ANALYSES CONCERNING PASSIVE AND ACTIVE SYNTHESIS
Lectures on Transcendental Logic

EDMUND HUSSERL

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RUDOLF BERNET

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Lectures on Transcendental Logic

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EDMUND HUSSERL

ANALYSES CONCERNING PASSIVE AND ACTIVE SYNTHESIS
Lectures on Transcendental Logic

TRANSLATED BY

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For Joseph and Samara

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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

The *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* was Edmund Husserl's phenomenological investigation into the *origin of truth*. We find here an early indication of an historical reflection and the identification of a "crisis," the description of primordial dimensions of experience, the genealogy of judgment, and the employment of a new, genetic phenomenological method. While a large portion of the material comprised under this heading is a translation of Husserliana XI, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, it also includes essential additions to the main text of Husserl's lecture, some supplements, and a partial reorganization of the material.

The "Translator's Introduction" is offered as an orientation to this work. This Introduction is divided into four sections. Section 1 situates the work historically and conceptually, discusses its composition and revised title, and provides a basic overview of material making up this lecture. Section 2 situates the *Analyses* in the context of a genetic phenomenology, since it is this methodological approach that enables the description of phenomena treated in the *Analyses*. Section 3 elaborates upon the novel and significant themes in these lectures, such as passivity, affective allure, association, motivation, the unconscious, etc. Section 4 includes final editorial notes on the translation and my acknowledgements. Rather than reserving a special section to explain the translation of various key terms, I integrate this clarification into the course of the explications of sections 2 and 3, and on occasion, discuss them in footnotes appended to the translated text.

1. The Historical and Conceptual Context

Presented here as *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic* is one of Edmund Husserl's most renowned series of lectures presented in the 1920s.

Offered three times, Winter Semester 1920/21, Summer Semester 1923, and Winter Semester 1925/26, Husserl's lectures are virtually contemporaneous with writings devoted to the problem of "intersubjectivity" and "individuation" (1921–1927) his reflections on the reduction from *Erste Philosophie* (1923/24), and his considerations of cultural crises and its potential for renewal in the *Kaizo* articles (1922-24). As such, the *Analyses* occupy both an historical and a conceptual "middle point" of his work.

Historically speaking, the *Analyses* are situated between major, well-known published works. On the one hand, they arise twenty years after Husserl's ground-breaking *Logical Investigations* (1900/01), a decade and a half after his first lectures on time-consciousness (1905), and nearly ten years following his *Ideas* (1913); on the other, they precede by several years his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and his *Cartesian Meditations* (both from 1929), and they anticipate his *Crisis* (1934–37) by more than a decade.

While the major insights, novel notions, as well as the import and contribution of these lectures will be explained below, it is possible to say provisionally that these lectures also occupy a center point conceptually. As expressive, even exemplary of his genetic method, they succeed Husserl's earlier phenomenology of consciousness by surpassing both the Cartesian static analysis peculiar to the *Ideas* and the formalism of his early time-consciousness lectures, and they anticipate his generative investigations into intersubjectivity, history, and the lifeworld by initiating a regressive style of inquiry into origins that becomes the hallmark of Husserl's later undertakings in the *Crisis*.

Husserl's fame was well established by the time of these lectures. According to the *Quästurakten* or the "registrar's list" at Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg where Husserl held these lectures, Husserl had 176 persons in attendance the first time he gave them under the title of "Logik" in 1920/21, 133 enrolled in 1923 (now entitled "Ausgewählte phänomenologische Probleme" ["Selected Phenomenological Problems"]), and the numbers tallied 65 in 1925/26 in lectures newly entitled "Grundprobleme

der Logik" ["Fundamental Problems of Logic"].[1] A survey of these registrar's lists reveal a number of names familiar to those acquainted with the phenomenological tradition: Alfred Adler, Oskar Becker, Franz-Josef Brecht, Käthe Hamburger, Max Horkheimer, Fritz Kaufmann, Paul Landsberg, Walther Marseille, Arnold Metzger, Fritz Neumann, Hans Reiner, Wilhelm Szilassi (1920/21); Marvin Farber, Karl Hanser, Ludwig Landgrebe, Hasime Tanabe (1923), and Eugen Fink, (again, Ludwig Landgrebe), Walter Sachs (1925/26).

1. Passive Synthesis and Transcendental Logic

In recent years, these lectures have achieved a near legendary status under the shorthand rubric of "passive synthesis." How does a lecture series preoccupied with the general problem of logic win its world-wide renown as the "passive synthesis" lectures? There are at least two reasons for this, one editorial (a), one philosophical (b). After discussing these reasons, I explain the composition of this English edition and the reasons for its revised title.

A. One reason these lectures have come to be known as the "passive synthesis" lectures—a reason almost too obvious to mention—is due to the title assigned to them by the editor of Husserliana XI, Margot Fleischer, namely, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* (1966) [*Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*]. Why this title? The original titles Husserl gave to the lectures—"Logic," "Selected Phenomenological Problems," and "Fundamental Problems in Logic"—she notes, were simply too broad for the collection of texts that she assembled in the Husserliana volume. While the title "Transcendental Logic," which Husserl assigned to the lectures on the folders containing the manuscripts, did give them more specification, this was to her mind still too imprecise. Instead, she wished to capture the sense attributed to these investigations by Husserl himself, to wit, *Urkonstitutionen* or the analyses of primordial modes of constitution. And while she

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[1] I am grateful to the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg's Universitätsarchiv for providing me with the *Quästurakten* of these three semesters in question. I would also like to thank Sebastian Luft and Matthias Haenel for transcribing the lists from the Sütterlin handwriting.

could have also chosen the title "Transcendental Aesthetic" to evoke this sense of the investigations—a title suggested by the occurrence of this expression both in the *Analyses* and in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*—she thought that in the wake of Kant it would have given the reader a false impression of what was to be expected from this work. For these reasons, Fleischer settled on the expression "passive synthesis" for the title of this collection, uniting the main portion of the lectures she collated and the supplementary material. This expression is not unwarranted, for it occurs at least a half a dozen times throughout the work. It has *de facto* proved itself to be a title suited to the material selected for publication in Husserliana XI.

B. The title, however, is not the sole reason for these lectures to have acquired their acclaim as the "passive synthesis" work. While the issue of passive synthesis is a fundamental one and does occupy a large portion of Husserl's investigations in Husserliana XI, the context in which the lectures unfold is a broader one. This context, as intimated above, is *transcendental logic*.

Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (published in 1929) was conceived as an "Introduction" to phenomenology, and as such joins the *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas I*, and is later joined by *Cartesian Meditations* and the *Crisis*. In distinction to, e.g., *Ideas I*, the way into phenomenology takes place *via* the natural attitude, in particular, as it is functional in the mathematician and logician. While formal logic—understood both as the apophantic science of propositions and deductive relations as well as the formal ontology of individual objects—serves as the starting point of analysis, it cannot be seen as self-sufficient; it requires an investigation into subjective accomplishments that constitute mathematical and logical truths; it requires a "transcendental logic." But even this, writes Husserl, demands a deeper founding. For as a "critique" of the limits and capacities of logical reasoning, a transcendental logic must understand how a streaming egoic life of consciousness can be constituted as a true being, and it must do this by appealing to a theory of experience and actuality that

founds active cognition and its ideal objects (pp. 112, 259–60, 386).[2]

Thus, when considering the function of the *Analyses* in this broader context, we are witness to a peculiar, but almost typical phenomenological movement, a "zig-zag," if you will. Even though Husserl understood his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* as another "introduction" to phenomenology, and even though this work followed his lectures making up the *Analyses*, Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* itself can be read as an introduction to the project of the *Analyses*. Let me explain.

Husserl's actual "Introduction" to these lectures given in 1920/21 (included here in the English edition as "Main Text, Part 1," but published only as an appendix to Husserliana XVII, *Formale und Transcendentale Logik*) begins with a preliminary consideration of the term "logic." Tracing the term "logic" back to its Platonic founding and to its Greek roots in "*logos*," and then to the more original "λέγω" as "gathering together," and "expounding upon," Husserl detects in logic a vocation of the critical justification of reason, and as such, a vocation to be the science of all sciences (pp. 1, 8, 387). As a radical and universal *a priori* theory of science, logic is not to be understood merely as an axiomatic and formalistic deductive system, formed by abstracting general traits from existing or past sciences; for intrinsic to all factual sciences at our disposal is an animating teleological orientation. Even if we never encounter this teleological idea as such, it nonetheless functions guidingly and efficaciously—even if implicitly—when we practice science or operate from theoretical interest. If we find today that the sciences treat their objects of study in a detached, particularized, and fragmented manner, this would only be an expression of the way in which the particular sciences themselves become detached from "the aim, sense, and possibility of genuine science." They have lost the sense of *their own* orientation that ultimately gives them meaning and to which they refer back as indexes.

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[2] All references to the *Analyses* in the "Translator's Introduction" will given to this English edition.

Yet despite the fact that the particular sciences have abandoned their own normative sense, a phenomenological investigation will not simply do away with the sciences in their current cultural forms; they cannot simply be passed over in a fundamental analysis. For as scions of the instituting idea of logic, the special sciences still harbor their internal sense even in their self-forgetfulness. By examining them, and more specifically, by examining the science of logic as it has been handed down to us, we can gain a clue, a leading clue, to logic's vocation of critical self-justification and as the universal theory of principles and of norms of all sciences.

This self-forgetfulness and possibility of recovery, however, is not as innocent and facile as it seems. The tragedy we currently face, laments Husserl, is that the sciences have *inverted* the original relation between logic and science such that (1) the sciences have made themselves autonomous; in this ostensible, mystifying self-sufficiency and groundlessness, (2) they have become splintered in relation to each other; and in this process, (3) logic has been transformed into a sub-discipline of the sciences, a pragmatic technology borrowing its methods from mathematics, becoming a limited theoretical instrument brushed aside with scorn.

It is precisely through this inversion and its ramifications that the sciences have lost their internal sense and landed in a kind of self-forgetfulness of scientific objectivism. "In other words, logic, which was originally the torchbearer of method and which claimed to be the pure doctrine of principles of possible knowledge and science, lost this historical vocation and, understandably, remained far behind in its development" (p. 4). The paradox here is that the autonomy of the sciences from logic (logic as a justifying system of principles of all objective justification) has only a putative autonomy, one which exacerbates the sciences inability to emerge as self-sufficient, since they are completely ignorant of their own sense and without foundation. So, writes Husserl, while at first we novices are filled with enthusiasm in engaging in the positive sciences, we end up being deeply dissatisfied because we do not become wiser and better through them, as is clearly their pretension (p. 6).

For Husserl, the fact that we were no longer moving in the same direction sketched out by this optimal idea of logic suggests that a rupture, a constitutive abnormality, has ensued, one which we might call a crisis in the "spiritual common good of humanity" (p. 28). But provided that we want to be more than mere professionals, specialists, and academics, provided that we want to take ourselves as human beings "in the full and highest sense," we are called upon to "raise ourselves above the self-forgetfulness of the theoretician ... who knows nothing of his accomplishment and of the motivations compelling them, who lives in them, but does not have a thematic view of this accomplishing life itself" (pp. 5).[3]

Phenomenology as transcendental philosophy wants to recover the philosophical spirit of logic. The way proposed to do so in these lectures is a genetic one. Though I will say more in section 2 of the "Translator's Introduction" regarding genetic method, let me remark here in a general manner that by clarifying its *origins*, not as something static, but as origins that are originating, we can recover the lost sense of logic, a sense that remains obfuscated in the present sciences. In this way we are in a position to discover the presuppositions of logic by investigating the genetic formations of sense.

Only a transcendental logic can be an ultimate theory of science, for it treats the objects of thought precisely as accomplishments of the activity of thinking. Transcendental phenomenology makes such a theory of science possible because it inquires back from ready-made propositions, from theories "already there," to thinking life in which these formations are accomplished; it goes back still more deeply from the givenness of all types of objects that underlie possible theories to the experiencing life in which those objects are pregiven, and most radically, it understands how the life of consciousness itself can be

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[3] It is not a mere coincidence that the issues of self-forgetfulness and the call for us to become more profoundly human are echoed in other articles Husserl penned during the early 1920s, namely, his "Kaizo" articles (1922-24). The Kaizo articles (Hua XXVII), which also presuppose a genetic method, are concerned specifically with the crisis of human culture and its "renewal" as an ethical humanity. See my "The Project of Ethical Renewal and Critique: Edmund Husserl's Early Phenomenology of Culture," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1994), 449-64.

constituted as a "true being," as an ideal correlate of possible verifications (p. 259–60).

In order to undertake a transcendental logic, "tremendous transcendental-phenomenological preliminary work must be accomplished" (p. 7). This preliminary work entails, in part, tracing the accomplishments of thinking to their genetic origins in *passive*, pre-cognitive syntheses. In moving from the dimension of the constituted to the constituting, Husserl incorporates a regressive, archeological movement from the *active* cognitive dimensions to the passive kinaesthetic ones. It is in this sense that the project as it actually took shape in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* becomes an introduction to and preparatory for the *Analyses*. But equally, this beginning regressive movement also has to be understood as preparatory for the inverse direction that the *Analyses* will take for their explicative method.

Once we have regressed back to the origins of the great world of constituting life, we describe this life "by beginning from below and ascending upward, to show how genuine thinking in all its levels emerges here, how it is motivated and is built-up in its founded accomplishment" from the most basic structures of consciousness (pp. 32 and 607 fn. 93), tracing the "storied structure of constitution" (p. 270). The *Analyses* undertake the task of a "transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic" as founding for a transcendental-phenomenological logic, thus investigating the systematic connections of passive sense formation. Only from the sphere of passivity, contends Husserl, can we grasp the most fundamental of all shortcomings in the foundation of traditional logic, one that concerns the validity of logical norms, and the ultimate principle of logical norms, namely, the principle of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle (pp. 143, 149, 386). A genetic method allows us to elucidate the dynamic formations of sense in the passive sphere as foundational for logic. For this reason, "paradoxically," a critique of the ideal structures of logical reason which takes as its point of departure the investigations into a formal and transcendental logic cannot be

limited to the sphere of logic; it demands a transcendental aesthetic.[4]

Described as a "transcendental aesthetic," the tremendous preliminary work mentioned above entails not merely recovering the foundation for active syntheses and cognitive operations, but of describing the passive sphere of experience in its own integrity, its own essential laws and contributions in the constitution of evidence, and the modalizations of evidence peculiar to it. A transcendental aesthetic within a genetic methodological register will bracket all judicative knowing, determinative and predicative thought, and focus on the occurrences of apperception in general, the objects of possible perception that have the sense-form of time and the sense-shape of spatiality, and investigate how sense unities are constituted through associative syntheses. It will require investigations into the structure of sensibility as the continual constitution of space and time through self-temporalization in time-consciousness and lived-bodily kinaesthesis (pp. 444–45).

Extending to all features of space-time constitution, a transcendental aesthetic will broach even a generative analysis of the constitution of space and time in terms of earth-ground and world-horizon, investigating lifeworlds in terms of their normative significance as "home" and "alien."[5] The *Analyses* from the 1920s dealing with "passive synthesis" did not go this far, and stays for all practical purposes on the level of genetic phenomenology, that is, within the span of individual facticity or the intragenerational constitution of community.

On the one hand, by understanding the tenor of this genetic methodological movement that underlies the *Analyses*, we have

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[4] In a manuscript belonging to the *Analysen* (F I 37, 68b), Husserl referred to his phenomenology of experience—in distinction to Kant—as a "new transcendental aesthetic." See the "Introduction" to Edmund Husserl, *Lezioni sulla sintesi passiva*, trans., Vincenzo Costa (Milano: Edizioni Angelo Guerine e Associati, 1993) p. 29, fn. 14.

[5] In a manuscript stemming from 1930 or 1931 that deals with the generative phenomena of homeworld and alienworld, Husserl notes: "Important for the method of the constitutive, correlative structure of the transcendental aesthetic—that is, of the correlative system of validity of the world as the world of experience" (Hua XV, p. 214 fn. 1). And in a similar context of elucidating the constitution of a homeworld, Husserl writes: "This becomes the task of a *transcendental aesthetic* ..." (Hua XV, pp. 234 ff). See also p. 632 fn. 102.

some further philosophical justification for these lectures having acquired their fame as the "passive synthesis" lectures. But the explication of passive synthesis does not complete the *Analyses*, since a transcendental aesthetic must ascend upwards to a transcendental logic, and thus is situated concretely within the problematic of a transcendental logic. To this extent, the rubric of passive synthesis though accurate also misses the broader context of his lectures. This is especially poignant with the inclusion of new manuscript materials that belong to this lecture series. As I will note below, the new material concerns the role of active synthesis and motivation for the constitution of formal ontologies.

In addition to Husserl's actual "Introduction," the material that is published here as Part 3, bearing on active synthesis, demands situating these passive synthesis texts in their original, proper, and broader context, and modifying the title of the edition to reflect this framework. To keep a continuity with the Husserliana edition, its title, and the recognition it has attained internationally under the rubric of "passive synthesis," but also to reflect its context and the content of the new material that completes the lecture series, I have, in consultation with the Husserl-Archives in Leuven, modified the title of the English edition: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Let me now turn to the composition of this edition and what appears under this title.

2. The Composition of the Analyses

What is published as Husserliana XI is not the complete lecture series Husserl delivered in the 1920s, but a portion of it, supplemented by relevant appendices and essays. The English edition includes all the material published in Husserliana XI, along with four new manuscript texts, two of which complete the lecture series (Parts 1 and 3 of the Main Text), and another two that complement the supplementary materials. I will mention these texts in the course of explaining the composition of the *Analyses*.

(i) *Main Texts*. The first new text included in this edition is Husserl's actual "Introduction" to these lectures already mentioned above. Entitled here, "Preliminary Considerations of a Trans-

cendental Logic," Part 1 sets up the framework for Husserl's phenomenology, his genetic investigations into the context of transcendental logic, and shows the necessity of beginning with an inquiry into the associative laws of passive synthesis or a transcendental aesthetic. This text from 1920/21, stemming from the manuscript F I 37 was published only in 1974 as an appendix to the Husserliana edition of *Formale und transzendentale Logik.*

Part 2, as noted, represents the main text of Husserliana XI and stems partly from manuscript F I 37, but mostly from F I 38. To fit into the comprehensive framework of Husserl's reflections, I have given this Part the subtitle, "Passive Synthesis: Toward a Transcendental Aesthetic." Here, Husserl discusses the problem of evidence, of modalization, articulates his phenomenology of association, and describes the roles of affection and attention for the constitution of sense, and eventually for the constitution and genesis of a phenomenological in-itself.[6] Since I will discuss some of its main themes below in section 3 of this "Introduction," let me highlight the second new addition to this volume.

The second new addition, included here as Part 3: "Active Syntheses: Toward a Transcendental, Genetic Logic," has been recently published as *Aktive Synthesen: Aus der Vorlesung "Transzendentale Logik." 1920/21. Ergänzungsband zu den "Analysen zur passiven Synthesis"* (Kluwer, 2000). Edited by Roland Breeur, this manuscript stems primarily from the signature F I 39 and originally belonged to the same series of lectures that make up the *Analyses* from 1920/21.[7] As Breeur notes, the fact that Husserl both continued to rework this Part and to integrate it into the new pagination of his lecture material (even though he presumably had to leave it out of his subsequent lecture due to

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6 A very small portion, approximately 28 out of 220 Husserliana printed pages of this Part 2 (from the Division on "Modalization") was taken by Landgrebe and used for *Erfahrung und Urteil*, though the order of presentation in the later does not often correspond to the presentation in Husserliana XI. See D. Lohmar, "Zur Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk *Erfahrung und Urteil*," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 13 (1996), 31-71.

7 When Landgrebe edited *Erfahrung und Urteil*, he also drew from Ms. F I 39 that makes up this Part 3. The portion taken equals approximately 31 pages of *Erfahrung und Urteil*. See Lohmar, "Zur Entstehung." Again, Landgrebe selected and published the material in a different order.

lack of time) supports the view that the entire lecture series demands being treated as an integral whole, and accordingly demands being presented under the same cover.[8]

Part 2 traces the constitution of sense through passive associative syntheses leading up to the constitution of the object as such through acts of remembering and expectation. Part 3 picks up on this transition from the passive to the active spheres and describes various levels of "objectivation." Thus, we have the movement from the perceptual to the judicative, from the pre-predicative to the predicative realms, or the genesis of the in-itself or true being. Active objectivation, as I will note below, can take shape with a mix of passive and active syntheses, although the overwhelming contribution here is by means of active, categorial syntheses, culminating in conceptualizing judgment, in particular, the realm of universal judging for all possible objectlike formations, the classification of their relations, and thus, the transcendental grounding of formal logic.

It is within this framework of Husserl's lectures on "Transcendental Logic" that the manuscripts in question rejoin their appropriate context. These three Parts (with two new additions) give the most complete presentation of Husserl's lecture series to date. As a whole, it makes up the Main Text of this volume.

(ii) *Supplementary Texts*. The second half of this edition entitled "Supplementary Texts" is divided into four sections. While Parts 1 and 2 of the Main Text date back to 1920/21, Husserl—in his own words—"unfortunately reworked" it in 1923 and "partly improved, partly spoiled" §§12 - 40 of Part 2 in 1925/26.[9] Section 1 of the Supplementary Texts reproduces the earliest original version of this segment of lectures from 1920/21; the passages printed here in italics are the passages left in tact by Husserl and reappropriated in the subsequent lecture of 1925/26.

Section 2 of the supplementary materials are the "Appendices." They include all the appendices originally edited by Fleischer and all those edited by Breeur in the *Ergänzungsband* that accompany

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[8] See Breeur, "Vorwort des Herausgebers," p. i.

[9] From the "Textkritische Anmerkungen" Hua XI, 445.

Part 3 of the Main Text.[10] By placing all the appendices directly after both versions of the lecture series, I depart from the order given them in Husserliana XI; I place them here because the first two sections of the Supplementary Texts make up a subsection of manuscripts that either have a direct connection to the Main Text (i.e., its earlier draft) or make direct editorial references to the Main Text.

Also included under the heading of Supplementary Texts, but without the same kind of direct reference to the Main Text are two further sections. Section 3 presents two supplementary essays provided by Fleischer that stem primarily from F I 37 and F I 38, with a date of 1920/21, with some pages possibly originating from 1923. These texts, "Perception and its Self-Giving," and "Consciousness and Sense—Sense and Noema," concern the nature of perception, time-consciousness, and the constitution of an objective sense.

The last section of the Supplementary Texts supplies texts that bear generally on phenomenological method, and in particular on the relation between "static and genetic" phenomenology and the phenomenon of genesis. The presentation of this section departs from the original German edition in two ways. First, whereas Fleischer included only one text on static and genetic method from 1921, the English edition includes two additional ones that are companions to the first, stemming from the same manuscript B III 10, but published separately in 1973 in Husserliana XIV, ed., Iso Kern.[11]

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[10] The appendices to Part 2 of the Main text are taken primarily from manuscripts D 19, F I 37, F I 38, and F I 29, but also from A VI 32, A VI 33, D 6, D 13, B III 12; those to Part 3 stem principally from F I 39, but with excerpts from F I 37 and A III 11.

[11] The first two longer essays Husserl wrote at St. Margen in 1921; the third shorter one carries a possible date of 1923 and makes an allusion to the lectures mentioned above entitled, "Einleitung in die Philosophie" from F I 29. The two not originally published in Hua XI (the second and third essays) are both taken from Hua XIV.

There is one other manuscript on static and genetic method belonging to this cluster of writings on static and genetic method, B III 10, entitled, "Statische und genetische phänomenologische Methode. Eingeborenheit. Genesis von Apperzeptionen. Allgemeinster Begriff von Apperzeption" ["Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method. Innateness. Genesis of Apperceptions. The Most General Concept of Apperception."]; it is, however, unavailable for this edition.

Finally, there are other texts dealing with static and genetic method dating from the 1930s, but they are beyond the scope of the material covering this translation.

Second, rather than being placed in the middle of the edition, preceding the appendices, the English edition positions them at the very end. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, as indicated, these writings on method stem from a different set of manuscripts, the B III 10 series and are not part of the lecture series on "Transcendental Logic." Second, these manuscripts focus explicitly on the question of genesis as a theme for phenomenology and on the difference between static and genetic phenomenological methods. In fact, they represent the *first explicit formulation* of this difference. To locate them in the middle of the volume risks losing them among *thematic* matters, when the question of *method*, genetic method, is essential to the undertaking of the *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* and actually makes them possible. Hence, though they are placed at the end of the edition, they deserve their own prominence in the constellation of issues raised in the *Analyses*.

Because genetic method is at the heart of these lectures, and in order to compensate for the sketchiness of Husserl's presentation of the ideas surrounding static and genetic phenomenology, I devote the next section of this "Introduction" to clarifying the question of method, with a particular emphasis on the difference between static and genetic methods.

2. Genesis and Genetic Phenomenological Method

It would be misleading to characterize phenomenological method only as a way of circumscribing modes of givenness, since the phenomenal field on its own part can overstep the bounds of a pronounced or presupposed methodological orientation, demanding the formulation of a new methodology. This is the position in which we find Husserl and his phenomenological philosophy by 1921. For it was at this time that Husserl was led to formulate explicitly the difference between static and genetic phenomenological methods.

Husserl's writings on static and genetic method not only mark Husserl's explicit effort to formulate systematically a difference internal to phenomenological method in terms of the static and the genetic, they also show the distinctive traits of each method, how

the methods are to be organized in terms of the motivational descriptor of guiding threads or "leading clues." To question back is to question after founding relations of validity, and this for Husserl means an inquiry into genesis.

To be sure, Husserl was not the first to distinguish between static and genetic elements of experience. Husserl himself suggests this by referring to the difference between static and genetic method in the same terms Dilthey used for psychology, namely, as "descriptive" [*beschreibende*] and "explanatory" [*erklärende*].[12] Lurking in the background is not only Dilthey, but also Brentano and his distinction between descriptive psychology and genetic and physiological psychology.[13]

To cite these historical precedents is to acknowledge that phenomenology did not develop in a vacuum; but it does not mitigate the originality of Husserl's own phenomenological distinctions no matter how tardy they may seem to the contemporary reader. Because Husserl had described genetic matters that exceeded the scope of static constitution, including phenomena like apperception, normality and abnormality, kinaesthesis, association, etc.—phenomena that came under the general title of "primordial constitution"—Husserl was provoked by the very matters themselves to catch up reflectively with his own descriptions. This means that Husserl had undertaken genetic analyses implicitly without phenomenology having been explicitly cognizant of itself as having this genetic methodological dimension, and that the distinction between static and genetic methods is internal to the movement of phenomenology.[14]

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[12] See Wilhlem Dilthey, "Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie" (1894) in *Gesammelte Schriften: Band 5. Die Geistige Welt*, ed., Georg Misch (Göttigen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957), 139-240. Whereas Dilthey takes description as interpretive description and explanation as something the natural sciences do, Husserl takes descriptive phenomenology in a narrower, "static" sense in order to contrast it with a genetic phenomenological research perspective that takes up an interpretative position with respect to the teleological genesis of sense. See Robert Scharff, "Non-Analytic, Unspeculative Philosophy of History: The Legacy of Wilhelm Dilthey," *Cultural Hermeneutics* (1976): 295-331.

[13] Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, second edition (Leipzig: Meiner, 1924).

[14] T. Sakakibara gives us one example of this, locating Husserl's turn to a genetic phenomenology in Husserl's concept of the pure ego with its habitualities both from the

Looking back from our privileged perspective, with the distinction between static and genetic method and matters already in hand, we can say that Husserl's initial preoccupation was with matters and an approach that are "static." By static we understand two things: first, a constitutive approach that is concerned with *how* something is given or *modes* of givenness, and second, a concern with *essential structures*. In Husserl's terminology, a static method can address both strictly "phenomenological" (i.e., constitutive) as well as "ontological" (i.e., essential) dimensions of experience. Thus, a static approach can interrogate the interplay of intention and fulfillment, the meant features of an object, the noetic qualities of an act, etc., as well as the structural or essential possibilities of the particular object or act within the intentional correlation. Here one would examine the structures and the being of these structures (for example, formal and material essences, typicalities, regions, etc.).

The fact that Husserl actually began from a static research perspective betrays the following two-fold methodological prejudice: First, it was assumed that it is better to begin with constitutive questions rather than taking the being of things for granted, that is, it is more helpful to see how sense as constitut*ed* is given to the constitut*ing* pole of experience, and *then* to proceed to structural or ontological questions. Second, it was assumed that it is better, constitutively, to proceed with something at rest rather than something in process; it is advantageous to begin with the "simple," and then advance to the "complex." Accordingly, Husserl granted a methodological priority to an investigation into constitutive problems that did not broach the question of temporal genesis.

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pencil manuscripts of *Ideas II* (1912) and in the main manuscript for Division 3 of *Ideas II* (1913) concerning the constitution of the spiritual world. See Tetsuya Sakakibara, "Das Problem des Ich und der Ursprung der genetischen Phänomenologie bei Husserl," in *Husserl Studies* Vol. 14, No. 1 (1997), 21-39.

Moreover, at least on Husserl's own account, his distinction between static and genetic matters pre-dates even this. For example, in June, 1918, Husserl writes to Paul Natorp that "... already, for more than a decade, I have overcome the level of static Platonism and have situated the idea of transcendental genesis in phenomenology as its main theme." Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel. Band V: Die Neukantianer*, ed., Karl Schuhmann (Boston: Kluwer, 1994), 137.

By genesis Husserl understands three variations of experience: (1) genesis within the purely active sphere of experience where the ego functions in rational acts, (2) genesis between the active and passive spheres of experience, where one traces the origins of activity in passivity (or between the judicative in the perceptual spheres of experience), and finally, (3) "primordial constitution" as a phenomenology of passive experience, including apperception, motivation, affection and association, kinaesthesis, etc. Ultimately these three dimensions of genesis are bound to the analysis of the genesis of the monad (a point that I address below).

The fact that Husserl began with static structures and a static model of constitution and not genesis does not mean that genesis was absent from the horizon of his thought, for *to prefer* stasis, even if it be in the form of ignorance, is already to acknowledge the problem of genesis for later work, implicitly rooting the problem of stasis in that of genesis—something that Husserl himself came to see. It is for this reason that Husserl provocatively asks whether one could even undertake a static phenomenology with the genetic dimension being fully suspended (see pp. 630f. and 633).

As noted, Husserl thought that the best way to handle more complex matters in phenomenology (like the problem of self-temporalization, or later the problem of cultural communities and historicity, in short, "generativity") was to prepare the groundwork with static investigations. Following such "preparatory" work, it would be suitable to proceed to higher constitutive levels of analysis.

Yet it was only after explicitly tackling the problems of genesis and more "complex" features of experience that Husserl *retroactively* understood the problem of genesis not to be more complex than that of stasis, but rather, more *concrete* and more fundamental. Likewise, static matters were no longer seen to be "simple," but now more *abstract*. This inversion was only discerned after having arrived explicitly at genesis through the leading clue of stasis, even though one could in no way derive genesis from stasis. Genesis has to be seen as more fundamental than stasis, though pedagogically, stasis guided us to the problem of genesis.

Ontological questions, questions concerning the being of things as they can be presented in the natural attitude, function as "leading clues" to constitutive questions, both static and genetic ones. While Husserl was initially wary of genesis (at least in the *Logical Investigations*, since empirical psychology imputed to ideal objects a subjective genesis in consciousness instead of taking logical entities as self-given to consciousness), he did confront the problem of genesis in a forceful manner after 1915. This is not to say that there are no themes peculiar to the problem of genesis earlier, say, as early as the *Logical Investigations* (1900-1) with his notion of motivation or association, or his *Thing and Space* (1907) with descriptions of the kinetic syntheses of perception and kinaesthesis. Husserl's own point is that these and similar analyses are still too implicit and abstract. Even Husserl's work on time-consciousness from his *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* is not really a full-fledged genetic analysis because it is too formal: "Mere form is admittedly an abstraction, and thus from the very beginning the analysis of the intentionality of time-consciousness and its accomplishment is an analysis that works on [the level of] abstractions" (pp. 173).

Remaining solely on the level of the temporal modes of givenness like impression, retention, protention, is still too formal, too abstract, and it is not until we get to the problems of association and affection, and the individuation of the monad that the problem of genesis really comes into play. This is due to the fact that an inquiry into the question of constitution is not necessarily an inquiry into the problem of genesis: "... attending to constitution is not attending to genesis, which is precisely the genesis of constitution and operates as genesis in a monad" (see pp. 644 and 639). The matter of genetic phenomenology, then, concerns monadic individuation and its genesis. What is monadic genesis?

The monad is a process of becoming in one unique time with one unique ego. As temporally enduring, the monad is not confined to a Now-point or a collocation of Nows, but exists as having been, a having been that transcends the past toward a futural becoming. As a uniform temporal form by virtue of horizons everything is related and interconnected to everything

else in the dynamic unity of the monad. The monad is a "living unity" capable of having dispositions that are "unconscious." It is true that habitualities as the precipitations of acts are no longer actively conscious since they have receded from the living present and can become sedimented to the null-point of active vivacity; nevertheless, there is a dynamic interplay between act and affection because as expressing an "abiding style" or "abiding *habitus*," the habitual character of the monad can affectively provoke sense, prefiguring a perceptual or even judicative world from the density of that personal character that is not egoic. This density, by which the monad retains its identity passively and that is in part formative of the active ego, points to the concrete individuation of the monad: the fact that the monad is a unique "unity of its living becoming," a unity of its "sedimented history" that it bears as a heritage of the past (see pp. 635 and 637f.). Phenomenology of genesis then is the phenomenology of the primordial becoming in time, of the genesis of one shape of consciousness emerging from another, acquiring a temporal opacity. In short, it is a phenomenology of what Husserl calls at this time, "facticity."

In an important and revealing appendix to the *Analyses* (Appendix 8)—the longest one in this collection—Husserl describes the peculiar temporality of the individual within a genetic register. Transcendental subjectivity (i.e., the "natural" individual as clarified in terms of its constitutive powers and limits—neither the mundane nor the phenomenologizing ego), Husserl writes, neither is born nor dies. This immortality of the individual is due to two things. First, as transcendental subjectivity, the individual is constitutive of time, is the source of temporalization, and to this extent cannot be contained within time.[15]

Second, it presupposes that the phenomenological investigations are limited precisely by genetic parameters, parameters articulated by the former constitutive issues. Static phenomenology, let us recall, cannot account for any constitutive disruptions beyond the living present; here something like sleep would be a

[15] Making explicit an earlier insight in the time-consciousness lectures that consciousness as self-temporalizing cannot be understood as "temporal." See PCIT, 88, 345f .

constant barrier to analysis. Genetic phenomenology, however, can give an account of how remembering can potentially span constitutive gaps like sleep, fainting spells, etc. (pp. 151f.), but it cannot cover more radical breaks like birth and death. Only when phenomenology is broadened and deepened to a generative dimension do birth and death become integrated into constitutive world features because now one investigates the constitutive sense of the individual being constituted within generative homeworlds and alienworlds, hence, admitting of transcendental successors and progenitors, the phenomena of sharing births and deaths, being constituted by another (say, *as* "father" by a child), etc.[16] Within a genetic phenomenology, however, it is quite correct to insist on the immortality of transcendental subjectivity.

Transcendental subjectivity, as individuated in its personal orientation, is the concrete monad. But this concreteness is not tantamount to independence. Husserl writes, for example, that in contrast to his contention in the Third Logical Investigation (and in *Ideas I*, § 15, as well), what is concrete should be regarded as non-independent; only an analysis that makes abstractions can view "phases" as if they were concrete and independent. This holds not only for the temporal phases of impression, retention, and protention in relation to the concrete unity of the living present, or living presents as phases in relation to the concrete monad, but *mutatis mutandis* for the phases of individuated monads in relation to an intermonadic community (see p. 639). Through a genetic account of monadic genesis, a static, one-sided account of intersubjectivity is implicitly called into question.

Although Husserl distinguished between two different methodological orientations, simply naming two different methodological dimensions is not sufficient for describing the (structural) differences between stasis and genesis, for this would still remain static. Rather the very formulation of static and genetic methods and matters itself demands articulating the relation between static and genetic methods, that is, it itself requires a *genetic* description. The questions to be handled now concern "how the investigations

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[16] See my "Liminality and Liminal Experience" in *Alter: revue de phénoménologie*, 6 (1998), 275-296.

are to be ordered," and working out the order of these "necessary phenomenological investigations" entails addressing "the leading clues of the system" (see pp. 633).

Expressing the differences between static and genetic methods in a relation of *leading clue* produces a ripple effect within transcendental method. First, one does not only move progressively from constitutive phenomenology to eidetic considerations, but now regressively from the natural attitude and essential structures (and the sciences of those structures) to constitutive matters. "Beginning with the natural attitude, one can also take the 'natural concept of the world' [i.e., the lifeworld] as a leading clue" (p. 633).[17] One begins with static method as eidetic analysis, which can take place "naively" within the natural attitude and all its rich implications, and then submit these results to a constitutive, properly speaking phenomenological analysis. And he writes: "*Is not static phenomenology precisely the phenomenology of leading clues*, the phenomenology of the constitution of leading types of objects in their being ..." (p. 644)? Within a static register now, one moves regressively to constitutive phenomenology.

Second, although we can find such a methodological reconfiguration implicitly at the conclusion of *Ideas I* as Husserl prepares to launch into a regional ontology of *Ideas II*, this reconfiguration of transcendental method comes into sharper focus for Husserl when the entire static method of investigation is placed in a relation of leading clue to genetic method. Here static ontology is not merely a leading clue to constitutive problems in general, but static constitution also becomes a leading clue to genesis. "Another constitutive phenomenology" named "phenomenology of genesis" is one that works from results of static constitutive phenomenology; a genetic phenomenology follows the histories of the constitution of objects that are there for the concrete monad as well as traces the genetic "history" of the monad itself (see p. 634).

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[17] This is evocative of what Husserl calls in his *Crisis* writings an "ontology of the lifeworld"; see esp. § 51.

Third, once Husserl has discussed the problem of genetic method and its matters in relation to static method and its matters, and has done this as a relation of leading clue, a peculiar reassessment takes shape. I have already noted that the "higher" more complex phenomena of genesis are now seen as more fundamental; in relation to them, static phenomena are grasped *as* "finished," as abstractions from temporality. But to recognize this is to reverse the direction of "leading clue." For now it is genesis that orders the investigation into static constitution and into structure. Now one must inquire into the essential relations on the basis of phenomena that are disclosed genetically; this may entail, as it did for Husserl, that one revise the previous results of static analyses *from the perspective of genesis*, but which nevertheless had served formerly as a leading clue to genesis. This is the reason one can move from a genetic constitutive analysis back to an eidetic analysis, back to examining invariant structures in the natural attitude, back to empirical sciences, etc. It is also now that we are able to grapple with both the genesis of structure (i.e., the structure of monadic individuation) as well as the very structure of genesis.

The essays on method by Husserl presented here as a capstone to this English edition give us a privileged and crucial glimpse into a pivotal moment in phenomenology. Such an introductory sketch of the background, import, and implications Husserl's distinction between static and genetic phenomenological methods alerts one all the more to what both needs and can be said about this issue. But even with more said, the formulation of static and genetic methods would not be the ultimate story told for phenomenology—if indeed one could give an exhaustive narrative of the generation of phenomenology and its possibilities. It does, nevertheless, provide an opening for various novel themes that lie at the heart of the *Analyses* and that animates its very enterprise. It is to an explication of some of these key themes that I now turn.

3. Novel Themes in the *Analyses*

An overwhelming proportion of Husserl's writings were never intended for publication; many have the tenor of experimental

investigations, often challenging the reader with repetitions, sharp transitions, laconic phrasing, and incomplete sentences. Husserl would take up a theme, develop it, consider it from different angles, relate it to other themes (sometimes even irreconcilably), let it ferment for a time, and pick it up even years later.

Because of the relative dearth of material published during his own life time, the difficulties involved in editing his work, and various contingencies associated with what actually does make it to print, we have labored under a myopic view of Husserl's work as merely a philosophy of consciousness, an egological solipsism, or a transcendental idealism detached from everyday life experience.

But as more and more of his writings have been published and translated, we have gained an appreciably broader and more complex view of Husserl's work than we had, say, in the middle part of the Twentieth Century. We have learned, for example, that Husserl penned literally thousands of pages, not only on well-known themes like the reduction and the lifeworld, but on the issue of intersubjectivity: not simply as the relation of ego to alter ego, but as an interrelation of geo-historical homeworlds and alienworlds; he devoted years to the problem of the lived-body and kinaesthesis, normality and abnormality, the primordial constitution of spatiality and temporality; he dealt prolifically with the problem of ethics, God, aesthetics, etc.

The *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* is a privileged work, not merely because it enacts a genetic method, but also because it introduces genetic themes, themes that for the English reader cast a new light on what phenomenological research entailed.

What we are privy to here are extremely intricate analyses of phenomenological matters that pertain to the structure of intentionality, evidence, and types of modalization as they are integrated into a genetic phenomenology of association, and as they unfold in both passive and active spheres of experience. In this section of my "Introduction," I deal with themes that are developed in the *Analyses* that might be less familiar to English reader, thus warranting some brief orientation to them. Such an orientation is not intended to be exhaustive. By selecting these

themes, however, I want to indicate the main efforts at work in this text. Throughout this explication, I will introduce several key terms and in this connection mention and/or explain the reasons for their translation. I address these themes under two main headings, (A) passivity and passive synthesis, (B) affection and association.

A. Passivity and Passive Synthesis

Passivity designates a dimension of experience that a regressive inquiry into origins unearths, and which serves as a point of departure for an explicative genetic account that traces motivations leading back "up" to cognitive activity. More particularly, passivity is that realm in which, through fundamental laws of association, affective forces spur an egoic attentiveness to objects, enabling acts of remembering and expectation to constitute objects as such, i.e., as in-themselves-for-us. This summation, however, still leaves the concept of passivity shrouded in ambiguity. For granted that passivity might be a relatively unfamiliar theme to us, for his part, Husserl also overburdens the term with a significance that is at best multivalent, and quite often, cryptic and vague. While Husserl does not explicitly delineate the meanings of passivity when he uses this term, it is possible to discern five distinctive, albeit interrelated meanings. This clarification of passivity will help to elucidate the significance of other key conceptions, like affection and association.

1. By passivity we understand a *lawful, fundamental regularity* in the way in which sense is constituted, particularly, as a mode of sense-*genesis*. This enables Husserl to speak of genesis in terms of "passive genesis". Moreover, since there is also a genesis peculiar to activity, Husserl will refer to the passive genesis as "primordial genesis" and this constitution of sense as "primordial constitution," and sometimes "pre-constitution."

On the side of the subject, or noetically, this fundamental regularity gets expressed as the way in which a present perception passes over into a retentionally lingering perception and fades back as a fundamental form of the past, linking up with previous retentions, motivating protentions or futurally directed intentions.

Such a formal lawful regularity or time-consciousness provides the primordial form of the constitution of the unity and identity of an object, as well as the forms of connection, coexistence and succession. Not only active syntheses, but passive ones as well function to form intelligible, meaningful wholes out of diverse manifolds.

On the side of the object, or noematically, this is articulated genetically in terms of the concordance or discordance of appearances, that is, the way appearances synthetically relate to one another in harmonious or disharmonious manners, forming synthetic unities of identity and heterogeneous fields of difference. Thus, if an appearance shows up that does not fulfill what was prefigured or sketched out by the past happenings—so that the sense gets "crossed-out" rather than fulfilled—Husserl will speak of a "passive modalization." Modalization is an experience of "otherwise," and arises when a new givenness challenges the intended straightforward presentation of sense. It can do this by annulling, suspending, or by crossing out the intended sense. But this modalization, which is concretely a question of genesis, also radiates back into the retentional phases themselves, preserves the old sense *as* crossed out, superimposing and reconfiguring a new sense through a "retroactive crossing out".

Evidence, on the other hand, is seeing the self of the object as it is meant in the on-going fulfilling, synthetic realization of the self of the object. "Confirmation" is a special synthetic function of corroboration that takes place in the passing of perception from phase to phase, a distinctive process of ratifying experience in a concordant manner peculiar to the passive sphere of experience. Distinguished from this is a ratifying experience belonging to the active sphere that Husserl calls "verification," and that requires various levels of cognitive interventions.

2. Husserl means by passivity a sphere of experience in which the *"ego" is not active*, i.e., *does not creatively participate or actively orient itself* in the constitution of sense. Here, "passive syntheses" refer to productions of sense formed through associative connections that take place prior to the occurrences of "higher lying activities," which in their turn cognitively fix a common element or actively make comparisons. Passivity,

however, does not mean that no ego is present, but only that the ego is not engaged in active participation.[18] This leads Husserl to a paradoxical formulation of the process as an "active passivity" in order to characterize a constitution and acquisition of sense that is, on the one hand, not nothing and is also somehow "subjective" (since there is in the intentionality of drive, or tendencies of desire toward an objectlike formation), but which, on the other hand, does not stem from "an activity proceeding from the ego."[19]

Seeking some historical anchorage for his concept of passivity, Husserl appeals to the notion of "productive synthesis" in Kant's First Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. A productive synthesis, he writes, "is nothing other than what we call passive constitution, nothing other than the team-work ... of the constantly higher developing intentionalities of passive consciousness ..." (p. 410). Husserl cites the A edition of the *Critique* because Kant speaks of a faculty, the power of imagination, that is independent of the Understanding rather than being subordinate to and a function of the Understanding. Whereas the understanding has the spontaneous character of *active syntheses* that hold together and connect the sensuous manifold according to rules, sensibility has the character of *passivity*, since the inner and outer senses merely receive sense data. In this case, of course, the expression, "passive synthesis" is oxymoronic from a Kantian perspective.

But Husserl's analyses of "*passive* synthesis" challenge this schism between the sensibility and the understanding by describing intentionality as the interplay of intention and fulfillment as they both pertain to the perceptual and the cognitive spheres of experience. If truth is not alien to the sphere of sensibility (any more than intuition is to judgment), then passive syntheses are not without epistemic import, and a transcendental aesthetic cannot be foreign to the problems of truth, evidence, and their modalizations. Sensibility does make a contribution to the acquisition of knowledge, and an enterprise that wants to determine the limits, powers, and conditions of human cognition

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[18] It is for a lack of available terms, writes Husserl, that we have recourse to the appositive "passive" even though this dimension of sense constitution is functionally operative and effective (p. 119).

[19] See Ideas II, 349.

(i.e., critical philosophy) must not only address active syntheses discernible in a transcendental logic, but it must be attentive to the unique and irreducible sphere of passive syntheses peculiar to a transcendental aesthetic.

3. The meanings of passivity are also determined *ex negativo*. Active processes include but do not exhaust making judgments, predicating something of an object, reflection, and linguistic acts. On this score, Husserl tends to regard passivity as basically equivalent to *perceptual, pre-predicative, pre-reflective, and pre-linguistic* experience, and thus with an implicit teleological orientation to reason. Because the constitution of space and time genetically and noetically understood also implies the presence of various bodily predispositions, passivity suggests a realm of bodily habits that were once actively acquired but subsequently have become *sedimented* into a style of comportment, and yet are accessible pre-reflectively. While one must not be too hasty in identifying the perceptual with the pre-linguistic (for language, too, becomes sedimented, and can become a passive acquisition without being distinctively aesthetic), Husserl does understand by passive, "aesthetic" experience, appealing both to the sense of the Greek *aesthesis*, and the constitution of spatio-temporal nexus through the kinaesthetic character of experience. This does not mean, as it would for Kant, that pre-meaningful accomplishments of sensibility are apprehended by the understanding in order then to constitute objects of knowledge, but rather that the origin of meaning must be sought in the sphere of passive intentionality, that aesthesis (passivity) is foundational for logos (activity), and echoing this relation of foundation, that a transcendental aesthetic should prepare the work for a transcendental logic.

4. Passivity is the sphere of *pregivenness and objectlike formations*. It is no coincidence that Husserl's use of the expression pregivenness [*Vorgegebenheit*] comes into full bloom in the years of the *Analyses*, and continues to flourish through out his subsequent investigations. For it is with the genetic explication of a level of experience (namely, passivity) in which objects are not (yet) constituted by an active ego that Husserl must speak in a way that evokes a mode of self-presentation that is not the givenness of an object in the genuine sense, namely, constituted

through egoic participation in temporal *acts*. And although this anticipates the discussion below of "affection," it is unavoidable to mention it here: According to the *Analyses*, something is *pregiven* insofar as it exercises an affective allure on me without being grasped by me as such, responsively or egoically.[20] Here, this "something" generally receives the appellation, objectlike formation [*Gegenständlichkeit*], that is, something that exhibits the basic structure of an object (including an object-phase), but is more "elementary" than an object in the full-fledged sense or has *not* (yet) exhibited objectivity.[21] This is not to say that the objectlike formation cannot have its own internal continuity maintained in passive time-consciousness, but only that it is not the result of active processes that give it an identity such that it becomes a theme of cognitive interest.

On the other hand, something is said to be *given* insofar as the *ego* yields to the allure and has turned toward it attentively, laying hold of it in egoic acts of interest, cognition, explication, or examination, etc. In any case, however, in order for an object to become an "object," it must first be constituted with the intervention of remembering.[22]

5. Passivity as the realm of perceptual and aesthetic experience is the *basis for* activity as the realm of cognitive and logical experience. The emphasis on the phenomenon of passivity in Husserl's writings arises about the same time as that of genesis, not only because there is a lawful regularity in the becoming of sense, but also because the inquiry into genesis implies the emergence of activity from passivity. In this respect, Husserl is

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[20] This is certainly one sense of pregivenness. Another sense also occurring around the time of the *Analyses* is what is always already there for the individual who can in turn appropriate it either passively or actively.

[21] This is why I translate the term *Gegenständlichkeit* as objectlike formation, rather than objectivity or even objecthood. The expression *gegenständlich* I render "objectlike," and depending upon the context, "with objects," since Husserl sometimes uses the expression to indicate it as qualifying the noun: e.g., *gegenständliche Feld*. Here he does not mean a field that is like an object, but rather, a field filled with objects that can potentially become thematic.

[22] Cf. pp. 230, 298 and p. 615; and see Appendix 26: Repetition and Essential Identity of Rememberings.

In this work, Husserl will use both *Gegenstand* and *Objekt* interchangeably, and for this reason I translate them both as "object."

attempting to give an account of the genesis of reason through ascending modes of attentiveness. By passivity, then, Husserl means that which makes the active levels of experience possible; passivity is a "founding" level of experience, the "subsoil" of creative life, provides the "basic, essential conditions of the possibility of a subjectivity itself," and readies what can then be taken up in specifically egoic cognition (cf. pp. 163, 169). Accordingly, the perceptual, passive sphere has the character of being "originary" in relation to the judicative, active sphere.

In sum, one can say that passivity indicates a primordial regularity of sense-genesis in which the ego does not participate; it characterizes a pre-reflective dimension of experience of pregivenness of objectlike formations, a dimension that is founding for activity. Discerning such a sphere of passivity (and its implicit relation to activity) Husserl is able to describe the motivation from the passive to the active spheres under the rubric of fundamental laws of association.

B. Affection and Association

In our ordinary, everyday attitude, something is present as if the whole object were already there, ready-made. A phenomenological shift in perspective will show that such a presentation is only a pretension, and a two-fold one at that. First, the thing does give itself in perception as the whole object, but by its very nature it does so "paradoxically," incompletely in and through perspectives or modes of givenness (p. 39). Second, the object in-itself is taken as such by us, which is to say, the in-itself is only constituted as in-itself-for-us. Underlying Husserl's analyses into affection is his attempt to describe fundamental regularities in the constitution of sense through passive syntheses of association that show *how* something can present it-self-to-us as in-itself, and to investigate the implications this has for a science worthy of its name.

From at least 1905 to the end of his life, Husserl devoted literally thousands of pages to his phenomenology of time-consciousness. A phenomenology of time-consciousness describes the most general and basic syntheses that connect particular

objectlike structures in a lawfully regulated manner; and it does so in a way that pays no respect to content. These syntheses give a necessary temporal unity to all potentially disparate objectlike formations according to the universal forms of connection: coexistence and succession.

As noted above in section 2, however, merely providing the simultaneous and successive forms of connection is still formal, and to this extent, abstract. It is a formality that is discerned only after more concrete levels are either presupposed or actually disclosed: Time-consciousness is only time-consciousness when it is viewed integrally with other, deeper constitutive structures. So, if we want to investigate what gives unity to a particular concrete object as in-itself, and further, what constitutes differences between concrete objects themselves, the "analysis of time alone cannot tell us, for it abstracts precisely from content" (p. 174); it does not give us appropriate insight into the necessary synthetic structures of the streaming, living present. For this we require a phenomenology of association and an inquiry into various "primordial phenomena" and syntheses. These include the passive constitutive syntheses of similarity, uniformity, concretion and fusion (as modes of homogeneity), contrast, discretion, and prominence (as modes of heterogeneity), and gradation. What is central to these concrete associative investigations is the phenomenon of affection.

1. Affective Allure. It was not uncommon for Husserl to appropriate terms from other contexts and give to them a new phenomenological sense. This is the case with the expression, *Reiz* (translated here as "allure"). The expression "Reiz" gained its currency in the discipline of medicine and physiology in the 18th and 19th centuries and referred primarily either to mechanistic muscle contractions or sensations caused by the stimulation of nerves, and latter interpreted as the principle of association.[23] We find this sense of *Reiz* imported into the German physiology and

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[23] Erasmus. Darwin, *Zoonomia*, Volumes 1 and 2 (New York: AMS Press, 1974; original ed., London: J. Johnson, 1794-96), see Vol. 1, Sections ii, iv, xi, xii; and David Hartley: *Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1971; original ed., London: S. Richardson, 1749), Part I, esp. Section III ff.; hereafter cited as *Observations.*

psychology of the 19th century, where it is also understood as a naturalistic determination or cause, and even the excitation of "attention," and in this way drew a causal connection between the physical-body and the psyche of animal life.[24] Interpreting *Reiz* as a cause of muscle contractions and sensations, authors like Wundt and Fechner also implicitly reduced an ontology of the normal and the pathological to mere quantitative variations of intensity.[25]

Rather than confining *Reiz* to a quantitatively defined psycho-physical relation, or defining it as a causal connection between a physical agitation by the outside world upon the central nervous system, or as naturalistically determining internal psychic life, Husserl gave to "the concept of *Reiz* a fundamentally new sense"[26]; he did this by bringing the concept of *Reiz* into the *motivational* relation between the lived-body [*Leib*] and intentional objectlike formations within a lived context, and by also implicating it in the process of apperception and formations of associative connection between one givenness and another (something that I take up below). This goes hand in hand with his attempt, also at the time of these lectures, to interpret the concepts of normality and abnormality as qualitatively distinct within a constitutive or phenomenological framework.[27] Since the draw or affective tendency on the part of the objectlike formation is motivational and not causal, and to avoid mechanistic,

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[24] See, for example, Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, *Grundriss der Erfahrungs-Sellenkunde* 1 (1795) and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, *Biologie oder Philosophie der lebenden Natur für Naturforscher und Ärzte* 6 (1822). See also William James, *Principles of Psychology* Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), esp., pp. 89-97. Theodor Lipps, *Grundtatsachen des Sellenlebens* (Bonn: Max Cohen & Sohn, 1883), esp., Division 2; hereafter *Grundtatsachen*. And, Johann Friedrich Herbart, *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* (Amsterdam: E. J. Bonset, 1965; original edition, Königsberg 1834), 30 ff.; hereafter, *Lehrbuch*.

[25] See for example, Wilhelm Wundt, *Grundriß der Psychologie* (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1896), esp., 49, 123, 299 f. And see Gustav Theodor Fechner: *Elemente der Psychophysik* (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1889; first edition, 1860), esp., 15 ff., 128 ff., 238 ff.

[26] *Ideas II*, 199.

[27] See my "The Phenomenological Concepts of Normality and Abnormality," in *Man and World*, Vol. 28, 1995, 241-260.

reductionistic, or behavioristic connotations, I translate the term *Reiz* as "allure," rather then, say, as "excitation" or "stimulus."[28]

By affection, then, Husserl does not mean a contextless power or a third person force; rather, he understands an "enticement to be" on the part of the "object," a *motivational* solicitation or pull to attentiveness, eventually to respond egoically and epistemically, though the response does not have to be egoic; in fact, even if there is an egoic response in the form of an active turning toward, this not imply the cessation of the affection (e.g., pp. 91, 196, 523). Intrinsic to the notion of affective allure is the notion of motivation. Let me clarify this here.

2. *Motivation.* The concept of motivation was explained in *Ideas II* in contrast to a law of cause and effect peculiar to the "naturalistic" attitude; it is a "because-thus" relation of efficacy peculiar to the "natural" (natural in the broad sense) or "personalistic" attitude, a relation that concerns not things of a natural-scientific reality, but givennesses of experiential actuality.[29] With respect to *Ideas II* one finds the concept of motivation greatly deepened in the *Analyses*. The concept of motivation is deepened in three ways. First, motivation pertains to both passive and active spheres, and the relationship between the two. Second, motivation is described in the context of modalizations of being and belief. Third, it is brought into the framework of affection.

A. Since I have already discussed the significance of passivity above, and address the issue of active synthesis below, I will not dwell on this point here. Suffice it to say that motivations can be functional within the passive and active spheres in different ways, and in a particular instance, motivations in the passive sphere can

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[28] R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, for example, translate *Reiz* as "stimulus" in their translation, *Ideas II*. With *Reiz* in the sense of allure, however, one could also speak of attraction, appeal, or lure.

[29] Perhaps one of the best formulations of the concept of motivation in Husserl comes from Merleau-Ponty: one phenomenon *releases* another, not by virtue of some objective efficacy connecting natural events, but by the sense that it offers; there is a "*raison d'être*" that orients the flow of the phenomena without being explicitly posited in the "awakening" or the "awakened" and which functions as an operative reason rather than a judicative rationale. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénomènologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 61.

provoke an active response. Relations of motivation permeate all dimensions of intentional life: broadly speaking, with the active sphere in terms of egoic motivations of interest; within the passive sphere, e.g., in terms of a fusion or connection of matters within a sense-field, or again, in terms of kinaesthetic motivations; and in the transition from the passive to the active sphere, typified in the advent of egoic awakening through an attentive turning toward, a turning toward instigated by some pregivenness turned givenness.[30]

B. Among the various possible modalizations of evidence that can occur: doubt, annulment, repression and superimposition, disappointment, negation, affirmation, it is possibility that stands out as one of the most significant for the issue of motivation. Here Husserl distinguishes between open and enticing possibilities. An open possibility is putatively a possibility that can be fulfilled in an indeterminate scope of determinations, where nothing in particular is called for, just, say, the scope of "color," but not any color in particular. An enticing possibility, on the other hand, will exercise a demand for a particular determination. Some possibilities will have more "weight" than others, some will speak in favor of or against a possible sense. Some will be overpowering. Thus, motivation is clarified in terms of a demand on the part of the object that entices its very constitution in varying degrees of weightiness. From the side of the "subject" motivations are explicated as soliciting appearances in the world; the subject, too, has a kind of power to usher a world of appearances, but because this is a co-relative structure, the subject's prompting is not an absolute imposition (p. 152).

From Husserl's explication of enticing possibilities, we can glean the noetic and noematic components of motivation. Noematically speaking, motivations stemming from the objective vector of the intentional relation can be understood as a "propensity to be"; noetically speaking they can be understood as a propensity or enticement to believe and "to turn toward" attentively (see §§11–13). (It is at this point that we can see a

[30] See §13 and Division 2, Chapter 4.

transition from the passive sphere of givenness to the attentive turning toward in the lowest active level, namely, "receptivity.")

C. But all of this still takes on one further step of exposition, for now the notion of motivation, interpreted in terms of enticing possibilities, is articulated in the context of affection—the topic of Division 3 of the analyses. Although Husserl will not give detailed phenomenological descriptions of affection in Division 2, he nonetheless introduces affection in the framework of motivations that function as enticing possibilities. This is more implicit than explicit. Here Husserl speaks of the demand of the enticing possibility as an "affective force" that is "in relief" or "prominent" (pp. 85, 90–1), of the weight as being "strongly affective," and noetically, of the fact that I am motivated not only when the thing exerts an affection or enticement on the ego, but when I yield to the affection either passively without egoic attentiveness, or actively in an attentive turning toward (pp. 86, 134).

Given the connections that Husserl makes in Division 2 between motivation, enticing possibilities, and affection, and given Husserl's later conclusions on the status of affection in the constitution of sense, we would have to read the latter back into the former and determine that concretely and phenomenologically, there really are no purely open possibilities, so that sense is always exerting a demand to be with some degree of intensity. And although Husserl himself hardly makes such a claim, one would also have to assert that from the phenomena of protention to epistemic striving, all consciousness is to some degree already affectively colored (cf. p. 277).

3. Affective Prominence. Gestalt psychology has shown that something can only be perceived as a figure against a background, and that this figure/ground organization is an irreducible perceptual structure. What marks Husserl's contribution is not his appeal to a perceptual Gestalt, or figure/ground structure[31]; this is already

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[31] Holenstein notes that the "figure-background" structure was systematically described for the first time by E. Rubin, *Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren* published in 1921 (Elmar Holenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation: Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei E. Husserl* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972) 287, fn. 37). On the relation between Gestalt Psychology and Husserl's thought, see Holenstein, 275-302.

operative in his thought. Not presupposing ready-made objects or taking for granted their genetic constitution, as in a data-sensualism peculiar to certain psychologies and epistemologies of his time,[32] Husserl's genetic inquiry demands asking whether or not the formation of sense-unities is given prior to or only along with affective force: Are there unities of sense first constituted as prominent that only subsequently become affective, or does the actual emergence of these unities coming into relief depend upon the play of affective forces (cf. pp. 200ff.)? Because Husserl focuses not on an already determined world, but on the *emergence of prominence* in the genesis of passivity, on the very becoming of sense as is in the *process of becoming determinate*, Husserl's analyses lead him to the conclusion that something coming into relief is *an affectively charged relief; prominence is always already an affective prominence* (pp. 211, 221).

But in the living present there is not just one single ray of affective force on me, for *many things exercise affections and rival for my attention* to some degree or other. In a field of affective tendencies that rival one another for attention, some will be more or less significant than others, and these rivalries can occur within the same sense field or across sense fields. Even though there is an affective force, it is not necessary that it draw my attention to it; it may only be "perceived" in a passive attention as it knocks at the antechamber of the ego; it may not yet or ever achieve an active attention, cognitive or otherwise (pp. 214–15).[33]

Through affective interconnections, one thing is connected to another and charged with affective resonance, prior to active egoic involvement. Just because the ego does not turn attentively toward a particular allure does not mean that it is not exerting its pull on us; it may simply be that the ego is following out some other affective force, or something else is drowning out this affective allure. This is why Husserl rejects an all or nothing account of

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It is interesting to note as a reminder that Husserl's first lecture of the *Analyses* was Winter Semester 1920/21.

[32] Cf. FTL, 286-88

[33] I encounter these rivaling forces with a *pre-reflective preferential directedness that is always selective/exclusive*, more precisely, a pre-reflective tendency toward the optimum as the principle of selection of practical possibilities (cf. Ms. D 13 3, 151a).

affection, and resorts to the analysis of the *gradation* of affective forces (cf. pp. 215ff.).

4. The Unconscious and Repression. A completely undifferentiated field of affective forces is only possible after something has exerted an affective force in some manner in the living present such that the zero of affective force takes place as *limes* in the retentional past, which in principle can be reawakened in a variety of ways. This subsequent dormancy of affective force corresponds to a zero-point of affective force, an affective zero-region that Husserl terms the "unconscious."[34]

When we hear the expression, "the unconscious," most of us immediately think of Freud. Husserl's phenomenology of the unconscious, however, must not be immediately assimilated to Freud's meta-psychological treatment of the unconscious. Briefly, for Freud the unconscious is formed by repressed contents that are affect laden drive or instinct representatives, governed by primary processes, e.g., condensation and displacement; while they are not given straightforwardly to consciousness, they can make it circuitously to consciousness by passing the "censor" in disguised form; they can emerge in jokes, dreams, slips of the tongue; in this way, what is repressed can return to consciousness and become accessible in a new way.[35]

But for Husserl the unconscious is the nil of the vivacity of consciousness, a nil, which he clarifies, is not a nothing; it is only a nothing of affective force that has arisen from original constitution, a nothing with respect to those accomplishments that presuppose an affectivity above the zero-point. The unconscious, then, is the realm in which objectlike formations are no longer affective. Still, they can be reawakened because the constituted sense is implied in the unconsciousness. Awakening occurs through various passive and active associative syntheses, an awakening produced by virtue of an affective communication.

Now, when Husserl uses the term "repression" he means generally the affective eclipse of one thing by another within a

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[34] See, for example, pp. 201, 216ff.

[35] See, for example, Sigmund Freud, "Das Unheimliche," in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 12, ed., Anna Freud (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1947), 229-68

field. Something emerges with more force than something else, thus repressing it, even though what is repressed can continue to exert its allure. In essence, the repression that takes place in this instance is not due to one element being in the present as opposed to something else being in the past; rather, the key to Husserl's epistemology of repression lies in affective force: Something represses another because it exercises a stronger affective force in this particular context. It is only because he tends to identify the strongest affective force with the present that the present is understood to repress the past, which it in fact can do. And in this case, a dormant retentional affection can surface in the present once more by provoking an active turning toward, namely, through remembering.

Still, the identification of the present with affective force is called into question when, for example, we have two or more things *in the present* beginning to exercise an affective force, issuing in a conflict in the perceptual field. The eclipse or repression of affective forces, where the repressed element still exerts an affective force, triumphs not because it is present *per se*, but because of the power that the affection exercises in this situation. As a consequence (and genetically speaking) something becomes present in and through its affective force, winning out. Insofar as both the repressed and the repressing objectlike formations are still affectively charged, and not the nil of affective vivacity, they cannot be ascribed to the unconscious. Accordingly, this epistemic "region" would warrant the title of the unconscious, not because it is not actively awakened—for this would be to equate the passive sphere (the "pre-consciousness," "pre-givenness," even the habitual lived-body) with the unconscious—rather, there are still affective forces in passivity that are not nil, as well as modes of attention, even if they have not surpassed the threshold of active awakening.[36]

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[36] For a more detailed discussion of themes relating to passivity, affection, and the phenomenology of the unconscious, and on the general problem of the genesis of logic, see Bruce Bégout's insightful work, *La généalogie de la logique: Husserl, l'anté-prédicatif et le categorial* (Paris: Vrin, 2000). See also, Anne Montavont, *De la passivité dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris: PUF, 1999).

5. Self-Givenness and the Object It-Self. The insight that something coming into relief is always already an affective relief suggests that an affective force is always exerted on the ego, or at least, on a "subject" that can become egoic and exercise an egoic response. It confirms that intentionality is not a structure that stems one-sidedly from consciousness; it is a dynamic co-operative structure, *a "constitutive duet"* (cf. p. 52).[37] Since both sides of the intentional correlation are operative, it is no coincidence that Husserl not only attributes ipseity to the subject, but also to the object. Legion throughout the *Analyses* are references made to the "self" [*Selbst*] of the object. This points not only to an identifiable core that makes up the object, but to the fact that the object is not reducible to consciousness, that it has its own kind of density and otherness that both solicits and evades us, and that one cannot arbitrarily prompt it into being. The object holds itself back, at a distance, which is precisely what allows it to give it-self in an intentional relation.

The more common expressions like *Selbstgebegenheit* (with which Husserl means both the giving of the self of the object on the part of the subject as a noetic process, and the self-giving of the self of the object from the object), I render as "self-givenness"; in this case, one should hear in the expression "self," then, not the subject, but the ipseity of the object, the self-givenness of object it-self in the intentional relation.[38] As such, the object it-self is never experienced in a neutral manner; it exercises an affectively significant allure on the perceiver to be constituted as such, that is, for the "ego" to turn toward it attentively and to constitute it as a theme of interest in an active manner. The fact that some*thing* is actually heard or seen or smelled, etc., is due to "affective rays" radiating from the object, drawing in its wake the horizonal referential implications.

But, what more precisely is the object it-self? The object it-self, the object in-itself-for-us, is the normatively significant

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[37] It is because of this affective pull that the object can also call out to us from it horizonal referential implications, providing the subject with a kind of pre-understanding that is elicited by a particular side of the object beckoning us to examine it more closely.

[38] Where the context is not always clear when Husserl simply uses the expression "Selbst," I will occasionally translate it with the interpolation: self [of the object],

"optimal."[39] The genetic concept of the optimal (or optimum) replaces or rather deepens the static notion of the "noematic core" of *Ideas I* and clarifies the normative significance of the "objective sense." Not only is normality defined by concordance [*Einstimmigkeit*] as a series of harmoniously interlocking appearances, but as the advent of norms in terms of the maximum of richness and differentiation in a unity. Thus, the thing itself, its true being, is the optimal, or the system of optima, as it is experienced as "saturated" for a perceiver in the context of the lifeworld (p. 61–2). All other possibilities fluctuate around it; they become constituted in experience as "abnormal," i.e., indexes to the optimal as *their* norm of givenness (Hua XIV, 121-23, 134; Hua XIII, 379.)[40]

As the thing it-self, the optimal is not only what is or what was, but what will be. As such, it functions as a norm that orients and guides a concordant course of present perceptions from the future, which is to say, it prescribes a course of possible confirmation and of possible verification that the active ego can discover (pp. 266–69).

