Weise die Verunendlichung unseres Vermögens. Die eigentümliche Evidenz solcher Idealisierungen wird uns noch beschäftigen" <"if we consider the obvious finitude of the individual and even the social capacity to transform the logical chains of centuries, truly in the unity of one accomplishment, into originally genuine chains of self-evidence, we notice that the above law contains within itself an idealization: namely, the removal of limits from our capacity, in a certain sense its infinitization. The peculiar sort of self-evidence belonging to such idealizations will concern us later," p. *HUA* 375>.

Therefore pure ideality is an *Idealisierung*. This does not mean that it is uncertain, but the evidence of our idealized capacity and of the idealized *constructum* is particular.

This evidence requires that the *Erzeugung* of the first *Idealisierungen* on the basis of the *Kulturwelt* were *written*, and also that the capacity to reactivate is itself *tradiert* (pp. *HUA* 375–376).[151]

This is what logic cannot guarantee by itself: logical treatment can produce, on the basis of propositions composed with sedimented sense, only propositions of the same sort (*HUA* 375). Logical activity is *spezifisch an die Sprache gebunde* (*HUA* 374) <"tied specifically to language">. The sense of truth is not immediately given with *jeder Satz {nicht bloß} als sedimentierten (logischen) Satzsinn* (*HUA* 376) <"every proposition, not merely as its sedimented (logical) propositional sense">. In the sciences is sedimented the sense which is no longer henceforth truly produced in the send of *Uridealitäten* (p. *HUA* 376). Dangers of a science which is *ganz den logischen Aktivitäten hingegeben* (*HUA* 376) <"completely given over to logical activities">: science allows *Sinnverwandlungen* (*HUA* 376) <"transformations of sense"> which work to the benefit of logical method, but these transformations are distant from the *Ursprung* (*HUA* 376 n. 6). One can inherit propositions and the method in order to construct always logically new idealities without inheriting the capacity to reactivate beginnings, *Sinnesquellen* (*HUA* 376) <"sources of sense">. Therefore *Sinnentleerung* during which one continues the *Methodik technischen Verwertung* (*HUA* 378) <"methodics of technical application">.

The theory of knowledge itself is also unaware of this profound historicity: *in den gegenwärtig vorliegenden Begriffen und Sätzen selbst liegt ihr Sinn* (*HUA* 379) <"the presently available concepts and propositions

themselves contain their own sense">. For Husserl, impossible to distinguish in this way the theory of knowledge from history, the *erkenntnistheoretischem* and the *genetischem Ursprung* (*HUA* 379).[152] We know that all geometry is a tradition and *tradiert,* and this knowledge is not that of an (inductive!) *Nacheinander* (*HUA* 379), but the implicit understanding of its historicity, i.e., of its permanence through human *Erzeugung* and of the possibility of explicating it. A possibility itself sedimented in language.

Ideality and historicity, history are "nichts anderes als die lebendige Bewegung des Miteinander und Ineinander von ursprünglicher Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung" (*HUA* 380) <"nothing other than the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimentations of sense">.

Science as *Praxis* (*HUA* 384): as operative history.

2. Consequences for philosophy.

How is philosophy as *theoria* distinguished? What is still philosophy? What distinguishes the historicity of the philosopher from the inductive knowledge of a *Nacheinander*? What is at issue is an *a priori* of history, a *struk-turelle a priori* (*HUA* 380).

Is this *a priori* the return of the Kantian notion found in the period of *Ideas*?[153]

No: it's *allgemeinen Sinnesboden* (p. *HUA* 380), concrete *a priori.* I.e.: philosophical history is distinguished from *Tatsachengeschichte* (p. *HUA* 381) <"factual history"> or ontic history as a series of facts. But it is not a system of concepts or categories. It is the ground or horizon of sense, explication of the dimension of history that we have behind us (p. *HUA* 375: axioms have a *Sinnbildung* already "behind" them): i.e., the structural *a priori* of history is the knowledge of this: that every cultural fact is given as *Gebilde aus einem menschlichen Bilden,* therefore that every cultural fact is susceptible to an *Explikation* or to a *Verdeutlichung,* to a "historical unconcealment," therefore bearer of a horizon of history ⇒ the *Kulturgegenwart* implies the entire *Kulturvergangenheit,* or rather a continuity of *praxis* of which each has been present: *Einheit der Traditionalisierung bis zur Gegenwart, {die die unsere ist, und ist als sich selbst} Traditionalisierung in strömend-stehender Lebendigkeit* (p. *HUA* 379) <"a *unity* of traditionalization up to the present, which is our present *as* [a process of] traditionalizing itself in flowing-static vitality">.

The history of philosophy is history according to the *Tiefendimension*[154] (*HUA* 381 n. 9).

There is no opposition between this *a priori* and history itself, for it is nothing other than its structure including the element of forgetfulness, i.e., the element of nonreactivation, i.e., including the overcoming of relations to others and to the past.

This element is so little eliminated that it itself intervenes at the most radical level in order to constitute philosophy. The explication of the *Ursprung* of geometry "awakens" *das Totalproblem der Universalen Historizität {der korrelativen Seinsweise von Menschheit und Kulturwelt} und die in dieser Historizität liegende a priorische Struktur* <"the total problem of the universal historicity of the correlative manners of being of humanity and the cultural world and the *a priori* structure contained in this historicity," p. *HUA* 378>. Fink: "Es wird zur Frage des Philosophie" (p. *HUA* 378).[155] Philosophy as *Frage*. What philosophy unconceals is hidden (*verborgene "Vernunft in die Geschichte"* Fink),[156] in "implicit," and that is not erased in the definition of philosophy. The problem of *Vernunft* <"reason"> is itself included in a *Problemhorizont* (p. *HUA* 385). The history of philosophy is *innere Historie* (p. *HUA* 386), but also philosophy is only the reverse side of history, the *universale Teleologie der Vernunft* (p. *HUA* 386).

Husserl says again *aeterna veritas* (p. *HUA* 385), philosophy as science of the *a priori*, but this eternity is "simultaneity," this *a priori* is horizon or ground and therefore it is hidden. Philosophy is the "Offenheit,"[157] i.e., consciousness of evidence as the latency of Being.

**(BN 43) "MP Husserl 18 addendum"**

Ideality: first: what is produced (*Erzeugung*).

More exactly, *nach-Erzeugung* across my time, across the plurality of times (others)—therefore "transgression" through the adjustment of a passivity (wake of my past—language) to an activity.

In this transgression, one does not know who is engulfing and who is engulfed.

Therefore "pure" ideality is neither first nor second in relation to *Einfühlung*, to speech. It is "simultaneous," it *auftritt* at the edge of Speech, by *Verflechtung*.

Husserl's method (intentional analytic):

Intentionality of acts (*Erzeugung*) (ideality) and intentionality of the passive (time) (language) distinguished. This is where the first use of Intentionality is.

Then confronted: how is the one realized in the other? In the first and in the second, we discover reciprocal reference and passivity-activity unity

of *Fungeieren:* historicity. Requirement of ideality, that it be realized in passivity. Total equivalence of ideality-speech and not a subordination of one to the other. History is not only the causal condition of realization, but participates in the sense of ideality: *Sinngenesis.*

New employment: after having shown ideality as a jointure through the me-others *Einfühlung,* we are referred to it: there is more sense in ideality than in this factual junction. Permanence outside of all factual *Einfühlung,* truth prior to *Einfühlung.* Are we going to conclude that ideality is outside of history?

No: we do the intentional analysis again: in history, there must be something else. What? The Written, foundation of the permanence and of the preexistence of ideality.

But is the Written only congealed speech, means of communication, nothing more?

No: it is necessary to explicate the sense of the Written: we will see that there is *Verflechtung* and simultaneity between it and ideality.

The written is sensible, "public" signs. But it is also the apparatus for *Nacherzeugung:* public or monumental meaning. Certainly, it is that only in order to be capable of *Erzeugung.* But, for this Being, it is transporter of meaning, not the simple occasion of *Nacherzeugung.* The written, the *grimoire,* is the existence of the idea. It implies, in sensible, fragile existence, the exact sense. cf. Valéry: the written is a lot more than the author and his *Erzeugung,* and a lot more than all mediate and immediate *Einfühlung.* It is the visible figure of the very principle of Speech as being coextensive with Being, i.e., as sublimation of speech beyond its empirical accomplishments: preexistence of the ideal.[158] Relation of *Einfühlung* with speech: as always bi-directional: it is a variant of speech, but speech is a variant of the written in the sense that it brings along the possibility of cumulation (Valéry) that empirical speech does not have, *Mitteilung* <"communication"> of X to X, Speech to the singular. Ideality is always the reactivation of something sedimented (*Nacherzeugung*) (something sedimented in me, in others). But, with the written, reactivation is no longer lost time, reconquest of a certain forgetfulness; it consists in going farther in the same direction (what Valéry was calling "imposture");[159] it is supported by acquired sense which is like a monument. With the written, there is no longer only a passage to the inactual which is compensated for by new *Erzeugung,* stratification as sclerosis: there is that all of what we say is offered to a complete Speech. Future anterior: the present open to a retrospective view which we will have when everything will have been

said. . . . [Therefore, sedimentation which is remembering. The fact is that I do not need to reactivate in order to think along the thread of my thought of yesteryear or along the thread of a thought of someone else.]

Intentional analysis: rediscover the connection between the literal sense (ideality) and the figurative sense (the written) and their equivalence which is historicity.

The rest of the text. consequence in regard to truth, in regard to philosophy.

1. Truth.

Sedimentation ("secondary passivity") is a danger (the seduction of language). But can we reactivate everything? In fact, it is impossible (the individual and even a cultural group have finite capacities of reactivation): it is only relatively *erfüllbar* and therefore *Wahrheitserkenntnis* is *eine unendliche Idee* (*HUA* 373 n. 5), i.e., *das Gesetz eine Idealisierung in sich bringt: nämlich die Entschränkung, und die gewisster Weise die Verunendlichung unseres Vermögens* (*HUA* 375) <"the law contains within itself an idealization: namely, the removal of limits from our capacity, in a certain sense its infinitization">. But this participates in our being: there is an *eigentümliche Evidenz solcher Idealisierungen* (*HUA* 375). What is at issue is to see how true, absolute, fixed ideality is legitimately posited as a limit for an Idealization. This idealization is the establishment of an order of ideality as a *Kulturwelt,* the inauguration of this order as distinct from the momentary *Einfühlung,* and it is inaugurated as such only if we give up reactivating everything in order to rely on an in principle possibility of reactivating: *Es ist klar, daß die Methode der Erzeugung der ursprünglichen Idealitäten aus den vorwissenschaftlichen Gegebenheiten der Kulturwelt vor dem Dasein der Geometrie niedergeschrieben und fixiert sein mußte in festen Sätzen; daß ferner das Vermögen, diese Sätze aus dem vagen sprachlichen Verstehen in die Klarheit der Reaktivierung ihres evidenten Sinnes überzuführen, in seiner Weise tradiert und beständig tradierbar sein müßte* (*HUA* 375–376) <"It is clear that the method of producing idealities out of what is prescientifically given in the cultural world must have been written down and fixed in firm sentences prior to the existence of geometry; furthermore, the capacity for translating these sentences from vague linguistic understanding into the clarity of the reactivation of their self-evident sense must have been, in its own way, handed down and ever capable of being handed down">. Reactivation itself become tradition. Inauguration of a second power of tradition or of sedimentation: a sedimentation of reactivation itself. That is what is at the origin of the *Idealisierung,* therefore of truth—and which is completely a nonexplanation (for good reasons).

There is therefore a truth which is the result of *Idealisierung,* forgetfulness of its genesis—and there a more profound truth which consists in rediscovering the instituting movement of the universe of ideas.

The first is logical truth: it assumes that the capacity for reactivating the operations that found ideality is sedimented. It does not interrogate the sediments that are there. It moves about in the given universe of *Sätze,* in the given universe of *sedimentierten Satzsinn* (*HUA* 376); it is *specifisch an die Sprache gebunden* (*HUA* 374); it crystallizes idealities into figures and at the same time into statements. It explains (for example, the logical explanation of constructive operations in calculus, the logical explanation of technical abbreviations of intuitive thought. But it does not explain the *Sinnbildungs-traditions: wo Reaktivierung im ersten Sinn zu Ende ist*

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*. . . beginnt überhaupt erst die Reaktivierung der Rückfrage in die "Urstiftung"* (Fink[160] and *Husserliana,* p. 375) <" . . . reactivation as return-inquiry into the primal institution first begins in general">. Logic inherits the propositions and the method in order to construct something new in logic without inheriting the capacity to reactivate *Sinnesquellen* (*HUA* 376). This is where the *Sinnenverwandlung,* the *Sinnentleerung* come from, which are of service to the logical method, but are distant from the emergence (*HUA* 376). One has a *Methodik der technischen Verwertung* (*HUA* 378) and the danger of a theory which is *ganz den logischen Aktivitäten hingegeben* (*HUA* 376). Similarly, the theory of knowledge, which has no dimension of *Ursprung* because it believes that *in den gegenwärtig vorliegenden Begriffen und Sätzen selbst liegt ihr Sinn* (*HUA* 379) and wants to distinguish between *erkenntnistheoritischer* and the *genetischer Ursprung.*

The militant truth, the one that puts constituted idealities and ready-made language in question and wants to rediscover outside of every "technique"—technization the very genesis of ideality, is philosophy, i.e., the dimension of historicity as "nichts anderes als die lebendige Bewegung des Miteinander und Ineinander vor ursprünglicher Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung" (*HUA* 380) <"nothing other than the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimentations of sense">. Philosophy, larger than "logic," on this side of the distinction between ready-made ideality and passivity, taking measure of the ideality from the preideal world (not only the sensible world of the empiricists, but as well the historical world: the *Lebenswelt* envelops everything).

## 2. Philosophy

Entering into this historic-prehistorical *Tiefendimension* (*HUA* 381 n. 9) = φ <"philosophy">. It is the "awakening" to the *Totalproblem der universalen Historizität.* The emergence of geometry "wird zur Frage der Philosophie" (*HUA* 378 Fink).

Difference between philosophy and science when it is fully understood is imperceptible: only because historicity is moved by philosophy all the way into the depths of the *Stiftung* of logic, philosophy is *universale Frage Horizont* (*HUA* 382).

The theme of φ <"philosophy"> is the horizon of horizons. Deepening of the initial definitions of φ <"philosophy"> as *strenge Wissenschaft.* In particular, the initial definitions of the *Eidos:* the *Eidos* is from now on the *Auslegung* <"interpretation"> of a horizon; eidetic variation seeks the invariant "als das im strömend lebedingen Horizont ständig implizierte Wesen" (*HUA* 383) <"as the essence constantly implied in the flowing, vital horizon">. Does philosophy explain this *Wesen*? Its theme is a *verborgene Vernunft in der Geschichte* (Fink), a *universale Teleologie der Vernunft* (*HUA* 386), but which can be grasped only in filigree, as a secret or hidden connection. Therefore *Wesen* does not engulf the horizon. It is the formulation of its structure as horizon of culture (implication in *Kultur-Gegenwart* of *Kulturvergangenheit* with *Traditionalisieren in strömend-stehender Lebendigkeit* (*HUA* 379)). But this "structural" or concrete *a priori* is neither a Kantian category nor even a Hegelian idea; it is the *allegemeinen Sinnesboden* (*HUA* 380) <"universal ground of sense"> = the sense finally, far from being an idea, is a ground. φ <"Philosophy"> seeks in the archeology of the ground, in the depth and not in the height (the ideas). We saw what that means last year: the intentional interiority which is sought for within intersubjectivity—philosophy as poetry—at least for every other who attempts to understand it again.[161]

But concretely? The *Umsturz* text shows this.[162]

Through its title and its most apparent subject matter, this text: elucidation of the ground in the literal sense: the earth.

Restitution of a sense of the earth as ground beyond Copernicus. The Earth as *Körper* <"physical-body"> (just like the stars), a universe of *Körper* = idealization which refers intentionally to the philosophical dimension. I—my body—my *Boden* (which is not *Körper* or ob-ject or ideate)—Elucidation of the *Boden,* of the earth as fatherland of the Ego. This makes that philosophy understood as the study of the *Sinnesboden* is to be taken literally: natural *Boden* (the earth) and cultural-historical *Boden* which is

built on the earth. Copernicanism is a *Weltmöglichkeit* constructed upon this permanent *Weltanschauung*. The figurative sense of *Boden* is the literal sense.

But, in passing, Husserl indicates all the ontological implications of this rediscovery of the *Boden*:

1—"fungierende ruhenden Erdboden"[163]

The earth as an ultra-thing (and the stars)—On this side of rest and of motion [this[164] is to rediscover also a new space-time, causality, and even historicity] *Erdraum* <"terrestrial space"> within the earth, in the limits or in the neighborhood of the earth: it is the "system of *possible* ends of corporeal movements" (a), it is therefore a space as *Unveranderung* <"invariance">, as a modality of time—the earth as a whole has no place in this *Allraum* <"universal space">. Not that it is riveted, nailed down, but precisely because it is not a *Körper.* It is something which engulfs.

b) *Umwelt, Offenheit,* prerepresentational—horizon (Gurwitsch p. 1).

[3][165]—c) Clarification about the notion of the possible: the possibles (even of thought)[166] are possibles of the earth, of the *Weltmöglichkeit.*

The possible is the openness of the *Umwelt* and not a system of logical Being (*Unendlichkeit* <"infinity">) in which we would be set up through idealization.

[2] a) Space-time, historicity to be reconceived on the basis of this bond.

The foundation of the unity of history is the uniqueness of the Earth.

From the earth to my body and to the bodies of others—and to egos.

My body also on this side of the object, on this side of motion and of rest, the *anderes ich* also,—although I can objectify it as a *Körper,*—possesses the same capacity toward me,—we are simultaneously: I am for the others the same as I am for me insofar as I am nonobjectivatable.

Presentation to the other of the *Nichturpräsentierbar.*

The homogenization, the universal reduction to the *Körper* is founded on the *ich gehe* <"I am walking"> as a dimension of animality, as the comprehensive principle of "flight," and therefore remaining true underneath objectification. One can change the place of *Boden,* but not suppress it. Every other planet is earth.

4—The earth as "Noah's Ark" = bearing the living and the thoughts above the Flood (= it is not the physical earth. It is the earth as a mass,

inertia and flying beneath all of us) (barbarous principle)—That makes ontology enveloping in relation to the thought of the infinite. Ontology of the *Offenheit.*

Is this spectacle constituting consciousness and its objects?

**(BN 45) "MP Husserl 20"**

May 7–9, 1934. *Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre in der Gewöhnlichen weltanschaulichen Interpretation—die Ur-Arche Erde bewegt sich nicht.*

1. The Earth that the Copernican man forgets: for him, the earth is a spherical *Körper,* like the stars, in an infinite space.

For us, it is not *Körper,* but *Erfahrungsboden* <"ground of experience">.

= *der große Klotz*[167] (the block) upon which the *Körper* rest.

—cf. ultra-things (like the stars) . . . "wie kann sie sich als 'ganze' bewegen, sie ist das denkbar? Nichts als ob sie fest angegeschmiedet wäre—dafür fehlte der 'Boden.' Hat Bewegung, also Körperlickeit für sie einen Sinn? Ist also ihr Ort im Allraum wirklich ein 'Ort' für sie? <"but how can it move as a 'whole'? How is that conceivable? It is not as though it were firmly attached—the 'ground' is lacking for that. Does motion, hence corporeality, make sense for the earth? Is its location in the totality of space actually a 'location' for it?" Farber 314>.

Die 'Erde' als der einheitliche Erdboden kann nicht in dem Sinne ruhend und somit nicht in dem Sinne als ein Körper erfahren werden wie eben ein 'Körper,' der nicht nur seine Extension hat und seine Qualifizierung, sondern auch im Raume seinen 'Ort,' aber als seinen Ort möglicherweise wechselnd und ruhend oder bewegt. Solange ich keine Vorstellung habe von einem neuen Boden, als einem solchen, von wo aus die Erde im zusammenhängenden und in sich zurückführenden Gehen als ein geschlossener Körper in Bewegung und Ruhe Sinn haben kann, und solange ich keine Vorstellung gewinne von einem Austausch der Böden und einem dadurch zum Körper Werden beider Böden, solange ist eben die Erde selbst Boden, aber kein Körper (Gurwitsch 8) <"The 'earth' as the unitary earth-ground cannot be experienced in the sense of being at rest and therefore cannot be experienced in the sense of a body, if 'a' body not only has extension and qualification but also its 'place' in space, as a place susceptible of change, of moving and being at rest. As long as I do not have a representation of a new ground as such, on the basis of which the earth can have in its coherent and circular orbit the sense as a self-contained body in motion and at rest, and as long as I have not acquired a representation of an exchange of grounds such

that both grounds become bodies, to that extent just the earth itself is really the ground and not a body," Farber 313>. We will see later what happens when other *Boden* are taken as a reference point and when we attempt to relativize the other *Boden* (one *Boden* always still remains). For the moment, let us be content with noting the originality of the *Erdboden*.

There is one *Erdraum* (Gurwitsch 3): bodies move on the surface of the earth, relative to it; moreover, from it I detach *Körper* which are moving and which are at rest. But "Einen umgebenden Raum haben wir als Ortssystem—d.i. als System möglicher Enden von Körperbewegungen. Aber darin haben wohl alle irdischen Körper, aber nicht die Erde selbst eine jeweilige 'Stelle'." <"We have a surrounding space as a system of locations—i.e., as a system of possible terminations of motions of bodies. In that system all earthly bodies certainly have their particular 'place,' but not the earth itself." Farber 313> (Gurwitsch 9). [Even spatially, the earth is an encompassing being.]

2. The earth, the carnal bodies, the egos.

—These are not some "Kuriositäten der 'Raumanschauung' " <"curiosities of the 'intuition of space,' " Farber 314> (Gurwitsch 10).

It is a dimension of being, which we are going to see by developing the intentionalities implied in the *Boden:* we are going to see it get everything.

We will see then that this is not psychology but philosophy.[168]

We will see not only a sector of (psychological?) experience, but also a constitution of the Copernican world itself.

—The Earth and my body: upon the earth there is the *Außerkörper* <"external bodies"> (which are not "implicit parts" of the earth),—my body,—and the bodies of others.

First, my body: like the *Boden* and distinguished from *Körper* has no *Fortbewegung;* it has only *Innenbewegung* <"inner motion," Farber 314> (Gurwitsch 10): i.e., it does not move as things do (by taking the steps of a motion external to it). It moves only in itself: i.e., it being here and it being there are not two objective positions: the two positions are internal to it: my body does move in relation to me, as things do; it neither approaches nor moves away from me: in relation to my body things are said to approach or move away from me—My "ich gehe" is in relation to the "ground" and it is no more an objective motion than the ground is an objective restfulness. Even when "ich gehe," my body is still the *Zentrum* <"center"> for me (Gurwitsch 11). Its quasi-motion ("Kinesthesen") and

the pseudo-rest of the ground (its identity across the unfolding of "appearances") belong to the same type—And the very rest of the *Körper* that I see on the surface of the earth as well finally belongs to the same type: when I say that a body is at rest, it is the correlate of an *Erscheinungswandlung* <"change of appearance," Farber 316> of kinestheses; this rest is thought by me as the correlate of this *Erscheinungswandlung,* its contrary, therefore as kinesthetic rest (Gurwitsch 13)—cf. *Einfühlung* with bodies, which has the result that, when I am throwing some stones, I say that they are "flying."

—But then how am I going to get out of this pre-Copernican world? Through access to others—(Moreover, the others are already implicated in my experience of the Earth: through them, my horizon is enlarged to the size of the earth)—

The others as "anderen Leiber" <"other carnal bodies">—(Gurwitsch 10): in contrast to my body, they are *Körper:* they can approach or move away from me. And yet, they are "Leiber im 'ich bewege,' wobei das Ich 'anderes Ich' ist" <"carnal bodies in the form of 'I move,' in which the 'I' is 'another I,' " Farber 315> (Gurwitsch 11): that means (1) being among my group of *Körper,* they have things to do with the very *Körper* with which I have things to do (2) being *anderes Ich,* they turn me into a *Körper* just as I turn them into *Körper* (Gurwitsch 11). Therefore we have two universes of *Körper* which are unified and two subjects each of which is lived as *Leib* <"flesh"> and objectifies the other into *Körper.* But the identity goes farther: it is not only the identity of the universe of *Körper:* the text on p. 11 <that is, Gurwitsch 11, Farber 315> is difficult; it seems to mean:

(1) there is an identification among the "they," an identification of others among them since their *Leib* as well as their *Körper* is the same for each and for the others (2) thanks to the *Körper,* this identity envelops my *Leib* as well as my *Körper,* and thereby my *Leib* as *Leib* for my ego, and thereby my experience of my body. For each there is an *Urpräsentation* of what is for it *nichturpräsentierbar* (the lived *Leib*): therefore an identity not only through the same objective universe but also through the same body-world structure.

Now this is to be taken very generally: my corporeality is communicable—participatable, dimension—through my corporeality I can "verstehen" other bodies and in this way I can put my experience into relation with theirs. For example with animality: the bird: *sei angenommen, dass ich ein Vogel wäre und fliegen könnte* <"let us now assume that I am a bird and can fly," Farber 315> (Gurwitsch 11). More simply, I understand the bird

as a (gliding flight) variant of my *Ich gehe*. Thereby as an extension of my experience: cf. the train and the "Relative Bodenkörper"—or the airplane. Thereby relativization of the *Boden*—the earth stops being a "source"[169]—But then do we take another planet as the "source"? But we could conceive a reciprocal relativization of two planets. We would have

**(BN 46) "MP Husserl 21"**

then two earths: *Aber was heißt zwei Erden? Zwei Stücke einer Erde mit einer Menscheit* <"But what do two earths mean? Two fragments of one earth with one humanity," Farber 318> (Gurwitsch 14). The earth *Boden* can change its objective location but as *Boden* it is always invariable. We exchange *Boden* just as in *Einfühlung* we exchange our bodies: nevertheless, my body is for me the primordial body, of a "seinsinn" which is not the relativity.

Phenomenological experience: I am on a flying-machine; it is my *Boden*. One day I discover that it is not the true *Boden* (Gurwitsch 15). So be it. But then this is accepted in order to carry the *Boden* function back to somewhere else: it is first my Earth; then it is something else; but there is always one earth.

Therefore the earth is constituted simultaneously "mit Leiblichkeit und Körperkeit" (Gurwitsch 15) "Die Allheit des Wir, der Menschen, der 'Animalien' ist in diesem Sinne irdisch, und hat zunachst keinen Gegensatz in nicht-irdisch. Dieser Sinn ist verwurzelt und hat sein Orientierungszentrum in mir und einem engeren Wir mit einander Lebender" <"The totality of the We, of human beings, of "animals," is in this sense earthly—and at first is not opposed to the nonearthly. This sense is rooted and has its orientation center in me and in a narrower We who live with one another," Farber 318> (Gurwitsch 15). I can conceive that I am here on the moon, that it is my earth,—or on an airship. "Aber frage ich zufällig 'wie sind sie hinaufgekommen?'—so ähnlich wie ich bei einer neuen Insel, auf der ich Keilinschriften vorfinde, frage: wie sind die betreffenden Völker dahin gekommen? Alle Tiere, alle Lebenwesen, alles Seiende überhaupt hat Seinsinn nur vor meiner konstitutiven Genesis und diese 'irdische' geht voran. Ja ein Bruchstück Erde (wie eine Eisscholle) kann sich viellicht abgelöst haben, und das hat eine besondere Geschichtlichkeit ermöglicht. Aber nicht sagt das, dass ebensogut der Mond oder die Venus als Urstätten in Urtrennung[170] denkbar wären und es nur ein Faktum sei, dass für mich und unsere irdische Menschheit eben die Erde ist. Es gibt nur eine Menschheit und eine Erde—ihr gehören alle Bruchstücke an, die sich ablösen oder je abgelöst haben" <"But I ask, perhaps, 'how have they gotten there?'—then, just as similarly

in the case of a new island where cuneiform writing is found, I ask: How did the people in question come there? All animals, all living beings, all beings whatsoever, have ontic being only on the basis of my constitutive genesis and this has 'earthly' precedence. Indeed, a fragment of the earth (like an ice floe) may have become detached, and that has made a particular historicity possible. But that does not mean that the moon or Venus could not just as well be conceived as primordial homes in a primordial separation and that does not mean that the being of the earth is precisely only a fact for me and our terrestrial humanity. There is only one humanity and one earth—all the fragments which are or have been separated from it belong to it," Farber 324> (Gurwitsch 23).

3. Ontological scope of this analysis.

With the earth, body and intercorporeality, this analysis concerns the whole ontology: everywhere a new type of being is unconcealed: in the *Raumanschauung,* the *Zeitanschauung,* the *Naturkausalität,*[171] and even the concept of history. Copernicanism, the homogenization of all of what is external transformed into objects, the conception of the stars as objects and as possible *Boden,* of the earth as *Boden* which is a "simple fact," all of that is constructed upon (and would not be able to erase) my corporeal implantation in a territory-Homeland-Being; all of that is an idealization, superstructure, of the terrestrial relation to the ground and to terrestrial coexistence. That history has a sense, that it be unified, that it be a dimension, that: this rationality, is founded upon the preobjective relation among humans and upon the preobjective relation of humans to the earth. "Im Wechsel der Heimstätte verbleibt allgemein gesprochen dies (wenn Heimstätte den gewöhnlichen Sinn meines jeweiligen, einzelnen oder familienmässigen Territoriums hat), dass jedes Ich eine Urheimat hat—und diese gehört zu jedem Urvolk mit seinem Urterritorium. Aber jedes Volk und seine Historizität und jedes Uebervolk (Uebernation) ist selbst beheimatet letztlich natürlich auf der 'Erde,' und all Entwicklugen, alle relativen Historien haben insofern eine einzige Urhistorie, deren Episoden sie sind. Freilich ist es dabei möglich, dass diese Urhistorie ein Zusammen völlig getrennt lebender und sich entwickelnder Völker wäre, nur dass sie all füreinander im offen unbestimmten Erdraumhorizont liegen" <"In the change of homelands (if homeland has the ordinary sense of territory peculiar to individual or family in each case) there remains universally stated that each ego has a primordial home—and every primordial people with their primordial territory has a primordial home. But every people and their historicity and every super-people (a super-nation) are themselves ultimately made at home, naturally, on

the 'earth.' All developments, all relative histories have to that extent a single primordial history of which they are episodes. In that connection it is indeed possible that this primordial history would be a collection of people living and developing entirely by themselves, except that they all are held mutually within the open and indeterminate horizon of earthly space," Farber 319> (Gurwitsch 16).[172]

The ontological mutation: "die Welt in der Offenheit der Umwelt—in der gedanklich gesetzen Unendlichkeit. Sinn dieser Unendlichkeit—{'Welt in der Idealität der Unendlichkeit existierend.' Was ist der Sinn dieser Existenz, der seienden unendlichen Welt?} Die Offenheit als nicht vollkommen ausgedachte, vorstellig gemachte, aber implizit schon geformte Horizonthaftigkeit." <"the world in the openness of the surrounding world—posited conceptually as infinite. The sense of this infinity —'world existing in the ideality of infinity.' What is the sense of this existence, of the existing infinite world? The openness as horizonality that is not completely conceived, represented, but that is already implicitly formed." Farber 307> (Gurwitsch 1). It makes no sense to speak of a *leeren Weltraum, wie wir es in der schon unendlichen "astronomischen" Welt tun.* <"empty mundane space, as we speak of an empty, infinite 'astronomical' world." Farber 313> (Gurwitsch 9). This infinite being is supported by the *Offenheit* of the *Umwelt.* This *Umwelt* is the world—for us as carnal subjects, with the openness from which idealization will come. But, no matter what idealization comes about, it changes nothing in relation to the primacy of our carnal coexistence on one Earth. This Earth is *the arche*. i.e., the reserve from which all life, all future, all history can issue. [Noah's ark[173] was floating on the waters, i.e., what is outside of it, nothing that has a form (*Geformte*), similarly, the earth-body-ego dimension is floating upon the infinity of thought, which, in contrast to the water, assures every possibility of Being.

In reality, the dimension is upon Being: is the earth (and this dimension) *blossen Faktum* in opposition to logical and physical necessity, identical necessity, simple modality of what is possible in itself and which is *Unendlichkeit?*

Possibility is the horizon (*horizontmöglische Bewegung*—horizon of causality)—it is the openness—"Körper sind in wirklicher und möglicher Bewegung, und Möglichkeit immer offene Möglichkeit an Wirklichkeit, an Fortsetzung, an Richtungsveränderung, etc." <"Bodies are in actual and possible motion and there is the possibility of always open possibility within actuality, within continuation, within change of direction, etc." Farber 309> The possibility of having an experience of this or of that is

an actual "möglicherweise erfahren" <"experienced in the mode of possibility," Farber 309>; a modality of presence (Gurwitsch 4) the possibilities are "seiende Möglichkeiten" <"existing possibilities," Farber 309> which have their "anschauliche Ausweisung. Das haben sie als Modi, die zum Sein der Körper und der Körpermannigfaltigkeit gehören" <"intuitional demonstration. They have these as modes which belong to the being of bodies and the multiplicity of bodies," Farber 310>.

