EDMUND HUSSERL

THING AND SPACE
LECTURES OF 1907

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Lectures of 1907

EDMUND HUSSERL

COLLECTED WORKS

TRANSLATOR AND EDITOR:
RICHARD ROJCEWICZ

VOLUME VII

VOLUME I	Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy THIRD BOOK: Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences
VOLUME II	Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy FIRST BOOK: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology
VOLUME III	Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy SECOND BOOK: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution
VOLUME IV	On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)
VOLUME V	Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
VOLUME VI	Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)
VOLUME VII	Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907

TRANSLATIONS
PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF
THE HUSSERL-ARCHIVES (LEUVEN)

EDMUND HUSSERL

THING AND SPACE
Lectures of 1907

TRANSLATED BY

RICHARD ROJCEWICZ

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON

Thomas J. Bata Library
TRENT UNIVERSITY
PETERBOROUGH, ONTARIO

B3279 .H93 T48 1997

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.

ISBN 0-7923-4749-8

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers
PO Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands

Sold and distributed in the United States and Canada
by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
PO Box 358, Accord Station, Hingham, MA 02018-0358, USA

In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers, Distribution Center,
PO Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands

Printed on acid-free paper

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Printed in the Netherlands.

Erratum

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ISBN 0-7923-4749-8

Due to a publisher's oversight, the dust jacket of this book does not distinguish the English-language translator from the German-language editor. The book is a translation by Richard Rojcewicz of the original German work edited in 1972 by Ulrich Claesges.

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https://archive.org/details/thingspacelectur0000huss

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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

This is a translation of Edmund Husserl's lecture course from the Summer semester 1907 at the University of Göttingen. The German original was published posthumously in 1973 as Volume XVI of *Husserliana*, Husserl's *opera omnia*. The translation is complete, including both the main text and the supplementary texts (as *Husserliana* volumes are usually organized), except for the critical apparatus which provides variant readings.

The announced title of the lecture course was "Main parts of the phenomenology and critique of reason." The course began with five, relatively independent, introductory lectures. These were published on their own in 1947, bearing the title *The idea of phenomenology*.[1] The "Five Lectures" comprise a general orientation by proposing the method to be employed in the subsequent working out of the actual problems (*viz.*, the method of "phenomenological reduction") and by clarifying, at least provisionally, some technical terms that will be used in the labor the subsequent lectures will carry out.

The present volume, then, presents that labor, i.e., the method in action and the results attained. As such, this text dispels the abstract impression which could not help but cling to the first five lectures taken in isolation. Accordingly, we are here given genuine "introductory lectures," i.e., an introduction to phenomenology in the genuine phenomenological sense of engaging in the work of phenomenology, going to the "matters at issue themselves," rather than remaining aloof from them in abstract considerations of standpoint and approach.

Now the specific matters at issue here are designated by the name with which Husserl often referred to this lecture course, namely the "Thing-Lectures" [*Dingvorlesung*]. To be precise, the matters at issue are the thing and space; or, as Husserl also expressed it, the analyses are devoted to a "phenomenology of the thing and, in particular, of space."[2]

---

[1] *Die Idee der Phänomenologie: Fünf Vorlesungen*, hrsg. Walter Biemel; Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1950 (*Husserliana II*). English translation by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, *The Idea of Phenomenology*; The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964. A new translation by Lee Hardy will soon be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in the present series, *Edmund Husserl: Collected Works*.

[2] *Cf.* the editor's introduction to the present volume, p. xx.

Why should Husserl's philosophical endeavors lead to these themes? The answer resides in the project of the "critique of reason," Husserl's own title for the lecture course and the general rubric under which it falls. In turn, Husserl's undertaking a critique of reason was motivated by a personal crisis. The editor of the "Five Lectures" reports that Husserl was at this time going through a "severe crisis," a doubt concerning himself which tormented him so seriously that he put in question his own existence as a philosopher.[3] In the Fall of 1906, Husserl records in his private journal the primary task he must carry out if he is to be able to call himself a philosopher. That task is a critique of reason. Without clarity in that regard, Husserl writes, he cannot "really and truly" live.[4]

For Husserl, as for Kant, pure theoretical reason makes certain claims, and a critique of reason amounts to settling those claims. For Kant, the claim of reason is, most basically, the claim to constitute scientific reality, the thing as it is the correlate of natural-scientific cognition. For Husserl, the crisis strikes more deeply, and the "thing" at issue is the thing of everyday experience:

> In order to solve the problems of the constitution of natural scientific reality in the context of the variegated cognitions and cognitive nexuses of natural science, we would need to settle the problems posed by logical-mathematical thinking and to clarify, from the side of experiential cognition, not only the lower levels of the experience which lies prior to all deduction and induction – in short, prior to all logically mediated cognition in the usual sense – but also, and *a fortiori*, we would need to clarify the higher levels.
>
> These are very lofty goals, to which we gaze up wistfully, but which we cannot at all seriously set for ourselves here and now. The first elaboration of the field of experience, its phenomena and its givens, will offer us an ample supply of difficult and deep problems. We will be doing well if we cultivate this field so effectively that our successors can then attempt to raise the higher forms of the problems. (pp. 1–2)

That, instead of sheer chaos, there should be things in experience at all, the unitary and meaningful things of everyday experience, things as we ordinarily see them, upon which are constructed things as science conceives them, that is the more basic accomplishment of theoretical reason or, to be precise, pre-theoretical reason. And it is this accomplishment which is the focus of Husserl's critique here. Thus his theme is the thing of the lowest constitutive stratum, but even that is not to say enough. For this thing itself has higher and lower strata, and Husserl is here pursuing the work of reason down to its very root. Thus his focus is the most foundational layer of the most foundational

---

[3] *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. viii.

things. A "full" thing is constituted in everyday experience as a substantial, material thing functionally interacting with other such things. Husserl penetrates deeper, to the lower stratum he calls, *stricto sensu*, not yet a thing but only a "phantom." Thus Husserl's critique of the claim of theoretical reason amounts to an analysis of its most basic accomplishment, the constitution of the lowest stratum of the appearance of a thing, namely the appearance of a mere *res extensa*, an extended structure filled merely with sense qualities and not yet with substantial or causal properties. Furthermore, as extended, this structure itself presupposes an even more ultimate level, the lowest level of all in the constitution of the thing for Husserl, the constitution of space itself.

Thus we come to understand the title of the book, "Thing and Space." That is, the term "space" applies to the lowest constitutive stratum *of the thing* and is not, as in Kant, a mere form of intuition: "Space is a necessary form of things and is not a form of lived experience, specifically not of 'sensuous' lived experiences. 'Form of intuition' is a fundamentally false expression and implies, even in Kant, a fatally erroneous position." (p. 37)

So Husserl's critique of reason leads to a phenomenology of the constitution of the thing and space. Does Husserl in the end vindicate the claim of reason to accomplish these unities, to present us, not with chaos, but with meaningful, unified things in a unified space? In a manner of speaking he does, since, after all, Husserl is able to uncover the constitution of a world which, more or less, makes sense to us. Yet Husserl does not find that rationality rules to such an extent that a meaningful world is *necessary*. The world is a fact; but it is not a secure, rational fact. Sense is constantly menaced by nonsense; and there is no *a priori* reason that appearances should make sense. Thus Husserl concludes:

> All in all, the world – in its existence and in what it is – is an irrational fact, and its facticity resides uniquely and exclusively in the strictness of the motivational nexuses – which actually permit all the examined possibilities to appear as fallow possibilities, as baseless, purely fabricated possibilities. On the other hand, the existence of a world in which not only do individual realities come together in general, but to which ultimately each and every occurring datum makes its contribution, is the only rational possibility, one which is indeed not pregiven *a priori* but founded *a posteriori*. This is not supposed to mean that the world is presumed to exist on the strength of a hypothesis; things, people, one's own Ego, all this is indeed perceived. Every perceived reality (real thing) can perhaps not be, and thereby in principle each and every thing posited in perception and also in memory might not be. Hence it is possible for there to be nothing real. But every perception is a rational positing of something (which possibly is not), a foundational positing, and that also holds for things revoked through conflict. Every perceptual apprehension is motivated, and in this motivation it has its right to proclaim, as it were, Being. Admittedly, however, this rational positing within perception is not

> an absolute positing; it is like a force that can be overwhelmed by strong counter-forces. ... This is how I have always viewed the situation, and I find no motive, in the investigations just carried out, to change anything. (pp. 250–1)

It is now nearly seven decades since Husserl was first translated into English, and I have certainly profited by the refinements and conventions that have been introduced in the intervening years.[5] Nevertheless, each text to be translated is unique, and each translator must make decisions based not on convention and the work of his predecessors but on his own linguistic intuition. This is not to warn the reader that I have introduced innovations; it is only meant to explain, first of all, why I have found it necessary, for the sake of consistency, to re-translate all the passages in the book where Husserl quotes himself, i.e., where he refers to other works of his that have already been translated. I have in each of these cases provided my own translation, though I have always included a reference to the relevant English publication so that readers may have at their disposal the context of the passage in question. I have preceded these references to extant translations with a "*Cf.*" in order to indicate that the reference merely serves to invite the reader to compare my version with the earlier one, from which it may or may not differ. Where there are differences, in no case should it be assumed that the previous translator would approve of my changes.

There are two terms in the original text of the present translation which have especially caused me a great deal of soul-searching. On the surface of it, they might seem the easiest possible terms to translate, since they have cognates in our language; the terms are *reell* and *Perzeption*. The problem is that *reell* must be distinguished from the German *real*, and *Perzeption* from *Wahrnehmung*, the ordinary word for "perception."

The distinction between the terms *reell* and *real*, both of which could be translated as "real," is that between immanence and transcendence. As regards perception, what is immanent to the stream of consciousness is *reell*; the paradigm example is a sensation. What is transcendent to the stream and only *intentionally* present in consciousness is the thing perceived; it is *real*. How do these relate to what we call "real" in English? Looked at from the perspective of consciousness, the sensations are more real; they are substantially present and form part of the content of the stream. Sensations are dated and unrepeat-

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[5] The first English translation appeared in 1929. It was Christopher V. Salmon's translation of the article, "Phenomenology," which Husserl wrote for the 14th edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. The second appeared in 1931. It was the translation of *Ideen I* by W.R. Boyce Gibson: *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*; NY: Macmillan. Each of these two translations has been superseded by a more recent, and much more adequate, version. The Encyclopaedia article, "Phenomenology," was re-translated by Richard E. Palmer in 1971 (*Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 2, pp. 77–90), and *Ideen I* was re-translated by Fred Kersten (*Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1982).

able; I can see the same thing many times but in each case my sensations of it are unique. In contrast, the thing perceived is "merely" intentionally present to consciousness and is the unity that remains the same throughout many individualized courses of sensation. Thus the thing is, for consciousness, an ideal unity, not a really present one. On the other hand, in an obvious way, the thing is more real than the sensations, especially if "real" is taken in the Kantian, etymological sense as what pertains to the *res*, or to the *realitas*, i.e., to what some thing is. When Kant says that Being is not a real predicate (*reales Prädikat*) he means that existence does not pertain to the "what" of anything, to the concept of anything. Likewise, we could say that sensations do not form part of the thing perceived and therefore are not real components of it. Thus from the perspective of the thing, it itself is real and the sensations are merely mental or ideal. Accordingly, the term "real" can, although in two different senses, be applied more justifiably to both the sensation and the thing. Two distinct, though practically synonymous, terms are therefore required – just what German offers but English does not, at least not without resorting to a neologism. I was in fact tempted to coin the word "reeal" to render *reell*. In the end, I decided that with so many stratagems already in print to render this Husserlian distinction, the world does not need yet another one. Consequently, I have adopted the policy being employed by Lee Hardy in his new translation of the "Five Lectures." The word "real" will be used for both *reell* and *real*; whenever it translates *reell*, the German word will follow in brackets. I agree with Hardy that while this is perhaps not a very elegant solution, here the reader is better served by precision than style.

The distinction between *Perzeption* and *Wahrnehmung* is that between the *leibhaft* and the *glaubhaft*. The ordinary word for "perception" in German is *Wahrnehmung*, and Husserl has resort to a word borrowed from the Latin to express a related, though broader concept. According to Husserl, every act of perception presents some object as "in the flesh," i.e., *leibhaft*. It pertains to the very sense of perception to do so; it is what distinguishes perception from other modes of intuition and representation. On the other hand, perception may or may not be accompanied by a doxa, an opinion or position-taking with regard to the object, i.e., a mode of belief (*Glaube*). In the case of perceptual doubt (Is this a veridical perception or an illusion?), both belief and disbelief are lacking, and yet the phenomenon of something present there in the flesh may persist. Every position-taking can be suspended at will, yet the thing continues to present itself in the flesh. Only the latter phenomenon is essential to perception, and the belief may or may not supervene. In other words, all perception involves the appearance of something or other; we may abstain, however, from taking up any position concerning the existence of what appears. If we do take up a position, as we ordinarily do, we have *Wahrnehmung*; if not, it is mere *Perzeption*. *Perzeption* is thus a phenome-

nologically reduced *Wahrnehmung*, the appearance taken precisely as such. Now *Wahrnehmung* must be translated with the ordinary English term "perception," which is already Latinized, and so Husserl's recourse to Latin roots for terms such as *Perzeption* and *perzeptiv* is closed off. I was forced to resort to some arbitrary convention to convey the sense, and my proposal is to use italics. Thus I render *Perzeption* and its cognates as *perception*, *perceptual*, etc. The reader then needs to remember that every perception (*Wahrnehmung*) is a *perception* (*Perzeption*), though not vice versa.

I have adopted two conventions involving capitalization, one of which André Schuwer and I introduced in our translation of Husserl's *Ideas II*.[6] Thus I render *Gegenstand* as "object" and the German *Object* as "Object," and, somewhat analogously, I translate *Körper* as "body" and *Leib* as "Body." Briefly, *Gegenstand* is the broader concept and applies to anything that can be the aim of any intention whatever; an *Object* is specifically an intersubjective *Gegenstand*. Likewise, every physical body is a *Körper*, and *Leib* refers specifically to living flesh. Thus the capital indicates the more restricted concept.

In addition, the reader should be advised that nearly all the articulations and section titles in this volume were provided by the editor, since they were almost entirely lacking in Husserl's manuscript. The editor based himself, naturally, on whatever textual and marginal indications he could find. It proved impossible to articulate the course lecture by lecture. The editor also gave the book its name. All editor's interpolations in the text are marked by angled brackets (< >), while square brackets ([ ]) serve for translator's insertions. All translator's notes are marked "Trans." Lastly, the pagination of the *Husserliana* edition is provided in the right-hand margin, and I myself prepared the index.

I worked on this translation under the aegis of the Husserl-Archives of the Catholic University of Leuven, and I am indebted to the staff of the Archives, and especially to Paul Crowe, for helping me resolve a number of ambiguities in the text. I also thank David L. Smith, the executive director of Duquesne University's Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, which is a branch of the Husserl-Archives, for allowing me to consult various manuscripts from Husserl's *Nachlaß*, especially Ludwig Landgrebe's original transcription (sheaf F I 13) of Husserl's shorthand text of these "Thing-Lectures."

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[6] Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989, pp. xiv-xv.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION [xiii]

For a long time, Husserl's *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy*,[1] which appeared in 1913, formed the essential point of orientation for the discussion and reception of his philosophy. Insofar as, prior to that, his thinking was judged only by the *Logical Investigations*[2] (1900–1901), the *Ideas* were seen as taking a radically new turn and as representing an essentially new beginning to his philosophizing.

The *Ideas* also formed a sort of point of orientation for the publication of Husserl's philosophical legacy in the series *Husserliana*. The period preceding the *Ideas* was for quite some time left out of consideration, with one exception: already in 1950, prior to the new publication of the *Ideas* within *Husserliana*, Volume II of that series, entitled *The idea of phenomenology*, brought into print five lectures Husserl delivered in 1907.[3]

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[1] *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. Erster Band, Teil* I; Halle, 1913, pp. 1–303; (later editions 1922 and 1928). Republished as Volume III of *Husserliana* with the subtitle: *Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*; Den Haag, 1950 (*Ideen I*). [Latest edition published in 1976 with a second volume of supplementary texts: *Husserliana* III, 1–2; Den Haag: M. Nijhoff. English translation by Fred Kersten: *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1982 (*Edmund Husserl: Collected Works*, Vol. II). – Trans.]

[2] *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Theil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*; Halle, 1900; *Zweiter Theil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, 1901. Second, revised edition: *Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, I. Teil.* (1913); *Zweiter Band: Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis, II. Teil.* (1921). [Republished in 1975 with the text of the first two editions: *Husserliana* XVIII and XIX, 1–2; Den Haag: Nijhoff. English translation (of the second German edition) by J. N. Findlay: *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols.; London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1970. – Trans.]

[3] [*Die Idee der Phänomenologie: Fünf Vorlesungen*, hrsg. Walter Biemel, Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1950 (*Husserliana II*). English translation by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, *The Idea of phenomenology*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964. – Trans.] Between the *Logische Untersuchungen* and the *Ideen*, Husserl published only his essay *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (*Logos, Band* I, 1910–11, pp. 289–341; book edition edited by W. Szilasi, 1965). [English translation by Quentin Lauer: "Philosophy as rigorous science," in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*; New York: Harper & Row, 1965. – Trans.] Prior to the publication of the *Idee der Phänomenologie*, the only work to appear from the period 1901–1913 was a part of a lecture course called *Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, from the winter semester 1904–05. This part was edited by Martin Heidegger and published in 1928 with the title: *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (*Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Band* IX, 1928, pp. 367–498). These lectures can be found, along with supplementary texts on

The relatively closed nature of these five lectures[4] gave them the character [xiv]
of a first "introduction" into pure phenomenology and justified their separate publication. Nevertheless, they were, as a general introduction, merely the opening portion of a four-hour per week lecture course in the summer semester of 1907 entitled "Main parts of the phenomenology and critique of reason."[5] The publication of the Five Lectures made it clear (thereby, in a certain sense, relativizing the significance of the *Ideas)*, that by 1907 Husserl had already worked out the essential lineaments of the fundamental principle of his later, pure, or *transcendental*, phenomenology, namely the phenomenological reduction. Furthermore, the Five Lectures showed that Husserl was already at that time in a position to devise a first outline of the problems, methods, and goals of a pure phenomenology.

To be sure, the discovery of the phenomenological reduction had already occurred in the summer of 1905 in Seefeld (in the Tyrol), as Husserl later testified repeatedly;[6] yet it seems that at first this discovery had no significant consequences.

Husserl's journal entries from the year 1906 bear witness to a crisis that touched both his personal life and his philosophical productivity.[7] According to these records, Husserl wanted to take up the "general task" of a "critique of reason,"[8] in order to find a unitary theoretical stance, without which the many individual analyses of the previous years would remain unsatisfying.

A lecture course Husserl conducted in the winter semester of 1906–07, entitled "Introduction to logic and critique of knowledge,"[9] placed the phenomenological reduction in service to that general task. This course, which took up anew certain fundamental problems of the *Logical Investigations*, [xv]
posed (specifically in its fourth part) the crucial question for any critique of reason, namely the question of the relation between psychology and theory of

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"Setting forth the development of the problem," in Volume X of *Husserliana*: *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (1893–1917)*; Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1966. [English translation by John B. Brough: *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1971)*; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991 (*Edmund Husserl: Collected Works*, Vol. IV). – Trans.]

[4] We will always refer to them here as the "Five Lectures."

[5] *Cf.* the editor's introduction to *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*.

[6] *Cf.*, for example, Manuscript A VII 25, p. 2a [The manuscripts alluded to throughout this introduction are Husserl's posthumous papers that have been preserved and classified by the Husserl Archives of the Catholic University of Leuven. – Trans.] and *Husserliana* X, pp. 237ff. [English translation, *op. cit.*, pp. 245ff. – Trans.]

[7] *Cf.* Husserl, "*Persönliche Aufzeichnungen*" ["Personal records"], edited by Walter Biemel, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XVI (1956), pp. 293–302.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 295.

[9] The manuscript of the lecture course is partitioned among sheaves F I 10, F I 16, and F I 25, with individual pages also in sheaves F I 7 and F I 17. On the wrapper of sheaf F I 25, there is an outline of the entire lecture course, as follows: "The idea of logic as theory of science, namely: 1.) as formal logic and *mathesis universalis* (formal concept of objects); 2.) as real ontology; 3.) as noetic logic; 4.) as theory of knowledge, phenomenological critique of reason, and phenomenology in general."

knowledge. In the process of working out this question, the principle of the phenomenological reduction acquired its truly decisive significance.[10]

The last part of the course of 1906–07 indicated (more than it actually worked out) something the Five Lectures of the summer semester of 1907 then elaborated in a fully-developed train of thought. Starting from the problem of transcendence as found in theory of knowledge, the principle of the phenomenological reduction was developed and determined as the suspension of all positing of Being, with regard to both the object of knowledge and the knower himself.

A skeptical consideration, taking its essential orientation from Descartes, secured the sphere of the *cogitationes* as one of absolute, immanent data, i.e., inasmuch as this sphere is free from the "riddle of transcendence."[11] Indeed, the fifth Logical Investigation[12] had already introduced a general concept of consciousness and determined it as the domain of psychic acts. Husserl there carried out a "subordination of the phenomenological characters and ideal unities of the logical realm under the very general characters and unities that have their domain in the realm of acts as a whole."[13] It is upon these very general characters and unities that Husserl constructed the already explicitly epistemological analyses of the sixth Logical Investigation.

The discovery of the phenomenological reduction, however, then made clear what was insufficient about the concept of consciousness in the *Logical Investigations*; to wit, these investigations overlooked the fact that their talk of "intentional lived experiences" remained saddled with the riddle of transcendence.[14] Only the phenomenological reduction makes a sphere of "pure phenomena"[15] out of the realm of "psychological phenomena," which is how the *Logical Investigations* still thematized consciousness. Such pure phenomena may very well relate "intentionally" to an "Objective actuality" without at all thereby pre-judging the "Being or non-being of this actuality."[16] Only the phenomenological reduction finally secures the sphere of absolute, immanent data – the result of the foundational skeptical consideration – as the field of pure or transcendental phenomenology. [xvi]

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[10] *Cf.* Ms. F I 10, p. 76a.

[11] *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, p. 43. [*Cf.* English translation, *op. cit.*, p. 33. – Trans.]

[12] *Cf. Logische Untersuchungen II* (1901), pp. 322ff.: "V. On intentional lived experiences and their contents." [English translation, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 533ff. – Trans.]

[13] *Logische Untersuchungen II*, p. 474. [*Cf.* English translation, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 667–68. – Trans.]

[14] The *Logical Investigations*, despite their directedness toward theory of knowledge, remain "descriptive psychology," which, as "empirical phenomenology," must be distinguished from "transcendental phenomenology." Husserl says in the lecture course of the winter semester 1906–07: "As long as descriptive psychology is, in the genuine sense, psychology, then, no matter how narrowly delimited, it is entirely on a par with genetic-causal psychology. As such, we must not lay claim to it, since it implies transcendences. And it actually implies transcendences as long as it is still some sort of psychology." Ms. F I 10, p. 75a.

[15] *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, p. 43. [*Cf.* English translation, *op. cit.*, p. 33. – Trans.]

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 45. [*Cf.* English translation, *op. cit.*, p. 35. – Trans.]

Which concrete possibilities were opened up by this new principle of the phenomenological reduction, even with respect to the totality of the problems Husserl had been occupied with in those years after the *Logical Investigations* and was still occupied with, and which immediate consequences resulted from the discovery of this principle for the elaboration of those problems – that could not be grasped from the very general and basic Five Lectures.

Only the publication, presented herein, of the lectures from the summer semester of 1907 that were attached to the general introduction will make clear the immediate consequences of the Five Lectures and of the principle developed in them, namely the phenomenological reduction, for the concrete tasks of phenomenology.

The present volume offers the complete text of the analyses attached to the Five Lectures, analyses devoted to a "phenomenology of the thing and, in particular, of space."[17] The stenographic manuscript, written during the summer semester 1907, of these "Thing-Lectures" [*Dingvorlesung*], as Husserl later used to call them, are located among coordinated pages of older and [xvii] younger date in the sheaf F I 13.[18]

On the basis of their general theme, the analyses of the "Thing-Lectures" stand thoroughly in direct connection with Husserl's philosophical endeavors of the previous years. In the already-mentioned journal entry, he names as the themes of a planned "phenomenology and critique of reason" the "problems of a phenomenology of perception, of phantasy, of time, of the thing."[19] Looking back, Husserl judges that his lecture course of the winter semester 1904–05, which bore the title "Main parts of a phenomenology and theory of knowledge,"[20] contained the first, though still "highly incomplete drafts" of a systematic treatment of that thematic complex. Those lectures from the winter semester 1904–05 dealt, however, only with the first three themes, while the phenomenology of the thing, as well as of space, remained a desideratum.[21] The "Thing-Lectures" of the summer of 1907 then fulfilled this desideratum and in that way are integrated within the projected total context of the "phenomenology and critique of reason."

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[17] *Persönliche Aufzeichnungen*, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

[18] Husserl reused parts of this lecture manuscript in his course of the summer semester 1909, *Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis* ["Introduction to the phenomenology of knowledge"] (Mss. F I 7, F I 17, F I 18), and on that occasion he undoubtedly read the entire manuscript once again. A series of emendations, supplements, and marginal remarks certainly stems from that new reading, although this series cannot be distinguished *per se*. In this regard, *cf.* Appendix I: "Husserl's critical remarks on the course of thought and the progression of the lectures, compiled by the editor," pp. 291ff.

[19] *Persönliche Aufzeichnungen*, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

[20] This lecture course is the origin of the texts Heidegger edited at that time. On what follows, *cf.* the editor's introduction to Volume X of *Husserliana*. *Cf.* also p. xvii above, note 3.

[21] *Persönliche Aufzeichnungen*, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

The thematic content of the "Thing-Lectures" presents no direct consequence of the Five Lectures, for the latter conclude with a generally formulated program of a phenomenological analysis of constitution as a whole. Therefore the question arises whether Husserl, after the development of the principle of the phenomenological reduction, simply took up a previously untouched region of problems or whether that principle (and the concomitant clarification of the relation between psychology and theory of knowledge) did not rather first make possible an adequate phenomenology of the thing. The latter would in turn mean that the phenomenology of the thing and of space did not remain a desideratum by accident.[22] [xviii]

Despite the fundamentally new approach presupposed by the "Thing-Lectures," Husserl could, above all for the analysis of perception in the first part, have recourse to material already at hand, namely insofar as the newly established transcendental phenomenology lets stands a rigorous parallel between psychological phenomena and pure phenomena. Husserl says in the Five Lectures: "To every psychic lived experience there thus corresponds, after the phenomenological reduction, a pure phenomenon, which exhibits its immanent essence as an absolute datum."[23]

In the *Ideas* of 1913, the foundation of a transcendental phenomenology acquires considerably greater clarity and fullness, compared to the Five Lectures. The *Ideas* go further by indicating the context within which the complex of problems expressed in the title "Thing and Space" can be integrated into the total system of transcendental phenomenology. That context is given along with the determination of the relation between ontology and phenomenology. The approach of a constitutive analysis, as the clarification of the "correlation between knowledge and object of knowledge,"[24] presupposes, following *Ideas I*, a determination of the respective object or objective domain in a formal or material (regional) ontology.[25] In this way, a guideline is acquired which is in a position to provide the constitutive analysis the requisite direction.

What are exemplified are the just-named relations to the regional ontology of the thing and to the function which the "regional 'idea' of the thing in general"[26] assumes as the transcendental guideline for the corresponding constitutive analysis. In this connection, Husserl says (thereby emphasizing the relative closedness and autonomy of the analyses as they exist in the "Thing-Lectures"): "It is clear (always in eidetic-phenomenological intuition) [xix]

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[22] This question can be answered later, especially as regards the problem of the constitution of space; *cf.* below, pp. xxvi f.

[23] *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, p. 45. [*Cf.* English translation, *op. cit.*, p. 35. – Trans.]

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 75. [*Cf.* English translation, *op. cit.*, p. 60. – Trans.]

[25] On the following, *cf. Ideen I*, pp. 357ff. [English translation, *op. cit.*, pp. 349ff. – Trans.]

[26] *Ideen I*, p. 367. [*Cf.* English translation, *op. cit.*, p. 359. – Trans.]

that every appearance of a thing necessarily contains a stratum which we call the schema of the thing: that is the spatial structure merely filled with 'sensuous' qualities – without any determination of 'substantiality' or 'causality' (*sc.* in quotation marks, thus to be understood as noematically modified). The appurtenant idea of a *mere* res extensa is already the title for a profusion of phenomenological problems."[27]

Why the analyses of the "Thing-Lectures" are in fact to be regarded as an elaboration of the program of a constitutive theory of the *res extensa* will be apparent from the fact that they consistently carry on the methodological abstraction required for such a theory. That is, the analyses of the "Thing-Lectures" nowhere take into consideration the proper "material" or "substantial-causal" properties of things. A series of pages, dating without a doubt from the year 1910,[28] recognizes this abstraction after the fact. In accord with those pages, the problem of the constitution of the thing must be seen as having two levels. The first level of the constitutive analysis, to which the "Thing-Lectures" are limited, thematizes the thing "as the Object of straightforward experience,"[29] an Object which, as such, encompasses three strata, namely the "temporal schema," the "spatial schema," and the "sensuous filling"[30] of the spatial schema.[31] These three strata, in their necessary unity, make up what Husserl called, since *ca.* 1910, the "phantom," or the "sensuous schema,"[32] etc. The mere phantom is, however, still not a thing. The thing in the full sense is constituted only through "a completely new stratum" announced by a "new class of inner, constitutive properties of the thing," the [xx] "causal properties."[33]

Even the analyses of the constitution of space belong in the context of a constitutive theory of the *res extensa*. Husserl writes: "The problem of the '*origin of the representation of space*,' whose deepest phenomenological sense has never been grasped, is reducible to the phenomenological analysis of the *essence* of all noematic (and noetic) phenomena in which space presents itself intuitively and is 'constituted' as the unity of appearances, as the unity of the descriptive modes of presentation of what is spatial."[34]

The significance of the "Thing-Lectures," which are in this way incorporated into the context of the phenomenological system, becomes fully clear

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27 *Ideen I*, p. 370. [*Cf.* English translation, *op. cit.* p. 361. – Trans.]

28 These pages are reproduced below as Appendix II, *cf.* pp. 297ff.

29 Appendix II, p. 297.

30 Appendix II, pp. 297ff.

31 It should be pointed out that the constitution of the temporal schema within the framework of the "Thing-Lectures" is indeed alluded to, while the problems of time and of the consciousness of time are otherwise bracketed. On this, *cf.* the Excursus, pp. 188f.

32 Appendix II, p. 299.

33 *Ibid.*

34 *Ideen I*, p. 371. [*Cf.* English translation, *op. cit.*, p. 362. – Trans.]

when we confront them with the second Book of the *Ideas*.[35] This Book II, already from its subtitle, has the task of carrying out the investigations into constitution that were alluded to at the end of Book I. The first section of *Ideas II*, under the title of the "constitution of material nature," offers a theory of the constitution of the thing, but with a clear displacement of the center of gravity: the results of the analyses of 1907, insofar as they concern the constitution of the *res extensa*, are in *Ideas II* extraordinarily abbreviated and insofar as they concern the constitution of space itself are altogether left out of consideration.[36] Husserl's principal interest in *Ideas II* is the constitution of substantial-causal reality in the narrower sense, thus precisely that stratum the analyses of 1907 had abstracted from.[37]

Husserl prefaced the proper analyses[38] of the "Thing-Lectures" with one more [xxi] brief introduction, and this introduction deserves attention.[39] There Husserl concisely determines the theme of the investigations to come. They will be a matter, he explains, of the analysis of natural, pre-scientific experience, which is primarily of a perceptual character. In and through this natural experience, the world for humans is familiar and always already there.[40] Now, a distinction must be made between the natural apprehension of the world and the scientific apprehension of the world, although the latter remains related back to the former: the world of pre-scientific experience is the same one to which all the experiential sciences also relate. Husserl says: "The scientific grasp of the world may be very far removed from that of prescientific experience, and science may indeed teach that the sense qualities have no immediate Objective reference such as natural experience attributes to them. Yet the fact remains that straightforward experience, immediate perception, memory, etc., give to the sciences the things they determine theoretically – merely by deviating from

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[35] *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Husserliana* IV, (*Ideen II*); Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1952. [English translation by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989 (*Edmund Husserl: Collected Works*, Vol. III). – Trans.]

[36] *Cf. Ideen II*, pp. 21ff., 29ff., and 55ff. [English translation, *op. cit.*, pp. 23ff., 32ff., and 60ff. – Trans.]

[37] *Cf. Ideen II*, pp. 33ff. [English translation, *op. cit.*, pp. 36ff.] Husserl's increased interest in the problems of the *res materialis* (to speak in the terms of *Ideas I*) already began soon after 1907. In this regard, *cf.*, for example, the titles of the sheaves listed in the general description of manuscript D 13 (Part 3) under numbers 1, 7, and 12 in the critical apparatus on pp. 418ff. below. [The critical apparatus is not included in this translation; the titles referred to are: 1.) Phantom and thing; 7.) Primary and secondary qualities. Inertia, power, intuitive causality. Substance and causality; schema, full phantom, materia prima. 12.) Thing-lectures. Orientation – constitution of the sense-thing, sense-space; as an "appendix" to the Thing-Lectures of 1907. – Trans.]

[38] The division of these analyses into six sections stems from the editor, as do all the other articulations, as well as the title *Thing and Space*.

[39] See §1, pp. 1ff.

[40] Pp. 2f.

the ordinary modes of thought."[41] The "Thing-Lectures" expressly abstract from the scientific apprehension of the world, since this apprehension presents a higher thematic level in relation to the natural apprehension.

The indicated determination of the relation between pre-scientific experience and scientific theory[42] obviously anticipates the distinction between the "life-world" and the "Objective-true" world, a distinction of decisive significance for Husserl's later philosophy.[43]

Although that distinction, in a manifold form, remains co-determinative for [xxii] the development of phenomenology after 1907,[44] it is the *Crisis* that first expresses this distinction with the appropriate clarity and with a full consciousness of its far-reaching consequences for the total system of phenomenology in general.[45]

The first section of the "Thing-Lectures" exposes, in general analyses, always guided by the idea of intentionality within the framework of the phenomenological reduction, the first foundational determinations and distinctions which have to be considered by a detailed analysis of perception (Chapter 1). Then, in a methodological reflection, the possibility of the analysis of perception is anchored in the structure of perceptual consciousness itself (Chapter 2).

In the second section, Husserl carries out the analysis of perception and of its givens first of all by starting from the fiction of the changeless givenness of an unchanged stationary thing, and then in the third section he draws into the consideration the cases of possible changes on the side of the perceiver and also on the side of the perceived thing. In this context, Husserl introduces the concepts of "visual field" and "tactile field."[46] The concept of field implies a diffusion or an extension, and Husserl determines this as "pre-phenomenal" or "pre-empirical,"[47] in order to indicate that it is still not a matter of spatial

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[41] P. 3.

[42] On this point of departure of the "Thing-Lectures," *cf.*, further, Richard Avenarius, *Der menschliche Weltbegriff*; Leipzig, 1891. Hugo Münsterberg develops a comparable point of departure for psychology; *cf.* his *Grundzüge der Psychologie. Bd.* 1; Leipzig, 1906.

[43] *Cf. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Husserliana* Volume VI, 1954; *cf.* especially §34, pp. 126ff. [English translation by David Carr: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*; Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp. 123ff. – Trans.]

[44] Thus, for example, in the distinction between "morphological" and "exact" essences in *Ideen I*; *cf.* pp. 169ff. [English translation, *op. cit.*, pp. 166ff. – Trans.]

[45] The discussions in *Ideen I* (pp. 57ff.) [English translation, *op. cit.*, pp. 56ff. – Trans.] that are comparable to those of §1 of the "Thing-lectures" have a different tenor, insofar as in the former it is primarily a matter of recognizing the general thesis of the natural attitude and its exclusion, and not a matter of the relation between the life-world and the scientific world.

[46] *Cf.* pp. 68f.

[47] *Cf.* p. 68: "The presentational contents of the total visual appearance form a continuous nexus: we call it the visual field. The field is a pre-empirical expanse and has these or those determinate visual fillings."

extension in the proper sense. Pre-empirical extension may be described as a two-dimensional manifold,[48] but it still cannot be regarded as a plane in space.[49]

At the end of the third section, Husserl once again reflects, within the framework of a backward glance, on the significance of the phenomenological reduction for the previous analyses (Chapter 7). [xxiii]

The fourth section then supplies a transition to the proper problems of the constitution of space. Husserl recapitulates the result of the previous sections, which consists in this, that the perceived, identically unchanged spatial body demonstrates itself only in kinetic series of perceptions which continually bring its various sides to appearance.[50] Now, however, he poses the question: "How then do the appurtenant phenomenological nexuses look? What in them constitutes the three-dimensional spatiality of the familiar qualities, what constitutes the corporeal thing in its identity, what constitutes its manifoldly possible movement and its position in relation to the Ego-center? We know that spatiality is doubly constituted, once with visual and another time with tactile determinations. We can therefore separately ask how visual space is constituted and how tactile space is, insofar as in general they are constituted independently of one another. ... And what constitutes the identity of space, which is materialized once visually and at another time tactually and yet in this double materialization is the one identical space?"[51]

With this question, which disposes of a methodological restriction found in the earlier analyses, since it thematizes what previously had to be presupposed, the central problem of the "Thing-Lectures" is broached. With this question, Husserl explicitly takes up the problem the psychology of the turn of the century had formulated as the problem of the "psychological origin of the representation of space."[52] This problem can be stated briefly as follows: how does it happen that the visual and the tactile sense-data are given in an extension or an expansion, and how, beyond that, does there arise the representation of space itself? [xxiv]

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[48] *Cf.* p. 140.

[49] *Cf.* p. 141: "We already said earlier that the visual field is not some sort of surface in Objective space, which makes no sense ...." For the same reason, the moment of depth, the "relief," that appears in the visual field is not sufficient to constitute the "third dimension": "For the rest, it should be said again that the sensation of depth, or pre-empirical depth, is not in itself the depth of things, and pre-empirical relief is not 'actual' relief, the relief of things" (p. 146). *Cf.* also p. xxvii, note 60.

[50] *Cf.* p. 132.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] Out of the wealth of literature, let us single out one work which was surely of decisive importance for Husserl himself: Carl Stumpf, *Vom psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung*; Leipzig, 1873. This book provides an overview on the various theories of space then current. Husserl himself studied this work closely, as is demonstrated by numerous stenographical remarks in the margins of his copy of the book. Husserl clearly alluded to this work again in *Ideen I*; *cf.* p. 371 therein. [English translation, *op. cit.*, p. 362. – Trans.]

The significance and fecundity of the principle of the phenomenological reduction can be gauged by the way Husserl takes up and resolves this question.

Of crucial importance for Husserl was also a theory of the Englishman Alexander Bain (1818–1903), as reported by Carl Stumpf.[53] Bain was the first to make a special kind of sensation responsible for the fact that what is seen (as well as what is touched) always appears in a spatial order, with parts outside of parts. He assumes a special sense, residing in the muscles, by which movements (as well as states of tension in the muscles) are sensed.[54] Stumpf writes about Bain's theory: "Space is not developed out of the qualities of the senses with which we ordinarily believe that we sense space, thus out of color-sensations and tactile sensations, but, instead, from the addition and preponderant accentuation of a new sense, whose sensations are conjoined with those of the remaining senses. This is how we designate the muscle-sense, i.e., the series of sensations we receive through the activity of our muscles."[55]

This theory and its variants, which see the origin of the representation of space in some sorts of sensation of movement, necessarily require, however, determinate physiological and anatomical presuppositions. Concerning the conjunction of the muscle-sense and of its sensations of movement with the sense of sight and the sense of touch, Stumpf writes: "For here, in virtue of the anatomical relations, there takes place precisely such a configuration of the relevant sense-nerves with an apparatus of the musculature that this peculiar combination of the sensations of color (and touch) with the sensations of the muscles must be formed."[56]

It was precisely the principle of the phenomenological reduction which allowed Husserl to construct, upon the concept of the sensation of movement, his theory of the constitution of space. That is, through this principle, Husserl [xxv] could free the concept of the sensation of movement from all physiological and anatomical – i.e., transcendent – presuppositions, without needing to discard the purely descriptive findings attached to the concept. Sensations of movement, like the sensations of the particular senses, are "pure phenomena." Even the specifically present moment of movement is a pure phenomenon: it is the consciousness of an actual or potential action understood as an "I move myself." Husserl says in regard to the concept of the sensation of movement: "The phrase is usually related to what is self-moving, and it will then be understood psychologically. To exclude this psychological meaning, we will employ the term *kinaesthetic* sensation, which, as a foreign word, is less misleading. Naturally, in the case of 'eye-movements, head-movements, hand-

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53 *Cf.* Stumpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 36ff.
54 *Cf.* Alexander Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*; London, 1855.
55 Stumpf, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
56 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

movements,'[57] etc., we have to do with continuous sequences of sensations which terminate at will, and every phase of which can extend, with unchanged content, into a duration. These unchanged sensations thus provide us with pure and simple kinaesthetic sensations versus kinaesthetic changes or sequences. We naturally will not determine the concept of this group of sensations psychologically, or psychophysically, but phenomenologically."[58] The totality of possible kinaesthetic sequences which pertain to one "organ" are called by Husserl a kinaesthetic system.[59]

The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections develop the theory of the constitution of space by means of a combination of the theory of sense-fields with that of the various kinaesthetic systems, whereby determinate systems of that kind lead to amplifications and modifications of the sense-fields.

With the determination of the various types and levels of fields that arise in this way, Husserl avails himself of certain theorems of a general theory of manifolds, for which he could have recourse to his own works from the years 1886 to 1894. By this procedure, Husserl again, in a second respect, tran- [xxvi] scends the psychological theories of the origin of the representation of space.[60] Let us then look briefly at those works on the theory of manifolds.

After completing the first volume of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*,[61] Husserl was occupied with the principal themes of the planned second volume. That was a matter of his vindicating the quasi-numbers that arise out of inverse operations: above all, the real and imaginary quasi-numbers which have intuitive models in the straight line and in the plane. Husserl first attempted, on the basis of the concepts of multitude and quantity, as acquired in the first volume of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, to attain a definition of "constant magnitudes" (Ms. K I 2, 1891). The real numbers are an orthoid manifold and, in particular, the greatest system of that kind; the basic imaginary unities 1 and i form a cyclical manifold. From there, hence, in the framework of a foundation of geometry, the straight line and the plane were to be determined through these two types of manifolds (Mss. K I 4, K I 5, K I 7; 1892). Required for

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[57] The quotation marks signify here, as they often do in Husserl's writings, that the phenomenological reduction has been carried out.

[58] P. 136.

[59] *Cf.* p. 159.

[60] Husserl's refutation of one of Stumpf's theses can serve as an example of the fecundity of the application of the theorems of the theory of manifolds to the theory of the constitution of space. Stumpf (*op. cit.*) maintained that the representation of depth was given necessarily and immediately along with the representation of a surface through the sense of sight. He said that a represented surface is either plane or uneven: "Planeness and unevenness, however, involve the third dimension" (p. 177). Husserl replies, in a stenographic remark in his copy of Stumpf's book: "We do not see surfaces, but the visual field is a two-dimensional manifold. The mistake lies in the equivocal concept of surface; 1.) surface = two-dimensional manifold; 2.) surface = formation, and specifically a two-dimensional formation in space."

[61] *Philosophie der Arithmetik. Logische und psychologische Untersuchungen, Erster Band*; Halle, 1891; republished as Vol. XII of *Husserliana*.

that, however, was a characterization of the Euclidean axioms in terms of the theory of manifolds as well as a critical examination of the concept of space, since on the basis of the theory of manifolds, naturally even "non-Euclidean" geometries can be constructed (Riemann, Lie) (Mss. K I 33, K I 55; 1893).[62] These investigations remained fragmentary; Husserl saw that the question of [xxvii] the Euclidean or non-Euclidean nature of the intuition of space required a clarification of the concepts of "intuition" and "deductive-axiomatic system." From here, a direct path then leads to the *Logical Investigations*.[63]

In the "Thing-Lectures," the concepts of "orthoid (linear) manifold" and "cyclical manifold" play an essential role for the crucial step in the constitution of space, which consists in the transformation of the two-dimensional oculomotor field[64] into the three-dimensional field of space: "Thereby the two-dimensional oculomotor field is transformed into the three-dimensional field of space as a conjunction of the one-dimensional linear manifold of receding with the two-dimensional cyclical manifold of turning. There are not, and cannot be, any other modifications, provided it is precisely a three-dimensional Objectivity that is to be constituted."[65]

We have already referred to the fact that Husserl's interest after 1907 turned more strongly to the constitutive problems of proper, substantial-causal reality, a development that led, in *Ideas II*, to a change of emphasis within the theory of the constitution of the thing.

In 1916, in connection with a planned elaboration of the "Thing-Lectures" by Edith Stein, Husserl again turned his attention specifically to the problem of the constitution of space. The result of those deliberations was a series of pages, which are reproduced here as Essay I.[66] Stein took over the greater part [xxviii

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[62] In sheaf K I 33, there is an outline (dated October 15, 1893) of Husserl's planned book on space. Journal-like records, which are devoted to the planned work and which begin on October 18, 1893, repeat and lightly modify this outline, which runs as follows:

"I. The space of intuition and the space of geometry.

II. Pure geometry and intuition (intuitive geometry and its conflict with purely symbolic geometry).

III. Geometrical space as a Euclidean manifold of three dimensions and the foundation of a purely deductive geometry.

IV. The space of Objective science and applied geometry.

V. Critical justification of the previous presentations against empiricism, Kantianism, and the realism of modern natural scientists and philosophers, especially Helmholtz.

This chapter to be moved ahead:

Va. Excursus on the psychic origin of the representation of space.

VI. Transcendent space and the transcendent (metaphysical) cognitive value of geometry.

VII. Results and theses." *Cf.* Ms. XX 3, p. 3.

[63] A planned volume of *Husserliana*, which is to bear the title *Studia mathematica*, will present important parts of Husserl's investigations (cited above) from the K-manuscripts. [This volume appeared in 1983 as *Husserliana* XXI, entitled *Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie (1886–1901)*. – Trans.]

[64] What is meant is the visual field insofar as it is enlarged in a determinate way through the kinaesthesia of the "eye-movements and head-movements."

[65] P. 216. *Cf.* at that point also the brief summary of the levels of the constitution of space.

[66] Pp. 257ff.

of these pages and placed them at the beginning of her elaboration. Husserl revised this portion of Stein's elaboration and gave it the title "Systematic constitution of space."[67] It is reprinted below as Essay II.[68]

Finally, I cordially thank the director of the Husserl-Archives at Leuven, H.L. Van Breda, and the directors of the branch Archives at Cologne, L. Landgrebe and K.-H. Volkmann-Schluck, for advice and assistance in my work on this volume. I also need to thank the former associates of the Husserl-Archives at Cologne, H.R. Brennecke and M. Lang, with whom I was able to discuss many editorial problems. And I thank U. Panzer and R. Jeuck for helping me correct the proofs.

Ulrich Claesges
Cologne, January 1972

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[67] This elaboration is contained in Ms. M III 3 V.

[68] Pp. 277ff. It should still be mentioned that even in his later years Husserl was again and again occupied extensively with the problem of the constitution of space. In this regard, *cf.* Ulrich Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*; Den Haag, 1964 (*Phaenomenologica Bd.* 19). On the "Thing-Lectures," *cf.* also Giorgio Scrimieri, *La formazione della fenomenologia di E. Husserl: La "Dingvorlesung" del 1907*; Bari, 1967. Scrimieri emphasizes the significance of the "Thing-Lectures" for Husserl's development and discusses extensively the connections of the "Thing-Lectures" with the psychology of the time and with the empirio-criticism of Avenarius and Mach.

THING AND SPACE

Lectures of 1907

INTRODUCTION[1] [3]

§1. *The world of natural experience and the world of scientific theory.*[2]

We completed our general introduction[3] in the last lecture. We clarified the necessity and the sense of a phenomenology and will not now be at a loss if terms arise such as "phenomenological reduction," "pure phenomenon," etc. Above all, we should be clear also about the general sense of the problem of the phenomenology of cognition, i.e., about the constitution of the object of cognition within cognition.

I can now in a few words indicate the theme of the following lectures. They will deal with the foundational parts of a future phenomenology of experience, i.e., with a clarification of the essence of experiential givenness, at least in its lower forms and levels, a clarification proceeding from the immediate and first beginnings, and from there carried out as deeply and broadly as possible. If we were to borrow our terminology entirely from the current jargon, we would say it is a matter of the theory of experience. Yet, on the one hand, for example in the case of the term "theory of knowledge," I already have misgivings over this word "theory," which is appropriate to the kind of explanation and grounding carried out in mathematics and the natural sciences but certainly does not at all apply where it is a matter of explaining and grounding nothing [4] in that sense. The word "theory" is already inappropriate to the procedure of the morphologizing or typologizing sciences, and *a fortiori* to that of phenomenology. In addition, the title, "theory of experience," ever since Cohen and the Marburg School applied it to Kant's critique of experiential knowledge, has assumed such a breadth that it practically encompasses all the problems of pure theoretical reason. We are not so bold as to think we can now pose and deal with all these problems. In order to solve the problems of the

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[1] On the following lectures as a whole, *cf.* Appendix I: "Husserl's critical remarks on the course of thought and the progression of the lectures, compiled by the editor," pp. 291ff. – Ed.

[2] *Cf.* Appendix II: "On the doctrine of the levels of givenness of things," pp. 297ff. – Ed.

[3] This "general introduction" refers to the five lectures published as Volume II of *Husserliana* under the title *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* [English translation by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964 – Trans.]. There Husserl expounds for the first time his concept of the "phenomenological reduction," which is thus presupposed for the course of thought of the following lectures. – Ed.

constitution of natural scientific reality in the context of the variegated cognitions and cognitive nexuses of natural science, we would need to settle the problems posed by logical-mathematical thinking and to clarify, from the side of experiential cognition, not only the lower levels of the experience which lies prior to all deduction and induction – in short, prior to all logically mediated cognition in the usual sense – but also, and *a fortiori*, we would need to clarify the higher levels.

These are very lofty goals, to which we gaze up wistfully, but which we cannot at all seriously set for ourselves here and now. The first elaboration of the field of experience, its phenomena and its givens, will offer us an ample supply of difficult and deep problems. We will be doing well if we cultivate this field so effectively that our successors can then attempt to raise the higher forms of the problems.

In the natural attitude of spirit, an existing world stands before our eyes, a world that extends infinitely in space, that now is, previously was, and in the future will be. This world consists of an inexhaustible abundance of things, which now endure and now change, combine with one another and then again separate, exercise effects on one another and then undergo them. We ourselves fit into this world; just as we find the world, so we find ourselves, and we encounter ourselves in the midst of this world. A pre-eminent position in this world, however, is proper to us: we find ourselves to be centers of reference for the rest of the world; it is our environment. The environing Objects, with their properties, changes, and relations, are what they are for themselves, but they have a position relative to us, initially a spatio-temporal position and then also a "spiritual" one. We immediately perceive a first environment round about us; it is together with us, contemporaneous with us, and stands to us in [5] the relation of being seen, touched, heard, etc. Actual perceptions thereby are connected to possibilities of perception, to presentifying intuitions; the nexuses of immediate perception contain conductors which lead us on from perception to perception, from a first environment to ever new ones, and thereby the perceptual gaze attains things in the order of spatiality. We also have a temporal environment, a closer and a more distant one; we immediately remember just-past things and events; they not only were, but they also now stand to us in the relation of being-remembered. Included here is the having-just-now-been-perceived. Memory, therefore, as continued re-remembering, is like a conductor; it leads us back in time step by step, and thereby ever new lines of spatio-temporal reality – specifically, past reality – enter into relation to us, into this peculiar relation of memory and having-been-perceived. The future of the world enters into relation to us by way of prospective expectation. On these lower acts the higher ones are erected, those in which we put ourselves in relation to the world by way of thinking, concluding, theorizing. Then there are added the so-called emotional acts, which in themselves consti-

tute new, comparable relations, though they are indeed relations which belong to another sphere. We evaluate things as agreeable or disagreeable, good or bad; we engage ourselves in the world through action; etc.

In this same world I also find other Egos [*andere Ich*]. They, like us, have their environment in this same world, and they also, by means of the givens of the immediate environment, draw conclusions about further givens. Furthermore, as beings with feeling and will, their comportment is similar to ours. Other Egos occupy other positions in the world than we do, and, accordingly, they possess an other immediate environment and other nexuses of mediation. If they exchange their position for ours, or vice versa, then immediate environment, perceptions, and perceptual possibilities, to speak in general, are also exchanged. Not all things count for us as Ego-things, as people, animals; the world breaks down for us into physical and spiritual things, or rather, merely physical things and those which are spiritual as well. Spiritual things have [6] lived experiences. In part these are not the kind that are turned to the outside, but they are also, and especially, lived experiences of perceiving, remembering, expecting, predicating, etc., by means of which the spiritual beings are related spiritually to things and events. On the other hand, spiritual beings, e.g. men, are physical as well; like all things whatsoever, they possess the properties which are precisely common to things as such, the so-called physical properties. These beings thus have color and shape, position in space, duration and change in time, etc. They also enjoy the privilege, however, of possessing lived experiences; in these beings, so-called spiritual properties are connected to the physical states and properties. And thereby certain functional nexuses of a known kind exist, by virtue of which excitations, external effects on one's own Body, have a psychical resonance, and conversely, psychic events, such as volition, discharge in Bodily movements and give rise to effects on the outside.

That is how the world presents itself immediately to a natural grasp, prior to science. To this world all the empirical sciences then relate. The sciences of physical nature busy themselves with things with respect to their physical qualities, whereas psychology and psychophysics are concerned with so-called psychic phenomena, i.e., with lived experiences and with the experiencing beings insofar as they possess these experiences. All these sciences speak of reality, which we see, or touch, or grasp by some other sense, and to which we have psycho-physical relations by means of our Body.

The scientific grasp of the world may be very far removed from that of prescientific experience, and science may indeed teach that the sense qualities have no immediate Objective reference such as natural experience attributes to them. Yet the fact remains that straightforward experience, immediate perception, memory, etc., give to the sciences the things which they determine theoretically – merely by deviating from the ordinary modes of thought. The

natural scientist may even say, "This piece of platinum is in truth an atomic complex of such and such a nature, endowed with these or those states of motion, etc.," yet in speaking this way he is always determining that thing there, the one he sees, holds in his hand, lays on the pan of the scale, etc. It is [7] of things of this sort that, in general, he always speaks. All the reality judgments grounded by the natural scientist lead back to straightforward perceptions and memories, and they relate to the world which receives its first givenness in this straightforward experience. All mediate grounding, as carried out by science, rests precisely on immediate givenness, and the lived experiences in which reality comes to be given immediately are perception, memory, and, taken in a certain immediacy, also expectation and other acts similar to it. That there exists something like hallucination, illusion, deceptive memory, and delusional expectation we know very well. But that changes nothing of what we have just said. Indeed, it is clear at once that it would be an obvious nonsense [*nonsens*] to explain everything given immediately from these sources as illusory. In any case, what would be abandoned thereby is not merely reality as the common man grasps it but also reality as it is for science and thereby science itself.

This reflection, which still moves completely on natural soil, makes us notice that we can, in good conscience and in fact according to nature, begin from below, in lower and common experience, without having to fear playing a phenomenological game which would be irrelevant to the highest problem of the constitution of scientific reality in scientific cognition.

SECTION I

THE FOUNDATIONS OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION

CHAPTER 1

FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINATIONS OF OUTER PERCEPTION [8]

§2. *Restriction of the field of research. The preliminary concept of outer perception.*

Thus we want to study the self-constitution – the self-manifestation, I could also say – of experiential objectivity at the lowest level of experience. We will be dealing, in other words, with the lived experiences of straightforward intuition or intuitive grasping, upon which the higher acts of the specifically logical sphere are first built and thereby first bring about, in this so-called processing of the underlying "sensuous material," the constitution of scientific objectivity.

First of all, we will be occupied with perception, which we must initially study for itself and then in connection with all Objectivating phenomena close to it and on the same level. We will examine the *correlation* between perception and perceived thinghood, and under the title of perceived thinghood there stands from the very outset the thing in the stricter sense of physical thing, and, on the other hand, the spiritual thing, the be-souled being, and, further, the distinction between "one's own Ego" and the "alien Ego." Here belongs not the mere isolated thing but the thing together with its thingly environment, insofar as perception and, as a further consequence, straightforward experience claim to function for this environment as the constituting phenomenon. [9] Whether perception, taken in this correlation, is the only phenomenon which, on the basis of the peculiarities pertaining to it essentially, deserves to be called perception, we of course do not now know. Properly and in the strict sense, we still do not at all know what perception is. Provisionally we have the word and, adherent to it, a certain vague meaning. To go back to the phenomena themselves under the guidance of this vague meaning, to study them intuitively, and then to create fixed concepts which would purely express the phenomenological givens – these are the tasks. In any case, we will go so far in the differentiating analysis, in the comparison, characterization, discrimination, and determination, as are demanded by the nature of the matters at issue and the goals we are pursuing. Obviously the goals themselves are not perfectly clear and will come to determine themselves only as we proceed in phenomenology.

We cannot tie ourselves to the conceptual determinations of the psycholo-

gists and philosophers. Those determinations are carried out from interests and points of view that are quite foreign to the ones which must guide us here. The goal of a purely phenomenological analysis and the principle of the phenomenological reduction are alien to them; misunderstandings, confusions, indeed crude errors, which such an analysis excludes without further ado, hold sway in the usual determination from the very outset. Indeed we do not wish to study the matters at issue indirectly, on the basis of what others say about them, but to approach them themselves and allow ourselves to be instructed by them.

We will therefore proceed by examples, and at first from specific examples of so-called outer perception or, to put it more clearly, from perceptions of things in the stricter sense, physical things. Seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting are titles which bring before our eyes examples of perceptions of things. We take these words from ordinary speech and thus employ them in the sense they have there as well. "I see" means in every case: I see something, specifically either a thing, or a property of a thing, or a thingly process. I see a house, I see the flying up of a bird, I see the falling down of the leaves. I also see the color of the house, the structure and size of the leaf, the form of its [10] motion, and so on. I hear something, namely the tone of a violin, the shouting of the children in the street, the droning of a bee. Thus everywhere. I also see and hear myself and other people; I see my hands, and I hear words and noises which belong to me, to my Body. Seeing and hearing relate in the first instance, even in the case of the perception of others, to what is Bodily. To be sure, in relation to the psychic domain we also say: I see, I see that the other is angry, or rather, I see the anger in his appearance, I see the scorn in the way he looks, the insincerity, etc. Nevertheless, even a superficial consideration will distinguish this seeing from the seeing of a color or a movement, from the seeing of a physical thing. One could then say that the face and the facial expression, the play of the features, the gesture, are seen, and they are apprehended as the expression of something psychic, which for its part is not itself seen. In any case, we will at first exclude this seeing of what is psychic.

The consideration of examples allows a certain unity in the way we speak of perception to become prominent without further ado, and we notice thereby a double relation. Perception is perception of some object, or more precisely here, of some thing, and on the other hand perception is the perception of a perceiving Ego. *I* perceive, specifically this or that. The relation to the Ego is proper to perception as a lived experience, and we find it in the same way in every example of lived experiences of other kinds. I phantasize, I judge, I conclude, I feel; thus phantasizing, judging, etc. is the phantasizing of the Ego, precisely of the one that phantasizes, judging is the judging of the Ego that judges, etc. In the case of perception, which is here our immediate interest, there accompanies this relation (inasmuch as perception is a lived experience)

to the Ego a perceptual relation of the Object to the Ego-Body [*Ichleib*] as well and, further, a certain constitution in the character of total perception, by virtue of which I have my standpoint and, pertaining to this, a certain perceived environment, to which the thing belongs which I in each case call specifically the perceived, the just-now seen or heard. At first, we will abstract as much as possible from these Ego-relations. In addition, we will not immediately focus on the differences between "total perception," which was distinguished from the separate perception of the Object which is especially called perceived, <and the latter itself>. Instead we will only take these differences [11] *ad notam* and use them to designate in a preliminary way an understandable restriction, namely a restriction to the separate perceptions.

We have thereby delimited a narrow circle of examples, the perception of things (the word now to be used always for physical things) or thingly processes, which perception makes individually its Object, an Object for itself as one specially perceived, even if it is perceived from out of a background, as is, for example, the house we see while we have in the field of our vision or gaze a comprehensive visual background, which we also are wont to designate as seen.

§3. *Essential cognition of perception on the basis of phantasized perceptions.*

I do not of course need to emphasize that this preliminary consideration already employs the phenomenological reduction, that it does not claim physical existence has validity as existence, and that it completely leaves such questions out of play. If we have before our eyes examples of the kind indicated and propose to study first of all the case of special perception, then we naturally do not tear this perception in earnest out of its phenomenological context. We are then at liberty to look into this phenomenon and its Objectivating accomplishment and to study its essential peculiarities. This looking involves an absolute givenness, which does not mean that its background and the Ego whose phenomenon it is are nothing, simply because in the framework of this looking they do not present themselves as given. The separate perception is seen as absolute givenness, and it is the foundation of the assertions destined to give expression to what is purely presented in it or what in general can be drawn out from it. About anything else precisely nothing is said. Here everything remains open, until we find the occasion to draw upon relevant new givens and to judge them accordingly.

Now let us proceed to the analysis. For our example we will consider the perception of a house. We will give an account of what we find phenome- [12] nologically in this perception (thus, phenomenologically, everything that does

not here concern us counts as nothing: Ego, house, and perception of the house as a psychological lived experience). The question at issue is the *essence* of this perception, just as it is given in the consciousness that is intuiting and is holding fast to the essence as identical. The unique fact, the phenomenological singularity of the "this here," is not the goal of our constatations, thus it is not something like the phenomenon in the sense in which it is new, if we, as we say, merely have it given in a repetition, even if in the consciousness of the identity of the givenness according to its essential total content.

We do not want to broach now already the problem of phenomenological singularity and bring it to the forefront. If our aim is in every case an essential cognition, then we should carry out here first of all that one that is most easily graspable. Perhaps what is then acquired will not have ultimate validity, inasmuch as it might need to be greatly deepened and might harbor unsuspected problems which will subsequently need to be resolved. But it is in general the nature of phenomenology to press on layer by layer from the surface into the depths. I recall to you our introduction,[1] which supplied examples in this regard. Products of a first analysis require a new purifying distillation; the new products do likewise, until the final one is attained, completely pure and clear.

We thus have to begin with the presentification of various examples of perceptions, ones which relate in part to the same things and in part to different things. In these singular givens, which, as phenomenological, include no positing of existence, whether psychological or some other transcendent existence, and include no other taking of any position as regards existence, we grasp as absolutely given something general: the general essence of the perception of things and the peculiarities pertaining to it. I must stress here that we are not presupposing that the examples serving us are actual perceptions, as if it would be a condition of phenomenological analysis that the grasping of the essence and the essential generalization had to be carried out on the basis of individual instances of actual lived experiences. It can indeed happen that [13] we take our examples from actual perceptions; perhaps at the beginning of the analysis we will linger over the perception of this bench, this surface, etc. That is, we may actually perceive and reflect on that perception (thereby carrying out so-called inner perception). We might begin that way. Yet this very positing of existence, which has a place in the reflection, the positing as *cogitatio*, as actual, as a currently existing perception, remains out of play. Here it has nothing to say. Phantasized presentifications of perceptions could serve us just as well,[2] insofar as they place before our eyes perceptions, and we then in fact see, and can grasp as given with evidence, what we want to grasp, namely the

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1 The allusion is to the "general introduction"; *cf.* p. 1, note 3. – Ed.

2 On the following, *cf.* Husserl's two critical notes in Appendix I, p. 291. – Ed.

essence of perception, the meaning of something like "perception." We have no interest in the dignity of givenness as actual lived experience versus mere presentification, no more than we are interested at all in the constitution of the conscious formations which make up the evidence we are now carrying out step by step.

In evidence, in the sphere of pure self-givenness, we are investigating the essential peculiarities of perception. But what we are investigating is precisely these peculiarities and not the evidence, the evidence which here determines the investigation itself. The investigation of the phenomenological constitution of these forms of evidence naturally belongs to another stratum of the problem.

I had already indicated earlier that the givennesses, which we have at our disposal in the examples, are singular essences. If the existence of the exemplar perceptions is set out of play, even the existence as *cogitatio*, and if even mere phantasized perceptions (where a positing of existence is completely lacking) suffice fully, then what is given here in the absolute sense is not something existent and yet is a being, namely a singular essence in each case (this singular perception here, whether existing or not). It is to these singular givens that the evident essential generalizations of a higher level relate; for example, we may draw out from these singular givens the universal essence "perception in general," which is singularized in them as such and such. [14]

Let us now see what we can say with evidence about perception in the first stratum of the analyses, i.e., in the first layer of essential constatations.

§4. *Intentionality as the essential determination of perception.*

To speak about perception is to refer to the thing perceived, as we have already said. In the sphere of pure evidence (or pure intuition, or pure givenness), we find that in a certain way the relation to the object constitutes an essential character of perception. In perceiving this bench or that house or the like, or in presentifying to myself such a perceiving, I find that to say this perception is a perception of a bench, that perception is one of a house, etc., is to express something that belongs – indissociably – to the essence of the perception in question. If we place before our eyes, in comparable intuition, other *cogitationes*, other pure phenomena, then we find, without letting them count as perceptions, that they are nevertheless like perceptions in that a relation to an object pertains to them essentially. Examples: a phantasized presentification of a bench or a house, etc., a presentation of a house by way of an image, a thinking of a house, etc. Without entering into an investigation of the essence of the natures of these sorts of pure phenomena, we recognize with

evidence that here too the relation to the object, expressed by the little word "of" (phantasy *of* a house, etc.), is something essential to them, but that, on the other hand, here the relation is of a different character than in the first examples, to which we give the name perception and to which we hereby intend to restrict that name. Thus there stands out in the initial consideration a peculiar character of perception which we can express in an intelligible way as follows: the object stands in perception as there in the flesh, it stands, to speak still more precisely, as actually present, as self-given there in the current now. In phantasy, the object does not stand there as in the flesh, actual, currently present. It indeed does stand before our eyes, but not as something currently given now; it may possibly be thought of as now, or as simultaneous with the [15] current now, but this now is a thought one and is not that now which pertains to presence in the flesh, perceptual presence. The phantasized is merely "represented" [*vorgestellt*], it merely places before us [*stellt vor*] or presents [*stellt dar*], but it "does not give itself" as itself, actual and now.

Likewise, in the image, the *subject*, the imaged,[3] does not stand there in the flesh but only *as if* it were there in the flesh. Something in the flesh, which in the image comes to givenness, presents something which is not given in the flesh, and it does so in the manner proper to an image.

This is a first and still quite rough characterization. More precise, thorough research into the relations of these various forms of givenness, i.e., forms in which objects may stand before the eyes, would require comprehensive and difficult investigations.

Obviously, the foregoing characterization is not to be understood in the sense that there would pertain to the essence of every perception as such the existence of the perceived Object, the existence of that which stands there in it in the mode of presence in the flesh. In that case, talk of a perception whose object did not exist would indeed be countersensical; illusory perceptions would be unthinkable. It is the essential character of perception to be "consciousness" of the Object's presence in the flesh, i.e., to be the phenomenon of it. To perceive a house means to have the consciousness, to have the phenomenon, of a house standing there in the flesh. How matters stand with the so-called existence of the house, with the true Being of the house, and what this existence means – about all that nothing is said.

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[3] Husserl distinguishes between the image-object (the portrait painted on canvas or the mental image hovering before our mind's eye) and the image-subject (that which the image is an image of, the model, the person or thing portrayed in the portrait). – Trans.

§5. *Presence in the flesh and belief.* Perception [Perzeption] *and position-taking.*

The matter at issue will be clear if we forthwith bring out the distinction between presence in the flesh and belief. If we take the word perception in the usual sense, then we will find that in our fundamental examples the moment of belief is fused with the one of presence in the flesh. The perception, the phenomenon, of the house as standing there in the flesh is at once the belief that it is standing there. If we presentify the example of an unmasked hallucination, then we find in place of belief disbelief. Moreover, other examples offer [16] themselves, ones in which we are at first perceptually doubtful whether it is a case of perception or hallucination. Here both belief and disbelief are lacking, and instead of them we have doubt and perhaps the suspension of every position-taking. Yet in all these cases the phenomenon of the standing there of the Object in the flesh persists or can persist. If in this consideration we carry out the obvious phenomenological reductions, then in the essence of perception in the ordinary sense a distinction appears between presence in the flesh (which is fundamental and essential to perception as such) and belief (which can either supervene or be lacking). How these two characteristics are related to one another, and how that issue is connected to the question of the sense of existence or non-existence and to the question of the difference between justified and unjustified belief – these are substrates for new investigations.

More often, the concept of perception [*Wahrnehmung*] is so restricted that it excludes the taking-for-true [*Für-wahr-Nehmen*] properly so-called (and *a fortiori* actual truth-taking [*Wahr-Nehmen*]; that is to say, it excludes the character of belief, the character of belief in what stands there. That has its advantages and its disadvantages. In any case, a name that holds the matter fast is needed for the concept that is more restricted in content (or, conversely, for the one that is more comprehensive). We will say *perception* [*Perzeption*] and then perhaps speak of *perceptual* [*perzeptiv*] belief (perception [*Wahrnehmung*] in the normal sense), *perceptual* disbelief, doubt, etc. Nevertheless, where the differences between the new characters, which we designate as differences in the position-taking, are irrelevant, and where in general there is no cause to separate them, we will continue to speak of perception [*Wahrnehmung*]. Thereby we will leave it open whether in any case it is a matter of mere *perception* or *perception* with position-taking or with other equivalent phenomenal characters. Basically, then we will be analyzing *perceptions*, though it will be more agreeable to use the familiar German expression [*Wahrnehmung*, "perception"] as long as we see to it that its ambiguities do not lead us astray.

§6. *Assertions about perceptions and assertions about perceived objects. Real [*reell*] and intentional components of perception.* [17]

The evidence that perception is perception of this or that object tells us already that perception and object are not one and the same. And in fact it is manifest that two series of evident assertions are possible at any time, assertions about perception and assertions about the object in the sense it has in perception, and that in these the perception and the object presenting itself in the flesh therein are not interchangeable. It is evident that perception is not a thing. The perception of a surface is not a surface; and yet an object does appear in the perception, and this appearing object is characterized as a surface. Furthermore, this surface is quadrangular, etc., but the perception is not. Without making any prejudgments about existence or non-existence, evident assertions can be formulated about the perceived object (i.e., the one presenting itself in the flesh), and these assertions express that this or that object is perceived and how the object is perceived: as black, quadrangular, etc. On the other hand, evident assertions are again possible concerning the perception as a phenomenon and concerning what pertains to it. With regard to perceptions and all those phenomena whose essence involves "relating to an object," it is now fashionable to distinguish between the act-content and the object. This distinction is by no means adequately clear, nor is it sufficient.

For our part, we provisionally have occasion to distinguish between appearance and the appearing object and, further, between the content of the appearance (real [*reell*] components of the appearance) and the content of the object. Perception has a "*real* [*reell*] *content*;" i.e., as a phenomenon it contains, as we can establish phenomenologically with evidence, these or those parts and inner moments, i.e., determinations in general. On the other hand, we speak in phenomenology of the *content of the appearing object*, and we do so with regard to the evidence that the essence of perception involves the presentation in the flesh of an object and that it presents the object with precisely these or [18] those parts or features and no others. We distinguish the one content from the other, since it is evident that the parts and features of the perception which presents this object in the flesh are not parts and features of the object which is presented, i.e., they are not parts and features with which the perception lets the object appear in the flesh.

That all these instances of evidence exist is certain; we merely need to carry them out in actuality by way of examples. On the other hand, we feel uneasy here. With regard to perception in the givenness of pure intuition, it is clear that we can assert what it is according to its essence, what this essence really [*reell*] contains in itself, and, correspondingly, what a singularly given perception really [*reell*] has and is. The object of a perception, however, is an appearing, "intentional" object, and so is not given in the same sense, not actually,

fully and properly given. Thus its individual essence is not actually and properly given in the eidetic consideration. Yet we are supposed to form evident judgments about this essence and find what really [*reell*] constitutes it, whereas in the strict sense it is not something that can be found. The perception which stands before my eyes, and on which I exercise phenomenological reduction, is an absolute givenness; I possess it, as it were, for itself, with all that essentially makes it up. It is "immanent." The intentional object, however, is precisely "transcendent." Indeed the latter appears in the flesh, and it is essential to perception to present it in the flesh. But do I actually possess it itself, given along with moments that really [*reell*] constitute it? Do I actually possess the table, for example, in its three dimensional extension, which indeed pertains to its essence? Do I really possess its essence? And yet I have the evidence that it is three dimensional in the sense of this presentation in the flesh. It appears as three dimensional and, for the rest, as characterized in this or that way.

In any case, the givenness proper to perception, proper to the phenomenon, is other than the givenness which pertains to the "perceived as such." Thus the two instances of evidence are of different characters. At the same time, the second evidence obviously belongs in a certain sense to the framework of the first, insofar as it is said that the essence of perception itself involves the presentation of an object in the flesh, an object which is presented as qualified in this or that way. Further research is therefore needed. We are not now advanced far enough to resolve this difficulty. [19]

§7. *Preliminary indication of the method of the further investigation.*

If we were to carry out strictly the method of progression from layer to layer, we would have the following path:

1.) We carry out the phenomenological reduction and now express, in series, the evidences we encounter with respect to perceptions (and so naturally with respect to the reduced lived experiences at issue in all the spheres of phenomenological investigation). We thus analyze everything that pertains to the "essence" of perception, everything we find immanent in it. Thereby we find belonging immanently to it the relation to the object, the circumstance that it is precisely the perception of this or that object. And we find evidences relating to it insofar as it represents this object and evidences which concern the object intended in it as such according to its content, its own proper character, its parts and properties. We then find evident possibilities to place in relation the real [*reell*] content of the perception with its "intentional" content, i.e., with the content belonging to its object. Through this contrast there first

come to the fore, clearly and evidently, real [*reell*] moments of the perception, for example: sensations versus the properties of the object, lived color versus the object's color, lived tone-content versus the object's tone, sensation of roughness versus the thing's roughness, etc. There comes to be set in relief, then, what is real [*reell*] in the perception: sensation and apprehension-character, belief-character, etc.

2.) Now, however, all this becomes problematic insofar as we indeed make these evident assertions and yet do not understand how they are possible. Thus there comes to the fore the fundamental difficulty of the constitution of the object in the phenomenon: how are evident assertions possible about an objectivity that is not actually given in the phenomenon? How are comparisons possible between it and the immanent moments of the phenomenon? How then further will we come to understand perceptual beliefs, which relate to the actual Being of the perceived object and which now are "confirmed" and now [20] "conflict," now get determined more precisely and now possibly are determined in a completely novel way through new perceptions which bring the object to "ever more complete" givenness and show in ever new directions "what the object is in actuality"? How is all this to be understood, since indeed in the entire process of cognition merely ever new sequences of lived experiences flow on, and despite all the evidence pertaining, with the appropriate restrictions, to the judgments about the object, still no place in lived experience can be indicated where the object is real [*reell*]? Objectivity is constituted in lived experience. How are we to understand that which is constituted in its various levels, as an intended givenness that confirms itself step by step? How does the constituted look? We must bring it to clarity. That is, I cannot be satisfied with all the evidence of judgments but must bring to pure givenness the evidence-consciousness itself according to all its moments, must follow its alterations, and subject it to an analysis which will establish, purely intuitively, what actually lies there, what lies in the essence of such nexuses of lived experiences. Instead of living in the evidences, I consider them and comport myself to them purely by considering and analyzing purely immanently what is given there absolutely and indubitably. We must therefore study the possibility of transcendent intention and validity in the sphere of the most pure immanence, i.e., in the sphere in which every constatation brings to intuition a kind of givenness containing absolutely nothing unclear.

That is the goal. And here resides the higher stratum of the investigations, one which can itself again separate into strata. I thought I would now, in view of this separation, gather together factually the first series of obvious givens – or indeed evidences – which then constitute the problems of the higher stratum, and would take into account only step by step the motives to the new investigations. These motives are the extensive difficulties which are connected everywhere with transcendence within evidence.

Meanwhile, this separation entails a great deal of labor for our lectures, since everything presented at the first level must be presented again at the new level, for the problem resides in the latter. We will progress somewhat faster – and our time is of course limited – if we enter step by step directly into the [21]
5 difficulties and their solution, to the extent that in each case the solution can be carried through. Accordingly, what I said at the beginning of the last lecture about our further project and its method will have to be corrected.[4]

[4] At this place the manuscript contains an inserted leaf with critical notes by Husserl on the course of thought of the lectures; *cf.* Appendix I, p. 291. – Ed.

CHAPTER 2

THE METHODOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF THE ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION

§8. *The absolute givenness of perception in phenomenological reflection. Broadening of the concept of perception.*

A component of this solution resides already in the following consideration. The distinction between *real* [*reell*] givenness and merely *appearing* – but not real [*reell*] – givenness is absolutely indubitable and absolutely given. Let us take and gaze upon, first of all, the case of an actual lived experience. We take it just as it is "in itself" and exclude every judgment which leads beyond, into "transcendence": e.g., a feeling we have just lived through, or a perception we have just carried out, a representation in phantasy, etc. If we adopt this attitude, then we have the lived experience not as a psychological one but as an absolute phenomenological datum, upon which we gaze and which is given in this gazing. How is it given? The lived experience, the absolute datum, stands there in the flesh; it is not somehow merely phantasized, thought in a simile or conceived completely symbolically and conceptually, but is given before our eyes as itself, actual, and now. We note that the so-called "gaze" at a lived experience, one carried out in the attitude we have described, has, most generally, the same basic character as the perception of a thing (which has been our concern hitherto). This basic character can also determine a *further* concept of perception, a concept not bound to the givenness of things. The perception of a thing becomes thereupon, although it is not itself something [22]
thingly, the object of another "perception," i.e., the object of that gaze, of that reflection (as is said since Locke), and likewise of any other lived experience insofar as the regard is directed to it. Presupposing the just-mentioned attitude, that of the phenomenological reduction, the object at issue, i.e., the pure datum of the corresponding lived experience (perception, representation, feeling, etc.) is still indubitably given, i.e., given absolutely and really [*reell*]. What does "absolutely" mean here? As regards outer perception, belief was separable from presence in the flesh; there could be a presentation in the flesh connected to disbelief and doubt. Here that is not the case. It is evident that the essence of the reduced lived experience of perception is incompatible with disbelief and doubt. For this lived experience is not only a consciousness whose essential character is to be consciousness of the actual presence of the

object, but it is also, as an absolutely giving consciousness, characterized as one that possesses the object as actual and in the flesh, in such a way that disbelief and doubt are precluded. In a certain sense, it even precludes belief. For belief in the ordinary sense is a mere aiming at Being. But here we do not have mere aiming. In aiming, the goal is not yet given; it must still be attained. In absolutely giving perception, however, the perceptual grasp is precisely a seizing of what is self-given.

On the other hand, we will indeed not fail to recognize the distinction between the absence of belief in this case from the one in which there is outer *perception* without belief. We make a fundamental distinction between the perception which is the mere presentation of an object in the flesh and the perception whose essence it is not only to present but also to seize the object itself in the flesh. They have this in common that in both cases we have to do with a "consciousness" of the presence in the flesh of an object. In normal perception there is a belief-consciousness, such that we can then say: the object is standing there in the flesh, it is actually there. On the other hand, we also find a contrast between the two kinds of perception: here, we have self-possession and thereby absolute givenness of Being, and every doubt about Being, every disbelief, and indeed even every belief in the ordinary sense (δόξα) are precluded in view of the pure and simple having and possessing; there, it is a case of presentation, specifically in the mode we call mere appearance of an actual present, which has its phenomenological character in [23] mere presentation but is not the Being of the absolute givenness of Being in the present.

The same obviously holds for the sphere of the grasping of the essence and the sphere of all universal intuitions whatsoever, naturally *mutatis mutandis*. Abstraction and generalization, grounded intuitively on single intuitions of houses, clarifies for us the essence of a house and presents the essence as given. This essence is here the object of an intuition and presents itself in the intuition as there, so to say, in the flesh.[1] But it does merely present itself. On the other hand, an "essence," a universal, can be given absolutely and indubitably; e.g., the essence of a type of lived experience in the phenomenological reduction and in intuitive abstraction does not merely present itself, but instead it is an absolute givenness in rigorous "immanent" abstraction and not merely a "presentation of."

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[1] On the expression "so to say, in the flesh," *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

§9. *Self-posing perceptions and presentational perceptions. Inseparability of* perception *and belief within self-posing perception.*

It appears most appropriate to distinguish terminologically between self-posing [*selbststellend*] perceptions and presentational [*darstellend*] perceptions. I found the expression "self-position" [*Selbststellung*] while reading Münsterberg,[2] but it has for him a completely different sense, so there is no danger of confusion.

Through the phenomenological characterization of self-posing perception, we first define the sense of immanence and transcendence. The self-posed is called immanent; the presented (whether in the sense of a perception as in the flesh or as self-presented) is called transcendent. Parts or moments of the self-posed are said to be immanent to it, and specifically, to obviate every ambiguity, really [*reell*] immanent, insofar as these can come to an evident self-posing, i.e., insofar as the essence of the total self-posing founds, according to its possibility, a new self-posing whose objects are in an evident way partially identical with the object of the total self-posing.[3] What is self-posed can itself, [24] however, be a perception, a representation, etc., i.e., an immanent object which for its part self-poses an object or presents it. In the latter case, this presented object is not then really [*reell*] immanent to the original self-posing but transcendent (it is what is often called a merely intentional Object). But if the self-posed perception is a self-posing, then its Object is immanent to the first perception. All this will be carried over to the Objectivating phenomena parallel to perceptions, which we call phantasies. We will distinguish the phantasies in phantasy self-posings from those in phantasy presentations, and we will speak of phantasy-immanence and phantasy-transcendence. But it is not yet time for that.

We have already seen that in the sphere of absolutely giving perceptions we cannot speak of a *perception* separable in itself, which is now bound with belief or disbelief, now with doubt. The self-possession of evident perception consists in a having and positing, and analysis is not to separate the having and positing. The having of the self-posing is then a real [*reell*] having. The positing is akin to belief; it is that which excludes disbelief. It is that which makes up the consciousness of Being and constitutes absolute Being in givenness. It is a character common to all self-posing perceptions. What differentiates them resides in *what* is given in them. The character common to all of them as "giving" is the consciousness of the presence of something in the flesh, and that is common to them as it is to all perceptions whatsoever. But, to be sure,

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[2] *Cf.* H. Münsterberg, *Grundzüge der Psychologie. Bd. I. Allgemeiner Teil: Die Prinzipien der Psychologie*. Leipzig, 1900, p. 50. – Ed.

[3] Here what properly defines self-posing perception. The object really [*reell*] immanent to it: partial identification.

one must not here simply multiply factors of presence in the flesh, factors of absolute self-posing of what is present in the flesh, factors of the content of the presence in the flesh and of the self-posed, as if in the end every arbitrary "content" were posited as one with these factors of self-posing and presence in the flesh, such that each and every object could be self-posed. On the contrary, we will still hear enough of the necessary transcendence of thinghood, although it presents itself in the flesh in every individual one of its perceptions; [25] self-posing is excluded here. On the other hand, we will hear of the virtues of the perceptual nexus, of the degrees of increase toward the "perfection" of the presentation, in which something akin to self-posing is carried out. Here at first we need only stress that objects or contents are not initially something, and then are multiplied by these or those arbitrary characters of cognition, but instead that we, in our analysis, which is to be carried out with evidence, consider and analyze only givennesses, set in relief their various sides, grasp now their separability, now their inseparability, and do all this in the domain of essences.

§10. *Identity-consciousness and difference-consciousness in presentational perception.*

We will now study the presentational perceptions, to which the perceptions of things obviously belong, but no less do Ego-perceptions, the perceptions of Ego-lived experiences. And we will study these according to the measure of the examples of the perception of a house, etc. In the case of self-posing perceptions, the identity of the object and the identity of the perception are one and the same; I mean different perceptions have different objects.