6. Association, Remembering, and the Object. Husserl's investigation into affection is grounded in his attempt to describe how something can present it-self-to-us as an in-itself, and to investigate the implications this has for phenomenology. The self of the object is constituted as such when the objectlike formation emerges from indeterminacy into prominence; it does this through the allure of the objectlike formation that rivals for determinacy by exercising an affective force on the perceiver as an invitation to be. One of the motivations for the whole Division on association is prefigured in Division 2, namely, the investigation into the origin of truth and into the role that remembering—as constituted through associative motivations and as a source of

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[39] D 13 IV, 26: "Das Optimum ist also ein relatives Maximum des geübten Reizes, dem nun auch ein Interesse, eine Zuwendung des Ich, folgen mag. Das Ich ist nun bei dem es affizierenden ...." And D 13 IV, 28: "Jedes außer-zentrale Bild, das das Interesse erweckt, leitet dieses Interesse fort zu seinem Optimum und weckt ein Streben, den geraden Weg dahin zu durchlaufen, um es zu realisieren."

[40] D 13 I, 242b: "Das normale Ding fungiert im Leben zugleich in dem anderen Sinne als normal, als es zur Norm für die anomalen Erscheinungen dient."

definitiveness—plays in constituting the identical object beyond the momentary present. It is his phenomenology of association that then allows Husserl to return in Division 4 immediately to the issue of the in-itself as the true self of the object.

Although there are many different ways of becoming attentive, even within the sphere of passivity itself, the privileged case of becoming attentive for Husserl is the transition from passivity to activity through an egoic "turning toward" the pregiven affectively charged objectlike formation, in turn, constituting it as "object" and now as "given" to consciousness. These affective awakenings or affective interconnections are understood as "associations" by Husserl, and while associations include passive syntheses that accomplish unity and diversity (through pairing, similarity, uniformity, heterogeneity, fusion and contrast, etc.), Husserl favors the affective awakening or association as a specifically *reproductive* temporal act that confers an identity or an ipseity on the object over time, namely, remembering. Before discussing the concept of remembering here, and its yield, let me first clarify Husserl's phenomenological notion of association.

Needless to say, the theory of "association" has had a long history, and is perhaps most well-known from the English empiricists and the tradition of empirical psychology, especially Locke and Hume, but also Hartley, and a little later, Brown and Mill, and still later Spencer.[41] In connection to Husserl, one should not overlook the movement in the German psychology of the 19th and early 20th century, represented especially by Lipps, Herbart, Wundt, and Stumpf.[42] The notions of resemblance, contrast, contiguity, vivacity, coexistence and succession, similarity and

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[41] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), esp. Book II, Chapter 33. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), I, 1, 4f : "Of the Connection or Association of Ideas." Hartley, *Observations*, esp., Part. I, 65-83. Thomas Brown, *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* in 3 Volumes (Andover: Mark Newman, 1822), esp., lectures 34-37; John Stuart Mill, *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* (London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1829), esp., Vol. 1, Chapter 3; Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Psychology* (London, 1899), §111 ff, 129 ff.

[42] Lipps, *Grundtatsachen,* esp., Division 3; Johann Friedrich Herbart, *Lehrbuch*, 30 ff. and 132 ff.; Wilhelm Wundt, *Grundriß der Psychologie*, esp., 264, 268 ff. Carl Stumpf, *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*, (Berlin: Königli. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1907), esp. 22 ff. Supplementary Texts, Appendix 17.

contrast, fusion, habit—all notions peculiar to Husserl's *Analyses*—are present in some form or other in these authors.

It would be fruitless to try to duplicate the historical documentation and philosophical acumen that Elmar Holenstein has brought to the problematic of association as it bears on Husserlian phenomenology and in particular, on the *Analyses*.[43] Here, I want to note two things. First, Husserl's own contribution to the theory of association is to have taken "association" out of both an objective and subjective explanatory framework by submitting it to a phenomenological clarification, which is to say, for Husserl association designates an *a priori* essential lawful regularity of *genetic*, "passive" constitution of sense, irreducible to habit, custom, or mental processes; he brings associative syntheses into an intentional and *motivational* (and not causal) nexus concerning affectively significant primordial phenomena and their role in the awakening of affective tendencies toward attentiveness (association even dovetails at times with "apperception" as the transference and implication of sense); thus, association is not a juxtaposition or succession of objective facts; rather, it designates an internal referring; and finally, association serves as a way of explicating how objects get constituted as such in the transition from distinctively perceptual functions to cognitive acts.

Second, Husserl's theory of association challenges a form/content dualism. Since an actual formation of sense necessarily presupposes affective force and affective differentiation, affection is an essential condition for every kind of synthesis, and without it there would not be a living present articulated with objects (pp. 212–13). It is primarily due to Husserl's phenomenology of affective force as co-eval with the emergence of prominence that Husserl's phenomenology of association is able to liberate his theory of constitution from a sensualism and a dualism. It is well-known, for example, that Husserl's earlier theory of constitution was articulated in terms of a form/content (hyle/morhpe) dualism whereby an interpretative intentional apprehending act is said to animate the intimately inherent (non-intentional) material sense-data (something that enabled Husserl to account for the fact that,

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[43] Holenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation.*

e.g., the same empirical stuff "over there" could be taken now as a bird, and now as fluttering leaves on a branch).[44]

His analyses concerning associative passive synthesis, in particular, his descriptions of affective relief, implicitly, if not explicitly, call into question such a scheme by understanding as *primordial* phenomena, not ready-made undifferentiated "sensations," "stuffs," "materials" upon which something else is structured and with which a lived-experience coincides, but "original singularities," associative concretions and discretions as genetic affective sense-unities which, as affectively prominent, exercise an allure on the perceiver. In doing this, they apperceptively point beyond themselves and elicit an associative transference of sense, an affective awakening.[45] In this way, a phenomenology of association implies an undercutting of the traditional form/content dualism characteristic of his earlier static analyses, even though his genetic analyses as such did not in Husserl's own eyes definitively overcome the "apprehension—content of apprehension" schema. Having made these two points concerning the general concept of association in Husserl's phenomenology, let me now turn to the role of remembering as a privileged associative act.

Associations most often run their course without ever being noticed by us. Associations can be of many sorts: They can function in the present between co-present similar or uniform objectlike formations; they can function between the present and the future, or between the present and the past. However, Husserl takes his prime example of an awakening, and thus of an association, as an object exercising an affective allure on the subject, motivating a tendency to reproduce it in memory (cf. §19 "First Version"). Rememberings are occasioned by awakening forces, and in this respect an awakening is called a reproductive

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[44] This is not to say that Husserl did not see this as a problem earlier. See, for example, Hua X, 269 – 334 from 1907-09.

[45] For a more complete discussion of the overcoming of the form/content dualism peculiar to Husserl's theory of sensation, see Shigeto Nuki, "The Theory of Association after Husserl: "Form/Content" Dualism and the Phenomenological Way Out," in *Phenomenology in Japan*, ed., Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), pp., 49 – 67; Holenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation*, Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964) .

renewal and this is why Husserl treats them as "reproductive associations".

Why is remembering privileged? Two reasons. First, it is through remembering that consciousness itself becomes an object for itself such that time-consciousness itself which is immanent is its own first transcendence. Consciousness is in a chiasmic relation to itself through remembering. It itself becomes a streaming idea, a streaming absolute that bears a futural orientation (pp. 255ff.).

Second, a remembering, Husserl relates, "is nothing other than the phenomenon of awakening the past objectlike formation that was constituted in the original living present and has sunken back into retention, and has finally become completely void of force" (p. 244). It is through remembering, through the awakening of a memorial act, that an object gains a temporal density worthy of the name of "evidence." It may be that perception is a mode of consciousness that makes present *originaliter* and, metaphorically speaking, "seizes a present with both hands by its shock of hair" (p. 591); it may be that the present accordingly has an indefeasible validity. "But what good is it," retorts Husserl, "since its validity is only momentary?" "The object is surely constituted from the very beginning as something temporal, and the momentary phase is an abstraction that we must first construct. The incapability of being crossed out peculiar to the moment is thus not primary" (p. 155 and fn. 94). This is one reason why Husserl asserts that a theory that would allow evidence to hold only for the punctual Now is pure non-sense.

The first condition for something to become an object is that affective unities be constituted. This is still prior to remembering, however, and we do not yet have "object"-constitution; we do have sense-unity formations as affective allures and objectlike formations, but again, not objects as such. A genuine object, claims Husserl, is first constituted with the help of remembering; even the retentional past, and the synthesis in the course of these pasts arising in the small circle of the living present, do not yet yield the genuine constitution of the object, but rather, only a fundamental portion of its constitution. An object cannot be constituted as such merely in the momentary present, because it

can only be an object when I can return to it again and again as "the identical," which presupposes remembering (pp. 141, 614f.). But as we noted, the object is also the futural object, and so the future too plays its role by projecting a norm around which perceptual fulfillment be achieved, and in this way expectation has a constitutive function in the constitution of the object it-self.

In the *Analyses*, Husserl does not generally differentiate between different active memorial levels[46] (only between retention and remembering) neither does he differentiate between various levels of active futural orientation (but only between protention and expectation, which he virtually equates with anticipation). Nevertheless, no matter how inchoate, remembering and expectation serve as transitions from passivity to activity; they can both be modes of active attentiveness, and they are formative of more active levels of objectivation.

C. Activity and Active Synthesis

If we were to live only in passivity, contends Husserl, and if it were not possible for us to carry out free activity, we would be blind to the sphere of true being. Part 3 of the *Analyses* picks up precisely here with the descriptions of higher and higher levels of attention and processes of active objectivation. In fact, having once moved through careful phenomenological analyses from the level of passivity "up" to that of activity, Husserl—in typical fashion—reinterprets this "higher" level now as "concrete" and understands that passivity and activity are really only phenomenologically designated internal differentiations of cognitive experience, and that we can only gain the level of experience of passivity for reflection by presupposing and *abstracting* from the accomplishments of activity. It is this movement within the concrete whole of experience that enables Husserl to consider explicitly in Part 3 the genetic transition from passivity to activity

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[46] Though on one occasion he does speak of a necessary "self-forgetfulness" in memory or a non-egoic remembering where in memory, the ego is not "awake." See pp. 595–96.

and to describe the roles of affection and attention in levels of experience peculiar to active cognitive life.

Remembering and expectation are necessary but not sufficient conditions for an object to be constituted as such. In addition, what is required for something to be constituted as an "object" in the "complete and genuine sense" is that it be constituted as identical with itself and that it be originally constituted as the thematic object for the ego in identifying activity (p. 297–98).

A consciousness of the "object" is genuinely carried out only first in egoic acts, and is only there as object for the active ego. "Identical sense," "being," "modalities of being," "true being," "verification," get their genuine character only first within the framework of activity (p. 275). One of Husserl's goals in the *Analyses* is to understand active objectivation as a genetic gradation of thematic accomplishments. Since the intellect is a name for the constitutive accomplishments of objects that the ego has given to itself through activities of identification, and since there are as many modes of identification that we have for a theme as there are modes of objectivation, we can expect a spectrum of so-called "intellectual" or "spiritual" *acts* that differ in manners of generating the object. Each level entails a new "attitude," new active syntheses, and a corresponding alteration in thematization: From cognitive interest, explication, determinative identification, conceptualization, to as-such judgments. Further, each stage or "attitude" can admit of further differentiation. For example, just within the level of conceptualization, one would have to distinguish between concepts (operating apophantically in meanings and judgments) and essences (operating ontologically in simple and categorial objects), and further, between various levels of essences from empirical universals, to morphological essences and types, to pure *eide*. To make all these differentiations explicit is far beyond the scope of this Introduction. Let me merely sketch the broad parameters of movement mapped out by Husserl to higher levels of active synthesis.

If receptivity is the bridge, as it were, from passivity to activity, and if the awakening peculiar to this transition initially entails a submission that motivates an active turning toward, then what Husserl calls cognitive interest goes beyond receptivity by not

merely focusing on a theme, but by taking it as an object that is in principle explicable as object: Cognitive interest naturally functions a spur to processes of explication, yielding an examination into the theme that a) delves into its content, and b) extends beyond the theme to other objects.

Examination is a special cognitive process in which several things are called to our attention in a unity, whereby one explicates a substrate or a subject in its properties: Now one says "S" is determined by the partial self-identification as α, β, γ, whereby the "S" remains one and the same "S" in the unity of this activity, as it progresses to newer and newer concentrations. What was merely a content of the theme (e.g., red), now becomes the thematic object; but here, what has gradually become the special theme enters into the partial identity with the S that is still retained. In this way, the interest in the object that goes from α to β is fulfilled in the concentration of each moment or special theme, and what we acquire is an enrichment of sense in this synthesis. Even though the special themes of the object are actively made explicit as a way of clarifying "S," the synthesis of coinciding that forms identity and determines their relation and the coinciding of S is *not active*, rather, it is a result of a special *passive* synthesis (pp. 339ff.). Moreover, this passing from object to object that is held together by passive syntheses are excitations for possible determinations, but it itself is not yet the activity of determinative synthesis, it is not a judging.

Judgment is a determining process that *actively* relates one theme to another such that S is determined as the form of the subject, and the α as the form of determination, etc.

If we focus on the "S" that is enriched in sense, "S" becomes an object of a new apprehension; now an active movement in the transition from, say, "S" to α is intent on generating the element accruing to "S." Now we have the active consciousness that the "S" undergoes determination by being expressed as "S is α" or "S contains α."

According to Husserl, the proposition is a correlate, the "What" of the judicative act, and in this regard is the "judicative proposition," the *propositio*. When we substantivize the proposition in the form of "that" statements ("that S is α"), we have a

new level of objectivation that fulfills the proposition, the judgment maintained as valid, we have an state-of-affairs or *Sachverhalt* (cf. §62). This is the foundation for other possible determinative judgments: the relation between whole and parts, the combination of parts and their forms of connection, the relationships between the elements as connected in these forms, etc.[47]

In each case, it is an enrichment of sense that gives occasion to turn to activities of determination that form relations. The universal investigation into the categorial realm, according to its forms, and pure laws determined by these forms, laws of true existence of states-of-affairs, make up the discipline called "formal logic." This is the systematic disclosure of radically different genera of relations that are possible for the object, in formal generality, that is, forms and pure laws of states-of-affairs; it is a matter of a formal classification and axioms of relations. When we are motivated by the association of similarity and our direction of categorial interest is trained on the universal, when the universal and its relation to particulars becomes an explicit issue for thought, and when we judicatively assess the objects as such, we have that mode of synthetic cognition Husserl calls conceptualization.

Grasping the One or the universal has a unique field of interest. In this case, we do not merely attribute similar features to different objects: "The bookcase is brown," "The desk is brown," "The cup is brown"; rather, now we mean by "brown" the same color in all instances, subsuming the individuals under the *eidos*, "brown": Thus, no longer "S' is β'," "S" is β"," etc., but rather, "S' is β," "S" is β," "S"' is β," etc. "For now" writes Husserl, "the interest, the ray of attentiveness must pass clear through the individual objects that are already constituted, and by traveling along the path of uniformity and carrying out the coinciding, the One that is constituted becomes thematic" (p. 350). This can yield a still new active determination. By focusing on the particular aspects, they will be shown to all have a peculiar relationship to the universal,

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[47] A whole is not an state-of-affairs, but an state-of-affairs is a whole insofar as it can be divided up (§59).

namely, as a *particularization of the eidos*. Here, the new judgment arises, "This is an α," i.e., it is a particular, an instance of α.

In turn, the field of openness that is constituted with the universal, (the universal of repetition with unending scope) unleashes the "whatsoever" or *Beliebigkeit*. We can choose any "this" or "that" whatsoever as the determinative theme; not only do new species emerge, but new thematic formations. Accordingly, it is one thing to have this rope before us thematically, and another to make a judgment about it *as such*, about any rope whatsoever whereby this rope gets constituted as an example.

By assuming the as-such into a theme, we have a conceptualizing function of universal and particular conceptual grasping. We can also operate in the scope of pure concepts, in a manifold of possibility; here we gain pure as-such judgments, like judgments of laws, like "A triangle has three angles"; or possibility, "A triangle can have a right angle." We can modify this in free variation and find a lawful regularity. "With this, the realm of universal judging is opened up, the realm of law-giving, the knowledge of law-giving for itself and for all judgments as such, and therefore for all possible objectlike formations" (pp. 354–55).

As these syntheses and categorial objects occur in *natural experience*, they are not yet "critical," and must be submitted to a constitutive or transcendental clarification. Still, as we noted at the outset, the scientific and ontological attitudes, formal logic, mathematics and regional or material ontologies that are constrained by the objects in question, can become clues to a transcendental analysis as an inquiry into the origin of truth. Beginning with a transcendental aesthetic, we will have the foundation for a broad scope of transcendentally formed disciplines, like a transcendental physics, as the transcendental science of space and time, a transcendental psychophysics and psychology, a transcendental sociology.[48] But we will also have the foundation for the most

[48] In his later writings, Husserl will regard not only the lived-body as constitutive of spatiality, but the Earth *qua* earth-ground as constitutive of the lived-body and the spatiality of nature. (See, for example: Edmund Husserl, "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Räumlichkeit der Natur"

universal theory of norms of all sciences in principle, transforming them and giving to them their justification, namely, a transcendental logic.

4. Note on the Translation and Acknowledgments

The writings that make up the English edition of the *Analyses* draw from four different sources published in the German Husserliana Critical Edition. In the order of the presentation of the English edition and translation they are as follows: Hua XVII (*Formale und transzendentale Logik*), Hua XI (*Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*), Hua XXXI (*Aktive Synthesen*), and Hua XIV (*Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*). The pagination given in the margins of the English text correspond to the pagination of these editions. All of the German editors' insertions are indicated by angled brackets < >, and the translator's insertions by square brackets [ ].

The *Analyses* are lectures. As such, they were never written with an eye to publication. The advantage is that the lecture format of these presentations provides the reader with a candor not seen in some of his other well-known writings intended for publication; we see Husserl addressing the participants in his lecture directly, and we observe Husserl working out insights and we witness a thinking in process. But this also means that much of what he wrote could be elaborated upon or modified in the course of his lecture. Its disadvantage is that this writing style does not make for the most cogent of presentations, and this is particularly dramatic in the case of Husserl. He is already known for his laconic style; on this score, the situation is only exacerbated.

(1934) in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, ed., M. Garber (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 307-25.) These analyses belong as well to a transcendental aesthetic begun here. Such transcendental problems will ultimately concern the co-generation of a generative nexus in terms of normatively, geo-historically, and socially significant "lifeworlds," i.e., homeworlds and alienworlds peculiar to a "generative phenomenology." See Anthony J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995).

But this has also meant that many of the connections he makes to earlier sentences or references are ambiguous, connections that he could have easily supplemented in his oral presentations. Rather than try to duplicate the ambiguity or even incomprehensibility of Husserl's text, I have often had to become an overt interpreter of this work, either by substituting nouns for pronouns, or by intervening with explications and/or interpolations supplied in square brackets []. Where the difficulty in terminology in concerned, the reader should be reminded that Husserl was still in the process of inventing phenomenological language by borrowing from the resources of "natural language," which is at root not bothered with "phenomenological distinctions" (p. 536). Where a common, technical term is used, or where I want to suggest that multiple interpretations of a term are called for, I cite the German expression in a footnote. Finally, some of Husserl's sentences are laboriously long; at times a paragraph can go on for pages. In these instances, I have simplified the syntax by breaking down the sentences, and where the longer passages contain several distinctive thoughts, I have broken down the text into shorter paragraphs.

While undertaking the translation and edition of such magnitude I have benefited from the support, advice, and assistance of several sources and persons. I owe a particular note of thanks to the Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (SIUC) which provided me both with a grant covering three years of funding for this project in the form of travel monies, commodities, contractual services, and a research assistant line, as well as an additional grant in the form of a Summer Research Fellowship. I am also grateful for a stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) covering two months of Summer work on this translation project (1999). The assistants at the Husserl-Archives in Leuven, and the director of the Archives, Rudolf Bernet, have been supportive in providing me with material and editorial advice. I would also like to thank Roland Breeur for keeping me supplied with advance renditions of "Aktive Synthesen," which has now become "Part 3" of the *Analyses*. Thanks are also due to Rudolf Bernet for allowing me to cite from unpublished manuscripts.

It has also been my fortune to have had capable and amiable research assistants. If this translation has accomplished its goal of providing the reader with an intelligible English rendition that is both accurate and faithful to the sense of this celebrated work of Husserl's, it is due in no small part to the diligent readings by and enlightening conversations with my research assistants, Ms. Stephanie Windolph (1997), Ms. Tanja Stähler (1998), and Ms. Christiane Hochkeppel (1999), all distinguished visiting doctoral students from the Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany. Thanks are also due to several people who have read portions of this manuscript and made helpful suggestions on the translation: Jim Hart, Sebastian Luft, Ullrich Melle, and Donn Welton, as well as to those who have offered comments on this "Introduction": Rudolf Bernet, Roland Breeur, Natalie Depraz, Christian Lotz, and Art Luther. Finally, I would like to acknowledge John Hartmann for the arduous task of compiling the index to the English translation.

On occasion, I have consulted Costa's Italian translation of Husserliana XI, *Lezioni sulla sintesi passiva*[49], and Bégout's, Depraz's, and Kessler's French translation, *De la synthèse passive*[50] either for advice or in order to control various technical terms peculiar to the *Analyses*. Finally, I owe special acknowledgements to Shin Nagai, with whom I first read the *Analysen*, to Donn Welton for having suggested this translation project, and to Leslie Brown, my spouse and best friend, for having encouraged it. Any shortcomings in the translation are solely my responsibility.

This translation is dedicated both to my son, Joseph, who spent many hours as infant and toddler nestled on my lap "helping" me translate, and to my daughter, Samara, who immediately followed suit.

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[49] See citation above, fn. 4.

[50] Edmund Husserl, *De la synthèse passive: Logique transcendentale et constitutions originaires*, trans., Bruce Bégout and Jean Kessler, with Natalie Depraz and Marc Richir (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1998).

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Hua VI *Die Krisis der europäschen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed., Walter Biemel. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954.

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Hua X *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (1893–1917)*, ed., Rudolf Boehm. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966.

Hua XIV *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlaß: Zweiter Teil: 1291-1928*, ed., Iso Kern. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973.

Hua XV *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß. Dritter Teil: 1929-1935*, ed., Iso Kern. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973.

Hua XVI *Ding und Raum: Vorlesungen 1907*, ed., Ulrich Claesges. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973.

Hua XVII *Formale und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, ed., Paul Janssen. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974.

Hua XXVII	*Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937)*, ed., Thomas Nenon and Hans Reiner Sepp Dordrecht: Kluwer. 1989.
Hua XVIII	*Logische Untersuchungen: Erster Band*, ed. E. Holenstein. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975.
Hua XIX	*Logische Untersuchungen (2 Vols.)*, ed., Panzer. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984. English Translations
LI	*Logical Investigations*, trans., J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
Crisis	*The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans., David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
CM	*Cartesian Meditations*, trans., Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977.
Ideas I	*Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book*, trans., Fred Kersten. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982.
Ideas II	*Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book*, trans., Richard Rojcewicz and André Schwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993.
Ideas III	*Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Third Book*, trans., Ted Klein and William Pohl. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980.
FTL	*Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans., Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978.
PCIT	*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, trans., John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991.
TS	*Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, trans., Richard Rojcewicz. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997.

<Main Texts>

<PART 1:
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE LECTURE ON TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC>[1] [351]

<1. Introduction>

It is my intention in these lectures to present a few fundamental considerations toward a phenomenological logic. By the word "logic" I do not understand a subordinated, theoretical, and normative special science in the sense that it is usually taken today, even, say, in the sense in which the modern mathematician has shaped logic as a special mathematical discipline. Logic in the full and universal sense, the sense that we will have in view, is the science that consciously reappropriates the task that was enjoined to logic in general from its historical origin in the Platonic dialectic: namely, the task to be a universal theory of science, and at the same time, a theory of science in principle. A theory of science in principle signifies a science that is in principle a science of all sciences as such.

Logic as a theory of science is then the science of the *a priori* of all sciences as such, the theory of what gives them sense as formations of practical reason, what they must necessarily fulfill if they are actually able to be what they want to be, namely, formations of practical reason. As a pure, *a priori* theory of science, logic wants to bring to light "pure" generalities according to the Socratic-Platonic method. Thus, it does not wish to follow

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empirically the same path as the pregiven so-called "sciences," the cultural forms that have emerged in fact and that bear the name "science," only then to abstract from them empirical types. Rather, free from all ties to factuality, it wants to bring to complete clarity the teleological idea one always has obscurely in mind when operating from purely theoretical interest. Steadily pursuing the pure possibilities of a cognitive life in general, it wants to bring to the light of day the essential forms of genuine knowledge and science in all their fundamental shapes, as well as the essential presuppositions to which they are bound, the necessary methods [352] that lead to them. In all of this, then, lie the necessary norms against which is to be measured how far a factual science (initially only a presumptuous science) conforms to the idea of science, the extent to which its particular modes of knowledge are genuine modes of knowledge, its methods, genuine methods—methods, that is, which according to their principle form do justice to a pure and formally general norm. The sense of "formal" here consists in precisely nothing other than this: The guiding question is not the one concerning a particular science with particular regions of science, but rather, the question concerning the aim, sense, and possibility of genuine science as such.

Historically, what we call science in the narrow sense today developed from logic, namely, it developed at first from the normative guidelines elaborated in the Platonic dialectic. The classical expression which says that all sciences have arisen from the maternal ground of philosophy fits especially well for logic and, on the other hand, for sciences in the particular sense that we all have in mind today.

In a broader sense, we likewise give the name "science" to the cosmological theories of the pre-Platonic era, to similar cultural formations of other peoples and times, even to astrologies and alchemies, and the like. But at best they are inchoate forms, preliminary stages of science—and this holds especially for pre-Platonic philosophy or the science of the Greeks no less then it does for ancient Egyptian mathematics, for ancient Babylonian astronomy.

Science in a new sense first arises from the Platonic founding of logic, from the radical and critical reflection on essence and

eidetic exigencies of genuine knowledge and of genuine science, and from the disclosure of norms according to which a science arises that is henceforth consciously directed toward normative justification, a science consciously justifying its own method. In accordance with its intention, this is a justification from pure principles, that is, a logical justification. Science in the new sense, then, no longer wants to operate naively on the basis of purely theoretical interest. It strives to justify from principles every step it takes in its authenticity, in its necessary validity. Accordingly, in this case, the original sense is such that the logical insight pertaining to principles, taken from the pure idea of possible knowledge and of the method of knowledge in general, precedes the method undertaken in a factual manner as well as the factual formation of science, and guides it in an *a priori* manner; but the sense is not such that the fact of some arbitrary method and science arising naively, and the type read-off from the fact, would have to pose as a norm in order to provide a model for scientific accomplishments in general.

Plato's logic arose as a reaction to the universal denial of science—a denial characteristic of sophistic skepticism. If skepticism denied what is in principle the possibility of something like science in general then Plato had to consider precisely what is [353] in principle a possibility of science, and he had to found it critically. If science as such was called into question, then of course one could not presuppose the fact of science. In this way Plato was led down the path of the pure idea. His purely ideal logic or theory of science that shapes pure norms (and not read-off from factual sciences), had the mission of only now making possible factual science and guiding it practically. And precisely by fulfilling this vocation it actually did help to fashion sciences in the precise sense: new mathematics and natural science, etc., whose further developments in higher levels are our modern sciences.

However, the original relation between logic and science has become curiously inverted in modern times. The sciences made themselves autonomous. They cultivated highly differentiated methods in the spirit of critical self-justification, a spirit that had now become second nature to them; the fruitfulness of these

methods became evident and certain <through> experience or <through> the reciprocal ratification by all the specialists being in agreement. While they did not cultivate these methods in the naiveté of the everyday person, they did it in a naiveté of a higher level, in a naiveté that dispensed with justifying method from pure principles by having recourse to the pure idea in accordance with ultimate *a priori* possibilities and necessities. In other words, logic, which was originally the torchbearer of method and which claimed to be the pure doctrine of principles of possible knowledge and science, lost this historical vocation and, understandably, remained far behind in its development. Even the grand reformation of mathematics and of the natural sciences in the 17th Century by figures like Galileo, Descartes, and Leibniz was still determined by logical reflection on the nature and exigency of genuine natural knowledge, on their *a priori* necessary goals and methods. Thus, if perfecting logic in these beginnings still precedes perfecting science, and if they still go hand in hand, then this essential relationship is modified in the following epoch, in the epoch in which the sciences, rendered autonomous, turn into special branches of science that no longer bother with a logic and that even brush it aside with scorn. But even logic completely departs from its own proper sense and its inalienable task in most recent times. Instead of pursuing the pure essential norms of science according to all their essential formations in order thereby to be able to provide an orientation in principle, it is instead happy to copy norms and rules from the factual sciences, especially from the highly esteemed natural sciences.

Perhaps this signals a deeper and more consequential tragedy of modern scientific culture than what one is in the habit of lamenting in scientific circles. It is said that the number of special branches of science have grown so vast, and each particular one has become so copiously diffuse in their special field of [354] knowledge and methods, that no one is any longer able to make full use of all this wealth, to enjoy having a command of all the epistemological treasures.

The shortcoming of our scientific situation appears to be a much more essential one, a more radical one in the literal sense of the term; it does not concern collective unification and

appropriation, but the rootedness of the sciences, which is a rootedness in principle, and the unification of them from these roots. It would remain a shortcoming even if an incredible mnemonic technology and a pedagogy guided by it would make it possible for us to have an encyclopedic knowledge of the theoretically and objectively established facts in the sum-total of the respective sciences.

Lacking are the centrating ideas that would easily illuminate all thinking in the special branches of science and that would spiritualize all its particular results by relating them to eternal poles; lacking is what removes from all the special branches of science the blinders that are necessary only for their special work; lacking is the capacity to integrate them into the single universal nexus of actual and possible knowledge and thereby to understand this nexus as a nexus that is necessary in principle. But there is still much more that is lacking, namely, the reference back to the phenomenological primordial sources of all knowledge, the deepest founding of all objective sciences arising from the universality of knowing consciousness. Thus, lacking is a systematic fundamental science that would provide an ultimate understanding of all theory arising from the originally sense-giving sources of the subjectivity that accomplishes knowledge.

If the highest task of knowledge is not only calculating the course of the world, but understanding it—as Lotze characterized this task in a well-known dictum—then we have to take this dictum in the sense that we rest content neither with the way in which the positive sciences methodologically shape objective theories, nor with the way in which a theoretical logic directs the forms of a possible genuine theory to principles and norms. We must raise ourselves above the self-forgetfulness of the theoretician who in his theoretical accomplishments devotes himself to the matters, to the theories and methods, and who knows nothing of the interiority of his accomplishment and of the motivations compelling them—who lives in them, but does not have a thematic view of this accomplishing life itself.

We will understand what is accomplished as genuine theory and genuine science only through a clarification of principles that descends into the depths of the interiority that accomplishes

knowledge and theory, i.e., into the depths of transcendental, phenomenological interiority; this is a clarification that investigates the theoretical sense-giving and accomplishment of reason in its essential necessity, a sense-giving and accomplishment that is carried out in the interplay of transcendental nexuses of motivation. But only through such a clarification will we also understand the true sense of that being, the sense that science wanted to bring to light in its theories as true being, as true nature, [355] as the true world of spirit.

Thus, only a transcendental science, that is, a science directed into the hidden depths of accomplishing cognitive life, and thereby a science that is clarified and justified—only this science can be the ultimate science; only a transcendental-phenomenologically clarified world can be a world that is ultimately intelligible, only a transcendental logic can be an ultimate theory of science, only it can be an ultimate, deepest, and most universal theory of principles and of norms of all sciences, and at the same time transform them into clarificatory and intelligible sciences. While the contemporary positive sciences, and even the exact sciences, initially fill the novice with enthusiasm and in fact spiritually enriches him, in the end they leave him deeply dissatisfied; *notabene*: provided that he wants to be more than a professional and a specialist, provided that he wants to understand himself as a human being in the full and highest sense and wants to understand the world, and wants to pose to himself and to the world questions of ultimate knowledge and conscience.

We sense this, and we are particularly sensitive in our unfortunate time to the fact that the sciences are lacking in philosophical spirit, lacking the spirit of ultimate and principle purity and clarity, and above all, the spirit of that clarity that we call phenomenological, transcendental clarity. And this is precisely the reason for the lamentation that we do not become wiser and better through them, as is certainly their pretension.

But if we seize upon the idea of logic once again as broadly and as broad-mindedly as it should be grasped in accordance with its original intention, and if we animate it with the transcendental spirit that has been awakened in the modern era but has not arrived at pure self-consciousness, then we will have to say that what is

lacking in the modern sciences is true logic as the mother of their true method: logic that lights the way for them with a most profound self-knowledge of knowledge and renders them intelligible in all of their activities.

Accordingly, this logic does not want to be a mere technology for sorts of extremely pragmatic accomplishments of spirit that one calls scientific, a technology after all that one orients in an empirical manner toward practical results. It wants once more to precede all possible sciences as a justifying system of principles of all objective justification, a system of principles that understands itself through an absolute method, namely, for what should count as science and should be able to develop as a genuine science.

Just how much the sciences are in need of such a logic, or rather, just how little they are capable of emerging as sciences that are self-sufficient, and of persevering in such a self-sufficiency is seen in the conflict concerning the true sense of their foundations, a conflict that all the sciences share, no matter how exact they may be. And we see that in truth they are completely in the dark regarding their own sense. To be sure, only transcendental logic allows one to understand completely that the positive sciences can only bring about a relative, one-sided rationality, a rationality that leaves in its wake a complete irrationality as its necessary counterpart. But only a comprehensive rational science is science [356] <in> the highest sense, like ancient philosophy originally wanted to be.

At the very least I would like to give you a look into some of the profound levels of this universal logic; and if I am not in the position of making this logic thematic in its entire universality, it is not only because of its magnitude and difficulty (as well as the multitude of its subordinated disciplines), but above all because it has become clear that in order to bring to light an actually intelligible transcendental logic, tremendous transcendental-phenomenological preliminary work must be accomplished from the very beginning. Even if, historically and subjectively speaking, the outlines of the positive sciences and of a positive or theoretical logic have been developed first, phenomenological investigations nevertheless form what is first in itself out of which all fundamental forms of logical structures must proceed in a general

manner and according to an intelligible motivation. We will be exclusively occupied with such transcendental-logical foundations in these lectures.

2. "Thinking" as the Theme of Logic. Speaking[2], Thinking, What is Thought

The term, *logos*, from which the name "logic" is derived, has a great number of meanings that have arisen from quite intelligible modifications of the more original meanings of λέγω, that is, from the meanings of gathering together[3], expounding upon[4], then expounding upon by words, by means of discourse. In developed language, λόγος sometimes means "word" and "discourse" itself, other times what the discourse is about, the matter of the discourse. But it also means, further, thought that is put in the form of sentences and that is generated by a speaking subject for the purpose of communicating or even for the subject himself, thus, so to speak, the spiritual sense of the linguistic proposition, what one also calls simply the theorem without thinking of anything grammatical here, precisely as something meant by the grammatical propositional expression, likewise, the sense of names; in particular, *logos* means, in the case of universal words, the universal concept belonging to them as sense.

Further, in many expressions *logos* also refers to the intellectual[5] act itself, to the activity of stating, to asserting, or to other modes of thinking in which such a sense-content relative to the respective objects or states-of-affairs are generated.

But all these meanings of the word *logos* assume a specific sense—especially everywhere scientific interests are in play—by the idea of a norm of reason entering into this sense. Then *logos* means reason itself as a faculty, but also rational, i.e., evidential thinking or thought directed toward evident truth. More specifically, *logos* also means the faculty of forming legitimate

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[2] *Reden*. Translator: Depending upon the context, I use the English expressions "speech," "speaking," and "discourse" to translate the German term "*Rede*" and "*Reden*."

[3] *zusammenlegen*

[4] *darlegen*

[5] *geistigen*

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concepts, and even this signifies the rational formation of concepts as well as this legitimate concept itself.

Finally, we mention an even more specific coinage of these [357] meanings whereby the specifically "scientific" element of its sense also comes to the fore: We then mean a scientific concept, a scientific concept-formation, a scientific thinking or the corresponding intellectual faculty.

If we now take this evidently harmonizing manifold of meanings of the word *logos* as a clue to the formation of the first idea of a science of *logos*, rich and closely related themes are opened up for theoretical research and normative application. It is easy to find a natural course of research here. If we concern ourselves with the second and third groups of meanings, the theme of reason as the faculty of correct thinking to be justified in an evident manner as a conceptual, scientific faculty, will lead us beyond the more general question concerning how temporary acts of an ego ground[6] corresponding habitual faculties, and will lead immediately to the question concerning the nature of the "rational" acts of thought that are under consideration.

But now, before the specific quality of this rationality can be considered, the specific quality of thinking itself must naturally become a theme, prior to all distinctions of what is rational and irrational.

We are led by the sense of our talk of *logos* chiefly to conceptual thinking and conceptual thought. Conceptual thinking in general prior to the norm however does not encompass all thinking in general, at least when thinking is taken in the broadest sense of the word. So, let us come back to thinking in the broadest sense, considering it for the time being.

Now, since human thinking is normally carried out linguistically, and all rational operations are practically completely bound to discourse, since all critique, from which rational truth is said to result makes use of language as intersubjective critique, and as a result always leads to statements, then not only acts of thinking and thoughts are at issue initially, but discourse,

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[6] Translator: Reading *begründen* for *bedürfen*. This reading is based on a correction by the Husserl Archives in Leuven of a transcription error.

statements, stated thoughts. Thus, we arrive at the first group of meanings of the term, *logos*.

The first group of meanings of "the logical" can be brought under three headings: speaking, thinking, what is thought. Naturally, we can likewise speak of their corresponding faculties: the faculty of discourse, to be conceived only along with speaking, and by means of thinking relating to what is thought. Thus, we are examining higher psychic beings, human beings, and are not referring to animals. Only human beings have language and reason, only human beings can carry out psychic acts such that they are subject to the normative regulation of reason, at least this is the general conviction.

Only the human being generates cognitive formations in the form of thinking, like those of a scientific culture, and is able to bring them to expression linguistically, documenting them; only human beings have something like literature. [358]

3. The Ideality of Linguistic Phenomena

The three headings that we specified above, however, are still quite ambiguous; due to the abundant obscurity of the terms employed they require further distinction and clarification. First, we recognize that we must not overlook a certain distinction where the term speech or language is concerned. We distinguish the articulated word, speech that is spoken at present taken as a sensuous phenomenon, especially as an acoustical phenomenon, from the word and proposition itself or from a string of propositions itself making up a larger discourse. It is for good reason that we speak precisely of a repetition of the same words and sentences in the event we are not understood, repeating [what we have said]. In a treatise, in a novel, every word, every sentence is singularly unique, and it cannot be duplicated by a repeated reading, be it aloud or to oneself. Indeed, in this case it is not a matter of who reads it: each one having his own voice, intonation, etc. We distinguish not only the treatise itself (taken here in merely a grammatical sense of a composition of words and language) from the manifolds of uttered reproductions, but likewise from the manifold documentations that endure on paper

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and in print, or on pergament and in ink, on clay tablets in cuneiform, etc. The one and only linguistic composition is reproduced a thousand-fold, for instance, in book form, and we say without hesitation, "the same book" with "the same name," "the same treatise"; and to be sure, this sameness already holds in a purely linguistic regard, while it holds in yet another way when completely distilling the content of signification of which we will soon speak.

Language as a system of signs—signs with which thoughts are expressed in contrast to other types of signs—provides us in general and in many respects with subtle and wondrous problems. One of these problems is the ideality of language that we just encountered and which is usually completely overlooked. We can also characterize it in this way: Language possesses the objectivity of objectlike formations[7], of the so-called spiritual or cultural world and not that of mere physical nature. As an objective, spiritual formation, language has the same features as other spiritual formations: In this way, we distinguish from the thousand reproductions of an engraving, the engraving itself, and this engraving, that is, the engraved image itself, is intuitively read-off of every reproduction, and is given in every one of them in the same way as identically ideal. Likewise, when we speak of the Kreutzer sonata in distinction to any of its arbitrary reproductions. Even if the sonata itself consists of sounds, it is an ideal unity, and its sounds are no less an ideal unity; they are not for instance physicalistic sounds or even the sounds of external, acoustic perception: the sensuous, thing-like sounds, which are only really [359] available precisely in an actual reproduction and intuition of them. Just as a sonata is reproduced over and over again in real reproductions, so too are the sounds reproduced over and over again with every single <sonata> sound[8] of the sonata in the corresponding sounds of the reproduction. The same holds likewise for all linguistic formations; indeed, what is at issue here does not concern what they express (no matter how great a role

[7] Translator: Reading *Gegenständlichkeiten* for *gegenständlichen*. This reading is based on a correction by the Husserl Archives in Leuven of a transcription error.

[8] Translator: <Sonate> added by the Husserl Archives in Leuven.

this may play). When taken as speech replete with sense, it certainly also concerns them as concrete unities of the body[9] of language and of expressed sense, but it already concerns them with respect to their corporeality[10] itself, which is also so to speak already a spiritual corporeality. The word itself, the grammatical sentence itself is, as we saw, an ideal unity that is not duplicated with its thousand-fold reproductions.

The one who expresses himself lives in the efficacious practical intention to articulate this or that view. That must not be understood as if he first formed the opinion *explicite*, and would only then seek suitable words to express it. We distinguish between the cases where one speaks to another communicatively, and the cases where one speaks to no one, thinking in solitude, expressing oneself monologically. In the first case, understanding and thinking along with another who is addressed corresponds to discourse; in the other case it does not.

In solitary thought in which one expresses to oneself, it is surely not the case that we would first have the formation of thought and then seek the suitable words. Thinking is carried out from the very outset as linguistic. What resides in our practical horizon as something to be shaped is the still indeterminate idea of a formation that is already a linguistic one. The thought that we have in mind and that we bring to expression interiorly is already equivocal, though still determined in an incomplete manner.

All meaningful speech as the concrete unity of the linguistic body and of linguistic sense is a "spiritual formation."

The principle discussions of the great problems that concern the clarification of sense and of the so-called transcendental constitution of objectivities of the spiritual world according to all their fundamental shapes—and among them, language—make up an entire domain unto themselves. It suffices to note here that language becomes an issue for logicians in the first place only in its ideality, as the identical grammatical word, as the identical grammatical proposition and nexus of propositions over and above the actual or possible realizations: in an entirely analogous manner

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[9] *Leib*

[10] *Leiblichkeit*

to the way in which the theme of the aesthetician is the particular work of art, the particular sonata, the particular picture, is the picture "itself," etc., and not the ephemeral physical tonal complex or the physical thing-like picture.

If an absolutely faithful reproduction of works of art of every kind were to be discovered, which would repeat the ideal content of the work with absolute indubitability, then the originals would [360] lose all their value of scientific privilege for the aesthetician; they would hold only an affective value: similar to original literary texts after they have been faithfully reproduced with respect to their linguistic composition.

We are not in a position to discuss here the extent to which something holds analogously for all sciences of cultural formations, and then further the extent to which it is necessary to pass over to the study of realizations concerning questions of the historical genesis of spiritual formations of the cultural world; so, for example, in which sense linguistic theory must be occupied with questions of acoustics in order to clarify the genesis of the verbal stock of languages. But it is clear that the moment the linguist becomes a grammarian, he already has before him the word in its ideal unity.

And the same holds for the logician, for the logician in a primary sense whose theme is *logos* as theory. Indeed, that already demands a focus on what is expressed linguistically.

4. Thinking as a Sense Constituting Lived-Experience

We now consider the second term we named: thinking, a word whose sense must be extracted from the connection in which it is so often joined: "language and thinking." Then this term will have a tremendously broad sense that may nearly seem to encompass the entire psychic life of the human being: for we are accustomed to say that "the human being expresses his psychic life in language."

But we must be more careful here. The human being does not actually ex-"press" all of his psychic life in language, nor can he express it through it. If one is wont to speak about this differently it is due to the ambiguous way in which one speaks of

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"expressing" and the dearth of clarity surrounding the relationships here. We can delimit this way of speaking about "expressing" in a preliminary fashion by noting that something is meant with every word and with every relation of words that is composed to form the unity of a discourse: namely, whenever speech is actually expressive speech, functioning normally. Of course, a parrot, a magpie does not really speak. We also exclude now deceptive speech or lying that means something other than what it says. Corresponding to the unity of discourse is a unity of meaning[11], and corresponding to the linguistic divisions and forms of discourse are the divisions and formations of meaning. But this is not external or juxtaposed to the words; rather, in speaking we continuously carry out an internal act of meaning[12] that melds with the words, as it were, animating them. The result of this animation is that the words and the entire discourse incarnate within themselves a meaning, and incarnated in them, bear it within themselves as sense.

We do not need to go any further now, and we can delimit the first and broadest sense of thinking provisionally, namely, that it should encompass those psychic lived-experiences in which this act of meaning consists, this act of meaning in which precisely the [361] meaning is constituted for the speaking subject or, in a parallel manner, constituted for the listening, comprehending subject—thus, the signification, the sense that is expressed in discourse. For example, if we pronounce a judgment, if we assert that Germany will rise again in glory, we have carried out a unity of an internally "thoughtful" assertion with the very words of the statement being asserted. Whatever other psychic accomplishments that may be carried out so that the words themselves come about, and whatever role they may play for the fusion generating the "expression," we only pay attention to what is fused, to the judicative acts that function as sense-giving, as bearing sense within themselves, which therefore constitute within themselves the judicative meaning that finds its expression in the assertoric proposition. Many kinds of psychic lived-experiences accordingly remain out

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[11] *Meinung*

[12] *Meinen*

of consideration. Not considered are the indicative tendencies belonging to the words, like those belonging to all signs, the phenomena of pointing away-from-itself and into-the-meaning, the phenomena of pointing-toward what is meant. Also not considered are other psychic lived-experiences that emerge along with them, like those for instance in which we turn to an interlocutor to whom we wish to announce our judgment, etc., but naturally only insofar as the character of the address is not itself expressed in the discourse; for example, "I tell you ...." What we have learned with the example of the assertoric statement holds generally. If we express a wish like "God be with me!," we will have together with the articulated generation of the words a certain wishing, a wishing that is expressed precisely in the articulated organization of words, a wishing that for its part has an articulated content running parallel to it; likewise when we promulgate an order, pose a question, etc. Taken in such a broad manner, thinking means each lived-experience which, during the act of speaking, belongs to the primary function of the expression, precisely to the function of expressing something; thus, it is that lived-experience in which the sense to be expressed is constituted in consciousness; this is thinking, be it a judging or a wishing, willing, questioning, supposing.

Let us retain this broadest concept, which I would like to note at once is not the concept determinative of traditional logic; whether or not we hold fast to this generality, it is important initially to take a stand on it and to examine it scientifically. We hold fast at once to the universality of the coinciding of language and thinking. That designates for us now two parallel domains; they correspond to one another as the domain of possible expressions and as the domain of possible senses, of possible expressive intended meanings. They yield in their intertwined unity the two-sided domain of current and concrete discourse, of sense-fulfilled discourse. Thus, every assertion is at once speech and currently intended meaning, more precisely, judicative intended meaning; every pronounced wish at once optative speech and the current wish itself, the current wish-meaning, etc. It will become clear that there is more than a duality here, so that we must sharply distinguish between the act of intending and the intended meaning,

the act of judging and the judgment, and in this manner for all cases, so that a three-fold relation results. We investigate, rather, [362] an important general character peculiar to all lived-experiences that exercise a sense-giving accomplishment, wherever expressions actually exercise their expressive function: thus, in normal discourse and listening that comprehends.

<5. Sense-Constituting Lived-Experiences as Egoic Acts>

All such lived-experiences are not only modes of consciousness in general, but egoic acts; and this is what we want to make clear now. In the course of our psychic life, waking life is only one type; there is another one besides this one, deep dreamless sleep, unconsciousness. We arrive at both these types in their contrast by presentifying actual lived-experiences of awakening, by a retrospective intuitive grasping of preceding phases of consciousness in comparison with wakefulness itself. Even if we cannot say anything in more detail at all about the content of what is past and about what is experienced in a torpid manner, we can describe with evidence the typical essence of the contrast. There is an experiencing taking place when in a stupor, as well. But there is not perception in the genuine sense or an experience of another sort; there is nothing of a cognitive theme; there is nothing of a judgment; there is nothing of an object of an emotional interest; there is nothing properly speaking of an object being loved or hated at present, there is nothing of a desiring or a willing. What is the distinguishing trait of such lived-experiences that, in the very broadest sense (a broadness that is certainly not customary), could be characterized as lived-experiences of interest, and that mark the wakeful psychic life with the character of wakefulness? We can respond: Psychic life is wakeful, that is, the ego is wakeful, and this is the case insofar as it carries out specific egoic functions in the present, that is, carries out in the present an "I perceive"; that is to say, I turn toward an objectlike formation, viewing it, seeing it, I am absorbed in it; likewise, I remember, I am absorbed in viewing the memorial object; likewise, I make comparisons and distinctions; in comparing I recognize that two different perceptual objects possess the same type; or I am inclined to love, to cherish,

the act of judging and the judgment, and in this manner for all cases, so that a three-fold relation results. We investigate, rather, [362] an important general character peculiar to all lived-experiences that exercise a sense-giving accomplishment, wherever expressions actually exercise their expressive function: thus, in normal discourse and listening that comprehends.

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to respect someone I have in mind, or I turn against him in hate and contempt; I carry out an act of striving, consider the means, make a decision and do it. Note well the way in which emphasis is placed on the "I," the ego. In such wakeful lived-experiences of experiencing, taking cognizance, drawing conclusions, valuing, willing, we find the ego as the peculiar center of the lived-experiencing, as the one being absorbed in it, or the one suffering it in a conscious manner; it is the identical pole, the center of actions and passions—the latter corresponds to conditions like: I am sad, I am delighted, I am happy. The term "I" here is not empty, and on the other hand, we mean "I" neither as a corporeal human being, nor as the entire psychic life, actually, nothing at all of life and living. Rather, here the ego is identified in reflection as the center of life and lived-experiencing, the center to which are related perceiving, judging, feeling, willing. [363]

But we understand this in such a way that the expressions, "I perceive," "I judge," "I feel," "I want," designate at the same time an essential shape of these lived-experiences themselves that is essentially given through their ego-centration. Here, the ego is everywhere living in these acts as carrying them out, as being related to the perceptual object, the judged object, the willed object through these acts. The ego is not a box containing egoless lived-experiences, or a slate of consciousness upon which they light up and disappear again, or a bundle of lived-experiences, a flow of consciousness or something assembled in it; rather, the ego that is at issue here can be manifest in each lived-experience of wakefulness or lived-experiential act as pole, as ego-center, and thus as involved in the peculiar structure of these lived-experiences; it can be manifest in them as their outward radiating or inward radiating point, and yet not in them as a part or a piece. This can be seen by the fact that in order to grasp this outward radiating point thematically, we must exercise a peculiar reflection, one going in a opposite direction. We do not find it like a part, as something in the lived-experience or literally on it; rather, the structure of the lived-experience, its directional structure that goes toward what is presented, toward what is wished for, etc., points back to an outward radiating point and to the directedness of this ego toward its intentional theme. It is also

evident here that all such lived-experiences that emerge in this distinctive shape, *ego cogito*, in the unity of a stream of lived-experience, manifest the identically same ego: I, who I perceive, am identically the same as the I who then judges or feels, desires, wants, and only by virtue of this identity can I say that all of these are my acts. A curious polarization of the stream of consciousness! All lived-experiential acts [are] centered in a single, fully identical pole. Only through a reflective grasping of this central ego—which however is only graspable as the subject of its acts, as a subject carrying them out—does every other concept of the ego, even that of the personal and psychophysical human ego get its sense, no matter the number of new determinative moments that may be taken up by these new concepts of the ego.

What we have said here will be further clarified when we note that the wakeful life of an ego does not only contain such egoic lived-experiences in which the central ego emerges as a present functional center, and thus gives to its lived-experiences the shape, *ego cogito* (to speak with Descartes). Wakeful life has, so to speak, a background of non-wakefulness, constantly and with eternal necessity. When I actually perceive an object, that is, look at it, take note of it, grasp it, regard it, it will never be without an unnoticed, ungrasped background of objects. In this case we distinguish what is secondarily noticed from what actually goes unnoticed. In general, in addition to the object that is primarily noticed, with which I am occupied in a privileged way while viewing it, there are still other single objects that are co-noticed, be they given in a second or third order co-grasping. This will take [364] place in such a way that in passing over from the observation of one object to the observation of another, I am indeed no longer looking at the first one, I am no longer primarily occupied with it, properly speaking; but I still have a hold on it, I do not let it slip from my attentive and conceptual hold, and along with that, everything I had previously grasped: It continues to belong to me in a modified way, and in this way I still have a hold on it. I am still present there as the central, present ego; as a wakeful ego, I still have a relation to it in an *ego cogito*. But in contrast to it we have a broad lived-experiential field, or as we can also say, a field of consciousness that has not entered into such a relation with the

ego or with which the ego has not entered into such a relation: It may knock on the door of the ego, but it does not "affect" the ego, the ego is deaf to it, as it were.

The wakeful ego with its lived-experiences in the specific sense of wakefulness, lived-experiences of the *ego cogito*, thus has a constant, broad horizon of background lived-experiences to which the ego is not present and "in" which it does not reside: They may be sensations, like sensations of sound, but the ego is not alert to them; physical objects or beings with a lived-body may appear in the surrounding space as in transition or as in rest, but the ego does not carry out an "I perceive" or an "I take note" with regard to <them>; affects may be intertwined with these background lived-experiences or with their objects, spilling over into a general atmosphere of well-being or malcontentment; even tendencies, lived-experiences of drive, may be rooted in them, tendencies which for instance incline away from malcontentment, but the ego is not present there. Belonging here are also flashes of insight, imaginings that arise, memories, theoretical insights that emerge or even stirrings of the will, decisions that are not however taken up by the ego. Only when the ego carries them out do they get the shape of "*ego cogito*," of the "I am occupied in imagination with what is shaped by the imagination," "I think through the theoretical insight," "I carry out the stirring of the will," etc. Thus, the wakeful egoic life is distinguished from the egoic life that is not awake, from the ego that is "in a stupor" in the broadest sense, and the two are distinguished by the fact that in the latter, no lived-experience in the specific sense of wakefulness is there at all and no present ego is there at all as its subject, while in the other case, precisely such a wakeful ego is there as the subject of specific acts.

6. Foreground Lived-Experiences and Background Lived-Experiences

Every act in the specific sense has the fundamental character of being a consciousness of something, an "intentional lived-experience." The perceptual lived-experience is in itself a perception of something, for example, a house; the cognitive

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lived-experience is in itself a lived-experience of something known, like when the house is recognized as a residence; in every judgment there is something, a judged state-of-affairs, in every desiring is something desired, in every willing, something willed. This is the broad concept of the concept of intentional lived-experience. For even background lived-experiences are [365] intentional. A universal life that is a life of consciousness through and through encompasses the specific acts, those that are specifically ego-consciousness, as well as the background consciousness. Thus within wakeful life, for example, we constantly have a visual space that is filled up and that is present to consciousness. If we take note of a single tree in a landscape that is open before us, then this landscape as a spatial field with multiple objects is given to consciousness and is there for us. That is to say, as a whole and according to all single features, the background objects are objects for us through the fact that they appear, through the fact <that> in their corresponding lived-experiences, they have the character of intentional lived-experiences. Every appearance is the appearance of what is appearing in it, the lived-experience of an appearance of a house <in> the landscape is precisely the appearance of this house, whether we pay particular attention just to it or not. The egoic act in the specific sense is thus a special form of carrying out intentional lived-experiences. Let me mention that I have originally introduced the term "act" in my *Logical Investigations* for this broadest concept of intentional lived-experience; this is the sense in which the term is now customarily employed in the literature. For this reason I now say emphatically "egoic act" or "act in the restrictive sense," where it is a matter of acts having a distinctive form of execution.

Taking place in the life of consciousness is a constant transformation of the modalities of execution; foreground lived-experiences, egoic acts, lose this form of execution and then take on the altered form and *vice versa*. That holds for all types of lived-experiences of consciousness. Cognitive acts, acts of pleasure, volitional acts do not simply disappear when we no longer carry them out from the standpoint of the ego; they become background lived-experiences.

It is evident here that background lived-experiences, in contrast to the acts corresponding to them, are modified through and through, whereas they do indeed share something essentially in common so that we find it necessary to speak further of the same judgments, wishes, etc. Certainly, they are not actually the same. It is not like shoving things in a room away from the window into dark corners, where the things themselves remain unchanged. The moment a background lived-experience becomes present, that is, the moment the ego becomes an ego carrying out acts through it, it has, as lived-experience, become completely and essentially transformed. So too, *vice versa*. And yet even the judging that has been shoved into the background is still a judging of this and that; background perception is still perception of exactly the same thing.

It belongs to the very essence of a lived-experience that it is a consciousness of the same thing in the transition from one mode of execution to another. Purely through their own essence and in passing from one mode to the other, they found the consciousness of the unity and of the sameness of what is given to consciousness in them; a kind of coinciding sets in, the coinciding that ensues precisely according to their intentional content as the content given in them. This situation makes intelligible our way of speaking of acts, acts that become latent and then patent again. [366]

A counter argument that emerges in the background of consciousness during a conflict is initially a latent act; its intentionality (which brings it to the idea of such and such an argument) is a hidden intentionality, up to the point where we intervene[13], as it were, and now actualize it, that is, carry out an explicit argumentation, an argumentation of the corresponding content that issues from the ego-center.

[13] Translator: Reading *eingreifen* for *angreifen*. This reading is based on a correction by the Husserl Archives in Leuven of a transcription error.

<7. The Interconnection between Expressing and Signifying as the Unity of an Egoic Act>

Our theme was the clarification of thinking, of thinking together with speaking, of thinking that exercises the sense-giving function on speaking. Whenever we actually speak or actually take part in a discourse by listening to it and by understanding it, this actuality will consist in the execution of egoic acts in sense we have defined. This initially concerns thinking that gives sense to words. The speaking person means something in the spoken words, and this act of meaning, this "thinking" that belongs to speaking is an act (or a unitary nexus of acts) carried out by the ego. That toward which the ego is intentionally directed in these acts is what the ego means in speaking these words, what the words as discourse "express."

Further, we note that even those lived-experiences in which the words themselves are produced for us as the ones speaking, lived-experiences in which the words are given to consciousness and are there for us, have the character of egoic acts, and [we note] that our analysis has accordingly also taught us something with respect to the specific mode of linguistic consciousness. Words as actually spoken words do not emerge in a background distant from the ego; as speakers, we generate them, and through this generation we are directed toward them in acts, and not in a latent intentionality. Further, if one says that we mean or express this or that with words, then even this synthetic unity of the act of meaning with words belongs to the circle of the specific participation of the ego. In verbal consciousness, words have the character of signs; the character of indicating is inherent in them; radiating from them are indicative tendencies that aim at what is meant and terminate in the content of the meanings. This intertwining belongs to the intentional stock of the unity of verbal and linguistic consciousness, and this peculiarity obviously produces the following: that the expression and what is expressed, that verbal and semantic consciousness are not juxtaposed to one another, disjointed, but rather, make up a unity of consciousness in which the doubled unity of word and sense is constituted. The moment we conceptually do away with these indicative tendencies and rid

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ourselves of them, we no longer have words at all, we have meaningless sounds like a parrot makes in its so-called "talk"; we have signs that do not signify anything, in fact they are then no longer really signs, to say nothing of expressions.

Even this intentionality unifying the words themselves and the sense, the lived-experience of the word and thinking, has the character of patent intentionality; the pure ego is present there. The ego seizes the word in regarding it; it grasps its indicative tendency; it willingly allows itself to be guided by it, to be initiated into the execution of thinking; it allows itself to be [367] oriented by what is thought as what is meant by the words. But we do not intend the words themselves here! We can also intend the words in other acts; we can become interested in them, as we are wont to say, making them our "theme" in this interest, possibly making them our theoretical theme like we would do if we were grammarians. In this case, we carry out theoretical judgments and theoretical discourses corresponding to them, discourses that proceed with new words; obviously, then, the difference comes to light between the words that are our grammatical theme, and the words that we use in order to express ourselves on this theme, in order to express our thoughts with respect to them. Both words are essentially given differently to consciousness; in one case, the acts that are directed toward them are acts of interest, in the other, they are not. In the broadest sense, but not in a customary literal sense, we could speak of interest precisely in order to say that an act is altogether carried out, that is, that in it the ego is present to the respective intentional object, that the ego is directed toward something in the act. But the normal concept of interest says more, it means that peculiar mode of carrying out acts whereby what is given to consciousness in it is a theme for the ego. If the words themselves are not given to consciousness thematically in each current discourse, they will still necessarily have a theme, namely, one that resides in what is meant with the words. Thus, the sense-giving act is an intending act in the specific sense of a thematic act that, in the mode of interest, is directed toward a theme residing in the content of the act.

The actuality of indication that adheres to the word in the consciousness of an actual discourse gains a clarifying

determination through our elucidation of the feature of thematic acts. The word points away from itself, as it were, [pointing] toward what is expressed as the thematic sense. This analysis obviously concerns every type of sign, or rather, actual signifying, be it a linguistic or non-linguistic one. A certain imperative, the firm indication of its thematic intending, firmly adheres to every sign according to its essence as sign.

If our interest is nevertheless turned toward the sign itself, then the thematic preference of the sign is one that runs counter to its function; it takes place in it despite this; and one senses that this "despite" has a phenomenological character.

We have arrived at the insight that neither any kind of intentional lived-experience, nor even any kind of act can be found in the sense-constituting function, neither with respect to signs in general, nor accordingly with respect to speaking. Only acts in the mode of thematic acts, acts of interest in a specific sense can function in such a way; only acts through which what is given to consciousness in them has for the ego the preferential character of thematic intending.

Naturally, this character even enters into background modifications, like everything we demonstrate in actual discourse [368] with respect to structures, but precisely as modified; modifications can be bestowed upon all acts, and hence those of discourse, too. In this respect it does not require any further special exposition. Let us remain in the sphere of wakeful activity which is alone fruitful for us. What I state, what I express in speaking is my theme, my "what I intend" in the moment of my current speaking.

If I assert something, then my thematic act is a judging, and I have my judicative theme, a judicative intending. Likewise, if I express a wish, then my wishing is the thematic act, the wish is made as my optative-intending, in interrogative discourse, the interrogative act has thematic form, etc. All in all, there is accordingly a multiplicity of acts carried out by the one presently speaking, acts synthetically connected to one another forming a unity of one act. Not only do we have a continual sequence of acts when moving laterally along discourse in its single words and sentences—a continual sequence of acts that are connected with one another and thereby constituting for the one speaking the unity

of a discourse built up out of the sense-endowed words and sentences, and which is now a unitarily meaningful discourse. Not only, I say, do we have this multiplicity moving laterally along discourse, but it also belongs to every cross-section, so to speak, to a diversity; that is, it belongs to every part of the discourse and possibly to every part of the word insofar as it is still discourse, still endowed with sense. At each place we have the organization of the act according to word and sense, thus the synthesis itself resulting from an overarching act, namely, from an indicative act that assigns to the connected acts simultaneously a different place and function.

<8. Theme, Interest, Indication>

At the end of our last lecture, we characterized the entire nexus of expressing and signifying as a unity of an egoic act. Now we can immediately pick up this line of thought here in order to provide the character of thinking with a necessary depth, a depth with which a novel and at the same time especially distinctive mode of execution by egoic acts in general will come to light. If we compare the mode of execution in which the central speaking ego carries out the word-constituting act and, on the other hand, the sense-constituting act, we will encounter a sharp contrast. We also called the latter mode of thinking the act of meaning or intending. For example, what is expressed in propositional speech like "geometry is the science of space," is what the person speaking judicatively "means." But while he means the judgment "with" the words, in this case he does not mean the words themselves. They are given to the ego in a manner that is quite different from the way in which what is judged is given to the ego. Residing in the latter, so to speak, is the *terminus ad quem*, and through this it has a special priority in relation to the word, although the ego's regard was also directed toward the word.

[The fact that we] have in mind words (like objects in general) in specific acts is not yet to say that the acts are directed toward the words by intending them. To be sure, we can also attribute to them the distinction of an intending, but then [this would only occur] in correspondingly altered acts. We can become especially [369]

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interested in the words, as one also says, we can make them our "theme" through this interest, like we do as grammarians, for instance. Then they become our theoretical themes; in relation to them we carry out theoretical judgments and corresponding to them, theoretical discourses that are deployed in new words. Especially clear here is the difference between words that are our grammatical themes, and words that we use in order to pronounce our theoretical thoughts about these themes. Both are given to consciousness in an essentially different manner; in one case, the acts that are directed toward them are acts of interest in the restrictive sense of the term, in the other case, they are not. One could indeed speak in a broadest though unconventional sense of the interest of the ego with respect to each act. For the ego, as pure ego, is absorbed in each act and *interest*[14]; it is directed toward something and absorbed in it. But the normal concept of interest means more; it means a peculiar mode of carrying out an act, whereby in this concept of interest something is given to consciousness, given in the special manner of a theme, of a theme that one has one's eye on.

The expression, "intending" or "meaning" is used generally now and then for all acts in order to depict the directedness of the ego toward the intentional content, and for this reason one must distinguish a thematic intending or the thematic act from intending or act in general. In this way there is a theme with potentially many special themes in every discourse, only that precisely the words themselves of the discourse are not themes. The theme resides in what is meant in the words. The sense-giving act is not only a second interlaced act, but interlaced as a thematic act, an act of interest. The different manner of carrying it out, suggested by the words "interest" and "theme"—where the former points to the ego and its action, and where the latter does not—obviously belongs to the lived-experiential acts even outside of assertoric discourse. It is also apparent here that there are different degrees of interest and, on the other hand, modes of interest that are not merely differences of degree. Thus, an intuitive regard of objects and events of the environing-world can be of more or less interest;

[14] Translator: Husserl uses the Latin expression, taking the term in its literal sense.

the ego has its theme in these matters, but is absorbed in them more or less intensely. On the other hand, while the ego has its primary theme in these matters that the ego regards, it can still not only notice additional events, but can take an interest in them. But then they are secondary themes, interests of a second order.

If we return now for a moment to the special sphere of expression, we will be struck by the curious interconnection between the function of sense as a thematic one and the function of indication, an interconnection whose fundamental character becomes intelligible only now. Expressed in a more complete manner, the word points away from itself and to the sense in normal discourse, that is, the word directs interest. The word-sign [370] that is in itself not a matter of interest serves to draw attention to the sense as something that matters to the ego.

This analysis is obviously fitting for every kind of sign or for acts in which they exercise their present signicative function, be they linguistic signs or other types of signs like signals from a boatman. The moment our interest is directed toward the signs themselves and is arrested there (rupturing this normal function), like when it is directed toward the written signs or toward the flag that serves as a signal, abnormality shows up in the lived-experience itself. One feels that it goes against the grain, so to speak, and that one is not only violating a habit, but a habitual determinative end, a practical imperative.

In this way we have thus also gained a deeper insight into the essential structure of living speech, above all the knowledge that sense-giving thinking cannot be just any act, but only one that has the general character of a thematically intending act, be it in other respects a judicative intending, a presumptive intending, an intending of doubt, an intending of a wish or an intending of volition.

<9. The Regression from Theoretical *Logos* to the Pre-theoretical Sense-Giving Life of Consciousness>

Now we want our investigation to go beyond the narrow realm to which it has been restricted, [namely,] the realm of thinking as the sense-giving function peculiar to statements. Actually, every

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step of our preceding analyses of interiority functioning in linguistic thinking has already elicited the demonstration of the general character of consciousness, which points beyond the narrow field. Now we want to enter the broadest generality in which it is no longer a matter of words and statements, although it does concern, in an expanded sense, sense-givenness and furthermore the distinctions between what is rational and irrational—distinctions that belong to the special theme of every logic.