"In aller Fortbildung der Weltapperzeption muss Einheit einer 'Weltanschauung' die Weltmöglichkeit bewahren,—als dis Möglichkeit, und universum den offener Möglichkeiten, die einen Grundbestand der Wirklichkeit der Welt ausmacht." <"In all progressive formation of the apperception of the world, the unity of the 'intuition of the world' must confirm the possibility of the world—as *the* possibility and the universum of open possibilities which make up a fundamental composition of the world's actuality." Farber 310> The world is prefigured (*eingezeichnet*) {from?} our kernel of experience as a "Spielraum von Möglichkeiten" <"open range of possibilities," Farber 310>. The world is constituted "in einer Horizonthaftigkeit, in welcher das Seiende als wirklich in allzeit vorgezeichneten Seinmöglichkeiten konstituiert ist; vorgezeichnet ist die von der Ontologie nachher auf Begriffe und Urteile gebrachte, mit ihnen 'bedachte' Weltform" (Gurwitsch 4–5). <" . . . constituted according to a horizonality in which something existent is constituted as actual within the ontic possibilities prefigured at any time; the world is prefigured and is subsequently conceptualized and expressed in judgments by ontology; the form of the world is 'taken into consideration' along with its ontic possibilities," <Farber 310>. Even thoughts are "Denkmöglichkeiten" (Gurwitsch p. 9) <"possibilities of thinking," Farber 313>, i.e., carried by the kernel of open being.

**(BN 47)**

4. Conclusion.

All of this, this philosophical dimension of the *Umwelt* (or of the *Lebenswelt*),—of the world and of the mind before their correlative idealizations,—is really different from an idealism: it is the "constitutive genesis" which is first and in relation to which idealities are constituted.

And yet, in the end, Husserl presents it again within the frame of constitution as "Sinnengebung" (Gurwitsch 23) <Farber 324> as *transcendental* phenomenology. He says that it is paradoxical because it demonstrates a priority of life over the physical world. Now the world before man? The world without man if he is destroyed? Death? Answer: all of that

diminishes nothing of the constitutive certainties. No biology which is simply physical. Limited rights of Copernican homogenization. There is a paradox only if we first realize {in itself?} the universe of idealizations. Death would not prohibit that what has been could be, would not cut off the reference of the physical world to (past) human subjects: because this is implied in the thought that I form of a world without humans,[174] a place where humans are dead. This is not philosophical *hubris,* although this thought is "a little extravagant" and nearly "crazy."

Perhaps Husserl would evade the objection and the complaint of paradox, if he had not enclosed his own discovery in the dimension of the "consciousness" of the absolute Ego. "Welchen Sinn können die zusammenstürzenden Massen im Raum, in einem als absolut homogen und *a priori* vorangestellen Raum haben, wenn konstituierendes Leben weggestrichen wird? Ja hat selbst solches Wegstreichen nicht bloss Sinn, wenn überhaupt welchen, als Wegstreichen von und in konstituierender Subjektivität." <"What sense could the collapsing masses in space, in one space constructed *a priori* as absolutely homogeneous, have, if the constituting life were eliminated? Indeed, does not that elimination itself have the sense, if it has any at all, of an elimination of and in the constituting subjectivity?" Farber 325>. Doesn't his own analysis really obligate him to consider constituting subjectivity as an eminent case of idealization? What do the analyses demonstrating the simultaneity of the earth and *Körperlischkeit* mean, if then all of this is posterior to the constituting Ego? Problem of *Selbstung* (Fink); because he leaves next to one another (correlatively) the realist-causal order and the idealist-constituting order, Husserl is obligated to sustain this nearly "crazy paradox." One would have to take up the concrete relation of these two orders by turning both of them not into a physical world relative to the idealistic *Sinngebung,* but into two correlative aspects of Being.

The Earth which is first is not the physical earth (by definition, it is homogenized); it is the source Being, the *Stamm und Klotz* being, in prerestfulness; the mind which is first is not the absolute Ego of *Sinngebung.* It is the *Denkmöglichkeit* and they are *Ineinander,* entangled.[175]

## Notes

1. Translator's note. Victor Delbos, "Husserl—Sa critique du psychologisme et sa conception d'une logique pure," in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale,* 1911, pp. 685–98.

2. Translator's note. Apparently, from early in his career, Merleau-Ponty had access to a draft of Eugen Fink's *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*. See note 2 of the avant-propos to Merleau-Ponty's *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945); English translation by Colin Smith as *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). In 1988, Kluwer Academic Publishers published Fink's *Vi. Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 1,* edited by Hans Ebeling, Jann Holl, and Guy van Kerkhoven; English translation by Ronald Bruzina as *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

3. Translator's note. Eugen Fink, "L'analyse intentionnelle et le probleme de la pensée speculative," in *Problèmes actuels de la phénoménologie* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1952) p. 53.

4. Translator's note. Suzanne Bachelard, *La logique de Husserl: Étude sur logique formelle et logique transcendentale* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957); English translation by Lester Embree as *Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

5. Translator's note. This quoted phrase is in English in the original. Unlike the French phrase, "l'homme *que* j'aime," what is missing in the English phrase is the relative pronoun. See Merleau-Ponty's analysis of this phrase in "Le langage indirect et les voix du silence," in *Signes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), pp. 54–55; English translation by Richard C. McCleary as "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," in *Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 43.

6. Translator's note. Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* are based on two lectures given at the Sorbonne on February 23 and 25, 1929. The original French translation was prepared by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas in 1931 (Paris: Armand Colin). The German edition appeared in the first volume of *Husserliana* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950). The English translation by Dorian Cairns appeared in 1960 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).

7. Translator's note. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours, 1959–1961,* edited by Stéphanie Ménasé (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), pp. 46–47, for Merleau-Ponty's comments on Mallarmé's use of language.

8. Translator's note. Jean Beaufret was the author of the letter to which Heidegger responded with his famous "Letter on Humanism." He also wrote the preface to the French translation of Heidegger's *Vorträge und Aufsätze,* translated by A. Préau as *Essais et conférences* (Paris: Gallimard, 1958). See also Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours, 1959–1961,* p. 147.

9. Marginal note. This phenomenology, however, is always on the horizon because it is the will to exhaust the things themselves, which are inexhaustible. What makes it be already there—never there—is its radicalism, which gives way to an impassioned fermentation.

10. Translator's note. English translation from Martin Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason,* translated by Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 71. Here Merleau-Ponty provides Heidegger's German text (*Der Satz vom Grund* [Pfullingen: Neske, 1957], pp. 123–24): "Je grosser das Denkwerk eines Denkers ist, das sich keineswegs mit dem Umfang und der Anzahl seiner Schriften deckt, um so reicher ist das in diesem Denkwerk Ungedachte, d.h.

jenes, was erst und allein durch dieses Denkwerk als das Noch-nicht Gedachte heraufkommt." Merleau-Ponty translates this comment into French as follows: "Quand il s'agit de penser, plus grand est l'ouvrage fait, qui ne coïncide nullement avec l'étendue et le nombre des écrits. Plus riche est dans cet ouvrage, l'impensé, c'est-à-dire ce qui à travers cet ouvrage et par lui seul vient vers nous comme jamais encore pensé."

11. Translator's note. Martial Gueroult, *Descartes selon l'Ordre des Raison* (Paris: Aubier, 1953); English translation by Roger Ariew as *Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons,* 2 vols. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

12. Translator's note. For more on *Stiftung,* see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *La prose du monde* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 96; English translation by John O'Neill as *The Prose of the World* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 68.

13. Translator's note. This quote is an allusion to "Appendix IX" of Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology:* "Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection. The Reflection [Must Be] Historical. How Is History Required?" At the end of this fragment, Husserl speaks of a "*Dichtung* of the history of philosophy" (p. 394 of the English translation by David Carr [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970]). Merleau-Ponty renders "Dichtung" as "poésie," which I have rendered as "poetizing."

14. Translator's note. See p. *HUA* 382 of "The Origin of Geometry," below.

15. Translator's note. Cf. "Le philosophe et l'ombre," in Merleau-Ponty, *Signes,* p. 227; English translation, p. 180. Cf. below, BN 43.

16. Translator's note. At this point in the Course Notes, Merleau-Ponty provides the bibliographical information on "The Origin of Geometry." See the "Editor's Note" at the beginning of this volume.

17. Translator's note. For more on *Nachvollzug,* see Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception,* p. 208 n. 2; English translation, p. 179 n. 2.

18. Translator's note. Merleau-Ponty provides no bibliographical information on this text. See the "Editor's Note" at the beginning of this volume.

19. Crossed out. Unveiling of a *Tiefenleben* (philosophy of depths).

20. Translator's note. Paul Valéry, *Variétés* (Paris: Gallimard, 1926), "Introduction à la méthode de Léonardo de Vinci," dans *Notes et digression* (1919).

21. Editor's note. These are Merleau-Ponty's square brackets.

22. Marginal note. References to Husserl's use of the word *tiefe* on p. *HUA* 365.

23. Marginal note. From p. *HUA* 365: "tiefste Sinnesproblem heranfurhen" <"lead to the deepest problems of sense">; "Tiefenprobleme des Sinnesursprungs" <"depth-problem of the sense-origin">; "Tiefenprobleme" <"depth-problems">. Translator's note. Derrida renders these phrases as "conduiront vers les plus profonds problèmes de sens," problèmes de fond concernant l'origine de sens," "problèmes de fond," in his translation of Husserl's work; see *L'Origine de la géométrie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1962), p. 174. Hereafter abbreviated as *LOG.*

24. Marginal note. *Selbstbesinnung* = be = to give but also to have. *Sinnen* <"to reflect"> = sense but also reverie entailed by. . . . Understanding is made

out of the present (lived) situation and the present (lived) situation is what is understood. Translator's note. Derrida renders *Selbstbesinnung* ("self-reflection") as "prise de conscience" (*LOG* 174).

25. Marginal note. Hence the word "interest." Our thought is situated, interested, present. But this interest which limits our thought, our thought has not to forget it, because the interest is its relation to the universal. The interest contains a *Vorhabe* <"prepossession"> of the universal, though it does not yet possess it, though it does not survey it, though philosophy is to be done: the universal is its entelechy. *Wohin* <"whither">.

26. Marginal note. Horizontal and vertical, temporal and intemporal: there is an intemporal which works on the inside of time, which is, rather, omnitemporal.

27. Marginal note. *Dem ursprunglischsten Sinn, in welchem die Geometrie dereinst ge geworden ist* <"the most original sense in which geometry once arose">. (enveloping in relation to propositions). Translator's note. Derrida renders this phrase as "le sens le plus originaire selon lequel la géométrie est née un jour" (*LOG* 175).

28. Crossed out. This sense once established.

29. Marginal note. *da sein* presence of openness—where the established calls for what comes after and what comes after recreates the established = *Leben, Lebendiger* (*in lebendiger Fortarbeit* <"lively forward development">) "absolute life" = what has been can no longer not have been, temporal structure which is essential to the mind.

30. Marginal note. The *nicht wissen* is a *wissen*. The "non" implies (cf. Freud *Verneinung*) that we cross over this limit, that we have the dimension in question, that it is "at work" (*fungierend*) in us. Translator's note. See Sigmund Freud, "Negation," in *The Complete Works of Sigmund Freud,* vol. 19 (Toronto: Hogarth).

31. Marginal note. *Weltlichkeit des Geistes* <"spiritual worldhood">: insofar as preternatural, effect of *Leistung* <"accomplishment">. It gets known by means of my fellow-creatures, its "fellow-creatures": it has its body and its world which is *die Sprache* <"language">.

32. Marginal note. A determinate emptiness: a lack, a privation, a dimension (new type of intellectual existence).

33. Marginal note. The *fertig* <"ready-made"> ideality is carried by *Urstiftung-Nachstiftung-Endstiftung* <"pre-institution-re-institution-final institution">.

34. Translator's note. Derrida renders this phrase as "validité génerale inconditionée" (*LOG* 176).

35. Translator's note. The term *Sinnesursprung* does not occur on p. *HUA* 365 of the Husserl text, but there is "nach dem ursprunglichen Sinn," which Carr renders as "into the original meaning" and Derrida as "le sens originaire."

36. Translator's note. Derrida renders this expression as "être-là en personne" (*LOG* 178).

37. Translator's note. Derrida renders this as "un réal psychique" (*LOG* 184).

38. Translator's note. Derrida renders this phrase as "est comme re-vécu activement de part en part" (*LOG* 184).

39. Translator's note. Derrida renders this phrase as "la compréhension mutuelle de langage" (*LOG* 185).

40. Translator's note. Merleau-Ponty translates this passage as "même s'il n'a pas encore eté vécu en évidence par personne." Carr renders it as "even when no one has [consciously] realized them in self-evidence"; Derrida renders it as "même si personne ne l'a effectué dans l'évidence" (*LOG* 186).

41. Editor's note. These are Merleau-Ponty's square brackets.

42. Translator's note. Merleau-Ponty is referring to Heidegger's *Was Heisst Denken?* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954); English translation by J. Glenn Gray as *What Is Called Thinking?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

43. Editor's note. These are Merleau-Ponty's square brackets.

44. Translator's note. Carr translates this phrase as "the originally intuitive life which creates its originally self-evident structures through activities on the basis of sense-experience"; Derrida translates it as "la vie originairement intuitive qui, en des activités, crée sur le fondement de l'expérience sensible ses formations originairement évidentes" (*LOG* 187).

45. Editor's note. These are Merleau-Ponty's square brackets.

46. Translator's note. Carr translates this phrase as "the goal of reactivability"; Derrida translates it as "la fin assignée à la réactivabilité" (*LOG* 189).

47. Translator's note. Carr renders *Fortpflanzung* as "propagative process"; Derrida, like Merleau-Ponty, renders it as "propogation" (*LOG* 189).

48 . Translator's note. Apparently, Merleau-Ponty is referring to the original version of "The Origin of Geometry" published by Eugen Fink in 1939 (*Revue internationale de philosophie,* vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 203–25); p. 371 of the *Husserliana* volume corresponds roughly to p. 212 of Fink's version.

49. Editor's note. These are Merleau-Ponty's square brackets.

50. Editor's note. These are Merleau-Ponty's square brackets.

51. Translator's note. Here Merleau-Ponty seems to be describing the last paragraph of p. *HUA* 373.

52. Marginal note. History flows neither from the past nor to the future alone: it reverses its course and, when you get right down to it, it flows from all the presents.

53. Crossed out. Nor either in the thought that we who are looking for it have.

54. Translator's note. Derrida translates this passage as "selon lequel, pour la première fois, elle est entrée dans l'histoire—doit y être entrée" (*LOG* 175).

55. Marginal note. Landmarks, not facts which are to be dealt with inductively.

56. Marginal note. Internally, I who learn it.

57. Translator's note. Derrida translates this phrase as "une genèse spirituelle" (*LOG* 176).

58. Marginal note. Trace: presence of an absent: experience of an absence.

59. Translator's note. Compare this comment to the following from p. 400 of Merleau-Ponty's *Phénoménologie de la perception,* pp. 347–48 of the 1981 English translation: "Each one [that is, cultural objects] spreads around it an atmosphere of humanity which may be determinate in a low degree, in the case of a few footmarks [*quelques traces de pas*]. . . ."

60. Marginal note. Open and empty dimension.

61. Translator's note. See Freud, "Negation," in *The Complete Works of Sigmund Freud,* vol. 19. See also Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy,* translated by Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 397–98, for an explanation of this term. Inspired by Merleau-Ponty, this book is useful for understanding Merleau-Ponty's comments about psychoanalysis.

62. Marginal note. Fink <p. 209 of Fink's version>: *Sinngebilde in de Seinsart der Gewordenheit aus einem subjektiven Leisten werden Originar 'erfaßt' im aktiven sinnlebe-den? Erzeugen des Sinnes:* the historicity synonymous with active production, what I produce truly in an active way is in principle historic, i.e., others can participate in it and it participates in other productivities.

63. Marginal note. *Eine offene Generationskette miteinander and füreinander Arbeit-ender, ob bekannter oder unbekannter Forscher, als der für gesamte lebendige Wis- senschaft leistenden Subjektivität* <"an open chain of the generations of those who work for and with one another, researchers either known or unknown to one another who are the accomplishing subjectivity of the whole living science"> (p. *HUA* 367). Translator's note. Derrida translates this phrase as "une chaîne ouverte de générations de chercheurs connus ou inconnus, travaillant les uns avec les autres et les uns pour les autres, en tant qu'ils constituent, pour la totalité de la science vivante, la subjectivité productrice" (*LOG* 177).

64. Marginal note. Analysis done in *The Crisis.*

65. Translator's note. Derrida translates this phrase as "C'est en tant qu'issu de la tradition ques le monde de la culture est là, dans sa totalité et sous toutes ses formes" (*LOG* 176).

66. Translator's note. Merleau-Ponty had first written "1—possible—2—necessary."

67. Marginal note. The essence of geometry is now a *bleibende Seinsart* <"persisting manner of being"> (p. *HUA* 367): Integrative *Beweglichkeit* and *geometrischer Zukunft* <"mobility and geometrical future"> (p. *HUA* 367). It is rather an inner framework, the *Fließende Wesen* itself (*Experience and Judgment*). Is there an *unbedingte Allgemeingültigkeit*? A transparency of ideality? Is total reactivation possible? Is sedimentation reversible? Isn't what defines idealization something which renders sedimentation (1) superfluous, (2) impossible? There are steps which thought takes, a mathematical *praxis* which "knocks about from side to side" (Galois), a blind consideration of mathematical beings which cannot be surmounted in certified? transcendental history. Translator's note. Evariste Galois, French mathematician of the early nineteenth century. See E. Galois, *Oeuvres mathematiques* (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1897). See also Jules Vuillemin, *La philosophie de l'algebra* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), pp. 222–300, for a discussion of Galois's theory.

68. Translator's note. At this point in the notes, Merleau-Ponty lists a series of texts to be considered: "p. *HUA* 367, ligne 40 (y incorporer la phrase de Fink) p. *HUA* 369, ligne 10 (j'ai explique dans commentaire p. *HUA* 366 ligne 42—p. *HUA* 367 L. 40)."

69. Marginal note. There is no conservation in the Hegelian sense (because of forgetfulness) and there is no overcoming in the Hegelian sense (because of *Urstiftung*). And the *Urstiftung* and forgetfulness join back up with themselves

in a way different from Hegel's conservation and overcoming, different from a conservation in and an overcoming into absolute consciousness.

70. Translator's note. At this point, Merleau-Ponty writes, "(3) Traduction de p. *HUA* 367, L 40 à *HUA* 369, L 16." This translation occupies page BN 17 of the sheets. The commentary which follows addresses these passages.

71. Marginal note. Ideality is supported by speech. *Der weiteste Begriff der Literature* <"the broadest concept of literature">.

72. Marginal note. *Zu ihrem objektiven Sein gehort es* <"it belongs to their objective being"> (p. *HUA* 368 n. 2).

73. Editor's note. This is Merleau-Ponty's square bracket.

74. Marginal note. There is only one word "lion," like one Pythagorean theorem, the latter is historical like language.

75. Editor's note. This is Merleau-Ponty's square bracket.

76. Editor's note. This is Merleau-Ponty's square bracket.

77. Editor's note. This is Merleau-Ponty's square bracket.

78. Marginal note. The emergence of language is the solution because language itself has a double existence: *in ihrer idealen und durch Außerung, Dokumentierung begründeten Existenz in der realen Welt*. Translator's note. This passage is from p. *HUA* 369. Merleau-Ponty adds this translation of it: "dans son existence ideale et fondee dans le monde real par l'expression, par la consignation." Derrida translates it the same way (*LOG* 181). The English translation is: "in its ideal existence and its existence in the real world grounded in expression and documentation."

79. At this point, Merleau-Ponty writes, "p. *HUA* 369, L 17 à *HUA* 370, L 12. Traduction." This translation is on p. BN 20 of the sheets; Merleau-Ponty numbers it as "9."

80. Marginal note. It is Kant's idea: only space limits space, but truly grasped in the experience (not the fraudulent identification of the form of intuition and formal intuition, i.e., space of surveying), but truly openness to the space where we are.

81. Marginal note. P. *HUA* 369.

82. Marginal note. The horizon is not only distance; it is the *Außenhorizont* <"external horizon">. In fact, there is a horizon of the near and a horizon within my body. Horizon = new Being.

83. Crossed out. And when I take account of myself and see myself, *Menscheit uberhaupt* <"humanity in general">.

84. Marginal note. P. *HUA* 369.

85. Marginal note. *Seine Mitmenscheit und, sich selbst immer zurechnend, die Menscheit uberhaupt* <"his cohumanity and, always counting himself, humanity in general">. Translator's note. Derrida translates this phrase as "tout le monde, et il a, s'y comptant toujours lui-même, l'humanité en general" (*LOG* 182).

86. Translator's note. The phrase "incomparable monster" refers to Malraux's novel *Man's Fate* (New York: Random House, 1934), pp. 49–50. My thanks to Ted Toadvine for deciphering this reference.

87. Marginal note. There is a description of this dialectic in Fink's *Sixth*

*Meditation*. But, for Husserl, this is not a dialectic in the sense of acting, deception, disguise, contradiction.

88. Marginal note. Tragi-comedy of consciousness and being, unhappy consciousness, becomes in Husserl, through horizon, not the ruse of being which escapes from consciousness, but *Offenheit:* neither finite nor infinite, nothing justifying finitude (Hegel): open.

89. Translator's note. At this point, Merleau-Ponty writes "Traduction. P. *HUA* 369, L 36, p. *HUA* 370, L 12." This translation is on page BN 23 of the sheets, which Merleau-Ponty numbers as "10."

90. Editor's note. This is a complementary sheet added to "MP 10."

91. Crossed out. To express.

92. Marginal note. The discovery through variation of the invariant is not a passage to positive essence, in the classical sense of being opposed to existence.

93. Translator's note. Derrida renders this phrase as "l'immense étendue de ses consignations, comme communications virtuelles, que l'horizon d'humanité peut être celui d'une infinité ouverte, comme il l'est toujours pour les hommes" (*LOG* 182).

94. Marginal note. We put language to the side and we see what it involves.

95. Marginal note. It is not a quiddity; it is a flap of indissociable experience.

96. Here Merleau-Ponty reproduces an extended passage from Martin Heidegger's essay "Die Sprache," in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Stuttgart: Neske, 1959), pp. 12–13; English translation by Albert Hofstadter as "Language" in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 190–92.

Hofstadter's English translation is as follows: "To discuss language means to bring to its place of being not so much language as ourselves: our gathering into the appropriation.

"We would reflect on language itself, and on language only. Language itself is and nothing else besides. Language itself is language. The understanding that is schooled in logic, thinking of everything in terms of calculation and hence usually overbearing, calls this proposition an empty tautology. Merely to say the identical thing twice—language is language—how is that supposed to get us anywhere? But we do not want to get anywhere. We would like only, for once, to get to just where we are already.

"This is why we ponder the question, 'What about language itself?' This is why we ask, 'In what way does language occur as language?' We answer: *Language speaks*. Is this, seriously, an answer? Presumably—that is, when it becomes clear what speaking is.

"To reflect on language thus demands that we enter into the speaking of language in order to take up our stay with language, i.e., within *its* speaking, not within our own. Only in this way do we arrive at the region within which it may happen—or also fail to happen—that language will call to us from there and grant us its nature. We leave the speaking to language. We do not wish to ground language in something else that is not language itself, nor do we wish to explain other things by means of language.

"On the tenth of August, 1784 Hamann wrote to Herder (*Hamanns Schriften,* ed. Roth, VII, pp. 151 ff.):

> If I were as eloquent as Demosthenes I would yet have to do nothing more than repeat a single word three times: reason is language, *logos.* I gnaw at this marrow-bone and will gnaw myself to death over it. There still remains a darkness, always, over this depth for me; I am still waiting for an apocalyptic angel with a key to this abyss.

"For Hamann, this abyss consists in the fact that reason is language. Hamann returns to language in his attempt to say what reason is. His glance, aimed at reason, falls into the depths of an abyss. Does this abyss consist only in the fact that reason resides in language, or is language itself the abyss? We speak of an abyss where the ground falls away and a ground is lacking to us, where we seek the ground and set out to arrive at a ground, to get to the bottom of something. But we do not ask now what reason may be; here we reflect immediately on language and take as our main clue the curious statement, 'Language is language.' This statement does not lead us to something else in which language is grounded. Nor does it say anything about whether language itself may be a ground for something else. The sentence, 'Language is language,' leaves us to hover over the abyss as long as we endure what it says. 'Language is—language.' Language speaks. If we let ourselves fall into the abyss denoted by this sentence, we do not go tumbling into emptiness. We fall upward, to a height. Its loftiness opens up a depth. The two span a realm in which we would like to become at home, so as to find a residence, a dwelling place for the life of man."

97. Translator's note. At this point, Merleau-Ponty inserts: "On ne peut que répéter" <"one can only repeat">.

98. Crossed out. It means that the objective world is human in an <u>immanent</u> way and that man is speaking in an <u>immanent</u> way.

99. Marginal note. The man of language and not the language of man.

100. Crossed out. This does not stop language from being able to be objectified through reflection, from being perceived then as itself being (like the human horizon) enveloped in the world. For which we do not substitute a mysticism of language for reflection. But . . .

101. Marginal note. World-language-man.

102. Marginal note. Because of claimed identification of contraries, Hegel's destruction-realization which makes the <u>circle</u> and the dialectic <u>disappear</u>, into the positively rational, new logic. Crossed out. Vicious circle.

103. Translator's note. The commentary which follows concerns three fragments from pp. *HUA* 370–71 of "The Origin of Geometry"; the commentary was written in the margin of Merleau-Ponty's translation of the three fragments.

104. Translator's note. The word "gehört" is found in p. *HUA* 370 line 35; and it is found in the following English translation: "To the passivity of what is at first obscurely awakened and what perhaps emerges with greater and greater clarity there belongs the possible activity of a recollection in which the past experiencing [*Erleben*] is lived through in a quasi-new and quasi-active way."

105. Crossed out. Where does this ideal being come from?

106. Crossed out. To the relation.

107. Crossed out. To language. Translator's note. The sentence was to have read: "provided that we apply it to the self-other relation and to language."

108. Crossed out. Beginning over.

109. Crossed out. Husserl has a problem with the emergence of language because he guesses that behind the things said there is an archeology of things said, because the things said are not behind, because they refer to something primordial. Philosophy does not set itself up in the immanence of language [marginal note. "the semantics of the British"]: would like to be the language of the things themselves and not a compartment of "things said." Investigation which is not resistance to language: (return to the immediate): rather discovery of its ontological part:

1. What is before it is prelanguage: "the pure expression of its own sense" (*Cartesian Meditations,* paragraph 16).

2. It itself is a layer of Being, transforms everything, opening the universe of *Dinge,* coextensive being in *Welt.*

3.

110. Translator's note. The word used here is *feuillet,* "leaf," as in the leaf of a book, a piece of paper. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 157; English translation by Alphonso Lingis as *The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 117.

111. Marginal note. We are led to discover already, in passive time, the characteristic structures of the time of culture: tradition as forgetfulness, remembering.

112. Crossed out. Simultaneous.

113. Crossed out. Of passive lived experiences and.

114. Marginal note. Passive thought which *auftaucht* <"emerges">, which is awoken.

115. Written below the sentence. One and many?

116. Marginal note. If we believe that the problem of temporality of the ego is easier and less radical, this is to prejudge on the basis of our notion of the subject: we believe that it is obvious; we do not see the intersubjectivity.

117. Crossed out. (Like that of *Mensch* and of *Welt*).

118. Crossed out. Language.

119. Marginal note. The "behavior," the words of others are quasi *erlebt* (with the help of available meanings—for I have not passed through there, through the life of others—but ontic language, "nameable," makes a horizon which gives to me the thought of others as something in principle nameable). This gives birth to an *Erzeugung* in the invisible. And the coupling of this passivity and of this activity:

120. Crossed out. Operative speech is a particular case of one general power of speech, the *Einfühlung* of one human, general atmosphere—but also they charge the horizon or atmosphere; they are the *Gegenwart-dimension,* originary speech and secondary speech and not a simple factual present.

121. Marginal note. We know moreover that historicity is not only for the *Gebilde,* for external accomplishments; they are not only causally historical. They are historical in principle because of their "weakness," insofar as they are an *Erzeugung.* Likewise, ideality is not drawn from language causally.

122. Marginal note. *Verflechtung* speech—thought and then me-others—to understand is to speak in others—*nachsprechen*—to speak is to hear oneself and understand oneself as if from the outside. Ideality is the principle of these substitutions, of these equivalencies. Each is two sides of the wall. Ideality = the axes of this historical community, of this chiasm—the hollow, the divergence in relation to the same Being.

123. Crossed out. Heidegger. *Erörtern*

*Ort Ereignis*

to place ourselves at the point or at the moment when we speak in order to discover the (verbal) *Wesen:* speech speaks and tells us its *Wesen.*

The *Sprach Abgrund:* neither founded nor founding [for "thought"]

The vertical *Sprache,* openness, nonfall or fall toward the height.

World of the *Tiefe,* of the vertical.

Is that philosophy or silence?

It is not extra-philosophical.

It is philosophy, but which does not say anything other than experience, not speculation.

124. Editor's note. We are leaving this preparatory page just as it is, which is copied over from the original German of the following text: Eugen Fink, "Die Spätphilosophie Husserls in der Freiburger Zeit" (1959), collected in *Nähe und Distanz* (Alber-Broschur Philosophie), pp. 113–14.

125. Editor's note. Fink, "Die Spätphilosophie Husserls," p. 224. In the margin of his copy of this essay, Merleau-Ponty translates: "concepts de perplexité" <"perplexity concepts"> and "concepts de mauvais augure" <"ominous concepts">. In this essay, Fink says that for Husserl these concepts are ones that come about due to embarrassment in the face of philosophical limit situations.

126. Editor's note. What follows is essentially notes based on Heidegger's text from his essay "Language," quoted earlier.

127. Translator's note. Apparently, Merleau-Ponty was using the 1958 French translation of Heidegger's *Einführung in die Metaphysik* by Gilbert Kahn (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), who translated "Seyn" as "ester" and "Wesen" as "essance." In his glossary for the translation (p. 225), Kahn says, "wesen: ester, se réaliser historialement comme essence, sans donc que celle-ci soit donnée hors du temps comme modèle pour cette réalisation." The term "ester," it seems, is a neologism manufactured on the basis of the Latin *stare,* which is the infinitive "to be," in the active sense of realization. It would be used to denote the being of a contingent, spatiotemporal property such as tiredness. Although clumsy, in English one would say "I am being tired," in order to indicate that this condition is an ongoing event. My thanks to Renaud Barbaras for clarifying this neologism. See also Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible,* p. 256; English translation, p. 203, where Merleau-Ponty also speaks of "ester."

128. Translator's note. Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1952), pp. 25–27; English translation by Ralph Mannheim as *Introduction to Metaphysics* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 27–29. See also Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible,* p. 154 n. 1; English translation, p. 115 n. 2; and Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours, 1959–1961,* p. 105.

129. Translator's note. Here I am using the English convention of translating Heidegger's "Seyn" with "Beyng." See, for instance, William McNeill's English translation of Heidegger's *Pathmarks* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). I am also following the English convention of capitalizing "Being" for Heidegger's "Sein" or "Seyn"—in these Notes Merleau-Ponty himself capitalized "l'Être")—since this capitalization seems justified by Heidegger himself, who in "The Letter on Humanism" says: "Denken ist l'engagement par l'Être pour l'Être" (p. 310 of *Wegmarken* [Frankfurt am Main: Klosterman, 1967]; p. 239 of the English translation). Here, in communicating with Beaufret, Heidegger himself capitalizes "l'Être."

130. Marginal note. Cf. p. *HUA* 371, where language appears as "constitutive" of ideality.

131. Translator's note. *Husserliana VI* is *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.*

132. Translator's note. This is an allusion to Merleau-Ponty's 1958–59 course "La philosophie aujourd-hui," in *Notes de cours, 1959–1961.*

133. Editor's note. Here Merleau-Ponty provides French translations of that portion of Heidegger's essay "Die Sprache" (in *Unterwegs zur Sprache,* pp. 12–13; English translation "Language," in *Poetry, Language, Thought,* pp. 190–92) which he has already quoted in the original German above. What follows now is a commentary on these two pages.

134. Editor's note. See BN 25.

135. Marginal note. *Die Bedenklichkeit ist daß wir noch nicht denken. Was heißt denken?* <"What requires thought is that we still don't think.">

136. Translator's note. This comment on Heraclitus alludes to Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences,* p. 170 (paragraph 49). See also Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours, 1959–1961,* p. 84.

137. Marginal note. And one must not say: let's go straight to Heidegger.

138. Crossed out. of *Einfühlung.*

139. Translator's note. Merleau-Ponty's dating: March 21, 1960.

140. Translator's note. Here Merleau-Ponty provides a translation of the indicated pages from the *Husserliana* version of "The Origin of Geometry."

141. Crossed out. But when there has never been *Einfühlung,* what is it the ideal Being of? It is then carried by *Sprache,* by man as *sprechende Wesen,* by language as openness of a field of the nameable which is universal.

142. Editor's note. These are Merleau-Ponty's square brackets.

143. Translator's note. *Grimoire* means a book of spells or incantations.

144. Editor's note. The passage between these square brackets replaced a crossed-out passage.

145. Marginal note. This is said in the following pages p. *HUA* 372.

146. Marginal note. (1): "logic"—technique.

147. Translator's note. Here Merleau-Ponty provides his translation of pp. *HUA* 370–72.

148. Translator's note. Merleau-Ponty is again referring to the original version of "The Origin of Geometry" published by Eugen Fink in 1939 in the *Revue internationale de philosophie,* vol. 1, no. 2; p. 375 of the *Husserliana* version corresponds roughly to pp. 215–16 of this original version.