It is otherwise in the case of presentational perceptions; that two perceptions have the same object does not mean here that they are in essence the same perception, and even less does it mean that they are one and the same identical perception. Therefore, essentially non-identical perceptions can, on the basis of their essence, relate to the same object. For example, perceptions of a house can, according to their real [*reell*] content, be very different and yet be perceptions of the same house.[4] You will understand if I employ the ordinary modes of expression. Take a house as seen now from the front, and now from the back, or as seen from the inside and then from the outside. If we [26] consider these perceptions within the phenomenological reduction or, as we can now also say, in self-posings, and specifically in their singular essence,

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[4] And here it is not a matter of the "Objective fact": it is a house and two perceptions are in fact perceptions of it; but instead it is matter of the ordinary cases, where, even in consciousness, they are manifest as perceptions of the same and therefore demonstrate themselves as such immanently, in the phenomenological reduction.

then each one appears differently, as it were; each is, according to essence, other and again other. Nevertheless, we say, and with a certain evidence, that they present the same house.

How does that happen? We find in their essence something which joins them or which allows and requires a certain conjunction. This conjunction is a conjunction of identity, which finds its pure expression in the statement that the different perceptions intend or present the same thing. An identity-consciousness, a peculiar phenomenon, given in a self-posing, binds perception together with perception. This consciousness, although not a perception in the manner of our sphere of examples, is nevertheless, in a certain sense, a giving consciousness; it is related to an object, namely the identity of that which is perceived here and there, and possesses something of the character of intuition or of perception, in a broader sense, insofar as it is evident that the double-sided object is, in the sense of the perceptions, the same.

But we must be prudent. It is to be noted, first of all, that we are speaking of an identity-consciousness which unites the two perceptions and thereby brings about the consciousness of their object as one and the same, but it is not that this identity-consciousness identifies the two perceptions and presents them as the same perception. That an A and a B are identified means phenomenologically that an identity-consciousness connects the respective representations A and B, whether this be a matter of perception or representation in phantasy, etc. An identification of the two perceptions would thus require representations of the perceptions as well as the unity-consciousness which connects these representations. If now, however, in the connecting consciousness, i.e., in the consciousness that a perceived object A and a perceived object B are the same object, there does exist a certain evidence for this identity, then can we actually say that it is thereby evident that the object is the same? The objection will immediately be raised: how can I be given the identity in the proper sense, if I am not properly given the object itself but instead possess only its presen- [27]
tations? Besides, can there not be deception here? For example, I have a perception, perhaps of a house from the front. I then walk around to see the back side, and when I perceive it I say: it is the same house; the earlier and the current perception grasp the same house. But I have been deceived, perhaps it was another house, which I did not notice while I walked round as I had to do. It was semblant evidence, which could be false. That is quite correct, and in fact neither the one nor the other single perception gives the object in absolute indubitability. The general proposition indeed is valid, as we just said: every "externally" presenting perception and, more precisely, *perception*, is compatible, insofar as it is exclusively its essence that is in question, with every position-taking, including doubt, in regard to its object. (We may perhaps believe ever so strongly, yet disbelief remains "conceivable;" disbelief is, as a matter of evidence, compatible with *perception*.) Furthermore, the identifica-

tion, i.e., the identity-consciousness encompassing both perceptions, is indeed consciousness of identity – that is evident, and it constitutes its essence, but it remains in a certain sense a merely representational identity-consciousness, a mere intending of identity. It is, as a matter of evidence, compatible with disbelief and doubt as to the actuality of the identity.

What then is evident on the strength of the identity-consciousness actually carried out on the basis of perceptions? We said that in perceptions, by their very sense, their object is one and the same. What does the sense, the essence, of the perceptions have to do here? Let us reflect; the datum is this: the perceptions stand in the synthesis of identification, the unity of the identity-consciousness encompasses them.

But we are not speaking of accidental events, transient perceptions as *cogitationes*. We are concerned with the "essential," and we notice here immediately that the identity-consciousness is not strapping tape, with which one can join together any two arbitrary phenomena or perceptions; on the contrary, whether or not the connection is possible depends on the essence of the phenomena involved. A perception or representation of an elephant and that of a stone can not be fit, according to their essence, into an identification; their essence excludes this identification. On the other hand, perceptions [28] which we call perceptions of the same object manifest themselves as such in the unity of the identity-consciousness which they found, which they found by their essence. To intend the same object[5] with evidence in several perceptions means nothing else than that they, by essence, fit themselves into the unity of an identity-consciousness, i.e., that in their essence the possibility of such a unification is grounded *a priori*. Or, expressed in a purely essential consideration, which is what is at issue here: two such singular perceptual essences ground in pure intuition an essence that encompasses them, namely the identity-consciousness; this consciousness is one with them in pure evidence. Therefore, if we have two perceptions, of which we say with evidence that they are perceptions of the same object – and that happens only in the synthesis of continuity – then there resides here the fact that the "sense" of the one and the sense of the other found a consciousness of selfsameness. And then perceptions, insofar as they in general, through their sense, through their essence, enter into such a consciousness of selfsameness, are called for that reason perceptions of the same object. Obviously, we can *say* of such perceptions that they do not found an identity-consciousness, that they perceive different objects; and conversely we can say and think and even intend about arbitrary perceptions, even if they are unrelated to one another as regards their object, that they represent the same object. But then, this is precisely merely said and thought.

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[5] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

But what we are concerned with here is that the perceptions, as we grasp them in self-posing evidence, are in fact connected through an identity-consciousness, so that if we now speak of this connection, it is not mere talk, it is not merely accepted in an empty intention of such a kind, but instead the talk simply brings to expression the identity-connection as it is absolutely given in the self-posing. By exercising eidetic intuition, we grasp now also the essential state of affairs, that identity-consciousness, by its very essence, is grounded in the essence of the connected perceptions and that it is grounded in the essence to speak of the fitting together into the unity of an identity- [29] consciousness.

Let us still contrast this with the opposite case: we say of perceptions, or, more precisely, *perceptions*, of different objects that they relate precisely to different objects, that they do not *perceive* [*perzipieren*] the same object; this again is of course not to be understood as an Objective fact but phenomenologically. Two perceptions stand there in themselves as characterized with evidence in such a way that they represent different objects. What resides in this phenomenological circumstance? Now, the two *perceptions* do not stand there before our self-posing eyes in an isolated way but as connected through a difference-consciousness which encompasses them, through the consciousness, "not the same." At first, a grasping together in intuition, a collecting grasp, can unify them in such a way that this grasp does not have, purely predicatively, the character we know as identity-consciousness. The perceptions thus do not stand there in the character that in a certain sense tells us: we are *perceiving* the same. But this is still not a difference-consciousness. When is something like that present? Supposing we had at first an identity-consciousness connecting p_1 and p_2, and then wanted to substitute for p_2 a p_1' which belonged to another object, then the non-identity would leap out. An aiming at or determining of identity grasps the p_1 and p_1' as one, and now this intention toward identity "conflicts" with the p_1 and p_1' given in the intuition that takes them together.

Again, it is an evident givenness in pure self-posing[6] that, in essence, "identity" conflicts with the substitution of p_1' for p_2, or, further, that there arises a "conflict," by reason of their essence, between "identity" and the p_1 and p_1' given together with it, or, further, that the essences p_1 and p_1' come to unity in the essence, "difference-consciousness." On the other hand, it pertains to the essence of p_1 and p_2 that they ground the possibility of an identity-consciousness yet exclude the possibility of a difference-consciousness. Furthermore, in general it pertains to the essence of difference-consciousness and identity-consciousness that they exclude one another in the case of identically taken members of the connection, i.e., that they again found a relation of [30]

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[6] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

conflict.

Therefore the expressions, "now fitting together into an identity-consciousness" and, on the other hand, "fitting together into a non-identity-consciousness" are very significant. And these are precisely only another expression for the state of affairs we designate as follows: two perceptions represent the same object, and they represent different objects.[7] All the cognitions we have acquired here are carried out in the sphere of pure self-posing and in the sphere of the eidetic intuition conforming to it, which is also in a certain sense a pure self-posing. In fact, the expression and the sense of the expression are completely transferable.

§11. *Resolution of a difficulty: even intentional components of perception given in the mode of self-posing.*

Now that we have seen that the evidences of the type, "two perceptions, A and B, present the same object (or, then again, a different object)," harbor no mystery and are intelligible without consciousness enigmatically reaching beyond what is really [*reell*] immanent in it, there immediately opens up the prospect of being able to resolve the difficulties which faced us in the first evidences in regard to perception and its objects.[8] Here we have the evidence that every presentational perception of the outer type presents a so-called object which does not reside in it as a real [*reell*] part and is not given in this perception in the mode of a self-posed object. And evident assertions should be possible which posit moments or parts of the perception in comparison, and in other relations, with the parts and properties of the object. The evidences exist. How are they possible? How do we know anything immediately about the presented, transcendent object, or about the relation to it?

This thought naturally imposes itself on us now: the relation to an object is, [31]
from a phenomenological point of view, nothing other than the fittingness, based in the essence of the Objectivating lived experience (here, the perception), to found an identity-consciousness. Or, better, it is the peculiar essence of perception, which makes it fit to found an identity-consciousness and precisely thereby to exclude difference-consciousness, or, conversely, to found the latter and thereby exclude the former. That is, in the essence of the respective perception are grounded, as the respective self-posings demonstrate, ideal possibilities for identity connections with other perceptions of such and such a character, actual or possible. Expressed subjectively, if we had before our eyes all essences of singular perception, and if we compared them in the self-posing

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[7] On this, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.
[8] On this, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

with the pregiven perception A, and if we were disposed to acquire and establish all the eidetic insight grounded in these essences, then these essences would break down into two classes. Every essence of perception of the one class would found with A, with the essence A, an identity-consciousness (this latter likewise taken as essence), and every essence of perception of the other class would found a consciousness of non-identity. The first group would include, e.g. in the case of the perception of a house, the ideal total content of "possible perceptions" of the same house. This is then transferable to the ideal total content of possible phantasy representations, memory representations, and image representations of this house, in their relation to one another as well as to the possible perceptions and finally in relation to all other representations, even empty intentions, etc.

We need to note that there is still no question here of the actuality or non-actuality, existence or non-existence, of the represented; at issue is only the mere "intentional relation" to an object, which relation is attributed to the representation whether or not an existential judgment related to it says with so-called justification: the object exists (or does not exist).

What we have clarified[9] is therefore the "intending or representing precisely this or that object" as something pertaining to the respective representation itself, as an immanent determination of "consciousness." It everywhere comes down to the same thing to say what sort of "consciousness," thus what sort of representation in the broadest sense, and what sort of object may come into question. It is thus, e.g., even when we intuit, represent, or intend, in whatever way, identity or non-identity, being qualified in such and such a way or not being so qualified, etc. Now too, with the exclusion of the question of existence (i.e., here, the question of whether the identity in truth exists, whether the state of affairs actually exists), the evidence is possible that the relevant intention intends precisely identity, such and such a quality, etc., although this is not and cannot be given as real [*reell*] therein; and this evidence is to be elucidated according to the same type we have previously outlined. [32]

Let us go further and take the evidence that the object of outer perception is not contained really [*reell*] in the perception. This naturally entails once again the problem as to how this perception is possible, i.e., in what properly consists its so-called possibility, and that always refers to its immanent essence.

This now leads us back to the fact that immanent perception, which is brought to a self-posing for us by the perception of, e.g., a house, is, by its very essence, not compatible with the perception of the house itself in the unity of an identity-consciousness and also is not compatible in such a unity with a perceiving which brings to perception any one part of the house. Instead of saying that the self-posing of the perception is incompatible, in the unity of an

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[9] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

identity-consciousness, with the perception itself, we could of course also say that they are compatible in a difference-consciousness or that they "fit" themselves therein. This is all to be understood, however, in the sense clarified earlier, i.e., as related to the essence. The same compatibilities and incompatibilities of essence then exist, as a further consequence, in every representation which finds its fulfillment in the perception of the house or which may enter with it into the unity of identification. Hidden in the background here is of course the axiom that if A is identical with B, and B with C, then A is identical with C; and the explanation of this axiom is here at hand. If we go back to the synoptic connection of the identity-consciousness AB with the identity-consciousness BC, then we find enclosed in the essence of this connection, as a possibility, the identity-consciousness AC; i.e., we find the [33] incompatibility of this connection with the difference-consciousness AC.

The exactness of the clarifications concerning the fundamental circumstances for all analyses of objects, circumstances that belong to the identification-consciousness and the differentiation-consciousness, would admittedly require much more. The first thing to note is that the total identification, which we have given preferential treatment, is not the only one there is. Thus we spoke just now of the incompatibility of the self-posing of perception with the perception of a part of a house, with one of its proper moments in general. Here we already utilized a partial identification or partial differentiation. These are also at issue when we consider the possibilities of evidence which arise in any given case from the "comparison" of the real [*reell*] content of the perception with the content of the object. "Content" means the parts and moments of the perception or the parts and moments of the object.

§12. *The relation of part and whole in presentational perception. Partial and total identification.*

Given parts are given in the partial identification. They may perhaps be given absolutely, for instance in a self-posing identification, as it were, if we carry out immanent analysis. A self-posing yields the whole as absolute Being; another self-posing sets into relief a part; but the part first becomes a part of the whole in the partial identification, which brings the one and the other object to partial coincidence, thus brings them to coincidence in the way we designate by the words part and whole. The difference of the words already signifies that in this identity-consciousness the conjoined representations are not compatible, unlike the case of total identification, which consists in the uniform consciousness, "the same."

Moreover, the total identification, the unity-consciousness of the objective

coincidence in the stricter sense, is a basic form of consciousness in which the sense of the expression "one and the same object" is demonstrated originally. In like manner, the partial identification is also a basic form of consciousness. The latter is a consciousness of coincidence, but in such a way that a "surplus" [34] of non-coincidence stands out. (The possibility of standing out is grounded in an evident way in the essence of the state of affairs.) And in this basic structure of Objectivating consciousness there arises the sense of the talk about part and whole and about containing and being-contained, possessing and being-possessed.

The partial identification differentiates itself; in its universality it encompasses, according to its ideal possibility, various cases corresponding to the basic differences in the type of part-relations. A part in the stricter sense is that which precisely supplements itself with the coordinate parts to form the whole, whereby the whole is "put together" out of the parts; members of a whole, pieces, are parts in this pregnant and stricter sense. On the other hand, the inner features, which the whole has as subject, as bearer, and has in the mode of determination, in the mode of predicate, are properties.

Obviously different modes of identification are to be distinguished here, ones which are closely akin and which we therefore bring under the one heading, "partial identification," yet they still must count as proper modes. Properties do not put the object together, the way pieces do a whole, and *a fortiori* they are not qualities in a broader sense, the outer features which fall to the subject, which it has, but which do not belong to it purely. Insofar as they fall to it in relation to something else, thus only in a unity-consciousness which "encompasses" still another Object, can they be given as belonging to the subject.

The thorough kinship of essence resides in the "is," in the unity-consciousness which is the standard everywhere: everywhere unity of the object, unity as absolute identity, unity as unity of the whole and the member, or piece, of the whole. Unity of subject and property, of subject and of the relative determination.

The idea of this consciousness of unity, or conjoining consciousness of the object, includes still different events, such as combination, perhaps the unity of two parts of a whole, the compatibility and incompatibility of elements which are supposed to go together into a whole, the compatibility or incompatibility of properties and relations which are supposed to fall to a subject. Furthermore, it includes the apophantic forms standing in essential relation to the "is" and "is not," i.e., apophantic forms of "and," "or," the plural, the [35] "one" in general, and the singular "one," etc. Of course, I do not need to examine all this more closely here.

The main point here is that, for the study of things as objects – and, we will see immediately, for the study of objects in general – we are led back at the

very outset to the study of the unity of giving acts, to identification, distinction, and their various differentiations and appertaining formations, which express themselves in the apriori forms of possible assertions, in their purely grammatical categories.

If the question of validity has already entered into our field of view, then we would speak not merely of purely grammatical forms but of purely logical laws. The elucidation of the logical and the making intelligible of the possibility of the Objective validity of knowledge are one and the same. Since we desire to deal merely with the constitution of things as objects within perception, let us be satisfied with a few further (at least provisional) steps in the analysis of the apophantic, such as we have carried out today.

To be sure, if we wanted to acquire a complete elucidation of the possibility of evident assertions in our sphere of concern, then we would have to undertake a general analysis of the essence of the word and its meanings, the difference between empty and fulfilled meaning-intentions, and a general analysis of the sense of the totality of forms pertaining to apophansis as well as the general possibility of their Objectivity, their objective validity, insofar as they are independent of the particularity of the underlying straightforward Objectivations. The beginning and main parts of such an analysis can be found in my *Logical Investigations*.

What we are doing here is to study the givenness of things in the sphere of intuition, and more specifically in perception, so that we can bring this givenness to a self-posing. Our assertions want to express purely what here comes to a self-posing. We take the essence of this expressing to be familiar and clear, in order not to have to enter upon comprehensive investigations directed in other directions. We are thus devoting ourselves only to the identifications and distinctions which pertain to the givenness of things themselves as objects, and we are not now concerned with those that pertain to the assertions in [36] which they are expressed.

The consciousness of the unity of the identification is a representational, Objectivating, consciousness and has, as does every such consciousness, various modes, which are indicated by the opposition between "meant" and "given." The essence of such a consciousness includes a relation to something objective and a bringing of the objectivity to absolute givenness in special formations. The objectivity is, as we already said, the identity or the state of affairs, the relation of whole and part, of subject and determination. The identity-consciousness, as is the case with other Objectivating acts, can now be an empty or a full intention; one can intend identity, e.g., in merely symbolic thinking, without "properly" having it before one's eyes, without exercising a proper identifying. Then again, the proper identification has various levels of properness. Proper identification can be carried out on the basis of empty intentions of the members of the conjunction, or it can be accomplished

on the basis of full intentions, i.e., from intuitions of the Objectivities posited in the relation of unity. The synthetic act itself then acquires the character of intuition. Again there belongs to this act, as to other intuitions, the distinction between adequate and inadequate intuition, and thereby we have here as well the difference between perceiving consciousness, one that posits and intuits the identity as existing, and a perceiving consciousness that possesses evidence, absolutely self-giving consciousness, in which the absolute self-givenness of an identity comes to light. Obviously, where no absolute self-givenness is present, we also have to distinguish the various modes of position-taking from mere representation, and more specifically, from mere *perception*. Belief in the Being of the identity, disbelief, doubt, and so on. I think I may express the proposition: where two absolutely self-giving acts are joined through a proper identity-consciousness, there the latter is necessarily a self-giving consciousness.

In the phenomenological analysis we synthesize (e.g., in a self-posing) an immanent whole and its real [*reell*] parts. Such syntheses intuit the part-relation of the absolute givennesses, and this intuition is also absolutely giving. The evidence that the coincidence exists, that the one is in the other, is [37] evidence just as absolute as that of the conjoined members. What I have said about identity-consciousness holds, of course, also for the consciousness of difference.

§13. *Rejection of a misunderstanding: articulation of the giving consciousness not an articulation of the object.*

Further, it is important to heed once and for all the following:[10] if we find, in an evident partial identification, a part in the whole and accordingly, with absolute justification, attribute the part to the whole and thus resolve the whole into the complex of its parts, and analyze it, then we must not mingle together what concerns the consciousness which constitutes the givenness and what concerns the object itself. Thus we must not interpret into the object the flux, the changing, and the articulation of the giving consciousness. That would be like arguing: the part is in the whole, but phenomenologically the part is in the whole prior to the analysis otherwise than it is after the analysis. The whole is partitioned; in the partitioning act, in the act which, as it were, sets something in relief for itself, and takes heed of it by itself, the part first becomes an object. Prior to that the part is supposed to have been "contained" in the whole, and we speak as if it previously was already contained therein just as it is afterwards, after the separate apprehension or setting of it into

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[10] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's remark, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

relief. But has the phenomenon not changed essentially? Is there not something quite different present, when the setting into relief and partial identification take place? Then how can I say with any actual justification that the same thing the analysis subsequently provides as something for itself was already "contained" in the whole prior to the analysis? The analysis modifies, it introduces a subjective moment, a falsifying moment; we do not have a whole phenomenon, which contains the part-phenomenon, but instead we have once the so-called total phenomenon, which we call, prior to the analysis, the whole, and afterwards call something quite different, which we have no right to place in the total phenomenon or to place in it that which it contains under the title of a part-phenomenon set in relief.

But this is all fundamentally false idle talk. It amounts to an absurd skepti- [38]
cism which annuls itself because it presupposes what it denies. In fact, if what it maintains could be true, then this truth would have to demonstrate itself in the self-posing consideration and analysis of the phenomena themselves. Do we not analyze the process of the analysis, when we name, as the first step in it, the total perception at the beginning of the analysis and then go on to speak of the setting in relief of the part as contained in the identification of the part within the whole? What legitimacy do the presumptuous assertions have, those that indeed distinguish parts in the total consciousness of givenness, if *in thesi* their Objective legitimacy is taken from all such assertions, namely with the tenet that the process of setting a part in relief and knowing the part involves a falsification? Let us now disregard the contradiction and consider the matter directly. In the self-posing identification, the perception of a whole and the perception of a part are brought into synthesis. This synthesis is absolute evidence, it is the absolutely giving consciousness that the whole has the part. If we were to ask what distinguishes the part prior to the analysis and the part after the analysis, the answer naturally would be: nothing.

There occurs, to be sure, much, but this is from the side of the constituting consciousness, to whose essence it pertains to elapse in such and such a way, to articulate itself in this or that manner. And as a whole of such a character and elapsing in such a way, it is evidence that the whole has the part. It is evidence; it is thus, therefore, that it is, and the assertion says purely and simply: the whole has the part. It does not say: the whole has the part only after the analysis or has it differently prior to the analysis than afterwards. On the contrary, all that is pure nonsense. If a self-posing makes an object of the problematic consciousness of evidence, and if there is carried out within the self-posing a comparison between the moments of this consciousness and of the object given in it, the part or the whole of this part, then we see before our eyes the nonsense, the evident contradiction. The flux and articulation of absolutely giving consciousness is not the flux and articulation of the given object. Skeptical arguments of the kind indicated jumble together conscious-

ness and object. The "phenomenon" alters. The consciousness of the given-
ness of the whole, with which I begin, does not remain unaltered, and the [39]
consciousness of the part, which finds its coincidence in the partial identifica-
tion, in the whole-consciousness, which is certainly altered in a certain way, is
in itself not a piece of the original consciousness, just as little as it a piece of
the altered one. But that is precisely the look of what we call the existence in
the flesh of the objectivity that here comes to givenness: "the whole has the
part." And if the self-posing intuition makes this consciousness of givenness
its object, and specifically again, its absolutely given object, and if it distin-
guishes in it the alterations, the parts, the moments, then there belongs to this
distinguishing again this or that quite differently elapsing series of individual
steps of separation, setting in relief, and partial identification. And it is again
evident that the essence of an elapsing of such a type is precisely what consti-
tutes the givenness and the absolute givenness of the objectivity and its parts,
which we call the first consciousness of evidence.

The conception we are fighting against acts, obviously, as if objectivity, Being of every sort, were something in itself without relation to consciousness, as if consciousness once accidentally approached the object, operated on it, and undertook these and those alterations, precisely in the mode of an operation in the natural sense. In the background lies hidden the presumed obviousness: things are in themselves and prior to all thought, and now comes the Ego-subject, a new thing, which works on and produces something with the thing, carries out with it acts of thinking, intuiting, relating, and connecting, whereby the thing is given to the Ego-subject precisely only in the formation imposed on it.

All this breaks down into nothing as soon as the phenomenological reduction is carried out and the natural attitude of spirit, along with its "obviousnesses," are suspended. All talk of object and objective Being is a phenomenon and has its meaning; it refers (as every step of phenomenological analysis teaches) to further nexuses of the kind that are designated by the word "consciousness" and which, in self-posing, come to absolute givenness. Ultimately, however, it refers to the absolute phenomenon of the respective givenness, which has its essential constitution: namely, to be therein precisely a consciousness of something in the flesh and a consciousness of givenness. [40]
Thus in these nexuses all sense of the talk of the object and of objective existence demonstrates itself, as well as does the sense of speaking about the knowing subject, the thinking Ego, etc., which are indeed once again objectivities. Objectivity – this word makes one think here of thingly objectivity, things, properties, thingly states of affairs, etc.

In a broader sense, however, consciousness too, i.e., everything included in this title, namely perception, intuition in general, judgment, etc., is something objective and undergoes the same law that prescribes the sense of objectivity.

But this "something objective" has a privilege that warrants our opposing, in a fundamental way, consciousness and object in the stricter sense, namely insofar as all transcendent objectivity has its primal ground and its bearer in objectivity in the broader sense, which we call consciousness. The thing is constituted in consciousness; there is an intentionality that gives sense to it and to its "true Being." This intentionality is one that comes to light, following essential laws, in nexuses of consciousness of a determinate kind, or it is one that is essentially proper to the thing. By virtue of its very sense, this intentionality is inseparable from such nexuses. Consciousness itself, however, is absolute Being and for that precise reason is not thingly Being. Pure and simple self-posing brings this consciousness to givenness as absolute; it is what is given in pure intuition. It is something identifiable and therefore also an object, but it is not first constituted in nexuses of consciousness and in the sense which binds these nexuses together. It is simple and is intuited. The world is borne, as it were, by consciousness, but consciousness itself needs no bearer. The intending can again be intended, but it is not in nexuses of intending that it is and first constitutes itself. These nexuses are what they are only in further nexuses of intending, and so on *in infinitum*. The thing, however, is what it is only in virtue of the nexuses of intention whose kinds and forms are still to be investigated.

Is the thing then only the nexus of my psychic acts, the nexus of my representations, perceptions, judgments, etc.? Whoever poses this question has of course failed to understand anything. The phenomenological reduction is not by any means the solipsistic reduction, and the Ego is indeed itself something thingly which is constituted only in intentional nexuses and their essential forms, and only thereby does it demonstrate itself. The justification of relating the formations of consciousness to an Ego, to this or that person, is to be grounded only in Objectivating thinking and its logic; and this justification demonstrates its sense in phenomenological analysis. But the thinking spoken of in this analysis belongs to no one. It is not that we merely *abstract* from the Ego, as if the Ego did indeed stand there and was simply not referred to, but instead we completely exclude the positing of a transcendent Ego and adhere to the absolute, to consciousness in the pure sense. [41]

SECTION II

ANALYSIS OF UNCHANGED OUTER PERCEPTION

CHAPTER 3

THE ELEMENTS OF PERCEPTUAL CORRELATION [42]

§14. *Contents of sensation and the qualities of things.*

Let us consider some outer perception, e.g. that of a house, and let us specifically take up perceptions which contain no change whatsoever. We will consider some unchanged object and extract one moment, holding fast to the essence as identical. If we compare the content of outer perception with the content of its object, then the following separate themselves: sensed color versus perceived color (i.e., the color of the perceived house), sensed roughness versus the object's roughness, sensed extension, sensed structural moment, sensed moment of form versus perceived spatial expanse, perceived spatial size and structure. The latter are filled up and covered in such and such a way by the "sensuous qualities" of the object; i.e., they are divided and distributed in this or that way. The sensed red is a real [*reell*] moment of the perception itself. The perception contains the moment red, but it is not itself red; red is not a "property" or feature of perception but a feature of the perceived thing. Perception cannot, as a matter of evidence, be designated a thing. Likewise, the perception contains a moment of extension; but it would be a fundamental perversion to claim it is extended, since this word, by its very sense, applies only to things: it designates a certain spatial modification. Space [43]
is a necessary form of things and is not a form of lived experience, specifically not of "sensuous" lived experiences. "Form of intuition" is a fundamentally false expression and implies, even in Kant, a fatally erroneous position. It is evident from the very outset that sensation and perception are not one and the same, that a distinction is to be made between total sensed content and perceived object, between individual contents of sensation and the actual features "corresponding to them." If the perceived object, for instance the house in perception, is really [*reell*] transcendent, then so also are all the parts and features that constitute the house. If the house does not exist, then neither do any of its particularities; and if the house is not a piece of the perception, then neither are any of its features. Nevertheless, there corresponds to every sensed content a moment of the perceived object, and the relation is so close that we employ the same terms to designate both sides: sensed color – the Object's coloration, sensed sound – the Object's sound, sensed structural moment – the thing's structure, etc.

Nevertheless, we can easily show with evidence that it is not something one and the same that is simply named twice here, as if some completely identical complex of contents would be, on the one hand, when grasped transcendently, a thing, and would be, on the other hand, when sensed immanently, precisely a complex of sensations. What is immanent to perception is not the same as that which is posited transcendently as a thing. If these were completely the same, then we would have two things, one immanent and one transcendent. There would be no reason to deny the pre-eminent name, "thing," to what is immanent. Our later analyses will show that this leads to countersense; it will become apparent that the thing is not a givenness which can be given immanently in straightforward perception. And what holds for the thing holds for the parts, properties, and qualities of the thing. Here it will suffice to indicate that there exists at least the possibility, as we will make clear with examples, that many perceptions, essentially distinct in their complex of sensations, are and can be perceptions of one and the same object, e.g. a house. Thereby the object can be taken as determined in completely the same way and as unchanged. It remains to be considered later whether this possibility does not belong to the essence of thinghood, thus whether it is not a necessary possibility. [44]

Such examples show that each of the various perceptions is indeed perception of the same object but that each displays the object only from one "side," and each displays it from a "different side." Whereas one perception presents the object from this side and brings to a proper presentation in this side these or those determinate groups of features, the other perception brings another group of features, instead of these, into the perceptual field, insofar as it denies to the other group of features the privilege of proper givenness. And again it is evident that the respective immanent complex of sensations has a special relation to the complex of features that present themselves properly and in the flesh. If I see the house from the front, then there corresponds to the coloration of the front, as a whole and according to all its partial moments, a sensed color; and, conversely, to every moment of the sensation there corresponds a quality of the object as presented in the "properly" perceived front side. We see from the following, however, that, even with this restriction, sameness must not and cannot arise: if we have the perception of a uniformly yellow sphere (one of Locke's examples) and specifically if we have a perception, unchanged throughout its duration, of an unchanged object, then we say on the one hand: the seen coloration, naturally related to the "properly" appearing front side, is uniform.

But if we attend to the immanent content of perception, we find a perpetual adumbration of the yellow, and it is clear that a necessary connection exists here: only if such an adumbration is sensed does a uniformly colored sphere present itself. And again we have an indication that the identity of objective

determinations is compatible, in the domain of proper perception, not only with a change or a continuous alteration of the contents of sensation, but that, with respect to many determinations, this is necessarily required. By approaching or receding from the sphere we have constantly new perceptions. The moment of extension within the sensation demands a continuous alteration, if [45] the manifold perceptions are to acquire unity in the consciousness: It is the same sphere, unchanged in its extension and form.

Thus identity of the Objective feature in no way signifies identity of the corresponding sensation. The sensation does not offer a reduplication of the feature. The perception thus does not contain an image of the object, taking the word "image" in its ordinary sense, as a second thing, one that is a representative of an original by way of similarity. Perception contains neither a repetition of a whole thing nor of such individual features. The image-theory is, looked at from any side, countersensical. Here we have one of these sides.

§15. *Presentational contents and apprehension* (perception).

Let us go further. Provisionally, the word sensation means only this, that in perception certain contents reside really [*reell*], ones which stand to the corresponding contents of the perceived object in a certain relation, such that we can oppose color as a really [*reell*] given moment in the self-posing of perception and the color of the perceived object. These real [*reell*] contents themselves we call the contents of sensation. Their complex does not make up, according to what we have already discussed, the entire content of perception. We have already mentioned the evidence indicating that the complex of the contents of sensation is quite varied, and yet the corresponding perceptions, by their very essence, pass themselves off as perceptions of the same object. Conversely, it is also holds that the same complex of contents of sensation can be the basis of diverse perceptions, perceptions of diverse objects, as every mannequin proves, inasmuch as here, from a fixed viewpoint, two perceptions stand in conflict, that of the mannequin as a thing and that of the presented man, both constructed on the same fundament of sensation. This consideration turns our gaze toward the surplus which, beyond the complex of sensation, is to be found really [*reell*] in the perception and which, in the most intimate fusion with what is sensed, first constitutes perception. The contents of sensation in themselves still contain nothing of the character of perception, nothing [46] of its directedness toward the one perceived object; they are still not that which makes an object stand there as a thing in the flesh. We call this excess the apprehension-character, and we say that the contents of sensation undergo apprehension. These contents would in themselves be, as it were, dead matter,

but through the apprehension they acquire animating significance in such a way that they are able to present an object. In this regard, we name the contents presentational contents, in contrast to what is presented in them, namely the determinations of the object.

Since there already stood out for us, as a changing moment of perception, the moment of position-taking, such as belief, disbelief, etc., it is then obvious that we are now grasping the concept of apprehension so narrowly that these distinctions are irrelevant for it and that it thereby relates to mere *perception*.

Thus it is apprehension which distinguishes self-posing perception from presentational perception. Only in the latter is there carried out the relation to the perceived object in such a way that a content really [*reell*] immanent in the perception functions as presentational, as one that is not simply grasped but is apprehended as something which it itself is not but which appears with its apprehension. This is a first, quite rough analysis. We must still study what resides in this "apprehension." And the restriction to the type of so-called outer perceptions, perceptions of physical things, must be taken into account.

The contents of sensation function in outer perception as presentational contents. One could establish a concept of sensation by means of this function, thus by taking sensation in relation to perception, and could then say that sensed contents, in opposition to perceived contents, mean those that function as presentational. That would be a very important and fundamental concept of sensation; and we will indeed employ it. On the other hand, it is clear that in outer perception the presentational contents are distinguished by means of their own intrinsic character; they can belong to very diverse genera: color, sound, etc. Yet as broad as the differences are here, still all contents that are [47]
supposed to be able to function as presentational for the perception of a thing have an intrinsic kinship. They stand under a highest genus, a genuine, essentially unitary genus, which can also serve to define the concept of sensation. Perhaps it will indeed be better to designate this genus with a different name: sensible content. To be sure, the name "sensible content" has its disadvantages, since it refers precisely to the functional interpretation, and we also speak of inner sensibility. Another name would be desirable.

When Brentano[1] speaks, in his brilliant psychology, of physical phenomena, he has these contents in view. That is unmistakable, despite some deviations. To avoid the ambiguous word "phenomenon," we could thus also designate this class as the class of absolutely physical data. That is, within the total domain of absolute givennesses, and more precisely within the real [*reell*] givennesses, there are delimited those capable of functioning as presentational contents of physical things and on that account can themselves be called physical data. Nevertheless, since they are capable of this accomplishment on

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[1] *Cf.* Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 1. Bd., Leipzig, 1874. – Ed.

the basis of their intrinsic generic type, we can use the name for this generic element itself. It is evident that the genus of physical data differs *toto coelo* from what, as animating apprehension and as opinion, belief, doubt, etc., is called, in a sense not further clarified, consciousness. A physical datum and the apprehension not only differ fundamentally and in essence, but it is also clear that their functions are not interchangeable, that the physical datum, the content of sensation, cannot function as apprehension, and the apprehension cannot function as content of sensation (the latter holds at least in the case of outer perception). We will have to consider subsequently whether what is included here under the vague title of consciousness cannot for its part also undergo an apprehension and constitute transcendences of an essentially new group, psychic transcendences. If that were the case, then we would have to speak of physical and psychic sensations, in a distinction that would correspond, at least somewhat, to the unclarified talk of outer and inner sense. [48]

We find physical data, as a rule, bound up with an animating apprehension. If we make them objects of a self-posing, then we either take as an object the whole unity of physical datum and apprehension, thus the whole *perception*, or we abstract from the apprehension, gazing exclusively at the physical. But we cannot say this involves an abstraction of the kind which brings to separate notice inseparable moments, such as the tonal intensity in abstraction from the pitch, etc. It cannot be said apriori that a physical datum requires an apprehension, thus that it must function as a presentational content. Similarly, a question that cannot be decided without further ado is whether in perception the interpretative apprehension is immediately one with the physical content, or whether this latter first has its immanent consciousness and the transcendent "apprehending" is then built upon it, as a further mode of consciousness. The distinction between mere *perception* [*Perzeption*] and apperception [*Apperzeption*], which plays such an equivocal role in modern psychology and theory of knowledge, is frequently understood even in such a way that mere *perception* or mere sensation is supposed to designate pure and simple possession, and specifically an immanently *perceptive* consciousness of a content, and apperception then designates an apprehension built upon, and going beyond, the sensation.

Thus we cannot accept this description as it stands, for we indeed are aware of a mere *perception* as a perception which is directed exclusively toward a physical content, namely the self-posing; but reflection does not show that this latter is contained in the normal perception of a thing. The physical content is as it is lived by the whole perception which contains it and its apprehension immanently. But the term "lived" does not mean, even as regards apprehension, that it is the object of a really [*reell*] immanent perception, a self-posing; "lived" does not without further ado mean "conscious" in the sense of just any consciousness [*Gewußtsein*]. We will have to speak about this further.

In any case, we will avoid this opposition between *perception* and apperception. We will call *perception*, according to the usual sense of the word, simple perception; it is just that we do not include the moment of position-taking. And we prefer to avoid completely the ambiguous word "apperception;" the term "apprehension" suffices, as Stumpf advocated long ago. [49]

The same thing we call *perception*, thus the contents of apprehension taken in their apprehension, forms as a whole a clearly defined concept of "perceptual representation," a concept which is often opposed to that of perception pure and simple. "Mere representation" is still not a judgment. Perception, at least normal perception, implies a "belief," a positing, etc. Once again, our concept of *perception* and the corresponding analysis result in a clarification of a concept of appearance, specifically understood as perceptual appearance. Talk of the "appearance of the object" does not prejudge whether what appears exists or not; even in hallucination we have an appearance. Thus appearance is obviously nothing other than *perception*.

§16. *The object of apprehension as appearance. Appearance in the proper sense.*

Nevertheless, a narrow concept of appearance delimits itself immediately, if we consider the already indicated distinction between what is properly perceived, or more precisely, what is properly *perceived*, and what is *perceived* is an improper sense. We see, it is said, a house, but properly we see only the front side. Only certain determinations of the object, precisely those included in the title "front side," properly fall within the scope of the perception. But that means that only they are properly presented. Actually, these are facts belonging within the domain of evidence, and they demonstrate their sense purely phenomenologically, whatever may be the case regarding the existence of the house. If we investigate the content of the *perception* as physical content, then we find that it has a presentational function according to all its parts and moments, and indeed necessarily, but that it brings to presentation, piece for piece, only a complex of objective determinations. It is precisely this complexion that we call the appearing side of the thing.

Thus we have the peculiar state of affairs that the perception of a whole does not imply perception of all its parts and determinations. Implied perceptions are separate perceptions, whose possibility is guaranteed, with evidence and essentially, on the basis of a perception as a total perception; and these separate perceptions found, with evidence, the possibility of a partial identification with the original perception. Now, if we adhere to mere *perception*, [50]

then it is just as evident that the total apprehension actually contains certain partial apprehensions, as it is evident that the total physical content really [*reell*] includes such and such partial contents; these are only parts or partial apprehensions that are not extracted and set in relief. We will still have to speak about this extraction. If we now pursue this content of sensation step by step, then we find with evidence, as something necessarily pertaining to it, that each of its moments has a presentational function especially appropriate to it. If we take all these special presentations together in their unity, such as they then necessarily form a unity, then it turns out that the entire apprehension is not exhausted. The thing, as given in perception, has more than the appearing or, in the pregnant sense, *perceived* front side; and this "more" lacks presentational contents especially appropriate to it. It is, in a certain way, co-included in the perception, but without itself coming to presentation. The contents of sensation have no relation to it; they are completely exhausted in the presentation of the front side. Accordingly, the total apprehension and total appearance of the perception divide into the proper appearance, whose correlate is the side of the object that is perceived in the proper sense and that actually comes to presentation, and the improper appearance, the appendage of the proper appearance, which has its correlate in the rest of the object. This appearance is not presentational, although it does indeed make its object known in a certain way. If we attend to a moment of this side that is "turned away," then we can no longer say of it, taken for itself, that we have it before our eyes, that we intuit it, that we perceive it. Only what is presented is perceived, given "intuitively." Yet the proper appearance and the improper are not separate things; they are united in the appearance in the broader sense. Consciousness is consciousness of the presence of the house in the flesh; that means, completely in the sense of the total *perception*: the house appears. It is just that a [51]
mere side of the house actually presents itself, and nothing more can at all present itself. A side, however, is a side only of a full object. A side is nothing for itself; it is unthinkable as being for itself. This evidence signifies that the proper appearance is not something separable. Through its essence it demands a supplementation by a surplus of apprehensional components, whereby the talk of the surplus naturally is to be taken *cum grano salis*, since indeed we can speak here of precisely nothing like a sum.

We note still further peculiarities. A perception[2] can be incomplete insofar as it perceives one piece of the object, yet it presumes to grasp an object that is whole and complete. For instance, a piece of an object, perhaps of a tree, is hidden, and yet in seeing we have the consciousness: the tree is there, in the flesh. Here, too, the apprehension – and, with it, the perceptual intention – reaches beyond the presentation, and not merely beyond the presented front

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[2] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

side but beyond the single properly perceived piece of the tree. But here we speak of what is properly perceived (and, in regard to the hidden piece of the tree, of what is improperly perceived) obviously in a different – though related – sense versus the way we speak of what is properly and improperly perceived with respect to the properly appearing front side and the properly not appearing back side. The one-sidedness of outer perception, the circumstance that it brings the thing to a proper presentation in only one of its sides, that the thing is given to perception only through the medium of an appearance in relief, is a radical incompleteness; and this pertains to the essence of all those perceptions we include under the title of perceptions of physical things, or outer perceptions. The piece-wise perception is different. The tree did not need to be hidden as regards those pieces which in fact were hidden. That hiddenness could cease; I would then see the whole tree. In every case, however, I see it only from a side. If the tree is partially hidden, then I see, in the proper sense, only the side of a piece of the tree, although the apprehension bears on the [52] piece according to all the sides implicated in it and then, further, not only on this piece but on the supplementary piece, the one leading to the full tree, the piece of which no "side" comes to appearance.

The supplementation of a piece indicates a constitution in the apprehension that is different from the supplementation that leads us beyond the appearing side to the full thing. The side is indeed something non-autonomous; the piece is something autonomous. More precisely, the piece can exist for itself; the thing would still be a thing if it were reduced to the piece. But the thing cannot be reduced to the side; the side is, evidently and necessarily, what it is only as a side. The thing, which presents itself in the side, could be manifoldly different than it is apprehended in the apprehension; it could be determined in its interior and its other "sides" quite otherwise than it is determined in the apprehension, while the appearing side remains identically the same. Yet by necessity and in every case, some supplementary sides or other, i.e., nexuses of further non-autonomous determinations, must be constituted in the apprehension so that an object can at all present itself in the appearing side.

Here resides[3] therefore an essential inadequacy in every individual outer perception, which is perception of spatial things and as such can only be one-sided. A three-dimensional intuition, we could also say, as a proper intuition, one that would bring to presentation all at once the full content of the thing in each of its constitutive parts and moments, outer and inner, front and back, is impossible. There is only an improper intuition of space. That holds for the moment of spatial form as well as for the spatial fullness founded in it. In any case, it holds in relation to the presentational forms and means which we have at our disposal phenomenologically; thus it holds for the specific essence of

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[3] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

physical contents and forms of apprehension which we find in phenomenological intuition and which delimit our idea of outer perception. We may not now venture to maintain that the essence of physical contents in general necessarily implies that, as the underlying sensations of presentational perceptions, these contents can found only one-sided perceptions of things.

Given with the one-sidedness of perception is necessarily also an incompleteness in the grasping of a piece of the thing. We cannot properly perceive every piece of a thing all at once. The pieces of the tree which are visible only from the back cannot come to appearance in the perception of the front, and vice versa. But this inadequacy derives from the essence of the one-sided presentation. The one-sidedness is primary; the invisibility, properly speaking, of the pieces which present themselves in other sides is secondary – precisely because the piece, exactly like the complete thing, requires a presentation and can appear only in a "side." It must be noted in this regard that the partition we introduced into the thing by taking it apart has to be clearly distinguished from the one the thing bears in itself in accord with the sense of the apprehension. For example, the tree stands there in perception as an articulated whole, articulated according to trunk, branches, leaves. These are articulations that are preseen from the very outset in the total apprehension; the tree is "intended" as an articulated whole, and only insofar as the articulations are intended, only insofar as they are constituted in articulations of the apprehension, only to that extent are they not introduced through subsequent partitionings, although the possibility of these latter may be rooted in the essence of the total apprehension. I can indeed consider the trunk and intuit it out point by point, piece by piece, and judge that each of these points and pieces is in the whole. But the straightforward original perception does not therefore need to have intended the tree in the sense of all these articulations in order to have Objectivated it as such in its apprehension. Accordingly, we cannot say that while we see merely the front side of the thing, we see, properly speaking, only a piece of it, namely the piece of the thing turned toward us, and we do not see the rest of its pieces. The front side can, in principle, be a front side with respect to arbitrarily many pieces, according to our carrying out their delimitation. But these delimitations are something subsequent, thought into the thing, a potentiality founded in the essence – but not an actuality. The front side is rather the total unity of the determinations of the thing which fall in the proper appearance; with them the thing itself appears, not an arbitrarily assumed front side of the thing. But the pieces belonging to the thing as given perceptually, in accord with the animating apprehension, are partly presented in the "front side" and partly are not presented. How it turns out in this regard in any given case is precisely the concern of the respective perception. [53] [54]

The setting into relief of the two moments in outer perception, as they reciprocally require one another, moments we have labeled with the titles

proper and improper appearance, gives rise to still further considerations.

The proper appearance lends unity to the total complex of sensations in perception, a complex that bears the presentational function,[4] and to the total content of the physical data exercising in it the function of sensations, by means of which the side of the object, its appearance in relief, presents itself. The presentation is, we are tempted to say, one through resemblance, although here prudence is in order, since we are not at all using the word "resemblance" in the natural sense. Color presents color, sensed roughness the object's roughness, etc., but, as we have already mentioned once and will understand still more deeply, this occurs in such a way that the presented is not somehow a second, merely transcendent, physical content but is something objective which, according to its nature, can never become content and is therefore to be radically distinguished from content.

§17. *Essential appurtenance of determinate genuses of sensible data to objective determinations.*

Basically, hence, the relation of resemblance means nothing else than that certain types of physical data are bound, according to their essence, to corresponding types of objective determinations: the physical datum of the type "sound" cannot present an objective feature of the type "color," the physical datum "color" cannot present an objective feature of the type "warmth," etc. The appertaining types, which belong essentially together in the presentational function, are called by the same name. The later analyses will show why I express myself in such a way and that this is not mere hair-splitting.

As to what, on the other hand, concerns the improper appearance, the one [55] that fills the total appearance of the perception, it thus contains nothing of a presentation. The improperly appearing objective determinations are co-apprehended, but they are not "sensibilized," not presented through what is sensible, i.e., through the material of sensation. It is evident that they are co-apprehended, for otherwise we would have no objects at all before our eyes, not even a side, since this can indeed be a side only through the object.

In earlier lectures, I used to express myself as follows: what improperly appears is represented by the given sensations not directly but indirectly, not by resemblance but by contiguity, not intuitively but symbolically. This way of speaking has a certain basis in the synthesis of the nexus of perception, in which the essence of the perceptual apprehension in a certain manner unveils or unfolds itself further. Nevertheless, I now have more than misgivings about

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[4] Here no account is taken of the groups of sensations that direct the apprehension of space, that motivate it!

this mode of expression, insofar as nothing of presentation, not even of one that could be called mediate, clings to the contents of sensation, even if we have in mind the synthetic nexus. The references back and forth, which help constitute the objective givenness in the elapsing of a manifold of appurtenant perceptions, do not concern merely the sensations but the totality of appearances in the unitary consciousness.

§18. *The mode of givenness of improperly appearing determinations.*

How are we then to understand the representing of the improperly appearing determinations? Here I must at the very outset reject the view (possible only as long as there was still no strictly phenomenological analysis) that what does not properly appear would simply not appear in the *perceptual* sense but would, on the contrary, appear indeed in the form of concomitant phantasy. Thus far, we have not yet carried out an analysis of the essence of appearance in phantasy, but this much is clear from the start, that it is closely akin to appearance in perception, despite, on the other hand, displaying a through modification with regard to the latter. Whatever may be the case concerning [56] this modification, even appearance in phantasy, as our further discussions will show more precisely, brings some thing to appearance only by presenting it and thereby necessarily presents it one-sidedly, exactly as does *perceptual* appearance.

Is it then permissible to charge the improperly appearing moments (e.g., the interior, the back side, etc.) of a perceived thing to the account of phantasy-presentations? Without a doubt, we often find, in connection with the perception (which does not mean *in* the perception) of a thing, phantasies of the sides turned away from us, and so it seems obvious to one who is easily inclined to operate with unnoticed – or indeed unconscious – appearances to suppose these phantasies in the remaining cases, thus precisely where they do not exist. Nevertheless, we can convince ourselves easily, by means of the following consideration, that this is a matter of a construction that is phenomenologically very naïve. An appearance in phantasy presents a thing in part properly, with respect to its front side, and in part improperly, with respect to its back side. How then does it present this back side? Again through phantasy? In that case, the difference would be quite abolished. In truth, even in phantasy we cannot represent a house from the front and from the back at the same time; if the front side stands before our eyes, then the back side does not, and vice versa. Thus even here there is the distinction between proper and improper appearance, and so there are here also components of apprehension which dwell in the presentation. In the case of the perception of a house, how then could it

help to have recourse to phantasy-representations of the improperly appearing side? It might be said that the front side of the house finds *perceptual* presentation, the other sides imaginative presentation. But then we would have to ask: what supplies the unity? The front side refers to the back side; the back side to the front. In other words, the *perceptual* presentation of the front side is bound up with components of apprehension, ones which refer beyond it to a back side, and the imaginative presentation is bound up no less to components which refer to the front side. But that is already to say that every such imagination is a full phantasy, which could also exist for itself as a mere phantasy and which binds the presentation to the components that refer beyond. Likewise, it is to say that *perception*, even without phantasy, delivers a full representation, namely as presentation of the front side along with components that refer beyond. If now actually, as indeed happens, there is given at the same time, along with the *perception*, a representation in phantasy of some back aspects or other, then the two representations, the *perceptual* and the one in phantasy, precisely "coincide." They enter into a synthesis of identification and, more precisely, into one having the character of fulfillment in regard to the empty pieces of apprehension which appear on this side and on that. Obviously, this receives full confirmation through the phenomenological analysis of the cases in which we see step forth, and then again vanish, phantasies as illustrations of the non-given sides of the perceived thing. That needs to be supplemented by saying that reproductive representations can indeed also be completely obscure, as are, for instance, phantasy in the intervals of intermittence. It is true of these obscure phantasies as it is of the clear, that they bring something to presentation through obscure appearances, one-sidedly, etc. [57]

The clear result of these considerations is therefore that improperly appearing moments of the object are in no way presented. *Perception* is, as I also express it, a complex of full and empty intentions (rays of apprehension). The full intentions or full apprehensions are the properly presentational ones; the empty are precisely empty of any presentational material. They actually bring nothing to presentation, although they have their direction toward the relevant moments of the object. This, as matter or principle, changes nothing in cases of the presentification in phantasy of the non-*perceptually* presented moments of the object; here occurs precisely a binding together of *perception* and imagination, a peculiar synthesis of separable phenomena. Thus we must not confuse empty representations in the sense of these empty apprehensions in perception and empty representations in the sense of obscure representations. Properly, we ought not speak of empty *perceptions* but only of empty components of apprehension; in the case of *perceptions*, we can speak only of ob-

scurity.[5]

To the just mentioned distinction between full and empty apprehensions within perception, we now add a further distinction, namely the one between determinate and indeterminate apprehensions. This difference intersects the first and presents a new distinction, one lying in quite another dimension, within the mode of the relation to the object. [58]

If[6] I see a house in sunlight, when the air is clear, then the color of the side turned toward me appears in its determinateness. If I see the house in the dark or in fog, then its color appears more or less indeterminately. According to the circumstances, a complicated corporeal form appears in a determinate way: it is apprehended clearly, or perhaps it is apprehended incompletely and leaves much to be desired as regards its determinacy. These differences are not to be understood here in the sense that they are a matter of conceptual classification; instead, they are a matter of a proper and essential character of perception and, more precisely, of apprehension themselves. This character demonstrates its significance subsequently even in regard to identifications, fulfillments, and disappointments, for the possibilities of identification and differentiation receive an essential delimitation and orientation through the apprehensional modes of determinateness and indeterminateness in their various functions. The differences between determinateness and indeterminateness, in their myriad gradations, play an especially visible role with respect to the moments of improper appearance. If I apprehend a box, from the very outset it has for the apprehension a back side and an interior, though for the most part these are very undetermined. For example, it remains an open question whether the box is full or empty, whether the back is polished or not, etc. On the other hand, empty intentions can also be determinate, as is the case when I have to do with an object precisely known by me in the relevant aspect. The indeterminateness is an immanent character of the apprehension, and we must note well that it is not at all identical everywhere and, as it were, of a monochromatic character but instead has many tints and grades. Indeterminateness is never absolute or complete. Complete indeterminateness is nonsense; the indeterminateness is always delimited in this or that way. I may not know exactly what sort of form the back side has, yet it precisely has some form; the body is a body. I may not know how matters stand with the color, the roughness or smoothness, the warmth or coldness, yet it pertains to the very sense of the apprehension of a [59]

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[5] We already see from our previous deliberations how the distinction, much praised recently, between act-content and object is insufficient to do justice to the essence of Objectivating acts and, above all, to the essence of perception. We indeed began by opposing the real [*reell*] content of the perception and the object and, within the real [*reell*] content, by separating the content of sensation and the apprehension. But that does not reach very far and provides nothing which could make understandable the sense and accomplishment of perception.

[6] This is surely the beginning of a new lecture; in the margin the date: May 30, 1907. – Ed.

thing that the thing possess a certain color, a certain surface determination, etc. When I glance at the thing it stands there as a thing; the apprehension gives it, in a meaningful way, a form, a color, etc., and does so not only with regard to the front side but also with regard to the unseen side. Yet this is only "a" color, "a" form, etc. That is, these are not "determinately" predelineated in the apprehension; with respect to those moments which occur within certain general spheres, the apprehension has the character of "indeterminateness." That implies at the same time that determinability pertains to the essence of this indeterminateness, and indeed this is determinability within a strictly delimited general domain, such as spatial figure, coloration, and the like. Determinability does not refer here to the possibility of using, in regard to the given appearance, the general terms "spatial figure," "coloration," etc.; thus it does not mean to carry out the corresponding predicative syntheses. Nor does it refer to the possibility of a special conceptual determination through a more precise indication of the particular kind of figure or color that gives the object a more precise determination. Instead, the determinability here is the one that is the presupposition for the predications which determine the object and express it precisely. It is determinability in the form of *perceptual* appearances, which, in place of undetermined intentions, contain determinate ones in such a way that in the transition from the first appearance to the second, the latter stands there as the determining one. For instance, let the back side be indeterminate in regard to color. I turn the object over; it stands there as the same, but now determined as to color. The determinate apprehension of the color coincides unitarily with the indeterminate one, whose object thereby receives determination.

We see that the more precise determination belongs, as do the fulfilling of empty intentions and the continued confirmation of already full intentions, in the sphere of synthetic perceptual nexuses, to whose treatment we shall now [60] turn. What a perception contains of immanent moments or component pieces accrues to us in cognition on the basis of immediate evidences. These, however, point back to nexuses of total and partial identification, ones we have discussed at length earlier. Accordingly, our analysis is actually moving constantly within the nexuses which bring perception into coincidence (or contrast) with perception. Thereby these or those peculiar moments step forth, ones which belong to the essence of perception and found the respective modes of unity and difference.

CHAPTER 4

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL EXTENSION OF THE APPEARANCE

§19. *The temporal extension of the appearance. Pre-empirical (pre-phenomenal) temporality.*

We have already made very general analytic constatations regarding the syntheses of identification and differentiation. Now it is a matter of research into the special synthetic events we encounter in the perceptual domain and into the special Objectivations, ones belonging to the sphere of things, which are still not exhausted by the most universal terms identity and non-identity, whole and part, subject and determination. At issue are not merely syntheses in the strict sense, ones which bring discrete appearances to a unity of a higher level, but also continuous unities, ones which already belong to the immanent essence of perception as individual, concrete, and in itself simple, and which, through partitioning and recombining, first become syntheses and specifically syntheses of identification. Precisely in the latter, in the circumstance that they turn into syntheses of identification, there lies the reason why these continuous unities must be treated in connection with the proper syntheses. Here I have in mind the wonderful phenomenological forms of appearance which have the [61] character of extensions of appearance: in them is constituted the spatial and temporal expanse that belongs to the essence of thingly objects; in them therefore lies the source of all spatial-temporal predicates.

Our previous analysis privileged certain of the most simple cases.[1] It did not relate purely and simply to all perceptions but was restricted to perceptions of unchanged objects, whereby these perceptions were taken in turn as completely unchanged in themselves. That might be an abstract fiction, but it could not shake the evidence of our analyses, insofar as this evidence adhered to moments which remain unaffected by possible factual variations of perception. For instance, I look at a house without moving my body. The house stands there as something unchanged and ever the same. What we have established here, namely presentational contents, character of apprehension, proper and improper appearance, etc., would obviously not be affected by the fact that, e.g., imperceptible fluctuations in the physical data took place. Likewise, it

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[1] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

does not matter whether the perception lasts a shorter or longer time, or even whether the object itself stands there in a greater or lesser duration. While expressing this, however, we become aware that our analysis itself was not at all complete in the sphere we marked out and are to adhere to. We have ignored the moment of temporal extension. If we draw that into the circle of our consideration, then we recognize that a kind of perceptual nexus belongs to the essence of every perception: to be specific, a certain extension belongs to its essence. The perception of the house perhaps lasts a minute, and this duration is divisible, for example into two half-minutes. And to every piece of the duration there corresponds a piece of the perception: a piece here means a fully concrete perception, insofar as the division is actually carried out. If the possibility of this division is guaranteed with evidence, that implies that the perception is in an evident way a whole, a concretum, one that can be divided into parts, and specifically into perceptions which are themselves full and whole. If we carry out the phenomenological reduction, then Objective time, [62] the determination as minute and half-minute, falls away. Thereby, however, the extension and the divisibility indeed pertain immanently to what is absolutely given, to the perception as phenomenological datum. We ought not call this extension temporal extension, to the extent that the word temporal is understood in the sense of Objective time. We will speak of pre-phenomenal or transcendental temporality, versus phenomenal temporality, the one attributed to objects, the one that, in virtue of the apprehension of things, is constituted as the time of things.

In every perception of things we find therefore a pre-phenomenal whole, which, in the sense of pre-phenomenal temporality, is again divisible into perceptions. Perception can be fragmented into perceptions. The perception of a thing, although an unbroken unity, is a continuous unity of pieces of perception, phases of perception, which themselves have the character of perceptions and thereby contain in themselves all the moments we have distinguished in perception.

We were thinking of pre-phenomenal temporality as an extension which falls to the lot of perception or, more precisely, perceptual appearance. In fact, it concerns the whole appearance uniformly, in all its previously distinguished moments. We find extension in the physical data, which, as contents of sensation, undergo apprehension. In our examples hitherto, namely unchanged perceptions presenting an unchanged thing, the moment of figure, the color which covers this, the roughness, etc., extended unchanged through pre-phenomenal time. Every physical datum and every form belonging to it have a temporal extension and allow this extension to be broken down into pieces; every piece is once again color, form, etc., unchanged as to content, and the same applies to apprehension and the entire proper and improper appearance. The fragmentation of the pre-empirical temporal extension fragments every

component of apprehension relative to this or that determination of the thing: every piece of the apprehension represents the same feature, the same part of the thing, or, if we take the whole apprehension, the same thing according to its identical content. There merely takes place a peculiar extension, an exten- [63]
sion of the total apprehension, which thoroughly penetrates all its components. On the other hand, this is not a matter of an arbitrary extension of the appearance of the thing, an extension that would be indifferent to the presented thing. For this extension also has an Objectivating significance.

In every temporal phase of the appearance of a thing, there appears the thing, the same thing as to content, and this also applies to every determination that builds up the content of the thing. But the thing has its time, it extends throughout a time and fills, with the content of its Being, this or that span of time. Thus time is a form, having its fullness, and this fullness is what we just called the content of the thing.[2]

The thing does not appear in perception, however, as mere thingly content, which is evidentially a pure abstraction; on the contrary, what appears is the thing as extending temporally in such and such a way, filling time in this or that manner. The thing whole and complete is something temporally extended, a concretion that fills time with a thingly content. Phenomenologically, the thingly content is constituted in every phase of the pre-phenomenal extension of the appearance; every cross-section contains the moments of sensation and apprehension and includes both proper and improper appearance. On the other hand, in the phase, insofar as it is a phase, and in the continuity of the phases, the temporality of the thing finally is constituted in the entire phenomenal extension; this temporality also appears and appears in a *perceptual* way. To bring a temporally extended thing to appearance is the essence of concrete perception, which, precisely as concrete, has its pre-empirical expanse or pre-empirical temporal form, which is what constitutes the temporal form of the thing. If we speak of the form of intuition and, here, of the form of perception, then we must not confuse the two forms, of which one is real [*reell*] and immanent, the other intentional and Objective.

The expression is appropriate, since we will indeed not understand by intuition the intuited or by perception the perceived, exclusively referring to the immanent extension of the perceptual appearance as such. A form gives [64]
what is formed unity and, specifically, ordered unity. The temporal form of perception gives unity, and in particular the unity of a continuous series, to the content of sensation of all the phases and likewise to the phases of the apprehension. This unity is, I repeat, continuous and thus unbroken unity. Pieces and abstract phases are distinguishable in it, but the phases and pieces do not exist for themselves, nor are they bound together through subsequent synthe-

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[2] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

ses. On the contrary, the unity is primary. Perception is at any time, and necessarily, continuous unity. In its essence is grounded the possibility of differentiation as fragmentation and as abstraction into phases, but this is precisely a mere possibility. If we carry out such a differentiation, thus if two phases are made prominent out of perception, then they enter into a synthesis of identification. More precisely, in the essence of these phases is grounded the possibility of their joining together in the unity of a synthetic identification. Both belong to the "same" thing, which stands there immediately as continuously one in the continuous unity of perception. If the thing is unchanged, then both phases present the same thingly content, but as filling different points of appearing time. And the same applies to the pieces, made prominent out of the same pre-phenomenal span of time of a perception.

This is a first, still very rough beginning of a phenomenological analysis of time. The most cursory glance at the case of change shows already that with this beginning we have not got very far and have not introduced clarity very deeply into the obscure abysses of the consciousness of time.

It also pertains to the essence of change to arrive at a givenness in appearances within a temporally extended perception. Here, however, there does not correspond to the pieces and phases of perception the same content as regards sensations and as regards apprehensions. The thing appears as in the process of change, thus it appears in every perceptual phase as a differently determined, although to be sure the same, thing. What constitutes the identity of the thing here, and what its otherness from moment to moment? If every phase of perception offers the same temporal content, the same sensation material, and the same apprehension (at least insofar as abstraction is made from the moment of temporality), then there appears to be no special difficulty. But where [65]
the sensation material and the apprehension change and must necessarily change, then the question arises as to how the unity is supposed to be constituted within perpetual otherness. Admittedly, we will soon see that even in the case of rest, nothing is very clear. For merely to speak of an extension of perception, in which the temporal extension of the thing is constituted, does not yet clarify this constitution. Every phase of perception indeed posits a temporal point. Each phase thus possesses in its apprehension not only moments relating to the determinations of the thing according to its time-filling content but also has a moment in which the temporal point is constituted. Is this such a simple affair that here no further questions remain? What gives this moment of apprehension a radical other position, an essentially other character, so that such a fundamental distinction as that between temporal point and temporal filling can come to light in it? What is it that makes intelligible the marvelous distinction between "now" and "just past" as well as the eternal drama of the Now perpetually generating itself anew and the Now perpetually sinking back anew into the past? In turn, every past, just like every Now, is

seized by an eternal movement: it constantly sinks back further, and the past becomes a further past, etc. If time thus appears as an eternal stream which precipitates everything temporal into the abyss of the past, yet, on the other hand, time has validity as an eternal and fixed form, since every being maintains its position in time. Even a god cannot alter the temporal positions of events in the past.

Here reside immense difficulties, which up to now have defied the acumen of the greatest. We will still devote efforts of our own to these difficulties. For the moment we will pass over them. Our present endeavor will only be to seek to lay bare everywhere the main lines with broad strokes. We will be moving on still another stratum.

§20. *Spatial extension of the appearance:* materia prima *and* materia secunda.[3]

Temporal extension is a sibling of the spatial. We wish to cast a glance at the latter as well. Like temporality, spatiality pertains to the essence of the appearing thing. The appearing thing, whether changing or unchanging, endures and fills a time; furthermore, it fills a space, its space, even if this may be different at different points of time. If we abstract from time and extract a point of the thing's duration, then to the time-filling content of the thing there belongs the thing's spatial expanse. Again we have a spatial form and a spatial filling. What fills space is the matter, a term we must take here is a quite naïve sense, namely in the sense perception prescribes for us: that which stands in perception as filling space. [66]

Obviously, these two titles, spatial form and matter (spatial filling) do not include all the determinations of temporal filling we attribute to the thing as given in perception. Or, as we can also say, they are all included or are not, according as we do or do not take seriously the concept of matter as filling space. A very significant distinction arises here. We distinguished initially between spatial form and matter. On the one hand we have the corporeal structure and its determinations, such as surface, corner, edge, and on the other hand the qualities which cover and fill the space, for example the colorations, which extend over the surfaces and which are distinct from one another at the edges, as well as the tactile determinations such as smoothness, roughness, and stickiness, and the thermal determinations, etc. In visual perception they are seen in the thing, in tactile perception they are touched, and in feeling over the Object they are found as filling space.

But this does not exhaust all the sensible determinations of the appearing thing. What about the acoustic qualities? In perception they are related to the

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[3] *Cf.* Appendix III: "The special position of the spatial feature (determination of space)," pp. 303ff. – Ed.

Object; according to their very sense they belong to it, but they do not fill up the Object in the primary and proper sense: i.e., they do not fill up its space. For instance, the sound of a violin is not only heard, it is also apprehended as the sound of the violin. But it is related to the violin quite differently than are the visual or tactile determinations of the violin as given in visual or tactile perception. There must already be an Object there phenomenally in order for a sound to be related to it. A certain mediation is thereby expressed: the corporeal expanse is materialized, in the primary and proper sense, through certain determinations, the complex of which makes up the *materia prima*. Thereby a complete thingly Object is already constituted; we have here already a spatially filled unity. Now, however, there supervene further determinations, ones which are appended to the object and in a certain sense make up a *materia secunda*. [67]

This[4] would be the genuine and very significant sense of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Yet we cannot employ this historically mistaken terminology. But we must make a distinction here, and so we will speak for example of materializing determinations versus ones that are merely appended. Materializing determinations fill up the spatial form as its *materia prima* and thus create, since spatial form is and can be in itself nothing, the thing as a concretum in the fundamental sense. If this is already constituted, then it can take on appended determinations such as sound and noise, smell, or even weight and the other empirical properties which are not reducible to singular primitive sense-contents. Accidental "activities," states, properties of effecting and undergoing, which are "detected" in the thing, presuppose, in order to be detected in it, an appearing thing constituted from another quarter.[5]

We must not let ourselves be led astray here by means of substructions we carry out with the appended properties, i.e., by attributing to them a filling of space, for this, as a proper filling of space, their very nature denies them. We attribute to sound not only a point in space from which it radiates and thus an appended localization, i.e., insofar as it "emanates" from the violin, but we also attribute to it a migration through space and a filling of space. It fills the space insofar as it is heard everywhere in the space, e.g., that of a hall. The point, however, is that in hearing, in perceiving in general, we do not and cannot perceive any space filled by a sonic quality. The space of the hall visually appears as determined in such and such a way through its corporeal limits and its surface limits. The floor, the walls, and the ceiling are covered with visual qualities. That is how they appear. But nowhere does there appear a sonic covering or an other sonic filling. We speak only by analogy of a [68]

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[4] Surely the beginning of a new lecture; the date in the margin: May 31, 1907. – Ed.

[5] On the preceding, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

diffusion of the sound and of a filling of space by the sound, guided perhaps by the image of a fluid. The image is a visual or tactile one, the image of a fluidity represented in the mode of a genuine filling of space. It now serves to analogize the propagation of the sonic effects in space.[6] These evidences related to the thingly object of the appearance pose further problems concerning how these various determinations of the object are constituted phenomenologically: that is, the spatial, constitutive determinations and the appended ones.

The first concern here is to establish something that especially interests us in our consideration of the forms of unity, namely the fact that even the spatial extension of perception is constituted in an extension of the appearance, an extension which belongs to every temporal point of the total appearance and is essentially different from the one that constitutes temporality. This extension, too, is a continuous and unitary one; it admits differentiation into pieces and phases, whereby phases present limits that can be fixed merely in the abstract. The fragmentation furnishes pieces of the total appearance, ones that can in turn supply concretely autonomous appearances. And the fragmentation occurs again and again, as long as we merely abstract from what pertains to the constitution of temporality in appearance.

§21. *The spatial diffusion of the thing's qualities and of the presentational contents.*

We find here immediately in the sphere of physical data, in the domain of the contents of sensation, extension. Here indeed the distinction between the primary, space-filling determinations and the merely appended ones proves meaningful. We must leave the latter out of consideration and discuss only the qualities that properly fill or cover the thing, i.e., only the contents of sensation that present those qualities. These contents of sensation, e.g., the sensations of [69] color which present the appearing coloration, have in themselves an extension and are fragmented along with the fragmentation of the total appearance. The color-data are not dispersed and without connection; they have a rigorous unity and a rigorous form, the form of pre-phenomenal spatiality. The same applies to all sense-data which pertain to properly space-filling qualities as presentational contents. Here too there corresponds to the fragmentation of the pre-phenomenally filled expanse a fragmentation of the Objectively filled expanse, thus a spatial fragmentation of the thing: its space is fragmented, but so is, along with that, its filling of space.

Once again there continues, over and above the extension of the physical

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[6] This analogizing is a new event occurring in the nexus of perception.

data, an extension of the apprehension; and thus the whole appearance is extended.[7] The entire appearance of the thing, with regard to its being a spatial appearance, is an appearance in extension. If this is fragmented, then thereby the phenomenal thing is fragmented with regard to its Objective spatiality and thereby at the same time with regard to its proper filling of space.

To be sure, the relations here are more complicated insofar as spatiality is constituted partly in proper and partly in improper appearance. Thus the fragmentation can be realized in very many possible ways. On the one hand, the adumbrational extension of the sensuous data and the appurtenant proper appearance can undergo fragmentation, for instance when I make prominent a part of the side of the thing turned toward me and let a part of the thing correspond to it. But it can also be that the fragmentation resides in the domain of improper appearance alone. And here it is sufficient to refer to the fact that the temporal extension of the appearance runs along, as it were, one line, whereas spatiality is three-dimensional and so offers manifold and very complicated possibilities of fragmentation. Admittedly, we must not simply impute phenomenological parallels to geometrical representations, but in a rough comparison we do indeed see that the complications in the latter case are much greater.[8]

There is still something to say about the manner of the filling of space. The [70]
materializing[9] determinations can fill space continuously or discretely, or to speak more precisely, continuously everywhere or not continuously everywhere and so discretely at the individual spatial limits, i.e., at the individual "points," lines, and surfaces. The filling determination makes, at these places, a "leap." To this correspond, with regard to the pre-phenomenal expanse and the pre-phenomenal filling of the expanse, parallel events. For instance, the pre-empirical color in an appearance of a sphere, which is presupposed to be the appearance of a uniformly yellow sphere, adumbrates itself, with respect to its specific quality, continuously and without leaps, without discontinuities. If the sphere is partitioned into fields, ones filled up with different and widely separated colors, then we find in the appearance pre-phenomenal boundary lines, which are lines of discontinuity. At these lines, one color leaps over into a distant color. The case of uniform covering can thus count as a limit-case of continuity: color passes over into color without a leap, without altering. The color passes over continuously in itself, in opposition to the cases of continuous adumbration in ever new nuances of the specific quality, ones that do not stand out in relief but on the contrary pass over into one another without a break. We have to distinguish two sorts of continuity here:

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7 On this, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 292. – Ed.

8 On the preceding, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

9 On the expression "materializing," *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

1.) The continuity that belongs to spatial extension as such and that comes to consciousness in us most clearly as an immanent moment when we allow unchange to pass over into change, for example in the continuous migration of a qualitative discontinuity over an expanse filled up unitarily in such and such a way. We continuously pass over from point to point, from line to line.

2.) The continuity of the filling determinations themselves, for example the flowing over from quality to quality, perhaps in the transition from red through purple to violet. The filling determinations have – as we must mention at least in passing – various aspects that are capable of a continuity, the aspect of quality in the stricter sense, the aspect of intensity, or, in the case of color determinations, the aspect of saturation, brilliance, etc.

Whereas the continuity of the spatial, Objective extension is a thorough [71] one, allowing no leap and no hiatus, the continuity of the filling is such that it can be broken up by a discontinuity: by leaps with respect to the color tone, the brilliance, etc. We cannot here enter into much detail, although there would be a great deal for phenomenology to investigate and say in this regard. We must merely stress two main points:

1.) Continuity is extension, and qualitative continuity qualitative extension. That essentially implies fragmentability and the ideal possibility of an abstract differentiation into phases. To very phase corresponds a species of quality. And the same holds for all aspects of the space-filling matter as well as of the appended matter. All the phases, however, belong necessarily under one and the same essential genus. Continuous transitions are possible only between color nuance and color nuance, brilliance and brilliance, sound and sound. But they are, by an essential law, excluded between different classes, between color and sound, color nuance and brilliance, sound and smell, etc. This obviously also holds pre-phenomenally.

2.) If spatial extension finds its proper covering or materialization through any qualities whatsoever, then this qualitative filling is necessarily in general continuous and can display leaps only at isolated places. Thereby continuous covering through one and the same species counts as constant covering. The essence of a leap implies that continuum collides against continuum of the same genus and leaps at the "edge." A leap brings about a fragmentation and first creates an "edge." It is a universal law, which Brentano had already expressed decades ago in lectures, that if a continuum undergoes filling through determinations of another genus, then this can happen only in the manner indicated, namely such that only isolated leaps are admissible, and they are interspersed between continuous coverings.[10] This is transferable, in

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[10] This pertains simultaneously, however, to spatial and temporal extension, the phenomenal and the pre-phenomenal. (There is still the question of how the pre-phenomenal is related to the phenomenal: continuity in what appears and continuity in the appearing.)

an easily visible way, to the pre-phenomenal domain. But it would require investigation to say more precisely how.

§22. *The significance of the various spatial fillings for proper and improper givenness. Visual and tactile components of appearance.* [72]

We[11] last spoke of materializing and appended determinations. The former are filling in the primary and original sense, i.e., in such a way that with them the thing is constituted as a purely static space-filled matter, and thereby is grounded the possibility that further determinations can be appended to this already constituted thing, localized in it, and can fill it in a secondary sense.

It pertains to the essence of the materialization of a thing for the thing to have a unitary structure, a unitary space, and for all fillings to belong to this one and the same space. The primarily materializing fillings are of various kinds, and every kind of filling acquires unity in virtue of the thing's space. Every filling diffuses itself precisely in this space and forms in it a unitary matter in virtue of this expanse. For example, the fillings in the class of colors coalesce into the unity of the coloration; the fillings in the class of tactile determinations coalesce into the unity of tactile qualities. To the extent that appended determinations are bound up with these primary fillings and are mediated, localized, and diffused by them, they also receive coherent unity, such as the one of odor, taste, pain, and even, as we will hear later, temperature. Yet we shall limit ourselves to the originary fillings. Every such determination thus possesses in itself, in virtue of its kind, its own extension and thereby its continuity. It is in itself extended, or, respectively, fragmented along with the fragmentation of the thing. On the other hand, however, the extension of the coloration is the same as that of the roughness or smoothness, of the tactile matter in general. The unity of the different kinds of materializing determinations is founded in the identical unity of the body, the spatial thing: a body filled by color and by tactile determinations.

If we pass over into the pre-empirical realm, then we must not say without further ado that this same state of affairs is reflected there, thus that the pre-empirical color has the same pre-empirical extension as the rest of the pre- [73] empirical filling. If we consider the diffusion pertaining pre-empirically to the moment of color and likewise the diffusion pertaining to the moment of touch, then we cannot say that they are the same identical moment. Yet let us look more closely into this state of affairs. We have, let us say, a visual perception of a sheet of paper lying before us; the perception receives visual determinations, as space-filling, and accordingly the perceptual appearance contains

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[11] Beginning of a new lecture? – Ed.

visual diffusion, filled with matter of visual sensation. If we do not feel the paper or, to speak of unchanged perception, do not place a hand on the paper and let it rest there, and so have no corresponding sensations of thickness, resistance, or smoothness, etc., then the perception is merely visual. In the other case, if we simultaneously see and lay our hand on the paper, we have a perception that is mixed in either respect, whereby, however, the seen parts of the paper are not tactually perceived, and the tactually perceived parts are not seen. Thus we have a mixed filling, but in such a way that it is always only one sort of filling that belongs to the same properly appearing surface parts. The appearing surface, which Objectively is one and unique, is covered in part visually, in part tactually, and the fillings that are fundamentally different according to their kind, coalesce, by interpenetrating, into a single *materia prima* insofar as they join together as continuous, i.e., spatially continuous. They cover precisely the whole appearing side. On the other hand, the visual covering permeates, as it were, the tactile one, and vice versa, though, to be sure, not in the proper appearance. Where the hand covers the paper there is color as well, but the color is not seen in the proper sense. And where the paper is merely seen, there is also something resistant, rough or smooth, etc., but this is not properly perceived, not sensed tactually or, on the other hand, seen.

This obviously teaches us, as regards the constitution of the appearance, the following: we have to note, first of all, with respect to the distinction between proper and improper appearance, that it crosses paths with the distinction between, as it were, different strata of the *materia prima*. If we make the fundamental distinction between the visual and tactile stratum of the *materia prima*, then we would have in each such stratum a proper unity. And both [74] together again form a unity, namely that of the total, space-filling primal matter. If the perception is merely visual, then a "side" of the space-filling visual matter, as a coherent filling of space within the spatial and properly appearing adumbration, comes to a proper appearance. The parallel tactile filling of space belongs, with respect to this same side of the thing, in the sphere of improper appearance. Accordingly, the improper appearance breaks down into two moments or parts: 1.) the one includes that of the object which does not come at all to proper appearance, and 2.) the other includes that which indeed comes to proper appearance visually but not tactually. The front side is seen; it pertains to the proper appearance. It is not perceived tactually, and so of it only the complex of visual determinations, but not the complex of tactual ones, comes to proper appearance. We also note that the improper appearance of the back side, which is neither seen nor touched, is essentially other than the improper appearance of the seen, though not touched, front side, i.e., in regard to its tactile determinations. What might strike us first of all, if we compare the one and the other determination of improper appearances, is

perhaps the difference in "clarity."

The smoothness we see in the paper, or the roughness we see in the file, is not a properly perceived smoothness or roughness. Yet we do indeed see it in the visually appearing thing (more precisely, in its properly appearing front side). The back side, too, is indeed in a certain sense co-perceived, i.e., co-intended in empty intentions. But we do not see the back side of the thing, at least not in the special sense prominent here. The roughness seen in the file, i.e., the roughness detected in the visually appearing front side of the file, is in a certain sense there in the proper appearance, but yet it is only detected, almost as if seen and yet not seen. But the clarity of this givenness of the roughness is incomparably greater than that of the back side. Admittedly, the word clarity receives sense here again only through a distinction that demonstrates itself phenomenologically. Here especially one is inclined to think of phantasy in relation to what is co-apprehended, and thus to say that at issue [75] here is a mode of coincident co-appearance which could be designated in essence as phantasy, a phantasy which receives a special character through the nexus at hand, a nexus that can still be analyzed further. This interpretation has much to recommend it. Nevertheless, on the basis of a phenomenological consideration, I am unwilling to maintain that the often intrusive intuition in phantasy, and its coincidence with the visual intuition of the parallel stratum, exhaust this state of affairs. The presentification in phantasy would not have to be something indispensable, even in this case, and the greater clarity of the problematic co-perception here, versus that of the back side, might have still other sources. To put it in an image, the parallel stratum draws from the seen stratum a power, a much greater power than the back side draws from the front.

In spatial contiguity there does not reside as much power as in spatial interpenetration, which is required for the parallelism of the strata. This is a mythical way of speaking, behind which, however, there lies something phenomenological, precisely as can be seen by immersing oneself in the phenomenological state of affairs.

The distinction in clarity, although striking, is indeed secondary, essentially grounded in that which constitutes the stratification. The appearing Object has, in regard to its *materia prima*, thus in regard to its complex of properly space-filling determinations, several strata; each in itself forms a self-enclosed filling of space and yet coincides with every other one. The strata are not mounted on top of one another; on the contrary, they interpenetrate or intersaturate. They thoroughly coincide in virtue of the identity of the corporeal space. That space is constituted in the appearance, which thus also admits a partitioning, one which proceeds according to these stratifications. If we adhere to the proper appearance, then it does not have these strata in regard to the pre-empirical extension and fillings of sensation. Merely visual perception has only one

stratum of sensation, the visual one, and, pertaining to this, one extension. The extension is extension of the visually pre-empirical filling. Here, obviously, the stratification of the appearance is the work of the apprehension and possibly of the interwoven appearances in phantasy, but, if so, then also in virtue of their apprehension. If the perception is a mixed one, containing in its foundational sensations, as material for the apprehension, at once visual and tactile sensations, then there belongs to the visual material a visual stratum of apprehension, in which the full visual thing is constituted, and there belongs to the tactile material a tactile stratum of apprehension, which constitutes the full tactile thing. [76]

I see the paper and at the same time, in laying my hand on it, I have the sensation of resistance, i.e., the tactile perception of the paper. The sensations pertaining to the seen parts are apprehended in such a way that the paper is constituted according to its visual properties and, more precisely, such that the visual properties produce a complete filling of space. The unseen parts of the front side, including the ones hidden by the hand placed on the paper, also have their visual filling; it is just that this is not a properly appearing one. The same applies, conversely, to the tactile aspect with regard to the non-tactually appearing parts of the front side. Furthermore, pre-phenomenal extension belongs to the visual sensations, and such belongs in turn to the tactile sensations as well. We have no right at all to say, however, that these two extensions have in themselves something to do with one another. They are never given together *perceptually* in such a way that they correspond to the same Objective piece of the surface, but only such that they pertain to disjunct pieces of the surface of the object. Thereby, however, they do not combine together, for instance into one and the same pre-empirical extension. The seen piece of the surface and the adjacent touched piece combine in the thing to form the one continuous surface; in the thing they limit one another. But the appurtenant sensations and extensions of sensation do not combine at the level of sensation. The correct description is rather as follows: to the seen parts of the front side of the thing there corresponds a continuous visual extension of sensation. Where the touching hand covers the thing, we do not have a break in the visual extension; it runs on continuously. A coherent piece of visual extension is in between and belongs to the apprehension, "touching hand." The apprehension of the thing, in our example the apprehension of the white paper, lets the paper pass "under the touching hand" and be "hidden" by it, and thus the appearing front side of the thing has no visual gaps but only gaps in the appurtenant sensation and proper appearance, and these gaps are filled up precisely by what we called improper appearance. I said "appurtenant:" i.e., belonging to the thing. For the pre-empirical color and extension of color, which go on without a gap, pertain, as was stated previously regarding a cohesive part, to the constitution of the "touching hand." [77]

Then is the perception of the white paper a double perception? In a certain sense yes, and in a certain sense no. In the strict sense, we have one perception, one unbroken unity of sensation and apprehension, in which is constituted the thing in its standing there itself. On the other hand, however, we find in this unity two self-coherent strata, the one corresponding to the visual thing, the other to the tactile thing. But these are not, once again, two things but one single thing having a manifold filling. That is, we have here the same space filled or covered in a manifold way, but in such a way that the fillings interpenetrate or, rather, coincide. They do not place themselves between one another but instead thoroughly coincide. Every part, no matter how strictly delimited, every surface, every line, and every point have the same manifold filling; every geometrical division (if this word be permitted) divides each of the fillings, since each one coincides with every other in the whole extension.