As we said right at the beginning, the genuine theme of logic alludes to the group of significations most rich in content and so to speak magnified: the group of significations of the word *logos* related to reason, specifically as scientific reason, and to the achievements that are accomplished in it, accordingly, to the entirety of the linguistically marked structure, the structure which the rubric "scientific theory," "scientific system" expresses. Thus <logic> should encompass the principles and theorems, the deductions and proofs in their entire systematic interconnections, just like they would be objectively presented in an ideal textbook, namely, as the spiritual common good of humanity. As I already said earlier, the term "rational" is a normative term. What is rational is the true, the genuine; it is what even irrationality, the human being insofar as he thinks irrationally, strives toward, but what he lacks in his unclarity and confusion because of an ingenuine, irrational method. We can accordingly say that logic bears on science in the genuine sense, or as we can also put it, it wants and wanted from the very beginning to be the universal [371] theory of science, the science of the essence of genuine science in general. Under the rubric of science, humanity wanted to know the world in a systematic manner, or in the specialization of investigative interests, wanted to know some type of special unending-open region of the world. This guiding idea of science which was initially unclear was supposed to have been made sharp and clear. The essential features of genuine science, those to which the truth of its methods and its theories are bound in regulative necessity, were supposed to be brought to light, and because of their clarity were supposed to be recognized in this pressing necessity. Thus, the goal was simultaneously to gain an

evident norm for all procedures of practical reason in the foundation of genuine science, and building upon this, to ever higher accomplishments of truth. Since it constantly concerns here the modes of the accomplishing and the results of the accomplishment, the subjective activity of the scientists and the structure of objective spiritual formations following from it, namely theories, the efforts of elucidation and of scientific knowledge pertaining to the theory of science or logic would have to be two-fold: subjectively directed toward the activity of knowing and, on the other hand, objectively directed toward theory.

However, only in the modern era has one seen, or rather first merely felt obscurely and then seen with evidence, how this two-fold structure demands deep and tremendously encompassing investigations if one really wants to reach an understanding of the essence of scientific accomplishment as the essence of an accomplishment of reason. As soon as systematic portions of sciences were won in a certain naive evidence (as already in antiquity, Euclidean mathematics, the beginnings of an astronomy and mechanics, and from there, certain firm and precisely formed theories were given in evidence, theories whose epistemic value seemed incontestable because of this naive evidence), one understandably held onto these models conceptually, and the focus was predominantly fettered by what was objectively available, by the manifold formations of theory. One initially held that theories consist of propositions, they progress from true propositions to true propositions; insight grasps the truth, and thus also justifies the pretension toward truth.

Propositions, whose truth is immediately evident, lead through deductions to conclusions that become evident in their dependent truth. The entire nexus composed of elementary deductions, produced in its unity, is itself the unity of truth as theory. These whole formations that are built up from single propositions are indeed linguistically expressive formations, but the linguistic element in it (for instance, varying according to the national language), is irrelevant here. Prominent in this variation of the mere linguistic element is the pure thought, the pure significance, the identical proposition, or as one also says, the judgment. It is

only to the latter that evidence and the predication of truth or possibly falsity adheres. In this sense not only is a single proposition only a very complex judgment, but so too is the whole unity of a theory.

In this way logic was directed toward a theory of theory; it [372] looked at these pure unities of significance; one examined it in a kind of descriptive and classificatory manner. One systematically distinguished the general forms of these significances, the forms of judgment and of their elements, and the form of the connections through which complex judgments arise; elementary forms of judgment like: *S is P, all S are p, some S are p, if S is p then Q is r*, etc. The systematic production of those forms of judgment-complexes that are called deductions also belonged here. Following this, one could then examine these forms to see to what extent they yield general conditions of possible truth and falsity of judgments formed in such a way. If one examines the forms of deduction in this way, it seems evident that one cannot arbitrarily tie propositions to deductions, or, forms of proposition to forms of deduction, namely, insofar as it is evident that deductions of certain forms are in principle false and that from the standpoint of truth, only certain forms of deduction are admissible. Every deduction with the form "*given all A are B and all B are C, all A are C*" is correct with respect to the consequence, but if it would read "*not all A are C*" the deduction would be false. From there one could see that belonging to the form of judgments as to the form of pure propositional thoughts are laws of form which, depending upon the circumstance, say that judgments and formations of judgments of such and such pure forms are contradictory once and for all, they are in principle false; others are not contradictory, they can be true according to their form.

The Aristotelian syllogistic form, and the later, more or less purely shaped formal logic arose in this way. According to the core which is alone useful, it offers in effect the beginnings of a doctrine of forms and a doctrine of validity of judgments related to the pure form, and thus the beginnings of a theory of possible forms of theories. Traditional logic did not bring about anything more with respect to a theory of theory; and on the other hand, with respect to the investigations subjectively directed to the

essence of scientific thinking, scant little was accomplished, that is, in relation to a critique of knowledge. One has sought in vain since Locke to make headway by means of a psychology of knowledge and a theory of rationally valid cognition grounded in it. But the naturalism of this psychology was unable to grasp consciousness and the accomplishment of consciousness from within, and although it had pretensions of being grounded in inner experience, it was even unable to see into this peculiarity of consciousness at all; the naturalism of this psychology got paid back in its absurd theories of knowledge emerging here—absurd in the strongest sense; one indeed felt the absurdity of these theories, but strived in vain to clarify it. What was completely unintelligible in the modern era was this marriage between pure ideal theories of the formal logic of signification, on the one hand, and the theories of epistemological investigations, on the other. The propositions, the theories emerge from the interiority of accomplishing thought, somehow; but just what this interior [373] thought looks like, and what it is, and what it accomplishes as so-called "evidence"—that remains obscure.

It was only with phenomenology that we first had avenues of access, methods, and insights that make possible an actual theory of science, namely, through its radicality in going back to sense-giving consciousness and the whole of conscious life. It is phenomenology that seriously inquires back from the ready-made propositions, theories, to thinking consciousness and to the broader nexus of the life of consciousness in which these formations are constituted; and it inquires back, going still more deeply from all types of objects as the substrata of possible theories, to experiencing consciousness and its essential characteristics which make the experiencing accomplishment intelligible. It has allowed us to see in a presuppositionless manner the feature of intentionality as the very feature that makes up the fundamental essence of consciousness. It has generated methods of developing the hidden implication of one consciousness in another, an implication that is given everywhere with this feature, and therefore of making intelligible how objectivity as a true being of every kind is shaped as an accomplishment in the subjectivity of the life of consciousness, and is then shaped as a higher level of

accomplishment which is there as theory. If one goes back from theory that is dead, so to speak, and has become objective, to the living, streaming life in which it arises in an evident manner, and if one reflectively investigates the intentionality of this evident judging, deducing, etc., one will immediately be lead to the fact that what stands before us as the accomplishment of thought and was able to show itself linguistically rests upon deeper accomplishments of consciousness. Thus, for example, in order to be able to emanate from actual evidence every theory that refers to nature presupposes natural experience—what we call outer experience. In this way, all theoretical knowledge in general ultimately leads back to an experience.

We see upon closer inspection that already under this rubric, "experience," a sense-giving accomplishment is carried out, indeed, a highly ramified, intricate one, and one that is even covered by a broadly apprehended rubric of reason and unreason, whereby the rational operation alone, one that has taken shape in a certain free spontaneity, can function as a verifying foundation of a genuine theory.

It is impossible to understand what thinking (which is a highly built-up accomplishment) is in the specific sense in order to be able to be expressed by language and universal words and in order to provide a science, a theory, if we do not go back prior to this thinking, back to those acts and accomplishments that make up the most expansive part of our life. For not only does a pre-theoretical life reside in this expansiveness, but a pre-linguistic life as well, one that immediately ceases to be in its original, primitive peculiarity with every expression.

And thus I set the task of our further lectures to open up this expansive, great world of the interiority of consciousness and [374] under the guiding viewpoint of a theory of science, and by beginning from below and ascending upward, to show how genuine thinking in all its levels emerges here, how it is motivated and is built-up in its founded accomplishment.

We want to deal with the great, universal theme of sense-giving. We called thinking sense-giving. And we had already distinguished this sense-giving thinking from what is thought in it, or as one can also say in this correlation, from the thought. Thus,

for example, judicative thinking, judicative intending and on the other hand the judgment itself, the optative intending and the wish itself, the volitional intending and what is willed itself in the intending. The word "intending" or "meaning"[15] is used for both; likewise, the special words judgment, wish, decision, question, etc., are ambiguous. In the psychological, logical, ethical language of the modern era, both of them are indistinguishably muddled, although the clarity and distinctness of the differences that are necessary here are not only useful but fundamental for all these disciplines; the differences are also of decisive importance especially for the pure distinctions concerning the investigative areas of the logical disciplines.

That there are constantly temptations for confusion shows from the very start how important the clarification of the distinction is. By engaging in such a clarification important insights are immediately opened up. Thus, we distinguish the intending and the intended meaning, the sense-giving act and the sense itself (which is given to consciousness thematically in the sense-giving act). This holds generally. When a thematic act is attached to words, what is meant in the act is called the sense of the word, or even, its significance[16] because the word signifies[17]. But independently of the fact whether an act has such a function of lending words significance, and perhaps being able to lend words significance, it has in itself a sense-content. Accordingly, we must liberate the concept of sense from its relation to expressions. Put in a quite general manner, every intentional lived-experience possesses as such its intentional sense; the latter becomes precisely a specifically meant sense when the ego becomes a subject who carries out acts thematically and becomes the subject of thematic interest. Let us now enter this realm of greater generality, the general realm of sense-giving and sense; without an encompassing study of this realm, all attempts to clarify logic in the specific sense are hopeless.

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[15] *Meinung*
[16] *Bedeutung*
[17] *deutet auf*

<10. Perception and Perceptual Sense>

Let us begin with any external perception. If we observe an unchanging object at rest, for example, a tree standing before us, we pass over it with our eyes, now we step closer to it, now back away from it, now here, now there, we see it now from this, now from that side. During this process the object is constantly given to us as unchanged, as the same; we see it as such; and yet a slight turn of our attention teaches us that the so-called perceptual images, the modes of appearance, the aspects of the object [375] constantly change. In a constant variation of modes of appearance, perspectives, that is, during a constant variation in the actual lived-experience of perception, we have a consciousness that runs through them and connects them up, a consciousness of the one and the same object. This variation is given to consciousness, and yet it is hidden in a certain way; in the normal attitude, the natural attitude that is turned outward toward things, we do not consciously notice the variation.

I spoke of a turning of attention. More specifically, I spoke of a turning of the thematic regard and even more precisely of a reflection. In fact, we speak of a reflection in all cases, where in any kind of conscious lived-experience a direction of the thematic regard is prefigured from the very start as normal, that is, as a necessary, thematic attitude that serves as a starting point from which we must turn away in order to get hold of something new in our conscious lived-experience. This is how it works for external perception.

Belonging to external perception is a thematic basic attitude, namely, the attitude directed toward the external object, which without further ado we call the object of perception. Customarily and from the very outset, we consider attentive perceiving,[18] that is, this normal thematic directedness toward the external object, as belonging to the concept of external perception. But a reflective conversion of the thematic regard is possible at any time and in an evident manner, and then our perceptual images themselves become graspable and grasped. In and through their variation, we

[18] *das Gewahren*

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also see then, evidently, a thoroughgoing unity of the perceiving lived-experience. However we may conceive of it as temporally articulated and temporally partitioned, we find it composed of perceptions (and it is not conceivable in any other way). Each one has its content of appearance as well as a content of appearance that is constantly different, and each one has its object that appears "there in the flesh." But this object is the same object in all these stretches and phases of the continual unitary perception; it is the same thanks to the thoroughgoing "coinciding" of the appearances being carried out in perception itself. And it is the same for consciousness! It is not the appearances themselves according to their contents of appearance that coincide; to be sure, they are always different and temporally spaced out; and yet there is a certain "coinciding" that is expressed in this evidence, to wit, that in every one of these modified appearances, the same tree appears, and the perceptual intending, the constantly thoroughgoing thematic intending, intends this object that is overall the same. We now name this same object given to consciousness as identical in the continuity of appearance using a preliminary concept: the sense or objective sense of perception. Let me say in advance: In precisely such a manner, every conscious lived-experience possesses its sense within itself. This is to say that instead of carrying out a conscious lived-experience naively, we can make any kind of conscious lived-experience thematic by reflecting on it; and then—be it with respect to the temporal stretches of its variable continuity, be it in comparison with other such separated lived-experiences—we can always find they make possible an evident consciousness of the identity of the content, that what two [376] consciousnesses intend is the same. In each case we call this meant same object the objective sense of these lived-experiences. To be sure, we are remaining for the time being with perception. The objective sense in our example is thus the perceptually appearing tree as such; it is meant in and through all perceptions in an evident manner.

But now it is extremely important to avoid a misunderstanding. The perceived tree is naturally and simply there for us as an existing reality as we live naively in perception: at least in the normal case of perception which is presupposed here, namely, in

which an experiential motivation for a doubt or a negation is not operative. Of course, this does not rule out the fact that we are still subject to deception. Were that not the case, if perception did not have its incontestable legitimacy that can also be demonstrated through further experience, the tree would exist as an actual part of nature. And *vice versa*: If the tree actually exists, perception has its demonstrable legitimacy in the form of possible acts of legitimating attestation. Both are evidently equivalent. Note now that the objective sense of perception is nothing less than or means the same thing as the actual perceptual object, the sense of perception of a tree nothing less than or means the same thing as the actual natural object, tree. When we speak of sense, we are not at all concerned whether or not the perceiver has carried out a legitimate perception that the perceiver or anyone else can ratify through new experiences. We only inquire into what perceptual lived-experiences bear in their very essence and what they as perceptions irrevocably bear within themselves, no matter how a judgment of legitimacy of it may run, attributing legitimacy to it or contesting its legitimacy. This is to say in other words that we do not inquire into whether this tree, the tree that the perceiver naively sees (and not merely given to the perceiver in a general manner, but posited by the perceiver in the certainty of its existence), has a place in nature, in the totality of realities that are to be posited with legitimacy.

It is a matter of indifference to us whether, in the realm of possible positings of the object to be grounded as legitimate, one of the positings comes about that accords or does not accord with our perception in its very sense-content. Be that as it may, it is beyond doubt that perception possesses in itself what appears to it as such, possesses its perceptually meant object, and that several perceptions with different perceptual contents accord within it in an evident manner and according to an evident identity. We can also put it in this way: Perception is an intentional lived-experience and has immanently, within itself, an intentional object as an inseparable sense. If we make a judgment about this sense, we thus judge something that is demonstrable in an evident manner and therefore has being, but immanent being, even if it also turns out later to be that the perception was a deceptive one.

By conceptually shifting our way of speaking, one speaks of the perceptual object only where one makes the claim to judge reality, [377] like in all normal perceptual judgments about the surrounding things, and <not> merely about purely immanent objects, for example, about the perceived tree as such. No one would disagree <in this case> that nothing in reality corresponds to this tree that I see before me, for instance, in a dream as actually there and in the flesh.

What is designated there as the "tree" is obviously the immanent sense-content of perception itself, and a sense-content is not a tree, not a thing as such; that is, it is not a thing in factual nature. Therefore, a shift of significance has occurred here and—since all similar shifts are customarily alluded to in written form by quotation marks—I also make a habit of expressing the shift as the difference between tree in quotation marks and the tree simpliciter. It is quite similar to the way in which we say, for example, "Socrates is a philosopher," and at another time, "Socrates is a proper name." In the latter case we use quotation marks to show more clearly that we do not speak of Socrates himself, but of the word, Socrates.

Our considerations have thus yielded a fundamental distinction, initially in relation to the very special fundamental shape of consciousness that we call perception:

(1) The full, concrete lived-experience of perceiving. We did not have the occasion to speak of many things that belong here; for example, when it was a thematic perceiving, the moment of the directedness toward the object that results from the pure ego. In particular then,

(2) the variable manifold appearances, aspects necessarily belonging to every phase of perception, but combined in the continuity of perceiving through a peculiar synthesis, a kind of "coinciding," a kind of synthesis, insofar as through it the phenomenally distinguished and possibly completely distinguished aspects form a unity in the evident consciousness of the same object. I—the one experiencing—know about the being of this lived-experience and about the different modifications of it only by a reflective change in perspective through which I grasp it thematically and then judge it thematically.

(3) This same object, the object in quotation marks itself; that which is the same appearing object in each of these appearances, what each appearance means, the intentional object as such.

The introduction of the concept of sense is unclear. Sense is initially introduced as the intentional object, what is meant or intended as such. That is ambiguous, as is the object in quotation marks. When I carry out the phenomenological reduction, I have for every "act" its meant object, the intentional object that contains in it all modalities of being, which is "being."

But then it amounts to this schism between the intentional content and the intentional modal-character, which initially looks like a distinction between two components. The intentional content in this sense, the "material," the "quality," is also the "intentional object," what is merely presented[19], what is qualified there modally. [378]

That is an entirely different concept of sense and intentional object. All of that will come to light in the following exposition, but it must be pursued in the correct manner from the very start, and the distinctions <must> be made, even if they are only provisional ones.

[19] *das bloß Vorgestellte*

<PART 2: ANALYSES CONCERNING PASSIVE SYNTHESIS: TOWARD A TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC>[20]

[3]

<SELF-GIVING IN PERCEPTION>

<§1. Original Consciousness and the Perspectival Adumbration of Spatial Objects>

External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. Thus, it harbors an essential contradiction, as it were. My meaning will soon become clear to you once you intuitively grasp how the objective sense exhibits itself as unity <in> the unending manifolds of possible appearances; and seen upon closer inspection, how the continual synthesis, as a unity of coinciding, allows the same sense to appear, and how a consciousness of ever new possibilities of appearance constantly persists over against the factual, limited courses of appearance, transcending them.

Let us begin by noting that the aspect, the perspectival adumbration through which every spatial object invariably appears, only manifests the spatial object from one side. No matter how completely we may perceive a thing, it is never given in perception with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides at once. We cannot avoid speaking of such and such sides of the object that are actually perceived. Every aspect, every continuity of single adumbrations, regardless how far this continuity may extend, offers us only sides. And to our mind this is not just a mere statement of fact: It is

[20] Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XI.

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inconceivable that external perception would exhaust the sensible-material content of its perceived object; it is inconceivable that a perceptual object could be given in the entirety of its sensibly intuitive features, literally, from all sides at once in a self-contained perception.

Thus, this fundamental division between what is genuinely perceived and what is not genuinely perceived belongs to the primordial structure of the correlation: External perception and bodily "object." When we view the table, we view it from some particular side, and this side is thereby what is genuinely seen. Yet the table has still other sides. It has a non-visible back side, it has a non-visible interior; and these are actually indexes for a variety of sides, a variety of complexes of possible visibility. That is a very curious situation peculiar to the very essence of the matter at hand. For proper to the very sense of every perception is perception's perceived object as its objective sense[21], that is, this thing, the table that is seen. But this thing is not [merely] the side genuinely seen in this moment; rather (according to the very sense of perception) the thing is precisely the full-thing that has still other sides, sides that are not brought to genuine perception in this perception, but that would be brought to genuine perception in other perceptions. [4]

Generally speaking, perception is original consciousness. We have, however, a curious schism in external perception: Original consciousness is only possible in the form of an actually and genuinely original conscious-having of sides and a co-conscious-having of other sides that are precisely not originally there. I say co-conscious, since the non-visible sides are certainly also there somehow for consciousness, "co-meant" as co-present. But they do not appear as such, genuinely. They are not there like reproductive aspects are, as intuitions that exhibit them; we can nevertheless produce such intuitive presentifications[22] any time we like. Viewing the front side of the table we can, whenever we like, orchestrate an intuitive presentational course[23], a reproductive

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[21] *gegenständlicher Sinn*

[22] *Vergegenwärtigungen*. See translator's note, p. 110, fn. 64.

[23] *Vorstellungsverlauf*. Translator: The term, "*Vorstellung*" is translated throughout as "presentation," and not, for example, as representation. Whereas the latter term suggests an

course of aspects through which the non-visible side of the thing would be presented to us. But here we are doing nothing more than presentifying a course of perceptions to ourselves in which we would see the object—passing from a perception to new ones—from ever new sides in original aspects. Still, that only happens in exceptional circumstances. It is clear that a non-intuitive pointing beyond or indicating is what characterizes the side actually seen as a mere side, and what provides for the fact that the side is not taken for the thing, but rather, that something transcending the side is intended in consciousness as perceived, by [5] which precisely *that* is actually seen. Noetically speaking, perception is a mixture of an actual exhibiting that presents in an intuitive manner what is originally exhibited, and of an empty indicating that refers to possible new perceptions. In a noematic regard, what is perceived is given in adumbrations in such a way that the particular givenness refers to something else that is not-given, as what is not given belonging to the same object. We will have to understand the meaning of this.

Let us first note that every perception, or noematically speaking, every single aspect of the object in itself points to a continuity, to multifarious continua of possible new perceptions, and precisely to those in which the same object would show itself from ever new sides. In every moment of perceiving, the perceived is what it is in its mode of appearance [as] a system of referential implications[24] with an appearance-core upon which appearances have their hold. And it calls out to us, as it were, in these referential implications: "There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see all my sides, let your gaze run through me, draw closer to me, open me up, divide me up; keep on looking me over again and again, turning me to see all sides. You will get to know me like this, all that I am, all my surface qualities, all my inner sensible qualities," etc.

You understand what I mean to convey with this suggestive manner of speaking. In the particular present perception I have just

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active cognitive operation, "*Vorstellung*" is functional on a passive level of experience as well.

[24] *Verweisen*

these aspects and their modifications, and no others, just these aspects that are always limited ones. In each moment the objective sense is the same with respect to the object as such, the object that is meant; and it coincides with the continual course of momentary appearances, as for instance this table here. But what is identical is a constant *x*, a constant substrate of actually appearing table-moments, but also of indications[25] of moments not yet appearing. These indications are at the same time tendencies, indicative tendencies that push us toward the appearances not given. They are, however, not single indications, but entire indicative systems, indications functioning as systems of rays that point toward corresponding manifold systems of appearance. They are pointers into an emptiness since the non-actualized appearances are neither consciously intended as actual nor presentified. In other words, everything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by virtue of being intertwined and permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo of emptiness with respect to appearance. It is an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but an emptiness to be filled-out; it is a determinable indeterminacy. For the intentional horizon cannot be filled out in just any manner; it is a horizon of consciousness that itself has the fundamental trait of consciousness as the consciousness of something. [6]

In spite of its emptiness, the sense of this halo of consciousness is a prefiguring that prescribes a rule for the transition to new actualizing appearances. Seeing the front side of the table, I am also conscious of the back side, along with everything else that is non-visible, through an empty pointing ahead, even though it be rather indeterminate. But no matter how indeterminate it may be, it is still a pointing ahead to a bodily shape, to a bodily coloring, etc. And only appearances that adumbrate things of that kind and that determine more closely what is indeterminate in the framework of this prefiguring can be integrated concordantly; only they can stay the course of an identical *x* of determination as the same, being determined here newly and more closely. This holds time and again for every perceptual phase of the streaming process

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[25] *Hinweisen*

of perceiving, for every new appearance, only that the intentional horizon has altered and shifted. Proper to every appearing thing of each perceptual phase is a new empty horizon, a new system of determinable indeterminacy, a new system of progressing tendencies with corresponding possibilities of entering into determinately ordered systems of possible appearances, of possible ways that the aspects can run their course, together with horizons that are inseparably affiliated with these aspects. In the concordant coinciding of sense, they would bring the same object as being ever newly determined to actual, fulfilling givenness. To our mind, the aspects are nothing for themselves; they are appearances-of only through the intentional horizons that are inseparable from them.

We thereby distinguish further between an inner horizon and an outer horizon of the respective aspect-appearance. It should be recognized that the division applying to what is genuinely perceived and what is only co-present entails a distinction between determinations with respect to the content of the object [a] that are [7] actually there, appearing in the flesh[26], and [b] those that are still ambiguously prefigured in full emptiness. Let us also note that what actually appears is, in itself, also laden with a similar distinction. Indeed, the call resounds as well with respect to the side that is already actually seen: "Draw closer, closer still; now fix your eyes on me, changing your place, changing the position of your eyes, etc. You will get to see even more of me that is new, ever new partial colorings, etc. You will get to see structures of the wood that were not visible just a moment ago, structures that were formerly only viewed indeterminately and generally," etc. Thus, even what is already seen is laden with an anticipatory intention. It—what is already seen—is constantly there as a framework prefiguring something new; it is an *x* to be determined more closely. There is a constant process of anticipation, of preunderstanding. In addition to this inner horizon there are then also outer horizons, prefigurings for what is still devoid of any intuitively given framework that would require only more differentiated ways of sketching it in.

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[26] *leibhaft*

<§2. The Relationship of Fullness and Emptiness in the Perceptual Process and the Acquisition of Knowledge>

In order to gain a deeper understanding we must pay attention to how fullness and emptiness stand in relation to one another at each moment, how emptiness adopts fullness in the flow of perception, and how fullness becomes emptiness again. We must understand the structure of interconnections for every appearance as well as the structure that unites all series of appearances. In the continual progression of perception, as in the case of every perception, we have protentions that are continuously fulfilled by what occurs anew, occurring in the form of the primordial-impressional Now. And here as well. As each external perceiving progresses, the protention has the shape of continuous anticipations becoming fulfilled. That is to say, out of the indicative systems of the horizons, certain indicative lines are continually being actualized as expectations; the latter are continuously fulfilled in aspects that are being determined more closely.

In the previous lecture we approached the unity of each external perception from different directions. External perception is a temporal run-off of lived-experience where appearances concordantly pass into one another and form the unity of coincidence corresponding to the unity of sense. We came to understand this flux as a systematic network of progressive fulfillment of intentions that obviously, when viewed from the other side, goes hand in hand with an emptying of intentions that are already full. Every momentary phase of perception is in itself a network of partially full and partially empty intentions. For, in every phase we have genuine appearances, that is, a fulfilled intention, albeit only gradually fulfilled, since there remains an inner horizon that is unfulfilled and an inner horizon of indeterminacy that is still determinable. Moreover, proper to every phase is a completely empty outer horizon that tends toward fulfillment and, in the transition toward a definite direction of progress, strives toward it in the manner of empty anticipation. [8]

Viewed more precisely, we now have to describe the process of perception as a process of acquiring knowledge; and we have to

distinguish further (in the following manner) between fulfillment and the process of determining more closely. While the empty horizon—both inner and outer—fashions its next fulfillment in the march of perception, this fulfillment does not merely consist in tracing over in intuition the prefigured sense of which one is emptily conscious. Indeterminacy, as we said, belongs essentially to the empty premonition which is, as it were, the presentiment of what is to come. We also spoke of determinable indeterminacy. Indeterminacy is a primordial form of generality whose nature it is to be fulfilled in the coincidence of sense only by "specification." As long as this specification itself has the character of indeterminacy (the specific indeterminacy as opposed to the general indeterminacy just mentioned), it can attain further specification, etc., in new steps. But now we should consider that this process of fulfillment, which is a specifying fulfillment, is also a process of knowing something more closely; it is not only a momentary acquisition of knowledge, but at the same time a process of acquisition [that takes place] within knowledge that is abiding and that becomes habitual. This will become clearer shortly.

Let us note in advance that the primordial place of this accomplishment is the continuously co-functioning retention. First, let us recall that the continually progressing fulfillment is at [9]
the same time a continually progressing emptying. For, as soon as a new side becomes visible, a side that has just been visible gradually disappears from sight, becoming finally completely non-visible. But what has become non-visible is not cognitively lost for us. Thematic perception does not merely drive at continually possessing some new aspect of the object that would be intuitively grasped from moment to moment, as if what was formerly given would slip away from the grasp of [perceptual] interest. Rather, in passing over the object, perception drives at fashioning a unity of originary acquisitions of knowledge through which the object, according to its specific content, would reach an original acquisition, and through it would become an abiding epistemic

possession.[27] And in fact we understand the original acquisition of knowledge by observing the following situation: The process of determining more closely, which comes about with fulfillment, imparts afresh a specific moment of sense. While it vanishes from the field of genuine perception in the progression to new perceptions, it remains held retentionally. (That already takes place prethematically, already in background perceiving. In thematic perception, retention has the thematic character of keeping-a-hold-of.) Accordingly, the empty horizon (into which what is new enters by virtue of retention) has a character other than the empty horizon peculiar to the expanse of perception, that is, before the latter originarily appeared. Having already once seen the back side of an unfamiliar object and, turning back to perceive the front side, the empty premonition of the back side now has a determinate prefiguring that it did not have previously. The unfamiliar object is thereby transformed in the perceptual process into a familiar object; in the end, I have exactly what I had started with, namely, a perspectival appearance. And if the object has moved entirely out of our field of perception, then we have an altogether completely empty retention of it. Nevertheless, we still have the entire epistemic acquisition of it, and we still have a hold on it in thematic perceiving. Our empty-consciousness now has an articulated, systematic sense that is sketched in—something that did not exist previously and especially at the beginning of the [10] perception. What was previously a mere framework of sense, a wide ranging generality, is now specified meaningfully in an articulated manner; to be sure, it awaits further experience in order to take on still richer epistemic contents as contents of determination. If I turn back again to the perceptions of the earlier determination, they will issue in the consciousness of recognition, in the consciousness: "I already know all that." Now a mere bringing to intuition takes place, and with it, a fulfilling confirmation of the empty intentions, but no longer the process of determining more closely.

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[27] Every content of an unaltered thing can be reached time and again through perception; I can go around the surface; ideally the thing can be divided, and can be viewed time and again from all surface sides, etc.

<§3. The Possibility of Our Acquired Knowledge Being Freely at Our Disposal>

By acquiring knowledge originally, perception also acquires permanent, lasting possession of what it has acquired; it is a possession that is at our disposal any time. How is something freely at our disposal? Although this thing that is already familiar to me has become empty, it is freely at my disposal insofar as the empty retention remaining behind can be freely filled up at any time; it can be made present at any time by a re-perception in the sense of a re-cognition. By walking around it, drawing nearer to it, touching it with my hands, etc., I can once more see all the sides that are already familiar to me; I can experience them again, they are ready for perception. And this holds true likewise for the next time. The fact that a re-perception, a renewed perception of the same thing, is possible for transcendence characterizes the fundamental trait of transcendent perception, alone through which an abiding world is there for us, a reality that can be pregiven for us and can be freely at our disposal.

To this we must add yet another essential observation. If we have become familiar with a thing and a second thing appears in our field of vision, and if, with respect to the side genuinely seen, it accords with the earlier and familiar thing, then according to an essential law of consciousness (by virtue of an inner coinciding with the earlier thing awakened through the "association of similarity"), the new thing receives the entire epistemic prefiguring from the earlier one. It is apperceived, as we say, with the same non-visible qualities as the previous one. And even this prefiguring, this acquisition of an inner tradition, is also freely at our disposal in the form of actualizing perception. [11]

But how does this having something freely at our disposal look now upon closer inspection? What makes possible the free foray into our world that is thoroughly interwoven with anticipations; what makes all existing knowledge and new knowledge possible? Let us privilege here the normal and basic instance of the constitution of external existence, namely, the constitution of unaltered spatial things. Whether alterations of things can occur without being perceived and yet can be known in all their

unperceived elements in a variety of perceptions and experiences that follow—this is a theme for a clarification existing on a higher level, a theme that already presupposes clarifying the possibility of knowing existence in rest.

Thus, in order to understand at least this basic feature of the constitutive problematic, we ask what having acquisitions of knowledge freely at our disposal looks like—acquisitions I already have, however incompletely; what does it look like specifically in the case of unaltered thingliness? What makes it possible?

From what we have said above, we see that every perception *implicite* invokes an entire perceptual system; every appearance that arises in it implies an entire system of appearance, specifically in the form of intentional inner and outer horizons. We cannot even imagine a mode of appearance in which the appearing object would be given completely. No final presentation in the flesh[28] is ever reached in the mode of appearance as if it would present the complete, exhausted self of the object. Every appearance implies a *plus ultra* in the empty horizon. And since perception does indeed pretend to give the object [completely] in the flesh in every appearance, it in fact and by its very nature constantly pretends to accomplish more than it can accomplish. In a peculiar way, every perceptual givenness is a constant mixture of familiarity and unfamiliarity, a givenness that points to new possible perceptions that would issue in familiarity. And that will continue to hold in a new sense, differently from what has come to light up to now.

Let us now take a look at the formation of unity through coinciding as it pertains to sense by examining the transition of appearances, for instance, when approaching or walking around an object, or in eye movement. The fundamental relationship in this dynamic transition is that of intention and fulfillment. The empty [12]
pointing ahead acquires its corresponding fullness. It corresponds to the more or less rich prefigured possibilities; but since its nature is determinable indeterminacy, it also brings, together with the fulfillment, a closer determination. Thus, here we have a new "primordial-institution," or as we can say here again, a primordial-impression, since a moment of primordial originality emerges.

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[28] *Leibhaftigkeit*

What is already given to conscious in a primordial-impressional manner points to new modes of appearance through its halo which, when occurring, emerge as partly confirming, partly determining more closely. By virtue of inner intentions—unfulfilled and those now in the process of being fulfilled—what has already appeared itself becomes enriched. In this progression, moreover, the empty outer horizon that was intertwined with the appearances achieves its next fulfillment, at least a partial one. The part of the horizon that remains unfulfilled passes over into the horizon of the new appearance, and it goes on like this continually. That aspect of the object which has already appeared is partially lost again as it moves away from givenness, i.e., the appearance; the visible becomes non-visible again. But it is not lost. I remain conscious of it retentionally and in such a way that the empty horizon of the appearance present at this time receives a new prefiguring that points in a determinate manner to what has already been given earlier as co-present. Having seen the back side and having turned back to the front side, the perceptual object has kept a determination of sense for me; likewise in emptiness, it points to what was previously seen. They all belong now abidingly to the object. The process of perception is a constant process of acquiring knowledge that holds on to what was acquired epistemically in sense; it thereby fashions an ever newly altered and ever more enriched sense. During the ongoing perceptual process, this sense is added to the grasped object itself in its presumed [complete] presentation in the flesh.

Now, it depends upon the direction of the perceptual processes as to which lines are brought to fulfillment from the system of unfulfilled intentions, that is, which continuous series of possible appearances will be realized out of the entire system of possible appearances of the object. Advancing along this line, the empty [13] intentions are transformed respectively into expectations. Once this line is pursued, the series of appearances run their course in the sense of continuously arousing and steadily fulfilling expectations that stem from the current kinaestheses, while the remaining empty horizons are left in dead potentiality.

Lastly, we still have to mention that the integral harmony [taking place] in the coinciding of adumbration-appearances,

which pass over into one another by way of intention and fulfillment, not only concerns the appearances taken as wholes, but also all their moments and parts that can be differentiated. Thus, there is something corresponding to every filled spatial point of the object in the entire series of appearances; they continuously pass into one another such that this point in the appearance exhibits itself as a moment of the appearing spatial form.

If we ask, finally, what gives unity within every temporal point of the momentary appearance—unity considered as the entire aspect in which the particular side is exhibited—we will also come across reciprocal intentions that are fulfilled simultaneously and reciprocally. The transition of appearances following one after the other are all in dynamic displacement, enrichment and impoverishment.

The object appearing constantly new, constantly different, is constituted as the same in these exceedingly intricate and wondrous systems of intention and fulfillment that make up the appearances. But the object is never finished, never fixed completely.

We must point here to a side of the noematic constitution that is essential for the objectivation of the perceptual object, [namely,] to the side of kinaesthetic motivation. We mentioned in passing time and again that the courses of appearance go hand in hand with the orchestrating movements of the lived-body[29]. But that must not remain something that we only mention haphazardly in passing. The lived-body is constantly there, functioning as an organ of perception; and here it is also, in itself, an entire system of compatibly harmonizing organs of perception. The lived-body is in itself characterized as the perceiving-lived-body. We recognize it then purely as a lived-body, subjectively movable and in perceiving activity, as subjectively self-moving. In this regard it does not come into consideration as a perceived spatial thing, but rather with respect to the system of so-called "movement-sensations" that run their course during perception, in eye movements, head movements, etc. And they do not simply run [14]

[29] *Leib*

parallel to the flow of appearances there; rather the kinaesthetic series under consideration and the perceptual appearances are related to one another through consciousness. By viewing an object I am conscious of the position of my eyes and at the same time—in the form of a novel systematic empty horizon—I am conscious of the entire system of possible eye positions that rest at my disposal. And now, what is seen in the given eye position is so enmeshed with the entire system that I can say with certainty that if I were to move my eyes in this direction or in that, specific visual appearances would accordingly run their course in a determinate order. If I were to let the eye movements run this way or that in another direction, different series of appearances would accordingly run their course as expected. This holds likewise for head movements in the system of these possibilities of movement, and again for the movement of walking, etc., that I might bring into play.

Every series of kinaestheses proceeds in its own way, in a manner totally different from the series of sensible data. It runs its course in such a way as to be freely at my disposal, free to inhibit, free to orchestrate once again, as an originally subjective realization. Thus, the system of lived-body movements is in fact characterized with respect to consciousness in a special way as a subjectively free system. I run through this system in the consciousness of the free "I can." It may happen that I involuntarily dwell upon something, that for instance my eyes involuntarily turn this way or that. But at any time, I can capriciously pursue such a path of movement or whatever path of movement I like. As soon as I have an appearance of the thing in such a situation, a system of internally coherent manifold appearances of the same thing is thereby prefigured in the original consciousness of the sequence of appearances.

A propos the appearances I am not free: When I undertake a series of movements in the free system, "I move myself," the appearances that are arriving are already prefigured. The appearances form dependent systems. Only as dependent upon kinaestheses can they continually pass into one another and constitute a unity of one sense. Only by running their course in these ways do they unfold their intentional indicators. Only

through this interplay of independent and dependent variables is what appears constituted as a transcendent perceptual object, precisely as an object that is more than what we directly perceive, as an object that can completely vanish from my perception and yet still persist. We can also say it is constituted as such only by the fact that its appearances are kinaesthetically motivated, and consequently that it is in my freedom, in accordance with the knowledge that I have acquired, to let the appearances run their course randomly as original appearances in their system of concordance. Through the appropriate eye movements and other lived-bodily movements I can, in the case of a familiar object, turn back at any time to the old appearances that give me back the object from the same sides. Or, by freely returning to the appropriate place, I can once again perceive and identify the object no longer perceived. [15]

Thus, in every perceptual process we see a constitutive duet being played: (1) The system of my free possibilities of movement is intentionally constituted as a practical, kinaesthetic horizon. This system is actualized each time I run through single paths of movements with the character of familiarity, that is, of fulfillment. We are not only thereby conscious of every eye position that we have at the moment, every position of the thing-body as the momentary sensation of movement, but we are also conscious of them as a place in a system of places; thus we are conscious of them with an empty horizon which is a horizon of freedom. (2) Every visual sensation or visual appearance that arises in the visual field, every tactile appearance that arises in the field of touch is ordered with respect to consciousness, to the current situation of the consciousness of the parts of the lived-body, creating a horizon of further possibilities that are ordered together, creating a horizon of possible series of appearances belonging to the freely possible series of movement.

In relation to the constitution of transcendent temporality we should note here that every path of actualization that we would *de facto* enter down in realizing this freedom would yield continuous series of appearances of the object. All of these series would exhibit the object for one and the same expanse of time; they would all exhibit the same object in the same duration, only from

different sides. In accordance with the sense of the constituted object, all determinations that would be known through this process would be co-existent.

<§4. The Relation of *esse* and *percipi* in Immanent and Transcendent Perception> [16]

All this holds only for transcendent objects. An immanent object, like a lived-experience of black, offers itself as a lasting object, and in a certain way through "appearances" as well. But it only does so like any temporal object in general. The temporally extending duration requires the constant modification of the modes of givenness in accordance with the modes of appearance of the temporal orientation. Now, the spatial object is also a temporal object, so the same holds for it, too. But it still has a second, special way to appear. By directing our attention to the temporal fullness and especially to the primordial-impressional phases, we come up against the radical difference between the appearance of transcendent and immanent objects. The immanent object has only one possible way to be given in the original in every Now, and therefore every mode of the past also has only one single series of temporal modifications: to wit, that of presentification, with the changing past objects being constituted in it. But the spatial object has infinitely many ways [to be given in the original] since it can appear in the Now, that is, in an original way from its different sides. Though it appears *de facto* from this side, it could have been able to appear from other sides, and accordingly every one of its past phases have infinitely many ways in which it could exhibit its past fulfilled points of time. We can also say: The concept of appearance has a new and unique sense for the transcendent object.

If we consider exclusively the Now phase, then in the case of the immanent object, appearance and that which appears cannot be separated in the Now phase. What arises anew in the original is the particular, new black-phase itself, and without being exhibited. And appearing means here nothing other than a to-be devoid of any exhibiting that points beyond, and a to-be-conscious-of in the original.

But on the other hand, with respect to the transcendent object, it is clear that the thing of which we are conscious in the flesh as a thing in the new Now is given to consciousness only in and through an appearance; that is, exhibiting and that which is exhibited, adumbration and that which is adumbrated are to be distinguished. If we exchange the noematic attitude that we have privileged up to now with the noetic attitude in which we turn our reflective regard toward the lived-experience and its "intimately inherent"[30] components, we can also say that a transcendent object such as a thing can only be constituted when an immanent content is constituted as substratum. Now, this immanent content for its part is substituted, as it were, for the peculiar function of the "adumbration," of an exhibiting appearance, of a being exhibited in and through it. When we do not regard the appearing thing-object, but the optical lived-experience itself, the thing-appearance that arises anew in each Now—as we say, the optical appearance—is a complex of surface color moments that are extended in this way or that; these surface color moments are immanent data, and we are thus conscious of them in themselves just as originally as, say, red or black. The manifold changing red-data in which, e.g., any surface side of a red cube and its unaltered red is exhibited, are immanent data. [17]

Yet, on the other hand, the matter does not rest with this mere immanent existence. In the immanent data, something is exhibited in the unique manner of adumbration, which the immanent data themselves are not; in the visual field, a sameness, an identical spatially extended body-color is exhibited in the alteration of the immanently sensed colors. All the noematic moments that we, in the natural attitude, see contained in the object and as related to it, are constituted by means of the immanent data of sensation, and by virtue of the consciousness that, as it were, animates them. In this regard we speak of apprehension as of transcendent

[30] Translator: "*reell*." Whereas "*real*" for Husserl designates the type of existence or "reality" peculiar to transcendent things, "*reell*" for Husserl depicts what is actual, *wirklich,* without it sharing the ontological status of a real transcendent entity, *res*. Accordingly, *reell* concerns the intimate immanence of consciousness. What is "*irreal*" from the perspective of the "*real*" can also be "*irreell*" from the perspective of the "*reell*"; this would bear on what Husserl understood generally as "noema" or "sense."

apperception: It characterizes consciousness' accomplishment which is to bestow on the mere immanent contents of sensible data, on the so-called data of sensation or hyletic data, the function of exhibiting something objectively "transcendent." It is dangerous here to speak of represented and representing, of interpreting data of sensation, or to speak of a function that outwardly signifies through this "interpreting."[31] Adumbrating, exhibiting in data of sensation, is totally different from an interpretation through signs[32].

"Immanent" objectlike formations, accordingly, are for their part not given to consciousness through apperception. In their case, "being given to consciousness in the original" and "being," "*percipi*" and "*esse*" converge. And indeed for every Now. However, they are to a large extent bearers of apperceptive [18] functions, at which time something non-immanent is exhibited in and through them. Now the *esse* (for transcendent objects) is in principle distinguished from the *percipi*. In every Now of external perception we do have an original consciousness, but genuine perceiving in this Now, that is, that feature in genuine perceiving that is primordial-impressional (and not simply retentional consciousness of the past phases of the perceptual object) is a conscious-having of what is being adumbrated *originaliter*.[33] This is not a pure and simple having of the object in which conscious-having and being coincide; rather, it is a mediate consciousness, provided that only one apperception is had immediately, a store of sense-data referring to kinaesthetic data, and an apperceptive apprehension through which an exhibiting appearance is constituted; in and through it, we are conscious of the transcendent object as adumbrating or exhibiting *originaliter*. Time and again we have the following situation in the process of ongoing perceiving in every Now: In principle, the external object is never purely and simply had in its original ipseity. It appears in principle

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[31] "*durch dieses 'Deuten' hinausdeutenden Funktion*"

[32] *signitives Deuten*

[33] Perception is original consciousness of an individual object, of a temporal object, and for every Now we have in perception its primordial-impression in which the object in the Now, in its momentary point of originality, is originally grasped. But it must be shown that original adumbration necessarily goes hand in hand with appresentation.

only through apperceptive exhibition and in ever new exhibitions; as the latter progress, they bring something new to the original exhibition from its empty horizons.

Yet, it is more important for our ends to recognize as inconceivable that something like a spatial object, which gets its original sense genuinely by means of external perception as adumbrating perception, would be given through immanent perception, be it human or superhuman intellect. But from this it follows as inconceivable that a spatial object and everything like it (for instance, an object of the world in the natural sense), could be exhibited in a discrete, self-contained manner from one point of time to the next, along with its entire ensemble of features (as completely determined) that make up its temporal content in this Now. In this respect we also speak of adequate givenness as opposed to inadequate givenness. To express this theologically and in a drastic manner, worse service cannot be rendered God [19] than conceding him the ability to make an odd number even and to transform every absurdity into truth. Inadequate modes of givenness belong essentially to the spatial structure of things; any other way of givenness is simply absurd. We can never think the given object without empty horizons in any phase of perception and, what amounts to the same thing, without apperceptive adumbration. With adumbration there is simultaneously a pointing beyond what is exhibiting itself in a genuine sense. Genuine exhibition is itself, again, not a pure and simple possession on the model of immanence with its *esse* = *percipi*; instead, it is a partially fulfilled intention that contains unfulfilled indications that point beyond. The originality of exhibiting the transcendent thing in the flesh necessarily implies that the object as sense has the originality of apperceptive fulfillment and that this harbors inseparably a mixture of actually fulfilling and not yet filled moments of sense. This is the case whether they be moments of sense only prefigured according to the general structure, and apart from that open indeterminate and possible moments, or whether they be moments already distinguished by being specially prefigured. This is why the talk of inadequation as a haphazard lack that a higher intellect could overcome is an unsuitable way of speaking, indeed totally preposterous.

We can formulate a principle here that will become much clearer in our future analyses. Whenever we speak of objects, no matter what category of objects they may be, the sense of this manner of speaking about objects originally stems from perceptions as lived-experiences originally constituting sense, and therefore an objectlike formation. But the constitution of an object as sense is an accomplishment of consciousness that is in principle unique for every basic type of object. Perception does not consist in staring blankly at something lodged in consciousness, inserted there by some strange wonder as if something were first there and then consciousness would somehow embrace it. Rather, for every imaginable ego-subject, every objectlike existence with a specific content of sense is an accomplishment of consciousness. It is an accomplishment that must be new for every novel object. Every basic type of object in principle requires a different intentional structure. An object that *is*, but is not and in principle could not be an object of a consciousness, is pure non-sense. [20]

Every possible object of a possible consciousness is however also an object for a possible originarily giving consciousness; and this we call, at least for individual objects, "perception." It is absurd to demand of a material object a perception that has the general structure of an immanent perception, and conversely, to demand of an immanent object a perception that has the structure of external perception. Both sense-giving and sense require one another essentially—and this concerns the essential typicality of their correlative structures.

In this way it is the nature of originally transcendent sense-giving, which external perception carries out, that the accomplishment of this original sense-giving is never finished as one expanse of perception progresses to another and so forth in whatever manner the process of perception may advance. This accomplishment does not simply consist in bringing to intuition something new in a fixed pregiven sense, as if the sense would already be prefigured in a finished manner from the very beginning; rather in the process of perceiving, the sense itself is continually cultivated and is genuinely so in steady transformation, constantly leaving open the possibility of new transformations.

Let us note here that in the sense of concordantly and synthetically progressing perception, we can always distinguish between an unceasingly changing sense and an identical sense running through the changing sense. Every phase of perception has its sense insofar as it has the object given in the How of the determination of the original exhibition and in the How of the horizon. This sense is flowing; it is a new sense in every phase. But the unity of the substrate *x*, which holds sway in a steady coinciding, and which is determined ever more richly—this unity of the object itself, that is, everything that the process of perception and all further possible perceptual processes determine in it and would determine in it—this unity runs through this flowing sense, through all the modes, "object in the How of determination." In this way, an idea that lies in infinity belongs to every external perception, the idea of the completely determined object, of the object that would be determined through and through, known through and through, where every one of its determinations would be purified of all indeterminacy, and where the full determination itself would be devoid of any *plus ultra* with respect to what is still to be determined, what is still remaining open.

I spoke of an idea lying in infinity, that is, of an unattainable idea. For, the essential structure of perception itself excludes a perception (as a self-contained process of courses of appearance, continually passing into one another) that would furnish absolute knowledge of the object; it excludes such a knowledge in which the tension would collapse between the object in the How of determination (which is changing and relative, remaining incomplete), and the object itself. For evidently, the possibility of a *plus ultra* is in principle never ruled out. It is thus the idea of the absolute self of the object and of its absolute and complete determination, or as we can also put it, of its absolute individual essence. In relation to this infinite idea which is to be seen, but which as such is not realizable, every perceptual object in the epistemic process is a flowing approximation. We always have the external object in the flesh (we see, grasp, seize it), and yet it is always at an infinite distance mentally. What we do grasp of it pretends to be its essence; and it is it too, but it remains so only in [21]

an incomplete approximation, an approximation that grasps something of it, but in doing so it also constantly grasps into an emptiness that cries out for fulfillment. What is constantly familiar is constantly unfamiliar, and from the very beginning all knowledge seems to be hopeless. To be sure, I said "seems." And we do not wish to commit ourselves here straight away to a hasty skepticism.

(Of course, the situation is entirely different with immanent objects. Perception constitutes them and appropriates them in their absoluteness. They are not constituted by constant sense modification in the sense of an approximation; only insofar as they become in a future are they laden with protentions and protentional indeterminacies. But what has been constituted as present in the Now is an absolute self that does not have any unfamiliar sides.)

We have rejected a hasty skepticism. At all events, we should have initially made the following distinction in this regard. Given that an object is perceived and that we progressively come to know it in the perceptual process, we had to distinguish [a] the particular empty horizon that is prefigured by the process running its course and that is attached to the momentary perceptual phase with its prefiguring, and [b] a horizon of empty possibilities without this prefiguring. Prefiguring means that an empty intuition is there that provides its general framework of sense. It belongs to the essence of such a prefiguring intention that when pursuing a suitable, appropriate direction of perception this would have to occur: [either] the process of determining more closely, which is a fulfilling process, or as we shall address later as a counterpart, disappointment, annulment of sense, and crossing out. There are also, however, partial horizons without such a firm prefiguring. In other words, aside from definite prefigured possibilities, there are counter-possibilities for which there are no support and which remain constantly open. [22]

Speaking purely in terms of the sense-giving process of perception itself, we can say, for example, that when something like an illuminated appearance, a shooting star and the like flashes in my visual field, e.g., while gazing at a star-studded sky, it is a completely empty possibility that is not prefigured in the sense,

but is left open by it. So, if we confine ourselves to the positive sense-giving process of perception together with its positive prefigurings, the question we pose is both understandable and obvious: whether no enduring and ultimately abiding self of the object is even attainable in going from the non-intuitable empty prefiguring to the fulfilling process of determining it more closely; put differently, whether not only newer and newer objectlike features can enter into the horizon of perception, but whether, in the process of determining more closely, even these features already grasped imply a further determinability, *in infinitum*, hence themselves continually and constantly maintaining the character of the unfamiliar *x* that can never gain final determinacy. Is then perception an "exchange" that can in principle never be "cashed in" or "realized" by new, similar exchanges, whose realization leads again to exchange and likewise *in infinitum*? The fulfillment of an intention is carried out by being exhibited in the flesh, to be sure, with empty inner horizons. But is there nothing at all in what has already become exhibited in the flesh that would bring with it a definitiveness so that in fact we are left stuck in an ostensibly empty business of exchange?

We feel that it cannot be so, and in fact looking more deeply into the structure of the series of perception, we come up against the peculiarity that is summoned to solve the difficulty initially for praxis and its intuitive sensible world. Also in the case of [23] incomplete fulfillment, that is, in the case of fulfillment laden with indications, it is the nature of genuine appearances as fulfillments of prefigured intentions to point ahead to ideal limits as goals of fulfillment that would be reached by continuous series of fulfillment. But that does not happen right away for the entire object, but rather for the features that have already come to actual intuition in each case. In view of what is genuinely exhibited in the appearance, every appearance belongs systematically to some type of series of appearances to be realized in kinaesthetic freedom in which at least some moment of the shapes would achieve its optimal givenness, and therefore its true self.

The phantom[34] as a sensibly qualified bodily surface functions as a basic frame for the object of perception. The bodily surface can exhibit itself in continually diverse appearances, and likewise every partial aspect that comes into relief. For each of them we have distant appearances and near appearances. And again, inside each of these spheres we have more favorable and less favorable appearances, and in ordered series we arrive at optima. In this sense, the distant appearance of a thing and a manifold of distant appearances already point back to near appearances in which the form given at first glance[35]and its fullness appear at best in the total overview. This [optimal] form itself given at first glance, which we have for instance when looking at a house from a well chosen standpoint, gives a framework for sketching in further optimal determinations that <would be brought about by> drawing closer, where only single parts would be given, but then, optimally. The thing itself in its saturated fullness is an idea located in a sense belonging to consciousness and in the manner of its intentional structures; and it is, as it were, a s<ystem> of all optima that would be won by sketching in the optimal frameworks. Thematic interest that lives itself out in perceptions is guided by practical interests in our scientific life. And that thematic interest comes to a rest when certain optimal appearances, in which the thing shows so much of its ultimate self as this practical interest demands, are won for the respective interest. Or rather, the thematic interest as practical interest prefigures a relative self: What suffices as practical counts as the self. Thus the house itself and in its true being, and specifically [24] with respect to its pure bodily thingly nature, is quickly given optimally, i.e., experienced as complete for that person who regards it as a buyer or a seller. For the physicist and the chemist, such ways of experience would seem completely superficial and miles away from its true being.

I can only say in a word that all such highly ramified intentional analyses, which are difficult in themselves, belong for their part to

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[34] Translator: The "phantom" for Husserl is the "schema" of the concrete material object, that is, examined without regard to a possible nexus of causality.

[35] *oberflächliche Gestalt*

a universal genesis of consciousness, and here especially in the genesis of the consciousness of a transcendent reality. If the theme of constitutive analyses is to make understandable how perception brings about its sense-giving and how the object is constituted through all empty intending as always only exhibiting optimal appearance-sense in a relative manner, and to make this understandable from perception's unique intentional constitution according to intimately inherent components of lived-experience itself, according to the intentional noema and sense, then it is the theme of genetic analyses to make understandable how, in the development proper to the structure of every stream of consciousness, which is at the same time the development of the ego—how those intricate intentional systems develop, through which finally an external world can appear to consciousness and to the ego.

<DIVISION 1: MODALIZATION> [25]

<Chapter 1: THE MODE OF NEGATION>

<§5. Disappointment as an Occurrence that Runs Counter to the Synthesis of Fulfillment>

We must now expand our insights in a new direction. Up until now we have investigated the continuous, unitary courses of perception in which the unity of an object is maintained concordantly. This took place by virtue of the unanimity of a coinciding that bestows fulfillment upon the intentions, namely, the intentions that are aroused as perception progresses. The process was a constant process of expanding knowledge. This expansion proceeds through discrete syntheses of perception in such a way that a thing, already fairly familiar through a previous perception, occasionally gets perceived again under a simultaneous remembering of previous perceptions, that is, in straightforward recognition. As we can easily see, the new acquisition of knowledge continues the previous acquisition with respect to new sides. But all of this concerns syntheses of fulfillment, that is, of concordance.

There is, however, an occurrence that runs counter to fulfillment, namely, disappointment; there is an occurrence that runs counter to determining more closely, namely, determining otherwise. Instead of the acquired knowledge being preserved and enriched further, it can be placed in question, annulled. In short, there is something like the difference between the modalized consciousness of being in distinction to the originally non-modalized consciousness of being, and we are now in a position of gaining deeper insights into the structure of the modalities of

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being and their constitution, and noetically speaking, insights into the structure of perceptual belief and its modifications such as "doubt," "supposition," "negation," etc.

As we know, the intentional systems occurring in the normal case of perception that we have described (noetically speaking, the [26] apprehensions apperceiving the respective sensation-complexes) have the character of actual or potential expectations. That is, if in perceiving I instigate a kinaesthetic series, for instance, a certain head movement, the appearances will run their course in a motivated succession such that they accord to my expectation. Thus, in the normal case of perception, all fulfillment progresses as the fulfillment of expectations. These are systematized expectations, systems of rays of expectations which, in being fulfilled, also become enriched; that is, the empty sense becomes richer in sense, fitting into the way in which the sense was prefigured.

But every expectation can also be disappointed, and disappointment essentially presupposes partial fulfillment; without a certain measure of unity maintaining itself in the progression of perceptions, the unity of the intentional lived-experience would crumble. Yet despite the unity of the perceptual process occurring with this abiding, unitary content of sense, a break does indeed take place, and the lived-experience of "otherwise" springs forth.

There is also a lived-experience of "otherwise" without a break, a disappointment of a regular style, which by virtue of its regularity can be anticipated and which thus can even be prefigured in the empty horizon. In other words, there is a steady consciousness of alteration whose phenomenological analysis is fundamental for [understanding] the constitution of a change. Change is a continuous process of becoming otherwise; however, this becoming otherwise maintains unity, namely, a unity of the object remaining concordantly the same as the substratum of its continuous alterations in and through which it becomes otherwise, and in and through which it becomes otherwise time and again.

Let us now already assume a unitary object, be it unchanged or changed, that first abides "concordantly" in the continuity of the original experience, "getting known" better and better. But then all of a sudden, and contrary to all expectation, green rather than red

shows up on the back side that is now becoming visible; instead of the ball-shape indicated by the front side, an indentation or something angular appears, etc. Prior to the ensuing perception of the back sides, perception in its living flow was intentionally prefigured toward red and ball-shaped; perception's referential indicators were determinately directed toward red and ball-shaped. And rather than being fulfilled in this sense, and thereby being ratified, the intentional prefigurings and referential indicators became disappointed. The general framework of sense is retained [27] and fulfilled, and only at this point, only after we have these intentions, does "something else" occur: a conflict between the intentions still living, and the contents of sense being newly instituted intuitively along with their more or less full intentions. We have a system of continual concordance once again insofar as the insertion of this new framework into the old one restores concordance. But in a partial system we have a superimposing group of intentions that exist in the relationship of disappointment with those upon which they superimpose. After we saw the green and the indentation, and after they lasted concordantly during the course of corresponding appearances, the entire perceptual sense gets altered, and not merely the sense in the current expanse of perception; rather, from it the alteration of sense radiates back to the preceding perception and all its previous appearances. They are reinterpreted in their very sense as "green" and "indented." Naturally, this does not take place in explicit acts; but if we were to go back actively, we would necessarily find the altered interpretation explicitly and consciously, that is, the continual concordance that has been produced. But layered beneath this is something that does not accord with it, and actually what does not accord pertains to the entire series that has flowed-off insofar as we are still conscious of the old apprehension in memory. But it especially comes to life at that place where "green" and "indented" emerged. Occurring here is not only the phenomenon of conflict involving both contrary determinations, ball-shaped and indented, red and green; rather, the "it is not ball-shaped and not red," the empty red-intention, is "annulled," negated by the superimposing "green," that is, by the full superimposing green-perception; and with it the substratum itself, the thing itself, which

in the original perceptual series bore the sense determination "red" at the corresponding place of its shape, is in this respect crossed out and at the same time reinterpreted: It is "otherwise."

<§6. Partial Fulfillment—Conflict through Unexpected Sense Data—Restored Concordance>[36] [28]

Our[37] considerations had taken a new turn in the last lecture. The study of the structure of perceptions with respect to their intentional accomplishments enabled us to gain deeper insights into the essence of modes of being and into the way in which they are intentionally constituted. In the normal case of perception, the perceived object gives itself as being in a straightforward manner, as existing actuality. But that "being" can be transformed into "dubitable" or "questionable," into "possible," into "supposed"; and then "non-being" can also occur here, and in contrast to this, the emphatic "it really is," the "it is indeed so." Correlatively, (i.e., in a noetic regard), one speaks of a believing inherent in perceiving; from time to time we already speak here of judging, that is, of judicative perception. In the case of normal perception—what is usually and straightforwardly meant by "perception"—even if the object is believed to exist with certainty, this belief can pass over into doubt, into taking-something-to-be-possible, into rejecting, and again into an affirming active acceptance. What one so hotly debated under the rubric of the theory of judgment in the newer logical movement since Mill, Brentano, and Sigwart is at its core nothing other than the phenomenological clarification of the essence and logical function of the certainty of being and modalities of being. Here as everywhere, the phenomenological method alone brought to light the problems of pure consciousness and their genuine sense. That is, it concerns understanding how consciousness necessarily equips sense with modalities of being in every sense-giving that it carries out, and it concerns understanding which feature of

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[36] Editor: For §§6-8 see Appendix 1: <Descriptions of the Phenomenon of Conflict without Regard to Position-Taking> pp. 425ff.

[37] Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

constituting consciousness is to be made responsible for this accomplishment. Here the source of really radical clarifications is perception; and for reasons that will become clearer below, transcendent perception is privileged where these clarifications are concerned. What we have said holds even though the specific concept of judgment, the one that dominates the [inner] logic of theory does not even occur yet in the framework of mere [29] perception. Still, the modalities occur precisely here, and it is no coincidence that perception and judgment have these modalities in common. From there we will be able to show that the modes of belief necessarily play their role in all modes of consciousness. Moreover, we must gain clarity so that we can surmount the confusion that blinded such a brilliant researcher as Brentano concerning the questions of belief and judgment, and on the other hand, so that we can understand the constant role of modalities in logic. Let this suffice as an indication of what is to come.

Our analyses up to now have illustrated that every phase of perception presents itself as a system of rays of actual and potential intentions of expectation. During the continual elapse of phases—and during the normal case of perception, during the so-called perception that occurs usually and straightforwardly—there is a continual process of inciting actualizations, then further, there is the continuous fulfillment of expectations whereby fulfillment is always a process of determining more closely. But we also have now the occurrence of disappointment as a possibility that runs counter to the fulfillment of expectations. In order for a unity of an intentional process to be maintained, however, a certain measure of thoroughgoing fulfillment must be presupposed under all circumstances. From a correlative direction this means that a certain unity of sense must be maintained throughout the course of changing appearances. Only in this way do we have the constancy of *a single* consciousness, a unitary intentionality spanning all phases during the course of lived-experience with its appearances.

What happens now if a disappointment occurs in the [perceptual] process rather than a fulfillment, regardless of whether a changing or unchanging object had been constituted in it perceptually? So, for example, we see a uniform, well-rounded red ball; the flow of perception has flowed-off for some time, and

has done so in such a way that this apprehension has been fulfilled concordantly. But now as it progresses a part of the back side that was non-visible gradually appears, and contrary to the way in which the sense was originally prefigured as "uniformly red, uniformly well-rounded ball-shaped," there occurs the consciousness of "otherwise," disappointing the expectation: "Not red, but green, not ball-shaped, but indented." Such is its sense now. A general framework of sense has been maintained in thoroughgoing fulfillment; only a part of the anticipating intention is affected, the part belonging precisely to that place on the surface in question, and the corresponding sense-part gets the character of "not so, rather otherwise." Here a conflict occurs between the still living intentions, and—emerging in newly instituted originality—the contents of sense and the contents of belief, together with the horizons proper to them. [30]

But there is not only a conflict. By being presented in the flesh, the newly constituted sense throws its opponent from the saddle, as it were. By covering it over with the fullness of its presentation in the flesh as the sense that is now demanded, it overpowers the former, which was only an empty anticipation. The new sense "green" in its primordially impressional force of fulfillment is a certainty that has a primordial force which overpowers the certainty of the anticipation of "being red." We are now conscious of it *as* overpowered; it bears the character of "null." In addition, the "green" is on the other hand integrated into the old framework. The "being green and indented" that occurs in the primordial impression, and in the entire aspect of the thing from the side in question, advances; in accordance with its sense, and as long as we remain on this one level, it advances the preceding series of appearance of which we are still retentionally conscious in a concordant procession.

<§7. Retroactive Crossing Out in the Retentional Sphere and the Transformation of the Previous Perceptual Sense>[38]

But surely, a certain duplication in the content of sense essentially belongs to the entire phenomenal state of affairs. Just as the unexpected New and "Otherwise" covers over and voids the prefigured sense "red and ball-shaped" that was prefigured in the train of perception up to this point, so too does something take place retroactively in a corresponding manner for the entire preceding series. That is, the perceptual sense is changed not merely in the momentary primordially impressional expanse of perception. The noematic transformation radiates back in the form of a retroactive crossing out in the retentional sphere, transforming its accomplishment of sense that stemmed from the previous perceptions. The previous apperception that was harmonized with [31] the consistently unfolding "red" and uniform "round" is "reinterpreted" *implicite* as "green" and "indented."

This retroactive crossing out and "reinterpretation" essentially means that if we were to bring the retentional elements (i.e., the series of appearance of which we are still freshly conscious, but which have become completely obscure) to intuitive givenness in an explicit remembering, we would notice the following situation in memory: We would find in all the horizons of these retentional components not only the previous prefiguring in the previous structures of expectation and fulfillment, just as this prefiguring was originally motivated at that time, but we would find superimposed upon it the corresponding transformed prefiguring that now points continually to "green" and "indented." But it does it in such a way as to characterize the conflicting moments of the old prefiguring as void. However, insofar as these moments of sense are mere moments of a unitary sense organized in a tight uniformity, the entire sense of the series of appearance is altered modally, and this sense is at the same time duplicated. For we are still conscious of the previous sense, but as "painted over," and where the corresponding moments are concerned, crossed out.

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[38] Translator: Paragraph title modified.

Accordingly, here we are studying what the phenomenon of "otherwise," of "annulment," of nullity, or of negation originally looks like. We recognize as basic and essential that the superimposition of a new sense over a sense that is already constituted takes place through repression, just like correlatively in the noetic direction, there is a formation of a second apprehension, a second apperception that is not juxtaposed to a first one, but lies over it and contends with it. Belief clashes with belief, the belief of one content of sense and one mode of intuition with a belief of a different content in its mode of intuition. The conflict consists in the peculiar "annulment" of an anticipating intention, the annulment of an expectation through a full primordial impression for which disappointment is only another expression. And specifically, it is an annulment that concerns an isolated component, while the concordance of fulfillment advances where the remaining components are concerned. The objectlike moment "red" and its anticipated "being" is immediately affected by the annulment, and is that which primarily bears the character of "not." It is only now as a result of this that the thing itself as the substratum of the presumed red is crossed out in the process of belief: The thing "intended" as being red over-all is not; this same thing is rather green at such and such a spot. After the original, [32]
simple, and normal perception is transformed by being crossed out, we have once more a perception that is like the normal perception insofar as the transformation of sense, which goes hand in hand with being crossed out, produces a perception of a unitary and thoroughgoing concordant sense, and we constantly find the fulfillment of intentions as perception progresses: With the substitution of "green" and "indented" everything is now in agreement. Yet, there is assuredly a difference insofar as the system of the old perceptual apprehension is also retained in retention for consciousness, and this old perceptual apprehension is partially imbued with the new one. We are still conscious of this old one, but with the character of being annulled. The previous normal sense of consciousness is crossed out in the manner stated above, and the new sense is imposed upon it. We can also say that the old sense is declared invalid, and another sense is interposed as

valid. These are only different expressions for the negation and substitution of a new fulfilling sense for the intended one.

Let us draw the most important results from this. First, an original negation here essentially presupposes the normal, original constitution of the object, which we have described above as normal perception. The constitution of the object must be there in order for it to be modified originally. Negation is a modification of consciousness that shows up as such in accordance with its own essence. Secondly, the original constitution of a perceptual object is carried out in intentions (where external perception is concerned, in apperceptive apprehensions); these intentions, according to their essence, can undergo a modification at any time through the disappointment of protentional, expectational belief. This modification takes place together with the superimposition of countervailing intentions arising here essentially. But it happens in such a way that some of the intentions are not only somehow affected by those intentions opposing them, but rather as affected in a special way, they are affected such that through this process, these intentions alter precisely their entire intentional accomplishment. Concretely put, and drawing on our example: The green that emerges as opposing the intention toward "red" does not alter anything in the intention toward "red" insofar as we remain conscious of it as the intention toward "red." The character of consciousness of an "annulled," an "invalid" <intention> [33] emerges now, and accordingly red has the modal character of "void."

In contrast, what is newly perceived has the character of "being valid," even though what is newly perceived disappoints the intention. Likewise, we can say that in such a contrast, every normal perception is a consciousness of validity—every perception in which an occurrence such as disappointment or similar occurrences have not yet arisen. But if we compare the unaltered consciousness, on the one hand, with the consciousness that is altered by being crossed out, on the other hand, and if we make this comparison in view of the content of sense, then we will see that while the intention is indeed transformed, the objective sense itself remains identical. The objective sense still remains the same after being crossed out *precisely as* a crossed out sense; thus,

the content of sense and its modality of being are distinguished: On the one hand, it has the mode of straightforward, uncontested concordance, on the other, it has the mode of being contested and being crossed out.