149. Editor's note. For these pages, Merleau-Ponty notes some words.

150. Editor's note. What is said in these pages justifies that the sheet numbered "19" by Merleau-Ponty precedes here the sheet numbered "18 addendum," which is more detailed and refers to the commentary that follows concerning the "Umsturz" text.

151. Marginal note. "*Idealisierung:* the ability to reactivate is itself *tradiert* (: language has speech).

152. Marginal note. → In order to guarantee the validity of ideality, it is necessary, since total reactivation does not work, the reactivation of *Uridealitäten,* the reactivation of procedures which have opened this field to philosophy as the return to the *Lebenswelt,* to the *Sinnesquellen.*

153. Translator's note. Merleau-Ponty is referring to the period when Husserl published *Ideas I,* around 1913.

154. Marginal note. It is history as *universalen Fragehorizont* (*HUA* 382)—dimension where we pose the historical, particular questions. The *Auslegung* <"interpretation"> of this horizon or eidetic variation: the "invariant" brought to the surface. "als das in strömend lebendingen Horizont ständig impiziert Wesen" (HUA *383*) <"as the essence constantly implied in the flowing, vital horizon">.

155. Translator's note. Merleau-Ponty is again referring to the original version of "The Origin of Geometry" published by Fink in 1939. In Fink's version (p. 219), when Husserl is speaking of "the total problem of universal historicity," he also says "es wird zur Frage de Philosophie" ("it comes to the question of philosophy").

156. Translator's note. In Fink's original version, this phrase occurs on p. 221 (which roughly corresponds to p. 381 of the *Husserliana* version): "the concealed 'reason in history'."

157. Marginal note. It is (p. *HUA* 384) *Horizont einer offenen Unendlichkeit* that *Umsturz* will oppose to Cartesian *Unendlichkeit.*

158. Marginal note. The *Book.*

159. Translator's note. Cf. "Le philosophe et l'ombre," in Merleau-Ponty, *Signes,* p. 227; English translation, p. 180.

160. Translator's note. Merleau-Ponty's quote comes from Fink's original version, p. 215 (which corresponds roughly to p. 375 of the *Husserliana* version): " . . . Sinnenbildungstraditions. Wo Reaktivierung im ersten Sinn zu Ende ist, an ihr Ziel kommt, beginnt überhaupt erst die Reaktivierung der Rückfrage in die "Urstiftung." English translation: " . . . tradition of the formation of sense. Where reactivation of the first sense is at the end, arrives at its goal, reactivation as return-inquiry into the primal institution first begins in general."

161. Translator's note. This is a reference to Merleau-Ponty's course "La philosophie aujourd'hui," in *Notes de cours, 1959–1961;* see particularly pp. 84–85.

162. Translator's note. Compare these comments on the "Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre" (i.e., "Foundational Investigations") text with those Merleau-Ponty made in the nature courses; see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *La nature, notes, cours de Collège de France,* edited by Dominique Séglard (Paris: Seuil, 1995), pp. 110–14.

163. Translator's note. A quotation from the original German version of Husserl's "Foundational Investigations," published in 1940 by Marvin Farber in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl* (Greenwood, 1968), p. 312. Hereafter designated in the text as "Farber." Merleau-Ponty's ensuing references to "Gurwitsch" are to page numbers of an unpublished version of the "Foundational Investigations" given to him by Aron Gurwitsch. Hereafter referred to as "Gurwitsch."

164. Editor's note. These are Merleau-Ponty's square brackets.

165. Editor's note. The order adopted here is that of Merleau-Ponty's first notes.

166. Marginal note. *Denkmöglichkeiten.*

167. Marginal note. Cf. p. 23 [that is, Gurwitsch p. 23]: Freilich nicht so, dass sie im Raume ruht, obschon sie sich bewegen konnte, sondern wie es oben darzustellen versuchten: sie ist die Arche, die erst den Sinn aller Bewegung ermoglicht und aller Ruhe als Modus einer Bewegung. Ihr Ruhen aber ist kein Modus einer Bewegung." English translation: "It is certainly not so that it moves in space, although it could move, but rather as we tried to show above: the earth is the ark which makes possible in the first place the sense of all movement and all rest as mode of movement. But its rest is not a mode of movement" (Farber 324).

168. Marginal note. "dem nun wieder fungierenden ruhenden Erdboden" <"to the earth now operating again as a resting earth-ground," Farber 312>: relation to <u>operative</u> intentionality: it is now invoked to enact not only our temporal, or speaking, being, but the external being.

169. Marginal note. *Stamm-Boden.*

170. Marginal note. Without being separated from the "source being."

171. Marginal note. All of that goes together *Miteinander,* hand in hand (3) <Farber 309>.

172. Marginal note. Cf. Heidegger: conceiving the relation to Being through the relation to dwelling.

173. Editor's note. This is Merleau-Ponty's square bracket.

174. Marginal note. The ideal suppression of the constituting life is itself an act of constituting life.

175. Editor's note. There are three final sheets which we did not reproduce here, since they constitute a recapitulation of the "Umsturz." Translator's note. For an explanation of Husserl's difficult later concept of *Stamm,* see Anthony Steinbock, *Home and Beyond* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995), p. 194.

PART 2

# "THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY" AND RELATED TEXTS

Edmund Husserl

3

# The Origin of Geometry

Translated by David Carr

[*HUA* 365] The interest that propels us in this work makes it necessary to engage first of all in reflections which surely never occurred to Galileo. We must focus our gaze not merely upon the ready-made, handed-down geometry and upon the manner of being which its sense had in his thinking; it was no different in his thinking from what it was in that of all the late inheritors of the older geometric wisdom, whenever they were at work, either as pure geometers or as making practical applications of geometry. Rather, indeed above all, we must also inquire back into the original sense of the handed-down geometry, which continued to be valid with this very same sense—continued and at the same time was developed further, remaining simply "geometry" in all its new forms. Our considerations will necessarily lead to the deepest problems of sense, problems of science and of the history of science in general, and indeed in the end to problems of a universal history in general; so that our problems and expositions concerning Galilean geometry take on an exemplary significance.

Let it be noted in advance that, in the midst of our historical meditations on modern philosophy, there appears here for the first time with Galileo, through the disclosure of the depth-problems of the sense-origin of geometry and, founded on this, of the sense-origin of his new physics, a clarifying light for our whole undertaking: namely, the idea of seeking to carry out, in the form of historical meditations, self-reflections about our own present philosophical situation in the hope that in this way we can finally take possession of the sense, method, and beginning of philosophy, the *one* philosophy to which our life seeks to be and ought to be devoted. For, as will become evident here, at first in connection with one example, our investigations are historical in an unusual sense, namely, in virtue of a thematic direction which opens up depth-problems quite

unknown to ordinary history, problems which, however, in their own way, are undoubtedly historical problems. Where a consistent pursuit of these depth-problems leads can naturally not yet be seen at the beginning.

The question of the origin of geometry (under which title here, for the sake of brevity, we include all disciplines that deal with [*HUA* 366] shapes existing mathematically in pure space-time) shall not be considered here as the philological-historical question, i.e., as the search for the first geometers who actually uttered pure geometrical propositions, proofs, theories, or for the particular propositions they discovered, or the like. Rather than this, our interest shall be the inquiry back into the most original sense in which geometry once arose, was present as the tradition of millennia, is still present for us, and is still being worked on in a lively forward development;[1] we inquire into that sense in which it appeared in history for the first time—in which it had to appear, even though we know nothing of the first creators and are not even asking after them. Starting from what we know, from our geometry, or rather from the older handed-down forms (such as Euclidean geometry), there is a regressive inquiry <*Ruckfrage*> into the submerged original beginnings of geometry as they necessarily must have been in their "primally instituting" function <*urstiftende*>. This regressive inquiry unavoidably remains within the sphere of generalities, but, as we shall soon see, these are generalities which can be richly explicated, with prescribed possibilities of arriving at particular questions and self-evident claims as answers. The geometry which is ready-made, so to speak, from which the regressive inquiry begins, is a tradition. Our human existence moves within innumerable traditions. The whole cultural world, in all its forms, exists through tradition. These forms have arisen as such not merely causally; we also know already that tradition is precisely tradition, having arisen within our human space through human activity, i.e., spiritually, even though we generally know nothing, or as good as nothing, of the particular provenance and of the spiritual source that brought it about. And yet there lies in this nonknowledge <*Nichtwissen*>, everywhere and essentially, an implicit knowledge, which can thus also be made explicit, a knowledge of unassailable self-evidence. It begins with superficial commonplaces, such as: that everything traditional has arisen out of human production <*Leistung*>, that accordingly past humans and human civilizations existed, and among them their first inventors, who shaped the new out of materials at hand, whether raw or already spiritually shaped. From the superficial, however, one is led into the depths. Tradition is open in this general way to continued inquiry; and, if one consistently maintains the direction of inquiry, an infinity <*Unendlichkeit*> of questions opens up, questions which lead to definite answers in accord with their sense. Their form of generality—

indeed, as one can see, of unconditioned general validity—naturally allows for application to individually determined particular cases, though it determines only that in the individual that can be grasped through subsumption.

Let us begin, then, in connection with geometry, with the most obvious commonplaces that we have already expressed above in order to indicate the sense of our regressive inquiry. We understand our geometry, available to us [*HUA* 367] through tradition (we have learned it, and so have our teachers), to be a total acquisition of spiritual productions which grows through the continued work of new spiritual acts into new acquisitions. We know of its handed-down, earlier forms, as those from which it has arisen; but with every form the reference to an earlier one is repeated. Clearly, then, geometry must have arisen out of a *first* acquisition, out of first creative activities. We understand its persisting mode of being: it is not only a mobile forward process from one set of acquisitions to another but a continuous synthesis in which all acquisitions maintain their validity, all make up a totality such that, at every present stage, the total acquisition is, so to speak, the total premise for the acquisitions of the new level. Geometry necessarily has this mobility and has a horizon of geometrical future in precisely this style; this is its sense for every geometer who has the consciousness (the constant implicit knowledge) of existing within a forward development understood as the progress of knowledge being built into the horizon. The same thing is true of every science. Also, every science is related to an open chain of the generations of those who work for and with one another, researchers either known or unknown to one another who are the producing subjectivity of the whole living science. Science, and in particular geometry, with this ontic sense, must have had a historical beginning; this sense itself must have an origin in a production: first as a prepossession <*Vorhabe*> and then in successful execution.

Obviously it is the same here as with every other invention. Every spiritual production proceeding from its first prepossession to its execution is present for the first time in the self-evidence of actual success. But when we note that mathematics has the manner of being of a lively forward movement from acquisitions as premises to new acquisitions, in whose ontic sense that of the premises is included (the process continuing in this manner), then it is clear that the *total* sense of geometry (as a developed science, as in the case of every science) could not have been present as a prepossession and then as mobile fulfillment at the beginning. A more primitive formation of sense necessarily went before it as a preliminary stage, undoubtedly in such a way that it appeared for the first time in the self-evidence of successful realization. But this

way of expressing it is actually overblown. Self-evidence means nothing more than grasping an entity with the consciousness of its original being-itself-there <*Selbst-da*>. Successful realization of a prepossession is, for the acting subject, self-evidence; in this self-evidence, what has been realized is there, *originaliter,* as itself.

But now questions arise. This process of prepossessions and successful realizations occurs, after all, purely within the *subject* of the inventor, and thus the sense, as present *originaliter* with its whole content, lies exclusively, so to speak, within his mental space. But geometrical existence is not psychic existence; it does not exist as something personal within the personal sphere of consciousness; it is the existence of what is objectively there for "everyone" (for actual and possible geometers, or those who understand geometry). Indeed, it has, [*HUA* 368] from its primal institution <*Urstiftung*>, an existence which is peculiarly supra-temporal <*uberzeitliches*> and which—of this we are certain—is accessible to all men, first of all to the actual and possible mathematicians of all peoples, all ages; and this is true of all its particular forms. And all forms newly produced by someone on the basis of pregiven forms immediately take on the same objectivity. This is, we note, an "ideal" objectivity. It is proper to a whole class of spiritual products <*geistigen Erzeugung*> of the cultural world, to which not only all scientific structures <*Gebilde*> and the sciences themselves belong but also, for example, the structures of fine literature.[2] Works of this class do not, like tools (hammers, pliers) or like architectural and other such products, have a repeatability in many like exemplars. The Pythagorean theorem, indeed all of geometry, exists only once, no matter how often or even in what language it may be expressed. It is identically the same in the "original language" of Euclid and in all "translations"; and within each language it is again the same, no matter how many times it has been sensibly uttered, from the original expression <*Aussprache*> and writing-down <*Niederschrift*> to the innumerable oral utterances or written and other documentations. The sensible utterances have spatiotemporal individuation in the world like all corporeal occurrences, like everything embodied in bodies as such; but this is not true of the spiritual form <*geistige Gestalt*> itself, which is called an "ideal object" <*ideale Gegenständlichkeit*>. In a certain way ideal objects do exist objectively in the world, but it is only in virtue of these two-leveled repetitions and ultimately in virtue of sensibly embodying repetitions. For language itself, in all its particularizations (words, sentences, speeches), is, as can easily be seen from the grammatical point of view, thoroughly made up of ideal objects; for example, the word *Löwe* occurs only once in the German language; it is identical throughout its innumerable utterances by any given persons. But the idealities of

geometrical words, sentences, theories—considered purely as linguistic structures—are not the idealities that make up what is expressed and brought to validity as truth in geometry; the latter are ideal geometrical objects, states of affairs, etc. Wherever something is asserted, one can distinguish what is thematic, that about which it is said (its sense), from the assertion, which itself, during the asserting, is never and can never be thematic. And what is thematic here is precisely ideal objects, and quite different ones from those coming under the concept of language. Our problem now concerns precisely the ideal objects which are thematic in geometry: [*HUA* 369] how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity? In advance we see that it occurs by means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its linguistic living body <*Sprachleib*>. But how does linguistic embodiment make out of the merely intrasubjective structure the *objective* structure which, e.g., as geometrical concept or state of affairs, is in fact present as understandable by all and is valid, already in its linguistic expression as geometrical speech, as geometrical proposition, for all the future in its geometrical sense?

Naturally, we shall not go into the general problem which also arises here of the origin of language in its ideal existence and its existence in the real world grounded in utterance and documentation; but we must say a few words here about the relation between language, as a function of man within human civilization, and the world as the horizon of human existence.

Living wakefully in the world we are constantly conscious of the world, whether we pay attention to it or not, conscious of it as the horizon of our life, as a horizon of "things" (real objects), of our actual and possible interests and activities. Always standing out against the world-horizon is the horizon of our fellow humans <*Mitmenschen*>, whether there are any of them present or not. Before even taking notice of it at all, we are conscious of the open horizon of our fellow humans with its limited nucleus of our neighbors, those familiar to us <*unserer uberhaupt Bekannten*>. We are thereby coconscious of the humans on our external horizon in each case as "others"; in each case "I" am conscious of them as "my" others, as those with whom I can enter into actual and potential, immediate and mediate connections of empathy <*Einfühlungskonnex*>; this involves a reciprocal understanding <*Verstehen*> of the others; and on the basis of these connections I can deal with them, enter into particular modes of community with them, and then know, in a habitual way, of my being communal. Like me, every human being—and this is how he is understood by me and everyone else—has his fellow men and, always

counting himself, civilization in general, in which he knows himself to be living.

Common language precisely belongs <*gehört*> to this horizon of humanity <*Menschheitshorizont*>. One is conscious of humanity from the start as an immediate and mediate linguistic community <*Sprachgemeinschaft*>. Clearly it is only through language and its far-reaching documentations, as possible communications, that the horizon of humanity can be an open and endless one <*endloser*>, as it always is for men. What is privileged in consciousness as the horizon of humanity and as the linguistic community is mature normal humanity (taking away the abnormal and the world of children). In this sense humanity is, for every human whose we-horizon it is, a community of those who can reciprocally express themselves, normally, in a fully understandable fashion; and within this community everyone can talk about what is within the surrounding world <*Umwelt*> of his humanity as objectively existing. [*HUA* 370] Everything has its name, or is nameable in the broadest sense, i.e., linguistically expressible. The objective world is from the start the world for all, the world which "everyone" has as world-horizon. Its objective being presupposes humans, understood as humans with a common language. Language, for its part, as function <*Funktion*> and exercised capacity, is related correlatively to the world, the universe of objects which is linguistically expressible in its being and its being-such. Thus humans as humans, fellow humans, world—the world of which humans, of which we always talk and can talk—and, on the other hand, language, are inseparably interwoven <*verflochten*>; and one is always certain of their inseparable relational unity <*Beziehungseinheit*>, though usually only implicitly, in the manner of a horizon.

This being presupposed, the primally instituting geometer can obviously also express his internal structure. But the question arises again: How does the latter, in its "ideality," thereby become objective? To be sure, something psychic which can be understood by others <*nachverstehbar*> and is communicable, as something psychic belonging to this man, is *eo ipso* objective, just as he himself, as concrete man, is experienceable and nameable by everyone as a real thing in the world of things in general. People can agree about such things, can make common verifiable assertions on the basis of common experience, etc. But how does the intrapsychically constituted structure arrive at an intersubjective being of its own as an ideal object which, as "geometrical," is anything but a real psychic object, even though it has arisen psychically? Let us reflect. The original being-itself-there, in the immediacy <*Aktualität*> of its first production <*Erzeugung*>, i.e., in original "self-evidence," results in no persisting acquisition at all that could have objective existence. Vivid

self-evidence passes—though in such a way that the activity immediately turns into the passivity of the flowingly fading consciousness of what-has-just-now-been. Finally this "retention" disappears, but the "disappeared" passing and being past has not become nothing for the subject in question: it can be reawakened. To the passivity of what is at first obscurely awakened and what perhaps emerges with greater and greater clarity there belongs the possible activity of a recollection <*Wiedererinnerung*> in which the past experiencing <*Erleben*> is lived through in a quasi-new and quasi-active way <*quasi neu und aktiv durchlebt wird*>. Now if the originally self-evident production, as the pure fulfillment of its intention, is what is renewed (recollected), there necessarily occurs, accompanying the active recollection of what is past, an activity of concurrent actual production, and there arises thereby, in original "coincidence" <*Deckung*>, the self-evidence of identity: what has now been realized in original fashion is the same as what was previously self-evident. Also coinstituted is the capacity for repetition at will with the self-evidence of the identity (coincidence of identity) of the structure throughout the chain of repetitions. Yet even with this, we have still not gone beyond the subject and his subjective, evident capacities; that is, we still have no "objectivity" given. It does arise, however [*HUA* 371]—in a preliminary stage—in understandable fashion as soon as we take into consideration the function of empathy and fellow mankind as a community of empathy and of language. In the connection of reciprocal linguistic understanding, the original production and the product of one subject can be *actively* reunderstood <*nachverstanden*> by the others. In this full reunderstanding <*Nachverstehen*> of what is produced by the other, as in the case of recollection, a present cofulfillment <*Mitvollzug*> on one's own part of the presentified activity necessarily takes place; but at the same time there is also the self-evident consciousness of the identity of the spiritual structure in the productions of both the receiver of the communication and the communicator; and this occurs reciprocally. The productions can reproduce their likenesses from person to person, and in the chain of the understanding of these repetitions what is self-evident turns up as the same in the consciousness of the other. In the unity of the community of communication among several persons the repeatedly produced structure becomes an object of consciousness, not as a likeness, but as the one structure common to all.

Now we must note that the objectivity of the ideal structure has not yet been fully constituted through such actual transferring of what has been originally produced in one to others who originally reproduce it. What is lacking is the *persisting existence* of the "ideal objects" even during periods in which the inventor and his fellows are no longer wakefully so

connected or even are no longer alive. What is lacking is their continuing-to-be even when no one has realized them in self-evidence.

The important function of written, documenting linguistic expression is that it makes communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address; it is, so to speak, communication become virtual. Through this, the communalization of humanity is lifted to a new level. Written signs are, when considered from a purely corporeal point of view, straightforwardly, sensibly experienceable; and it is always possible that they be intersubjectively experienceable in common. But as linguistic signs they awaken, as do linguistic sounds, their familiar significations. The awakening is something passive; the awakened signification is thus given passively, similarly to the way in which any other activity which has sunk into obscurity, once associatively awakened, emerges at first *passively* as a more or less clear memory. In the passivity in question here, as in the case of memory, what is passively awakened can be transformed back,[3] so to speak, into the corresponding activity: this is the capacity for reactivation that belongs originally to every human being as a speaking being. Accordingly, then, the writing-down effects a transformation of the original mode of being of the sense-structure, within the geometrical sphere of self-evidence, of the geometrical structure which is expressed. It becomes sedimented [*HUA* 372], so to speak. But the reader can make it self-evident again, can reactivate the self-evidence.[4]

There is a distinction, then, between passively understanding the expression and making it self-evident by reactivating its meaning. But there also exists possibilities of a mode of activity, a thinking in terms of things that have been taken up merely receptively, passively, which deals with meanings only passively understood and taken over, without any of the self-evidence of original activity. Passivity in general is the realm of things that are bound together and melt into one another associatively, where all meaning that arises is put together passively. What often happens here is that a meaning arises which is apparently possible as a unity—i.e., can apparently be made self-evidence through a possible reactivation—whereas the attempt at actual reactivation can reactivate only the individual members of the combination, while the intention to unify them into a whole, instead of being fulfilled, comes to nothing; that is, the ontic validity is destroyed through the original consciousness of nullity.

It is easy to see that even in human life, and first of all in every individual life from childhood up to maturity, the originally intuitive life which creates its originally self-evident structures through activities on the basis of sense-experience very quickly and in increasing measure falls victim to the *seduction of language.* Greater and greater segments of this

life lapse into a kind of talking and reading that is dominated purely by association; and often enough, in respect to the validities arrived at in this way, it is disappointed by subsequent experience.

Now one will say that in the sphere that interests us here—that of science, of thinking directed toward the attainment of truths and the avoidance of falsehood—one is obviously greatly concerned from the start to put a stop to the free play of associative constructions. In view of the unavoidable sedimentation of spiritual products in the form of persisting linguistic acquisitions, which can be taken up again at first merely passively and be taken over by anyone else, such constructions remain a constant danger. This danger is avoided if one not merely convinces oneself *ex post facto* that the particular construction can be reactivated but assures oneself from the start, after the self-evident primal institution, of its capacity to be reactivated and enduringly maintained. This occurs when one has a view to the univocity of linguistic expression and to securing, by means of the most painstaking formation of the relevant words, propositions, and complexes of propositions, the results which are to be univocally expressed. This must be done by the individual scientist, and not only by the inventor but by every scientist as a member of the scientific community after he has taken over from the others what is to be taken over. This belongs, then, to the particulars of the [*HUA* 373] scientific tradition within the corresponding community of scientists as a community of knowledge living in the unity of a common responsibility. In accord with the essence of science, then, its functionaries maintain the constant claim, the personal certainty, that everything they put into scientific assertions has been said "once and for all," that it "stands fast," forever identically repeatable with self-evidence and usable for further theoretical or practical ends—as indubitably reactivatable with the identity of its actual meaning.[5]

However, two more things are important here. First: we have not yet taken into account the fact that scientific thinking attains new results on the basis of those already attained, that the new ones serve as the foundation for still others, etc.—in the unity of a propagative process of transferred sense <*einer sinntradierenden Fortpflanzung*>.

In the finally immense proliferation of a science like geometry, what has become of the claim and the capacity for reactivation? When every researcher works on his part of the building, what of the vocational interruptions and time out for rest, which cannot be overlooked here? When he returns to the actual continuation of work, must he first run through the whole immense chain of groundings back to the original premises and actually reactivate the whole thing? If so, a science like our modern geometry would obviously not be possible at all. And yet it is

of the essence of the results of each stage not only that their ideal ontic sense in fact comes later than that of earlier results but that, since sense is grounded upon sense, the earlier sense gives something of its validity to the later one, indeed becomes part of it to a certain extent. Thus no building block within the spiritual structure is self-sufficient; and none, then, can be immediately reactivated by itself.

This is especially true of sciences which, like geometry, have their thematic sphere in ideal products, in idealities from which more and more idealities at higher levels are produced. It is quite different in the so-called descriptive sciences, where the theoretical interest, classifying and describing, remains within the sphere of sense-intuition, which for it represents self-evidence. Here, at least in general, every new proposition can by itself be "cashed in" for self-evidence.

How, by contrast, is a science like geometry possible? How, as a systematic, endlessly <*endlos*> growing stratified structure of idealities, can it maintain its original meaningfulness through living reactivatability if its cognitive thinking is supposed to produce something new [*HUA* 374] without being able to reactivate the previous levels of knowledge back to the first? Even if this could have succeeded at a more primitive stage of geometry, its energy would ultimately have been too much spent in the effort of procuring self-evidence and would not have been available for a higher productivity.

Here we must take into consideration the peculiar "logical" activity which is tied specifically to language, as well as to the ideal cognitive structures that arise specifically within it. To any sentence structures that emerge within a merely passive understanding there belongs essentially a peculiar sort of activity best described by the word "explication" <*Verdeutlichung*>. A passively emerging sentence (e.g., in memory), or one heard and passively understood, is at first merely received with a passive ego-participation, taken up as valid; and in this form it is already our opinion <*Meinung*>. From this we distinguish the peculiar and important activity of explicating our opinion. Whereas in its first form it was a straightforwardly valid sense, taken up as unitary and undifferentiated—concretely speaking, a straightforwardly valid declarative sentence—now what in itself is vague and undifferentiated is actively explicated. Consider, for example, the way in which we understand, when superficially reading the newspaper, and simply receive the "news"; here there is a passive taking-over of ontic validity such that what is read straightway becomes our opinion.

But it is something special, as we have said, to have the intention to explicate, to engage in the activity which articulates what has been read (or an interesting sentence from it), extracting one by one, in separation

from what has been vaguely, passively received as a unity, the elements of sense, thus bringing the total validity to active performance in a new way on the basis of the individual validities. What was a passive form of sense has now become one constructed through active production. This activity, then, is a peculiar sort of self-evidence; the structure arising out of it is in the mode of having been originally produced. And in connection with this self-evidence, too, there is communalization. The explicated judgment becomes an ideal object capable of being passed on. It is this object exclusively that is meant by logic when it speaks of sentences or judgments. And thus the *domain of logic* is universally designated; this is universally the sphere of being to which logic pertains insofar as it is the theory of the sentences in general.

Through this activity, now, further activities become possible—self-evident formations of new judgments on the basis of those already valid for us. This is the peculiar feature of logical thinking and of its purely logical self-evidences. All this remains intact even when judgments are transformed into assumptions, where, instead of ourselves asserting or judging, we think ourselves into the position of asserting or judging.

Here we shall concentrate on the sentences of language as they come to us passively and are merely received. In this connection it must also be noted that sentences give themselves in consciousness as reproductive transformations of an original sense [*HUA* 375] produced out of an actual, original activity; that is, in themselves they refer to such a genesis. In the sphere of logical self-evidence, deduction, or inference in forms of consequence, plays a constant and essential role. On the other hand, one must also take note of the constructive activities that operate with geometrical idealities which have been explicated but not brought to original self-evidence. (Original self-evidence must not be confused with the self-evidence of "axioms"; for axioms are in principle already the results of original sense-formation and always have this behind them.)

Now what about the possibility of complete and genuine reactivation in full originality, through going back to the primal self-evidences, in the case of geometry and the so-called deductive sciences (so called, although they by no means merely deduce)? Here the fundamental law, with unconditionally general self-evidence, is: if the premises can actually be reactivated back to the most original self-evidence, then their self-evident consequences can be also. Accordingly it appears that, beginning with the primal self-evidences, the original genuineness must propagate itself through the chain of logical inference, no matter how long it is. However, if we consider the obvious finitude of the individual and even the social capacity to transform the logical chains of centuries, truly in the unity of one accomplishment, into originally genuine chains of

self-evidence, we notice that the above law contains within itself an idealization: namely, the removal of limits from our capacity, in a certain sense its infinitization. The peculiar sort of self-evidence belonging to such idealizations will concern us later.

These are, then, the general essential insights which elucidate the whole methodical development of the "deductive" sciences and with it the manner of being which is essential to them.

These sciences are not a ready-made inheritance in the form of documented sentences; they involve a lively, productively advancing formation of sense, which always has the documented, as a sediment of earlier production, at its disposal in that it deals with it logically. But out of sentences with sedimented meaning, logical "dealing" can produce only other sentences of the same character. That all new acquisitions express an actual geometrical truth is certain *a priori* under the presupposition that the foundations of the deductive structure have truly been produced and objectified in original self-evidence, i.e., have become universally accessible acquisitions. A continuity from one person to another, from one time to another, must have been capable of being carried out. It is clear that the method of producing original idealities out of what is prescientifically given in the cultural world must have been written down and fixed in firm sentences prior to the existence of geometry; furthermore, the capacity for translating these sentences from vague linguistic understanding into the clarity of the reactivation of their self-evident sense [*HUA* 376] must have been, in its own way, handed down and ever capable of being handed down.

Only as long as this condition was satisfied, or only when the possibility of its fulfillment was perfectly secured for all time, could geometry preserve its genuine, original sense as a deductive science throughout the progression of logical formations. In other words, only in this case could every geometer be capable of bringing to mediate self-evidence the sense borne by every sentence, not merely as its sedimented (logical) sentence-meaning but as its actual meaning, its truth-meaning. And so for all of geometry.

The progress of deduction follows formal-logical self-evidence; but without the actually developed capacity for reactivating the original activities contained within its fundamental concepts, i.e., without the "what" and the "how" of its prescientific materials, geometry would be a tradition empty of sense <*sinnentleerte*>; and if we ourselves did not have this capacity, we could never even know whether geometry had or ever did have a genuine sense, one that could really be "cashed in."

Unfortunately, however, this is our situation, and that of the whole modern age.

The "presupposition" mentioned above has in fact never been fulfilled. How the living tradition of the formation of sense of elementary concepts is actually carried on can be seen in elementary geometrical instruction and its textbooks; what we actually learn there is how to deal with *ready-made* concepts and sentences in a rigorously methodical way. Rendering the concepts sensibly intuitable by means of drawn figures is substituted for the actual production of the primal idealities. And the rest is done by success—not the success of actual insight extending beyond the logical method's own self-evidence, but the practical successes of applied geometry, its immense, though not understood, practical usefulness. To this we must add something that will become visible further on in the treatment of historical mathematics, namely, the dangers of a scientific life that is completely given over to logical activities. These dangers lie in certain progressive transformations of sense[6] to which this sort of scientific treatment drives one.

By exhibiting the essential presuppositions upon which rests the historical possibility of a genuine tradition, true to its origins, of sciences like geometry, we can understand how such sciences can vitally develop throughout the centuries and still not be genuine. The inheritance of propositions and of the method of logically constructing new propositions and idealities can continue without interruption from one period to the next, while the capacity for reactivating the primal beginnings, i.e., the sources of sense for everything that comes later, has not been handed down with it. What is lacking is thus precisely what had given and had to give a sense to all propositions and theories, [*HUA* 377] a sense arising from the primal sources which can be made self-evident again and again.

Of course, grammatically coherent propositions and concatenations of propositions, no matter how they have arisen and have achieved validity—even if it is through mere association—have in all circumstances their own logical sense, i.e., their sense that can be made self-evident through explication; this can then be identified again and again as the same proposition, which is either logically coherent or incoherent, where in the latter case it cannot be executed in the unity of an actual judgment. In propositions which belong together in one domain and in the deductive systems that can be made out of them we have a realm of ideal identities; and for these there exist easily understandable possibilities of lasting traditionalization. But propositions, like other cultural structures, appear on the scene in the form of tradition; they claim, so to speak, to be sedimentations of a truth-sense that can be made originally self-evident; whereas it is by no means necessary that they actually have such a sense, as in the case of associatively derived falsifications. Thus the whole pregiven deductive science, the total system of propositions in the unity of their

validities, is first only a claim which can be justified as an expression of the alleged truth-sense only through the actual capacity for reactivation.