There corresponds to this, in the appearance itself, on the one hand the possibility of speaking of two appearances, a visual and a tactile. But these two appearances interpenetrate and coincide in a peculiar way that must be investigated more closely. This interpenetration allows the material of sensation not only to be ordered through its proper pre-empirical extension, which would produce no ordering of the visual material with the tactile, but allows the visual to appear to be placed materially between the tactile, and the tactile between the visual. But this "placing between" is not a function of sensation but of apprehension. It comes about through the apprehension, which bestows on the extensional moment of visual sensation the value of appearing spatiality and on the extensional moment of tactile sensation, in turn, the value of spatiality, wherein at one time this and at another time that matter is ordered as Objective matter that fills space. And, furthermore, the interpenetration allows the double apprehension to be in such a coincidence that the expanse, the total [78] expanse, which includes the entire visual and tactile body since it reaches beyond the properly appearing expanse, is one identical expanse and constitutes one identical body, merely covered or filled in a manifold way. The great problem is the more precise manner of this constitution. It is here posited as determined. We will later seek ways to acquire at least pieces or rudiments of the solution.

§23. *Proper appearance (side) and appended determinations.*

The distinction[12] between *materia prima* and *secunda* makes it possible to determine the pregnant sense of the appearing side of the object. Within the complex of the determinations that come to a proper appearance, a distinction

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[12] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's two critical notes, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

arises between those that relate to the body of the thing (phantom) and those that pertain to its filling matter. They form either a unique, self-coherent unity or many such unities. And they are articulated into the appearing visual side and the appearing tactile side. If I see a thing from the front side and touch its back side, then I have a visual side and a tactile side separated from it, separated in proper appearance. If the touching hand separates the image of the face of the object into two separate parts, then the visual side consists precisely of two separate pieces, which are intentionally bound through a piece that gives them unity: the tactile side; together they form a self-enclosed, unitary side. That suffices to provide examples of the various occurrences possible here. What is important is that the side is a filled expanse, specifically an expanse of a surface, which delimits the three-dimensionally filled body. The body comes to appearance only through filled surfaces, whereby "points" and "lines," which are possibly all that appear as filled, are included under the title of surfaces. Mathematical objects are here out of the question.

Do the appended determinations also have sides? I characterized the appended determinations as those that are not constitutive of the thing in the first and proper sense and that presuppose an already constituted thing, to which they can then be appended. I also said that they are not filling in the proper sense; they are only and precisely appended. It now appears to me that we must be somewhat more exact and that we can perhaps concede to many secondary determinations an actual filling, insofar as the essential feature of *materia prima* might not consist in filling in general but in constitutive filling. I am thinking here of the thermal determinations, which already in the last lecture I characterized, though not in good conscience, as materializing (to the extent that I designated them at all). That is, it seems to me that they are appended determinations. The body must first be there, in order to be able to appear warm or cold. If I hold a metal sphere in my hand, the temperature may change faster or slower in passing from warm to cold. The tactile determination of space, which is constitutive for the body, remains unaltered and is the foundation of the localization. The warmth and coldness fill space; they cover over the actually appearing tactile space of the body by overflowing it, so to speak. The warmth in itself, although it stands there as filling, has no proper space; it diffuses in the tactile space and is bound to it. This way of speaking already to some extent casts a glance over into the pre-empirical domain. Pre-empirical extension pertains to the tactile moment and only pertains to the moment of warmth or coldness by transferring there, as it were, its scope of action. The same will apply to the sensation of pain, which is localized in the edge or point of the knife but which properly and it itself bears no moment of location and no extension. [79]

If we should, therefore, attribute a filling of space, even in a secondary sense, to the appended determinations, then to them also, insofar as they in

fact diffuse, the concept of side can be applied. Yet it can be applied there only mediately, insofar as indeed the foundation for forming the concept of a side resides in the *materia prima*, to the extent that it comes to appearance. Still further removed, however, is the application of the concept of side to the determinations that do not precisely follow the original extension but are only loosely posited in a relation of localization to it, as happens, for example, [80] when the sound of the kettle-drum is related to the seen skin of the kettle-drum and then comes to appearance with it. Naturally, our interest in these things is not a matter of this or that use of words but rather a matter of the phenomenological and ontological events made prominent by our analyses.

§24. *Environing things and perceptual nexus.*

Before we broaden our circle of examples, which has up to now determined our investigation, I want to remove the isolation in which we have hitherto considered the perceived thing and, in connection with that, make up for a certain abstraction in the way we took up perception. We acted in a certain sense as if the object perceived at any time were alone in the world, *nota bene* in the perceived world. But a perceived thing is never there alone by itself; instead, it stands before our eyes in the midst of determinate, intuited environing things. For instance, the lamp rests on the table, amid books, papers, and other things. The environing things are equally "perceived." As the words "amid" and "environment" signify, this is a spatial nexus, which unifies the especially perceived thing with the other co-perceived things. The thing we just said was perceived in a special sense has its space, but this space, the body, fits within the more encompassing total space, which embraces all physical things. These things, that are co-perceived, always also include the Ego-Body, which, as a body, is likewise in space, in the space of the total perception. It stands there as the ever-abiding point of reference, to which all spatial relations seem to be attached. It determines the apparent right and left, front and back, above and below. It therefore occupies a pre-eminent position in the world of perceptually appearing things. Everything that appears is its environment, abstraction made from the fact that every thing that is especially perceived and made prominent amid appearing things, insofar as it is perceived as prominent and so is taken for itself, possesses its own environment. This all has importance for phenomenology and for the critique of cognition. In relation to the general problem of constitution, a series of determinate new [81] problems arises here, and as soon as we set about to formulate them, we are struck by several distinctions that are new and significant.

We speak of a thing perceived in a special sense – for example, when we

say that we see this house, that tree. And on the other hand we speak of the "total perception" of things, within which this house fits. That is, we speak of the perception of the environing things, out of which the house is perceptually extracted. Are total perception, background perception, and special perception all of one and the same kind? Or do these terms signify, besides much that is common, also essential phenomenological distinctions? That these are not lacking here is clear. What is perceived in the special sense is what we especially heed, what we attend to. The background things stand there, but we bestow on them no preferential attention. It will then in any case have to be our task to lend some interest to the role played by attention here and in the sphere of perception in general. It is clear that the distinction between what is attended to for itself and what is incidentally co-perceived or co-noted does not suffice to resolve the question we have posed. If attention extends beyond the perceived thing and includes a thing and, at the same time, what appears beside it, still there does not somehow appear here one thing having two pieces.[13] Attention can indeed also be directed especially to a side or feature of a thing. What then about the constitution of a unitary thing or the constitution of a manifold of things, which is encompassed here by the one total space and yet is not one total thing which fills its space with matter as does an individual thing? We might perhaps have grounds in scientific thinking to regard the world as a sort of total thing, insofar as the many individual things and the processes related to them are encompassed by the unity of lawfulness. But here it is a matter of determining what the world is as it stands there straightforwardly in perception, what it is as given in this perception.

In any case, this much is clear, that the distinctions we have previously established are insufficient to account for the constitution of actual individual things. For these distinctions are suited for the total perception, which brings to givenness, along with the thing, also the manifold of things, and along with the body the totality of space in which the bodies are filled with separate matter and crystallize into separate things for themselves. [82]

Moreover, it is clear that when we distinguish, having in view the perceived thing, presentational physical contents and apprehension, which unite in the unity of the appearance of the thing, we must acknowledge at the same time that this appearance is nothing isolated and for itself but is embedded in a continuum of appearance, which for its part allows for the distinction between apprehension and contents of apprehension and fuses into the unity of a total appearance. Furthermore, the distinction between proper and improper appearance carries over to the total appearance. The contents of sensation of the thing have their function as sensation for that thing. On the other hand, however, they have their connection with other contents of sensation which func-

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[13] The individual thing has its own motility and changeability, independent of the environing things.

tion as presentational for other things. Likewise, the apprehension that pertains to the thing continues on, in such a way that it is, so to speak, constantly in touch with the further apprehensions, the ones that relate to new physical data. And this all happens in such a way that a total apprehension arises, in which a total space presents itself, one embracing the many individual things. The total space and the world of perceived things in turn come to proper appearance only partially and merely from one side. This proper appearance in its completeness embraces in a unity all proper appearances of all individual things included in the same perceptual glance, and the appearing side of the world includes the appearing sides of all things that precisely come to be perceived in the same perception, and it includes empty space as well. And therein resides a unity which is in accord with all our previous descriptions.

§25. *Visual field and tactile field.*

The presentational contents of the total visual appearance form a continuous nexus: we call it the visual field. The field is a pre-empirical expanse and has these or those determinate visual fillings. All visual pre-empirical expanses, which in every case provide the presentational foundation for all things given in the same total perception, fit within this field as pieces; and in the *perceptual* apprehension, which belongs to the perception itself, every piece of the visual field is, conversely, presentational for some thing or other. Of the physical data within the field of sight, the ones pertain to the presentation of this house, others to the presentation of that field, and still others to the presentation of the vault of heaven, etc. [83]

Naturally this holds for the other, parallel field that is primarily constitutive for things. I am speaking of the tactile field. To be sure, not just any arbitrary fragmentation of the two fields produces, with the appurtenant apprehension, an appearance of a thing. The fields partition themselves in a determinate manner, and only if we have appearances of things can we say that within these, through every fragmentation, there are again constituted things, i.e., pieces of things. Besides the two just named primary or proper fields, we could also speak, in an improper sense, of the auditory field, the olfactory field, or the field of thermal sensation. But we grasp thereby only the other physical data of the different classes, apprehended at any time as pertaining to things; these data are not capable of constituting space and things in the primary sense, since they lack original pre-empirical extension. Therefore, properly speaking, they do not form fields, even if other modes of fusion might be proper to them. Extended over the fields – first and foremost, the proper fields – are, as it were, the apprehensions. They form an apprehensional unity and

are in themselves articulated in such a peculiar way that an appearing thing corresponds to every articulated member (i.e., to a peculiarly constituted apprehensional complex). What makes up the inner characteristic of an apprehension of a thing, i.e., of an appearance of a thing embedded in the total appearance and yet in itself self-enclosed? How, beyond that, is the unity of the total space constituted for perception, the space which encompasses all bodies although it is not itself a body? These are again the problems.

Moreover, it is a problem – the complementary problem – how the wonderful separate position of the Ego is constituted phenomenologically as the correlate and referential center of the thing and of the whole surrounding world. There[14] is a problem parallel to that of the environment of things as a spatial environment, i.e., parallel to the problem of the constitution of a total space which is co-perceived in every special perception, insofar as the perceived thing, as a body, appears residing in it. This parallel problem is offered by the temporal environment and by the constitution of the one time in which the temporality of the thing resides and into which its duration is integrated, just as is the duration of all things and thingly processes belonging to the environing things. Into this same time the Ego is integrated as well, not only as an Ego-Body but also according to its "psychic lived experiences." The time that pertains to every thing is its own time, and yet we have only one time. It is not just that the times of things are integrated side by side into a single linear extension, but, rather, different things or processes appear as simultaneous, although they do not have times which are alike in being parallel but have one time, numerically one time. The situation is not here like that in the case of multiple fillings of space, where visual and tactile filling coincide. Instead, we have separate, non-coincident things, which yet are and endure in the one identical span of time. [84

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[14] This text, to the end of the §, was published within Appendix X of volume X of the present series [i.e., *Husserliana* X, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, p. 120; English translation by John B. Brough, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, p. 124. – Trans.]. *Cf.* the text-critical annotations there on pp. 439ff. – Ed.

SECTION III

ANALYSIS OF THE KINETIC SYNTHESIS OF PERCEPTION. CHANGES IN PERCEPTION AND CHANGES IN APPEARANCE

CHAPTER 5

THE GIVENNESS OF THE THING AT REST IN CONTINUOUS COURSES OF PERCEPTION [85]

§26. *The various possibilities of changes in perception.*

We will now set about to study a new form of continuous synthesis that can belong to the unity of a concretely individual perception. Thus we will now enlarge our sphere of examples by considering a new type of perception.

Hitherto we dealt with perceptions that remained unchanged phenomenologically, which implies *eo ipso* that they brought unchanged objects to appearance. For it is easy to see and make evident that an objective change can be constituted only in a change of appearance, therefore that it can be given only in a perception which itself changes in the pre-phenomenal sense. Unchanged perception had its temporal extension but filled it with constantly the same content. We will now take up changing perceptions. They too have their temporal extension (I do not always have to repeat that I mean pre-phenomenal extension), in which an objective temporality is constituted. But this is the general character of change, that the temporality is constantly filled [86] with a new content or at least with a content that is in general constantly new. Only at isolated places, at points of time that are discrete and removed from one another, are leaps or discontinuities possible. Once again, we have to speak of continuity here in a double sense. On the one hand, continuity belongs to the essence of the temporal expanse as such, as it does in the case of every expanse whatever. On the other hand, continuity can belong to the filling of the extension, here to the filling of time. If the perception changes, the change can consist in an instantaneous leap, as occurs when an appearing quality suddenly leaps over into another and when, accordingly, in the very perception which constitutes this objective leap, an instantaneously discrete exchange takes place in the presentational physical datum and possibly also in the apprehension. The change, however, can also be a constant one, a thoroughly constant one, or it can be broken up by isolated leaps; an example for us is every case of a perception of the movements of an Objective thing or a perception of a constant change in its qualities.

Unchanged perceptions, which we have considered up to now, were limit-cases and possessed, it seems, something of an idealizing fiction, insofar as indeed there were never lacking changes in position and posture or at least

changes in the fluctuating gaze of the eye in accommodation. The descriptions given earlier are thus to be taken with an appropriately greater amount of prudence. The temporal filling does not need to have been truly identical from moment to moment. Absolute sameness is to be replaced by general sameness, which includes imperceptible difference or similarity, where the gaps are not allowed to appear in a noticeable way.

Nevertheless we were still proceeding quite correctly, since the pure expression of the phenomenological state of affairs, as we find it in the case of unchanged perception and as it characterizes the unchanged perception as a differentiated type over and against changing perception, cannot run otherwise than as follows: extracted pieces or phases of perception are alike, i.e., they enter into the synthesis of a consciousness of coincidence, which allows no differences whatsoever to appear. In opposition to this, the changing perception is characterized by the fact that its extracted pieces found syntheses of [87] difference. Only if we study more closely the character of this sameness and difference and notice that this difference and sameness perpetually pass over into one another, and notice also that in the difference there takes place a coincidence which increases in opposition to the sameness and constantly changes in the opposite direction – only then will it appear that sameness requires a limit point of the increase of coincidence, analogously as the series of increasing intensities requires the null-point of intensity. At the outset, however, in the first stratum of a phenomenological consideration, simple sameness as coincidence without visible distinction stands out from difference as the making prominent of similar, though distant, distinctions.

What sort of thingly occurrences present themselves in perceptions which undergo change as they stream on pre-empirically? If we include under the title perception the total perception, which intentionally includes, along with the thing or process perceived in the special sense of the term, both Ego and surrounding world, then the proposition holds that in every change of perception there also comes to appearance a change in the appearing world of things. Thus only an unchanged perception represents non-change, i.e., not only a thing at rest, but also its appearing surrounding world as resting and changeless.

In regard to an appearing individual Object as a thing in changing perception, we have the following possibilities (disregarding mere changes in attention, although they also are phenomenological changes):

I. a) The thing remains unchanged with respect to its material peculiarities, which include all primary or secondary properties, i.e., the space-filling or appended ones. The body of the thing likewise remains unchanged and does not move. On the other hand, the Ego does not remain unchanged, and specifically the relative position of the Ego to the Object changes: I walk around the Object, bring myself nearer to it or make myself more removed.

b) The otherwise unchanged thing moves, the Ego rests.

c) Both.

We could speak of merely kinetic changes, specifically just as much in regard to the Object as in regard to the perceiving Ego-subject.

II. The Object changes in its constitutive determinations and not merely in its kinetic ones. In this respect, it can change either in its intrinsic geometrical determinations, which belong to its "geometrical" body, or on the other hand in its material determinations, ones that fill space and are spatially localized. In the former respect, it can undergo deformation or change in size while maintaining its form. On the other hand, mere rotation and displacement are kinetic determinations. [88]

III. It can change in all these ways at once.

Further changes, which are relevant for the changes of perception, supervene and intersect all the previous changes: I mean certain changes the Ego undergoes in the form of accommodation or convergence, stronger or weaker tension of the muscles in feeling and clasping Objects, etc. Changes in perceptual appearance are connected to these as well.

If we wanted to be complete, then we could not merely interest ourselves in perceptions of things. Things exist in time, they have their time, in which they arise, endure, pass away, move, or change qualitatively. Things are in time, but they do not, in the proper sense, fill time. Temporality does not belong among their constitutive determinations. On the contrary, temporality applies to the temporally extended Objects, namely the processes and changes, insofar as we make thematic in perception not the changing Object but the Object's changing. We will here disregard all this.

We will now study the phenomenological occurrences pertaining to the various cases, and in particular our first task will be to bring out certain most general and very important occurrences.

§27. *Manifold appearances of the unchanged thing. The process of more precise determination.*

We will choose first the case that is most akin to the previously examined case of unchanged perceptual appearance. That will happen if we consider a continuously unitary manifold of appearance, in which an unchanged object presents itself in a continuous way. Thus, instead of considering a thing with our eyes at rest, with a determinate degree of accommodation and convergence, and with the entire bearing of the body unchanged, we will run our gaze over the Object, whereby the perception will change in manifold ways. Or we will walk around the Object, considering it from all sides with our gaze [89]

in motion or fixed. It is obviously not essential to the appearance of the Object whether we ourselves change our relative position or whether we maintain our position in space and let the object move, rotate, or turn. To be sure, in the one case the Object appears in motion and in the other case unmoved, but the immanent content of the appearance of the Object, abstracting from the apprehension of the change of place, remains the same.

We are thinking of a change in perception of the type at issue here as proceeding in such a way that spans of change are interspersed with intervals of rest; in other words, we are considering the object "by steps."For instance, I perhaps move my eye, changing my fixation from one point of the Object to another one, and then I consider at rest the resting Object. Then I move my eye from this new point of the Object to another one again, etc. Or I move my head and keep it still for some time, considering the object from the position now attained, and so on repeatedly. We can then look upon the whole perception, which is a continuous unity, as a chain of unchanged perceptions, linked and made continuous by transitional phenomena which themselves have the character of perceptions. For while they play out, the object does not cease to appear, just as it – this same object – also appears in the linked unchanged perceptions.

According to our presuppositions, the object always appears not only as ever the same but also as unchanged in itself. On the other hand, it appears in an ever different way just as much in the intervals of change as in the intervals of unchange. Ever and again, other sides of the object come to appearance, or, in the case of the same sides, these appear in an other givenness. If the object is perceived only by pieces, then thereby new pieces, ones which perhaps were "hidden" or did not up to then fall within the field of view, may now for the first time come to a proper appearance. [90]

What does this imply phenomenologically? If we examine the intervals which stand out in the unity of perception and, first of all, the intervals of unchange, then it is the same object that in the first place stands there in them. In other words, they found syntheses of total identification. If we examine the perceptions themselves or, more precisely, the appearances, then the perceptual gazes related to the these latter do not enter into an identifying synthesis. The appearances rather stand there as being of "another" content. The differences within these appearances do not merely consist in this, that the ones especially concern – and perceptually extract for itself – this feature of the object, the others that feature. We have, while speaking in general of the partial identifications, already spoken of this and were once again able to make it prominent in our theory of unchanged perceptions that on the basis of an unchanged appearance certain series of modifications are possible *a priori*, ones we designate precisely as the accentuation of an objective part or moment. Various objective moments, within an appearance that is essentially the

same, can come to givenness through attention and can do so on various levels. And the different ones in the series can also come to be perceived separately along with the distinctive special attention. The latter suggests an incidence of partially identifying synthesis.

The total appearance lies at the foundation; the fixation and separate perception do not disrupt it. But the prominent separate apprehension, which remains in continuity with the underlying total apprehension, is brought along with the latter into the synthetic unity of the consciousness of identity. Naturally, it must not be denied that in parallel with these modifications there also can take place – and often enough do take place – modifications of the objective apprehension. The representation of the object enriches itself, psychologically speaking, by the fact that dispositions are newly aroused and corresponding new moments of apprehension are annexed to them. Nevertheless, we will disregard such enrichments, which indeed are not, in principle, necessary. We will also at first omit the description of that which the modification of the attention contributes here and signifies in itself. [91]

The just-described modifications of the attention and of the partial identification interwoven in it, in which objective singulars appear in – or on – the object of the total appearance, accompany the process of perception in its various stages, both in the case of unchanged perception and in the case of changed perception. The ever new sides of the object that come to appearance, or the previous ones that come to appearance in a new way, attract the attention toward themselves, now toward these and now toward those, and come to be perceived separately along with the separate attention.

§28. *Change in the presentational contents and change in the apprehension.*

Let us now leave these modifications out of account; more important for us are other ones, which can be expressed precisely by speaking of sides that newly come to appearance or already seen sides that appear in a new way. The changes in appearance which we find here are obviously changes of the presentational contents just as much as they are changes of the apprehension. With every new position of the object relative to my eye, and with every turning of the eye while the relative position otherwise is unchanged, the presentational contents are changed, whether they do or do not belong in other respects to the same side of the object and to the same determination of the same object. A change in the apprehension runs parallel to this change in the apprehensional contents. What was "clearly" apprehended in the one appearance is apprehended "obscurely" in the other (intuitively – non-intuitively, properly – improperly). Consider an object, e.g. a die. The one appearance

offers the red surface of a die; in the other, this no longer comes to proper appearance. It is not only that in the second appearance the presentational contents relative to this red surface are lacking, but there is also lacking the apprehension that would animate them into a clear appearance. In the complex of improper apprehensions pertaining to the second appearance, there may be a component which does relate to this same surface of the die; but that is precisely improper apprehension, which is other than proper apprehension, [92] functionally conditioned by the lack of the presentational contents, but not consisting of this mere non-presence. Moreover, the improper appearance does not have the character of determinateness in any respect; it can represent in an indeterminate way the same thing that stands before the eyes determinately in the clear apprehension, i.e., in the proper appearance. In all these cases, in a comparative consideration that takes together the various perceptual steps, a synthesis of identification joins perception to perception, and they then, as it were, coincide despite their different immanent content. Let us assume for the moment the fiction that the object is completely known; then in the respective sphere of obscurity of the perception in question there would be lacking any component of indeterminateness, and we will find an identifying coincidence which relates not only to whole appearances but also to all their possible partial appearances and to all the articulated members of the apprehension which we find in them or which we can make prominent through a separate consideration.

We thus find a mutual and univocal correspondence, and the respective corresponding partial apprehensions or moments of apprehension "coincide." They found the consciousness, "objectively the same": the same flank, the same surface form, the same coloration, the same edges, etc. Thereby the corresponding moments of clear appearance coincide, if precisely the same objective determination comes clearly to appearance on both sides. Or there is a coincidence of one moment of proper appearance of one side with a moment of improper appearance of the other: a full piece with an empty piece. We already know that all such instances of coincidence are founded in the essence of the coinciding appearances and that to bring the same object to appearance refers to nothing else than the essential peculiarity of the appearances in question: to make identifications possible.[1] In our case, there exists not only a synthesis of identification in general, and thus, with respect to the appearances, an identity of the objective relation, but also an identity of the sense of [93] the objective relation, insofar as every appearance intends, so to speak, the same object not just in general but as determined in the same way. The one appearance intends it as having a red square surface, the other does the same, even if the square surface appears in the first case in one adumbration and in

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[1] On the preceding, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

the other case in another adumbration, or if it actually appears in the one case and in the other is confused but meant with the same determinateness. If one appearance "leaves open" whether the square surface is red or of some other color, or if it itself leaves undetermined the more precise corporeal form, which the other appearance intends as determinate, then we would have a distinction in the sense, despite the identity of the objective relation. We would again have, however, the identity of sense if both appearances intended the same objective moment indeterminately but with the same determinability. In all cases, we ascribe to two appearances (as in general to two representations) an identity of sense insofar as they intend the same object as determined, or determinable, in the same way. If the whole appearances are not identical in sense, then we might, consequently, be able to speak of an identity of sense with regard to these or those components of the appearance or to speak of an identity of sense of the whole appearances with regard to such components.

§29. *More precise determination and re-determination.*

If the identity of sense is lacking within the identity of an objective direction, thus if we abandon the fiction of "absolute familiarity," then both appearances can have a harmonious sense insofar as, besides the components of identical sense, only those arise which, on both sides, in mutual correspondence, are related to one another as the more precise determination to the less. Thus the one is directed determinately to the objective moment in question, the other indeterminately. Or both are related indeterminately, but the one is more narrowly and more precisely determined, and the other is broader and more imprecise. Examples are the relation of "quadrangle" to "triangle," triangle to figure, crimson red to red, "red" to "color." But we should not think here of a mediating conceptual consciousness, as the choice of these conceptual terms suggests, but of the pure relation among the appearances in question, which [94] enter into a relation of mutual harmony, without the least consciousness of conflict. This is a harmony which, in the transition from indetermination to determination, takes on the peculiar character of the consciousness of a more precise determination. Naturally, this is transferable to the coinciding components of the appearances: one can speak of "harmony" as regards certain components but not of total and determinate coincidence. The consciousness of indeterminateness is, with respect to the objective moments in question, a consciousness which leaves "open" the content of this moment, its specific content – i.e., open for further, more precise determination. The moment in

question is co-intended insofar as a certain component of the apprehension, coordinated to that moment, is at hand, but in such a way that this apprehension has no univocal relation to the content of the moment, according to its entire fullness, but rather is such that it contains manifold determinability. The objective moment in question is, however, determinate "in itself;" i.e., in the perception in which it is given properly and fully, it contains a fully determining component of apprehension, and the harmony of this component with that component of indetermination in other perceptual appearances of the "same" object allows us to say that the latter had already represented the same moment, but in an indeterminate way. Here, however, in the proper appearance, what was previously represented indeterminately is first exhibited in the way it "properly is": what figure pertains "upon closer inspection" to the object previously grasped in indeterminate generality, what color it has upon closer inspection, etc. The term "indeterminate generality," which I just used, admittedly points beyond the sphere of our analysis. In fact, a generality pertains to every indeterminateness, a range of possible determination to be delimited by a "concept." This range indicates, in the form of a conceptual thought that is to be constituted, the general type of that which can function here as special determinateness. And to this logical relation of subordination there corresponds the phenomenological relation of more precise determination and determinability within a sphere of mere perception. In the essence of the indeterminate apprehension of a figure is grounded the fact that the apprehension can be more precisely determinate in the further progress of perception [95] only in the form of a determinate appearance of the figure, as determinate appearance of a triangle, quadrangle, etc.

In the essence are founded here certain possibilities of harmony and more precise determination, thus lawfulnesses which exclude chance, as if perhaps the moment of the apprehension of the figure were determinable through fusion with a moment of color appearance, etc.

Therefore in regard to the apprehensions or perceptual appearances, we speak of a harmony of sense, distinct from the identity of sense, and possibly speak more precisely of the subordination of one sense with another, whereby in the harmonious synthesis, which belongs to this subordination, the superordinate sense receives more precise determination through the one subordinated to it. Naturally, harmony is the more general over and against identity of sense and subordination or superordination of sense.

Harmony is opposed to non-harmony, and thereby, within the manifold of perceptions we are studying, a manifold unified in one perception, we are referred to a new, important occurrence. The same unchanged object shows itself from various sides, which come to a proper appearance step by step within the manifold-unitary perception. At every step, the "same" object stands there; we bring it for ourselves into an explicit consciousness of iden-

tity, whose possibility is founded in the essence of all these steps. Thus there is everywhere an identity of the "objective direction" but not necessarily a harmony of sense everywhere. Therefore non-harmony is also possible despite the identity of the appearing object. We had previously conceived, for a moment, the fiction of an object known completely, from all sides. Now, to the extent that this knowledge actually exists, to that extent the harmony also extends, and if it is precise knowledge with regard to the individual particularity of the determinations in question, then it is precisely a case of identity of sense. (Knowledge is an issue for us here only insofar as a certain determinateness of the objective apprehension belongs to its essence. What lies beyond, as individual recognition, does not concern us here.)

Now there belongs to every perception of things a certain construal beyond what comes to proper appearance, and this construal [*Hinausgreifen*] may very well be a misconstrual [*Vergreifen*]. In the first step, a front side presents itself in proper appearance; and the back side is co-grasped in an improper way. This side assigns to the object, in provoked, improper intentions, much that is not properly given of it. In the subsequent perceptual steps, other sides of the object, these or those, come to a proper appearance, but it is manifest that the object is here indeed "otherwise" than it was "envisioned" at first. Instead of corresponding to, it contradicts the first apprehension and the confused intentions included therein. The words "otherwise" and "contradict" naturally refer to a synthesis of conflict, thus to the fact that in the essence of the appearances present in the first and in the new step, appearances which belong, as do all the steps, to the coherent perception, there is founded the possibility of a consciousness of conflict. In all the steps, however, the same object stands there; the same object appears once as determined in such and such a way and another time as determined otherwise, i.e., otherwise than first apprehended. Without jeopardizing the possibility of an identification founded in the essence of appearance or the possibility, manifest in the former, of an identity of an objective direction, but indeed essentially presupposing these, a consciousness of conflict is thus established. We see, as a first step, a uniformly red sphere. We walk around it, and it, the same sphere, the same thing, is on the other side not, as we apprehended it, uniformly red. Contrary to our supposition, it has stains, dents in its form, etc. In juxtaposing the case of non-harmony and that of harmony we are led to say that the apprehension carried out in the first step is confirmed or contradicted by the apprehensions carried out in the further steps, in the progression of the unitary perception. That is, the intentions carried out in the first step in connection with the proper presentation are fulfilled or are disappointed. Yet we will have to distinguish later more exactly between the forms of unity which pertain immanently to the [97] partial perceptions embedded in the unity of the coherent perception and the explicit syntheses of identification and of conflict which, in virtue of that

unity, are founded and subsequently established as possibilities in the so-called emphasized steps of the perception. In any case, it is evident that conflict presupposes harmony, disappointment presupposes fulfillment. The contradiction certainly does not annul the unity of the object; the conflicting or disappointing moment indeed stands there as a moment of the object, belonging to the object as a determinate being-otherwise in place of the originally apprehended being-such. "In place" – that implies that with this disappointing moment others are interwoven, indeed interwoven indissolubly, ones that are corroborated and fulfilled in the new perception and, in relation to which, harmony and coincidence take place. The special determinateness of what conflicts with the original apprehension harmonizes at the same time, nevertheless, with the original apprehension as regards general type and form of conjunction. It pertains to the essence in general of being-otherwise, conflict, to presuppose a base of harmony.

If I find, when the back side of our red sphere becomes visible, a stain that was not co-presupposed in seeing the front side, the red sphere having been apprehended in the first step of perception as uniformly red, then there is still harmony, namely in that it is indeed a sphere, covered with a unitary color, in general red, "up to" the stain. This stain is always integrated into the unity of a total coloration which belongs necessarily to the apprehension. There is at this place another color, but indeed a color. If a conflicting deformation manifests itself as well, it still holds that the thing is a unitary body, into whose unitary form the deformation fits, precisely as a partial structure into a total structure. We see here that absolute being-otherwise in any respect is just as countersensical as absolute indeterminateness. It is the same in general with the determination through conflict as with the more precise determination. Under all circumstances, the new perception must agree with the old, must harmonize with it – i.e., in general. On the basis of a general harmony, various occurrences are then possible: e.g., total harmony, the superordination and subordination of sense, determinate being-otherwise, other differentiation of what is [98] given with respect to the possibilities essentially included in it in general. This differentiation does not need to be ultimate. For the new perception can still be undetermined in regard to the moment that appears "otherwise," can still leave open further, more precise differentiations. For example, I grasp already that the sphere is not actually spherical in its back side, but the form is still not clearly grasped and requires still further determination through new perceptions.

All the occurrences we have described are founded, as general possibilities, in the essence of perception. If we see any thing at all from one side, then it is in general evident that we could, while maintaining the proper appearance, in many ways vary, or also leave open, the more precise determination of the other sides within the general framework the idea of a thing prescribes. Thus

every proper appearance could be developed, in many, though essentially limited, ways, whether in the direction of determinateness or in the direction of indeterminateness, into a full perception of a thing. It is further evident that every one-sided perception, in terms of ideal possibility, thus according to its essence, could undergo contradiction instead of corroboration; the front side is not essentially decisive for the back. The back side of the thing is always thinkable or intuitable "otherwise" than it was co-apprehended in the front side. It is not a matter here thus of accidental occurrences, ones belonging to accidentally chosen examples.

We have up to now compared certain individual pieces of coherent perception and have extracted, by way of identification or differentiation, what lies in their essence. That is, we conceived of perception as carried out in steps, as a chain of resting perceptions, unified by transitional phenomena, in which various sides and parts of the thing present themselves in a stable way. Thereby we had the advantage of being able to study at the same time the relations among resting perceptions which prove to be perceptions of one and the same object. For the resting points of the coherent perception are, disregarding the nexus, comparable to any arbitrary resting perceptions with the same objective direction.

§30. *Continuous synthesis of manifold perceptions.* [99]

We now need to carry out supplementary analyses relating to the remaining parts of the nexus and to the unity of the nexus as such. The transitions between the resting pieces of perception are continuous mediations. The appearance changes in the transition, whether the latter be faster or slower, whereby the speed of the change is founded, as is the case with all continuity, in the fact that one and the same extension can be filled with various continuous densities, i.e., that one and the same continuum of specific differences can extend over either a greater or a lesser expanse. Naturally, what holds for whole expanses grasped visually also holds for all their parts, which are indeed in turn expanses, and thus ever new possibilities arise. I cannot enter into the more precise description of these occurrences pertaining to continua that coincide in various ways and in various densities (non-mathematical continua). They belong to a general phenomenology of continuity.

In our case, we have a pre-empirical, temporal expanse filled by a continuity of appearance. I look at a cube resting in a first position, and then I move. Now one and the same square surface appears to me in a different adumbration than before. The one adumbration passes over into the other, while changing continuously, and the same amount of change can fill spans of time

of different lengths, depending on the speed of my movement. The general essence of continuous-unitary perception of things includes the possibility of variation in the temporal relations while the fillings that extend over the spans of time with various degrees of density are preserved. This possibility has objective and constitutive significance not for the proper constitution of the thing itself, which indeed remains unchanged by presupposition, but for the appearance of the movement as such and for its velocity: greater or less, uniform or not. We will now exclude these variations and leave the temporal relations alone; instead, we will look into the fillings of the various phases and into the general form of their unity.

The fillings – that means here the phases of appearance that pertain to the [100] phases of the temporal extension. It will be enough if here, too, I give the description a somewhat rough shape. Phenomenological exactitude would involve considerable complications. If the movement is "very slow," then during the movement I can still attend to individual parts of the appearing expanse and thus to parts that are so small that no trace of change can any longer be noticed in them. They are then comparable to spans of appearance at rest, except that there pertains to them merely one "temporal point," the term not taken, of course, in the mathematical sense. Thus at every now-point, as it were, I attend to the appearance offered in it. But, to be sure, I indeed never have an unchanged appearance, but rather, if we grasp the essence of appearance, it is immediately other and continuously ever again other. I can also, however, bring the movement of the various phases to a halt and hold fast to the current phase, because it delimits the change and itself extends in a temporal duration as an appearance at rest. As the study of such occurrences shows, it obviously pertains to the essence of the change in appearance to bring itself to rest in manifold ways of this type and to let itself be delimited by non-change. Or it pertains to its essence to consist in phases which can be coordinated, in correspondence to unchanged perceptions, such that on both sides – all the way up to the temporal extension – an essential identity exists. Conversely, we can also imagine that the resting spans of perception, while their temporal extension condenses into one point, convert into phases such that the entire coherent perception is now a continuous change which no longer includes any pauses of rest.

For every phase that we abstract and set in relief here, we need to distinguish, in virtue of their essential identity with resting perception, proper and improper appearances, and for the relations between any two phases we have as a whole the same possibilities as for the relations between two unchanged appearances separated by some intermediate pieces or other. Thus, when two phases have been bought into relief, we can carry out syntheses of identification and differentiation and can recognize, for example, the identity of the [101] objective direction, the harmony of the sense, and the more precise determina-

tion of the objective moment apprehended indeterminately in the one phase through the subordinated moment of determinate apprehension of the other phase, etc. And since these syntheses are founded in the essence of the phases, an essential characterization of these phases is thereby also carried out. Yet the syntheses are merely possibilities; their actualization does not belong to the unity of the continuous perception. Let us now pass over from phase to phase in continuity. The change in appearance is continuous, at least in general. It does not lack isolated discontinuities, ones which arise in the continuous unity of the nexus of appearance but which are, so to speak, revoked in this unity. We will at first dismiss them and concentrate on spans of actual continuity.

Thus the appearance is gradually transforming itself into an ever new one. That implies the possibility of the transition from an appearance to precisely one that is noticeably changed and so implies a progression in differences that precisely are still noticeable, in "small" distinctions which are almost alike yet are already distinguished. If we pass over in this way from phase to phase, then the proper appearance, the one we especially want to hold our gaze onto now, changes continuously. To every objective moment that comes to a proper appearance there belongs a continuity of constitutive moments of appearance, which thus are exposed in a series of phases proceeding by the smallest differences: e.g., the adumbration of the square, which I precisely bring into focus out of the cube, and perhaps specifically in regard to its geometrical form. It is not that one adumbration is there, once and for all. Instead, a continuity of adumbrations pertains to the square, ones that pass over into one another "perpetually," i.e., a sequence of least differences within one and the same proper genus. The same applies to the unitary coloration of the square: the color does not present itself in one color-adumbration but in a continuity of color-adumbrations. Thus again we have generic unity and gradation in least differences. And this presentation is a necessary one. It is precisely a manifold of adumbrations of this type which must continuously elapse so that in appearance, in the progress of the appearing movement, the consciousness can arise: [102] "the same unchanged square of the cube." The order of the adumbrations is an order in continuity, thus an actual order and not the arbitrarily interchangeable agglomeration of a mere collection. And the order is one within a fused unity.

The square surface thus also has in a certain sense its "sides," and it is given and can be possessed only in the form of "sides," i.e., adumbrations. It is unity in multiplicity, i.e., identity in continuity; it is what presents itself in the continuity of appearance as a continuity of adumbrations of the object, and only in this presentation does it come to givenness and demonstrate itself for what it is. The presentational contents are thereby perpetually changing. But they indeed also bear apprehensions, by virtue of which the standing there itself of the square surface of the cube is constituted continually, in every phase, in every part of the change, and in every change-differential

(determination): its standing there itself in the form of a perspectival adumbration. Obviously, the apprehensions, or the entire appearances in their perpetual flowing away, constantly enter into a relation of harmony, which presupposes and includes the identity of the objective direction. This is also a relation of identity of sense and not merely harmony, since we are limiting ourselves to the actual presentation of the square. We could speak here of a perpetual identifying coincidence and specifically of a coincidence of sense. Nevertheless, actual identification does not take place but only a certain unity of the homogeneous stream, which, by its very sense, harbors the possibility of multiple emphases and of the identifications of what is emphasized. Precisely this possibility, however, as founded in the essence, justifies speaking of the fact that the presentations pertaining to a properly appearing determinateness and essentially fusing into a continuity are thoroughly dominated by continuous unity of sense. With this is constituted the consciousness of the same – and enduring as the same – unchanged square surface. But there is still more that pertains to the essence of this presentation.

If,[2] in a perception, the series of appearances runs its course in continuous unity, then the first determination of the change, the so-called differential of movement, already defines the "direction" of the course, and thereby is given a system of intentions that are continuously setting out and continuously getting fulfilled. In normal perception, these are anticipatory intentions. (The series of appearances is dominated by a certain teleology.) Every phase refers to the following one. That, of course, should not be taken to mean that we focus on the appearances, since we are indeed directed to the object as the perception flows on. But every adumbration is precisely an adumbration of the square; every one "brings the square to appearance," but each in a different way. And every one brings to appearance something that previously did not appear, not precisely that way. In addition, each one points forward: in the stream of appearances, the stream of objective adumbrations, we feel ourselves drawn on from adumbration to adumbration; each one points forward objectively in a continuity, and in this forward referral, the adumbration is an intimation of what is now coming, and the intimation, the allusion, the intention, is fulfilled. The one-sided view opens out to what is "omni-sided." Already in the case of a single determination, we experience what this determination is, not in the one view with its single adumbration, although it indeed stands there as self-given, but only by traversing the adumbrations, whereby the determination is brought to a complete, "omni-sided" givenness. And this complete givenness is constituted in the consciousness of unity which pro- [103]

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[2] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

duces a perpetual fusion of intention and fulfillment.[3]

Yet we must be prudent. The completeness has various degrees and levels. A greater piece of a continuous series signifies richer givenness than does a smaller piece or, of course, an unchanged appearance. But if we follow the square of the cube from the moment in which it becomes visible to the moment in which it again disappears, then it is a closed series, and indeed not the continuity, that constitutes the absolutely complete givenness. The cube could move in many other ways; it can rotate around the most varied axes, it can [104] draw near and move away, it can undergo at once displacement and rotation. These present ever different changes in the appearance and, more precisely, changes in the adumbrations of the square surface that is serving as our example. All these continuous series stand toward one another in a lawfully essential relation. They continually collaborate with one another, and only in the all-encompassing unity of these series does the square come to actual, "omni-sided," complete givenness. The square is what it is only as the identical pole in the systematic unity of these adumbrations or possibilities of adumbration.

§31. *Possibility of reversing the series of appearances in the case of spatial objects, in contrast to temporal objects.*

It is important to establish that the possibility of the reversal of any direction of change belongs here among the essentially founded possibilities. Whether the square rotates from right to left or from left to right, i.e., whether I move around it in this or that way, is all one; the same square is rotating, the same square stands there when I reverse my movement. Phenomenologically speaking, the object which presents itself as given in the continuity of appearance remains the same when the continuous order is reversed, i.e., when the elapsing of time is filled with series of appearances in the exact reverse order. To put it better, the essence of this constitutive presentation includes the ideal possibility of a reversed presentation in which the same object is given, and the reversed presentation forms an essential component in the constitution of full givenness. Let it be said at once that this does not hold for all objects of perception. The objects that fill time or that are distributed in time, as, e.g., the object that we call "melody" (melody not as static unity, however, but the unitarily individual sequence of sounds), are constituted in a continuity of

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[3] If we consider this state of affairs and are struck by the fact that in the perpetual fulfillment there exists the consciousness, "It is so, actually so," then we might doubt whether an absolutely unchanged perception can already be claimed to be a consciousness of something given. Such a perception is indeed a fiction: the slightest oscillation of the eye already brings into play intention and fulfillment. But the lightning flash in the middle of a stormy night?

appearances or in a series of appearances. In general there is no possibility of reversal while preserving such an object. And above all it does not in the least pertain to such an object that a reversal is required for its full givenness. At [105] issue then are specific peculiarities of the objects we call spatial things.

The example of such sequences of sounds, which can indeed also be related to things in the mode of appended determinations, leads us to reflect on whether we must not restrict our consideration to the properly constitutive determinations of the thing, i.e., to the spatial determinations, the ones that properly fill space. In any case, we have been dealing primarily with these, as the ones that above all make the thing possible. We had best exclude the appended determinations that are filling in the broader sense, although some of this is transferable to them. For instance, if a steam engine continuously emits the same unchanged whistling sound, then it makes no difference whether we move closer and then farther away or, conversely, move away and then approach it again. Here, too, we have a continuity of adumbrations which can be reversed and which, in being reversed, contributes to the constitution of the givenness. Nevertheless, our interest is focused on the core of all thinghood (on, as it were, the primal thing), which already makes up full thinghood, even if we continue to think of appended determinations.

CHAPTER 6

THE POSSIBILITY AND SENSE OF AN ADEQUATE PERCEPTION OF SPATIAL THINGS

§32. *Intention and fulfillment in the perceptual process. Increase and decrease of the fullness of the givenness.*

The continuous manifold of appearances, in which is carried out the givenness, or a line of the givenness, of the surface of the square, offers us a substrate for further observations. The continuity of the apprehension includes the perpetual play of intention and fulfillment. We understand this in such a way that in the transition, as soon as the direction is indicated by the differential of movement, there continuously take place anticipations and fulfillments of the anticipations, which always, in whatever direction the movement takes place, are directed from whole presentation to whole presentation and thereby from [106] each emphasized moment of presentation to each one following continuously, or else they proceed alongside the continuity. The square comes to givenness in ever new ways with ever new adumbrations, and each new adumbration "belongs" to this course of direction and integrates itself in it as "intentionally" belonging therein. But we must still pay attention to another, narrower play of intentions and fulfillments that is interwoven here. Let us consider in particular the visual primal thing, the cube, and pay attention especially to the square surface. The square first comes to a proper appearance, perhaps by the rotation of the cube, as a slight indication within a rather unclear, "incomplete" presentation. The more the rotation proceeds, so much more clear becomes the presentation, so much more complete, and finally a high point or peak is reached, in which the square "best" presents itself in this direction of change, such that further changes would again decrease the completeness of the presentation, progressing on again to slight indication and then complete disappearance.

This holds for the seen square surface just as much with respect to its geometrical form as with respect to its visual filling, its coloration. Under such circumstances, we will say that we see the coloration from the beginning, but that it "manifests itself more and more as it is in truth." We see it ever better and finally see it best, i.e., finally as it is in truth (in the best possible case, that is how we would express ourselves plainly).

Behind these words are obviously hidden special forms of unity which

pertain to appearances as objective presentations and which are founded in the essence of these appearances. In these forms resides what we call, according to the circumstances, increase or decrease of the fullness of the givenness, the perpetually more complete or less complete coming-to-givenness-in-perception. But we are saying still more. We are not at all content with the incomplete, if we have once enjoyed the complete. The incomplete lacks something; it refers to the complete, which, if it were experienced, would satisfy us. The same applies here as well. The incomplete is in our case already a consciousness of givenness. The thingly moment appears in the mode of perception. But the consciousness of givenness does not count as complete; it is not valid purely and simply, it refers beyond itself. It is an intimation of [107] what is properly intended, which implies here that it bears intentions that point in the direction of the more complete presentations or, in other words, to the "object itself," as that would come to givenness in such presentations precisely in a more complete way. And these intentions refer to it through the intervention of presentations which by their very essence are mediating and in the elapsing of which a coherent intention holds sway, one that is perpetually getting fulfilled and at the end, in the best of cases, reaches the goal and rests content in a givenness where nothing more is missing with respect to the fullness of the givenness. This fulfillment, when it proceeds in the opposite direction, has its correlate in an "emptying," in a continuous receding from the goal, which is still now what is "intended" in every phase of the presentation.

The series of increasing fulfillment, or of increasing completeness in the givenness, elapse, in every case, into limit-points or limit-regions, which present junctures where increase passes over into decrease. The decreasing series have, for their part, limits of decrease in the null-point of appearance, where the appearing of the moment in question first begins. We see that these are quite different intentions and fulfillments, and to them pertain quite different forms of unity than before. Previously we had to do with arbitrary series of change, and to them as such there pertained nexuses of intentions, i.e. references, which at any time elapse following the phases, from phase to phase: being drawn forward in the familiar nexus, in the line of continuous appurtenance. The movement might, for the rest, go this way or that; it might achieve givenness either in a better or worse way. The form of unity that here offers the substrate for the coherent intentions is the general one, the one that pertains to the essence of any continuous synthesis whatsoever. In the present case, however, we have to do with intentions that in another way take possession of the "sense" of the appearances, hold sway in it, and penetrate it. The first appearance to arise is already significance, and it already signifies givenness. Nevertheless, it will still be interpreted in some direction. In what direction? Toward that which is indeed objectively presented in it already and thus is presented in every further phase of the presentation, yet still not in the way

it is supposed to present itself. Thus it presents incompletely what will come in the further phases to ever more complete presentation, but relatively most complete in a certain phase, namely at the high point of the direction of the movement aimed at increase. The incomplete phase will be interpreted in the direction of the object as given in such a way. If the phase arises in phantasy, then the phantasy presentation unites with the living presentation in the consciousness of the fulfillment, in the consciousness, "It is so." But whether phantasy plays a role or not, indeed even whether the movement actually goes on or not, still the significance is there, and in its essence resides the "reference" to possible fulfillment in the explicating presentational continuity of increasing constitution. Yet that is only a potential reference. In the actually elapsing series of increase, in the continuous synthesis of perception, the reference is more than significance, it is alive in the significance; it is an intention that penetrates the significance and the continuity of the significance, an intention toward the complete "self-sameness" that is manifest or is supposed to be manifest in the applicable direction and respect. This intention that penetrates the applicable continuity of appearance and the unity of its sense finds perpetual fulfillment, fulfillment in the perpetual increase in the consciousness of givenness. But only in the limit point as the maximal point is the goal of the increase attained. The intention in this state no longer refers to fulfillment; in this phase of the intentional movement it is itself consciousness of the attained goal. It is immediately clear that this play of intention and fulfillment is constructed on special forms of unity within the continuous synthesis. Not every span of a continuous synthesis has, either in general or in a dominant attitude of attention, the peculiar structure we have provisionally designated as the increase of the consciousness of givenness. [108]

Other examples of the relations just described between intention and fulfillment are offered by approaching and receding: the first coming into visibility of a determination, e.g. the facade of a palace, seen from a distance, the constant change of appearance that accompanies our approaching it, until the object comes to its best presentation. If the whole comes to presentation in its best form, in a most favorable adumbration within the relevant series of change, then this does not need to be the best for all the parts. For instance, I see the quality of the surface of the facade better, as regards this or that part of a wall, when I approach closer and closer, although then the overall look of the facade gets lost. I would have to proceed in such a manner for each part, and the result would be further series of changes from the most favorable overall adumbration to the partial adumbrations, which are grasped in these series of changes in a continuous consciousness of unity, as pertaining to the same part of the wall, and in a certain sense are gathered within the overall adumbration. That is, its interwoven partial apprehensions bear further intentions which are fulfilled in the mode of increased completeness. [109]

If it is not merely a matter of the surface of a wall, in its own determinateness, but a matter of its spatial relation to the whole house, or if it is a matter from the very outset of the house itself or of a completely spatial feature of the house, perhaps the form of a jutting balcony, then merely "approaching" will not fulfill all the intentions. If we have attained the best view in the earlier direction of change, then new paths of change are now necessary. We must move about the corporeal thing in such and such a way in order to attain, in this sphere of relatively best presentations, the clear consciousness of the givenness of the corporeal form and the corporeal coloration. Among these presentations, one presentation or one continuous sphere can again be preeminent in that it offers the best in that regard. It is to this presentation that the intentional references will then lead us.

Furthermore, there belongs here the manifold of changes that pertain to the movement of focusing the eyes, which brings to clearest vision, point by point, all the parts of the side (of, e.g., a thing at rest) that is turned toward the perceiver. To the side turned toward the perceiver there corresponds not an adumbration but a two-dimensional continuous system of adumbrations. In every adumbration is found a small, undelimited part of the clarity in which the corresponding thingly moment presents itself with relative completeness. This part passes over, without limitation, to ever further spheres of increasing unclarity. I focus, e.g., on a word from a printed page lying before me. It appears relatively clear, and further, within it, a letter appears most clearly, and at the normal visual distance it is completely clear, while the neighboring letters and the more distant ones are already diminishing in clarity. And so it continues: what is by far the most is a vague *je ne sais quoi*, continuously [110] diminishing in clarity as one proceeds out toward the margin of the field of view, where the paper is apprehend in undeterminate generality as printed writing but is not graspable in its definite individuality. If we now run our eye along a line, a continuous series of change elapses in the fields of view, ones related to one another through unity of sense. Unclarity is ever and again transformed into clarity, ever new words enter into the narrow field of the circle of clear light, while words already lit up fall back ever and again into the half-shadows and then into the full shadows of the background. And everywhere there is the play of intentions and fulfillments. The unclear refers to the coming clarity; the latter demonstrates what was properly intended by the unclear, what it properly presented, at least relatively. For the best presentation in the relevant direction of change can still be incomplete for other directions of change and can still bear references which require, and possibly will receive, increase in fulfillment.

Nor are such relations lacking as regards the tactile thing. The same table I perceive tactually, by laying my hand on it while writing, is perceived better when I take the fingertips and feel the surface of the table by running them

over it. Here, too, each object has various possibilities of presentation and in every case its best presentation, whether this be a best overall presentation or a best partial presentation (e.g., I may clasp a sphere with the palm of my hand, or, then again, I may feel it point by point with my fingertips to obtain the best and most distinct apprehension). Yet what is mediating here in great measure is the continuity of visual space and of the series of changes that accompany it; this continuity is helpful for grasping the identity of the various presentations instead of having them merely fade into one another continually.

§33. *The role of improper appearance in the process of more precise determination. The ideal of adequate perception.*

Nevertheless, let us now disregard these complications and turn first instead, in order to be able to study more completely the structure of the continuous synthesis, to the moments of improper appearance, which we have hitherto left out of consideration. There is no need to say that in regard to them as well a [111] harmony of sense takes place in the stream of the continuous synthesis. A complex of such moments can now continually remain an improper appearance in the stream and thereby either remain unchanged or undergo change, the latter in the form of enrichment, i.e., more precise determination. It is an enrichment insofar as a filling of new moments of apprehension is fit within the total framework of the apprehension (psychologically speaking, through the excitation of new associative dispositions). That can happen to the new moments, however, only in the sense of a modification of the extant apprehension, which indeed by presupposition continually brings to appearance a concrete object, thus something completely determinate in itself, even if apprehended vaguely and with all sorts of indetermination. The object in the sense of the enriched apprehension stands there hence not merely as subjected to more determinations but also in certain respects as present "otherwise," appearing otherwise than previously, although not changed. The coloration appeared homogeneous, and now into its unity have been fitted manifold particularities of coloration, discontinuities, etc. The coloration is now a richer one than appeared at first, but it is also a different one; it is precisely not in truth homogeneous. Enrichment thus necessarily also signifies re-determination. That concerns either the properties, which, within a preservation of the identity of the geometrical body, qualitatively determine it in a different way, or it concerns the body itself, perhaps its expansion or contraction. What was originally apprehended proves, in due course, to be a mere piece; i.e., it then counts as a mere piece and is apprehended as such, even if improperly. Hence these are modifications which, while letting the appearing

object appear as an other in relation to the previous apprehension, at the same time enrich it, insofar as the object now stands there with a greater fullness of parts and determinations. The more precise determinations are added: in the course of the stream of appearance, the apprehensions are modified in such a way that they convert a broader determinateness into a narrower. We have already spoken earlier about the phenomenology of re-determination and more precise determination; what we discussed can naturally be applied without further ado to the present case of continuous synthesis. We viewed these [112] modifications as possibilities in the stream of improper – continually improper – moments of apprehension.

A further synthetic occurrence, however, is the conversion from the improper to the proper. The empty intention is converted into the full; the constant modification of the respective complex of presentational contents, which is necessarily constant, at least with respect to its pre-empirical extension, lends a fullness to the empty components of apprehension and creates proper apprehension in place of the improper. Conversely, proper moments of appearance can likewise, and in fact must necessarily, according to the respective type of the series of changes, turn into improper ones. The presentational fullness disappears: it at first contracts, becomes poorer in properly presentational moments and already harbors, within the proper appearance, improper moments, confusions. It then completely disappears, and left over is an empty apprehension, gradually diminishing in determinateness. That is at least a possibility.

All these occurrences also concern what we have designated, in a narrower sphere, with the titles decrease and increase in givenness. That is, we paid attention at first only to moments of proper appearance and to the possibilities of increase in the consciousness of givenness. Here too, upon closer inspection, the increase resides partially in the enrichment of inner determinations or differentiations, partially in a more precise determination (whereby in each case the new has its motivation in the nexus and fits itself in as belonging within). To this is added, as we must indeed say, a certain increase of the intention of filling, as that is, e.g., clearly prominent when a homogeneously colored surface comes to appearance in ever greater breadth of perspectival presentation and, without augmentation of inner differences or apprehensional determinateness, increasingly approaches that presentation in which it presents itself, in the relevant continuous series of appearances, "best," "according to its true Being." Hence this increasing intention is also a moment that is essentially co-involved here.

In studying the inner structure of the continuous synthesis, we thus find everywhere, in all the phases of constant transition, either enrichment or impoverishment, in some respect the one, in some respect the other. The [113] consciousness of givenness is in one regard more complete, bringing a mo-

ment of the object to appearance in a better way, and in another regard worse. Among the possible continuous syntheses, however, certain of them, or individual spans of them, stand out because a continuous increase in completeness takes place therein with respect to a visually grasped objective moment and with respect to others we have a continuous decrease, progressing from phase to phase, i.e., a reduction of the completeness and fullness of the givenness. As a whole, however, the continuous synthesis is at any time, as it were, a braid of partial syntheses of increase and decrease, in which, to be sure, the individual strands of the braid have and can have no autonomy.

In the progress from more complete to less complete givennesses, the continuous synthesis has the character of emptying or lessening of the fullness of givenness. In the other direction we have the unitary form of fulfillment. The unity is accompanied on the one side by an empty or unsaturated and on the other side by a full and (at least relatively) saturated consciousness of givenness. The appearances have a moment of increase, of relative saturation, of relative fullness or emptiness, specifically with respect to the manner in which they bring the object to givenness.

We have just used the word fulfillment in regard to the unitary form of appearances. It can also relate, however, to the "intention" that holds sway in this unitary form and that thoroughly dominates it: intention not now taken as the presentation itself, which in the synthesis fills itself or is fulfilled more richly, but as the intending that follows the sense of the direction of increase. Just as the anticipation directs itself toward what is coming, and does so through the representation lying at its foundation, and just as the anticipation is fulfilled entirely by a determinate course of representations, so the same applies here to the intention that penetrates a line of increase.

It may be that the feeling-oneself-directed to the object in its complete givenness not only presupposes the just-described unitary form of the continuous elapsing of appearances but is also necessarily co-given with it, supposing only that the self-presentational moment in the increasing series has been [114] made prominent by attention. In any case, however, the unitary form itself is to be distinguished from the "intention toward" that holds sway in it. The distinction is admittedly a difficult one. The first task would be to establish the apprehension itself as the meaning-intention and thereby to see the very consciousness of increase or decrease, i.e., the respective unitary form of the presentations, as uniquely at issue. Nevertheless, it seems to me, from a more precise consideration of the state of affairs, that the goal-directed intending is something new versus the presentational continuity of the constitution just described.

For the rest, these moments of the intending, a title which includes, besides the attention, still many other things, as we will see, and a great deal to be distinguished phenomenologically, belong within a higher analytic stratum.

What is for us here the main point, and belongs to the main thrust of our previous reflections, is the unitary form of mere appearances in the continuous nexus of an explicational perception. The making prominent of that higher "intention toward" has this usefulness, namely that it brings out for us, purely and clearly, what is precisely at issue in the unitary form of the appearances themselves.

The differences in the saturation of the givenness, which stand out in the comparison of the appearances pertaining to an unfolding manifold of perceptions, suggest the question of whether or not a perceptual manifold would be thinkable that could lead up to a limit point in which there would be absolute saturation and saturation in all respects. Every perception of things is inadequate: the one at rest is already inadequate because it is merely one-sided, and the variable one because, while it does indeed gradually or in steps bring the object to many-sided and ever richer givenness, yet it never attains the goal of absolute givenness. What comes to givenness in the latter does so above all only in a dispersed way: the self-continuous manifold of appearances brings this particular moment to givenness in one appearance, and in another appearance it makes that other moment appear. And whereas it ascends one level of completeness, one degree of saturation, with respect to one determination, the saturation already given in the previous appearances is now lost to it. Enrichment on the one side goes hand in hand with impoverishment on the other. If [115]
we approach an object that, due to its distance, appears only very incompletely, then at first we have nothing but pure gain: although, admittedly, in terms of that object alone. For the total perception is already impoverished with respect to the environing things, ever fewer of which may fall into the ever more narrowly delimited field of view. Yet if we restrict ourselves to the thing itself, then we are constantly gaining. Still, merely approaching it does not bestow a fully saturated givenness. Supposing that the appearing front side, qualitatively characterized as such and such, came to a fully saturated givenness, then there would still be required the perception of the other sides, and as soon as we passed over to them, we would lose what we had gained in the first series of change. We cannot hold fast to the givenness of the front side in its fullness and saturation and at the same time have in view the other sides, i.e., have them in view in the most complete possible way. Thus the full corporeal form, in particular the corporeal surface, with its materializing determinations, is already unattainable by this intention toward absolute givenness. That naturally holds if it was from the very outset correct to say that a resting perception can never be "adequate." The other phase of the absolutely increasing perception, increasing from all sides, can be expanded, as can indeed every phase, into a resting perception. Is it a matter here of an accident of human perception, or is this state of affairs grounded in the very essence of the type of perception we include under the name "outer perception"? Does inadequate

perception not refer to the possibility of an adequate one, which, for us, is only an unattainable ideal?

Underlying these questions is a certain ideal, constructed in view of the relation of saturation. It is an ideal that is oriented toward the naïve interpretation of perceptual givenness which dominates our ordinary life. At a distance from things, restricted to a one-sided viewpoint preventing us from seeing the thing from all sides, and under unfavorable perceptual conditions, such as darkness or fog, we perceive the thing, and it appears, but not "as it is in truth." Only if we approach it and are in a position to walk around it and look into and feel its interior, spread it open, etc., and only if we ensure good [116] lighting and the normal perceptual conditions, only then do we see how the thing properly is and grasp its true qualities. We may now, as we did previously, abstract from the perceptual conditions and their variability; we may think of them as normal from the very outset and treat them as absolutely constant or presuppose them to be such. If we restrict ourselves then to the kinetic changes and presuppose the thing to be unchanged, we will in fact find differences in saturation, differences between more full or less full givenness, and in certain directions we will discover points of maximum completeness. Here there seems to result an appearance which leads to complete givenness, at least in an objective respect, with regard to that objective determination which here undergoes increase in givenness: it leads to the most complete givenness, the best one in the relevant perceptual series, and thus in general only to the one that is relatively the best. But why can it not lead for once, by selecting the most favorable series of appearances, to the absolutely best, thus to absolute givenness of the objective determination in question? Even if we would not possess the thing full and whole, yet we would have the determination as it itself is; the determination would be adequately given. Accordingly, the ideal now appears possible and justified, i.e., the ideal of a givenness which would accomplish the same for all the determinations, for the full and entire thing: an appearance which is absolutely saturated in every respect and shows its object in an adequate way, as it is in itself.

Yet if we look at matters more closely, we become skeptical. If we think of the ideal appearance that is extracted from the nexus of fulfillment and is temporally extended, then we would have a fully concrete appearance as the absolute givenness of a thing. What sort of givenness would this be? It would contain nothing of improper givenness, thus no back side and no interior would be without presentation. It would contain nothing indeterminate; it would be a thoroughly proper and fully determining appearance. Would there still be a difference among appearance, what appears, and the transcendence determined thereby? The appearance would indeed be no mere adumbration; it would contain no unfulfilled moments of apprehension, moments that, so to [117] speak, point beyond themselves. At first that seems to be quite thinkable,

namely in the manner of really [*reell*] immanent perception, as we have it when we attend to the extension of the visual contents in the visual field and objectivate this extension exactly as it is given. An infinitely complete intellect, we may phantasize, has a pure intuition of the thing and of the whole world. This intellect has in its field of view such and such structures, fulfilled qualitatively in this or that way, and these are the things. To be sure, our visual field is two-dimensional. But the infinite intellect has a three-dimensional field of view. That is "Objective space," which can be delimited in various ways. That is, it can undergo partition in various ways – through the segregating extensions of quality and through the partition adhering to every moment of time. The manifold of fulfilled structures – that is the "world" pertaining to the respective temporal moment. Nevertheless, grave misgivings arise here. A field of view is not a space, and an excerpt from such a field is not a thing, either for us or for God Almighty. What, then, about movement?

§34. *Movement and location in the field – Objective movement and location.*

The thing is in itself completely unchanged in the series of its merely kinetic changes. It is something individually identical, both as a whole and as regards all its constitutive determinations. That is evident according to the very sense of thinghood (the thinghood that demonstrates its sense in "outer perception"). This apparently also holds for the field-interpretation of space; however, that is only because we succumb to the obvious temptation to regard the change of the presentational contents in the visual field, a change which is parallel to the apparent movement, as itself a movement and thus to endow it with a spatial significance. This happens exactly as, and in consequence of the fact that, we are inclined to take what brings an objective quality to presentation, e.g., the pre-empirical color, as one with (or as only un-essentially different from) the quality itself, the Objective color. The section of the visual field that is covered precisely with this or that color can be emphasized and perceived immanently. But that is not a thing as an Object which could undergo movement. The [118] thing thereby presented does move, and in parallel there also moves, we could say, this immanent content formed in such and such a way. We already impose onto the field a spatial surface, and we think of the contents as moving, like a colored shadow [*farbiger Schatten*] on the surface of a paper. But the content does not move, because its individuality is the individuality of this filled piece of the field, and the piece of the field is this one and no other. If the content changes in the sense of a *quasi*-displacement in the field, however, then we have ever new parts prominent in the visual field; they may be like others and possibly, in regard to their pre-empirical form and color, similar. But similarity

is not identity. I am even quite prepared here to concede the fiction that would abolish all differences between clear and unclear vision and that would have the whole field consist of sheer points of the clearest vision. If we take, in this absolutely homogeneous field, the most complete similarity of the pre-empirical figure in its *quasi*-movement, then the individual identity of something moving never arises in this *quasi*-movement, and thus we never have movement in the genuine sense. We have movement only when the *quasi*-moving content, which at every moment is a section cut out of the visual field, is not itself the thing but is a presentation of the thing, and the thing is what is identical in the continuous change of the presentations. And then the field is not itself space but is the presentational field for everything spatial and thus for all things.

Therefore the ideal of adequate perception does not seem to be deposed. In the *quasi*-movement of the pre-empirically formed content, a presentational function, one could say, animates this content in such a way that this function constitutes, in this *quasi*-movement, something individually identical which presents itself in every phase of the change. The presentation, however, may be an adequate presentation insofar as it requires and permits no fulfillment. All the same, I cannot rest content so quickly. Can we extricate ourselves with such a presentation? Does it suffice to assume an identifying presentation, penetrating the *quasi*-movement of the pre-empirical content, in order to constitute already movement and rest, change and unchange, in every respect? And thereby also Objective spatial location, space in general? Does that [119] identical something move when the visually presentational content and the remainder of the field, related to it by being co-affected, are modified in the sense of this *quasi*-movement? Or does it rest? And what does the appearance of movement – or rest – look like? Is perhaps the relevant change in presentation, which we are now calling "*quasi*-movement," supposed to signify, without further ado, a movement of what is identical, and does the *quasi*-movement of what is presentational then signify rest in the Objective sense? And, connected to this, what about the location of the thing? Does the location present itself in the field, in the *quasi*-location of the presentational content? But here we arrive at the difficulty that space is infinite (as Kant says, it is represented as an infinite given magnitude. In any case, we do not doubt the evidence of the infinite.) But the field is finite. We will leave God out of consideration here; nor do we desire to assail the evidence that an appearance, a total perception, cannot be fragmented into infinitely many pieces and that everything infinite must be reducible phenomenologically to something like "limitlessness in the progression of intuition," thus to ideal possibilities of continuous manifolds of perception.

Thus we are, with the presentational means of the finite field, once again at the end, and we see that in any case with the presentation precisely through

these or those parts of the field, and through the *quasi*-movement or the *quasi*-rest of a part of the field, nothing is yet determined regarding Objective location, regarding the rest and movement of what is presented. And, in fact, we ourselves have a limited visual field and possess all the pre-phenomenal occurrences that belong there. But Objective location does not present itself without further ado through *quasi*-location; rest in a thing is presented at times through unchanged appearance, but for the most part through changes in appearance, whereby the presentational contents stroll continuously across the field of vision. And finally movement is very well compatible with the *quasi*-rest of the presentational contents in the visual field. Thus I speak of "compatibility." But, on the contrary, it obviously pertains to the essence of the relevant presentations that they are qualified for rest and movement respectively and that, if they were qualified otherwise, rest could not be presented as rest nor movement as movement.

In any case, we see from this consideration that with the mere field and the [120] possible means of presentation in it, such as pre-empirical quality, pre-empirical figure, filled with quality in such and such a way, and pre-empirical location, still nothing is accomplished for the full possibility of the constitution of spatial things, to which belong precisely space and the possibility of omni-sided infinite movement, the possibility of rest in a determinate location, etc. Even if we add to pre-empirical extension and fullness a presentation which, given in the respective field, posits in its *quasi*-movement an individual identity, we still do not account for the constitution of the thing. But that is how the accomplishment of the ideal of an adequate presentation offered itself, at first quite plausibly. Is this sort of phenomenological accomplishment not, however, the necessary consequence of the ideal itself? Let us reflect: the thing is supposed to be given adequately, and in an appearance the geometrical body is supposed to come to presentation, to an actual and not an adumbrated presentation, such that it is filled with properly materializing determinations, fully and completely, according to all its sides, parts, points, punctual fillings, etc. Naturally, then, the entire thing, as it were, pertains to the phenomenon. It is evident then that the filling moments are represented point for point in the presentation; to every extensional quality there must correspond necessarily a *quasi*-quality, i.e., a corresponding pre-empirically presentational moment. And the same naturally applies to the extension: to the seen, appearing extension there must correspond a pre-empirical extension as means of presentation. Thus the entire thing coincides, as it were, with its presentation, i.e., with the extension of the pre-empirical sensuous data, therefore with the fulfilled piece of the field for each of the primal things whose sensuous qualities suffuse it. Then we would have pieces of the field but not things. What still remains left over? The presentation, which converts the shifting piece of the field into a phenomenon of a thing, into a presentation of something individually identi-

cal. And that will not do. We would indeed also have to ask how pieces of a field from different fields come to be presentations of the same thing. How does a penetration of the various primal things happen such that the visual and tactile thing are the same spatial thing, with individually one spatial body? Ideally speaking, a thing may have quite other groups of primal, materializing [121] qualities; but to the essence of the thing pertains the one identical body, which is completely materialized through the qualities of each group, and thus is covered in as manifold a way as there are fields. If this difficulty could be removed, there would still remain the insurmountable one of movement.

§35. *The field as finite means of presentation. The perception of things as necessarily inadequate.*

Space is an infinite manifold of possible locations and thereby offers a field of infinitely many possibilities of movement. Each thing is moveable *a priori* as a fulfilled spatial body and is so *in infinitum*. Therefore the possibility must be guaranteed *a priori* that movement can be given, i.e., can come to presentation. Where are the presentational means for locations and changes of location *in infinitum*? It is certain that the field can offer only finitely many means of presentation and that, in two respects, this cannot suffice here. On the one hand, in a piece of a field, a continuous body is supposed to come to presentation. Since the piece of the field cannot offer an intrinsic infinity of distinguishable points, therefore the presentation of the geometrical body, which finds its means therein, must be inadequate, supposing that this body does indeed reside wholly in the perceptual field. And we can foresee that there will have to be, for the purposes of presentation, an analogon of "approaching and receding," in which the piece of the field, continually changing in its *quasi*-magnitude, counts as a presentation of the same corporeal moment. To this is added the possibility in principle of an ever renewed process of expansion, so to speak, of the adumbrations which the parts and the parts of the parts can undergo *in infinitum*, and through whose identifying enrolment into the schema of the whole, the respective total presentation, and finally every partial presentation as well, stand there ever again as incomplete and capable of completeness. We see that the continuity of the corporeal thing presupposes "inadequate" perception, perception through adumbrations which are ever capable of enrichment and more precise determination.

Likewise, in virtue of the finite extension of the scope of the field, a second [122] sort of inadequation is required: i.e., by moving, the Object can step out of the field and can step back in, and therefore it can fall partially within the field and partially outside it. Naturally, this is also employed in the case of the

continued claiming of larger pieces of the field for the presentation of one and the same corporeal piece in the process of continuous approach. Finally we no longer have a piece of the field large enough for a full presentation. However we think about this "approach," whether as something that is the same as the familiar approach, or only similar to it, in any case it is clear that the intensive and extensive infinity of space, of which in its own way every thing partakes, cannot come to presentation in an adequate fashion. Every possible presentation must economize with limited presentational means, and it can do so only if ever and again the same means of presentation, finitely manifold, come into action and the infinity comes to presentation through the serial form of the order of the operations. And an inadequation is necessarily involved here: the individual appearance can refer to an infinity of possible operations and presentations, but as soon as it does so, it is precisely inadequate in terms of the guiding ideal.

This consideration was, in a certain sense, an apriori one. We analyzed the ideal of adequation and examined the possibilities of a phenomenological constitution, as possibilities belonging to the nature of a spatial thing: the necessary possibilities, the ones that must be guaranteed if things are to be constituted phenomenologically.

We will now proceed in a somewhat aposteriori fashion. I say "somewhat," because we will not relinquish eidetic analysis. Specifically, we will now consider our so-called human intuition of space, in order to see whether it can actually refer to the ideal of would-be adequate perception as an ideal possibility intrinsic to it. Do not be shocked by my speaking of the human intuition of space. In the phenomenological reduction, the human intuition of space naturally ceases to be human. On the other hand, the idea of this intuition of space, i.e., the intuition of things as the constitution of things in the empirical sense, can very well be a species of a higher genus, to which, as correlate, things in a more general sense could correspond. For the considerations we [123] carried out hitherto, it was irrelevant whether, e.g., the space of things was three-dimensional or four-dimensional or whatever, or whether, moreover, it was flat or curved, etc. Presupposed are only the congruence in itself that pertains indissociably to the very sense of movement and continuity.

Thus now we will consider "our" intuition of things, our grasp of things, and our way of bringing them to presentation: *nota bene* the phenomenological species pertaining hereto. At first it actually seems that the essence of the presentation of things includes the possibility of an adequation, indeed that the idea of the presentation of things necessarily requires it. I remind you of what we said about the maximum points in the possible increasing series. I myself was formerly a victim of the illusion that here lies so near at hand, and I thus expounded something false when I lectured on these matters two and a half

years ago.[1]

What must disconcert us at once is the circumstance that, if the maximum points did signify actually adequate givenness, if not of the thing, then of some side or moment of the thing, we would find ourselves in a serious difficulty. The intuition of a thing, we said, is not adequate; the thing as a whole is never given conclusively. But with respect to this or that moment of the thing, ever more complete presentation can take place, and that appears, in the directions of change taken at any time, to culminate in a best presentation, in an appearance, which needs no further increase. Fine, let us take this best presentation as adequate givenness of the relevant moment. But what sort of moment is this? It cannot be a piece, for a piece could as a matter of evidence be rendered autonomous as a full thing for itself, and in regard to a thing there is progressive explication of the givenness in the form of a nexus of perception or a nexus of appearance, but there is no adequate explication in an individual appearance. Then the moment is only a non-autonomous moment of the thing. Can a non-autonomous moment, inseparable from the thing, alone come to [124] adequate givenness? Is there not a difficulty here? At the same time, this is a very good argument against the field-theory of givenness, which understands adequate givenness as real [*reell*] Being in perception. How is the moment supposed to be really [*reell*] immanent, while that is perhaps not at all the case for what is inseparable from it?

To gain clarity, let us undertake the following reflection: the essence of the perception of a thing implies that the thing, in the mode of givenness in the flesh, stands there as appearing in this or that way, which means as endowed with these or those determinations. The[2] appearance refers, by virtue of its sense, to possibilities of fulfillment, to a continuous-unitary nexus of appearance, in which the sense would be accomplished in every respect, thus in which the determinations would come to "complete" givenness. (The evidence of this possibility signifies, upon closer inspection, the evident possibility of phantasy appearances which are adapted to the perceptual appearance and which, as phantasy modifications of perceptual appearances, make up the "representation that such and such would come to more complete givenness." The evident possibility exists of integrating the relevant appearance into a continuous manifold of phantasy appearances, in which is present the perpetual fulfillment of the perceptual appearance, according to its immanent sense, as possibility, namely as phantasy fulfillment; therein we intuit the essential possibility of fulfillment, the essential possibility of increase in the conscious-

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[1] The reference is to the lecture, "Main parts of a phenomenology and theory of cognition," which Husserl delivered in the Winter semester 1904–05. Portions of this lecture were published in Vol. X of *Husserliana: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*. – Ed. [English translation by John B. Brough, *op. cit.* – Trans.]

[2] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's two critical notes, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

ness of givenness.) If we consider the state of affairs more closely, then we find, with respect to the various determinations, maximum points or maximum regions; i.e., to every determination there belongs, in ideal possibility, an appearance or a region of appearance in which the determination counts as "completely given" in such a way, therefore, that every other appearance, if it is a lived experience, finds in this region its pre-eminent fulfillment and in it is unified into a consciousness of fulfillment, one that, as it were, says: thus is the determination actual, or here it is properly and fully given, no longer as confused anticipation, or as unclear adumbration, and certainly not as empty intention. In the sphere of proper appearance we have presentations everywhere, and if we name every presentation an adumbration, then we everywhere have adumbrations of the determination. This means here, however, that these adumbrations are graduated in the sense of increase and adumbrate themselves in this new sense, and that we come to a limit sphere where the givenness is clear and complete and where the goal attained resides in the adumbrations: the most proper self-presentation, which, as ultimately fulfilling, refers to no further fulfillment. In the manifold of proper appearances we thus have everywhere the consciousness of givenness, but within it a region of the most proper consciousness of givenness, which in the highest sense gives us the very self of the determination, gives us the determination "as it actually is in the sense of the intention." Every other presentation, every other consciousness of givenness, is, so to speak, aiming at this determination. That is again to be understood in the sense of possibility. If I have an appearance, then it intends its object as so determined, and the essence of this "intending" implies the possibility of a *quasi*-fulfilling phantasy appearance or, rather, continuity of appearance. [125]

§36. *Optimal givenness and direction of interest.*

We[3] were engaged in the last lecture with the idea of adequate perception and with the question of whether the essence of the perception of a thing includes or excludes the possibility of actualizing this ideal. We pursued the question specifically in this sense: is an appearance (we could just as well speak of a finitely closed continuum of appearance) thinkable in which the thing would be constituted as an absolute givenness in an absolutely fulfilled way? The impossibility of this ideal seemed to spring forth clearly on general grounds. Now, however, it still remains to deal with the maximum points or maximum spheres we have found. In order to penetrate through to clarity in this regard, we began in the last lecture the following reflection:

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[3] Beginning of a new lecture. – Ed.

The essence of perception implies, indeed, that the thing stands there in the mode of givenness in the flesh and as determined in such and such a way, thus [126] with a sense which refers to possibilities of fulfillment whereby the thing would come, step by step, to full givenness. It seemed to correspond to this that the perceptions of things, with respect to the various determinations, refer to maximum points or maximum regions, thus respectively to an appearance or to a narrowly delimited region of appearance, in which, if it is actualized, the relevant determination counts as "completely" given. The transition to this sphere of appearance fulfills the intention pertaining to the initial perception. What was in that confused anticipation, whether as empty intention or confused adumbration, now stands there in the mode of complete givenness. Even proper appearance does not therefore do so. In the proper appearance we always have the consciousness of givenness with respect to what properly appears there. But the proper appearances have gradations in the sense of a progressive increase within a series of such appearances, and we end up in limit points or limit spheres, where the goal of the increase is attained, where the givenness is complete and stands there as such. It is at this limit, at this consciousness of the most proper givenness, that the intention is aiming in the respective stream of perceptions, insofar as this stream is characterized as demonstrating the relevant determination, exposing it in full givenness. This consciousness of the most proper givenness is the goal of the perceptual movement. We already find an orientation toward such a goal in individual perception; we can ask what it "means" and find an answer in the evidence that it is driving, so to speak, at an appearance which has the character of an appearance increased to the maximum. More precisely, the essence of this intention implies the possibility of a *quasi*-fulfilling phantasy appearance as the terminus which a continuity of phantasy appearances comes up against, a terminus that represents the maximum givenness as such, as the final fulfilling goal. In the modified fulfillment in the form of phantasy, the possibility essentially comes to evidence that the appearance would be fulfilled in such givenness, within the continual stream of appearances, and that what is presented in it in an incomplete way, with incomplete givenness, would there be presented completely and would appear in complete givenness.

I see, for instance, the surface of a cube in an incomplete way, in a mere [127] "projection." I understand the intention, I make it clear to myself, by representing the surface such as it would appear, after the appropriate rotation (which I carry out in phantasy), in a position parallel to the frontal plane and, *nota bene*, under good lighting. The surface appearing in this way is as a matter of evidence the one intended in the present appearance. It is the one we are referred to in the latter as exposition of the proper self-givenness, the givenness which shows, fully and completely, what the surface properly is, corresponding to the sense of the original appearance, and how it properly looks.

(Or the cube in the dark – in daylight.)

It must be noted that with respect to the entire thing, just as with respect to its individual determinations, we need to speak naturally not of a single maximum point but instead of a correlated group or sphere of maximum points, which are connected in the continuous series of appearances. I do not clearly see the corporeal form of my match box, in a dark nook between books, nor do I see its color. I would also say that I do not discern the form or color as they actually are if I am too far away, etc. But if I have the box in front of me on the table in full light, then I am satisfied, *nota bene* as long as I see it from all sides and each of these continuously coordinated appearances in the course of the rotation and turning has the character of the consciousness of maximum givenness.

It must be noted in addition that this circle of maximum givennesses is not a fixed one, insofar as it can be freely varied within certain limits. The differences pertaining to each of the appearances of maximum givenness are quite noticeable, but they count as irrelevant; they are without significance in regard to the increase or decrease of the completeness. If I have, in regard to the box, "good light," then it makes no matter whether the sun is higher or lower in the sky, whether it is covered by clouds or not. Nor is the appropriate viewing distance an absolutely fixed one. Within not inconsiderable limits, I can modify my position by approaching or receding. That does indeed yield differences in appearance that are not inconsiderable and are quite noticeable. But if what [128] is at stake is the general form of the box and the total coloration, if these are what is under consideration, if, in other words, I take the thing precisely as an ordinary thing in the sense of any common interest of practical life, then those differences in the increase of the fulfillment are of no account. The meaning intention pervades the privileged domain, but for the fulfillment of this intention every appearance within the domain, provided it does not overstep certain limits of variation, is a good one. And every variation yields equally good appearances. If the interest changes, if perhaps some "intimation" in the appearance that previously counted as complete gives the interest a new direction, then the circle of completely satisfying appearances is transformed into an unsatisfying circle, and the differences in the appearance, which previously were irrelevant, may possibly now become very relevant. These appearances no longer bring to givenness, to fully sufficient givenness, what now interests me, e.g. the striking surface; what sort of properties does this surface have, what kind of material is it coated with, etc? Or if we are interested in a house in regard to its architectural form, then the question arises as to which appearances provide this form in the best way. If the building material is the object of the interest, if it is questionable whether the pillars are of sandstone or cement, and what their "more precise" properties are, then we have to approach closer; and the new series of perceptions culminate in new limits of

increase, limits which are once again domains of irrelevance for this interest.

The natural interest in a flower is different than the botanist's interest, and thus in the two cases the best appearances are different, and the full givenness, in which the interest is satisfied, is essentially very different in each case. The flower is nevertheless the same flower, and there is one and the same nexus of appearance and, more precisely, nexus of perception in which the flower is constituted as a givenness and in which the full givenness is integrated in the sense of the common interest and in the sense of the morphological-botanical interest.

Thus we encounter here differences of interest, and conjoined with these are differences of a certain "intention" or, as we could also say, "representation." Every so-called "incomplete" appearance of the flower bears [129] an intention, directed toward the circle of appearances of completeness, in whose ordered actualization one sees what the flower properly is, i.e., what it is in the sense of the defining interest. According to the respective direction of interest, the "representation" is different, and accordingly the fulfillment, the satisfaction of this interest, terminates also in different appearances. The circle of complete givenness is a different one. Under the heading of fulfillment, we obviously have to distinguish here:

1.) The consciousness of the attained goal, which has its foundation in the appearances which terminate the process of fulfillment insofar as these appearances are "representatives," i.e., inasmuch as the appearing object, precisely in this mode of presentation, is what is intended and now is self-given just as it is intended.

2.) The satisfaction pertaining to the interest as such, a satisfaction which is built on that interest and which has a possible correlate, in a negative sense, in the consciousness of lacking nothing.