<Chapter 2: THE MODE OF DOUBT>

<§8. Conflict between Two Superimposed Perceptual Apprehensions Having the Same Hyletic Stock>[39]

Let us now consider still another affiliated, possible type of occurrence that exhibits the mode of transition to a negating annulment, but that can also occur as a lasting condition. I mean the phenomenon of doubt that can be resolved, be it in the form of negation or also in the form of affirmation, in the former case [i.e., negation] like in the previous example that we already cited concerning an illusion being unmasked in consciousness: What is initially seen as a human being becomes dubious and is finally disclosed as a mere wax figure. Or conversely, doubt resolves itself in the affirmative form: Yes, it is indeed a human being. During the doubt of whether it is an actual person or a wax figure, two perceptual apprehensions obviously overlap. One of them [34] lives in the normally flowing perception with which we began; we see a human being there for a time, concordantly and uncontested like other things in our surroundings; they were normal intentions, partly fulfilled, partly unfulfilled, being fulfilled normally in the continual succession of the perceptual processes, without any kind of conflict, without any kind of break. And then what follows is not a clean break in the form of a decisive disappointment, not a break such that a perceptual appearance of a normal intentional type clashes with a component of expectation that was aroused, and crossing it out with its fullness, covers it over and annuls it. Rather, in our present example we have the situation that all of a sudden the full concrete content of the genuine appearance

[39] Editor: For §§8-11 see Appendix 2: <Sense and the Modality of Being in Perception and Remembering> pp. 431ff.

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(alongside the original empty horizon and the original prefiguring) gains a second content, one that overlaps the other: The visual appearance, the spatial shape filled with color, was previously endowed with a halo of intentions of apprehension that gave the sense "human lived-body" and "human as such." And now the sense "dressed up wax figure" is superimposed upon this. Nothing has changed with respect to what is actually seen; indeed, they even have more in common; they both share apperceived clothes, hair, and so forth. But in one case it is flesh and blood, in the other, wax.

If we go back to the ultimate structures, we can also say that one and the same stock of hyletic data is the common support for two overlapping apprehensions. Neither one of them is crossed out during the period of doubt; they stand here in a mutual struggle; each one has, so to speak, its own force, each one is motivated, demanded, as it were, by the previous perceptual situation and its intentional content.[40] But demand opposes demand, one contests the other and is wronged in the same way by the other. There remains in doubt an undecided struggle. Since an objectlike formation is only constituted by the empty horizons together with the common, genuinely intuited core, we accordingly have a bifurcation of original, normal perception (which only constituted [35] one sense in concordance), into a duplicity, as it were, into the form of a doubled perception. We have two interpenetrating perceptions by virtue of the common core-content. But actually, this expression does not really fit. For its conflict also means a certain mutual repression: If the one apprehension overpowers the common intuitive core, if it is actualized, we will see a human being for instance. But the second apprehension, which is directed toward the wax figure, has not become nothing; it is suppressed and put out of commission. Then, for instance, the apprehension "wax figure" obtrudes, and accordingly we now see the wax figure; but now the apprehension "human being" is no longer functional, but is suppressed.

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[40] The choice of these expressions is not arbitrary; it shows that all apprehensions consist in tendencies, motivated in their interconnections, and that they have their "force" in this motivation. See below (pp. 81-2) where the propensity to believe is first introduced for doubt. Correlatively we would have to speak of a *inclinatio ex.*

This holds, however, not only for the momentary situation of perception, for the Now-phase. For we recognize even here the essential retroactive efficacy of the conflict on the process of lived-experience that has flowed-off: We recognize even in this lived-experiencing the crumbling of the singular-sense consciousness into a many-sense consciousness; that is, the process of becoming bifurcated, with its apperceptive overlapping, advances into retentional consciousness. If we explicitly presentify the expanse of perception preceding the doubt, then it will no longer be there as having its singular sense like any other memory; instead, it has taken on the same doubling; the apperception of wax figure is everywhere superimposed upon the apperception of human being. But of no less importance—indeed, it is of the utmost importance—is the fact that the doubling is not really a doubling of perceptions, even though the fundamental character of perception, the consciousness of something being presented in the flesh, exists in both cases. If the apperception of human being suddenly changes into the apperception of wax figure, then the human being will stand there first in its presentation in the flesh, and then a wax figure. But in truth neither of them are there like the human being was prior to the onset of doubt. Evidently, the mode of consciousness has altered, although the objective sense and its modes of appearance, now as before, has the mode of being presented in the flesh. In fact, we have not yet thoroughly taken into account the essentially altered mode of belief or mode of being. The way in which we are conscious of what appears in the flesh is different. Instead of it being given to consciousness precisely as being there in a straightforward manner, like in normal, univocal perception, i.e., in perception running its course concordantly, it is now given to us as questionable, as dubious, as [36] contentious: It is contested by another givenness, a givenness in the flesh, a givenness of another <apprehension> permeating it and in conflict with it.

We can also express this in the following manner: Consciousness, which gives its object in the flesh (originally), does not only have the mode of presentation in the flesh, which distinguishes it from presentifying consciousness and empty consciousness (both of which do not present the same sense in the

flesh); it also has a variable mode of being or a variable mode of validity. Original, normal perception has the primordial mode, "being valid *simpliciter*"; this is what we call straightforward, naive certainty. The appearing object is there in uncontested and unbroken certainty. What is uncontested points to possible contestations, or even to breaks, precisely to those we have just described, and by becoming bifurcated, they undergo a modification in their mode of validity. In doubt, both presentations in the flesh contending with one another have the same mode of validity, "questionable," and each presentation that is questionable is precisely in dispute and contested by the other.

We already see here that what has been demonstrated for perception as the consciousness of something being presented in the flesh must be carried over to memory. For, modalization also occurs in memory by virtue of a radiating back into retention, and therefore into remembering that makes [what is retended] explicit. Naturally, we only have in mind here the segments of the past for the same object that continues to endure as being present in the flesh. While normal memory (by virtue of the fact that it is the reproduction of a normal perception) gives the reproduced element in the normal mode of validity, of certainty as certainly existing, the memory that is encumbered by discrepancy due to that radiating back yields the altered mode of validity, "questionable," questionable whether it was this or that, whether it was a human being or a wax figure.[41]

<§9. Resolving Doubt through the Transition to a Ratifying Certainty or Negation>

The possibility of deciding, of resolving, and the possibility of their potentially active forms belong to the very essence of doubt. In contrast, doubt itself means indecisiveness, consciousness is [37] indecisive consciousness. In the sphere of perception a decision is necessarily carried out such that as we progress to new appearances (for instance in the free orchestration of

[41] For the completion of our descriptions concerning the essence of the situation of doubt, see pp. 81-2.

corresponding kinaestheses running their course), a fitting fullness that suits an expectation is integrated into one of those empty horizons engaged in a mutual dispute. This is the most original form of decision. Under the given intentional situation, modified or completely new sense-data that arise demand precisely [those] apprehensions that complete the remaining uncontested intentions; they demand the apprehensions to complete the intentions in such a way that the source of the contention is quelled, and what is especially motivating the doubt will be annulled through the force of a primordial impression. Fulfillment through a primordial impression is the force that mows everything down. We move closer to it, we clasp it with our hand, touching it, and the dubious intention of wax we just had gets the priority of certainty. It gets this through the concordant transition to new appearances that do not accord with the apprehension of human being and its unfulfilled horizons, and negates the latter through its fulfilling weight of being presented in the flesh. With respect to the one instance, a negation takes place in this decision; in particular, it takes place with respect to the apprehension of human being that is guiding the original perception and that then becomes modalized as dubious. In the opposite case, an affirmation would have occurred, or what amounts to the same thing, a ratification of the original perception, but which later became dubious. That which appeared in the flesh would have then received the modal validity character of "yes, really."

So, in a certain respect even the ratifying Yes, like the No, is a mode of modifying certain validity and is distinct from the entirely original, entirely unmodified mode of certain validity; the straightforward constitution of the perceptual object is carried out univocally in this mode, and without struggle. But I said "in a certain respect." For speaking of "modalization" is ambiguous. On the one hand, we can mean each transformation of the mode of validity as distinct from the original mode of validity, naive certainty, so to speak, that is not ruptured by discrepancy or doubting. And on the other hand, we can mean a transformation where the validity-mode of certainty is concerned, where it ceases to be certainty. The primordial mode is certainty, but in the form of the most straightforward certainty. Just as an affirming decision

occurs by passing through a period of doubt, so too do we have a [38]
restoration of certainty; when something turns out to be real[42] "in effect" I become certain of it anew. And yet, consciousness is altered now. Passing through a period of doubt to a decision gives to consciousness precisely the character of resolved consciousness, and it gives to its noematic sense the corresponding character that expresses itself in the "yes," "in effect," "truly so," and in similar turns of phrase.

Here as everywhere it becomes clear to us, and it will become even more clear to us later, that everything that consciousness undergoes through changes and transformations, even after the transformations, remains sedimented in it as its "history," and this is, so to speak, the destiny of consciousness. But since consciousness is what it is as consciousness of something, as a process of giving sense, this means that every such transformation shows up in the sense, and that even where the objective sense is the same, yes even where the mode of appearance is the same, it expresses itself as a modality, as a transformation in this sense.

If we observe consciousness as a whole being at variance with itself, we find constituted uniformly within doubting consciousness the disjunctive "*A* or *B*," in the negation, the "not *A* but rather *B*," and further, in the affirmation, the "not Not-*A*, but *A* indeed." In this way, straightforward "being" of the objective sense is transformed into " doubtful being" or what amounts here to the same thing, "questionable being," and then possibly through a decision it is transformed into "not being" or into "being indeed." In phenomenological considerations above all, in considerations whose intentions are directed toward an ultimate understanding of consciousness and the accomplishments of consciousness, we must persistently orient our regard toward both these sides, toward the noetic, toward the side of the lived-experience, and toward the noematic, toward the side of that which gives itself to consciousness in the life of consciousness, toward the side of sense and its modes that are so diverse. This we must do in the sphere now under consideration.

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[42] *wirklich*

Already guided by being and modalities of being, and in the focal orientation toward consciousness and toward the ego that carries out this consciousness, we find the original mode of naive perceptual certainty, or if you will, naive perceptual belief. Then we find the modified modes, doubtful uncertainty, negating as the negative decision that crosses out a certainty and annuls it in the form of a positive contrary certainty. We find further the affirming, the renewed becoming-certain, a certainty, however, that is in the form of a ratifying experience. We also speak here of [39] active acceptance, just as in the opposing instance of rejection. We see here that active acceptance is something different from naive certainty, and unlike the latter, presupposes passing through uncertainty as doubting, questioning. Let us note in passing that when we speak of questioning, we are not concerned here with the wishful intention to decide, an intention that co-determines its sense. It does not concern us here, and logically, is not essential to it.

Finally, let me mention some important parallel expressions: "To hold to be true" where any kind of certainty is concerned, and "to hold to be false" where "rejection" is concerned. Correlatively, we have on the side of sense the expressions that we have constantly employed, "being certain," "not being," and so forth, and appropriate to the latter way of speaking, we also have the "true," especially as an expression for the "yes really," and the "false" as an expression for "not being." We want to note that the concepts of true and false occur here as expressions for the modes of being we have characterized. In fact, all analyses of the origins of these concepts must begin at this point. I say begin. For we have not even hinted at how these concepts will develop all the way up to the full concept of truth.

<Chapter 3:
THE MODE OF POSSIBILITY>

<§10. Open Possibilities as the Indeterminate Scope of Intentional Prefiguring>

We still have to address the important group of modalizations with respect to possibility and probability. They fall completely within the scope of uncertainty, where we understand by uncertainty not merely a privation of certainty, which would encompass the case of negation; rather by modalities of uncertainty, we mean those that do not pertain to decision at all. Whenever consciousness has lost the mode of certainty and has passed over into uncertainty we will also speak of possibilities. But also more than that. For in this sphere we encounter several concepts of possibility.

Let us mention first of all the concept of open possibilities with respect to the following context: What is intentionally prefigured in the apperceptive horizon of a perception is not possible, but [40] certain. And yet, possibilities, indeed a whole range of manifold possibilities, are always included in such prefigurings. The prefiguring for the non-visible side, which is given in the perception of a thing from the front side, is as we know an indeterminately general prefiguring. This generality is a noetic trait of consciousness emptily pointing ahead, and correlatively is a [noematic] trait of sense for what is prefigured. Thus, for example, the color of the thing's back side is not prefigured as an entirely determinate color when the thing is still unfamiliar to us, and when we have not yet looked at it from the other <side> with more precision. "A color" is indeed prefigured. But potentially still more than that. If the front side has a pattern, then we will expect the back side to follow this thoroughgoing pattern; if it is a uniform color with a medley of specks, we would also possibly expect specks for the back side, and so forth. But there is still indeterminacy. Pointing ahead has now, like all other intentions in normal perception, the mode of naive certainty; but it has this mode precisely according to what it gives to consciousness and in the manner in which it gives something to consciousness, that is,

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according to the sense in which it gives something to consciousness. What is certain, therefore, is some kind of color in general, or a "color in general broken up by specks," and so on, i.e., indeterminate generality.

Let us reflect on the consequences of this. Naturally, we use the term generality here only as a provisional aid for an indirect description pointing toward the phenomena themselves. For we do not have in mind here logical concepts, classifying or abstracting generalities. Rather, we have in mind simply this intending into the future peculiar to perception as it is given in perception with its mode of consciousness of indeterminacy. Belonging to the general structure of every empty intention, and likewise to such an indeterminate pointing-ahead, is the possibility of explicating it in the shape of presentifications. We can freely form presentifications that bring to intuition what is non-visible, for instance, by imagining that we are walking around the object. If we do this, then intuitions appear with entirely determinate colors. But we can obviously vary these colors freely within the scope of indeterminacy.

What does that mean? If we are purely directed toward a mere bringing to intuition[43], in other words, toward a quasi-fulfillment of perception through presentified perceptual series, a concrete intuition with determinate color will occasionally set in. But this determinate color has not been prefigured, i.e., it has not been demanded. What is presentified is there as certain, and indeed as *the* back side; but it is so precisely in an indeterminacy-consciousness that does not indicate this determinate color appearing there in a fortuitous manner. If other intuitive presentifications occur with other colors, certainty will be extended just as little to these. For none among them is settled in any particular way in advance. None among them are demanded. [41]

Let us contrast this with the following case. In the instance of an actual fulfillment in the actual progression of perception, the appearance of color fulfilling what is indeterminately prefigured is constituted in itself as certainty. In this case, what takes place with certainty is a specification that determines [more closely] and thus

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[43] *Veranschaulichung*

a gradation of knowledge. The new emerging expanse of perception with its content of certainty contributes a concreteness by determining more closely the generality that was indeterminate and prefigured; this concreteness is encompassed by the unity of perceptual certainty and therefore uniformly fulfills what is prefigured, the anticipation. The fulfillment is at the same time an increase in knowledge. (The specks that are determinate.) However, that is not the case with the illustrative presentification; every other color can serve just as well for the color that has just appeared. Presentification is only endowed with the mode of certainty to the extent that it retains its mode of indeterminacy in relation to the coloring, despite the determinate coloring occurring in it. Only in this respect does it distinguish itself from a determinate memory, like the kind [of memory] that we would have of it were we to presentify the back side to ourselves again after having actually perceived it. Accordingly, it is clear that every presentification that is merely an intuitive presentification prior to an actual acquisition of knowledge must have a modalized character of certainty in relation to the quasi-determining content. But this uncertainty has the distinctive feature that in it the color that is given fortuitously is precisely a fortuitous color for which not just anything could arise, but rather some other *color*. In other words, the general indeterminacy has a range of free variability; what falls within it is encompassed *implicite* in a similar way, and yet it is not positively motivated, not positively prefigured. It is a [42] member of an open range of closer determinations that can be adapted to this framework, but beyond this they are completely uncertain. This makes up the concept of open possibility.

<§11. Enticing Possibilities as the Tendencies to Believe within Doubt>[44]

Motivation prefigures something positively, and yet does so in the mode of uncertainty; what this means can be illustrated even more clearly by contrasting it with another kind of possibility that

[44] Editor: See Appendix 3: <Evidence of Possibilities as Such and Modal Modification *in infinitum*> pp. 436ff.

we will come to know. Let us look back to the phenomenon of doubt. Whenever we speak of doubt, we also speak of propensities to believe. What occurs in the front side that is seen, together with its apprehended sense for the back side, may prefigure something determinate. But it does so ambiguously and not unequivocally. This happens when we become unsure whether what we see is a complete thing or a piece of scenery, for example. That yields a conflict in consciousness that plays itself out here in empty premonitions of what is to come, which was not the case with our example of the wax figure/human being. In this new case, the struggle can take the form of a static state of suspension. But as soon as the ego directs itself toward it and even carries out a presentifying intuition, the struggle passes over to a dynamic play of opposing [senses], to a doubting vacillation. This issues in a propensity to believe for each side. Namely, by initially actualizing for itself the motivations leading to the one side, the ego experiences the concordant demand that is coming from this other side. By exclusively surrendering itself to these motivations, as it were (while what speaks in favor of the other side remains out of action), it experiences a force of attraction, a propensity to turn toward it in certainty. But this also holds likewise when actualizing the opposing intentions. In this way the normal egoic act of perception is modalized into acts we call enticements to believe. From the side of the objective senses, from the side of the objects given to consciousness, we also speak here of enticements to be, which is to say that affection issues from the side of the object, that the object exerts on the ego an enticing demand to be, just as if the object were its hostile partner. The sense itself has the propensity to be.[45]

Now, we likewise call this enticement, possible (regarding it outside of its relation to the ego); but it determines a [43] fundamentally different concept of possibility than the concept of open possibility that was described previously. The difference between them both becomes completely evident precisely in their contrast.

[45] Translator: See the discussion of affection, Division 3.

<§12. The Contrast between Open and Enticing Possibilities>

In principle, an open possibility does not imply a propensity. It does not exert an enticing demand to be; nothing speaks in favor of it; there is no demand directed toward it, even if there were one inhibited by opposing demands. Thus, we do not speak here of enticements at all.

Let us call these new possibilities problematic possibilities or questionable possibilities. We do this because the intention to make a decision arising within doubt between one of the enticing factions of the doubt is called a questioning intention. We speak of questionableness only where enticements and contraposing enticements play off of each other, when something speaks for or against them. The most direct expression for these possibilities, however, is enticing possibilities. It is completely clear that they designate a totally different kind of modalization than the modalization of open possibilities. For modalizing consciousness in each instance has a fundamentally different origin.

We can even characterize open possibility as a modalization of certainty. But this modalizing consists in the fact that an indeterminately general intention, which itself has the mode of certainty, implicitly bears in a certain way a diminution of its certainty with respect to all conceivable specifications. For example, if within an indeterminate generality a speckled color is demanded in certainty, then the fulfillment is restricted insofar as precisely "some kind" of color with "some sort" of shaped specks is demanded. And every specification of this type fulfills this demand in the same way. The specification fulfills the demand; thus, something of a demand also belongs to it. But not only does each one of them exert the same demand; rather, the demand is an implicit one insofar as each contingently occurring specification is essentially grasped in accordance with the indeterminately general demand; it is co-demanded in accordance with it, while as has been shown no actual demand aimed precisely at this specification is directed toward it from the beginning and at present, be it a diminished or even an unrestrictive demand.

This is entirely different where the enticements are concerned, [44] where each one is intended in its particularity.

It is now clear that we have determined a closed and exactly limited group of modalities from a primordial mode of straightforward naive certainty. We have done this by [recognizing] that they are modalizations by virtue of conflict, namely, by virtue of an originally and straightforwardly certain demand with opposing demands. Problematic consciousness with its problematic possibility belongs to this group. We therefore make a fundamental distinction between the modalities arising from conflict, and the modality of open specification.

We can continue our exposition of problematic possibilities by noting that they and only they appear with a different weight. The enticement is more or less enticing; and that also holds particularly when comparing all potentially diverse problematic possibilities that belong to one and the same conflict and that are bound synthetically through this conflict. For, the conflict, the bifurcation of a consciousness into reciprocal inhibitions, creates a unity; noematically speaking, it is the unity of opposition, of the possibilities bound to one another through it.

<§13. Modes of Certainty As Such in Their Relation to Enticing and Open Possibilities>

It is of no little consequence now to regard a unique group of modes of certainty that have this peculiar trait: Certainty remains certainty. [These modes] concern the differences pertaining to the "purity" or "completeness" of certainty.

Let us imagine the following situation. I believe that it is so; I do not doubt; I am not indecisive; I carry out the unbroken thesis: "It is so." But it can nevertheless transpire that while I am so entirely certain, so "sure," it may also be the case here that there is much that speaks against it being so. Another being (or several like it) stands before me as an enticing possibility.

Such opposing enticements, opposing possibilities, can have differing weight; they exercise a stronger or a weaker pull, but they do not determine me. Determining me in belief is just the one possibility for which I am resolved, for which I have decided earlier, perhaps in a process of passing through doubt. [45]

We see, moreover, that a concept of "conviction" belongs here. Different witnesses speak and present their testimonies, having different weight. I weigh them and decide for the one witness and his testimony. I reject the other testimonies. Here the weight of the other testimonies can even become null and void. In other words, they lose every bit of weight; in truth they have no weight. And yet, it must also be the case that they do retain a weight (and do not turn out to be downright false). But this one testimony in particular has such an "overpowering weight" that I decide for it and do not "accept" the others, do not "take them up," and in this sense reject them. I take the side of this testimony, I come out in favor of this testimony, and against the others.

Yet I can potentially mark the differing weights without deciding in favor of one of the enticements. I hold it in abeyance like the others. I wait possibly for an "objectively decisive" experience, withhold an opinion, wait for an experience that turns up one of the possibilities as an "indubitable" reality, namely, for one that will negate and annul every one of the other "possibilities" thereby robbing them of their weight. In this sense, one can characterize these groups of modes of certainty as modes of conviction.

Thus, the modes of impure (or incomplete) certainty are modes of certainty that refer to the realm or sphere of what is enticing. Let us ground this impure certainty phenomenologically, and more particularly, in the original field of perception. Then we will see still finer distinctions.

Something entices me as a possibility, something speaks in favor of it; but there are other opposing possibilities, and something speaks in favor of them, too; or rather, this or that speaks "against" the others. Or I am "conscious of" only one possibility. For example, a cloudy sky together with humidity speak in favor of a thunderstorm, but not "for sure."[46] It entices in this way, and it does so in varying degrees, changing according to the particular circumstances. [46]

[46] What does "being" conscious of mean here? Being in relief. I am "unconscious" of the other possibilities or entirely indeterminate other possibilities; they are not awakened, but inhibition is still there.

It may be the case here (a) that I am conscious of this possibility in and through its enticement and nothing more: I "do not let myself be determined by it." (b) I am inclined to decide for this possibility, I go along with it for awhile, as it were, and let myself be drawn into it; I am ready and willing to follow its pull. Insofar as the enticement as such means an affection on the ego, which from the perspective of the ego corresponds to a being-drawn, a "propensity" lies in the enticement itself. But the fact that I let myself "willingly" be drawn in, that I am about to follow after it, is still something new phenomenologically. However, here this "following" can be inhibited by opposing propensities, or not be "efficacious" at all. (c) This efficacy means that I straightforwardly yield to the inclination, perhaps without inhibition, that I take up its position, that I definitively "decide" for this possibility. I believe, I am "subjectively certain" that there will be a thunderstorm, and fetch my raincoat and my umbrella. We can then speak of presumption or of a presumptuous certainty in a specific sense. This is similar to the way in which we believe the one witness in the clash of testimonies, although the testimonies by the other witnesses are not shown to be simply false since they still have weight; but they have a weight that we no longer accept. It is not merely the case that the one testimony whose enticement is privileged is stronger: We lend it validity, believing in it in our subjective certainty; and this inner Yes means a No! for the other testimonies of the opposing enticements. They do not hold for us, that is, they are not valid for us "subjectively." In itself, in its own phenomenological character, this presumptuous certainty is characterized as an impure certainty. To be sure, the decision is made, but it is gnawed at internally, so to speak, weakened by the opposing possibilities whose weight is still there and still weighs upon us, only that we deny them their validity. That gives presumptuous certainty an inner character distinguishing it clearly from pure certainty. Obviously, this impurity, this murkiness, has its degrees.

We must take note of still another distinction here. When we say that "something speaks in favor of one or several possibilities" we confront an ambiguity that points us to different phenomenological connections.

(1) An enticement refers to leeways[47] of possibilities, and these [47]
possibilities are not merely imaginary possibilities. Insofar as this is the case, something "speaks" in favor of them all.

(2) But that is only to say that they are "leeways," and from them the determinately directed expectations, inhibiting one another or uninhibited, (the determinate "signs"), mark out all sorts of things. And this is what we had in mind when we spoke in the more restricted sense of something speaking in favor of possibilities. And we hold firmly to this concept.

Whenever we have certainties that refer to leeways of open possibilities we speak of "empirical, primitive certainties." All types of external perception belong here. Each perception implicates a leeway of specifications at every moment within the certainty of a general prefiguring. Yet nothing speaks in favor of these specifications in their particularity. We can also say that the same thing speaks in favor of all the open possibilities of a leeway, they are all equally possible. This implies that nothing speaks in favor of the one possibility if it speaks against the other.

(a) Certainty is a pure certainty; only one single possibility is just right; "something speaks" in favor only of it and lacks the character of mere enticement. It is a complete certainty, complete precisely in the sense of this purity that has no "opposing motives." The raised hammer will fall!

(b) Certainty is an impure certainty.

But in comparison to the immanent sphere, and to the givenness within the immanent present that is evident in not being able to be crossed out, another opposition also emerges now, namely, the opposition between:

(α) those empirical-primitive certainties that implicate precisely the leeways of other possibilities, even if nothing speaks positively in favor of these possibilities (except for the decisive ones). Non-being here is not ruled out; it is possible, just not motivated.

(β) absolute certainties whose non-being is ruled out, or again, if you will, is absolutely certain. There are here no open opposing possibilities; there are no "leeways."

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[47] *Spielräume*

But there is still a question here concerning how we place what we have just said in relation to modes of evidence.

I can have leeways, "real possibilities" given in evidence, as in [48] experience. On the other hand, I can have an apodictic exclusion of opposing possibilities, of a conceivable being-otherwise. And accordingly the decision can be "evaluated." (Empirical certainty—apodictic certainty.) Still, I can also be conscious of emptily meant possibilities and opposing possibilities without such evident givenness; and I can decide, endorse a possibility when something speaks in favor of it presumptively, etc.

That is clearly a unique theme and yields its own distinctions.

We have become familiar with modes of certainty, modes of straightforward belief. On the other hand, certainty can be "modalized," which is to say, can cease to be certainty at all: For instance, it can pass over into an enticement, and moreover, into an inclination to follow the enticement, but still without leading to a decision. Accordingly, this would be exactly not a resolve, not certainty, but a modalization of certainty. Likewise, [we have modalization as] a doubting understood as being divided in the vacillating propensity to believe one or the other; and in this indecisiveness, [we have the propensity] to believe the one or the other, striving further to reach a decision, to seek certainty. And likewise [we have a modalization when] calling-into-question, despite certainty; certainty is bracketed, put out of play, etc. Put more precisely, under the general structure of certainty, straightforward belief, we have different specifications, different modes of certainty: Empirical and apodictic certainty. We have still further distinctions within empirical certainty, namely, distinctions of act. Within empirical certainty and certainty in general, and potentially in doubting, distinctions of act can emerge as transformations of the mode of certainty. But there is always certainty! We had come to know impure certainty as a certain decision for an enticement. But there is also a decision that remains within uncertainty.

Let us consider doubting and questioning. Doubting is a doxic mode of comportment experienced as being torn between two or more possibilities; it is a vacillation between different possibilities concerning a judicative intending, namely, between possibilities

that are enticements, and whereby judicative intending is precisely not actually passing judgment, not having certainty, but is rather a "problematic judging." I am not certain, but I am inclined to believe that *A* is; something speaks in favor of *A*, and I "would like" to judge it so. We see that this "I am inclined to" can initially mean the same thing as "something speaks in favor of." Thus, both expressions can be construed as merely correlative expressions. On the other hand, we distinguish from this an inclination-toward as an inner complying, as it were, a sort of deciding for, and yet without being decidedly resolved. I am about to follow the counsel, but an inner "contra-diction" inhibits me, a propensity that inclines me no less to believe otherwise. The decision is inhibited. I can inhibit this propensity, and I can explicitly become conscious of the enticement without already setting off internally to make the decision, that is, without "following" the lead, and perhaps only at this point then curbing or inhibiting myself. [49]

Doubting is a wavering in decisiveness, and each member [of the doubt] which is not being decided upon is still a mode of making a decision. But it can also happen that we decide for the most weighty problematic possibility, for the one that is most strongly affective. What takes place here, however, is not making a decision in certainty, but a particular mode of making a decision that is peculiar to the enticement. Then we have presumption as taking-it-to-be-likely.

Where several problematic possibilities are separated and united we have then a consciousness of problematic disjuncts, the consciousness of "it is 'questionable' whether *A* or *B*"—to be sure, without taking questioning in the narrow sense of the word.

The question arising in doubt is a striving after a decision that issues from the comportment of doubt, a striving that is being motivated within this comportment of doubt. Or, it is a striving to reach a certainty that is motivated from an inhibited decision, from a decision that remains incomplete. But is not the propensity itself such a striving like when we have a singular propensity toward an enticement? Is the question: "Is that so?" a striving to overcome the inhibition, and to reach the corresponding resolved certainty? With respect to the genuine sense of a question arising in doubt, namely, as a multifaceted indecisiveness: Is this the striving

intention to decide the doubt, to overcome the inhibition here or there, and to arrive at a certainty? Certainty of the fact that *A* is, then, annuls all opposing propensities. And it is not only the case that certainty annuls the propensity for *A* insofar as it is transformed precisely into a certainty, losing its inhibition, by finding completion in certainty; it crosses out the opposing propensities, too, insofar as these cannot also pass over into certainties. To decide for *A* means to reject *B*, *C*, etc., with certainty. [50]

In any case, it is now characteristic of doubt and also of the question arising in doubt that I am not convinced in advance about what is there in certainty; and it is not the case that I have only put this certainty out of play.

There is a type of question, then, that has different foundations, namely, where I am already interiorly resolved that it is for instance *A*, but where I call into question whether *A* is or *B* is, etc. (in other words, without being in a position to want to decide a doubt that has gripped me). But how do I arrive at this? What sense can that have?

Certainty can be incomplete, impure, and I seek a more complete or a completely pure certainty.

In[48] the previous lecture we distinguished between impure and in this sense incomplete certainties, and complete or pure certainties. And we have done this with respect to a particular type of certainty, namely, certainties of transcendent perception. Let us consider a little more closely the modifications of certainty about which we speak.

Such a certainty is impure insofar as it has the mode of making a decision for an enticement, more specifically, a subjectively secure decision for an enticement, even though opposing enticements are there, and against which the ego decides despite their weight; the ego does not accept them, although due to their weight, they "demand" being validated. Naturally, this demand or claim consists here in this weight itself, that is, in the affective force that the enticement exercises on the active ego. By affective force I mean a tendency directed toward the ego, a tendency

[48] Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

whose reaction is a responsivity[49] on the part of the ego. That is, in yielding to the affection—in other words, by being "motivated"—the ego takes up an endorsing position; it decides actively for what is enticing, and it does so in the mode of subjective certainty.

A "pure" certainty occurs here when the opposing enticements completely lose their weight, when, accordingly, they are entirely [51] crossed out as the experience progresses; they are experienced as straightforward nullities. "What is there" is decided upon from the standpoint of the matter,[50] by itself, and in making a decision, the ego follows the decision on the part of the matter. It does not need to take sides; it does not need on its part to back one of the possibilities. Each one of the other possibilities, as the possible ground for taking a position, is yanked out from under its feet, and the only ground as the ground of a certainty pertaining to the matter is there of its own accord. The ego finds itself standing on it, and then merely establishes itself subjectively on its ground.

We have a simpler case still where we could not be further from speaking about making a decision, because the opposing enticements are lacking from the very start, and in their place are open possibilities. Let us take an example from external experience: Watching the smith, I expect the raised hammer to fall down and bend the iron; watching the glass fall, I expect it to strike the ground and break, and so forth. – Alternative possibilities are there: Some unforeseen effect can intervene, an accidental bump can make the glass fall on the nearby straw mat instead of on the stone floor, etc. Every event as a physical event is surrounded here by a horizon of open possibilities—but they are open; nothing speaks in favor of them in this given moment; the expectations are straightforward certainties that are not inhibited; a modalized expectation does not oppose other like expectations in relation to an enticement.

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[49] *antwortende Tätigkeit*

[50] *Sache*

<Chapter 4:
PASSIVE AND ACTIVE MODALIZATION>

<§14. Position-Taking of the Ego as the Active Response to the Modal Modifications of Passive *Doxa*>[51]

What strikes us now is the ambiguity in speaking of a decision that come to pass on its own or in the matter itself, namely, as undergoing a decision that just arises, and the deciding position-taking that is carried out on the part of the ego as the ego's reaction. Looking back at our initial introduction to the modalities [52] of being and the modalities of belief, we recognize that everything that was disclosed at that time was initially a modalization taking place purely in the intentionality of perception, potentially as completely passive; and in any case it had to be taken purely that way at first. It is clear now that we must distinguish between the passivity and the activity of the ego: (1) modal modifications of passive *doxa*, of passive intentions of expectation, their inhibitions passively accruing to them, and the like; (2) responsively taking a position that is peculiar to making a decision, doing so actively, as proceeding from the ego.

Furthermore, it is also clear that the concepts of belief and of modalities of belief themselves undergo a modification with this distinction. For now we have to separate out the essentially different processes and occurrences of passivity and activity according to their constitutive accomplishments. Thus, we have:

(1) Initially in passivity the syntheses of concordance or discordance, of uninhibited intentions that are fulfilled freely, or inhibited intentions that are crossed out, etc. And correlatively, we have in the noema modes of being that maintain the identical objective sense, possibly in connection with an opposing sense.

(2) The active position-takings of the ego, the active decisions, convictions, letting oneself be convinced, and taking sides, etc., and finally the activity of conviction in the broadest sense (where we no longer speak strictly of testifying for or against). These

[51] Editor: For §§ 14 and 15 see Appendix 4: <Levels of Decision. Receptivity and Spontaneity> pp. 439ff.

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activities also have their noematic correlates. We must note here that it is not a matter of merely making passive intentionality patent; it is not a matter of becoming merely cognitively aware in perceiving, a mere living through the enticement that is taking place in an attentive turning-toward, that is, a matter of merely becoming consciously attentive to enticements, nullities, and the like. Rather, the ego passes its judgment in its own position-taking, *it makes* a decision for or against, and so forth. One may well say that here lies the specific source for what we normally mean or can mean by judging. "Conviction" expresses more: Issuing from the passive perceptual situation, letting oneself be determined such that one has a judicative position and then has a judicative determination. Thus, we also understand why in practice, judging and conviction become equivalent expressions. [53] We will see shortly that this position-taking or this group of position-takings that occur here are completely non-independent from the standpoint of intentionality, namely, insofar as they presuppose the occurrences of passive *doxa*. Let us note in advance that these position-takings, this validation and its transformations, further, are not to be confounded with other modes of comportment by the ego that belong to the sphere of judgment, especially not with active explication, colligation, comparison, differentiation, and the like—all of the operations to which we are indebted for the logical forms of different state-of-affairs.[52] In all these actions, judging is always only a process of conferring or denying validity that stems from the ego.

The ego does not always take a position judicatively in this strict sense. When it simply perceives, when it is merely aware, apprehending what is there and what, of itself, is presented in experience by itself, there is no motive for taking a position provided that nothing else is present. There must be opposing motives in play, open or not, effecting a particular consciousness; disjunctive possibilities in a tension of opposites must be at hand. Judging is always deciding this or that, and is thus deciding-for or deciding-against, active acceptance or dismissal, rejection. But that must not be conflated with the modes of being themselves:

[52] Translator: See Part 3.

with straightforward "being," with the "null," and again the "not null" already appearing in the objective sense by merely becoming patent, with the "it is too so" resulting from being twice crossed out. In all these modalities the ego of itself does not need to take a position actively, even though it can also be motivated to take such a position by them.

The noetic Yes and No, however, arise from taking a position specifically as judging. As with every mode of consciousness, we have a noematic correlate. Here, of course, this correlate is the noematic "valid" or "invalid" arising in the objective sense; it occurs in the objective sense with the character of being declared valid or invalid by the ego. Judging in the specific sense is thus the ego's act of *posito*, of positing, in its possible dual shape: In the shape of the ego's assenting decision or in the shape of dismissal, rejection. We must still consider whether this means that the positing itself has a dual "quality" in the sense of traditional logic. [54]

We can at least say this much initially: Where a judging arises in the primordial sphere of a motivating perception, two opposing position-takings become possible, and as the case may be, actual. Both, however, are completely non-independent insofar as they have their motivation founded in what goes on in perception itself, in perception's proper and potentially purely passive course. Perception has its own intentionality that as yet does not harbor anything of the active comportment of the ego and of its constitutive accomplishment. For the intentionality of perception is rather presupposed in order for the ego to have something for which or against which it can decide. By virtue of the unity of this motivational situation, that is, by virtue of its unity arising from bifurcation, both opposing position-takings are intimately related. For example, where two possibilities were in conflict with one another, the decision for one possibility is accompanied, as a correlate, by the decision against the correlative possibility, potentially, if not actually.

If we look more closely at how the motivation bearing on the ego functions, and how the ego reacts to it with an active affirmative or negative response, then we would have to say the following: The motivational foundation for the decision as the ego's firm positing-as-valid, or again for the negative decision, is

thus the restoration of perceptual concordance. The split occurring in a conflict, in which perceptual apprehensions are reciprocally repressed, returns to an unbroken unity.

The ego is affected by all of this. As the ego, it is itself at variance with itself in its own way; it becomes torn and finally becomes united. It was inclined to endorse the one apprehension, that is, to carry out the apprehension's tendencies of expectation above all, to let them become active expectations issuing from the ego-center. But it still finds itself inhibited once again; it is drawn toward the opposing tendencies of expectation and is inclined toward the opposing apprehension. If perceptual concordance is restored, a single perception in the shape of a normal perception running its course, then the inner conflict of the ego with itself is resolved. The ego can no longer be swayed in this way or that; for [55] the annulled apprehension along with its annulled intentional tendencies cannot be carried out, and this is especially the case with its expectations that are directed ahead in a living manner, but crossed out. But the ego does not merely have as its operational field the free horizon of expectation and the intentionality that is now concordantly established. It actively takes up this position, appropriates what is concordantly given as being *simpliciter*. "Active acceptance" is what carries out a peculiar appropriation, determination,[53] thereby establishing this being as valid for me from now on and abidingly.

An important moment emerges here as characteristic of judicative decision-making. It is no longer a question of making something present, of merely making the intentionality of perception patent; rather, it is a question of appropriation through which the active, strivingly active ego appropriates to itself an acquisition, that is, an abiding knowledge. But it does this in a conscious manner. For what thereby accrues to the ego as being valid for it, having the character of being valid for it from now on, that is, continually, and remaining abidingly valid—this belongs, as we have said, to the essence of declaring-something-as-valid, to the essence of the so-called active acceptance that the ego carries out. In other words, it has a validity extending into an open, egoic

[53] *Festlegung*

temporal horizon of conscious life. Perhaps it is not too much to express it in the following way: When I posit something as valid in an affirmative and judicative manner, I mean by this that it is settled for me from now on, as established for the future, and in particular, as being in this way or that. If we were to stand already within the sphere of expressive, predicative judging and in the sphere of communication, then the accomplishment of judgment would be articulated most acutely with the phrase, "I ascertain," or also "I assert that." But we must observe—and this belongs to the essence of judgment—that we do not already find the communicative relation in judgment's first originality; as a rule the communicative relation is presented along with the expression, the assertion[54].

What happens now to the opposing apprehension that has been negated? Naturally, it is still held in retention; the ego was previously drawn to it, and perhaps already inclined toward it in a preliminary fashion. Indeed, it could be that precisely this apprehension was previously concordant in the form of a normal perception, and that it was carried out by the ego by regarding it as a presumptively existing thing. Thus, there are affective motives that also orient or reorient the regard in this direction. But here the [56] ego responds by dismissing it, by declaring it invalid. The latter obviously turns either against a previous declaration of validity, or against a propensity to such a declaration; that is, it already turns against taking a position and its final result, establishing it.

But now it becomes clear that the affirmative or negative position-taking does not simply exhibit two interchangeable "qualities," like red and blue in the sphere of colors, and that consequently speaking of "quality" is not appropriate here at all. The negating act carried out by the ego is a process of striking down validity; this expression already suggests the secondary intentional character of negation.[55]

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[54] *Behauptung*

[55] Translator: The process of striking down validity (*Außer-Geltung-Setzen*) should not be conflated with the process of suspending validity (*Außer-Aktion-Setzen*) peculiar to the epoche. For the latter neither affirms nor negates validity; it merely puts it out of play, makes no judicative use of it. See *Ideas I*, esp. 59-61.

Yet something of the highest importance surfaces here concerning every logical concept of judgment. Namely, we have characterized deciding-in-favor-of by taking-possession-of, appropriation as being henceforth valid, as settled for me from now on. Deciding-against means that such a validity, which was somehow expected of us and possibly taken up by us earlier, is rejected—just as we find something analogous with other acts, for instance, when I reject a decision because a motivational situation has altered or when I resist an inclination of the will.

But the "invalid," which I can make valid once more by a slight shift in attitude, corresponds to negation as deciding-against; that is, by judging affirmatively, I can establish it. The "no" or the "null" then enters into the content of what is established. Accordingly, one can also take the concept of judgment in such a way that it deals exclusively with the activity of establishing being, and that it encompasses nullity as a moment of content, so to speak, as existent non-being. In fact, logic and science reduce everything to judgments that establish [something], and with good reason. No matter how much it is possible to deny, there is nothing of denial in theoretical statements; rather, at one time they establish that something is so, at another they establish that it is not so. Accordingly, a judgment that knows only one "quality," establishing something as valid, is our privileged concept of judgment. Naturally, this does not change the fact that making a decision itself does not have a single modality, but develops in opposing modalities: even if cognitive interest, which logic serves, is interested exclusively in establishing [something], in making assertions, and even if every dismissing negation is [57] ultimately thought of as reduced to the position of a *negativum*, and then perhaps still further to positions with an exclusively positive content.

Still, these considerations need to be filled out considerably. Firm active acceptance and resolved rejection are not the only modalities of taking a position in belief that the ego carries out. Rather, it is clear that a subjective-active comportment of the ego—precisely what we characterize in the genuine sense by the term "doubt," or the expression "I doubt whether it is this or that"—also corresponds to what we called, already in perception

itself and in its passive course, a split perception, "perception modalized as a doubtful perception." Indeed, I already mentioned previously that the ego itself can be at variance with itself, even though this takes place on the motivational ground of that split running through the intentionality of perception. I am now at variance with myself, I am torn to the extent that I am inclined to believe now this, now that. This inclination-toward means in general, and in active doubting specifically, more than a mere affective pull of enticing possibilities. They entice me as being, which is to say in general, that I go along with the one, and then with the other already in the manner of a deciding for; I confer on it something of validity, though to be sure, [validity is conferred] in a such way that [it] can be inhibited again and again.

This "going along with" on the part of the ego is motivated by the weight of the possibilities themselves. A judicative tendency, which I actively follow for a stretch, issues from these possibilities as enticing. This means that I carry out something like a momentary decision in favor of it. But I am stopped in my tracks by the opposing possibilities making an affective claim on me. Even this wants to be heard, as it were, and makes me inclined to believe. The inhibition here is not a mere privation, but a mode of the phenomenon of an inhibited decision, precisely of a decision being arrested along the way. I do go along for a stretch in carrying out a decision, as it were, only I do not go all the way to a firm decision of belief. Likewise, in such motivational situations, the decisions on the part of the ego, decisions that dismiss the other possibilities and that go against them, are then inhibited negative decisions.

The phenomenon of taking the side of a possibility and internally closing oneself off to the others would belong here especially. In this case, a genuine decision already comes about, a subjective certainty and establishment, assertion; but it is an impure decision, one that is gnawed at so to speak, a decision not made with good logical conscience; this is unlike the case where the motivation for precisely this firm resolve issues from the matter itself as a concordantly constituted experience. [58]

Also belonging here is the phenomenon of presumption, of taking-to-be-likely. If I consider possibilities having different

weight, then the strongest weight will possibly motivate me to make a decision for it, it will motivate a kind of privileged active acceptance, which does not therefore mean establishing it or affirmatively asserting it as being *simpliciter*. To be sure, when one possibility has an overpowering weight, or when what continues to speak in favor of it on the side of the matter[56] takes on an overpowering weight from subjective motives, I can pass over even further to a certainty, albeit to an impure conviction. But then one no longer speaks of "presuming" or "taking to be likely." The negative correlate of this is naturally taking-to-be-unlikely, whereby a kind of rejection is expressed, but not a straightforward negation.

<§15. Questioning as a Multi-Layered Striving toward Overcoming Modalization through a Judicative Decision>

What happens, finally, with questioning, questioning that is so inextricably intertwined with doubting? Does it also belong, like doubting, to the rank of these judicative modalities? Within the passive sphere and, in particular, within the intuition that is split in the intentional conflict, the *disjunctivum* corresponds at the same time to the process of doubting and questioning that can be motivated here. In and through their rivalry, *A*, *B*, and *C* are apprehended and united in the unity of the conflict. We can express this in no other way than by saying: We are conscious that "either *A* or either *B* or either *C* is"; and we find just this in expressing the active question and the active doubt, namely, as the content of the question or the content of the doubt. This is to say: I question, I doubt whether *A*, etc.

Stated in our previous manner of speaking: A unitary field of problematic possibilities in the passive sphere precedes questioning and doubting. Naturally, there are at least two of these [59] possibilities. But it can also be the case here that merely one of these contesting possibilities comes consciously to the fore, or as we also said, becomes patent; meanwhile the others go unnoticed in the background in the manner of empty presentations that are

[56] *das sachlich für sie Sprechende*

not carried out thematically. Every egoic act has its theme that can be a singular theme or a unitary manifold of thematic singularities, which then make up the entire theme in their unity. Obviously, either the theme of a question (like of a doubt) is a problematic singularity whose disjunctive opposing terms remain then unthematic (like when I merely ask: Is that a wax figure?), or it is the entire problematic disjunction (like in the question: Is that a wax figure or a human being?).

What now is characteristic of questioning as an activity that is obviously peculiar to the ego? The passive disjunctive tension of problematic possibilities (of doubt in the passive sense) motivates an active doubting, a mode of comportment that displaces the ego in an act-schism. This essentially and immediately implies an uneasiness and an original drive to get beyond it, to come back to the normal condition of unanimity. There arises a striving toward a firm decision, that is, one that is ultimately uninhibited and pure. Questioning already gives rise to this striving. It frequently happens that the established concordance, and through this the inner unity of the ego with itself that is aimed at, can be lost once again. This recurring experience can provoke a further motivation, namely, it can awaken a drive to overcome this renewed uneasy insecurity. Unlike the other instances, in this case the matter does not rest with striving toward a judicative deciding and toward an appropriation and establishment of the passed judgment; rather, the striving is directed toward a definitive, secure judgment, that is, toward a judgment that the ego can justifiably ground and with regard to which the ego can be subjectively certain of not lapsing again into embarrassing modalizations. This multi-layered striving is expressed in the following two kinds of questioning.

(1) Straightforward questioning in general is the process of striving, from a modal modification (or if you will, arising from a schism and inhibition), in order to arrive at a firm judicative decision. Questioning has its intentional correlate in the question, just as judging has its correlate in the judgment. Perhaps it is clearer when I say that the ego-*actus* of judging as the process of passing a judgment is to be distinguished, naturally, from the *judgment* that is passed in the judging. In the linguistic sphere, the statement as that which is stated corresponds to the stating; what is [60]

written is there as a proposition, what is verbally expressed is there as what is asserted, as what is established. Likewise, we have the stated question as opposed to the activity of questioning.

The proper sense of questioning is manifest in and through the process of responding or in the response. For with the response there is a tension-releasing fulfillment of striving; satisfaction sets in. Corresponding to the various possible responses are [1] the diverse modes and levels in which satisfaction can occur: as relative and yet already as satisfaction, or as full and ultimate, and [2] the different directions in which the questioning intention can go. For example: Is *A*?. The response runs: Yes, *A* is! Or, no, *A* is not. Thus, it has both firm modes of judgment as possible responses.[57]

Since the questioning endeavor is fulfilled, answered in the corresponding judgments, it is clear that the experience of the forms of judgment, forms of judgment that in a parallel manner fit the sense-content of the questions, implies that the questioner already consciously anticipates these possible forms of response, and that they already occur in the articulation of the questions themselves as the contents of the question. Every possible judgment is conceivable as the content of a question; naturally, it is not yet an actual judgment in the question, but a prospective judgment, a merely intended[58] (neutral) judgment, which as the content of the question, points to Yes and No.

Even doubting within developed consciousness is a doubting comportment, an inhibition and being divided when taking a position in relation to prospective,[59] possible judgments.

If the question has several components and is posed as a complete disjunction, then it may read, for instance: Is *A* or is *B*?. Thus, it shows disjunctively the corresponding prospective judgments. When the question has two components it can also read here: Is *A* not or is *B*?, and so forth. The responses turn out accordingly; they are directed toward the prospective, possible judgments as contents of the question which are taken into [61]

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[57] "<Further> Is *A* not?" "Yes, *A* is not." "No, it is not not *A*."

[58] *vorstellig*

[59] *vorstellige*

consideration according to the terms of the disjunction. Wasn't Rome victorious, or was it Carthage? Yes, Rome was victorious, but not Carthage.

Yet, there are still other parallel responses throughout insofar as the response is a decision, affirmative or negative, but not every decision must have the mode of a firm certainty. Even taking-it-to-be-likely is taking a position that makes a decision, even though it may not be satisfying in a definitive manner. Yet, in a way, it already resolves the indecisiveness insofar as the ego, in taking it to be likely, has endorsed one possibility by believing. In fact, we can also respond to the question, Is *A*? with, Yes, it is likely. No, it is unlikely.

As we might expect, then, further mitigated responses are still possible. This is the case insofar as every mode of judgment that still has something of a decision in it, and accordingly, every form of decision that is arrested, can serve as a response as well. For example: Is *A* or *B*? Response: "I am inclined to believe that *A* is." To be sure, this is usually preceded by: "I don't know," or "I haven't made up my mind," "I'm not sure." This shows that the practical intention of questioning is actually directed toward a "knowing," toward a decision in a special sense, toward a judgment in the strict sense. But it is nonetheless a response, even if incompletely satisfying. On the other hand, it would not be a response at all if we were to say, for instance: *A* is fascinating. So, response in the genuine sense of this word is a judicative decision, taken very broadly. Let me retract this statement. For in a certain sense, to say "I don't know," or even "I'm not sure," is also a response to a question. This obviously concerns communicative interaction in which I merely inform the other with my response that I cannot comply to his wish, that I have no response at all for his question. And in fact one can also reply in such cases with the phrase: "I have no response."

Still, our preceding analyses have not yet expressly taken a position regarding the extent to which questions themselves belong to the modalities of judgment. Following our analyses, this does not require a long exposition. Of course, questioning belongs to the sphere of judgment and knowledge, indeed, it belongs to them inseparably; and it belongs inextricably and necessarily to [62]

logic as the science of knowing and of the known, more precisely, as the science of cognitive reason and its formations. But it does this only because the judicative life, even the rational judicative life, is a medium for a peculiar wishing, striving, willing, acting, whose goals are precisely judgments, and judgments of a special form. All reason is at the same time practical reason, and this also holds for logical reason. Of course, we will still have to distinguish valuing, wishing, willing, acting (which aim at judgments and truths through judging), from judging itself (which is itself not a valuing, wishing, willing). That is, questioning is a mode of comportment that is related in practice to judging. I find myself disagreeably frustrated when I pose a question and do not reach a decision; this may also frustrate me in other decisions relating to my practical life. Accordingly, I wish for a decision.

Yet, questioning is not merely a static state of wishing, but a directedness striving toward a judicative decision that already belongs to the sphere of volition. Only later when we see practical ways of actually bringing about the judicative decision does it become a resolved willing and acting. To be sure, the normal concept of a question is an interrogation directed toward another person, and possibly toward myself in turning back to myself, an interrogation proceeding from myself toward myself. Here, communication with others does not fall within the scope of our reflections, just as predicative questions in their relation to predicative judgments do not. But we can also leave out of consideration turning-toward-oneself that makes oneself the terminus of communication, just like others are made the terminus of communication (for the ego can in fact interact with itself). Thus, primitive questioning is a practical striving toward a judicative decision, and is further a habitual practical attitude that can be possibly effective for a long time, being always on the verge of passing over to corresponding volitions, endeavors, actions, of trying out methods for solving problems, etc.

(2) Having also given a breakdown of questioning *implicite* in what we have just said above, which we are not in a position to carry out further here, we must now consider the levels of questioning alluded to above. First, it is apparent that questioning [63] can find its firm reply through a firm assertion with which we

seemingly reach a definitive position, and that then, in spite of this, we can renew the questioning. For example, we ask: "Is *A* true?" The answer runs: "Yes, *A* is true." But we ask once more: "Is *A* really true?" And we do this without ever doubting. This may happen in our perceptual sphere, and can be clarified in the following manner: A perception at variance with itself has passed over to a concordant perception that harbors the decision; it has passed over to a concordant perception according to the sense of one of the apprehensions. But all the same, there is always the open possibility that the further course of perception will not ratify affiliated anticipations, and thereby the validity of the apprehension's sense. The need may thus arise to secure it further and to justify the perceptual judgment, to ratify and strengthen it. This can take place by drawing closer, putting perception freely into action according to prefigured possibilities in order to realize and to see then whether it is actually true. Accordingly, the new question is a question permeating the open possibilities of the horizon and relating a justifying question, i.e., a question directed toward actual, true being to the anticipatory intentions. Through the ratification, then, what is already judged as existing is endowed with the new character, "truly and really so," such that we could also characterize this question as a question concerning truth and reality. Naturally, the interplay can be repeated here, indeed the actual and the true are not completely definitive, since new horizons can open up. What we have presented here suffices to bring to light the difference between straightforward questioning and questioning concerning justification or truth that are adjoined as higher levels to straightforward questioning.

The investigations of our previous lectures have presented a portion of the phenomenology of judicative acts in the higher sense, although our necessary analyses of the lower levels were not yet brought to completion. This was due to the fact that the fundamental theory of judgment initially leads to *doxa* and doxic modalities that belong to the passivity of intuition itself. Here it was quite necessary to disclose immediately its contrast with the [64]
higher level of judging that takes place as specific egoic decision making. Otherwise one would have formed the view that the theory of perceptual belief, and likewise the modes of judgment

occurring in passive intuition of every other kind, would already make up a full theory of judgment. But it is important to keep this in mind from the very beginning, and not as an empty generality: that the cognitive life, the life of *logos*, indeed like life in general runs its course in a fundamental stratification. (1) Passivity and receptivity. We can include receptivity in this first level, namely, as that primordial function of the active ego that merely consists in making patent, regarding and attentively grasping what is constituted in passivity itself as formations of its own intentionality. (2) That spontaneous activity of the ego (the activity of *intellectus agens*) that puts into play the peculiar accomplishments of the ego, as was the case with judicative decisions.

<DIVISION 2: EVIDENCE>

[65]

<Chapter 1: THE STRUCTURE OF FULFILLMENT>

<§16. Fulfillment: Syntheses of Empty Presentation and Corresponding Intuition>[60]

By pursuing our interest especially in the clarification of knowledge, that is, by focusing especially on the function of knowledge within pure subjectivity, we had acquired an orderly series of systematic insights before our break.[61] At the end [of the lecture] we were occupied with the rudiments, the most basic elements of a theory of judgment. By undertaking a systematic study of perceptions we came across the moment of belief, of passive *doxa*, and attended to the modalizations of belief. Naturally, what was demonstrated here is mirrored *mutatis mutandis* in each mode of intuition and accordingly in remembering, which in itself is characterized as a re-perceiving, as it were. We then contrasted with these doxic events occurring in the passive sphere, the functions of higher judicative activities that are founded in them. By doing this, we acquired an initial, concrete understanding of the opposition between the passive and experiential accomplishment and, on the other hand, the spontaneous accomplishment of thought, the accomplishment of the ego who in the strict sense makes judgments, makes decisions, and who actively appropriates and establishes its acquisition of knowledge.

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[60] Editor: See Appendix 5: <Intuitive Presentations and Empty Presentations>, and Appendix 6: <Sense and Intuition> pp. 445ff. and 447ff.

[61] Editor: Christmas break, 1925.

E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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We are now going to study the peculiar characteristics and accomplishments of the sphere of judgment that are of particular importance for logic, characteristics and accomplishments that we already encounter in the sphere of passivity or mere receptivity. I mean the functions of fulfilling confirmation,[62] corroboration. They are special synthetic functions that we already encountered much earlier, but at that time we were unable to clarify their relation to other syntheses sufficiently. While carrying out our analysis of perception we had to point to its synthetic character as something fundamental. Perception is a process of streaming from phase to phase; in its own way each one of the phases is a perception, but these phases are continuously harmonized in the unity of a synthesis, in the unity of a consciousness of one and the same perceptual object that is constituted here originally. In each phase we have primordial impression, retention, and protention, and unity arises in this progression by the protention of each phase being fulfilled through the primordial impression of the phase that is continuously contiguous to it. Considered concretely, as in process, the perceptual lived-experience is continuously being fulfilled, and precisely for this reason, it is a unity of continual concordance. When this concordance is ruptured, which is altogether possible, modalization occurs, and we no longer have a perception in the normal sense, namely, we are no longer continually consciousness of the one perceptual object as something existing in a straight-forward manner. [66]

We also speak of fulfillment in other respects within the sphere of mere presentations to which we restrict ourselves now, within mere receptivity. And so, with respect to all expectations that arise as special presentations in presenting life. We expect something to happen—now the very thing occurs, confirming the expectation in the most original confirmation of a ratifying perception. We are interested in such an original confirmation in which a presenting

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[62] Translator: Throughout this Division, Husserl tends to use the term *Bewahrheitung* and its cognates to refer to a corroboration or kind of "verification" belonging to the *passive sphere*, and the term *Bewährung* and its cognates to refer to a process of verification proper belonging to the active sphere. To remain consistent with Husserl's employment of these two different terms, I translate the former term *Bewahrheitung* as "confirmation," and the latter *Bewährung* as "verification." See p. 133.

intention is fulfilled in a synthesis of the intended object and the corresponding object itself: We can also say that we are making an initial study of the nature of evidence. Making a presentation evident to us is indeed bringing it to originally fulfilling confirmation. Thus, it is not a question of an arbitrary synthesis of identification; rather, it concerns a synthesis of a presentation that is not self-giving with a presentation that is self-giving.

Naturally, we take at first the mode of certainty and positionality as a basis for these presentations. From the outset we see that the important distinction between empty and full or [67] intuitive presentations, a distinction with which we are familiar, especially becomes an issue for the syntheses of confirmation. To be sure, we know that even a perception, in particular, an external, transcendent perception, can occur in syntheses of fulfillment—and not only as a perception confirming an intention; rather, it can even occur as a mere intention that becomes fulfilled in new perceptions. This happens, for example, when we perceive a tree from the front, and wanting to know it better, draw nearer to it and now perceive it in new perceptions; by determining the tree more closely, we also have a fulfilling confirmation. Meanwhile, every external perception harbors its inner and outer horizons, regardless the extent to which perception has the character of self-giving; this is to say, it is a consciousness that simultaneously points beyond its own content. In its fullness it simultaneously points into an emptiness that would only now convey a new perception. The self-givenness of a spatial thing is the self-givenness of a perspectival appearing object that is given as the same in the fulfilling synthesis of appearances intertwining and devolving upon one another. But it is the same object that itself appears now this time in one way, now another time in another way, appearing in other perspectives, always pointing from a perspective to ever new perspectives in which the same object that is exhibited is continually determined more closely, and yet is never determined definitively. For we always expect appearances of newly opened, empty horizons. Thus, where there is no horizon, where there are no empty intentions, there is likewise no [synthesis of] fulfillment. A datum that is given in immanent perception, i.e., that is adequately given in each Now does not therefore admit of any

further confirmation with respect to this Now. Still, it does occur as a fulfillment insofar as the preceding perceptual phase already points to what is to come. This fulfillment is a fulfillment of an anticipation and is a definitive, absolute fulfillment, or evidence.

Accordingly, it may now seem that the unity of a synthesis of fulfillment (of a confirming one) would be characterized by the fact that an empty consciousness (be it a consciousness that is standing completely empty for itself, or a consciousness incompletely saturated by intuition) would be synthetically united with an appropriate intuition, whereby what is emptily intended[63] and what is intuited coincide in the consciousness of the same [68] [object], that is, coincide in the identity of the objective sense. One would like to think, however, that fulfillment is certainly a bringing to intuition: confirming an intending, that is, meaning an object but not having the object itself intuitively, or having it intuitively, but still meaning beyond what is already intuitively given, and now passing over to the intuition of what is not yet given. But we will see that this characterization would not work, for not every process of bringing to intuition, that is, not every fulfillment is confirming.

It is of fundamental importance to distinguish between the different possible syntheses pertaining here to intuitions and empty presentations, and to characterize them in more detail. The possible syntheses are determined according to their phenomenological character by the types of intuitions and empty presentations founding them. Conversely, one can become aware for the first time of the different sorts of founding presentations in the different operations of closely related presentations within the synthesis, and in the different character that the synthesis assumes in these cases. Without distinguishing between different possible syntheses, one might easily overlook distinctions within intuitions and within empty presentations that could occur here.

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[63] *Vorstelliges*

<§17. Description of the Possible Types of Intuition>

Let us pursue this matter more deeply by proceeding initially from the general distinction between intuitive presentation and empty presentation. The intuitive presentation has for its part different modes. Perception is the primordial mode of intuitiveness (as always, understood as doxic positionality). It is to be contrasted with the mode of presentification, which, upon closer inspection has various forms, too. By studying intuitive remembering we have learned that a remembering in itself manifests itself as a presentification of a perception, thus, that it is not structured as simply as a perception. It is a present lived-experience that is not itself a perception; instead, it presentifies a perception in the temporal mode of a past perception, and precisely thereby it presentifies its previous perceptual object as having-been. Every other kind of presentification has a similar structure.[64] Thus, there are intuitive presentations of something [69] present that are surely not perceptions of that present something, but rather are presentifications of it: for example, when we make intuitively present the back side of a thing that is more or less familiar from a previous perception, or when we make intuitively present the co-presence of other things, like when we intuitively presentify Berthold's Fountain.[65] Here we do not merely <present> it as the fountain seen yesterday in its mere pastness, but <present> it as now and as actual, just like the intuitions that we

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[64] Translator: Empathy [*Einfühlung*] as a mode of presentification does not make present a previous or futural perceptual object because the other or the alien can in principle never be given "originally." This is certainly different from a remembering that literally re-presents its object, or from a futural presentification that anticipates a futural object as present, or finally from a co-presentification in which something that is not given in the original at present, but can in principle be present (cf. below 367, 373f., 377f.). Accordingly, rather than translate *Vergegenwärtigung* as re-presentation, which would be well-suited for temporal acts, I prefer the common neologism, presentification, since it includes the full complement of acts ranging from imagination to empathy.

[65] The original Berthold's Fountain to which Husserl refers was located in the center of Freiburg at the junction of Kaiser-Joseph-Straße and Salzstraße. It was erected in 1807 for Bertold III. Herzog von Zähringen and was destroyed in 1944. In 1965 a new fountain was erected for the Dukes of Zähringen, the founders of Freiburg. (This is not to be confused with the fountain built in Freiburg to commemorate the Franscian Friar Berthold Schwarz, which was erected in 1852 and is still standing on the Rathausplatz.)

have here and now of the outside entry ways and the vestibule, etc. To be sure, the memory of the past plays its role here—indeed the vestibule initially appears in the current intuition as a remembering—but what is past extends unaltered into the future in the manner of an object for consciousness. This future proceeds from the reproduced past and does so in such a way that this future is at the same time co-present, relative to our current perceptual present to which these things here in our current perceptual field belong.

Furthermore, we also have intuitive presentifications of what is to come from the future, that is, intuitive expectations. Proper to being subsequent, to what takes place tomorrow, being futural as being-in-anticipation or being expected by us is what we fore-see[66] as a futural duration, for example, the enduring-character of this lecture-hall, of the university, of the street, of the city, etc. Accordingly, we have a consciousness of something futural in an intuitive presentation. Obviously, expectations are not always like this, merely extending the perceptual moment continuously into the future. Something unknown, something singular never yet experienced can also be fore-seen, like an event that is indeed expected, but yet is singularly new, an event that is accordingly expected as completely determinate, as in the case of periodic repetition, or an event that is expected as more or less indeterminate, which is more often the case.

We had focused on a tremendous, new theme in the previous lecture.[67] On the level of passivity, it concerned the tremendous problem of making evident or of confirmation, as well as the closely related problems of mere ratification and corroboration on the level of passivity. The problem of evidence led us back to the distinctive syntheses of coinciding that forms identities, namely to [70] such syntheses in which intuitions and empty presentations (or intuitions and intuitions) are synthetically united, but whereby empty presentations and their fulfillment once again play an essential role. This happens insofar the intuition, on the one hand, brings empty horizon-intentions into play and the intuition, on the

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[66] *voranschauen*

[67] Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

other, provides the appropriate fullness for these empty horizon-intentions.

A logic that would leave obscure the accomplishment of making evident within logic itself [would] remain hopelessly unclear. But should one not forgo this central problem, then the primary task becomes elucidating the founding level of the passive syntheses of "verification" lying at the basis of all active verification. To do this, however, one must gain deeper insights into the structures of the intuitions and empty presentations that may be functional here. The universal significance that we have repeatedly emphasized, a significance that all these types of consciousness possess for the entirety of a transcendental life as a whole-consciousness, leads us to analyses that are not at all a mere special problem of logic, no matter how important the latter may be. We will be led to insights into the most universal lawful regularities of essences, to the most universal lawful regularities of structure concerning the unity of transcendental inner life, but also to the most universal lawful regularities of genesis.

In the last lecture, we proceeded from a descriptive consideration of the types of intuition that can function in the syntheses of confirmation. They were either perceptions or presentifications; the presentifications were either memories of the past, like when a past lived-experience is presented, or memories of the present, like intuitive presentations of a co-present, for instance, the antechamber of this room, or the co-presence of alien psychic life that is given perceptually along with the alien lived-body; or finally, they were memories of the future, intuitive presentations of an expected future.

Indeed, it occurred to us there that in perception we are nevertheless "horizonally" co-conscious of the past and future. But we are conscious of them emptily, even though they can be exposed subsequently and in an intuitive manner. Likewise in the [71]
case of remembering: In every remembering not only is there a past, which can be traced back by remembering, and a future, but there is also a relation to a current present, to the future by perceiving, and therefore to its current future. Finally, even expectation is not isolated and without relation to the current present and to the past of something expected. In all of this we

find internal structural intertwinings. We will soon see that it will not suffice to juxtapose as types, perceptions, memories of the past, memories of the present, and memories of the future,[68] and to describe them in an entirely general manner according to the noematic character of their objectlike formations. Or that we cannot be satisfied with a general phenomenological impression and with the evident differences between all types. Only when we understand them in their structural interrelatedness can we also understand how they function in synthetic interrelatedness, including here, as well, how they can function as confirming or confirmed.

This holds not only for types of intuitions, but similarly for the other side, for the side of empty presentations.

<§18. Description of the Possible Types of Empty Presentation>

There are empty presentations of all possible objects in all subjective modes of inner givenness; in other words, corresponding to every mode of intuition is a possible mode of empty presentation. That we relate corresponding empty presentations and intuitions to the same [object] means that through a synthesis they achieve a coinciding with respect to the object.