Through this state of affairs we can understand the deeper reason for the demand, which has spread throughout the modern period and has finally been generally accepted, for a so-called epistemological grounding of the sciences, though clarity has never been achieved about what the much-admired sciences are actually lacking.[7]

As for further details on the uprooting of an originally genuine tradition, i.e., one which involved original self-evidence at its actual first beginning, one can point to possible and easily understandable reasons. In the first oral cooperation of the beginning geometers, the need was understandably lacking for an exact fixing of descriptions of the pre-scientific primal material and of the ways in which, in relation to this material, geometrical idealities arose together with the first "axiomatic" propositions. Further, the logical superstructures did not yet rise so high that one could not return again and again to the original sense. On the other hand, the possibility of the practical application of the derived laws, which was actually obvious in connection with the original developments, understandably led quickly, in the realm of *praxis*, to a habitually practiced method of using mathematics, if need be, to bring about useful things. This method could naturally be handed down even without the ability for original self-evidence. Thus mathematics, emptied of sense, [*HUA* 378] could generally propagate itself, constantly being added to logically, as could the methodics of technical application on the other side. The extraordinarily far-reaching practical usefulness became of itself a major motive for the advancement and appreciation of these sciences. Thus also it is understandable that the lost original truth-sense made itself felt so little, indeed, that the need for the corresponding regressive inquiry had to be reawakened. More than this: the true sense of such an inquiry had to be discovered. Our results based on principle are of a generality that extends over all the so-called deductive sciences and even indicates similar problems and investigations for all sciences. For all of them have the mobility of sedimented traditions that are worked upon, again and again, by an activity of producing new structures of sense and handing them down. Existing in this way, they extend enduringly through time, since all new acquisitions are in turn sedimented and become working materials. Everywhere the problems, the clarifying investigations, the insights of principle are *historical*. We stand within the horizon of humanity, the one in which we ourselves now live. We are constantly, vitally conscious of this horizon, and specifically as the temporal horizon implied in our given horizon of the present. To the one humanity there corresponds essentially the one cultural world as the surrounding life-world with its

mode of being; this world, for every historical period and humanity, has its particular features and is precisely the tradition. We stand, then, within the historical horizon in which everything is historical, even though we may know very little about it in a definite way. But it has its essential structure that can be revealed through methodical interrogation <*Befragung*>. This interrogation prescribes all the possible specialized questions, thus including, for the sciences, the regressive inquiries into origin which are peculiar to them in virtue of their historical mode of being. Here we are led back to the primal materials of the first formation of sense, the primal premises, so to speak, which lie in the prescientific cultural world. Of course, this cultural world has in turn its own questions of origin, which at first remain unasked.

Naturally, problems of this particular sort immediately awaken the total problem of the universal historicity of the correlative manners of being of humanity and the cultural world and the *a priori* structure contained in this historicity. Still, questions like that of the clarification of the origin of geometry have a closed character, such that one need not inquire beyond those prescientific materials.

Further clarifications will be made in connection with two objections which are familiar to our own philosophical-historical situation.

In the first place, what sort of strange obstinacy is this, seeking to take the question of the origin of geometry back to some undiscoverable Thales of geometry, someone not even known to legend? Geometry is available to us in its propositions, its theories. Of course we must and we can answer for this logical edifice to the last detail in terms of self-evidence. Here, to be sure, we arrive at first axioms, and [*HUA* 379] from them we proceed to the original self-evidence which the fundamental concepts make possible. What is this, if not the "theory of knowledge," in this case specifically the theory of geometrical knowledge? No one would think of tracing the epistemological problem back to such a supposed Thales. This is quite superfluous. The presently available concepts and propositions themselves contain their own sense, first as nonself-evident opinion, but nevertheless as true propositions with a meant but still hidden truth which we can obviously bring to light by rendering the propositions themselves self-evident.

Our answer is as follows. Certainly the historical backward reference has not occurred to anyone; certainly theory of knowledge has never been seen as a peculiarly historical task. But this is precisely what we object to in the past. The ruling dogma of the separation in principle between epistemological elucidation and historical, even humanistic-psychological explanation, between epistemological and genetic origin,

is fundamentally mistaken, unless one inadmissibly limits, in the usual way, the concepts of "history," "historical explanation," and "genesis." Or rather, what is fundamentally mistaken is the limitation through which precisely the deepest and most genuine problems of history are concealed. If one thinks over our expositions (which are of course still rough and will later of necessity lead us into new depth-dimensions), what they make obvious is precisely that what we know—namely, that the presently vital cultural configuration "geometry" is a tradition and is still being handed down—is not knowledge concerning an external causality which effects the succession of historical configurations, as if it were knowledge based on induction, the presupposition of which would amount to an absurdity here; rather, to understand geometry or any given cultural fact is to be conscious of its historicity, albeit "implicitly." This, however, is not an empty claim; for quite generally it is true for every fact given under the heading of "culture," whether it is a matter of the lowliest culture of necessities or the highest culture (science, state, church, economic organization, etc.), that every straightforward understanding of it as an experiential fact involves the "coconsciousness" that it is something constructed through human activity. No matter how hidden, no matter how merely "implicitly" coimplied this sense is, there belongs to it the self-evident possibility of explication, of "making it explicit" and clarifying it. Every explication and every transition from making explicit to making self-evident (even perhaps in cases where one stops much too soon) is nothing other than historical disclosure; in itself, essentially, it is something historical, and as such it bears, with essential necessity, the horizon of its history within itself. This is of course also to say that the whole of the cultural present, understood as a totality, "implies" the whole of the cultural past in an undetermined but structurally determined generality. To put it more precisely, it implies a continuity of pasts which imply one another, [*HUA* 380] each in itself being a past cultural present. And this whole continuity is a *unity* of traditionalization up to the present, which is our present as a process of traditionalizing itself in flowing-static vitality. This is, as has been said, an undetermined generality, but it has in principle a structure which can be much more widely explicated by proceeding from these indications, a structure which also grounds, "implies," the possibilities for every search for and determination of concrete, factual states of affairs.

Making geometry self-evident, then, whether one is clear about this or not, is the disclosure of its historical tradition. But this knowledge, if it is not to remain empty talk or undifferentiated generality, requires the methodical production, proceeding from the present and carried out as research in the present, of differentiated self-evidences of the type

discovered above (in several fragmentary investigations of what belongs to such knowledge superficially, as it were). Carried out systematically, such self-evidences result in nothing other and nothing less than the universal *a priori* of history with all its highly abundant component elements.

We can also say now that history is from the start nothing other than the vital movement of the coexistence <*Miteinander*> and the interweaving <*Ineinander*> of original formations and sedimentations of sense.

Anything that is shown to be a historical fact, either in the present through experience or by a historian as a fact in the past, necessarily has its *inner structure of sense;* but especially the motivational interconnections established about it in terms of everyday understanding have deep, further and further-reaching implications which must be interrogated, disclosed. All factual history remains incomprehensible because, always merely drawing its conclusions naively and straightforwardly from facts, it never makes thematic the universal ground of sense <*Sinnesboden*> upon which all such conclusions rest, has never investigated the immense structural *a priori* which is proper to it. Only the disclosure of the essentially general structure[8] lying in our present and then in every past or future historical present as such, and, in totality, only the disclosure of the concrete, historical time in which we live, in which our total humanity lives in respect to its total, essentially general structure—only this disclosure can make possible historical inquiry <*Historie*> which is truly understanding, insightful, and in the genuine sense scientific. This is the concrete, historical *a priori* which encompasses everything that exists as historical becoming and having-become or exists in its essential being as tradition and handing-down. What has been said was related to the total form "historical present in general," historical time generally. But the particular configurations of culture, which find their place within its coherent historical being as tradition and as vitally handing themselves down, [*HUA* 381] have within this totality only relatively self-sufficient being in traditionality, only the being of nonself-sufficient components. Correlatively, now, account would have to be taken of the subjects of historicity, the persons who create cultural formations, functioning in totality: creative personal civilization.[9]

In respect to geometry one recognizes, now that we have pointed out the hiddenness of its fundamental concepts, which have become inaccessible, and have made them understandable as such in first basic outlines, that only the consciously set task of discovering the historical origin of geometry (within the total problem of the *a priori* of historicity in general) can provide the method for a geometry which is true to its origins and at the same time is to be understood in a universal-historical way; and the same is true for all sciences, for philosophy. In principle,

then, a history of philosophy, a history of the particular sciences in the style of the usual factual history, can actually render nothing of their subject matter comprehensible. For a genuine history of philosophy, a genuine history of the particular sciences, is nothing other than the tracing of the historical sense-structures given in the present, or their self-evidences, along the documented chain of historical back-references into the hidden dimension of the primal self-evidences which underlie them.[10] Even the very problem here can be made understandable only through recourse to the historical *a priori* as the universal source of all conceivable problems of understanding. The problem of genuine historical explanation comes together, in the case of the sciences, with "epistemological" grounding or clarification.

We must expect yet a second and very weighty objection. From the historicism which prevails extensively in different forms today I expect little receptivity for a depth-inquiry which goes beyond the usual factual history, as does the one outlined in this work, especially since, as the expression "a priori" indicates, it lays claim to a strictly unconditioned and truly apodictic self-evidence extending beyond all historical facticities. One will object: what naivete, to seek to display, and to claim to have displayed, a historical *a priori*, an absolute, supratemporal validity, after [*HUA* 382] we have obtained such abundant testimony for the relativity of everything historical, of all historically developed world-apperceptions, right back to those of the "primitive" tribes. Every people, large or small, has its world in which, for that people, everything fits well together, whether in mythical-magical or in European-rational terms, and in which everything can be explained perfectly. Every people has its "logic" and, accordingly, if this logic is explicated in propositions, "its" *a priori*.

However, let us consider the methodology of establishing historical facts in general, thus including that of the facts supporting the objection; and let us do this in regard to what such methodology presupposes. Does not the undertaking of a human science of "how it really was" contain a presupposition taken for granted, a validity-ground never observed, never made thematic, of a strictly unassailable type of self-evidence, without which history <*Historie*> would be a senseless enterprise? All questioning and demonstrating which is in the usual sense historical presupposes history <*Geschichte*> as the universal horizon of questioning, not explicitly, but still as a horizon of implicit certainty, which, in spite of all vague background-indeterminacy, is the presupposition of all determinability, or of all intention to seek and to establish determined facts.

From a historical perspective, what is in itself the first thing is our present. We always already know of our present world and that we live

in it, always surrounded by an openly endless horizon of unfamiliar actualities. This knowledge, as horizon-certainty, is not something learned, not knowledge which was once actual and has merely sunk back to become part of the background; the horizon-certainty had to be already there in order to be capable of being laid out thematically; it is already presupposed in order that we can seek to know what we do not know. All nonknowledge concerns the unfamiliar world, which yet exists in advance for us as world, as the horizon of all questions of the present and thus also all questions which are specifically historical. These are the questions, which concern humans, as those who act and create in their communalized coexistence <*Miteinander*> in the world and transform the constant cultural face of the world. Do we not know further—we have already had occasion to speak of this—that this historical present has its historical pasts behind it, that it has developed out of them, that historical past is a continuity of pasts which proceed from one another, each, as a past present, being a tradition producing tradition out of itself? Do we not know that the present and the whole of historical time implied in it is that of a historically coherent and unified humanity, coherent through its generative bond and constant communalization in cultivating what has already been cultivated before, whether in cooperative work or in reciprocal interaction, etc.? Does all this not announce a universal "knowledge" of the horizon, an implicit knowledge that can be made explicit systematically in its essential structure? Is not the resulting great problem here the horizon [*HUA* 383] toward which all questions tend, and thus the horizon which is presupposed in all of them? Accordingly, we need not first enter into some kind of critical discussion of the facts set out by historicism; it is enough that even the claim of their factualness presupposes the historical *a priori* if this claim is to have a sense.

But a doubt arises all the same. The horizon-interpretation to which we recurred must not bog down in vague, superficial talk; it must itself arrive at its own sort of scientific discipline. The sentences in which it is expressed must be fixed and capable of being made self-evident again and again. Through what method do we obtain a universal and also fixed *a priori* of the historical world which is always originally genuine? Whenever we consider it, we find ourselves with the self-evident capacity to reflect—to turn to the horizon and to penetrate it in an interpretative way. But we also have, and know that we have, the capacity of complete freedom to transform, in thought and fantasy, our human historical existence and what is there exposed as its life-world. And precisely in this activity of free variation, and in running through the conceivable possibilities for the life-world, there arises, with apodictic self-evidence, an essentially general set of elements going through all the variants; and

of this we can convince ourselves with truly apodictic certainty. Thereby we have removed every bond to the factually valid historical world and have regarded this world itself as one of the conceptual possibilities. This freedom, and the direction of our gaze upon the apodictically invariant, results in the latter again and again—with the self-evidence of being able to repeat the invariant structure at will—as what is identical, what can be made self-evident *originaliter* at any time, can be fixed in univocal language as the essence constantly implied in the flowing, vital horizon.

Through this method, going beyond the formal generalities we exhibited earlier, we can also make thematic that apodictic aspect of the prescientific world that the original founder of geometry had at his disposal, that which must have served as the material for his idealizations.

Geometry and the sciences most closely related to it have to do with space-time and the shapes, figures, also shapes of motion, alterations of deformation, etc., that are possible within space-time, particularly as measurable magnitudes. It is now clear that even if we know almost nothing about the historical surrounding world of the first geometers, this much is certain as an invariant, essential structure: that it was a world of "things" (including the human beings themselves as subjects of this world); that all things necessarily had to have a bodily character—although not all things could be mere bodies, since the necessarily coexisting human beings are not thinkable as mere bodies and, like even the cultural objects which belong with them structurally, are not exhausted in corporeal being. [*HUA* 384] What is also clear, and can be secured at least in its essential nucleus through careful *a priori* explication, is that these pure bodies had spatiotemporal shapes and "material" <*stoffliche*> qualities (color, warmth, weight, hardness, etc.) related to them. Further, it is clear that in the life of practical needs certain particularizations of shape stood out and that a technical *praxis* always aimed at the production of particular preferred shapes and the improvement of them according to certain directions of gradualness.

First to be singled out from the thing-shapes are surfaces—more or less "smooth," more or less perfect surfaces; edges, more or less rough or fairly "even"; in other words, more or less pure lines, angles, more or less perfect points; then, again, among the lines, for example, straight lines are especially preferred, and among the surfaces the even surfaces; for example, for practical purposes boards limited by even surfaces, straight lines, and points are preferred, whereas totally or partially curved surfaces are undesirable for many kinds of practical interests. Thus the production of even surfaces and their perfection (polishing) always plays its role in *praxis*. So also in cases where just distribution is intended. Here the rough estimate of magnitudes is transformed into the measurement

of magnitudes by counting the equal parts. (Here, too, proceeding from the factual, an essential form becomes recognizable through a method of variation.) Measuring belongs to every culture, varying only according to stages from primitive to higher perfections. We can always presuppose some measuring technique, whether of a lower or higher type, in the essential forward development of culture, as well as the growth of such a technique, thus also including the art of design for buildings, of surveying fields, pathways, etc.; such a technique is always already there, already abundantly developed and pregiven to the philosopher who did not yet know geometry but who should be conceivable as its inventor. As a philosopher proceeding from the practical, finite surrounding world (of the room, the city, the landscape, etc., and temporally the world of periodical occurrences: day, month, etc.) to the theoretical world-view and world-knowledge, he has the finitely known and unknown spaces and times as finite elements within the horizon of an open infinity <*einer offenen Unendlichkeit*>. But with this he does not yet have geometrical space, mathematical time, and whatever else is to become a novel spiritual product out of these finite elements which serve as material; and with his manifold finite shapes in their space-time he does not yet have geometrical shapes, the phoronomic shapes; his shapes, as formations developed out of *praxis* and thought of in terms of gradual perfection, clearly serve only as bases for a new sort of *praxis* out of which similarly named new constructions grow.

It is evident in advance that this new sort of construction will be a product arising out of an idealizing, spiritual act, one of "pure" [*HUA* 385] thinking, which has its materials in the designated general pregivens of this factual humanity and human surrounding world and creates "ideal objects" out of them.

*Now the problem would be to discover, through recourse to what is essential to history* <Historie>, *the historical original sense which necessarily was able to give and did give to the whole becoming of geometry its persisting truth-sense.*

It is of particular importance now to bring into focus and establish the following insight: only if the apodictically general content, invariant throughout all conceivable variation, of the spatiotemporal sphere of shapes is taken into account in the idealization can an ideal construction arise which can be understood for all future time and by all coming generations of men and thus be capable of being handed down and reproduced with the identical intersubjective sense. This condition is valid far beyond geometry for all spiritual structures which are to be unconditionally and generally capable of being handed down. Were the thinking activity of a scientist to introduce something "time-bound" in his thinking, i.e., something bound to what is merely factual about his

present or something valid for him as a merely factual tradition, his construction would likewise have a merely time-bound ontic sense; this sense would be understandable only by those men who shared the same merely factual presuppositions of understanding.

It is a general conviction that geometry, with all its truths, is valid with unconditioned generality for all humans, all times, all peoples, and not merely for all historically factual ones but for all conceivable ones. The presuppositions of principle for this conviction have never been explored because they have never been seriously made a problem. But it has also become clear to us that every establishment of a historical fact which lays claim to unconditioned objectivity likewise presupposes this invariant or absolute *a priori*.

Only through the disclosure of this *a priori* can there be an *a priori* science extending beyond all historical facticities, all historical surrounding worlds, peoples, times, civilizations; only in this way can a science as "aeterna veritas" appear. Only on this fundament is based the secured capacity of inquiring regressively from the temporarily depleted self-evidence of a science to the primal self-evidences.

Do we not stand here before the great and profound problem-horizon of reason, the same reason that functions in every human, the *animal rationale,* no matter how primitive he is?

This is not the place to penetrate into those depths themselves.

In any case, we can now recognize from all this that historicism, which wishes to clarify the historical or epistemological essence of mathematics from the standpoint of the magical circumstances or other manners of [*HUA* 386] apperception of a time-bound civilization, is mistaken in principle. For romantic spirits the mythical-magical elements of the historical and prehistorical aspects of mathematics may be particularly attractive; but to cling to this merely historically factual aspect of mathematics is precisely to lose oneself to a sort of romanticism and to overlook the genuine problem, the internal-historical problem, the epistemological problem. Also, one's gaze obviously cannot then become free to recognize that facticities of every type, including those involved in the historicist objection, have a root in the essential structure of what is generally human, through which a teleological reason running throughout all historicity announces itself. With this is revealed a set of problems in its own right related to the totality of history and to the full sense which ultimately gives it its unity.

If the usual factual study of history in general, and in particular the history which in most recent times has achieved true universal extension over all humanity, is to have any sense at all, such a sense can only be grounded upon what we can here call internal history, and as such upon

the fundament of the universal historical *a priori*. Such a sense necessarily leads further to the indicated highest question of a universal teleology of reason.

If, after these expositions, which have illuminated very general and many-sided problem-horizons, we lay down the following as something completely secured, namely, that the human surrounding world is the same today and always, and thus also in respect to what is relevant to primal institution <*Urstiftung*> and lasting tradition, then we can show in several steps, only in an exploratory way, in connection with our own surrounding world, what should be considered in more detail for the problem of the idealizing primal institution of the sense-formation "geometry."

## Notes

1. So also for Galileo and all the periods following the Renaissance, continually being worked on in a lively forward development, and yet at the same time a tradition.

2. But the broadest concept of literature encompasses them all; that is, it belongs to their objective being that they be linguistically expressed and can be expressed again and again; or, more precisely, they have their objectivity, their existence-for-everyone, only as signification, as the meaning of speech. This is true in a peculiar fashion in the case of the objective sciences: for them the difference between the original language of the work and its translation into other languages does not remove its identical accessibility or change it into an inauthentic, indirect accessibility.

3. This is a transformation of which one is conscious as being in itself patterned after what is passively awakened.

4. But this is by no means necessary or even factually normal. Even without this he can understand; he can concur "as a matter of course" in the validity of what is understood without any activity of his own. In this case he comports himself purely passively and receptively.

5. At first, of course, it is a matter of a firm direction of the will, which the scientist establishes in himself, aimed at the certain capacity for reactivation. If the goal of reactivatability can be only relatively fulfilled, then the claim which stems from the consciousness of being able to acquire something, also has its relativity; and this relativity also makes itself noticeable and is driven out. Ultimately, objective, absolutely firm knowledge of truth is an infinite idea.

6. These work to the benefit of logical method, but they remove one further and further from the origins and make one insensitive to the problem of origin and thus to the actual ontic and truth-sense of all these sciences.

7. What does Hume do but endeavor to inquire back into the primal impressions of developed ideas and, in general, scientific ideas?

8. The superficial structure of the externally "ready-made" men within the social-historical, essential structure of humanity, but also the deeper structures which disclose the inner historicities of the persons taking part.

9. The historical world is, to be sure, first pregiven as a social-historical world. But it is historical only through the inner historicity of the individuals, who are individuals in their inner historicity, together with that of other communalized persons. Recall what was said in a few meager beginning expositions about memories and the constant historicity to be found in them.

10. But what counts as primal self-evidence for the sciences is determined by an educated person or a sphere of such persons who pose new questions, new historical questions, questions concerning the inner depth-dimension as well as those concerning an external historicity in the social-historical world.

4

# Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, Does Not Move

Translated by Fred Kersten and revised by Leonard Lawlor

[307] Regardless of their many repetitions and corrections, the following pages are, in any case, foundational for a phenomenological doctrine of the origin of spatiality, corporeality, Nature in the sense of the natural sciences, and therefore for a transcendental theory of natural scientific knowledge. Doubtless it remains open whether it might still be necessary to supplement them.

Distinction: the world in the openness of the surrounding world—posited conceptually as infinite. The sense of this infinity—"world existing in the ideality of infinity." What is the sense of this existence, of the existing infinite world? The openness as horizonality that is not completely conceived, represented, but that is already implicitly formed. Openness of the countryside—knowing that I have finally arrived at the borders of Germany—then arriving at the French, Danish, etc., countryside. I have not paced off and become acquainted with what lies at the horizon, but I know that others have become acquainted with a part further on, then again others yet another part—representation of a synthesis of actual experiential fields which mediately produces the representation of Germany, Germany within the boundaries of Europe, and gives rise to a

representation of Europe itself, etc.—ultimately of [308] the earth. The representation of the earth comes about as a synthetic unity in a manner analogous to the way in which the experiential fields of a single person are unified in continuous and combined experience. Except that, analogously, I appropriate to myself the reports of others, their descriptions and ascertainments, and form universal representations. Explicitly the following distinctions must be drawn:

1. making intuitive the horizons of the ready-made "representation of the world," just as it is formed in apperceptive transference <of sense>, conceptual anticipations and projects;
2. the way the representation of the world is further constituted on the basis of an already made representation of the world, e.g., the surrounding world of the Negroes, or the Greeks, in contrast to the modern Copernican world of the natural sciences.

We Copernicans, we moderns say:

The earth is not the "whole of Nature"; it is one of the stars in the infinite space of the world. The earth is a spherical body, certainly not perceivable in its wholeness all at once and by one person; rather it is perceived in a primordial synthesis as a unity of mutually connected single experiences. Yet, it is a body <*Körper*>! Although for us it is the experiential ground for all bodies in the experiential genesis of our representation of the world. This "ground" is not experienced at first as body but becomes a corporeal ground at higher levels of constitution of the world by virtue of experience, and that nullifies its primordial form of the ground. It becomes the total body: the carrier of all bodies that, until now, could be fully (normally) experienced with empirical sufficiency on all sides as they are experienced provided that the stars are not to be regarded as bodies. But now the earth is a huge block on which smaller bodies exist and on the basis of which they also always have become, and could have become, for us by division into fragments or by separating them off from the whole.

If the earth gains constitutive validity as body and, on the other hand, the stars are apprehended as appearing in distant appearances, only not as perfectly accessible [309] bodies, then that includes the representations of rest and movement which must be attributed to them. Movement occurs on or in the earth, away from it or off it. In the primordial shape of its representation, the earth itself does not move and does not rest; only in relation to it are movement and rest given as having their sense of movement and rest. But, subsequently, the earth "moves" or is at rest—and entirely likewise the stars "move" or are at rest, and the

earth as one star among them. How do movement and rest acquire their legitimate ontic sense in the extended or modern version of the "intuition of the world"—their conceptual, established intuition or evidence? It is certainly not apperceptive transference <of sense> but, as always, it must be capable of being demonstrated.

In general, the elaboration of the intuition of the world, of the intuition of single bodies, of the intuition of space, of the intuition of time, of the intuition of the causality of Nature, all of that goes together hand in hand.

Bodies being moved in the earth given in an original and intuitive manner, <namely,> as "ground," or rather, bodies understood in primordiality, actually in possible mobility and changeability. Bodies thrown into the air, or being moved by any means whatsoever in any direction—in relation to the earth as the ground of the earth. In terrestrial space, bodies are mobile and they have a horizon of possible movement. And, if the movement is complete, experience nevertheless indicates in advance the possibility of further movement, perhaps simultaneously with the possibility of a new causality of movement by a possible push, etc. Bodies exist actually in open possibilities which are realized in their actuality, in their movement, change (un-change as a possible form of change). Bodies are in actual and possible movement, and there is the possibility of possibility always open within actuality, within continuation, within change of direction, etc. Bodies are also "among" actual and possible bodies, and correlatively bodies are actually experienced or experienced in the mode of possibility, in their actual movements and changes, etc., in their actual "circumstances." Possibilities which, in advance, are *a priori* open; and, as existing possibilities, they can be intuitively [310] presented, they have their intuitional demonstration. They have these as modes which belong to the being of bodies and the multiplicity of bodies.

In all progressive formation of the apperception of the world, the unity of the "intuition of the world" must confirm the possibility of the world—as *the* possibility and the *universum* of open possibilities which make up a fundamental composition of the world's actuality. The core of actual experience is ontically what is experienced of the world from this or that side; and it possibly already obtains as known actuality on the basis of the experiential synthesis in harmony. As an experiential core, the core becomes a core of what is prefigured by the world and prefigured as an open range of possibilities: and that means a range of harmonious possibilities to be iteratively continued. The world is constituted progressively and is finally—with respect to nature as its abstractable component—constituted according to a horizonality in which something existent is constituted as actual within the ontic possibilities prefigured

at any time; the world is prefigured and is subsequently conceptualized and expressed in judgments by ontology; the form of the world is "taken into consideration" along with its ontic possibilities. And all relatively determinate, inductive prefiguration moves within the form of the world—induction which, in every case, is determined through expectation and in the course of actual experience, my own and communicative experience, as a consequence of actuality is shown to be confirmed or disconfirmed.

Inductively prefigured actual experience in the frame of actual possibilities penetrates the horizon in a synthetic and harmonious way and grasps actually, intuitively, as confirmed being, a fragment of the mundane field that is being offered; this experience gives me and eventually gives us in an actual communization bodies at rest or in motion, in nonchangeableness or changeableness. But what is given there is an aspect in which everything is still not decided about what, in view of the possibilities that are still horizonal, is still determining sense for the fully constituted world. Therefore, rest is given as something decisive and absolute, and likewise movement: that is, they are so given at the first level in itself of constitution of the earth as the ground.

But rest and motion cease to be absolute as soon as the earth becomes a world-body [311] within the open multiplicity of surrounding bodies. Motion and rest necessarily become relative. And if this claim can be disputed, this dispute can only happen because the modern apperception of the world as world of infinite Copernican horizons has not become for us an apperception of the world that has been confirmed through an intuition of the world that has been actually accomplished. ("Apperception" of the world, apperception in general, is the consciousness of validity, with the ontic sense of World with all the levels of constitution.) Apperceptive transference <of sense> has taken place such that it remains but a reference for a confirmative intuition rather than actually being constructed at the end as demonstration.

How must one conceive properly a body, its place, its temporal position, its duration and form insofar as thus qualified, identifiable and recognizable, determinate in itself and as such determinable? All demonstration and all confirmation of apperceptions of the world forming themselves and being formed progressively—as progressive apperceptive transfers in which "*the*" self-same world is endowed with a higher level sense, up as far as the last level, on the basis of already constituted objectivity and of the world already constituted (and the fully constituted world in its own peculiar firm style is further constituted)—all demonstration, I say, has its subjective starting point and ultimate anchorage in the Ego who does the demonstrating. The confirmation of the new "representation of the world," in the derivative sense of "world," has

its first support and core in my perceptual field and in the oriented presentation of the segment of the world about my flesh as the central body among the others, all of which are given intuitively with their own essential contents at rest or in motion, in change or nonchange. Already a certain relativity of rest and motion is formed here. Necessarily a motion is relative when experienced with respect to a "ground-body," which is itself experienced as at rest and in unity with my corporeal flesh. The latter itself can be in movement moving itself, but can come to rest at any time and then be experienced as at rest. However the relative ground-body is, naturally, relatively at rest [312] and relatively in motion with reference to the earth-ground which is not experienced as a body—not actually and primordially experienced. Consider the relative "ground-body": I can be in a moving car which is then my ground-body; I can also be borne by a railway car, in which case my ground-body is first of all the body carrying me while moving, and in order for this to happen, the ground-body is again the railway car, etc. The car is experienced as at rest. But when I look out the window I say that the railway car is moving even though I see that the countryside is in motion. I know that I have gotten into the car; I have already seen such cars in motion with people in it. I know that they, like me when I am inside, see the surrounding world in motion. I know about the reversal of the ways of experiencing the rest and motion on the basis of the toy car from which I have so often gotten into and gotten out of. But all this is nonetheless directly referred to the ground of all relative ground-bodies, to the earth-ground: implied in the apperception I have all mediacies and can for confirmation return to them in harmony.

Now, when I "conceive" the earth as a moved body, I use a ground to which all experience of bodies, and hence all experience of continuing to be at rest and in motion, is related. I do so in order to be able to conceive, indeed, to conceive the earth at all, as a body in the primordial sense, i.e., in order to acquire a possible intuition of the earth in which its possibility as being a body can be directly evident. What is to be emphasized here is that I can always go farther upon my earth-ground and, in a certain way, always experience its "corporeal" being more fully. Its horizon consists of the fact that I walk about on the earth-ground, and going from it and from everything that is found there I can always experience more of it. Similarly with other people who bodily walk about on it and, in common with me, experience it with everything on and above it, and can come to an agreement about it. In a fragmentary way, I become acquainted with the earth and also experience the division into parts which are the true bodies having, as parts so fragmented, their being in rest and motion in relation to the earth now operating again as a resting earth-ground.

I say eventually [313] the "resting earth," but the "earth" as the unitary earth-ground cannot be experienced in the sense of being at rest and therefore cannot be experienced in the sense of a body, if "a" body not only has extension and qualification but also its "place" in space, as a place susceptible of change, of moving and being at rest. As long as I do not have a representation of a new ground as such, on the basis of which the earth can have in its coherent and circular orbit the sense as a self-contained body in motion and at rest, and as long as I have not acquired a representation of an exchange of grounds such that both grounds become bodies, to that extent just the earth itself is really the ground and not a body. The earth does not move; perhaps I may even say that it is at rest. But that can only mean that each fragment of the earth, which I or someone else separates off or is broken off by itself and which is at rest or in motion, is a body. The earth is a whole whose parts—if conceived by themselves as they can be, as fragmented and fragmentable—are bodies, but which insofar as it is a "whole" is not a body. Here a whole "consisting" of corporeal parts is for that reason not a body.

Now, what about the possibility of ground basis "bodies"? What about new "earths" as referential foundations for the experience of bodies with the expected possibility that, as a consequence, the earth could become a normal body just like any other ground-body? It could have been said immediately that it is senseless to speak beforehand of an empty mundane space as we speak of an empty, infinite "astronomical" world, as a space in which the earth is in the same way as the bodies that are there, in the space which surrounds the earth. We have a surrounding space as a system of locations—i.e., as a system of possible terminations of motions of bodies. In that system all earthly bodies certainly have their particular "place," but not the earth itself. Perhaps, the issue is different if the "possibility of thinking" the change of grounds is acquired.

*Objection:* Is not the difficulty of the constitution of the earth as a body hopelessly exaggerated? The earth is after all a [314] whole of implicit parts, each being able to be really divided off and be a body, each having its own location. And thus the earth has an inner space as a system of locations or (even when conceived in a nonmathematical way) a continuum of locations in regard to a total divisibility. Thus for the same reason every body whatsoever, insofar as divisible, has its location from the viewpoint of parts. However, the inner and outer space of the earth form a single space. Or is there something left over? Any part of the earth could move. The earth has its inner motions. Similarly, any ordinary body is not only divisible but also has its deformations and its continual inner motions, while as a whole it can in its own way preserve or change its place in space. Thus the earth has deformation and continual inner

motion, etc. But how can it move as a "whole"? How is that conceivable? It is not as though it were firmly attached—the "ground" is lacking for that. Does motion, hence corporeality, make sense for the earth? Is its location in the totality of space actually a "location" for it? On the other hand, is the totality of space not precisely the system of locations of all bodies which, accordingly, divide themselves into the implicit parts of the earth (as fragmented and moveable) and into free outer bodies? What curiosities of the "intuition of space," of space at this level do we have there?

But now we still have to consider outer bodies—the free bodies which are not implied pieces of the earth-lived bodies: my flesh or lived body and other lived bodies. These are perceived as bodies in space, always in their place, and unperceived yet perceivable (or experienceable in a modified way) as what is continually enduring, in a motion-rest that is spread out over this duration (also inner motions and inner rest).

Consider my flesh. In primordial experience, the flesh has no moving away and no rest, only inner motion and inner rest, unlike the outer bodies. In "I am going," in any "I am moving myself" kinesthetically, all the bodies do not "move themselves" and the whole earth-ground under me does not move. For what defines a bodily rest is that the [315] aspects of the body flow kinesthetically "in a mobile way" or do not flow, according to whether or not I hold myself still, etc. I do not move away; I stand still or go; thus my flesh is the center and the bodies at rest and moving are around me, and I have a ground that does not move. My flesh has extension, etc., but no change and nonchange of location in the sense that an outer body is presented as in moving, coming closer or moving farther away, or as not in motion, near, far away. But the ground on which my flesh walks or does not walk is not experienced as a body to move away from or not *completely*. The flesh of others are bodies at rest and in motion (always moving away, in the sense of coming closer or going farther away from me). But they are carnal bodies in the form of "I move," in which the "I" is "another I" for whom my flesh is a body, and for whom all outer bodies which are not carnal bodies for it are the same outer bodies as mine. But every carnal body as well, which is for me the flesh of someone else, is for all other egos (with the exception of their own flesh) identically the same body and the same flesh of the same ego. Likewise for every ego, my flesh is the same body and at the same time the same flesh for the same ego (which for them is an alter ego) that I myself am for myself.