§37. *Direction of interest and formation of concepts.*

The distinctions of intention and of the interest which determines its goal are obviously joined essentially to the formation of empirical concepts. The concept of flower, the meaning of the word, intends something, i.e., refers to something in this intention: something that comes to givenness in the appearances (whether these be perceptual appearances or phantasy appearances) which fulfill the intention. These appearances are intuitions of what is intended. What is ultimately intended, however, manifests itself in the intention that penetrates the manifold of appearances (in which the intended object is constituted) or, rather, in its fulfillment in the consciousness of completeness. Thus we have the intention in the case of the word-meaning and the intention

in the appearances, and in the appearances an ultimately fulfilling intention, ultimately fulfilling through its appearing content, converts the sense of the intention into a clear, ultimately fulfilling sense in the concomitant process of fulfillment. Naturally, the ultimately fulfilling intention does not relate to a single phase of appearance but, as we already discussed, to a pre-eminent circle of appearances, which itself is in turn variable within a sphere of irrele- [130] vance. The orientation of the concept is determined by the interest that dominates the concept-formation, dominates the constitution of the consciousness of generality.

Let us now go further. We established that every perception of things has its intention, which determines the way the apprehended object will count, so to speak, i.e., what the perception is driving at, as it were, and thus the sense of its possible fulfillment. On the other hand, this intention can change, although the perception remains perception of the same thing. From this, the view seems to follow that the spheres of completeness, the maximum points and maximum regions, do not pertain to the essence of the appearance as such but to the interest founded therein and to the appurtenant intention. Let us attempt to follow this through. We would then have to say that no delimitation whatsoever lies in the appearances as such; their essence prescribes possibilities of a unitary progression. If an appearance is presupposed, then infinitely many possible series of appearance are thereby open, which would be series of appearances of one and the same thing.

Infinitely many possible appearances: that does not mean all possible appearances whatsoever. The unity of a possible perceptual synthesis in general, into which the relevant appearance is supposed to be ordered, prescribes a rule and law to the appearances that are possible in such a unity. If this norm is adhered to, then we have to think always about the various occurrences which pertain, as apriori possibilities, to every appearance as a phase of a perceptual synthesis. Here are enrichment and re-determination, to which every appearance in the streaming on of the manifold of appearances is liable, and is liable as a matter of principle. Here, too, is the taking on of new moments of indeterminateness, according to which ever new possibilities of more precise determination can then arise. With reference to this, it is already evident that we cannot speak of an adequate perception of a thing in the sense of an appearance of it which, as absolute givenness, would leave nothing more open, no possibilities of re-determination, enrichment, or more precise determination. The possibility is always open that it, the same thing, might have new determinations, ones which are not presented in the current appearance or at least are not presented in such a way that they could not present themselves, in new appearances, with a hitherto unsuspected richness of inner differences. [131] It does not help, in regard to the limitless multiplicity of possible annexed determinations which could arise in the nexus of experience, to fall back on

the primal thing with its primal determinations. For in a certain sense, limitlessness, which is founded in the essence of the appearances, rules even here. We must distinguish the relations of fulfillment which pertain to the intention (a changing intention) holding sway in the appearances and the intertwining, founded in the essence of appearances, of increases and decreases, among which are the continuous increases we spoke of under the title of "saturations." No possibility of absolute saturation is founded in the essence of appearances. Every saturation leaves open, ideally speaking, the possibility of further saturation. But, to be sure, an increased moment, an increased appearance, or a concomitant circle of appearances, can be distinguished by a quite different saturation of interest and fulfillment of a pre-eminent intention. If we choose from the indeterminate qualities the example of extension, then we know that a continuous increase of presentations is included phenomenologically under the title "approach." But approach has, lying in the very sense of perception, no limit that would itself still be perception. The very sense of our perception of things includes the spatial position of the Object with reference to the spatial Ego-center as the relational center of all spatial orientations and all possible presentations (i.e., as co-apprehended in all presentations).

The approach is the approach of the Object toward this point of orientation. In principle, that can go on *in indefinitum*. In practice, the normal viewing distance, or the like, sets a limit on the approach; but what does normal viewing distance have to do with the essence of appearances? Now could one say that the approach still always has a limit? Why should not the approach, in principle, go on until the distance is actually nil? And what about tactile space? Do we not touch the thing itself, do we not approach it all the way to the null point? Why should the eye not lie on the thing and be able to grasp the thing by seeing it from zero distance? In fact, that cannot be done. But in principle it is thinkable. Nevertheless, it is to be noted in the first place that the [132] comparison with the sense of touch will not do, for the approaching or receding of the Object is not, tactually, the approaching or receding of the Object in relation to the touching finger, since the latter does not appear tactually. At most, the analogue would be the act of holding onto some object, grasped first with the outstretched hand and then with the arm bending inward.

It is to be noted further, in the visual example, that the immanent change of appearance, which constitutes the approach, has, considered purely immanently, and thus phenomenologically, no limit of increase. On the contrary, by its very essence it can be increased to infinity. It is evident that the change of the image does not approach a limit, as, e.g., the intensities of a sound approach the limit point of silence, or luminosities approach black.

§38. *Clarity and distinctness in the givenness of the perceived thing.*

If these considerations leave a residual doubt, then that could in fact relate only to those distinctions of saturation which delimit a determinate concept of clarity or unclarity within the sphere of proper appearances. We can indeed speak of unclarity in various senses. In the framework of our present considerations, "unclear" can on the one hand mean improper appearance over and against clear, proper appearance. Further, it can refer to appearances which are determinative in an incomplete way, which leave open a more precise determination. This unclarity also appears in the sphere of proper appearances. In this latter sphere, we have again the differences in the "clarity" or, better, in the distinctness, which relates to the inner richness of the presentation, thus differences such as those of near and far, favorable or unfavorable position toward the Object, whereby now more, now fewer, determinations of the Object come to presentation, including the determinations of intensity. Also included here, first of all, is the unclarity (if upon close inspection it amounts to something proper) that arises from the particularity of the physical circumstances: poor lighting, night, fog, etc. Yet I am not now thinking of all that but rather of differences in clarity which likewise affect the richness of the presented determinations but which require a special attentiveness. I am referring [133] to distinctions in the visual field between the sphere of most distinct seeing and the gradations of ever lessening distinctness in the direction of the margin of the field. We have similar differences in the field of touch. We have spheres of the most distinct touch, of which there are several, interspersed with spheres of indistinct touch possessing now increasing, now diminishing distinctness. Here one could doubt whether the distinctness or clarity is not a privilege that is delimited in a fixed way, and that as such it has its transcendental significance, insofar as it perhaps pertains to the possibility of the Objectivation of space, something we will still have to consider. In any case, we could refer to the fact that if the Object is, as it were, shifted into the sphere of the most distinct vision, a modification is thereby carried out which leaves open no further increase, and this not only empirically but essentially, whereas, on the other hand, indistinctness can be conceived as stratified *in indefinitum*. (We note that these gradations of clarity lie on quite a different line than the ones mentioned previously, i.e., the ones pertaining to proper appearances, because these have no presentational significance for the Object. The darkening has Objective, physical significance. The expansion or contraction of the image has spatial significance, namely approaching and receding, whereas the modifications of unclarity in the visual field do not. If the visual field were clear everywhere, then it seems that this would change nothing as regards the presentation. It would concern only the possibility of *quasi*-movement.)

We[4] could now refer to the fact that, apart from all pre-eminent theoretical and practical interests, every indistinct appearance in the visual field bears a reference to the corresponding distinct appearances or to a certain circle of distinct appearances which brings one and the same Object to full distinctness (within the sphere of the most distinct vision). And we could say that in this way a proper givenness is originally distinguished as a givenness in this sphere of distinctness. On the other hand, however, the essence of the Object would imply that it comes to givenness in every distinct appearance and can dispense with no distinct appearance if the Object is to show itself from all sides and completely. The constitution of full givenness requires the completely ideal, limitless nexus of appearances, whether this be the givenness of the Object in itself or of its spatial and other relations to the Ego and to other Objects. I think that little can be said in opposition to this. Our considerations are now allowing us to understand to what extent neo-Kantianism was justified in designating the ultimate determination of the Object an infinite task; i.e., we can now see where the phenomenological grounds of that position reside. For every appearance includes, *a priori*, possibilities of re-determination, enrichment, etc., and also includes, *a priori*, an infinity of possible kinetic determinations, arising from the sides of the Object, which are mastered in geometry, and also includes *a priori* the possibility of infinitely many appended determinations which, in their character as actually pertaining to the Object, arise out of the nexus of experience through empirical motivation. However the Object stands there in appearance, however rich are the determinations by which it is apprehended and posited as existing through experiential beliefs, every new constellation of experience in which the appearance is integrated (or every change in the circumstances under which the thing stands phenomenally) introduces new experiential motives which necessarily acquire an influence over the apprehension of the thing. Thus there exists *a priori* infinitely many possibilities and ever new possibilities of determining the thing, which I in fact would not care to designate as an infinite task. Precisely because of this state of affairs, we will not be able to designate it as a reasonable goal to absolutely determine any thing whatsoever; the determination of the thing must be guided and delimited by reasonably practical interests. The same applies to an other ideal, which we will not discuss here more precisely, namely of determining things not individually but in general. This is the ideal of the research into the morphological "laws" that rule over thinghood. Whether matters are different for the exact laws of nature in "physics" would require a new investigation. [134]

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[4] On the following, up to the end of the §, Husserl remarks in the margin: "Not read; *cf.* new lecture." *Cf.* Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

§39. *Summary. The perception of the thing as a process interminable in principle.* [135]

In[5] the last lecture, we attempted to work out the thought that the distinguishing characters of the maximum points and maximum regions do not pertain to the proper essence of appearances as such but to the interest that dominates in them, or to the intention that belongs to them. In the appearances as such there resides no termination in limits which can count as limits of complete givenness, as if, once these limits are actualized, the full thing, or even only one of its determinations, would be given conclusively, as if thereby an appearance for itself could produce givenness in the adequate sense, be it only with respect to the same ever so small objective moment. If the interest is in tune with a region of appearances drawn from the continuous synthesis pertaining to the thing, then this interest is fulfilled in terms of this region, and so is the intention attached to the remaining appearances, provided the appearances of this region precisely elapse cohesively. But to have an appearance, or to have a group of appearances, matching the currently dominating interest and fully satisfying this interest, giving of the thing, and presenting in fullness and determinateness, that which is required by this interest, does not mean to bring the thing itself to adequate givenness just as it is and according to everything that pertains to it. That can be accomplished neither by an individual appearance nor by a group of appearances from a synthesis that continues on, ideally speaking, to infinity. Only this entire synthesis can accomplish it. And this is an infinite, never closed, never finished synthesis, because in principle there always exist the possibilities of presentations that are more precise, more complete, and richer in content. If we simulate an absolutely unchanged thing, which never enters into the manifold of possible kinetic changes and which presents itself accordingly, then we have to say first of all that, in virtue of the continuity of the geometrical corporeal thing, to be thought of henceforth as motionless, and in virtue of the finitude of the moments that can be distinguished in the appearance (whichever ones we extract), we are relegated to an infinite progression.

And in fact the appearance can, in accord with its essence, undergo constant [136] modification *in infinitum* with respect to its *quasi*-extension; in principle, an "approach," understood as a peculiar modification of the expanse of the visual appearance, can ensue *in infinitum*. And this expanse progressively offers an increase in distinctions for the appearing Object. These distinctions concern the possibility of grasping or phantasizing qualitative differences and thereby of introducing partitions into the appearing surface. On the other hand, no pregiven apprehension will help remove the possibility that the progress of

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[5] Beginning of a new lecture. – Ed.

actual perception will involve new determinations and re-determinations, that expectations will be disappointed, and that, in re-determination and perhaps in more precise determination, inhomogeneity will be attributed to what was apprehended as homogeneous. Even if we simulate an absolutely known thing, still that which belongs to it, that in terms of which it would be absolutely known, is never and nowhere given conclusively; that would have to demonstrate itself first and manifest itself as a givenness in the progression of the continuity of perception. And this givenness is never a closed and ultimate givenness, since the progression of perception first decides about admissibility or, more precisely, about the delimitation or alteration of the apprehension, thus about the validity of the belief-intention that pertains to the appearance at the beginning and that supplements the appearance to form a full perception. The spatial thing and already every piece, no matter how small, of the surface of the thing can find their full givenness only in the infinite process of demonstrating themselves through expansion and partitioning under continuous and constant positing of the unity of the unextended with the extended. And the same applies to the materialization of the expanse – and in the same process. Ultimately it is also a fiction, or an assumption, that the thing is absolutely unchanged. It is indeed not that the thing is pregiven to us, and the series of appearances and the series of perceptions something subsequent. Instead, the thing, which perhaps at the beginning appears to be unchanged, first demonstrates itself as such in the appurtenant constitution of the perceptual manifold, and this self-demonstration is nothing ultimate, nothing that could be given adequately at one stroke but is in general something given only relatively and with reservations. In principle it is always possible that the thing indeed change and that the apprehension of unchange, no matter how much it is [137] corroborated in continued confirmation, will give way, as a consequence of new motives given in the appearances, to the apprehension of change. And, naturally, the reverse holds if the thing was initially apprehended as changing.

This result is not in danger, and that would indeed be the sense of the comments I had to break off at the end of the last lecture, if, within the continuous synthesis, there are modifications in appearance which do not fit into what we have set forth in general, to the extent that in themselves they found limits and, specifically, limits of completeness. In this regard I referred to the gradations of that clarity of presentation in the visual field which proceeds from the marginal region of this field, as a region of indistinct vision, up to the region of the most distinct vision. The latter constitutes a limit in regard to this peculiar series of modifications and a limit for the completeness of the consciousness of givenness, insofar as, under conditions of equal brightness, what is presented through such "distinct" visual contents has a priority over the same thing as presented through indistinct contents. (In the dark, we see better, to be sure, with the peripheral portions of the retina than with the central

ones.) And something analogous holds for the distinctness and indistinctness of the accommodation. Nevertheless, if, correspondingly, what is indistinct bears a reference, and does so in general, to what is distinct, in the sense just indicated, still the distinctness of the presentation never signifies absolute givenness; for in the privileged sphere of givenness we stand *a fortiori* in the infinite stream of relativities founded in the essence of the perceptual appearances and of the positing intentions (the *belief*-intentions) built upon them. The moments of the appearance are not articulated, and cannot be articulated *a priori*, into ones that signify absolute givenness and into others that do not.

Instead, the essence of thinghood, with respect to all its moments, includes a stream of limitless continuity, a limitless realm of open possibilities *a parte ante*, which *a parte post* can ever be more precisely determined, delimited, and enriched, but which always have to await infinity. That holds for determinations of every kind and for every group in every class. For the materializing [138] determinations, the same result already arose from the preceding, and in addition we should note the thorough relativity of the "sensuous qualities," deriving from their dependence on the "circumstances." We see at once that this also holds for the appended qualities. We see indeed that everything appended has its source in the experiential motivation, i.e., in the motivation founded in the essential peculiarity of all manifolds of individual perceptions included in one perceptual consciousness, the peculiarity that they make their objects reciprocally dependent on one another and allow them to be reciprocally determined in experience. The power of this motivation depends *a priori* on the number of cases in which the same object appeared under "the same circumstances." Obviously, from this there results a limitless host of possibilities for the annexation of empirical determinations as determinations appended to the things materialized in the primary sense. Belonging here are obviously not only the acoustic determinations, which seem to pertain immediately to the things, and the determinations of the other senses, but also all the determinations of acting and being acted upon, all the causal determinations, and everything physics will determine Objectively as physicalistic properties.

To be sure, the question immediately arises as to the consequences for cognition that result from this limitlessness in the demonstration of all givenness.

Things, and everything pertaining to the sphere of things in general, are never given conclusively and never can be. They come to givenness only in an infinite progression of experience. Does knowledge not then become an aimless undertaking? Or are we supposed to be satisfied with the "infinite task"? Who would reasonably give himself a task the solution of which can be achieved only through an infinite process or, to express it better, the solution of which, as a matter of essence, is not something that can be achieved?

Naturally, if the task lies in the production of absolutely complete given-

ness, then it is *a priori* unsolvable; it is an unreasonably posited task. What we will conclude from this is therefore in the first instance the fact that the knowledge of reality cannot have this ideal, insofar as we may have confidence that knowledge accomplishes something actually rational and does so [139]
5 because it posits rational goals.

On this path lie great problems. It cannot be our duty to enter into them here.

CHAPTER 7

RECAPITULATION. THE ANALYSES OF PERCEPTION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

§40. *The sense of the phenomenological analyses of perception.*

Having concluded[1] the general considerations, to which we were compelled by certain excessively intrusive particularities in the sphere of the continuous synthesis of perception (e.g., those maximum regions which seemed to merge into the differences in saturation that pertain to appearances), the task would now be to proceed with the description. Let us recapitulate. We are aiming at an analytic and thoroughly clear understanding of the constitution of the thing as an Object in perception, i.e., an understanding of the intentionality that belongs to perception, an understanding of the givenness of the thing that occurs in it. We do not say: outside are the things, how can we know anything about them? We will not ask, as Kant did in the year 1772: what ground supports the relation of that which we call representation in us to an object existing in itself? We do not say that the things outside stimulate our sense organs and that to these excitations are linked certain psychophysical sensations and, subsequently, representations and other movements in the soul. How can we conclude back from these effects, present to us in consciousness, to their causes? Nor will we say that all allegations and assumptions about things trace back to experiences, ultimately to perceptions. These subjective lived experiences are all that is given to us. Since they themselves are not the things (which are, on the contrary, supposed to exist outside the subject), there must be inferences which induce and justify our assuming the things outside. How are we to formulate these inferences, where do they have their foothold within the sphere of subjective lived experiences of perception, which is all that we are given? How does the reality of what is subjective guarantee a merely hypothetically assumed reality of what is Objective, of what lies in the outer world? [140]

With such questions, supposedly so clearly justified and so insistent, we will have nothing to do. They are not only different than our own questions, they are also, as we know, perversely posed. We will prescind from the things-in-themselves of metaphysics, just as we will prescind from the things of

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[1] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

physics and the realities of psychology, namely souls, persons, dispositions, lived experiences, etc., and we will also prescind from the things of ordinary life. We will "prescind" from them: that means we will refrain from any judgment about real existence; our world is, so to speak, the world of absolute givens, of absolute indubitabilities, the world of "phenomena," of "essences," in short that which is unaffected by the positing of real existence or non-existence. We will consider no proposition of any science, no opinion of ordinary life, no perception or memory or anticipation to be a premise or a ground of knowledge. That is, we will not take these as they are intended in science or life, as a true positing of a state of affairs, as a perception of an object posited as existing, etc. On the other hand, all this does come back into consideration for us after the phenomenological reduction: the proposition as a phenomenon or as the essence of judgment, perception as a phenomenon or as the essence of perception, etc. It is not the existence of the perceived or any sort of real existence at all that is in question or is presupposed, in however distant a way, but rather it is the essence of perception, the essence of judgment, the essence of evidence, etc., that will concern us. Thus phenomenology and not psychology, physiology, or metaphysics. And what especially interests us here is onto-phenomenology, at its lowest level.

Things appear. Things, thingly determinations, and thingly occurrences, such as processes, relations between things, etc., appear. They are given in individual perceptions and nexuses of perceptions, they are presentified again [141] in memories, they are presented in images, and they are phantasized in phantasies. Here we have certain "phenomena," the phenomena of "experience" in the most original sense and the related phenomena of fiction and phantasy. We will exclude all judgmental positing of the experiencing persons and of the experienced things; we will exercise phenomenological reduction and carry out an eidetic consideration. We will ask: what resides in the essence of experience, in its originary "sense"? Its essence, the essence of the totality of absolute phenomenological givens, includes, or rather is, relatedness to an experienced object. Perception in itself is perception of a perceived; its essence is to bring some object to appearance and to posit what appears as something believed: as an existing actuality. How are we to understand this intentionality of perception, of experience, and the intentionality of the parallel, modified phenomena we designate as fiction and phantasy?

We do not ask how experience arises (i.e., as a totality of psychological lived experiences, interwoven in the real nexus of lived experiences and lived dispositions of empirical persons) but what "resides" in it, what there is to draw out of it, in virtue of its essence, as absolute givenness, i.e., what it shows, purely phenomenologically, as its own proper content and sense. What resides in it essentially, thus irrevocably, can be infringed by no theoretical assumption, nor can it be violated by any putative self-evidence of empirical

psychology or of metaphysical judgment, for every such violation signifies counter-sense. The sense that resides essentially in experience, in perception, memory, etc., must supply the ultimate norm for measuring the legitimate sense of all interpretation of real Being. The conditions of the "possibility of experience" are the first. Conditions of the possibility of experience signify, and may signify, here, however, nothing else than all that resides immanently in the essence of experience, in its *essentia*, and thereby belongs to it irrevocably. The essence of experience, which is what is investigated in the phenomenological analysis of experience, is the same as the possibility of experience, and everything established about the essence, about the possibility of experience, is *eo ipso* a condition of the possibility of experience. To expect of [142] experience something that contradicts its essence as experience of things, or to expect of its object something that contradicts it as object of experience, as constituted in experience in accord with the very sense of experience, means to interpret experience and the objects of experience in a countersensical way. That is absurd.

If we now investigate the essence of experience and first of all the essence of perception, then our dominant goal is to understand how it, so to speak, undertakes to be the consciousness of the givenness of an object, of a thing as an object. It is evident in the phenomenological position that a perception of a thing, such as a perception of a house, intends precisely a thing, a spatial Object, and that the sense of this spatial Object, as what is intended and posited in perception, includes this or that determination.

It is equally evident, however, that what is intended in this way is nothing really [*reell*] immanent in perception. How, in which moments, is this intentionality of perception constituted? How does the "self-givenness" that characterizes perception show itself through an analysis of its essence; through what analytic moments is it manifest, in what way?

To clarify this, we have carried out, step by step, distinctions and contrasts. We have argued that in perception as such a perceived object stands there as believed and in the flesh, that in uni-fold perception,[2] as we could name it (versus mani-fold perception), the object indeed stands there as given, but only from "one side," and in the mani-fold perception as given from many sides, and that in every uni-fold perception (whether for itself or as a phase of a mani-fold and continuously mani-fold perception) a distinction is to be made between presentational contents and the moment of apprehension, on which are founded, in a changing way, the intentions and act-characters of a higher stratum, including belief. We disregarded these higher characters and gave prominence to the appearance as something constant within the changing characters and as founding, i.e., as that which is present and lies at the founda- [143]

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[2] On this, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

tion, whether the attention is primarily directed to this or rather to something else, although the Object indeed "appears," and, furthermore, whether the Object counts as actually existing or whether, as in unmasked hallucination, it does not, or whether, in doubt, it counts as doubtful, or in abstention of belief, as something whose existence is prescinded from, etc.

Appearance was designated as the unification of the presentational contents with the apprehension, and this unity naturally is understood not as a summation or as two things bound together, but as a most intimate unity which we have sought to characterize with the word "animation." The presentational contents do not exist for themselves, with the moment of apprehension then fit into them, but instead the apprehension gives them animating sense; the contents stand there in the apprehension purely and simply. The making prominent results from the juxtaposition of perceptions, or appearances, whose content is different but which are perceptions or appearances of the same object, which intend the same object but display different presentational contents. And above all it takes place in the case of a change of intention while the presentational contents remain identical within intuitive conflict over appearances that interpenetrate and cancel each other out. In connection with this, we distinguished proper and improper appearance, with reference to the fact that uni-fold perception lets the thing appear from only one "side" and yet intends the thing, which is not just its side. We distinguished that of the thing which comes to proper presentation in virtue of the presentational contents pertaining especially to it, and that of which especially appurtenant presentational contents are lacking and which thereby lacks proper appearance. Apprehension therefore reaches further than presentation, and even this property of reaching further is not something that can be broken off as a piece and is only affixed to the proper apprehension. On the contrary, it is something that can be made prominent merely by way of evident identification and differentiation within the juxtaposition of different appearances which pose as appearances of the same object. It belongs to the essence of such appearances to found the possibility of such an identification and differentiation. Thus the intention aiming at individual objects is not restricted to what, as it were, strikes the eyes as a "side" of the object but also includes what of the object does not strike the eyes. The intention implies a relation to the non-presented sides. This signifies nothing else than that the intention has an essential character [144] which makes it adept at such identifications, where the evidence indeed resides that the same thing, which is here presented from one side and not from the other, is also intended in the other perception, the one which presents not this side but, instead, that one.

§41. *Attitude toward the thing and attitude toward the appearance (the given side) of the thing.*

Mr. Hofmann[3] has taken exception to this presentation, whose evidence is to me inescapable every time I live through it. He cannot make the *quale* of the phenomenological datum become an objective perception, in the manner, he maintains, of the *quale* of a determinate sound. And he says: If I perceive a house, there is not, juxtaposed to the physical thing, the house, still another psychic or phenomenological thing, called "perception."

This last statement expresses a juxtaposition we have certainly never stated. Naturally we have only one thing, in the phenomenological sense, only one absolute givenness, and yet two evidently different directions of judgment: one concerned with the appearing object, the other with the appearance. We not only distinguish appearances numerically but also according to their content. We indeed say that they are all appearances of the same thing. We have phenomenological evidence for this, namely within a full epoché of thingly existence. That also holds for the example of the sound. If I hear the homogeneously expanded whistling sound of a steam pipe, then I say, as I approach the pipe, that it is the same, continuously homogeneous whistling sound; that is the object. But if I attend to what is given phenomenologically, then I find, for every temporal fragment of what appears, an essentially different appearance; this *quale* is not the same. I thus separate appearance and what appears, and in the appearance, in which the whistling sound of the steam engine appears, I find a sensuous *quale*, the pre-empirical sensuous datum.

What may have contributed to the identification of the appearance and the [145] thing is the circumstance that in the transition from the consideration of the appearance to the consideration of the appearing thing, the appearance does not separate itself from the thing as a second, juxtaposed thing, but instead stands there as a matter of the thing, as befalling the thing. In other words, it is only in the appearance and with the appearance that the thing stands there. To this is conjoined the Objectivation the appearance acquires as "a side of the thing." I want to make some remarks on this; perhaps they will help clarify matters.[4]

The Objectivity of the side of the thing. The green meadow on the Rohn hill, covered with yellow blossoms, offers a different "appearance" from every viewpoint: it is always the same meadow, the same hill, but in a "different side." The "side" means here the particular adumbration of the Objective surface of the hill or, for this can also be understood, the proper appearance of

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[3] Husserl's student, Heinrich Hofmann, whose dissertation appeared in 1913. *Cf.* H. Hofmann, "Untersuchungen über den Empfindungsbegriff" ["Investigations into the concept of sensation"], *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, vol. XXVI, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 1–136. – Ed.

[4] On the preceding, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

the surface of the hill (not the complex of determinations that fall within the appearance). This side is something Objective of the thing, the side of the thing.

What sort of Objectivity is that? What do we have to distinguish?

a) The hill itself, which presents itself in the side, in its side;

b) the side, in which the hill presents itself, in which it appears.

α) The extension of the sensuous contents: the extension in which the "surface" presents itself (comes to proper appearance), the sensuous filling of the extension, its covering, in which the Objective coloration presents itself. Parts of the extension pertain to the individual plants and flowers, of which single ones are made prominent and distinct, and the same applies to parts of the total coloration.

β) That which makes the extension into a presentation (presentation thus here constitutes a proper appearance), that which bestows a sense, a signification, on the extension along with its filling.

γ) That which allows the unity of α and β to appear as something of the thing, as the side of the thing.

1.) The first, "natural" position is the one lying at the foundation if I describe the thing in words, for example. To describe the thing, I say: here is a [146] green hill, full of flowers, the Rohn hill with its fields. And even if I am not about to describe, and so am not in that attitude, I can be in a "perceptual" attitude such that I intend this same thing.

2.) I attend to the "appearance," it is my object: the side, i.e., the adumbration, the spatial adumbration, filled in such and such a way (proper appearance).

What sort of changed position-taking is involved here?

To attend to the hill of blossoms – to attend to the proper appearance: that is the opposition. I battled in my *Logische Untersuchungen*[5] against the fundamental prejudice to the effect that attending to something necessarily signifies intuiting and attending to an immanent content, and that therefore we must necessarily attend to the pre-empirical sensuous data and, on the other hand, to that which makes them presentations, to the so-called "feeling" of consciousness or to the character of "consciousness." I mean that we can attend to that as well, but to do so we need to turn our regard to it; i.e., a new lived experience is required, a new pre-phenomenal *dabile*, which is akin to the character of perceiving (perceptual apprehension and determination). Thus I mean that attention is a certain "attitude," an ineffable characteristic, which, in the turning of the regard to the seen object, presupposes nothing more than the

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[5] *Cf. Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. II, (1901) V, "*Ueber intentionale Erlebnisse und ihre 'Inhalte*,'" pp. 322ff. [English translation by J. N. Findlay, *Logical Investigations*, New York: Humanities Press, 1970, Vol. II, Investigation V, "On intentional experiences and their 'contents,'" pp. 533ff. – Trans.] *Cf.* also Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

lived experience of the appearance. Appearance, however, means the lived experience of the sensuous contents along with their interpretation, along with the moment of apprehension that animates them. But this animation means nothing other than consciousness, which is what changes when the sensuous data are apprehended in various senses, whether with a different objective direction, as when we vacillate between two conflicting apprehensions of the thing, or whether it is the determinateness of the objective interpretation that changes, and a new understanding, one that determines the object more precisely, arises, etc. All of that is something we can notice, which we do not merely speak of but also in a certain sense "see" and can lay a perceiving [147] finger on: it occurs, it comes forth anew, it changes, although it is not a sensuous content.

I say now that the animated sensuous datum, the animated and fulfilled extension, is a lived experienced, if we are turned toward the object, but it is not the Object, it is not that upon which we focus and to which we attend. In the lived experience of "attending to the object" nothing else is present than the animated datum and an ineffable intersaturation with the intention of attention, which, precisely in this intersaturation, constitutes that which we call attending to the object of the interpretation. It is an attitude which is the foundation for the objective description, and for the identifications in general, in which the object manifests itself as the same and as constantly intended, as the theme of consciousness, the about-which. On the other hand, if we attend to the appearance, then a new position-taking is carried out, and then the appearance, the adumbration, is the thematic about-which. And now we find that which makes the theme the theme, namely the objective positing and the attending, which here, I maintain, are just as little Objectivating as they are in the other case. In any event, it is clear that the attention functions here quite differently and that a different Object is present depending on whether we intend the meadow, the hill of blossoms, or the adumbration, the side. On the other hand, the appearing as such [*das Phansische*] of the "side" is, in every case, a lived experience. Whatever attitude we may take up, it pertains to the essence of the state of affairs that the one or the other position-taking is possible, and so is a transition from the one to the other. Thereby, however, there also exists at any time the possibility of placing the two objectivities into relation.

If we are in the attitude of focusing on the "side" in the indicated sense, then the side is itself nothing other than the presentation or proper appearance of the hill, which expands into the full "appearance" of the thing (also improperly), insofar as proper appearance is precisely not something autonomous. If the side is at all experienced in a lived experience, then the thing, the hill, appears as self-presentified; for the lived experience of the "presence of the hill itself" is nothing other than the lived experience of the "side," of the

sensuous data as extended in such and such a way, animated with such and such an interpretation, specifically also interwoven with a surplus of "improper" intentions of appearance. If we now turn our attention to the thing and then again to the side, or conversely, if we pass over again from the side to [148] the thing, then the side belongs to the thing, and the thing has the side, the thing presents itself in the side in such and such a way. It is the relation of presentation to the presented, and the interpenetration of the two lived experiences of perception allows the relation to appear as especially intimate. While focusing on the side I can express what it presents, how it allows the thing to appear, what the thing is according to the sense of the side. And I can also say of the thing that it is what is presented in this side in such and such a way.

The thing, however, has its environing things, which are co-apprehended, and the environing things include also the Ego, naturally the empirical Ego along with its empirical incarnation and its lived experiences. And now the empirically co-appearing relation between thing and Ego includes the fact that the Ego has its spatial relation to the thing and the fact that it pertains to this spatial relation, insofar as it is an appearing one, for the thing to come to presentation precisely in this side. Thus the side possesses a relation not only to the thing but also to the empirical Ego and to the relation between the two. Therefore, the side is something subjective, it is "my perceptual appearance," which belongs to me insofar as I occupy this or that position relative to the thing. And the side is also something Objective. It belongs to the thing, the thing appears in the side, and in the side it comes to givenness as "itself there."

If I turn toward the thing, and then to the appearance, I do not find in some sense two givens, the thing and the appearance, i.e., insofar as in reflection I find only what is phenomenological, thus no thing. I find the appearance and a different position-taking of attention, to which certainly there still belongs a new focus, the gaze of "reflection." Phenomenologically, I have merely a somewhat changed fabric, in which ever and again the appearance constitutes the predominant main core; objectively, however, I have two givens, since the object, meadow, is different than the object, "meadow-adumbration" or "meadow-appearance." And so it happens that we are inclined to say on the one hand, following the natural judgment about the thing, that here is the thing, and inclined to say on the other hand, with regard to the appearance, that the appearance, this side of the thing, is there to be sure, but only in it is the thing given. The thing is not otherwise to be found as a "thing;" i.e., the appearance is appearance of the thing, and nothing else is present. To have the [149] thing and to have the sides of the thing in view are one and the same. We do not have two givennesses, the thing and the side – or appearance – of the thing.

We say, however, that various givens are present: always the appearance of the thing, but now the appearance of the thing is Objectivated, i.e., itself made

into an object, the thematic about-which, and now the appearance of the thing is not Objectivated but is instead Objectivating and foundational for attention and possibly for judgment. Thus the thing not only appears but is now the thematic about-which. And again there exists a relation among thing, appearance, and Ego, in short, a relation linking all that we have expounded.[6]

§42. *Changed and unchanged perceptions.*

In[7] the last lecture, I began to recapitulate the general course of our considerations. I do not want to continue the recapitulation in full detail but instead only take a few words to recall as much as we can fruitfully link up to. After having brought out certain of the most general peculiarities of perception, we distinguished unchanged perceptions, i.e., those that are unchanged throughout their phenomenological duration, and changing perceptions. Change and unchange were thereby related to the appearances lying at the foundation of perceptions. Unchanged perceptions present objects as unchanged, but they always present them only from one and the same side; these perceptions are one-sided and uni-fold. The others can just as well present changed or unchanged objects; these perceptions are in general many-sided and are in any event manifold, insofar as the appearance in the case of these perceptions is precisely a continuum of appearance, possibly interspersed with spans of unchanged appearance. To each phase of the continuum of appearance there corresponds, through mere temporal extension, a possible unchanged appearance. To that degree, the continua of appearances are manifold, continuously manifold.

Within the manifold perceptions we then distinguished the various cases of [150] change in relation to the appearing object; from the other changes there stood out for us the purely kinetic ones. The appearing Object is in itself unchanged in all its constitutive determinations. Thus the spatial corporeality of the thing remains unchanged in all its inner geometrical determinations and equally in its qualities, above all in its primarily materializing qualities, which we especially wanted to grasp.

On the other hand, there exist external changes; i.e., either the thing appears as moving or resting, but the perceiving Ego, or its body, moves. The eye, the head, or the whole Body moves; the relations between the thing and the Body change, and to these there correspond ever different modes of appearance of the thing.

We studied the continuously manifold perceptions, these remarkably pre-empirical temporal courses, according to certain most general peculiarities.

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[6] On the preceding, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

[7] Beginning of a new lecture. – Ed.

We paid attention to the identity of the objective direction, an identity founded in the essence of the phases of appearance that are yoked together in this continuity. We distinguished harmony of sense from identity of sense; we spoke of the occurrence of indeterminateness and of the appurtenant more precise determinability, enrichment, and re-determination. Joined to these occurrences is the talk of fulfillment, yet we were immediately attentive to another sense of this talk, since we observed that certain appearances in the continuous synthesis are wont to be pre-eminent; to them the course of the synthesis seems to be, as it were, tuned. We paid attention to certain maximum spheres in which a privileged consciousness of givenness exists, one that claims to produce a more complete givenness than do the other phases that are not privileged in this way. That led us to more general considerations touching the question of whether the sense of this completeness includes the ideal of immanent, absolute givenness, or whether, on the contrary, absolute givenness in the form of an appearance at rest or of a pre-eminent piece of the synthesis is excluded by the essence of perceptual givenness in general. In fact, full [151] givenness, as we see, involves the whole synthesis in its infinity. Thus the ideal was a false ideal.

§43. *The role of belief-positing in the kinetic synthesis of perception.*

Yet these general considerations do not close the analysis of the kinetic synthesis of perception. On the one hand, we have not taken into account the moment of belief-positing and its coordinated modifications. On the other hand, there obviously remain very difficult individual analyses of the appearances that enter into the synthesis, needing to be much more penetrating than our previous analyses, in order to clarify phenomenologically the constitution of the unchanged object in the manifold of changing appearances and, further, the differences between the motion of the Object and the motion of the perceiving subject.

As regards the first issue, I will only indicate briefly that the belief and its coordinated moments are not a matter of insignificant annexes but are essential, unifying moments. In perception in the strict sense, what appears stands there as a being; it counts as actual. Yet the essential core of the phenomenon, which we call appearance, can be preserved even though this character of belief is lacking. Belief may pass into doubt, into disbelief, into presumption, into a prescinding from belief, into a mere inclination toward belief, and such like. There still remains the question of which are the actually coordinated and primitive occurrences and which are complex and founded. For instance, in doubt we vacillate between belief and disbelief; this vacillation is a peculiar

phenomenon founded in the conflicting belief-tendencies, conflicting on the basis of various appearances that are by their very essence incompatible with unity.

These various occurrences, which we need to study more closely, can be founded, ideally speaking, in the same appearance. We do not need to say that appearance does not signify a piece that remains identical in the exchange of such characteristics, as if these latter were annexed to the appearance as [152] adjuncts. Perhaps it is a matter of modifications which thoroughly penetrate or, on the other hand, of ones with include something abstractly identical under the title of appearance. Accordingly, the continuous synthesis of appearances will have its unity with respect to this intellective character of a higher level as well, and for the constitution of the thing, this unity is obviously not a matter of indifference. You will see that from the following: every appearance can be transformed, in infinitely many ways, into other appearances. The synthesis, taken as infinite, is, despite its infinity, a fixedly determinate one, insofar as it is supposed to be the synthesis that pertains to the determinate thing and constitutes precisely this thing and no other. This infinity is extracted from infinitely many infinities, i.e., from an unlimited number of other syntheses, in which the seen appearance could also be integrated. What makes up the fixity of a synthesis, such that in it is constituted a fixed, self-identical thing? Obviously it is the unity of the belief which, precisely in this succession of appearances, again and again is reinforced and validated, and which constitutes the unity of the experience.

Naturally, belief is nothing for itself; in its unitary character, it penetrates the appearances of continuity and penetrates all the Objectivating moments of these appearances. And the appearances are unitarily bound in the continuity, which is called continuity for precisely that reason. But they are unitary in the mode of ever newly motivated and ever newly fulfilled belief. If we phantasize a thing, the appearance is an appearance of a thing only because, in the phantasy, by its very sense, it is supposed to count as pertaining to a possible fixed synthesis. Then, in place of the belief, in place of the actual belief, there arises a phantasy-belief, which now dominates, and unifies, the appearances, the modified appearances, as they elapse. In phantasy we can, to be sure, arbitrarily modify the appearance. We have in mind, e.g., a red sphere; we can, disregarding every law, let is pass over into all possible spatial forms, and we can introduce into it all possible qualities – whether lawful or not. If an intention of phantasy-belief, being *quasi* reinforced and fulfilled, unitarily dominates spans of such change, then we have the representation of a thing whose form [153] or color is becoming modified now in this way, now otherwise. If everything becomes arbitrary, if the unity of the coherent experience, which distinguishes a possible fixed synthesis, is abandoned, then we can also no longer speak of a thing that would be constituted here in phantasy as fixed and self-identical.

Thus no matter how much appearances can be addressed, individually or in part, as appearances of things (and that happens only with reference to a phantasy-synthesis borne by the phantasy-belief), still a thing will never be constituted without maintaining a thorough unity of possible experience. In order to bring a thing in phantasy to constitution, what is required is a unity of experience constituted as possible in phantasy. Unity of experience is therefore not merely a continuity of appearances; it only presupposes that continuity. The thing is "not a mere unity of 'representation' but a unity of 'judgment.'"

That indicates a line of fundamental investigations. They do not lie in the direction we are now following. We would merely need to stress the unity of judgment, which is what produces experience, so that our analyses of appearance will be understood in the correct sense and within the appropriate limits.

SECTION IV

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KINAESTHETIC SYSTEMS FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PERCEIVED OBJECT

CHAPTER 8

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF KINAESTHESIS [154]

§44. *Preliminary indication of the further themes of the investigation.*

Our task is now to carry on the analyses of appearance and, in particular, to analyze the distinctive and relatively more simple case of mere kinetic change. The great task here would be to penetrate as deeply as possible into the phenomenological "creation" of three-dimensional spatiality, i.e., into the phenomenological constitution of the identical corporeal thing in the manifold of its appearances. These appearances, however, are appearances of movement. All spatiality is constituted, i.e., comes to givenness, in movement, in the movement of the Object itself and in the movement of the "Ego," along with the change in orientation that is given thereby. In individual, "uni-fold" perception, spatiality does indeed appear to us, and so does the thing, equally in its corporeal space and in its location relative to other things (specifically in virtue of the integration of the perception into the more comprehensive "total perception"). In a number of uni-fold perceptions, then, a body may possibly appear from various sides, i.e., in the unifying synthesis of identification. But in this way it does not attain full and self-demonstrable givenness. It must already be noted, since it is a matter relating to all discretely given uni-fold perceptions, that in isolated appearances there does not reside enough to allow [155] the actual identity of the appearing object to demonstrate itself therein. In popular terms, if I have a determinate perception of a thing, let us say of a familiar, and perhaps very familiar, thing, and if I now have a discrete second perception of the back side of this thing, then I may synthetically bring the first perception, which still lives on in memory, into a unity of identity with the new perception. In fact, the two perceptions, by their very essence, are bound together through an identity of sense. But I must immediately issue a restriction. I said, "through an identity of sense;" that would mean that the back side, as it is represented in the first perception, itself comes to appearance in the second. But is this fact given? It is indeed possible that the second perception relates to a second object, entirely similar to the first object, such that I see the first object from the front and the second from the back. Thus we would have, possibly, similarity of sense but not identity of sense, and, more generally, we would have similarity of the objective direction, i.e., direction toward something similar, but not identity as a direction toward something

identical, toward one and the same object.

We may speak of the evidence that the identity is given only if a continuous transition from the one perception to the other is guaranteed in the unity of experience. The unity of the object demonstrates itself only in the unity of the synthesis continually joining the manifold perceptions, and this continuous synthesis must lie at the foundation in order for the logical synthesis, that of identification, to produce the evident givenness of the identity of the objects appearing in the various perceptions. The perceptions must be integrated as phases into the synthesis, and we see that precisely only if we carry out the synthesis.

This important fact holds generally. In our case, it means that an identical and unchanged spatial body demonstrates itself as such only in a kinetic series of perceptions, which continually brings to appearance the various sides of that thing. The body must rotate or be displaced, or I must move, move my eyes, my Body, in order to see it from all around, and at the same time I must keep approaching it and receding. Or, finally, both I and the thing must move. [156] That is how the state of affairs is expressed from the standpoint of the appearing thing.

How then do the appurtenant phenomenological nexuses look? What in them constitutes the three-dimensional spatiality of the familiar qualities, what constitutes the corporeal thing in its identity, what constitutes its manifoldly possible movement and its position in relation to the Ego-center? We know that spatiality is doubly constituted, once with visual and another time with tactile determinations. We can therefore separately ask how visual space is constituted and how tactile space is, insofar as in general they are constituted independently of one another. (In any case, we must be able to establish their shares.) And what constitutes the identity of space, which is materialized once visually and at another time tactually and yet in this double materialization is the one identical space?

It is easier to pose these questions than to answer them. It would be the height of presumption on my part to claim that the following remarks are going to provide the answers. It is a matter of first beginnings, which can only show that the problems are graspable and actually solvable, although we can say without exaggeration that they belong among the most difficult ones in the domain of human cognition. We will be able to take advantage, however, of what we have already accomplished this semester in our preparatory work on the phenomenology of the thing.[1]

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[1] We distinguish thinking about a thing, about its rest and motion, and perceiving it. I know in thought that I am moving, along with the earth, in the space of the universe, but I do not "see" it.

§45. *Rest and movement of the unchanged thing, in relation to the rest and movement of the perceiving Ego.*

We wanted[2] to investigate the phenomenological givenness (the phenomenological self-constitution) of the visual thing, specifically within a determinate restriction. It is a matter of the thing that is the same and unchanged in the manifold of kinetic appearances. The identity of the thing remains preserved in various series of changes. In Objective terms, the change can be a merely [157] kinetic one, with the entire constitutive fund of the thing then remaining unchanged. What remains unchanged thereby is first of all the thing as a body, i.e., the body in the sense it has in geometry as the science of the body; on the other hand, the matter that fills the geometrical body is also unchanged. We say simply that the thing remains unchanged; it "merely" moves. We will have to discuss later the thing as what is identical in stereometric changes (mere changes of form) and also as what is identical in "material" changes. Obviously, it is a question here of a necessary division within the general task of the constitution of the thing, a division residing in the very nature of the matters at issue.

The unchanged thing can now be at rest and can now move. The appearances of the thing's rest and movement are manifold, and we are specifically seeking to gain a sort of overview by taking into consideration the movement or non-movement of the perceiving Ego.

I.) First of all, I can, in perception, persist in complete immobility: I can keep my eye, my head, and my entire Body still, insofar as this can be significant for the kinetic appearance in general. Then the Objective field of perception can

1.) be at rest – in terms of appearance, naturally. Should this be the case, then the total phenomenon must remain unchanged, and in particular so must the presentational contents, the entire fund of sensations, which is in service to the apprehension of the field of Objects. As soon as the visual field undergoes noticeable change, movement or some other change necessarily appears.

2.) Under the given presuppositions, movement can also appear. Then the presentational visual contents in the visual field change, and specifically in a certain manner that remains to be investigated. Movement in the field of Objects allows various possibilities: individual Objects can appear at rest, and all of them can be in motion. As regards an Object that appears to be stationary within a field of moving Objects, its presentational contents must remain unchanged as long as it actually stays in the Objective field. If the Object is partially or completely hidden, then it precisely steps out of the Objective field, either partially or completely. But as long as it is actually given, and to

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[2] Beginning of a new lecture. – Ed.

the extent that it is given, it is unchanged in its presentation. Conversely, as regards moving Objects, the appearance of movement presupposes a change in [158] the presentational contents. All this can take place under our assumption of a completely unchanged corporeal posture and position of the eyes (the accommodation, too, thought of as fixed).

What we have discussed is not at all affected by the possibility that motion can Objectively take place while the content of the appearances remains completely unchanged: e.g., if I move in Objective space along with my entire perceived environment. We are not speaking here of Objective movement but of the appearance of movement. And the latter is possible only in the case of a change in the visual field.[3]

II.) Instead of keeping my Body still, I can move it. In every case, this yields phenomenological changes already by the very fact that the sensations of movement flow on in determinate series of changes. But various systems of series of visual changes are joined to these. The Ego-movements that are relevant for the appearances of things divide into several independent systems of movement. The eyes can move, and so can the head, the trunk, etc. Here a distinction must certainly be made between "self-movement" and "being moved." Being moved is an Objective fact. If I am unaware of it, and, above all, if it does not at all appear to me, then it changes nothing in the world of appearing Objects. What matters above all, then, is "self-movement," and that manifests itself in kinaesthetic sensations. In order to study the relations here, we will especially focus on eye-movements. They form a system in themselves. The remainder of my body may be completely still. In the case of eye-movement, a thing can appear to be stationary, and it will appear as stationary while the phenomena change continuously and in all sorts of ways. A certain pre-eminent continuity of change in the presentational visual contents belongs here to the very self-sameness of the unchanged thing. The series of changes is again a determinate one but is quite different when it is the Object that appears to be in motion and, in particular, in motion in this or that way.

How then are rest and movement constituted in this confusing profusion of appearances? Rest in a thing, in a materially and stereometrically unchanged [159] thing, signifies complete changlessness. How do manifoldness and continuously changing appearances succeed in posing before the eyes something completely changeless, e.g., in the case of manifold "eye-movements," other "corporeal movements," and the determinate phenomenological changes indicated by these words? In all these, the determinateness of the corporeal thing is constituted, and so is its "location," its place, and thus also the determinateness of every place in space. And which changes in appearance then constitute movement as change of place, the displacement and rotation of an

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[3] Naturally, it is different if we include sympathy. We are not speaking here of the intersubjective thing.

identical body?

§46. *Presentational and kinaesthetic sensations.*

There seems to be an inconsistency in the way we have begun. We wanted to consider the visual thing and the visual constitution of space and place, and now we are introducing at the very outset the movements of our Body and, through them, the sensations of movement which indeed do not belong in the category of visual contents. But it will soon be exhibited that visual contents are not sufficient by themselves to serve as apprehensional contents for visual spatiality and for a thing in general. And I add immediately that the same holds for tactile contents and for tactile spaces.

There is, to be sure, a certain justification in speaking of visual and tactile space, as follows quite clearly from our previous discussions. This way of speaking refers to certain classes of sensations which have the distinctive peculiarity of coalescing into fields. And that implies further that sensations of a type such as the visual (the same then applies to the tactile) allow their concretion to be distinguished into two kinds of moments; the material and extensional moments of the matter (of the quality in a broader sense) cover or fulfill a pre-empirical expanse, and indeed they do so necessarily. The red-moment, with such and such a brilliance and saturation, is what it is only as the fullness of a certain extension; the red-moment expands. We can now say that only sensations which exhibit such peculiarities are capable of bringing a thing to presentation and of presenting an Objective matter as extended in [160] Objective space. If a materially filled space is to appear Objectively, then it must present itself in a field of sensations, in a predication of sensation, in an image, as it were.[4] Classes of sensation that have no fields, to whose concretion no "extension" belongs originally, are therefore incapable of a projective presentation. They can serve as presentations only for a secondary filling of space, for secondary determinations of a thing. These determinations are dependent on the thing being already constituted from another quarter and can then just as well be present in the thing as they can be absent (the thing may now make a sound and now not, may now be warm and now without thermal determination, etc.).

Upon closer inspection, we see that the projective and therefore necessarily materializing presentation does not exhaust presentation in general and in the broadest sense, insofar as we understand "presentation"[5] to be a term that includes all contents of sensation, all that enters, as physical datum, into the

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[4] On this, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 293. – Ed.

[5] On the concept of "presentation," *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 294. – Ed.

unity of appearance and undergoes animating apprehension, precisely making possible thereby the appearance of a thing. I am naturally thinking here of the sensations of movement. They play an essential role in the apprehension of every external thing, but they are not themselves apprehended in such a way that they make representable either a proper or an improper matter; they do not belong to the "projection" of the thing. Nothing qualitative corresponds to them in the thing, nor do they adumbrate bodies or present them by way of projection. And yet without their cooperation there is no body there, no thing.

This says that the extensional moment of visual sensation, and also that of tactile sensation, indeed adumbrates spatiality but yet does not suffice to make possible the constitution of spatiality, just as little as the qualitative moment suffices for the constitution of the Objective, space-filling feature. Still new sensations are needed, and we speak here of the sensations of movement which, in the animating "apprehension," naturally have a position and function [161] that are quite different than those of the presentational contents. They make possible a presentation without being presentational themselves. Yet I must at once note terminologically that the phrase "sensation of movement" is unusable to us, since we do not want to suggest that we sense the movement of the thing or even that the movement of the thing is presented in these sensations. The phrase is usually related to what is self-moving, and it will then be understood psychologically. To exclude this psychological meaning, we will employ the term *kinaesthetic* sensation, which, as a foreign word, is less misleading. Naturally, in the case of "eye-movements, head-movements, hand-movements," etc., we have to do with continuous sequences of sensations which terminate at will and every phase of which can extend, with unchanged content, into a duration. These unchanged sensations thus provide us with pure and simple kinaesthetic sensations versus kinaesthetic changes or sequences.

We naturally will not determine the concept of this group of sensations psychologically or psychophysically, but phenomenologically. Whether they make up a fundamentally and essentially new basic category of sensations, or whether they do not rather belong together with the tactile sensations in a higher genus, is a question the doctors can dispute. For our part, we need to consider only the fact that, whether functioning in visual or tactile appearances, they have indeed their determinate proper type over and against all visual and tactile sensations and are specifically bound together with these sensations and, if you will, are interwoven with them, but they still cannot blend with them in the sense of exchanging functions with them.

§47. *Insertion of the kinaesthetic sensations into the Body.*

I said that the sensations of movement do not present any matter, and this statement relates to the appearing external thing. But in a certain way it does not apply to the Ego-Body, into which indeed these sensations are inserted as appearances. This happens, however, in a way that essentially distinguishes the Body from all external things. On the one hand, the Body is also a thing, a physical thing like any other, namely insofar as it has its space and is filled with a proper matter and an appended matter. It is a thing among other things, and among them it has its changing location; it is stationary or it moves just as other things do. On the other hand, this thing is precisely a Body, the bearer of the Ego; the Ego has sensations, and these sensations are "localized" in the Body, in part as thought there and in part as immediately there by appearance. To be sure, in seeing, I do not localize the visual appearances, as appearances, in my body, although I do indeed so localize the tactile sensations and the others interwoven with them, including the sensations of movement. The touching hand "appears" as having touch sensations. If we turn to the touched Object, smoothness and roughness appear as belonging to it. But if I attend to the touching hand, then it possesses the sensation of smoothness and the sensation of roughness, and it possesses them on or in the appearing finger tips. Likewise, the sensations of location and of movement, which have their Objectivating function, are attributed immediately to the hand and to the arm, as encased in them. If with my left hand I touch my right, then along with the touch-sensations and the kinaesthetic sensations there is constituted, reciprocally, the appearance of the left and right hands, the one moving over the other in such and such a manner. At the same time, however, i.e., with a reversal of the apprehension, the self-moving appears in an other sense, which applies only to the Body, and in general the same groups of sensations which have an Objectivating function are apprehended, through a reversal of the attention and the apprehension, as subjectivating and specifically as something which members of the Body, those that appear in the Objectivating function, "have" as localized within themselves. [162]

There are all sorts of phenomenological analyses to be made here. Our present concern will only be the intertwining, in a remarkable correlation, of the constitution of the physical thing with the constitution of an Ego-Body. This latter is also a physical thing and is constituted like any physical thing but is pre-eminent in its appearance and is above all other physical things through a class of appended determinations[6] which pertain to it exclusively, and indeed in proper appearance. These are the "subjective" determinations. The kinetic sensations belong here, but other sensations also do, ones that even have a [163]

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[6] On this, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 294. – Ed.

primary materializing function for the appearing things, such as the sensations of touch, and also feelings like pain and pleasure, etc. If we remain merely with the sensations that have an Objectivating function for things, then we find that they take on a double apprehension, first the one that allows the physical thing to appear and also allows the Body to appear as a physical thing, and then the one that allows the Body to appear as sensing, as the bearer of these and those sensations. From the Objectivating sensations, appended determinations of a special type arise, subjective occurrences inserted in the Body, localized in it. If we go beyond the domain of proper appearance and of appearance in general, then there arises from this, finally, the introjection of all sensations and all appearances, all phenomenological occurrences, into the Ego and into the Ego-Body, and likewise the possibility of attributing to other physical things introjective "psychic occurrences," "lived experiences of sensation, perception, etc.," and of apprehending these physical things as "animate Bodies." But that already transcends the line we are now following. Here we are especially interested in the kinetic sensations. (They are not essential for the appearance of physical things.) They are not presentational in the pregnant sense; they do not constitute the matter of any thing, even an appended matter. They only allow an apprehension which transforms them into appended determinations, i.e., a subjectivating apprehension, which is in principle accessible to all sensations and which presupposes the Ego-Body as already constituted from another quarter and thereby presupposes that the kinetic sensations have functioned in another manner.

Disregarding the subjectivating objectification, our concern will be to understand the physical-Objectivating function of the kinetic sensations and to understand thereby the constitution of a thing in general. We shall focus on the unchanged thing, identically the same, simply here at one time, then there, now stationary, now changing its place.

CHAPTER 9

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VISUAL FIELD AND THE KINAESTHETIC SEQUENCES [164]

§48. *The presentational means of the visual field.*

Let us consider the presentational means, specifically for the visual thing, and restrict ourselves to monocular presentational means. The term "visual field" offers us one group of such means; in this field, pre-empirical "matters" are extended. Thus we have to distinguish pre-empirically here between matter and "form" or, to avoid this equivocal word, "form," between matter and extension. I think it is indubitable that this distinction is justified phenomenologically. It obviously exists independently of movement; these two moments are present in every concrete visual sensation whether the appearance changes or does not change, whether sequences of sensations of movement take place or do not. There indeed exists here an independent variability, which we grasp immediately, within certain limits. If we consider the state of the phenomena which is offered precisely by the most favorable analytic conditions, the state of the phenomena within the sphere of "distinct vision," we find that the same quality (including the moments essentially pertaining to it, such as brilliance and saturation) can undergo certain modifications, modifications of the extension. And, conversely, the same extension can undergo modifications with respect to the quality, i.e., with respect to quality in the narrower sense, brilliance, saturation, or all these together. In many appearances we can find sameness of extension along with difference in filling, just as we can have sameness of filling along with difference in the extension; and in addition, there can be in both respects various levels of similarity, up to dissimilarity. The essence of this state of affairs, which is indicated by the words "field" and, concretely, by "contents in the field," implies a distinction in location. Two of the same visual concreta (same just as much in extension as in matter) can be distinct only in virtue of their locations; the one is here, the other there. Furthermore, two concreta, distinct by their extension, can be [165] different in size and shape. Complete sameness of extension is sameness of size and shape, but each can vary independently. We presume here that actual concreta of sensation are closed off and delimited. The field can be a unity that has no internal delimitations, but it can also have boundaries and can delimit various unities against one another. The field can be partitioned and can allow

unities to break down into parts which are themselves delimited as unities or which can in turn delimit further parts.

There is a great deal to be described here. In any case, we see in general that this partitioning through delimitation includes, essentially includes, mutual limitation and that an ordered nexus exists with respect to the parts which are delimited and mutually limited in a whole. Precisely this characterizes the field, that a manifold fragmentation belongs to it as a possibility and that every disjunct fragmentation founds an ordered nexus. The partitioning is constituted in appearance by virtue of a qualitative discontinuity. For example, I may partition the field through a series of levels of discrete color quality: red, blue, green; red, blue, green; etc. Then every level has its determinate neighbors, these again have others, and so on. A fixed order results. Accordingly, every piece of the visual field, every visual concretum that can be distinguished in the field, has its position in the total nexus, and within this concretum so does every part, as well as, ultimately, even the smallest part that can still be differentiated, and every limit, every point.

It is this order that for us characterizes the field as a fixed system of locations. Every distinguishable concrete element of sensation has its corresponding location, its "here." And this "here" is a moment which belongs to it and which founds the relations of distance. Every element of the field can be conveyed "continually" to others, perhaps while preserving its full sameness, and thereby the "here," the place, continually changes into ever new places. This is what "displacement" and "rotation" in the field are reducible to. In rotation, one element maintains its position, and others change theirs while maintaining the same relative distances, etc. We come finally to recognize that the visual field is a two-dimensional manifold which is in itself congruent, continuous, utterly coherent, finite, and indeed bounded; it has a margin, [166] beyond which there is nothing. Two-dimensionality means that every piece of the field is bounded by non-autonomous limits, which are themselves in turn continuous manifolds, and thus each piece is again fragmentable in such a way that these fragments "limit one another." But the limits are not fragmentable; they are simple elements of extension, "points." The limits of the pieces of the visual field are continuous punctual manifolds, whose pieces are bounded by points; i.e., they are lines. This is what characterizes the two-dimensional manifold, that the limits of its pieces are lines. The coherence of the field is thereby never broken. Every piece is fragmentable, has an interior and an exterior, and from the interior of every piece possible continuous paths lead into the interior of every other piece. What is ultimate, what can be fragmented and delimited no further, is the point, in connection with which we need to consider whether in principle a fragmentability *in infinitum* does not repose in the essence of the field, or whether the *de facto* fragmentation, which leads to *minima visibilia*, provides in them the essentially ultimate elements,

thus whether points and visual atoms are one and the same. To answer this question we would need to attend to the essential similarity within the visual field itself, in the great and the small, in the intact and the partitioned, in displacement and rotation. It is obviously this immanent similarity which, as an evident generic sameness, founds the transference of the essential relations that are located in, as it were, the macroscopic realm to the microscopic "atoms" residing beyond all partitioning.

In all these appearances, it should be noted that the terms we have been using, such as line, point, location, shape, size, etc., are not to be understood in the spatial sense. We already said earlier that the visual field is not some sort of surface in Objective space, which makes no sense, any more than points and lines in the visual field are points and lines in Objective space or even have any spatial relation whatsoever to spatial points and lines.

The visual field, in virtue of its essential peculiarities, thus offers us, besides the pre-empirical matter, pre-empirical places, shapes, sizes, etc. Furthermore, their possible changes come into consideration as presentational means. A concretum in the field can change *quasi*-materially according to [167] quality, brilliance, and saturation, while remaining within fixed limits as to size, shape, and location. But it can also change in these latter respects as well, either by themselves or also qualitatively. Thus *quasi*-displacement and *quasi*-rotation are possible, and so are *quasi*-contraction or *quasi*-expansion, *quasi*-distortion, etc. The delimitations can also become vague, through a slackening of the precision of the qualitative discontinuities. We need to mention here the striking occurrences, which are significant for the presentational goals, that take place in the change of location of a visual formation when it is transferred to the margin of the visual field. Furthermore, we should allude to the changes that are usually designated Objectively as changes in accommodation.

Naturally, these changes, too, must never be interpreted in the empirical-spatial sense appropriate to things. Thus we can indeed speak, although, to be sure, only within a narrow sphere, of a mere movement of an "image," i.e., the movement of a visual concretum in the visual field. (We know that qualitative changes always occur in the transition from the middle of the field to the margin.) But the moving image is not a moving empirical thing. It is certainly of the essence of a thing to be identical with itself in the stream of its changes. But not everything identical in a stream of changes is a thing in the empirical sense. In general, the following should be elaborated: in every continuity elapsing in a pre-empirical temporal stream, there "resides" an identity; i.e., there exists the ideal possibility of carrying out the continuity in the consciousness of unity, thus of intuiting the identity of an object in the stream of its phases and of determining it as given. Thereby we also have the possibility of unifying, in a synthetic consciousness of identity, the phases extracted analytically from the unity as well as the possibility of raising them to the

evident consciousness of the identity of the "object" "presenting itself" in these phases. That is an essential law, valid for all continua elapsing in the pre-empirical stream of time. For example, a sound endures or changes, according to whether all the temporal phases in the stream of time of the elapsing sound have the same temporal filling or have a changing temporal filling (constant temporal filling or one that changes disjunctively in the individual phases). While living through the succession of sound, we can focus on the sound as what is identical in the succession. The sound, which changes, is the unity in the streaming and changing manifold. The sound is an adequate givenness in the consciousness of unity but is not a really [*reell*] immanent givenness; it is a transcendence, if we designate the really [*reell*] immanent as the immanent pure and simple. It is a transcendence given on the pure ground of immanence. In this connection, I spoke last semester[1] of pre-empirical substance and pre-empirical accidents. The sound changes its pitch, e.g., or its timbre, or the one remains unchanged while the other changes. Obviously the moments of the individual phases participate in the substantialization; they receive unity through the unity-consciousness that binds them together: the pitch of the tone is what is identical in all the pitch-moments present in the phases of the sound. [168]

This Objectivation, which belongs to the essence of the streaming on of a continuity, whether it is a continuity of the same data or a continuity of continuously changing or continuously-disjunctively <sic!> changing data, is naturally for the benefit of the visual data as well, as soon as the data are grasped in an unchanging duration or in a stream of change. Even in the visual field, therefore, we can occupy ourselves with pre-empirical substantializations, and we do so as soon as we say and intuit: "This image is changing its coloration, its brilliance, its place." And to that extent, we also have here an evidential foundation for speaking of movement and possibly of mere movement as mere change of place. Yet no matter how important a piece of the Objectivation of the thing is indicated by the words "identity in the continuity," still that is not the identity of the thing, and it remains an enormous task to penetrate through to that identity. The identity of the sound is an identity in the actual phenomenological stream and does not reach beyond it; that identity of image in the pre-empirical change of location is what is identical in this actual change, in this "movement." The thing, however, is in and with the stream not only of its actual changes but also of its possible changes, and the latter are indeed infinite, though firmly delimited. And the empirical thing is what appears as identical in the stream of pre-empirical occurrences, but it is not something identical "residing" in them, something that could be ade- [169]

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[1] This is surely a reference to the lecture, "Introduction to Logic and Critique of Knowledge," which Husserl delivered in the Winter semester 1906–07 in Göttingen. *Cf.* Vol. X of *Husserliana, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, Appendix XI, p. 125. [English translation by John B. Brough, *op. cit.*, p. 128. – Trans.] Husserl speaks there of "pre-empirical, pre-phenomenal substance." – Ed.

quately drawn out from them. No one perceives two sorts of things, the external things and the immanent things in the field. For instance, if an Objective thing appears as stationary while the eyes move, then the image executes a *quasi*-movement in the visual field. We can attend to this, we can notice the image changing its place in the field, but it is not that we thereby perceive a moving thing and subsequently, with another direction of attention and with the addition of apprehensions that would give us an empirical thing, perceive a stationary thing. There appears, and can appear, precisely only a single thing, because the "image," in changing its location in the field, can indeed be posited as an identity but not as a thing. It is no more a thing than a sound, which appears as identical in its changes of intensity, would already be a thing in virtue of its being posited as identical. In principle, it makes no difference that in the contents of the field we have a moment such as location in the field and, accordingly, change of location and identity in the stream of this "movement."

§49. *Functional connection between visual data and kinaesthetic sequences. Monocularity and binocularity.*[2]

The class of presentational means that we now have to discuss lies on a completely new path. These means stand outside the visual field and have no more of an intrinsic and founded connection with the visual contents than the latter have with the tactile. Color and extension belong together; they are founded in one another. The color fills the extension; the color diffuses in it and generates a colored extension. Every change of the extension, or of its form, also in a certain way affects the color, and vice versa. The determinations pertaining to color, such as hue, brilliance, and saturation, obviously belong together otherwise than do color and extension and, again, otherwise than do the moments of size, shape, and location within the extension. But there are indeed everywhere [170] appurtenances which are founded in the essence and which still condition, despite all the variability of the individual moments, their generic alliance, and thus they produce inseparable unities.

It is otherwise with regard to the kinaesthetic sensations. They lack an essential relation to the visual sensations; they are connected to them functionally but not essentially. The bond in the case of functional unity is a bond of what is separable; it is not the bond, or, rather, the intrinsic unity, of what is mutually founded. The kinaesthetic sensations form continuous multidimensional systems, yet in such a way that they, like the aural sensations, form continuous unities only as sequences. Thereby a linear manifold, extracted out of the total manifold of the kinaesthetic sensations, coincides in the

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[2] *Cf.* Appendix IV: "The kinaesthetic systems of monocularity and binocularity," pp. 307ff. – Ed.

mode of a filling continuum with the continuous unity of the pre-empirical lapsing of time. A kinaesthetic manifold can acquire continuous unity only as a linear manifold, i.e., by filling a span of time. Since only a continuous linear manifold can function as a filling of time, a multi-dimensional system of kinaesthetic sensations cannot arrive at a closed temporal unity. If we make prominent the system of kinaesthetic sensations of the eye (system of eye-movements), then this is, disregarding the rolling of the eye, doubtlessly two-dimensional; for to every position in the visual field there corresponds a sensation of the position of the eye (at least within certain limits), and every visual line that the gaze runs over has a correspondence in a continuous kinaesthetic sequence which, in terms of sensation, is distinct from every other one. Whether the "refinement of distinction" in the two domains is the same or different (we know the latter is the case) is not essential. In general and on the whole, the correspondence exists, and there also exists the possibility of a two-dimensional gradation of the kinaesthetic sensations corresponding to the bi-dimensionality of the visual field. In virtue of the essential similarity of all kinaesthetic sequences among themselves, the essential fragmentability of the greater ones is transferred to the smaller, and to the latter an unlimited divisibility and, ultimately, continuity are likewise attributed. It is evident that there [171] is a phenomenological kinship between the kinaesthetic sensations of the eye and the kinaesthetic sensations of the head and thus in general among the kinaesthetic sensations of the various systems. On the other hand, these are separate and do not continuously pass over into one another, at least not normally. We cannot now investigate whether this derives from their specific character as simple sensations or whether it does not rather follow from the fact that we properly have to do here with considerably complex products of associative fusion which have characteristically distinct features in the diverse systems. In general it is not important for our purposes whether the term "kinaesthetic sensations" designates an essential, new genus of simple sensations. It only matters for us that phenomenological sensations and sequences of sensations are demonstrable here, ones which form multi-dimensional continuous manifolds and which, through the apprehension of a thing, have a function related to these visual sensations and sequences of sensation and constitutive, in this connection, of spatial things. Problems lie hidden here at every step. But we only want to follow the main lines.

Besides the kinaesthetic sequences, we still have to mention another group of sensations or modifications of sensations which come into play for the constitution of a thing; the ones discussed hitherto pertain to the visual space of one eye. Those that we will now take up are provided specifically by binocular vision. Since they are separable, I preferred to wait until now to discuss the moments in question, although they are intimately joined to the visual sensations.

Among the changes in the visual image that occur only in binocular perception, we need to mention the splitting of an image, or of a visually sensed adumbration, into two images or, conversely, the fusion of two images into one. It is a matter of two images which stand in a relation of especially thorough similarity, one that reaches all the inner moments of the images, although a distance separates these images in the visual field of cross-eyed seeing, and there they have a different orientation (the differentiations are according to a type, however, and occur within certain limits) and in any case, therefore, a different locality. The similarity is so great that the one image appears as the [172] "repetition" of the other, and often the similarities are in fact so great that the consciousness of dissimilarity can find no foothold. Nevertheless, in other cases the differences in content are noticeable. On the one hand, they concern clarity, which can be different for each image. Objectively speaking, the one has the privilege of more precise accommodation in relation to the other. Furthermore, even if the levels of clarity are equal, if the sharpness of the peripheries is the same, and if the sizes and shapes are "completely" alike, there can still be considerable differences in coloration.

Connected to double images is the phenomenon of competition, the peculiar change an image undergoes when its coloration gets, as it were, diluted, and the image becomes "transparent," whereby it finally always gives way to another phenomenon, the one that appears through it, and it disappears in favor of that one. Yet what is most important is that every image resulting from the unification of double images, or, conversely, every one breaking down into double images, displays, apart from the quality of fullness, also the quality of standing in relief, of being differentiated in depth or of having depth-values. Here we will attend to a manifold of graduated moments of sensation which move within fixed limits in such a way that one limit has the character of null-point. It is a matter of moments of sensation which, abstracting from the apprehension, are appended to the images and extend over the expanse of the image and thereby in a certain sense fill that expanse, concurrently and in parallel with the coloration. They exactly follow the differences in location that pertain to the extension of the image, and they also follow the moments of coloration which are thereby localized. But they do not do so as if various depth-values would also correspond to the various extensional values, as if the depth-values therefore formed a two-dimensional manifold, coinciding with the two-dimensional manifold of the extension. Instead, they only form a one-dimensional system, which owes its continuous unity to its coincidence and fusion with the unitarily continuous system of the extensional manifold and which now fills this manifold either with constantly the same value or with changing values. As is the case with all double continua, here too a break in the continuity or the emergence of discontinuities in the depth can only occur within limits that are joined by continuous mediation. Thus [173]

here, too, the case of continuous similarity counts as continuity.

This moment of depth is founded in the moment of extension, and precisely thereby the coloration acquires not merely extension but extension with depth, possibly with a changing relief. If we go beyond the image, *nota bene* the simple image in the binocular visual field, then the moment of depth extends further, whether this be over the entire field, in case the field is free of double images, or over coherent parts of the field. The moment of depth conditions distinctions in depth which, like all continuously graduated distinctions, are the foundations of distances. In the monocular visual field (therefore likewise in the case of double images) all distinctions of depth cease. Thus it seems to be a matter of a continuum of distinctions which can extend over the pre-empirical expanse either completely or partially but do not necessarily do so, and thus they are separable from it. For, in essence, a field is a field and an image an image, whether monocularity or binocularity is involved. Nevertheless, we need to ponder the fact that there is actual separability here. The absence of distinctions in depth in the "monofield," if you will pardon this expression, does not signify without further ado the absence of every depth-value in it, but perhaps the absence of a constant depth-value. A still unclarified difficulty confronts us here. On the one hand, I cannot refrain from grasping the relation between depth-values and extensional values as a relation of founding. Indeed, a sensation of depth by itself is unthinkable. Should we then say that an extension totally without depth is thinkable, but not depth without extension? But there are serious objections involved in attributing depth, even a constant depth, to the monocular field. We must consider these things more closely.

The element of depth, in its continuous fusion with the continuously unitary system of places of bi-dimensional extension, constitutes an essential phenomenological distinction between the double field and the monofield. The consciousness of depth might arise ever so vividly with the monofield – in empirical terms, monocular vision might "perceive" depth – yet the sensation of depth would be lacking as the specifically presentational moment for properly seen depth. For the rest, it should be said again that the sensation of depth, or pre-empirical depth, is not in itself the depth of things, and pre-empirical relief is not "actual" relief, the relief of things. Here "depth" can be meant only in the sense of the relief which, as it were, covers the appearing thing and shows "by way of sensation" only the appearing side of the binocularly grasped thing. It remains to consider in what sense the so-called moment of depth presents three-dimensional spatiality and in particular, over and against the right-left and above-below, presents the in front-behind as relative to "me." [174]

Note that the "relief" changes with every movement of the eyes, but it signifies the same relief of things, which is a system of three-dimensional distinctions. We still have to determine more precisely what sort of distinc-

tions these are. "Breadth" presents itself through the differences of place in the visual field. Yet what is "breadth"? Let us say first of all that it is distance, relative location. What is identical in the manifold of differences in location is the image in the visual field; that is the original. Those distinctions of "relief" are not at first distinctions of location, but they acquire the significance of certain distinctions of location. The distinction is evident here already by the fact that the distinctions in the depth of things are comparable with other distinctions of place: all distinctions of the place of things are comparable and can be brought to partial or total coincidence in the mode of congruence. But the pre-empirical distinctions of depth reside in a completely new genus over and against the distinctions of extension. As little as a temporal distance can be like or unlike a distance in breadth, no more can a distance in breadth, speaking pre-empirically, be like or unlike a distance of pre-empirical depth. It would naturally be a fundamental aberration to say that if a straight line in some way rotated from the plane into the "depths," it then would rotate itself out of the plane visual field, and that we then see the likeness of the extensional straight lines with the ones that are displaced into the depths and other similar things. Naturally, it is not possible for something to rotate out of the visual field, and the straight line that is displaced into the depths is, for sensation, constantly changing: it perpetually changes in a determinate way its [175] moment of extension on the one hand and on the other hand its gradations of depth.

Finally, I need to mention still one more group of kinetic sensations pertaining to binocular vision, namely the sensations of convergence or of divergence. These are certain coordinations of the sensations of the two eyes; functionally connected to them is the changing divergence of the double images, i.e., their various distances in the double field, or the connection of these in one image and then the changing depth-value.

After the description of the presentational means, i.e., the material of sensation, which, in the manifold of the appearances of a thing, bears the function of apprehension and constitutes, as it were, the matter with which consciousness carries out the creation of nature, our task is now to focus on the character of this creation.

§50. *The sequence of images in the case of eye-movement and in the case of the movement of the Object.*

The appearing thing is what is identical in rest and movement, in quantitative and material change. Each of these titles includes manifolds of appearances. Following our plan, we have first to consider identity in rest and movement,

specifically as limited to monocularity. Here the kinaesthetic sensations will play an essential role in the constitution of a thing. In view of the fact that a thing can appear either at rest or in movement while the eye and the remainder of the Body are completely motionless, one might at first think that kinaesthetic sensations are unessential to the constitution of a thing. Kinaesthetically, nothing changes here. It therefore seems that what the purely visual field offers as presentational means is sufficient to constitute the appearance of a thing. Yet we can recognize the inadmissibility of this thought by comparing the case in which the field of Objects is stationary and only the eye is in motion with, on the other hand, the case in which the eye is stationary and the field of Objects is moving. In both cases, the exact same change can occur in the visual field. With mere eye-movement, the visual image wanders over the visual field and undergoes a determinate series of modifications, including [176] qualitative ones. If the eye is stationary, the exact same series of modifications can still elapse, and then movement appears.

The same holds, if, instead of mere eye-movements, we take movements of the Body as a whole, ones which occasion changes in appearances. In carrying out certain movements, we may have the appearance of a continuously stationary field of Objects, and yet there is elapsing a certain series of visual images as they constantly pass over into one another in such and such a way. If we allow the Body to be completely motionless, and if the thing appears to be stationary, then we have a single unchanging image. But the Object might now begin to move, in such a way that the exact same series of visual images elapses as did previously, when it was the Body that moved. Yet now we have the appearance of movement, whereas formerly, despite the identity of the sequence of appearances, something stationary appeared. We can therefore contrast the following two cases: first, our eye and our Body as a whole are motionless, and a stationary field of Objects appears. The field of visual sensation is unchanging. Now the Body may move and at once the field of Objects may move as well, but it is obviously possible for the field to move in such a way that it in a certain sense imitates our motion, i.e., such that the field of Objects constantly appears in the exact same "appearance," presenting itself in the exact same visual field. Thus, with one unchanged visual field, in the one case rest appears and, in the other, movement.

From this we see that in fact the merely visual sequences are not sufficient for the apprehension and that they do not contain the means to bring rest and movement to an appearance where they would be discriminated. But that is to say that the constitution of the Objective location and of Objective spatiality is essentially mediated by the movement of the Body or, in phenomenological terms, by the kinaesthetic sensations, whether these be constant or changing kinaesthetic sequences.

§51. *Sequence of appearances in the case of mere oculomotor changes.*

Let us now consider the manifold of appearances that belongs to mere rest. The thing stands there materially and stereometrically unchanged and stationary. Let us first set in relief the stratum of appearances which belongs to the kinaesthesia of the eye-movements. We can leave the remainder of the body stationary and thus leave its appurtenant kinaesthetic sensations constant. We will also assume a determinate accommodation. If the kinaesthetic ocular [177] sensation K_1 is at first also constant (thus, Objectively speaking, the eye is stationary) perhaps during the stream of time t_0–t_1, then the visual image i_1 is also constant during precisely this time. If then K_1 changes in a continuous sequence, during the new span of time t_1–t_2, into K_2, then the image i_1 also changes into i_2. If K_2 reverts back to K_1, then so does i_2 into i_1 in the same time span. Every change whatsoever in K conditions univocally a change in i in such a way that the same span of time that is filled with the one change is also filled with the other. Every pause in the change of K signifies a pause in the change of i. If K becomes constant during some time, then so does the appurtenant i. In every appearance of a stationary thing, these two factors of sensation are involved, the K-factor and the i-factor. Their relation is one of dependence, as we have just attempted to determine. And the dependence is reciprocal. The same K-sensation is accompanied by the same image, and the same image also by the same K-sensation.

On the other hand, we know that the connection between K and i is not a fixed one, as if the determinate sensation of movement K contained once and for all a reference to the determinate image i and, conversely, the determinate image i contained such a reference toward the determinate sensation of movement K. *A fortiori*, then, this connection is not an intrinsic and indissoluble one. That is clear. Every sensation K is compatible with every visual image, and if I now find K and i appearing together *de facto* while I perceive a stationary Object within a determinate perceptual situation, then every turning aside of the head teaches me (as do memory and intuitive phantasy) that the same K can just as well be joined to another image for purposes of a unitary appearance of either the same thing or a different thing. Precisely this same reflection teaches that K and i do not somehow stand in perpetual coexistence, nor could they be founded on a corresponding empirical relation of motivation such that the one would refer in an empirically motivated way to the other as appertaining to it once and for all. On the other hand, we cannot see how contents that possess no unity of foundation stemming from their own proper character could be unified except through association. The title "association" here is not a matter of a genetic-psychological fact of dispositional propensity [178] toward the emergence of an α on the occasion of the lived experience of a β within a soul, for example if K and i were repeatedly experienced together. On

the contrary, association here refers to the phenomenological fact of a certain appurtenance and of a certain reference of the one to the other, such that the positing of belief in the one motivates belief in the other, and the one stands there as something pertaining to the other, unified with it in a peculiar way, yet without this unity being the inner unity of essence, i.e., unity through foundation.

To be given together, to be given together repeatedly in one consciousness, creates a sort of unity whose force increases with the number of cases of the givenness together in the one consciousness. And this creating is itself a phenomenological fact; i.e., it is evident by an essential law that the more often an α and a β were given contemporaneously or successively in a consciousness, the stronger does the assumption that an α is given motivate the assumption that a β is given along with it or, in the other case, will be given after it. Furthermore, it is evident that the actually given α and β then all the more manifest an appurtenance and refer to one another more "strongly;" i.e., this reference is fulfilled all the more "strongly." These propositions are to be interpreted in the correct way, however, i.e., phenomenologically, entirely within a nexus of motivation carried out in an actually intuitive manner. The phenomenological state of affairs also includes the "counter force" of contradictory instances. The disappointing of associative intentions weakens their motivating and unifying force and in conflict posits a counter force opposed to them. Apart from any hypothesis about the soul and its so-called dispositions, which is customarily placed at the foundation of the theory of association, association as such includes phenomenological findings, findings based on essential laws, as I already indicated on occasion in my *Logical Investigations*. Here we do not need to consider the role association plays in the constitution of the experiential connection of objects and in the occurrences of a thing's existence and of its qualities under certain circumstances. We are speaking of association here in the simplest form of the merging of "clashing" lived experiences into "harmonious" ones; i.e., we are speaking of the associative intentions and fulfillments through which the phenomenological data that lack essential unity acquire a certain extra-essential unity: i.e., aposteriori or empirical unity versus apriori unity. To be sure, the word "empirical" instills its own equivocity here. [179]

If we now turn back to our kinaesthetic sensations and to the images united with them, then at first no association appears between *K* and *i* that could accept responsibility for their determinate connection. Indeed, it is certain that if I move my eyes closer to a stationary thing and then farther away, and in so doing repeatedly come back to the same location, I again find there the same *i* along with the same *K*. And thus they acquire an associative relation to one another. But its force is weak, since it is "destroyed" through the ever new connection of such a *K* with completely different images that are as a rule


altogether dissimilar. Now I turn my head and my body, and the visual field is filled in another manner; I am turned toward other things, and ever again toward others.

On the other hand, there is indeed a connection here. If I now, with the *K*-location of the eye, have a certain partitioning of the image in the visual field, and if I desire to have another one which (always in relation to a stationary field of Objects) transports an image i', now belonging to the left half of the field, to a determinate position in the right half, at the place now occupied by the image i'', then I know immediately what movement of the eyes I have to carry out. With the representation of a movement of the image $i' \frown i''$, I have at once the representation of a kinaesthetic sequence $K' \frown K''$ as one that appertains to it; K' thereby pertains phenomenologically to i', and K'' to the new location i''. If I investigate in this way the system of the movements of the images, the system that always inserts each image in whatever part of the visual field, I find as appertaining to it the system of variations of the *K*'s, and to every image, or every partitioning of an image, there pertains a determinate *K*. How is that to be understood?

However I position my eye, the entire visual field is always there with all its places. The manifold of places is something absolutely invariable, something always given. And this manifold is never given without a *K*, and neither is a *K* given without the total manifold of places which is merely fulfilled in a changing manner. To that extent we have a fixed association, one that is never to be disturbed, yet it is not between one *K* and one place, but between the [180] entire extension of places and "*K* in general," though, once again, to be sure, this is not a definite *K*. For "*K* in general" signifies that some *K* or other, or some continuous sequence of *K*, is always empirically one with the manifold of places. And if it is a sequence, it does nothing to the manifold of places. It is, as we said, what is absolutely invariable. On the other hand, there does indeed exist a certain coordination of the *K*-sensations with the images of the stationary field of Objects: to every determinate image, there corresponds a determinate *K*; and to every changed *K* there corresponds another image from the Objective manifold pertaining to the same stationary Object. What do the terms "correspond" and "appurtenance" mean here? Are there not indeed present here associative connections, and how is the phenomenological state of affairs to be grasped and described more precisely?