In fact, we would not be able to speak at all of empty presentations and to attribute to them the character of having a relation to an object if it did not belong essentially to each empty presentation that it admit, so to speak, of a disclosing, of a clarification, of a manifestation of its objectlike character, i.e., that it could enter into a synthesis with a corresponding intuition. By bringing to intuition what is emptily meant there, the synthesis allows us to realize for the first time that something is presented there in an empty manner. We can say without hesitation that non-intuitive presentations are only called presentations in an inauthentic sense; genuinely speaking they do not actually present [72]

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[68] Translator: *Wahrnehmungen, Rückerinnerungen, Miterinnerungen und Vorerinnerungen*. See Supplements to the Main Text: "First Version of Main Text Part 2," p. 377, where Husserl explains his motive for using such formulations.

anything to us, an objective sense is not constituted in them; nothing is built up in them as the being of this or that content through actual intentional structures such that we could continuously acquire knowledge of it. What is genuinely presented to us is what is intuited in an originary manner: What is constituted perceptually in its ipseity and in its features, in its different facets, etc., comes to our originary knowledge. But then this is also true of what is quasi-perceived, what is intuitively presented to us in a presentifying modality of intuition, what takes place before our inner eyes piece by piece, reproductively or in the intuitive anticipation of what is to come. Nothing takes place genuinely in the empty presentation, an objective sense is not genuinely constituted. And yet we do say that it presents this or that, i.e., that I am conscious of this or that. In this case, however, we can always place this "something" given to consciousness next to an intuition of it; in the synthesis, we gain an evidence-consciousness, a consciousness that exactly the same [object] that was meant in an empty manner is there in intuition in a genuine way, as the same [object] actually presented.[69]

Naturally, corresponding to every intuition is an empty presentation insofar as an intuition never disappears without a trace after it has elapsed. We are "still" conscious of what it had intuited, now in a non-intuitive way; to be sure, in the end it fades away in a general, undifferentiated emptiness. Every *such* empty presentation is a retention, and the fact that it necessarily connects up with past intentions characterizes a fundamental law of passive genesis. As we know, this law extends further than what is expressed here to the extent that it already plays an unflagging role in the inner becoming of every intuition itself. This is certainly the first aspect of the fundamental lawfulness of the constitution of original time-consciousness: that every lived-experience, speaking most basically, every Now-phase that arises in a primordially impressional manner is continually modified in retention by essential necessity, and this [retentionally modified Now-phase] continues further no less in this manner. What holds for the phases

[69] One must avoid confusing relatively unclear reproductive intuitions and empty presentations, empty intentions.

holds then for the expanses, for the concrete lived-experiences themselves. If nothing new occurs in a primordially impressional manner, then the intuition as such is past, which is to say, it has [73] entirely passed over into the living retention. The objects found in such a retention are disclosed through a process of bringing [them] to intuition; this process of bringing to intuition is connected to the retention according to an essentially lawful possibility, but not a necessity. In other words, they are disclosed in the synthetic transition to an appropriate intuition in the consciousness of them: This is obviously a synthesis of confirmation.

But now it must be said that not all empty presentations have one and the same nature and function; in particular, not all of them have the same nature as retentions do, namely, a nature that we find in the primordial genesis of the temporal stream whereby as retentions [these empty presentations] are connected to any kind of intuition, to any kind of presentation (thus even to any kind of retention); and as we have shown, [this holds] not only *in concreto*, but also in the structural integrity of every intuition itself, which (like every lived-experience in general) can *only* be in the process of time-constituting becoming. With respect to the doctrine of this primordial genesis, we have not only had to speak of retentions, but also of protentions. In our analysis of perception, which was in this regard an analysis of temporal modes of givenness, we have already observed and touched upon the essentially new role of protentions over against the role of retentions. The rubric, protention, designates the second aspect of genetic primordial lawfulness that strictly governs the life of consciousness as the time-constituting unitary stream. Just as a retentional horizon of the past is invariably connected to each impressional present, a protentional horizon of the future is no less invariably connected to an impressional present. Just as one can disclose the retentional horizon, so too can one expose the protentional horizon. Just as the past is first clearly exposed as such through intuitive remembering, namely, as just-having-been, so too is the constitutive accomplishment of protention exposed as the just-about-to-arrive, as becoming originally conscious of the future.

All of this is familiar to us. But when we make the following question the focus of our attention we arrive at something new: whether the two empty presentations as empty presentations are essentially homogeneous, and whether they bring about differently characterized constitutive accomplishments (past – future), for instance, only through a differently regulated order of functioning or merely through an inner complexity. On the other hand, the [74] expressions already tell us something, expressions that we had to choose, in differentiating them, by being intuitively immersed in both situations. In spite of its pure passivity, we spoke of protention as an expectation, and with the colorful image of the present meeting the future with open arms. Accordingly, we already speak this way in pure passivity, which is to say, even prior to [actively] grasping and viewing the perceptual object. We did not use such expressions, and we could not use such expressions with respect to retention. In this connection, there is a difference in the way in which retention and protention function in mindful perception, when we take note [of something] and grasp it. We are mindfully directed, purely and simply, toward the present object, toward the ever new Now that emerges as fulfilling the expectation; and in and through it, it is directed further toward the approaching object. Mindful perceiving follows the protentional continuity. The directedness-ahead, which already lies in passive perception itself, becomes patent in the mindful perceiving. On the other hand, there is however not a directedness in the retentional continuity; there is not a directedness that would follow the trail of pasts being pushed back further and further. One may object here that we can surely also cast a backward turning glance back toward the pasts. While this may be true, it soon becomes clear that there is a tremendous difference in the two cases, and that we must clearly differentiate between the direction of the egoic regard, and the direction in perception itself that already takes place prior to the apprehending regard. In one instance, the egoic regard follows the direction in perception itself, in the other, it does not.

In order to clarify all this it will do us well initially to go beyond protentions as intentions of expectation, and to draw upon other empty presentations that are structurally related to them, and

that are at the same time different from all mere retentions. We have in mind making co-present,[70] memories of the present as forms of intuitive presentations, alongside memories of the past and memories of the future. Let us note throughout that these intuitive memories do not, for instance, come first in genesis; instead the corresponding empty presentations are essentially earlier. Thus, the corresponding intuitions first arise through motivations of awakening, already within perception (where empty retention and protention necessarily link up with the primordial impression, and likewise where a concrete empty retention, or even possibly an empty expectation of the future for a new perception, link up with the entire course of perception). [75]

If we now consider the genetically more original modes of making co-present, then at issue, e.g., for every perceptual object, are its entire horizons that are constitutive of it, horizons that belong immediately to it.

In the previous lecture[71] we pointed to the entire compass of empty presentations that share a common structure with protentions and anticipatory presentations. Belonging here are all the horizon-intentions that have been awakened in the concrete connection of possible intuition, for example, when on occasion we become conscious of some elements of an environing-thing-world (that is not perceived) as co-present through particular empty presentations. We recognize this peculiar feature with respect to all such presentations: that they exist with other presentations in a synthetic nexus of a special kind, namely, in a synthetic nexus that lies entirely outside of the genre of identifying syntheses or syntheses of coinciding. In our example of the awakened co-presence of the antechamber, the empty presentation of this antechamber does not occur in an isolated way; rather, it arises in connection with the perceptual presentation in which we survey the seen room with our gaze knocking on the door, as it were. The connection of this perceptual presentation with the empty presentation is a "synthetic" one, which is to say, a unity of consciousness is produced that carries out a new constitutive

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[70] *Mitgegenwärtigungen*

[71] Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

accomplishment, whereby the both objectlike formations receive special characters of unity noematically. More precisely, the perceptual presentation, what appears perceptually in this way or that, points to the emptily presented object as something that consequently belongs to it. A directed ray arises in perception and goes clean through the empty presentation to what is presented in it. From a genetic perspective, we also say with reason that the perception has awakened the presentation, but awakening means precisely both the emergence of a synthesis of directedness in which the one presentation is "directed toward" and in which the opposing presentation is accordingly directed in itself, or in which [76] the one presentation is characterized as *terminus a quo*, the other as *terminus ad quem*.

Let us now consider such syntheses of consciousness in a wholly general manner, syntheses that have essentially the same character. They are not syntheses that the ego has actively instituted; rather they are syntheses that are produced in pure passivity and that nevertheless can then be produced when the particular lived-experiences entering into connection with one another have arisen from the activity of the ego. If, from the very beginning, we remain focused most simply on the realm that already has our exclusive interest now, the realm of passive presentations as the material for passively emerging syntheses, then we will be concerned generally speaking with such syntheses in which a presentation points beyond itself to another presentation. The latter thereby gains a new inner character that it otherwise could not have. It is the character of the specific "intention," that is, of teleological directedness, of being-intended, of meantness, or correlatively speaking, the presenting is not merely a general presenting consciousness of its object, but rather, is in itself directed toward its object.

There is a danger in this description only insofar as it is not a matter of those very common meanings of the words, "to mean," "to be directed toward," "to intend," which refer to the ego and its acts, whereby the ego, and in a totally different sense, is the radiating point of directedness, of a directedness toward the object. For want of terms at our disposal, we avail ourselves of the apposition, "passive," passive intention. And from here on we will

speak only of passively intending presentations. At the outset we also want to name the synthesis in which this intention arises: associative synthesis. We will hold in abeyance for the time being what this association has to do with that association peculiar to the naturalistic psychologist and to empirical psychology; likewise, we will postpone for the time being any further foray into the general doctrine of association as one of the most important of all and completely universal functioning shapes of passive genesis. What we have expounded upon suffices to delimit sharply a class of empty presentations as "intending," as specifically directed toward their objects in the manner of an intention. This is to say that they stand in an associative synthesis, and that in it they have gained their oriented structure from counter-presentations that function as awakening—whether or not we look, incidentally, at this synthetic nexus. [77]

Now we have already said that not all presentations intend an object, and, coming back to our special theme, we now point to the fact that all retentions arising originally in time-consciousness are of this sort, completely unlike all protentions. Indeed, even retentions, those emerging originally, synthetically cohere with one another and with the primordial impression, but this synthesis proper to original time-consciousness is not a synthesis of association; retentions do not arise through an associative awakening directed backward from the impression, and thus, they do not have in themselves a directedness radiating out from there toward the emptily presented past. Therefore, it was not phenomenologically correct when Brentano characterized the regulated connection of retentions to impressions as an original association. One could only speak like this if one employed the word "association" in a completely superficial and frivolous manner for just any connection of presentations to presentations, without regard to what kind they are and how they originally emerge. Association is only at work in the protentional path of original time-constitution, and also functioning there as

awakening[72], as we know, is the continual retentional path. Accordingly, traversing the protentional path we have directed presentations, intending presentations in perception (in particular, in pure passivity), namely, expectations.

I said that retentions, as they arise in their originality, have no intentional character. This does not rule out that in certain circumstances and in their own way they can assume this intentional character later. Thus, we should not allow ourselves to get confused by the fact that we do encounter directed retentions occasionally, like in those instances where the ego directs its egoic regard toward something retained.[73] For it holds generally that what is presented, toward which the ego directs its regard—what is perceived, what is remembered, even what is retained—must already in itself be intentional, that is, must already have in its passive content a directedness toward its object. Now, how does a retention get this oriented structure? By a subsequent association, of course. In the normal case of perception, for example, in the [78] perceptual course of a melody, a tonal phrase that has just sounded reminds us of one of the previous tonal phrases that we still hold retentionally in consciousness; it points back to it. Thus, an associative awakening proceeds from the present toward a retentional past that had already arisen originally prior to this association and is fading away. Naturally, the retention in question has now taken on an oriented structure. Likewise, out of the realm of forgetfulness that has apparently become nothing, out of the distant horizon into which all retentions finally sink, one of the stale, non-living retentions that is no longer in relief can once again be awakened as it were; in this case, it initially takes on and must take on the shape of an empty retention that is in relief. The awakening results from some kind of present presentation through association. Thus, from the very beginning every stale retention arising in this manner has the character of a passive intention. The remembered past is remembered by means of a pointing back, and this is analogous to pointing-ahead to what is to come, which is

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[72] Translator: Strictly speaking, even though retention can sketch a protentional path, a retention cannot function as "awakening"; rather, it is more proper to speak of a retention being "awakened."

[73] Translator: i.e., a remembering.

peculiar to every memory of the future, expectation. On the other hand, having stated this, we must however maintain the distinction between mere retentions prior to association, and the intentional shape of retentions corresponding to it.

<Chapter 2: PASSIVE AND ACTIVE INTENTIONS AND THE FORMS OF THEIR CONFIRMATION AND VERIFICATION>[74]

<§19. Picturing, Clarifying, and Confirmation in the Syntheses of Bringing to Intuition>

On those frequent occasions when we spoke about intention and fulfillment in phenomenology (and in fact the syntheses of fulfillment do play an enormous role), we certainly did have something particular constantly in mind, but we could not manage to clarify the particular trait of consciousness that the word "intuition" and correlatively the word "fulfillment" characterizes in a general and pure manner. Now, is the concept of intention that we have previously obtained sufficient to attain the particular concept of fulfillment as confirmation? Or does our concept only initially provide a framework for a further distinction that discloses, through a difference, the concept that is actually at issue? [79]

It would be best to proceed by initially considering the possibilities of bringing to intuition, that is, of their verification for empty presentations, and in particular for the intending empty presentations as we have described them up to now. If we consider the types of presentations called protentions, then from the very outset they are presentations directed toward an object by virtue of genetic syntheses in which they emerge according to a primordial lawful manner. And this holds with respect to every expectation or making co-present. Here we find essentially two different modes of bringing to intuition, that is, two different kinds of syntheses of

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E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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coinciding of the empty intention with an appropriate intuition giving intuitive fullness to the empty intention:

(1) The mode of bringing to intuition which is merely clarifying, merely disclosive, as for example when we picture an expectation that is initially empty, when we picture how it will arrive. And likewise we have the mere "picturing" of a co-present. The generality of expectation is always relatively determinate or indeterminate. By virtue of the generality of expectation, this process of bringing to intuition is actually disclosive only with respect to those components that were, so to speak, foreseen within what was prefigured, that is, [it is] disclosive as actually clarifying the intended objective sense. Only such components have the character of an affiliated filler; only they achieve an actual coinciding in the synthesis. But since intuition must yield a completely pictured image,[75] a concrete one, there is a remnant left out of the coinciding. This remnant is characterized in a purely phenomenological manner as mere filling.

(2) There is an entirely different mode of bringing to intuition, i.e., there is an entirely different synthesis of coinciding between intention and a suitable intuition, namely, the specific fulfillment of intention. Where expectation is concerned, this means that it enters into a synthesis with an appropriate perception; the merely expected object is identified with the actually arriving object, as fulfilling the expectation. Obviously, this is entirely different from merely picturing; it is a genuine confirmation. Thus, merely filling the emptiness is not yet the fulfillment of the intention.

What occurs here beyond what is prefigured, beyond what is determinately expected, we characterize not merely as filling, but rather as determining more closely. As such, the latter has the [80] character of fulfillment. What first comes on the scene as coinciding with the prefigured element is a primary fulfillment. But the overabundance that intuition supplies is also a fulfilling, a secondary one, insofar as it is given as belonging to the object itself which is intended there and is now given in intuition as itself, precisely fulfilling the intention.

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[75] *ausgemaltes Bild*

Let us compare this with the process of bringing retentions to intuition. We realize that we are not concerned here with all retentions. Those retentions taking place *originally* do remain non-intuitive and sink into the undifferentiated general horizon of forgetfulness that has, as it were, become lifeless—provided that an associative awakening has not taken place. Thus, only directed retentions, namely, retentions that have become intentions by such an awakening are at issue for a synthesis of bringing to intuition.

If we consider the existing possibilities here, we will realize immediately that the process of bringing to intuition as a clarifying process, and the process of bringing to intuition as a confirming one, are not sharply distinguished here, as is the case with protentions. That is, they are not such that the first would be characterized as merely picturing, but then not confirming, and the other as confirming, but then not as merely "picturing." The matter is different here. If an intending retention passes over to an appropriate intuition under synthetic coinciding, then this intuition is indeed an intuitive remembering. Doubtlessly, we can say that through an intuitive remembering we become intuitively clear about what was only emptily intended precisely in the empty retention. Surely the synthesis then accomplishes a sense-clarifying process of bringing to intuition. It discloses the intended objective sense, but an objective sense that is initially presented in an empty manner. But we can and must say no less that this synthesis simultaneously has the character of a confirming synthesis. The empty retention—which as reawakened should actually already be characterized as a remembering, though as a non-intuitive one—is confirmed by a coinciding with the appropriate intuitive remembering. Insofar as it is an empty memory-intention it is fulfilled in the specific sense: In a remembering-intuition the object *itself* is placed before the empty memory-intention, and it is before us as the very object that the memory-intention had merely intended.

Hence, clarifying and fulfilling confirmations are not to be [81]
separated here; here every synthesis of bringing to intuition must accomplish both *a priori*. In contrast to the parallel situation with respect to protentions, there is no mere picturing where the memories of the past are concerned. To be sure, mere picturing

implies a process of bringing to intuition whose accomplishment is merely a pre-view[76] in which we picture for ourselves what probably will be, or as it must be called in our case, what probably has been. An anticipatory image of a matter is not the matter itself, that is, a merely anticipatory seeing is not an intuition of the self [of the object].

It is not as if a remembering could not also be a "picturing," but what we ascertain here is that it cannot merely be a picturing; rather it is simultaneously and necessarily self-giving and thus fulfilling-confirming. This will become completely clear in what follows (let us keep clearly in mind what we have already expounded upon): Every empty retention, like an empty presentation in general, presents in the way of an indeterminate generality. That is, it has a "prefiguring" for its content, a prefiguring that leaves open and indeterminate what goes beyond it, as is shown precisely through the process of disclosure. Remembering, which alone can accomplish a bringing to intuition here, now brings *the* past directly to intuition as [the past] itself, [namely,] a past that was intended in empty memory; accordingly, as we said, it accomplishes a fulfilling confirmation in the synthesis. What is prefigured initially is fulfilled, and this takes place in all circumstances. But the clear memorial image in its concrete fullness offers more than what the prefiguring determinately intended-ahead.

What happens now to this surplus? We obviously have two possible scenarios here for any of the moments accentuated in this filling surplus. Either the moments are characterized in and for themselves as belonging to what is remembered itself, to the past itself; and if this is the case, they will have the character of determining more closely what is remembered, the past, and will themselves belong to what is fulfilling. Or they are not characterized in this way; and if this is the case, they will have the character of mere filler, or as we can also put it, they will have the character of a mere picturing. A non-intuitive memory of a person who we had met some time ago is fulfilled, for example, by an intuitive remembering. Now, if we scrutinize the "memorial-

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[76] *Vor-Bild*

image" more precisely, we will notice for instance that the shape, the reproduced full beard, the glasses, and so forth, have an actual [82] memorial character to be sure, but not the color of the beard, the color of the eyes, etc. What is intuitive there is filling, picturing.

We should note, however, that we merely want to treat occurrences that are purely passive. The word "picturing," as useful as it proves to be for us, normally points to an active comportment of the ego. Where the prefiguring is no longer any help to it, the ego would at least like to get an image, and then pursuing this get various possibilities, various suitable images, possibly waiting for a more complete remembering to flash forth later through associative awakening and waiting for one image or another, according to its content, to take on the memorial character still lacking, the memorial character of determining more closely.

Naturally, we are not speaking here of such activities. Accordingly, mere picturing designates for us the merely distinctive character of filler that does not fulfill, as opposed to the actually fulfilling filler that is given in and for itself as belonging to the directly reproduced past: It is given as past in the mode of "itself."

We can say in general that the processes of determining more closely and picturing are actually always intermingled where remembering is concerned, and that a purely fulfilling confirmation is an ideal limit-case, so to speak, a *limes*, while nevertheless in the opposite direction—and that is a main point of our considerations—there is precisely no *limes*. That is, empty remembering does not admit of a bringing to intuition that thoroughly pictures and that would not be confirming. Now, insofar as it is actually a normal, constant process of picturing bit by bit, it is still an unfulfilled intention. Thus, only the ideal limit-case of an absolutely complete remembering is excluded here.

Every remembering is also an unfulfilled intention in other respects. On the one hand, it is unfulfilled insofar as it wavers in clarity, i.e., is only relatively clear. Obviously, a reproduced image is never absolutely clear, which points once again to an ideal. Unclarity is always intuitively unfulfilled emptiness. Moreover, it is an unfulfilled intention in another respect, namely, when remembering intuitively reproduces only a fragment of the intended past, for instance, only the beginning of an awakened [83]

melody. In this respect, then, it is entirely analogous to the case of an expectation being fulfilled; namely, insofar as an appropriate perception occurs, the expectation is fulfilled. Insofar as perception has not yet spoken, it is still an unfulfilled expectation, an unfulfilled intention.

<§20. Intention Toward Fulfillment is the Intention Toward Self-Giving>[77]

The intention is directed toward its object; it does not want to be a merely empty intending toward it; it wants to go to the object itself—to the object itself, that is, to an intuition that gives the object itself, to an intuition that is in itself the consciousness of having a self. But the intention does not really just want to drive at coming into contact with the intended object in a corresponding intuition of the self, merely to find, for instance, that what was prefigured has been brought to fulfillment; even then it is still unsatisfied and strives onward from one closer determination to another, again and again. The indeterminate generality peculiar to what is prefigured in every abiding emptiness is always only a form for the fulfillment intended in an affiliated objective sense, a fulfillment which is to be accomplished in the form of a new, closer and closer determination.

What else does this entire manner of speaking of "driving at" mean than that there is still something more that belongs to the opposition, intention/fulfillment, and to the idea of confirmation than what had been expressly mentioned up until now. It has not only been shown that a directedness stemming from an awakening belongs to all actual intentions and thus to an actually fulfilling, confirming synthesis. Rather, now this comes to the fore as belonging to a confirming intention: This directedness is tendentious, and as a tendency, as a striving, it is from the very beginning "driving at" a satisfaction. This satisfaction is only possible in a special kind of synthesis that brings to intuition, in a synthesis that brings the presented object to self-givenness. And it does it in such a way that the satisfaction is merely a relative one

[77] Editor: See Appendix 7: <Belief and Intention> p. 449ff.

and leaves a remainder of dissatisfaction so long as the intuition still contains indeterminacy or mere filling. In general, confirmation has a merely relative character, or rather, confirmation can only become relativized precisely because of this essential relation to a tendentious intention; this is the case even [84] though at any moment there is already, in a good sense, a fulfillment in it. It is not simply an issue of a synthetic unity of presentations for itself, but also of a synthetic unity which concerns the striving that traverses the presentations. Corresponding to this is the double meaning of fulfillment, whose one side is equally expressed by satisfaction, as that relaxation of a striving in which the sought after goal is reached as such.

We spoke of *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* with respect to association as the synthesis between what is awakening and what is awakened by it, between the directedness-toward and what is taken up in the directedness. This way of speaking now takes on a new sense, and a more authentic one. For now it concerns an actual taking-aim. The intention is that lived-experience that is a merely aiming-at, a having-in-sight; its fulfillment lies in the lived-experience of being-at-the-goal-itself. And this is not a seeing that pictures, but rather, a self-giving seeing. It is only that the intention remains an intention so long as something is still lacking with respect to having the goal-self, that is, with respect to what is to be reached. It is also clear that every lived-experience, which is in need of fulfillment, can be characterized as an intention even though, on the other hand, it can exist at the same time in relation to another intention as fulfillment, as confirming lived-experience. The latter, insofar as it is self-giving, the former, insofar as it is incompletely self-giving, i.e., it still contains facets that are possibly unsatisfied.

If we now regard the ego as comporting itself merely receptively, and if we do this within a genetic analysis, then we are obliged to observe that an affection precedes the receptive action. A presentation occurring in the background, a directed one, affects the ego, which is to say, a tendency heads toward the ego; the ego reacts by turning toward, the presentation assumes the shape of a grasping in which the egoic regard is directed toward the object. This yields the most strict, normal concept of

intending[78], more precisely, of doxic intending, of intending being, extending far beyond the sphere of simple presenting. But there is more here if the directedness should have the shape of that intention that terminates in confirmation.[79] The presentation now has the form of a striving issuing from the ego, of an *intentio* that [85] intends the true self: As such *intentio* is initially characterized by everything that we have described; it is then a presenting endeavor that wants to realize itself in the continuous acquisition of knowledge, in a fulfilling grasping of the self that is constantly in the process of determining more closely, that is, not just in a mere grasping of the self in general, but rather, being interfused with an endeavor to foray into the moments of the object and to see to what extent they are not yet intuitively realized as grasping the self, in order to bring them to this realization. Through all of this, the ego is the center as the wakeful radiating center of active striving.

But perhaps one will have to say that at root the character of the specific intending and even of this intention can already be without the participation of the ego. Accordingly, when the expression "intentional lived-experience" is employed for any type of consciousness (and this is still very often explicated by saying that every consciousness is a meaning-something, but also often as a mere intending that has not reached the goal of truth), it is only correct to do so when it is correctly understood in accordance with our analyses. One cannot say without further ado that inherent in every consciousness is a striving, an intending toward its object to possess the self [of the object], namely, that there is already a directedness. This has been shown with decisive clarity where original retentions are concerned. Still, it is certainly a general, essential possibility that every consciousness, no matter through what kind of motivation (we mentioned associative awakening in the passive sphere), takes on an orientation, and in this connection takes on the intending directedness toward the very self of a being. At most, there is the possibility that every consciousness become a

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[78] *Meinung*

[79] Translator: Husserl should either speak here of egoic verification [*Bewährung*] and not confirmation [*Bewahrheitung*]; or he should articulate a passive striving that is not yet egoically directed. See above, footnote 62.

consciousness that intends being, that it become a striving after knowledge, an endeavoring meaning that is satiated in a synthesis of confirmation. Striving after knowledge in the very broadest sense is precisely a striving directed toward being itself, and already belonging here is the most primitive presenting that has the structure of aiming-at. To be sure, we must not take this striving as an isolated intending, but rather, if we want to have the normal concept of knowing in the logical sense, we must conceive of the epistemic striving in connection with a habitual consistency that does not break off and is not arrested in a single act, and does not break off when the knower sleeps. So much for a preliminary exposition.

Retention and protention, which we have contrasted in our analyses, are brought closer together in certain respects through our radical clarification of the concept and phenomenon of intention. By virtue of its origin, protention, unlike retention, is essentially a meaning-intention. More precisely, protention is to be interpreted accordingly as a "fore-," namely, as an *intentio* directed into the future, as an intending and a striving that is directed forward—whether the ego itself is an ego that intends-ahead, and whether the striving is the striving of an ego, or whether it concerns an egoless tendency that is precisely a presenting tending-toward what is arriving from the future. We also call protention an anticipatory, expectant meaning. In positionality, and specifically in non-modalized positionality, we have a certain belief in this or that presentational content; it does not believe within the present what is given impressionally in the present, but rather anticipates in belief, as an intending into the future concerning what a futural perception itself will indicate. [86]

Let us compare with this a retention that has taken on the form of an intending, for instance, that has the shape of a memory of the past (even if non-intuitive), and has the shape of a tendentiously directed memory of the past. Thus, in it is the intention toward the past that is made available in an intuitive remembering in the mode of self-givenness. It is clear that even this intention is intending-ahead in a certain respect, although the "fore" or "ahead" does not have the temporal sense of future. The present lived-experience of the empty memory means, intends beyond

itself in an anticipatory manner, only now it intends something that lies in the past and that would come to fulfilling givenness in the memorial-intuition that gives the past itself. Generally, and without further ado, we see that every intention whatsoever is anticipatory, and this feature is due precisely to the striving that, as such, is directed toward something that can only first be achieved through a realization. Intention anticipates either the effective realization of the self in the future and likewise the effective realization of the self of something that is co-present through perception, or the realization of the self of what is past through remembering.

Yet, we find ourselves in a paradox here. The past has surely long since been realized and can no longer be realized—this does not make any sense. On the other hand, when the protentional striving or tending is directed toward what is futural, it is of course [87] not actually a striving whose fulfillment realizes or makes actual what is futural. Such a realization can take place now as deliberate, as active, or it can take place now non-deliberately in passivity, like when we pull our hand back involuntarily because of an insect bite (while being perhaps quite occupied with something else entirely). With this, a spatial course of events is realized in the perceptual environing-world.

But all this becomes clear when we focus strictly upon the phenomenological situation itself. In particular, it is worth considering what kind of a striving functions in this intending, and what kind of sought after goal this intending has.

§21 Epistemic Striving and Striving after the Effective Realization of the Presented Object[80]

Naturally, we are not speaking here of a wishing, a desiring, or a willing with the expectation that the intended element should be actual, should become actual, or should have been actual. Thus, even with respect to confirming fulfillment we are not speaking of a corresponding satisfaction of a wish or of a willing that occurs in

[80] Translator: Paragraph heading modified. Given here is Husserl's complete heading for this paragraph.

the joy of something that has become a reality with certainty: in the joy that it actually is, that it has become actual, etc., while previously we had felt within us a sorrow at the lack of this certainty, at a doubt in being, or at the certainty of its non-being. As we said, we are not speaking of this at all. For example, the continual protentional intention in connection with a perception actually taking place harbors, at every moment, the anticipatory certainty of what is to come, the certainty of its futural occurrence (and it does this completely without our help). While listening to a melody as it runs-off, we are certain at every moment that further tonal rhythms will arrive and fit in, and when we hear a melody that is long familiar we are even certain of its completely determined contents. For its part, new strivings may be triggered, fulfilled, or disappointed depending upon whether we like the sounds or not. But this does not have anything to do with the anticipatory intention as such. The aesthetic pleasure or displeasure does not imply a fulfillment or a disappointment for the expectation *qua* protention within the merely tonal perception. Since we are certain from the outset that something is going to arrive in the living perception, there is no room at all for a wishing that it should be, or even for a willing that it should become by realizing it in our actions. [88]

On the other hand, we cannot deviate from our descriptions that we have obtained phenomenologically [which show] that every process of meaning that intends and wants to know is precisely a tendency-toward, a striving. We must only note that it is a differently directed striving, and that on occasion manifold strivings may very well become intertwined without disturbing each other. If the striving that intends and wants to know is not directed toward being, in the expectation toward what is to come, or in the memory toward a past being, then it is a directedness toward the experiential seeing of the self of what is taken for being, or rather it is a directedness toward the experiencing itself so that what is already meant from the outset as being with certainty is or will be actual in the subjective mode of experiencing the self. Specifically, the anticipatory intention bears

on a situation in which what is meant in the anticipation[81] as certain will come in the future, as it were, in grasping the self[82]; that is, it is directed toward the actual object in the mode of being presented in the flesh. Furthermore, the memorial intention is directed toward a situation where what is anticipatorily certain as past will become a past that is self-given. Here, then, the aim bears on the modified mode of being presented in the flesh that is provided by the intuitive remembering as a modal modification of perception.

The unique and new acquisition of the synthesis of confirmation is, *first*, the coinciding that results at the end of the synthetic transition, a coinciding of the presentation functioning as an intention with the corresponding experience of the self, whereby the emptiness gets its fullness of the self. In the coinciding, which is given to consciousness as a resultant one, the meant object is identified as a sense that now shows the dual mode of the unfulfilled self and the full self as united; and it does this specifically with the character of "verified intending," namely, with the character of saturation resulting from this process. *Second*, however, what was already uniquely characterized in this lower level has in addition its peculiar character that stems from the higher level, the level pertaining to striving. The striving becomes satisfied, what is experienced in the mode of the self is characterized as an achieved goal that, as achieved, i.e., as resulting from the synthesis, *eo ipso* has the character of the resultant coinciding of an anticipatory intending and an intending in the mode of grasping the self; it therefore has the character of a double-layered fulfillment.

Displacements in striving are not only essentially possible here, [89] but *de facto* occur quite often. The result-character in the synthesis, the character of "true," can become the sought after goal, and likewise the verifying synthesis as the process of accomplishing [the result] can become the sought after goal, and finally, even the sense of well-being that occurs as a result of the tension endemic to striving being relaxed, as a result of a striving

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[81] *Vorgriff*

[82] *Selbstgriff*

being satisfied, can become the conscious motive and sought after goal, i.e., the willed goal.

Our analyses have made clear the essential distinction between doxic intending in the lowest sphere of presentation, that is, presenting meaning, a striving prevailing in it, and every other striving and being satisfied that is possible on the basis of presentations that are similar with respect to content. In every presenting we have the presentational content as the material of belief and the belief itself; that is, in the full sense of presenting, we have the sense-material and the modal moment "being with certainty," or its modifications. If the presenting has the normal form of an intending intention in certainty, then it can also be the case that there ensues a valuing determined by the particular moments of the presentational content and a striving motivated by valuing. We are interested in the being and the modes of being peculiar to the presented matter: We wish that it were, we find it a practical possibility for us, and then we strive, possibly through our actions, to realize it. If such a striving aims at the actuality of the matter as such, which is of value to us by virtue of these or those features, if it is fulfilled in the production of the certainty of its being, and in a superior manner in grasping the self through experience, it nevertheless does not drive at grasping the self to verify it, but rather, to realize its value, to fulfill the valuing intentions, which for their part are precisely founded in the presentations and the effective realization of their presented objects.

We are occupied with the analysis of the synthesis of fulfillment that corresponds on the level of passivity to that higher synthesis that we call in the level of thought verification, in the normal sense of the term (we spoke directly of confirmation in the passive sphere). This analysis led us to the strict concept of a passive intention as a special shape that a consciousness of something must assume in order for it to be able to function in [90] syntheses of fulfillment. We distinguished two things under the rubric of intention:

First, a consciousness of something does not necessarily need, in itself, to have the distinguishing trait of a directedness toward this something, toward its objectlike formation. This was seen in

the case of retentions that originally link up with every perception. Only when an associative ray, when an "awakening" radiates in this consciousness from elsewhere, from another presentation, and directs this consciousness toward its object, does it have in itself precisely a directedness. A different orientation can go hand in hand with this, namely, the ego's attentive orientation. But this is not at issue here. Such awakenings have the character of tendencies, and hence also gradations of intensity; like forces, they can become stronger and potentially weaker. This can be seen, for example, in the intensification that perceptions impart to the periodic terms in retention where something is repeatedly perceived, an intensification that animates them and at the same time secures them as intentional objects. Let us note here that only through these and similar syntheses can the element, which has passed over into a retention together with the new perceptual objects, actually be an object, that is, an intentional object. In perceiving a series of repetitions, but also a melody for instance, the newly appearing objects within pure passivity are not the only objects of the intention (although they are this) toward which the primary directedness aims. To the extent that they retain their force, the objects that have faded away in retention are not given to consciousness in the same way that something new [is given to consciousness when it] arises, and the previous object fades off as something that does not have any connection with the new and does not concern it. The unity of a successive multiplicity, of a diversely articulated process, presupposes that forces issue from something new, or again, that from something new, syntheses interweave as they move back; through this, a unity of intention is instituted, a unity of intention that transports back (or "awakens") the objects fading away in the form of the living intention and uniformly binds this latter intention with the intention of the new object.

Second, as a further moment of the specific *intentio*, we emphasize the tendency toward a terminating in the self, that is, the tendency of the presentations already directed toward self-giving insofar as they are not already self-givennesses. The self-giving presentations, intuitions, which give the presented object in the mode of self, are necessarily intending presentations, namely, [91]

directed toward this self [of the object]. But insofar as this directedness terminates precisely in the goal of this orientation itself, the intention is fulfilled.

On the other hand, concretely self-giving presentations are always at the same time intending (in the special sense of intending, namely, as pointing toward fulfillment) insofar as they contain anticipatory intentions, namely, protentional intentions that become fulfilled in the continual progression of self-giving. In other words, concrete perception and self-giving in general are only possible as a continual synthesis of fulfillment. Thus a presentation can only be fulfilled when it is either a straightforward anticipatory intention or when it is intertwined with an anticipatory intention in its complex structure.

Let me note the following here: I have repeatedly wavered, and I do not feel entirely confident about the question [concerning] how the merely tendentious directedness, for instance, of an empty anticipatory presentation toward its objectlike formation (that is, what makes it the "intending" of its objectlike formation), would make it to the further tendency toward fulfillment in the corresponding self (that is, to the tendency of verification). When I gave my lectures a few years ago on transcendental logic,[83] I conceived of both tendencies as basically one and the same, distinguished only by the kinds of effects they have. Namely, the orientation toward the emptily intended[84] object is that mode of presentational tendency toward its object in which the presenting consciousness is not yet intentional. Only as intentional is the tendency precisely a goal-directed tendency which, relaxed and unfrustrated, and operating intentionally, leads to fulfillment, to the goal itself. This goal is thus already its goal in the mode of a frustrated tendency, but precisely in the mode of not being reached. Perhaps this is entirely correct if all involvement of ego-activity is actually left out of play.

If it is a matter of empty memories then the intentional tendency prevailing in them would accordingly be characterized as a

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[83] Translator: Husserl is writing this version of his lecture in 1925/26 and is undoubtedly referring to his earlier version from 1920/21 (Cf. "Translator's Introduction, Section 1.)

[84] *leer vorstellige*

reproductive tendency. Associative awakening would thus also be a tendency toward a corresponding reproduction, that is, toward the transition to an intuitive remembering that brings the past as such to self-givenness. Potentially, this tendency can be at work in an uninhibited manner: The empty awakened memory continually passes over into a memorial intuition and, as it were, in a completely awakening manner. The precise analogy for this would be, then, the continual efficacy of anticipations, protentional tendencies as the process of perceiving progresses. Where the intention remains inhibited, and where a fulfillment only occurs subsequently, there the synthesis of fulfillment becomes a discrete one. But naturally—and we must never forget this—all the talk of verification applying to such fulfillments in mere passivity is inaccurate. Indeed, we are not speaking here at all of an active striving and accomplishing that is directed toward a true being which normatively regulates[85] or measures its intending according to what is given as true in the self-giving, although, however, it surely does concern the presuppositions, and in a certain manner, the analogies of passivity, without which that activity could not function. [92]

<§22. The Different Relationships of Intention and the Intended Self. Secondary Verification>[86]

Viewed precisely, our previous considerations have still not yielded any ultimate and pure results. We have clearly discerned that intuitions are essentially distinguished according to whether they are self-giving or not self-giving, and thus that a synthesis is characterized quite differently according to whether it passes over into a self-giving intuition or into a non-self-giving intuition, and then as we also put it, merely pictures. Now, however, what unifies such a synthesis where this synthesis is conceived concordantly is not as a mere accord, as coinciding in the objective sense, but rather, as an accord of the *intentio* (in our sharply defined sense) prevailing in the synthesis in question and

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[85] *normieren*

[86] Editor: See Appendix 27 to §45.

in its components. The intention running through the empty expectant consciousness is fulfilled in the transition to self-giving, to perception; it is a satisfied intention, so to speak, in the self-giving intuition, being characterized here as a confirmed intention. And likewise in all similar cases. Even when we have a synthetic [93] unity of a perception with a perception, i.e., an original self-giving with an original self-giving (as the process of perceiving progresses), we have the rays of intending aroused by the kinaestheses in the appearances, and these intendings into the future, anticipations that are aroused, become satisfied as it were in the continuously emerging new appearance. But if we keep the phenomena sharply in view, then we discern a distinction here between the intentional ray and the intuition into which the intentional ray enters, and then in general a distinction between the particular consciousness-of (even if it is an empty consciousness) and the *intentio*, which traverses this consciousness as a goal directedness or an aiming. For example, the subsequent retention in strict passivity is an empty consciousness into which (as we have shown) the associative intentions issuing from the living present can sink, intentions radiating-back into what has just been. If, then, reproductive awakening ensues from the emergence of a corresponding remembering, then this intuition has taken over into itself the intending ray, and the latter has here the mode of the fulfillment terminating in the self-given past.

With respect to the presentation of what is expected, the presentation that pictures, we will likewise distinguish the intuition itself (which functions as picturing) from the intention that enters into it; but here the intention is not fulfilled and does not terminate in its sense that has become intuitively given. This objective sense has here just the character of what the intended object is, the character of clarifying, of bringing to intuition, picturing; but as unfulfilled, the intention still goes clean through this "image." It is only when the corresponding experience takes place, that is, [the experience of] self-giving, that the intention is satisfied, that it takes on the character of a goal directed intention, of a seeing into the *terminus ad quem*.

But now we must take one step further. Just as we have distinguished between empty consciousness and intention with

respect to the empty retention, so too do we make a distinction with respect to the empty anticipation, and this is significant. When perceiving, I move my eyes this way and that, the intentional rays radiate out from these determinately running kinaestheses. But they are not merely rays that radiate out, which by themselves are nothing, for they are only orientations in presentations; empty presentations are awakened, and running throughout them are the anticipatory rays directed toward the [94] emptily presented objective sense. The emptiness is the potentiality of what is actualized in corresponding intuitions and syntheses of disclosure.

But now we see that corresponding exactly to the fundamental distinction between intuitions as self-giving and non-self-giving is the distinction between the corresponding empty presentations, retention and protention (and to be sure, purely as empty presentations, irrespective of the intending rays belonging to them). Then we see, however, that the empty consciousness of retention is of a fundamentally different kind than the empty consciousness of the empty memory of the future. The uncovering of the one leads to self-giving; to a certain extent, it already has the self in advance, it already has it potentially within itself. But this is not so with the empty expectation. What lies in it as potentiality is nothing other than that intuition which pictures, which does not have any self given within itself. We can express it in this way: Just as remembering brings the past self to givenness more or less clearly, and in the ideal limit-case in a completely clear manner, so does the empty retention have this self in a completely unclear, empty manner within itself; the retention has the self as an originally held, safe-guarded self, as still conscious of the self, and still with a hold on it. When the originally giving impression is over, the self is not lost, despite its emptiness. On the other hand, just as the intuitive expectation only offers a pre-presentation, a pre-view of what is to come instead of the matter itself, so too is the empty consciousness of what is to come an empty pre-presentation of what is to come, but not an empty presentation of the self.

We can also say that whether the expectation is empty or intuitive, it is an anticipatory presentation, only that by the

expression "anticipation" we simultaneously mean to suggest that the *intentio* is directed toward what is anticipated.

Elucidating this situation has enabled us to understand that a possible level of ratification lies prior to verifying the self, for example, that presentations radiating-back into the past, that is, into the realm of memories already have a certain character of fulfillment, a ratified one, as soon as the past attains even an empty awakening. Illustrated more precisely, when we have anticipating presentations that refer to our past, as we so often do [95] when for instance we hold an old letter in our hands that we had ourselves written, we initially have an empty pensive presentation, intentionally referring to our own past, but which is at first entirely indeterminate and general. Now, the moment a determinate memory flashes forth we are conscious of a ratified fulfillment, and even before a reproductive remembering occurs. To be sure, that is not a genuine and ultimate fulfillment; it first requires an actualization whereby the past itself is actually and genuinely there for the first time. Still, it is entirely different from the anticipating consciousness that precisely cannot fulfill, even when it becomes intuitive.[87]

There would be still more to study here. In a certain way, anticipating presentations are also involved in the functioning of fulfillment; they are constantly involved, as it were. This was indicated by the fact that every perception in itself, every experience in itself, draws in its wake such presentations as horizons, and more precisely, as intentionally awakened horizons. The moment a conflict between the anticipating intentions breaks out here, the self-giving is also inhibited. The self-giving of the whole, what makes up for example the entire perception as a perception, is not only determined by what in it is genuinely a perception; rather, it is also determined by the anticipatory intentions that are concordantly harmonizing and also sense-giving. Where the realm of anticipation in general is concerned, one realizes that there is something like a one-sided and a

[87] Ratifying the empty empathies [*Einfühlungen*] <through> one another in the development of expression. On the other hand: How does it stand with intuitive empathy? And viewed precisely, how does it stand with fulfillment in the development of expression?

reciprocal corroboration, a ratification in a certain respect, even though no actual verification can take place here. And in contrast to this, abrogation, namely, inhibition, doubt, annulment: We already see that we run up against modalization as related back to the specific element in intention.

Our analyses still need to be completed somewhat. Let me say a few words about the opposition within the realm of positional intuitions, about the opposition between self-giving and non-self-giving, an opposition that has become increasingly significant for us. We have seen that not all intuitions can function as fulfilling-confirming; we have seen that it is a prerogative of certain [96] intuitions to be self-giving, among which we counted perceptions and memories, while on the other hand there are intuitions like the intuitive anticipations or presentifications that are similar to them such as presentifications of an unfamiliar co-present, and so forth. Here we introduce the term "experiencing intuitions" and note that with it the Humeian concept of impression (in its broader sense) is clarified. That perceptions are self-giving is quite familiar to you and should not give you any difficulties. Phenomenologically, "self-giving" means here that every perception within itself is not only, in general, a consciousness of its object, but that it gives its object to consciousness in a distinctive manner. Perception is that mode of consciousness that sees and has its object itself in the flesh. To put it negatively, the object is not given like a mere sign or a likeness, it is not grasped mediately as if the object were merely indicated by signs[88] or appearing in a reproduced copy, etc. Rather, it is given as itself just like it is meant, and it stands there in person, so to speak.

You could have reservations in allowing rememberings to count as self-giving, however. But as you think more deeply about this mode of consciousness, you will see for yourselves that we also have to speak about self-giving here, only in a modified way; this self-giving shares a common structure with other self-givings, elucidating similar functionings within confirmations. Remembering does not offer the present in the flesh, but in a good sense, a "past in the flesh." For that surely means nothing else than

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[88] *angezeigter*

a direct return to the past as having-been perceived for us, and as possessing the self of this having-been as such in an original re-execution, as memory. We can also say that perception is characterized as an original acquisition of the object, and remembering as originally going back "in thought"[89] to what is already acquired, as originally having it once again at our disposal.

Referring back to our earlier exposition, let us also note that *both* functions are mutually related in knowledge, and that this relation first makes knowledge possible. The analogy of acquisition and the acquisition being at our disposal once again (which is basically more than an analogy) rightly indicates this. An acquisition that we cannot have at our disposal again is not an [97] acquisition. An object that has been grasped in the flesh can only be there as existent for the subject (having abiding validity in its knowledge and cognition) and can only be an actual object in its surroundings when it is "the identical" to which the subject can return in iterable rememberings. Or [when it is] "the identical" that the subject can mean through rememberings as the same, time and again, or that it can possibly verify in new perceptions, but also as what it can recognize, "the identical" that it has remembered at this time, has perceived at another—which, once more, presupposes remembering.

In contrast to these are the non-self-giving intuitions. Using the expression, "picturing," like we did with respect to intuitive anticipations could tempt us here to oppose such intuitions to self-giving intuitions, regarding the former as mere acts of phantasy. But such a facile characterization of these kinds of intuitions will not do; they are in fact in need of a much deeper analysis. Mere phantasies are not positional lived-experiences, whereas intuitive expectations are precisely expectations; something is believed in and through them, posited as being in the future. The futural thing that is intuitively contrived is thereby not the futural thing itself; it does not appear any differently then a pre-view or projected image through which runs the intention as unfulfilled, so to speak, being directed ahead merely expectantly toward the corresponding self.

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[89] *"geistiges"*

But the structure of the function of such a projected image and of its genesis requires further analysis.

It is clear without further ado that the fundamental distinctions of intentions requiring fulfillment correspond to the fundamental distinctions within self-giving intuitions as such, which are capable of being fulfilling confirmations: since, obviously, not every intention is capable of being fulfilled by just any kind of self-giving in any manner. For example, an expectation can only be fulfilled by a perception, and an intention that is directed back can only be fulfilled as remembering.

Up to this point we have focused exclusively on the syntheses of fulfillment and have not considered the opposing occurrences affiliated with them, namely, disappointment, the synthesis in which a different self appears in place of the intended self, appearing likewise in the mode of the self, whereby, so to speak, [98] the negative of a coinciding results. The intended self overlaps with a different self in the transition to intuition. It does not achieve the unity of an identifying coinciding, but rather the unity of being otherwise whereby what was intended gets crossed out. Obviously, we return to the doctrine of passive modalization; but through the deeper clarification of the concepts of intention and fulfillment it opens up new insights and a deeper understanding of its essence. Above all it is important to connect up a phenomenological consideration of association with the doctrine of intention. This will open up the possibility of a genetic elucidation of modalities, initially in the sphere of immanently given matters, and then in the sphere of transcendent, externally given matters.

Going back further and further enables a gradual elucidation of how the unity of the life of consciousness itself is constituted as the field of being on another level of being within the immanence of the life of consciousness, how this unity is constituted in the syntheses of fulfillment and in the syntheses of the concordance of other doxic intentions that are further intertwined with the fulfillment; moreover, it enables an elucidation of how things existent in themselves are constituted as a higher level of being in the unity of this life, and the highest level of all, the universe, an entire universe of objective being, of our objective world in its

open infinity. But all of this is constituted in concordant syntheses, even though there are always discordances, semblances of appearance, illusions. In a certain respect, the untrue, the non-being is already eliminated in passivity. A thoroughgoing consciousness of one and the same world comes into being through revisions and corrections in the form of consciousness's restoration of the disrupted concordance. I will shortly give a idea of the great problems and the extremely extensive investigations that they demand by confronting the primitive concept of "verification" that we have obtained with the traditional logical principle of contradiction and of the excluded middle. Through this, we will make clear the very special concept of being and the special concept proper to it, normative regulation[90] which, quite understandably, is presupposed by this principle and thus by logic.

But before I pass over to this, I must first still speak about those secondary verifications within the primitive level I just mentioned, the secondary verifications that exist alongside the verification through the self that we treated as the lowest level of the phenomena of evidence. We are considering the realm of intendings, of doxic intentions. Normally, straightforward belief always characterizes intending such that our clarification of intention obviously presents a fundamental portion of the theory of judgment. Intendings can accord with intendings, even where they are not fulfilled. Through the arrival of intendings that accord with a given intending, the latter can get the character of a ratifying intention, and of a stronger and stronger ratifying one without having to speak of an original confirmation or of a process of making evident. Likewise, empty intendings can contend with other intendings and can give rise to an irresolvable doubt, then the conflict can be resolved in the form of reawakened certainties that negate one of the horns of the dilemma and ratify the other. But all of this takes place in the realm of mere empty intentions of belief, while earlier we had studied the parallel occurrences of possible modalization in the originality of perception. For example, if we hold an old letter in our hands it will refer to a person in an indeterminate generality, but we do not know which [99]

[90] *Normierung*

person it is. We recognize the handwriting as familiar, and several people come to mind in our memories, but we are not sure who it is. In reading the first lines of the letter a determinate memory arises concerning the occasion we first received it, but it is a memory that is in no way intuitive, and as we continue to read the letter, the person is immediately specified, the decision is there, ratified.

It is important to note that such ratifying and corroborating functions, which are in accord in manifold ways, actually play a role everywhere and even in self-givings. They are involved in every self-giving, in every perception, and in an entirely originary manner. Their accord belongs to the functions of self-giving fulfillment, just as their discordance can awaken modalizations in them. The "horizons" of perceptions are another name for empty intentions (intentions in our clarified and precise sense) that are integrally cohesive and that are actualized in the progression of perception in and through different orientations. All of these intentions must accord with one another should the perception be normal, that is, continuously self-giving. If they come into conflict with one another then the belief proper to self-giving is inhibited [100] in its fulfillment. For example, as the process of external perceiving progresses optically, the thing is not only intended optically. Intentions of other sense spheres are continually co-awakened and must continually accord in the unity of a synthesis with the genuine impressional ones of the optical sphere. They must do this because they are co-constitutive of the objective sense. However, the moment something does not accord in the tactile sphere, even though it is not impressionally realized, fulfillment of belief is inhibited; the unity of perception as it accords with all intentions in forming the unity of a whole intention is inhibited. But here we must actually go beyond the individual perception and go to the encompassing nexus of external perception in general which makes up a unitary consciousness of the environing-world and an original consciousness in a universal synthesis of all empty intentions, even of the empty intentions co-determining sense. We can see a thing, and everything in the thing jibes; in themselves the tactile features that are co-indicated would assuredly conform. But we

look through a stereoscope for example, our hand resting atop the table; through this and also through the continuous preceding perceptual nexus as a whole, we know ourselves to be in a small room, even though the stereoscopic object is a waterfall located on larger isolated rock cliffs. Something does not jibe, and the perception is now broken, modalized; it takes on the character of an illusion, and in this case it simultaneously takes on the character of an impressional likeness of a Swiss waterfall. Now running through the likeness is the intention directed further toward a fulfilling self-givenness that is to be produced some other way.

Thus, we see that in each and every case it is a matter of intentional systems that go together to form the unity of a synthesis and a whole intention arising through it. These unities must be thoroughly in accord so that on the whole the particular intention can have the character of unbroken belief. Modalization belongs to the intention and is carried out in intentions; it is however not carried out in an isolated manner in elementary intentions, but rather in the intentions that are integrated concretely into the synthetic intentions as a whole. Special forms of this, then, are the self-giving intentions which, by constituting a self, are able to fulfill and to confirm non-self-giving intentions.

<Chapter 3: [101]
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITIVENESS IN EXPERIENCE>

<§23. The Problematic Character of a Verification that is Possible for All Intentions and Its Consequence for Belief in Experience>

That we have a consciousness of our own life as a life endlessly streaming along; that we continually have an experiencing consciousness in this life, but in connection to this in the widest parameters, an emptily presenting consciousness of an environing-world—this is the accomplishment of unity out of manifold, multifariously changing intentions, intuitive and non-intuitive intentions that are nonetheless concordant with one another:

look through a stereoscope for example, our hand resting atop the table; through this and also through the continuous preceding perceptual nexus as a whole, we know ourselves to be in a small room, even though the stereoscopic object is a waterfall located on larger isolated rock cliffs. Something does not jibe, and the perception is now broken, modalized; it takes on the character of an illusion, and in this case it simultaneously takes on the character of an impressional likeness of a Swiss waterfall. Now running through the likeness is the intention directed further toward a fulfilling self-givenness that is to be produced some other way.

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E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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intentions that in their particularity coalesce to form concrete syntheses again and again. But these complex syntheses cannot remain isolated. All particular syntheses, through which things in perception, in memory, etc., are given, are surrounded by a general milieu of empty intentions being ever newly awakened; and they do not float there in an isolated manner, but rather, are themselves synthetically intertwined with one another. For us the universal synthesis of harmonizing intentional syntheses corresponds to "the" world, and belonging to it is a universal belief-certainty.

Yet as we already mentioned, there are breaks here and there, discordances; many a partial belief is crossed out and becomes a disbelief, many a doubt arises and remains unsolved for a time, and so forth. But ultimately, proper to every disbelief is a positive belief of a new materially relevant sense, to every doubt a materially relevant solution; and now if the world gets an altered sense through many particular changes, there is a unity of synthesis in spite of such alterations running through the successive sequence of universal intendings of world—it is one and the same world, an enduring world, only, as we say, corrected in its particular details, which is to say, freed from "false apprehensions"; it is in itself the same world. All of this seems very simple, and yet it is full of marvelous enigmas and gives rise to profound considerations.

Let us reflect on the following. We have made clear that doxic life on the level of pure passivity takes on the shape of the passive intention again and again, of a directedness, which, as a tendency [102] operating in an uninhibited manner, passes over to self-givennesses. Thus, running through passive life are ever newly interweaving syntheses of fulfillment. A continual striving after intuition that realizes the meant self, a continual—we couldn't help thinking of the term—confirmation. The fulfilling self as that at which the intention was driving, has indeed the character of truth and henceforth abiding validity for the subject. This seems to be exactly what active cognition, and in the highest level, predicative and theoretical cognition accomplishes. Even it is initially a mere, only active process of intending, even it is a tendentious believing, only now it is a believing that is actively striving, set on fulfillment, becoming operative in evidence. But what is evidence

other than seeing the self of what is meant, that is, the fulfilling effective realization in possessing the self; what is it other than the synthesis of coinciding that forms an identity, a coinciding of a merely anticipatory intending with the fulfilling self? Showing-as-true, showing the correctness of the intending takes place precisely through this. It is directed toward the self that is realized in consciousness; accordingly, an evidence that verifies is thus nothing other than the consciousness of the *adaequatio rei et intellectus* carried out in the originality of possessing the self.

No matter how elucidating and even in a certain respect how indubitable our presentation may be, the accomplishment of a genuine confirmation, which strives toward knowledge in the strict sense, surely cannot be exhausted by what activity and passivity have in common here.

Does evidence, does the immediately seen *adaequatio* already yield truth in the full sense? Truth is surely definitiveness. But possessing the self, experience, can come into conflict with another experience; modalizations can occur. Can this not go on *in infinitum* such that definitiveness is never reached? And if there should be such a definitiveness, how would we know it? All knowledge as the grounding of judgment begins with experience. Doubtlessly, it is an initial phase of grounding. But is grounding already accomplished with mere experience? An analysis of experiencing passivity is surely fundamental for the elucidation of this initial phase. But we cannot expect to have come very far with this so soon. From what we have already said, it has already become questionable if behind every judgment there is a definitive truth: because of the relativity of experience. Doubt receives a new [103] sense if we initially recognize experience as being definitively correct. Does every question have to be able to have a response? A definitive response, and in advance? Put differently, in our view, every judgment has its norm in a truth that is valid in itself, whether we know it now or not and are ever able to reach it or not. Normative regulation, measuring up to the norm, is carried out subjectively in evident verification, since to our mind the true that regulates in a normative manner,[91] precisely as the seen self,

[91] *das normierende Wahre*

comes into our grasp immediately precisely in the experiencing, self-giving intuition.

But are there not many profound difficulties to be found in this in-itself, difficulties that lie in yet a different direction than the one of which we have already spoken? For example, must every judgment that is directed toward the future have a definitive truth or falsity? Must it be decided in advance, only that we do not know how it is decided? Let us follow the matter in [the sphere of] passivity and discern what is missing here. Only from this [sphere] can one grasp the most fundamental of all the shortcomings in the groundings of traditional logic, a shortcoming that concerns the ultimate principle of all logical norms in the most astounding way, namely, the principle of contradiction and of the excluded middle.

To be sure, we think of this principle above all when we speak of logical norms; all knowledge must be logically shaped, a truthful logical knowledge is referred back to the principle of contradiction.

But when we articulate and think through such principles, we notice first of all that we have not yet acquired concepts like truth and falsity here in the full sense, and that speaking of the norm, of a norm of correctness and incorrectness had an incomplete sense. In immanent time-consciousness we have the stream of givennesses in lived-experience, givennesses that are strung together temporally with their anticipations which have the character of an anticipatory believing that is directed-ahead. A spatio-temporal world is given in the stream that is contained in immanent time-consciousness, in the stream of transcendent experiences,[92] the intuitive and non-intuitive. And constantly referring to this spatio-temporal world are manifold lived-experiences of a transcendent believing that is in need of fulfillment. In both respects, belief is not only directed toward the present, but also toward the anticipated future and toward the memorial past; manifold memory-beliefs and expectant-beliefs emerge that can be verified or rejected. [104]

What happens now with the verifiability or refutability of experiential belief in all these respects? What is to be meant by the

[92] *Erfahrungserlebnisse*

axiom we tested that every such belief is either positively or negatively verifiable? To be sure, it does not just mean that the mere possibility of one or the other belongs to the essence of such a believing, and that when the one possibility is taken up as realized, the other would thereby be annulled. It is certainly evident from the principle of contradiction that positive and negative verification, fulfillment and disappointment, are mutually exclusive. But if we want to say that every belief is verifiable in the sense that it is valid or invalid in the usual sense, as it is in the view of the traditional principle of the excluded middle, then quite a bit more is being said here.

Let us get clear about this by drawing a parallel to mathematical judgment, to a judicative believing that bears on what is mathematical. Either it is valid, it is verifiable, or it is not valid, it is verifiable in a negative manner. This certainly implies that whether we ever will or are even able to carry out a verification or not, even without thinking about whether it may ever become a decision of the positive or negative sort, it is surely decided in itself whether the judgment is verifiable or whether it is refutable, already in advance and thus for all actual and possible consciousness in the future. Only we do not know in advance how it is decided; we only first know this in the actual, intuitive verification as the current decision. It is determined in advance, as it were, how the die is cast, whether on the positive or the negative side. If we actually and positively confirm the judgment, then we will know that it was already established beforehand that only a positive confirmation could take place and that the opposite was excluded (and for every conceivable ego).

Let us now turn to the spheres of our external experience as they had been constituted in passivity, and so far as we are able to understand them from there up to this point. We ask with respect to these spheres: Is it an actually intuitable, essential law to be drawn from the structure of the intentionality of experience that every belief, no matter how it arises in the stream of consciousness [105] and its motivations, is decided in advance according to the possibilities of verification and refutation? How can this "in advance" be understood? Certainly, if a fulfillment occurs, then belief is decided as valid; a prehension of the self has emerged

from mere anticipating, the anticipation has been ratified. But as long as the verification has not taken place, both of the open possibilities do exist. Must it be determined in itself and in advance what alone can occur there, if it is ever to be decided at all and regardless of whether a decision takes place or not? To elucidate the structure of truth or validity is to elucidate this "in itself," and perhaps there are fundamental differences there. In fact, truths of the mathematical kind and other essential truths are fundamentally different from truths like experiential truths. This in-itself is divided according to the correlations: As correctness in itself it belongs to believing, as truth in itself, truth in the strict sense of the word, it belongs to sense or rather to a proposition. The object in itself corresponds to the truth in itself. Now the in-itself belongs to the object.

Thus, we have brought the problem of the empirical in-itself clearly into relief by drawing a parallel to the mathematical in-itself where it is easiest to detect the peculiar trait of validity in itself. And we were able to understand that we are in no way in the position of fashioning in an original manner the axioms of the sort that we previously tested relating to the empirical in-itself. This concerns no less the immanent sphere despite its privilege through the evidence of the ego. In fact, if we conceive of a consciousness that has sounds, colors, and similar hyletic data given in passivity in immanent time-consciousness, and these data are being constituted in the process of becoming, then it is not clear in the least how it should be decided *in itself*, in advance, whether precisely this new tone, or whether a new tone at all should follow a previous tone. And even if an anticipatory belief in a new determinate tone were motivated by the preceding immanent experience, we cannot tell in advance that it should be decided in itself, whether it will actually occur, or instead will fail to appear, or will take place in an entirely arbitrary and altered manner.

What happens with respect to transcendence, that is, the spatio-material world, at least when we conceive of it constituted purely [106] passively in a consciousness? Naturally, proper to the constitution of a spatio-material environing-world is not only a super-abundance of prefigurings of inner horizons for every thing that is actually experienced, but also of outer horizons—which are

reciprocally interwoven with one another, and ultimately all things of experience are connected in the unity of an environing-world with a unitary outer horizon—and thus a superabundance of prefigurings for the path of further possible experiences. But there are precisely prefigurings, there is motivated experiential belief, superabundantly corroborated and ratified through innumerable accordances; but in the final analysis is it not possible for the further experience with its ever new self-givings to continue as it will? Contrary to each and every expectation, contrary to all the overwhelming preconvictions and probabilities? Can it not continue such that everything becomes a confused muddle, such that the entire perceptual world-order is destroyed, such that this world as the unity of experience is no longer even maintained, such that it becomes unstable for consciousness, such that all sense-data lose their apperceptive apprehensions, which themselves only actually grasp appearances in concordant believing? But we have held that there would be the world in itself, and every experiential belief would be valid in itself, would be in itself true and false.

If it is a matter of the future, for example, then it is decided, even where I lack a decision. To our mind, every belief directed toward the future has its truth or its falsity prefigured in advance, once and for all.

However, if we remain in the framework of pure consciousness and consider the immanent and transcendent given matters that are constituted within it in passivity, then as I said, what we have shown has not yet accounted for the clarification of the idea of that in-itself. Where the immanent given matters are concerned, and especially the sense-data, every Now brings with it new ones. But in spite of all aroused anticipations, it cannot be foreseen why it must necessarily be decided which data will occur in the future. And this also holds no differently where the transcendently constituted spatio-temporal world is concerned.

Perhaps some clarification is still required here. This world is given to us originally through external perceptions. Generally [107]
speaking, they cohere with one another in continual concordance, and they are likewise intertwined concordantly with self-giving rememberings that potentially span gaps like those of sleep. To be

sure, occasionally discordances do also occur. We speak of illusions, experiential belief being ruptured, passing over into doubt; but in the progression of experience, which never undergoes breaks in each and every respect, a thoroughgoing concordance is indeed restored through the changes in meaning and the crossings out just described; that is, running through our consciousness is a sustained unity of world-certainty that is produced again and again over against the disturbances. "The" one world is constantly there, only it is determined more closely and occasionally determined somewhat differently.

The first problem arises here, however: Must it then remain just as it was up to this point, according to the testimonies of our memory? Must an external experience be continually adjoined to another external experience in this way? Can it not be that an external experience is the last one, while consciousness endures? An external experience is assuredly a complex structure of consciousness that emerges in the nexus of consciousness as naturally motivated. Still, must the motivations proceed in such a way that a perception has to be connected up with another perception? We have kinaesthetic courses with which the appearances of things are connected in accordance with associative motivation: thus, certain exhibiting sense-data (in the case of the visual appearance, that is, visual data) along with their apprehensions. By motivation we mean that certain data and their protentional horizons are demanded as co-emerging along with the emergence of other data in our lived-experience. But such associative demands can be annulled in the course of present experiencing. The series of sensation must actually arrive in a certain way in order for the apprehension of a thing to be experienced according to the kinaesthetically aroused pre-demands, and in order for the consciousness of an existing thing to be maintained. If the sense-data were suddenly to begin appearing in a muddle, if our visual field were suddenly to be filled with a confused muddle of colors, the kinaesthetic motivations would [108] lose their force. What was formerly linked up to the kinaesthetic courses in an expectant manner would no longer be able to occur in the otherwise firmly regulated manner in anticipatory believing, and it would therefore be an end to the play of external

perceptions. Their emergence means precisely a regulated functioning and a continuous further development of cultivated motivations, and this essentially depends upon the actual course of sensations. Yet this is always conceivable as an entirely different course, and as a completely unregulated one. That it is not an unregulated course, but is such a course that makes a continual perceptual flow possible, that is simply a fact. However, if we inquire into the truth of this fact and more precisely, if we ask why what was previously so must still be or will be so, this truth will obviously not be such that it could be decided by recourse to one of those passive confirmations of which we were alone able to speak.

Secondly, even if we do presuppose the truth of this fact, and thus assume that for us, that for the particular experiencing pure ego, external experiences will continually be adjoined in its stream of consciousness and will also issue in concordance every time, this would only be to say that for this ego the unity of a true world will be continually maintained in ratifying judicative intendings. But this is not to say that this world, beyond our present experience of it, is a world determined in advance, determined in itself, such that the decision of true or false would be univocally prefigured for every believing that is directed toward any temporal situation, or for a corresponding believing that is produced hypothetically.

This is illustrated most simply by referring to the difference between the world-view of that part of humanity that is influenced by modern natural science, and alternately, the world-view of the rest of humanity. This world is constantly and self-evidently there for all human beings, and they believe that it will also continue to endure. In their conscious lives they live into a world-future. But by far most human beings do believe that what will come depends to a large extent upon accidents that cannot be ascertained, or that gods decide the world's course according to a momentary whim. Only roughly is there an order that can be foreseen, according to which one can be practically directed, but only roughly. A [109] conviction was indeed forged quite late in a causality that lawfully and absolutely determines each and every thing occurring in the world; and the sense of this conviction is none other than precisely

this: that each and every temporal being (and in the natural attitude this means all beings in the world) is determined in itself, determined as truths in themselves. From the very beginning, nothing is open in order to have to wait and see first how the Fates of destiny will decide.

Our question rested in this consideration, namely, whether we already attain definitiveness (in the mode of experiential ratification) should an intending into the future actually be ratified by experience. Here, then, the other, last mentioned difficulty comes into play, and in a way that is very touchy where external experience is concerned. Does not external experience evidently lead *eo ipso* into infinity? Each experience is still itself an open intention; it has dimensions that are unfulfilled. Must, indeed, can a synthetically progressing acquisition of knowledge come to an end?

<§24. Development of the Problem of the In-itself for the Immanent Sphere>[93]

Let us turn back to the immanent sphere. Let us directly pose the question with respect to immanence whether self-givenness here cannot be something that is entirely relative, that does not contain any definitive self at all or that does not have this definitive self supporting it as a persistent norm. Can it not be that every self-giving is to be rendered invalid through a conflict with other self-givings, and these again in conflict with others, and so on *in infinitum*? More explicitly, can it not be the case, when any kind of presentation is verified by a corresponding self-giving, that the latter is forthwith annulled through negation, whereby now what is presented would also be given as not actual; that then, however, the self-giving functioning as norm is also negated once again, and so the actual and the non-actual are always only something momentary, something belonging arbitrarily to the process of fulfillment? Or when we take any kind of presentation, is it decided in itself that corresponding to its meant being, to what

[93] Editor: See Appendix 8: <The Apodicticity of Remembering> pp. 451ff. Translator: See also Division 4.

is given in it in the mode of belief-certainty, is a definitive being of the self as true and as incapable of being crossed out for all time?

To be sure, at first we see that immanently constituted being in [110] its living present is not only self-giving as being, but that this being is essentially incapable of being crossed out. The moment we assert that it is not, like we can do at any time, we see that apodictically this assertion is annulled with respect to what is given. Here the indubitable, the indefeasible validity is clear. But what good is it, since its validity is only momentary? What is immanent flows-off and is gone. But where we speak of a true self and of a presentation that is verified definitively, there we reach beyond the momentary consciousness through rememberings in which we repeatedly come back to the same presentation and to its same meant object; and in which, on the other hand, we can repeatedly secure for ourselves and potentially do secure for ourselves the verified self as an identical self, and one that is not capable of being crossed out. Surely, we do have the momentary lived-experiencing (e.g., of an immanent sense-datum that we see in its present becoming) in a certainty that is not capable of being crossed out. But the being that we grasp there is only meant as being in itself when we not only take it as a momentary datum in the mode of the present, but also as the identical *dabile* that could be given in arbitrarily iterated rememberings—that is, when we take it as a temporal datum, for instance, as the tonal datum in its temporality, a temporality that is identically one as opposed to possible orientations like those that are given through variable rememberings.[94]

We see that the temporal form is the form of objects which, as objects, pretend to have their in-itself. All talk of objects thus leads back to remembering. Thus, this does not only hold for immanent objects. Even when we consider a noema, even when we consider that which is momentarily present as sense in the mode of the present and make an objective assertion about it, we

[94] I am not entirely satisfied with this. The object is surely constituted from the very beginning as something temporal, and the momentary phase is an abstraction that we must first construct. The incapability of being crossed out [*Undurchstreichbarkeit*] peculiar to the moment is thus not primary.

grasp it as such a [noema or present object] that can be presentified to us and identified in iterated memories, namely, with this reproductively presentified character, "momentary present." We learn from this consideration that the question [111] concerning how an objectlike formation, an objectlike formation in itself, is constituted, how it can show itself as such originally, leads overall and from the very start initially to the problem of the constitution of an in-itself of remembering, thus, to the question concerning how remembering can be justified and to what extent it can become a source for definitiveness. We must first of all become clear about it.