For all the earth is for everyone the same earth—the same bodies rule over it, in it, above it. "Over it," etc., the same carnal subjects, subjects of carnal bodies, which are for everyone, in an altered sense, bodies. For all of us, however, the earth is the ground and not a body in the complete

sense. Let us now assume that I am a bird and can fly—or assume that I watch the birds which also belong to the earth. To understand them is to put oneself in their place as flying. The bird sits on the branch or on the ground, then leaps into the air and flies upward: the bird is like me in its experiencing and in its action when it is upon the earth; it experiences the ground just as I do, it experiences different bodies, also other birds, the flesh of others, and carnal egos, etc. But the bird flies upward—that is like walking upside down, a kinesthesia whereby all courses of appearance, otherwise perceived as rest and motion of bodies, undergo variation and in ways similar to [316] walking. It is different only insofar as, for the bird, holding itself still and being "borne by the wind" (which, however, does not have to mean an apprehension of something bodily) forms a combination of experience with the "I am moving" and always still furnishes, by means of a "change of position in flight" and a new holding itself still, an "apparent motion," but in a different way. The holding itself still ends up as a "fall," in which the bird no longer flies but sits on the tree or on the earth and then eventually leaps up, etc. The bird leaves the earth on which it has, like us, nonflight experiences; it flies upward and again returns. Returning, the bird again has the modes of appearance of rest and movement like me who is earth-bound. Flying and returning the bird has other modes of appearance motivated by other kinesthesias (by its particular kinesthesias of flying), modes of appearance however analogously modified. Yet, within the modification, these modes of appearance have the meaning of rest and motion because the kinesthesias of flying and walking form, for the bird, a single kinesthetic system. By understanding the bird, we understand precisely this extension of its kinesthesias, etc. What is at rest has its system of appearances which one must always produce again as nonwalking, nonflying, etc.

Let us consider leaping upon and away from a moving body. The reversal of courses of appearance gives to me and thus to everyone rest and motion in the old mode. Thus I necessarily understand everyone. Indeed, I understand their leaping away as such. I understand bodies entering into my visual field, for example as falling "from empty space," precisely as such. "How" do I do that? Moving upon the earth they are moving for me because of the fact that I can vary and eventually accompany kinesthesias and because of the fact that the change of appearance still maintains rest—the very rest which would mean rest for me were I to hold myself kinesthetically still. I can do that in the case of bodies which do not move in extraterrestrial space; I could do it if I were to fly. But I can throw stones into the air and see them come back down as the same. The throwing can be more or less weak; obviously, the appearances are

therefore analogous to movements upon the earth so that they become [317] experienced as movements. Just as a jolt makes bodies such as balls, etc., roll, so bodies thrown, etc., are. I would also mention the experience of the movement of falling, in the case of falling from a body above the earth, from the roof of the house or a tower.

My carnal flight-vessel is based upon a mobile body (the car). "I can fly so high that the earth seems like a sphere." The earth can also be so small that I could traverse it from all sides and indirectly arrive at the idea of a sphere. I therefore discover that it is a large spherical body. But the question is whether and how I would arrive at corporeality in the sense that the earth is "astronomically" just one body among others, among the celestial bodies. One could hardly say how, even if I imagine the bird at any altitude and intend that it can experience the earth as one body among others. Why not? For us humans on the earth, the bird or the flying-machine moves, and that is valid for the bird itself and the people on the flying-machine insofar as they experience the earth as the source <*Stamm*> "body," as the ground "body." But can the flying-machine not function as "ground"? Can I exchange or conceive the exchange of, as the primordial land of my movements, the ground and body with the ground in motion? What would that be in terms of a change in apperception and what would its demonstration be? Must I not conceptually transfer to the flying-machine in constitutive validity (according to the form) what in general endows the earth with the sense as my ground, as the ground of my flesh?

Is that like the way in which I still presuppose my primordial flesh and everything belonging to it in understanding someone else's flesh? But here, I have necessarily the ontic validity of others in a comprehensible way. The difficulty repeats itself in the case of the stars. In order to be able to "experience" them, to apprehend them indirectly as bodies, I must already be a human being for myself on the earth as my source-ground. Perhaps one might say that the difficulties would not arise if I and if we were able to fly and have two earths as ground-bodies, being able to arrive at the one from the other by flight. Precisely [318] in this way the one body would be the ground for the other. But what do two earths mean? Two fragments of one earth with one humanity. Together, they would become one ground and, at the same time, each would be a body for the other. Surrounding them would be a common space in which each, as body, possibly would have a moveable location, but motion would always be relative to the other body and nonrelative to the synthetic ground of their being together. The locations of all bodies would have this relativity. However, one would always still have to ask, motion and rest with respect to which of the two ground-bodies?

Primordially, only "the" earth-ground can be constituted with the surrounding space of bodies. But this constitution already presupposes that my flesh and the known others and the open horizons of others are constituted, distributed in space within the space which, insofar as an open field of bodies that are near and far, surrounds the earth and endows the bodies with the sense of being earthly bodies and space with the sense of being earthly space. The totality of the We, of human beings, of "animals," is in this sense earthly—and at first is not opposed to the nonearthly. This sense is rooted and has its orientation center in me and in a narrower We who live with one another. But it is also possible for the earth-ground to be extended, possibly such that I learn to understand that, within the space of my first earth-ground, there are large aerial vessels which travel in it for a long time: I am born on one of them and my family lives on one of them. It was my ontic ground until I learned that we were only sailors on the larger earth, etc. Thus a multiplicity of ground-lands, of homelands, is unified into one ground-land. However, more about this later in necessary supplementations.

But if the earth is constituted with carnality and corporeality, then the "sky" is also necessary as the field of what at the extreme can be spatially experienced for me and all of us—and that happens on the basis of the earth-ground. Or an open horizon of reachable distance is constituted; on the basis of any point of the space which is accessible for me, there is an outermost horizon or limit (a sphere of the horizon) in which what can still be experienced as a distant thing finally disappears by moving away from me. Conversely, I can naturally think that "points" becoming visible [319] are distant bodies coming closer and can now approach until they reach the earth-ground, etc. But now I can also think that they are homelands.

But consider this. Each has his "acquired history" on the basis of the respective ego which is made at home in it. If I am born a sailor's child, then a part of my development has taken place on the ship. But the ship would not be characterized as a ship for me in relation to the earth—as long as no unity would be produced between the ship and the earth—the ship would itself be my "earth," my homeland. But my parents are not then primordially at home on the ship; they still have the old home, another primordial homeland. In the change of homelands (if homeland has the ordinary sense of territory peculiar to individual or family in each case) there remains universally stated that each ego has a primordial home—and every primordial people with their primordial territory has a primordial home. But every people and their historicity and every super-people (a super-nation) are themselves ultimately made at home, naturally, on the "earth." All developments, all relative histories

have to that extent a single primordial history of which they are episodes. In that connection it is indeed possible that this primordial history would be a collection of people living and developing entirely by themselves, except that they all are held mutually within the open and indeterminate horizon of earthly space.

Once clarifying the possibility of flying arks (which can also be a name for the primordial homeland), let us now consider the stars. These are exhibited in "experience" (that is, in the historicity in which the world is constituted, and in the world in which corporeal Nature, space belonging to Nature and space-time, humanity and the animal universe, are constituted) as mere "airships," "spaceships" of the earth, by departing from it and then returning back to it, inhabited and guided by human beings who, according to their ultimate generative origin which is for itself historical, have made their home on the earth-ground as their ark. We are therefore now considering "stars"—first of all, as points of light, specks of light. In the course of experience in the process of formation, they are apperceived as distant bodies, but without the possibility of normal experiential confirmation in the primary sense, [320] in the strict sense of a direct demonstrative showing. We deal with "celestial bodies" just as we deal with bodies that are for each of us (and eventually for others) present but are accidentally, factually, and temporarily inaccessible. With respect to them, we draw experiential inferences, make our empirical observations concerning location, observations of their inductively inferred motions, etc., as though they were bodies like any others. All of that is relative to the earth-ground ark and the "earthly sphere" and to us, earthly human beings, and the objectivity is related to universal humanity. What about the earth-ark itself? It is not itself already a body, nor is it a star among other stars. Only when we think of our stars as secondary arks with their eventual humanities, etc., only when we figure ourselves as transplanted there among these humanities, perhaps flying there, is it otherwise. Then it is like children born on ships, but with some differences. The stars are indeed hypothetical bodies in a specific sense of the "as-if," and so too the hypothesis that they are homes in an accessible sense of a particular kind.

The homogenization of celestial distances even by iteration generates its phenomenological questions. What eidetic possibility is there and what possibility is pregiven there with the earthly world through its essential kind of being as constitutive as well of its being? With the hypothetical interpretation of visible stars as distant bodies, and by the eidetic form of the limit of what can be experienced of distance, there is already given the open infinity of the earthly world as endowed with an infinity of possibly existing distant bodies. We understand the homogeneity without further

ado such that the earth itself is a body upon which we wander around accidentally. With the problems now being considered we confront properly the great problem of the legitimate sense of a universal, purely physical science of "Nature"—of an astronomical physical science operating in "astronomical" infinity in the sense of our modern physics (in the broadest sense, astrophysics), and the problem of an inner infinity, the infinity of the continuum and the way to atomize or [321] quantify in the open endlessness or infinity—atomic physics. In these sciences of the infinity of the totality of Nature, the mode of observation is usually the one in which carnal bodies are only accidentally particularized bodies which can therefore also conceivably be completely ignored so that a Nature without organisms, without animals and humans is possible. It is almost necessary to believe, and occasionally even also seriously believe, that it is a mere factual occurrence, a state of affairs determined by the laws of nature that hold in the world, if animal flesh, psychical life, is (causally) connected to certain bodies or types of bodies of physical structure. Accordingly, it would be conceivable that these same carnal bodies, that precisely bodies of such a character, are just mere bodies. As one also believes can be proved with respect to the earth, there was once no "life" on it, long spans of time were needed until highly complicated organic substances were formed and subsequently animate life emerged on the earth. And that also takes for granted that the earth is only one of the accidental bodies of the world, one among others, and that it would be ridiculous to want to believe after Copernicus that the earth is the center of the world "merely because by accident we live on it," which is even privileged by its "rest" in relation to which everything moveable moves. It would seem that in our natural scientific naivety (not insofar as natural science is treated theoretically, but insofar as it naively believes it has acquired absolute truth about the world in its theories, even at levels of relative completeness), we have already broken through what has been previously taken for granted. Perhaps phenomenology has supported Copernican astrophysics—but also anti-Copernicanism according to which God had fixed the earth at a place in space. Perhaps at the level of phenomenology, notwithstanding the calculations and mathematical theories of Copernicus, subsequent astrophysics and thus the totality of physics preserve a legitimacy within its limits. Quite different is the question if a purely physical biology (which, however, accordingly should be biology) can retain its sense and legitimacy.

Therefore let us reflect: How should we acquire the right [322] to accept the earth as a body, as a star among stars? At first the earth is given only as possibly another star. But let us start with another possibility. The physicist will agree that it is a mere fact that we see the stars at

all. He will say, "Could it not just as well be that the stars, even the sun, are so far away that they would not be there for us?" Indeed, in fog they are invisible. Thus it could have been through all historical periods—we would have lived therefore in a generational historicity and could have had our earthly world, our earth and earth-spaces, flying and floating bodies there, etc., everything as before, only without visible stars that could be experienced by us. Perhaps we would have had an atomic physics or a microphysics, but not an astrophysics or a macrophysics. But we would have to consider to what extent the former would have been changed. We would have had our telescopes, our microscopes, our ever more precise instruments of measurement. We would have had our Newton and law of gravity. We would have been able to discover that bodies exert gravity on one another, and that accordingly bodies could have been regarded at the same time as divisible, as wholes of corporeal parts bodies which therefore exert their gravity as self-sufficient bodies and operate according to the laws of mechanics, yield results, etc. We would have discovered that the earth is a "sphere" divisible into bodies, that as total unity of corporeal parts it exerts, as totality, a gravitation in relation to all bodies detached from it, bodies that are visible and invisible in terrestrial space. We would know that these are bodies in terrestrial space which we can perceive only by telescopes and always better telescopes as always again lying beyond what is usually visible for us. We could then tell ourselves that, finally, naturally, bodies of any size whatever still could not and could never be inaccessibly far from our senses. Without seeing them or having direct cognizance of them, even if distant bodies are to be equated by hypothesis with ordinary bodies, we could make inductions and, on the basis of gravitational effects, etc., calculate the existence of such "stars." The earth, finally, would be a body conceived in physics like any other and would even have stars around it. As a matter of fact, we already have [323] stars in view and discover them scientifically in physical calculable relations to the earth and we discover the earth as equivalent to these stars, as one body among bodies. We do not therefore get to physics.

But everything comes to this: we must not forget the pregivenness and constitution belonging to the apodictic Ego or to me, to us, as the source of all actual and possible ontic sense, of all possible broadening which can be further constructed in the developing acquired history of an already constituted world. One should not perpetrate the absurdity, indeed the absurdity, of presupposing tacitly beforehand the naturalistic or prevailing conception of the world—in order to consider then, in an anthropological and psychological way, the formation of science and of the interpretation of the world in human history, in the history of the

species, within the evolution of the individual and people, as an obviously accidental event on the earth which might just as well have occurred on Venus or Mars. This holds too for the earth and we humans, me with my flesh and me in my generation, my people, etc. This whole historicity belongs inseparably to the Ego, and is in essence not repeatable, but everything relates back to this acquired history of the transcendental constitution as pertinent core and as an ever-widening core—everything that is newly discovered as a possibility of the world is connected with the ontic sense of being ready made. Following implicitly from this, one might therefore think that the earth can no more lose its sense as "primordial homeland," as the ark of the world, than my flesh can lose its wholly unique ontic sense as primordial flesh from which every flesh derives a part of its ontic sense and as we human beings in our ontic sense precede the brutes, etc. As a consequence, however, nothing of that constitutive dignity or order of validities can be changed if the flesh and body are conceived as necessarily equivalent (homogenization), or if the corporeal flesh is conceived as a body like any other, if humanity is conceived as one animal species among animal species, and therefore finally if the earth is conceived as, one mundane body among mundane bodies. I could just as well [324] think of myself as transplanted to the moon. Why should I not think of the moon as something like an earth, as therefore something like a land for animal habitation? Indeed, I can very well think of myself as a bird flying off from the earth to a body that lies far away, or as a pilot of an airplane that flies off and lands there. Certainly, I can conceive of human beings and animals already being there. But I ask, perhaps, "how have they gotten there?"—then, just as similarly in the case of a new island where cuneiform writing is found, I ask: How did the people in question come there? All animals, all living beings, all beings whatsoever, have ontic being only on the basis of my constitutive genesis and this has "earthly" precedence. Indeed, a fragment of the earth (like an ice floe) may have become detached, and that has made a particular historicity possible. But that does not mean that the moon or Venus could not just as well be conceived as primordial homes in a primordial separation and that does not mean that the being of the earth is precisely only a fact for me and our terrestrial humanity. There is only one humanity and one earth—all the fragments which are or have been separated from it belong to it. But if this is the case, need we say with Galileo: *par si muove?* And not on the contrary: it does not move? It is certainly not so that it moves in space, although it could move, but rather, as we tried to show above, the earth is the ark which makes possible in the first place the sense of all motion and all rest as mode of one motion. But its rest is not a mode of motion.

But now one may find it a little extravagant, frankly crazy, to contradict all natural scientific knowledge of actuality and real possibility. It is possible that entropy will put an end to all life on earth, or that celestial bodies will crash into the earth, etc. But even if one found in our attempts the most unbelievable philosophical hubris, we would not back down from the consequences for the clarification of necessities pertaining to all sense donation for what exists and for the world. We do not back down even when confronting the problems of death in the new way phenomenology conceives them. In the present, I as something present [325] am progressively dying, others die for me when I do not find a present connection with them. But a unity by recollection permeates my life—I still live, although in being other, and continue to live the life that lies behind me and where its sense of being behind me lies in reiteration and the ability to reiterate. Thus the We lives in the reiterability and continually lives in the form of reiterability of history while the individual "dies," that is, the individual can no longer be "remembered" empathically by others, but only by the historical memory in which the subjects of the memory can be represented themselves.

What belongs to constitution is, and is alone, the absolute and ultimate necessity. Only on that basis is everything conceivable concerning the constituted world to be determined ultimately. What sense could the collapsing masses in space, in one space constructed *a priori* as absolutely homogeneous, have, if the constituting life were eliminated? Indeed, does not that elimination itself have the sense, if it has any at all, of an elimination of and in the constituting subjectivity? The ego lives and precedes all actual and possible beings, and anything existent whether in a real or irreal sense. The constituted time of the world, more particularly, conceals in itself psychological time, and the psychological refers back to the transcendental. But it does not do so in such a way that one can simply convert the objectively psychical into the transcendental, and, above all, not in such a way that one can convert all the ways in which, under any abstractly and relatively justified viewpoint, one harmoniously presupposes the homogeneous world and, more precisely, nature with the psychical which is psycho-physically attached to it—in practice, one can operate very well with that presupposition (the natural human *praxis* for forming and utilizing science)—not in such a way that one can convert that presupposition into the transcendental in order finally to oppose, as valid, the paradoxes that arise to phenomenology.

5

# The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World That Is Outside the Flesh

Translated by Bettina Bergo and
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III[1]

[323] Have I taken into consideration everything that will eventually be significant for our question? Every perspectival "distant thing" indicates an existing thing, indicates the entire system of perspectives whose optimal sphere is the sphere of near things, the sphere of perspectival near things. And this indication is not an isolated one either for the individual perspectives which can be near or far or for the individual things that really optimally legitimate themselves, that is, for the things whose reality we can fully legitimate through the practice of bringing them near to us.

The whole present world which appears as real is rather [324] a totality of the perspectives for me. Not only is every individual thing a unity within the variation of its perspectivization, but rather every pair, every group of things existing in a simultaneous present perspectivizes itself as all of a piece. The entire perceptual field of things, insofar as it is a constituted multiplicity of things appearing perspectivally, is a harmonic unity[2] of perspectivity. *One* perspectival style governs and continues to govern through the variation of the perceptual field that is brought about either by the emergence of perceptual appearances of things that were not in

the field a moment ago or by the departure of perceptual appearances of things that were just now in it. And this perspectival style governs not only in every momentary present, but also in the concrete present flowing in its continuing synthesis, a synthesis which also concerns the perspectival coexistences and successions, in the way in which they turn into one another and, in so doing, fit together as a whole.

This style is constantly prefigured and maintains itself, always confirming itself in a concordant way, within the form such that indeed certain individual appearances can enter and break up this style. If certain appearances either develop themselves in a discordant way—"contrary to the style" (by not allowing distant things to turn into near things or by not allowing near things to turn into distant things in the normal way)—or develop themselves in an unanticipated way within the style as a whole, then doubt, corrections, and semblance arise.

But what we have described so far is not the whole concrete style of appearing in which for me, as the perceiver, as the one who experiences originally the living present, the world is experienced in a concordant way as existing. For there has been no discussion yet of qualities. It would be more precise to emphasize that the concrete total style, in its layering, also continuously constitutes a layer of things that are in the majority "unchanged." It thereby has a core layer of primary normalcy, to which the layer of things "at rest without qualitative change" which stand out only "after the fact" belong (namely, the layer that stands out as a continuous unitary association by means of qualitative change and in the full qualitative similarity a layer of different bodies "standing still"). The still body is the normal body, because even the deformation of the body can turn into stillness in any of its phases. Precisely in this way can the unchanged body be regarded as the normal body for qualitative change. In addition, the causal style constituting the appearances of the thing is itself to be grasped as a founded level; that is, we still have to take into account that the causal style is founded within the above-described style of appearing. The lower level is constituted by "fantasy images."[3] A constituted thing is produced only by the founded style of regularity, that is, the style which is founded on the basis of the usual behavior of fantasy images under fantasized circumstances.

[325] As the overall integrality of the style, causality has a holistic form that runs through the "nonchange" and the "change" of perspectives (as merely spatial perspectives) (a change and nonchange which is neither that of things themselves, nor a change and nonchange of perspectives perceived in the temporality of things, but rather a change or nonchange that is experienced as within the temporality of immanent life).

The style of variation in its "rest" (in its momentary nonvariation) and "motion" is inherently related to my capacity for being at rest or for moving myself; and, accordingly, the style of variation can at times (in immanent temporality) vary "by itself." We must then distinguish the following. On the one hand, there is the variation of appearances within the system of appearance (the variation of subjective presentations going up as far as the causalities that present themselves) and the variation "from itself" of the entire system of appearing, including what-does-not-vary "by itself." And on the other hand, there are variations coming from me, from my doing, begun from my kinesthetic doing. It is, however, always a doing, and a doing in the system of *being-able*-to-do. In respect to appearances of spatiality, a capacity of this kind is related to self-variations, namely, to the fact that I may, generally speaking, compensate for each self-variation—in my closest, intimate sphere—and thereby more or less completely compensate for them. Thus the total variation of style, including every harmonious style of variation in the mode of the "by itself" proper to the appearance of individual things, is variable on its side through the related capacity that I possess. And in this way, whether the ego leaves it to itself or whether the ego freely influences it, this style in its entirety is so constructed that, while preserving its character of being harmonious, every individual that appears in it (and appears in a continuously, concordantly varying way) can be experienced as one and the same, and accordingly as "objectively" changed or unchanged in a determinate manner, as occupying a place and having spatial extension or as moving itself, as deforming itself, as changing or not changing itself qualitatively.

This universal experiential style of the world in the experiential form of the "living present" possesses the following characteristic. Always already, this universal experiential style of the world has or can have as a potentiality (when accidental checks do not intervene) an outermost distance, a fading that occurs by itself or through my doing, a fading that is proper to things of experience, a distance that continually carries things to the zero-point; and this occurs in such a way that all figural differences, all qualitative differences, all internal separations of parts, disappear in general and so, in the constant identification of the same thing, the same thing nevertheless appears finally as a "point." Likewise, going in reverse, a distant point in the outermost distance can, by itself or through my doing (although we do not always have in fact the capacities for doing this), transform itself into the continuity of a distant thing, [326] in which it shows itself, *qua* distant thing, as ever more highly differentiated. The outermost distance can also, like the blue skies or like a distant, monotonous background, be constituted in such a way that in

the process of fading what is differentiated vanishes into its background, losing its separate contours.

The following also belongs to the perspectival style of appearance. Its own variation according to its style indicates possibilities of resolution into appearances which, as appearances adapting themselves harmoniously to the universal style of appearing, would be experiences of worldly objects—without the question being raised "whether I really can go there or not." It indicates—and we could also say, it induces—the world as a world making ontologic sense through this style, either as a world that constantly appears cogiven with a distant circle (the circle of the horizon) or—say, when I am in a room or in a cave and am, nevertheless, not tied down there—as a world whose horizon we could actually make appear and, moreover, make appear as articulated into proximity and distance.

Thus, it appears in such a way that the possibility is cointended, that objects can approach by themselves from the remotest distance (this is why the remotest distance is still called distance), as is quite the usual occurrence, that a horizon-point begins to stand out in accordance with its appearance, transforming itself into a distant appearance and a continuity of appearing, which then awakens the ontic sense of "approaching thing." And correlatively, the possibility is cointended, that, as I advance toward the distant thing, following any one whatsoever of the directions of orientation, the distant horizon, however imperceptible it may at first remain, is correspondingly resolved, or at least partially so, into a horizon of appearing things.[4]

These possibilities are "prefigured" through experience. They are possibilities containing in themselves ontic validities. They are not mere fantasized possibilities; they are precisely inductive possibilities, which are suggested, in accordance with the style, by prior experience which includes the entire course of the living present, even though no determinate ontic certainty is motivated in the individual details or in the whole.

The style of perspectives, among those the spatial perspectives, and then the qualitative perspectives, is already constituted in spatiotemporality, which is after all the form of realities, and thus of realities such as they are in themselves. We have here already the distinction between "immanent time," the time of the perspectival developments, and the "fantasized time of perspectivally appearing unities."

But how far does this extend? Here we first have to inquire about immanence: do we not have pauses that come from sleeping? What does immanence do with the pauses of a single time which binds together the interrupted flux of perspectival appearances? One might say that we have here the hidden originary temporalization, which is temporalized

through memories in their remoteness.[5] [327] But how does it stand with fantasy images? If the fantasized perceptual fields and temporal fields were not dissociated but were bound together only through immanent time, would not immanent time and fantasized time still be indistinguished, even though the fantasy image would already be distinguished as a potentially constituted unity of appearances from the appearances themselves? How would it be for space? Coexistence would be constituted in the manner of fantasy, in distinction from the coexistence that consists in perspectives. Every fantasy image already contains spatiality in itself, already has some coexistence, and it has what is now, but it does not give what is now as a whole in the manner of perception. Fantasy images can move by themselves or be moved by my doing or as well by both together, and several can move as a unity in space *qua* form.

Up to what point, however, may I maintain the unity of a fantasy image? I can maintain it naturally through perception and through a recollection,[6] which is extended within a sphere of continuously advancing perception, thus as it were extended within a present that is being enlarged at will. But what about pauses, interruptions, during which immanent time can indeed run on, but not the unity of the perception of the fantasy image?

But we do not need to touch on the problem of "sleep," of "unconsciousness." The mode of the living, flowing present of the fantasy image comes first, that is, the problem that fantasy images emerge into it and go out of it again, and then can reemerge into it, and so forth. But do the fantasy images still *exist* after this "going out of," as the phrase indicates, and does it still make sense to say that the newly emerging fantasy image is "the same" as the one leaving earlier?

Within a certain range, I have the capacity to inspect anew the past fantasy image that has left. In the passage through continuous perception, from my particular field of fantasy images which (in the variation of perspectives) persist enduringly as perceived to a field enlarged by new fantasy images and in the capacity to revert back at will to the earlier field with its earlier fantasy images—whereby, in the passage from phase to phase, a core of enduringly perceived fantasy images is provided—I identify without further ado the newly perceived fantasy images with the similar ones perceived earlier, that is, with those recalled as being found in the earlier field. This passage has the character of a continuous total perception, and therein is grounded also a unity of the total experience of a "fantasized world," which was continuously there for me in a perceptual way, though in that present, I actually only perceive, and perceived, a section of it. We here acquire a style of perception of such a type that a horizon of potentially perceivable and coexisting, copresent

objects—eventually known, but also unknown—belongs to each perceptual present. [328] Each manner of putting into play my kinestheses brings to perception what already might earlier have been perceived, etc.

But is all this not simply the case for a normal sphere of persisting fantasy images, unchanged (at rest and in a state of qualitative nonchange) in the continuity of our experience of them? And when I have been only concerned with fantasy images and thus with unities of perspectives in these investigations, have I not taken into consideration bodily nature as it is given to me in perception? Have I not done this precisely according to the viewpoint of what there is to say within the limits of nature's perspectival modes of appearing (thus abstractly), according to the viewpoint of what there is to say of nature properly according to perception or purely on the basis of the sensuous intuitable present? Thus, in other words: I then have the world as pure nature reduced to its primordial level, as oriented around my functioning flesh (the flesh likewise primordially reduced). And through the variation of orientations within my uninterrupted continuity of living experience, I have experienced the world as identical, namely as persisting through the variation of perspectives, as persisting in a variation that, proceeding from itself, is also potentially susceptible to variations directed by me.

The further problems that follow from this must naturally be those whose object is the synthesis of this primordial world with the worlds of others existing for me, and on the other hand, the problem of "pauses," sleep, and also death.

Yet now, how do we get through the normal case of rest, of nonchange, and how do we come upon the form of space already constituted as a form of unchangeable fantasy images, indefinitely open by virtue of the permanently prefigured horizon of possible coexistences of fantasy images? No difficulty is posed by the constitutive formation of unity in a passage from an unchanged fantasy image to the same one modified in one or another way, and persisting now as again unchanged, in a passage which sooner or later leads to nonchange and can terminate in nonchange. No difficulty is posed by the capacity for multiple forms of change grasped as a continuum of phases always corresponding to a definite accompanying nonchange (construction on the basis of differentials); rest and movement will be experienced and the latter in different figures of movement in spaces, in the form of uniform and nonuniform movement, etc., and so too for the different modes and qualitative directions of changes.

All that is, however, not so simple in relation to the different "senses," etc. If the necessary clarification is carried out, then we understand the abstract layers: the fantasy image in change or nonchange, persisting

first as the same, so long as the perception of this fantasy image [329] (and of any fantasized group) runs on, uninterrupted, and as long as the emergence and exit of fantasy images from the perceptual field proceed in a certain style. When I see a pendulum swing, and when, while turning my gaze where I please only to return it continually to the pendulum, I see the same resting clock and its surroundings, I then "experience" that the pendulum moved regularly during the intervals of not-being-seen, although it is conceivable that it might have moved otherwise in the interim. I also know that movement could pass over into rest, change into nonchange, and this could happen in very different ways. But if I experience durable rest, then I continually expect rest. I continually expect rest as long as nothing suggests movement by anticipation, as happens when I had already earlier been able to experience the resting of this object or of this type of object as a partial process within the periodic alternation between rest and movement, and so too for any given series or for series typical of various processes of change.

Through its manner of change, every fantasy image prefigures in itself (including here the borderline case of rest) its imminent persistence and its imminent change and, within a certain range, also the mode of change itself. Yet the prefiguration nevertheless occurs in such a way that the possibility of its happening otherwise, and thus indeed not only as something fantasizable, is always open. Instead, a beginning and a cessation take place, breaking through such anticipations. And the style of this experience of the fantasy image possesses this possibility as a thing itself <*Sache selbst*> that is normal.

Not the mere individual element but rather entire fields function thereby. But then qualities within the already constituted space, the visual-tactile space, come into view. And there the further problem results, the problem of the constitution of space as a space that is empty of thing but penetrated by rays: space as a resounding object of the radiation of sound in space; space as an object that gets hot, the radiation of heat, and the manner by which these radiations are experienced without the objects that are radiating, the manner in which this experience, which is not aimed directly at the spatial object, indicates its object and indicates in a perspective of its own—the heat of the oven, shading off perspectivally in changing radiations at different sites in space, where my body happens to be. When experienced under similar kinesthetic circumstances, this is what makes the similar available at the same time, constitutes the same together as a unity of shadings.

The constitution of the fantasized world results from the moving, uninterrupted flowing perception, which continually confirms and verifies the constitutive accomplishment that is already lying in its sense.

This is precisely a continuing constitution. Spatiotemporality is already a form, the form for the *res extensa*.

If we survey the path of our investigation up until now, we find that [330] rest and movement, change and nonchange, are already in a certain sense there in the constituted world of fantasy images, namely, by what our explicative commentary has exhibited, elucidated according to a determinate sense.

And yet, we still have given no account of the contribution of the fantasy images to real objects, to objects persisting through real objective changes and nonchanges, and which are in themselves inasmuch as they persist in this way.

Properly speaking, up until now we have only given account of the constitution of unities from those subjective, kinesthetic-associative variations that develop in the living present and which hence produce only unities that are immediately kinesthetically available; these unities are those which are constituted in the perspective of their adumbrations individually and as whole perceptual fields, with the individual object's emergences and exits, but always in the mode of permanently conscious unities presumed to be permanently immediately available. Thanks to their mode of constitution, these unities are already unities of change and nonchange. In rest, the thing—or the fantasy image as we have been saying—is given one-sidedly, each side being given as available starting from the lateral variation just expired; thereby, each side continually brings along with it the anticipated horizon of the opposite side and thus brings the anticipated opposite side with it in the style of nonchange. If the one-sidedly given fantasy image is in the process of changing, then change is also anticipated for what is unseen. Indeed, it is never out of the question that, in the case where the anticipated object was anticipated as rest, the anticipated object, posited as properly un-experienced copresent, shows itself as movement or change when we produce the experience; and inversely, in the case where it was anticipated as movement and change, it shows itself as nonchange and rest. But, at least to some degree, I can always convince myself that, for example, the back side has remained unmoved in its parts or that the body has there been somewhat deformed, has been qualitatively changed, and by repeatedly walking around it I can obtain an ever-strengthening certainty of this. And so likewise for change—but all this always in the sole present of the originally living flow, and the spatiotemporal present that is constituted in the former and filled with objects. Naturally, the same goes for every past present and also every future present.

But is all of this sufficient to account for the constitutive structure of the experience of the world that exists for me, sufficient to account

for the sense of the one and the same world, lasting over many times, the sense that this world has for me in this experiential life? How can this sense become proper to my empirical life in its flowing continuity? [331] What universal structure does it have? And what sedimentations of experiential sense refer back to it in the midst of each living present? How does the specific structure of living present experience in which this sense is grounded behave, and what is the appearance of the verification which is fulfilled in it?

It is certainly the case that when recollection makes its appearance within the living present and when it has produced its effect in the permanence of that present, recollection reproduces for me my earlier life, my prior living present, and thus reproduces the world experienced in it as a spatiotemporal present. However, to what degree is this world, without further ado, experienced as the same one that I am still experiencing now, though the circle of things that I am now experiencing, my present surrounding world, is nevertheless one generally different from the one that had been previously actually present? In the living present, I have the succession of phases, succession of intervals of presence, in which, on the one hand, things come to experience that were not yet there and, on the other hand, things vanish from effective experience, which however were grasped as having been there earlier or as having persisted after their disappearance. This is due to the fact that it is always possible for us arbitrarily and at our discretion to locate again in usual experience the thing that has disappeared, it is possible for us to be able to experience it again and on the basis of the apperceptions that this possibility founds. This seems easily understandable, and this as well: in the passage from one unified present in the flow to a more recent one that has already become reproductive, I nevertheless say in relation to the things that the latter offered and which my immediate present does not offer that "It's just that I don't see the things now, they are still there, and, by approaching appropriately I can also see them again"; likewise I can say: "I could already then have experienced what is now experienced as something new, if I had then let my kinestheses play appropriately."