A definite *K* and a definite *i* are not connected "once and for all." Phenomenologically, this means that K_0 as specifically so characterized, K_0 as K_0, does not refer in general to the relevant i_0 as i_0. If I turn around, and the same K_0–sensation does not refer me to i_0, then I am not disappointed to find together now with K_0 a different *i*. But K_0 does indeed belong to i_0 under the given circumstances. What makes the connection here, and what distinguishes it? Let us think of a stationary square in a visual field, in any stationary

environment:



We move our gaze and occasionally also pause it. Let *a* be the fixation point, and then let the gaze wander in such a way that, in running along the perimeter, we fixate *b*, *c*, *d*, *a*. To every ocular position, there then corresponds a determinate pre-empirical figure: f_a passes over into f_b, f_c, f_d. At the same time, the *K*-sensations are continuously in transition as well: K_a passes over into K_b, K_c, K_d. Phenomenologically, we find that in this continuous transition, f_a "refers" to its continuous neighbors, and that therefore intentions penetrate the series f_a to f_d and are continually fulfilled in the elapsing of the series. We discover, founded in these moments, a thorough consciousness of unity. [181] Admittedly, this consciousness grasps more than actually is present in these intentions. We know indeed that this series does not give us the Objective square completely; its full presentation includes still many other possible series, ones which relate to other bodily movements and to the appurtenant changes of the images. Apart from the corresponding intentional components, the present intentional series is indeed in any case a component, and in fact one that constitutes givenness.

It is quite different with the series of the *K*'s. They do not refer to each other; they elapse, but they are not bearers of intentions that penetrate them, intentions of the kind which the *f* 's possess. That is, they are not traversed by a consciousness of unity. The reversal of the succession of the *K*'s again gives us a stream of intentions which penetrate the *f* 's: f_d, f_c, f_b, f_a, directed to each other and through each other, whereas the *K*'s elapse in reverse and again without this distinguishing mark. We thus find in the appearances two moments functioning quite differently. The *K*'s are the "circumstances," and the *f* 's are the "appearances." A determinate change in the circumstances results in a determinate change in the appearances, specifically in a change which gives to their intentions the character of a stream, fulfills them, and instills in them a thorough consciousness of unity. The *K*'s and the *f* 's naturally do not together form a unity of the sort that the *f* 's possess among themselves. The consciousness of unity runs only through the *f* 's, not partially through the *K*'s, partially through the *f* 's. On the other hand, they are not joined as a mere conglomeration but rather in such a way that if K_0 passes over into K_1, f_0 passes over in expectation to f_1, referring to – and being fulfilled in – each new phase.

For the rest, the *K* can now still change arbitrarily in the firmly delimited manifold of *K*'s (manifold of eye-movements). My fixation point is no longer

in the square; I perhaps fixate points in the environment, traversing these or those paths of fixation. The state of affairs remains the same. The *f*'s assume new modes of change, the image travels along these or those *quasi*-lines of the visual field, but the image always remains in the consciousness of unity: in the elapsing series of images one perpetually refers to the other, and ever again to others, or the one image is penetrated by the unitary intention and unitary fulfillment. But it is only under its "circumstances" that the image has this intentionality. If an f_a is once given together with K_a, then to every determinate change, ΔK_a, there belongs, in temporal coincidence, a determinate course of fulfillment Δf_a, and to the mere duration of K_a there belongs the same duration of f_a. [182]

§52. *Transfer of the just-discussed state of affairs to the total field of Objects.*

Hitherto, we have been privileging a determinate Object of the field, the determinate square in any given stationary environment. If we now draw the remainder of the Objective field into the consideration, our description then acquires a new, essential supplement. What we have discussed applies not only to the square but also to every Object in the field of Objects. And, as we now see, the determinate kinaesthetic sensation *K*, which belongs to a determinate location of the image of the square in the visual field, thereby pertains to every image and image-point of all Objects of the field: thus the same identical *K* for all of them, for the entire field of images. Under the same kinaesthetic circumstances, we have the same field of images. Every kinaesthetic change alters the field of images. The phenomenon of the stationary field of Objects in the manifold of variabilities and invariabilities of the field of images is a phenomenon which places the continuity of the *K*-sensations, as well as that of entire fields of images, into univocal correspondence with the essentially different characteristic by which the *K*'s are determined as circumstances but are not bearers of the consciousness of unity. For this consciousness exclusively penetrates the fields of images and is fulfilled in them or with them. And it penetrates the field of images implicitly; it penetrates all the individual images, and these separate themselves off within this consciousness.

Now the same also holds for every stationary field of Objects. Every distinct field presents itself in a different manifold of images; and there is already a difference if the same Objects in the same Objective nexus are presented with different images, even if it is only such that the coordination of the images in relation to the *K*'s is changed. Thus perhaps the same field of images, which was previously bound with K_0, is now linked to another *K*, for example [183]

when I move my head very slightly without any perspectival changes becoming noticeable.

Accordingly, it is clear that if association is supposed to be in play, it naturally cannot be association between the *K*-sensation and just any image, since the entire field of images is co-involved. Furthermore, it is not an association with a determinate field of images, since every other field of images could just as well enter in. The same *K*-manifold is bound together with all the possible manifolds of fields of images which in themselves present the unity of a stationary (and ever different) field of Objects. What do all the fields have in common? Naturally, the identical manifold of places[3] of the pre-empirical field. But this manifold offers no basis on which a connection could be made. For it is precisely always there, always given together with some *K*'s or other and thereby with all possible *K*'s and *K*-sequences.

Therefore the connection can reside only in the formal unity of the sequences. Each of the sequences in which a stationary Object is presented as in a field forms a type, whether this is smaller or greater, whether it goes in one direction or in the reverse direction. Every such sequence has its counter-sequence, and in this reversal it again forms a type. And all these sequences are to be bound together, perhaps by way of mediation, into comprehensive sequences, and they form a universal type. On the other hand, every such type, actualized in the stream, is given together with a determinate *K*-sequence in temporal coincidence. Thus, with the omni-sided transformation and re-transformation of the gaze, we have again and again the parallel sequences of the two serial systems: on the one hand the systems of images and on the other hand the kinaesthetic streams and systems of these streams. The temporal series on both sides are identical, and, in their filling, they correspond reciprocally and univocally. The associative connection joins together the corresponding phases through co-existence and joins the pairs, in their continuous sequence, through succession. If ever new stationary systems of Objects offer themselves to the gaze, perhaps through the turning of the body, or if the system of Objects changes through its own movement or in some other way, and finally ends in a stationary state, then, in the transitions to the new stationary states, it is certain that other systems of images, of a quite different type, are lived through and are given together with the same *K*-systems. But now, even in ever new cases of stationary systems of Objects, if the manifolds of images that present them are different and ever different, yet each one indeed has in itself the same general type, and thereby the parallel connection of these manifolds with the ever unchanged *K*-manifold possesses the same general type. This type founds the general association in virtue of which, if there is given a piece, as it were only a differential, the beginning of a sequence which [184]

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[3] Whether the Object moves or is stationary, or whatever it does, the system of places is always the same.

could be ordered within such a type, then immediately there results apperceptively the ordering within the type; i.e., a stationary Object or field of Objects presents itself. It appears, and thereby the function of the *K*'s is distinguished from the function of the images, for the *K*-sensations are what is given, or what streams on, with the same determination and form everywhere. The images are what is new everywhere; or, rather, the type of covering of the always identically given visual field of places is what is new everywhere, and all that the images have in common is the form of their sequence in parallel unity with the *K*-sequence.

After this small excursus into the associative interpretation of the state of affairs, in connection with which it must be noted that such an "association psychology" is free of all transcendent suppositions, we will return to the description.

§53. *The visual field as a system of places and its possible transformations.*

In[4] the last lecture we entered into an immanent association psychology and investigated the connections among phenomena in the case of a merely stationary manifold. We now return to phenomenological description. The system of images which pertain to the same stationary Objective field, as well as their continuous shifting into one another by means of kinaesthetic ocular changes, signify an ideally closed system of transformations of the visual field as a system of places in itself. Thereby we note that both components of the image, quality and extension, function in a different way. Every image has its [185] own quality, and that means at the same time a quality that stands out prominently. Without qualitative discontinuity in relation to the environment, no image is delimited and so no image can be attended to for itself. This discontinuity is therefore a condition of the possibility of the determinate image as a visual givenness for itself. If the image travels, so does, as it were, this qualitative discontinuity. More precisely, what travels is the prominent unity of the coloration formed in such and such a way. But coloration is determinate only through the determinateness of the form, the figure, which it fills. Through the order of the system of local points, the color elements localized in them are ordered and unified into one coloration. In the qualities as such there resides nothing individually distinctive. Two instances of the same quality can exist only as qualities of different places, and they owe their distinctness or duality to the places. The places are in themselves distinct, but the qualities are distinct only in virtue of the places. On the other hand, the places and complexes of places owe their individual prominence to the quality, i.e., to their qualita-

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[4] Beginning of a new lecture. – Ed.

tive (specific) discontinuity. The unity of the coloration is founded therefore in the ordered form of the extension as a system of places which is covered by the coloration. Thus the concept of coloration, if we can even consider it in abstraction from the system of places, presupposes this system and in a certain sense also implies it.

On the other hand, the prominence of the coloration as a unity for itself, and thereby the prominence of the entire image, are founded in the specific discontinuity of the coloration or, more precisely, in the discontinuity of its margins in relation to the environment. As the image travels, under the *K*-circumstances, the whole images now maintain a continuous coordination, but this is granted in a privileged way to their systems of places; the qualities of the images, i.e., their unitary colorations, indeed have unity only through the systems of places and owe their coordination to these systems. The coordination extends to all the qualitative elements, but even there it does so only through the medium of the subtending places. On the other hand, the systems of places owe their coordination to the respective character of the qualitative covering, i.e., to the discontinuous gradient in the covering at the edges. This is a very general condition, however. We understand accordingly that the transformation of the visual field of places in itself, which is produced by any kinaesthetic change whatsoever (whereby, in the transition from one image to another, the absolute shape of the one is transformed into the absolute shape of [186] the other), can also be accomplished with a quite different coloration, as long as only the discontinuous gradient, the prominence, remains preserved. If the coloration were modified otherwise than it is in the merely stationary manifold (appearance of the same stationary, unchanged thing), then the transformation in itself which is undergone by the manifold of places would remain unchanged. In fact, the same would apply to the movement with respect to qualitative change.

In every appearance, or manifold of images, in which the presentation of an object unfolds systematically and unitarily in this or that direction, there is still a unity that in every case penetrates the pre-empirical extension and coloration. The manifold of the pre-empirical extensions signifies everywhere a transformation of the visual manifold of places in itself. The colorations give the extensions fullness and prominence and come to unity, while the images disclose themselves on the basis of those transformations; i.e., on the basis of those transformations the whole images, colored in such and such a way, come to unity.

The ideally closed manifolds of possible appearances of a thing in general, or of possible presentations of a thing in general, now contain different, characteristically closed partial manifolds which make up, as it were, the strata of the constitution of a thing. Such a closed stratum is the one of the stationary manifold, whose analysis has been occupying us and to which we will return again.

CHAPTER 10

THE THING AS UNITY IN THE KINAESTHETICALLY MOTIVATED MANIFOLD OF APPEARANCES

§54. *The consciousness of unity in the sequences of images and in the kinaesthetic sequences.*[1]

If a complex of *K* and *i* is apprehended, in its typical elapsing, as stationary, then an apprehensional character is attached to it, which, distributed differently to *K* and *i*, refers, as it were, to the possible sequences of *i* in the total system under the possible kinaesthetic circumstances and thus bears the ideal possibilities of fulfillment in the elapsing of precisely such systems. In every such nexus of fulfillment, the images are subtended by the consciousness of unity, the consciousness of the self-same, which is and remains the same, where the appurtenant appearances are fulfilled, under the relevant kinaesthetic circumstances, in the sense of the general type. This consciousness of unity constitutes the one identical stationary thing as presented identically through the images or as appearing in the individual appearances, and indeed lawfully appearing that way under the relevant circumstances. If intentions only ran through this system, if this systematic type were not integrated into more encompassing types, to which the components of the appearance and of the apprehension referred, then the thing would be completely constituted in this manifold, and the thing would have no relation to movement and change. But the thing then would clearly not be a thing. In any event, an essential part of the constitution of the thing and of space is clarified through our stratum already. The main character of the constitution of a thing is already visible. We can describe it as follows: [187]

A continuity of images (images in the visual field), extending in the pre-empirical procession of time, streams on in temporal coincidence and in fusion with a continuity of kinaesthetic circumstances. This continuity of images is a linear manifold, extracted out of a multi-dimensional manifold of possible images, and, like the latter, it still includes infinitely many other linear manifolds of images, and each one, according to its determinate type, is encompassed by the determinate general type of the total manifold. This one is of the

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[1] *Cf.* Appendix V: "Strata in the constitution of the thing," pp. 315ff., and Appendix VI: "Motivational nexuses and apperception," pp. 319ff. – Ed.

same strength as the continuous manifold of possible *K*'s. Every actually elapsing double manifold of images and of *K*'s is united through the unity of the continuity of apprehension, which functionally unites the *K* and *i* belonging to every temporal phase into an apprehensional unity (into an appearance) and unifies the appearances into a temporally flowing total appearance. The appearance in each phase and the unity of the appearance in its temporal extension have two essentially different components, the *i*-component and the *K*-component. The former supplies the "intention toward," the latter the motivation of this intention. The "intention toward" is differentiated and directed in such and such a way under these circumstances *K*. More precisely, the stream of the *K*'s or, to be exact, the stream of these *K*'s, determines by way of motivation the type and form of the "intention toward"[2] in its elapsing. Every phase of the *i*-component is an "intention toward" in such a way that it penetrates the next phase, i.e., penetrates its image, by referring to it and referring through it: here the *i*-component fulfills itself, but it again penetrates the next phase and again is fulfilled, etc., such that every *i* is both fulfillment and fulfilling and is so naturally by means of its apprehensional function. [188]

This series of fulfillment, the actual one, is, however, only one among a manifold of possibilities, and that comes into consideration, naturally, not as an Objective fact but phenomenologically, i.e., because every phase of apprehension, in its very essence, contains the relation to all the possibilities. The currently actual *i*-phase contains, besides the "intention toward" (with its linear direction) which fulfills *a parte ante* and is at once fulfilled *a parte post* in the constancy of the stream, still a halo of *quasi*-intentions. Under the given *K*-circumstances and within the motivations appended precisely to these *K*'s in their elapsing, these *quasi*-intentions are not "intentions toward," and they are not either fulfilled or fulfillments. Now they are only possible intentions, which means, however, that if the *K*'s follow a different direction of change, then these and those new intentions would necessarily be motivated and actually at hand. Now, however, with the given direction of the elapsing of the *K*'s, they are not so, and in their place are apprehensional moments corresponding to them, ones we have been calling *quasi*-intentions, fused with the actual *i*-intentions and coloring their character. The stream of the *K*'s can be a stream of mere duration. Then the *K* motivates the "intention toward" of the image in such a way that the *K* is in harmony with constant duration, with the *i* and ever and again with the *i* changelessly. If the stream of *K* is a stream of change $K_0 \frown K_1$, then each differential of change motivates a concomitant differential of change in the "intention toward." The image refers in a definite line to a changing image. But the thing is not merely what is identical in this line (previously, a line of unchange, here a line of determinately characterized [189]

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[2] Naturally "intention toward" does not mean here to aim at something with attention, etc.

change). On the contrary, it is what is identical in this line and at the same time in all possible lines, all possible continuities of images under all possible *K*-circumstances. While it stands there as a thing, it has, in terms of the apprehension, a relation to all. But it has an "intention toward" in an actual way as the intention that penetrates this line and is thereby fulfilled. For the rest, the apprehension possesses in its essence the characteristic that makes it precisely fit to enter into other series of fulfillments and to found the consciousness that "if *K* were such and such, then the 'appearance' would be so and so." The appearance in the characteristically strict sense is thereby the *i*-component.

The unity-consciousness which develops in this continuity of appearance, along with the essentially concomitant continuity of the *K*-motivation, posits the unity of the thing; i.e., it constitutes the thing. It belongs to the sense of this unity, which we call the thing, to be unity in a manifold of appearances, in a continuity of appearances of a determinate, ideal, infinite type. And the thing is given in every actually streaming piece of this continuity. The thing is also given in every appearance of such a piece, and in each one the consciousness of the identity of the fulfillment is alive, even if it is a changed appearance (as we saw before, fulfillment even in duration). But it pertains to the essence of this givenness to leave open infinitely many possibilities of new givenness in a determinate way as motivated possibilities. The consciousness of proper givenness, which penetrates the actual continuity of images, is consciousness of givenness in an image which is fulfilled and which points ahead to new fulfillment. Here a line of actual givenness (most proper perception) is bathed in a halo of *quasi*-intentions. The "intention toward" is thereby a breadth of intentions which penetrate all the distinguishable parts and moments of the image, and this precisely characterizes the presentation through adumbrations, the proper presentation. Therefore to every part of the image there corresponds a part or a ray out of the ideal (though completely unitary) beam of rays [*Strahlenbündel*] of the total intention.

§55. *System of kinaesthetic sequences and proper appearance.* [190]

According[3] to what we said in the last lecture, the mere stationary thing is constituted in a type-determined continuum of appearances, in union with a continuum of motivating "circumstances" *K*. More precisely, it is a matter of an ideal system of possible continuous series of appearances in temporal coincidence with possible, continuously motivating kinaesthetic series. The thing is given as what endures in an unchanged and stationary manner in every actually streaming piece of any such double series. It stands there in every

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[3] Beginning of a new lecture? – Ed.

appearance, and every appearance is living consciousness of fulfillment, even if it is an unchanged appearance: e.g., when we perceive the stationary thing with momentarily stationary eyes. In the presently actualized piece of the total continuity of appearance and, more precisely, in a line out of this continuity (since it itself is an infinite continuum of possible linear manifolds), the total continuity of appearance is included, in a certain sense, as potentiality, namely in such a way that the actualized appearance, the actualized piece of the line from the total continuity, contains a perception in the proper sense, in the form of a continuity of images which is connected by way of animation to a continuously penetrating "intention toward" that is always self-intended and self-fulfilled. And this belongs, for its part, as a constant motivation, to the constantly motivating *K*'s. The "intention toward" is an undelimited intention, insofar as, by its very essence, is does not terminate in a determinate image, as if it were limited to this momentary image content, to this momentary phase. It penetrates the phase and retains this character of penetration, in whatever way the actual continuity of appearance may be enlarged. This unlimitedness pertains to the essence of the state of affairs.

The intention aimed at the elapsing of the *K*'s is essentially different from the intention alive in the appearance and actualized in the givenness. Just as the actual sequence of the *K*'s is one out of a profusion of unitarily intimate possibilities and just as, accordingly, the *K* is at any time surrounded by a halo of apprehensional tints, i.e., *quasi*-intentions, which correspond to these [191] possibilities, so the constant intention living in the appearance is encircled by a dependent halo of *quasi*-intentions which first give the appearance its determinate character, as the appearance of a thing. The appearance is phenomenologically of such a kind, and the apprehension of the circumstances which stands with the appearance in the unity of the motivation is of such a kind, that "if the *K*'s were to elapse in such and such a way, a correlative sequence of appearances of this or that kind would be motivated." Such and such a continuity of images would therefore belong to the relevant *K*-sequences; instead of the presently occurring modification of images, new changes would appear, and the intentional fulfillment, the constant consciousness of givenness, would penetrate them.

These possibilities are predelineated in the essence of every actual appearance of the thing and can be related to the appearance with an evidence that conforms to an essential law. An actual continuity of images, unitary as a continuity and in itself already motivated by an associatively appurtenant *K*-series, would be thinkable, but in such a way that no transcending apprehensional characters would be interwoven in it. In this way the thing would not stand there as what is unitary, something that could present itself in other continuities of images and would be demonstrated in other corresponding series of appearances from its other sides. What is unitarily presented in the

actual stream would have no other sides and would refer to nothing like that.

As to the intentional rays that penetrate the actually given images, in this way they connect, in a consciousness of unity, the corresponding points of the images that continually pass over into one another, and they thereby constitute the same objective moment that always comes to proper appearance. What we previously called the proper appearance is the beam of rays of the pre-eminent intentions that penetrate the images and that were taken merely as related to every phase of appearance. In our restriction to the manifold of appearances of a stationary Object involving eye-movement alone, and indeed within monocular vision, the Object comes to appearance always from the same side. For the sake of more precision, we must add still another restriction, namely that the Object lies there in such a way that it cannot disappear, either completely or in part, from the Objective field due to excessive eye-movement. Then the same [192] side of the Object would always appear and would appear in its entirety. All the living intentions motivated by the change in K penetrate the relevant image, specifically in such a way that the penetrating ray again passes through the new image. (We will learn that this is not always the case; specifically it does not occur when we walk around the Object, whereby appearing moments of the Object disappear and new ones arise. In this regard, it will also be shown that the beam of rays of motivated living intentions is not purely and simply identical with a beam of intentions that penetrate the image and are thoroughly fulfilled and that would bring the images to the unity of coincidence.)

Here we should note the following: the images posed in correspondence, which always present something that is one and the same in the object, are similar to one another; within the sphere of clearest vision the similarity increases up to indistinguishable sameness. As far as the similarity extends, every distinguishable part of the image has its correspondent in the similar image. The correspondents distinguish themselves only through their individuality, i.e., through the absolute places in the field. In the penetrating ray of fulfillment, they present one and the same thing as given. A field would indeed be thinkable which would in itself be completely homogeneous with respect to its possible transformations, hence such that with mere "movement" of the image in the field, the constant similarity of the image with itself would be a similarity of indistinguishable sameness. Then in the manifold of images, in which the stationary Object or the completely stationary field of Objects would be presented with mere eye-movement, we would have images constantly related to images in such a way that a penetrating beam of rays of intentions would place all the distinguishable points or parts into a single univocal correspondence. And what corresponds would everywhere be the presentation of the same Objectivity. In other words, to every part or point of the appearing side of the Object there would correspond in each image a

presentational part or presentational point, and all images would have the same fullness and completeness of presentation. But the field that is given to us phenomenologically is inhomogeneous; i.e., when an image moves to the periphery it never remains completely the same, and the presentation of the [193] stationary Object within mere eye-movement is necessarily a presentation through a continuity of similar images, which, however, are graduated from sameness to considerable dissimilarity. If these now present the same thing, the same side of the Object, and if, simultaneously, each distinguishable piece of every image presents something of this side, and if, therefore, the living intention is a beam which sends its implicated rays through all these pieces and points, then the question arises as to the nature of the correspondence of the images among themselves. The apprehension of the similarity is such that the image, in being moved out to the periphery of the field of places, becomes impoverished of inner distinctions or of inner possibilities of distinctions. The first to suffer in this way might be the extensional partition of the image that is carried out by making qualitative differences prominent; ever fewer separate parts can stand out prominently. The qualitative modifications, however, can also take place in a direction which, in any given case, does not contribute at all to the impoverishment of the distinctions within the parts. Within this state of affairs, a reciprocal and univocal correspondence can naturally not exist. The correspondence can only be unilateral, i.e., such that to every distinguishable part of the image that is poorer in content there corresponds a distinguishable part that is richer. In the continuous transition to the richer content, however, a continuous fulfillment takes place, a continuous identification in an ever richer presentation. There is thus a partition, in the mode of explication, of every intentional ray which permeates a part that can be divided no further in the poorer presentation and extends into the richer presentation in such a way that it appropriates, as correspondent, a determinate coherent piece with more inner distinctions. Thereby, however, it is partitioned, in accord with these inner distinctions, in an explicit way. To every richer presentation there corresponds, according to all the distinguishable moments, an intentionality; thus the intention penetrating this presentation is an intentional complex. The poorer presentation, as being fulfilled and identified in this complex, can, despite the greater poverty, contain no less of an intentionality; it merely contains this in another form, in the form of implication, i.e., in such a way that its intention, according to its very essence, possesses the suitability to pass over into a greater manifold of presentational rays and to do so naturally in the mode of fulfilling identification.

We have to think back here to the previously distinguished occurrences of [194] intentional enrichment as more precise determination and also as redetermination. The type of the stationary manifold, and in particular the separate type of the system of appearances in the case of mere eye-movement, are associative

types, though general ones. With the elapsing of the kinaesthetic circumstances, the change in the image is determined in advance, beyond the change that is actually carried out, although only according to the general type, and consequently the character of the penetrating intention is also so determined. The indeterminateness of this change is more precise determinability in a certain sphere, and every new image of greater richness that presents itself according to the general type offers a more precise determination. The intentional ray in the mode of indeterminateness is not itself a beam or amalgam of subsequently separated rays, although it gets explicated and determined while unfolding into a multitude of intentional rays. It has in itself no separation but does have its own characterization, whose essence includes the possibility of such a dispersal in the form of a manifold explication.

But the situation is quite different with the transition from the manifold ray, one that penetrates a more manifold presentation, to a ray that is presentationally poorer. The inner explication of the intention is not, or not completely, lost. Even in the transition to the poorer image, the determination might change up to a certain degree of indeterminateness, and indeterminateness might again arise insofar as the precise determination of the new, even if poorer, presentation was not predelineated. Yet the separation of the intentional rays, which was carried out with the richer differentiation of the more favorable image, can and must survive to some extent. In popular terms, the thing is what is determined after – and by means of – the emergence of the richer presentation; it is from then on meant as it is presented in this richer presentation.

Now, however, how does this richer intention pervade the poorer image and the series of poorer images in which the movement of the images elapses? Here a greater manifold of intentional rays penetrates the poorer manifold of distinctions. The distinguished detail now signifies, as it were, more than it [195] presents. Thus we encounter a remarkable difference. If, in focusing on an Object, we grasp a richness of inner distinctions, and if we then transfer our gaze and then again return to the clear distinction by focusing on it, and then transfer our gaze once more, we see that every poorer image, every unclear one, signifies just what the clear image signifies; in each image, the same Object (the same side of the Object) is given, and indeed with the same Objective distinctions. And yet, to repeat, in the most proper sense, it is only in "clear" vision that this side is given with these inner distinctions. In all other presentations, fewer Objective differences are actually given; but each presentation means more than it presents, in that the profusion of intentional rays, which was segregated in the best presentation in accord with its presentational moments, settles itself into the poorer presentations and in general penetrates the entire presentational continuity, although it now acquires another character. A distinct presentational content does not correspond to every distinct ray;

the rays stream together as one beam and have their presentational content unitarily in the content which is in itself undifferentiable and which is now presentational in a different way than is the richer content of the image focused on. The content predelineates something – e.g., the figure – and does not predelineate other things – e.g., the inner partitions and particularities; in relation to certain rays, it offers no appertaining content at all. (And even in the case of the figure, the presentation is less rich and in general is incomplete.)

Thus within the sphere of proper appearances, which are actual presentations, a distinction is formed between a sphere of explicit and a sphere of implicit presentation, and we understand the priority of the completely explicit presentation, or the most complete presentation, within the manifold of appearance that is here occupying us, a manifold that is closed as to type and closed unitarily. This presentation does not merely present the side of the Object in a general way but presents it so that all the moments of the side which are intended here are also expressly presented.

The Object has, to be sure, still other sides, and even as regards the appearing side, there are still more possible distinctions and determinations to be made. But within the closed system of the appearances that pertain to the *K*-system of the eye, only so much and not more is objectively motivated. [196] Among the intentions that are motivated here and that are "alive" in this motivation, we have to make the distinction at issue; we find those intentions to be privileged which, within this nexus of motivation, allow no further explication, whether through more precise determination, through partitioning, or finally through a partitioning into completely founded partial presentations endowed with a differentiated profusion of images. The system of rays of these complete intentions then penetrates all the appearances in a certain manner, being fused and modified in them by way of implication and possibly by becoming more indeterminate. The privilege of explicit givenness then immediately becomes the privilege of the interest, and thus the substantive interest is fulfilled in the complete, i.e., explicit, givenness of the matter at issue and is all the more satisfied the closer it approaches the explication. This therefore also signifies relatively "adequate givenness" of the matter at issue, i.e., adequation in relation to the typical manifold of motivating circumstances. The adequation resides in an appearance or in a whole region (of equal value in terms of the explication) of appearances in which the level of explication is the highest, where every changed objective moment finds its proper presentation. This, however, alters nothing regarding the fact that the presentational content of the phase is not the object, but that the object is rather what is unitary in the kinaesthetically motivated manifold of appearances.

It seems to me interesting that the manifold of images and a manifold of appearances founded on the former could obviously constitute, under the

circumstances of mere eye-movement, an objective unity for itself, i.e., insofar as the appearances would not have to bear any *quasi*-intentions referring beyond this manifold, as I have already mentioned. In a certain quite correct sense, an object is constituted; it is just that further apprehensional components are added on. The object is thus not the complete thing grasped precisely in complete perception. This object would come to adequate givenness in a consideration that focuses on it (at least under easily visible restrictions). It [197] would not be a thing, but would still be a kind of Objectivity having essential traits in common with the Objectivity of the thing.[4]

§56. *The temporal structure of the kinaesthetic sequences.*

In the entire previous consideration of presentation, we only discussed the function of the content of the image with its changing absolute locality, its extension, and its filling *quasi*-quality, but we did not look at the moment of temporality. Givenness[5] is carried out as a process in phenomenological temporality; the total phenomenon, with its *K*-component and its *i*-component, is temporally extended. In the transition from K_0 to K_1, the images thereby motivated have their progression i_0–i_1 and stand in temporal coincidence with the *K*'s. Like every fulfilled temporal stream, this one also has its temporal form; and it can be a changing temporal form. The stream of the *K*'s and thus the stream of the *i*'s can elapse faster or slower and can do so in the most varied ways, with equal or unequal velocity according to the way the temporal filling extends over the span of time and fills these or those partial spans with greater or lesser "density." Furthermore, the streaming of the *K*'s, and thereby that of the sequence of images, can be reversed, and, again, with a changing temporal form. The temporal forms of the consciousness of givenness follow from that. In a certain way this is all irrelevant for the appearing Object which stands there as given, and so is the greater or lesser extension of the kinaesthetic stream and the stream of images, i.e., the greater or lesser stream of the possible appearances out of the ideal total manifold. I say they are "irrelevant" insofar as the same stationary thing continually stands there with an unchanged content and extends the fullness of its content as a thing in a temporal form that is one and the same, i.e., in a density that is homogeneous throughout. And yet the temporality of the stream has something to say about the Objectivation: something temporal indeed appears; temporality pertains essentially to the appearing object, and in our case the temporality has the [198]

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[4] On the preceding, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 294. – Ed.

[5] This text (up to the end of the §) was published within Appendix X of Vol. X of *Husserliana*. [*Cf.* English translation by John B. Brough, *op. cit.* – Trans.] *Cf.* the critical apparatus to that volume, pp. 439ff. – Ed.

form of the duration of the unchanged, stationary thing. It will now be said that the Objectivation of time must have its "presentational" foothold in the phenomenon, and where else but in its phenomenological temporality? More precisely, the appearance in the strict sense, the respective appearance that stands under the motivating circumstances, naturally will come into question, and just as in it the image presents, through its locality, the Objective location, and also presents, through its *quasi*-figure and *quasi*-size, the Objective figure and size, and through its *quasi*-coloration the Objective coloration, so through its temporality it presents the Objective temporality. The image is an image in the stream of the continuity of images; to every phase of the image in this stream there corresponds the appearing Objective temporal phase of the thing or, more precisely, the temporal phase of the side of the Object presented in this image. The pre-empirical temporal position of the image is a presentation of the Objective temporal position, and the pre-empirical temporal extension in the elapsing of the continuity of the images is the presentation of the Objective temporal extension of the thing and therefore of its duration. All that is evident.

Upon closer inspection, this "presentation" of Objective time is, to be sure, essentially different than the presentation of the thing that exists and endures in the Objective time as something identical in the time and as filling time in the mode of duration. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the continuity of the same images, thus ones of the same richness, within the narrow sphere of "clearest vision." Then a beam of intentional rays penetrates the images streaming on in the *quasi*-temporality and does so in such a way that the images are thereby placed in a unitary and univocal correspondence. The points lying on the same intentional ray present, through their contents, one and the same point of the Object. Here, consequently, a consciousness that posits unity penetrates the pre-empirical temporal continuity. A stream of contents, strung out on the intentional ray, presents the same point of the thing, phase by phase. Every point of the image also has, however, its pre-empirical temporal position. But a consciousness of unity does not in turn penetrate the consecutive temporal positions, Objectivating them into an identical unity. The series of points of the images which extends in this continuity of temporal positions presents the same point of the thing, but the series of temporal positions does not present an identical temporal point of that point of the thing but again presents a temporal series. And the individual point of the image has [199] the same temporal position as do all the other co-existent image points. The whole image has a temporal position, and each individual image has a different position. Every distinct temporal position in the pre-empirical stream of images presents a distinct Objective temporal position. Otherwise, a thing would indeed not appear, a thing which, as such, has its duration, its fulfilled Objective temporal series.

The clarification of the consciousness of time involves quite extraordinary difficulties, already so in the case in which what is at issue is not at all the constitution of the duration of a thing but only the constitution of time in the sphere of evident and adequate givenness. I will not here enter into these difficulties. We will presuppose that they have been clarified in their main outlines and that it is phenomenologically intelligible how the identity of the Objective temporal point is posited in the stream of phenomena that are continually sinking back into "primary memory" and are thereby changing phenomenologically and are ever and again changing. Then we can say this much about our case: the consciousness of unity that is continuously being expanded in the pre-empirical march of time posits unity in the temporal progression of the presentational images, in that it makes every image precisely into a presentational one, posits givenness in it, and posits with every new image the givenness of something "one and the same." What is given in each phase, however, is given and posited as a Now with such and such a content. In the transition to the next phase, it is held fast in its Now. Thus the new phase, every new phase, is held fast with its Now. Therefore in the continuous transition, the phases are posited in unity in such a way that every phase in the Objectification retains its Now and such that the series of Now-points (as Objective temporal points) is fulfilled with a continuously unitary and identical content. We need to note that when the phase *a* is actual, it possesses the character of the actual Now. But in the stream of time, phase is annexed to phase, and as soon as we have the new actual phase, the phase that was precisely "now" has changed its character as actual. In this stream of changes, the temporal Objectivation is carried out insofar as in the stream of the phenomenological change that is undergone by the *a* in sinking back, there occurs the continuous positing of the identical *a* with its determinate temporal point. In the Objectivating consciousness, the elapsing stream of images appears as a stream of change of [200] sensuous contents, provided that precisely every image is Objectivated with its Now in such a way that it is taken as it is in itself: the unity of this manifold would be the unity "residing" in it, the one that can be drawn out of it.

In the Objectivation of the thing, however, the content of the image is apprehended transcendently, in the direction of the kinaesthetic unity of motivation, in such and such a way. Therefore, the content is not simply accepted as it is but as a presentation, as the bearer of an intentional beam with this or that character, a beam that is ever being fulfilled in the mode of pure coincidence. This intentionality penetrates the contents of the image, while every Now-moment belonging to the respective image undergoes the same Objectivation of the temporal point, an Objectivation it would undergo even without the Objectivation of the thing. Thus an Objective temporal series is constituted everywhere in the same way. But the series of appearances, in whose stream Objective temporality is constituted, is in its matter a different

series, depending on whether the temporality that is constituted is the one proper to a thing as such or not – e.g., depending on whether what is constituted is Objective time in the duration or change of a sound or Objective time in the duration of a thing. Both series of appearances have something in common, a common form, which makes up the character of the temporal Objectivation as such. But the appearances are in the one case appearances of something immanent, and in the other case appearances of a thing. Just as the identity of the sound in the stream of tonal phases, of which each has its temporal individuality, is a unity in the continuity of the phases, i.e., it is the identity of the sound that exists and thereby endures in all the phases, so, likewise, the identity of the thing in the stream of appearances, in the mode of self-givenness and Now-givenness, is the self-sameness of the appearing thing, appearing in the ever new Now and thereby enduring.[6]

§57. *The total kinaesthetic system of the visual sphere. The oculomotor field.*

We have been speaking hitherto of stationary Objects as related to any and all eye-movements, and as related to eye-movements alone. We will now expand [201] the system of movements. It is not only the eye that might move but also the remainder of the body; therefore, besides the elapsing of the kinaesthetic sensations of the eye, which we have designated *K*, and which are to be thought of now as sequences of change, and now as sequences of immobility, there might elapse kinaesthetic sensations pertaining to the head, the trunk, etc. We do not want to consider here the individual groups for themselves but only want to investigate the general relations. Since, along with the kinaesthetic sensations, there are also always given to us sensations of location with respect to the other systems of movement, the kinaesthetic circumstances are therefore in general always something complex. We thus have a complex of variables (K, K', K'', ...) which are independently variable in relation to one another but in such a way that they form a system wherein each of the variables always has a definite value. In our earlier case, we thought of the remainder of our body as in some fixed location or other, and we considered only the kinaesthetic circumstances of the eye. In other words, we thought of K', K'', ... as constant and then of K as sometimes constant, sometimes arbitrarily varying. If we now pursue the relations with respect to the new K', K'', and if we do so in general for the total system of kinaesthetic circumstances, then we need to note first of all that in general a part of our analysis still holds good.

Again we have the peculiar coordination of the kinaesthetic complexes and

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[6] On the preceding, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 294. – Ed.

of any given manifold, i.e., the coordination of the visual field as now filled this way and as now filled that way, in virtue of which, in the unity of apprehension, "circumstances" and "appearances" are juxtaposed: the circumstances are the motivating, the appearances the motivated. A certain field of images, filled in such and such a way, is given together with every kinaesthetic complex; and a determinate change of the field of images is given with every determinate change of the kinaesthetic complex, always presupposing that we still have to do with the constitution of a stationary Object and field of Objects that are unchanged in other respects as well. Every return of K, K', etc., into the old constellation produces the same field of images, thus the reversal of the kinaesthetic sequences also produces a reversal in the sequences of images, both always in temporal coincidence. Most generally, what also holds good is what we said about the appearances in which the images function as presentational contents (and it is only in virtue of the presentational function that we name them, with respect to the presented Objects, "images"). It is a matter of an associative complex. In the earlier sphere, we could think that all the intentions we called *quasi*-intentions are absent. They indeed relate to the possible appearances which pertain to the broadened kinaesthetic circumstances. If the K', K'', ... were absolutely constant or not at all present, then the appearances would lack everything that could bestow significance on them in relation to the kinaesthetic circumstances. The entire intentional relation would be unfolded and exhausted in the manifold of intentions which are motivated by the K's (of the eye) alone and which penetrate the images in the manner we described, now becoming more complicated, now becoming more explicated. [202]

Nevertheless, since the change in the images, i.e., the character of the delimitation and fulfillment of the visual field, is not merely dependent on the individual K-variables, but also on the manifold system (K, K', K'', ...), and since the variation of the K''s (a name for "K', K'', ..."), in the case of the constancy of K, determines new occurrences and manifolds of images of a new type, the intentional system from the very outset is therefore a very complicated one. The totality of the variable circumstances forms a closed system of possible circumstances, and there pertains to this system a closed system of possible changes in images, which, according to its type, is determinative of the possibility of the self-unfolding givenness of a stationary field of Objects. It is a general (though now very complex) type, and this type includes partial types. We know, as it were, how a field of images looks when we keep all circumstances constant and move only our eye. If we keep changing our bodily posture, we can then allow the system of mere eye-movements to come into play again and again. In this way the system of images, which we have come to know as K, ever again undergoes a transformation. Every disarrangement of the corporeal posture modifies the K's, introduces into the system of images of K a modification which was not predelineated in it itself and which

was precisely not motivated by K alone. We thus acquire, so to speak, new dimensions for the constitution of the thing. We can indeed also apprehend the matter at issue by saying that we have been considering the identical, purely oculomotor "side" of the constituted Object, and we understood by that ex- [203]
clusively what is identical, what is constituted in the possible total manifold of the images, which, under the presupposition of a fixed corporeal posture K'_0, pertain to a total manifold of variations of the kinaesthetic ocular circumstances. Now the K''s may run through their possible series of changes. This identical oculomotor "side" then undergoes a system of transformations, and it becomes, as we could say, the "presentational" foundation for a system of intentions which relate to the totality of now possible transformations and endow the "side" everywhere with a new and richer intentional character. What is identical in all these "sides," on the basis of the manifold of appearances determined by those new intentions, makes up the Objectivity of the higher levels. We now have to pursue these transformations.

SECTION V

THE TRANSITION FROM THE OCULOMOTOR FIELD TO OBJECTIVE SPACE. THE CONSTITUTION OF THREE-DIMENSIONAL, SPATIAL CORPOREALITY

CHAPTER 11

AMPLIFICATIONS OF THE OCULOMOTOR FIELD [204]

§58. *The limitations of the previous analyses. Overview of the further types of modifications in appearances.*

From the multi-dimensional stratification of the constitution of a thing, we have thus far come to know only one stratum or one type of stratum. In geometry, this would be equivalent to studying the essence of plane figures alone. Although in fact every body can be resolved into an infinite manifold of plane sections and can be considered a continuum of plane sections, yet the geometry of plane figures, which encompasses all these sectional figures, is still not the geometry of the spatial body. In proceeding beyond the plane, what is at issue is precisely the laws according to which the planes and the formations lying on them are continually modified. This is a modification by which the formations are not simply varied on the same plane but instead enter into a coherent and continuous system of planes and thereby generate spatial figures. The analogy must not be misunderstood as implying, however, that the system of images of mere eye-movement would constitute a plane and a plane figure of Objective space and that, through continuous modification of the plane, space and spatial bodies would then be constituted. It is only in space that we have planes, and where no space is constituted, there is no plane. Likewise, [205] where there is no complete thing, there is no plane projection of a thing.

The task is now to study the new occurrences, those brought into play by including the circumstances comprehended under the title *K*. We will name here the following: first of all, an occurrence which is actually not a new one, insofar as it can already be found in the *K*-system of mere eye-movements, but which we prefer to discuss only now. It did not play a great role in the earlier system and only took place in a restricted way. I mean that the amplification of the field of Objects, i.e., the change of the images, can be such that the image disappears in moving beyond the visual field, in passing beyond the boundary of the field. On the other hand, new images step into the field, images of Objects that were not presented up to then.

In the complete *K*-system, we have to note in particular the manifold possibilities of a cyclical amplification of the field of Objects. In the transition from appearances to appearances, Objects step out of the Objective field, and new ones step in, as ordered in such a way that ultimately the old field of

Objects re-appears.

Type:[1]

O (a, b, c, d)
O (b, c, d, e)
O (c, d, e, f)
O (d, e, f, a)
O (e, f, a, b)
O (f, a, b, c)
O (a, b, c, d)

More simply:

a, b, c, d
b, c, d, e
c, d, e, a
d, e, a, b
e, a, b, c
a, b, c, d

On the other hand, we have the infinite amplification of the field of Objects: [206] the same fields of Objects never recur; the new follows upon the new *in infinitum*. For instance, I move by drawing away further and further without ever completing a revolution.

Furthermore, we have to comment on the occurrence of semblant rotation and, at first, specifically the occurrence of the rotation of a continuously visible side of an Object within a series of appearances: e.g., one particular square side of a cube. It is a matter of a phenomenon pertaining to a stationary Object; thus the Object itself does not rotate. In empirical terms, we turn ourselves around, and the Object executes a "semblant rotation." We will retain the word "rotation," because the phenomenon, apart from the kinaesthetic circumstances, is the same as the one in the case of the actual rotation of the Object, at least it is so with regard to the *quasi*-spatial moments of the image, i.e., the moments in which Objective spatiality presents itself. Moreover, very closely connected to this is the emergence of new sides of one and the same Object. For instance, what is first of all visible of the cube is a square side, and, by turning our head, two new square sides enter into appearance while the first square remains visible and undergoes its relative rotation. In the continuous progression from the appearance of a side to the appearances of new sides of the Object, the sides are ordered in determinate ways, and there exists the possibility of a cyclical recurrence of the initial appearance. The closure of the corporeal form thus manifests itself in the cyclical nexus of appearance, and, in different cyclical lines of this sort, different cyclical

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[1] E.g., I turn around in a room.

nexuses of the sides of the same body appear. We could say that in this way cyclically closed sides of the body appear and that the completely closed body is what is identical in all such cyclical sides.

A further occurrence we should discuss here is one intrinsically interwoven with rotation, namely approaching or receding, and the corresponding series of changes in appearance: i.e., the series of certain expansions and contractions of the appearing side. Furthermore, there is the phenomenon of covering. One thing conceals another, and the appearing side of the thing conceals sides of other things in an interchangeable way. These should be the main general occurrences; we now have to take a closer look at them.

To begin with, we need to make the following general comments. As we [207] observed earlier, there is a determinate universal type to the modifications a field of images, or any given image prominent in it, undergoes on account of eye-movement alone within unchanged *K*′s. If the *K*′s now change, then there arise the new manifolds of modifications we previously brought under one general heading. This is not to say that such modifications could not also enter into the visual field without a change in the *K*′s. But the modifications then do not stand related to the *K*′s in the determinate functional connection that characterizes a stationary field of Objects which is unchanged in every respect. That is, the motivational connection between the *KK*′-complexes and the appurtenant images should be of such a kind that a determinate modification of images belongs to every *KK*′-modification whatsoever and that furthermore a reversal of the motivated modification of images and of its continuity would belong to every reversal in the continuous sequence of the *KK*′s. All this is to be understood as occurring in temporal constancy. Within this motivational type, which characterizes the appearance of rest and unchange, there can arise, in the special type which pertains to the constant *K*′s and to the arbitrarily variable *K*'s, no phenomenon such as "approaching and receding," "rotating," concealment, etc., i.e., none of those modifications of images included under the headings of these types. Or, to express it still differently, if, with the elapsing of a continuity of images which pertains to mere eye-movement, but with constant *K*′s, any of the indicated phenomenological occurrences arose, then rest and unchange could no longer appear. And we immediately add that movement would then have to appear instead, whether this be a receding, or a rotating, or the like. This supplement obviously alludes to analyses which are yet to come.

We need to say furthermore that important common discussions, which we carried out recently as regards the coordination of images in the mere *K*-manifold within the consciousness of unity, are also pertinent to some of the occurrences we have just mentioned, though, of course, *mutatis mutandis*. If it is a matter of modifications undergone by a side that always and entirely falls within the field of Objects, for example in the case of continuous receding or

rotating, where what is visible is always kept visible, then obviously a beam of [208]
intentional rays penetrates (so as to coordinate and unify) the perpetually modified image. Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the *K* has a fixated position and remains constant in it in such a way that the image falls into this fixation; in the course of the *K′*-variation, perhaps of one that corresponds to receding, the same Objectivating apprehension of the image is always motivated, and it is not only the image as a whole that hereby subtends the presentational function but the image according to all its distinguishable moments. Again it holds good that in general the inner richness of distinctions in the various "locations," i.e., in the *i*'s that pertain to the respective variations of *K′*, will be different, whereas it is always the same Objectivity, the same side, that appears. Thus, here too, we will have to make the distinction between implication and explication; the greater the richness of inner distinctions in the image, so much greater in the appearance is the richness of explicit intentions "aroused" (motivated) by the actual *K″*s. If the image is impoverished of inner distinctions, then the intentions that were once aroused remain aroused – they are still "living" intentions motivated under these circumstances – but they still in part lack the proper image-contents that would fill them and fulfill them. The intentions here sink to the stage of confusion and implication; in other words, the appearance is not as distinct an appearance of the Object. Naturally, however, these beams of intentional rays are different than the ones we treated before. The system of intentions pertaining to eye-movements is different than the one that would pertain to the other kinaesthetic changes. These systems are different insofar as they are beams of rays which give unity to different manifolds of images. Yet they are alike insofar as they bring to appearance the same side of the Object with the same determinations. Therefore they cannot step forth in a double way. If eye-movement is connected to the movement of the body, if both variables vary in the *KK′* complex, then indeed it is not two appurtenant manifolds of images that arise but only one – a diagonal manifold, as it were. There necessarily pertains, to every value of this complex, one and only one image-value. The modifications combine together like forces, so to speak. Whether we carry out an eye-movement in a determinate way and thereby at the same time bow the upper [209]
body in a definite way, or whether we first carry out the eye-movement while keeping the trunk motionless and then afterwards bow it, is all one, apart from the temporal relations; i.e., it makes no difference as regards the end result. A unitary intentional beam always traverses the images, unifying them, and according to the fullness of their content, now they are implicated and now again explicated. The intentionality of expansion and contraction in the form of the constitution of the infinite field of Objects, however, as well as the exposition of new sides of an Object in rotation, will require new considerations.

§59. *Amplification of the field of Objects. Positing of the Object beyond the sphere of actual presentation.*

Among[2] the new occurrences we wanted to discuss today in connection with the constitution of the stationary Object, I named in the first place the amplification of the field of Objects. Already in the case of mere eye-movement, the field of Objects does not remain completely constant; Objects which present themselves closer to the margin of the visual field disappear with the appropriate eye-movement, and new Objects, from other sides, enter into the Objective field out of the margin. A core of persistently appearing Objects is thus surrounded by a marginal zone of Objects that now appear and now do not. Naturally, these Objects, if they do not appear, are not perceived in the strict sense. Nevertheless, in the case of a comprehensive complex of Objects, one which cannot come to appearance in a single glance, we say that we perceive it and that we do so by moving our eye and body. We see a room full of people, a forest with trees, a meadow, or a cornfield, and these cannot be grasped in one glance. What is at any time properly seen is not all that is there for our "seeing"; just as the back side of the Object is not properly seen and yet is co-apprehended and co-posited, so likewise is the unseen environment of the Object as well. The presented field of Objects is a field of Objects in a "world," in a nearer and farther environment, whether determinate or ever so indeterminate, and ultimately in infinite space. [210]

How are we to understand this positing of Objects beyond the sphere of actual presentation? While the kinaesthetic circumstances remain constant, a restricted manifold of Objects presents itself in the visual field; but what is properly perceived in this way does not count, so to speak, for itself but instead counts as an extract from a broader environment of Objects. The apprehension, and possibly the intending, reach beyond the proper perception. If the kinaesthetic circumstances change, then every phase ushers in a newly fulfilled visual field, and in it a new – even if partially identical – field of Objects is presented. In the successive elapsing of proper appearances, a sequential perception of a comprehensive Objectivity is carried out, and this is specifically such an Objectivity that it could never be perceived in a stationary perception (thus with kinaesthetic constancy). Each phase offers the proper perception of a restricted part of this Objectivity; but the apprehension reaches further. While a perceptual phase continually passes over into another, we do not merely have various fields of Objects, one after the other, even if they are such as to present partially identical Objects. On the contrary, in the succession of perceptions one after the other, in their continuous transition, we have one field of Objects. Just as stationary perception, or the individual momen-

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[2] Beginning of a new lecture? – Ed.

tary phase of a kinetic perception, has its perceptual field, so does likewise every sequence of kinetic perception. And this kinetic field of Objects also has its environment; the apprehension still goes beyond what is perceptually grasped, although it is grasped in succession. The world does not come to an end where the current kinetic perception ends. Phenomenologically, we obviously have to say that the fields of images which continually pass over into one another in the kinaesthetic sequence perpetually undergo such an apprehension that the continuous succession of appearances founds the unity of one appearance; this unity of appearance is a unity that extends throughout pre-empirical time.

Put so generally, the proposition also holds for the appearance of a thing which continuously presents itself within the visual field in kinetic perception, thus which is continuously and entirely visible in every phase of the perception. But what matters to us is that it also holds for the appearance of the context of the thing, a context that is not continuously and entirely visible; i.e., it holds for the alliance among all the fields of appearance which change from phase to phase with respect to the presented Objectivity. There is a unity to the perception which always presents the same Object in a continuum of appearance and does so in such a way that the Object has its fully presentational image in every appearance, and the same applies to a group of Objects which continuously and completely presents itself and always does so with respect to every Object in the group. On the other hand, however, there is a unity to the perception which in every perceptual phase specifically presents some particularity of the Object or of the group of Objects but does not present the whole. Thus we could also say that there are perceptions whose Objects present themselves in their visual fields through complete images, and, on the other hand, there are those perceptions whose Objects present themselves only in incomplete images. An individually extracted phase of perception is a proper perception only of a piece of the Objectivity, and yet, as a phase in the continuity of perception, its intention reaches further and joins this phase with the other phases in such a unitary way that the result is the unity of the perception in which the more comprehensive Objectivity is presented. The Objectivity is a stationary one, enduring without Objective change, while the presentation and the perception are sequential and constantly changing. Thereby it remains true of these perceptions as well that they bring their object to appearance merely "from one side" and that therefore the same manifold of Objects must be given in many such perceptions and series of perceptions in order for it to be manifest as given in all its various sides. Indeed even a single side can come to incomplete appearance through a succession of perceptions. It may indeed be that the determinate side of such an Objectivity (i.e., of an Objectivity which, so to speak, transcends the visual field) comes to givenness in a unitary sequence of appearances, as happens, e.g., when we, from the appro-

[211]

priate position, sequentially perceive a yew-alley in a series of perceptions. But it may also be – and is frequently the case – that the side does not come to exhaustive presentation in a sequence of appearances and that still more sequences of appearances must elapse and be joined through a unitary con- [212]
sciousness which gives them the unity of a total appearance of the side, like, for instance, the appearance of the starry heavens. Another example is the unity of a room: the gaze must move around the room in the direction right-left, but also in the direction above-below, etc.

Thus here we encounter a new inadequation. A spatial thing can in general come to appearance only from one "side." In every case, therefore, a sequence of appearances is required to bring the thing to appearance from all sides. But there are two distinct possibilities: the thing may fall completely inside the visual field, i.e., in an image as an extract from the field, and thereby the thing presents itself with respect to this side in a momentary appearance or in a enduring and unchanged appearance; that is one possibility. In the other, only a part of the side of the thing can be presented in the field; the thing, with respect to this side, does not appear in an individual momentary appearance or in a single stationary appearance. Rather, a nexus of appearances is already required in order for even only the one side of the thing to be perceived. Precisely the same holds for a multiplicity of Objects, according to whether or not this multiplicity can fall completely in the visual field as a presentational field.

§60. *Objectivation on the basis of incomplete presentational means.*

Thus far, we have studied the constitution of the Object only within the circle of permanent and extensively complete presentation. We must now give an account of the Objectivation that makes do with extensively incomplete presentations. We are to consider inner incompleteness, which is connected to the inner impoverishment of the presentation of one and the same Object, but not outer incompleteness, i.e., the sort of perception whose apprehension goes beyond the framework of the image that is actual at any given time. Basically, however, this latter incompleteness applies to every presentation of a thing, insofar as every appearing thing, which just now still completely fell within the visual field, can, with a change in the kinaesthetic circumstances, be displaced beyond the margin and can thereby be at first partially deprived of representation in an image. If, in the end, the thing steps out of the visual field entirely, then it does not therefore disappear, nor did it previously half- [213]
disappear; it is only unseen, which does not prevent us from designating as perceived the more comprehensive Objective context to which the thing

belongs and which precisely interests us in its unity. This designation applies when we change our gaze and move our body and thereby have series of appearances in which the Objects of the context appear in their determinate order as more properly seen.

To clarify this relation, we must first consider the following: the kinaesthetic modification is one that touches not merely an individual image of the visual field but the whole field. If the K changes in a determinate way, if it traverses a course, K_0–K_1, then it is not only the individual image i that changes as i_0–i_1, but the entire field of images is altered. We might first take a nexus of images which always falls entirely within the field, while the K is varying in a sufficiently limited way. Then each image undergoes its modification, although we could just as well say that all the images together undergo a modification; they form a complex which undergoes a single modification, determined and rigorously motivated by this variation of the K's. In this modification, there is constituted, within the characteristic system of the stationary manifold, not only the individual Object as belonging to the individual system of images but also the spatial context of the Object. For the complex of Objects, which is what appears as unitary in the unitary modification of the totality of images, is a spatial complex. Any two Objects have their determinate location relative to one another, their determinate distance, and their determinate relative orientation as wholes and in all their parts. That is constituted in the unity of the total modification. The individual image has its location in the field, but in the K-sequence it constantly changes its location and in general undergoes modifications. These are constituted, apprehended, and posited as one by a consciousness of unity, in such a way that not only do the images as a whole, in their continuous passing over into one another, present the same Objectivity, but so do all the distinguishable parts of the images. And, as we have discussed, the standard here is the image that is richest in content, that allows the greatest profusion of partitions and differentiations. In this way, a beam of intentional rays therefore penetrates, as it were, [214]
the series of images. Every image presents, through each of its distinguishable pieces, a piece of the Object, and the order of the objective pieces corresponds to the order of the pieces of the image. In addition, every piece refers to further possibilities of partitioning and is apprehended from the very outset in the sense of those possibilities, just as they would manifest themselves in a richer image during the further course of the modification of the image. Thus while every image presents the same thing, it also presents it through the type and order of its own parts. The identification penetrates the partition, and if, as the course proceeds, an inner enrichment takes place, then the order is retained and is merely enriched from within. In our figurative way of speaking, what was an intentional ray receives the character of a beam of rays. The ray which corresponds to an ultimate part of an image acquires the character of a com-

plex of rays in virtue of its unitary relation to a part of a continuously mediated different image, i.e., to that part which presents something unitary and which breaks down, through inner division, into an ordered multiplicity of parts that are presentational in turn. The presentational identity of every distinct part is not an identity for itself but rather an identity as a whole. The unitary modification of the whole, which as a piece of the visual field is an ordered totality of parts, includes the modification of each part, and the fixed order of the parts thereby undergoes, as an order, a fixed modification.

What is Objective and unitary about this modification is the spatial order of the parts in the spatial whole. Every ray posits a spatial unity, and if, as it takes its course, the ray receives the character of a beam of rays, then each new ray posits a spatial unity, and the order of the rays in the beam of rays is a fixed one, since it is oriented according to the ordered context of the parts in that image which is richer in content. The originally posited unity becomes the spatially manifold whole which divides itself into inner spatial distinctions, as ordered in a fixed way, i.e., into pieces which again and again have their fixed order within the unity of the whole. What holds good for the individual thing holds good for its context. Let us for instance take two things, given in such a perception that they are completely represented by images in the visual field. The images have a determinate relative location in the visual field. In the kinaesthetic sequence, both things undergo a unitary modification, the same [215] modification they would undergo if they were both pieces of a total image in which one thing was presented. The total modification includes, on the one hand, the modification which every individual thing undergoes and which provides a foothold for the constitution of the individual thing and, on the other hand, the modification undergone by the distance of the images and by their relative location in general. With this modification, the spatial relation between the two things is constituted. If the images had a different position in the visual field, then, provided they belonged to a stationary manifold, the kinaesthetic modification would again touch both of them unitarily; the distance between the images would again be modified unitarily throughout the series of pairs of images and again would help constitute an Objective distance, but one that was different than before, and the same would apply to every distinction in the location of the images in the visual field.

In[3] virtue of the fixed order in the visual field, a fixed order in the field of Objects then becomes possible under the circumstances of the stationary manifold. But now the visual field and, therewith, the Objective field of proper perception are restricted in every phase of the perceptual stream. Let us now consider the comportment of the entering and exiting of Objects into and out of the Objective field when the kinaesthetic circumstances change. Since the

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[3] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 294. – Ed.

Objects have a fixed order, which, according to our discussions, is constituted with the determinate unitary modification of the respective order of the images, the entering and exiting can therefore be carried out only in a determinate way. Every image of an Object travels over the field, over this fixed order of location, and thereby changes its locations continually, and so does every series of Objective images in its own order. The Object enters into the Objective field because an image appertaining to it emerges anew, and that is possible only through a perpetual entering of images from the margin as well as through a departing from the field by means of a perpetual exiting out beyond the margin. Otherwise, the fixed order in the continual elapsing of changes would be interrupted, and this elapsing is constitutive of a stationary thing. The entering and exiting are therefore carried out according to this sample schema:

$$O\,(p, q, r, s) \qquad O\,(q, r, s, t) \qquad O\,(r, s, t, u)$$

whereby we are to think of our eye (or the entire body) as moving from left to right; thus new Objects become visible from the right, and they disappear from the visual field to the left. [216]

§61. *Preliminary indication of the constitution of space. Space as the ordered context of the thing.*

In[4] the last lecture, we stopped at the consideration of the constitution of an Objective field transcendent to the visual field, i.e., at the consideration of a continuous kinetic perception which, in each of its phases, brings to presentation a restricted field of Objects, specifically while the total presentational image of that field in the respective phase fills up the entire visual field. Yet, in the exchange of the images that fill the visual field, the unity of perception penetrates the continuity of the phases. The complex of Objects that comes to presentation in a continuous succession coalesces, in the consciousness of unity, into a more comprehensive complex of Objects, and, with the appropriate elapsing of the kinaesthetic circumstances, the consecutive series of Objective complexes as well as their coalescence into an ordered manifold have no end and in principle can have no end. As a consequence, in the progression of the perceptual continuity, which always has the character of a unitary perception, there is constituted the appearance of infinite space and of the infinite world.

To clarify the phenomenological state of affairs, I will anticipate a general

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[4] Beginning of a new lecture. – Ed.

consideration. I indicated how the fixed order of images in the visual field must, in the first place, play an essential role in the constitution of the Objective order, an order that can be presented in a unitary image and is thereby narrowly restricted, within a unitarily visible field of Objects. In the accumulation and elapsing of the kinaesthetic series, the strictly ordered complexes of images in the field undergo, concomitantly, unitary as well as typically and strictly determined sequences and reverse sequences of modifications. These modifications are unitary for the individual images but are also unitary for the figural constellations of the images, for their ordered context. That which stands in the unity of the modification undergoes apprehension as self-same. [217] More precisely, what runs through a unitary series of changes, and always does so in a motivated way along with the elapsing of the *K*'s, such that, in temporal coincidence, the *K*-phases and the phases of the change correspond and such that to the same *K*'s, whenever they recur, there pertain the same phases of the change, and to the same sequences of *K* the same sequences of change (and to the inverse sequences of *K* the inverse sequences of change), is posited as one and the same unchanged thing in virtue of the thorough apprehension of unity. Conversely, where an actual stream of appearances has the character of the unitary appearance of a stationary and unchanged Objectivity, we find that it pertains to the essence of this appearance for the sequences of the presentational images and complexes of images to be motivated by the kinaesthetic circumstances and to be motivated in such a fashion that, in accord with the sense, the evidence holds good to the effect that if the same *K*-sequence were to recur there would also arise such a sequence of images in temporal coincidence with it and that furthermore to every other *K*-sequence there would pertain, by way of motivation, a determined sequence of images, always assuming that a protracted appearance of a stationary Object is supposed to take place. Therefore this motivated unity of the modifications belongs essentially to the constitution of something identical, and it is a unity of modification that concerns the ordered contexts, or constellations of places, which are founded by means of the images and which allow them to be grasped as unitary complexes. Likewise, this unity pertains to those constellations of places which affect every individual image and which are founded in its distinguishable pieces. In the consciousness of unity that penetrates these modifications of the ordered contexts, the order of space is constituted.

Nevertheless,[5] since the field, through its inner order, prescribes a fixed order to all the images, and since the positing of unity follows the continuity in the transformations of the individual images and of their reciprocal orientations, there arises the consciousness of a strictly ordered manifold of things and, ultimately, the consciousness of the world. This fixed identity of the thing

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[5] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 294. – Ed.

is the fixed identity of its space as filled in such and such a way. In this identity, every piece, no matter how small, and every limit of a piece, as well as every point in its relative location, are posited as self-identical and are intentionally held fast as identical; and the same applies to every orientation of the thing toward another thing visible together with it. The relation of a thing to things which are not presented with it in one field is naturally determined only mediately. It is a fixed relation, because fixed connections of order run from thing to thing through mediating things. The absolute identity and steadfastness of the mediating orders signify absolute identity and steadfastness of the relation of order among things that are distant and cannot be intuited together. Every thing can indeed enter into the unity of perception with every other thing, and that pertains to the very essence of any thing, without which it would have no sense; but the unity of perception is not the unity of presentation in one temporal point or in one field of images but is instead a unitary perceptual sequence which brings the one thing to appearance and, in a sequence whose order is fixed, brings to appearance a series of mediating things which finally terminate in the second thing. Every individual or complex thing, constituted once in an actual field, is held fast; it is what it is in the continuity of the determinate transformations under the appurtenant kinaesthetic circumstances. It remains held fast even if there is no longer a changing group of images that could present it. The constitution of a thing includes precisely a firmly ordered nexus of manifold images under the kinaesthetic circumstances and also includes the appurtenant consciousness of unity, whose essence implies the evidence of the possibility of receiving a determinate series of images, through a determinate modification of the circumstances, and of being able to see thereby determinate Objects in this or that mode of appearance. [218]

But how does the spatial order extend, as it were, beyond the visual field? Perception changes in the pre-empirical stream of time, and perception, in its phases, always offers restricted fields of Objects; how can it then become, in its perpetual passage through the phases, consciousness of the existence of a more comprehensive – and, ultimately, of an infinite – world of Objects? Or, to restrict ourselves to a unitarily prominent extract of that world, how can it become perception of an object which does not come to appearance completely in any one phase but only shows itself "little by little"? [219]

In the progression from phase to phase, we do not have completely new fields of Objects. It pertains to the essence of the modification that it be the constant modification of what the field of Objects offers in its fixed order, and the modification must, if it posits Objects as identical and unchanged, likewise also posit their order. Let us now take the simple case in which no Objects are concealed, and thereby no new Objects appear by stepping out from under concealment and none disappear by becoming concealed. The modification of

the Objective manifold, as a perpetual modification of its fixed order, can then introduce new Objects from the outside only through their new entrance into the visual field from the margin. I speak of new Objects; I naturally mean ones which do not arise from the inner enrichment of the presentation as having become remarkable, as gradually standing out more distinctly, etc.

§62. *The new entrance of images into the field. Elucidation through the example of the perception of a yew-alley.*

Let us consider, as a very simple example, a yew-alley, of which only the trees, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, and *e* present themselves in the field of images at a definite moment under the kinaesthetic circumstances *K*. If we gradually turn to the right, then, motivated by the corresponding elapsing of the *K*'s, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, and *f* now present themselves in the visual field, whereby the new tree *f* enters into appearance, and afterwards *c*, *d*, *e*, *f*, and *g* are presented, etc. Naturally, we have here, if we wanted to consider the matter in terms of association psychology, an associative connection. In the accumulation and elapsing of the kinaesthetic series, there ever and again occurs, within a concomitant sequence, the series of images in its unitary order and in its perpetual modification. There are formed, on the one hand, the connections and the apprehensions of unity coordinated to them, which follow the immanent continuity in virtue of which, within a continuous modification of similarity, images pass over into similar images and complexes of images into similar complexes of images. In doing so, they are rigorously motivated by the kinaesthetic values that elapse along with the constancy and that are univocally coordinated therein. This produces [220] the intentional beams which penetrate the images in the continuity of the fields of images, precisely as long as this modification transpires, thus as long as we still find, in the progression of the variations of the visual fields, images which belong, as continuous sequels, to the images of the precedent fields. This ceases when the images, as it were, pass beyond the margin of the field.

On the other hand, it is not only the fields of images, following one another continuously, that acquire a connection through these intentional beams which pervade the corresponding images. Not only are the individual images connected, namely those that pass over into one another and are apprehended in the consciousness of unity as the same Object, but so are the successive fields of images, insofar as they in some way or other participate in the unity of the motivated course of change by which the yew-alley presents itself as sequentially given. To the determinate kinaesthetic sequences there indeed pertains a determinate sequence of fields of images completely filled in such and such a way, or, better, there pertains a determinate and constant course of change in

the fulfillment of the same identical field of locations through these or those distributions of images (at least insofar as it is a matter of the presentation of the identical, unchanged yew-alley). Thus the stepping forth of the image of the new tree is motivated, and so are its determinate movement within the field and, finally, its disappearance. If we reverse our motion, then what is motivated is the stepping forth of the image of the tree again, its movement within the field in the opposite direction, and then its disappearance out of the other side of the field. This applies to every image and to the entire series of images in its unitary change from phase to phase. Accordingly, every total series of images which steps forth together with certain kinaesthetic circumstances, and which makes up the total presentation of the yew-alley in the corresponding field of images, acquires its determinate character as an associative nexus. In its motivated intertwining with the kinaesthetic circumstances, the total series of images points, no matter how these *K*'s elapse, to determinately appurtenant changes which elapse as anticipated, and the series in general bears such a character that a manifold of other possibilities of change is implicated in the corresponding change of the kinaesthetic sequences. In addition, this includes everywhere the possibility of finding as motivated, when the direction of the *K*-sequence is reversed, a reversed course in the elapsing of the series of images as well, which implies the determinate entering and exiting of images [221] in the firmly ordered nexus and in the stream of the modifications that concern the individual images and the configurations of their locations.

Therefore, as a result of the association, every field, or every total presentation of the yew-alley in the respective field pertaining to the determinate *K*'s at a definite temporal point, bears an intentional character: I mean a unitary apprehensional character, in the direction of which the *K*'s also elapse, whether they in general do elapse or persevere in constancy. If they remain constant, then the living anticipatory intention is directed to the non-change of the presentation in images; but besides this living intention as "intention toward," the unitary apprehension is directed, as it were, to the manifold possibilities. The mere series of images along with the mere directedness toward the determinate changing stream or toward the determinate non-change would still not be an apprehension of the Objectivity presenting itself in it and transcending it both from within and from without, so to speak. That is, it would still not be an apprehension of the yew-alley. This is also shown by the evident possibility of following, in phantasy and in mere "thought," the sequences of appearance with their presentational sequences and their kinaesthetic sequences and of re-living them as the unity of the sequentially developed appearance of this Objectivity, the yew-alley.

The apprehensional characters, which pertain to every phase of the continuous perception and thus animate the series of images belonging to the respective phase, found the unity of the uninterrupted consciousness of unity as a

constant consciousness of fulfillment. In the determinate movement which we carry out in viewing the yew-alley, thus in the sequence of the relevant kinaesthetic series, the appearance of the piece of the yew-alley just now visible passes over, in a motivated way, into the appearance of the piece currently visible, and so on again and again. But every such appearance still has its apprehensional surplus, which is taken into account by speaking of the visible "piece." And in that way, the complete appearance, to which we ascribe this surplus, then finds its identifying fulfillment. Living intentions radiate out from every series of images, under the kinaesthetic circumstances, and these intentions are fulfilled from phase to phase. At first they run alongside the order of succession of the series of images, insofar as there passes over, in a determinate way, [222]

a, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*

into *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, *f*

c, *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*

as motivated. But, in union with this, there are also carried out the identifications intimated by the identical letters, i.e., the beam of rays of *b*, *c*, *d*, etc. Thereby, to be sure, the ray which traverses *a* falls into emptiness, but its intention is not lost. Its intention remains merged in the new total appearance as appearance of the whole Objectivity, even if this is now visible only with regard to *b* through *f*. Thus, in a certain sense, with respect to *a* there takes place an emptying, but one that is motivated in this nexus. The proper appearance of the tree *a* passes over into an empty intention. On the other hand, however, the empty intention of the first series, attached to the total appearance, is fulfilled with the new entrance of *f*. In the elapsing of the series of proper appearances, the continuous perceptual consciousness is fulfilled as a consciousness of identity not only with respect to the individual objects but also with respect to total objectivity presented in the whole series. Yet this objectivity is presented only partially, precisely because every Object, once presented, is not only held fast in its presentation and in the continuity of its presentational change but also leaves behind its contextual intention, after the presentation has disappeared. The fact that at the absolute location, where *a* just stood, there now comes to appear, in a continuous change, b', which for its part is posited as one with the *b* that previously occupied another position, and that the presentational series are thus displaced, although they appear as identical Objects – all this belongs to the fixed course of the motivation, and so does the possible reverse change. In this fixed passing over into one another on the part of the series, and in the retention of what was once posited in them,

there is constituted the one Objectivity that is perceived again and again, though always perceived only partially, i.e., the Objectivity that has its order of parts and of images and, in accord with this order, comes to visibility sequentially, piece by piece and series by series, and would come to visibility in [223] the reverse order if the kinaesthetic sequences were reversed.

The determinateness of the spatial order and the determinateness in the order of visibility, i.e., in the current order of the actual coming to visibility, belong together essentially. The Being of the non-perceived parts of the Object refers to possible, and indeed motivated, ordered sequences of self-demonstrating perceptions (and thus of their presentations) which connect those non-perceived parts with the actually perceived ones. The essence of the beings that endure conjointly with what is actually perceived includes the possibility of unitary and firmly ordered perceptions which lead over to them by way of a determinate appurtenance with the directive kinaesthetic sequences.

Excursus: The unity of the perceptual apprehension as the unity of the Objectivational positing of time.

The[6] unity of the sequential and transcendent perceptual apprehension is at once the unity of the Objectivational positing of time in regard to the reality which comes to proper givenness sequentially in the phases of the perception and which is in itself ordered.

In the sequential perception, presentation passes over into presentation, appearance into appearance, doing so in parallel with the elapsing of the kinaesthetic circumstances. The phases of the earlier appearance do not survive in the fresh memory merely in the way this occurs in every sequence of appearance (at least within certain limits). The perceptual appearance that is actual in the respective now-point is not co-terminal with what the appearance brings to actual present givenness, i.e., with the reality posited by the perception as now. It does not happen that the preceding appearances, as living on in memory, are preserved as appearances of what was. The memory-consciousness of the earlier phases is, to be sure, a memory-consciousness, but it is so with respect to the earlier perception. Nevertheless, what was perceived earlier is not now merely presentified as something perceived earlier but is [224] taken over into the now; it is posited now as still existing now. What is now posited is not only what was just properly perceived but also at once what

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[6] Husserl marked this text, up to p. 189, l. 21, as follows: "(omitted) (time)". It was published within Appendix X of volume X of the present series [i.e., *Husserliana* X, p. 123; *Cf.* English translation by John B. Brough, *op. cit.*, pp. 126f. – Trans.]. *Cf.* the text-critical annotations there on pp. 439ff. – Ed.

previously existed as given. In the course of the stream of proper perception, not only is what is visible posited as enduring Being in the stream of its appearances, but so is what had been visible; and the same applies to the future. What is posited as now is also what will come to be perceived in the anticipation of the further phases of proper perception. That, too, is in the now; it endures and fills the same time as does everything that is unseen though visible: i.e., everything that could be perceived as appertaining to a possible elapsing of K's. What is carried out here is only an amplification of the temporal Objectivation we spoke of earlier in the restricted case of something seen constantly while presenting itself in an ever different way in the course of being seen. Everything seen can also become unseen; yet it is still visible. Every stream of perception, by its very essence, admits of an amplification whereby the perceived is ultimately converted into something unperceived.

The positing of time, by identifying, in the exchange of their complete appearances, the things appearing there "completely," co-Objectivates every temporal position of the phase of appearance and provides the Objective temporal position its significance such that therefore something Objectively enduring is unfolded in the series of appearances. So, likewise, in a similar way, the positing of time is also carried out in regard to the total appearances which present one and the same Objectivity in an incomplete – and ever again incomplete – manner.

How then are we to clarify the perception of a more comprehensive thing, or a manifold of things, which does not present itself in the visual field completely but instead presents itself in the stream of perception piece by piece and therefore always incompletely? There is to be sure no summation of different fields of images. There is always only one field, with its fixed system of places, which neither expands nor contracts. And so there is also no summation of perceptions into one perception in the sense that now there would arise a perception of the simplest sort, in which the object would fall, with each of its sides, into one phase of appearance or into one single enduring appearance.

CHAPTER 12

THE TYPICALITY OF THE MODIFICATIONS OF APPEARANCES IN THE OCULOMOTOR FIELD [225]

§63. *Single appearances and sequences of appearances. The stratification of the problem of constitution.*

We[1] can designate the problem of the last lecture in the following way. There are two sorts of appearances for a stationary Object: appearances in the usual sense – single appearances – and sequences of appearances. The latter are included in the broader concept of appearance insofar as in them, too, the givenness of a unitary object is carried out. Every phase of a sequence of appearances is a single appearance, or else such a single appearance corresponds to every phase through mere temporal expansion, such that, where temporality is not at issue, we can treat the phase of appearance and the single appearance as the same.

For complete givenness, a single appearance is not enough. What is required rather, and this by essence, is a sequence of appearances, fundamentally an infinite sequence, one that is never closed and is indeed manifoldly infinite. To that extent all things are alike, taken under no matter what circumstances. But now an essential difference arises. Co-existent pieces of a thing which are included in one appearance, and whose sides make up a total side, present themselves in the visual field by way of disjunct images. We can also say that they admit of a unitary presentation in a single appearance because they do not cover each other over. If they did, if their respective presentation made claims on the same parts of the visual field, then they could not present themselves singly. On the other hand, co-existent pieces of a thing which do not conceal each other do not need to present themselves in a single presentation in one visual field. This fact is based on the narrowness of the visual field. In principle, they could, so to speak, present themselves singly, but they cannot do so *de facto*, i.e., under the relevant kinaesthetic circumstances. Instead, a se- [226]
quence of appearances is needed, whereby the Object presents itself piece by piece. We can naturally include under the title of "thing with pieces" individual things and their real [*reell*] pieces as well as complexes of things with their members.

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[1] Date in the margin: July 18, 1907. Beginning of a new lecture. – Ed.

The problem was how we can perceive a complex of Objects which portrays itself in the visual field without any of its members being concealed, i.e., how such a complex is constituted as a unity within the determinate modification of all these members. That is now understandable. But how can we understand the perception of a complex of Objects for which always only a part of the members is portrayed in the perceptual phases? How can a perceptual sequence, whose phases are by necessity single perceptions of only some members, accomplish what a single perception, which presents all the members at once, could accomplish and, as it seems at first, alone could accomplish? How can we understand the constitution of an aggregate of Objects or a complex of Objects, whose parts can, under the given circumstances, adumbrate themselves only sequentially, since the presentation of any one already fills up the visual field?

We see from the very outset that this is in essence the same problem as that of the constitution of an Object in the sequential presentations of its sides. In order to take up the problem of constitution stratum by stratum, we can articulate it best as follows:

1.) The thing is an objectivity for which it is essential to be constituted in a continuity of single perceptions on the basis of a manifold of presentational images. How can that be understood; i.e., how does perception come to transcend the presentational images and grasp, in their changing stream, an unchanged Object continuously presented in them? This is the most general question.

2.) The study of the case of mere eye-movement refers to the possibility of fictively or abstractly conceiving a stratum of the constitution of a thing as follows: the thing would be reduced to the identity we call the oculomotor image. Thus a first step would consist in the clarification of the possibility of a perception which, within a perpetual modification of images under the appurtenant *K*'s, posits an identical Object as unchanged in an Objective duration. Of this, we have already spoken extensively.

3.) We think of yet another series (*K′*) of bodily movements added to the eye-movements, and we consider the field of Objects to be such that no concealment or rotation occurs in these movements. If we then simulate again that the Object would be reducible to the oculomotor image, these oculomotor images would always be disjunct within the added bodily movement. The problem is now the identity of a comprehensive Object or complex of Objects which is perceivable, in the case of a fixed *K′*, only in part and in the form of an oculomotor image or complex of images but which does come to givenness as a whole, though only in a sequence of such images. Thus it is a matter of the amplification of the oculomotor field or the problem of how a continuity of oculomotor fields could present a new field of Objects. This is the problem we have been treating just now. [227]

4.) The Objects here are still not things. We then take into consideration expansion, rotation, and concealment, and we ask how a series of appearances characterized as rotation can, in the continuity of its modifications and especially in the continuity of its individual presentations, posit an Objectivity, namely that of a closed corporeality with a surface closed on all sides. The previous point was a matter of an external amplification of the field of Objects, and here we have, so to speak, its inner intensification, one that makes the oculomotor field (possibly in its infinite amplification) a mere projection of a multi-dimensional spatial thing.

Thereby we pass over to the study of the further occurrences introduced by the amplified kinaesthetic system. And so we will now study the phenomenological occurrences corresponding to receding, rotating, and concealment in the field of images.

§64. *Receding, distance, and depth as occurrences in the oculomotor field.*

Receding is Objectively a matter of the Object's being more remote or closer, and the Object acquires its second relational point in me, the perceiver, whose body is co-integrated into the world. More precisely, this relational point is not the entire body but is set within an unseen part of the body. It resides somewhere in the head, in the eye or behind the eye. Since it does not fall within [228] the domain of presentation or possible presentation, neither does remoteness, as the distance between the Object and this Bodily relational point. In the proper sense, remoteness is therefore never given as this distance and never can be so given; it is nothing perceivable in the "proper" sense.

It would be a separate question to ask how this relational point is determined and how the apprehension of this "remoteness" is accomplished. In any case, these issues cannot concern us here. Our interest now lies in what actually presents itself, what comes to proper givenness. If we disregard the (so to speak) imaginary Ego-point, there indeed remains a distinction between the close and the far, a distinction that is graspable phenomenologically in some sense prior to the connection with an absolute Here in the back of the head, a Here that is constituted (or inserted) from another quarter. Obviously it is a matter now of something quite different from what presents itself as the distance between two Objects presented concurrently in the visual field or, after the extension of the field of Objects, as the distance of two Objects presented successively in the unity of a sequential perception. What is responsible for this is the fixed order in the field of images, i.e., the distance between the images and their appurtenant determinate modification under the determinate kinaesthetic circumstances. We therefore distinguish provisionally between

remoteness and distance. It can only be shown subsequently how remoteness comes to acquire the significance of distance and, more precisely, the distance from an imaginary Ego-point. In monocular vision, only certain expansions and contractions of the images are involved in the presentation of remoteness. In the stream of these modifications, the same unchanged Object always appears; it seems to be different only as regards its "remoteness." In binocular vision, what will be involved additionally is the changing relief or the changing "depth." This is phenomenologically different; i.e., the modification of the "images" of the double field which correspond to the changing remoteness, or the modification of the individual parts of the images which signify a different remoteness or depth, is quite different. It goes hand in hand with expansion and contraction, but it is fundamentally different. The word "depth," although again referring Objectively to the remoteness from an imaginary Ego-point, should awaken thoughts of a presentation in relief. For the rest, we note from [229] the outset the priority of the presentation in relief, which consists in this, that the individual image of the competition-less double field possesses its "relief" as a particular determination of this field and thereby has its system of "differences in depth,"[2] whereas in monocular vision, in the simple field, the individual image only has its form, size, and similar determinations but is not presented with any "remoteness"-determination. What arises here and is unique is a certain modification of the images in the stream of appearances, a modification predelineated as a possibility in the nature of the visual monofield as a constantly ordered system: i.e., what is possible here is not mere displacement but also expansion and contraction, specifically while the similarity of the shape is preserved.

It is this constant modification that becomes Objectively significant; in its stream, in the typical sequence of these changes, an unchanged Object constantly appears – merely drawing near at one moment and receding at another. The remoteness presented in this way is independent of the position of the eyes, and its appurtenant modification is independent of the one that is conditioned by the variation of *K*. Instead, this modification pertains completely to other kinaesthetic variations, to certain other *K*'s. Therefore in whatever position I place my eye, a certain modification of the contraction of the image elapses while the figure is preserved, if I, as it were, "directly" recede from the Object. As a result, we can regard the modification of the remoteness as a modification of the oculomotor image, an image that in its unity integrates, so to speak, all the eye-movements and all the appurtenant modifications in the images.

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[2] These are differences which, in a peculiar way and through a peculiar moment of sensation, intimate (but do not properly "present") remoteness from me.

§65. *Displacement and rotation.*

For the sake of a more precise consideration, we now want to see how receding, displacement, and rotation are related. We will distinguish mere or "direct" receding for the one that is at the same time rotation.

The modification[3] of mere receding is characterized by the preservation of [230] the oculomotor figure as completely the same while its size is constantly altered. What this means is of course something phenomenological intuition alone can teach. This modification is such that along with the whole image every distinct piece of it undergoes the same modification, just as it is by nature unitarily motivated along with the *K*-motivation of the whole. At the same time it is to be noted that if the entire field of Objects is stationary, the whole, in all its members, undergoes the same modification, and if only a few objects are stationary, then all those that are precisely still stationary present themselves unitarily. Furthermore, we see that all these presentations then undergo, through the same kinaesthetic motivation, a determinate motivation of the same kind. Since the contraction of the image signifies the fulfillment of a smaller sector of the visual field, and the expansion of the image the fulfillment of a larger sector, and since, furthermore, the entire visual field is always and necessarily fulfilled and ever remains the same delimited system of locations, therefore nearness, for a stationary field of Objects, goes hand in hand with its expansion, and receding with its narrowing. Yet this holds only in the sense that more Objects, or fewer ones, are presented respectively in a single appearance.