Indeed, seen more precisely, we are still lacking an intermediate term for a completely systematic exposition. The living present which is structured immanently is as we said not capable of being crossed out so long as it unfolds in constitution; doubt is not possible here. This also concerns, therefore, the span of the living retention proper to it. To make ourselves explicitly clear: Every progressing retention that continues to exist in a living fading-away cannot be modalized. But once again we must add that we still cannot identify an in-itself here. I can keep a hold on a sound fading away attentively, yes even hold onto it more tightly. Here is something of the most primitive activity. But it can also be the case that I am not even attentively aware of it, that I do not actively turn toward it and toward the series of sounds, and yet it exercises a special allure. By virtue of an associative awakening, it gets the character of an intention. In both cases, and in an entirely spontaneous[95] fashion this provocation (this affection) is possibly discharged in a remembering that not only arises in general, but arises as the fulfillment of the intention.

Note that this remembering is something essentially different from a retention, and is not for instance a mere reanimation of it in the sense of an increase in the level of clarity. A clear retention whose essence we grasp in the retentional levels lying most closely to the primordial impression always remains a retention. Every retention is what it is and has its intentional mode only at the place of the streaming perceiving at which it stands. But

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[95] *unwillkürlich*

remembering is a kind of re-perception, that is, it is not a perception to be sure, but a being constituted anew, a beginning anew with the primordial-Now, and a retentional fading-away, but precisely in the mode of reproduction. Thus, in remembering all retentional levels emerge "once again," reproductively modified. If such a remembering now occurs in connection with a retention harboring an allure that is just past, it necessarily occurs in a [112] coinciding of sense and in a coinciding of being with the retention. The same sound that has just sunk back and just faded away appears once more on the scene, and I live through its being once more. This can be repeated; I either deliberately or involuntarily reproduce the tone or an entire tonal phrase once more, even an entire melody. What happens here to the incapability of being crossed out peculiar to remembering? Is it to be rejected out of hand? Are we speaking in epistemology from time immemorial about the general possibility of deception in remembering? And does this not hold as well for the immanent sphere?

<§25. Rememberings as the Source for an In-Itself of Objects>[96]

We will obviously have to make distinctions here between close memories and distant memories, (1) between rememberings that are awakened through the retention that is still primordially living, still articulated in itself and found in constitutive flux, and (2) between rememberings that reach into the distant horizon of retention, like with those of an entire piece of music.

1) Rememberings as Arisen from the Awakening of Primordially Living Retention

Where the first are concerned we will say: For what has just past and is still sinking back, which remembering intuitively grasps once again, we have what is absolutely incapable of being crossed out—and we have this even if remembering is repeated,

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[96] Translator: See Appendix 9: Both Variations <of Modes of Givenness> pp. 474ff, and Appendix 10: <Possession of the Self and Concealment in Remembering: Reproduction and Retention> pp. 475ff.

whereby the second now creates its evidence from the first and no longer from the retention that has, in the meantime, completely faded away. In spite of all that, we certainly do not grasp the self and the identity of the self in such a repeated coinciding of the self without incompleteness and degrees of completeness. For we know indeed that remembering can essentially waver in its clarity, and can even be intermittent. The different moments of content are more or less veiled, as it were, as if by a fog of unclarity. And yet, [113] it is not one of those concealments in the usual sense, namely, of objects by other objects. The fog of unclarity does not blacken out objects, it is not a real[97] fog. And yet it does conceal, renders the self-giving incomplete. And yet, what is just past as past is absolutely secure, it is incapable of being crossed out, indubitable, and it is absolutely secure with respect to everything that is given from it according to quality, intensity, timbre. It is itself there passing through the fog of unclarity, in all relative unclarity, but just not in an entirely obvious manner, just not as realized ultimately. Accordingly, something is lacking with respect to this incapability of being crossed out. Essentially belonging to this situation is the necessary coinciding that forms identity, the coinciding of given matters throughout the alteration of different levels of clarity, and a certain enhancement in the direction toward an ultimate, most genuine self, the self that is completely evident in its appearance[98] but which is only an idea to be discerned intuitively, an ideal *limes*.

But what is peculiar here is that it does not first require something like approaching this ideal limit in order first of all to confirm a less clear reproduction. In this connection with the living present, it has its original justification in itself, continually. And "original justification" means that it contains a self that is inviolable, although it only stands in a gradation of degrees against a *limes* which in its very nature would alone completely exhibit the "self." The less clear remembering is less saturated, the clearer one is more saturated, it is a "more intensive" self-givenness, but if it is an intuitive remembering at all, it will give just one self and

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[97] Translator: reading *realer* for *reeller*.

[98] *das der vollen Augenscheinlichkeit*

not give any other self, or any of its moments.[99] However, empty remembering is not actually a remembering, but an awakening or an affective allure of a retentional sedimentation that is emerging as prominent from the immersion of memory.[100] In a certain sense there are also gradual differences of proximity and distance here.

One must say then that we still have another gradation, namely, [114] with respect to reproductions that reach into the outermost horizon of immersion, even with respect to those reproductions that draw near to it. Namely: Self-givennesses arise here that are indeed actual self-givennesses and are incontestable in this connection, while it is left gradually undetermined how far the actual self-givenness reaches, and what can yet actually be ascribed to it with respect to determinate moments.

2)[101] <*Rememberings of a Submerged Past of Consciousness*>

The systematic path leads then further to rememberings that do not have their retentional connection to the immediate realm of the present, but rather, that revive a distant, long submerged past of consciousness. We speak here of distant memories as opposed to close memories. Even here, for distant memories, I hold that every remembering has its original justification, and this means that we are to understand essentially that corresponding to every remembering, even to this group, is a necessary idea, the idea of a self that is incapable of being crossed out. My guiding thought here is the following: An intuitive distant memory, when it is not one that fleetingly flashes forth, but is a steady one and is

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[99] During the course of our lectures the following was added: The justification of close memory does not yield any elucidation of the possibility of the knowledge of an immanent object as being in itself. For we are still bound here to the chain of rememberings, rememberings which adhere to a living retention, which had a departure from it, and were carried by its self-giving evidence. Only when we have first justified the distant memory do we have the possibility of recognizing at any time an immanent temporal object as existing.

[100] *Gedächtnis*

Editor: See Appendix 9: Both Variations <of Modes of Givenness:> (1) of Proximity and Distance within Clarity, (2) of Obscurity as Veiledness, Nebulousness, and Appendix 10: <Possession of the Self and Concealment in Remembering: Reproduction and Retention>.

[101] Translator: Husserl's enumeration.

synthetically iterable and identifiable, has with respect to its objectlike formation essentially only one possible way of passing over into doubt and then turning out to be null, namely, as a confused muddle of rememberings. Thus, becoming discordant, inhibition, and annulment of the belief that is initially unbroken in the self-given past, necessarily leads to the phenomena of bifurcation in which the distant memory in question splits into several distant memories. And it does so in such a way that the unitary objectlike formation of an undivided memory is disclosed [115] as the fusion of single objects, single features and events that belong to the separated memories and are self-given there with partially different objectlike determinations. In the same way it could now happen that every one of the splintered memories lose their character of unbroken concordance, and undergo a crossing out by splitting into yet other memories that are in themselves concordant.

But on the one hand it is still the case that the content of every memory that is characterized as false is only false with respect to the unity of the combined whole, but it remains correct with respect to its parts. What is crossed out is always the whole that has arisen through a commingling, but the elements that issued in the commingling remain self-given, only they belong to different nexuses. On the other hand, however, this process of splitting cannot continue *in infinitum*; it is a muddling up of discrete matters, and thus it must come to an end. Indeed, it suffices that what appears in a memory, essentially, cannot as remembered be completely empty, that its self-giving cannot be an empty title, but rather that it has its source in actual self-givings such that we are necessarily referred back to the idea of a chain of pure self-givennesses that are no longer capable of being crossed out, but are only identifiable with respect to their content and repeatable in complete identity and concordance. Naturally, even here we have degrees of clarity for every portion of genuine self-givenness, and in this respect the idea of the most complete self-givenness as *limes*. Thus even this type of saturation <has> differences of evidence. In both relations we are certainly referred to the active ego and its free activity in which it is guided, precisely, by the experience that memory can turn out to be deceptive, and that, in

particular, clouds of unclarity can conceal the comminglings. Accordingly, the ego strives to check its memories thoroughly, to clarify them deliberately, to investigate the intentional nexuses with respect to memories' parts, to disclose the illusion by analyzing, and thus to advance to the true self.

But still necessary for our further understanding is the elucidation of the origins of error in passivity, and in particular of [116] error in its most original shape of commingling. This problem leads us to a radical portion of the analysis of passive consciousness, namely, as genetic analysis: to the phenomenology of association.

<DIVISION 3: ASSOCIATION> [117]

<Chapter 1. PRIMORDIAL PHENOMENA AND FORMS OF ORDER WITHIN PASSIVE SYNTHESIS>

<§26. The Position and the Delimitation of Themes Concerning a Phenomenological Doctrine of Association>[102]

The rubric "association" characterizes for us a form and a lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general; but it does not characterize, as it does for psychologists, a form of objective, psychophysical causality; it does not characterize a regulated manner in which the emergence of reproductions, of rememberings, is causally determined in human and animal psychic life. For we are working within the framework of the phenomenological reduction in which all objective reality and objective causality is "bracketed." What is there for us is not the world taken as reality with its psychophysical[103] beings and its causalities, but only the phenomena of them, thing-phenomena, human-phenomena, etc., in their intentionality. In this framework of pure consciousness, we find the streaming present of consciousness, we find constituted in every case a perceptual reality constituted as in the flesh. But pasts can also enter into present consciousness through remembering. Put more precisely, in the unity of a consciousness that is streaming in the present, we find concrete[104] perceptions with their retentional components, as well as concrete retentions—all of that

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[102] Editor: See Appendix 11: <The Concept of Associative Causality> pp. 477ff.

[103] *animalischen*

[104] Translator: See below footnote 120.

E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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in the flow of retention fading away into the distant horizon of retention. But in addition to this, emergent rememberings as well. [118] Between the noematic components of something present and something remembered we find a phenomenologically peculiar connective trait that can be expressed in the following way: Something present recalls something past. Likewise, a second remembering can occur while a remembering runs-off; the second remembering can occur along with the first one in a nexus that is characterized noematically by the fact that the first recalled event recalls the second recalled event. A perceptual consciousness, that is, a consciousness that is constituted originarily can accordingly be characterized as a consciousness that awakens, awakening a reproductive consciousness, and this consciousness can function as awakening in its turn as fetching a past of consciousness, as it were.

It follows from the exposition of our previous lectures that association is a possible theme of purely phenomenological research. For instance, there is still something that remains of the Modern, customary psychology of association after the phenomenological reduction; if one goes back to its immediate experiential material, the phenomenological reduction will initially yield a core of phenomenological facts that also remain within the pure inner attitude and that will shape the preliminary point of departure for further research. If we pursue this more deeply, we will realize that the path is cleared from here toward a universal theory of the genesis of a pure subjectivity, and in particular, initially in relation to its lower level of pure passivity. Phenomenological eidetic analyses of consciousness constituting a temporal objectlike formation already led to the beginnings of a lawful regularity of genesis prevailing in subjective life. We see very quickly that the phenomenology of association is, so to speak, a higher continuation of the doctrine of original time-constitution. Through association, the constitutive accomplishment is extended to all levels of apperception. That the specific intentions arise through it is already clear to us. Actually, Kant already saw that in phenomenological contexts, which we first come across in the natural departure from objective-psychological observations under the rubric of association, not mere accidental

facts, but rather, an absolutely necessary lawful regularity is manifest without which a subjectivity could not be. But his [119] brilliant doctrine of the transcendental necessity of association is not supported by a phenomenological eidetic analysis. It does not attempt to show what is actually at issue under the rubric of association with respect to elementary facts and essential laws, and thereby making comprehensible the genetic unitary structure of pure subjective life. On the other hand, I do not want to say that the development of phenomenology has already progressed so far that it would have neatly solved the genetic problems existing here. But it is far enough along to be able to specify these problems and to sketch the method for their solution.

A first group of pure phenomena and nexuses to which the traditional doctrine of association leads us concerns facts of actual and possible reproduction, or more clearly, of actual and possible rememberings. When we practice the phenomenological reduction, they are initially given as transcendental facts. Accordingly, this is still prior to eidetic, essential insight that would intuitively obtain essential necessity and essential laws. Right in the midst of these facts are the phenomena that interest us: the splitting of rememberings into rememberings. These rememberings have been muddled, as we say, such that the memorial images of separate pasts have blended to form a unity of an illusory image. This problem of the fusion of rememberings leads us a step further, then, to the problem concerning the extent to which mere phantasies lead back, through intentional analyses, to rememberings, that is, the extent to which they are products of the fusion of rememberings with respect to their intuitive content.

The doctrine of the genesis of reproductions and of their formations is the doctrine of association in the first and more genuine sense. But inseparably connected to this, or rather, grounded upon this is a higher level of association and doctrine of association, namely, a doctrine of the genesis of expectations, and closely related to it, the genesis of apperceptions to which belong the horizons of actual and possible expectations. All in all, it concerns the genesis of the phenomena of expectation, that is, of those specific intentions that are anticipatory. We could also call this association inductive association. For it is a matter here of the [120]

founding level proper to passivity, the founding level of all the active-logical processes that are treated under the rubric of inductive proofs.

Taking them in order, let us now first of all observe reproductive association, naturally, as a purely phenomenological occurrence. We can <call to mind> here the Aristotelian distinction between what is in itself first and what is for us first, namely, what is first from the standpoint of explanatory knowledge (knowledge that makes comprehensible). The associative facts and essential insights of the reproductive sphere that are accessible to us as first (for essential reasons and not accidentally) concern reproductively awakening intentional lived-experiences and awakened reproductions in which we are conscious or become conscious of objects as objects for themselves. It does not initially occur to us that this is something special; therefore, wherever we speak of a consciousness, of an intentional lived-experience, we think without further ado of a consciousness of something offering itself as something for itself, a consciousness of something prominent, existing in a singular manner.

But it is precisely the analysis of associative phenomena that draws our attention to the fact that consciousness must not necessarily be a consciousness of a single object for itself, and accordingly, we touch on a new problem here: how a consciousness of something particular and how a consciousness of explicit particulars becomes possible as a consciousness of a multiplicity and a consciousness of wholeness; namely, a comparative analysis also shows the opposing possibility of many [elements], indeed, a multiplicity being continually fused into a unity within one consciousness, *implicite*, such that consciousness is not a consciousness of a multiplicity, a consciousness that becomes aware of separated particulars in a unitary and yet separate manner. The following example can clarify roughly what that "*implicite*" should mean. A white square, which is in itself completely and homogeneously white without any specks and so forth, becomes prominent as a single square, and many like squares as a multiplicity of particular ones. But however much every square is given as a unity, and given as a unity that is

undifferentiated in itself, it is indeed our view that each one can be divided in a number of ways; to our mind each one is in itself a continuum of white whose phases are just not prominent for themselves. Naturally, that is not an arbitrary interpretation but [121] one that has a phenomenological basis.

Let us now set aside the problem of prominent particulars and their implicit multiplicities and only point to the fact that for the time being we can only catch sight of associations, and only of direct ones, by having particular objects given to us phenomenologically or by having in consciousness closely consolidated multiplicities forming unities for themselves or by having articulated wholes, in short, if we have unitary, prominent objectlike formations which, as such unities, recall other unities as past ones; naturally, recalling them as past for us. Remaining within the phenomenological reduction, the associative relation concerns exclusively the *given*[105] objects *as such* in their respective noematic mode, that is, correlatively it concerns the corresponding modes of consciousness. We are not saying that we see this "recalling something" everywhere, but only that we see it in certain cases, that is, that we have grasped it in originary prehension. For example, if winding down a path we catch sight of a cirque, we are reminded of another cirque, one that emerges reproductively. We can note that the reproduced one is not only altogether reproduced, and is not only an altogether reproduced, similar object, but that there exists a certain relation between them both beyond the mere relation of similarity. Something present recalls something reproductively presentified, which is to say, there is a tendency that is directed from the former to the latter and a tendency that is fulfilled by intuitive reproduction. It follows from this that we, as attentive egos, look from this to that by being referred from the one to the other; and we can also say: The one points to the other—even though there is still not an actual relation of indication by signs and designation. Further, the phenomenon gives itself as a genesis, with the one term as awakening, the other as awakened. The reproduction of the latter gives itself as aroused through the awakening.

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[105] *bewußten*

Within the purely phenomenological framework, then, there are further distinctions falling between immediate and mediate association, and we observe that both are always intertwined with one another. First, we frequently and easily observe that an *a* recalls a *b* and then this again recalls *c*, and thus that we are not immediately reminded of *c*, but rather, precisely on the way through *b*. But associations can also run their course without being noticed. Just as we fail to notice so many different things that are in our field of consciousness, so too, we fail to notice the connections of association. As usual, we also want to become aware here of our past consciousness and its content by looking back retrospectively, that is, in the manner of reflection. Our interest skims right over the terms when a certain and often very mediate final term especially appeals to us, and in this way, this final term dawns on us like a sudden thought for itself; while the entire associative nexus runs it course in consciousness, it is not noticed in any special manner. For instance, the thought of a magnificent seascape occurs to us during a talk. If we reflect upon how it came to us, we will find for instance that a turn of phrase immediately reminded us of something similar that was uttered during a conversation last summer at the sea. The beautiful image of the seascape, however, completely monopolized our interest. [122]

If we think of intuitive examples in this way, we will then find the similarity of something awakened with something that is immediately awakening as proper to immediate association, as proper to immediate awakening.

At any rate, we find that the awakening does not often lead to an intuitive memory, but instead to an empty presentation. This empty presentation is directed in a determinate manner and as such has a determinate (just not always efficacious) tendency to turn into a remembering, and then through immediate association, to turn necessarily into a memory of something that is similar. We notice, however, that this "something similar" does not remain isolated; in a certain way, the entire past-consciousness is co-awakened; it is from this that the particular thing, which is especially awakened and reproduced, becomes prominent. It is then that something else, another particular thing can still be preferred in a special way in the manner of awakening in the

framework of this entire past, and thereby be predestined to a possible intuitive reproduction. The memory of a painting by Titian transports me into the Uffuzzi Gallery; but only special traces from that present become especially awakened and appear: certain other paintings hanging there, or more prosaically, the image of the yawning museum attendant, etc.

Certainly, we can quickly skip over this entire past present insofar as the more effective awakening of this past goes back into another, deeper past, or following the outline of the future, pursues the incidents that followed there. [123]

These are of course familiar occurrences; we can all find them in ourselves and take note of them. That every memory is open to the question concerning how we arrived at it, a question that arises even in everyday discourse already shows that it concerns matters of fact that must have arisen in everyone's experience. For phenomenology, it forms a point of departure for a treatment and description in the reduction, and then above all, for the method of eidetic research, of research into essential necessities. Proceeding from examples we consider, for instance, whether immediate association as such is possible, is conceivable, if we were to give up the relation of similarity between what awakens and what is awakened, or again, whether the awakening of something through association, of something whose content is alien, is possible in a way that is different from the transmission occurring by means of an awakening through similarity.

One sees then that essential laws surely prevail here. Every awakening goes from an impressional present or a present that is already non-intuitively or intuitively reproduced toward another reproduced present. This relationship, or as we can say forthwith, this synthesis presupposes a "bridging term," something similar; from here the bridge arches across as a special synthesis by means of similarity. Transmitted in this way, a present enters into a universal synthesis with another past present, correlatively a full consciousness of the present enters into a universal synthesis with another submerged consciousness of the present, a synthesis which serves as the framework for special syntheses of awakening and for special reproductions.

This gives us a rough and ready beginning; and now it is a question of first making comprehensible in a more precise manner how certain awakenings come about, namely, how a similarity among a variety of similarities becomes privileged to build a bridge, and how each present can ultimately enter into a relation with all pasts, how—extending beyond the living retention—it can enter into a relation with the entire realm of things forgotten. It is obvious that only through this can we completely solve the problem concerning how the pure ego is able to become conscious of the fact that it has behind itself an endless field of past lived-experiences as its own, a unity of past life in the form of time, as a [124] life that is in principle everywhere accessible to it through rememberings, or, what amounts to the same thing, is capable of being reawakened in the core of its being.

But could subjectivity in truth have its own past, could we speak meaningfully of this "having" if in principle every possibility of remembering were lacking, and further, if the genetic conditions of this possibility (the conditions of possible awakening) that are to be disclosed through essential insight remain unfulfilled? We realize, then, that it really concerns nothing else than clarifying the fundamental problem, the basic, essential conditions of the possibility of a subjectivity itself. What must belong to it so that a subjectivity can have the essential sense without which it could not be subjectivity, [namely,] the sense of an existing[106] subjectivity being for itself, and precisely thereby of a subjectivity constituting itself as being for itself? Certainly, a complete phenomenology of reproductive awakening concerns and exhausts this problem only with respect to the one side, namely, with respect to the constitution of one's own past, or rather, the constitution of the self-having-been in endless immanent time. But we will see that the supplementary part, the other half of the problem, is the realm of the phenomenology of inductive, anticipatory association. Here we will make clear the essential conditions of the possibility of a subjectivity that can know itself as identically one, having its inherent endless future life. Can know: through the possibility that is demanded here of a

[106] *seienden*

verification that is not to be grounded initially by the self-giving of something futural in the future current life, but rather through a novel verification [that takes place] constantly in the determination of anticipations that are to be made possible and that are already being prefigured in an indubitable manner in the particular present.

The problems that we have formulated are not entirely new to us; they are only new formulations of the problem of validity-in-itself that had set this entire Division of lectures in motion.

<§27. The Presuppositions of Associative Synthesis. The Syntheses of Original Time-Consciousness>[107] [125]

Let us now turn back to association, and let us consider how this new field is to be taken into a deep mining phenomenological investigation, and naturally into a systematic investigation that begins with what is elementary, which every association presupposes. We do not need to seek the very first beginning. Clearly, what is presupposed is the synthesis that is continually accomplished in original time-consciousness. In the concretely full, streaming living present[108] we have present, past, and future already united in a certain mode of givenness. But this manner in which subjectivity becomes conscious of its past and future life along with its inherent intentional contents is an incomplete one. The aforementioned manner would be meaningless for the ego if there were no awakening, for the retentions are empty and even sink into the undifferentiated retentional background. Our consciousness of the protentional future is especially empty. On the other hand, there would be no progress without this beginning. In the ABCs of the constitution of all objectivity given to consciousness and of subjectivity as existing for itself, here is the "A." It consists, as we might say, in a universal, formal

[107] Editor: See §29 and Appendix 12: <Note on the Fundamental Founding of the Doctrine of Original Time-Consciousness> p. 479, Appendix 13: <Primordial Present and Retentions> p. 479ff., Appendix 14: <The Accomplishment of the Association of Simultaneity> p. 482ff., and Appendix 15: <Unitary Consciousness and Its Correlate: the Identical Objects> pp. 486ff.

[108] *Lebensgegenwart*

framework, in a synthetically constituted form in which all other possible syntheses must participate.

Still many other types of syntheses are transcendental in the special sense, as apodictically necessary for the genesis of a subjectivity (which is indeed only conceivable in genesis). As we said, these syntheses run their course together with the synthesis constituting the temporal form of all objects, and thus must co-relate to the temporal content, the temporally formed content of the object. In his nearly overwhelming genius (overwhelming precisely because he did not have at his disposal the phenomenological problematic and method), Kant has already sketched out an initial system of transcendental syntheses in the transcendental deduction [126] of the first edition of the *Critique*. But unfortunately, he only had in mind there the higher lying problem of the constitution of a spatio-worldly object[109], of an object that transcends consciousness. Thus, his question is only this: What kinds of syntheses must be carried out subjectively in order for things of nature to be able to appear, and thus a nature in general. But lying deeper and essentially preceding this is the problem of the inner, the purely immanent objectlike formation and the constitution, as it were, of the inner-world, that is, precisely the constitution of the subject's stream of lived-experience as being for itself, as the field of all being proper to it as its very own. Since the spatial world is constituted through consciousness, since it can only be there for us as existing and can only be conceived at all by virtue of certain syntheses carried out in immanence, it is clear that the constitutive problems of the world presuppose the doctrine of the necessary, most general structures and the synthetic shapes of immanence that are possible in general. Hence, we are to seek here in immanence what are in principle the most general syntheses, especially, as we said, the syntheses concerning content that extend beyond the transcendental synthesis of time, and which as such, according to their general character, are discernible as transcendentally necessary. Our task, therefore, will be to seek precisely these syntheses.[110]

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[109] *Gegenständlichkeit*

[110] Editor: See Appendix 15: <Unitary Consciousness and its Correlate: the Identical Object>.

It is extremely important to note that under the rubric of time-constituting syntheses, we consider not only the syntheses of the temporal object's retention and protention that belong on the whole and for itself to some kind of temporal object, but also that the concrete, full living present is a unity arising from a synthesis encompassing it. And further that in the continuous process of streaming from living-moment to living-moment, a synthesis, particularly a higher level synthesis is carried out once more. What is constituted universally through these syntheses is known under the rubric of coexistence and succession of all immanent objects in relation to one another. In every living-moment various kinds of temporal objectlike formations are constituted, each one has a momentary Now together with the momentary horizon of retentional having-been and the momentary protentional horizon. [127] This momentary structure is continually in the process of streaming and is synthetically united, precisely thereby constituting this temporal object as identical with itself, e.g., a lasting sound. But still other objects can be constituted in the same concretion[111] of life, now and again in the same living-moment and in its continuous process of streaming; each object can be constituted through a parallel constitutive structure, for example, another sound, a color, etc. Simultaneity is necessarily constituted here; the temporality of one such datum would not be constituted for itself and yet have nothing to do with the temporality of another. A single Now is constituted that brings the Now of the one datum into a unity of identity with the Now of the other. And likewise, the entire formal structure of the subjective temporal modes for both data, and thus for all data constituted from the same Now, is in a coinciding that forms identity—the diverse primordial impressions are connected to a primordial impression, inseparably; a primordial impression streams as one such that all special impressions must run off at an absolutely identical pace. This provides for the fact that there are not many times corresponding to many objects; rather, the proposition goes: There is only one time in which all temporal courses of objects run their course.

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[111] Translator: See footnote 120.

Accordingly, corresponding to every Now is a universal synthesis. Through this synthesis, a universal concrete present is constituted, a present into which all particulars that are set off from one another are integrated. Further, the fact that the Now streams in and through temporal orientations implies at the same time another universal synthesis in constituting life whereby we are conscious of the presents coursing as a sequential unity. What is given to consciousness originally as existing simultaneously and sequentially is thus constituted from an originally synthetic unity as existing simultaneously and successively.

This is the most general and the most primary synthesis that necessarily connects all particular objects of which we become conscious originally in passivity as being, no matter what their content may be and however else they may be constituted as unitary objects with respect to content. We had directed our attention to what necessarily gives temporal unity to all distinguished and distinguishable objects: being with-one-another.[112] But naturally, the synthesis of time-consciousness also contains (and already as a presupposition for possible coexistences [128] and succession) that synthesis in which one object is constituted as identically one or (what amounts to the same thing) as enduringly one in streaming manifolds.

If, now, time-consciousness is the primordial place of the constitution of the unity of identity or of an objectlike formation, and then of the forms of connection of coexistence and succession of all objectlike formations being given to consciousness, then we are still only talking about that consciousness which produces a general form. Mere form is admittedly an abstraction, and thus from the very beginning the analysis of the intentionality of time-consciousness and its accomplishment is an analysis that works on [the level of] abstractions. It grasps, it is only interested in the necessary temporal form of all singular objects and pluralities of objects, or rather, correlatively it is only interested in the form of manifolds that constitute the temporal object. An object is something enduring, as constituted this way and that in consciousness. But it is something enduring with respect to its

[112] *miteinander*

content, and that this is the case, that it has this content for this object, that content for that object, all this is constituted in consciousness itself, or otherwise we would not even be conscious of it. The extent to which several objects are differentiated with respect to content, or the extent to which an object is divided or divisible with respect to content, is the extent to which we have (or rather, the extent to which there emerge for us) particular objects that are with one another in relationships of coexistence and succession. But what gives unity to the particular object with respect to content, what makes up the differences between each of them with respect to content (and specifically for consciousness and from its own constitutive accomplishment), what makes division possible and the relation between parts in consciousness, and so forth—the analysis of time alone cannot tell us, for it abstracts precisely from content. Thus, it does not give us any idea of the necessary synthetic structures of the streaming present and of the unitary stream of the presents—which in some way concerns the particularity of content.

<§28. Syntheses of Homogeneity in the Unity of a Streaming Present>[113]

Let us remain in the continual synthetic unity of a streaming present; let us initially not draw upon any of the functions of [129] remembering that we should only take into account later regarding their genesis and new accomplishment, and let us make just as little use of the functions of bringing the future to intuition,[114] the expectations that spring ahead beyond continual protention. We even leave out of play all types of phantasy, all types of conceptual acts, valuing and willing activities, without prejudicing the case concerning their indispensability or dispensability for subjectivity. We presuppose that objects are constituted, immanent objects already prominent, singularities or unitarily closed groups

[113] Editor: See Appendix 16: <On the Connection of Similarity> pp. 491ff., Appendix 17: <Sensible Connection of Similarity. Sensible Uniformity and Eidos> pp. 495ff., Appendix 18: <Association and Synthesis> pp. 505ff., and Appendix 19: On the Phenomenology of Association> pp. 512ff.

[114] *Vorveranschaulichung*

or wholes, as articulated in explicit parts. Standing as we are here before the questions concerning association we must obviously forge a beginning with this in order to set our eyes on new primordial syntheses. But we can only set our eyes on something, grasp something directly where we have something prominent for itself.

The most general connections of prominent objects that are determined with respect to content are obviously similarity or uniformity and non-similarity; or let us say more concisely: connections of homogeneity and connections of heterogeneity. Connection as constituted by consciousness is an accomplishment of syntheses of consciousness, and here we encounter something new, consciousness' synthesis of homogeneity. Where real objects are concerned, there are surely good reasons for contending that mere similarity does not create any kind of connection, any real connection between them. That two people are similar to one another, for example, with respect to their noses, does not produce any real bond between them. However, we are speaking about immanent data, for example, about concrete color-data in the unity of a streaming present, thus, that are given to consciousness in immanent coexistence under some longer constituting duration. But these necessarily have a unity through consciousness, a unity of kinship, as similar to one another or uniform with one another: Several discrete color-data in the visual field are grouped together; they are especially united by virtue of their similarity; [and they are united in] different ways as well. This kinship has its degrees and according to them it unites them now more strongly, now more weakly. The most complete kinship or similarity is uniformity, that is, it makes the strongest connection of homogeneity. What is given there as coexistent in one [130] consciousness with regard to the particulars that are uniform does not remain for itself indifferent to the other ones; rather, it is united into a special group that is now a multiplicity as unity; in the broadest sense of the word it is already a whole that has bound the particulars together purely through kinship. But similarity accomplishes the same thing, only to a lesser degree, remaining behind uniformity.

Let us regard statically the coexistence of two or more objects that are related with respect to content; although their unity through homogeneity already emerges in this case, and although the differences in the intimacy of this connection emerges if we regard a variety of such cases together, the deeper characteristic among the combinations will be disclosed in a kinetic regard, as it were, in a comparative transition from one component of the relation to the other. The new uniform characteristic is given in such a transition as a "repetition" of the same thing. This is not so with something that is merely similar, though in a certain respect a sameness does come to the fore in the relation of similarity. When we compare the components of the relation, we find that a kind of overlapping of one consciousness over the other takes place; in spite of the modification that it undergoes, the one consciousness is preserved through the transition as a consciousness of the same first object and coincides with the second consciousness, with the consciousness of the second object, and in the case of uniformity, are congruent. That is to say, in spite of the consciousness of duality that is maintained, an identity-consciousness results, the consciousness of a same content, a same what-content. The repeated uniform characteristic is completely the same with respect to content, completely congruent. In comparing matters with similar characteristics we find two things that stand out, (i) the synthetic coinciding in a commonality, that is, in a sameness, and yet (ii) the synthetic conflict of particular matters of this commonality that repress one another reciprocally in the process of overlapping. Repressing means that the one conceals the other, that the concealed element tends toward unconcealment, then breaking through conceals the previously unconcealed element, etc. Thus, when a red square overlaps with a blue one. Visually there is similarity, but there is not uniformity. Red and blue clash.

We can also observe this: Where there has been a coinciding through overlapping, the coinciding without conflict (the coinciding of uniformity) does not yield at that moment anything more of duality, of splitting in two with respect to content. A [131] fusion with respect to content is carried out in the synthesis of the two respective consciousnesses, specifically, the fusion forming a singularity of community with regard to content. But while there

is also something of fusion here in the overlapping of similarity, there is not a pure fusion and formation of unity; rather, there is unity as presupposition, as the ground of a concealment, and thereby of repression and eruption. Accordingly, we will say: What is present statically as the uniform connection of discrete contents (or as the merely similar connection of discrete contents) is itself already a mode of the two respective syntheses as coinciding. It is coinciding *par distance*. And obviously, an affective tendency simultaneously belongs to it; for something that is prominent for itself functions affectively. And a connection of something prominent stemming from homogeneity exercises a unitary and augmented affective force or tendency upon the ego, whether it gives into it or not; and this affection relaxes, becomes fulfilled in a turning toward, which when completely at work simultaneously produces the kinetic form of a transition from one term to another and the kinetic form of an overlapping, thus producing the results we described. All of this takes place, however, prior to the occurrences of the higher lying activities of cognitively fixing the common element as something concretely general or as a generic generality proper to a higher level.

What we have expounded upon also holds where successions of discrete objects have been constituted in the unity of the streaming living present, and in particular, as successions of uniform or similar objects or processes. Thus, pure sounds follow one another, and among them for instance a series of repetitions of uniform sounds, where we say that it is "the same sound" being repeated.

When[115] we use overlapping as a way of disclosing what is present in the phenomena of uniformity and similarity of discrete data, we see, as the previous lecture showed, that a fusion in distance is at work in every synthesis through homogeneity; in the case of mere similarity this fusion is inhibited by a distinguishing, a contrasting. If we employ the same method of disclosure, we notice further that these types of connections through homogeneity can be connected differently by bridging terms, thus forming different groups of homogeneity that have the single terms in common. For [132] example, a red triangle is in a unity with other differently colored

[115] Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

triangles, and if we pass through them and compare them explicitly in pairs, this will mean that they are similar to one another as triangles, indeed, they will be completely uniform. The same red triangle, however, can form a uniform group with other figures that are not uniform but that are all red—uniformity with respect to red, difference or (what amounts to the same thing) similarity merely varying with respect to figure. For ultimately, all figures are similar on the one hand, all colors are similar on the other. Thus, formally speaking, we distinguish "the uniform element with respect to *a*" from "the uniform element with respect to *b*," and likewise for everything similar. We notice that already prior to making a comparison, but by virtue of such intertwining syntheses of homogeneity, red distinguishes itself from figure, that the two respective moments in the red triangle come into relief as moments and therefore exercise an affective force for itself.

Let us look more closely at this situation by simplifying our examples. Within a streaming present, the distant affinity of the red triangle with another red triangle grounds fusion, a kindred unification forming a pair. The fusion or unification of the same triangle with another triangle yields a pair again: Both pairs are now linked by a binding term, namely, by a term of identity. We realize in this case that each respective pair has also moved into a relation of homogeneity. And in fact, speaking in an entirely general manner: Even groups of similarity, even homogeneous pairs as groups become united purely through homogeneity. Two coexistent pairs that are paired by being red coincide as pairs; they form a pair of pairs such that at the same time the corresponding terms coincide in a red-congruity. If, instead, we take pairs that have one term that is not uniform, more precisely, pairs that have one term that is similar in distance, there will be a less integral unity of pairs produced between the pairs as such. They are not completely unified as pairs; they do in fact form a pair of pairs, and the terms that correspond to one another by being paired as red for themselves are, for example, more intimately connected with each other; but because there is a difference with respect to the other terms, both pairs diverge as if each one were going its own way. Now, if we allow the one term to become identical as before, we will then have two relationships diverging from it that [133]

will nevertheless still have something of a materially relevant community, but in relief. Precisely by this, moments come into relief through the bridging term, namely, as different moments, as moments grounding the two similarities. Obviously, here lies the beginning of the internal particularization and division within passivity, and thus the presupposition for explicating the internal features and parts within activity, and ultimately within judicative activity.

New relationships, i.e., forms of unity also come to the fore here in the framework of homogeneity—the relationships of the object and of the inner, dependent feature, and of the object as a whole and as a part in the special sense of a part that is possible for itself. Certainly, they only come to the fore in the strict sense through active explication and a corresponding identification; but it becomes clear that the syntheses in question are being prepared in passivity already in the lower level. An example of the process of being divided into parts within passivity would be, for instance, a unified succession of a short tone and a long lasting tone. Here a sustained piece of the longer lasting tone, which does not really come into relief that sharply, is already distinguished from the rest through coinciding.

Other special syntheses arising from homogeneity that have just as much fundamental importance concern the gradations of similarity leading up to uniformity, according to which the pairings and connections of groups are themselves fused more or less intimately, more tightly or more loosely. Namely, the stronger similarity among terms also determines the intimacy with which the pairs themselves are fused together into a unity, into the unity of a group and into the unity of a group of groups.

<§29. Primordial Forms of Order. Supplementing the Previous: The Phenomenon of Contrast>[116]

Here, however, we encounter the problem of the unity of order and other fundamental problems in connection with this, the

[116] Editor: See Appendix 19: <On the Phenomenology of Association>.

problem of continuity as continuous order in undivided fusion. What are the primordial phenomena here? [134]

Up until now we had presupposed, as primordial phenomena, the unity of a prominent object, the multiplicities of prominent objects as the mere multiplicities of coexistence and succession, but then also multiplicities as connected multiplicities with respect to content, that is, connected through homogeneity. Now, what characterizes the order that is obviously a phenomenon in the sphere of homogeneity, and the disorder opposing it? One primordial phenomenon is the disorder, for instance, in the form of a bunch of spots in a visual field that is otherwise uniform. As uniform spots, they can also be thought of as an order in the visual field; we may be able to give them an order *idealiter*, or we may be able to parcel them out in any ordered manner, so that we would see order and then would have order given as a phenomenon of passivity. Thus, even this is initially a primordial phenomenon.

Primordial phenomena especially include the phenomenon of uniformity and the phenomenon of a series of gradation: [in the first instance] a unity of similarities, of sheer color-data, namely, in coexistence, but [in the second] a graduating from red to blue as the unity of an ordered sequence. Or a series of triangles as an order of size consistently getting larger. We can take as a parallel primordial phenomenon, however, a temporal ordering of just such data that follow one another and are unified according to an order through similarity, through uniformity, or through a gradation according to color or according to the size of the shape. On both sides we can describe the concrete unity of order as already being at hand: Proper to it is not merely a general formation of a pair through similarity, but a special similarity that we call here gradation. Then the connection of pairs with one another such that the graduated term, the final term of a pair, is the beginning term of the next pair, the term as a point of departure for a new gradation, etc. Let us note that coinciding in a gradation still has a special intimacy, even though it is not a uniformity. The lesser one is not simply repeated in that which is graduated, and yet it is the same, but still more than that. Obviously, a special binding force in the ascending concatenation, however, is inherent

in the increase, in the gradation; for every pair of data that is relatively graduated is itself again an increased gradation in contrast to a previous pair of data that is relatively decreased. Just as a single graduated pair more strongly exercises an affection than just any similar pair, so too is a concatenation of graduated pairs, in the unity of a gradation that is being augmented in the repetition, a stronger affective unity than a different unity of similar pairs. [135]

Indeed, now the question arises: What brings about the concatenation, the process of joining together? How do concatenations (as opposed to mere collections) come about in mere passivity, as opposed to mere collections in which everything forms a bond with everything else, singularities and connections, in a disordered manner?

We are led here above all to the primordial phenomenon of succession, that is, to a primordially ordering accomplished by time-constituting consciousness. What is already prominently accentuated in it going from one present to the next and is constituted in the train of presents as a lasting unity of identity is linked together temporally; that is to say, the temporal relations are from the very beginning and by essential necessity linked together in being constituted. If we pay attention purely to the formal aspect of time, we can even discern here relationships of gradation that are built up as the most original relationship within necessary concatenation. All temporal relations among temporal objectlike formations are constituted in subjective modes of orientation, and thus there is, in consciousness, the concatenation of past element with what is more past, then with what is still more past, but whereby a unity of identification runs clean through the flux of this relativity, a unity that constantly produces a concatenation of order between the identical, successive data themselves. Now, if this primordial order has produced a necessary concatenation between data, however they are determined with respect to content, then the gradations determined with respect to content can now link up as such in a temporal sequence and thus form unitary series of consistent gradation. Likewise unitary series can also arise with pure uniformity and similarity with respect to content. We should recognize that the

source of succession must give the series a higher force than they would possess if they were not to operate from this source. For succession introduces a new moment, to be sure, a necessary moment of uniformity; it introduces the uniformity of the sequence as sequence, and if they are enduring uniformly, then possibly in addition to this, it introduces the duration of single data of sequence as a uniform duration.

But what happens now in the coexistence that is still not ordered in itself by the order of succession? Let us consider the visual field and the special data that occur in it. They have a unity [136] of homogeneity, but that is not yet order. Nevertheless, there are orders here, and as in time, independent from the content that is ordered there. In the visual field, taken in a purely immanent manner, there are possible series that, admittedly, we can characterize in language only by borrowing from the language of the perceptions of [transcendent] objects. Thus, an order of coexistence of random specks of color or sharply delimited figures in the order of right-left and in the order of above-below, or in a certain path going right and then up, etc. [This holds] likewise in any other possible direction of being ordered.

We realize that within the visual field there are multifarious orders that are related to one another, relations that are not clearly understood prior to analysis. We see that there is also a field of ordered loci here that prefigure concatenation in coexistence just like there is an original field of order with varying temporal loci that prefigures the field of succession. Even here form and content are distinguished in a new way: [a] the form of positional[117] order, and [b] as content, the thing ordered (as we will see) what stands at this or that visual locality[118] occupying it.

But surely there is a great difference here: Succession is a singular, a "linear" concatenation that is always uniform. In the visual field, however, we do not always have all data in a concatenation, in an identical linear order; rather, various series of concatenation can be formed, and these various series of concatenation can be formed simultaneously, originally, such that

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[117] *örtliche*
[118] *Lokalität*

many lines are contained within the field as systems of local positions; they appear filled out, now with this content of the object, and another time with a different content of the object, making order possible for it in advance, and all of these linear local systems go together to form this one field-form, just as a detailed analysis teaches us. Nevertheless, similar to the form of succession, we have a prefigured form of order and in it, now these and now those contents as ordered, forming a unity.

But a problem immediately arises here: Insofar as every order necessarily becomes an allure to progress through local laws of order if the order comes into relief as a unity through a special affinity with respect to content, do not the local lines of order that are distinguished in experience bring along their layers of temporal apperception? But progressing through it also [137] immediately fashions a temporal order which, however, can also be freely carried out in an inverse order by identifying the ordered data.

What holds for the visual field holds for the tactile field—for all authentic fields as such that are unities of locality. Not for the auditory field; it is not an authentic field. For here we lack every possibility of ordering the coexistent.

Let us now pass over at once to new primordial phenomena, still keeping with phenomena of unique syntheses. We had considered similarity, uniformity, and gradation, connection through uniformity and connection through gradation but we had only done this in a rough manner. We also encountered sequences and naturally the intertwining of sequences as well which form an encompassing sequence, and likewise the intertwining of orders of coexistence. All of that for *prominent* data.

But if we consider one such datum, then features can become prominent within the datum itself, and among these features, the feature of inner evenness, like an evenly colored white square, and again the feature of an inner non-evenness, of an inner self-dissociation of indeterminate specks, which pass over into one another and flow into one another in an undifferentiated manner. Or also, and especially striking, a continuous process of gradation and thereby flowing, continually in the process of gradation, for instance, in the sense of something becoming-redder-and-redder,

or in the sense of a colorful ribbon whose colors lead into one another as in a prism. This problem immediately comes to the fore, namely, of relating these and similar occurrences of inner continuity (each one of which initially makes up an undifferentiated global character of a content) back to the phenomena of discrete matters that are prominent.

How far have we come in our previous lecture?[119] Let's take a look back for a moment. In order to sketch a natural way toward a phenomenology of genesis and, in passivity, toward a phenomenology of association, we considered the structure of a living immanent present which is itself indeed the most universal genetic phenomenon. We find in every such present essentially a hyletic core; a unified multiplicity of sensible data (visual data, [138] sound data, etc.)—unified in the most loose manner—is essentially and constantly constituted in simultaneity and living succession. In this respect, we take impressional consciousness to reach as far as the retention that is still living reaches. Multiple data that are prominent for themselves must emerge in wakeful conscious life; we have now described what gives unity to such sensibly impressional data in the living present, to all data as a whole, and to singular groups, and to entire sense-fields for themselves. We found special unifications arising from homogeneity within the all-encompassing forms of coexistence and succession. Everything in a present that is prominent and at the same time homogeneous is connected. Accordingly, every sense-field is a unitary field for itself: Everything visual is connected through visual homogeneity, everything tactile through tactile homogeneity, everything acoustic through acoustic homogeneity, etc. We speak of unitary sense-fields in the broadest sense. They are heterogeneous, and accordingly are only united by the temporality of the living present. In addition to this formal unicity, every field has in itself a materially relevant unanimity, a unanimity with respect to content, which is precisely the unanimity of homogeneity with respect to content.

If we consider a field for itself and disregard the general homogeneity, we will have special connections arising from

[119] Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

homogeneity, especially multiplicities that become prominent in a unity, like a group of red figures and a group of blue figures. The greater the "similarity," the homogeneity, the narrower is such a unity of groups, the more it is a unity of prominence.

I still have to add an important supplement here, for I had unfortunately forgotten the other day to discuss beforehand the phenomenon of contrast as a primordial phenomenon. Everything that is in relief for itself within a field comes into relief from something precisely in this field. This yields a specific, fundamental concept of differentiation. We could also contrapose concretion and discretion, whereby we now understand concretion in a more or less literal sense.[120] Uniform things and things that are very similar grow together as it were. Here, things that are very similar are so similar that they do not break apart in the separating conflict that creates distance when coinciding occurs, but rather blend, even if not purely.

We still have another especially useful expression for the relationship involving the unity of a prominent datum and that datum from which it is set in relief: contrast; but it is not used only [139] for extreme cases, like the contrast between a loud bang and a soft background noise or tonal background. Both concrete fusion and contrast belong to a homogeneous multiplicity of groups: Each term of the multiplicity is a term for itself through contrast, but they are not opposed to each other; indeed, they are especially united with one another by a fusion without contrast, for example, red specks on a white ground. Alternately, inherent in every contrast that remains a phenomenon of homogeneity, there is

[120] Translator: The German term "*Konkretion*," like the English term, "*concretion*" comes from the Latin "*concretus*," meaning, growing together. It derives its meaning from the roots, *crescere* "to grow" and *con* "with or together." In this case, what is abstract is not what is less specific or less particular, but what is not joined together, not connected. In fact, Husserl uses the German term, "*Konkreszenz*," in place of "*Konkretion*" on occasion and in order to emphasize this "more or less literal sense" of *Konkretion*. Although I will render *Konkretion* as "concretion," and will use the English term "concrete" for *konkret*, one should not forget its resonance with its root sense as "concrescence" and "concrescent." To maintain this connection, moreover, I translate the German term "*Diskretion*" as "discretion" and its cognates as "discrete." Likewise, these terms have the sense of not being joined together, not being connected, and hence are to be understood as "discrescent."

something of fusion, there is something that unites the concrete data homogeneously and at the same time disturbs concretion by rupturing its continuity. To be sure, in order to understand this we already need the more detailed expositions of the previous lecture. In any case, any deeper clarification presupposes a clarification of primordial phenomena: prominence under contrast, on the other hand, fusion, concretion of prominent data in similarity without distance. Since data that are prominent for themselves become united in a discontinuous fashion, fusion here is a fusion at-a-distance; we will soon get to know fusion at-close-proximity.

We then turned to the forms of order of prominent data and of multiplicity of data, and we distinguished the universal order of succession from the special forms of coexistence proper to particular sense-fields, if not to all fields. The universal form of coexistence that is accomplished by time-constitution itself is not a form of order. For that we need special forms such as visual locality or the local order of tactile data proper to the tactile field.

The universality of successive forms of order means that all coexistences together form a single order of succession in every living, streaming field of present. If we take any sense-field, that is, a field of coexistent homogeneity, then its stock of data will be a stock of concretely existing data: concrete, not only with respect to momentary coexistence, which cannot be anything for itself, but rather also with respect to succession. Something constituted as an existing datum and as prominent for itself is constituted as enduring, possibly beginning now, lasting awhile, and ceasing. Before any closer analysis, we discern here the distinction pertaining to primordial phenomena, the distinction between the longer or shorter duration of such a temporal datum that is [140] concretely self-contained, just like the phenomenon of something being in a shorter or longer "state" of duration, enduring, becoming. Likewise within becoming as a primordial phenomenon, we can distinguish something that has already become in the shape of invariability from something that has become in the shape of variability. Everything that has already become, in one mode or another, has its firm place of order in the universal form of succession. This is a form of unity, namely, a form of order into whose movement everything that is still in the

process of becoming is simultaneously integrated insofar as it has become. Distinguished from the concrete groups that have formed a special unity in each coexistence are the groups as concretions of succession that are being formed in a special intertwining in succession, (e.g., a configuration of black colored specks in the visual field, on the other hand, a sequence of light signals or a sequence of sounds). Both groups as concretions will simultaneously prevail here because this or that particular datum within one field will begin anew and something else will cease, thus belonging within the living past and to its materially relevant fusions. In both of these inseparable relations, concretion is only possible as fusion in the form of order, that is, as the fusion of something that is ordered temporally.

We already know (and a closer analysis will immediately show), that this order of all discrete matters is in itself a continual one which, in its continuity, runs through everything that is prominent for itself as a unity. In other words, every prominent datum is not merely juxtaposed with other data in the living relations of succession. Rather, it has in itself an inner synthetic structure and in particular is in itself a continuity of sequence. This inner continuity is the foundation of a continual fusion with respect to content, fusion at-close-proximity. The duration of a content, of a color in the visual field, of a sound in the acoustic field—whether they are data giving themselves now as unvaried or as variable—does not have the character of an unanalysable quality; rather, as a phenomenological analysis immediately shows, it has the feature of continuing, of stretching from phase to phase; in what has become, it is the finished temporal extension, expansion. In the living process of temporal ex-tension, the contents that are extended in it normally fluctuate; delimited partial domains come into relief more or less sharply; but [141] whatever becomes prominent in it is necessarily seen in the form of an internal succession, conveyed by a flowing that is unexplicated and undifferentiated.

Now, we easily see that in this inner continuity of the temporal extension of a temporally extended content, the material content is not there in a juxtaposed manner, but rather, that the materially relevant unity is only conceivable as continually ordered, as

temporally extended. A concrete unity, the unity of an immanent datum, is only conceivable as the continuity of content in and by virtue of the continuity of an extension as the continuity of a duration. I said, "in and by virtue of." For it also becomes clear that what provides the material content precisely with a materially relevant, inner continuity and thus unity, is in the first place rooted in the most original continuity of temporal extension. All continuity with respect to content (e.g., the continuity with respect to the content of a sound from a violin) is the unity of a continual fusion passing from phase to phase; but the content can only meld together continually in the continual process of becoming in the order of time. Even what we call a continuous graduation according to quality or intensity in coexistence, e.g., in the visual field, is only imaginable as a steady continuity of similarity in temporal continuity. Only in temporal continuity is there an intimately inherent unity in which two things that are similar to one another can become a "real" datum, a datum existing for itself.

But certainly, other essential laws hold here. We must not think that temporal continuity can be filled with just any content: We cannot mix color data together with sound data to form a unity of an immanent temporal datum; homogeneity in continuity belongs to a self-contained datum. But we are bound even further. A certain materially relevant continuity must be held with respect to content. The unity of the tone is dissolvable *idealiter* into a tonal phases. These phases have unity through successive fusion in accordance with temporal continuity; this fusion can only be made possible as unitary in the flux of continual temporal becoming if the data meld together in a materially relevant manner without distance, continuously from phase to phase. Thus there can be no break at any point, that is, a distance in content occurring abruptly. To be sure, there are various possibilities here. Continuity need not prevail in all moments with respect to their content. For [142] example, if the continuity in the tonal quality is maintained, e.g., as a continuous uniformity with respect to the quality c, then a break in intensity can take place, a sudden change from loud to soft. Every such contrast makes divisions, is a breaking up into sections. In addition, every section is then in itself a unity. But a sound cannot consist of sheer discontinuities; it can only be one

sound with particular discontinuities. And actually then it is already a multiplicity. On the other hand, however, it is indeed a unity for itself if for its part, in its being divided, it sets itself off in prominence from something else by means of an encompassing contrast, for instance, from a general background of sound.

The unity of the impressional present can offer diverse successive unities and multiplicities as unities of continuity that, in the unity of a continual, temporal fusion under contrast, have turned into concrete special unities within passivity in the manner we have described. Thus, there are a variety of successive data that are respectively real bonds.

<§30. Individuation in Succession and Coexistence>[121]

But the successive form of the field of the present is a unique one. Something that is concretely simultaneous, and likewise, something that is simultaneous as an abstract phase has its identical temporal duration, or rather, its identical temporal locus. Fundamental here is the distinction between temporal uniformity and temporal identity. For example, several successive sounds can all have a uniform length of duration. But the uniform element in this duration is the uniformity of the temporal shape, but it is not the identity of the temporal expanse, the expanse of an order of temporal loci.

We are standing here before the problem of individuation, indeed, before the problem of the most original individuation within immanent time-consciousness. Every immanent temporal object has its temporal shape, that is, its temporal length: if, in a special sense, it is a "singular" and not a multiplicity. If it is a "multiple" object like a melody, then not only does the duration of the melody as a whole, as its temporal length, belong to the temporal shape, but also the special ways of filling out and not filling out this temporal length, i.e., not only the temporal lengths of the single sounds, but the pauses, too. In the repetition of the melody, this temporal shape is completely uniform. However, an [143]

[121] Editor: See Appendix 20: Time as the Form of Individuality and Subjective Transformation, pp 519f.

individually new temporal object is thereby constituted—new, but completely uniform. The temporal shape (like every quality that makes the temporal shape concrete) belongs to the temporal object as its "essential" character. We distinguish from the temporal shape the place of this temporal shape in time, or better, this temporal shape itself in its individuality through which it is an element of universal time itself, as a local system built up out of single temporal loci. In the same measure that we repeat a sound, say, in full uniformity, we will have a full uniformity not only with respect to content, but also with respect to duration. Every point of time here corresponds to a point of time there. But the points of time themselves as temporal loci in the unique temporal order are irreplaceably different; they are in principle incapable of being repeated. All the objects take part in this unrepeatability. Each one is itself and singularly unique as the object of its system of temporal loci that belongs to the universal system of temporal loci, to the system of singularly unique time. But the temporal shape and the fullness of the temporal shape are repeatable and yield, through comparison and through induction, the general essence that is individuated here.

We need to carry out similar expositions with respect to locality. Locality is what orders the coexistences peculiar to a homogeneous region (of course, not necessarily each one of them), and it is locality that can individuate something uniform and simultaneous within a homogeneous region. Just like every successive unity (formed from fusion and prominence) has its temporal shape and individual location, so too does every unity of coexistence of a local field belonging here have a field-shape that is potentially repeatable in uniformity within the same field, and it has its process of individuation through the individual location that is unique and cannot be repeated. The elementary analysis as the analysis of phases of a local field, as the analysis of phases of a continuity of coexistence, leads again to the fact that it (e.g., like the visual field) has the form of a continually ordered local system analogous to time. Only it is a two-dimensional local system that in itself accordingly allows more diverse and more intricate local shapes. Repeated here is the set of laws (and everything else that belongs to it) that the qualitative filling-out of local continuity

must continually obey for a leap in quality not to be able to take place at each point of the phase of the local order. Only that the unity running along a local continuity is not a unity of continual becoming, which would be precisely succession. [144]

We must note well that the temporal and local locus as that which individuates a concrete temporal objectlike formation in succession and coexistence is not something like a distinguishing trait or even something like a hallmark, an index whereby every individual thing is distinguished from every possible thing like it. The traditional discourse of individual difference in contrast to specific differences might easily suggest this. The latter refer to something specific, to something that is generally uniform with respect to content according to temporal shape or size, and according to qualification; something specific, something that is generally uniform as such, is to be grasped generally and conceptually by induction as a concrete essence, divided according to *genus* and *species*.

In any case, something that is originally constituted in consciousness as an object, that is, such that the object is grasped as it is itself *originaliter* in consciousness, is constituted in essential necessity within original time-consciousness as continually identical and enduringly identifiable—and therefore also as identifiable beyond the sphere of the living present by means of the concatenation of remembering. The ever new continual, synthetic identification that has a varying content is necessarily maintained in the continual constitution of immanence, and then within the constitution of immanence, the constitution of transcendence in an unmixed manner; it thereby necessarily forms the system of successively ordered coexistences. The uniqueness of the temporal locus is accordingly nothing other than the correlate of the form of the respective process of identification that is carried out in its unique nexus, that of constituting life in which this object is constituted as this object and is only identifiable as this object precisely because consciousness can go back to its original process of constituting, can reawaken it, and can find it as this same process of constituting, as this object that is recognizable at any time.

On the other hand, insofar as the constituted object and the reawakened object, and many other objects besides that have been respectively constituted, exist in relations of homogeneity and are connected according to uniformity and similarity in syntheses of homogeneity while they have become prominent through contrast—insofar as this is the case, interconnections of comparability will then arise, common and distinct features become prominent, and thus, the possibility of logically conceptual predication. Accordingly, every object necessarily not only has its *toion*, its comparable or its specific essence, whereby [145] it can become linked with other objects generally and conceptually according to genus and species; as the presupposition of all such syntheses of homogeneity and comparisons grounded in them, it also already has its individuality, its thisness constituted beforehand. That is, it is the same, constantly recognizable, and as such it belongs to the determinate nexus of originally constituting life. Even this life has its unity of identity in each phase, and is constituted in original time-consciousness. No matter how much this may look like it leads to a precarious *regressus in infinitum*, I believe that a reflective analysis can overcome this difficulty perfectly well.

With this crisp differentiation (in which modes of constituting the object as an identical object are necessarily intertwined with the constitution of the temporal form of order and with the formation of syntheses of homogeneity made possible by the constitution of temporal forms of order), it is clear why identity, on the one hand, and (predicatively) uniformity and diversity, [on the other,] are so closely related and yet remain distinct in principle. Correlatively, syntheses of coinciding are distinguished as syntheses of coinciding that form identities and syntheses of coinciding [that form] non-identities.

<§31. Problems of a Phenomenology of Sense-Fields>[122]

From here we could proceed further toward a systematic phenomenology of the universal temporal field and of sense-fields, toward a typification of occurrences grounded in the essence of these fields, a typification that is carried out from the perspective of eidetic analyses. For the fields as systems of order, and with respect to the mere form of these fields, at issue is the formation of essential concepts and axioms that lead to a grounding of a geometry and a topology of these fields: figure, line, point, distance, segment, direction, size, straight line, etc. On the other hand, at issue is the typicality of possible qualified structures, and temporally, the typicality of the forms of becoming peculiar to variability and invariability, to overlapping, to rivalry (rivalry of [146] the visual fields), to covering-over, etc.

Now would be the place to allude to problems in the phenomenology of sense-fields that have localization: [1] the possible types of the disintegration of the unity of a sense-field or [2] the possible types of concrete occurrences. [a] Occurrences under the rubric of concrete independent contents that could subsist for themselves, which is another way of saying that the sense-field can be conceived as being contracted to those contents. [b] But also occurrences of the typicality of possible change that would be a change of shape and a change in quality corresponding to the distinction of shape and coloring of the shape as its qualification. Where changes in shape are concerned there are distinct types of an expanding extension whereby the shape continuously expands to encompass the new pieces; these elements now become prominent or they do not (in accordance with their qualifications), or they become diminished. There is especially a contraction of shape that produces both the intuitive *limes* forms, line and point, from the typicality of a plane, whereby every line for its part also admits of a kind of contraction transforming it into a point. The point is a punctual plane if it approaches the type, pure point as a *limes*, while still admitting of

[122] Editor: With respect to §§ 31-36 see Appendix 19: <On a Phenomenology of Association> pp. 512ff.

a kind of contraction. Likewise the line that is a plane which has a linear form. The *limes*-shapes still have a sense if we remain within sensibility and do not import any notions of which we are not in possession, like a mathematical *limes* formation. These *limes*-forms within sensibility function like those of quality, for instance, pure red, pure white, which are also not mathematical *limes*. We evidently arrive at the same *limes* in another way, namely, by division for which we let one part (in a sharp contrast) change from one qualification into another. A border, indeed, a line results from the leap in quality that occurs by dividing one plane into two planes, for instance, when both parts having been evenly colored, a color completely uniform in itself, are set off in relief from one another through sharply contrasting colors. A "gradual" transition through a gradually changing qualitative graduation yields a border only if the transition first goes very slowly and then proceeds very quickly, and then very slowly again. Separate bands with a velocity have a linear form, and [147] should they become a pure line, we would have to modify the velocity so that through a sudden increase in velocity, it would finally spring over into a line.

Certain formally similar concepts need to be formed for the continuous temporal order and for each local order as well, especially for the visual one. Thus, the concept of point, of segment with segment-length and segment-orientation, the concept of series as "straight" series. With respect to its form, time is a mono-dimensional continual "straight" series ("homogeneous"); likewise, the visual field with respect to form is a two dimensional manifold that is to be grasped as a continuous double series (a series of series).

In abstraction from any qualification (which is to be thought of now as freely variable), two points within the visual field form a punctual pair that is connected by means of fusion. Every such unity of a pair can be uniform and non-uniform from two different perspectives: according to size (the size of the distance) and orientation. The unity of a pair regarded according to orientation forms a connection that is not uniform whereby two correlative relations are determined: $a>b$ and $b<a$, with the axiom: if $a>b$, etc. A manifold of points is prefigured through two points, a

manifold whose entire distances lie "in the same direction." All the points of this point-manifold form a mono-dimensional, continuous manifold that is called a straight line. Time is a straight line. Departing from each point there are many straight lines in the visual manifold; every new, second point that has been added to the first determines such a new manifold.

Accordingly, the following axioms are valid: If *a* is in direct vicinity to *b*, and *b* is in direct vicinity to *c*, then *a* is in the direct vicinity to *c*. With respect to orientations: If *a*>*b*>c then *a*>*c*. And every segment has a length, segments are comparable according to length (size). For each segment there is the same segment, etc. in each direction. All of these are axioms that are exactly expressed for the *limes* and which hold approximately for the approximations to the *limes*.

Let us bear in mind here that the fields are themselves limited and that the expansion *idealiter* of the fields into infinity is a kind of idealization that one can entertain, but which, however, does not imply any necessity. But however the *limes* may arise here, it [148] would not make any sense to infer that straight lines meet (somewhere in the far distance). Of course, the homogeneity of a field is an idealization. For sharply defined lines, and even lines that approach being sharply defined, do not run through the actual visual field everywhere in the same way, etc. Still, constructing an idealization does sketch the field of possibilities.

Problems of a phenomenology of sense-fields (to be carried out systematically): A theme that is missing includes the overlappings that arise spontaneously in passivity under fusion through affinity, or under conflict. Affinity especially is to be defined as unifying prominent elements: undifferentiated fusion as a counterpart to contrast. For example, an overlapping occurs when an "image" is suddenly superseded by another at some point in the visual field, or when maintaining the shape, the coloring suddenly changes over into another.

An important phenomenon that belongs here is the rivalry of the visual fields and potentially also the phenomenon of the concealment of a visual content through another, like when one eclipses another. Objective apperceptions should surely not be included here, and bracketing them takes some effort.

<Chapter 2:
THE PHENOMENON OF AFFECTION>

<§32. Affection as Effecting an Allure on the Ego. Contrast as its Fundamental Condition>

We must not get embroiled in a phenomenology of the sense-fields here. It must suffice to have pointed to it. There is still another direction of research bringing us much closer to questions of association, a direction characterized under the familiar rubric of affection, and even though we are familiar with it, we especially want to focus on it now. By affection we understand the allure given to consciousness,[123] the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego; it is a pull that is relaxed when the ego turns toward it attentively, and progresses from here, striving toward self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of [149] the self of the object, thus, striving toward an acquisition of knowledge, toward a more precise view of the object.

Consciousness constitutes partly explicit objects, that is, prominent and actually affecting, and partly implicit (parts and moments) that have not come or have not yet come into relief, but which, however, insofar as they can be brought into relief under "favorable conditions," are still taken into account under the standpoint of affection. In this respect we must distinguish between the actual affection and the tendency toward affection, the potentiality of affection that is not empty, but that is rooted materially in essential conditions. Sensible data (and thus data in general) send, as it were, affective rays of force toward the ego pole, but in their weakness do not reach the ego pole, they do not actually become for it an allure that awakens.

Affection presupposes prominence above all else, and within the impressional sphere it presupposes that prominence which we could find in it alone, namely, when as before we left out of play every consideration of the distant horizon of forgetfulness and likewise, of course, the realm of rememberings. Thus, prominence was for us a prominence that takes place through fusion under

[123] *bewußtseinsmäßiger Reiz*

E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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contrast with respect to content. In a certain way, affection is now a function of contrast, although not of contrast alone. Insofar as the most original affection is to be seen as the affection generated in the impressional present, contrast is then to be characterized as the most original condition of affection. Connected to the gradation of contrast is a gradation of affection, but also already a tendency toward affection. The same contrast can, for instance, actually exercise an allure on the ego, another time it can be that the ego will not be reached by the affective tendency. Extremes of contrast are so strong, make such a forcefully efficacious prominence that they drown out, so to speak, all competing contrasts. Thus, there is something like a possible competition and a kind of concealment of active tendencies by especially strong ones. For example, particular colored figures becoming quite prominent affect us; affecting us at the same time are noises like the sound of a passing car, the notes of a song, prominent odors, etc. All of this takes place at the same time, and insofar as we turn [150] to it alone, listening to it, the song wins out. But the rest still exercises an allure. But when a violent blast breaks in, like the blast of an explosion, it drowns out not only the affective particularities of the acoustic field, but also the particularities of all other fields. What otherwise spoke to us, no matter how little we paid attention to it, can no longer make it through to us.

If we rule out such extremes, then diverse objects can be prominent for themselves through contrasts insofar as each one fulfills the essential conditions of unity from a specific affinity of concrescing fusion and contrast. But for this not all of them need to become prominent for the ego, to say nothing of actually forming groups, configurations, which as such are actually there for the ego—that is, which as such syntheses actually affect the ego.

What gives a single prominent datum the priority of affection? Yet in its interconnection, the single datum is dependent upon the others for its affective force, as these are dependent upon it. We stand in a relativism of affective tendencies, and the question is, what kind of laws and ultimately essential laws can prevail here?

In our considerations of the lowest genetic level we formulate the problem in an abstract manner that is necessary for a

systematic [phenomenology of] genesis: We do so as if the world of the ego were only the impressional present and as if transcending apperceptions arising from further reaching subjective lawful regularities did not play any role at all, as if there were no modes of knowledge acquired in the life of the world, aesthetic and practical interests, values, and the like. Thus, we consider functions of affectivity that are founded purely in the impressional sphere. Accordingly, we may only take from the sphere of the heart[124] some feelings[125] that are co-original with the sensible data, and say: On the one hand, the emergent affection is functionally co-dependent upon the relative size of the contrast, on the other hand, also upon privileged sensible feelings like a passionate desire founded by a prominence in its unity. We may even allow originally instinctive, drive related preferences. Naturally, these would be unique themes of investigation whereby a suitable experimentation (not an inductive-objectively oriented one) would be quite possible: It would have the task of producing favorable conditions for the production of pure cases of the kind in question. [151]

<§33. Laws of the Propagation of Affection>[126]

But let us pay more attention to another direction. Suffice it to say that in the relativism of affective tendencies something, at some point, has necessarily become affective as such. Now, are there not laws concerning the propagation of this first affection? Where the object is concerned, we can also characterize affection as the awakening of an intention directed toward it [i.e., the object]. Put differently, are there laws of propagation of intentional awakening? The most privileged case here is where affection results in attentiveness, grasping, the acquisition of knowledge, explication. Then this lawful regularity would of itself pass over into the lawful regularity of awakening or again would lead the attentiveness further, or which is to say, would lead

[124] *Gemütssphäre*

[125] *Gefühle*

[126] Editor: See Appendix 21: Sensible, Multi-Radiating Affection. Sensible Group—Genuine Collective Objectlike Formation, pp. 520ff.

thematic interest further, and would even possibly lead the graspings and acquisitions of knowledge further. Naturally, introducing the language of awakening already alludes to the fact that we are dealing here with something that is so closely related to associations in the common sense that we could already speak of associations in a broader sense, of primordial associations, where there is not yet any question of reproduction. Now, there is a law here saying that every original awakening in propagation, that is, in the associative transference of awakening to new data, is bound through homogeneity. Original association is carried out in our sphere of hyletic sensibility exclusively within each one of the sense-fields for itself. In other words, every sense-field forms for itself a unique, self-contained realm of affective tendencies, capable of forming organizing unities by means of association.