However, even in this narrow sphere, are things quite so simple? Doesn't this elucidation presuppose something structurally in order to be able to come to such experiences of identity that rest upon the "I-can-always-again"? And first of all, how is it in the case of present surrounding worlds that lie far in the background? Cities, countrysides, mountains, etc., which I came to know a long time ago, perhaps during voyages, nevertheless still exist, although I am now here, am now at home. I can certainly visit them again, I can see again the cities of my childhood. But how can I say this, how is what is seen again experienced as the

same for me, how is it experienceable as the same? I do in fact still recognize, and thereby I usually experience that the same thing has changed more or less or even entirely, that much has wholly disappeared, that the familiar house no longer stands, and that in its place there is another one, and things like this. But how can [332] we say all that? Through what experiences is that possible? I say "the same thing" and not "something similar," "the same, only changed." I say "the same" for something that is similar in the present and in recollection; but also, under the category of the "changed," I say "one-and-the same" for what is different, what presents "a completely other appearance." I distinguish the similar from the same, from the identical, and I do this in experience. To be sure, I cannot always distinguish, I cannot always be certain of the presumed identity. And yet I say "the same world." And I also say "the same world" in such uncertainties that are undecided and that are in fact un-decidable for me that I doubt whether it is identical or similar; or I doubt whether it is the same thing under a stronger modification or whether it is an other. In any case—this is also what supports such doubts—the thing which I remember is not only something appearing to me subjectively during my experience at the time, nor something that, in experience, was proved true merely subjectively and temporarily. In being objective, it was experienced as an enduring thing, eventually as something changing in the mode of decay (which also is just a manner of enduring in the form of decaying objects, to which then a further similar transformation can happen).

Perhaps this apprehension which dominates our life is (at least when it is thus taken strictly, namely, as the apprehension of an absolutely persisting nature) an artificial, already mediated product of science. Perhaps a real disappearance and a coming-to-nothingness are primarily something to be left open; above all, they are to be left open, when we consider the primordial world by way of abstraction and make no constitutive use of the accomplishments of the shared experience of others.

However, in any event, we must nonetheless understand, and thus understand it first as a sublevel, how one comes to the constitution of the unity of a temporal world *qua* persisting one, with its intrinsic content of the living present and with the identifications of things that binds my past with this present over the course of experience. Only then can we ask how we come to the "idealization" that allows no disappearance, no miraculous origin of things.

We can see that the question of the constitutive possibility of a unitary, objective world (and first, of nature) is intimately connected, indeed is equivalent, to the problem of the possibility of being able to experience the same object in different times (and then according to

different human individuals), to the question of the transcendental possibility of experiencing the same as the same.

The problem of the recognition of the concrete typic of objects and the objects themselves according to their type is moreover connected to this. We distinguish on the one hand what is generally typical, or the general types (the house, the tree, the animal, etc.), the experience of an object, even [333] an unknown object, as "a tree," "an animal," and so forth; its type is known and recognized, although not as a generality that is objectified separately, but the individual object is unknown in its individuality. On the other hand, we distinguish the individual type, in which the concrete individuality of the object is recognized as such. A man has, for example, a body. And if this man is not thematically divided into a body and a person, he has also his general typical characteristic within his being grasped as a man in a unitary way, but also his immediately apprehended individuality (however incompletely this is grasped), his behavior, his demeanor, which designate him as being without comparison to others and in which he straightway is recognized as this man (even though the general typical characteristic is not conceived through comparison and abstractive generalization, but rather is known as a moment of the experience itself). The world familiar to us through experience, our life world, is in every present; and in every overview the unity of spatiotemporality that inheres in our experience is found in the unitary world, which is ours not only through a flowing present, but also as our spatiotemporal world of experience. Thanks further to past events which memory can find anew and to the expectation that prefigures a living future for us, this is a world thoroughly typified; all that exists there, whether known or unknown, is an object of experience, formally "an *A*," and "this *A*."

And all real relations, connections, wholes, parts are themselves relations and connections of these typifying forms, which should here be understood, if one likes, as "forms of appearance," "forms of experience," and not, as it were, as the artificial forms of a logical construction, which all traditional logics already presuppose implicitly.

Here is, however, the problem to be cleared up: how and at what levels is the constitution of types,[7] which essentially belongs to the constitution of objects as mundane objects of possible experience, constructed? Or how are they structured or founded in their sense-formations as the "ready made" and as belonging to the always already ready experience of objects? And from there, we must then understand how individuals at different moments of experience, to which the objective times of experiences nevertheless correspond, can be identified, and recognized, and verified through experience, as the same which is always already

something typified. Further on, the problem arises of how the merely similar (which already has the form of two or more *A*s) can be experienced as the similarity of different individual objects—beyond the intervals of time.

The objects are constituted as persisting unities of nonchange and change. The constitution of types embraces at every level the constitutive formation of unities of change as well as the different "concepts" or types of change, finally objective change. [334] How does this constitution of types operate, such that it allows objects to be recognizable anew, to be incessantly and continually verifiable through experience as the same ones, though in quite different states of change, in states of change that exist in different times, as the same ones persisting, yet always existing as the same throughout these times?

Let us imagine abstractly a world of perception, a living perceptually oriented present at rest. How must we proceed? (a) Reduction of intersubjectivity to subjectivity as my own; (b) every new change has its sense of rest; the constitution of rest must therefore found that of "change"; (c) every past acquires its sense in the flowing present and is thus self-constituting on the basis of its flow; every objective past is constituted from the objective present, and the objective present is constituted ultimately in the structure known as the "living present," by virtue of which the objective present carries in itself, in its flowing, an originary present. In this authentic present of perception, the perceptually oriented world present is constituted and thus the first world of perception, and in it the constitution of rest.

Every present is a situation, no matter how change takes place in it: kinesthetic variation and orientation variation, variation of perspectives, rest and motion, qualitative change and nonchange. And unity is maintained nevertheless in this present throughout all the changes in this present. The unity of spatio-corporeal things will not only be experienced as "the same, which nonetheless moves itself," but also the whole situation itself has a unity, or better, what is experienced coexisting in the unity of a living present has itself a unity, that of the situation.

1. Let us take as a first point, as the normal case from which we can proceed: the situation of a "surrounding world at rest." Thus, nonchange is always experienced, over the variation of kinestheses, nonchange in the process of the always again identification of the same things, nonchange in the process of the harmonious experience of these things, of our first acquaintance with them. Thereby, we have in the ever continuing process cogiven the horizon of what is newly to be known and eventually the horizon of the simple reexperiencing, the horizon of the "able-to-be-perceived-again-as-already-known." In this temporal process (which is

immanent temporality, and in which the time of things is exhibited as the persistence of all things in nonchange), all things have not merely their persisting figure, rather all things have at the same time a persisting spatial configuration, which exhibits itself through the configuration of exhibitions in their respective fields of sense.

This change possesses the following characteristic: in every phase of the flowing present, a determinate configuration is realized perceptually from a particular side; however, in the flowing passage from phase to [335] phase, things enter into perception while others leave it; and this happens in such a way nevertheless that such a variation does not come in if I keep the kinestheses at rest. But, as important as it is constitutively, the keeping of the kinestheses at rest is nevertheless only a transitional stage for the normal way we let things flow by or for the arbitrarily determined direction of the kinestheses. The perceiving that progresses thus in its flow is integrated with the unity of a perception, which extends as far as what has flown by; what has flown by is past in the living process and is still distinct in the present despite the "obscuring," present precisely as the freshly living "retentional past." Likewise, a living future, flowing in its passage toward the living present of effectuation, is potentionally prefigured. What is flowing here, what is constituted as a unity, is a continuously persisting "spatial field" of unchanged things, or, which means the same thing, what is flowing here is an open spatial configuration of unchanged things that is constantly coming to knowledge and being enlarged in the taking up of this knowledge, being enlarged in the continuous flowing experience. The "whole" of things that are experienced simultaneously in the living present is not a simple "being-experienced-together," but the unity of a "whole" connected spatiotemporally, or a "whole" connected configuratively within spatiotemporality. The word "configuration" must not only make us think of the spatial, but at the same time make us think of the qualifying factor, thus of the phenomenological unity which here renders the individual *concreta* concretely unified.

As the association (kinestheses-perspectives) constitutes the thing at rest in a particular structural figure, so too the universal structure of the connected whole—which delivers a single and integral field of perception in the flowing of the living present—is an associative structure, supposing that we understand what association as an intentional synthesis means.

Here then the association functions. This implies permanent apperception: the synthetic unity which is formed in *one* place—as a formation of adumbrations, as adumbrations that are appearances of the same in the kinesthetic passage—and which is transposed to all the places of sensible fields. And in the simultaneous process of formation there is,

nonetheless, all at once, a process of association of formations, and this takes place in a reciprocal apperceptive transposition, as it were, and in a coincidence—a coincidence, namely, in the type of unities synthetically transposed. Every object which newly emerges is already apperceived as an object, as a unity of appearances which are to be formed in this or that manner, thus which are to be brought to the point where they unfold; and thus that, the apperceiving of the object *qua* object, is in general the first universal type constitution—precisely the type constitution of the object as an object of experience, an object of perception, and the type constitution of unities as a configuration of objects. Also, this first universal type constitution contains the typic of the enlargement of the configuration within [336] the framework of the remaining-held, the new admission of properly perceptible objects, and the loss of such objects is enveloped in this first constitution, but this is a loss that is nonetheless a conservation in the form of the remaining in living validity, in the form of the simply retentional modification.

Every separated object is itself something figured; it is in itself a closed configuration, that is, a configuration of extensive parts set out within it. We could just as well say that it is a configuration of objects that is integrated as a partial configuration into the total configuration. In effect, through this constitution of unities of simple rest, the object is not, in truth, yet constituted.

2. The constitution of change on the basis of un-change is already presupposed for the perspectival constitution of the un-change of spatial things, and including first the constitution of spatial rest. I want to excuse myself, here, from examining more closely the constitution of the change of an individual thing. This should be elucidated as the constitution of a something that persists within change under a persistent spatial figure which itself can be deformed, and as a qualification which for its part remains unchanged or can be altered. Besides, we would have to elucidate the constitution of the change as the change of a simple fragment (a member, etc.) or of several fragments, as well as of change as decomposition into independent parts. Similarly for the fundamental structure of bodies (nature). With this is constituted a "separated object," as a persisting reality within the substitution of change for nonchange and reciprocally vis-à-vis another "separated object" and, of course, always within the limitation of the investigation to the present of living perception.

Now let us consider that all change is *eo ipso* at the same time a change of the global, objective, and concrete (spatiotemporally concrete) situation, or of the global "configuration." Insofar as it is a flowing totality, it too has its nonchange and its change, and its change also

leads from total nonchange to total change, or can lead there, when the changing objects pass over into states of nonchange. If we grasp how un-change and change belong to the constitutive outcome itself—un-change and change at once of the variation which belongs to the duration of the object, the variation of the remaining-like-itself or the becoming-unlike in the flowing temporal phases of the duration of a variation in which the object persists as the same "changing" object (and that is what its object here amounts to)—if we then grasp "change" in a broadened sense, then the following results. The total objectal present, as it temporalizes according to perception during the flowing immanent present, this objectivizing present is a persisting total unity, which is not that of *an* object, but rather that of a configurative [337] connection of all immanent, simultaneously experienced objects. It is, so to speak, the first world as world of experience (here, the world of the simple experience of the living present, and of course, more precisely, the world of the experience of its objective structure of perception alone). Consequently, the multiplicity of change, which extends through the continuing duration (the continuance of the perceptual object), and in which the object has its existence as a persisting identical unity, is not isolated and also cannot be. This multiplicity of change is ordered instead according to the universal multiplicity of the change of the totality, together in the unity of the flowing objects perceived in the flowing present of perception. These do not persist alone, but rather form a company within the form, persisting in its own way, of objective time (the form of objective time persists in a way which is a completely different way from that of persisting in the flowing present of perception).

Yet we must not overlook that the spatiotemporal configuration—(each object also has its duration; it starts, it finishes; in decomposing into many objects it is no longer the same object; or it is in general no longer as an object in the sense of the now)—is prior to space and time themselves. The spatiotemporal configuration is prior inasmuch as space and time are understood as identical persisting forms. As concerns the form of space, all objects are spatial insofar as they have a place in this form, insofar as they have a situation through the form of space, which is, as the determination of the object, the "situated form of space." And as concerns the form of time, all times are durations that belong properly to objects as their determinations. The "representation" of these forms arises only on the ground of the continuously varying configurations.

We have hereby gained, as the first world, the world both experienced in the living perceptual present and pure on the basis of its own intentionality. This world extends as far as my retention, also as far as the

retention which is available to me extends. The just experienced is not lost. It continues to belong to the world that is for me. Yet we must not move out beyond the problem too quickly. . . .

Apperception is an apprehension of the being which is similar, in accordance with a similar entity which already exists for me. I have the newly experienced thing immediately experienced as valid with the experiential sense which comes from its similarity with the similar entity already existing for me as a prior acquisition. The sense of apprehension is an ontic validity with an anticipated horizon of possible confirmation. Apperception refers to an earlier originary institution, but apperception is also a continual process in coexistence, namely, in the sphere of the living present. If I have, [338] in my field of the present, in an originary association, a plurality of like things (sensuously similar things), then every new sense formation is transposed in a passive-associative manner as a new apperception of one of the things that is like all the others while the likeness persists: passive-associative transposition in accordance with similarity is fulfilled analogically.

Now, objects of experience and pluralities (i.e., likenesses, similarities) already in normal modes are for us very complicated structures of apperception. Anticipations of apperceptions from which sense can be constructed, anticipations that are not effectively fulfilled but rather are only implicit, are hidden (in the mode of intentional modifications) in these structures. This is the case, for example, when we experience the likeness of two things, of which the one is given as a nearby thing and the other as a distant thing. Apperception continues to function through intentional modification and assimilation; the motivation through similarity is itself something that produces an intentional modification.

Now association or apperception constitute entities of one type, often of the kind that has levels. This happens in such a way that the apperception of the similar thing, in accordance with the similar thing itself, remains nevertheless in force in a certain way when the typical similarity is broken, namely, it remains in force insofar as, beside the typical resemblance that remains preserved, a member has a still-supplementary layer of sense which the other members do not have, and insofar as these others all have an apperceptive community that this exceptional member does not have.

Yet this is all too formal. What is at issue for me is the formation of apperceptions through the intentional inflections of already formed apperceptions; thus the issue is the formation of perceptions, of presentifications, etc., of different levels, or the formation of perceptions, etc., such that, in their higher sense-formations, they are unique intentional

inflections of the lower-level apperceptions that are more originary experiences, but that constitute again and again, in their kind of higher level, experiences for the entity.

A particular case of such higher-level apperceptions is formed by empathy as the experience of the alien,[8] the perception of another person. The flesh over there, which subsequently will turn out to be an "alien flesh," will be experienced as a flesh in accordance with the apperception of my own flesh. That seems simple. It is apperception of the similar being through and in accordance with a previously experienced similar being. But it is, nevertheless, precisely not the sort of apperceptive transposition as we encountered before, when, in the already constituted field of things existing outside of me, I immediately transpose apperceptively what I am learning to know of the one thing on to the other that is similar to the first. At first my flesh still has no flesh like it in a field of preconstituted external things. It acquires such a thing only through the new kind of carnal apperception that already presupposes the apperception of the external thing, but transformed into a new kind of apperception. In other words, [339] the constitution of my flesh as a corporeal thing like another external corporeal thing, is presupposed for the constitution of an other existing for me. This first makes possible the experience of things similar to my flesh. And it then makes possible that I can thus experience a thing that is similar to my carnal flesh but that is the flesh of an other.

Before this, there is here the constitution of the primordial world outside the flesh as a spatiotemporal world, wherein my flesh, with its kinestheses, is a functioning flesh. Through the transformation of kinesthetically motivated modes of appearance, each external thing is constituted as the same and thus every whole constituted configuratively as the same and, indeed, as persisting in rest and motion, and likewise in qualitative nonchange and change.

What is thereby presupposed and really first is the constitution of motion (with the inclusion of deformation) and rest. And this constitution occurs within the spatial field which functions as the system of invariance of possible situations. This constitution takes place in two stages.

1. At the first stage, the kinestheses of walking are still out of play. We abstract from the "I am walking" and from the sense of this "I am walking" the following: "I am being moved in space." In connection with this, we also abstract: I will be moved "mechanically" in space, thus without walking. Simply in play then, at this stage, are my various other kinestheses, like the movements of arms, fingers, eyes, etc.

2. Only after we have considered the accomplishment of this sphere can walking come into question. The "I am at rest" constitutively

precedes the "I am moving myself," insofar as the latter must first get its meaning as a continuum of possible points of rest. In the system of the "I am moving myself," thus taken purely in its subjective kinesthetic sense, we here now consider the particular rest of standing, of sitting, of the "not-moving-myself-forward," as the language of a viewpoint that is already objective states, which here must first be built up constitutively. All other kinestheses are in play, in their free flowing out as "rest" and "motion." Thereby the appearing outer world of things in their motion and rest is constituted. But also, my flesh is constituted; through its carnal and self-referential being, it is also constituted as mobile, at one with the "I am stretching my arm out," the eyes rolling spatially in their sockets and simultaneous with the "I am moving my eyes," etc. The kinestheses and the spatial motion stand in unity through association, and from this follows a combination of different movements in a twofold sense: the head moves and the eyes in the head, while at the same time the hand, the upper arm, the finger, and so forth. If we leave the kinestheses out of consideration, then the organs and their unity, [340] the flesh, are just a body like the other bodies of the external world; they are like the others, constituted as bodies in relation to the modes of appearance. But, for their part, these are motivated through the kinesthesis functioning at any given time, which as functioning at a given time do not belong to the things of space, but rather to their subjective modes of givenness. So too for the bodily flesh *qua* thing. The carnal body is constituted at any time through the functioning kinestheses with their respective modes of appearance, which will certainly be experienced here in the change of attitude, as kinesthetic processes localized in the hands, in the eyes, in the members of the flesh, and as parallels of the external spatial movements of its members.

In this constitutive whole we have things given as near and far things. We have movements and changes given in different modes of appearance, which are relative to the different, particular kinesthetic systems. For each such system we have a system of the appearances of rest and motion, of the appearances of change and nonchange; but all of this is modified when other kinesthetic systems start to function as well. In the total situation, however, they already constitute—in a way to be clarified and albeit with a very limited content—the variable "world" existing as a thing.

Thereby, I have a core sphere of completely original constituted things, a core world, so to speak. It is the sphere of things that I can reach with my kinestheses, and which I can experience in an optimal form through touching, seeing, etc. It is the sphere where I thus have available systems of appearances for the things, which, according to my

ability, I can transport into the optimal modes of appearance. Therein, I also could have a possible *praxis,* and thus an immediate one to be accomplished through my flesh in movements of striking, pushing, etc.

Nevertheless, I also have apperceived things outside of this core sphere. What is in question here? "Things" grow distant in their perspectivization up to the outermost border of the horizon, and from there these things which are entering the core field exhibit inversely a coming closer in their perspectivization. They—the distant things—are in perspectivization like things that belong to the core sphere. In their unfamiliarity, in contrast to the familiar near (or core) sphere—this sphere which is what is first familiar as a result of its completely original constitution—very "distant" things are like near things in a reduced format. And yet again they are not quite like this insofar as they are not perspectivized perceptibly through the setting in play of the kinestheses. When they are moving, they resemble near things only in being lost ultimately in the horizon: then they may be seen as picture book images.

Naturally, such a thing does not come into question when what is experienced takes place in a "closed space" [341] (e.g., in a room). Then the "unfamiliar distant" and its horizonal circle is lacking. We are, moreover, not taking into consideration those phenomena constituted in perspectives through the play of all the kinestheses together: the constellations, the clouds, the rainbow, the sun, the moon, the northern lights, and the like.

But now walking is from the first a part of those phenomena constituted in perspectives through the play of all the kinestheses together. And this occurs already in closed spaces, in which everything becomes accessible in the normal way and everything is thus constituted in the same way as real things spatiotemporally exterior to one another. Closed space, however, is closed the way a thing can be closed, and it has its exits out into open space; and now the apperceptive extension of the near sphere (the originary core sphere) toward a homogeneous space-world open endlessly is complete.

The distant appearances will be perspectivally varied as near appearances and thus will be grasped beforehand in the capacity of being displayed as things first in walking, which plays together with the other kinestheses and with the already constituted things of a "core world." The capacity of handling them actively, in immediate activity, is also part of this.

The same goes for all things outside the flesh. The flesh has from the first an exceptional constitutive place. This is readily shown when I consider the constitution of the flesh in a standing-still position. The flesh (similar to the wall in closed rooms) is not experienced as possibly

and also potentially sometimes at rest, sometimes moving. In any case, the flesh is not experienced in this way insofar as it is the whole body; instead, only the members of the flesh are thus experienced and as well this happens only to a limited extent. I can indeed experience my hand as moved and experience it in the perspectival mode as moved in a way just like the motion of a thing. And yet it cannot be moved in any way whatsoever or moved like any other thing whatsoever, namely, my hand cannot be moved as far as moving it any way whatsoever toward all the orientation points. I cannot throw my hand forward such that it flies far away from me, etc.

But concerning the flesh, its modes of appearance as at rest without regard to all the movements of the members thus resemble how a tree rests as a whole when its branches are being moved. And yet every way that a thing is at rest is experienced, according to its sense as rest, only with the potentiality of the particular variation of appearance through which the motion of things is constituted. But this is precisely not the case for the flesh. Leaving aside the fact that, as my flesh, the flesh is unique by way of its being experienced as my total organ and as articulated into distinct organs in which I <*Ich*> am the functioning "ego" <*Ich*>, and experienced in such a way that in this functioning all perceptions of things takes place, including the perception of the flesh itself which therefore perceives itself through itself—leaving all this aside, the flesh is also uniquely constituted in that it is, so to speak, half constituted as a thing [342] and yet not experienceable for itself in a motion of a thing, thus how a motion of a thing is originally constituted in perspectivizing phenomena.

Nothing is changed in this when we include walking. This kinesthesis effects something new, owing to the emergence of a variation in orientation of the coexisting subjective appearances. We have seen that this first "world"—which is constituted in the kinesthetic mode of standing still, as the keeping still of the "walk-kinesthesis"—is one world firmly oriented around my bodily flesh, or around the null-site that it constitutes. When walking enters into the picture, it is still the case that everything worldly, which is there for me, appears to me oriented around my phenomenally still, "resting" flesh, namely, oriented according to the here and there, the right and left, and so forth. By way of this, a firm null point of orientation persists, so to speak, as an absolute here. But now there is an "appearance." And what happens is that everything that, in an arbitrary interruption of walking and in the reversal of the kinesthetic activity (i.e., in walking backward), is showing itself as a resting object, and is proving to be at rest in remaining-standing-still, now shows itself as in one variation of orientation and in a correlative apparent movement,

whereas movement gives itself, in standing-still, either as rest or phenomenally as varied movement. Walking consequently gets the meaning of a variation of all coexisting subjective appearances, through which alone the intentionality of the appearance of things now remains preserved, like a self-constituting *qua* identical things in things oriented and in the variation of the orientation.

Just as every kinesthesis functions, endowing sense by means of its having its "holding still" and its "staying mobile" ("I move") modes, and just as the kinesthetic motion, having become a continuum (through constitution),[9] is the continuum of places of a possible holding-still, it is also the case for the definitive kinesthesis, as it were, of walking. Walking has its particular way of functioning by its retroactive connection to the already synthetic accomplishment of all the other associated kinestheses, each of which has already taken the sense of an accomplishment potentially combinable with every other one in the holding-still or in self-motion; and thus each kinesthesis is a functional member in a functional whole, in a unity, as it were, of organized functions. In its flowing form, walking constitutes (like all other nonchange and change) new movement and rest of the surrounding world of experience (of the world of perception). Now, what is first constituted is the firm system of place, with firm intervals, its firm configurations, its groupings of things at rest, and also the objective modifications of these configurations through change in the intervals of movement.

I wonder: does the homogeneous objective world, the homogeneous spatiotemporality, in contrast to which the oriented primordial [343] world is but mere appearance, first constitute itself through the coordinated play of self-propelled walking and being driven, being mechanically moved? Let us try this with simple self-propelled walking. Can one not say that in the first system, that of space oriented in a fixed way, every thing has in this "world" its persisting or firm distance relative to every other thing? My flesh too, like its members, has a variable distance relative to oriented things; only, insofar as it can effect no variation of positions, it remains a fixed zero-degree object.[10] And only other objects can effect changes in position, take other distances relative to my flesh, and be at varying distances from it. By walking, however, I change, on my own, my distance relative to persisting objects, which are identically at rest in the variation of orientation. And just as two external objects can ultimately touch each other, whereby their distance at the point of contact becomes null, so too my flesh and any external object can touch each other. In this way can I not, consequently, in accordance with the range of my ability to walk, arrive everywhere? And is space not already thereby constituted as a system of sites (and not only as an orientation system, an

orientation space)? And is not my flesh already thereby constituted as an object like any other external object, and as containing and occupying a part of space, as having a site in space, and being moved, spatially moved like any other object?

The fixed system of sites of all perspectivally accessible external things for me is obviously already constituted through self-propelled walking, and also, that I can carnally bring every thing and every object closer (at first directly on the "face of the earth," but also indirectly, by means of empathizing with birds I understand flight, and then by idealizing I have before my eyes the ideal possibility of an ability). (That, however, is not part of the present constitutive level.) I can approach every site and be there, and thus my flesh is also thing, a *res extensa,* etc., that is mobile.

But does being moved in space, mechanically (e.g., being driven, being carried, etc.), accomplish nothing for the constitution, does it accomplish nothing essential for the possibility of empathy?

## Notes

1. In explanation of this fragment's opening heading "III," the typescript states as follows: "In reference to another manuscript, itself not designated, probably D 12, Husserl begins:"—Alfred Schütz, Editor's note.

2. Translator's note. The German term for this is *harmonische Einheit.* Throughout the essay, Husserl employs musical metaphors such as *einstimmig* ("concordant," "of a single tone") and *unstimmig* ("discordant," "inharmonious") when speaking of the play of perspectives. I have tried to preserve these where possible, using the root "-cord"; however, "harmony" and "harmonious" should be understood to render what is generally a term from the German roots *-stimm* and *-tön,* meaning "voice" and "tonality," respectively.

3. Translator's note. The German word actually used here is *Phantom.* In the first third of this essay, Husserl is trying to show the dependence of the fantasized world on that of the living present. Hence his discussion of sleep, which implies dream images. Note composed with the help of Thomas Nenon.

4. Translator's note. The German allows construction of a considerable semantic field from *horizont,* such as *Horizontkreis, Horizontpunkt, Fernhorizont,* and *Erscheinungshorizont;* some of which are less readily translated without prepositions in English. Thus I translate the first as "circle of the horizon" and the second as "horizon-point"; the third as "distant horizon," and the last with a subjective genitive.

5. Translator's note. Here the original editor of the German adds the word (sich) "zeigt," or "is indicated" or "shown," between brackets. I will not indicate most of these brackets, as they serve generally just to make the text grammatical.

In that, I follow the option taken likewise by Lavigne. Here, however, Lavigne writes "which is temporalized [shown(?)]." See *La terre ne se meut pas,* translated by D. Franck, D. Pradelle, and J.-F. Lavigne (Paris: Minuit, 1989), p. 73.

6. Translator's note. The term *Wiedererinnerung* adds to the term for recollection or remembrance, *Erinnerung,* the intensifying prefix *wieder.* Since English already attaches the "re-" prefix to acts of memory, one way to translate this would be "recollecting." In Derrida's French translation (*L'Origine de la géométrie*) and Lavigne's translation of the present work, the term *resouvenir* captures the intensification and repetition implicit in the German.

7. Translator's note. I follow Cairns's suggestion here, for *Typisierung:* the reduction, or constitution, of types.

8. Translator's note. Lavigne translates *Fremderfahrung* as *expérience de l'étranger,* or "experience of the stranger, the foreign one."

9. Translator's note. The German for this is *zum Kontinuum geworden (konstitutive).* One could translate this as "having become a continuum (constitutively)," but it is not the continuum that is constitutive, it is through the constitutions that there is a continuum. Thus Lavigne writes "(by constitution)," and I, "through constitution."

10. Translator's note. Lavigne translates *starres Null-Objekt* as "a fixed origin-object," whereby, appropriately, the German *Null-* is less zero, or null, here, than the starting point in any enumeration.

Afterword

# Philosophy as *Perspectiva Artificialis:* Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Husserlian Constructivism

Bettina Bergo

> A poetizing of the history of philosophy. . . .
>
> *—Merleau-Ponty, citing Husserl in his Course Notes on "The Origin of Geometry"*

In a recent study of the history of perspective, the French art historian Hubert Damisch compared the ruse of artificial perspective with grammar and, by extension, a certain conception of vision. "Perspective . . . is not a code," he writes, "but it has this in common with language, that in and by itself it institutes and constitutes itself under the auspices of a point, a factor analogous to the 'subject' or 'person' in language, always posited in relation to a 'here' or 'there,' accruing all the possibilities for movement from one position to another that this entails . . ."[1] From the Renaissance until well past Descartes's time, the *meaning* of this technical discovery in art was debated, and its implications for both practical and theoretical sciences were explored. "Perspective designates [this 'point'] in the art of painting. But *who* designates it in truth and ethics?"[2]

In the seventeenth century, Pascal responded to this question in a way that evokes the work of Merleau-Ponty, as we shall see. Of course, he did so in the religious register of his time and concerns, in light of original sin, since it was incumbent upon an ethics of that time to confront

human acts and thoughts in light of the mortal inheritance. Any such judgment, albeit even then perspectival (theological or philosophical), presupposed the possibility of a universal vision of humanity. For Pascal, however, this vision was impossible. Although the creation of the artist centers upon such a point, in truth and in ethics a comparable point, however desirable, is *mad*. Moreover, it is mad with *a madness incomprehensible* even to the Cartesian logic that had entertained the possibility of a *malin génie*. Thus Pascal's response:

> Original sin is madness in the eyes of men, but it is put forward as such. You should therefore not reproach me for the unreasonable nature of this doctrine because I put it forward as being unreasonable. But his [God's] madness is wiser than all the wisdom of man. . . . For without it, what are we to say man is? His entire being is dependent upon this imperceptible point. And how could he have become aware of it through his reason, seeing that it is something contrary to reason and that his reason, far from inventing it with its own means, draws away when confronted with it.

The "mad point" is a philosophical feint: if it is divine by essence or created by God, it could not be created by divine *reason;* and it is incomprehensible to human reason. The point, like Merleau-Ponty's example of the cyclopean eye, is thus blind from a rational perspective, and what it sees would be humanly horrifying, because it sees all perspectives, all positions, times, and values in a single gaze. It is a feint for another, more ironic reason. If the "mad point" is *divine* madness, then reason in God and in humans has an other: an other of a kind refractory to sufficient reason, which conceives itself as either dependent upon (Descartes) or drawn to (Aristotle) divine reason. But this other is also the other of God, or of God's reason, which tradition held to *be* God, whether as pure thought thinking itself or as the Perfect Being, source of all ideas. The madness of God is then the other of God, and Pascal, with a mixture of irony and utter sincerity, allows that this madness be diviner than any human wisdom. Pascal's mad point is *not* nothing; its absurdity undercuts thinking. It cannot be held to be the true reason of God lest we lose the very sense of "madness" (in human terms). Yet it is no madness that thinking can readily bring to light, or "make speak."

Between existence and nonexistence, possibility and impossibility, Pascal conceives the mad point against the *cogito* and against Descartes's *malin génie,* which for Descartes is defeated in advance by the cause of the Idea of Perfection in him. Further, Pascal ventures this feint against any endeavor to transpose the aesthetic dispositive of the *perspectiva artificialis* into the works of reason. It is as though he recognized already that the

Renaissance humanist creation of a transcendent perspective in art was transcendent only relative to each frame, each painting, and so, as a continually renewed construction, had to be redeployed with each new painting and in regard to it as a microcosm. For that reason, the point was absolute *and* relative, and no similar perspective could be conceived—much less constituted—rationally, for ethics or truth.

Pascal's feint did not halt the search for the mad point. A certain "poetic history" of rationalism and empiricism, understood as two sides of the same abstractive coin, could be written as the search for the *perspectiva artificialis* in philosophy, but also in literature as the quest for the pure language. This history would have its apex in Kant's early critical philosophy, where the constructive activity of mind is most systematically charted. Of the model of his project, that is, mathematics, Kant marveled: "Sic volo, sic jubeo"—or "I will thus, I command thus." If philosophy's own destiny as a divine commander has been less felicitous and less comprehensive than that of mathematics, it remains true that philosophy alone has sought to determine the ground of mathematics itself, and so to set itself outside the framework of even the exact sciences, precisely at the "mad point." Indeed, it has often insisted that humans' entire being depended upon the existence of this point.