A further occurrence that belongs here is displacement, specifically the mere displacement of the Object (or of the field of Objects) and the mere change of its orientation or, again, its partial or total rotation in the field and indeed as mere rotation. Naturally I do not mean the rotation of an Object or of a nexus of Objects in Objective space, "actual" rotation, but apparent displacement and apparent rotation in the field. We could call it field-rotation. It is again a matter of a type of possible modification whose very possibility is predelineated in the essence of the visual field and, consequently, in the essence of the oculomotor field. These modifications pertain to a determinate kinaesthetic system which is of course not the one that arises without further ado from the general type of stationary manifold. Visual occurrences of different types, insofar as they have different Objectivational significance for the constitution of the stationary Objectivity, pertain to different kinaesthetic circumstances, and vice versa. The visual field, as a strictly ordered system of two "dimensions," has its fixed orientations, and so does, accordingly, the [231] oculomotor field as well. The oculomotor image is the same and retains its

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[3] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's two critical notes, Appendix I, pp. 294f. – Ed.

oculomotor orientation; i.e., with the same ocular position we always have the same image. For example, when the eye moves and all the kinetic circumstances remain completely stationary, the presentational image of an Object always has a different position in the visual field. But as often as we direct the eye "straight ahead," or in general return it to a determinate position, the image is the same. Accordingly, we say that the oculomotor orientation is in this case unchanged. But as soon as we turn the head a little, the oculomotor orientation (presuming it is unchanged) will alter its orientation: e.g., its fixation now requires a different ocular position than the previous one. Thus we can introduce coordinates, and indeed a system of coordinates is predelineated as an original one, namely the system which coincides, for the normal ways of holding the head, with the right-left and above-below orientations but which naturally is distinctive for every way of holding the head, precisely as pertaining to the visual or oculomotor field itself. We then speak of the orientation in breadth or in height. All the remaining lines of direction are, as it were, mixtures of these two (or indeed better: every positional value is a mixture of a right-left value and a height value). An Object can now present itself in such a way that under the relevant *K*-circumstances the image undergoes mere displacement, perhaps in its breadth orientation, such that all the parts of the image undergo the same positional change which precisely characterizes mere displacement. The concept of image may already include the kinaesthetic image.

§66. *Correction of a misunderstanding: expansion and remoteness not identical.*

I must begin today[4] by correcting myself. Toward the end of the last lecture, when I was speaking of the modifications of the image-field which correspond to approaching and receding, my presentation contained an unsuitable terminology that tended to make a false assertion out of one that makes sense only as a definition. Every expansion of an image possesses, Objectively, the significance of a change in remoteness, and I then named the modification of the expansion of the image itself a modification of remoteness. I thus called mere receding that expansion which, without rotation in the field, occurs in general without a change in orientation. And this especially applies to uniform expansion since it consigns to every part of the image the same modification of remoteness, i.e., modification of expansion, and is thus also characterized by its modifying the size of the image alone while preserving completely the same shape. Although it is correct to say that modifications in remoteness go [232]

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[4] Date in the margin: July 22, 1907. Beginning of a new lecture. – Ed.

thoroughly hand in hand with modifications in expansion, yet we see that it is still not permissible to identify terminologically, without further ado, expansion and remoteness. For what we Objectively call mere receding is nowhere and never a uniform expansion.

If we approach a yew-alley, in whatever straight direction, the image of the series of trees obviously does not undergo a uniform expansion according to all its parts. And, upon closer inspection, the same holds for any stationary Object whatsoever in regard to its image-modifications in the case of approach along any straight direction at all. Naturally, the non-uniformity of the expansion is, often enough, imperceptible. With smaller kinaesthetic sequences the expansion may be judged as uniform. Yet the very sense of the apprehension includes the possibility of progressive actualization, and that refers to kinaesthetic sequences which ultimately produce a continuous expansion, even if at first, with small pieces of the sequences, the expansion is not perceptible. In every phenomenological continuity, there are limits to the perceptibility of the gradations. What matters here is that with respect to the appearance of receding (as constant self-receding), if it is unfolded with sufficient completeness, expansion, specifically non-uniform expansion, proves to be appurtenant. Moreover, it is self-evident that uniform expansion cannot at all arise within a stationary manifold. For in that case all the parts and points of the Object would always appear to be equally removed from the relational point for the receding, thus from the imaginary Ego-point, which, however, is a definite point in Objective space. That is obviously impossible. Accordingly, we will [233] call expansion precisely expansion and will take care not to speak of the modification of remoteness instead of expansion. How the one is related to the other will surely become clear as we proceed.

§67. *Continuation. Further modifications of appearances in the oculomotor field. Displacement and rotation as changes in orientation.*

Having made this correction, let us continue on our considerations. At the end of the last lecture, we were reflecting on the functional connections among the various typical occurrences appertaining to the field of images when our body moves in one way or another. We thus have an opportunity to discuss the occurrences of expansion once again, this time correctly, yet without an extensive repetition being necessary.

We spoke of the fixed orientation in the system of locations in the visual field, and we showed how, correspondingly, we can speak of a fixed orientation in the oculomotor field as well. If we think of any qualitatively distinguished piece or point in the visual field, and if we now think of the con-

sciousness of unity as carried out within the variation undergone in any given eye-movement by that point, then the latter defines a fixed point of the oculomotor field. The same applies to every pair of points, every configuration of points, every constellation of visual images. Corresponding to every distance, every series, order, and ultimately to the entire ordered system of the visual field, there thus is Objectivated a series, an order, and a system of places as what is unitary in the fixed manifold of modifications in which the visual appears. We then already have, as it were, something like space. We already have an Objective system of places, every point a unity presenting itself in a possible manifold of "appearances."

Nevertheless, this would be space only if all the modifications that lead out beyond the system of oculomotor images were sunk in the realm of absolute oblivion and of non-being. Just as the system of locations in the visual field is a fixed one, in which the respective determinate images are reciprocally ordered in a definite way, and just as this order is indeed, however, not an Objective order, since perception does not posit images but instead, in the [234] lawful connection of the local and qualitative modifications of images, posits in intuition Objective unities, i.e., unities in these manifolds, so also is the oculomotor order not yet an order of things, and the oculomotor field not yet a field of things. Oculomotor unities, although they are unities in manifolds, are still always "images." They are not what is posited in outer perception as Objects; instead, lawful changes of these oculomotor unities, which are again at once changes in the oculomotor location and in the oculomotor quality, acquire apprehensional unity: in these higher manifolds, as manifolds of appearance, there is unfolded a higher unity, one "intuited" in them, the unity of the thing. Furthermore, just as we could speak of ever new fields of visual images, although, properly, we have the same identical system of locations in which the manifolds of images are merely ordered against one another in an ever new way, so likewise we speak of ever new oculomotor fields, although there is always the same system of oculomotor locations, in which system the oculomotor images merely delimit themselves against one another in an ever new way. But since the manifolds of oculomotor images undergo constant modification in a lawful way and are lawfully motivated by the modification of the kinaesthetic manifolds, and since a consciousness of unity penetrates these constant modifications undergone by individual images and by groups of images, there thus arises the Objectivity of the thing as an Objectivity in a new fixed system of order, i.e., in space.

Within the orientation of the oculomotor field, there now appear, as we can say in general, the following conceivable occurrences, ones predelineated in the very essence of the field. The oculomotor image can simply be displaced, and all its points undergo the same change of location. For instance, it can be displaced from right to left, or it can rotate, with one point remaining fixed and

the complete rotation resulting in the recurrence of the earlier orientation, or it can rotate and be displaced at the same time. This can apply to the whole oculomotor field. It can undergo displacement as a whole. This necessarily implies that some oculomotor images step out of the field and new oculomotor [235]
images enter in from the other side of the field. Ideally, we can to be sure already think of the oculomotor field as amplified by extension into an infinite field. For the amplified field is a unity constituted in a manifold of proper and simple oculomotor fields as phases. But then the parallel displacement indeed exists and is characterized by the fact that, e.g., the fixating gaze must assume another position (possibly after we first had to carry out the bodily movement that brings the image into the proper oculomotor field) in order to be directed to the same Object it had fixated earlier. And a rotation of the whole is conceivable in a similar way. In each case, we include displacement and rotation of the oculomotor image or of the oculomotor field under the heading of change in orientation.

A concealment does not occur whenever a total change in orientation appears but does occur whenever a single image moves in the field. The moving image conceals one that was actually constituted earlier as an image and renders it either partially or completely invisible. This suggests an Objectivation which holds fast to the image after it is no longer seen. A further new occurrence of the highest importance is expansion (we therefore will now avoid speaking immediately of receding). We include here both positive and negative expansion. In virtue of the nature of the oculomotor system of places, various cases are conceivable here: a uniform expansion in the sense illustrated by geometrical similarity and then manifold possibilities of non-uniform expansion. Expansion can in every case either encompass the entire oculomotor system or allot itself to individual images of that system. It can be uniform for some images and non-uniform for others. And it can be positive expansion for one part of the field and contraction for another. Thus of itself the necessity arises for the non-uniformity of the expansion to go hand in hand in certain cases with a concealment or with the removal of a concealment. If a piece of the field contracts in some way while its surroundings do not do so, or not as quickly, then something steps forth out of the background that was not visible; and, conversely, in the opposite case a piece of the field is concealed. [236]
Furthermore, it is clear that expansion can be connected to displacement and rotation in the field; or, rather, these various possibilities are by themselves mere abstractions. With respect to the phenomena we might possibly find one or the other imperceptible, but the variations always elapse into one another with the most diverse relations. I still observe that this general consideration of the possibilities of the modification of images, as possibilities founded in the nature of the field, does not yet ask which of those modifications function presentationally for the constitution of a stationary Objectivity, whether they

all do or only some.

The most important of all these possible occurrences is now obviously expansion. With mere displacement and rotation (concealment is not, in principle, anything new), we would always have a mere oculomotor Objectivity, simply somewhat amplified, i.e., one whose identity would be preserved not only as it is unfolded in the system of eye-movements but also as it is in the new displacements and rotations which are kinaesthetically motivated in such and such a way. The "Object" would therefore be what is identical in this system of displacements and rotations, and it would be a stationary Object if the general type of the stationary manifold were at hand: every kinaesthetic course provides a determinate series of appearances, and the same course always yields the same series. But this Object would still always be a kinaesthetic image and not yet a thing. It is only the multiform system of expansions that makes possible a new dimension which creates a thing out of the image and space out of the oculomotor field. A new dimension does not signify here, however, anything analogous to geometry. A parallel displacement of the plane "generates," as the geometer says, space. But it would certainly not make sense to speak of a parallel displacement of the oculomotor field, as if that field were integrated like a surface into the space of things. In the case of geometry, we already have space, and we "generate" it by means of a parallel displacement in it of the plane. Two locations of the plane have a distance that is completely homologous to the same distance in the plane. But two visual fields no more have a distance than two oculomotor fields do, i.e., as something that would make sense to identify with the distance between two points [237] in the oculomotor field. And the oculomotor field is also anything but something which would occur as a surface in the entirety of space. It must indeed always be kept in mind that just as we have only one visual field, so we have only one oculomotor field, merely filled with images in an ever different way.

It is therefore a matter of actually generating something as new, something not yet there, whereby the principle of the generation is the same as the one that, within the lawful variation of images in the visual field, posits unity under the heading of oculomotor image and oculomotor field. In the oculomotor field, lawful changes of images arise under lawfully coordinated *K*-circumstances; they fuse into a typical system and acquire apprehensional unity. The modification which accomplishes this, or mainly accomplishes it, is expansion. What is held fast not merely throughout all the oculomotor displacements, rotations, and concealments, but also throughout all the expansions, and which is, as it were, intuited in them, is the thing. And the thing is posited at the same time as an identical being after it exits from the actual visibility of the currently actual oculomotor field, or, in brief, it is posited as identical in the extensional amplification or joining together of the oculomotor fields of images. Naturally, however, we always have to attend to the general

type of the positing of unity; it is always a matter of appearances under appurtenant "circumstances": the appearances are presentations. Apprehensions animate presentational contents and give them a presentational function by pointing, as it were, to lawful sequences of such contents under the motivating circumstances. In the actual sequence of presentational contents within the motivational type, the functional characters are continually animated; and in the unity of a consciousness that is always fulfilled anew and that always has new intentions, the givenness of the object is constituted according to its appurtenant "sides" and parts.

This still needs to be supplemented with a few more remarks. New presentational contents, stratified in parallel with new kinaesthetic series, are necessary in order to rise to a higher level of empirical unity as a unity in the manifold of motivated appearances, and therefore to bring a thing, as it were, to a higher level, to a new dimension. I said "new presentational contents," but it would be better to speak of new modifications founded in the essence of the [238] genus of presentational contents and of their unitary field. The identity of the thing is indeed supposed to penetrate all appearances, in each of which the thing already presents itself. We have the same primal material everywhere: the visual field with its system of places, in which, through changing qualitative fulfillment, the images are distinguished and ordered in such and such a manner. The possibilities for intuitions of unities in the manifold reach just as far as the possibilities of the modifications founded in the essence of the field. The manifolds are continuous manifolds of change of a primal material given once and for all. That is first. What is secondary is the possible coordination with the kinaesthetic manifolds which must precisely also be at hand and be coordinated in a correspondingly rich form. All the possibilities have not now been exhausted by the mere oculomotor field and the series of appearances constituting it. Displacement, rotation, and concealment can be enlisted for Objectivation beyond the oculomotor modification. This provides a surplus and does so *a fortiori* if an extensional amplification has been carried out. But the things here, which might possibly lie upon one another and conceal one another, are not full things in the sense of the spatiality that exhausts all the possibilities. The "upon one another" acquires no relation to the "beside one another" and thereby lacks a component essential to the constitution of the world, namely the integration of the Ego, through the Ego-point, into space and the relation of all spatial appearances to this Ego-point. Only when expansion is added do we have the full presentational material capable of presenting space.

§68. *The special significance of expansion for the constitution of space.*

Nevertheless, is expansion not a realm of completely vague possibilities? We can compare the field, as a continuous two-dimensional manifold, to a plane, even if the continuity of the field, like phenomenological continuity in general, is not susceptible to the subtleties of the Archimedean axiom and other conditions of mathematical continuity. Still, it is clear that, just as in the plane we [239] can continually transform every closed figure, by way of expansion (we could possibly say distortion, although that is in principle nothing new), into any other *ad libitum*, so also every visual figure in the field of images can be transformed in any other. Is this not a boundless manifold, an ἄπειρον, as it were, which defies every givenness of unity? Do we not already see sufficiently that empirical unity includes lawfulness in the manifold of appearances, thus laws of selection governing the continuous transitions of presentations under the respective kinaesthetic circumstances? Hence whatever may be the case regarding the things in general that maintain their unity throughout the stream of thingly changes and movements, this certainly and above all holds for the absolutely identical things that are absolutely identical in the sense of being stationary and qualitatively unchanged. And the thought is inescapable, from the entire course of our previous considerations, that space is perhaps constituted primarily with these absolutely identical objectivities, as their Objective form of order, and that they accordingly could function as the norm or basic standard for the constitution of changing objectivities.

It is now clear that if an absolutely unchanged Objectivity is to be constituted as apprehended in the stream of the continuous presentational foundations, i.e., an Objectivity that appears as it does in a strictly determinate way under the respective circumstances and that has its determinately motivated kind of appearance or presentation for every possible variation in the circumstances, then this manifold of appearance, and the manifold of presentation therein, must form a lawfully unitary type of motivation. They must be bound in a lawfully coherent way; thus, in the manner of a generally delimited selection out of all the existing possibilities, they must be bound to an equally powerful and generally determinate manifold of motivating circumstances. With regard to the circumstances, we cannot speak of a selection insofar as we must take together here the total manifold of the circumstances that are in general called to play a role in the motivation. This does not mean all the circumstances that, in the sense of logical possibility, could be thought of as motivating. For, in the sense of logical possibility, we could conceive the number of motivating variables as increased *ad libitum*. It is a matter of the [240] manifold which *de facto* is called to be motivating or which, in the terms of association psychology, has entered into associative interweaving with variations of presentational contents. In the total apprehension of every objectivity,

this entire manifold has, in a certain sense, its "representative," and that is why it is available in thought or in phantasy. We can in thought run through this manifold in its various directions and can constantly follow up its appurtenant motives, merely as long as we have assumed a coordination, i.e., an appearance as the initial appearance of something that is stationary and is of any further character whatever. On the other hand, however, the manifold of the presentations of a stationary objectivity is – and must be – a limited one. Out of the innumerable possibilities that arise for the variation of images in the visual field, from the very nature of this field, the stationary manifold renders prominent, as possible motives, only certain lawfully delimited series of variations. Every discrepant series of variations which actually emerges is then not motivated kinaesthetically, and what appears therein is not something stationary but something changing. Therefore every expansion, as well as every distinguishable occurrence whatsoever in the visual field, acquires objective significance. For if the presentational content is fastened within the givenness of unity, it still loses nothing of its content of stratifiable moments, and, just as it is, it signifies something. For all that, obviously not every arbitrary expansion can have constitutive significance for the constitution of an absolutely identical objectivity, and thereby for the constitution of an absolutely fixed spatiality, and thus for the constitution of the absolutely identical Objective system of locations, a system which subsequently furnishes the field for the possible movements of things that now change qualitatively and now do not.

§69. *Presentation of a three-dimensional Object in two-dimensional images.*

We can now assert something – not phenomenologically, but instead on the basis of an apriori consideration of constituted space, which is "our" Euclidean space, and from the position of the Ego-point therein – about the kind of lawfulness that resides *de facto* in the motivated streaming of the expansions and that conditions the constitution of stationary things and of Objective spatiality. In the first place, there pertains to every location of our body in [241] which a determinate stationary Objectivity appears a determinate oculomotor field, fulfilled in such and such a way and containing the presentation of this Objectivity in the form of some oculomotor image or other. The oculomotor field is two-dimensional, and, accordingly, so is the image. Every image in this coordinated series of oculomotor images or fields is apprehended as possessing the sense of the same three-dimensional Object. Conversely, this Object appears at any time only in the form of a two-dimensional image. It unfolds in a determinate manifold of two-dimensional images which pertain *au fond* to

one and the same "plane" (as we could say) manifold of places. The series of images in its continuous succession is characterized as a continuous sequence of expansions undergone by the "same" image in the relevant kinaesthetic transition. Formally, therefore, these various expansions will behave exactly like the projections of a geometrical body onto a plane or, still better, like the colored plane images of the corporeal thing. For expansion is obviously a concept applicable at once to both the figure and the coloration. Let us here pay special attention to the figure. But what kind of projections? Every expansion has a relationship to the Ego-point; it presents a change in the remoteness from that Ego-point. The stronger is the positive or negative expansion, the greater is the approaching or the receding. In the case of non-uniform expansion, an ever smaller remoteness pertains to the more strongly expanded part of the image, and a greater remoteness to the more weakly expanded part.

In virtue of its motivational relation to the respective *K*-circumstances, every image is now inserted apperceptively into a lawfully determinate context of expansion. And at the same time, along with the stationary thing appearing therein, the Ego is assigned its changing position in space: it stands here or there; it moves hither and thither. A strictly determinate correlation is thereby constituted between the position of the Ego and the appearance, such that a determinate image from the series of the manifold of expansions pertains to every determinate spatial point as the position of the Ego.

We need to conclude here with the character of the projection. Objectively, a beam of rays of remoteness issues from the Ego-point toward the visible points of the Object. The totality of the visible points of the Object forms the continuum of the appearing side of the Object, the side that presents itself in the oculomotor image as a formation in a two-dimensional manifold. With a change in the kinaesthetic circumstances, the Ego-point moves in space, and its remoteness from the points of the appearing side of the Object changes; the beam of rays of remoteness is ever again different, and at the same time the oculomotor image changes, expanding in such and such a way. The question now arises: is there a plane that so intersects the beam of rays which corresponds to the respective oculomotor image (i.e., is there hence a plane upon which we can so project the thing from the Ego-point) that the projected images pertaining to the various locations of the Ego-point must correspond exactly to the oculomotor images? In the continuum of these plane central projections, we would then have brought the lawfulness of the expansion to an Objective and spatial expression. The location of this plane would then have to be such that every possible perceptual Object can be projected upon it from all the spatial locations of the Ego-point. These conditions are obviously satisfied by a moving plane which is always parallel to the frontal plane and is situated in such a way that it lies in front of every possible Object. And this presupposes that between the Ego-point and every possible Object there is an

[242]

open distance which can never be bypassed. Instead of this moving plane, we can then naturally take a fixed one, upon which the images vary among themselves just as they do on that moving plane in its movement.

For the rest, it is clear *a priori* that the occurrences in a two-dimensional plane manifold, such as is the oculomotor field, can be presented univocally through occurrences on one plane. On the other hand, it is to be understood, and to be founded mathematically in every case, that not every arbitrary lawful variation of images that are continuously expanding, and whose orientation is constantly changing, needs to be apprehensible through the projection of a three-dimensional body in three-dimensional space. Thus the constitution of precisely a three-dimensional space, on the basis of the conversion of the oculomotor field into a manifold of expansion or of displacement, will then certainly not be deducible *a priori*. We can only say this much: if a fixed [243] Objectivity in general is to be constituted in streaming manifolds of presentation such that the appearance of the same identical Objectivity pervades them, then a fixity of lawful order must hold sway in the appearances or in the motivation of the sequences of presentation through coordinated sequences of motivating circumstances. The forms of this lawfulness are then circumscribed by the further requirement that this Objectivity is to be a thingly one, i.e., one in which things in manifolds are posited in fixed relations such that possibilities of movement and change remain open. But identity in the movement presupposes a perpetual continuum of places and specifically one that is in itself congruent.

CHAPTER 13

THE CONSTITUTION OF SPACE THROUGH THE CONVERSION OF THE OCULOMOTOR FIELD INTO AN EXPANSIONAL AND TURNING MANIFOLD

§70. *The appurtenance of images to one identical Object.*

All the same, let us now return to the consideration of the changes in orientation – above all, the expansions – and to the more precise analysis of the way the consciousness of unity is formed there. In the constitution of the oculomotor image (or Object), what gives the image separate existence, what makes it stand out over and against other "Objects" in the field, is nothing else than qualitative discontinuity. The Object is the unity of the figure that is qualitatively distinguished in this or that way, and the figure is distinguished precisely by the fact that its coloration does not blend into that of the surroundings. Naturally, in this way two images that border each other can also be grasped as an Objective unity, and so can, ultimately, the entire field. But if we do not posit every such arbitrary unity, or if we do not take every arbitrary one into consideration, then that happens because we already have in view the relation of the oculomotor images to the things. Precisely this oculomotor image pertains to the thing *A*; even if the image breaks down into several [244] images set in relief against each other, still they all pertain, in their nexus, to the same Object. Likewise, these or those disjunct images in the field pertain to the Object *B*, etc. Even images that do not border one another may possibly pertain to one Object, whereas images that touch in the oculomotor field may pertain to different Objects, as happens in the case of concealment. In the merely oculomotor field, insofar as it is a unitary and stationary field, we therefore possess no principle that could decisively anticipate the future constitution of the thing with regard to the nexus of images appertaining to one Object. If we now pass over to the continuity of the oculomotor fields, the change in orientation and in expansion creates the unity of the appurtenance and contains principles of conjunction; mere displacement in the oculomotor field already does this, and displacement goes hand in hand, as we know, with a changed concealment. In displacement, that which is displaced remains the same, and the streaming on of the motivating circumstances motivates this transition from oculomotor image to oculomotor image in such a way that the

image undergoes no inner change; it remains the same, and only the coordinations of the kinaesthetic circumstances change, and thereby so does the orientation in the field.

The rotation of the field already goes further; but the change is a continuous one and is so not only in general. On the contrary, there exists a reciprocal and univocal correspondence with respect to all distinguishable moments of the images; each one has its correspondent in every other image, and each one, proceeding continuously out of another image, has undergone the same modification, the same one we call rotation. And the rotation is alike everywhere. An identity penetrates the constant modification, and insofar as the modification is such that it unitarily penetrates a whole of distinguishable parts, the general proposition holds that in the result of the modification every part which has arisen as continuous out of one part of the original image presents the same thing. The unchanged preservation of the image in the stream of phenomenological time thereby counts as a limit-case of modification and is included therein.

The proposition holds not only for the modification that continuously penetrates a concrete series of images but also for the modification of concealment. If an image which travels by and conceals (but which in its modification always presents the same Object) constantly obliterates another image, then at first, according to the given rule, the image that is not yet obliterated remains, in all its visible parts, a presentation of the same thing: the image is identical in virtue of its visible modification. But now, as the concealment progresses, more and more is always obliterated, possibly the entire "Object." When the movement is reversed, however, the Object is continuously built back up. This constant demolition and rebuilding due to such a concealing Object is a system of modifications which is strictly motivated by the kinaesthetic circumstances. A certain stage of this concealment pertains to every kinaesthetic situation, and a similar one pertains to a similar situation. [245]

The appearance, just as it receives its sense through the motivating circumstances in every situation, requires that the visible refer to the invisible. But the visible does not include in its presentational content the co-motivated intention that pertains to the invisible. The series of images in which what is concealed presents itself concretely does not go on continuously in the series of presentations of what is concealing. In this respect, there is no bond of unity. The beam of rays of alert intentions which penetrates the concealing image and the beam which penetrates the concealed image are not identical; on the contrary, they are separate beams. In the continuity of the modifications, in which the concealing image is forever a concrete image, its living and concretely presentational intention always penetrates this image; likewise, it penetrates the images of the Objects that are not yet concealed. But if an Object is constantly concealed, then its full intentions are constantly converted

into empty ones; its concrete intentions, so to speak, become imaginary ones, and they forfeit forever their presentational content. They still retain, however, the character of perceptual intentions, motivated as alive in the motivational nexus. The total motivational unity demands that this determinately characterized phenomenon of modification (namely, concealment) take place in such and such a way, and that, as often as the kinaesthetic situation is modified by means of a reversal of the kinaesthetic sequences, the Object is constituted again in a complete presentation and is constantly built up visually. On the other hand, the motivational unity demands that, in connection with the ever-given concealing Object, the Object constantly sinks back again into concealment if the former circumstances recur. Thereby the concealing Object acquires its phenomenal relation to the concealed Object: an Object-point of the concealing Object corresponds to every point of the disappearing Object, since the same position of the oculomotor field which just now still presented the Object *a* now presents a point of the Object *b*. But if we ask why the content pertaining to the same point in the field did not assume a presentational function for *a*, then the answer is naturally that a content is presentational only in its determinately characterized (or lawful, as we could also say) nexus of motivated modifications. The content in question is integrated precisely into the nexus which is constitutive for the concealing Object. But the concealed Object demands for itself, at this place, a different content. If its motivated content undergoes a change not required by its own lawfulness but, on the contrary, one that pertains to a different constitutive series, then the change does precisely not belong to the concealed Object but to another one. (The content cannot belong to both simultaneously.) [246]

§71. *The constitutive function of expansion (approaching and receding).*

Let us then proceed to the class of modifications included under the term "expansion." There resides here once again a particular principle of selection and of unification which distinguishes, out of the multiplicity of delimitations in the oculomotor field, certain determinate ones as pertaining to the unity of the thing. If the continually unchanged oculomotor field is already integrated, in virtue of the apprehension of a thing, into the manifolds of possible changes and, especially, expansions, insofar as this field includes sufficient indications pointing to a type of possible motivated change, then the different way in which expansion and other changes in images distribute themselves among the various pieces of the oculomotor field also proves to be effective – anticipatorily, as it were. It gives determinateness to the apprehension of things and excludes the accidental and the arbitrary from the delimitation of the presenta-

tions of things.

To be sure, expansion can also apply unitarily, and in the same lawful form, to the whole field. But then, insofar as this field alone offers the apprehension [247] a foothold, the thingly Objectivity must also appear as a unique one (moreover, the exact same statement would have to be made in the case of a unitary displacement or rotation of the whole field). For the rest, expansion generally distributes itself in different ways to the different pieces of the field. Obviously, the unity of the expansion stands out against that which does not participate in this unitary expansion and which instead either does not expand at all or else expands in another typical form. According to our principle, what pertains to the unity of a continuous expansion certainly also pertains to the unity of a presentation (the presentation of something objective). Admittedly, that which belongs to expansions of different types can indeed still be joined into the unity of an object, insofar as a unitary type of modification can coalesce the expansions which are in themselves of different types into the unity of a presentation. Think, for instance, of the case of two mutually bounded surfaces. Let us take two simultaneously visible and mutually bounded surfaces of a polyhedron which present themselves in different expansional modifications. Yet the two series of modifications belong together; they pertain to the same kinaesthetic circumstances, they stream on together, and they form in this unitary stream a determinate type of unitary modification. In the same sense, it can also be that images without a mutual boundary are considered one Objectivity (concealment) due to being affected by one kinaesthetically related, typical modification. Here, in the domain of expansion in general, there are various occurrences to be studied with respect to their Objectivational significance.

What is remarkable in the first place is the way expansion can be mixed with concealment. An image can undergo mere expansion without any external or internal loss of presentational contents through concealment. For the sake of an example, let us pursue the oculomotor presentations of an ever-visible, plane, limit-surface, perhaps those of the surface of a cube. These presentations continuously pass over into one another, specifically in such a way that a reciprocal and univocal correspondence exists among the points, parts, and correlations. The correspondent is a continuous modification of the correspondents, and it therefore presents the same thing. Thereby, however, the one is precisely the expansion of the other; the oculomotor figure has changed, i.e., the whole figure as well as every extractible constellation of [248] points and also, already, every mere pair of points. Each oculomotor distance is constantly changed, but in a way that is kinaesthetically motivated in a strict fashion; therefore it presents the same Objective distance.

Now consider the example of an undulating surface, and pursue its presentations in the case of kinaesthetic change. Here it is not mere expansion that

arises but internal concealment. For instance, a pair of points, of which one pertains to a crest of the wave and the other to a trough, undergoes, as the modification progresses, a continuous expansion, perhaps a negative one. And then the distance suddenly disappears: the two identical points, taken individually in virtue of the continuous transitions, and always preserving their identical distance, suddenly coincide. All at once we no longer have any distance in the image. As the movement progresses, the one point perhaps coincides with ever new points of the image which present new, separate points of the Object. That holds not only for isolated pairs of points but also for continuous nexuses of points. Pieces of the already Objectivated unity of the surface are missing from the actual presentation, but they are preserved in the consciousness of unity in the mode of being concealed. Therefore these are occurrences of internal concealment in the stream of unitary expansions. The Objectivation ensues here just as it does in the case of every concealment.

On the other hand, there is also another concealment that often goes hand in hand with expansion. This one is such that, in the progress of the unitary expansional modification, a shrinkage of the sphere of presentation occurs from the outside, and thereby a concealment takes place. But what matters is that this is a concealment by means of the Object itself. And it is such that if a round calotte, in the *quasi*-rotation that is presented through expansion, offers itself ever more laterally, whereby a peripheral part of the image expands unceasingly, then other parts, located near the other edges, shrink and finally disappear, concealed by the expanded part of the image or by the corresponding side of the Object. Or again, a cube may present itself in a continuous modification in such a way that, of a pair of lateral surfaces, the one undergoes continued expansion, and the other constant contraction up to the limit-case – i.e., it contracts into a line that coincides with the edge of the other surface. Thus it disappears behind the surface that remains visible. Yet it is indeed [249] preserved intentionally in the mode of something concealed, specifically as pertaining to the whole object, because the modifications of the one and the other surface, including the determinately qualified occurrences of nullification and of temporally enduring concealment, belong to the unity of a motivated total modification.

§72. *The constitutive function of turning. The linear modification of expansion and the cyclical modification of turning.*

We can now immediately try to define, in a general way and under the heading of "modification of turning," a most important type of image-modification. We will refer first of all to the fact that here the new acquisition and loss of

presented points of an Object are essentially different than they are in the case where the acquisition and loss have their source in the entering and exiting of parts of images into or out of the oculomotor field, as can occur with changes in orientation or in remoteness. For turning requires that concealment and unconcealment be in play in a determinate way. Through concealment, parts of the image can in general become invisible, and through unconcealment they can in general become visible (i.e., the presented object can become visible). But what conceals can at one time be precisely a foreign Object and at another time the same Object with respect to its own Objective points, and this latter situation belongs to the definition of turning. New fundamental characteristics of these two groups of modifications now supervene.

Pure receding is a linear modification. The motivating circumstances vary infinitely in a linearly orthoid manner. Pure turning is a cyclical modification; the kinaesthetic circumstances vary cyclically, and in the system of pure modifications of turning they bring back the turning series of images.

In the mere modification of remoteness, the image, so to speak, merely contracts (disregarding inner concealments and unconcealments) *in infinitum*, with the null-point as the limit. Kinaesthetically, infinity corresponds to the null limit. In the reverse direction, we have the infinite enlargement of the image, and therefore the limit is here in a certain sense the "infinite," although, [250] kinaesthetically, a finite limit corresponds to this diminishment of the remoteness. The appearing side is ever the same: it is always the "front side." That the Object has other sides is due to its co-constitution through the possible modifications of turning. The series of these appearances is cyclical; it cyclically transforms one side into another and finally constitutes the closure of the sides, which is the closed corporeal surface. We cannot yet properly speak of a surface, however. Nevertheless, we realize that what is constituted on the basis of continuous turning must be a two-dimensional system of points. In other words, it is to be noted that this cycle is not a linear one but is instead a cyclical manifold of two dimensions. Turning (always taken as mere turning) can occur in various ways, specifically according to the standard of the two-dimensional system of directions in the oculomotor field. If we examine the perpetual concealments carried out by a point of the Object, and if we pay attention to the positions of this point in the oculomotor field, the ones that pertain to every phase of the turning, then we see that all the points of the Object can execute a turning from left to right and, in the beam of rays of the polar coordinates in the oculomotor field, can also execute a turning in every other direction, e.g., from below to above, etc. A determinate system of appearances pertains to every one-dimensional, cyclical turning, and in order to acquire a closed corporeality in an adequate way – from all sides and in all appearances – each of these systems of turnings would therefore have to be traversed. Furthermore, every turning has its counter-turning, as is obvious,

since the type of the stationary manifold requires that a counter-modification pertain to every modification, both kinaesthetically as well as with regard to the constant coordinated appearances.

A general remark: mere expansion is not a modification that is related to the change of mere orientation in the oculomotor field as are two powers which can be combined according to the principle of the parallelogram of powers. I said, not very clearly, that mere expansion is a modification independent of mere orientation. Expressed more precisely, mere orientation is the displacement or rotation of a figure that maintains its identity in the oculomotor field. For instance, in the case of "displacement," every point in the field maintains [251] the same linear transformation of coordinates: every determined distance undergoes the same mere displacement in parallel. The reciprocal orientation of the points toward one another is the same in the one location of the figure and in the others. As regards expansion, on the other hand, the points do not retain their reciprocal orientation. The concept of expansion implies in the first place, generally speaking, a change in the location of the points in the field. Where all the points maintain their location, we can naturally not speak of a modification. On the other hand, however, the locations may change in such a way that the relative orientation of the points toward one another is not preserved. This implies that if we pursue the course of modification of any pair of points, the distance between them changes, in general, incessantly and does so, specifically, at least with respect to one of these two components: size and direction. Accordingly, the total figure constantly changes, either in its size or form or in both respects. A determinate type of expansion characterizes turning. It is that modification of images in which the rotation of the Object appears. (Limit-case: mere change of orientation in the oculomotor field.)

It struck us lately as characteristic of turning that in the modification of expansion the changing image constantly takes on from the outside new presentational contents and loses old ones, whereby the new contents of the images perpetually emerge out of concealment by means of those image-contents to which they continuously attach themselves. Conversely, the concealing image-contents are themselves constantly concealed by their neighbors in the image. But this character is connected with another one. Every turning has a rotational direction, specifically either a constant or a variable one. Let us consider a turning of constant direction or a turn-differential from any turning whatever. We might think of a semblant rotation, arising from our movement around a stationary Object. It can be a rotation from right to left or from lower left to upper right, etc., and if the direction is always changing we can consider a small fragment of the turning. In any case, it is clear that in a certain sense all the points change their orientation in a harmonious way with regard to their direction. For instance, a perceived point in the field may travel from left to right, and all the image-points may travel with it in a unitarily [252]

harmonious way, i.e., in such a way that they can be integrated into a determinate system of cyclical modifications, a system which constantly brings one image after another and, finally, brings back the original image itself. If we continue the turning in a constant direction, it then reverts back to itself. Thereby, however, the turning necessarily leads beyond the oculomotor field. What is carried out is not a mere rotation of the oculomotor image in the field, possibly with a cyclical distortion, while the reciprocal-univocal correspondence of the image-points that pass over into one another would be preserved before and after the modification. On the contrary, the cyclical process necessarily penetrates the concealing and the unconcealing. And only individual parts of the image that is grasped in the stream can preserve their presentational identity with themselves and therefore can undergo in the field itself a complete cyclical change of the kind just described. We can think of this as occurring when a die is rotated in such a manner that during the complete rotation one definite surface of the die always remains visible. Its image executes a cyclical change with determinate expansions, but a reciprocal-univocal correspondence is preserved in all the locations. In all its points it is precisely the same surface, and in all of them it appears continuously; it is merely rotating.

It is clear that this indicates a lawful peculiarity of the turnings, and since a complete turning brings back the same appearance, that already says the turnings are motivated by closed kinaesthetic series.

Every turning, as we emphasized in our characterization, constantly brings new presentational contents; the image contributes something new. Precisely this implies that to say "the Object is turning" means the same as saying "it constantly shows itself from new sides," whereby gain matches loss, and thus for every new appearance something just seen disappears. Therefore the essential peculiarity of the visual Object consists phenomenologically in its being seen as "having sides" and in always presenting itself incompletely in the "sides," in the characteristic system of rotational modifications. If a complete revolution is carried out, the sides are joined to one another as continuous in the unity of the sequential appearance, and they bring to appearance the [253]
closedness of the nexus of the sides and therefore make the complete corporeal surface appear as a "closed" one. To be sure, we cannot yet properly speak of a "surface" here. In any case, a complete revolution constitutes the closedness of the corporeal form. But we must be more precise. A complete revolution is not sufficient for the full givenness of the corporeal thing in all its sides. The totality of the phases of the revolution does not form a one-dimensional, but a two-dimensional, cyclical system, or, in other words, the rotational directions and the rotational continua as well, just like the vectors that in a plane emanate from a point, both form a one-dimensional cyclical system. Accordingly, the kinaesthetic system is likewise a two-dimensional

cyclical system. If we have in sight any Objective point in the presentation and if, in the rotational modification, this point moves, e.g., from right to left, then we can conceive of another turning which would transport this same point in every other direction of the directional cluster in the oculomotor field, and in that way then the total turning could elapse accordingly. Nevertheless, in every single direction here, many possibilities still exist, because expansion can be connected with both approaching and receding and will then present itself in different types, insofar as we consider it purely. We must now speak of these matters.

The expansional modification in which mere approaching and receding appear lacks the cyclical character; it is in itself neither ready nor suited, if it continues on in the same direction, to come back to itself cyclically. It has the character of a kind of modification that goes on bilaterally *ad infinitum*. "Bilaterally" means that it has two and only two directions, which fuse as opposites into a linear manifold (an open, bilaterally infinite, and, as it were, orthoid manifold). Precisely this is what the correlates "approaching and receding" signify. We can also take as one of its characteristics that which makes up the opposite of the main character of turning. In the system of a stationary manifold, there are exactly only two basic forms of expansion: turning and receding, apart from their combinations. We can therefore say that in the case of mere approaching or receding there takes place no gain or loss of presentational contents through generally constant and extensive self- [254] concealment or self-unconcealment. This means that it pertains to the essence of the modification of mere receding that it always presents the Object from one and only one side and, furthermore, that if the stationary manifold had at its disposal only this mode of expansional modification there could be presented in it nothing like a "closedness" of the form of a thing in a continuum of sides or in any more sides above and beyond the given ones. The very concept of side would then completely collapse. This does not mean that in the modification of remoteness identically the same points of the Object would always appear and never new ones. We have indeed not excluded internal concealing and unconcealing. Not every appearing side of a thing is like a plane or like the side of a sphere – i.e., without recesses which could be inspected better by means of drawing near to the thing without its turning.

In the modification of remoteness, there is no uni-directional expansion, whether straight or turning, but, instead, an omni-directional expansion asunder. This is a typical and lawful kind of expansion, but it is one that is not amenable to cyclical processes or to passing beyond the margin. Nevertheless, the manifold is still a very large one, because every differently formed body must have its different modes of expanding and receding. For every determinate (determinately formed) body there are, however, determinate modes, specifically ones that are reducible, for that body, to a uni-dimensional mani-

fold of change. Likewise, even in turning, every body indeed looks quite differently, but for each body its rotational manifold is cyclical in two dimensions and completely determinate.

The pure manifold of remoteness does not proceed infinitely on both sides, according to proper receding as well as according to approaching. With respect to receding, there exists a null-limit. The image contracts to the "point." On the other hand, for the parallel kinaesthetic series, the "infinitely" corresponds to this null point. To be sure, if the kinaesthetic modifications consisted in mere simple modifications of sensation, then we would seek in vain for a kinaesthetic sensation amenable to infinite increase.[1] It is clear what is presupposed here. Think about walking. Instead of a uniform change, it presents an operation to be carried out again and again in the same way, by means of a periodic alternation, according to the type *ab*, *ab*, *ab*, ... This would require its own consideration. [255]

As regards approaching, the image undergoes a positive expansion, ideally speaking, *ad infinitum*. Kinaesthetically, however, there corresponds to the image a finite limit. Yet this is an unattainable limit, apart from the fact that the image may surpass the field extensively. The finite limit is an ideal one, yet it is obviously founded in the essence of the kinaesthetic coordination.

§73. *Summary. The constitution of space and the levels of that constitution.*

Every kinaesthetic modification is either oculomotor or else it concerns the remaining kinaesthetic systems. The former alternative constitutes the merely oculomotor field, and the latter introduces into that field the system of expansions as recedings and as turnings, in which all orientations are co-included. Thereby the two-dimensional oculomotor field is transformed into the three-dimensional field of space as a conjunction of the one-dimensional linear manifold of receding with the two-dimensional cyclical manifold of turning. There are not, and cannot be, any other modifications, provided it is precisely a three-dimensional Objectivity that is to be constituted.

It has thereby been shown that the constitution of the spatial thing must be examined on various levels that are clearly distinct functionally.

I. Constitution of the oculomotor field.
II. a) The linear manifold of approaching and receding.
b) The two-fold cyclical manifold of turning.
c) Combinations.

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[1] On this, *cf.* Husserl's note, Appendix I, p. 295. – Ed.

In addition, essential points in the clarification are the distinction between circumstances and appearances, the occurrences of extensive amplification of the field and of space, and those of intensive enlargement and contraction, of concealment in its various forms.

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CHAPTER 14

SUPPLEMENTARY CONSIDERATIONS [256]

§74. *Delimitation of the individual thing out of the nexus in things in the case of a stationary Objectivity.*

Many supplementations are still called for: for example, the question of the separateness of individual things, to the extent that (and to what extent) a stationary Objectivity can already be responsible for this separateness. In a continuous modification, in receding or in turning, where one point is connected continuously to another point, one side to another side, there the unity of an Objectivity pervades the nexus of things. But if we look into the nexuses in the unfolding of the thing, is not everything ultimately connected with everything else? The consideration arises that, in the case of a thoroughly stationary Objectivity, the modifications of expansion and receding seem to penetrate the entire field. If we adhere to mere intuition, however, we find an exception. For intuition, there appear infinitely distant bodies, namely, those that are not involved in the general stream of expansions. But here lies a contradiction. If, e.g., the blue of the sky appears as a vault and is thereby interpreted as a body, then this body must indeed have its front and back and its closed surface, which must be constituted in possible transitions, in possible cyclical turnings, etc. To be constituted in such a way pertains irrevocably to the essence of a body, which indeed manifests its sense as a unity in such motivated modifications of appearance, even in the case of a very distant mountain or the moon, etc. With very distant terrestrial Objects, the course of experience, i.e., the actualization of perceptual possibilities that go on infinitely, leads ultimately to the continuous change of the image; there occur expansions, turnings, etc. We then say that the changes were imperceptible and have now become perceptible, "the apparent exception confirms the rule." But as regards the vault of the heavens, we say that the corporeal interpretation is an interpretation about a very distant body, and here the interpretation is [257] inadmissible. It is not an actual body but only a semblant one. The blue (or, if we include familiar experiences, the black which would appear in the course of approaching in a definite direction) is not an Objective blue (or black) and does not belong to any thing. It is a merely subjective phenomenon. We will leave this subjectivity alone; in any case, this much is certain, that the essence of the thing includes the possibility of demonstrating itself through the phe-

nomena we have described and of constituting itself as a unity in them, and that we therefore have no other choice than one between these two possibilities: the becoming perceptible of something previously imperceptible or else a semblant thing, a deceptive thing. In addition, it is in itself clear that, considered purely from the standpoint of visual givenness, an empty space is conceivable within the domain of mere vision, namely as a residue of visual contents which cannot be accommodated to the yoke of the apprehension of a thing; it must be that precisely not all of them are so accommodated. Those that are constitute things that have their distances and their orders; those that are not constitute the nothing between the things. Accordingly, what results here as the one and only principle of the delimitation of individual things is the complete and omni-sided closedness of the body, a closedness which is at the same time a separation from every other body and is therefore a partition by means of empty space. As soon as two things (in the ordinary sense) lie upon one another or in one another, etc., the continuity of a thing penetrates them both, and the question is why any arbitrary piece should not just as well count as a thing, since pieces also "touch" and lie on one another. Naturally we will say that autonomous things can be detached from one another; they are independent of each other as regards motion and change; they have distinct physicalistic properties, distinct modes of activity, etc. But the constitution of a stationary Objectivity tells us nothing about this. Therefore the preceding has supplied no principles for this distinction.

§75. *Addendum. The apprehension of a concealment as the distance of a remoteness.* [258]

We[1] have not hitherto given an account of how a concealment comes to be apprehended as the distance of a remoteness.

The concealing and the concealed are different Objects, but both are unchanged Objects. If we now take a stationary Objectivity, consisting of various separate Objects, then it pertains to them, in view of their Objectivity, to be presentable out of an oculomotor field through connected and motivated processes of displacement, turning, coincidence, and extension. Accordingly, there must be a field filled in an oculomotor way with presentations of this Objectivity, a field in which two Objects present themselves in every case, either wholly or partially, without any concealment. Hereby it must be noted, however, that, in the sphere of the manifolds which present a purely unchanged Objectivity, no interior of a closed Object is or can be presented. We know nothing of an interior here, and we have no occasion here to maintain

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[1] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's note, Appendix I, p. 295. – Ed.

such a thing as possible at all. What enters into a concealment, and again exits from it, is what comes to givenness. Conversely, we have a phenomenology of this entering and exiting. We have heard how a being that is not seen is constituted insofar as it is concealed or lies outside the presentation of the oculomotor field, i.e., how it can only be given by means of a certain kinaesthetic process. A concealment that is in principle always a concealment cannot be given here. Points "in" the "interior" of the closed surface would be points that, by necessity, would have to be concealed, namely, within the mere stationary manifold. Hitherto we have had no notion, and in any case we have been able to offer no account of the fact, that there is still something else to put forth, other possibilities, other points.

Do we now know at least this much, that there is a distance corresponding to every Objective pair of points? Then indeed there would be guaranteed, even if not the possibility of "interior" points, yet the possibility of the deformation of every surface according to all the possible distances between its points lying on different sides. Moreover, a fragmentation would certainly be thinkable such that the pieces would have something between them, a space between themselves, i.e., precisely unfilled distances. Every perceived distance is preserved. Consequently, the oculomotor field is enlarged, and thus we can speak mediately of a distance as well, even where neither of these fall within an intuition. In addition, something not seen unitarily (let us say at first: not seen through the modification of remoteness, and thus not through contraction) can enter into a field and let itself be transformed into something seen unitarily. Likewise, it happens, and so is possible, that what is concealed becomes separate and that therefore a point and a concealed point display a distance by means of being converted into a perceived distance. The identity of every point is indeed ever held fast, and the same applies to every pair of points. Yet this is not to say that in every case two identical points also have a "distance," nor that they therefore manifest the stratifiable relation demonstrated in the field. [259]

§76. *The modes of givenness of empty space.*[2]

Before[3] we move on to the constitution of the thing as identity in change, I would like to add a word of supplementation or clarification to the discussions we just concluded. Those dealt with the delimitation of a closed Object within the framework of a stationary totality of things. Expansion, as the expansion of turning and of receding, is the foundation of the consciousness of unity that

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[2] *Cf.* Appendix VII, "Empty space," pp. 323f. – Ed.

[3] Date in the margin: July 27. Beginning of a new lecture. – Ed.

transforms the oculomotor field into the spatial field. Up to a certain degree, expansion also founds unitary separateness. Not every image prominent in the oculomotor field produces an Object. Not every series of points that passes over continuously into another one in the individual oculomotor field gives us a continuous Objective series of points. The entire field is indeed continuous, and even if we wanted to take the differentiated unity of a coloration as the ground of unity, that would settle nothing. For to the same Object there can [260] pertain continuously either a series of points or a continuous nexus of points, a nexus that is partitioned by the discrete colorations. It remains the case, however, that every continuous manifold of image-points which enters into the continuous unity of a nexus of expansion presents a continuous manifold of Objective points, and the same applies to mere receding. It may even be – e.g., when we have no infinitely remote visual background – that everything without exception is expanding in the oculomotor field; still this does not give us thereby the continuous unity of the expansion of receding that continuously penetrates the entire field. Objectively speaking, if several Objects stand before our eyes, each one has a different spatial location in relation to us; one is in front, one behind, etc. Now, a continuous and unitary expansion, to speak in general, pertains to each of the Objects (disregarding individual positions of internal concealment, etc.); one pertains to each but not to all the Objects taken together. The edges, by means of which the respective images delimit themselves from one another, are, for the expansion, places of discontinuity. The same holds for turning. Every Object presents itself in a different rotational continuity, and even if all the appearing Objects are turning, still the edges of the images are again places of discontinuity for the rotational continuity. A continuous series of image-points which enters into a continuous turning constitutes a continuous series of thing-points. Admittedly, it is not thereby decided whether, in the broader nexus of experience, continuities do not appear between points which prove to be discontinuous in an actually streaming course of expansion, insofar as these points, considered in their immediate nexus, do not pertain in an obvious way to a continuity of points, presented in images, that is expanding continuously. But continuity can appear mediately, precisely through the fact that, e.g., Objectively, *a* is connected in a continuous way with *b*, *b* with *c*, and *c* with *d*, whereby the pairs *ab*, *bc*, and *cd* all pertain to the unity of an image and to its unitary continuity of expansion. At first, therefore, we have here only one principle enabling us to decide on the Objective continuity and discontinuity, which are constituted precisely in the continuity and discontinuity of the expansion of the image. We have an actual and complete separation where, between the system of points Objectified in a manifold of expansion and the one constituted in another manifold of [261] images, there exists no continuous transition and naturally, in the indicated sense, no continuous transition of the expansion of the image, whether imme-

diately or mediately. This would be the case of two spheres standing out against an empty background such as the apparent vault of the heavens. Between them there is empty space. Moreover, we can also say that there is always empty space between two Objectively "distant" regions of points, i.e., between regions constituted in discrete expansions. For instance, two Objects or pieces of Objects which conceal themselves in the ordinary sense are relatively separated: they do not behave unitarily when they become more remote and when they turn, and each has its own expansion, which is discontinuous with that of the others. In phantasy, however, we can think of the discrete points as mediated by a continuity; we can add in phantasy some sort of linkage which, by co-expanding in the image, would produce for the linked points the unity of the continuity of expansion. In this way we can think of many continuous series of points as mediating, and they would be connected to the unity of corporeality. Insofar as these are possible but not actually given, we distinguish between the currently actual corporeality and space, and we say that space is to be filled in a manifold way through corporeality, specifically in a definite order, precisely its own spatial order.

Therefore, whereas the oculomotor field, like the visual field, is always and necessarily filled up, that is not the case with space. A corporeality is seen, but it leaves open infinitely many possibilities for further corporealities, namely in the "between." But the "between" is constituted by the fact that discontinuous expansions, however they exist, can be joined in various ways, and ultimately in a continuous way, by the intermediary of continua of expansion.[4] The "between" as empty, though continuously fillable, space, as the mere possibility of real intermediaries characterized in a lawfully determinate way, is what we would thus have here, although we cannot say that empty space would be seen. What we see are bodies, and, together with the seen, we grasp the "between," which phantasy can then populate with bodies in this or that way. [262] Thus space is rather co-seen.

§77. *The mode of givenness of the interior of a body.*

What about the interior of a complete, closed body? I do not mean the spatial interior, which is also a "between," but the corporeal interior as a filled interior space of the body in contrast with its surface. The essence of the intuition of a stationary Objectivity naturally implies that in continuous and in discontinuous expansion this intuition constitutes on the one hand a closed corporeality and on the other hand the "between" but that it can present no interior in

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[4] If I focus my attention on a point in empty space, I need no clear phantasy, but is it then indeed an empty representation of something that is there?

contrast with a surface. We may also proceed here by way of phantasy modification. Just as we can represent the "between" as mediated by material series of points, specifically where the "between" is, so to speak, open and actually presented, so we can conceive the "between" as gradually and continuously closed. This happens when, e.g., we think of a coffee cup and then join the points through material series until everything is complete.

Nevertheless, better paths to the goal are certainly offered by the sphere of broadened experience, by the things as they are set in relief against one another and are again super-imposed on each other, whereby the things that were one from the standpoint of the stationary manifold now separate and have, within the super-posed surfaces, an interior which, from the standpoint of the stationary manifold, could not demonstrate itself. Likewise, a better path is offered by the occurrences of opening and closing, breaking apart and adhering together, etc. As a consequence, we could then also take the movements of the phantasy which follows these possibilities and divides the same body by means of sectional planes or, conversely, generates it by means of the motion of a plane, etc.

There would still be many series of further discussions to carry out in regard to the stationary manifold, of which I will mention by way of example the characterization of the basic spatial figure through its distinctive behavior in the constituting series of modifications. Nevertheless, I will not now linger over these issues but will instead pursue further the constitution of the world of things by entering into the domain of change.

SECTION VI

THE CONSTITUTION OF OBJECTIVE CHANGE

CHAPTER 15

QUALITATIVE CHANGES OF THE PERCEPTUAL OBJECT [263]

§78. *The nexus of spatial form and qualitative filling.*[1]

We have simulated, hitherto, an absolutely stationary world of things.[2] It was not merely stationary in the phoronomic sense but was also unchanged qualitatively, i.e., in regard to all qualities that fill space (whereby we could disregard the appended qualities). Since we had to do with the visual thing, the respective total coloration remained constant. We will now consider the changeableness of the colorations. The geometrical corporeal thing properly stands out from the stationary thing only through this changeableness, and consequently there is first constituted, in regard to the possible variability of the colorations, pure space as the form into which all corporeal things are inserted as pieces and within which all their points are ordered in an absolutely rigorous way. In the manifold of appearances that constitutes a stationary corporeality, every image has its pre-empirical form (which also includes the size) and its pre-empirical color as filling (covering) the form in all its parts. In the stream of the modifications, both these components undergo their changes, and what is constituted is the Objective form, filled throughout with Objective [264] coloration. The coloration is thereby a function of the form and yet is variable independently of it. The seen red cube could be blue, or partially red, partially blue, etc. Two bodies can be completely alike in themselves, disregarding their location and their comprehensive nexus of things, insofar as there pertains to each of them, taken in themselves, a completely similar system of constitutive modifications. But they can also be alike merely in form and distinct in coloration.

On the other hand, however, the coloration is inseparable from the form to the extent that it is the condition of the possibility of the concrete form and, as the coloration set in relief in the image, a condition of possibility for the constitution of a corporeality set in relief. Moreover, there exists a functional relation between pre-empirical color and the Objective form insofar as the pre-empirical colorations must undergo quite definite modifications, under a rule prescribed to them by the form, if the Objective form is to appear with a

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1 *Cf.* Appendix VIII, "Problem of the quality that fills space," pp. 325f. – Ed.

2 On this, *cf.* Husserl's note, Appendix I, p. 295. – Ed.

definite Objective coloration. For instance, if a cube is to be uniformly of a particular kind of red, then its constitution requires a system of red-adumbrations whose rule is prescribed by the form of the cube. Yet this does not prevent the same form from being uniformly blue as well, or of some other color. The same holds for every coloration; it must then expand into the image-forms precisely in its own way and undergo modifications according to a rule. This granted, we can also say that modifications of coloration, regulated in such a way, must penetrate the respective manifold of images if they are to present a stationary thing. Yet, on the other hand, we can indeed pay attention purely to the nexus of the forms and can conceive of them as differently colored, provided we consider merely the typical laws that rule the filling of the forms. We acquire in this way that which is purely spatial, as the basic form of things, along with its changing possibilities of qualitative filling.

§79. *The thing as what is identical in qualitative change.*

Thus far, we have spoken of the changes in coloration in order to bring "pure space" into pure relief. We will now pose a new basic question: how is the thing constituted as what is identical in change and, more precisely, in "qualitative" change? The thing is what is unitary when the coloration changes and the form remains identical. [265]

Instead of thinking of the given coloration as different or setting the pure form in relief by juxtaposing things of similar form and different color, we can also allow the coloration to change constantly, and we can do so not only in phantasy but also by perceiving things changing qualitatively and only qualitatively. First of all, they change in this way. The same things thus remain. They are still always stationary. But they change their coloration. We know how change is constituted in the phenomenological domain and in the simplest form. For example, a sound *c* changes with respect to intensity; in the stream of time we find the phases of the same quality as they perpetually flow into one another. The common quality is constantly pervasive, but it continuously pervades a different intensity, a different species of the same genus of tonal intensity, which for its part is bound up with the generic quality by way of founding so that we therefore have not a mere totality but an inner unity. The consciousness of unity thus penetrates this continuity: the same *c* in the entire duration, changing in intensity, ever and again different. In the present case, however, matters are not so simple.

The thing is not given in the sense in which a phenomenological sound is given. The thing is the unity of a manifold. The multi-dimensional infinite manifold of image-modifications becomes the bearer of the consciousness of

unity, a consciousness that beholds therein not modifications, nor change, but non-change: the stationary thing colored in such and such a way. And now the coloration is supposed to change. Let us assume that this happens quite suddenly, unexpectedly; then it means that the actual perception, which at first elapsed in the sense of the manifold of modification which corresponded to the first coloration, experiences a leap with respect to the moments pertaining not to the figure but to the coloration. Thus the coloration of the image experiences a leap, by virtue of which it no longer elapses in the sense of the original apprehension. It disappoints the intention instead of fulfilling it; that founds the consciousness of the "otherwise" and the "changed." If the thing is again supposed to appear henceforth as qualitatively unchanged, then the series of [266] further modifications of the color of the image is strictly predelineated, and the corresponding apprehension again experiences a constant fulfillment, provided it elapses normally.

Let us now consider the case in which the coloration changes continuously while the thing is otherwise unaltered. How does the appurtenant manifold of appearance look? That is a very complicated matter. The actual perception of a thing changing merely with regard to its coloration is one line of perception out of a lawful infinity of perceptual possibilities. The kinaesthesias can be absolutely stationary for a certain period of time, to take the most proximate case. Then the image endures unchanged with regard to pre-empirical form and location, but the pre-empirical color changes. Subsequently, mere eye-movement can come into play. A certain oculomotor system of pre-empirical color-modifications would then pertain to the unchanged coloration. Yet this system of modifications cannot now take place. With the eye-movement, there constantly appears, from one phase to the next, an image that is colored differently than was to be expected in the sense of the stationary manifold. If, for a certain period of time, the color-modification elapsed constantly in the sense of an unchanged manifold, we would necessarily have to perceive non-change. The stream of the modification of the form always provides, in the consciousness of unity, the one identical oculomotor form; and the coloration of this form is, from one temporal moment to the next, constantly "different," "changed." The identical oculomotor form changes its fullness of color, or, since color and form belong together by way of founding, the oculomotor image of an identically the same oculomotor form changes its color – in a manner similar to the way a sound, which is as such determined both qualitatively and intensively, may change its intensity while retaining the identical quality *c*. We can now think of each phase as fixed and as extended in a temporal duration. The change is then bounded; it ends in something henceforth completely unchanged. As regards the oculomotor image, the fixing of the phase signifies that, starting from one temporal position, the image-modifications with respect to color henceforth elapse in the direction of non-

change. The "differently" of the Objective change in color had its sense in the disappointment of the expectation that was in accord with non-change. It [267] elapsed differently than it would have in the normal case of "unchanged Objective color," and it elapsed differently in each phase, constantly deviating from what would have been supposed. Naturally, the deviation can occur with a different speed and acceleration or, in short, by taking various deviant forms. The basic question now is: how? Can this deviant form be quite arbitrary, perhaps even unlawful? And supposing it is lawful, can it elapse according to an arbitrary law, if, *nota bene*, an Objective change, here a change in the oculomotor image, is to be constituted?


If we then pass over to the complete system of kinaesthetic motivations, the same problem arises. If the oculomotor image is apprehended as a thing and as changing with respect to coloration, it is absorbed into the infinities of possible series of modifications pertaining to the comprehensive kinaesthetic systems of the Body. In the system of absolute non-change, there pertains to every kinaesthetic situation, to every determinate Bodily position (once the coordination is carried out through a first perception), a strictly determinate appearance according to color as well as form, and to every kinaesthetic series, to every determinate change in position, there pertains a determinate series of appearances. Here the system of appearances can be traversed arbitrarily, and through a recurrence of the former situation, the previous image can be acquired as well. Now, however, when the color changes, every phase offers something different than it did in the stationary manifold, and naturally the recurrence of an image that is ever the same will no longer be possible.

Let us now take a determinate line of perception, a line leading beyond the oculomotor field of the stationary Body; this perception will elapse differently than it would if we presupposed the Body to be motionless. Differently in an arbitrary way? That is again the problem. It is easy to see that arbitrariness is out of the question here. If it were in general merely a matter of a deviation from the series of lawful modifications which would be required by this kinaesthetic series for the sake of remaining stationary, i.e., a matter of an arbitrary and thus unlawful deviation, could an Objective change then be constituted? Objectively, the body has at every moment a determinate color, and in every constantly new moment it has a new color, whereby the type and [268] the speed of the change are Objectively determined. What does this imply? It implies that if we fix any phase whatever and extend it in a temporal duration, that phase will be converted into a stationary body which is also unchanged with respect to color. The color of the body in the phase becomes its durational color. To this color pertains the entire infinite system of possible perceptions or possible image-modifications as well as the fact that it is precisely a stationary, unchanged thing that requires this relation. If we now again contract the temporal duration to the null-point, this entire manifold persists as

a possible manifold, just as the images of the infinite manifold have in themselves no real [*reell*] temporal order but instead completely belong, as possible, to every point. What does this consideration imply? The same cube which changes its color from red to blue is what I now perceive, perhaps from this or that standpoint. I would have been able to perceive it from any other standpoint, and, in particular, I would have been able to see, from each and every standpoint, instead of from the actual one, a determinate phase of this change which presents the cube in a determinate color-phase. And the determinateness of the Objective color-phase within the Objective change includes the fact that there pertains to it, for every possible standpoint, a possible perception of determinate content, i.e., with an image having its determinate pre-empirical coloration. This comes down to saying that every perceptual series whatsoever, whether actual or possible, which pertains to an objective change in color has its strict lawfulness with regard to color and that all these perceptual series must be integrated into a lawfulness which excludes all that is arbitrary. And this in turn comes down to saying that every possible perceptual series pertaining to an Objective change must deviate, in a lawfully determinate way, from the one that pertains to the same thing but this time with a coloration that remains unchanged and with identical kinaesthetic circumstances. To perceive change, it is not sufficient that in general the varying image-colorations elapse differently than they do in the case of non-change, but in addition they must, in a lawfully determinate way, elapse differently in such a manner that, for every possible perceptual series in general, the law of the "elapsing differently" is [269] rigorously prescribed. Thereby all the possible perceptual series are temporally coordinated to each other, phase by phase, each one presenting the same Objective series of change as appurtenant to the same Objective span of time.

§80. *The lawfulness of the modifications of appearances in the case of qualitative change.*

We will follow any given train of perception (one line of perception out of the bi-dimensional manifold of perception). The images can thereby be designated I_1, I_2, ... and are naturally to be thought of as being in constant transition. Every such image pertains to a determinate kinaesthetic situation which we designate simply as the situation K_1, K_2, ... In the time t^1, t^2, ... the kinaesthetic lived experiences therefore constantly pass over into one another: K_1, ..., K_2, ... If we were to persevere in the situation K_1, then I_1 would remain unchanged in form, but its color would change continuously. If we now note the colors and designate them as C, we would have:



Times: $t^1, \quad t^2, \quad \ldots, t^\lambda, \quad \ldots$

If K_1 passes over continuously into K_σ, the C's of the diagonal continuously pass over into one another, whereas the forms would undergo the changes of the stationary manifold (this is not shown in the diagram). The vertical series pertain to the same temporal point. They represent, with respect to the coloration, the color-adumbrations belonging to one determinate Objective phase of coloration in the various possible kinaesthetic situations. If the Objective coloration, from the appurtenant temporal point on, were to remain unchanged instead of changing, then the vertical series would indicate, for this temporal [270] point and equally for every further one, the colorations pertaining to all the K's: i.e., we would merely have to repeat the vertical series in the diagram again and again. If the change proceeded only for the time $t^1 \underbrace{\ldots} t^2$, then, in the appurtenant change of the kinaesthetic situation $K_1 \underbrace{\ldots} K_2$, the change in color $C_1^1 \; C_2^2$ will ensue in the diagonals and then will continue to elapse in the direction of the vertical series, since the latter indeed remain parallel and unchanged henceforth. What we have set down here as regards a perceptual series that is motivated by the kinaesthetic series $K_1 \underbrace{\ldots} K_\sigma$ also holds good for any perceptual series in general, i.e., for the entire three-dimensional system of the K's.

Thus we have here a wonderful lawfulness holding sway in the color-adumbrations. If the thing is completely unchanged, then the lawful variation of the color-adumbrations runs exactly parallel to that of the geometrical adumbrations of the thing. For every possible kinaesthetic situation, it is univocally determined which division of colors rules in the appurtenant adumbration of the form, and it rules specifically such that, within the temporal duration of the non-change of the thing, the adumbration of the form is constant for every kinaesthetic situation, and likewise so is the color-adumbration that covers the former. Every closed kinaesthetic series brings back not only the same adumbration of the form but also the same adumbration of the coloration. If the thing now changes with respect to its coloration, while retaining its geometrical corporeality, then there again belongs to every possible kinaesthetic situation a determinate unity of form-adumbration and coloration.

Whereas, in regard to the form-adumbrations, the state of affairs remains unchanged, and thus the cyclical recurrence of the old kinaesthetic circumstances yields the same form-adumbration, yet this no longer holds for the color-adumbrations. But because it pertains irrevocably to the essence of change for every phase to extend as unchanged and stationary, therefore an unchanged coloration of the thing corresponds to the change in color of the thing at every phase (and the ideal possibility exists of bringing the change to a stop and thereby of having a thing with the enduring coloration that corresponds to the phase). We have, precisely herein, the foundation of an apriori [271] lawfulness, which is a condition of possibility for the constitution of Objective change. At each phase of the change, the thing can be seen from all possible standpoints; and if it is to be the identical thing which, being identically the same thing, has this Objective phase of coloration, then strictly determined adumbrations of coloration must take place for all the possible standpoints, specifically in such a way that to every phase of the change there pertains an adumbrational manifold whose elements are divided among all the possible kinaesthetic standpoints. Since the form is unchanged, there corresponds to the manifold of possible standpoints a strictly coordinated manifold of form-adumbrations. This latter manifold is the same from one moment to the next in the duration of the thing. Furthermore, in every phase of the duration, every form-adumbration of the system has a determinate appurtenant coloration. We therefore have a manifold of coloration coinciding with the manifold of form but a constantly new manifold of coloration coinciding with the unchanged manifold of form. For change to be possible, however, the determinateness of the manifold of coloration must, at every phase, be such that it is identical, according to its general type and up to its temporal extension, with the type of that manifold of coloration proper to a thing that is unchanged in its coloration. If this condition is fulfilled, it is self-evident that, were this manifold of coloration suddenly to remain constant (thus such that, like the form-manifold, it could only elapse in itself with every kinaesthetic change), the change of the thing would lead to non-change, and therefore the coloration of the phase would become the enduring coloration of the thing. Now, all this is not a trivial matter but instead is constitutive of the very possibility of the Objectivation of change.

One thing more: the systems or manifolds – pertaining to every changing phase – of possible adumbrations of form and color have a fixed temporal order; more precisely, the Objective temporal relation of the Objective phases of change prescribe a rule to the phenomenologically temporal sequence of possible perceptions. For every kinaesthetic situation (thus for every position I occupy), there is a determined series of appearances I must have, provided I [272] remain in this location, and, if I change the kinaesthetic situation, there is a determined series of appearances I must have for every phase of this changed

situation. That holds for an Objective stationary state as well as for change. It is just that in the case of change the complexity is very much greater, insofar as the series of appearances is now cut up diagonally into a manifold of several dimensions.

CHAPTER 16

THE CONSTITUTION OF MERE MOVEMENT

§81. *The founding of all change in identity.*

We will now proceed to a second basic type of change, namely, movement, and we will take up specifically, first of all, movement without qualitative change and without change in form, thus mere movement.[1] What we found in the analysis of the relation between change and non-change – that is, the recognition of the lawfulness to which are bound the deviations from the system of the manifold of non-change, if a type of non-change is to correspond to every phase of the change, and if, hence, it is to be possible for every phase of the change of a thing to be extended to an enduring unchanged thing – all that is also transferable to the change we call movement as well as to every type of change of a thing.

Here, too, change means becoming otherwise, and the "otherwise" refers back to a "not otherwise" or, resolving the double negation, to a remaining identical. This in turn signifies that change has its norm in rest. As stationary, the "Object" is constantly the same, and to this the determinate, previously described character of the constitutive stationary manifold corresponds. While changing, the Object is not constantly the same; it is changed, and there corresponds to this a deviation from the system of the stationary manifold, and in particular a deviation from it in the actual or possible sequence of appearances of the object. These deviations cannot be arbitrary, however; they stand under the condition that every phase of the change is to function as a phase of a stationary state and should be able to be extended to an enduring stationary state. With respect to coloration, a discontinuous leap is possible. It may be that the identical Object has this or that Objective coloration as enduring and then at one temporal point leaps over to a new coloration. The continuity of the spatial corporeality, for instance the identity of the corporeal form that constantly remains unchanged, retains a thorough unity. Unity always rests on the continuity of the filling of time. [273]

First of all, in the phenomenological domain: if the sonic intensity changes discontinuously, then something or other must still be retained continuously in the concretion of the sound. If the quality, too, changes discontinuously, and

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[1] On this, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 295. – Ed.

so does everything in general, then there is no longer any unity. Something or other in general must maintain a unity through continuity. Somewhere or other, continuity must reside in the phenomenon, or else we would have two disconnected matters, in succession, rather than one. All the moments are not here on the same footing, however. If we already have a sound, its intensity can then change continuously. Intensity by itself, however, cannot provide the sounds with unity. Two temporally adjacent, discrete sounds do not come to unity by means of an intensity continuously stratified through the two unities. That indeed makes no sense. It is not then a sound there or some other "reality" which changes, i.e., makes a leap with respect to quality while remaining the same through the intensity. The intensity is precisely the intensity of the respective "quality," but the quality is not the quality of the intensity. When the quality is maintained continuously in the mode of change or nonchange and thereby constitutes unity in duration, then and only then is the one there which, as determined qualitatively now in this way and then in that, becomes louder and softer. All the same, what quality means here is problematic.

We find something similar in the relation between visual quality[2] and visual [274] extension. Quality is not here a sufficient ground of unity. The ultimate foundation for unity here is the unity of extension. The same extension can be filled with color either continuously or discontinuously. Extension founds an enduring unity, but quality alone does not. A thorough continuity in coloration would not make two separated images continuously one. That is transferred from the phenomenological aspect of the thing to the Objective. The unity of the spatial form is the foundation of the unity of the coloration and is the foundation of the unity in all change of coloration. In the constant stream of images, it is always the image-extensions that make possible and maintain the unity, and accordingly, in the Objective sphere as well, the spatial body is the ὑποχείμενον, the substrate for all qualities in the specific sense. It is the bearer of the quality, in particular such that it is covered by the quality everywhere. In all its pieces and points, the body "bears" the quality, and each point has its own quality. Thereby the law holds, and it governs all filling of a continuous whole by particularities belonging to another continuum, to the effect that the filling can be discontinuous only at individual places and therefore not everywhere. Thus the body can have discontinuities of coloration, in constancy as well as in succession, but can have them only in a medium of qualitative continuity (whereby persistent similarity counts as continuity).

Let us now return to movement. Its very essence prescribes that movement be continuous movement. The identity of the thing presupposes, indeed

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[2] Under the heading, "visual quality," we include unitarily the color and its determinations, e.g., brilliance (whose relation to color is analogous to that between the intensity and the quality of a sound).

throughout its duration, the constant duration of the substrate, the body. The unity of the body is the foundation for the unity of the thing as qualitatively determined in such and such a way. But unity presupposes continuity in the body, whether it be that the body remains absolutely unchanged as a body, or whether it changes.[3] It must therefore change in a continuous way, which means that if one form of its change is movement, then this one, like any other bodily change, must necessarily be continuous.

§82. *Movement as change of location, and the appurtenant kinaesthetic motivations.*[4] [275]

What primarily characterizes movement is that the body occupies different "locations." Thus the body undergoes a change and yet is ever the same. If we add qualitative non-change as well, then the entire thing is always the same. What sort of sameness is this? It can be characterized as follows: we say of two co-existing things that they are completely the same, except for their location, if each of them, taken for itself, is constituted in the same – i.e., in a completely similar – manifold of appearances. What then is left over as their difference? That can reside only in their kinaesthetic relations and possibly in their relation to other things, i.e., in the more comprehensive nexus of appearance, in which is constituted the totality of the things existing here. Assuming there were only these two things in the whole world, those relations would already be sufficient to distinguish the one from the other. The corresponding appearances of the two things have a different kinaesthetic coordination, and must have a different one, for sameness of appearances means sameness of the visual images, indeed complete sameness. But the image is in each case there only once; and if the first appearance is identical, then so is every other one, in virtue of the presupposed sameness of the nexus of appearances that pertains to the same stationary things. Thus the sameness is constituted in such a way that, after the system of appearances of the first thing once has its kinaesthetic coordination, which is established with the first apprehension of an image as an image of this thing here, then another kinaesthetic index pertains to the correlatively similar appearance of the other thing. We must first cross a certain kinaesthetic path in order to arrive at this appearance, and it is not, in any case, a cyclical path which would lead back to the same kinaesthetic sensation. Apart from the kinaesthetic index, however, the systems of appearances are, on both sides, completely the same. What makes out of them both a single world, i.e., a unity of coexistence, is precisely the fact that a kinaes- [276]

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[3] The body = the geometrical body.

[4] *Cf.* Appendix IX, "On the constitution of movement and rest," pp. 327ff. – Ed.

thetically motivated path leads from the one to the other. (Whereby, naturally, there can also be appearances, which in fact are required by the nature of the unitary stationary manifold, in its very possibility, and which show that both things can present themselves simultaneously in one field. Then there is nothing that could separate them; there is indeed no thing in between.)

As a consequence of the different kinaesthetic orientation of the systems of appearances pertaining to the two different things, they each have a different orientation to any given, co-existing third thing (*a b c*). The fixity[5] of the coexistence between *a* and *c* consists in the fact that in every temporal phase in which, on the whole, one or both things appear, these appearances have their fixed kinaesthetic coordination, after a first appearance has once received its own kinaesthetic coordination. The same holds for *a′ c*, and again for *a a′*, and it is also valid for the totality *a a′ c*. Since the corresponding appearances *a a′* have different kinaesthetic coordinations, they cannot have the same ones that any of the appearances of *c* have. If the same kinaesthetic path led from the *a*-appearance, and from the similar *a′*-appearance, to the *c*-appearance, then, conversely, the same path would lead from the *c*-appearance to the *a*-appearance and to the similar *a′*-appearance, which would amount to saying that the latter were identical.

Two things that are alike are "the same" except for their different locations. Similarly, a thing that moves, that constantly changes its location, is always "the same," always self-same in every respect – with the exception of location. This implies that various phases of the change we call movement behave like things which are completely alike and that continuous change therefore consists in nothing else changing except the kinaesthetic coordination. For instance, if I keep my body stationary, perhaps while sitting, and even keep my eyes still, then, at the beginning of the course of movement of the thing, the image α pertains to this bodily posture, thus to the determinate *K*-complex. Now the thing moves. If we extract a phase of the movement, it offers a different image, β, as pertaining to the same *K* (I am still sitting) but to a different time. Thereby, however, this β-image also already pertains to the thing in its initial location, prior to the movement. But in order to reach this image, I must assume a different bodily posture: *K′*. Due to the movement of the thing, however, β is now connected to *K* instead of *K′*. Likewise, α also pertains to the thing in its new location, but α is not coordinated to *K* but to a different *K*, let us say *K″*. This now takes place throughout. The demand that movement must be constituted as the change of location of a thing whose content remains identical includes, as we said, a lawfulness which rules the constant change in the mode of a coordination of the kinaesthetic circumstances. Not only does a presentation of a thing appear in general as coordinated to kinaesthetic cir- [277]

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[5] On the following, *cf.* Husserl's critical note, Appendix I, p. 295. – Ed.

cumstances which are different than those in the case of an unchanged location, but, rather, there corresponds to every phase a complete, systematically closed stationary manifold as well as a constantly changing one. The diagram we drew a moment ago is also transferable to this case. At the same time, however, the specificity of the case adds the following: the actual series of appearances that pertains to a changing thing, or, more specifically, to a merely moving thing, is one out of an infinity of possible series of appearances. Expressed Objectively, I can view the same movement from innumerable standpoints; I can assume infinitely many positions in relation to it. We have here infinitely many (though, in themselves, closed) possibilities of kinaesthetic circumstances, whether I could have assumed these positions individually while remaining stationary or whether I myself could have moved and did move while intuiting the movement. Every series of appearances of this kind, however, exclusively consists in appearances such as they pertain to the stationary thing in any given location and also such as every continuous nexus of appearances pertains to the system of possible nexuses of appearances in the case of the stationary thing. The entire difference between change and rest indeed consists in the kinaesthetic coordination. Therefore, the same series of appearances in which a stationary thing presents itself as given in the case of a determinate kinaesthetic sequence, i.e., with my determinate change of position relative to the thing, produces the givenness of a moving thing, if a different kinaesthetic sequence is carried out, although the latter is still a completely determinate sequence. Included here is the possibility that I so [278] choose the kinaesthetic circumstances that the thing is always presented with the same identical image and that the appearance is therefore an unchanged one.

As regards this limit-case, we thus find the following opposition: If the thing is stationary, then I always have the same image, provided I myself remain absolutely still, i.e., phenomenologically speaking, in case of kinaesthetic constancy. If the thing moves, then I can still have ever the same image, provided, namely, that I make a Bodily movement and stage a determinate kinaesthetic sequence, constantly following the image, step for step. With regard to the same enduring image, we therefore judge that the thing is stationary, if there is kinaesthetic constancy, and we judge that the thing is moving, if there is kinaesthetic change. In the case of a changing continuity of images, matters are not so easy to describe. We can then say only that the stationary character pertaining to this series of images is a completely distinctive kinaesthetic modification. If the kinaesthetic series is different, but the series of images the same, then what Objectively takes place is movement. The movement stops as soon as, from a certain image on, the appearances elapse under such kinaesthetic circumstances, and with such a coordination to them, that the elapsing receives the precise character of an appearance of

something stationary.

Admittedly, we have in a certain sense still not exhausted the entire theory of judgments about movement and rest. Instead, we have taken into account, and have tried to clarify, only those judgments that conform purely to the intuitions of movement and rest.

§83. *The self-movement and the being-moved of the Body. Limits of the kinaesthetic constitution of the corporeal Body.*[6]

An intuition of movement can be interpreted as rest, and an intuition of rest as movement. I am reminded of a class of so-called sense-illusions. The source of [279] all illusions of location and of movement obviously resides in the identity of the manifold of appearances which pertains both to what is moving as well as to what is not, but the source does not reside in this alone. We have not yet considered the apprehension of kinaesthetic sequences as an instance of "self-moving," the moving of the Ego-Body, and *a fortiori* we have not taken up the groups of appearances relative to "being-moved," such as riding in the compartment of a train car. Here new problems and difficulties arise. What we need to emphasize now, however, is merely the fact that while riding we do not see the movement of our Body or of the conveyance. We see the car's surroundings move: the landscape, the houses, trees, etc. always and necessarily appear to be moving, and the car stationary. As regards our Body, we see its visible parts either as stationary or as moving relatively to the car, as happens, e.g., when we raise a foot or a hand while sitting in the compartment. The first apperception, the foundational one, which makes appearances out of visual contents, is the one we described extensively. That it leaves open the possibility of new "interpretations" and thus of further apprehensions is something we shall have to investigate later. The problem is how kinaesthetic series come to be apprehended as movements of the Body, movements deserving of the name just as well as and in the same sense as any other movements. Furthermore, how does the reference point of the receding become the Ego-point and designate the specific Ego-position which, as pertaining to the Body, signifies the position of the Ego in space? Also, how then can this reference point, together with the Body, be taken for a ride in Objective space, and how, in the case of the kinaesthetic non-change given thereby, can the same series of appearances, which appears as movement, receive the significance of rest, insofar as it pertains to kinaesthetic non-change, while the series of appearances of the car, a series that appears as rest, receives the significance of

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[6] *Cf.* Appendix X, "Subjective self-movement and Objective corporeal movement," pp. 333ff., and Appendix XI, "Visual space and Objective space," pp. 337f. – Ed.

movement? This amounts to a complete reversal of the interpretation in contrast with normal appearances.

We have, in general, taken no account of the Body, which is indeed, if only partially, also an appearing thing, despite the just-mentioned problems. We have acted as if the Ego were a spirit endowed with eyes, a Body-less spirit, which otherwise, however, has precisely the same series of appearances of things as we ourselves have, along with the same groups of kinaesthetic sensations. [280]

The Body is primarily a thing like any other, insofar as it (although only to a limited extent) can also be constituted like any other thing. We can look at our hand and see it lying stationary on the table. We can move our eyes, bow our head back and forth, bow the trunk a little, etc., and all of these yield, in a rigorously determinate way, ever different series of appearances. To be sure, we cannot walk around our hand or around our own Body, and we cannot approach or recede from ourselves at will. For all that, however, what we can do is sufficient to carry out the same sort of apprehension, on the basis of the given presentational material, and thus sufficient to see the Body as a corporeal thing. Admittedly, we do this in a peculiar way, always and necessarily losing ourselves in the margin of the visual field and never able to pursue ourselves beyond that margin. In this way we indeed already arrive at the fundamental anomalies distinguishing the Body, although it is an appearing thing, from all other things. In popular terms, every thing in the whole world can escape from me, except for my own Body. In relation to a seen part of my Body I can approach or recede (i.e., the relevant modifications of expansion and turning can elapse here as well), but only to a very limited extent: I can think of myself as expanded in such a way that my feet would ultimately get lost in the infinite, but then my Body would be infinite and would not disappear at infinity into the null-point, as does every other thing, which approaches the null-limit through infinite remoteness. The infinitely remote foot would still always have its continuous connection with the other parts of the Body, with the chest, etc., which would retain their finite remoteness from the Ego-point and, losing themselves in the margin of the field, would have there always the same minimal remoteness from the Ego-center. The state of affairs here, however, is not such that I could not draw near a thing because of obstacles or could not distance myself from one because I was fastened to it. Instead, the manifold of images that pertains to the Body has a distinctive kinaesthetic motivation in contrast to other things. The same series of kinaesthetic changes, which, under the heading of walking, running, or, in general, moving, brings, as it were, the entire world into flux, and which, in the case of a stationary world, allows the stream of the stationary manifold to elapse, also allows the Body to enter into action somewhat, with respect to its images, and in part not at all. Precisely thereby, however, the Body diverges, specifically in [281]

such a way that it changes its distance from the other things, the stationary ones. And so it must be apprehended as moved. To the kinaesthetic circumstances we call "walking," there appertains not only a movement of the legs in relation to the other parts of the body but also a movement of the entire visible body through a change in its distance from other bodies.[7] Admittedly, this is not like the movement of other things. That is, the Ego-point is always co-moved; the Ego does not recede in any movement. The Body moves, but does so without "receding" from itself: the images of it do not change in the sense of "receding." In this way, therefore, the Ego moves.