How does the lawful functionality of this formation of unity look now? We spoke of the structure of the entire impressional field and, running parallel to this within the form of time, we spoke of its division into the impressional special-fields, the visual field, etc. As a whole, and with respect to its special prominent characteristics and special groups, each impressional special-field is a unity of temporal becoming, coming into being and passing [152] away, whereby relatively enduring coexistences are formed as groups, into which possibly new terms enter, excluding others. On the other hand, in this process of becoming, integrally cohesive unities for themselves, unities of temporal sequences that are homogeneous and connected with respect to content are formed for each sense-field: melodies, successions of color, and the like. But when is what we view in abstraction from the questions of affection, like something existing and becoming, which arises purely through concrescence and contrast—when is that there as actually affective on the ego? When does a group, a configuration of the visual field or tactile field, when does an acoustical series like a melody actually become prominent for me?

Where successions are concerned, it would seem that only when they have been formed affectively, only when the affection beginning with one or more points is propagated as an actual affection under the conditions of concrescence and of contrast, and

potentially under the conditions of affect[127]—only then does a new formation of unity first come about.

Accordingly, in our analyses of possible immanent objectlike formations and, precisely speaking, of possible hyletic objectlike formations, we would have disclosed the temporal and local form as essential necessities (as well, the mere significance of the *conditions* of the possibility of hyletic formations of unity as the essential necessities of filling these forms with respect to content), while the formation of unity itself, the actual formation of hyletic groups and particular data existing for themselves would still depend upon the remaining factor of affection that is not taken into account.

Naturally, what we said about consciousness, namely, that essential functions of affective forces are disclosed here, can be applied immediately to the elementary components, to continuities through which objects of sense are structured with an order. If a datum that has just begun is awakened, the awakening will continue to proceed further; the awakening accompanies the datum that is continually unfolding, but will lose the datum in this unfolding, for example, through a diminution of intensity, through an effacement of contours and the like with respect to affectively significant conditions, so that in the case of a datum that has an unfavorable beginning and that would otherwise not come into relief, the continual transference of affective force will exercise a steady awakening upon what is less favorable, consequently working against the affective diminution, halting it. In its [153] transition to *pianissimo*, the beginning loud tone carries the tone in affective force to the softest *piano* that would otherwise remain unnoticeable.

The forms of order obviously have a special affective significance. The universal, successive order [has a special affective significance] insofar as everything is constituted as in the process of becoming, and affection primarily follows the constitutive process of becoming. But not, for instance, as if succession as such would be a principle of association. Association does not function as the association of succession

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[127] *Gemütsbedingunen*

from one field to another. What is essential is not succession, but rather a nexus that is akin in its own order.

In the final analysis, do not the essential, lawful regularities of the immanent formation of unity that we have described—those of the formation of particular, self-contained objects, wholes, groups, configurations—do they not express the mere conditions of the possibility of such unities, while the actual emergence of these unities itself is dependent upon affection and association? Let us consider the following in relation to this question. Everything that we expounded upon earlier concerning the formation of unity through the coalescing of matters that are kindred and coming into relief through contrast had to be tied to the instances of unities and connected multiplicities. These unities could only be there for us either as given directly in the scope of attentiveness, or through the fact that we grabbed hold of unities subsequently by reaching back into the past horizons of a sphere of attentiveness; these unities were given to us without and prior to our becoming attentive, and yet, they had at least affected us to some degree. Thus, affection (and obviously the awakening transference of affection as well, hence, association) played its role overall.

Accordingly, the question arises: In their regulated dependency of those essential conditions of the formation of unity, but also codetermined by novel essential laws, do affection and association not first make possible the constitution of objects that exist for themselves? Are there not regulated inhibiting, weakening counter potencies which, by not letting affection arise any longer, also make the emergence of self-subsistent unities impossible, unities in other words that would not emerge at all without affection? These questions are difficult to answer; and they are especially [154] difficult if we wish to make our way from the sphere of the living present into the sphere of forgetfulness and to comprehend reproductive awakening, as will be necessary to do later. I do not need to say that the entirety of these observations that we are undertaking can also be given the famed title of the "unconscious." Thus, our considerations concern a phenomenology of the so-called unconscious.

In order to shed some phenomenological light in this darkness, let us begin with clear examples that will enable us to catch direct

sight of awakening in its propagation and the motivation determining it. We assume that something prominent is already constituted, it may even already be affective. It is evident that not every affection can have arisen through the awakening of another affection. Every instance of affection through an isolated extreme contrast, like an explosion, illustrates this essential possibility. Certainly, we do not need such extremes. While taking an evening stroll on the Loretto Heights a string of lights in the Rhine valley suddenly flashes in our horizon; it immediately becomes prominent affectively and unitarily without, incidentally, the allure having therefore to lead to an attentive turning toward. That in one stroke the string of lights is affective as a whole is obviously due to the pre-affective lawful regularities of the formation of unity; because of them possibly other groups of lights in the visual field will also simultaneously be there affectively as prominent special unities, and this *ceteris paribus*. Indeed, the straight string of lights can have an affective priority, that is, can have the affective priority of a stronger affective allure, of a stronger prominence for us. In these examples, we are conscious of an articulated unity (however much it, as articulated, has within itself special prominences that are materially relevant) in an unarticulated affection. On the other hand, we are not conscious of them through an awakening from the outside, from the part of other unities. We are quite comfortable in characterizing such cases of unawakened affection as awakenings if we characterize them as the zero-point of awakening, similar to the way in which the arithmetician counts zero, the negation of number, among numbers.

Let us now revise our example and suit it to the case where a propagation of affection takes place, that is, where an awakening radiates from an affection and is directed outwards. The string of lights is already in the process of awakening, even if it only be in a [155]
zero-awakening. One of the lights suddenly changes its coloring from white to red with sufficient intensity. Or we only alter its intensity; it becomes especially luminescent. It now becomes especially affective for itself, but at the same time this accentuation obviously benefits the entire string, which in other respects remains affectively unarticulated. We will have to say that a new affection has ensued and that an awakening ray issues

from it (or that with respect to both string segments a double ray of awakening issues from the light situated in the middle); this ray becomes unified with the awakening force of the string that is already affectively at work, forming a unity of an awakening that is stronger. Obviously, we will also be able to say that a type of propagation of affection takes place with respect to every articulated whole that was directly affective as a whole: namely, the propagation of affection to its members. Insofar as this is the case we did not need to alter the original example. We could have said at the outset that the awakening of the entire string is distributed among the members from the very beginning, apportioning to them mediately a special affection, doing it within the entire affection of the whole. Also needing to be studied here is a certain opposition of fusion and contrast insofar as when the radiating single light obtrudes too strongly, it can also inhibit the spread [of affection] to the accompanying interconnected lights.

Here is a different example from the sphere of successive objects that are in the process of forming a unity: A melody sounds without exercising any considerable affective force, or if this should even be possible, without exercising any affective allure on us at all. We are occupied with something else, and the melody does not affect us for instance as a "disturbance." Now comes an especially mellifluous sound, a phrase that especially arouses sensible pleasure or even displeasure. This particularity does not merely become affective for itself in a living manner; rather, the entire melody is accentuated in one stroke to the extent that it is still living within the field of the present; thus, the affection radiates back into the retentional phases; it is initially at work by accentuating [the retentional phases] in a unitary manner, and at the same time it has an effect on the special matters that are prominent, on the particular sounds, fostering special affections. With this, the motivational causality is completely and immediately evident. The particularity of the sound has made me attentive. And through this I became attentive to the entire [156] melody, and, understandably, the particularities thus became alive to me.

We also see from these examples an important distinction regarding the objects' mode of givenness for the subject of

consciousness. Sometimes the givenness of the wholes, their affective prominence and therefore the possibility of grasping them, precedes the parts, sometimes the givenness of parts the whole. That depends upon the varying conditions of affection and fundamentally upon the conditions determining the materially relevant unity in a materially relevant manner. Insofar as this is the case the distinction can be relativized. If the lights in the string of lights were to radiate in a temporal succession, then the string as a whole in its givenness would naturally follow upon the givenness of the particular parts. But in the final analysis, we do arrive at original singularities, that is, at objects that must be given beforehand as a whole in all circumstances and for essential reasons in order for their parts to be given.

Let us now attempt to tease apart the elementary relations of affection. In the living present the primordially impressional emergence has *ceteris paribus* a stronger affective tendency than what is already retentional. For that very reason, affection has a unitary tendency toward the future where the orientation of the propagation is concerned, intentionality is predominantly oriented toward the future. Naturally, this should not mean that the progressive fading away of retentions is merely a weakening of affection; rather, it is the nature of retentional modification not to alter the affinities and contrasts with respect to content in the same way that a materially relevant modification takes place within clarity; rather it produces a new dimension of blurred distinctions, a growing cloudiness, a murkiness that essentially decreases the affective force. However, this does not preclude the fact that an awakening emanating from the more luminescent sphere of the affection that is still in full force works upon this penumbra, thus, a backward working affection in contrast to the affection that is constantly making its effect forward. If, for example, an acoustical object is awakened right when the entire field of acoustical data had been dormant, as it were, then the neighboring past is co-awakened insofar as it has an acoustical affinity to what was especially awakened; as one can easily see, it points to a [157] respective affective past-horizon. Every object structured in a completely undivided continuity would belong here, like a completely even tone, and similarly in the visual field, an even

color. This does not preclude parts from subsequently coming to the fore precisely in and through an awakening—for example, when something that becomes a particular part by being set off through internal differentiation is placed next to uniform elements in similarity, or in another kind of uniformity, and when in overlapping or mere coinciding at-a-distance, this particular part carries out a kind of internal division of something continuous right within the consciousness of the absence of internal distinctions within the impressional sphere.

In our examples we had our eye on awakenings that are maintained in the line of enduring coexistence, like when brighter rays of a light are transferred to the string of lights, or that are maintained in the line of successions that are sinking back into the successive series: like the awakening radiating back from the mellifluous tone toward the series of tones given to consciousness in a living retention.

Obviously, however, the associative awakening also goes forward in the direction of the future. Even the new tones of the melody, the entire futural series that is intertwined along with the new becoming profits from the first awakening. Tonal formations, which perhaps would not have fulfilled the conditions of affection, become noticeable now, indeed they even become the objects of thematic interest. Thus starting from the place of awakening, the awakening also expands in a forward direction, following the path of the fusion of objects.

In the other example, since we are already attentive to this one row of lights, we would likewise be especially prone now to become attentive to a newly radiating row of lights, even a relatively weak one, and so forth.

We obviously have something analogous here in primordial association to the two different kinds of association in the customary sense that we distinguished earlier: associations turned toward the past (and as we will add, potentially reaching into the present by means of reproduction) and associations as awakening anticipations.

The analysis of these kinds of examples and observations of them carried out within an eidetic attitude show without further ado that within every living present (and restricted initially to the

sense-data that are being unified within it), affections are constantly at work beyond themselves; we always find affective [158] awakenings, that is, associations. The principles of the constitution of hyletic objectlike formations, namely, as connected coexistences and successions, the principles of local systems that constantly function to individualize and their fillings, the principles according to which contrasts and inner fusions (concrescence) take place, are constantly operative. They constantly form essential conditions of affection and the transference of affection as awakening.

If we thus presuppose the structure of the present according to primordial impression, retention, and protention, then with regard to it there are, on the one hand, associations, awakenings that radiate into the co-present and the retentional pasts, and on the other hand, associations that head in the direction of the future. Heretofore we have substantiated only the former with examples, for they are, as we see, the more original. In other words, the distinction we made at the outset in our initial, rough consideration of association in the customary sense of the term (namely, between the backward turning and first association, on the other hand, the forward turning, anticipatory, secondary association), also holds here when we deal with primordial modes of association with respect to the living sphere of presence, and when the concept of association is expanded.

Let us therefore investigate more closely now the immediate awakenings that are directed nearby and that are turned backward. In accordance with the lawful regularities of the structure of the concretely living sphere of the present, the entire primordial impression belonging to it can only have the form of an articulated coexistence, articulated according to the sense-domains and according to the data for themselves, objects for themselves that are connected and separated within the sense-domains. So far as succession is concerned, it has the form of articulated succession such that homogenous orders and nexuses of succession must be formed, that is, for every sense-sphere in itself. Every primordial-impressionally constituted object belongs within an order that is homogenous and successive with it.

<§34. The Problem of the Relationship between Affection and the Formation of Unity>[128] [159]

Yet, in accordance with what we have already suggested in our previous lecture the essential conditions of affection can now mean two things. Either it means this: If we presuppose this objectlike structure of the field of living presence, then all affection is, or again, all emergent awakenings of one objectlike formation by another are subsequently bound to this regulated structure. And in particular, they are bound in such a way that all associative awakening can only accompany the regulated forms of connection according to which multiple unified objects of a higher level arise from single objects. Our examples belong here. Objects were already given to us, and we left it open whether they are already there for us through affection; our only object of consideration was the progression of affection. We saw this progression, i.e., association, fundamentally bound by the kind of higher object formation that arises through affinity and contrast. For this reason, association could not pass over from the objects of one sense-domain into those of another, and had to follow persistently the unifying affinity of prominent objects within a specific domain. It also had to be determined through the contrasts of such objects by their "background" objects.

[Or] secondly, one could also understand the essential conditions differently according to the other interpretation of the constitution of the typical structure of objects peculiar to every living present, an interpretation that was suggested previously in our last lecture. One can tentatively say that affinity, continuity, contrast are relations that need not yet be viewed as an actual fusion-in-itself, as actually producing a unity in and through prominence. Only what keeps to certain forms of such relations can actually be fused. But perhaps we must distinguish here between (a) unconditionally necessary fusions that are carried out in a fixed lawfully regulated manner under all circumstances, namely, in such a way that we would have to consider that even if

[128] Editor: See Appendix 21: Sensible Multi-radiating Affection. Sensible Group—Genuine Collective Objectlike Formation, pp. 520ff.

affection were to be everywhere functional, no matter to what degree, it could not exercise any special accomplishment on the formation of unity; and (b) fusions, formations of unity that are [160] owing first to affection. Let us see if such a theory is tenable.

Among the first, the unconditionally necessary fusions, we would obviously have to rank those fusions that constitutively bring about the fixed form of the field of living presence: the temporal form and the form of the local field, but also what should manifest itself as the firm form of unity of another sense-field. This would mean that just as the original process of streaming within immanence cannot at all be a special accomplishment of an affection, but rather is an original continuous fusion that necessarily takes place, and yet has the conditions of its structural possibility in order for the necessary continuity to be precisely fulfilled continuity; this must likewise be the case with respect to the streaming *hyle*. That is, hyletic fusion must be carried out in the fixed necessity of temporal constitution, a hyletic fusion arising from original continuity as successive fusion, and again without any accomplishment from affection. Furthermore, there must likewise be able to be unities of coexistence; and the most original unity is the unity arising from coexistent continuity: Every sense-field for itself is such a unity, constituted without any affection.

Now, however, every sense-field also has special unities that are constituted—here we are approaching the realm of affection. The wakeful life of the ego is such that the ego is explicitly affected, affected by special unities that are, precisely through this affection, given to, graspable or grasped by the ego. But does affection not also presuppose here the work that is accomplished, to wit, the special fusion that necessarily ensues when the formal and the material conditions are fulfilled? In fact, if we examine these conditions, then we must certainly admit that continuity can be a more or less complete continuity, a multi-layered or a single-layered continuity; this is a matter concerning the contents themselves and does not as yet concern affection at all, initially. Thus, for example, that on the underlying basis of the local continuity of positions, as the fixed form of the visual field, the colors occupying it continually extend and thereby continually fuse as the coloring of the extension; that the colors do this in a

continuous uniform fusion or qualitative graduation in and through the continuity of intensity; and again, that such a continuity with respect to content is only maintained for a time, that it makes a [161] leap at a certain point and produces a contrast—all that is a matter of the fixed formation of unity. It is evident that affection has nothing to do with it.

What happens now when we pass over to the higher level of objectification, that is, when we take into consideration the varying homogeneous syntheses of multiplicities, spatial and temporal configurations? When we carry out overlappings there, and then speak of a coinciding and fusion *par distance* independently of an actual overlapping, when we speak of a kind of attraction of prominent, uniform, and very similar <contents>, when we speak of a kind of synthesis at-a-distance, then it already looks like an associative awakening at-a-distance and suggests that the latter is responsible for the emergence of a fusion at-a-distance here. Naturally, affection does not make the relationships that are grounding in the particularity of the contents.

But perhaps it is so that initially every concrete, particular constituted thing, everything that is constituted in relief for itself and not constituted first through affection, necessarily exercises an affection to some degree or other. This degree would then depend upon the particular conditions. But then it can be the case that among simultaneous special objects, things that are similar to one another emerge, and by simultaneously affecting the ego, take on a peculiar unity: Initially [it is] a unitary point of prominence for the ego, but later it becomes a materially relevant connection to a higher articulated unity. On this interpretation, it is first through the synthetic unity of affection that the synthesis of fusion at-a-distance, of the unity arising from affinity, would come about.

One could attempt to interpret this situation likewise in the case of succession and its configurations, like melodies, and so forth.

However, upon a closer inspection of the possible interpretations we find what we have just uttered to be untenable. The division that is made here between the constitution of objects of a higher level as opposed to the objects that are constituted in an original singularity is unjustified because it is incomprehensible that fusion should first be generated through the unity of affection.

If it is understandable on the lower level that continuity [162] necessarily implies fusion, and if the conditions upon which such a fusion depends are also self-evident, then the formation of unity, fusion at-a-distance, is also certainly no less self-evident here as soon as we look deeper into the formation of homogeneous multiplicities. Conversely, it would obviously be wholly incomprehensible to attribute the accomplishment of fusion to affection in the lower level, but not to do so in the higher level.[129]

But how do we arrive at a comprehensible unification, and once clarified, at an evident unification of both these motives, affection and the formation of unity?

I would like to respond to this question by stating that it is the accomplishment of passivity, and as the lowest level within passivity, the accomplishment of hyletic passivity, that fashions a constant field of pregiven objectlike formations for the ego, and subsequently, potentially a field of objectlike formations given to the ego. What is constituted is constituted for the ego, and ultimately, an environing-world that is completely actual is to be constituted in which the ego lives, acts, and which, on the other hand, constantly motivates the ego. What is constituted for consciousness exists for the ego only insofar as it affects me, the ego. Any kind of constituted sense is pregiven insofar as it exercises an affective allure, it is given insofar as the ego complies with the allure and has turned toward it attentively, laying hold of it. These are fundamental forms of the way in which something becomes an object[130].

To be sure, this does not yet completely characterize what an object as object means for any ego and for subjectivity in general; but it certainly does designate a fundamental form. Affective unities must be constituted in order for a world of objects to be constituted in subjectivity at all. But for this to be possible, affective hyletic unities must become and must intertwine with one another homogeneously in essential necessity, initially in the hyletic sphere, that is, again, initially in the living present.

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[129] But under the assumption that we have been moving precisely within the living present and that we have constituted concrete objects in it! See the new lecture and the clear results there.

[130] *Vergegenständlichung*

Of course, for themselves unities are constituted according to the principles of concrescence and contrast that we have demonstrated—as unities for themselves they are *eo ipso* also for the ego, affecting it. At first glance, the generality of this [163] statement seems risky. Certainly, we do not always have an affection that is actually noticeable. But if we reflect upon the essential character of affection which is obviously relative, whereby something noticeable can become unnoticeable, and something unnoticeable can become noticeable, then we will hesitate in interpreting something unnoticeable as something that does not exercise an affection at all. Further, once we have examined the phenomenon of the propagation of affection, we will say that we encounter it in evidence as the phenomenon of the modification of a current affection. An affection that is currently weak will become strong by means of a radiating affection that awakens. Conversely, a strong affection can become weak when the conditions upon which this strong affection depends are accordingly altered. This becomes quite clear, especially when we take into account the type of these conditions. But that something should gain an affective force at all where nothing of the sort was available; that something which was not there at all for the ego—a pure affective nothing—should become an active something for the first time, precisely that is incomprehensible. If we follow the gradation inherent in the nature of affection, we will remain within the realm of intelligibility and of insight into essences, and then we will have no occasion to make up incomprehensible substructions that would *eo ipso* take us beyond the sphere of essences.

According to this methodological principle, we thus ascribe to every constituted, prominent datum that is for itself an affective allure [acting] on the ego.

We can secure decisive insights into the essence of association when we comprehend the lawful structure pertaining to the function of affection, its peculiarity, and its dependence upon its essential conditions. But this must first be done within the scope of the living present, and only then do we consider the realm of the non-living past of consciousness that is still capable of being awakened affectively—the realm of forgetfulness, as we also said,

though by importing in a certain way the natural manner of speaking about forgetfulness.

We had studied the indivisible objectlike structure of the impressional living present without taking into consideration the differences of affection. Then, as we passed over to affection, we saw at once that the way in which affection is distributed among [164] immanently constituted objects and propagated (and with this how the entire living present, as it were, takes on a constantly varying affective relief) is in a certain way dependent upon the general structural lawfulness of the sphere of the present with respect to the typicality of its temporal and local configuration (organization of objects). The objects are grouped as enduring unities of coexistence, segregated according to sense-fields, and they form connected configurations in the local fields. On the other hand, they are grouped as connected successions, they form configurations of temporal sequences that are in process, like melodies, etc. This extensional formation according to the temporal shape and local shape should not be anything different than what Kant had in mind under the rubric of figurative synthesis.[131] On the other hand, the filling of these forms, which makes the concrete formed unities possible, is subject to the special conditions of concrescence and contrast. Affection accompanies the connections; only insofar as the conditions of materially relevant or figurative homogeneity are fulfilled such that syntheses of coinciding can be formed in being adjoined or at a distance, can the affective framework exist and can the affections propagate, can the current affective force be augmented, etc.

While it is quite correct to say that the path of affection and the change in the entire affective relief within the living present is

[131] Translator: Husserl refers here to a type of synthesis that Kant describes in the second version of his "Transcendental Deduction" (the "B Deduction") in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (see B 151 and B 154). Whereas the "intellectual synthesis" concerns the functioning of the pure concepts of the understanding in general and universally, allowing us "to think" an object without contradiction, the "figurative synthesis" is the concrete work of "transcendental imagination" relating the pure concepts of the understanding to the manifold of sensible intuition that is ultimately temporal. In the chapter entitled "The Schematism," Kant will describe this process in slightly differently terms as the work of the "schemata" (see B 186 - B 187 and B 308).

dependent upon the types of interconnection and ways in which objectlike formations run their course (objectlike formations that in each case have been constituted within the living present), this does not mean that these objectlike formations for their part already exist prior to all affection. Rather, it is not ruled out, and it is even quite probable that affection already plays its essential role in the constitution of all objectlike formations such that without it there would be no objects at all and no present articulated with objects. We have said and we have shown that hyletic objects are *constituted*, they *are* in the constitutive process of *becoming*; in every phase of this becoming we have phase-contents that are not yet themselves objects and yet are not nothing. What belongs to one and the same object being constituted in the unity of a momentary phase, e.g., to a speck of color in the visual field, must have some kind of integrally cohesive unity opposing it to what [165] constitutively belongs to another object in the same point of time. The content of one momentary now and of another momentary now must, in the transition from the one moment to the next, be connected in an integral togetherness—in this example, precisely so that the one and very same speck of color, be it changing or unchanging, can be constituted. The constitutive unification, the fusion into *one* object, the separation from every other object is thus subject to the elementary essential conditions according to form and filling of form. Concrete objects are not what is elementary here, but rather object phases, sensible points, so to speak. If we already presuppose objects, we can then inquire into the essential conditions of the structure of new objects arising from objects and the essential conditions of the structure of the entire impressional sphere arising from objects simpliciter. But if we go back to what is constitutively elementary, then the analogous question returns once more.

Accordingly, the problem of affection returns once more with respect to what is elementary, and in particular it returns as the problem of whether affection is not already an essential condition for the emergence of every constitutive synthesis, and whether both of these must not go together: a pre-affective characteristic of the elements, with the essential presuppositions for the formation of unity proper to the pre-affective character, and the affection

itself. Thus, we must consider the possibility whether all the fusions and separations, through which objectlike unities become in the field of the present, do not require an affective vivacity in order to become at all, and that perhaps they could not become it if the materially relevant conditions of forming unities were indeed fulfilled, but the affective force were nil. Only a radical theory that does justice in the same way to the concrete structure of the living present and to the structure of the particular concretions themselves arising from constitutive elements can solve the enigma of association, and with this all enigmas of the "unconscious" and of varying modes of "becoming conscious."

On the other hand, all motives of a theory arise from the evidences of the first level, from those that are for us necessarily the first: the evidences found in the phenomena of the living present which is, so to speak, structured as ready-made.

Being already familiar with the form and content of its concrete object-structure, let us then begin with this living present in a systematic fashion. But let us now consider its affective formation. [166]

<§35. The Gradation of Affection in the Living Present and in the Retentional Process>[132]

We must make an initial distinction here under the rubric of affection between: (1) affection as that varying vivacity of a lived-experience, of a datum of consciousness; whether the datum is salient in the special sense and then perhaps actually noticed and grasped depends upon the datum's relative intensity; and (2) this salience itself. Here affection has the special sense of a specific affection on the ego, and in doing so meets the ego, excites it, calls it to action, so to speak, awakens and possibly actually rouses it.

For example, a soft noise becoming louder and louder takes on a growing affectivity in this materially relevant transformation; the vivacity of it in consciousness increases. This means that it exercises a growing pull on the ego. The ego finally turns toward it. However, examining this more precisely, the modal

[132] Editor: See Appendix 22: <The Empty Horizon and Knowledge of It> pp. 524ff., and Appendix 23: On Questioning the Potentiality of the Empty Horizon> p. 530f.

transformation of affection has already occurred prior to the turning toward. Along with a certain strength that is at work under the given affective circumstances, the pull proceeding from the noise has so genuinely struck the ego that it has come into relief[133] for the ego, even if only in the antechamber of the ego. The ego already detects it now in its particularity even though it does not yet pay attention to it by grasping it in an attentive manner. This "already detecting" means that in the ego a positive tendency is awakened to turn toward the object, its "interest" is aroused—it becomes an acutely active interest in and through the turning toward in which this positive tendency, which goes from the ego-pole toward the noise, is fulfilled in the striving-toward. Now we understand the essential modal transformation that has occurred here. First an increasing affection; but the affective pull is not yet, from the standpoint of the ego, a counter-pull, not yet a responsive tendency toward the allure issuing from the object, a tendency that for its part can assume the new mode of an attentively grasping [167] tendency. There are further distinctions that can be made here, but they do not concern us at this time.

Significant for us is the peculiarity of the varying vivacity itself, irrespective of the significance it has for the ego. In every living present that is looked upon universally, there is naturally a certain relief of salience, a relief of noticeability, and a relief that can get my attention[134]. In this case, we accordingly distinguish between background and foreground. The foreground is what is thematic in the broadest sense. The nil of salience is found in a potentially considerable vivacity of a conscious having that does not, however, arouse any special responsive tendency in the ego, does not make it to the ego-pole.

Therefore, if we ignore the comportment of the ego-pole, then we will still have the difference of vivacity, which is not to be confused with a materially relevant intensity, like the intensity of sound, the intensity of smell, etc. Independent of the character of the data of consciousness (and if we include any kind of object of consciousness, then precisely these kinds of data) there is a

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[133] *ist ... zur Geltung gekommen*

[134] *Aufmerksamkeit*

gradation of vivacity, and this difference is still maintained in the ray of attentiveness.

This gradation is also what determines a certain concept of consciousness and degrees of consciousness and the opposition to the unconscious in the appropriate sense. The latter designates the nil of this vivacity of consciousness and, as will be shown, is in no way a nothing: A nothing only with respect to affective force and therefore with respect to those accomplishments that presuppose precisely a positively valued affectivity (above the zero-point). It is thus not a matter of a "zero" like a nil in the intensity of qualitative moments, e.g., in intensity of sound, since by this we mean that the sound has ceased altogether.

Every concrete datum of the sphere of the living present is submerged, as we know, in the phenomenal past, succumbs to retentional transformation and thereby necessarily leads into the region of affective nullity into which it is incorporated and in which it is not nothing. Thus, we must reckon within the living present in general an affective zero-horizon that is constantly varying with the living present itself. Before we treat the affective zero-horizon more closely, we want to characterize the entire affective peculiarity of the living present: Viewed as a whole, the [168] latter is an affective unity, has accordingly a unitary vivacity into which all special affections that belong to the affective unity are integrated as moments, as moments that are unified synthetically within it.

I have already employed the quite suitable expression, affective relief.[135] On the one hand, this alludes to a unity, on the other hand, to a difference of "peaks" for the different particular moments, finally, too, the possibility of entire augmentations or entire diminutions insofar as the affective relief can arch out more prominently or become more flattened depending upon the alterations of the living present. I am alluding here to the differences of freshness in which all present objects, possibly through a sudden transition, but altogether, gain (or in the opposing case, lose) something of the vivacity of consciousness, of affective force. But at the same time within every present there

[135] Translator: See p. 212, and the related expression "affective prominence," p. 204.

are relative differences of vivacity, differences of more or less affectively efficacious data. Hence the discourse of affective relief.— The affective relief has as a materially relevant support the structural nexuses of the present; by affection proceeding from a point and being distributed in an awakening manner along these lines, the entire relief is accentuated along these lines.

Further, according to what has been said, a background or subsoil of non-vivacity, of affective ineffectiveness (nil) belongs to every present. Within the positive vivacity then, an ever newly affective awakening and transference of affective forces takes place, and precisely along with this, relative alterations in the uniform level of relative freshness as a whole.

The primordial source of all affection lies and can only lie in the primordial impression and its own greater or lesser affectivity. The lines of affective awakening, or again, the lines of the maintenance or propagation of affectivity proceed from there.

Retention links up to the primordial impression. The retentional process is, as we have learned, the process of a peculiar, continuous modification of the primordial impression. What is given in the mode of original intuitability, of having a self in the flesh, givenness in the flesh, undergoes the modal transformation of the "more and more past." The constitutive process of this being modified in consciousness is a continual synthesis of identification. What is given to consciousness is continuously the same, but it is pushed back further and further into the past. In the [169] primordial phenomenal process in which the concrete temporal objectlike formations become, the emergence of a new primordial impression goes hand in hand, inseparably, with the retentional transformation; the emergence of the new primordial impression is continuously linked up with the impression that has immediately passed and is modified into the form of the just-past. Within this entire process we have in each phase a primordial lived-experiencing of something, i.e., something that is primordially impressional: During the latter's continuous retentional modification, the affective force of the datum that is constituted as identical is preserved, but it does not go undiminished. We have also described the retentional process as the process of clouding over. What had been constituted concretely with these particular

internal differences and external prominences, initially in a unity of the primordial impression, becomes more and more unclear; it loses its distinguishing traits and prominences. It is clear that the affective force accruing to them and to the whole is constantly diminished in the process.

We can divide up this process. The primordial impression initially passes over continuously into a retentional expanse that we can describe as the expanse of the fresh retention. One will certainly have to concede that a concrete perceptual object, here the respective enduring, concrete sensible datum, is actually perceived for a stretch as temporally extended (I have doubted this at times, but it seems to me, unjustly). If we reduce a long, protracted sound to what is actually given in intuition, we will find not its entire length, but rather a small and extensive portion remaining constantly the same in an actual intuition, even if the momentary and primordially impressional element is distinguished in it again as the peak, so to speak, of the most intensive intuitability. On the other hand, the intuitability loses more and more richness as it approaches the past, to the point of the nil of intuitability. Let us say with respect to the affective height that in the steady sounding of a tone every new primordially impressional moment of the Now brings a new primordial vivacity, which in spite of the diminution in this expanse of fresh retention is nonetheless sustained on a level of intense force such that the expression "fresh" also refers to something affective. The affective force is therefore not nil when the intuitability becomes nil.

The expanse of fresh retention, then, continuously passes over into an expanse of empty retention. One can characterize this as the genetic primordial form of empty presentations. The empty [170] retention remains a sphere of maintaining the objectlike formation that has its original sphere of institution in the primordial impression. What is the same in its very sense is still given to consciousness, this is still given to consciousness in the special sense, namely, as affective. But this affective force goes back inexorably, the objective sense becomes inexorably poorer with respect to internal differentiations, thus emptying itself in a certain way. The end is an empty presentation that presents its presented object in a completely undifferentiated manner; its presented

object has lost the entire wealth of internally prominent features that the primordial impression had instituted. What is left over? This empty presentation is still a presentation, this portion, this end is still an end of the continuous retentional procession that has streamed out from the primordial impression and that is being constantly fed anew by the primordial impression that is ever new and synthetically attached.

Thus the end is a consciousness of a completely empty bygone "That" which only has the one determination, to be that which is "the identical" of this identifying procession. For this very reason it is the past given to consciousness as empty of content, a past of something that is still in the process of the constitutive becoming in its ever new present. If several objects have been constituted simultaneously and are potentially still running their course, then proper to each one for itself is its own empty expanse of the past and an empty end, that is still maintained, that is, is still affective and not yet blurred with its like. I say, not yet. For the process continues, ineluctably losing the remainder of differentiation and affective force that had been retentionally derived from the point of origin. Thus that separation, which has arisen by belonging to several retentional processions, and which keeps these processions differentiated even in the final segments, cannot at all be maintained. Accordingly, the end is completely undifferentiated; its lack of differentiation arises from complete powerlessness of affection. By every retentional procession losing its affective force in the process of change it itself becomes dead, it can no longer progress by fusing under prominence; for positive affective force is the fundamental condition of all life in dynamic connection and differentiation; if it is decreased to zero, its life ceases, precisely in its vivacity.

We must now supplement our description for the sake of [171]
clarifying this principle interpretation. On the one hand, we said that the retentional process is a process of identifying synthesis—the sameness of the objective sense runs clean through it. For example, the tone that sounds, and in this sounding has reached its completion, is the same through the entire process of the retentional still-being-retained-in-consciousness. The same holds for every phase and expanse of the piece that has respectively

faded away during a tone that is still resounding. Thus the differences, which belong to the sense itself, remain with it in its identity through the continuity of the retentional fading away. The sense's [temporal] mode of the past is altered, but it itself is not altered.

On the other hand, we do speak of a loss of internal differences in the progressive "clouding over" of the retention. In the fading away, the tone itself thus does not lose anything that it originally was; if it is given at the end as completely empty of differences with respect to content, then this concerns its mode of givenness, not it itself.[136]

At all events, it is a matter of an affective phenomenon, so we say now. The altered mode of consciousness persistently belongs in connection to the synthesis of identification, but the sense that lies in it is little affective, less and less affective in its particularity. And finally, everything runs together as one, all retentional ebbs and flows form one unity in which a multifaceted sense is lodged *implicite*, for it has flowed into it through multifarious particular lines of unity, but in such a way that no affective pull proceeds from this unity. This pull would allow any one of the past objectlike formations (contained within the unity *implicite*) and their peculiar features to have a voice, which could make them efficacious for themselves. One may well say that within the zero-stage, all special affections have passed over into a general undifferentiated affection; all special consciousnesses have passed over into the one, general, persistently available background-consciousness of our past, the consciousness of the completely unarticulated, completely indistinct horizon of the past, which brings to a close the living, moving retentional past.

This explains the phenomenon of perspectives coalescing as they move away from the diversely articulated impressional present and into the flowing past that is less and less articulated [172] and that coalesces more and more closely. It is especially a matter here of the perspectival phenomenon proper to the living present and to its retentional streaming itself. We understand it not as a

[136] Translator: For this discussion and the one that follows, see "Consciousness and Sense—Sense and Noema", pp. 591-623.

phenomenon of an actual loss of differentiations within the object, but in the first place, affectively: The perspective is an affective perspective. Regarded noetically, the retentional modification is a transformation of consciousness itself, a transformation that is so peculiar that for all syntheses of identification it ultimately leads to the inability to be differentiated. But insofar as it contains the objective sense, precisely by having been integrated into the different lines of the synthetic coinciding that forms identity, we can say from the standpoint of the object: Less and less becomes affective from it. And when there is no affection coming from the diverse objects, then these diverse objects have slipped into sheer nightfall, in a special sense, they have slipped into the unconscious.

<Chapter 3: THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF AFFECTIVE AWAKENING AND REPRODUCTIVE ASSOCIATION>

<§36. The Function of Awakening in the Living Present>

But essentially belonging to this [scil. slipping into the unconscious] or to the implication of a concealed sense is the primordial phenomenon of awakening. By awakening we understand and distinguish two things: awakening something that is already given to consciousness as for itself, and the awakening of something that is concealed. Every living present brings an ever new original constitution of the object, ever new perceptual data in extensive articulations, as ordered particular data, as a kind of ordered world; that is, an ever new source of a new affective force that can spread over the nexuses in an awakening manner, spread over the unities constituted in retention, and that can make possible syntheses of fusion, of connection, of contrast in every coexistence. An actual connection, an actual formation of unity always and necessarily presupposes affective force or affective differentiation.

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On the other hand: The affective accomplishment is not merely carried out in the form of the distribution of an affective force on [173] something that is already differentiated, that is, on something that is affectively at work. Rather, we already encounter an entirely peculiar affective accomplishment within the living present, namely, the accomplishment of awakening the concealed element, the accomplishment of awakening the element shrouded in implicit intentionality. An influx of affective force, which naturally has its primordial source in the impressional sphere, can enable a retention (which is poor in or completely empty of particular affective content) to restore what is concealed in it concerning an overcast content of sense. A retention cannot be analyzed, disassembled like a fixed thing. It is not something fixed, and it cannot be reified, the retentional process cannot be halted in the steady necessity of its course. But if the object constituted in the flux has taken on a special affective force, then the process of the retentional transformation may continue to progress, the process of *affective* clouding over going hand in hand with it is halted. So long as the new force lasts, the objectlike moments that have attained a special affection are affectively preserved in the empty form of the presentation, thus, sustained longer than without this new force. But an essential tendency is also given with such a radiating back of affective force into the empty consciousness, a tendency toward an eruption of a more or less clear reproduction that is more or less rich with respect to content, and with this a tendency toward the identifying transition of the empty presentation into a self-giving, which re-news "after a fashion" the constitutive process in the mode of remembering, and therefore "re"-covers the identical objective sense in its explicit differentiation.

In the previous lecture[137] we began to sketch out a theoretical idea that is called upon to clarify for us how an awakening of objectlike formations, which are in the process of becoming ineluctably concealed and which are finally already completely veiled, comes about in the living present, in the streaming life of the original constitution of an object. The multiplicity of objects,

[137] Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

connected and ordered in this way and that, the multiplicity that is manifest in a constantly uniform structural typicality, manifest in every Now in original experience, and manifest precisely out of living constitution, manifests itself in multiple manners of modes [174] of givenness. This style of givenness is designated under the headings of primordial impression, retention, the empty horizon of something submerged; it is preserved like a rigid form in streaming transition, designated noematically from the side of the object as the system of forms of the Now, of the graduated just-now, right to zero, to the lack of differentiation. Because new content constantly runs through this form in the direction of its flow along the lines of the synthesis of identification, we have the phenomenon of objects continually reaching the living impression, of objects, however, that are intuited, pass away, and ultimately disappear.

The retentional process is already a process of steady impoverishment in its expanse of intuitiveness, despite the continual identity of sense; sense has less and less intuitive fullness. By this we actually mean to say that the intuition is less and less a pure intuition, and is more and more a mixture of intuition and empty presentation. A progressive diminution of affective force is given with this which, when the retention has become a completely empty presentation, ultimately no longer has any of its own hold on what is intuitive; and it can actually only bring into relief its sustained sense in accordance with these or those partial moments by virtue of a retroactive affective force that is already at work, an affective force proceeding from the intuition, in the final analysis, from the primordial impression. But this ultimately dries up, the retentional modification leads to an empty identity that has lost its particular differentiation, and even that identity cannot last; the retentional synthetic line loses itself in the nil that is common to them all, namely, the lack of differentiation. And yet, in the continuity of this process, the sense remains identical, it has only become veiled, it has shifted from an explicit sense to an implicit one.

What else can awakening mean here than this: What is implicit becomes explicit once more. And initially no other way is prefigured here than the way of transforming an empty retention

(in which little or nothing is affective with respect to the objective sense) into another empty retention in which more is affective now, that is, more "emerges" from out of the "fog," potentially in an especially salient manner, and is grasped. In fact, that is the [175] first form of a disclosive awakening.

If we inquire into how such awakening takes place, the answer will run: Just as within coexistence an intuition becomes unified with an intuition, and initially within primordially impressional coexistence, an impression becomes unified with an impression, becomes unified not only in a continuous local juxtaposition, but also through a synthesis of coinciding in distance that takes place essentially, and just as in this case coinciding and affective communicating are inseparably bound together, so too when we pass over to succession; in this case, what has finally become non-intuitable achieves a synthesis with what is actually intuitive, and especially with what emerges in the new impressional vivacity. Affective communication would mean that every contribution of affective force by any "member" of something connected in distance through homogeneity and prominence augments the force of all its "comrades." Moreover, according to our principle interpretation this means further: Only by virtue of affective force does connection come about at all, and the affective force is *eo ipso* there so long as intuition takes place. Within the streaming living sphere of the present there cannot be individualized intuitions. The extent to which the conditions of near-connection and distant-connection proper to the intuitions' "content," to their objective sense, are fulfilled is the extent to which the interconnection comes about; only that depending upon the affective relief, there will exist differences of salience, differences of affective intensity of the prominence of these or those particular objects and of these or those particular interconnections.

Let us now turn to succession. We naturally assume, and it is indeed actually quite evident in a certain way, that distant syntheses as well as near syntheses can also take place in succession. Without this there would not be a world for us, and above all, as the basic feature of a possible world of experience, there would be no world given originally in experience, not only with respect to coexistence, but also with respect to the successive

order. However, in original experience one thing constantly follows another, there are processes, and not only those that continually stretch back, but also those in which temporally distant objects and processes are involved in a unitary manner, e.g., the successions of hammer blows or the sequence of tones as in melodies, etc.

But would the like be possible if these syntheses were bound to [176] the extraordinarily narrow sphere of successive and actual intuition? It is clear that the awakening of a concealed element already plays its role here in order to make possible any expanse of successive syntheses, even if not exactly an arbitrarily large expanse. When the second hammer blow rings out, how does the synthesis come about between it and the first one which has in the meantime become intuitively empty or even completely empty? How can the synthesis be the synthesis of the succession of uniform blows, how can it arise before us in a unified manner as a uniform pair? The contents that are genuinely intuitable there are not uniform. But as the retention changes, precisely the identical objective sense has been maintained, and the uniform sense-content, only once in the mode of the impression and the other time in the mode of emptiness, grounds the synthesis. But the emptiness is "clouded over," has more or less lost the efficacy of the distinguishing feature with respect to content. So, how then can we become conscious of uniformity? The answer naturally runs: No matter how incompletely affective the one objective sense is, it is still there as the first, obscured hammer blow, and can thus still enter in a community of sense with the new hammer blow. From the affective force of this hammer blow and as a consequence of this community, an affective awakening now goes back into senses that are uniform. The affective awakening does not bring the uniform sense to intuition for instance, but does indeed effect an un-covering. That is to say, now it has its own affective force—the reanimated past hammer blow, just like the new hammer blow. The condition is thus fulfilled so that uniformity as such can now actually be produced synthetically. That is, as a unique, as an affectively prominent synthesis of uniformity.

Let us now imagine hammer blows progressing even further. We experience the chain of hammer blows extending relatively far back, given in consciousness in an actually living manner, and actually constituted in a synthetic manner; we experience it as a chain only by virtue of an awakening running back. Finally, however, the chain is lost in the zero-horizon, the efficacious concatenation presupposes an affective awakening that still has an ample positive force. The force of intuition is limited, and the diminished forces of the derived intuitions are limited, and it finally becomes nil in the radiating back. –The concatenation that is already formed, the pair, the triplet, etc., are new objects and [177] sink back as objects of a higher order, etc. Thus retroactive awakening concerns them as such.

<§37. Retroactive Awakening of the Empty Presentations in the Distant Sphere>[138]

If the final remainder of affectivity is lost as the retention becomes obscure, and if the process itself has lost the final remainder of vivacity of the streaming process, what is essential is of course preserved. Earlier I thought that this retentional streaming and the constitution of the past would continue to go on incessantly even within complete obscurity.[139] But now it seems to me that one can dispense with this hypothesis. The process itself ceases. Thus we have the following, never ending typicality: The primordially instituting process of ever new sense-objects goes on and on ineluctably at the head of the living present; it is bound to the lawful form of the entire objectlike structure; the primordially instituting process begins again and again with impressional momentary data that immediately crystallize as coexistent objectlike formations and are systematically articulated; these formations are continually modified in retention while ordered articulations of succession are simultaneously constituted. But this retentional modification leads further and further into the one nil.

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[138] Editor: See Appendix 24: <Effect and Cause of Awakening> pp. 531ff.

[139] Editor: See "Consciousness and Sense—Sense and Noema," pp. 591ff.

What does this nil mean? It is the constant reservoir of objects that have achieved living institution in the process of the living present. In it, they are tucked away from the ego, but quite at its disposal. Heretofore their being consisted in nothing other than the process of their being experienced originally, that is, in their being-given-to-consciousness *originaliter* and remaining-held-in-consciousness in this process of a streaming, synthetic coinciding that forms identity. Where the retentional line of identity is concerned, this being and even this remaining-held-in-consciousness does not cease when the process has reached its end in the zero-point. The constituted object, the identical element, is no longer constitutively vivacious; thus, it is also no longer affectively vivacious, but the sense is still implicitly there in a "dead" shape; it is only without streaming life. It is not efficacious for new constituting—*notabene* for new, originally experiential constituting. How it can become efficacious and even [178] constitutively efficacious in a new shape is the problem of association. Initially, however, we want to say that every accomplishment of the living present, that is, every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes sedimented in the realm of the dead, or rather, dormant horizonal sphere, precisely in the manner of a fixed order of sedimentation: While at the head, the living process receives new, original life, at the feet, everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition of the retentional synthesis, becomes steadily sedimented.

One is only acquainted with sleep by waking up; so too here, and in an entirely original manner. Waking up sedimented sense can initially mean that it will become affective once more. And we do not need to rehearse how this is possible. As we have already mentioned, it is all the same whether we conceive empty presentations (empty intentions) that are still living as being awakened or ones that are already fast asleep. The motives must lie in the living present where perhaps the most efficacious of such motives (which we were not in a position to take into consideration) are "interests" in the broad, customary sense,

original or already acquired valuations of the heart[140], instinctive or even higher drives, etc.

Certainly, there is an unmistakable distinction between the awakening of the entirely submerged sphere, the distant sphere, and the awakening of empty intentions (or of their contents) that are still in wakeful life or that are standing on the edge of life. In the latter case the thing awakened is once again integrated into the originally living constitutive nexus—as has become clear with the example of the expansion of the near sphere through repetitive affection (the hammer blows). But the distant sphere, with its sedimentations of all previous accomplishments of previous living presents, yields an awakened sense by rousing any empty presentation that is related to what is in the distance; it yields a sense that stands outside of continual, living connection with the sense being constituted and coming to life in the moment of awakening. This is very significant. All intuitions and presentations, which are originally at home in the framework of the living present, that is, which belong to the continual unity of its syntheses and its downward directed movement of identity, are integrally related in the unity of this continuity. We speak without [179] further ado of integrally cohesive intuitions and of other kinds of presentations. The awakening of the submerged past, however, yields presentations that are not integrally cohesive with those of the living present. Accordingly, these syntheses in which these presentations can enter, by virtue of their affective force, together with the presentations that have arisen originally and that are capable of being constituted originally, stand in contrast to those syntheses of presentations that have arisen originally with each other. These syntheses have a fundamentally different character. We will have to pursue this further.

But first: Awakening is possible because the constituted sense is actually implied in background-consciousness, in the non-living form that is called here unconsciousness. Here awakening is also the production of an affective communication and therefore the production of a relevant synthesis, of an objectlike connection which, as connection, is actually produced like a simple object,

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[140] *Gemüt*

affective for itself. Once something is constituted in the manner of an object, it can connect with anything else that is already constituted as an object; in this instance, precisely two kinds of conditions are to be fulfilled, on the one hand, the conditions of content, of both senses of the objects, on the other hand, the conditions belonging to the consciousness of them. Only something that is grasped explicitly, that is, something that exercises an affection, can become connected in consciousness. Certainly, should the connection of both objects itself be given as a connection, that is, be given intuitively, so too must these objects be self-given. There is a further, important special case where the connection of objects should yield a unity of objects in the special sense of a connected whole understood most broadly. For this, the intuitive modes of consciousness of these objects must be integrally cohesive, fit together into the universal unity of a constitution encompassing them.

Awakening the obscure distance is initially an empty awakening. Where the content is concerned, the awakening is made possible in accordance with the principle that makes a unification with respect to content and affective communication possible in every present: The fundamental condition is namely the "similarity" of contrasting discrete matters, and everything belonging to it. One color can awaken a concealed color, a pronounced sound, a sound that has become masked. A rhythm can also awaken another rhythm, e.g., the rhythm of knocking [180] blows can awaken a similar rhythm of signal lights. (Insofar as this is the case, awakening can certainly transgress the sense-fields.) Through our analyses of the necessary structure of a living present, the vague principle of association of similarity and of contrast takes on a unequaled richer and deeper sense. In this structure lie all associative preconditions of content. The first synthesis, which is made possible through the affective communication gained by the transference of affective force, is of course precisely the synthesis of the similarity that has become currently given to consciousness, a similarity between the awakening and something presented in an empty manner, the awakened, this similarity in the essential noematic mode of the "recalling another."

If the matter rested here, precious little would be accomplished. Although the awakened element obviously lies in the direction prefigured by the course of the constituted past that has come to life as the past-directedness and, as it were, as the objectlike formation in the most distant past, what we naturally count as the past would still be quite far from being constituted. A genuine object to be grasped and disclosed as identically the same again and again is first constituted with the help of remembering, as we have already ascertained long ago. Even the past and the synthesis in the course of pasts, which are carried out in the small circle of the living present, does not yet yield the genuine constitution of the object, but rather, only a fundamental portion of its constitution.[141]

<§38. The Transition of Awakened Empty Presentations in Rememberings>

In the last lecture,[142] we stood before a new level and accomplishment of association. The first level, which we addressed under the rubric of primordial association, was that systematic or systematizing affective awakening that makes possible the objectlike structure of the living present, all kinds of original syntheses proper to the formation of unity of manifolds.

The second level, the one we just treated, was the awakening that radiates back, which illuminates once more the darkened [181] empty presentations, bringing the contents of sense implicit in them affectively into relief. Belonging here is the especially important case of awakening the presentations of the zero-sphere.

The third level is the level of the transition of such awakened empty presentations in reproductive intuitions, and that means here, rememberings.

One may well promulgate the principle with certainty that belonging in general to empty presentations that have undergone

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[141] Translator: In the last two instances, I have rendered *Gegenständlichkeit* as object. See "Translator's Introduction," Section 3.

[142] Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

an awakening is the tendency to transmute them into self-giving intuitions, which at any rate goes by way of rememberings.

In any case, the law holds that rememberings can only arise through the awakening of empty presentations. Accordingly, they can only appear as consequences of empty presentations, which for their part have arisen from an awakening in order to enter into the living present; rememberings that have arisen in the most immediate way only appear through the awakening of those empty presentations that arise in a fixed necessity of the structural elapse of a living present in itself. Thanks to the establishment of this origin the entire, essential lawful regularity of reproductive association is prefigured. It becomes entirely dependent upon the fulfillment of those lawful systems that make possible the association on the previous level, that is, make possible the awakening of empty presentations, whereby we already come back then, naturally, to the sense-structure of a living present and to the affective conditions proper to it generally. I hardly need to say that through this, the traditional laws of the association of similarity, of contiguity, of contrast in their obvious, but vague and entirely incomprehensible truth obtain an intelligible and precise sense through essential insight. However, the precision lies in the systematic analyses and affiliated laws.

Let us now examine the situation according to what is most essential. Let us take a distant awakening leading back in one blow from the present into a deeply lying layer of sediment in the zero-sphere, that is, into a submerged, distant past. There is now an empty presentation that makes us conscious of a past singular datum or of a singular connected nexus. Naturally, it is awakened [182] by a uniform or a very similar nexus in our present. Thus, a similar synthesis is necessarily given with it, a synthesis comparable to what must have been formed in the original present itself in a primordially associative manner, and therefore also with the noematic character of all association. The awakened element has itself the noematic character of something to-be-awakened through the awakening element (the character of recalling something).

Further: Just like, awakening and connection progress[143] in accordance with the standard of affective force within the primordial sphere of all associations, and are determined ever anew in it through the influxes of affective forces, so too [do they progress] with the arrival of the awakened distance. A firmly constituted objectlike nexus, only having fallen asleep, is awakened at a location, at the location of a present that has passed by. Note well that it is a matter here precisely of the objectlike formations, of the inner connections and prominences, the connections and orders that had actually just been constituted and are now forever enclosed in the zero-sphere. Naturally, the awakening can now progress, living on the affective force of what was first-awakened, potentially augmented through the stimulation of affective interests[144] etc. that arise in the progression. When awakening progresses, only individualized, especially strong sense-moments of the distant present in question will come into relief in the emptiness, just like rough contours in a dimly illuminated fog. An even more favorable case is when awakening passes over into remembering. Of course, this transition is carried out as the synthesis of identity; the synthesis of identity is the accomplishment of intuitive remembering, the accomplishment of the re-constitution of the objectlike formation, but in the mode of coming-back-again to something familiar, in the mode of being-presentified-again, not genuinely experiencing, but rather as if one would experience. Now the past present is reproduced in the vivacity of the noetic-noematic flux with all accomplishments—with all accomplishments of remembering, which in the ideal case, are completely intuitive, while in truth remembering wavers in clarity and distinctness, thus, mixed with empty moments, a middle stage between pure, complete intuition and empty presentation.

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[143] Translator: reading *fortschreiten* for *fortschreitet*.

[144] *Gemütsinteressen*

<§39. The Difference Between Continuous and Discontinuous Awakening> [183]

The greater richness of affective efficacy is advantageous to the progression of awakening. But it is clear that awakening is not tied to only one reproductive present; rather, it can pass over continuously or in leaps into the other layers of sedimentation.

The direction toward higher situated layers, that is, the direction forward into the relative future is prefigured in a regulative manner and *a priori* for the possible continuous progression, while only the progression of awakening that takes place in leaps is possible for the transition to the underlying layers. This is to be understood in the following manner: The reproductive tendency is a tendency toward the re-constitution of the objectlike formation under consideration. Thus, just as the original constitution as such is now a process directed forward into the future, so too is the re-constitution. The object is not in the present as something fixed and dead; rather, it becomes in the living constitutive nexus in which, moreover, it is not isolated; instead, in the intertwining of the becoming and being-transformed, it is a term in the process of becoming, the term of an objectlike-whole being shaped progressively.

The moment the tendency toward re-constitution starts to be realized, we stand in the process of becoming which is just what the tendentious memory strives to re-produce. Accordingly, here is the field of continual awakening. On the other hand, every awakening radiating back is naturally discontinuous, whether it goes near-by or into the distance. If the reproductive process goes tendentiously forward, then the impoverishment and submersion into the old zero-sphere is repeated in the process reproductively; the discrete awakening that radiates back can acquire something once again from the zero-sphere in repeated reproductive tendencies. The awakening can jump from one sedimented layer to another, which can be now higher, now deeper; it can jump in leaps and without any determinate order. In this way, manifold possibilities develop for rememberings that follow upon one another and that are entirely and immediately disjointed. Each one is characterized as a beginning expanse of streaming re-

constitution, but one that is sinking once more into powerlessness. All these rememberings are nevertheless referred back to the [184] continuously integrally cohesive system of sediments existing in concealment—a coherent nexus that would however only be reproductively realized if we would continuously reproduce, if we *could* continuously reproduce our entire life from the very beginning and in one stroke.

The emergence of rememberings yields a peculiar enrichment of that living, originally constituting present that we conceived heretofore in a necessary abstraction, purely as a process of immanent hyletic experience—of original experience. Now joining the particular intuitions of this living experience, which are connected in thoroughgoing internal continuity, that is, particular intuitions that cannot be isolated at all, are rememberings like tattered rags, rememberings arising from an entire previous experience that is reanimated. United in a certain way with the current present through association, they do not have any direct experiential connection with it, they arise in a narrow sense, disjoined. Different rememberings are also without an internal coherence between each other, where they emerge in leaps through discontinuous awakening. This difference between the interconnections arising from a constitutive continuity and the interconnections arising through a mere distant-awakening is highly significant. On the one hand, we understand from this that in the continuity of original experience the phenomenon of modalization cannot emerge—original experience is a nexus of thoroughgoing concordance in absolute necessity. Only first with remembering, in more general terms, with the phenomenon of reproduction does there arise the possibility of connecting discordances, the possibility of modalizations. Before we examine this more closely, we want to bring the principle contours of the theory of association quickly to a close.

<Chapter 4:
THE PHENOMENON OF EXPECTATION>

<§40. Motivational Causality Peculiar to Expectations>

We now turn our attention toward a new fundamental direction concerning the lawful regularity of association. It will already have occurred to you that I have, so to speak, kept dead silent [185] about the long familiar phenomenon of protention and of expectation in general—so essential to the structure of every original experience, and thus, to the sphere of the living present. All formation of unity and every nexus in experience is rooted in homogeneity, formal and material. Or, as we can also say, in uniformity or similarity. Homogeneity effects the institution of the unity of experience only in impression and retention, specifically, in the temporal form of the present and past in the constitutional form: enduring coexistence and the sequence of something enduring. The future, however, which as a more or less prefigured horizon belongs to the constituted objectlike formation, arises from the continuous and discrete protention according to the laws of the formation of expectation. The future does not fashion the unities of experience in the original sense, it presupposes them.

Yet viewed more precisely, we must recognize that even already in the hyletic primordial sphere of immanence, expectation is not only possible as the expectation of something futural. We have already alluded to the fact on various occasions that there is also an expectation within the impressional present, as is evidently the case with respect to the phenomenon of lacking a term which is otherwise part of configurations that exist in the synthesis of similarity. Something similar recalls something else that is similar, but it also allows something similar to be expected in coexistence, as in succession.

Obviously, all the analyses that we have undertaken are already presupposed for the elucidation of the phenomena of expectation, be they tied to the synthetic formations of coexistences or successions. The structural formation of a living hyletic sphere of the present occurs in the process of impressions and retentions under the essential conditions of fusion and segregation,

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connection at a distance proper to this process. This structural formation is presupposed in order for expectation to be able to make its own marks in this structure, and then in order for a fulfilled or annulled expectation to be able to occur as a future phenomenon.[145] It is quite evident that with expectation we [186] simultaneously move into the most original headwaters of modalization where genesis is concerned.

Memory—taken in the broadest sense, thus initially the most original retention—already precedes protention in what is elementary. If any kind of *a*, a sound for instance, is in the steady process of melting down new impressional phases, if it is, in other words, a course of continual connection corresponding to certain essential conditions in this original process of becoming, then a futural horizon, that is, an expectational horizon is immediately there along with it; a progressive process of becoming analogous to the previous becoming is expected according to the previous becoming, expected according to the same continual style of the course: If the invariability is of this or that qualitative and shaped content, then it is the invariability of a uniform content, and if it is variable, then the variability will likewise be prefigured, but according to the same style of variability as before. Thus, it is a matter of a necessary motivation: In accordance with what is given to consciousness retentionally, there is "to be expected" something new on its way having a uniform style. Obviously, the expectational presentation is characterized as a presentation of a new kind, specifically, as a presentation of a second level, as the replica of the more original presentation of the past. With respect to the object, what is expected is naturally not like what is perceived, that is, characterized as being in the flesh and as present; likewise, it is not characterized as what is remembered, as just-now, and in the subsequent expectation, what has previously been; but rather, it is characterized as in accordance with what has been, with its primordial image, as what is anticipated or as a projected image or model of being prior to its actual being.

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[145] The abstraction of a purely passive world of sensation must still be circumscribed more precisely. To be considered are kinaestheses as originally "free," "subjective" courses. Editor: See Appendix 25: <Kinaestheses and Potential Expectations>.

If we go beyond the momentary singularities that are immediately at work, existing at the head of the constitutive process, over to the successive nexuses constituted in an articulated manner, then every past constituted in a unified manner, that is, every succession flowing-off in a unitary manner, is projected into the future as an expectation, even if it has already become emptily presented. Accordingly, we have in the progression of experience on the one hand an ever new coexistence formed out of original experience itself, and on the other hand we have it interwoven with a structure of expectation, with a layer of anticipation, which is partly fulfilled by the experiencing, partly in conflict with the experiencing and [187] annulled. Naturally, we likewise have a progressive structure of expectation in the temporal series, anticipating the futural experiences on the basis of the coexistence that is already given, and anticipating the futural sequences of coexistences on the basis of the entire expanding sequence of coexistences that has heretofore run-off.

Let us examine the situation in the sphere of the living present more closely. The occurrence of something futural is expected through its similarity to what has occurred in the past, like already happens in the most primitive case of a steady protention. We must take as a basis unified data connected through community. If p is connected to q in the order of succession and p' uniform with p immediately occurs in the sequence, in other words, as a repetition, then (in accordance with what we said earlier) it recalls the p that is submerged in retention. The latter gets a shot of affective force and is passed on further to q. In this connection, the q' following the p' that has just occurred will also be expected in original essential necessity. This associative expectation obviously presupposes association as an awakening reference-back of "memory." Let us now advance one step further.

This also holds for the distant sphere provided that it has been awakened precisely in an associative manner. The distant p can be complex in any manner, an enduring complex, a coexistence that is potentially constituted successively by the approach of new terms to form a self-contained and then enduring connection, such that after it has become a self-contained configuration given to

consciousness, q then ensues. We then say, under the enduring "Circumstances" $C{=}q$ joined with p. If we assume that the Circumstances C would be constituted in a unitary manner in a previous situation of consciousness of the distant past and then a q had ensued; and if we assume in addition to this that now in the currently present new situation of consciousness, the similar Circumstances C' would have been (implicitly) repeated, then in the event that the previous C and their q have been awakened, the occurrence of q' will now also be necessarily motivated as arriving. If the awakening has become a distinct, clear remembering, then the occurrence of q' will be given in original evidence as something to be expected, and in particular, motivated by the memorial q in the previous situation C. Here we can [188] directly see motivational causality as a necessity; we can say in evidence: I expect q' here because I have experienced q under similar circumstances, and this "because-thus" is given in evidence.[146] Correlatively: I infer "inductively" in complete evidence the present, similar arrival from what has arrived under previous, similar circumstances. Like every inference, this too has necessity and yields in essential generalization an evident law of inference. Only that here the open possibility that something else will indeed occur belongs to the evidence of the motivation of something arriving as something to be expected.

<§41. Strengthening and Inhibiting Expectational Belief. The Function of Expectation for the Formation of Configurations>

It is further evident that the anticipatory belief of expectation has a differentiation of force, that is, a gradation, and that this force grows with the number of inductive "instances," that is, with the frequency of what has occurred under similar circumstances. It is likewise clear in the alternate direction that when under the Circumstances C, now q, now r, now s has occurred, exclusively, the motivated tendencies of expectation will be inhibited. It is likewise clear that the increase and the inhibition of intensity do

[146] Translator: The "because-thus" structure of motivation was also treated in *Ideas II*, especially, 238 ff., 241 ff., 244 f.

not merely emerge in a contingent and arbitrary manner, but rather can be motivated in a necessary and evident manner.

If for example earlier in the circumstantial situation *C*, *a b c* have occurred, and in the current similar situation *C'*, *a'* has occurred, then according to what we already said, *b'* and then *c'* are naturally motivated as arriving. If now, however, *b'* has actually occurred, then obviously *c'* is doubly motivated, since here the law gets applied once more. Thus, the occurrence of the expected *b'* does not only ratify the expectation, which was already awakened by the occurrence of *a'* and was also mediately awakened for the arrival of *c'*; it also strengthens this expectation.[147] If the motivational situation is clear, that is to say, if the awakened, previous situation of consciousness and what has occurred in it has resulted in a clear remembering, then the [189] motivations and their augmentation are also given in evidence, that is, the confirmations and the corroborations in their graduation are also given in evidence along with every actual occurrence of a term of the series concerned.

Let us note, moreover, that when in the place of an expected *a* only a part, α occurs, the supplementary part β is now "missing," it is "lacking." Indeed, proper to expectation is a certain coinciding between the present and the associatively awakened remembered past, the retentional past and potentially the past that is distant from us; and the surplus of fulfillment as the surplus of a coinciding, the surplus of too much and too little, becomes prominent within the coinciding; what has not occurred stands there in the consciousness of "lack."

Likewise, with the other types. If *a* has repeatedly emerged under certain circumstances or as a final term in a regular sequence, and if the corresponding expectation is there through associative awakening, then the absence, the non-occurrence becomes salient, the expectation is disappointed; the present temporal field, that is, the sense-field is filled out, but filled out "otherwise." And it does so of course in conflict with the content

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147 *a b c*
a' b' c'
b' c'

of the current sense-field that is actually realized. In the further progression of the genesis of consciousness such an absence acts as a diminution of the force of expectation that has been gathered through repetition. In the clear reproduction and reference-back of the present situation to the previous situations, the positively and negatively motivating instances become evident, each newly emergent having-been motivates with uniform force, each one speaks with uniform force in favor of a reoccurrence, each absence likewise speaks against it, and this "speaking in favor of" and "speaking against" is given here in evidence. But in the empty sphere of retention the forces—and with them also the forces of expectation, blind like any drive—are [either] compounded [or] inhibited; in any event, the typicality and lawful regularity of expectation is, we see, thoroughly dependent upon the typicality and lawful regularity of reproductive association and thereby is also mediated by the typicality and lawful regularity of original association in the livingly streaming sphere of the present.

If one configuration has formed a prominent, specially bound unity through the affective forces governing in it, then the force will radiate out from it to accentuate objects that will fulfill the [190] conditions for forming a uniform configuration—initially within the same living present. The part "demands" the whole—something uniform awakens something else that is uniform, which is not yet at all constituted as a unity explicitly for itself; and it does not demand the whole by a pure and simple awakening, but rather by a co-connected "expectation," by the demand as coexisting as co-belonging to the unity. Even the force of this apperceptive expectation increases with the number of "instances"—or with habit, which amounts to the same thing. At the same time, a more forceful formation of unity occurs here—a habitual one—as the regularity of the expectation being ratified; on the other hand, [we experience] the disappointment that accompanies becoming conscious of the lack of the habitual [connection], and [we experience] the disappointment that accompanies becoming conscious of something other than the habitual [object expected].

With the number of instances, I said. Reflecting on it more precisely, what does that mean? If a plurality of data emerge in the

same present as it continues to develop, data that can go together with the configuration in question, then the entire configurations in question will be awakened by the awakening that reaches back and that issues from the particularities. And these configurations radiating ahead in a protentional-expectational manner will awaken the projected image or model of this configuration, allowing it to be expected, and through this the coalescence of the configuration will simultaneously be favored once more as fulfillment. In this way, the anticipation is at work "apperceptively," it is co-productive in the configuration of the coexisting objects.

Naturally it is exactly the same with respect to the apperceptive efficacy of the distant pasts with respect to the influence that they exert upon the formation of new configurations by awakening their already configured unities: here continually according to "uniformity," which can be "great" similarity. The past configurations that have been awakened overlap with the present, and are capable of being generated as similar in this present, in this way they become generated and are then coincident with the old ones, they are "familiar"—not individually, but rather according to their type.

The unity of apperception that has become, the configuration in this motivation, is surrounded by configurations that are awakened and that are similar to it, coinciding with it in obscurity. At the same time, the nexus of the terms of the configuration is not merely a nexus with respect to content, like when the nexus has become a fusion, forming a special unity beyond the particularities by virtue of the affective circumstances, but rather apart from [191] affective motivation, which governs selectively in the configuration. (Various figures could have been formed out of the chaos, and could still be formed, but the path of awakening that was privileged favored the path of special unifications of a lower and higher level up to the entire configuration in question.) A unity of integral togetherness has become a unity in which the terms, the connections of subordinate levels (the parts), refer to one another as to be expected reciprocally in being together, as being demanded reciprocally and fulfilling this demand. The integral togetherness—the unity formed from habitual

connectedness (and by virtue of diverse experience)—the force of unity, increases with the frequency. Finally, the unity is surrounded by an open and clear horizon of something long familiar and of something that has been experienced this way time and again, and will also be found this way at once in the new instance with "empirical certainty," and it presents itself as such a whole without further ado.[148]

[148] The formation of a type.