This poetic history would be complex. It would evince *both* a unity of questing *and* interrupted fragments suggesting a dialectic, or dialectics, between, on the one hand, the various pursuits of the "cyclopean" point, to use Merleau-Ponty's phrase,[3] and, on the other, discontinuous efforts to work within the incommensurability of orders, whether human and divine (cf. Pascal, Kierkegaard), spiritual and corporeal, or ideal and sensible. What was lost with the untimely death of Merleau-Ponty was the most rigorous rethinking of the conceptual armature that evolved from, and ultimately ran countercurrent to, the modern constructivist project, which, unlike painting, could not relinquish the method and ideal of a *perspectiva artificialis,* whether in logic or metaphysics, or in the thought proceeding from their conjunction.

Curiously, in so doing, Merleau-Ponty did not dispense with the notion of truth. He insisted, rather, upon its uncompleteable meaning, and upon its complexification from the ground upward. As such, he stands both within the aforementioned dialectic of the history of philosophical constructivism *and* outside it, close to some of its critics, notably the critical strain in Husserl, Heidegger, and Bergson. Yet the conceptual matrices[4] his later thought unfolded were such that we might begin, in a fresh way and without recourse to transcendentalisms of various sorts, to philosophize in the depth dimension—questioning a world while questioning the one who formulates the question. Philosophy had and still

has, thanks to his work, the possibility of rejoining art and "letters" as the exploration of the intersecting horizons of that field of presence which, in a more transcendentalist idiom, is called Being. I will return to this at the end of the present essay.

As Merleau-Ponty writes of this field, which is also the field of geometry, he considers the ontological meaning of a different space. His notes to *The Visible and the Invisible* argue elliptically:

> Take topological space as a model of being. The Euclidean space is the model for *perspectival* being, it is a space without transcendence, positive, a network of straight lines, parallel among themselves or perpendicular according to three dimensions. . . . Underlying appropriateness of this idea of space . . . with the classical ontology of the *Ens realissimum,* or the infinite entity [cf. the mad point in philosophy]. The topological space, on the contrary, a milieu in which are circumscribed relations of *proximity,* of *envelopment,* etc., is the image of a being that, like Klee's touches of color, is at the same time *older* than everything and "of the first day" (Hegel), that the regressive thought runs up against without being able to deduce it directly or indirectly . . . from being by itself, [it is] a perpetual *residue.*

## Merleau-Ponty as Reader of Husserl

In his commentary on Merleau-Ponty's last lectures on Hegel at the Collège de France, Claude Lefort depicts his teacher as a sort of vast digesting machine of the tradition. "So many themes, of which we could not say that Merleau-Ponty seizes them for his own ends, because it *appears* that they carry within them a latent truth to which the Hegelian aims do not do justice. So many themes of which Merleau-Ponty convinces us that they take on meaning only on condition of renouncing at the same time the separation of the ultimate fusion of the *für sich* and the *an sich,* as Hegel would have it. . . ."[5] The question of Merleau-Ponty's reading, then, is a question of finding the latencies in the text and developing them such that they appear to bring to light an unthought dimension. If we are discomfited before the doubt that an un-thought [*impensé*] might legitimately belong to such a thought, then we must return to the question of what it means to read a text—this time, following Merleau-Ponty's conception of reading. Speaking of Husserl's notion of *Vorhabe* (or historic and cultural prepossession of humans),[6] he states, "I find everything in me . . . and everything outside of me" (BN 8).[7] An implication of his chiasmatic thinking, as Leonard Lawlor notes in the foreword to this

volume, is that "I borrow myself from others; I create others from my own thoughts. This is no failure to perceive others; it is the perception of others." . . . [So too] "between an 'objective' history of philosophy . . . and a meditation disguised as a dialogue . . . there must be a middle ground on which the philosopher we are speaking about and the philosopher who is speaking are present together, *although it is not possible even in principle to decide at any given moment just what belongs to each*"[8] (cf. also *VI* 115–16). This is preeminently true for Husserl as well, but it contains a significant, if less evident, hermeneutic implication. In the case of Husserl—whose work is crossed by tensions *between* a tendency toward the transcendental logic of a synthesizing and constituting consciousness *and* his oft-recommenced efforts not to assimilate original being and experience to the conscious level of representation and reflection—the implication is acute: if we can point to thematic influences upon Husserl's readers, can we ever disentangle the question of the actual similarities and differences between the philosopher and his interlocutors, especially when they are separated by time and space, as is the case of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl?

A contemporary reader of Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Garelli, has argued that there are more similarities between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty than there are differences, *provided* one reads Husserl with a certain inflection. The inflection does not deviate his thought, particularly the later thought as exemplified in the posthumous *Experience and Judgment.* Instead, it *chooses* one pole of two, which, between them, mark clearly the profound tension in Husserl's work. I have alluded to this tension, but we can put it another way for the sake of clarification. It lies between, on the one hand, his search for a ground, a *unifying principle* that would be revealed by the phenomenological and transcendental reduction *and,* on the other hand, the conviction that the ground, whether in the world or in the ego, is ultimately never wholly reducible and so cannot serve as an epistemic foundation. Some, including Merleau-Ponty himself, have argued that Husserl's gradual modification of his own conceptual tools through his elaboration of the prepredicative world, makes any search for a unitary origin impossible. More significantly, it makes Merleau-Ponty's own choice from the two Husserls better than plausible. Of this interpretation, Garelli writes, "The other [tension], attentive to the insertion of the natural I [*moi*] in the world, develops . . . a genesis of meaning in which the preindividual dimension of the world unfolds, according to an extreme complexity, an entire network of signifying tensions not clearly thematized, and which are organized according to what Merleau-Ponty has termed a 'coherence without concepts,' which is put forward as genealogically prior to the logical activity of the *Ego.*"[9]

Using Garelli's remark about the tensions in Husserl, I want to stress that the task of determining *if* or *how* Merleau-Ponty resembles or differs from Husserl would be relatively easy if we could determine which Husserl was the true one. To be sure, over the course of his writings, a certain fidelity to idealism is evident. It maintains the thetic consciousness, or transcendental "subject," despite elaborate and ongoing work on passivity and passive syntheses. And it is as though Husserl draws back from the multiplication of horizons and the complexity of sedimentations that his reduction of the natural attitude uncovers. These are, after all, irreducible to a unitary and representable *foundation* and require the philosopher to be continually *en route,* continually beginning his project. The further implications are drawn precisely by Merleau-Ponty himself since he, more than any of those responsible for introducing Husserl's thought in France, ventured to pursue the an-archic phenomenological option. As Lawlor has remarked in the foreword, we can see this choice in published works like *The Visible and the Invisible* and clearly in the essay "The Philosopher and His Shadow." It also appears at various points in the Course Notes presented in this volume, of which there is space to note but two: the open foundation and Husserl's unconscious thematic.

First, take the emphasis on an *open foundation* of what comes before all theory and the profound change in method that this implies:

> Therefore a strange situation: his thought of the thing itself is not published, because his thought was aiming at making silence speak, at saying what is not-said, at exploring language beyond its usual destination which lies . . . in saying what is obvious, the familiar. . . . Therefore the maximum divergence [*écart*] between the signifier and the signified, and the acuteness of the interpretative problems. (BN 2)

Given a maximal space between the signifier, the signifying intention that is reflective or thetic, and the signified, we also find ourselves aiming at a level where there is also an irreducible separation *of meaning* between the noetic act and the noema. For this reason, Merleau-Ponty suggests that we must follow Husserl beyond constructivist approaches to philosophy, and beyond "internal critiques" and "interpretations of systems," toward a method more like the "poetics of the history of philosophy"—Husserl's own words in the *Crisis of European Sciences.*[10]

Such a poetics amounts to a focus upon the creative fact, and general unity, of the continuous encounter with the world, with the self and the other, and with traditions like that which produced geometry. It is arguably, for Merleau-Ponty, the heuristic step requisite to the development of an ethics. The method follows the upsurge of creative moments

of the history—here, of geometry; but it must do so in a circling fashion, because the originary "moments" have sunk back into a general human heritage; they have been forgotten, and this is the mark of their human, or social, origins.

The circling movement suggests the oft-lamented Husserlian recommencement of phenomenology in evidence in the first pages of his major works. This renewed search for a new beginning is not, however, an exercise in futility or a demonstration of the inadequacy of phenomenology to its ultimate tasks, Merleau-Ponty argues. "But that is not a failure, not a return to psychologism-historicism. Husserl speaks of interweaving, of the transgression of *Ineinander*" (BN 4; Merleau-Ponty's underlining). The Husserlian notion of *Ineinander,* which Merleau-Ponty expands into his concepts of the *chiasm* and the intertwining, but also of "winding" (or "serpenting" in the French), "reversibility," and "encroachment,"[11] argues for the crossing and multiplication of the horizons of perception and meaning. It bespeaks the multiplication of sedimentations across history, but also in the world in which we are active here and now. If there is a sort of *archē* of human "experience," and it can only be found beneath the level of our reflective life while being irreducible to thought objects, then the origin or principle is neither fixable, nor objectifiable. Yet it is never absent from our active intentional life, against which it forms a sort of permanent lining.

Although Merleau-Ponty argues in several places that this present absence, this open origin, is above all the unthought or *impensé* of Husserl's thought, we might wonder whether this is not an excessive claim that is part of a certain strategy of the French philosopher. Indeed, while commentators like Claude Lefort and Marc Richir have asserted that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is ultimately neither Husserlian nor a classical phenomenology,[12] others have recently suggested that this dimension of Husserl's thought is *clearly* found in his work *Experience and Judgment.* It is surprising that Merleau-Ponty does not appear to know this work. Indeed, many citations from it show that Husserl was profoundly concerned to make the prethematic "world" the primary object of his later investigations. For example, in §7, Husserl argues, "The world, as universal ground of belief in as much as always already given to all experience of singular objects," is "the universal passive pregiven that is prior to any activity of judgment."[13] It is therefore surprising that Merleau-Ponty had recourse, for his lectures, to Husserl's short and opaque essay "The World of the Living Present," rather than turning directly to *Experience and Judgment.*[14]

More significant is a certain derivative tension in his own presentation of Husserl. Merleau-Ponty argues that his own development of

Husserlian phenomenology is latent in, but fundamental to, Husserl's conception of the discipline: "a contact with Husserl's philosophy as a total *Stiftung.*" But he *also* argues that his task is to bring forth a sort of Husserlian unconscious thematic since the latter was, like all philosophers, the "bearer of an unthought" (BN 4). It seems fair to conclude that Merleau-Ponty set about to clear any idealist residue from the path of the later Husserl and, in so doing, pushed numerous concepts of his own both into what would become exploded series of concepts and concept matrices like those cited above (chiasm, intertwining, encroachment, pregnancy, serpenting or winding, endo-ontology, intra-ontology, etc.), while holding these in the paradoxical position of originary ideas describing the prethematic beginnings of experience and traditions (in Husserl's late sense of the world's thesis and the original belief, or *Urdoxa*)[15]—none of which could be taken as ideas in the traditional sense.

Significant concepts or operations in Merleau-Ponty thus come from Husserl, most notably those of the originary or *Ursprünglich,* the *Weltthesis* ("world's thesis"), the *Urdoxa* ("originary *doxa,*" or "opinion"; or, for Merleau-Ponty, the "perceptual faith"), that of founding or *Stiftung* in its variety of forms, those of sedimentations, intersubjectivity, and empathy—to name a few. But Merleau-Ponty pulls him in a direction at once more pluralist and perhaps more ambiguous than his own but also, curiously, clarified in relation to idealism. The question of the motivation of this clarification has been addressed in light of the influence of Bergson and Heidegger in several places, including Lawlor's foreword to this volume.[16] Suffice it to say that, in regard to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty argues in his Course Notes that the late Husserl and Heidegger are closer than often supposed. Lawlor has developed this convergence lucidly, so I will not examine it further here. In regard to Bergson, the gradual return to his inquiry into the source of human experience provided the later Merleau-Ponty with the means by which to inflect Husserl's project toward his interpretation of, among other things, the *Ineinander* as a continuous movement *between* the prereflective and reflective existence.[17]

## A Different *Epochē*

One of the most prolific contemporary inheritors of Husserl, the Belgian phenomenologist Marc Richir, suggests that in Merleau-Ponty's hands, the use of the phenomenological reduction gives us the possibility of a phenomenology which, "like music, could be sufficiently set back from the world of our preoccupations to be apt to set forth the 'sketches of

Being,' rhythms, phases or *movements* intrinsic to the phenomenological field, and constituting a sort of universal membrane . . ."[18] The present Course Notes illustrate Merleau-Ponty's debt to the phenomenological reduction, but when read with other of his works, they show the acuity of Merleau-Ponty's insight into the *meaning* of the reduction as a return to the pretheoretical and the "living present" in the later Husserl.

If we grasp phenomenology—as Merleau-Ponty does, following his inflection of the tensions in Husserl—as "neither materialism nor a phenomenology of consciousness" (*S* 165)—then we recognize that the reduction is reflection suspending the natural attitude in order to reach meanings *not* as objects or even as abstract constructions, but in the precise sense of different "beginnings of inquiry" (*S* 161). This is neither a constructivist nor a criticist reflection, but one whereby thought challenges itself. The challenge, moreover, does not suggest a mad elision of thought from itself, or some sort of venture beyond thought. "It is up to us not to forget half the truth," writes Merleau-Ponty, notably that "thought participates in everything and reciprocally everything in thought" (*S* 161). Instead, "it is not the unreflected that challenges reflection; it is reflection that challenges itself" (*S* 161). How shall it challenge itself? By holding itself at the point of tension between thought's objects and our experience of sensible indeterminacy, and their passage into one another.

It is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty can seek, in the Course Notes, points of intersection, knots, or third terms between knowledge and ignorance, philosophy and history (BN 8). Here he means a nonknowledge almost analogous to the unconscious such as we discover it when we deny that we have a desire or that we intended a certain statement (Freud's *Verneinung*). This nonknowledge "functions"—the term comes from Husserl—in me in a nonpositive connection to knowledge (BN 8). Merleau-Ponty's quest thus takes the reduction and strips it of Husserl's Cartesian constructivist element,[19] recalling that through the Husserlian-Cartesian suspension we had discovered, at the basis of a thinking in which all thought-objects had been suspended, *no* gap between the prereflective and the reflective, merely a thinking of thinking that was structurally similar to reflection at the "higher" levels of mental activity. (Think of Descartes's "clear and distinct" *ego cogito*—as clear and distinct as his geometric idealities were, albeit decidedly unlike them in its origin and function.) But this could not correspond to our prethematic "nonknowledge." For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, the reduction is without end, because it reveals a depth at which the Husserlian layers actually cross and overlap each other, prior to the already constructed solipsist subject who thinks itself emptily.[20] Thus the

*epochē* is modified by Merleau-Ponty's attention to the meaning of what it discovers, *both* in terms of Husserl's layers of consciousness *and* their ontological ambiguity. The "layers," which become "fields of presence" in Merleau-Ponty, are not deduced from each other in a descending or ascending order that would be part of a transcendental logic. Thus one "layer" no longer gives unilateral rise to another. They are always already imbricated, or contaminated by each other. And, as the *unthought* Merleau-Ponty is looking for, the fields are continually *with* us, in an alternating near-simultaneity comparable to his famous example of the right hand touching the left hand.[21]

So the reduction opens a different space, a moving site in which are *held together* the combination of doubt and belief typical of our everyday "perceptual faith" (a development of Husserl's *Urdoxa*) *and* the stability of certitude that reflection affords us in the midst of that perceptual faith.[22] So by keeping its focus upon the tension between perceptual faith and reflection, and by keeping present to mind that ideality itself lies *within the field of phenomenality* and not the reverse, Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the reduction holds in a *relative* position the supposition that the act of mind is adequate to its objects and constructs, in the space of its "natural light," and gives us the object in its truth. This is a refinement of the Husserlian notion which, even in his later works, is pulled by the force of his constituting ideal locus, the *Ego,* which lies outside its field of constitution and its "objects."[23]

When applied to the tradition from which geometry, but also literature, arises, this understanding of the reduction allows Merleau-Ponty to ask how, in a given social and historical space, or in a transhistorical discipline like geometry, "there is something other than the lived thoughts of Galileo and others—taken up or realized again by others" (BN 8)? He would push this understanding of geometry toward "a 'sense' which is larger, 'deeper,' onto which their thought opens, a field which is intended right off, but not enveloped by their thought" (BN 8; Merleau-Ponty's underlining). This too goes a good way toward answering the question of those who were disappointed by the results Husserl obtained through the *Rückfrage* directed to the origins of geometrical construction in the life-world. As Barbaras writes, because of the tension in Husserl's own thought and his continuing debt to positivism and objectivism, " . . . far from recognizing the originality of the world of experience, Husserl asserts an absolute *eidetic continuity* between the life-world and that of scientific activity, which amounts to saying that the return of reason to perception is dominated [still] by the categorial of reason, that the world of experience is regrasped according to the *telos* of rational activity."[24]

It is this *telos* and this rational framework that Merleau-Ponty renders problematical in the reduction, by way of a dislocation of the Husserlian hierarchy of levels of experience and activity, by allowing the openness of the field of presence thus revealed to have its meaning *gap* in relation to *reflection*, and by refusing to presuppose the *central activity* of a constituting ego—whether in history or daily practices. It is, moreover, of extreme interest that the phenomenological field, as understood above all by Merleau-Ponty in light of his "topological space," is grasped in different but mutually illuminating ways by contemporary multidimensional geometries of curved space and by art and literature. We should recall his reference to the "touches of color" in Paul Klee here; but also his oft-cited reference to Paul Claudel's query by the man immersed in his "field" of perceptual faith which, suddenly, interrupts itself and gives way to reflection: "'Where am I?' and 'What time is it?'—such is the inexhaustible question turning from us to the world . . ."[25]

The debt of Merleau-Ponty to Husserl is also found in the spirit and motivation of Husserl's *Urdoxa*, which becomes the former's *foi perceptive*, or "perceptual faith." Not only does Merleau-Ponty open the perceptual faith and refuse to model it upon rationalist ideality as the faith *of* a transcendental consciousness, or the spontaneous construction of ideal objects, he underscores the presence of negativity—"a circumscribed negativity"—error and forgetting, within it. As if pushing his own thought about the ambiguity of perceptual faith, and the originary upsurge of meaning in tradition, Merleau-Ponty writes, "[Our investigation] looks for the originary neither in the thoughts of the geometers nor in their works; nor either in the thought that we who are looking for it have" (BN 14). Whereupon he promptly crosses out the last clause, as if the complexity of reaching toward the unformed, dynamic, and repeated origins was so great, at this very moment, that it threatened to undermine the very formation of discursivity (his own discursivity) itself!

He reminds his auditors, at this juncture, that to think is not first to construct or even to repeat acts precisely: "to think is not <u>having</u> but <u>not having</u>" (BN 13; Merleau-Ponty's underlining). So it *should* run the risk of its own provisional dissolution in indeterminacy. This is why, in regard to the origin of geometry, the danger is always present that we may *alternately* lose the possibility of reactivating the meaning of its originary creation, *or indeed* find ourselves as if overwhelmed by the "positive" (not positivist) indeterminacy of that same origin, comparable as it is to the moving multiplicity of points that *is* the perceptual field. Notes Merleau-Ponty: "the universe of thought, like that of perception, is lacunary and baroque in itself" (BN 13).

Inquiry into the perceptual faith also reveals the antinomy of thought, which posits itself as capable of establishing—or winning for us—stable points, ideas, while always in strict dependence on what is without points. The antinomy arises because, in attempting this establishment, thought proceeds in the conviction that its thought-acts are "absolute appearance . . . more solid before doubt than the positive and full things" (*VI* 31). By way of reflection, thought thinks both perception *and* itself in an ostensibly lucid, if abstract, milieu (again, of thought itself). The danger arises whenever this *mi-lieu* takes the place *both* of the world as field of presence *and also* that other "field" which thought erects into the thinking subject as *sub-iectum*.[26]

Merleau-Ponty thus argues in a Husserlian spirit for the continuous requestioning of the act of reflection in its imbrication with the perceptual faith. However, this "hyper-reflection," as he calls it (*VI* 38, 46), opens into what risks becoming an infinite regression, or its eventuality. Again, this risk should be run, because the classical alternative of reifying the objects or the milieu of reflection fixes it outside the being or world it was attempting to approach and to order in the first place. The risk, for Merleau-Ponty, was indeed ventured by Husserl himself in certain writings—about which Merleau-Ponty will remark: "This is also to say that the phenomenological field cannot remain open to the reflective attitude unless the latter, in some way, accepts situating itself at the very site of its antinomy, of its rending [*déchirure*], which Husserl always did in the best moments of his work, [and indeed] without flinching *before the circles and contradictions*" it entailed.[27]

Thus the movement to the life-world is learned from Husserl, but privileged by Merleau-Ponty over Husserl's constituting egology; and the latter's project of transcendental construction is rendered more horizontal, with the "layers" set into intersection and mutual encroachment (see BN 28). However, in the midst of this horizontality, Merleau-Ponty insists upon an open vertical pole: the "absolute," as he says in his lectures on Hegel and in *The Visible and the Invisible,* is "depth."[28] Yet the depth dimension is never *wholly* constitutable, and these horizontal and vertical axes fold over and upon each other. As Jacques Garelli puts it: "[These] metamorphosing exchanges between the "me" ["*moi*"] and the things . . . lead to a total restructuration of the situation of man in the world; for, henceforth, it is from one of the folds of the world that man arises, takes action, and thinks, alongside the peripheral emergence of things . . . revealing an invested space like a 'thinking visibility.' "[29] This "thinking visibility" of multiple folds is the Merleau-Pontian inflection of Husserl's *Lebenswelt.* And this is, no doubt, the thematic site from which Merleau-Ponty might have begun his own reflection on ethics. That said,

we must emphasize, in regard to the tradition that produced and reproduces geometry, that total reactivation of that historic tradition is neither possible nor desirable. There is also "reunderstanding" (*Nachverstehen*) and counderstanding (*Mitverstehen*) of the origins of geometry, and literature; these too are possibilities by which a tradition re-creates itself. The latter two are not, however, identical with reactivation. This is why history is never just monological or a simple matter of fact. We must wonder what, moreover, the implications of this grasp of "tradition" and the human situation are for an ethics, especially in light of Merleau-Ponty's paradox of cohumanity in act and our idea of humanity *in abstracto.* Lawlor has discussed this in his foreword in relation to language and memory.

A brief word should be said about the Merleau-Pontian notion of Being, although I will have more to say about it in the next section on the divergences between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. Briefly, then, and in one respect, he owes Husserl a debt for the refusal of any commencement that *posits* nothingness as coeval with being (Hegel's logic), or indeed, as primordial. In this regard he is indebted to Husserl for emphasizing that nothingness should never be taken as a pure (abstract) void, but rather as "being—crossed out."[30] This emphasis derives from both men's fidelity to the fact of the positivity and indeterminacy of the *Lebenswelt.* In short, no philosophical beginning should suppose an absolute nothingness that abstractly presupposes away being, or even inhabits it as the proto-subjectivity (Sartre).[31] Indeed, this Husserlian theme is significant enough that it recurs in several of the latter's inheritors' thematics, including Heidegger, whose "experience of nothingness" arises only through tonalities or *Stimmungen* (and which opens, preeminently, the encounter with Being *per se*), and Emmanuel Levinas's residual, positive "atmosphere," which is nevertheless experienced (as something) in the absence of all things.[32] Thus, whether we can approach Being directly or only indirectly,[33] no ontology can be constructed on the basis of that abstraction called "nothing." Now although Merleau-Ponty had come to know Heidegger's work well, and had focused on the convergences between Husserl and Heidegger, he is peculiarly Kantian in his fidelity to Husserl here: there can be no legitimate understanding of that which we cannot experience. At issue is philosophy's tendency to make of being, and nothingness, an ideality. Writes Merleau-Ponty, "reread, if you doubt it, the extraordinary pages in which Husserl implies that even if we meant to posit absolute or true being as the correlative of an absolute mind, such an absolute being would not merit its name *unless it had some relationship to what we men call being.*"[34] I will return to the question of being in the next section. Suffice it to say that this complex understanding of

being represents the heart of Merleau-Ponty's critique of metaphysics; surprisingly, he credits Husserl with its conception.

## Divergences from Husserlian Phenomenology

In posing the question of the "*meaning* of phenomenology" to the work of Merleau-Ponty, Marc Richir argues that "inasmuch as it appears evident . . . that the last work of Merleau-Ponty is inscribed in the extension of that of Husserl, and even in the margins of that of Heidegger . . . it also appears urgent to me, today, to show that the Merleau-Pontian sense of phenomenology is, strictly speaking, *neither* Husserlian nor Heideggerian, but *new,* and with a novelty apt to shake up those judgments [that] throw phenomenology into the storehouse of abandoned antiquities by a supposed movement of History's actuality."[35] Old and new; Husserlian and beyond Husserlian: the question of their convergence and divergence becomes vertiginous, because curiously circular.

One entry into this question is afforded us by the philosophical tradition itself. As we know, Hegel argued that a certain accumulation of *quantitative* modifications in a given state gives rise to a point at which the total modification must be considered *qualitative.* That is, a new state emerges that does not appear deductively contained in, or presaged by, its predecessor. This is perhaps the best characterization of Merleau-Ponty's relationship to Husserl and his other influences, notably Bergson, Heidegger, and Hegel himself. Although we have an inadequate sense of where Merleau-Ponty's own philosophy would have evolved past his ultimate lectures on Husserl and Hegel at the Collège de France, the above characterization suggests that we take seriously his way of "digesting" his influences. It bears repeating that, when Merleau-Ponty reads a philosopher like Hegel or Husserl, one is brought to believe that the arguments and themes he evinces are truly latent in that thought and have simply gone unthought by the philosopher in question (cf. the introductory remarks in the present Course Notes on the *impensé,* or "unthought"). Whether this is precisely so or not is rendered trivial by Merleau-Ponty's own hermeneutic, based upon his version of the *Ineinander* or chiasm, to the effect that when "I" read, I read "my thoughts" as much as the "other's thoughts," and this is equally true for perception. That is, it is not that I see myself *in* the other, but, as Husserl already understood, I see another body like my own, I see it seeing me, and I see the spectacle that the other sees in part *as he* or *she sees it;* and, finally, I also see myself (indirectly) seeing him and it. It is a positivistic

illusion to insist upon lines of division between what a thinker, or novelist, poet, artist, *actually meant* and what he did not mean, and this cannot be remedied by citing the words he used. With this in mind, let us venture to identify some significant differences that would have become clearer had Merleau-Ponty not died prematurely.

## The Critique of the Traditional *Adæquatio Rei et Intellectus*

As a persistent notion whose origins takes us back to scholasticism, the supposition of an *adæquatio intellectus ad rem* ("adequation, or fit, of the mind *to* the things") survives in Husserl as the end of the project of transcendental constitution.[36] Against this tendency in Husserl's thought, Merleau-Ponty will argue that our contact with things is neither something constituted as phenomenal objects by a transcendental ego, nor reducible to Cartesian *cogitata:* "that is to say, essences and significations."[37] Indeed, the adequation, or "fit," dissolves before the anonymous presence of "il y a le monde" (Merleau-Ponty) which "imposes itself in its being and precedes our rational operations." This highlights what might be considered the naive quality of the perceptual faith—albeit in its complexity and its irreducibility. It argues for the necessity of a continuous interrogation of the *mens,* or "mind," which *sive anima* ("as, or in the place of, incarnate 'soul' "), sets itself above the things and endeavors to equal their images or signs occurring within itself. But this is precisely the *illusion* of reflection for which the thought of the perception stands as valid in the place of the perception; an illusion that is necessary for the stability that thinking introduces into the fields of presence of mind and world, but that is fatal to any grasp of the prethematic world. In the naive attitude, on the other hand, "what makes the weight, the density, the flesh of each color, each sound, each tactile texture, of the present and the world is that he who grasps them feels himself emerge from them *by a sort of coiling up* [*enroulement*] *or redoubling,* fundamentally homogeneous with them, that he is the sensible coming to himself and that in return the sensible is to his eyes like the double or an expression of his flesh" (*VI* 114). Here, in the place of the *adæquatio,* or even the weaker, aesthetic notion of the "fitness" of the perception to the perceived, we have a folding together or an intertwining, a chiasm. This represents the distinctly Merleau-Pontian sense of *Urstiftung.*[38] Merleau-Ponty understands, in addition, that Husserl's adequate intuition was invariably limited by the presupposition of an *ideal* of fulfillment (*Erfühlung*). Husserl's "object," as determined and determinate, formed an "eidetic continuity with the

world of limit-forms" and was, as such, "already an idealization."[39] For this reason, the present Course Notes argue, the questioning of a tradition like that of geometry as a transhistorical ideality *and its other,* is an inquiry into "a fullness made out of a certain emptiness (out of a certain 'forgetfulness')" (BN 9). And it is the investigation of language, not as capturing the things or conceptualizing them in a pure and complete sense, but as creating a new mode of "intersubjective Being,"[40] that allows idealities (like those—all of them?—which presuppose the fit between the idea of thing and the thing itself) gradually to emerge in it (BN 11; also BN 13).

## The Critique of Husserl's Reduction

While Merleau-Ponty's work maintains the theoretical value of the reduction as the best means by which to upset the "natural attitude,"[41] it also advances a critique of the reduction, which Merleau-Ponty presents as the rectification of its misunderstood meaning,[42] notably: " . . . when philosophy ceases to be doubt to become disclosure, explicitation, since it has detached itself from facts and beings,[43] the field that it opens is indeed made up of significations or essences" (*VI* 148). But such explicitation—whether Husserlian or, for that matter, Heideggerian—rarifies the field in question, turning it into an abstraction or cluster of abstractions. In the place of all Husserlian eidetic reductions, Merleau-Ponty insists upon an interminable crossing of the phenomenological fields where phenomena are, from the outset, "mounted upon axes, pivots, dimensions, the generality of my body" (*VI* 114). Part of the phenomenological "feint" that the reduction, as the privileged commencement of philosophizing creates, is to give the illusion "to be always already supported, *a priori,* in its very existence, by an ideality-principle that only ever appears emptily [*en creux*], as its other face."[44] In the place of this, Merleau-Ponty argues for a separation or hiatus between the sensible individual and the idea; indeed, he writes: "What there is is not a coinciding by principle or a presumptive coinciding and a factual noncoinciding, a bad or abortive truth, but a privative noncoinciding, a coinciding from afar [horizonality], a divergence, and something like a 'good error' " (*VI* 124–25). The "good error" is part of the fields of language and its lost sedimentations. In a sense, Merleau-Ponty's approach to the idealities born from and born in language thus resembles the Wittgenstein of language games and forms of life. Rather than effecting an adequation, linguistic conceptuality intertwines me and the other, the present and the past, and this rapport "extends to the *Nichturpräsentierbar* ['originary-non-presentable']" (BN 12).

The rejection of the constructivist claim to adequation, a central tenet of modern philosophy, represents a departure so radical from that

philosophy that one might wonder whether Merleau-Ponty had not ventured into a sort of anti-or nonphilosophy. Citing Merleau-Ponty's call to "leave the philosophy of *Erlebnisse* and pass to the philosophy of our *Urstiftung*" (the latter term gets translated as originary "initiation"; *VI* 221, 224),[45] his student Claude Lefort has suggested that we are invited here to "something like a nonphilosophical philosophy, or a philosophical surpassing of philosophy" ("PNP" 106).

This means that the extension of the philosophy of the *Lebenswelt,*[46] the rejection of Husserlian egology and even of an originary thematizing consciousness,[47] and the insistence upon a separation between "wild" experience and reflected experience, between experience and concepts, and between the signifier and the signified—these radical revisions of phenomenology risk doing more than enlarging that philosophy, they appear to take us out of philosophy itself. This brings us back to the aforementioned tension in Husserl's own thought; the greater the extension of indeterminacy in levels of experience, and the deeper the immersion of the Ego in the life-world, the more ineluctable is the return of some kind of a *malin génie.* Merleau-Ponty considers this in a number of ways, the most significant of which is to reject the distinction between rationalism and irrationalism; in another way, he borrows from Freud's concept of *overdetermination*—here, of memory, thought patterns, perceptions—and its ontological implications. "The interior monologue—the 'consciousness' itself [is] to be understood not as a series of individual . . . *I think that*'s, but as openness upon *general* configurations or constellations, rays of the past and rays of the world at the end of which, through many 'memory screens' dotted with lacunae and with the imaginary, pulsate some almost sensible structures, some individual memories. It is the Cartesian idealization applied to the mind as to the things (Husserl) that has persuaded us that we were a flux of individual *Erlebnisse,* whereas we are a field of being" (*VI* 240).

Having uncovered this in its own way, and riddled with its own mechanistic tensions, psychoanalysis offers a lesson comparable to that of Merleau-Ponty, albeit from the vantage point of psychopathology. Merleau-Ponty adds, "The 'associations' of psychoanalysis are in reality 'rays' of time and of the world. . . ." But "there is no association that comes into play *unless* there is *overdetermination*" (*VI* 240, emphasis added). This is why he indicates, in the present Course Notes, that the quest for sense, Husserl's *Selbstbesinnung,* is at once "meaning, but also reverie brought about by . . ." The remark goes unfinished here and can only be understood if we maintain the bracketing of the distinction between objective life and subjective life. But how far can we go with such a suspension, given that we live in a world always already objectivated by discursive

intersubjectivity? And how long shall we hold on to the brackets; how do we return from the Husserlian *Rückfrage?* As Claude Lefort admits tersely, "We are justified, for a moment, to wonder whether [this] philosophy does not dissolve itself in an indefinite experience."[48] I will return to this difficult theme at the end of the essay.