Let us now think of a moving object, a train car, and of my Body as placed within. If I were walking beside the train, such that I and the car were moving together, then its position relative to my Body would be constant. If I am seated in it and am no longer walking, the outer world remains unchanged in its mode of appearance, and the same flux of images is apprehended as stationary. I say that the horse is still "running," the car is still moving, but I "am moved." I now have the kinaesthetic circumstances of rest and the apprehension of the car as movement, as still moving, and the surroundings as ever stationary. When I sit down in the car, a change takes place. If I have the perception of a moving Object while replicating its movement, then the Object maintains its location relative to the Ego-point and to my Body. But the background is constantly changing. If I place an Object from the background on the moving Object, then it becomes co-moved: while it retains its relative location to the moving Object, it is itself necessarily moved in the same way. Now, however, I am seated in the car.

Thus my Body can in a double way maintain its location relative to a moving external Object: 1.) first, in such a manner that "I move myself:" i.e., such that a kinaesthetic sequence takes place to which there appertains an elapsing [282] of the manifold of images of the "outer world." The continuum of images of the Body also pertains to the kinaesthetic sequence. (Does this continuum not function in a certain sense also as a "condition of perception"? Precisely the unclear parts: nose, moustache; thereafter the remainder of the body, but in a changing appearance: the body always visible). The kinaesthetic sensations are constantly bound up with "movements of the Body"; if I raise an arm, I have such and such a sensation, etc., and the same applies to the determining movements of the upper Body, the feet, etc. That gives these nexuses of images of one's own Body a special appurtenance to the kinaesthetic sensations, in distinction to exterior Objects, which are forever different. Therefore the kinaesthetic sensations function, on the one hand, as constitutive of the ap-

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[7] We have to make a two-fold distinction: 1) the way parts of my body, just like other things, are modified under kinaesthetic changes and are, accordingly, apperceived as things, and 2) the result of the movement of the Body as a change of distance in relation to other things.

pearance of things – other things as well as the Body – and on the other hand as localized in the Body. What does this double apprehension include? In any case, my Body, appearing on the whole in the same mode of appearance, whereas the kinaesthetic relations change, moves "with me," precisely as do all the other Objects which always appear to be the same in kinaesthetic change – i.e., they move and move "with me," since precisely I myself also move thereby.

2.) But now comes the remarkable fact that if I move in parallel with the exterior Object, running along with it, I maintain the same location relative to it (provided the images on both sides elapse precisely in the same way). And this "being moved together," "maintaining their location together," is constituted by means of changeable kinaesthetic circumstances. If I am seated in the train car, however, then "I move with it," but without kinaesthetic change. In the first place, stationary kinaesthetic states, connected to stationary images, motivate stationary Objects. Here I have a stationary kinaesthetic state connected to moving images of the surroundings and to stationary images of the car and of my Body. Yet this does precisely not mean that the surroundings move but, on the contrary, that they are stationary. And it does not mean that I am stationary but that I move (am moved). Should we say that the car, with its states of movement, or with the corresponding phenomenological changes, assumes the function of kinaesthetic sensation? If I think of myself as driven in the car through the whole world, then it holds good that, as often as I compensate for the jostling, I have the old image of the world, and a determinate series of images of the world pertains to every movement of the car; and when the movement is reversed, I again have the former images, etc. Let us reflect: to be sure, I do not see the differences in the states of the car (or else I see hardly anything of them). Is this apprehension already mediated by the perception of the others who board the train car and who therefore move along with it in the stationary world? And do I now think myself into it and interpret myself as traveling (as if I had boarded the car), and do I thus convert the apprehension I have into a semblant apprehension? If I have been moved in the car, then, after the execution of the "movement," I find the former world. I can also return to the starting point and thus pass over kinaesthetically from the earlier to the current series of images and produce the entire continuous sequence of images. More correctly, however, I should say that the world has moved while I was stationary, and after the movement it is otherwise exactly the same world as it used to be, except for the fact that my Body (along with the conveyance) has a different position in it. Now indeed, it is exactly as I perceive it: under me the earth moved away while I was stationary. The final result would have been exactly the same if I had run beside the moving train and in that way had arrived here. The same applies to all the phases of the "semblant movement." The series of appearances are in both cases exactly the [283]

same, except that instead of the kinaesthetic motivation of running, there is now the shaking of the car, the noise of the rolling wheels (which is different in the two cases), etc. To be sure, we must note, however, that the title of kinaesthetic motivation also includes, in part, very different series, ones which can appear vicariously for one another. (What is accomplished by a certain movement of the head can possibly be accomplished by a certain movement of the upper body, etc.). Thus if we exclude the cases (e.g., that of a hot-air balloon) where no series of motivating circumstances are visible or otherwise sensibly noticeable (apart from indirect knowledge), then we can say that the role normally played by the kinaesthetic circumstances (i.e., by what we earlier called the complexes of sensation) are now played by other circumstances, although of course not directly but instead through the fact that they are apprehended as vicariously standing for the normal ones. If I board the car and it "now rolls," "jostles me," etc., then, in terms of the series of appearances and the end result, these appear exactly as they would if I had moved myself to the final location and everything had been stationary. This again yields the general character of a stationary manifold. That is to say, these things present themselves in the same complete system of appearances, specifically in such a way that the same appearances pertain to the same circumstances. Whether I move myself here or there, or whether my car transports me here or there, I always have determinate appearances, and with the return of the former circumstances I have the same ones (reversed movement of the car as well as a turning around of the body and running back). [284]

It therefore pertains to the constitution of space that under the same circumstances, in the case of rest, the same things appear. The "same circumstances" always include one's own body in a certain appearance and, beyond that, certain groups of sensations of movement and of pressure, tactile sensations, etc., and even auditory sensations (of the rolling of the car, for example). That is how external things are constituted. This principle of production also applies to the appearances of one's own body, and just as other things "move" when they remain unaltered in appearance under kinaesthetic change, so the body, too, is interpreted as moving. And it is so also if, instead of kinaesthetic changes, there appear vicarious changes which can constitute, under the same type, both rest and movement alike.

An important complement is contributed here by the indirect modes of apprehension based on mutual communication, mirrors, and so on. I cannot see myself moving the way I see other bodies in motion, namely such that I am stationary kinaesthetically while my body appears to me to move. My body cannot run from me, cannot move away from me, i.e., from me as "stationary" (experiencing no sensation of movement, etc.). I also cannot see that I am being moved along with the train car the way I can see this happening to someone else, namely by seeing the movement against an unmoving back-

ground landscape and also while I myself am stationary kinaesthetically. Thus here certain perceptual possibilities are lacking, ones present in the case of every other thing. I can, however, empathize with other people, relate their assertions to mine, or mine to theirs, and I can relate their assertions about their appearances of movement to my assertions about the fact that (and the way in which) I find them moving themselves and being moved.

§84. *Real existence and real possibility.*

It[1] pertains to the essence of a thing in general to be an identical intentional unity "constituted" in a certain actual or possible manifold of appearance and demonstrating itself, both as regards its Being and its current mode of Being, in a regulated and always motivated nexus of appearance. But the nexus is one of harmonious, mutually fulfilling appearances which are subtended by a constant belief-consciousness or, if you prefer, by a consciousness that posits Being. The relation between this positional consciousness and the mere appearances would require deeper investigations.

From previous indications, we know this much about it, that individual appearances can lack the character of actual positing but that, with the motivation making the respective total appearances appearances under the given circumstances, basic positings are determined. These supply the presuppositions for the possibility of conflict and thereby for the revocation of positings, in the form of so-called "repudiation" or "nullifying consciousness." They are also the presuppositions for the indecisive wavering between two or more belief-tendencies related to conflicting appearances, i.e., for modified positings and repudiations, for the transition from the "is" to the "is not," from the consciousness of Being to the nullifying consciousness. In none of these cases, however, is there "decisiveness" or "certainty," and so precisely each of them displays a certain character as a modification.

The "not" enters in with every disappointment of anticipations, but it can find its resolution in the form of re-determination or in the form of change. [286] The thing is, but it is not as it was apprehended. The thing is, but it is not identical in the sense of being stationary in qualities and in location; it is not absolutely identical but is identical only in constantly becoming otherwise, in changing. In the case of redetermination, the new determination, as a substitute for the revoked one that was joined to the original apprehension, is integrated within the unity of the thing, a unity that is sustained and that is to be sustained harmoniously. It is the thing, always still the same thing; it is merely different than the previous apperception had posited it, prior to the actual

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[1] Date in the margin: August 3, 1907. Final lecture. – Ed.

givenness of the relevant determination. The lawful manifold of the fulfilling perceptual nexus, i.e., of the nexus which produces, or would produce, the unfolding of the givenness of the thing, remains, on the whole, the same. It is just that one feature, resident in certain appearances, is corrected or else is affected anticipatorily by the correction of the apprehension. For instance, if the color of a certain surface area is other than it was assumed to be in the first apprehension, then the correction only affects all the images that present this part of the surface. Furthermore, it thereby affects precisely only the presentation of the color, not that of the form of this side of the Object, and *a fortiori* not the manifold of images pertaining to the remainder of the thing.

In the case of change, the being-otherwise is lawfully determined from moment to moment and founds in itself a continuous unity, the unity of the thing within change. The thing is other from moment to moment, but, in changing, it is ever the same. The constitutive perceptual series are indeed, without detriment to the consciousness of being-otherwise which pervades each phase, harmonious. They are subtended by the continuous consciousness of the unity of fulfillment, insofar as the intention is disposed toward and is fulfilled precisely in the perpetual otherness, where the form of the presentations (i.e., the presentations that diverge from those that correspond to the identity of content) is integrated into a general and lawful type. This type, precisely through its lawfulness, makes possible a constant fulfillment and thereby the constitution of a continuous unity.

Matters are quite different with not-being than they are with being-otherwise and being-changed. Not-being obviously implies that appearances arise which do not fit within the lawfulness of Being as posited otherwise or within Being as posited in strict certainty. This amounts to saying that these appearances of themselves refer to a series of appearances and to nexuses of appearances which do not flow harmoniously into the actually elapsing series of appearances and into the actually comprehensive nexus of appearances. Nor do they collectively make possible a single harmonious unity of a nexus of things. An example would be a pictorial fiction. On the wall hangs a picture, an image. There appears, specifically in the mode of perception, a landscape, and it is indeed set within the unity of the wall. Yet the wall is continuous and is not broken up by the picture. The wall is apprehended as such and is posited as such in the mode of certainty. Precisely thereby, the landscape, no matter how much it appears perceptually, is degraded to fiction, to a not-being. The series of appearances in which the wall, the room, and the physical thing which is the "picture hanging on the wall" are spread out, and are constituted as given, confirms the first certainty in an on-going, fulfilling certainty. And so, the room, the wall, and the physical picture as a thing are. The fulfilling certainty is simultaneously a presumptive certainty for the further possible series of perceptions pertaining to this Being. The same actual nexus of cer- [287]

tainty is simultaneously a constant nexus of disappointment and conflict with regard to the fiction, which manifests itself as a fiction precisely by the fact that it cannot be accommodated, along with the wall and the room, into a harmonious thing.

If, in this way, not-being, as the term already might suggest, takes its measure from Being, and if it is only the conflict against pre-given Being that makes possible a pretention as mere pretention, which forfeits its claim and manifests its pretended Being as a fiction, then we could say that it is countersensical to maintain that absolutely nothing is, that each and every appearing being is mere fiction and thus is imaginary, hallucination, dream.

That is without a doubt correct. But we must indeed be prudent. Certainly, without Being, there is no not-being. Yet can we interpret Being also as thingly Being, as it was indeed apprehended hitherto, and then say that without thingly Being, there is no thingly not-being, without "reality" no irreality? We do not deny that every irreality manifests itself as such through conflict, which allows the belief-tendency pertaining to the irreality to be dashed to pieces [288] upon the certain belief in which Being is posited as existing. But is this a necessary state of affairs? *De facto*, the nexuses of appearances elapse in such a way that continuous unities of fulfillment allow things, ones posited intentionally, to be held fast as constantly in being and as having been. Series of appearances now thrust themselves between, and their intentional determinations do not fit within the remaining series of appearances, which in themselves are harmonious. Upon a broad background of continuously valid and believed realities, ones posited in the mode of certainty and perpetually confirmed, there stand out the anomalous appearances, which constitute fictions and which are possibly posited in belief but are not to be held fast in belief, insofar as the course of experience dashes belief in them to pieces and this belief must pass over into unbelief.

But must this be so? Cannot all perception ultimately be the illusion of reality? Could it not be that, from one temporal moment on, all harmonious fulfillment would cease and the series of appearances would run into one another in such a way that no posited unity could ultimately be maintained, even if it did here and there confirm itself as existing while ultimately invalidating itself once again? Could it not happen that all fulfillment whatsoever would cease completely and the entire stream of appearance dissolve into a mere tumult of meaningless sensations? Since it is indeed clear that in such a case the apprehensions would necessarily also be dissolved.

Concerning this, we can only say that we should not at all disregard how an absolute necessity can be demonstrated for the fact that there must be a world, *nota bene* a real world as a world of things.

Naturally, it is self-evident that there cannot be nothing. But a mere "tumult of sensations," a chaos, which elapses in the pre-empirical procession of time

so irrationally that no apprehension of things could be found and maintained, a mere maelstrom of sensations, I say, is indeed not absolute nothingness. It is only nothing that can in itself constitute a world of things. But why must a world exist, and why must it have <sic!> to exist? In fact, I do not see that it would have to. This concerns the world in the broadest sense, including the Ego as a person and other Egos. For we must indeed not believe that only the [289] physical world would be affected here and not psychic realities as well. The unity of the person, the unity of the individual soul, which is the soul of the individual Body, obviously has its lawfulness of appearance and is constituted as a unity in a manifold. Yet must there be manifolds of this kind, and do the appurtenant appearances, taken as data, have to elapse lawfully in one way or another? Thus we arrive at the possibility of a phenomenological maelstrom as unique and ultimate Being. It would be a maelstrom so meaningless that there would be no I and no Thou, as well as no physical world – in short, no reality in the pregnant sense. And this train of thought continues on as follows:

It may be that unity can be achieved and determined in a rough and ready way but not precisely and minutely. There exist rough regularities, which, as approximately ordered connections of the successive phenomena, provide a rule to guide the anticipation, entirely in the sense of the lawfulnesses pertaining to the constitution of the unity of things on its various levels. It is just that these regularities are precisely not rigorous laws or cannot be maintained as such in every case, and so we must not make inordinate demands on the things. The regularities would thus exist *taliter qualiter*, but if we transcend the rough main lines, we run up against contingencies and contradictions. The contradictions would be such from the standpoint of the absolutely identical thing, the thing in accord with an absolutely fixed lawfulness, i.e., if the pretentions to unity were taken with complete seriousness and rigor. But if we abandoned the idea of the thing as a rigorous concept, these pretentions would constitute accidental Being-otherwise and ever-and-again-Being-otherwise. Obviously it would also not be excluded that regularity might gradually pass over into irregularity and that the presumed unity of things might again be dissolved – into a beautiful memory and phantasy, impossible to hold fast.

All in all, the world – in its existence and in what it is – is an irrational fact,[2] and its facticity resides uniquely and exclusively in the strictness of the moti- [290] vational nexuses – which actually permit all the examined possibilities to appear as fallow possibilities, as baseless, purely fabricated possibilities. On the other hand, the existence of a world in which not only do individual realities come together in general, but to which ultimately each and every occurring datum makes its contribution, is the only rational possibility, one which is

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[2] Or the rationality residing in the actual and possible nexus of appearance and making possible the steadfast unity of the thing and of the world – this rationality would be an irrational fact.

indeed not pregiven *a priori* but founded *a posteriori*. This is not supposed to mean that the world is presumed to exist on the strength of a hypothesis; things, people, one's own Ego, all this is indeed perceived. Every perceived reality (real thing) can perhaps not be, and thereby in principle each and every thing posited in perception and also in memory might not be. Hence it is possible for there to be nothing real. But every perception is a rational positing of something (which possibly is not), a foundational positing, and that also holds for things revoked through conflict. Every perceptual apprehension is motivated, and in this motivation it has its right to proclaim, as it were, Being. Admittedly, however, this rational positing within perception is not an absolute positing; it is like a force that can be overwhelmed by strong counterforces. Experience is the force which guarantees the existence of the world, and it is a force which constantly draws new force from itself and continuously integrates this new force into itself. Every perception, already while it endures, integrates its force, and in the perceptual nexus every perception is augmented by every other one, corresponding to all the series of fulfillments which interweave into a manifold braid, unitarily and harmoniously, the various sides and rays of the perceptions. The force that grounds Being grows in the course of experience, with respect to its advancing rationalization, in the form of an experiential science which secures for every exception its reintegration under a rule and coordinates to every not-being a semblance that pertains to Being. In this way the force of the experience that constitutes the world grows to such an imposing potency (and this is a rational potency) that the possibilities which work toward the not-being of a real world constituted with strict lawfulness and unity in the nexus of appearance, and always determined ever more completely, precisely become empty possibilities – not meaningless, but irrational and baseless ones. This is how I have always [291] viewed the situation, and I find no motive, in the investigations just carried out, to change anything. Yet I do not mean this as a proclamation of eternal truth; I merely exhort you to reflect on your own and to take the utmost care in these matters.

Perhaps I will conclude by adding still the following train of thought. The thing is constituted in a certain actual or possible manifold of appearances. What does this mean: a thing is, but it is not given? It can only mean that within the manifold of actual appearances the thing does not find its presentation, insofar as it is perhaps outside the current field of view, concealed, etc. In other words, in the motivated transition from field to field, in the process of motivated sequences of images and modifications of images, the thing's image, its presentation, is to be attained, and it is therefore perceptible. In the motivational nexus of actual and possible perceptions belonging essentially to the unity of experience, there is also to be found the system of possible perceptions in which the thing in question is constituted and with the elapsing of

which the thing would thus come to givenness. The actuality of the non-given thing is therefore reduced to possibilities. But these possibilities are not empty possible thoughts but are possibilities grounded in motivation. Actual appearance "refers" to such and such possible appearance, and actual perception in a harmonious perceptual nexus refers to these or those possible perceptions that are in accord with the elapsing perceptual nexus; i.e., it refers to precisely those actually occurring perceptions that would confirm, by fulfilling, the previous sequence of perception and would maintain the Being posited therein.

Every phantasy has the value of a possibility, and it guarantees a perceptual possibility. At first, however, this perceptual possibility is groundless. Compared to the phantasized, un-founded possibilities, matters are quite different with regard to the "real," founded possibilities, as these are implicated in every perception. The appearances occurring at any time are appearances under motivating circumstances. A functional relation is thereby determined, however. We could perhaps formulate it as follows: if the appearance A arises [292] under the circumstances K, then there "pertains" to the K-sequence $K \frown K'$ a sequence of appearances AA'; and to another sequence $K \frown K''$, a sequence of appearances AA''; etc. That means that in itself every appearance is compatible with any circumstances K_μ, and to that extent it is in possible unity with any K_μ. But assuming that one of these possibilities is now actualized, that the appearance A is actually given with the circumstances K, then, since it is an appearance under the circumstances K, the series of appearances AA' is functionally motivated in case KK' were to elapse, and so is the series of appearances AA'', in case KK'' were to elapse, etc. Therefore if the definite unity AK is determined (or thought to be determined) as actual, then no longer is any arbitrary further connection "possible" between appearances and circumstances, but instead precisely A' then "pertains" to the determination of the actuality of the circumstances K', etc. Here a new possibility thus arises, a real possibility, which is a delimited, functionally motivated one.

The supposition that a possibility is actualized does not require the actualization of other possibilities. Instead, it carries out a certain selection in the domain of possibilities as phantasized possibilities and determines "real possibilities." The association that A will occur under the circumstances K does not found the occurrence of A' under the circumstances K' but instead founds the real possibility of this occurrence. That is to say, this association founds the fact that, if the further association is made, according to which K passes over into K', then the appearance A' would have to occur, since A would have to pass over into A'. This "would have to" is not an absolute "must." But it is a "must" in the empirical sense, in the sense of empirical motivation. Every real possibility is a possibility under the association of an actuality, which means, here, under the association of the present actuality of

these or those appearances. And it is, under this association, always still a possibility, insofar as it refers to a compossibility, a further association, which is related to motivating circumstances whose association would then empirically motivate the actuality of what was designated as really possible.

This then goes on. If we already have a real possibility, thus a possibility under such associations, then this possibility can once again prescribe to other [293] possibilities a rule like the one expressed in hypothetical propositions of the form: if *x* is really possible, then *y* is possible as well. Or again, under the association that *x* is a real possibility, then *y*, too, as dependent on it, becomes a real possibility in such a way that the actualization of *x* first of all makes *y* a motivated possibility. We have to do everywhere in this domain with these sorts of dependent possibilities, which are not perceptual possibilities in and for themselves in the mode of phantasized possibilities, mere possibilities in general, but which are instead possibilities that are dependent on posited actualities, motivated by them, and which pass over into motivated actualities by the assumptive actualization of supplementary circumstances. This is what is meant by placing real existence in relation to a system of perceptual possibilities.

SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS

A. ESSAYS

I.

SYSTEMATIC CONSTITUTION OF SPACE [297]

HUSSERL'S DRAFT

A. Sense-fields and kinaesthetic systems.

Each body is constituted in an orientation, and that implies above all else (actually, as a mere different expression for the same thing) that each body is given to intuition in a kind of "quality," in a "location," which has its dimensional modifications. Let us now speak more clearly:

1.) Each body, and, more precisely, each sensuous schema of a complete corporeality, is a spatial corporeality (a spatial form), "over which" or "in which" sensuous qualities are extended. Every such sensuous schema has a "location" as a variable determination, such that, given the identity of the schema, a closed system of locations (orientations) is possible idealiter. These locations have the character of qualities within a system of qualities; i.e., two locations for the same schema (thus also for the same body) are incompatible with one another. On the other hand, however, each body must have a location in intuition; each body is, as a matter of principle, given in intuition only as oriented. Must we not then immediately say that each body has its location, one that is given, that belongs to it? In contrast to the multiplicity of the "locations," however, the body is one and the same as regards form, formed qualities, etc. The body can be completely unchanged in those respects, and if it does change, then every phase has its location and could occupy, without itself becoming a different phase, any other location of the system. The possible system of locations or system of orientations is of one type for each body, and, according to the various dimensions of the qualities having this peculiarity, every location of each body is thus comparable with every other one, and thereby each body is also situated and oriented in relation to all the others. [298]

2.) A body is constituted as a sensuous schema by the sense of touch and the sense of sight, and every sense is a sense through an apperceptive conjunction of the corresponding sense-data with kinaesthetic data. We distinguish sense-fields from the one kinaesthetic field, which we do not call a sense-field. We do not speak of a kinaesthetic sense. The kinaesthetic field is a field of continuous data, or, rather, there are several kinaesthetic fields (though

they all belong to the genuine class, "kinaesthetic" datum). A kinaesthetic field is variable immediately and freely, and what is dependent on the free variation of the kinaesthetic data that enter into the apperception of a body is the variation of the sense-data, which, in this apperception, perform the necessary constitutive function of adumbrations. The content of the perception of a body implies the coordination, in virtue of this apperception, between a sense-datum and a kinaesthetic complex. Upon closer inspection, we have to make the following distinctions:

1.) A sense-field – restricting ourselves to the primal fields, namely the field of the sense of sight and the field of touch – is without qualitative differentiations; it is a continuum of equal qualities, distinct only in their position within the order of the field.

2.) In the sense-field, differentiations arise. A part of the extension of the whole field is delimited more or less "sharply;" it is differentiated in content.

In the apperception as a body, this sensuous content is coordinated to a kinaesthetic datum in a way which implies, for consciousness, that if the kinaesthetic datum traverses (freely or unfreely), within its system, a "line" or a series, then the adumbrational content of the sense-field traverses a certain appurtenant, characteristic modification. Therefore, if the modification is not present in the actual elapsing of the kinaesthetic series, and if the sensuous content remains practically unchanged within the determinate order of the modification, then the apperception undergoes its cancellation. Every kinaesthetic prominence, out of a system whose availability makes it surveyable and familiar, includes an adumbration, and every adumbrated object is thereby the same. The same Objectivity presents itself differently with each sensuous adumbration and in relation to the appurtenant kinaesthetic datum which is consciously integrated in the system. This coordination determines the orientation, which thus has its footing there and in the kinaesthetic. Since the sensuous "image," the adumbration as such, is constituted in terms of, and thus is related to, the kinaesthetic system and its position, the Object is then given in a determinate orientation. The same Object, with respect to the same perceived objective moments, can be constituted through various series of adumbrations and various kinaesthetic systems, but all these constitutions must coalesce into the unity of one constitution, and this unity makes possible the consciousness of something self-same. [299]

One kinaesthetic system functions in the apprehension of a certain system of data, while another system is in a state of rest; i.e., one kinaesthetic moment or other is fixed, while, in a different system, motivating transformations occur along with the appurtenant sequences of adumbrations. My head is stationary; my eyes are moving. But now my head also begins to move, and then perhaps my upper body leans over, and then I begin to run. All this yields changes in orientation, and adumbrational changes correspond to every modification of

the kinaesthetic moments, in whichever one of these systems the modifications take place. Nevertheless, changes in one or the other system can be cancelled at the individual points of intersection and lines of intersection (to speak metaphorically). We will then have to make a clear distinction between orientations in the individual system, or ones purely related to it, and orientations in the total system. (Orientations in the oculomotor field in itself, orientations in the field of cephalomotor movements which are simultaneously oculomotor movements, etc.)

We now have a significant difference in the kinaesthetic situation:

1.) Visually: I do not walk or run (I do not move myself – the correlative is still to be discussed: I am not moved). I can move my eyes, my head, my upper body. All locations are then ordered with respect to depth in such a way that we arrive at an absolute limit of depth for the relatively stationary body. What [300] does that mean? A body which displays no adumbrational changes in the fixing of one kinaesthetic group (of an autonomous kinaesthetic point) extracted from all the systems, and which maintains its identical "location," is here said to be relatively stationary.

2.) I walk; what was absolutely deep now becomes relatively deep; what was relatively deep can convert to absolute depth. A closed, possible system of locations, endowed with the quality of absolute depth, receives a dimension of kinaesthetically motivating change and does so in such a way that the quality of depth receives, even at its limits, a merely relative meaning. Constitution of infinite space.

The same applies to the sense residing in the skin. "I remain in place," and thus I have a closed system with an absolute depth (within arms' length). But this entire system is in transit when I am walking: the distant becomes close, and new distances open up. Every location in a partial system and every location in a complete system (whereby the infinitely distant has the meaning of something to be transformed, *in infinitum* and repeatedly, into the close) allows itself to be transformed into any location whatsoever, and ideally does so in a free movement. Two types of change of location in the case of the identity of the object and in the case of its identity according to all the extended determinations that fill space (the body unchanged in quality and in form as well).

1.) Changes of location (changes of orientation), whereby kinaesthetic nonchange occurs, whether completely or in partial systems;

2.) Changes of location in the *I move myself*.

First level. System of finitely closed orientation: intuitive in the stricter sense;

Second level. System of open orientation: intuitive in the broader sense.

Now, if they are such (for the apprehension) that with the inhibition of my *I move*, and in general with kinaesthetic standstill, all the changes in orientation cease, then "the body rests." Conversely, changes in location accompanied by kinaesthetic non-change (standstill) are experienced in consciousness as [301] "movements" of the body. Every change in location, accompanied by kinaesthetic standstill, disappears through a corresponding kinaesthetic modification. Therefore non-change in location, accompanied by kinaesthetic modification (e.g., I move myself forward) is experienced in consciousness as movement. Every movement can retain the "image" of rest; i.e., the moving object can appear in the aspect of a stationary body, if I move myself in the appropriate way and thereby annul the change of location.

Phenomenon of the *I am moved, and not merely my hand but all of me is moved* (my Body as a whole: if I include the Body). The kinaesthetic modifications condition, generally speaking, modifications of all locations and thereby all aspects of the basic case of rest and, in a lawfully modified way, all aspects of the case of movement of all bodies together. But if we now take up for once the case of our corporeal Body (whose constitution we have not previously considered, tranquilly thinking it was not necessary to do so), then it distinguishes itself radically from all other bodies as follows:

If all environing bodies retain their orientation (display a stationary orientation), while I "move myself," which means while I traverse the appurtenant kinaesthetic series, then each body retains its position, specifically within the system of orientations, but still moves. If all the environing bodies retain their orientation in the system of orientations, simultaneously with my making no movement (carrying out or undergoing no kinaesthetic change), then everything is stationary. But this is all terribly imprecise.

1.) Basic case. No changes in orientation, along with kinaesthetic standstill; or ever the same appurtenant changes in orientation, along with free traversal of all the kinaesthetic series in cyclical nexuses: case of Objective rest.

2.) Deviation of whatever type: case of Objective movement, therefore indeed "no changes in orientation, but also no kinaesthetic standstill"; or changes in orientation, but not reproducible in parallel with kinaesthetic changes in the coordination and not reproducible cyclically. Thereby, however, no account is taken of the *I am moved*. Here we make no progress with- [302] out asking about the roles played by null-bodies.

The Objective phenomena of "rest" and "movement" relative to the null-point and to the null-system of the coordinates of orientation.

If there is no transiently or enduringly fixed null-body, or if there are some, but excluded as not belonging in the system, then the following would be established: we could call each body which is not a null-body an environing body. If all the environing bodies present themselves in "orientational movements" (thus if all their orientations are changing), while my kinaesthetic

system is at a standstill, then we have the possible consciousness, "I am moved," when a free kinaesthetic modification is continuously producible in the system, a modification which reproduces, retrogressively, the changes of orientation in a single continuous modification, including all the particulars, and which, in the inverse direction, produces anew, in a cyclical freedom, the previously elapsed changes of orientation.

But how does this idea of "movement" arise? In the first place, it is clear that it would not be correct to speak of more than possibility. Nevertheless, all the environing bodies could move while "I am stationary," but in such a way that this movement would be completely equivalent, in terms of the modes of appearance, with "my" movement: these are therefore two unseparated possibilities. And yet, even if the Objective interpretation is lacking, the phenomenon is one of corporeal movement. In relation to that, or, more simply, in the null-system: I see all bodies approaching or receding, rotating or turning in the orientational system, which is always an ideal system and always has depth, height, etc., as well as its sense. (Properly a system of rays, doubly cyclical from the null-point, but a right-left direction and an above-below direction, etc., are differentiated.) Thereby everything is a matter of the constitution of the basic forms of change and non-change, "movement" and "rest," specifically in each system. The basic rule is:

That which is constituted as movement must appear in such aspects that modification of the aspects can be offset by the appurtenant kinaesthetic motivations (thus already in the oculomotor system, etc.). On the other hand, [303] in the case of kinaesthetic standstill, the movement must of itself be transformed in this system of modifications which corresponds to the condition we have discussed (always presupposing that the *I am moved from my position* is still lacking). That which appears as stationary must require and permit only those modifications of aspect that are kinaesthetically motivated and that disappear when kinaesthetic standstill occurs.

As soon as a new kinaesthetic system arises as motivated, movement and rest can and must then be constituted again in such a way that what formerly was an appearance of movement can, or must, become an appearance of rest.

Every kinaesthetic system has its null-position and its basic directions of modification starting from that position. Every system has its extremes therein and thus also in the combinations. With each one, therefore, a horizon of the appurtenant level is constituted.

The second system I spoke of earlier is distinguished by the fact that it does not consist of a kinaesthetic system which leads on uniformly (possibly in several directions) from a null-point to an extreme. Walking is a periodic movement, with which, however, the delimited remote image at the edge of the horizon changes continually and does so in such a way that the reversal of the periodic movement again restores that image. In this periodic form, the

kinaesthetically new modification continues on *in infinitum*, namely as *ab*, *ab*, ... etc.

Then what about the *I am moved*? If my hand is moved in the process of touching something, it is as if I were touching freely, i.e., with regard to the sequence of images. What is quite different is an *I am moved* that concerns the whole Body; in this case it does not at all pertain to the kinaesthetic systems.

Is the apperception "I am moved" (driven, etc.) thinkable without the Body, without introducing a null-body? Furthermore, is it not conceivable that a null-body is there without being a Body or without having in unity with the Body the property of a null-body? And would such a Body-less null-body suffice for the possibility of the *I am moved*?[1]

What is important in advance is the concept of the displacement of the null-point of orientation and the displacement of the coordinate system of orientation. [304]

We have two kinaesthetic systems:

1.) The kinaesthetic system which we can also designate as the one constitutive of the closed horizon of Objective space.

2.) The kinaesthetic system which brings it about that this horizon is displaced and in its displacement becomes the apparency [*Apparenz*] precisely of Objective space.

Spatiality, that of the individual body as well as that of space, presents itself. The body is always given in an aspect (view); a closed system of possible aspects constitutes the complete apparency. That is indeed the complete appearance of the surface of the body, as this appearance is constituted without my moving (or being moved) from my place. This appearance of the surface, the complete apparency, is itself, however, only one appearance in a manifold, and this manifold consists of utterly identical complete apparencies, but with a new system of kinaesthetic motivations, precisely those of the second group.

Corresponding to this is the system of the ideal "aspects" of the spatial horizon, and, in this system, that horizon itself is constituted as a unity. And then further the manifold of spatial horizons, which differentiate themselves only through a new kinaesthetic motivation, that of the second group; in these horizons Objective space is constituted (for me).

As regards the first system, there pertains to visual space a null-point and a null-system of pre-eminent directions and planes of direction which are "qualitatively" distinguished and which yield, by combination, the entire

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[1] At the end of this line, Husserl remarks: "'Horizon' quite an improper name. It is 'space' as sensuous space on very different levels. Perceptual field of a constituted, sensuous transcendence. Horizon is appropriate for the delimitation of the current visual space; thus, e.g., the oculomotor visual space has a one-dimensional horizon, and complete visual space has a spherical horizon, at any rate a two-dimensional horizon." – Ed.

directional system. A kinaesthetic complex corresponds to the direction, and just as this complex cannot proceed *in infinitum* in the same kinaesthetic "direction" but instead is delimited, then so is visual space delimited. The "space" constituted here as visual space therefore has an end; thus it is a three-dimensional, delimited manifold. Further investigation would be needed to determine how many partial systems it has. Optically, it is clear that the oculomotor field is a system that is constituted first and that makes up a lowest level of aspects and a lowest level of "movement" and "rest." The ascent to the higher forms of constitution always occurs through new systems of kinaesthetically motivating indices. How then does the system #2 come to be differentiated? Visually, the cephalomotor system and, *a fortiori*, the system of leanings of the upper Body, etc., already impart, over and against the oculomotor system, new changes in aspects. These changes do not arise in this way in the oculomotor system; i.e., they have there the meaning of "Objective changes" in size, whereas here these modes of change can be cancelled and then become constitutive of space (instead of indicating a change in form). Yet in this way we are limited, and these systems, as kinaesthetic ones, are also limited. Only a new system makes a beginning out of the end and, in new motivations, annuls what was Objective in the lower system. [305]

Walking and the "displacement of visual space within homogeneous space" conditioned by it, or the degradation of the complete visual space of the highest dignity into a mere "appearance" of Objective space – how is all that to be made intelligible?

An amplification of visual space, e.g., an amplification of the visual space of the oculomotor field, means that in every phase I retain the same form of the horizon, but there occurs a certain modification of content as a mere change of orientation, whereby some objects enter into the horizon and other objects step out. This is accomplished in continuous series of kinaesthetic motivations (whether these series are one-dimensional or two-dimensional) without a pause and in such a way that, in the normal case of "stationary Objects," I can reverse everything kinaesthetically and reproduce the same horizons at each phase. (The constitution of the oculomotor field is already such that it gives me a form of the phases, but I still do not have there a kinaesthetically constituted object.) The first constitution of an Object, of a two-dimensional Object without depth, through oculomotor movement of the gaze. The second constitution of an Object through the constitution of the dimension of depth: enlargement and reduction according to "geometrical similarity." A dimension of kinaesthetic data, to which is coordinated a two-dimensional cyclical manifold of kinaesthetic data, with a coordination of the modifications in the "rotation" of the Object around any axis; i.e., the Object shows itself from all sides. Conjunction of a one-dimensional kinaesthetic (orthoid) manifold with a two-dimensional cyclical manifold. And the "images" are the [306]

motivated; what must their qualities be? What further requirements need to be posited, beyond the stated one, namely that recurrence of the images must, in the case of rest, coincide with the recurrence of the same kinaesthetic complexes and combinations?

That, in the case of mere (geometrical) movement, every change in images within the appurtenant kinaesthetic standstill must be producible through mere kinaesthetic change and the entire continuity of change must be annullable through kinaesthetic modification or change?

Furthermore, still not mentioned: there can be something like mere change in size (as a distinctive case of "deformation"; null-deformation). Every appearing change in size offers "similarities" in the kinaesthetic relations and, on the other hand, in the relations among the qualities. But is this clear and precise, hardly even questionable?

Likewise, modifications in size while the form is preserved; finally, modification in form and modification in both. Then, qualitative modification, distinct from all that.

Eye-movement: normal position of the eyes. Hand-movements, arm-movements: normal position? What constitutes the null-points?

Notes:

a) Horizon of the moving hand when the forearm or upper arm is stationary, and then the upper Body.

b) Amplification of the horizon through movement of the forearm.

c) A second level of the amplification of the horizon through movement of the upper arm, etc. These are mere amplifications, since the moving hand already constitutes the complete "three-dimensional horizon."

Several separate touching parts, like the fingers of a hand, coalescing into the unity of one organ. How do they succeed in constituting the same bodies or the same spatial horizon, specifically through mere feeling and touch?

To do so, is it not essential that the parts can be in contact with one another in an individual act of touch, that thereby for finger F_1, as a unity, there is [307] constituted F_2 (as an object) lying on the surface of the table, and likewise for F_2 "F_1 lying on the table"? No, that happens too incompletely, although it can help. Better: the other hand H_2 touches H_1 and the surface of the table and mediates the identification. Therefore what appears to be essential here is the constitution of the organ as a body [*Körper*] and as a Body [*Leib*]. Likewise, we also see the surface of the table and the finger on it. (Whereby the constitution of the same objectivities through sight and touch is lacking here.)

The mere oculomotor field does not constitute a three-dimensional horizon, just as a mere finger (an inflexible, stiff finger) would not constitute a three-dimensional horizon. The amplifications of the horizon through mere movements of the head (which present a double manifold of movement), in simply

turning right and left, yield only an amplification of the manifold of the two-dimensional field. The up-down movement already produces an approaching and a receding and thus something new: depth.

Therefore we have two sorts of amplifications of visual space:

a) ones that increase the number of dimensions;

b) ones that do not increase the number of dimensions.

Further, in another respect:

A) ones which amplify a one-dimensionally delimited visual space into a closed and delimited visual space; e.g., they amplify the oculomotor field into a closed field of "spherical form";

B) ones which do not do so.

Further, A′) ones which present an extension in depth, something that was still not given thereby. In addition, indeed an especially important:

M) constitution of finite horizons, up to a supreme finite horizon.

N) Extension of the finite horizon into the infinite. But not only this; (it must be added, as a special case:)

P) constitution of an Objective space, which now has no null-point and in which every point is equal; the constitution of a homogenous space, which is no longer a "horizon" but instead presents itself in a horizon with the null-point and the null-axis.

The horizon itself never becomes, properly speaking, infinite; on the contrary, instead of being amplified, it is related, while its form remains constant, to a periodic kinaesthetic series and is apprehended as infinite homogeneous space. [308]

The horizon ("visual space") is an enduring form throughout all perception (intuition) of space.

If we proceed from the factual constitution of space for us humans, then we always find in visual space our own Body as the constant null-body: constant, no matter how visual space may phenomenally be "displaced in Objective space." When I walk, and move myself from place to place, the null-point of the orientations travels, in a certain sense, and coincides with ever new points of Objective space. My corporeal Body can travel only because the null-point "travels," and, along with that, so does my visual space. Basically, however, I have one enduring form of visual space and have it filled with different "content." That has to be described more precisely.

Furthermore, what is implied here is that my Body cannot undergo the phenomenal changes in appearance brought about by "receding" (withdrawal in depth) or "approaching"; my Body can only move around the null-point (and can undergo only the appurtenant phenomenal changes). Every other body, every environing body, is free within the horizon and "moveable" in relation to the null-point and the null-system. The null-body is capable of only a limited group of these "modes of movement" within the horizon.

Furthermore, let us now consider Objective movements, i.e., geometric movements in "Objective" space. In this space, each body can move, my body as well as every environing body. But the Objective movement of the corporeal Body must, as a matter of principle, appear quite differently than that of every other body, something that was already implied in the preceding. As soon as a body is conjoined strictly and geometrically to the null-body (the Body), or, more clearly, as soon as it maintains a fixed location relative to the null-body, it must then participate in the properties of the null-body. It can then no longer be free within the horizon; henceforth it maintains a fixed position relative to the null-point.

B. Levels of the constitution of space.[2] [309]

I. The visual space of the first level, oculomotor space. The eye alone movable and moving.

This space is restricted, rigidly circumscribed. In it there is an emergence and a disappearance of "oculomotor bodies." It has a null-point, to which is kinaesthetically coordinated the basic position of the eyes ("straight ahead"). In this null-point, the two basic axes – the system of oculomotor coordinates (or orientations) has only two – intersect: the above-below axis and the right-left axis. Corresponding to them are qualitative, specifically gradual, modifications with extremes, and the entire field is a mixed system. (Of the same type as the system of black-white shades, i.e., a one-dimensional mixed system? No. Pure black would then have to correspond to the extreme right, which would then be the pure right, and that is obviously not correct.) Naturally, as is indicated by speaking of space and bodies, we have constituted here the phenomena of "Objective" movement and rest, of distance, which remains the same in "mere" movement within a body or within two "strictly conjoined" bodies, etc. Here there is a disappearance of bodies; concealment cannot properly be concealment when the concealed is preserved.

II. A closed, two-dimensional space is constituted by the rotation of the head around its basic axis, while the remainder of the body is in its normal position, a position that is supposed to remain motionless and fixed. The oculomotor visual space is an enduring form, which, however, receives a new index with every position of the head. We then have a new kinaesthetic system as a new line of motivating data. Oculomotor space becomes the apparency ("image") of a new space, and the oculomotor body becomes the apparency of a body of a new type. What still counts as movement within oculomotor space

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[2] *Cf.* Appendix XII, "On the constitution of Riemannian things," pp. 339f. – Ed.

can now be rest. That is, the displacements of the oculomotor image, which are now motivated as aroused through the mere movement of my head, are precisely images of a stationary body. And the reversal of this movement brings back the old sequence of images and the original image with its former [310] orientation and in its original oculomotor field. In certain motivated "movements" of oculomotor bodies, there now "appears" a stationary cephalomotor body.

This new space has no limits on the "right and left"; it is a closed space. What functions here as the basic system of orientation is not an "intersection of axes" but a closed line of coordinates in the right-left direction, as an abscissa, and an unclosed line in the direction above-below. What distinguishes itself as the null-point is the kinaesthetic complex characterized by the normal position of the head and by the normal position of the eyes as they gaze straight ahead. Nevertheless, it could be said more clearly that we have a turning to the right from the basic position, a turning that ideally could indeed continue so far that it would lead to the same oculomotor space and corporeal system as an ideal turning to the left would lead $(+ a, - a)$. Perhaps an autonomous turning around, $0 + a + 0$, and then $0 - a - 0$ are also conceivable.

The spatial field would be delimited above and below, and we would have a null-line, the closed abscissa axis and two parallel lines $y = + b$, $y = - b$, thus a kind of cylinder. For $a = 0$, we would have a length with two opposite directions (traversal from below to above and from above to below).

III. Let us take the entire cephalomotor space, but let us simulate that everything constitutive of depth is imperceptible. Then no turnings, concealments, or rotations would occur which could be brought to disappear as a consequence of these movements. And so there would arise a spherically closed space, presupposing that the motility of the head is idealized in the appropriate way. We could also add other movements of the Body, if precisely a coordination is produced, in which the movements that accomplish the same thing appear apperceptively in interchangeable relations and thus count as the same motivation. Yet this would require a special discussion. The basic orientational system of this space is composed of two null-lines, which are closed "circles," namely the closed right-left line (which was already constituted previously) and the closed above-below line. The one intersectional point is null and has, as it were, a shadow, a counter-null.

IV. All bodies have been, hitherto, "surface beings," at best "spherical [311] beings." A homogeneous Riemannian space of two dimensions would be constituted here. A third dimension, depth, and a three-dimensional corporeality would have no sense. But those are constituted when groups of movements, i.e., groups of kinaesthetic data, are coordinated to new sorts of changes in images. The difficulty is to describe this.

There come into consideration phenomena of concealment, perspectival

expansion and contraction, and, in general, perspectival changes in size and form, in such a way that approaching and receding, as well as rotation in various directions, are constituted in them.

5 Addendum to I., II., and III.

We have an oculomotor right-left, which, by means of eye-movements, proceeds from the null-position in the direction of the preferred side and in the reverse direction: $L \leftarrow 0 \rightarrow R$. The movement from R to 0 is harmonious with the direction from 0 to L; the movement simply continues on. What does this 10 mean? Indeed, it means that, on the one hand, 0 is distinguished by a lack of tension; on the other hand, we have a dimension of differences in tension, an intensification, which increases with the progress in one direction. This qualitative difference is connected with the difference in direction. We have a cyclical continuum of directional qualities. Whether I proceed from the ex- 15 treme L toward 0 or then proceed "further" toward the R-point, I always have the same directional quality of movement (apart from differences in velocity); and in the reverse course I have the counter-quality of the opposed direction. The same holds for every direction passing through 0. But we do not only have a cyclical continuum of directions but also a total continuum of directions 20 which are exactly like the directional manifolds in a plane, specifically in a bounded one (or in a two-dimensional "plane" manifold, possibly a closed one). The kinaesthetic manifold is precisely a two-dimensional manifold, which can be "generated" by traversing it, and it is a "plane manifold." There then arises here the manifold of straight or curved transitions and thus the 25 manifold of directions as directional manifolds of a "plane."

In systems II and III, the cylinder or the round calotte and the sphere are the [312] images for the kinaesthetic plane manifolds in question. But thereby the pre-eminence of 0 and of the preferred coordinates is still conjoined again with the purely kinaesthetic directional manifolds determined by kinaesthetic data. And 30 so we have everywhere, under the heading of kinaesthetic moments, various things. Their distinctions remain to be described better. A direction is indeed a vector of traversal. Qualitatively, every kinaesthetic datum is characterized in itself according to the plane manifold. The null-position of the eyes has its quality, like any other one, and in itself it is incidental which position I take as 35 the starting point of a traversal and, consequently, how I draw the coordinates therein. What makes a system of coordinates privileged? Thus here I was imprecise. Naturally, my eyes look straight ahead; with every position of the eyes, thus with every "kinaesthetic point," I have a visually saturated field of sensation. Within the oculomotor apperception by which I have a spatial field 40 of these or those "bodies," looking straight ahead still tells me nothing about a right or left or about an above or below ("about the respective 0") pertaining to the bodies in this field. It is clear that the kinaesthetic system is coordinated to

the system of "local signs" in the field of visual sensations and that a 0 is pre-eminent in this field itself. If I now move my eyes to the left, producing a distinctive qualitative series, and thereby bring the left marginal Object *L* into the null-orientation and thus allow the axis of coordinates to be displaced, there is then Objectively constituted for me the left of the 0; and the movement itself is pre-eminent. This obviously needs to be elaborated and clarified.

For now, the following must be considered. We have here no depth and, in that sense, no near or far. On the other hand, even the oculomotor field, like every constituted orientational field, or like every "visual space," has its own sort of approaching and receding – provided we pay attention to the meaning of these words and to the phrase "to draw near to something" – to fixate, to bring into the central point. That is, in the oculomotor movement, a "spatial Object" (a "visual thing") is identified in movement and rest, in change and non-change, but not only because manifolds of "sense-images" maintain their [313] coordination to the kinaesthetic data motivating them, but also because of the reference back of all appearances to an optimum. The "center," ideally a null-point, of the visual sense-field (always understood as the field of sensation) is distinguished by that fact that, in the transitions from one apperception to another and thus in the traversal of the manifold of appearances of one "Object," it has the greatest richness of content, it is an optimum.

The visual sense-field has its *quasi*-local order, its *quasi*-expansion (diffusion). Every point therein (every ordered position), thus the null-point as well, has its qualitative particularity. But the null-point becomes significant as the central point of the optimal region for the apprehension of Objects.

Now, in the apprehension of Objects, every visual sense-point (local sign) must present an Objective point of oculomotor visual space, and this point is constituted as Objective by the fact that the visual sense-image, which stands out somewhere in the field, changes in specific series of images with various eye-movements but does so in such a way that at the same position the same images always appear again, etc. And not only that. As long as the image lies outside the optimal region, it is a mere "remote image" and refers to the corresponding "close image," which would be attained by means of various eye-movements. Every "point" of the visual sense-field then acquires a relation to the central point of this field, and every apprehension of an oculomotor spatial point refers to a fulfillment by means of a conversion into a fulfilled point, i.e., into a fixation point: I have to "direct" my gaze there. It is only in the identification of the fulfillment that I have the oculomotor point "itself." And the oculomotor field, the visual space of this level, comes to givenness through my bringing all points and bodies that present themselves in the visual sense-field, all spatial formations, and all aspects, into the form of presentation in which I fix their objects. Therefore visual space is the idea of a two-dimensional manifold, which, in a certain sense, consists of utterly fixed points. In percep-

tion, a visual sense-field (i.e., the field with its fixed form, but with the determinate content by which it is a presentation of space) is pre-eminent; any Objective point is fixed, or at least the one focused on is fixed: the pre- [314]
eminent null-point of the visual sense-field is always pre-eminent in the presentational function of bringing an Objective point to givenness as that which is focused on. But in these oculomotor modifications, it is precisely the ocular position that changes, and we have a basic position, namely the null-position of the kinaesthetic system. Likewise, we have as kinaesthetically pre-eminent the right-left direction of flow, the above-below direction of flow, and the system of kinaesthetic coordinates. If the two null-points coincide, we have the pre-eminent case in which I find my eyes (as well as my entire body, which has a role to play in the total kinaesthetic system) in the straight-ahead position, and the Object focused on is also now pre-eminent: it is at the null-position of oculomotor space. That position then determines the right, left, above, and below for the entire system. Admittedly, the privilege of this position has a mere ordering significance. All eye-movements proceed from the null-point of movement and revert back to it. And they travel on straight paths.

This is transferable to the systems II and III, except that now a further kinaesthetic series supervenes, and so does, therein, a privileged null-determination. That is to say, for the cephalomotor system, the "straight," perpendicular posture of the head (what matters phenomenologically, of course, is only that this posture is a determinate one) has a privilege as the null-posture, and this null-posture, conjoined with the null-posture of the oculomotor system, yields the kinaesthetic 0 of the amplified system. And thereby the 0 of the visual sense-space II is also determined (in conjunction with the 0 of the visual sense-field). Thereby, hence, the function of the optimum is also transferred to the higher domain of constitution. The relation to the kinaesthetic null-null-position and to the null-null-system of coordinates produces the order of the optima and therefore the ordered constitution of the new visual space.

The constitution of visual space IV is more difficult. The previous systems yielded a univocal apperception, insofar as, ideally speaking, every image had to be apprehended as an image of a determinate body of these visual spaces.

*[3]

Important note. [315]

Constitution of Riemannian visual space. It is nevertheless not necessary to allow the oculomotor manifold to be constituted first of all as a delimited two-

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[3] The editor indicates that the pages between stars could not be definitively placed chronologically. – Trans.

dimensional manifold of visual space.

Let us think of the eye as motionless in the head. The head has a pre-eminent kinaesthetic basic position, and round about this it has a two-dimensional kinaesthetic surface of movement. Then Riemannian visual space would be constituted anew and more simply.

This indicates that our consideration was not sufficiently correct and lucid. Our Body contains several systems of movement, which, however, can stand for one another vicariously and thereby do not have, in relation to each other, a different constitutive significance for the constitution of visual space. Thus it happens that several systems of movement do not exist side by side in such a way that we could add up the number of their dimensions. The same thing is accomplished whether I move my eyes to the left or move my head to the left while the eyes remain fixed in their sockets. This also applies, to a certain extent, to the up and down movement of the head and to the up and down movement of the eyes.

Accordingly, all the systems that constitute a closed visual space belong together, and the kinaesthetic system must correspond to the number of dimensions of this manifold and thus must be a two-dimensional cyclical manifold. Likewise the visual sense-field, which is two-dimensional with a "center."[4]

Second note.

The optimal region of the visual sense-field also plays a role as a region, and that determines how the visual sense-"figures" of a restricted "size" are constituted, through a coordination with the kinaesthetic movements, in presentations of bodies and in relation to the corresponding optimal figures of the central region. It would then have to be examined how larger figures are Objectivated by integrating smaller pieces. Then again, there are bodies so large that their presentations fill up the entire visual sense-field or indeed "overrun" it by far. The closed visual field is formed. In it, a maximal spatial [316] Object would be conceivable, one that fills up the whole of space and that rotates around itself like the surface of a sphere. It would be divisible only in pieces that could be thought of as detachable and as moveable on their own, whereas they would actually move only as parts of the entire "surface of the world-sphere." There is added to this, however, the system of the three-dimensional world of depth, and then the question arises as to whether the latter could be conceived as an infinite, filled spatial corporeality.

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[4] This point marks the end of the text Edith Stein had available for her elaboration, published below as Essay II.

Not to be overlooked in the doctrine of visual space:

1.) If we exclude the system of the *I walk* and take into account merely the system of movements of the "standing" body (system of the *I stand*), then a three-dimensional corporeality and a three-dimensional "spatiality" are already constituted, but as a visual space possessing a pre-eminent null-region. This visual space breaks down into

a) a near region, in which an actual three-dimensionality, an actual depth, is constituted;

b) the remote region, the remote horizon, the horizon properly so-called, which is essentially nothing other than the closed (amplified to the point of closure) oculomotor system, which exhibits no differences of depth ("my" approaching and receding by leaning back and forth, sidewards, etc., do not at all change the images, which are perhaps still understood as corporeal ones, although they are not demonstrable as such and do not exhibit depth and "corporeality" in actual perception).

But even if we include the system of the *I walk* (system of walking movements, ambulation), this distinction still properly exists, and it thus characterizes our horizon. This horizon also has a remote region, with the designated qualities, except that depth is indeed perceived, to the extent that the apperception includes the fact that I can walk from here and that depth and relief would be visible "so far," i.e., so far as "walking" is a possibility for us, for us Bodily beings, human beings, on the surface of the earth. This does not apply to the space of the world. There, "being-moved" arises as an ideal possibility, and this fact has constitutive significance. The question is to what extent it is a [317] necessary significance. And to what extent in general "surface of the earth," "Body"? Walking in the proper sense, which involves necessities.

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If I have a closed visual field, and if I already have an identification of rotating and receding Objects merely through leaning my corporeal Body back and forth while its position remains fixed, then I have a delimited field of depth and a delimited sensible space. For I indeed look into the distance beyond this space, but beyond the limits of this space rotations appear. Yet the expansions are not influenced by the changes of my corporeal Body, as long as I am not walking. Since I cannot generate or cancel the expansions kinaesthetically, I cannot say that they are not expansions of the Objects themselves, nor can I say, on the contrary, that unchanged and stationary Objects appear in them.

May we speak here of the unity of a sensible space? With a fixed "place of our Body in Objective space," we would specifically have Objects that, in approaching and receding (which indeed would be possible to a limited extent), manifest no change (except for displacement to the side), so that here no

particular kinaesthetic coordinations would exist. In a streaming transition, we have an environing domain where that is the case, thus where depth is constituted. But therefore a similarity indeed exists, and an Object can pass out of the domain of actually appearing depth into the domain that lacks depth. Could these Objects not still be apprehended as Objects with depth, as corporeal Objects? Could not the idea of something approaching and receding come to be developed, quite in analogy with the case of near Objects? If we assume so, then we would indeed have a horizon with the boundary of the most extreme remoteness (contraction up to the null-point) and not two regions, i.e., in virtue of the continuous modification. A remote Object moves into the near region, therein shows itself as unchanged, again recedes, and does so with a style which makes possible the constatation of the non-change. Rest can also be seen but not completely demonstrated.

In walking, this form is maintained: always a near region and a remote one, [318] in continuous mediation, and the null-region characterized by the greatest possible nearness and even by the limit-case.

Since every remoteness is kinaesthetically transformable at will into a nearness, then every position in such an ordered "world" can become the null-position, the null-position can become a form, and we would have identical Objects and Objective distances whose orientation, as a mere form, is a matter of indifference. The peculiarity of a horizon therefore resides in the non-uniformity of the dimension, in the fact that depth has a "null-point" and an "infinity-limit," whereas breadth specifically has qualitatively different directions but no limits that have to be distinguished by means of qualitative peculiarities.

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The system of ambulatory movements. *I walk.*

I can walk toward every point of Riemannian sensible space and can walk back again: every point "approaches" and, if it is not occupied by a body, becomes the null-point and "disappears." Ideally, each body can coincide with the null-body, and my Body can coincide with each body. Accordingly, there is constituted an Objective spatial point as well as a spatial region and an Objective corporeality. Each body is what it is independently of its position in the momentary and the ambulatory horizon; for me, the body is always given in a horizon, but it is the same in every change of horizon. Thus a new system of movement and rest is constituted. The body moves if it changes its orientation while the horizon remains fixed (I stand still) and thereby traverses series of appearances which I can offset by changing the horizon in the course of walking. My Body is the permanent null-body, and it can thereby undergo no change of horizon (other than rotation, turning about the null-point, etc.) but

can indeed "assume any position in space." It will never know the phenomenon of approach or of movement in a horizon like other bodies. But how does it come to count as a body like any other and to count as a moving body in the case of every horizonal displacement which, for other bodies, signifies rest?

IV. Visual space for Euclidean space; or complete visual space. We thus already have two-dimensional, cyclical, visual space (Riemannian manifold). [319] We will add to that a two-dimensional, cyclical kinaesthetic system of a new kind, which should yield a system of the *I move from my position in this visual space following the various directions in it*. At the outset, naturally, there is none of this. With the constitution of the Riemannian visual space, we had at our disposal a two-dimensional, cyclical system of movement; in addition, we had the visual sense-field. The coordination of the "figures" prominent in this field (field-"forms," disregarding the qualities stemming from their material "content") was produced in such a way that an ideal limit-case of modifications in form (and in the appurtenant qualities of the content or material in the system of possible changes) was distinguished (or, rather, a system of limit-cases with a main limit was distinguished) in this way: on the one hand, in the latter respect, we have geometrical rest, and on the other hand the continuum of geometrical movements. The identical geometrical body is constituted as a "constant" Objective form. The filling is changeable, but it is not arbitrary. It also contains conditions of the possibility of Objectivation, and these conditions have only one universal type, which is determinative for the constitution of mere spatiality as a general form but not for the special form of the manifold of this spatiality (the question is indeed how far this extends, which would have to be answered here in some way or other). The constitution did not include the similarity of form (change of corporeal structure along with a preservation of the similarity) and other possible manifolds of formal changes which could have been distinguished. Nevertheless, these changes acquire, as "perspectival adumbrations," a new constitutive significance in the new system.

1.) We will begin with the assumption of a new kinaesthetically motivating dimension, and we will specifically assume that it continues openly from the null-point into the infinite (possibly a periodic movement, which raises the problem of how an infinity can arise out of two delimited continuities of lines by way of a periodic process) as an expressly qualified dimension, whereas we will leave the other kinaesthetic dimension indeterminate. We call the new dimension the one of the *I recede – I approach*. With the elapsing of the kinaesthetic modifications in the one or the other direction of this dimension, [320] there transpire modifications of the Riemannian images (which now become adumbrations).

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System of walking "straight ahead" into the depth. System of appurtenant modifications of the images constituted in Riemannian visual space; specifically, a pre-eminent group, pertaining to the limit-case of stationary and geometrically unchanged bodies; thus everything related again to the merely geometrical forms.

Identity of the point of departure. What does that mean? The null-point of a kinaesthetic series of a type like walking is the "stationary position," and if I walk a certain distance in one direction, I can return to the initial position; i.e., I can interrupt and reverse the direction of the movement and take the same individual steps back to the starting point. From there, I can strike out on a new series (whereby we also have recurring possibilities: I walk to the side, or I turn around on my axis and then walk forwards) and again return to the point of departure. On the other hand, I can stop after any number of steps, and then I have a new initial position for possible directions in which to walk. Naturally, instead of walking in a single direction, I can change my direction with every step. If the directions have a two-dimensional, cyclical manifold, then the one-dimensional, plane manifolds stand out. I can then walk around in a circle, if, while remaining in such a plane, I continue to walk on the same path with the same deviation of direction.

Pre-eminent case: approaching a spatial body, i.e., a body which presents a stationary, Euclidean, unchanged spatial body; this approaching conditions the magnification of the body into the infinite, and indeed the infinite is a limit to be reached (or to be bordered) in a finite number of steps. At this limit, the body disappears or would have to disappear. This needs to be described first of all. Conversely, after a finite number of steps of receding from a body, the body decreases to the null-point. The "receding" from a body – is it not better to recur to the optima? From the opposite point of view: the body approaches me or recedes from me. But I can run after it. [321]

2.) The body rotates – correlatively: I walk around the body. The same cyclical, kinaesthetic modifications of walking around produce the same appearances. Rotation in one or the other direction. Conjunction of rotation with approaching and receding – in a double sense, cyclically. Rotation is something cyclical. A body rotates: its images change cyclically in a two-dimensional cyclical modification, as it must if this modification is to be redressed by the two-dimensional, cyclical modification of my kinaesthetic movements of walking.

As indeterminate as this portrayal is, it includes a determinateness. Every Riemannian image must display a determinate system of modifications, and these must permit a mathematical derivation.

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II.

SYSTEMATIC CONSTITUTION OF SPACE

EDITH STEIN'S ELABORATION[1] [322]

§1. *Necessity of a location for each body.*

Each body is constituted in an orientation, and that implies above all else (actually, as a mere different expression for the same thing) that each body is given to intuition in a kind of "quality," in a "location," which has its dimensional modifications. Let us now speak more clearly:

1.) Each body, and, more precisely, every sensuous schema of a complete corporeality, is a spatial corporeality (spatial form), "over which" or "in which" sensuous qualities are extended. Every such sensuous schema has a variable determination (= location) such that, given the identity of the schema, a closed system of locations (orientations) is possible *idealiter*. These locations have the character of qualities within a system of qualities; i.e., two locations for the same schema (thus also for the same body) are incompatible with one another. On the other hand, each body must have a location in intuition; each body is, as a matter of principle, given only as oriented. "In intuition," we said. Then we must immediately say that each body has its location, one that belongs to it. In contrast to the multiplicity of possible locations, however, the body is one and the same as regards form, formed qualities, etc. The body can be completely unchanged in those respects, and if it does change, then every phase of the change has its location and could possess, without itself becoming a different phase, any other location of the system. The possible system of locations or system of orientations, every location of each body, is thus comparable with every other one, and therefore each body [323] has an orientation toward all the others, a location in relation to them.

§2. *Sense-fields and kinaesthetic field.*

2.) A body is constituted as a sensuous schema by the sense of touch and the sense of sight, and every sense is a "sense" through an apperceptive conjunc-

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[1] 1917.

tion of the corresponding sense-data with kinaesthetic data. We distinguish the various sense-fields from the one kinaesthetic field, which we do not call a sense-field. We do not speak of a kinaesthetic sense. The kinaesthetic field is a field of continuous data. Or, rather, there are several kinaesthetic fields (though they all belong to the first class, "kinaesthetic datum"). A kinaesthetic field is variable immediately and freely, and what is dependent on the free variation of the kinaesthetic data that enter into the apperception of a body is the modification of the sense-data, which, in this apperception, perform the necessary constitutive function of adumbrations. The content of the perception of a body implies the coordination, in virtue of this apperception, between a sense-datum and a kinaesthetic complex. Upon closer inspection, we have to make the following distinctions:

1.) A sense-field (restricting ourselves to the primal fields, namely the field of the sense of sight and the field of touch) would be without qualitative differentiations; it would be a continuum of equal qualities, distinct only in their position within the order of the field.

2.) In the sense-field, differentiations arise; a part of the extension of the whole field is delimited more or less "sharply" as a differentiated content.

In the apperception of a body, this sensuous content is consciously coordinated to a kinaesthetic datum in such a way that if the kinaesthetic datum traverses (freely or unfreely), within its system, a "line" or a series, the adumbrational content of the sense-field traverses a certain appurtenant, characteristic modification. Therefore, if the modification is not present, if, with the actual elapsing of the kinaesthetic series in the determinate order of the modification, the sensuous content remains unchanged, then the apperception undergoes "its cancellation." Every making prominent of a kinaesthetic datum, out of a kinaesthetic system whose availability makes it surveyable and familiar, includes an adumbration, and the adumbrated object is thereby the same. [324] The same Objectivity presents itself differently, with each sensuous adumbration, and does so in relation to the appurtenant kinaesthetic datum which is consciously integrated into the system. This coordination determines the orientation, which thus has its footing there and in the kinaesthetic. Since the sensuous "image," the adumbration-"of" as such, is constituted in terms of, and thus is related to, the kinaesthetic system and its position, the Object is then given in a determinate orientation.

§3. *The significance of the various kinaesthetic systems for the constitution of space.*

The same Object, with respect to the same perceived objective moments, can

be constituted through various kinaesthetic systems, but all these constitutions must coalesce into the unity of one constitution, and this unity makes possible the consciousness of something self-same. One kinaesthetic system functions in the apprehension of a certain system of data, while another system is in a state of rest; i.e., one kinaesthetic moment or other is fixed, while, in a different system, motivating transformations occur along with the appurtenant sequences of adumbrations. My head, for example, is stationary; only my eyes are moving. But now my head also begins to move, and then perhaps my upper body, and finally I begin to run. All this yields changes in orientation, and changes of adumbrations correspond to every change of the kinaesthetic moments, in whichever one of these systems the change takes place. Nevertheless, changes in one or the other system can be cancelled at the individual points of intersection and lines of intersection (to speak metaphorically). We will then have to make a clear distinction between orientations in the individual system, or ones purely related to it, and orientations in the total system. (Orientations in the oculomotor field for itself, orientations in the field of cephalomotor movements which are simultaneously oculomotor movements, etc.)

We now have a significant difference in the kinaesthetic situation, first of all with regard to the visual data:

1.) I do not walk or run (I do not move myself "forward" and am not moved "forward" – a correlativity that is still to be discussed). But I may move my eyes, my head, my upper body. All locations then are ordered with respect to depth in such a way that we arrive at an absolute limit of depth: for each and every "relatively moving" body. A body which displays no adumbrational changes in the fixing of one kinaesthetic group (of an autonomous kinaesthetic point) extracted from all the systems, which maintains its identical "location," is here said to be relatively stationary (stationary in the orientational system). [325]

2.) I walk; what heretofore had been absolutely deep now becomes relatively deep; what was relatively deep can convert to absolute depth. A closed, possible system of locations, endowed with the quality of "absolute depth," receives a dimension of kinaesthetic, motivating change and does so in such a way that the quality of depth receives, even at its differential limits, a merely relative meaning. On this basis, there arises the constitution of infinite space.

The same applies by analogy to the domain of the sense residing in the skin. "I remain in place," and thus I have a closed system with an absolute depth (within arms' length, or possibly as far as I can stretch my legs). And this entire system is in transit when I am walking; the distant becomes close, and new distances open up. Every location in a partial system and every location in a complete system (whereby the infinitely distant has the meaning of something to be transformed, *in infinitum* and repeatedly, into something close) allows itself to be transformed into any location whatsoever, and ideally does

so in a free movement. Two types of change of location in the case of the identity of the object are possible, specifically in the case of an identity according to all the extended determinations that fill space (i.e., complete lack of change in quality and in form):

1.) Changes of location (changes of orientation) in the case of kinaesthetic non-change (whether completely or in partial systems);

2.) Changes of location in the *I move myself*. Here again, there are two levels to distinguish, namely

a) the system of finitely closed orientations (those that are intuitive in the stricter sense) and b) that of the open orientations (intuitive in the broader sense).

§4. *Significance of kinaesthetic sequences for the constitution of Objective rest and movement.* [326]

If, with the inhibition of my *I move*, and in general with kinaesthetic standstill, all the changes in orientation cease, then "the body rests." Conversely, changes in location accompanied by kinetic non-change (standstill) are experienced in consciousness as "movements" of the body. Every change in location, accompanied by kinaesthetic standstill, disappears through a corresponding kinaesthetic modification. Therefore non-change in location, accompanied by kinaesthetic modification (when I move myself freely) is experienced in consciousness as movement. Every movement can assume the "semblance" of rest; i.e., the moving object can appear in the aspect of rest, if I move myself in the appropriate way and thereby annul the locational (orientational) change.

§4a. I am moved; my body.[2]

Let us now consider the phenomenon of the *I am moved*, and indeed not merely, e.g., my hand, but "all of me" may be moved (my Body as a whole, if we thus include the Body).[3] The kinaesthetic modifications condition, generally speaking, modifications of all locations and thereby all aspects of the basic case of rest and, in a lawfully modified way, all aspects of the case of movement of all bodies together or of individual bodies.

But if we now take up the case of "my" corporeal Body, whose constitution has not previously occupied us, then it distinguishes itself radically from all other bodies in this way: if all environing bodies retain their orientation

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[2] *Cf.* Appendix XIII: "Active and passive locomotion," pp. 341f. – Ed.

[3] This belongs in the analysis of the Body's relationships.

(display a stationary orientation), while I "move" myself, "move forward," traverse these and the other appurtenant kinaesthetic series, then my corporeal Body retains its position as the "null-body" within the orientational system, but it still moves. If all the environing bodies retain their orientation in the system of orientations, simultaneously with my making no subjective movement (carrying out and undergoing no kinaesthetic change), then everything is ("Objectively") stationary. [327]

For the environing bodies, there exists (provided we still do not take into account the case of the *I am moved*) the basic condition of Objective rest, if, along with kinaesthetic standstill, no changes in orientation take place or if, with a free traversal of all the kinaesthetic series, ever the same appurtenant changes in orientation occur in cyclical nexuses.[4] It is a case of Objective movement if, along with kinaesthetic sequences, no orientational changes arise or if the orientational changes do not elapse in parallel with the kinaesthetic changes, are not coordinated to them, and are not cyclically reproducible.

We must now consider the still neglected case of the *I am moved*. If all the environing bodies (all bodies that are not null-bodies) present themselves in "orientational movements," changing all their orientations, while my kinaesthetic system is at a standstill, then we have the possible consciousness, "I am moved," when a free kinaesthetic modification is continuously producible in the system, a modification which allows to transpire anew the previously elapsed orientational changes, in all their particularities, but retrogressively, in the inverse direction. But how does the idea of movement arise here? In the first place, it is clear that it would not be correct to speak of more than possibility. For it could indeed be that, while I am stationary, all the environing bodies move in such a way that this movement would be completely equivalent, in terms of the modes of appearance, with the case of "my" movement; there thus exist two unseparated possibilities. Even if the Objective interpretation is lacking, however, the phenomenon is one of corporeal movement in relation to the null-system. I see all bodies approaching or receding, rotating or turning in the orientational system, which is always an ideal system (properly a system of rays, doubly cyclical from the null-point, but a right-left direction and an above-below direction, etc., are differentiated.)[5] Thereby everything is a matter of the constitution of the basic forms of change and non-change (movement and rest) in each system. The basic rule is: that which is constituted as movement must appear in such aspects that changes in the aspects can be offset by the appurtenant kinaesthetic motivations (thus already in the oculomotor system). On the other hand, in the case of kinaesthetic standstill, [328]

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[4] This does not express the most important point, namely that my Body retains its position as the null-body amid all the changes in orientation and under all circumstances.

[5] That should indeed have been described extensively earlier.

the aspects must of themselves vary (provided we disregard the case of the *I am moved from my position*). That which appears as stationary must require and permit only those modifications of aspect that are kinaesthetically motivated and that disappear when kinaesthetic standstill occurs. As soon as a new kinaesthetic system comes into action as motivated, movement and rest can and must then be constituted again – in such a way that what formerly was an appearance of movement can, or must, become an appearance of rest.

§5. *Null-orientation of the kinaesthetic systems.*

Every kinaesthetic system has its null-position and its basic directions of modification starting from that position. Every system has its extremes therein and thus also in the combinations. With each one, therefore, a horizon of the appurtenant level is constituted.

What is important thereby is the concept of the displacement of the null-point and the displacement of the coordinate system of orientation.

§6. *Basic distinction within the kinaesthetic systems and within the constitution of space. Closed visual space and infinite Objective space.*

We have to register a basic distinction among the kinaesthetic systems:

1.) the system in virtue of which the closed horizon of Objective space is constituted;

2.) the system in virtue of which this horizon is displaced and in its displacement becomes precisely the apparency of Objective space.[6]

The spatiality of the individual body, as well as space itself, "present themselves." The body is always given in an aspect (view). A closed system of possible aspects constitutes the complete apparency, i.e., the complete appearance of the surface of the body, as this appearance is constituted without my moving (or being moved) from my place. This appearance of the surface is itself, however, only one appearance in a manifold, and this manifold consists of the universality of identical complete apparencies, but with a new system of kinaesthetic motivations: precisely those of the second group. [329]

Corresponding to this is the system of the ideal "aspects" of the spatial horizon, and, in this system, that horizon itself is constituted as a unity. And then further the manifold of spatial horizons, which differentiate themselves only through a new kinaesthetic motivation, that of the second group; with these horizons Objective space is constituted (for me). This second kinaes-

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[6] Should not the distinction between a near thing and a remote thing already have arisen with #1?

thetic system is distinguished by the fact that it does not lead on uniformly from a null-point to an extreme (possibly in several directions). Walking is a periodic movement, with which, however, the delimited, remote image at the edge of the horizon changes continually and does so in such a way that the reversal of the periodic movement again restores that image. In such a periodic form, this new kinaesthetic modification continues on *in infinitum*, namely as *ab, ab, ab*, etc. Walking conditions a constant displacement of the horizon (= visual space) in "homogeneous space," i.e., a degradation of visual space to a mere "appearance" of Objective space. How is all that to be made intelligible? An amplification of visual space, e.g., an amplification of the oculomotor field, means that in every phase I retain the same form of the horizon, but with certain modifications in content; there occur orientational changes, and new objects enter into the horizon while others step out. This is accomplished in continuous series of kinaesthetic motivations (whether these series are one-dimensional or two-dimensional) without a pause and in such a way that, in the normal case of "stationary Objects," I can reverse everything kinaesthetically and reproduce the same horizons at each phase. The first constitution of an Object is that of a two-dimensional Object without depth, accomplished through oculomotor and cephalomotor movements of the gaze. The second level is the constitution of the dimension of depth: the enlargement and reduction of the Object according to "geometrical similarity." To a dimension of [330] kinaesthetic data there is coordinated a two-dimensional cyclical manifold of kinaesthetic data, conjoined with the coordinated changes of the "rotation of the Object around any axis" – the Object shows itself from all sides. A one-dimensional (orthoid) kinaesthetic manifold is thus conjoined with a two-dimensional cyclical manifold and with the appurtenant motivated "images." These relations must now be studied more closely.

§7. *Further distinctions in the kinaesthetic systems and in the constitutive levels.*

I. The visual space of the first level is oculomotor space, the space constituted when we think of the eye alone as moveable and moving.

a) The oculomotor system – delimited, plane space.

This space is restricted, rigidly circumscribed. In it there is an emergence and a disappearance of "oculomotor bodies." It has a null-point, to which is kinaesthetically coordinated the basic position of the eyes ("straight ahead"). The oculomotor coordinate system has only two basic axes: the above-below axis and the right-left axis. Corresponding to them are qualitative, specifically gradual, modifications with extremes, and the entire field is a mixed system (it

is not of the same type as the system of black-white shades, since the "most extreme right" is obviously not to be apprehended as an analogon of "pure black"). The oculomotor right-left is constituted by means of eye-movements from the null-position in the direction of the preferred side and in the reverse direction (L←0→R). The movement 0←R is harmonious with the direction L←0; the movement simply continues. On the one hand, 0 is distinguished by a lack of tension; on the other hand, we have a dimension of differences in tension, an intensification, which increases with the progress in one direction, thus from 0 to R or from 0 to L. This qualitative difference is connected with the difference in direction. We have a cyclical continuum of directional qualities. If I proceed from the extreme L toward 0 and then proceed further toward R, I always have the same directional quality (apart from differences in velocity), and in the reverse course I have the counter-quality of the opposed direction. The same holds for every direction passing through 0. But we do not only have a cyclical continuum of directions but also a total continuum of directions which are exactly the same as the directional manifolds in a plane, specifically in a bounded one (or in a two-dimensional "plane" manifold, possibly a closed one). The kinaesthetic manifold is precisely a two-dimensional manifold, which can be "generated" only by traversing it, and it is a plane manifold. From this, there then arises the manifold of straight or curved transitions and thus the directional manifold as a manifold of directions of a "plane." Naturally – as is indicated by speaking of space and bodies – we have constituted here "Objective" phenomena in oculomotor space: the phenomena of "Objective" movement and rest, of distance, which remains the same in "mere" movement within a "body" or within two "strictly conjoined" bodies, etc. There is, however, a disappearance of bodies here. Concealment cannot properly be concealment when the concealed is preserved. [331]

b) System of head-movements around the basic axis (cylindrical field of vision).

II. A closed, two-dimensional space is constituted by the rotation of the head around its basic axis, while the remainder of the body is in its normal position, a position that is supposed to remain motionless and fixed. The oculomotor visual space is an enduring form, which, however, receives a new index with every position of the head. We then have a new kinaesthetic system as a new line of motivating data. Oculomotor space becomes the apparency ("image") of a new space, and the oculomotor body becomes the apparency of a body of a new nature. What counted as movement within oculomotor space can now be rest. That is, the displacements of the oculomotor image, which are now motivated as aroused through the mere movement of my head, are precisely images of a stationary body. And the reversal of this movement brings back the old sequence of images and the original image with its former orientation and in its original oculomotor field.

This new space has no limits on the right and left; it is a closed space. What functions here as the basic system of orientation is not an "intersection of axes" but a closed line of coordinates in the right-left direction, as an abscissa, [332] and an unclosed line in the direction above-below. What distinguishes itself as the null-point is the kinaesthetic complex characterized by the normal position of the head and by the normal position of the eyes as they gaze straight ahead. It could be said more clearly that we have a turning to the right from the basic position, a turning that ideally could indeed continue so far that it would lead to the same oculomotor spatial and corporeal system as an ideally possible turning to the left would lead ($+ a, - a$). Perhaps an autonomous turning around is also conceivable ($0 + a + 0; 0 - a - 0$). The spatial field would be delimited above and below; we would have a null-line, the closed abscissa axis and two parallel lines ($y = + b, y = - b$), thus a cylindrical field of vision. For $a = 0$, we would have a length with two opposite, possible ways of traversing it (from above to below and from below to above).

c) Complete cephalomotor system – Riemannian space.

III. Let us take the entire cephalomotor space, but let us simulate that everything constitutive of depth is imperceptible – then no turnings, concealments, or rotations would occur which could be brought to disappear as a consequence of these movements – and so there would arise a spherically closed space, presupposing that the motility of the head is idealized in the appropriate way. (We could also add other movements of the Body, if a coordination is produced in which the movements that accomplish the same thing appear in interchangeable relations and thus count as the same motivation – which would require a special discussion.) The basic orientational system of this space is composed of two null-lines, which are closed "circles": namely the closed right-left line (which was already constituted previously) and the closed above-below line. One of their intersectional points is null and has, as it were, a shadow, a counter-null.

§8. *The pre-eminence of the null-position. The optimum of the visual field.*

In systems II and III, therefore, the cylinder (or the round calotte) and the sphere provide the images for the kinaesthetic plane manifolds in question. But the pre-eminence of the Null-point and of the preferred coordinates is [333] thereby still conjoined again with the purely kinaesthetic directional manifolds determined by kinaesthetic data. And so we have everywhere, under the heading of "kinaesthetic moments," various things: a "direction" is a vector of traversal. Qualitatively, every kinaesthetic datum is characterized in itself according to the plane manifold. The null-position of the eyes has its quality

like any other one, and in itself it is incidental which position I take as the transition of a traversal and, consequently, how I draw the coordinates. We must still investigate what effects the movement of a system of coordinates. With every position of the eyes, with every "kinaesthetic point," I have a visually saturated field of sensation. Within the oculomotor apperception in which I have a spatial field of these or those "bodies," looking straight ahead (characteristic of the null-position) still tells me nothing about a right or left, about an above or below, or about a 0 with respect to the bodies in this field. Now, it is clear that the kinaesthetic system is coordinated to the system of "local signs" within the field of visual sensations and that a null-point is pre-eminent in this field itself. If I now move my eyes to the left (producing a distinctive qualitative series) and thereby bring the left marginal Object *L* into the null-orientation and thus allow the axes of coordinates to be displaced, there is then Objectively constituted for me the left of the 0, and the movement itself is pre-eminent. Thereby, the following must still be considered: we now have specifically no depth yet, and in that sense, no near or far.

On the other hand, even the oculomotor field, like every constituted orientational field, or like every "visual space," already has its own sort of nearness and remoteness – namely, if we keep in view a determinate sense of these words: "to draw near to something," to fixate it, to bring it into the central point. That is, in the oculomotor movement, a "spatial Object" (a "visual thing") is identified in movement and rest, in change and non-change. But not only because manifolds of "sense-images" maintain their coordination to the kinaesthetic data motivating them, but also because of the reference back of all appearances to an optimum. The "center," ideally a null-point of the visual [334] sense-field (always understood here as the field of sensation), is distinguished by that fact that, in the transitions from one apperception to another and thus in the traversal of the manifold of appearances of one "Object," it has the greatest richness of content, it is an optimum. The visual sense-field has its *quasi*-local order, its *quasi*-expansion (diffusion). Every point (every ordered position), thus the null-point as well, has its qualitative particularity. But it becomes significant as the central point of the optimal region for the apprehension of Objects. Now, in the apprehension of Objects, every visual sense-point (local sign) must present an Objective point of oculomotor visual space, and this point is constituted as Objective by the fact that the visual sense-image, which stands out somewhere in the field, changes in specific series of images with various eye-movements and does so specifically in such a way that at the same position the same images always arise, etc.

But not only that. As long as the image lies outside the optimal region, it is a mere "remote image" and refers to the "close image," which would be attained by means of various eye-movements. Every "point" of the visual sense-field then acquires a relation to the central point of this field, and every

apprehension of an oculomotor spatial point refers to a fulfillment by means of a conversion into a fulfilled point, i.e., into a fixation point: I have to "direct" my gaze there. It is only in the identification of the fulfillment that I have the oculomotor point "itself." And the oculomotor field, the visual space of this level, comes to givenness through my bringing all points and bodies that present themselves in the visual sense-field, all spatial formations, and all aspects into the form of presentation in which I fix their objects. Therefore visual space is the idea of a two-dimensional manifold, which, in a certain sense, consists of utterly fixed points. In every perception of spatial things, a visual sense-field (i.e., the field with its fixed form, but with the determinate content by which it is a presentation of space) is pre-eminent; any Objective point is fixed, or at least the one focused on is fixed. The pre-eminent null-point of the visual sense-field is always pre-eminent in the presentational function of bringing an Objective point to givenness as that which is focused on. But in these oculomotor modifications, it is precisely the ocular position [335] that changes; and we have a basic position, namely the null-position of the kinaesthetic system. Likewise, we have as kinaesthetically pre-eminent the right-left direction of flow, the above-below direction, and the system of kinaesthetic coordinates. If the two null-points coincide, we have the pre-eminent case in which I find my eyes (as well as my entire body, if we take into account the entire kinaesthetic system) in the straight-ahead position and in which the Object focused on is at the null-position of oculomotor space. That position then determines the right, left, above, below, etc., for the entire system. Admittedly, the privilege of this position has a mere ordering significance. All eye-movements proceed from the null-point of movement and revert back to it, and they travel on the straightest path.

This is transferable to the systems II and III, except that now a further kinetic series supervenes and so does, therein, a privileged null-determination. That is to say, for the cephalomotor system, the "straight," perpendicular posture of the head (what matters phenomenologically, of course, is only that this posture is a determinate one) has a privilege as the null-posture, and this null-posture – conjoined with the null-posture of the oculomotor system – yields the kinaesthetic 0 of the amplified system, and thereby the 0 of the visual sense-space II is also determined. Thereby, hence, the function of the optimum is also transferred to the higher domain of constitution. The relation to the null-null-position and to the null-null-system of coordinates produces the order of the optima and therefore the ordered constitution of the new visual space.

§9. *Interrelations among the kinaesthetic systems in question.*

With regard to the interrelations among the three constitutive levels we have delineated, many sorts of variations are possible. It is, e.g., not necessary that the oculomotor manifold be first constituted for itself. If we think of the eyes as motionless in the head and the head as being in its basic kinaesthetic position and as free to turn, in a two-dimensional kinaesthetic movement, round about this basic position, then Riemannian space would be constituted as well, and more simply.

We must certainly consider that various systems of movement of our Body [336] can arise as partially substituting for one another, and so they do not have, individually, a different significance for the constitution of visual space. Thus it happens that we cannot add up, without further ado, the number of the dimensions of the various systems of movement. The same thing is accomplished whether I move my eyes to the left or turn my head to the left while the eyes remain fixed in their sockets. Likewise, the up and down movement of the head and the up and down movement of the eyes can substitute for one another, within certain limits. Accordingly, all the systems that constitute a closed visual space belong together, and the kinaesthetic system must correspond to the number of dimensions of this manifold and thus must be a two-dimensional cyclical manifold. Here belongs the visual sense-field, which is two-dimensional, with its "center."

The constitution of the third dimension must now be considered as something new.

IV. All bodies have been, hitherto, "surface beings," at best "spherical beings." A homogeneous Riemannian space of two dimensions would be constituted here. There would not yet be a third dimension, depth, and a three-dimensional corporeality. These are constituted when groups of movements, i.e., groups of kinaesthetic data, are coordinated to new sorts of changes in images. The difficulty is to describe these changes. There come into consideration: phenomena of concealment, perspectival expansion and contraction, and, in general, all sorts of perspectival changes in size and form, in which approaching and receding, as well as rotation in various directions, are constituted.[7]

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[7] From this point on, Stein's elaboration corresponds with the wording of the lecture printed herein as the main text. What follows is the beginning of Section V, §58, p. 173. – Ed.

B. APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

HUSSERL'S CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE COURSE OF THOUGHT AND THE PROGRESSION OF THE LECTURES, COMPILED BY THE EDITOR.[1] [337]

Re **10**, 38: *Nota bene* thus already 1907, but no doubt much earlier.

Re **11**, 1–11: No! The entire further procedure consists precisely in this; *cf.* already the rectification in the next lecture 11 < = **15**, 25ff. >

Re **17**: *Nota*. Immediately prior to the beginning of the lecture, I became aware that this valid distinction (which I made, under the heading of the "phenomenological substance" of evidently given temporal points, etc., in my lecture course of the previous semester[2]) would have to break down into a double distinction, namely with regard to my knowledge of transcendence in immanence. Therefore I delivered the lecture differently than it was written out, and I drew a double distinction, no doubt quite correctly:

1) The distinction between adequate and not adequate perception, or, which amounts to the same thing, between absolutely giving and non-giving perception;

2.) The distinction between self-posing and presenting perception.

Every self-posing perception is absolutely giving, but not every absolutely giving perception is self-posing; at least I left open, during this session, the possibility that presentational perceptions are self-posing (and they are such in the case, e.g., of phantoms).

On the whole, I lectured by following leaf 12a < = **19**, 6 – **21**, 7 >, with the appropriate changes. I started out from "lived experiences in the phenomenological reduction"; they are given as indubitable or absolutely and really [*reell*].

What does "absolute" mean? Indubitability of absolute givenness; to be given in the flesh and with the consciousness of indubitable actuality. Indubitability admittedly a negative criterion: absolute ontological character; absolutely given = adequately. [338]

On the other hand, what does "real" [*reell*] mean? Real [*reell*] givenness is *eo ipso* absolute, but there is a distinction conceptually. Real [*reell*] givenness constitutes the character of self-position over and against presentation. In the

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[1] These remarks surely date from 1907–08. The numbers preceding the notes refer (by page and line) to the relevant passages in the main text. – Ed.

[2] The reference is to the lecture course, "Introduction to logic and critique of knowledge," which Husserl gave in the winter semester 1906–07 in Göttingen. – Ed.

content of perception, as a part, "real [*reell*] relations" of the objects, i.e., as is indicated on the other side, possibility of partial identification. Such partial identification, however, is perhaps not possible in the case of every absolutely self-giving perception (thus in the case of phenomenologically given transcendences). Therefore self-posing and presenting (presentation different from the object presented; no partial identification).

Re **20**, 30: No! In the flesh = impressionally; here that makes no sense.

Re **24**, 22–35: But that is not enough. We must assume from the very outset the synthesis of the continuous consciousness of unity, to which alone the evident identification is related.

That, too, is something I myself saw later. *Cf.* 101 < = **131**, 15ff. >.

Re **25**, 31ff.: Better; *cf.* 57f. < = **78**, 23ff. >.

Re **26**, 6: Two perceptions "simultaneously," two perceptions "successively": here is much food for thought.

Re **26**, 18: Problems of the evidences relative to perception and the perceived. Set forth, but not actually solved; up to 22 < = **34**, 33 > at the same time problems of explication.

Re **27**, 18ff.: Either we are related to a continuous synthesis, and then we see the identity of the "objective relation" – or we adhere to the identifying "intention."

But here I am now saying that every perception can be identified in this way with every other one that is simply not simultaneous with it and that belongs to the same consciousness (for where empathy is in play, this consciousness still remains to be identified).

Re **31**, 24ff.: At any rate, worth reading!

Re **43**, 35ff.: Not used. The following doctrine of the essential inadequation in the perception of a thing, insofar as this perception could only be one-sided, needs to be considered anew on the basis of the later analysis of space, which indeed conflicts with it.

Re **44**, 32ff.: To be considered anew; doubtful!

Re **51**, 22: Unfortunately, however, this was not emphasized sharply.

Re **53**, 14: *Cf.*: about content: the parallel spatial contents and the note in the margin 37 < = **56**, 14ff. > [3]

Re **56**, 26: Concerning 34b < = **53**, 9ff. >. To be discussed (already in the case of time): parallel between the filling of space and the filling of time. The sound as filling time (duration of the sound); it materializes time in a certain sense. But do we not have here any appended determinations? Or should we bring in ideal correlates of the acts?

Re **57**, 37 – **58**, 2: Continuum of physical data – continuum of the apprehension. How are these related? [339]

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[3] The note in question is reproduced here after the next one. – Ed.

Re **58**, 19: As regards the distinction between materializing and appended determinations: a distinction in the pre-phenomenal domain obviously corresponds to it. That is, only certain physical data have, in the primary and proper sense, a pre-empirical extension, as do pre-empirical color, roughness, etc. Therefore only certain physical data are fit, in virtue of their immanent essence, for the constitution of things in the primary sense. The extension is content for the constitution of the spatial form; the filling is content for the constitution of the *materia prima*. Other pre-empirical data, like sounds, are, by their essence, apprehendable only in the form of appended determinations.

Re **58**, 21ff.: The expression "materialization" is unusable, since, strictly speaking, we are constructing here only the lowest stratum of the thing (phantom).

Re **64**, 35ff.: Later, "side" is used in still another sense, as appearance itself; and the side of the thing is the appearance in its "way" of appearing. Yet already earlier, p. < **42**, 19ff. >, the other concept of appearance, the ontical one, was used. One cannot say "side"; stratum.

Re **65**, 4ff.: Is this not still more appropriate to the "side" as the appearance itself?

Re **78**, 34: During the lecture, I corrected everywhere the mistake of maintaining that the front side is always represented in a determinate way and only the back side is possibly indeterminate. Indeed, an earlier lecture had already presented this correctly.

Re **86**, 17ff.: The following unsatisfactory. We should have disregarded the "intentions" = references and studied, at first, the structure of the unity of the apprehensions. Here only the occurrences of more precise determination, enrichment, and illustration come into consideration.

Re **103**, 25ff.: Originally, the sense of this presentation was that no maximal points were admitted; merely elevations in appearances.

Re **103**, 27ff.: Main point recapitulated better at the beginning of the next lecture.

Re **111**, 1–37: Not read; *cf.* new lecture.

Re **118**, 4ff.: This lecture was determined by Hofmann's objections. *Cf.* 93 < = **121** >.

Re **119**, 31ff.: "Uni-lateral" perception certainly better than "uni-fold."

Re **121**, 32: It is to be noted that the word "presentation" is always taken in the strict sense; thus presentation is not confused with apprehension in general. Only what properly appears is presented; what appears "improperly"1 is not presented but represented.

Re **122**, 28: Imprecise.

Re **125**, 5: Better account must be taken, in the preceding pages, of the [340] distinction between proper and improper appearance.

Re **135**, 23ff.: Already dealt with earlier.

Re **135**, 35: Presentation in the stricter sense (projection, "assimilation") and presentation in the broader sense. Not all data of sensation are presentational in the first sense.

Re **137**, 35–38: This "appended" is essentially different than that of dead things, however.

Re **165**, 9: *Nota*. The region of clearest vision is so small and the clarity shades off so quickly, that, in general, every image actually extending beyond this smallest region will undergo changes in clarity in the case of movement, and so all the appearances, as they progress, will become richer in explication. In the movement, every moment of clarity will be woven, so to speak, into the "object." What is clearly apprehended is held fast intentionally and serves to enrich the implication. Every apprehension of an image is, we could also say, for the most part confused and unclear, but it contains, in the mode of unclarity, that which will unfold into distinctness and clarity through the appropriate eye-movement and explication. The function of attention was not taken into account. If the entire visual field were a field of the highest clarity throughout, the ray of attention would still only penetrate certain moments and would lend its presentational power to the corresponding intentional rays, which will also co-determine their richness with respect to the *quasi*-intentions. This would have to be studied more closely.

Re **168**, 13: At this point in the lecture, I treated time somewhat more extensively. If time is taken into consideration, then the question is how to structure more precisely the doctrine of the intentional beam of rays, since the sinking back of every image in time does not give us a series of images as a linear series in a real sense but rather a two-dimensional series; time adds a dimension.

What is linear is the series of images that pertains to any given Objective point of time (the now-image and the series of fading images), and the beam of rays of this temporal point passes through that series. It is therefore a beam which pervades that series of images: in the same phenomenological point of time. On the other hand, in phenomenological succession, the beam passes through every new "now" and every memory-modification of the entire temporal series. The beam of rays is displaced and pervades a new now-image, simultaneously with the new now-point.

This needs to be examined more closely. It is clear that time must be treated much earlier, already before entering into these analyses.

Re **181**, 35ff.: Recapitulated in a better form in the next lecture.

Re **183**, 36ff.: Appendix. Belonged to the previous lecture but was not read.

Re **195**, 5ff.: False! And, unfortunately, spoken, but rectified in the next lecture. P. 152 < = **196**, 25ff. >.

Re **195**, 10–16: That is false. Homogeneous expansion would occur only if [341] a totality of Objects, all equidistant from me, were to approach me uniformly

or recede from me uniformly.

Re **216**, 8–10: Orally, I emphasized here, as I have very often, that it is not, and must not be, a matter of a type of simple and specifically peculiar sensations, and, in addition, that the heading of "circumstances" includes more than just an open eye!

Re **220**, 24 – **221**, 30: Modification. Not read.

Re **228**, 2: The treatment of mere movement begins at 178 < = **235**, 3ff. >.

Re **235**, 5: That would indeed have to come already prior to qualitative change.

Re **238**, 8ff.: Does not the relation to the central region of clearest vision also come into consideration here ...?

APPENDIX II (TO §1)

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEVELS OF GIVENNESS OF THINGS.[1]

We are considering the thing as given in perception, i.e., in the continuous synthesis of perceptions. We call this synthesis straightforward experience (over and against the conceptual determination of objects in a more complete way in the form of natural science).

I. The thing as Object of straightforward experience (Object of "empirical intuition").

1.) It is a unity in a duration; it "has a duration" and has its determinate location in time. Its duration is different from the duration it would have if it existed at another point in time. The determinate duration, as the duration of the thing, is filled with thingly determinations in a unity, and these determinations constitute the thing precisely in its temporal content (*in abstracto*, disregarding the absolute location in time as a universal form). Specifically, the entire span of duration possesses a thingly content by the fact that every temporal point of this span (an "individual" point) possesses its own.

We now distinguish the duration of the thing (and indeed the entire determinate duration, which implies its distinctive location in "the" time) from the temporal schema. To complement this, we will then also employ the concept of temporal location.[2]

2.) The same applies to the spatial schema of the thing. At every temporal point of its duration, the thing occupies and fills a determinate sector of "the" space. This sector of space is an "inner" constitutive determination of the thing and has indeed a determinate structure (geometrical body; the best name for it is "spatial schema") which, as geometrical, can be the same structure in different places (in different locations). This unity of structure (size included: the completely determinate geometrical body) and location is what we call the [342]

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[1] Surely 1910. – Ed.

[2] It is more correct to remain with the concept of the duration of the thing as a unique duration and to define the temporal schema as the general temporal structure; and we will actually do so as we proceed. This also applies to the spatial schema.

spatial schema.[3] If we pursue the spatial schema in the temporal schema, then both produce a unity, the spatial-temporal schema.

3.) The sensuous filling of the thing and, more precisely, the sensuous filling of the spatial schema at every temporal point, the sensuous matter, as it were, which belongs to the basic essence of the thing (i.e., always, of the perceptual thing as such). This designates a complex of fundamental properties (although, as a rule, they are called the opposite, "secondary properties"), primarily constitutive of the thing (disregarding the spatial-temporal element of the schema), i.e., properties such as color, roughness, smoothness, etc. Upon closer examination, we still have levels here in the sensuous filling, a first and a second sensuous matter, namely the visual and the tactile properties, possibly also the temperature, and, on the other hand, the sound, odor, taste. The latter presuppose the former but do themselves become a filling. Still, that should be studied more closely; *cf.* my lectures.[4] To be noted: the sound is in the thing but also emanates out from it, filling space, affecting me. This affecting – we are now, as a matter of principle, abstracting from it.

(Principles: duration is what it is only as the duration of a thing – of something real in general – and, in a somewhat different sense, as the duration of a process, which in turn presupposes a thing undergoing the process, and a thing is inconceivable without duration. But empty time between two real processes!

Structure, spatial body, etc., are possible only as the structure of a thing, as filled structure. Filling conceivable only as the filling of something corporeal. No; empty space between things!)

In the field remaining after our current abstraction from all causality and genuine substantiality, every structure, every spatial schema, is to be thought of as filled with all sorts of fillings. The analysis of the filling comes down to the fact that the filling is distributed among the spatial parts and the spatial points (of the schema) and that, ideally speaking, every point has its filling and, in principle, every other point could have the same filling. Therefore, in principle, every geometrical body could be filled with an identical filling (conceptually identical) at every such point. Thus, there exists the ideal possibility of homogeneous bodies, specifically with any corporeal structure and location whatever, as well as the ideal possibility of all sorts of inhomogeneity.

(Principles: in the case of inhomogeneous filling of the spatial schema, there can be only a finite number of discontinuities. Furthermore, the temporal schema, the linear duration, can be arbitrarily small, but it cannot be a mere point, which is a mere limit in a finite duration.) [343]

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[3] I wonder whether I should not designate the mere structure (body) as the schema and then distinguish schema and location.

[4] Husserl might be referring primarily to the lectures published herein as the main text. – Ed.

The temporal-spatial schema, together with its sensuous filling, again yields a unity, and we could call this the phantom of the thing (or the complete schema, or the sensuous schema). It includes what is given of the thing in sensuous intuition (I would readily call it the sensuous "image," which would indeed be reminiscent of Kant, if the word "image" were not so misleading): i.e., not everything we "see" as given in perception but everything we see in the stricter sense, everything we grasp sensuously.

II. The causal nature of the thing.

4.) A completely new stratum stands out when we attend to a new class of inner constitutive properties of the thing, the properties designated by the words "ability," "power" (character of effecting and suffering), "disposition." These are the causal properties. Every thing possesses a complex of such properties and has a "nature" (in the sense of natural science).

It is clear that these properties have a secondary character over and against the properties of the phantom we have just summarized. This is evident in the fundamentally different modes of givenness of the new group of determinations and in the fact that their givenness already presupposes that of the schematic types of determinations and naturally does so *a priori* (like everything we are discussing here). A thing would, so to speak, first have to be something, before it can have the ability to do something. I am now speaking of the perceived thing. The sensuous thing in the stricter sense, the phantom, the sensuous schema, is the bearer[5] of the ability, of the power, of the causal property: thus in the sense of pure *perceptive* experience.

But even these properties, including, e.g., weight, "fill" the space of the thing. Yet, considered more closely, the sensuous determinations fill the schema in the first and proper sense, and every filled point and filled part of the schema is then the bearer of the property of being able to effect something. And whereas the distribution of a property among the spatial positions and spatial parts is intuitable in the domain of the schema, that does not apply to the new properties. We do not see the weight diffuse itself; we think it as doing so, and we may possibly schematize that in the image.

Furthermore, the fundamentally different mode of givenness of the sensuous filling versus that of the filling of the causal properties. Sensuous properties are given as unities of those constant manifolds; causal properties are given in causation. We must go back to cases of the causal directedness of one thing toward another, of one thingly process toward another, and must intuit

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[5] Husserl subsequently struck out the word "bearer," remarking: "The word 'bearer' is not suitable." – Ed.

therein the effecting and being effected of the effective thing and of the thing undergoing the effect. Presupposed here is the givenness of the sensuous [344] things, the sensuous nexuses, which in a certain sense are the bearers of the causality. But in sensuous vision we see precisely only what is sensuous. Nevertheless, we "see" the causality. We "see" that the stone is shattering the window; we notice its sensuous weight (not its power), which is actually given to us when we lift the stone or catch it in mid-air (this weight is a sensuous property), and we notice that it is in virtue of its weight that it accomplishes the shattering. We must not change our point of view here; we must strictly adhere to the ground of phenomenology and ask ourselves rigorously: what is given here? Is something given here? Everything we "notice" in the seen Object is already given in a certain way, but here is more than just noticing: the stone in its movement effects something and accomplishes the effect. Therefore causation is given in this consciousness. It does not matter to us whether or not this consciousness stems from experience. Every consciousness of things stems from experience and does so, generally speaking, in the same sense. On the one side we may have the sensuous mode of givenness (sensuous representation and unity in the manifold of constant sensuous representation), and on the other side a non-sensuous mode of givenness, but this does not in the least alter the fact that givenness is givenness. Here, and everywhere, givenness still does not imply true Being, and just as every straightforward sensuous perception must demonstrate itself, so must every giving act. Essentially different types of demonstration correspond to the various classes of giving acts.

Thus in the experience of causation, it is precisely the effecting and the being-effected that are given. Thereby the causal property[6] is given as an adjunct, since power is a unity over and against the manifold of effects, possible and actual, and indeed of the same type. The causal property is the general capacity or power to accomplish such effects. We could say that we attribute a capacity, a power (better: a real property) to a thing in the sense that it is of such a kind that, if it appears (or changes) in nexuses of such and such circumstances, together with these or those things, then, in contiguous temporal succession, this or that enters into this nexus. But it is to be noted that if I think in this way, I am representing the thing as causal. The difficulty, or the confusion, lurks behind this "if"; I am thinking not merely of a succession but of an encroachment of one upon the other. And I grasp this encroachment, even if not by way of sensuous intuition, still in some mode of intuition, i.e., in some mode of givenness (in the *quasi*-givenness of phantasy, or possibly in

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[6] Instead of "causal property," the manuscript originally had "power"; Husserl remarks: "Should we speak of 'power' here? The Objective light, the quality in the physicalistic sense, is the capacity to produce a determinate system of effects, etc." – Ed.

the givenness of memory). And in this way I can also apprehend a seen object as capable of various effects. Admittedly, I cannot say here that I *sensually* see [345] it to be the bearer of a power, but I do have an immediate consciousness of the existence of power, and this consciousness is made plain in examples.[7] All this prior to a higher level of thought, although it is higher in relation to sensuous perception. In this way I see the power of a man in his bulging muscles (naturally I can also see mental powers, except that there I enter into a further domain), I see the power of the hammer, even if it is not being swung, etc. Or I notice the steel's elasticity, which demonstrates itself in a group of correlative effects. This, too: the steel spring has its own way of moving, and the feather of goose down its own way of flying. These would be peculiarities of behavior within change.

Must we not explicitly specify the various types of change, change of location, change in sensuous qualities, thus changes in the mode of filling, and also the peculiarities in the modes of these changes? All properties of change lead to causal properties, because every change has its cause and also has its effects. All measuring of power leads to effects; it is a measuring of effects. Hence there is still a great deal to investigate here.

In particular, the problem of the connection between substance and causality. Is the thing not a substance exclusively insofar as it is the bearer of a causality? The mere phantom is not yet a thing. The phantom is in eternal flux, and the sensuous properties, such as coloration, are in constant dependence on the properties of other things, on "circumstances." The color is dependent on the changing light of the sun, is modified by clouds, etc. Ultimately, does not everything, every Objective determination of a thing, every determination of an Objective feature of a thing, lead back to causality? Do I not encounter dependencies everywhere? The coloration depends on the lighting; it is constantly flowing and coming to be, and the unity of the color as an Objective property is a causal concept, a property relating to power, namely the capacity of the "thing" to pass over into such and such series of manifolds under the respective possibilities of the lighting. This "Such and such appears under these or those circumstances" is the basic schema for the entire stock of determinations of a thing. How can I do justice to all this and to the "stratification" from which I abstractively departed earlier?

I must surely distinguish from the very outset:

1.) the spatial-temporal schema;

2.) its filling at any moment. But how understand the filling?

My lectures[8] started out from the unchanged thing (non-change of the thing

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[7] We must distinguish: the tendency holding sway in every movement of a thing and the effecting, although the latter is connected unitarily with the former.

[8] Husserl is referring to the lectures published herein as the main text. – Ed.

itself and of its conditioning circumstances), from an idea. Is this not a neces- [346]
sary starting point? I took the unity that is made possible by every abstraction from causality. Thereby I do not grasp unitary features, which already presuppose causality, but instead, e.g., the unitary coloration, related to the identity of the unchanged lighting.

APPENDIX III (TO §§20FF.)

THE SPECIAL POSITION OF THE SPATIAL FEATURE (DETERMINATION OF SPACE)[1]

I. Pre-empirical coloration and pre-empirical expanse.

We naturally speak of things as enduring unchanged, constantly self-same in their constant features. The priority of the spatial feature consists in the fact that its continuity corresponds with the continuity of the qualities and that it is the source of the unity of the various (visual and tactile) qualities which in themselves are without connection. The same spatial moment includes, in the presupposed case of a motionless body of unchanging content, determinate color-moments, etc. The color-adumbrations elapse *eo ipso* along with the spatial adumbrations, specifically because the color spreads out over the form, and the steadfastness in the continuity of the form-adumbrations also conditions a steadfastness in the color-adumbrations. Nevertheless, all this is still not enough; more is involved.

Let us consider an individual adumbration as a whole (pertaining to a relief); it contains a pre-empirical expanse and a pre-empirical color. The color spreads out over the expanse, forms and orders itself in the expanse. A piece of the coloration corresponds to every piece of the expanse, and, in turn, one corresponds to every piece of a piece. All the partial colorations are ordered in the unity of the total coloration, whose form of order is precisely the total expanse. The form of the order can be covered by color in various way: the same expanses, different colorations. Also the same colorations and different expanses? In a certain sense, yes; in a certain sense, no. The various expanses can have the same unitary colors; i.e., they each have, in all their parts, "the same" color. The same color-quality extends uniformly over every part and likewise does so uniformly in the other expanse. Likewise, uniform changes in color on both sides and in all parts. The case of "non-uniform" coverings is more difficult: certainly comparable only through a reduction to the same small parts.

All sorts of qualifications must be made here. In the first place, it is a matter of visual appearances within either "monocular vision" or binocular vision, restricting the latter in a certain way (no double images which inter-penetrate,

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[1] Surely 1907. – Ed.

etc.). We also need to attend to the difficulty of the comparison. Furthermore, we must say that out of the adumbrational continuum in which the relief of a [347] thing (possibly an unchanged thing) is constituted, we extract one phase (specifically a phase of sensation), etc.

Alright. Let us assume the total coloration is an *S* made out of color-elements and qualities which partially "repeat" themselves from point to point and partially leap over one another discontinuously, even if merely at intermittent places; only in such a way is this possible as a matter of evidence. Then these qualities are ordered in the expanse, and in it they fuse into unitary colorations which have their own unitary form of order. Coloration is the way the points of the expanse are colored in their order and the way they fuse, in virtue of this order, into a unity and present a unity as a qualitatively conjoined one. But the conjunction does not reside in the colors in themselves; as ordered differently within the same expanse, they result in different unties of coloration. This applies in the first place to the Objective colors and to the Objective covering of the expanse by color.

Therefore the pre-empirical, spatial order lays the foundation. The determinateness of the coloration is the localization in this order, the circumstance that this quality covers this point of this plane, that this spatial part is covered over uniformly and the other part is covered with a different quality or with a different uniformity (with a different density, as it were) and not the reverse. Identical colors (identical in essence but different as individuals) are differently "individualized" only by the different places, but the different places are not individualized by the colors, which indeed can change. An individually identical color means the color at a determinate place. The numerically identical place can take on different colors in the course of "time." The numerically identical color (an individual color) cannot occupy different places; only a specifically identical color can do so and can do so simultaneously (in the same phase). The places do not receive their order through the colors, but instead the colors through the places. The unity of the coloration is thus founded in the form of order of the expanse it covers.

II. Different pre-empirical colorations. How they are synthesized as adumbrations of one and the same unitary thing.

Let us now take different pre-empirical expanses with their colorations. At first they have nothing to do with each other, apart from their common generic character. Let us now suppose, however, that they are "adumbrations" of a unitary thing. What do we then find? Let us consider presentations, adumbrations, in which the same feature of the object is presented in a mode of given-

ness. One coloration passes over into another, and perpetually does so, through a continuous series of colorations which pertain, as adumbrations, to the same thing. This says, *eo ipso*, that one expanse passes over into another (from the standpoint of the thing: one spatial adumbration passes over into another). On the other hand, that still does not say everything. One coloration passes over into another; to "pass over" here signifies especially that both are supposed to [348] be adumbrations of the same Objective color, one which comes to appearance in them both times, and completely comes to appearance: e.g., the same surface of a cube seen from two different locations. There then exists a reciprocal correspondence,[2] a coordination of the points of the perspectival adumbrations, in such a way that the qualities of the points pass over into one another and thus are posited together in correspondence. In this continuity of coloration, every coloration presents the one objective coloration, and the latter appears in all the colorations, in all their parts and points and as totalities. Let us assume, to remain with the example of the visual thing, that we were viewing the thing, the cube, from the same standpoint, and it always turned toward us the same, unchanged, side, and that "we merely allowed our eyes to roam back and forth over it." Then we would have the same thing, insofar as all this already yields changes in the appearance of the adumbrations, such that the adumbrations, in the way indicated, correspond to each other and pass over into each other. What is identical here is the Objectivity of the "side," as it presents itself from a particular point of view. And if one side passes over into another, then, accordingly, the manifold that pertains to one side passes over, in correspondence, to the manifold pertaining "to the other." Naturally, what pertains to M_i as such is characterized unitarily, and the same applies to what pertains to every M_k in general, and then further to what is common in all M_i, ..., M_k, in the unity of the appurtenance to the thing. This happens partially through the possibility of constant transitions and partly, of course, through something else; for the mere possibilities of transition are still nothing for the consciousness that apprehends by discrete leaps two sides as sides of the same thing.

Every adumbration is a phase in manifold, possible, adumbrational transi-

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[2] Instead of "reciprocal," the manuscript originally had "reciprocal-univocal." Husserl remarks, "That is not entirely correct: reciprocal-univocal correspondence. Every distinguishable moment of the one adumbration does not need to find a distinguishable moment in the other one (or vice versa), namely a moment in regard to which there exists an identity of apprehension. Nevertheless, there does exist, naturally, a certain correspondence. That is, in the case of mere expansion through approaching (same lighting), the greater richness in the nearness yields a lesser richness in the remoteness. Every partition on the poorer side has its correspondent on the richer side, and the correspondents are "similar" (geometrical similarity): the same differentiation in the figure, merely different in "size." The filling on the poorer side is not identical with that of the richer side, and is not even always completely similar to it, but in the transition new moments are separated off: mere expansion and, further, even discrete leaps. But what is similar passes over into what is similar, also with respect to the concretion (including color and every sort of covering), except that on the one side there is more richness." – Ed.

tions; starting from the same phase, I can pass over to others in the most varied "directions," and in turn, from these to still others, or even "back" to the first adumbrations. Naturally, every apprehensional character bears in itself references back and forth, ones which follow these relations and thus are ambiguous, but determinately ambiguous. A "differential" then determines the direction of progress in the actually fulfilling development and determines the direction of the fulfilling components. Fulfillment takes place according to the sides of the apprehensional direction that is now pre-eminent, whereas all the other apprehensional directions, ones implied here, remain unfulfilled in the [349] apprehension of the relevant phase and in the apprehension of every phase whatsoever that is reached in the course of the progression.

The essence of every continuous transition that is actually carried out includes an apprehensional possibility which grasps "the" changing, transitional, object as the same; e.g., the sound changes, the color passes over into another. Thereby, all phases of the transition receive their objective unity, the unity of the sound which endures (a continuous transition is also a remaining alike) or varies.

APPENDIX IV (TO §§49FF.)

THE KINAESTHETIC SYSTEMS OF MONOCULARITY AND BINOCULARITY.[1]

Oculomotor type

1.) The motivating, two-dimensional, free manifold *M* with a null-position and null-directions. There come into action kinaesthetic occurrences, extracted out of this manifold in phenomenological time; specifically, one in each case, elapsing in one line. We therefore have a conjunction of the one-dimensional manifold of time with this two-dimensional "movement" in the *M*.

2.) The manifold of the sense-field, two-dimensional with respect to its local signs; i.e., the occurrences of the sense-field require a separation between locality and quality, or between figure and quality and location of the qualified figure. That needs to be described more precisely. "*S*"

3.) The optimal modification, an increasing manifold, uni-dimensional with a limit, the optimum.[2]

Laws which connect the temporal sequences of the *M*-manifold and that of the *S*-manifold and condition the separation between blind positions or blind spots and visual things. (Other names desirable! We can indeed not say that a silhouette in the field of half-sleep is a blind spot. We perhaps speak of irreal and real images and likewise of an irreal total field, in which no images arise, and a real field, thoroughly filled with real images, every piece of which is subject to the lawfulness of real images,)

I. Monocularity.

Coordination of the monocular kinaesthetic system (or of the binocular one in the case of the position of directedness toward infinitely remote objects that fill up the visual field) with the visual sense-field as a sense-field of visual sensations. The kinaesthetic system is a two-dimensional manifold; what can be actualized of it are only its individual "points" and "lines" in succession. More clearly, the eye can maintain its position for a duration, or it can change [350]

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[1] Surely 1916. – Ed.

[2] On this, *cf.* Appendix VI, p. 319. – Ed.

its position; in the latter case, it traverses the kinaesthetic points, a kinaesthetic line. Nothing else is possible. The visual field is an empty field that is dark or bright, an irreal field, if it is furnished with contents (e.g., dust floating in the light or figures in half-sleep) that are unaffected by eye-movements and have no lawful connections to eye-movements, apart from the contents that are conditioned by the laws of full fields or full pieces, pieces of the visual field. A real image can appear in an empty field and then be subject to the rules governing visual things; and this can co-affect the empty field, while that field otherwise retains the character of an empty field (real [*reell*] images – irreal [*irreell*] images, "semblant" images).

We must say that, prior to all laws, every enduring, real [*reell*] image coexists with a kinaesthetic point. Every local modification of an image is a univocal function of kinaesthetic modifications along determinate lines; in the case of rest, however, always a dependency on kinaesthetic modifications.

Laws for things in the visual field (for real [*reell*] images). The kinaesthetic system is a two-dimensional manifold, and we can represent it with the idea of a plane: null-point (stationary position of the eyes), right-left and above-below directions, qualified as the system of privileged coordinates. The visual sense-field is analogously distinguished as two-dimensional with a null-point and two main directions (directions of coordinates). Every real [*reell*] image exists in its duration with an enduring kinaesthetic point. Every local modification is a function of kinaesthetic modifications.

a) Law: every visually sensed body "rests" (presents rest) or "presents movement." A "body" that is neither stationary nor moving is a semblant body, i.e., a "blind spot." A visually sensed body displaying rest signifies that there exists kinaesthetic standstill for some duration. If the actualized kinaesthetic "point" retains its position, then the visually sensed body "displaying rest" also remains in its position within the field. If the kinaesthetic point travels along any line whatsoever ($f(x,y) = 0$), then every point of the resting (presenting rest) body travels along the same line in the visual sense-field. If the entire visual field is filled up with such things, then that naturally holds for the entire field, whereby, however, pieces get lost in traveling, and possibly new complete pieces arise as substitutes, for the field is a fixed form. This is movement without deformation; and thus still further laws.

b) The visually sensed body that presents movement; its law. If a visually sensed body travels in the field, without any eye-movement taking place, then it "presents movement." There then is a roaming of the eyes in the kinaesthetic field, specifically along the "same" curve of points traversed by every point of the visually sensed body, only this time in the opposite direction. This eye-movement annuls the traveling of the visually sensed body in its field and thereby changes it into an enduring standstill (while the eye-movement is occurring). What is lacking here is merely the proper mode of expression.

"Presenting rest," "presenting or displaying movement" – these are now [351] defined terms. What matters here is that the phenomena appearing in the visual sense-field break down into two groups, namely real [*reell*] and irreal [*irreell*] images, blind positions and full positions, that these latter are in general phenomenally distinct in themselves, and, if not, they demonstrate themselves through movement, and that a fixed rule, in the sense of what we said above, exists for the full positions. (Naturally the visual field is not the retina, and the law is not a physiological one.) The law expresses a fact.

*II. Binocularity (cyclopean ocularity [*Zyklopenauge*]).*

Monocularity, along with its visual sense-field and the motivating system of movements, is sufficient to constitute three-dimensional space.

How is monocularity related to cyclopean ocularity? Each eye is not constitutive by itself in binocular vision, but instead the eyes are constitutive unitarily and obviously in a quite different way than are several fingers, several simultaneous organs of touch, although there, naturally, an analogous problem arises.

1.) What corresponds to cyclopean ocularity as a visual sense-manifold?

2.) What corresponds to it as an oculomotor system of kinaesthetic modifications?

The two visual sense-fields, the two monocular ones, can "act separately"; i.e., "each eye" has its own "eye-closing," the result of which is precisely the separate monocular field *L* and the monocular field *R*, each for itself. The "eye-closing" of both eyes together produces the dark visual field, where no differences arise through eye-movements. All this is to be understood without Objectivation. If both eyelids are raised (here the kinaesthetic movement is motivating only for the size of the opened field), the result is not two separate fields but one visual sense-field, though only under certain circumstances and with peculiar occurrences. Functional dependence on the "position"of each eye in the pair. First of all, the integration of the two open eyes yields (in any given kinaesthetic situation) the following possibilities: competition or unity. But our descriptions can be more precise, since every visual sense-field of the two eyes can lawfully refer back, while the simultaneous kinaesthetic situation remains steadfast, to the two respective, possible, monocular sense-fields, by means of the closing and opening of one eye.

An "image" in the cyclopean field can be such that it remains identical, with no change in content, when any one eye is closed. Each monocular field has identically the same image, and the same image is to be found when both eyes are open; the image passes over, as identical, from one eye to another and to

binocular vision. Or else, if there were only such images, we would have to say (especially if very slight differences were not to be noted) that only one visual sense-field is there; and if this concerned the unity of the entire field, a unity which is always filled up in some way or another, then the opening and [352] closing of a single eye would be without significance, and only the opening and closing of both eyes together would have significance; i.e., the field either is visible, is there, or is not.

If there were an amplification through the opening and closing of one eye, then we would have an identical central portion, which would be amplified at one time from this side and at another time from that side, and we would then have something identical in binocularity, which therefore still has an amplification. After this central portion we would thus have no further visual fields (possibly small qualitative deviations of the single eyes and a combination without a relief in a plastic material).

A second occurrence is "combination." The binocular image deviates from the monocular images while retaining a general similarity. Nevertheless, amplification and contraction can take place in the figure and in the filling, and prominent moments on the one side can be missing on the other. The total image possesses relief.

A third occurrence is that of double images and competition; in addition, seeing one image through another by way of inversion.

We should now discuss the distinction between the oculomotor visual field of each single eye and of the two eyes (terminology: single image – full image – double image). Then a distinguished movement of the eyes such that these movements acquire coordination in a peculiar way (and, in virtue of the factically ever-elapsing images, *can* acquire coordination) toward the full images of the sense-field of binocular vision. In itself, the system of movement of the two eyes, if each eye were moveable independently (and could move freely, which is factually not the case), would be a quadruple manifold. The actually free system of our factical eye-movements is a three-dimensional system, and that is a system to which is coordinated, by way of motivation, the system of fixed, possible, Objective points and Objects. That is, there corresponds to it, as motivated, the system of possible full images which coalesce into a full field. Yet we had best be cautious here with regard to a concrete description.

The sense-field of binocular vision is always one and full, but in each instance it is very different, disregarding, at first, the motivating kinaesthetic systems. It can be one that contains no competition and thus is free from double images (which are themselves images competing to be victorious and which can, without any kinaesthetic motivation, be inverted and then engulfed by the background images). To the extent that such occurrences dominate, we speak of a chaotic field; to the extent that they do not, we speak of a fully unitary visual sense-field. If we include the kinaesthetic motivation, if we

traverse the three-dimensional kinaesthetic system which is distinguished as being free, then it may happen that a closed, fully unitary sense-field offers itself in one position and that this field, in its further progression, is continually changed into other fields that are again and again fully unitary. In general, however, this does not happen; it may pass over into a chaotic fields.

There is now present a determinate coordination between the modifications [353] of the visual sense-field and the kinaesthetic modifications. The coordination comes down to this, that certain distinctive systems of two-dimensional manifolds, drawn from the kinaesthetic manifold, are transitional manifolds that constitute oculomotor fields. Specifically, we fixate and hold fast to a certain oculomotor plane. A particularly distinctive one constitutes an unplastic field, and others constitute plastic surfaces.

The kinaesthetic system includes a null-line: "straight ahead into the depth." There pertains to every point on this line a two-dimensional manifold: right-left, above-below (with the head in a fixed position and perhaps head-movements in the null-position). If the two eyes are directed toward a point of the pure line of depth, then the visual sense-field which is thereby given can be chaotic. Yet the chaos is not an arbitrary one; it includes a movement on the null-line and a modification of the chaos, which is then converted into a harmonious sense-field at a determinate point in depth (i.e., a ϕ-phenomenon). If this point is reached kinaesthetically, the traversal into the surface of coordinates determined by this point yields a harmonious oculomotor field with a determinate relief, possibly with a relief that is null throughout. A harmonious and plastic oculomotor field is conceivable for each point of the kinaesthetic line of depth; and a surface of possible plastic fields is also conceivable for each.

Every seen point, every seen piece of the visual field at all its points, can be fixated and traversed, or, more precisely, it can be reduced to its optimum, and thus to its plastic primal image, through movements of convergence and through lateral movements. The fixating traversals of the points of a relief which presents itself in one gaze yield modifications of the kinaesthetic depth: "*quasi*-disparity," the relative elevation or deepening in the sensed relief, related in an indicational way to kinaesthetic depth and vice versa.

Must we not say that the relation to the optima plays the major constitutive role? The background appearances provoke the eye-movements in the three-dimensional system, whereby permanent points are fixated, and then a fixating traversal ensues, one which yields, in nearby space, a system of appearances in relief, possibly passing over into appearances of double images, which likewise possess indicational significance for transitions into appearances in relief. Nearby space: visual space of possible relief. That yields "arched surfaces," but actual bodies are constituted only through the rotation of the remainder of the body and on the basis of these peculiar "adumbrations" of three-

dimensional corporeality. And only thereby do spatial surfaces become actual spatial surfaces.

Therefore the three-dimensional system of eye-movements, in unity with the phenomenon of "disparity," results in a three-dimensional continuum, which, however, is still not plane Euclidean space. We must say instead that what is constituted is a three-dimensional manifold which can be generated out of possible two-dimensional manifolds of relief (one form of which is the unplastic, plane, two-dimensional manifold of relief). If we take sufficiently [354] small bodies (covering is still meaningless and is not yet constituted as a bodily covering in the Euclidean sense, and thus there are no sides of pieces), so small that a unitary relief appears without breaking down into double images, then such a body can recede in depth, and whereas it does "shrink," it always presents relief (I follow it through fixation), and, likewise, vice versa. I can compensate for that through my own movement. Thus the body recedes in depth or approaches. The relief becomes null in the course of the receding, and I then have a distant field without relief. Thus, before walking, again a dissolution into two visual spaces.

But a body can also be larger, so that, while fixating on one point, the next part specifically appears in harmonious relief, although, beyond that, we have a dissolution into double images. Following the body (e.g., a pencil receding in depth) with a fixating gaze, I retain a harmonious optimum piece and thus in general a harmonious sequence of optima, continuously passing over into one another, while the changing double image becomes a sign for the optimum. The body itself is constructed out of the pieces pertaining to the various relief-strata of visual space, pieces which perpetually pass over into one another and present a sequentially constituted unity of something co-existent, similar to a seen rafter which extends beyond the visual field (perhaps monocularly). I can indeed look while moving up and down, back and forth, and what is available at any moment in its time is what is there simultaneously.

The space in relief, the mere oculomotor space in depth of cyclopean ocularity, is therefore a three-dimensional manifold, which is an extension of possible relief, ordered according to the motivation of kinaesthetic depth, each relief of which is constituted in the two-dimensional, complementary, kinaesthetic system, along with small modifications in depth which run, in a motivated way, parallel to the distinctions in relief. The task (it is no longer a great problem) is the systematic presentation of this constitution. We can say, idealizing:

If a fixed coordination toward the kinaesthetic modifications in depth and toward the depths in relief (*quasi*-disparities) has been built up in individual bodies through a fixating traversal, yet unrelated to any approaching or receding, then every body is apprehended as a body in relief and is seen as self-same in the right-left and above-below modifications.

Ambulatory (or some other) approaching and receding in correlation with the "movement of the body in depth and back again" then creates Objective rest and movement and constitutes the space of depth. This space is a deepening of the oculomotor space of monocularity, but it is not Euclidean space, because depth is not a dimension that is comparable to length and breadth. A Euclidean space (although it can also be constituted monocularly without relief) arises only through new kinaesthetic systems, thus in addition to walking forward and back (and the like): through walking around the body, or through seeing it from all around by moving the head, or, correlatively, [355] through a covering of the body, and thereby, so to speak, through the visual space of relief. The relief increases and decreases; it is a perspective and a perspectival presentation of the natural relief of the optimum, which, for its part, bears the significance of a perspectival presentation of an Objective surface.

The appearance in relief, the plastic surface, always has a similarity to a monocular unplastic surface which is qualified in the appropriate way. That is why we can also recognize things with one eye.

The phenomena of perspectival adumbration (that accompany receding) and the adumbrations of the phenomena of covering are by and large similar to those in the case of monocularity; their sequence is such that it can have quite the same constitutive effect that it has in the monocular domain. Therefore the two constitutive nexuses grow stronger and fuse together.

Nota. Naturally we need to heed the fact that the kinaesthetic manifold of binocular movements is restricted, specifically in the dimension of kinaesthetic depth, just as the accommodation bound up with it also has an end, namely the parallel position of the eyes (directed at infinity), and a beginning, which is even more of a limit, namely the strongest convergence toward the null-position.

APPENDIX V (TO §54)

STRATA IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE THING.[1]

A thing in the broadest sense: identity in phenomenological continuity. The sound which endures, which changes in its duration. A thing of outer perception; the physical thing, the spatial thing. It, too, is an identity in phenomenological continuity, but a transcendent thing. "Transcendent thing" – we have to distinguish two sorts of transcendence, however. Each thing is transcendent, provided, namely, that we understand "immanent" to mean real [*reell*] immanence, the stream. Only this, of course, is the precise determination of the concept of immanence. Then we have:

1.) adequately given transcendence;

2.) inadequately given, and to be given, transcendence.

Here it must be said that if we take the sound under the phenomenological reduction, then in that regard it is given adequately in its duration. If this duration is limited, then "nothing is lacking." There would already be a "transcendence" (in the sense of inadequation) if the intention were directed toward the "more" or, in the partial spans, toward the "further."

If we take inadequate givenness in the sense that applies to a thing (according to the model of outer perception), then one line of continuity does not unfold the thing fully and completely. Here, too, we do not have a mere identity in continuity (e.g., if the eye roams over the visual field), for we have, in the adequate sense, a "change" of the same thing, but here it is called "non-change." Despite the commonality, which is designated as an identity in continuity, there is an essential difference here. The unitary identity of the sound is grasped, since one phase enters into a unitary relation with the next, but here there is no other relation besides that of sameness, similarity, and the temporal stream. [356]

Now, however, it is not a matter of grasping the sameness and similarity residing in the phases, i.e., this unity which unfolds as generic and specific similarity but which is an identity in the stream of these similarities. On the contrary, precisely this identity is what is not aimed at in the apprehension of a thing, measured according to the standard of an external thing or the Ego-thing (an empirical thing; I need a name for it!). Instead, in the streaming on of the phases, where each phase is, in the first sense, a changed, although similar,

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[1] Formulated for the first time in the discussion period of June 26, 1907.

one (this is indeed continuity), the intention in a certain way aims at the changed phase, precisely in this change. Admittedly, as this now stands, it is badly expressed. If I hear a phenomenologically reduced sound changing, and if the sequence of change is familiar to me, then I anticipate the coming change, every phase offers me something familiar, and the changing sound elapses in its change in a familiar way. I have here, however, anything but a thing in the empirical sense. Should I say the correlativity is lacking? If the "perceptual conditions" remain the same, so does the appearance. If the conditions constantly change, then I have this or that change in the sequence of appearances. Naturally, the perceptual conditions cannot be thingly changes and thus cannot be understood causally; if the thing *U* changes, then, under these circumstances, the thing *W* "necessarily" changes. We indeed still do not have a thing. Things must already be constituted for me to have their changes, which could then count as "circumstances." This, too, is clear: if two sensuous contents, let us say a sound and an odor, change in such a way that, if *A* changes, and at one and the same time *B* also changes, and if now, in terms of appearances, the occurrence of the change in *A* motivates this or that change in *B*, then I would still not have a thing. I would then have only the "if-then" or the "because-so." Therefore the description of this peculiar state of affairs, of identity in "movement" (e.g., the identity of an empirical thing), presents an enigma. For instance, the eye-movements form a system of changes, but what is here extracted out as their unitary identity? The situation is also not such that, as often as the sensations of movement are the same, the same sensations of the thing (which present its constitutive content) are also given. With the same position of the eyes, I can perceive all possible Objects.

This is to be understood in the following way. In the sequence K_0, K_1, K_2, ... the motivated series of images O_0, O_1, O_2, ... elapse, and so do, in the consciousness of unity, perhaps i_0, i_1, i_2, ..., i.e., images of the same Object. But not only that; on the contrary, every Object is identified. In the consciousness of unity, the intentional ray which provides unity penetrates the corresponding images. If an image now disappears, the intention does not disappear but is [357] transformed from one furnished with a presentational foundation, from a full one, into an empty one. Likewise, if, in O_r, a new *i* arises as an indication and then continues to develop (extensively), this change of *O* then pertains to the corresponding *K*-development, and so does this supervening of new Objects in the consciousness of unity (for the old ones are held fast in the consciousness of unity, and so the penetrating intentions that pertain to them do not pass over to the "new" Objects).

Thus the *K*-development motivates, on the one hand, the determinate manifold of images pertaining to the same Object, along with the stream of intentions penetrating this manifold, and, on the other hand, the enrichment of appearance due to new Objects, the being-seen of the new ones and the no-

longer-being-seen of the old ones. Thus here we have not only a beam of rays of intentions penetrating ever-given images (therefore every image is the bearer of a ray of appearance), but every image bears, with its ray of appearance, a reference to determinate changing manifolds of images which have the same ray of appearance (the image moves over the field of locations). And, at the same time, the image belongs in its external nexus (the entire field of locations), and its environment includes references to its changes and to its identification in those changes. Therefore we have a transition to new *O*-fields (fields of appearances) of such a kind that new appearances of Objects present themselves in the same region of locations in a determinately predelineated order. Thus the entire *O* has penetrating intentions, but the living intentions elapse in such a way that they are, on the one hand, intensive intentions, serving to identify the remaining appearances, and, on the other hand, extensive intentions, directed to the outside, to an amplification, i.e., empty intentions that are fulfilled, whereas the full become empty.

The field is always filled up; therefore the disappearance of images does not mean the field becomes empty but only that it is filled differently. The identification transpires in such a way that it does not bring the field of the *K*-stage to coincide with the field of the K_1–stage but instead brings them to overlap and only partially coincide. In addition, an intentional ray of a new type arises, motivated by the *K*-movement. Likewise, an intentional ray gets "lost"; it becomes unclear and loses its presentational foundation. Thereby, two cases: known or unknown Objects. Then only the general type is determined; the *K*-movement motivates in general something new, and the form of the elapsing series of images motivates the character of this series as well as its rest and movement, etc.

APPENDIX VI (TO §54) [358]

MOTIVATIONAL NEXUSES AND APPERCEPTION.[1]

Movement and optimal modification.

Law: all possible movements of real images are possible in the field. But there is a lawfulness residing in the fact that the straight lines in the field, extending out from the null-point, simultaneously coincide with the lines of increase. Therefore, if a real [*reell*] image moves into the null-region, it becomes "more complete." And if the null-point alone were actually optimal, then the transporting of every real [*reell*] image-point into the null-point would be required to transform the real [*reell*] image into an optimum. There would then be no optimal image, because every image lying round about the null-point would have only one optimal point.

Now that is not the case, and it is in general a problem to describe the optimal increase and to take account of the fact that this increase is not univocal. A region is optimal: that means that a real image, anywhere in the field, becomes optimal if it is transported into the pre-eminent region, whether the image thereby "rotates" or not, and this applies specifically to the piece that coincides with the pre-eminent null-region. Yet there are still gradations in moving toward the margin, i.e., in receding from the null-point.

We have not as yet discussed motivation and apperception. How is apperception to be understood, if we subject the motivational nexuses to lawful coordinations?

A. Let us disregard the optimal modification. If the eye passes over from any given position to any other, then the real [*reell*] image elapses, in a familiar, appurtenant way, into the "if-then," etc.

Yet we could appeal to the following counter-example. If I think of a taut string, constantly bowed in such a way that a tone keeps resounding, and if I could freely and continuously protract or curtail the sound, or pause it at will (without seeing all this), then I would have an analogous "if-then" system. Would there now be any intelligible reason to say we apperceive therein a sort of transcendent Objectivity of sound? Yes, but here I have no local order of sounds as a constituted order, i.e., no figure and no size. It would already be different if a melody or any given stream of sound were a unity of existence,

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[1] Surely 1916. – Ed.

and if we could continuously displace this unity in ϕ-phenomena or slowly and jerkily, and in a free motivation. Analogous formations, something like "figured" formations of Objects, extracted from an ordered system, are distinct and yet are the same melody, merely transposed higher or lower. But these are sequential unities. Nevertheless, I fail to see the intelligibility of the unificational positing, the apperceptive positing of the unity that presents itself in the manifold.

B. It surely becomes better, however, if we appeal to the optimal modification. That introduces the "intention" that clings "apperceptively" to every [359] image as an intention directed to the "object itself": the optimum. The optimum has its priority in the fact that it is the "most interesting" image in the lawful, appurtenant system of real [*reell*] images and constitutes an original stimulus for the interest. Let us take the apprehension of rest. Every motion of a real [*reell*] image in the visual field is then, we said, a univocal function of kinaesthetic modifications. If a kinaesthetic point traverses a kinaesthetic line, or even if it remains unchanged, the respective phenomenon of the motion of the real [*reell*] image (possibly the non-motion) is univocally determined (the speed of the traversal is arbitrary and has no influence).

Once again, A: what can be constituted first of all without an optimum, on the basis of the omni-sided traversal, is the freely available system of M,[2] conjoined with the appurtenant possible modifications of any "arbitrarily" given real [*reell*] image. I have the practical horizon: a system that can be freely traversed in representation and that is freely available in practice, a unitary horizon of possibility and, simultaneously, a practical horizon, a peculiar intentional formation, whose elements are interwoven out of the motivating and the motivated. Here we have complexes of kinaesthetic points and images, complexes of kinaesthetic sequences and of the corresponding modifications of images, complexes of appurtenance, whereby, however, a unilateral relation resides in the character of the motivation: along with, and in consequence of, the eye-movements, the image is modified; not vice versa. If I arbitrarily determine the kinaesthetic series, as well as the location of the image in the visual field, at the beginning of the kinaesthetic sequences, then the change in the image follows as a consequence and in a mediately arbitrary way, provided I have the apperception of rest, and the same applies, in an appropriately changed way, to every further apperception. It is a system of possible anticipations: assuming M_z, ..., then the style of the elapsing of the images must be such and such, etc. But the size and the quality are not arbitrary, nor are the figure of the individual images and the rule governing rest and movement.

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[2] "*M*" was introduced earlier as a designation for the two-dimensional kinaesthetic manifold. *Cf.* Appendix IV, p. 307. – Ed.

B. If the optimum is now especially interesting, and if I have at my free disposal the modification of every image into its optimum, then a practical tendency of the transition of any image into the optimum becomes intelligible. It is intelligible that in the system of possibilities, of which we are conscious as a living horizon, if I factually have an image, the optimal possibility is privileged and transitional tendencies arise which aim at this possibility and are fulfilled in it (provided it is actualized by way of "looking").

The image that is not optimal becomes a representative for the optimum by way of similarity; it not only recalls but also shows that a determinate kinaesthetic sequence can lead me to the optimum at any time, whenever I want. The [360] optimum is an ever-ready possibility, permanently at my disposal, at my bidding, as long as I have the image. If I want, I can have the optimum.

In the figure, in the quality, in the inner distinctions, the given image refers to the optimum. Yet this reference is saddled with indeterminateness. The given optimum is more, richer, more precisely determined, than was predelineated in a relatively indeterminate way. The pure series of increase in the straight transition to the optimum leads the ray of interest through the lines of the corresponding moments, both the determinate and the indeterminate ones. The increase is an increase in the attainment of a goal which is similar at every step and in every phase, as far as the resemblance extends, and which is presentified intuitively but always predelineated by analogy. Thereby the predelineation concerns the end of a flowing tendency of a sequence of images motivated with the kinaesthetic sequence. A selection therefore takes place out of the manifold of practical possibilities, a selection of the series that move from the given image to the optimum in the sense of a continuous series of fulfillment.

Thus we have a system of practical possibilities that can be freely generated and, specifically, a peculiar system pertaining to all the figures in the visual field that are able to be fulfilled through a real [*reell*] image (all these systems belong in the ordered total system, which in turn has its motivational total system in *M*). Within this system, a practical tendency toward the optimum again clings to the respective stationary image, and this tendency is continuously mediate and is fulfilled in a constant series that is tendentious in every member or in every phase. In the natural rapid transition, we have the transitional phenomenon ϕ, which is a unitary, sequential phenomenon. The tendency thus passes through this sequential phenomenon, as mediating the fulfillment, and moves toward the optimum that corresponds (appertains) to it.

The difficulty, however, is to understand the peculiarity of the "aiming," i.e., to understand that we, in possessing *i*, thereby have an Objective consciousness, specifically a perceptual consciousness, and not only in the optimum i_0, and that if we cannot bring *i* into the optimal domain, a manifold of i_0, i_0', i_0'', ..., i_0 constitutes for us the consciousness of the complete perception of

"*i*," which is ideally integrated out of the "properly" perceived, optimal parts. The interest terminates in the optimal givenness. A tendency to have this interest (the experiential interest) as an impression aims exclusively at this optimum, because it is the optimum. Experiencing it provides the most satisfaction. We are interested in any other image only insofar as it leads to the optimum, and it does so not only in its totality but in all its features that bear the similarity.

APPENDIX VII (TO §76)

EMPTY SPACE.[1]

How do we see empty space? Is the dust we visually sense as it floats in the light perhaps arbitrarily localizable and the bearer of a sensation of the intervening space?[2]

What about our phantasizing of structures into the intervening space? Can phantasized colors be the bearers of sensed depths? Naturally, phantasized colors can only be conjoined with phantasized depths. Is not the respective relief in visual space (i.e., the properly perceived space of the respective visual things in the total current visual field) precisely a mere relief, a mere, incompletely closed surface, such that the "between" is not perceived? Indeed, this is obviously incorrect, and the expression "relief" is not entirely usable.

If I look through a window and see the street or perhaps look through a tube (or look through a tube and see a window, along with the wall of the house, and through that window see a second house and, in turn, see *its* window, etc.), then I have seen simultaneously (and in the actual "visual field") several strata or surfaces of visual space. Likewise, it can be (with the appropriate screening) that I see a multitude of sticks, each of which has a different depth. I could see (as might happen stereoscopically) a multitude of points uniformly distributed in visual space and located at different depths.

All this still remains to be studied. If we look deeper and more closely into the phenomenon of spatial intuition, then, with a little honesty, which, to be sure, is not easy to come by, we cannot escape the thought that we see the "between" and the entirety of space. If I cast my eye on these or those edges of a seen cavity, or of a hollow space formed by books, tables, etc., and if I transfer my gaze from these edges to the opposite ones, then I "see the air," the "between." I can attend to these or those intervening points or intervening positions, without interesting myself at all in the form or the type of the border (and exactly as Hofmann[3] expounded in his work).

Is there not an essential difference here between such a spatial distance, the way the "between" is "given," and chromatic distance, where we are given no "between" (in the sense of a color)? This or that thing is always given, and

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[1] 1909.

[2] It must be noted, however, that a given empty space is necessarily an empty space between given things or phantoms of things. If nothing spatial at all is given, then neither is any space.

[3] *Cf.* p. 121, note 1. – Ed.

specifically in a space; likewise, visual things are given in their own way, and the totality of visual things pertains to a given visual space.

One can cudgel one's brains about this, but one must still face the facts and begin with them. Therefore we must ask not only how the thing and the manifold of things are constituted but also how unitary space is constituted as a form of givenness, specifically in the harsh sense, which is the true one, as a given form of given things, as a form of the total intuition which thereby itself [362] is, in a certain way, intuited.

What sort of distinction this is, i.e., the seeing of color versus the "seeing" (or other perceiving) of space, is a problem.

I have not hitherto launched an investigation into the fundamental distinction, already noted by Euler, between the expanse of a thing, as its property, which moves together with the movement of the thing, and the place, which remains left over, even when the body has moved away; and the place pertains to space. I "abstract" the expanse of the body as a property, just as I do with the other concepts of properties; the abstraction of the concepts of place, space, and the like is carried out quite differently.

APPENDIX VIII (TO §78)

PROBLEM OF THE QUALITY THAT FILLS SPACE.[1]

With regard to a thing, I can consider *in abstracto* its spatial structure, its own space, and its geometrical body, and then further the "surface" of this body, the limits of the partial regions of this surface, the edges, etc. But (it is said) I can also consider *in abstracto* the color. Yet how is that possible? How can we carry out the abstraction of the color of the thing, the color which covers and fills the surface? The coloration is indeed determined by the determinateness of the geometrical corporeality, by the determinateness precisely of this surface as extended in such and such a way. The color as coloration is structured color. Yet how is the color to be grasped in abstraction from the structuration?

It might be said that if I think of this sphere here as uniformly red and then as uniformly yellow (or if I think of two equal spheres, one uniformly red and one uniformly yellow), the differentiation clearly stands out for me. The one has the quality red, the other the quality yellow. Or again, if I think of spheres of different sizes, then I always have different corporealities, always different surfaces, but with something in common, e.g., the redness. Likewise, I may attend to various parts of a uniformly red surface, however they are delimited; they are all red. To be sure, an extension is always there, and so is a coloration which is extended. But, independently of the form (of what is geometrical, of what is spatial, which is colored) I have "something common," and that is the redness.

This is clear in the case of the "simple quality"; and, after what was just said, can this be defined otherwise than as something general and identical that covers the changing structures and the structures which are soon the same once again? Does not the idea of "coloration," the simple quality, immediately stand out as something general in a manifold of colorations (which, as such, have their structures and their extension), i.e., as something that can be completely independent of the mode of extension and independent of the geometrical structure and size and can be identical in what is large and in what is [363] small, in what is structured one way and what is structured another way?

But if I have a plane that shades off from one "quality" (an expression I should not still use) to another, I can break it up into parts arbitrarily and extract something common. Is that also something simple? Now, here too, I

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[1] 1910.

can carry out such an abstraction. But the quality is simple only when it is the "same" for any surface-forms whatever, for planes, spheres, irregular forms, etc. And it must actually be identity and not merely similarity. There are manifold similarities; very different colorations can have something in common, namely that they are "reddish," bluish, etc., or also dappled and the like.

Now, is the general employment of the concept of quality not mediated by an idealizing concept-formation? We can see "small" parts of the surface as qualitatively simple in coloration (see their coloration as a simple coloration, as a simple quality), insofar as we can think of arbitrarily many instances having the same simple quality. Every coloration that is not the extension of a simple quality thus becomes, through the partitioning of space, decomposed into partial colorations of a different simple quality, and thus every coloration is determined through manifold simple colorations. Every qualitative covering which is not simple is put together out of simple ones. In this way, the simple quality becomes the filling of a spatial point (of the limit of the diminution of a closed piece of the surface). A surface is colored simply, homogeneously, if all its points have the same coloration; every coloration consists of punctual colorations. This still calls for a more precise and more thorough reflection.

APPENDIX IX (TO §§82F.)

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF MOVEMENT AND REST.[1]

I. The primal visual phenomenon of movement is the phenomenon of "mere" movement that proceeds according to possibility in the primal visual field, the visual sense-field, namely the movement of a "thing" that remains in constant and complete similarity (sameness) with regard to "size" and "structure," i.e., the movement of a concrete, delimited, and localized "patch" prominent in the field. Naturally this "going back and forth" of the motion of the patch is not movement in the proper, spatial sense. But already an analogon of it. There is still not given any reality constituted by the "if-then."

The same applies to the "movement" of a tactile patch in field of touch. "Mere" movement is the limit-case of a change, and, specifically, it is a continuously occurring change of a patch, whereby the identity, the greatest possible identity, according to all determinations, with the exception of a constant local change, remains preserved. A distinction then arises between the identity of the structure as a limit-case of a manifold of structural changes, whereby a dimension of changes, namely that of the quality of the structure, remains variable. And, on the other hand, the identity of the structure and of [364] the quality, which presents precisely the most complete identity of the essence that remains throughout the movement. Furthermore, the identity of the structural form and the structural size. Continuous modification, which constantly changes the structure and the content (quality); each phase can be thought of as extended in a duration and is itself then to be thought of as "moveable." All apprehensions (thus concepts) therefore related to the ideal limit-case of mere movement.

Hence there is much to describe here as belonging to the essence of the visual sense-field (to its idea, its ideal – and partially idealized – type), which precisely makes up the foundation for the further Objectivations of all these concepts (structure becomes the mere spatial body, etc.). Concept of rest, obviously defined as "non-movement," and the change can then specifically be: 1.) mere deformation, 2.) mere change in quality, and 3.) both together.

II. If the first Objectivity is constituted in the oculomotor visual space of the first level, then a two-fold mode of givenness (mode of appearance) pertains to the perceived movement and rest:

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[1] Surely 1916. – Ed.

1.) a purely visual component, which provides the visual sense-field;
2.) a component of kinaesthetic motivation.

Rest can present itself visually and kinaesthetically as rest, if I do not move my eyes. But it can also present itself while I carry out kinaesthetic changes, whereby, however, visual "movement" is the counter-component. In the sense of the primal visual phenomenon of movement, we have here the "semblance" of movement but the perception of rest. Movement can present itself visually, whether I keep the eyes stationary or even if I move them (though not in a fully compensatory way), and, according to the degree of speed, I then have visual movement of "different speeds" and possibly of different directions. But movement can present itself, in the case of complete compensation, in the phenomenon (in the purely visual phenomenon) of rest: movement is then perceived in the consciousness of the compensation. Analogously in the space of the tactile sense.

III. If the first visual space of three-dimensions has been constituted, then what we have just said repeats itself. I "see" movement, I have in vision the semblance of movement, wherever in visual space the visual image itself is displaced, which ultimately leads back to the visual sense-field.

But I have perception and proper perception thanks to both the components involved. (*Nota*. If I see two objects, one behind the other, and both are stationary, e.g., there is the armchair in front of the bookcase, which is sitting further back, then if I move my head, while focusing on the armchair, I see it as stationary. But this movement of the head displaces the series of images of the bookcase in the visual field, in the sense of a relative movement against the image of the armchair; the latter image then "moves" in the field, upon the background of the image of the bookcase (over the bookcase); and conversely, the bookcase moves behind the armchair, past it, if I focus on the armchair.)

Looking through the window, I see a displacement of the landscape; it is as if it moved visually, but the motivation would have to read differently. [365]

Then what about the "seeing" of movement when my Body is riding in a train car, and what about the vision of this riding itself?

The progressive, ambulatory self-movement and the being-moved in being carried, being driven, etc., stand in a constitutively interchangeable relationship (i.e., in a relationship of equivalence). In walking, forward or backward, walking along any path and walking back again, we have sequences of images in which a three-dimensional visual space is constituted. In this space, one's own Body is constituted as walking, running, etc. A narrow, nearby space is also already constituted, without ambulatory movement, through mere movement of a member. In walking, I "shift" this space and can bring every remote Object near and so bring it closer and closer to the null-point. In walking, the surface of the ground and the bottom of the feet receive a priority, which needs to be studied. I can stop at every step; running is also a ϕ-phenomenon,

which gets interpreted according to its possibility of stopping at any moment.

The exact same environing phenomena (let us take the normal case of a stationary environment) which elapse in "running from *A* to *B*" also elapse in "riding from *A* to *B*" (on the same path). Phenomenologically, there is a distinction here as regards the Body, however: it does not move itself, or, we can say, it does not need to move itself (then it does not offer the corporeal image of a moving Body, and it also lacks subjective lived experiences of movement (the "I move")). On the other hand, it may move itself on or in the car, and then the environing phenomena break down into two groups: first, those which pertain to the train car elapse in visual space in such a way that it is as if the car were a stationary Object of my environment (and the same applies to all the objects in the car, all those strictly conjoined with it and rigidly and geometrically conjoined with my Body, and thus co-moving). Secondly, the other objects of the surrounding world, whose phenomena elapse in such a way that it is as if I moved myself by walking and the car moved as conjoined to me.

"Experience shows" that every object I take along or carry while walking behaves toward me as relatively stationary. "Experience shows" that, if a body is given as Objectively moving, I can, by running beside it, convert its phenomenon of movement into a phenomenon of rest, while all stationary bodies then take on the phenomena of movement. Experience shows that it is the same whether I "move myself" and thereby keep pace with the movement of a body (and exchange the phenomena of movement and rest) or whether I make myself one with it by climbing aboard, being seated within it, or in some other way, provided only that if I sever the connection everything then proves to revert to its former state. "It moves, whether I climb aboard or not," whether I run after it or not, whether I stop running or not.

What is a matter of experience here, a fact? What could also be otherwise? Now, eye-movement, or the like, is also a fact, but its type founds a constitutive form. Nevertheless, first of all we should expound further what we said above: [366]

Visual space is constituted in such a way that there is also constituted a position for every object, an Objective distance between any two objective or possible points. Even if the distance between the points of my Body and the points of remote objects may not offer entirely the same phenomena that are found in the distance between any two environing points (a distance which can indeed become infinitely remote and phenomenally invisible), yet I can change this distance in such a way that the one point falls within the null-region and thus make this distance similar to the one separating my Body from the object over there, etc. My Body "can move to any position in space"; any position can become null or can reside in the null-region. If the distance between two environing bodies is diminishing, they are moving and drawing near to one another. My Body offers different phenomena in walking than do the moving

bodies of the environment, but it does change its distance from those bodies. Since my Body can coincide with any body, can "come up to" any body, and since the null-point and that place can become identical, the null-point then receives the significance of an Objective place, and every place the significance of a possible null-point. The Body therefore has a spatial position just as any body does. Constituted first is the location of the environing bodies, in relation to other bodies, as well as their identity in movement and rest. The apprehension of my Body as filling space, and as comparable to any other body with respect to spatiality and location, presupposes a complicated mediate apprehension, the equivalent of the "distance" between an exterior body and my Body or between two exterior bodies, or it presupposes the apprehension of the possibility of the coincidence of my corporeal Body with any other body and its congruence with a possible "similar body" in the environment.

This also implies that I can represent the distance and the spatial location of my body in relation to other bodies as a remote location (an environing location), as "seen from any standpoint whatever." That is, I can represent myself (walking) to (any arbitrary) standpoint *A* and then represent a return of my corporeal Body to my earlier place, but in the mode of appearance that would be a mode of appearance of the environment, unified with the appearances of other objects of my former environment, changed into the end of the appearances that pertain to walking over there.

My Body, precisely as a Body, can, to be sure, never have an outer appearance but only a null-appearance. Yet if I can represent any outer appearance of any body whatever as changed into a null-appearance, and if I must apprehend my Body, according to its corporeality, according to all its locations and distances, as a spatial body, then I can make for myself an "image" of my Body in outer appearance, whereby my Body of course necessarily loses the property of being a Body.

The question arises, however, as to how this properly relates to coincidence and to what extent we do not have here merely a limit-consideration. For, as it stands, all this is not entirely sufficient and certainly not precise enough.

Visually: null-region a spatial hole, something not constituted, not intuited, not intuitable. But every actually constituted region can be changed into such a null-region with a hole. Every space that can be filled corporeally can also be transferred to my Body, and the hole acquires spatial significance. [367]

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Phenomenological concepts that are indispensable for the constitution of the movement of the Body from the *I walk* as a kinaesthetic movement into a movement of an Objective body (namely the "Body") in Objective space.

1.) Visual space as oriented space, with its null-point and its axes;
2.) Objective space, perceived space.

In re 1.): The orientational phenomenon of rest, the orientational phenomenon of movement. Every body of this space is stationary in oriented space if it undergoes no orientational changes. The body is moving if it is changing its orientation.

In re 2.): The phenomenon of Objective rest and of Objective movement. For example, I perceive that in walking I not only let my legs, etc., stir in oriented space, but I also see that my Body, to which these movements relate and appertain, is a moving body in space and that the "seemingly moving bodies of the environment" are only changing their orientation in visual space but in truth are stationary.

APPENDIX X (TO §83)

SUBJECTIVE SELF-MOVEMENT AND OBJECTIVE CORPOREAL MOVEMENT.[1]

I move myself; and I have the perception of my self-movement. Here we need to distinguish:

1.) I move my hands or feet, I move individual parts of my Body, and I perceive these movements just as I perceive the movements of any external body whatever, *scilicet* as moving in a horizon – therefore relatively. This means that series of appearances elapse under motivating circumstances in exactly the same way, i.e., in the same style, as in the case of the perception of an external body as moving "in the horizon."

2.) I also perceive these Bodily members, however, according to their properties, as subjectively self-moving or voluntarily moved "by me," or as stationary and not moved by me. And I perceive them in this way even if I do not actually perceive their movements as movements of bodies, i.e., not originally, as I do in the case of external bodies and in the case of 1.). Thus, if do not see this Bodily part, I have no visual constitution of the corporeal movement, provided I do not otherwise perceive it as moving through touch, etc. [368]

3.) If all these movements are originarily constituted as corporeal movements, they are constituted as movements relative to the null-point of orientation, thus in a horizon, i.e., relative to the nuclear Body, which is always at the null-point. This nuclear Body, however, cannot be perceived as a body moving relative to the null-point of orientation. It is clear that, apart from (very limited) rotations relative to the null-point, and except for relative displacements of the moving parts of the Body (moving relative to the null-point), an originary appearance of the movement of the Body is not possible as a body, i.e., in the sense applicable to other bodies: as movement in a horizon.

4.) The study of the constitution of any spatial bodies whatever (with respect to their movement and rest while preserving their identical corporeality, hence without deformation) must begin with what is first, namely with what we find phenomenologically in the mode of givenness of bodies: orientation. All bodies are given as oriented relative to the "here," the null-point, and are given either as enduring (in the examined duration), as unchanged in orientation (in an unchanged "relative location" over and against what is always

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[1] Surely 1916. – Ed.

grasped in consciousness as "here"), or as in a changing "location." The latter yields a phenomenal "movement," a phenomenal "change of location," precisely as a change of location of orientation, as an apparent approaching and changing and likewise as an apparent rotating and turning: we are given not only a 0 but also a right-left, above-below, front-back. These phenomenal "changes of location" (or non-changes of location) relative to the constant system of orientation are thus a proper stratum. They make up a proper, original type of "movement." This is something to be studied on its own, and we must also take into account the changes in location that pertain to the visual field in itself. The field of sight has its own "null-point," corresponding to the "null-position of the eyes;" i.e., it has its own central point and, in relation to that, an above and below, a right and left (to be sure, these expressions are not to be understood here in relation to the tactile domain). The front and the back also constitute an issue that needs to be considered. The field of sight and the field of view; correlation: the system of "eye-movements," and then head-movements, etc.

Nevertheless, the unity of the consciousness of identity, in which the same body (as an unchanged body) appears in changing phenomena, includes correlatively, on the one hand, the fact that we have a manifold of phenomena when the eyes, the head, and the body remain unchanged, i.e., when the motivating moments of the *I move* remain unchanged, and, on the other hand, the fact that we can "move ourselves" and that correlative modifications then appear in the phenomena. In regard to the case of the constitution of an unchanged body, a compensation is possible: every change in appearance on the one side can be compensated for by a change in appearance of the *I move* [369] *myself* on the other side. Constitution of Objective "rest": if I do not "move" myself, then the phenomenon of the body remains completely unchanged; if I do move myself, then change appears, which ceases when I no longer move. To every system of motivating sensations (then Objectively apperceived as the position of my head, of my eyes, etc.) there appertains a determinate outer appearance. The constitution of Objective movement includes, on the other hand, precisely the fact that, if non-change occurs in the manifold of subjective complexes of motivation, then the aspects (of various levels of order, naturally) change phenomenally (the body is ever unchanged as regards its corporeality), and this change is characterized as a change in orientation, as a seen "change of location."

Careful account must be taken of all this. It is clear that the constitution of corporeality everywhere presupposes the *I move myself* – but this is a "genetic" consideration, thought of as the foundation of the phenomenological domain (sequence of levels of constitutive products, which is by no means naturalistic psychology) – and this *I move myself* does "not yet" signify the phenomenal, corporeal movement of my Body. The Body is "not yet" consti-

tuted here.

Therefore, the question then is: how does the lived experience of the *I move* (I am the subject of free sequences of sensations of movement) change into the apprehension: my corporal Body is a moving body just like any other, and the *I move* has the significance of an Objective, corporeal movement? To this, we can perhaps attach the question:

How does the constitution of a "here" arise in the proper sense, as a location in space? Does it already require the priority of one's own corporal Body? Of course not. Various bodies can be given in different "remotenesses," and, following this order, we arrive at possible bodies which have "no" remoteness: as ideal limit-cases, which then can appear only insofar as they have a limit-point without remoteness (in relation to which the remaining parts have remoteness) and therefore are only mediately and as a whole considered to be without remoteness.

Now, the Body is such a body. Every other body appears to move, we could perhaps say, in virtue of the *I move* or *I refrain from moving my Body*. But how can the Body itself then appear as moving? An apprehension of it as a body is understandable, and so is even an apprehension that "a member of the body moves itself and is moved by me," but not an apprehension of the Body in the sense of "moving as a whole." In the first place, it is clear that the apprehension of the latter as a Body can be constituted, and the apprehension of the movements of its members can also be constituted, as well as its peculiar capacity (and that of its members) to be the bearer of free movements. Therefore it is understandable that, with the (voluntary or even involuntary) execution of certain sequences of sensations of movement, I acquire, as co-apprehended, the *I make my hand move*. My hand appears as corporeally moved like any other body, although it cannot recede from itself at will, and [370] this corporeal movement is (at least, very often) an event in virtue of my *I move*. This latter therefore at once receives the significance of a hand-movement. The same applies to every corporeal part that moves. Thus also the foot in walking, but only in a certain respect: I raise the foot, extend it forward. But not walking as "moving myself forward"? How then do I come to "experience" that, in walking, my whole Body moves toward the bookcase, as a body moving there corporeally? Very simply, we will say. Within the visible domain, I can bring every visible part of my body into relation with an external body, and the same applies to any thing whatever that is given as close to my body. If I move myself *ambulando* (changing my "location" and thus letting the "here" move, which, however, is naturally not seen), then I see that that thing remains in its place, but that the visible parts of my body recede from it, approach other bodies, etc. I see this, because the parts of my body appear like other bodies. And ultimately, indeed, my corporeal Body altogether appears like a body. What I see and feel of my corporeal Body undergoes a change in

position relative to other bodies through my *I move myself*; thus the change in position applies to my corporeal body as a whole. This is naturally not a conclusion but an apperception. Is that completely satisfactory? Is everything now clear?

APPENDIX XI (TO §83)

VISUAL SPACE AND OBJECTIVE SPACE.[1]

There is a distinction between:

1.) visual space, which is constituted "prior" to the *my Body is moved* or the *I am moved*;

2.) Objective, "perceived" space, apperceived in the Objective perception of things and of space.

In other words, there is a distinction between:

1.) movement and rest in visual space;

2.) movement and rest in Objective space.

It should be noted here that this visual space already constitutes the "body" in the geometrical sense, insofar as the body does not change in size and structure through the transition to Objective space. In that respect, the apperception remains steadfast.

Furthermore, this visual space already has an Objectivity and is the unity of a manifold of adumbrations of visual space; in these adumbrations, visual space presents (and must present) itself as possessing a center. Visual space is already homogeneous and has all the properties of geometrical space, except that it presents itself, so to speak, as absolute space and, through the new apperception, becomes relativized with reference to the constitution of fixed or moving "bodies that serve as the ground" and with reference to the Body that "walks" upon them, thus with reference to the constitution of the Body as a thing like any other.

But we can also say that the spatial form of the designated visual space is [371] Euclidean, and this form is retained at the higher constitutive level. Remarkably, however, Euclidean space is constituted only with regard to the environing bodies and not for the Body and for a null-body unified with it. Therefore space is not Euclidean in every respect. Geometrical space in the Euclidean sense is a formal schema for all possible corporeality, and there is no difference here between the null-body and the environing bodies. All bodies are equal, the presentation in the null-appearance is equivalent to any other presentation, and movement and rest in the geometrical sense are of the same type for every body presenting itself in any "accidental" orientation. On the other hand, the designated visual space does have those distinctions, and they can be

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[1] Surely 1916. – Ed.

dissolved only if the movement of the corporeal Body in space is constituted, specifically as equivalent to any movement of other bodies.

APPENDIX XII (TO ESSAY I)

On the constitution of Riemannian things.[1]

Important supplement *in re*: I-III.[2]

With regard to the introduction of the constitution of movement and rest, i.e., with regard to the constitution of the "spatial body" (geometrical body), we have to say that among the modifications of the field, as a mere visual sense-field prior to the modifications (thus with the limit-case in which these stand still) that are motivated in an oculomotor way, we have the following possibilities. A visual sense-structure within the two-dimensionallly ordered visual sense-manifold remains unchanged with respect to its material filling (its qualities). Or else this filling changes; the relevant concretum (the "filled piece of the field") changes with respect to its filling. Then again, the concretum may change with respect to its structure; thereby it either retains its "form" (it retains a similarity), or else it changes its size, or changes both, in addition to the distinction in the duration. If the kinaesthetic modifications now supervene, as motivating, all this then becomes significant. But what is significant for the constitution of Riemannian corporeality is the following: the Riemannian geometrical body is unchanged geometrically and completely unchanged, and all the distances between its points and all its straight expanses remain unchanged, provided it is first of all a geometrical body in general. This concept is a limit-concept; i.e., what is motivated in the apprehension of a thing as a "Riemannian thing" is the entire concretum. In other words, the respective concrete piece of the visual sense-field is constituted as an adumbration just as much on the side of matter as on the side of form.

What was lacking in the discussion: [372]

1.) A limit-case is first of all the one in which the same concrete "image" always recurs in the system of oculomotor modifications on the occasion of the same "eye-position" (or, if not, the deviations are not arbitrary but are determinately regulated under the concepts of movement, or qualitative change, or both). In the reduction to the optimum, again and again the same concrete optimum.

2.) Let us now assume "change." The visual sense-thing does not remain

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[1] Surely 1916. – Ed.

[2] The Roman numerals "I-III" refer to the levels of the constitution of space. *Cf.* Essay I, pp. 266ff. – Ed.

completely unchanged, and so its possibility is distinguished as a limit-possibility:

a) With all the oculomotor modifications, the structure remains identical as a Riemannian geometrical corporeality; i.e., all visual sense-structures recur cyclically again and again and lead ever again to the same optimum, but, on the contrary, the fillings do not. Therefore an independence of form from the filling.

b) The fillings, too. Thus we have here a new concept, that of the mere geometrical body, specifically as "stationary."

Once again a new limit-concept: the identical geometrical body, only now in movement. Or, rather, movement and rest are now first differentiated. Instead of the same structure recurring again and again with the oculomotor modifications, "the structure is displaced." Here I become aware that a change is already distinguished in the visual sense-field; the displacement of a field-concretum in the field; in the continuum, again and again the "same" structure (similarity) and similar or dissimilar total filling. Through oculomotor movements, I can "follow" the self-displacing structure. Here are constituted geometrical movement in opposition to rest as well as movement with or without a change in matter. As regards the latter, only a general rule predelineates how the form can be filled by content; otherwise, relative independence.

Every form can change or be preserved, and it can be preserved in the sense of geometrical similarity. Here, this has no constitutive significance, since to these changes, and likewise to the corresponding qualitative fillings and to their changes, there correspond no kinaesthetic motivations which would make them into adumbrations. That arises only in the system of Euclidean visual space.

APPENDIX XIII (TO ESSAY II, §4A)

ACTIVE AND PASSIVE LOCOMOTION.[1]

I walk (active locomotion)
I am moved (passive locomotion)

My Body, as the null-body, does not display any change of orientation. The special character of its modes of appearance in the *I turn, I rotate, I lean over*, and in similar "Bodily movements" must be described separately, in its own individuality, over and against the "rotations," etc., of other things, for these latter movements elapse in "rotations of orientation." [373]

With the turning of my Body I do not have a change of orientation which can be offset by my Bodily localized kinaesthesia. I can retrace every turning that I have Bodily carried out, every movement of the hands or feet, or else these movements can be retraced while I am passive. In the latter case, I do indeed have the inverse kinaesthesias, except that now they do not elapse in the freedom of the *I move* but "under compulsion" (which also needs to be described).

Therefore in kinaesthetically free action my Body has its special phenomena, and, first of all, there can be no question here of an appearance of Objective movement after the fashion of external things. My hand or my foot is moved like other things insofar as optically but also haptically (in touch, through the other, corresponding organs) I have kinaesthetically motivated modifications in orientation, ones I can retrace at any time.

I walk – all things in orientational modification.

I do not walk – all things offer the appearance of moving, of going past my Body. But not arbitrarily. I begin to "run," and all things change their "movements." I run in a certain way (rushing, locomotion), and all apparent movement (orientational movement) disappears.

That did not succeed. Yet I can intervene by changing my locomotion in such a way that I see: the annulment of the movement would reside in the line of an ideal increase.

But I experience the individual moving object: the moving train car. I jump aboard: "everything is moving," "I am stationary." I jump off: the car is moving between stationary or moving things. I run after it: it is stationary.

By means of locomotion I can change every individual movement into rest.

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[1] Surely 1926. – Ed.

But I can also change an apparent movement into rest – individually – by means of hand-movement, by means of arbitrary kinaesthesias. By means of locomotion I can do so not only for an individual moving thing (which demonstrates thereby its actual Objective movement), but instead I can thereby "set into motion" the entire world of appearance, or change its movement, or annul certain changes in its movement.

Active locomotion – a certain periodic kinaesthesia.

Passive locomotion – passive floating, the free-fall of a bird, or sliding down an incline, or attaching oneself to a moving body. Always the free possibility of offsetting (more or less, ideally with completeness), through active locomotion, what is happening there. That must be made crystal clear.

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