## The Tying of Essences to the Chiasmatic Theory of Perception, and a Novel Theory of Language

Insofar as the illusion of what was called the "mad point" at the beginning of these remarks extends through philosophy, but also art and literature where it amounts to a search for the pure language, or the perfect oeuvre, the ideal of adequation in conceptual or figural expression has been universal in modern intellectual culture. In one sense, the essence or invariable being of beings would be the precondition, and the product, of the "fit" of mind and its ob-jects. In reading "The Origin of Geometry," Merleau-Ponty does not so much evacuate the notion of essences as he historicizes it. The requirement of this reading is, for him, "a total remanipulation of the distinctions between fact and essence, real and ideal" (BN 8; Merleau-Ponty's underlining). This is not so much a turn toward relativism, he takes pains to shows us, as it is a necessity. For without a certain tie between a tradition's creation of ideal objects and its history as *human* history, the *origin* of geometry would always be either determinate and "reactivatable" (by virtue of invariant but worldly essences) *or* it would require a mystical stepping out of the Platonic cave of sensuous existence (understood as providing access to supratemporal essences or *ideas*). For Merleau-Ponty, neither of these options is satisfactory, nor absolutely required. The origin of geometry is neither perfectly repeatable nor ever precisely lost; it is not, itself, an object or an idea that would depend upon fixed essences. It is, rather, an intersubjective, linguistic phenomenon: a *Vorhabe,* or pregiven heritage. Here we glimpse the outlines of a theory of language that refuses the Saussurian structuralist avatar of the *adæquatio* between signifier and, if not the signified, then the referent. Language as spoken "changes the mode of being" of what is expressed (BN 13). The new mode is intersubjective, contains its proportions of truth and error, and tends to create ideal objects without the spoken words ever being strictly identical to idealities. Moreover, with the institution of writing, the complexity and possibilities for the historical sedimentation of "things said" are transformed and multiplied: now, there is "virtual communication" (BN 13) such that the new ideal stratum is "neither inaccessible nor truly given" (BN 13; Merleau-Ponty's

underlining). At the level of its actual operation and at the symbolic level, the "speech-community" realizes the objectivations. For Husserl, therefore, there is a *Mitvollzug* (or a "cofulfillment"), an active *Nachverstehen* ("reunderstanding"), and a co-*Erzeugung* ("cocreation of ideal objects") that is present both with and from the initial *Erzeugung* itself. For Merleau-Ponty, each of these is indeed effective, yet open ended. That means that the archeology in question need not reconquer something like the precise objects of thinking of a given culture of geometry. What we are in search of, instead, is an understanding of the "larger meaning" attained by the "undivided sense between us and the past" (BN 14).[49] This "sense" is not positivistic; it entails "indications [*jalons*], historical reflection, and a continuous movement *between* the constitution of the past by the present (interpretation) *and* the determination of the present by the past."

In the spirit of Husserl, for whom humanity as a whole strove for, and with, itself in its cultural productions, Merleau-Ponty's optimism that essences can be historicized proceeds from the open possibility of "recognition of the spiritual [and so, the human] by the spiritual" (BN 14). Thus, "the Essences are *Etwas*es at the level of speech, as things are Essences at the level of Nature" (*VI* 220). To understand this fully, we must keep three things in mind. First, these sorts of essences are different from each other *in their mode of being*. Second, essences are open, and they belong to a series of horizons just as they are loaded with sedimentations activatable and nonactivatable (cf. the concept of overdetermination which makes any association possible). Third, essences, both perceptual and linguistic—these are intertwined in fact and in effectuation—belong to the formations and dynamics of intersubjectivity and as such are conscious and unconscious (cf. his concept of the "tacit *cogito*," *VI* 240, 273; the constitutive human phenomenon of "forgetting" *VI* 193, 196; and the aforementioned assertion that "to think is not having but not having"). Thus, understood as universals, the Husserlian, and classical, essences are here radically modified: "The universal is not above, it is beneath [Merleau-Ponty credits Claudel with this insight here], it is not before, but *behind* us—atonal music = the equivalent of the philosophy of Being in indivision." "Being in indivision" is not monolithic, it is dynamic, determined in part by cultural formations, and, like perception, has for its constitutive dimensions a certain blindness and invisibility. Essences, then, like the phrases or tone points of atonal music, maintain a certain sameness through their displacements. Using Husserl's notion of *Transponierbarkeit* ("transposability"), Merleau-Ponty notes, "The *Transponierbarkeit* is a particular case of a more general transposition

of which atonal music is the thematization. All this implies Being in indivision—[that is] this universality of the sensible, . . . [or] that Being which is *between* my perspective and that of the other, my past and my present" (*VI* 218–19).

This move to enrich the Husserlian notion of essences lies in Merleau-Ponty's intuition that essences undermine themselves when posited as an ideal, or a generalization, of multiple perspectives—in short, as something to be constituted or derived. Such an option again places an abstraction in the place of the "thing" whose being is always a combination of visibility and invisibility, of true perception and error, of perceived front, or side, and unperceived but "believed" back, etc.[50] Thus, rather than stepping out of philosophy, Merleau-Ponty would argue that the notions of transposability, horizonality (*Horizonthaftigkeit*), and the "flesh—of the world intertwined with that of the 'me' "—saves philosophical conceptuality from a sclerotic attachment to polarized categories like subject/object, mind/man, or mind/world.

## Inconclusive Remarks on Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, and Heidegger

Throughout this discussion, Merleau-Ponty's focus upon the implications of intersubjectivity, perception, speech, and writing *for being* represents a question insufficiently unfolded by Husserl. Is this the mark of other influences—notably, Heidegger's or Bergson's—on his work? An answer to this question has been lucidly adumbrated by Leonard Lawlor in the foreword to this volume. For our purposes, let us note that Merleau-Ponty hesitated to set Heidegger and the later Husserl too far apart. Yet in his published work, many of his references to Heidegger are oblique, consisting of a note here and there.

It has been argued, however, that inasmuch as Merleau-Ponty took up Heidegger's ontological concerns, he did so by way of a "naturalization" and a deliberate, naive revision of Heideggerian Being. This has earned him criticism and praise alike,[51] and Lawlor has discussed this in his foreword to the present volume. The mixed reaction is due in part to the various notions and formulations that stand as almost interchangeable with being in Merleau-Ponty.

Consider, to begin with, being in its tie to perceptual faith, which stresses *reversibility:* perceptual faith is "a relation to being that is made from the interior of Being" (*VI* 219). Or again, "what is this indecisive milieu in which we find ourselves once the distinction between fact and

essence is rejected? One must answer that it is the very sphere of our life and of our life of knowledge. Now would be the time to reject the myths of inductivity and of the *Wesenschau* . . . transmitted . . . from generation to generation" (*VI* 115–16). Rejecting both Husserl and Heidegger, here, the sphere of our life dissolves concepts as it engenders a kind of "infinite conversation" in their wake.

Consider, also, being without an ontico-ontological distinction or, as Marc Richir has noted, "if there is, in Merleau-Ponty, a new ontology, it is, by way of the mediation of the flesh, more an ontology of 'mixture' ["*mélange*"]—crossing, overlapping [*empiètement*], chiasm—than a sort of ontological monism à la Parmenides (as interpreted by Heidegger)."[52] Moreover, this being, without the ontological difference is assimilated to a certain prethematic, prereflective "nature" (out of which geometry would have arisen and, to some extent, could continue to arise). This Being is deemed "wild"; a horizontal and horizonal indeterminacy, a field—and it is crossed by Being as a depth dimension, which is vertical, is profundity. Here, then, is the onto-logical chiasm.

Consider also the analogy—which seems to be more of a heuristic than a comparison—with the topological space mentioned earlier as "a model of being" (*VI* 210). Further, the "flesh" also takes on the sense of Heidegger's Being at points. In other words, there is a dizzying polysemia at work in Merleau-Ponty's notion of being. And perhaps justifiably, since he has dispensed with the categorial systems that would set being in opposition to something, or set it as the basis of other notions or entities. Merleau-Ponty is clearly aware of this. Indeed, he is aware to such an extent that one commentator has argued that his late work, notably *The Visible and the Invisible,* deliberately resembles *Being and Time* in its "structure," despite the fact that the Merleau-Pontian "existential analytic" is centered upon the reversible meaning of perception and on being-in-the-world as *immersed* in that world, *rather* than on being "alongside of things," or on Heideggerian notions of care and *Eigentlichkeit.*[53] "The whole [Merleau-Pontian analytic] is cashed in, finally, in the last chapter of the work [*The Visible and the Invisible*], through a *Kehre,* or a turning point analogous to that practiced by Heidegger, wherein it is the flesh . . . that it will be a matter of thinking as such, in its *ontological* truth, as though it were sufficient to think 'being' in the Heideggerian sense when Merleau-Ponty writes 'flesh.' "[54] As Merleau-Ponty himself writes in the "Working Notes" to *The Visible and the Invisible:* "Flesh of the world—Flesh of the body—Being" (*VI* 248).

In this often unstated, yet quite massive critique of Heidegger concerning the meaning(s) of Being, we find what is to my mind the most significant divergence from Husserl (even as it remains curiously tributary

to his late work). With the flesh, we have a meeting point, a chiasm, between inside and outside, human being and world, same and other. Others among Husserl's inheritors, including Levinas, have criticized Heidegger for his maintenance of this residue of a metaphysical, binary logic.[55] For Merleau-Ponty, the chiasm is a meeting point like "the finger of a glove turned inside out," a meeting point impossible to establish ultimately in fixed positions. It is a "field of phenomena" *qua* "polymorphous matrix" (*VI* 221) comparable, as one philosopher suggested, to the *chora* described in Plato's *Timaeus:* a "bastard concept,"[56] or a return to the Greeks different from Heidegger's own. Indeed, it has been argued that this bastard thing, claimed to be eminently thinkable albeit not a *concept* in the traditional sense, allowed Merleau-Ponty to avoid Heidegger's move toward a certain metaphysics that took the form of "a questioning into the transcendental-ontological conditions of the possibility of thinking."[57] In other words, it allows Merleau-Ponty to place a brake on the impetus to outshoot or outstrip the ontic and to ground the ultimate meaning of beings upon something transcendental to which they are irreducible.

This move is entirely his own. If it is a radicalization of Husserl, then the radicalization has taken him beyond the latter toward an *Urstiftung* that insists upon the continuous insertion of the being of the questioner, in the form of its lived perceptual faith, into the being that it questions. Moreover, his multiplication of horizons—profoundly Husserlian in inspiration—makes the "polymorphous matrix" meaningful thanks to notions like encroachment (*VI* 202), divergence and separation or *écart* (*VI* 201), promiscuity (*VI* 115), perpetual pregnancy (*VI* 115), partial coincidence (*VI* 195), and the emphasis on Husserl's *Lebenswelt* over his acts of constitution and their requisite sense of the reduction; thanks too to the refusal to formulate "a direct ontology" (*VI* 179). Finally, it has been argued that this move preserves both a *cosmos,* taken in the sense of "wild,"[58] dynamically and paradoxically structured, from the *acosmism* of Heidegger, while justifying the phenomenological reduction as an incompleteable, but necessary, approach to being.[59] An evaluation of the success of this project depends upon the determination of his commentators, *and* critics, to remain firmly within the enterprise itself before, indeed *while,* attempting to debate the prospects it offers us for thinking. This afterword has ventured a brief step in that direction. But the project, which is ongoing today, carries the present book with it just as this book carries, in its unfolding, that project.

## Notes

1. Today known as the "vanishing point" in a classical, linear perspective where lines converge, the point revolutionized painting by creating a nonnatural, artifactual space that appeared variably deep. As a fixed site, the point—wherever the painter situated it—stabilized the space of the painting, organizing its perspective. Although it is technically "on" the canvas (according to projections of conical or spherical geometries), the point so orients the planes of the image that this point *becomes* the gaze or vision in the painting, and it appears to vanish somewhere behind the surface of the canvas. The "artificial perspective," made possible by the fixed point, was characteristic of the sixteenth century's obsession with measure and origin in analytic geometry and cosmology. As Hubert Damisch notes, "One need not resort to science to state that according to whether one's philosophical outlook privileges the geometry of the sphere, the cone, or the plane, the fixed point will be a center, a site, or an origin. . . . Which does not exclude the possibility of passing from the point of view of the subject to that of the eye (which, in painting, came to be known as the *vanishing point* . . . ), by a kind of 'shifting of gears' analogous to the linguistic one allowing us . . . to pass from 'I' to 'you' or 'he' . . ."

Without this point, however, no stable localization of an *archē* or gaze is possible in a work. The hope of finding a comparably fixed orientation in political and ethical thought persisted though Kant's time (Hubert Damisch, *The Origins of Perspective,* translated by John Goodman [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994], p. 51).

2. Damisch, *Op. cit.,* pp. 53–54.

3. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Intertwining—The Chiasm," in *The Visible and the Invisible,* translated by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 141. Hereafter abbreviated as *VI.*

4. I borrow the expression "matrices of concepts" from Merleau-Ponty in his *The Prose of the World,* in which he argues that in the work of art we find something "better than ideas, matrices of ideas . . ." (translated by John O'Neill [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973]), p. 90.

5. Claude Lefort, "Philosophie et non-philosophie," in *Esprit,* no. 66 (June 1982), p. 111.

6. See also Lawlor's foreword to this volume, p. xviii, in which he translates *Vorhabe* as "prepossession."

7. Indeed, in the "Working Notes" of *The Visible and the Invisible,* Merleau-Ponty states that "philosophy is the study of the *Vorhabe* of Being, a *Vorhabe* that is not *cognition,* . . . that is wanting with regard to cognition, to operation, but that envelops them as Being envelops the beings" (p. 204). Later, he will place the very ontological difference (Being versus beings) in question; and much of his thinking leads us to believe that beings, in their indeterminate, positive presence as so many "fields," envelop the idea of "Being" and the distinction itself.

8. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and His Shadow," in *Signs,*

translated by Richard McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 159.

9. Jacques Garelli, "L'Héritage husserlien et l'expérience merleau-pontienne du commencement," in *Merleau-Ponty: Notes de cours sur* L'Origine de la géométrie de Husserl (suivi de *recherches sur la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty)*, edited by Renaud Barbaras (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), p. 98.

10. See Merleau-Ponty, "Working Notes," in *The Visible and The Invisible,* p. 177 n. 12. The editors of the English translation of this work point out that this "passage . . . is copiously underlined in the copy of *Krisis* the author owned."

11. Ibid. See especially "The Intertwining—The Chiasm," pp. 130–55.

12. See, for example, Claude Lefort's remarks in his *Sur une colonne absente: Écrits autour de Merleau-Ponty* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978). On p. ix he argues that Merleau-Ponty's writings "marked a profound rupture not only with the classical tradition, but with the Hegelian dialectic, Marxism, and phenomenology." Elsewhere he adds that, while Merleau-Ponty long made Husserl's thought his own, he "came to discover that there is no return to an in-side of language and thought," and indeed to the canonic interpretation of a thinker. Marc Richir goes farther and writes, against the charge of a latent Heideggerianism guiding Merleau-Ponty's work: " . . . it appears to me urgent, today, to show that the Merleau-Pontian sense of phenomenology is, strictly speaking, neither Husserlian, nor Heideggerian, but new . . ." See Marc Richir, "Le sens de la phénoménologie dans *Le visible et l'invisible,*" in *Esprit,* no. 66 (June 1982), p. 125.

13. See Garelli, "L'Heritage husserlien," in *Merleau-Ponty: Notes de cours,* p. 99.

14. Certainly Derrida—of whose thought Lawlor has shown convergences with that of Merleau-Ponty on the necessity of "writing-down" to stabilize the lacunae in our "ideal structures"—owes a debt to this signal work of Husserl. See Lawlor's foreword.

15. See for example, Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and His Shadow," in *Signs,* pp. 163–64. Hereafter abbreviated in the text as *S.*

16. See Renaud Barbaras's essay "Le tournant de l'expérience: Merleau-Ponty et Bergson," in his *Le tournant de l'expérience: Recherches sur la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty* (Paris: Vrin, 1998). In this essay, he argues that as Merleau-Ponty took distance from his early *Phenomenology of Perception,* and particularly in his later course *La nature* and his book *The Visible and the Invisible,* he returned to Bergson's thought, attributing to it an "equal philosophical dignity" with that of Husserl. This is especially so, Barbaras argues, insofar as it was Bergson who allowed Merleau-Ponty to make his "passage to ontology" by "freeing himself from . . . the limitations of Husserlian phenomenology" (p. 34). For the difficult connection to Heidegger, note that Merleau-Ponty himself states in the Course Notes in the present volume that the thought of the final Husserl and that of Heidegger are not as far apart as one might suppose, they are "sometimes convergent." For his part, Marc Richir rejects "the myth of an at least latent Heideggerianism" in Merleau-Ponty, while showing that *The Visible and the Invisible* "proceeds . . . structurally or methodologically the way *Sein und Zeit* does, except that it proposes a remarkable generalization of the latter" ("Le sens

de la phénoménologie," pp. 125 and 140). Michel Haar notes the similarities between the two, but criticizes Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh of the world and his conception of the originary depth dimension of sensible experience as falling back into a certain metaphysics because it "lacks a sufficient deconstruction of the tradition." See Michel Haar, "Proximité et distance vis-à-vis de Heidegger," in *Merleau-Ponty: Notes de cours,* edited by R. Barbaras, p. 144. Leonard Lawlor argues cogently for a deepening Heideggerian influence upon Merleau-Ponty in the present volume.

17. See Barbaras, "Le tournant de l'expérience: Merleau-Ponty et Bergson," pp. 60–61.

18. Richir, "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 144.

19. Ibid., p. 136.

20. Ibid.

21. See Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and His Shadow," p. 166: "When my right hand touches my left, I am aware of it as a 'physical thing.' But at the same moment, if I wish, an extraordinary event takes place: here is my left hand as well starting to perceive my right, *es wird Leib, es empfindet.* The physical thing becomes animate. Or, more precisely, it remains what it was . . . but an exploratory power comes to rest upon or dwell in it." The German expression Merleau-Ponty uses here, "it becomes flesh, it feels," comes from Husserl's *Ideen II. See a*lso Merleau-Ponty's development of this touching-touched phenomenon in his "The Intertwining—The Chiasm," in *The Visible and the Invisible,* p. 141.

22. Note Richir's remarks on the aporias of reflection as the appearance of stability that draws from the instability of nonreflective experience, in "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 128.

23. Richir ventures a more polemical formulation of Husserl's transcendentalist side: " . . . taken in its unilaterality, the reflective attitude in fact only leads to a *fiction of phenomenology,* to an *artifact* that converts the phenomenon into a thinking of the phenomenon which is supposed, through a constitutive illusion, to be adequate to the phenomenon itself. That is to say, also, that the phenomenological field cannot remain open to the reflective attitude [i.e., of the classical reduction] unless this attitude accepts being situated in the very site of its antinomy . . ." ("Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 9).

24. R. Barbaras, "Merleau-Ponty et la racine de l'objectivisme husserlien," in *Le tournant de l'expérience: Recherches sur la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty* (Paris: Vrin, 1998), p. 67 (emphasis added, my translation). See also Lawlor's remarks on "faith" as beyond absolute knowledge, in his foreword to this volume, p. xxx.

25. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible,* pp. 103–4 and 121. Hereafter abbreviated in the text as *VI.*

26. See Richir's remarks on the absolute appearance of thought and the illusion of utter truth it poses to everyday experience, in "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 128. See also Lawlor's discussion of the *telos* according to Merleau-Ponty in the foreword, p. xvii.

27. Richir, "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 129; as justification he refers to "The Philosopher and His Shadow" in its entirety.

28. See Claude Lefort, "Philosophie et non-philosophie," p. 117. In the "Working Notes" of *The Visible and the Invisible,* Merleau-Ponty writes, "Like humanity (*Menschheit*) every concept is first a horizonal generality, a generality of style . . ." (*VI* 237). And again, in "The Intertwining—The Chiasm": "but what is proper to visibility is to be the surface of an inexhaustible *depth* . . ." (*VI* 143, emphasis added).

29. Jacques Garelli, "Il y a le monde," in *Esprit,* no. 66 (June 1982), p. 117. (My translation.)

30. See Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible,* p. 140. Note also Merleau-Ponty's introduction to *Signs,* p. 21: "When I speak of nothingness there is already being; thus this nothingness does not really annihilate . . ." See also Barbaras, "Merleau-Ponty et la racine de l'objectivisme husserlien," in *Le Tournant de l'expérience: Recherches sur la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty* (Paris: Vrin, 1998), pp. 72–73.

31. See Renaud Barbaras's remarks on philosophies supposing nothingness in his "Merleau-Ponty et la racine de l'objectivisme husserlien," in *Le tournant de l'expérience,* p. 71ff.

32. See Emmanuel Levinas, *Existence and Existents,* translated by Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), p. 63.

33. Note Merleau-Ponty's elliptical remarks on ontology interspersed in the "Working Notes" of *The Visible and the Invisible,* for example: "The principle of ontology: being in indivision" (p. 208). And again, "One cannot make an indirect ontology. My 'indirect' method (being in the beings) is alone conformed with being . . ." (p. 179). Or, in regard to nothingness: "The intent to reach the absolutely hard being of the essence conceals the mendacious pretension to be nothing . . . a lived nothingness, is precluded . . ." (against Sartrian subjectivity), p. 120. Or, "The negintuition of nothingness is to be rejected because nothingness is always elsewhere. The true solution: *Offenheit der Umwelt, Horizonthaftigkeit* ["openness of the environment, horizonality"]," p. 196. And " . . . it lapses into the Cartesian defect of being a *hypothesis of the Nichtigkeit of the world* ["nothingness of . . ."], which immediately has as its consequence the maintenance of the *mens sive anima* ["mind as/in the place of the soul"] . . ." (p. 172).

34. Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and His Shadow," p. 171. See also Lawlor's foreword.

35. Richir, "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 125. This article was translated into English and appeared in the journal *Thesis Eleven,* no. 36 (1993). (My own translation, emphasis added.)

36. See Jacques Garelli's remarks on the *adæquatio* in "Il y a le monde," p. 114.

37. Ibid., p. 115.

38. See Merleau-Ponty, *VI* 114; and Garelli, "Il y a le monde," p. 117.

39. See R. Barbaras, *Le Tournant de l'expérience: Recherches sur la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty,* p. 68.

40. To which Merleau-Ponty adds, "ideality is at the hinge [*à la charnière*] of the connection between me and others. It functions in this connection; it is operative, effective there. It is realized in and through this connection" (BN 12).

Moreover, because this "hinge" is indeterminate and tied to linguistic practice, there is always a gamut of modes of ideality.

41. See Richir's remarks on this in "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 136.

42. Cf. Richir, "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 133; and *VI* 148–49.

43. Richir argues that this remark is nothing less than an oblique reference to the phenomenological reduction.

44. Richir, "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 133.

45. See also Claude Lefort, "Philosophie et non-philosophie," in *Esprit,* no. 66 (June 1982), p. 106. Hereafter abbreviated in the text as "PNP."

46. Merleau-Ponty writes in *The Visible and the Invisible:* "We are making a philosophy of the *Lebenswelt,* our construction makes us rediscover this world of silence." See *VI* 170.

47. Here, in the rejection of egology, a rapprochement with Lacan, whom Merleau-Ponty cites on occasion, is clear. His conception of proto-subjectivity entails a language that speaks by itself—*ça parle* ("it speaks"), as Lacan put it. Or, in Merleau-Ponty's language: "The soul cannot fail to think because a field was opened in which *something* or *the absence* of something is always inscribed." To which Claude Lefort adds: "*but* it [the fact of thinking] is not a matter of an activity, [and] *I* am not the author of it" (cf. Lefort, "PNP" 106).

48. Lefort, "PNP" 107.

49. See Lawlor's discussion of the "necessity" of writing in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida in his foreword, pp. 32–36.

50. Cf. Lefort, "PNP" 107.

51. See Marc Richir's praise of Merleau-Ponty's conscious "naive" ontology in "Le sens de la phénoménologie," pp. 140–41. See also Michel Haar's Heideggerian critique of the unconscious metaphysical content of many of Merleau-Ponty's concepts in "Proximité et distance vis-à-vis de Heidegger," in *Merleau-Ponty: Notes du cours,* pp. 1123–45. Notably, his trenchant observation: "Can an ontology do as much without the excess of the gift as of its *retenue?* Does not a carnal *there is* [*il y a*] without immeasurableness [*démesure*] and without reserve, without negativity—an 'element,' a 'matrix,' a 'milieu forming the subject and the object,' carrying dehiscence like a well-ordered 'fold,' a 'close bound system that I count on,' which is 'not chaos, but texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself', thus perfectly harmonious and transparent—does this not establish itself on a too comfortable forgetting of the nothing?" (p. 145; and citing *VI* 146). Otherwise put, for Haar, who insists excessively, to my mind, on the *harmony and transparency* of Merleau-Ponty's *there is,* the forgetting of this nothing is not, then, the revision of an abstract and metaphysical concept in need of rethinking: it is itself the most metaphysical of Merleau-Ponty's concepts. Although Merleau-Ponty does use the notion of "preestablished harmony" (*VI* 133), he does not use it naively; for Merleau-Ponty's critique of "harmony," see the "Working Notes" to *The Visible and the Invisible,* p. 223.

52. Richir, "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 141. See also Lawlor's foreword, p. xvii: "Merleau-Ponty has always tried to root all abstract concepts in factuality."

53. Ibid., pp. 140–41.

54. Ibid.

55. See Levinas, *Existence and Existents.*

56. The term "bastard concept" comes from Merleau-Ponty speaking of "false problems posed by bastard and unthinkable experiences": see "Reflection and Interrogation" in *The Visible and the Invisible,* p. 31. See also Richir, "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 141.

57. Ibid.

58. The French term used for "wild" here is *sauvage* and contains a reference to Lévi-Strauss's *La pensée sauvage.*

59. Richir, "Le sens de la phénoménologie," p. 144.

# Glossary of German Terms

Note: In general, the English translation has been placed in pointed brackets after the German term only at its first occurrence. When context seems to make the meaning of the term obvious, I have not rendered it. Also, at times, Merleau-Ponty provides a translation of the term immediately following it.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Abgrund* | abyss, or without ground or without reason |
| *Allgemeingültigkeit* | general validity |
| *Anfangsuntersuchungen* | beginnings of investigations |
| *Anschauung* | intuition |
| *Auffasung* | apprehension |
| *Auftreten* | to tread |
| *Ausdrücken* | to express |
| *Ausführung* | execution |
| *Auslegung* | interpretation |
| *Aussage* | assertion |
| *Aussprechen* | to express |
| *Bedeutung* | meaning |
| *Befragung* | interrogation |
| *Beweglichkeit* | mobility |
| *Bewegung* | motion or movement, depending on the context, that is, depending upon whether it is "Körper" (physical body, and therefore motion) or "Leib" (flesh, or the lived body, and therefore movement) that is at issue |
| *Bewußtsein* | consciousness |
| *Beziehungseinheit* | relational unity; Derrida renders this term as "corrélation." |
| *Bildung* | formation or education |
| *Boden* | soil or ground |
| *Dasein* | existence; obviously, Merleau-Ponty's use of this word is supposed to allude to Heidegger's *Being and Time.* |

| | |
|---|---|
| *Deckung* | coincidence, overlapping; Derrida renders this word as "recouvrement" |
| *Ding* | thing |
| *Doppelschichtig* | two-layered; Derrida translates this word as "la double stratification." |
| *Einfühlung* | this term is usually rendered into English as "empathy," into French as "intropathie." See Natalie Depraz's discussion of it in her *Transcendence et incarnation.* |
| *Einseitigkeit* | one-sidedness |
| *Einstömen* | to flow |
| *Eintritt* | appearance, in the sense of making an appearance, entering |
| *Empfindung* | sensation |
| *Endlos* | unlimited |
| *Endstiftung* | final institution |
| *Entschränkung* | removal of limits |
| *Erdraum* | terrestrial space |
| *Ereignis* | event, appropriation, event of appropriation |
| *Erfahrung* | experience |
| *Erfinder* | inventor |
| *Erkenntnis* | knowledge |
| *Erleben* | to experience; this term is also connected to "Erlebnis," lived experience. |
| *Erneute* | what is renewed; Merleau-Ponty seems to be translating "die Erneute" as "elle est renouvelée." Carr, however, renders this term as "what is renewed," which we have followed here; Derrida renders it as "le renové." |
| *Eröffnung* | disclosure |
| *Erörtern* | discussion |
| *Erscheinung* | appearance |
| *Erweben* | acquisition |
| *Erwirkte* | what has been realized |
| *Erzeugung* | production |
| *Etwas* | something |
| *Fertig* | ready made |
| *Forschung Manuskript* | work in progress |
| *Fortarbeit* | forward development |

| | |
|---|---|
| *Fortpflanzung* | reproduction or propagative process; Derrida, like Merleau-Ponty, renders it as "propogation." |
| *Fortstiftung* | continued institution |
| *Fungieren* | to function or to operate, or to act |
| *Füreinander* | for one another |
| *Gebilde* | structure; Derrida renders this term as "formation." |
| *Gegenständlichkeit* | objectivity |
| *Gegenwärtigkeit* | present |
| *Gehören* | to belong |
| *Geschick* | destiny, sending, missive |
| *Gleiche* | the same; Husserl often makes a distinction between "das Gleiche," what is the same, and "das Ähnliche," what is similar (a lower degree of homogeneity) |
| *Idealisierung* | idealization |
| *Ineinander* | in one another |
| *Können* | to be able |
| *Konnex* | connection |
| *Körper* | body, physical body |
| *Kulturwelt* | world of culture |
| *Lebenswelt* | life-world |
| *Leib* | flesh, lived body |
| *Leistung* | accomplishment; Derrida renders this term as "production." |
| *Mitmenschheit* | cohumanity |
| *Mitsein* | being-with |
| *Mitteilung* | communication |
| *Mitverstehen* | counderstanding |
| *Mitvollzug* | cooperation or a cofulfillment; literally, it is a coexecution in the sense of a cocarrying out. |
| *Nacheinander* | one after another, succession |
| *Nachstiftung* | reinstitution |
| *Nachverstehen* | reunderstanding |
| *Nachvollzug* | reoperation |
| *Nichturpräsentierbar* | originary nonpresentable |
| *Offenheit* | openness |
| *Ort* | place |
| *Reaktivierbarkeit* | reactivability |

| | |
|---|---|
| *Rede* | discourse |
| *Riss* | tear, rip, schism |
| *Rückfrage* | return-inquiry. Carr renders this terms as "inquiry back"; Derrida renders it as "question en retour." Currently this term is rendered as "regressive inquiry," as in the English translation of Fink's Sixth Meditation. See Derrida's introduction to *L'Origine de la géométrie,* p. 50 (English translation), for an explanation of his translation of this term. |
| *Schweben* | suspension |
| *Seinmodus* | ontic mode |
| *Selbstbesinnung* | self-reflection; this word is usually rendered in French as "prise de conscience." |
| *Sinn* | sense |
| *Sinnentleerung* | the process of sense being emptied out |
| *Sinngebung* | donation of sense or meaning |
| *Sinngemäß* | in accord with the sense |
| *Sprache* | language |
| *Sprachgemeinschaft* | community of language |
| *Stamm* | the base or part of a tree, the stem, which supports every other branch; the source. Merleau-Ponty renders this word with the French "souche," which carries similar meanings. |
| *Stiftung* | institution |
| *Tatsache* | fact, state of affair |
| *Tiefendimension* | depth-dimension |
| *Tiefenleben* | life of depths |
| *Tiefenprobleme* | depth-problem |
| *Überhaupt* | in general |
| *Überholungre* | vision |
| *Überstieg* | crossing over |
| *Umwelt* | surrounding world |
| *Unendlichkeit* | infinity |
| *Ungedachte* | unthought |
| *Ursprung* | origin |
| *Urstiftung* | primal institution |
| *Verdeutlichung* | explication |
| *Verflochten* | interwoven |
| *Vergangensein* | past being |

| | |
|---|---|
| *Vermöglichkeit* | faculty or capacity |
| *Vernunft* | reason |
| *Verstehen* | to understand |
| *Verwertung* | application |
| *Vorgegeben* | pregiven |
| *Vorhabe* | prepossession. Carr translates "Vorhabe" as "project"; Derrida renders it as well as "projet." But Merleau-Ponty himself renders it as "prepossession." |
| *Vorstellung* | representation |
| *Wahrheit* | truth |
| *Welt* | world |
| *Weltlichkeit* | worldhood |
| *Wesen* | essence or being or nature |
| *Wesengemäßig* | as essentially |
| *Wiedererinnerung* | recollection; Derrida renders this word as "ressouvenir." |
| *Wiederholungen* | repetitions |
| *Wissen* | knowledge |
| *Zeitbewußtsein* | time-consciousness |
| *Zentrum* | center |
| *Ziel* | goal |
| *Zuschauer* | spectator |

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Combining Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 1960 course notes on Edmund Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry," his course summary, related texts, and critical essays by each of the editors, this collection offers a unique and welcome glimpse into both Merleau-Ponty's nuanced reading of Husserl's famed late writings and his persistent effort to track the very genesis of truth through the incarnate idealization of language.

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