<DIVISION 4: [192]
THE IN-ITSELF OF THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS>

<Chapter 1:
ILLUSION IN THE REALM OF REMEMBERING>

<§42. Overlapping, Fusion, and Conflict of Rememberings of Different Pasts>

The question concerning the intensification and inhibition of associative awakenings naturally demands a fundamental investigation. The living force of awakening, which radiates out from the impressional present, flows over into the retentional sedimentations of memory in accordance with the principle of similarity: The prominent intentional objects, the singularities and connected complexes of the intuitive present, link up with similar objectlike formations that are implicitly constituted in memorial sedimentations; they radiate toward them *via* the awakening force. But actual prominence and then further, awakening, reproductive renewal, is only of benefit to few. The awakening forces can reciprocally combine with one another, but can also inhibit one another, and it remains a question upon what the actual revival and reproduction can depend when the departing force has a uniform level of intensity. A uniform object with a uniform force of prominence necessarily has behind itself another consciousness that has run-off, that is, another horizon to be revived; and something that gets remembered at one time through the associative force of the respective object, and at another time, that does not get remembered, depends upon its formation. It remains a question how far essential insight reaches into this dark sphere of retention. It is otherwise in the realm of already reproductively developed memories and of the expectations that are awakened through them. There are obviously many kinds of clear essential

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laws here whose systematic delineation would be an important task.

I would now like to say something that relates to the problem I posed earlier and not yet solved: how memories can become discordant, how a muddle of different pasts is possible, and how the appearance[149] of a unitary past, which later turns up through splitting as illusion, as mixture [is possible]. [193]

Remembering—more or less empty, or again, more or less intuitable, right to the *limes* of ideal reproduction—is according to our presentation nothing other than the phenomenon of awakening the past objectlike formation that was constituted in the original living present and has sunken back into retention, and has finally become completely void of force. Thus, just as this process of wakeful consciousness, of the wakeful constitution of consciousness and of the sinking into quiescent sleep is a process that never breaks off, and therefore the sediments of the unconscious element are continuously layered upon one another, so too is the potentiality of awakening one that continues to infinity. And it is evident then that belonging ideally to every remembering is a possible continuity of awakening, a continuity of possible rememberings that will lead to the living present in which we stand right now. Every single remembering and every such continuous series must, it seems, be concordant. How should an "error," an "illusion" have sense here? Certainly, it is merely a reproduction of something already there in the unconscious, and this is itself something that has arisen from original constitution. Since this original constitution fashions sense originally, it certainly cannot falsify its sense. What is that supposed to mean? But remembering as mere reproduction is not in a position to do that either. Remembering would then indeed be productive in a peculiar sense, in a way that is incomprehensible at first glance.

If we have not demonstrated a source of sense at all for such concepts as illusion, error, nullity in the sphere we have considered up to now, this would seem to be a fault in the theory. For we already know that remembering can be deceptive even in the immanent sphere. Accordingly, we must first discover the

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[149] *Anschein*

source of this deception and therefore the origin of this concept of deception.

If we ask how discordance is possible, if we thereby ask how an overlapping and interpenetration of memories, which belong to [194] diverse pasts, is possible genetically, then we must point to the following: Memories emerge as awakenings of components of the subsoil of memory. The latter contains ordered sedimentations—layered in a fixed order—of all particular retentions, of all presents that have been constituted. If now several retentions occupying diverse positions in this order are awakened together by virtue of what they have in common, awakened from an awakening present or from an already reproduced memory, then these retentions will never be able to be remembered at the same time in a completely intuitive manner. It is an essential law in general that the original temporal field can only be filled out once in a completely intuitive manner. That is to say that even the perceptual present does not allow one remembering to become completely intuitive at the same time as and as long as it, the perception, is actually completely intuitive. The moment we put ourselves back into the past and in this way actually see intuitively, we are removed from the perceptual present, or we experience a peculiar competition. At one time we have the full intuitive present, then a clear memorial image breaks forth, then the one shines through the other, which however is damaging with respect to the intuitability of both. The same holds to a still higher degree where two reproductions are in question from the very beginning. Each one constitutes a fulfilled temporal field in the stable, steady formal system of the living Now and of what has just-been, and this formal system can only function constitutively once, can only be filled out one time, namely, in completely intuitive, i.e., actual constitution. What is given in the unity of a full intuition is given as a present with a fresh past belonging to it. In general, the living present as a formal system of original constitution is only given originally once in a lived-experiential manner.

Now, if both memories have a uniform affective force from the very beginning, a contest will ensue. The least fortification of affection, then, will give a preference to one of the reproductions, and depending upon the circumstances, will lead *mutatis mutandis*

to its reanimation and then to the break through of its continued development and to a transition to the other reproduction. If there is a bridging term of similarity between both reproductions, that is, [195] an association, then both intuitions that undergo a transition from one to the other coincide in a congruent manner according to this term; they are gradually fused through this term in the transition, and fused without distance if they are completely uniform. Let us take the case of reproductive association in genesis, which indeed implies an order in the emergence. If a reproduction brings into play another reproduction through its bridging term *a*, then the awakening *a* must coincide with the awakened *a'*, and in such a manner that initially the awakening one covers over the awakened one by virtue of the force of the completely intuitive memorial situation which forms the point of departure; that is, it does not allow it to push through properly to an intuition. For the increase of force that is apportioned to it will, reaching back, also become advantageous to the force of the awakening *a*. But where the similarity is very great, in particular, where an identity of sense is constituted (which the similar terms carry within themselves, for instance, as appearances of the same [sense]), there exists a tendency toward complete fusion. Through the similar terms that are coinciding with one another and becoming fused with one another, both reproductions stand in a relation of overlapping with respect to their temporal fields. What extends beyond the coinciding similar terms, coinciding in the sense of a congruence, also exists in a certain negative coinciding, in a relation of conflict, but in a certain relation of correspondence—namely, corresponding to the generally uniform structure of both temporal fields and the fields of coexistence proper to them, like the sense-fields.

Every[150] remembering constitutes in an intuitive manner a fulfilled temporal field as a reproductive "present" that is in the process of becoming constituted; it is a "present" of a fixed formal system to which all alteration with respect to content is bound: inalterably a Now and a continuum of just-having-beens. While a remembering seizes hold, so to speak, of this formal system and

[150] Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

fills it intuitively, no other remembering can be there, namely, as an actually intuitive remembering. But it can be awakened, and only through the victory of the other remembering that is taking place intuitively, [can it be] suppressed. Two intuitions find themselves in competition such that each one has approximately [196] the same overpowering force, and in contrast to all the other affective stirrings. Then the least priority of reproductive force, which will be of benefit to the one, or rather, to its preliminary stage (the awakened retention), will allow it to break through to an actual intuition whereby the opposing intuition becomes forestalled and suppressed. This can lead to a change, a transition from the one intuition to the other. A certain coinciding of the sense-contents can already occur here. A coinciding according to commonalties takes place essentially with each transition of consciousness; and, after all, there can never be a lack of such commonalties; for at least the temporal form is something held in common, even possibly where something spatial is remembered, something extended in a local field, the local shape.

But in general, that is a mere overlapping of images, a concealment that in itself does not produce any fusing, any unifying synthesis that is tied to the conditions of content. However, the matter is otherwise if an associative connection exists between both reproductions, noematically speaking, if the one thing reproduced reminds us of the other. The similar bridging terms form precisely a bridge that allows the one reproduction not only to flow over to the other in the transition, and proceeding from the awakened bridging term of the other side, to the contiguous bridging terms. For in this case the common bridging terms coincide in a special way. They fuse, each one with a different intimacy according to its similarity; they are congruent most intimately when they are uniform or even when they reach a congruence of identity through an identity of sense constituted in them.

Let us consider this case of reproductive association in its genetic development; an order of becoming is sketched out here. The one reproduction R, the associating one, arouses the other reproduction R' through its bridging term a. The bridging term a initially awakens the other term a', and in such a way that a, being

congruent with *a'*, not only covers it, but fuses with it by virtue of the materially relevant similarity; and the covering over in question here only means that the *a'* does not achieve its own intuition, that in its own being it is in the mode of repression, and yet according to a common sense in which *a* is maintained, it has entered into this common sense.

The awakening that spreads out from the *a'* now tends to bring the *R'* progressively to intuition (tracing the connective lines of contiguity), and intuition can set in gradually, in sections or as a whole: But it does this in conflict with the intuition *R*. [197]

We note here that even the non-congruent regions of *R* and *R'* stand in a certain coinciding. We could well characterize the incongruence of the fields of *R* and *R'* extending beyond *a* or *a'* as a negative coinciding or as a covering over. In a certain, systematic way they correspondingly refer to one another: such that the one correspondent is in conflict with the other, such that the intuition of the one suppresses that of the other. Thus for both especially, the forms held in common correspond to one another: The temporal form, "original present" of *R*, is in a relationship of correspondence with the temporal form of *R'* according to this or that Now, and according to every level of what has been, such that through the common form the correspondents cover over each other in an incompatible manner; in the form, Now, the reproduced element can be given only once, and the other reproduction awakened in this form must meanwhile remain repressed. This also holds for the forms of coexistence that run through the stream of lived-experience under constant formal coinciding: for the realms of sensation, the forms of sense-fields proper to them, the analogy of the spatial form as the form of the optical field with its localities and of the spatial form of the tactile field. But also, on the other hand, with respect to the constantly constituted transcendent thing-world, the spatial form, and specifically in its constant mode of orientation. These forms produce a connection insofar as, when *R* is intuitable, the *R'* that is awakened through it is not only awakened in general with is sense-content. Rather, the original form of temporal orientation belonging invariably to the sense-content of *R'*, the field-forms belonging to the realms of sensation of the *R'*—all the like has a

necessary and original affinity to the corresponding forms in the *R* that has become intuitable, coinciding intentionally with it. But what is formed in the concretion of the *R* excludes what is formed in the concretion *R'*. They can only become intuitable one after the other.[151]

<§43. The Possibilities of a Repressed Memory Breaking through to Intuition. The Disclosure of Illusion through the Transition to Higher Levels of Clarity> [198]

If, now, the affective force of *R* and the affective force of its inner affective connections is depleted to such an extent that the corresponding forces of *R'* become preponderate, then various possibilities are given.

1) Either (and this is the most obvious one) the terms in the connection emerge out of the dark; the reproduction spreads out from here, moving along the connections, and is raised to increasing clarity, and finally, the entire past present comes completely to life. (Every element that becomes vivacious represses the corresponding element of *R*, corresponding to the formal systems of succession and coexistence.) This implies that the entire affiliated temporal field stands there concretely filled out, but also that as the process of bringing to intuition progresses, as it radiates back to the bridging term, the latter breaks away from its coinciding and fusion with its complementary term. Now it comes to an intuition for itself for the first time. We then completely live, as it were, a portion of the past present. The associating situation, the current present or the first memorial situation *R* from which the awakening departed, is entirely submerged.

2) But there is also another possibility. By virtue of their own affective force, the interrelated elements of the stimulating intuition *R* stand their ground. On the other hand, by breaking through, the elements of the associative situation triumph. Both

[151] *Nota*: Earlier, I introduced protention as the title for anticipatory intentions. In this case I should strongly emphasize that the empty intentions which are found in memories are not anticipatory protentions; this also follows from what was said earlier. They are not anticipations of perceptions, but rather of memories. This requires more consideration.

can prevail without linking up, whereby each one of these *disiecta membra* bears its own protentional horizon of the repressed supplementary elements for consciousness. The fixed forms as frameworks are then spottily filled out with the contents of *R* and *R'*. This is similar and in fact essentially related to what happens in the competition within the visual fields—and for good reasons. Here we have parallel phenomena: the alternating victory of an optical image that is in itself unitary and concordant. Then the phenomenon of the piebald muddle, which also gives itself as a muddle. And finally, the phenomenon that we now find with [199] reproductions as well, the phenomenon of a combined image. In fact, rememberings can link up to form a connected remembering that has joined the elements of different memories into an intuitively concordant image. What makes the fusion into an illusory image is the force of apperception: If the components *a* and *b* have frequently been connected in a present and have been connected to form the unity of an objectlike formation, like they occur together here in an intuitive manner in the irruption of memories overlapping with one another (and in the irruption of the forms of temporal fields becoming momentarily fused through overlapping), then the components *a* and *b* will here, too, be taken as connected in the form of the unity of such an objectlike formation. But this unitary perception and the unitary intuitive image is an illusion. That is to say, to put it at first in a suggestively rough and provisional manner: The components *a* and *b* are, now as before, elements of intentional wholes, they have repressed supplementary elements that protest from the subsoil against the demands directed in the illusory image from *a* to *b* and vice versa, and they protest above all against their reciprocal fulfillments, although the protests are too weak, not loud enough to lead to a clear doubt and to a negation. But the illusion will be disclosed as illusion as soon as the affective force of the suppressed one becomes livelier and even now wins out, as soon as it leads to a reproductive development and to an unfolding, and now both the situations and their segregated temporal fields diverge intuitively, and each one developed to completeness and clarity. The illusory image will show itself in these transitions precisely as a conglomeration and fusion of

different memorial images that are concordant in themselves, and the suppressed element within the fusion and its force of belief will come to life behind the fusion.

Let us expound upon these thoughts in a more precise manner and bring them to a conclusion so that what is essential will come to the fore. We spoke of protests that would be too weak to be able to break through and become "audible"; we spoke of the suppressed protests possibly coming-to-life—what is implied in this line of speaking? How are we to understand the unity of a memorial image and the corresponding concordance of the deceptive memorial belief that must abandon its unitariness in the [200] alterations of such affective transformations and that must let itself be discredited as illusion? How do we understand this discrediting itself, this claim to legitimacy and rejection of it? Obviously the gradation of clarity plays a great role here. We pose the question: Would it be conceivable that a memory, a unity of reproductive intuition in which a unitary objectlike formation is intuited according to coexistence and succession, would ever become dubious and negated if it were to remain presented in constant graduating clarity as identically the same intuitable givenness? Would it be conceivable that a reproductive intuition of ideally complete clarity could become negated by just any affective transformation, by just any synthesis with other rememberings? To pose such a question means to answer in the negative. A remembering that offers an "illusory image," an image that is to be parceled out to different rememberings, cannot be a completely clear one. All mixtures take place in the mode of unclarity. Only in unclarity can motivations, can expectations, potential coherent nexuses, their reciprocal fortifications and inhibitions, lose their efficacy, entire layers of the like can become, as it were, dimmed down; they lose their affective relief, fade away into the background. Every disclosure of an illusion is carried out in the transition to higher levels of clarity, just as every disclosure of a reproduced intuition through continual confirmation takes place in the progressive clarification of what is less clear.

<Chapter 2:
THE TRUE BEING OF THE SYSTEM OF THE IMMANENT PAST >

<§44. Confirmation of Self-Givennesses by Expanding into the Outer Horizon, on the One hand, and by Approximating the Idea of Absolute Clarity, on the Other>

In[152] our summary of the previous lecture with respect to the disclosure of a deception or an illusion in the sphere of [201] remembering, we said that the illusion as illusion is disclosed in principle only in the transition to higher levels of clarity. The illusion that is not disclosed is only possible in a self-giving consciousness of a relatively lower level of clarity—principles which by the way hold quite generally for deceptions and for the disclosure of deceptions—something that we will expound upon further here. Every confirmation is a process of bringing something concealed to light, a process of bringing it to the clarity of self-giving. If for their part self-givings admit of further confirmations and the free ego actively demands them and aspires toward them, then as we know this implies that a self-giving also has, generally, its concealments, and that what remains within it in an empty or veiled manner can be brought to the light of clarity, namely, in the form of new self-givings. We know further that verification can take place positively and negatively, essentially, in two mutually related types, the concordantly confirming and the disconfirming. Even these processes can take place in a medium of unclarity, of potential emptiness, of mere intending. For their part, these processes are self-givings for the true and the not-true, that is, for verified being or invalidated being, the nullity, only insofar as the self-givings take place "in the clear light of day" for the moments of the object as their self-givings related to the moments of the object in an accomplishing manner—thus, insofar as the synthesis of fulfillment actually imparts the fullness of the self to the emptiness; and likewise for the negation, insofar as the conglomeration [having arisen] through overlapping, the

[152] Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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suppression of the suppressed (i.e., of one party struggling for the intuitable validity) has become visible. Therefore, a progression to newer and newer, richer and richer clarity, namely, to the clarity of self-giving belongs to the essence of all processes of confirmation, processes that in this way confirm in an evident manner. But in this case not only does the progression to further clarity play a role in general, that is, the mere progression of self-giving to self-giving; also playing a role is the progression to higher levels of clarity. This is especially essential, we believe, for the disclosure of an illusion.

Let us take this up more clearly. Confirmations of empty presentations lead to self-giving presentations which themselves demand confirmation once more. But now, two things belong to the confirmation of a self-giving: First, the synthetic apposition of new self-giving intuitions with respect to those components of [202] self-giving that are merely appresentational and not really presentational, that is, not actually already self-giving for the objectlike formation in question. Elements or sides of an object, of an object that is self-given in an intuition, can remain outside of genuine self-giving (for instance, with each external perception, say, of a house, the non-visible sides and parts of the house), we distinguish something that is genuinely perceived, genuinely presented, from something that is merely co-perceived, but genuinely speaking which is as yet only intended in an empty manner. We also speak of an empty outer horizon. And precisely with respect to remembering. A situation or a process extending further on in time, like a symphony, appears intuitively, but upon closer inspection only elements of the situation, small segments of the symphony, are genuinely self-given, even though we do "mean" or "intend" the whole. Thus even here we have a merely appresented outer horizon.

Secondly, like external perception remembering, too, has an "inner horizon," namely, with respect to the element already presented, with respect to the element that has already achieved self-giving. Even this genuine self-giving makes still another confirmation possible. Hence, required for the confirmation of the concrete, full self-giving is not only the foray into the outer horizon and its fulfillment through appropriate genuine self-

givings, but all these self-givings demand confirmation once again, namely, progressive clarification. "Progressing": Here is the place of the gradations of clarity. All self-giving, specifically, all self-giving that is already limited to actual presentation, stands under laws of the gradation of "clarity" by which we understand in the most general sense a gradation of self-giving whose ideal *limes* is an absolute or "pure" self-giving; absolute clarity is only another word for this. This "pure" is to be understood, for instance, like the "pure red" in the series of entirely different gradations, those of the nuances of red. In both, there is a consciousness of graduation that is continually progressing in the process of self-givings, a consciousness in which the idea in question is self-given as an evidently motivated anticipation, as a degree that is never self-given, and yet is self-given in evidence as an anticipatorily motivated *limes*, self-given precisely as "idea." [203] The further this graduating process goes on, the clearer and purer the self-giving is with respect to the *limes*. All self-givings are full of such gradations, and, I said, all self-givings are potentially operative in such gradations; and by this we also mean that it concerns a universal law of consciousness in general. For consciousness not only exists, but consciousness exists in the form of the self-giving, in the form of a constant original self-giving *qua* perception, and in the form of a self-giving in the form of reproductive memory.

Examining this more closely, we will see however that immanent perception is only a perceptual self-giving with reference to possible immanent rememberings. Certainly, it originally constitutes a self [of the object], but a self that is identical and identifiable for the ego only by virtue of the manifold possible rememberings, which for their part are thoroughly subject to the law of gradation of all self-giving. A self, an object, we already said earlier, is only there with reference to the active ego, "available" for it as something that remains at its disposal, something identifiable again and again. And precisely for this reason, we already speak of a constituted self in the passive sphere because the conditions for something being freely at our disposal are already prefigured there. They are prefigured there for the immanent constitution of inner perception through corresponding

rememberings, which, even if to a restricted extent, are a realm of freedom, of free generation, of the free graduation of clarity, like the realm of free expansion in the form of the fulfillment of the empty intentions in a persistent continuation in the series of newer and newer rememberings. An immanent self that has been primordially instituted is a constant possible telos for the active ego on the basis of possible rememberings; or rather it is a member of a realm of being in itself that is a universally possible telos for this ego. The path to it however is the path of attaining it, the path that is called confirmation, positive and negative. According to what has been presented, it is a dual path: the path of expanding self-giving through the broadening of rememberings, and the path of the self-givings that have already been won, self-givings approaching their *limes*, approaching the idea of absolute clarity.

<§45. The Primordial Transcendence of the Past of Consciousness and the Idea of its Complete Self-Giving>[153] [204]

Consider this significant point: All self-givings that are called upon to bring out the self of the object (here in the sphere of memory, but likewise in all spheres) as a true and identifiable self that is available, are in a certain sense "transcendently" giving intentional lived-experiences; this concerns all self-givings that enter into a possible active identification. Lived-experiences of remembering arise in the immanence of the primordial present, but what they presentify once again, the past, is transcendent to the lived-experience and to the entire stock of things constituted originally in the present. In this way, our own entire past of consciousness is given to us in a transcendent manner in the respective present, an entire past of consciousness that can be expanded any way one likes through new rememberings. Thus, every self-giving here has its own transcendent [self], and every

[153] Editor: See Appendix 26: <Repetition and Essential Identity of Rememberings> pp. 536ff., and Appendix 27: <Two Fundamental Concepts of Evidence: Self-Giving as Such and Pure Self-Giving> pp. 538ff.

self is transcendent in an original and a good sense—this certainly presents us with a curious paradox.

The stream of consciousness and its immanent time is the first transcendent in the manner of a primordial source, namely, it is the transcendent self, which in the immanence of the originally streaming present is primordially instituted, and then through rememberings issues in a self-giving and a verification of the self that are freely at our disposal in just this present. The stream of consciousness lives with streaming, and simultaneously becomes objectlike, objective for its ego; the stream of consciousness becomes an object as the transcendent self that comes to incomplete and approximate self-giving in rememberings and in syntheses of remembering of a particular present. For the ego it corresponds to the idea of a true self, to the idea of the true past of consciousness, as the idea of complete self-giving. According to what we said previously in a general manner, this idea is two-fold: The one concerns the orientation toward clarity and its *limes*, the other toward expansion, insofar as the entire self of the stream of consciousness is in question. Obviously, and in a curious way, this idea is itself essentially a streaming one because here the object, namely consciousness, is precisely a stream that carries out within [205]
itself ever new primordial institutions. In just a bit we will want to address what holds for the primordial transcendence of remembering, that is, what holds for the primordial self, for the primordial objectlike formation that is constituted in the streaming of the living present as the existing stream of consciousness in the universal form of immanent time—that this also holds for transcendence in the customary sense, for the objective world, and correlatively for the realm of external perceptions. This transcendence of the spatial world is a transcendence of a second order; in relation to it, the stream of consciousness is called an immanent object.

But before I go further in this direction, let us complete our analysis that we have undertaken with good reason in the primordial sphere of remembering, and in particular with respect to the gradations of clarity. At the basis of every remembering is a retention that was prominent from the very beginning or has come into relief through a subsequent associative awakening. Its

awakening entails being singled out from the memorial background. Through remembering it has become a revived self-giving, which as a reconstitution essentially runs continually toward the present at least for a time, but then for self-evident reasons is able to follow in both directions in leaps. Essentially, every portion of self-giving is more or less clear, and this gradation of clarity is *eo ipso* the gradation of the fulfillment of the underlying corresponding moments of the empty retention, the gradation of bringing the self of retention's empty sense to intuition. We also call this gradation a gradation of disclosure because essentially the intuitability not only has an awakening force in general, but an increasing awakening force; it increases according to the level of clarity. Correspondingly, along with the increase of clarity there are more and more differentiations of sense that become distinguished and that come to the fore in self-givenness. Thus, the inner horizon is disclosed more and more when we ascend through repeated rememberings of the same [inner horizon] from an unclear self-giving to clear ones. And even where no new differences are discernible, there is, in the graduation, a more intense fulfillment and approximation to the true self, to the anticipatory ideal *limes* of complete clarity, to the *limes* of the idea of absolute fulfillment. Naturally, running [206] through every such series of graduation, which is carried out in the unity of a consciousness, is a synthesis of coinciding that forms identities, namely, through coinciding according to the same sense and according to the same graduating self, or rather, a graduation according to the content of the self, according to the content of truth. We can also say: We are conscious of what appears in the mode of the self as something determined closer and closer, determined ever more completely (here we do not mean it is determined predicatively).

Accordingly, the degree of concealment is also to be characterized as a degree of relative indeterminacy, of relative poverty, emptiness, which runs through every self-giving. Self-giving is always an incomplete fullness, that is, fullness that is attenuated by emptiness. It has an inner horizon of emptiness in the form of attenuation. In those syntheses of the graduation of clarity we are also conscious of a deficiency that occurs in the

transition because of the coinciding that overlaps. In the *limes* we would thus have the idea of an unattenuated self, of a self that could no longer be satiated any further, and this is the norm of all approximation, the norm of the true having-been; it is the true self of every having-been that is intended.

But in place of pure series of gradation, through which runs the concordance of ratifying belief, there can also be syntheses of discordance; it can happen that in the graduation of clarity, a part of what is self-given gets progressively fulfilled and continues to progress in the sense of an approximation, but that the accompanying process of the expansion of self-giving, which radiates out from this place, will lead, with the clarification, to clear and clearer and clearer supplementary elements that clash with the corresponding elements of the entire image given originally in relative unclarity. The image splits into two images, remembering into two rememberings referring to different pasts; each one maintains itself in increasing clarity. In the condition of complete inner clarity, only one remembering can be concordant, and all other completely clear rememberings are either mere repetitions of it or they harmonize in a system of integral togetherness. That is to say that if one follows through with every such remembering, completing it, to the point of fulfilling its empty outer horizons, and if one does so again and again, then this operation will yield one and the same complete self for every clear [207] remembering: The completion of every clear remembering leads to the same temporal nexus, to a single filled temporal nexus of immanent having-beens.

On the other hand, conflict also belongs in a certain way to the sphere of ideally clear remembering; that is to say, with the corresponding conditions of the community of sense, overlapping and a partial coinciding, partial repression can be generated, and the synthesis of conflict can be produced. But if a mixed image is also to be possible in ideal clarity then it is indeed necessarily crossed out here. The easiest way for you to see how something like this is possible is to imagine "in phantasy," as we say, that a house which is presented in memory is displaced onto another street, and to do this in full clarity, but yet in a way that has been crossed out in evidence.

However, if we take normal rememberings, then the gradation of clarity and the reference back to an ideal self belong to their essence, but such that both cases of determining more closely and of determining otherwise, of verifying approximation to the self or of negation are essentially open. But necessarily belonging to the latter case is the fact that parts of self-giving are confirmed through verification, [whereas] crossing out concerns lumping together things that do not belong together.[154]

What we expounded upon earlier did not merely present us with special features for a theory of remembering and for the theory of a norm of true being that essentially rules over the manifold of possible rememberings of an ego. Essentially, and understood from *a priori* laws of genesis, living, streaming consciousness contains a realm of true being that gets continually richer. But in accordance with the primordial institution in constant identity with itself, it becomes an abiding realm of true being, a realm of objectlike formations in themselves that are pregiven, available for the active ego and its active apprehension, identification, verification, and invalidation: But not only available in a current experience, but rather as a lasting and an enduring in-itself; in a certain respect, the actual process of experience is incidental to [208] this in-itself. To be sure, this in-itself of the stream of consciousness is on another level of being by virtue of the fact that its future is not likewise in itself.

We must make the marvelous feature of this situation abundantly clear. Consciousness is not only a streaming original present in which rememberings occasionally show up, and lived-experiences do not merely follow upon one another in the process of streaming through the steady form of this primordial present, and not only are there lived-experiences in an ordered sequence, in a fixed temporal form, lived-experiences that make up a unity of a past stream terminating in an ever new present. Rather, that this is the case is a fact that is available for the ego. It is a truth that it can ascertain as an active ego. The stream of consciousness up to the Now is a true being and it is for the ego, whether it notices <it> or

[154] The important supplementary exposition belongs here (pp. 260ff.).

not.[155] Every past lived-experience has been: in itself. And yet [it is there] for the ego, namely, in such a way that it is something available, something truly existing, something recognizable for the ego. If that were not the case, then we would not be able to speak about a stream of consciousness at all, and we can easily see that if it were not its nature to bear within itself an "in-itself," a true being of consciousness itself (according to the primordial conditions of passivity that make active cognition possible), then in a world that is already constituted objectively-externally, no empirical ego could attribute to another ego a stream of consciousness and everything else we reckon with it. It is therefore the most radical problem of a transcendental logic to understand how—in the streaming egoic life that is the life of consciousness—this life itself can be constituted as a true being; as a true being, I say, that is, as the ideal correlate of possible verification, as an ideal norm which, according to essential laws, lies in consciousness, and more precisely, in the self-givings belonging to it. And this ideal norm is implicitly contained within consciousness, so that later in its freedom the ego can seize hold of it and can make it manifest. In this case, the true self that is to be disclosed in the processes of concordant clarification is essentially not something fortuitous and fleeting, belonging only to this process as its momentary *limes*. Indeed, two self-givings, two rememberings, which emerge in a synthesis of identity as rememberings of the same past, can essentially turn up as rememberings of something different. But for essential reasons, the connecting consciousness of identity cannot be annulled if both terms are verified in a continual identity with themselves as they continuously approach the *limes*. The synthetic consciousness "*A* is identical to *B*" is essentially transformed if *A* and *B* approach their *limes* in a parallel manner and are verified as true, both of them in a pure self-giving of identity; then the identity is also given as a true self. Accordingly, belonging to every true being, once manifest, is the ideal possibility of repeating a pure self- [209]

[155] In the lecture: Objectivated consciousness as a first universe, as a totality of objects. But I forgot to say that this totality does not only have a mobile endpoint in the Now, but also a beginning—as a problem. I made an allusion to the parallel between the universe as object and its reference back to the universe of consciousness.

giving, and all iterations are capable of being integrated into a synthesis of identification and only of identification, according to which the true is thus the identical and unique, like the corresponding identity itself. Certainly, all that would remain hidden, that is, the ego would be intellectually[156] blind to it if it were only to live in passivity. On the other hand, if it lives in an active manner, it does not have to exercise a cognitive activity; but in this case it is blind to everything "in-itself," to everything that it has not brought to self-active cognition, that it has not brought to a verifying appropriation which is actually carried out in free acts. But in each case, everything that makes the accomplishment of the active ego possible is already prepared in passivity, and it stands under stable essential laws according to which the possibility of this accomplishment can be comprehended.

Thus, the ego has a first, absolutely and necessarily constituted sphere of the in-itself, a first sphere of absolutely secure, true objectivity[157] without which it is altogether inconceivable as ego. We distinguish between [a] the current living ego along with the living present of consciousness with the primordial impression, retentional modifications and the [retentional] horizon's end, and [b] objectivated consciousness, the objectively temporal system of lived-experiences that presents itself in the primordial immanence of that present of consciousness partially, incompletely, unclearly, and potentially demonstrable as false in the orientations: noetically in rememberings, in the momentarily fresh retentions with the limit of the primordial impression. [210]

In originally living consciousness, however, other objectivities[158] also present themselves, namely, through the medium of the current, living lived-experiences of consciousness. These contain then not only the intentionality that leads to the constitution of immanent time and of objectivated immanence, but also a second intentionality in which different and other individual objectivities are constituted. Thus external perceptions, external memories, etc., are lived-experiences that have their objective

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[156] *geistig*
[157] *Gegenständlichkeit*
[158] *Objektivitäten*

being in the first sense, insofar as they get their place in immanent time in the form of objectivated subjectivity for itself. On the other hand, they are presentations of things, of animals, of human beings, etc., and what they present in them is something objective in space existing in itself and in objective time existing in itself.

Thus, we have come to understand how consciousness prior to all activity of the ego manages to objectify itself, or how it manages, according to the essential laws of original genesis, not only to have its own past in general, but to be able to gain knowledge of it. Belonging essentially to the genesis of consciousness are the possibilities for series of rememberings to be able to be continually awakened in the form of series of fulfillment for every remembering in which the true past being is constituted as an absolute *limes* of clarity such that it cannot be crossed out. Consciousness not only is and not only becomes; an absolute norm is also inborn in it, so to speak, an absolute norm for each of its rememberings and for the closed universe of rememberings. Certainly, this norm would remain hidden and the ego would be, so to speak, intellectually blind to the true being of this sphere if it were only to live in passivity. But if proper to the essence of an ego and of an egoic life is also the possibility of a free activity, and if the possibility of a free activity extends essentially to rememberings, and if further, proper to it is the fact that it seeks fulfillment for such self-givings and strives after true being, then an attainable truth with respect to the ego's sphere of the past is prefigured for the ego by virtue of the essential structure of the underlying basis of passive life. What is prefigured for the ego is the true being of its own past life as a necessarily valid idea; it lies ready, even though higher thought processes are required to realize them as already prepared and necessarily valid. [211] All of this holds, as we said, for the past of consciousness.

<Chapter 3:
THE PROBLEM OF A TRUE BEING FOR THE FUTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS>

<§46. Disappointment as an Essential Moment of Expectation>

Our considerations did not have any bearing on the direction of the future. While streaming consciousness constantly projects a protentional horizon ahead of itself, it is not clear that this prefiguring should be so determined and so compelling that we are able to say that a norm of true being as a binding one is secured for the future. What I have experienced[159] actually was, even if I have momentarily forgotten it, and it remains for me a true reality; progressing from rememberings to rememberings, I am able to awaken it once more and to legitimate it in pure immanence: Here, the norm is contained securely within me. But how about for the future?

Expectations can really only be fulfilled through perceptions. Thus, they are also essentially susceptible to disappointment in all circumstances. Perception brings something new; that is its nature. To be sure, it may have a prefiguring that stems from the past of consciousness, something new arrives in accordance with something already familiar, something already constituted as past for me. Potentially, the motivation can be evident to me and it can be of a force that outweighs all counter forces; it may even happen that no counter forces are at work, and further, that none of them can be exhibited in the past. But it is certainly clear that it is perception that first decides, and that something new can be a slap in the face to all expectation. Think only of prefigured sequences of sensations like melodies. The "must" that expectation harbors is not an absolute necessity of being, but rather the necessity of an anticipated being. It seems that we must say: In its life, the ego has a more or less determinately anticipated future ahead of it. Moreover, it may have the freedom to picture intuitive possibilities that in the framework of this prefiguring project a fulfilled future according to the pattern of the past. But in this [212]

[159] *erlebt*

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case, only the form of a possible future and the fact that something in general will undoubtedly arrive is *a priori* incapable of being crossed out. The ego living toward the future also naturally experiences what arrives right at the moment when it has become present and when the ego actually perceives it. From this point on the in-itself of the objectlike formation in question is secured; but it is first of all here, in the actual perception, that it is instituted as a reality which is freely identifiable and demonstrable in its self at any time. The unfamiliar is then transformed into something familiar, and in a certain respect every object is a familiar object when it is an existing, true object for the ego, and in its true being, knowable for the ego.

The future is the realm of the unfamiliar, and insofar as this is the case, it is initially not a realm of the in-itself, not a realm of true objectlike formations that are pregiven to the ego in their truth, but rather a realm of indeterminacy that the ego occupies with objectlike formations only insofar as it is sure that determining fulfillment will later constitute an objectlike formation. This is what we must say, so it would seem. And yet an expectation can also constitute an objectlike formation and make the future determinate.

<§47. The Constitution of the Objective World in Its Significance for the Determinate Prefiguring of Futural Consciousness>[160]

How does the immanent stream of consciousness accomplish this? In fact, our inner life actually does accomplish this. Naturally, in the phenomenological reduction we grasp an essential type of consciousness through our factual consciousness, an essential type of a streaming lived-experience in which an objective future is constituted, at least to a large extent, and according to the belief of contemporary science, universally. Thus, not an indeterminate future that must first wait until we actually experience it in order for it to take on the character of a [determinate] object for us, that is, in order for it to be able to [213]

[160] Editor: See Appendix 28: <The Problems of the Definite Determinability of the World> pp. 541ff.

become demonstrable in the manner of an in-itself, in the manner of a true being along prefigured paths of verification, and to be able to become determinable again and again as the same according to a norm. But rather, precisely a determinate future which is determinable in this way, in advance and prior to actual experiencing. I do not ask now whether it belongs to the essence of a consciousness in general, according to immanent necessity, to have to be so shaped, that is, that it must correspond to such an essential type of consciousness. I assert that our given consciousness and its essential type has this marvelous feature, not only to constitute objectively (in the sense of demonstrated absolute necessity) its own temporal being with respect to the past up to the present, but also its future. If we ask, however, how our streaming consciousness brings that about, our answer runs: through the fact that it constitutes within itself an objective world in a transcendent intentionality. A stream of lived-experiences of spatio-material experience runs throughout the stream of the lived-experiences such that all things experienced in the course of the steady sequence of perception are referred to one's own lived-body with which everything else that emerges in the course of lived-experience under the rubric of psychical lived-experiences is then constituted as intertwined in a regulated manner; psychical lived-experiences that are bound to the lived-body are regulated as psycho-physical lived-experiences.

Yet, first of all we have to attend to the main point: Things are constituted in immanent lived-experiences, but are not themselves [constituted] as a lived-experience, neither as a past lived-experience, nor as a futural one. They are essentially constituted as intentional unities, as identifiable unities of actual and possible perception, so that they, extending beyond the current perceptions, are unities only appearing in them. And they are thereby constituted as enduring unities reaching *via* the experienced past and present into a non-experienced past and present, but also *via* the experienced past and present into the future, and reaching into it objectively. The thing is constituted from one side, but it is more than what I see of it; it has sides that are presently non-visible, but that in themselves befit it. Likewise, the thing has, in itself, a future, it is in itself not only with respect to the past and present,

regardless of whether the past and present have been genuinely experienced or are now genuinely being experienced; the thing is [214] also what it will be, in itself, no matter how little I may be familiar with it. In my lived-experiences of so-called external perception, such an external existence is constituted with such a sense-giving of the in-itself. Much is indeterminate here, partly in the current perceptual thing or the thing-complex, partly with respect to its surroundings, which are constantly co-constituted as a horizon—and yet everything here is constituted as objective, as in itself; everything is constituted as determinable indeterminacy. A being that can be legitimated, a true being in itself, lies at the basis of all of this; all error, all illusion has its norm in a hidden truth, but a truth that is to be attained.

If we accept this claim as belonging to the sense of nature as the objectivity of actual and possible external perception, then we will now have to consider that this nature is constituted precisely in the immanent sense-giving of these perceptions, that is, of consciousness. The following is accordingly clear: In the natural objective attitude, nature presents itself as a universal nexus of thing-like objects in which the objective past, present, and future is determined in itself. According to this claim, the futural course of nature can be legitimated from the standpoint of every experienced present, ultimately, logically knowable and predictable—it is thus in the objective attitude.

But it is now clear, I say, that by virtue of the constitution of nature as a nature, which universal time fills out objectively, a rule of lived-experiencing and initially of perceiving—a rule encompassing the whole of consciousness and therefore also its future—is prefigured. There are norms of verification, there are originally prefigured ways of possible verification that the active ego in its freedom can discover and survey. That genuine verification is possible at anytime—this is intrinsic to the sense of every objectivity being experienced, whether we understand this objectivity in a constitutive manner or not. Every genuine verification prescribes a determining rule for the course of perceptions, of past and future ones. Just because a thing existed does not mean that we would have to carry out a perception and a progressive legitimation relating to it; but given that it existed,

what is prefigured along with it is something that I could have seen or must have seen at some time by appropriately running through my kinaesthetic data; as it is also prefigured that I could see it and the manner in which I could see it in the future, and the manner in which I could continue to legitimate it as that existing- [215] being by the appropriate position or movement of my lived-body. Naturally, this yields the regulation of my perceptual appearances and therefore the regulation of my current or possible perceptual lived-experiences. Certainly, this concerns a narrower sphere at first, a sphere that we first instinctively prefer; it is a sphere in which we do not pay attention to the abnormal functioning of our lived-corporeality (which of course is itself only taken into account as constituted from a phenomenological perspective). However, every abnormality that belongs here as well—a blow to the eyes that modifies our visual images, a burnt hand whereby the tactile appearances break the rule of normality, and the like—even such abnormalities I say only indicate new rules for the interconnections between lived-experiences; they, too, belong in a grand preshaped constitutive nexus; set down in this nexus is transcendent objectivity, the universal objectivity of a world constituted as existing in itself, and therefore a universal regularity encompassing the course of lived-experiences, a regularity that prefigures a firm determination for future consciousness from past consciousness. The objective existence of the world has its correlate in the unity of experiences that are concordant and continually verifying, experiences that can now only run their course in such a way that they continually verify precisely this existence. The possibilities of experience are freely at the disposal of the ego as paths of possible verification; it orchestrates their flow through its kinaestheses.

Thus, we see that the stream of consciousness, in which a nature is constituted in a thoroughgoing manner, has a marvelous inner organization. This lies in the fact that we not only always have external experiences, but that a steady rule is prescribed for all possible experiences, those that are actually transpiring and those that are freely possible. This prefiguring is not a blind and fundamentally senseless prefiguring coming from the outside; rather it is one that is accessible to ego-consciousness in the form

of knowledge: just like the objective reality of nature is not a fact that exists for itself and without any relation to the ego, but rather is a fact for the ego, namely, through actual and possible experiences and verifications that are prefigured in it—verifications which in their self-giving of a transcendent world are referred to determinate paths of verifying legitimation of true being and of bringing out its true being. In other words, the spatio-temporal world and the correlative regulation of the stream of [216] consciousness not only exists, but exists precisely for the ego, it is for the ego as a pregivenness, an availability, as a readiness for possibilities of cognitive activity that are to follow. A consciousness that would be entirely without organization is completely inconceivable. For try as we might to imagine a consciousness without regularity, and try as we will to conceive of each new present bringing new data in an entirely unorganized manner, the general structure of consciousness in general would still prefigure certain binding relationships; and in this respect it also prefigures a steady regulated order as we have come to understand, namely, that everything that has emerged in a primordially impressional manner must be held in retention and that the ego's own secure past must thereby be constituted for it.

Yet, an infinitely much richer organization, and an organization that encompasses consciousness as a whole and in advance for the future means, as we now see, the constitution of an objective world. At first, the constitution of a physical nature. But this is only a lower level, only a constitutive sublayer of the entire world pregiven to us. This world is also a psychophysical world. In it we find animals and human-beings given objectively, we find consciousness objectively tied to their objectively experienced natural lived-bodies, objectivated consciousness, so-called psychical lived-experiences that maintain through it an integration into objective space and objective time. Other kinds of consciousness also participate in objectivation, kinds of consciousness that we previously only mentioned in passing and did not consider in more detail: the kinds of consciousness like emotion and willing; and not only functions of passivity, which we have alone pursued up until now, participate in the formation of sense, but also creative activity peculiar to the functions of

reason. The world that lies in front of us is not merely psychophysical nature, but also a personal, communal world, and a cultural world with manifold special types of objectivities that are there for the ego who experiences them, constituted in the ego, in the immanence of its stream of consciousness, objectivities that are indices in the ego for regulations of consciousness of higher and higher levels. For every kind of objectivity that is there for us there are kinds of self-giving, and then obviously corresponding to them, affiliated ways of legitimating the corresponding true being which as transcendent being, is always given perspectivally. Thus, [217] ever new rules of a possible course of consciousness are indicated, and modes of preparedness are developed in consciousness itself; but this regulation encompasses each and every consciousness, even emotional-consciousness and willing-consciousness, since this, too, participates in constitutive functions.

<Transitional Methodological Considerations>[161] [218]

<§48. Consciousness as a Storied Structure of Constitutive Accomplishments. The Disciplines of a Systematic Investigation>

Naturally, all of this is of the greatest interest not only from the standpoint that we utilized as a leading clue, according to which the constitution of transcendence is a means of prefiguring futural consciousness and of giving to it as well the steadiness of identifiable elements, objectivity. The great theme of transcendental philosophy is consciousness in general as a storied structure of constitutive accomplishments in which ever new objectivities, objectivities of ever new types, are constituted in ever new levels or layers, in which ever novel self-givings are developed, and belonging to them, ever novel prepared ways of possible legitimation, of possible ideas of true being. All other levels are thereby taken up into the higher ones, but are not lost in

[161] Translator: Section heading modified. With the inclusion of the "Active Synthesis" Material as Part 3 of the Main Text, this section can no longer be function as a "concluding consideration" as it did in Hua XI, namely, as the end of the Main Text.

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them; rather they are themselves ready at any time for corresponding orientations of interest and demonstrations.

It is necessary to make all of that intelligible through the phenomenological method, that is, in pure consciousness and in a systematic order. The leading thought is this: Nothing can be grasped in a stream of consciousness, or rather, in its ego, without this consciousness having accomplished the corresponding intentional genesis from its material of hyletic components and according to essential laws, that is, according to laws that are purely and simply irrevocable. This is an intentional genesis whose emanation is the respective consciousness of the object, and whose sedimentation is the respective retentional system in which we find the preconditions for the in-itself of this type of intentional objectivity and for its normative regulation. Consciousness is an incessant process of becoming. But it is not a mere succession of lived-experiences, a flux, as one fancies an objective river. Consciousness is an incessant process of becoming as an incessant process of constituting objectivities in an incessant *progressus* of [219] graduated levels. It is a never ending history. And history is a graduating process of constituting higher and higher formations of sense through which prevails an immanent teleology. And belonging to all sense is a truth and a norm of truth. History in the usual sense of its relation to human culture is only a highest level, and even this we see has its in-itself prefigured.

The path of radical phenomenological investigation must trace the storied structure of constitution, and it must itself seek out and bring this structure to light. Of course, it can do nothing else but take its departure from the objective world as it presents itself immediately and naively; and in it mere physical nature—dead, spiritless nature—becomes distinct as a lower level that is relatively easy to tease apart insofar as all creative accomplishments of the free ego remain out of play with respect to the constitution of nature and insofar as one abstracts from all such accomplishments in this consideration of the world. An obvious task here, one that is both encompassing and in itself already very difficult, is the study of ready-made intentionality within the self-giving of nature in multifarious modes of external perception. Many of our expositions were developed in this direction before

the Christmas break. Offered to us in these expositions is, so to speak, a static understanding of the noematic contents of external perception and thus of the ready-made phenomena of external nature, or rather, an understanding of the variety of phenomena that integrally cohere in a regulated manner and that are able to coalesce noematically, and while running their course, bring into view the phenomenal unity of a spatio-temporal infinity and a nature interwoven with causal dependencies. Precisely such analyses open to a multifaceted phenomenology of lived-corporeality and of psychophysical animality.

But the further course of our considerations showed that this is only a beginning. The general theory of belief points us further down the path. The preferred consideration of concordant nexuses of experience must be superseded by a consideration of possible occurrences of modalization, of bifurcation, of negation and then the occurrences of verification. What is to be accomplished in this regard for every kind of objectivation only first became and becomes clear to us in the self-objectivation of consciousness with [220] respect to its past; and at the same time we also became sensitive in this most fundamental and most primitive sphere to the problem of genesis, a problem that we had also tackled there. The same would now have to be accomplished as well for the constitution of nature. This entire network of possible concordant and discordant modes of givenness of nature, of possible verifications and invalidations, must be integrated into the history of constituting consciousness, and it must be made intelligible genetically how, and according to which essential laws, something can be prepared in consciousness, how the latter can arise in consciousness and can make possible these kinds of constitutive nexuses and the normative regulation according to ideas of truth.

It must suffice for us to have at least brought the problematic to light, and at those places where we have carried out our analysis, especially where we have undertaken the work for the most universal and at the same time the most primitive constitution of immanent temporality, to have gained a clear understanding of the style of such investigations. By virtue of the tremendous variety of problems that belong here, these investigations lead to an entire range of transcendental disciplines, to a transcendental science of

nature, or rather, to a science of a possible nature in general, we could say to a science of a transcendental physics; taken in its full sense, this would encompass a transcendental science of space and a transcendental science of time; in the same sense they will lead to a transcendental psychophysics and psychology, to a transcendental science of personalities, of individual personalities and personalities of a higher level, thus to a transcendental sociology related to possible personal communities in general. Likewise [they will lead] to a transcendental science of culture as a transcendental science of possible accomplishments of communities in general. They all treat, statically and genetically, the corresponding constitutive problems.

These [constitutive] disciplines stand in an intimate relationship to the *a priori* sciences which (only in part developed in a pure manner) explicate the *a priori* of the pure "essence" of the respective regions of objectivity or their affiliated existential forms. We also call such sciences, ontologies. The essence of a nature in general, its pure idea, naively develops so to speak the [221] ontology of nature, especially the essence of space, pure geometry, that of time, the pure doctrine of time, that of specific *physis*, of physical materiality, pure mechanics, a pure science of the possible causal formations of physical being. The fundamental concepts of empirical physics, fundamental concepts in the most strict sense of concepts of principle, are not any different than the leading concepts of the ontology of nature or of rational physics. These concepts and the axioms that are grounding in them constantly serve the physicist as norms for all possible physical being and for the empirical truths to be established for it. They serve the transcendental philosopher if we assume that ontologies that are developed naively and dogmatically exist as leading clues to transcendental analyses.[162] In theorizing, the physicist places himself on the soil of a nature that is given in experience; he wants to determine it theoretically according to its true being. The rational physicist, generally speaking, the pure geometer and mechanic, the ontologist of nature, places himself on the soil of

[162] *transzendentale Leitfäden*

the givenness of essences of the pure idea of space, of time, of a possible nature in general.

But the transcendental phenomenologist takes nature and a possible nature in general purely as the correlate of the consciousness of it. "Material object" designates for him a type of meant and potentially self-given object that he regards purely in this correlation and in the phenomenological reduction. The ontological fundamental concepts, which in principle explicate the essence of a space, of an objective time, of a materiality, serve him as indices for certain systems of verification; the systematic series of self-giving, which terminate in the true self, contain this self as a *terminus ad quem* that is distinguished noematically. The general knowledge that all true being is constituted noematically as an ideal *terminus* in the processes of self-giving, and that it must essentially be constituted in this way, and that unique lines must correspond to every essential moment in true being in the constitutive nexuses of self-giving, leads to the fact that one will begin the phenomenological investigation into an object-type like physical nature precisely with the [following] consideration: What belongs essentially to something like physical nature?—in order then to see how something of this sort gives itself to consciousness and how it gets legitimated in consciousness in a verifying manner [222] with respect to all its essential aspects, i.e., how these nexuses of legitimation must be shaped according to noesis and noema. This task, which is in no way a trifling one, of the systematic explication of a highest concept for a region of being, for example, of the concept material nature, is however already accomplished in the corresponding ontology or would be accomplished in it were it to be established in a completely scientific manner. Thus, phenomenology and ontology exist in a kind of alliance. The principle difference of method, not merely, but already with respect to the basis of their work consists in the fact that the ontologist takes the idea of nature as a kind of ideal reality, that he situates himself on the soil of this idea in order to investigate it according to its properties; for example, as geometer the ontologist takes the idea of space as given and inquires into which essential properties and ideal shapes belong to it; while the transcendental phenomenologist does not have as his theme an existing ideal

space, but rather, the idea of a consciousness in general in which an objectlike formation in the form of spatiality can be given. He does not pass a geometrical judgment, but judgments about all the transcendental possibilities, upon which rest even the possibility of geometrical judgments and geometrically true judgments.

<PART 3: ANALYSES CONCERNING ACTIVE SYNTHESIS: TOWARD A TRANSCENDENTAL, GENETIC LOGIC>[163]

[3]

<INTRODUCTION. CIRCUMSCRIBING THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIVE EGO>

<§49. The Relation between Activity and Passivity>

Let us now turn, then, to the transcendental consideration of the accomplishments of activity. We said repeatedly that a consciousness of the object is actually and genuinely carried out only first in egoic acts; an object—an object as object—is only first there for the active ego. All of the concepts that refer back to the concept of the object: "identical sense," "being" and "modalities of being," "true being" and "verification"—all of these get their genuine character only first within the framework of activity. We must now elucidate what this means, and therefore we must first of all completely elucidate what is actually accomplished on the lower level of passivity as well. It is endemic to the nature of the situation that we can only speak of these lower levels if we already have before us something constituted in activity, ready-made; and if we abstract from activity, then the lower level is at first unavoidably and essentially still indeterminate, so that we can also have the purity of understanding the accomplishment of <the> lower level only with the successive investigation into the higher level. In addition, every accomplishment of activity itself in turn sinks in a regulated manner into passivity, and is sedimented in the accomplishments

[163] Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XXXI.

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of original passivity, which once more demands successive processes of purification.

Passivity is what is in itself first because all activity essentially presupposes a foundation of passivity as well as an objectlike formation that is already pre-constituted in it. Thus, this also holds for the spontaneous accomplishments of genuine *logos*. In general, we can say: The investigation into the active accomplishments of [4] the ego, through which the formations of the genuine *logos* come about, operate in the medium of an attentive turning toward and its derivatives. Turing our attention toward is, as it were, the bridge to activity, or the bridge is the beginning or *mis en scène* of activity, and it is the constant way in which consciousness is carried out for activity to progress: All genuine activity is carried out in the scope of attentiveness.

We are familiar with the fact that there are differences in the mode of attentiveness and that what we call negative attentiveness, or the counter mode of all attentiveness within passivity is called affection. Something can be noticed in a primary fashion; if this is the case, then the ego is attentive <in> a distinctive sense, the ego has turned toward it in a primary sense; but something can also be noticed in a secondary fashion; a single thing or several things in the unity of a single grasping can be called to our attention in a primary fashion or can be noticed in a secondary fashion and, for instance, can still be held onto in a secondary manner after it was primary. The affections proceed to the ego from out of the passivity of the background; they are what are presupposed [for the ego] to turn toward. Carrying out this turning toward, the ego complies with the affection; it directs itself toward what is exercising the affection. Now, before we enter this sphere, we must make the limits of our entire previous transcendental investigations clear. Naturally, we will keep these investigations in mind as we proceed in order to facilitate our task.

<§50. The Constitutive Accomplishments of Affect-Consciousness[164]. Affection of Feeling and Turning Toward in Feeling. Will and Desire>

Up to now we have left out of consideration *affect-consciousness* and its constitutive accomplishments, even though it also already plays its constant role in the passivity of the life of consciousness. At this time we want to say a few words about it so that we can reach a better understanding of the sphere with which we are occupied. It was the *sphere of presentation*[165], a term that is unfortunately extremely ambiguous, a term taken in a certain sense that is now determinative, *the sphere of objectivating consciousness in the specific sense.* [5]

We had in the back of our mind some kind of consciousness as the consciousness of something, as the consciousness of an object,[166] and this *something* was the same thing given to consciousness running through varying and possibly very diverse lived-experiences, namely, by virtue of those peculiar syntheses that have a continual or a discrete coinciding of sense. As long as the concordance of this coinciding sufficed, the One, the objective sense, was characterized in the mode of *being*. As this thoroughgoing unity, every constituted thing for itself in the background of consciousness exercises an affection on the ego precisely as one. If a turning toward ensues, this One and this being with its objective sense has emerged from the obscurity of passivity; it has become something grasped; the ego has turned toward it and is possibly occupied with it in manifold ways. By following the affection, a theme is made out of the identical object; I sidle up to it, as it were, in order to get to know it better, to determine it, to know it in its true being.

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[164] *Gemütsbewußtsein*

[165] *Vorstellungssphäre.*

Why sphere of presentation? Sensuous sphere would be better.

[166] Yet that can only mean that sensuous consciousness underlies all valuing, consciousness that constiutes matter, and in a higher level, consciousness that constitues nature. Or, intitially, relative objectivating.

But now what is constituted within passivity as identical, as *an object*, can lead to a *feeling*[167] already within this passivity; it can be characterized as pleasurable or unpleasurable, as agreeable or disagreeable, varying according to the context in which the respective consciousness of the object occurs, thus, correlatively, according to the noematic horizon in which the object in question noematically occurs. That is to say, the consciousness of the object founds a *novel* consciousness: a layer of consciousness of the intentionality of feeling[168], which exhibits a novel intentionality. Certainly, even this new layer yields an accomplishment with respect to the object, the object that was already constituted in the lower level as the object of such and such sense. Sedimented in it, or rather, in the noema, is a new moment precisely as the character of feeling, for instance, as "pleasurable," or in the case of frustration, as "painfully lacking," and the like. The same thing occurs noematically with respect to what is given to consciousness as being or what is given to consciousness in the corresponding modality of being. It is something that is already there and [6] discovered with a turning toward directed [to it] in a fitting manner, in its own way, constituted once more in the manner of an object, like consciousness as a whole and all its noematic contents.

But if we hold firmly to the directedness toward the underlying object in relation to the self-contained objectivation through which it is given to consciousness—toward the object to which feelings relate—then it is evident that its objective sense does not undergo any enrichment through the process of objectivation, that nothing at all enters into the objective sense, that it is not determined more closely, like what happens precisely through the fulfillment of its empty horizons or by virtue of its connection to other objects by means of relative predicates.

The object is constituted in and through the objectivating that underlies the intentionality of feeling, and is progressively constituted in a distinctive path of identifications, a path that is trodden by means of this objectivating and that is prefigured according to further possibilities. The intentionality of feeling as

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[167] *Gefühl*
[168] *Fühlen*

such has nothing to seek down this path. On the other hand, the entire life of consciousness is certainly a progressive objectivating, too, precisely in this sense: Not only is every consciousness itself constituted as an object, but each one has its accomplishment which is, so to speak, seized by the objectivating, and which is interlaced with further objectivating accomplishments by the objectivating. Objectivating consciousness is irrevocably bound to every consciousness; what it itself brings to consciousness as non-objectivating is at the same time given to consciousness with an objectlike character; in this way, a path of possible identification is instituted. If an objectivating consciousness is already at hand, if an object is, so to speak, already instituted, a feeling consciousness can be built upon it and can enter into a peculiar relation with it, into a relation that only a consciousness relating to another consciousness can enter: namely, in such a way that neither are juxtaposed to one another, but rather in such a way that the one consciousness, the founded one, has its object in that which the other consciousness has instituted as object, and that now this object gets a new character; this new character itself becomes an identifiable one by virtue of this essential feature of every founded consciousness: only to be able to relate to an object through [the relation of] foundation by accomplishing something for it, by precipitating something on its noema, and simultaneously by objectivating the latter as sense.

Owing to this, the sense contents that have arisen from non-objectivating lived-experiences can be intertwined with them in higher objectivations; objectlike formations like objective values, like, e.g., works of art, economic goods and so forth that are given to consciousness as matters that are laden with objective value predicates. The latter are predicates that obviously arise from the intentionality of feeling. These value determinations are not the arbitrarily varying characters of feeling, they are predicates, that is, elements that are identifiable; but the sources from which the objectivation for these predicates are drawn are the feelings and the contents of them accruing to the matters in question. But in the final analysis, one must distinguish here between the intentionality of feeling itself, and the objectivating—be it passive or, in higher levels, active—the objectivating that objectivates the contents [7]

arising in the intentionality of feeling and that makes use of them in order to constitute new predicate layers with respect to matters that are constituted in other ways.

If we go back to the genetically most primitive series of development, what is carried out in an manner entirely independent from all accomplishments of feeling is a graduated objectivating, beginning with the hyletic data coming into relief, up to things of the senses like visual things, then to intuitive material things, whereby the varying feelings do not even enter into the unity of identity of the respective constituted objects. In this way, nature is constituted as mere physical nature in manifolds of a pure objectivation without the objectivating interlacing of the accomplishments of feeling. A concept of presentation, precisely as mere, pure presentation, is characterized through this kind of pure objectivation (presentation—feeling—will).

One can also point to the following for the purpose of drawing a contrast. Each time we spoke of affection, we had in mind a mode of consciousness being carried out as the consciousness of an objectlike formation, that is, each consciousness was treated here to the extent that each one is either purely objectivating or founded, and then also according to its higher accomplishments seen from the perspective of objectivating, of following the series of intentional identification. Affection was a mode of carrying out objectivation; the constituted object exercises an affection, exercises an allure of gradually varying intensity on the ego as the ego of possible knowledge. On the side of the ego, it is a tendency [8] to turn toward and to pass over into active objectivation, into the system of determining and verifying accomplishments in paths of coinciding that form identity. Thus, already within passivity, affection is a specific modality of objectivation for the ego. The ego is aroused in a special way here, although it does not yet orient itself actively. We must judge *dynamis* according to entelechy, and for this reason we called the ego here the cognizing ego.

If we pass over now to *feeling*, we also find here a *different mode of execution*, that of *passivity*, which means here the mode of intentionality of feeling without active egoic participation and the corresponding active mode. Again, we have different degrees of affection, different degrees of the tendency toward the

corresponding turning toward, of the *turning toward in feeling*. But now when the feeling emerges out of its latency, what is new is *not attentiveness* in the usual sense, but rather a *mode parallel to attentiveness*. And the progression is not an objectivating process, but rather an *intentionality of feeling*, an unfolding of feeling, albeit a feeling that is *active* now, an intentionality of feeling on the part of the ego that is actively referred to the corresponding matter at hand.

The active intentionality of feeling has become *pleasurable or displeasurable activity*, the ego regards the object, namely, the underlying object whose consciousness of it has itself taken on the active form of execution. *The object lies in the scope of attentiveness*. But the role of this objectivating is to serve, the *ego lives in pleasure*, for instance, it regards the object with pleasure. But in this case neither the pleasure nor the character of feeling with respect to the object has for its part become actualized as object, that is, it has not become a theme of identity. Instead, what is required for this is *a new attitude*, that is, a *new active objectivation* that directs precisely *the thematic gaze toward the "pleasurable" and identifies it* and determines it *as object*. While the ego is a cognizing ego when it is attentive and when it is engaged in other *active objectivating* behavior, it is the *feeling ego* when it is *turning toward in feeling*. Feeling, while not a theme, is [9] not a passive feeling at this time, but rather an intentionality of feeling radiating out from the ego. Accordingly, we also distinguish the *objectivating* affection from the *affection of feeling*.

Further, just as objectivating consciousness has its own syntheses, which on the active level are the specific cognitive syntheses, judgments, so too does the consciousness that carries out the intentionality of feeling have its own syntheses and likewise its own modes of modalization as well, modes that accord with modalities of being through the relation of foundation. Belonging here, to give just one example, is the sense of lack that is founded in the modality of non-being, the lack of what would be given to consciousness as gratifying for the feeling ego in the modality of being.[169]

[169] Not given in the lecture and probably written in a moment's haste.

Striving, desiring, and shunning are so tightly connected to the intentionality of feeling (which can have manifold possible qualities that always move within the general typicality of positivity and negativity) that one might be tempted to see in them[170] only the modalities of feeling. Desire is related to those affections—of which we have spoken as tendencies of a turning toward, be the tendency of turning toward an objectivating or a feeling one—by the fact that it likewise is tendentious, but yet with an entirely different character. It is a tendency that occurs in the way that both passivity as well as activity are carried out, everywhere an intentionality of feeling in the mode of striving that, unlike the tendency of turning toward, is striving after, or driving away from, shunning, that is, it has its positivity and negativity, like feeling in general. Its fulfillment is a relaxation that results from realizing [the striving, etc.], in the change into the corresponding joy of fulfillment: At root, joy lies in the arrival of what was lacking. On the other hand, the tendency to turn toward is relaxed precisely in the turning toward, in the activation of passive consciousness, of objectivating, feeling, possibly desiring consciousness.

Realizing a desiring is a synthetic consciousness that can still run its course in a special sense actively and passively: namely, voluntarily and involuntarily. Volition is not a mere desire; it belongs in the more general sphere of pure activity. Should one [10] say that there is no originally latent volition? Should one say, it is effective in passivity only as habitual resolve, that is, only through the fact that formerly it was precisely a current, firm resolve? The concept, "will," has been taken so broadly sometimes that every egoic activity, that is, every active presenting, intentionality of feeling, etc., has been apprehended under its name, i.e., attentiveness has been taken as the activity of the will. The strict and genuine concept of will, however, designates only a special mode of activity which spreads over all other regions of consciousness insofar as all activity can occur in the form of voluntary activity. It seems to me more and more that the will is not a separate mode of consciousness, but rather a special and

[170] Translator: Reading *ihnen* for *ihm*

higher form of activity that can appear everywhere under certain essential conditions that lie in presupposed objectivations and intentionality of feelings.[171]

<§51. Playful and Positional Consciousness>

In the last lecture, we contrasted objectivating consciousness and feeling-consciousness only to circumscribe our own direction of investigation. We did not want to go into the special feature of the intentionality of feeling, and in connection with the latter, into the functions of the heart[172] in general and the functions of willing, and we also did not want to go into the way in which the contents arising in these spheres of consciousness undergo that exceedingly significant objectivation through which a spiritual environing-world, a world of culture is constituted over and above mere nature. If such an objectivation has come about, then it has at all events the general feature of such an objectivation, [namely,] we have paths of possible identification, possibilities of determination. We want to get to know what holds in an entirely general manner for an objectivating activity, and what kinds of forms of unique structures generally arise from it.

Certainly, the realm of activity is *eo ipso* a realm of free [11] volitional activity; here the ego—be it fleeting, be it steady—directs its activities toward cognitive goals that are as such naturally of value to it. Insofar as this is the case, feelings, strivings, volitions, play a constant role here. Yet to a large extent we can circumscribe the accomplishments of cognitive activity and make them intelligible without entering into a systematic investigation of all kinds of consciousness, which, to be sure, would be required for a universal, transcendental elucidation of the eidetic interconnections between subjectivity and objectivity.

If we limit the scope of our analyses in such a way, we must, on the other hand, also expand <it> and still take into account the *constitutive accomplishments of phantasy*. These accomplishments

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[171] All of this is very obscure, and remains behind what was previously said. Much is lacking to make it definitive. In any case, what I have said here is completely unsatisfactory.

[172] *Gemüt*

are a great field of free activity for the objectivating ego, but they already play a role in passivity that is very much in need of clarification. When the term "phantasy" is understood in the way we understand it here, the accomplishments of phantasy have the significance of a curious general modification that encompasses all types of consciousness with all of their noematic structures, a modification that I want to circumscribe in broad strokes in order only later to provide some descriptions of the manner in which phantasy provides the basis for its own formation; and I want to do this by considering the forms of judgment and the categorial concepts proper to them.

We all know the difference between an actual perceiving, that is, having an object given to consciousness in originary givenness, in the consciousness of actual existence, and on the other hand a quasi-perceiving, like we have for example when viewing a painted phantasy-landscape, with phantasy-houses, trees, and the like. The latter are there with the character of originarity, and we also speak freely here of perception, and yet [this] consciousness is something else entirely: The things are there not as an actuality *simpliciter*; rather, they are there as a quasi-actuality, as a phantasy-figment. We also say: as an aesthetic "illusion"[173]. But this is unlike the case of a bifurcated consciousness and the resolution of it, where it is a matter of a consciousness of a deceptive illusion, where two intuitions as it were struggle with belief: [where] the one that inserts itself into the concordant belief- [12]
unity of the encompassing experience of the environing-world is the true one, [and stands] in contrast to the one that is crossed out and is not inserted into it. In our example there is no conflict, there is also no resolution on the basis of a conflict, no negation and no affirmation here. The perceptively exhibited phantasy-world is a world for itself and yet not an actual world, [it is a] mere "image." On the side of consciousness we must say here that it is an analogue, a counterpart of a perceiving, experiencing consciousness, but it is not itself a perceiving, an experiencing; it is an experiencing-as-if. But in this case it is not a reproduction. Since the objects are given as being presented in the flesh,

[173] *Schein*

consciousness does not have the character of a presentification in the mode of a memory. But even though they do this, we do not take that existence seriously; constituting consciousness is a playful-consciousness; being, in which the objective sense is characterized, is a playful being.[174]

This is similarly the case in the comparison of a remembering as an experience to a reproductive phantasy which, by the way, could appear completely uniform to a memory where the intuitive content is concerned. Reproductive phantasy is illusory[175], but not illusory the way a deception is, like in the conflict of rememberings that interpenetrate one another; rather, a "phantasy-image" stands before us as mere "image," as play, and the reproductively given image in this case can be imagined as present, or also as past, or also as future: But all that is play, and being as present-being, etc., is itself playful being. This can be seen in the fact that we do not speak here "seriously" of an attestation, but only of a phantasy-play of an attestation. An experience is binding precisely as a serious act that actually constitutes a being, an act that has actual retentions and protentions at work admitting actual fulfillment, or in the opposite case, then, of a necessarily actual rejection. A phantasy-experience is the play of an experience, and in play the progression of concordant verification can be added onto it, but the opposite [can occur] in play as well. In play, everything is possible, so to speak, one thing like the other. In fact, phantasy is a realm of freedom [13] and that means arbitrariness. We can continue to play this way or that[176]. Consciousness is continually a consciousness of the "as if" and as such has the character of this modification through and through, a modification that we call here precisely play: phantasy.

But the same can be said now of each and every [mode of] consciousness. We can contapose a playful analogue to each one of these [modes of] consciousness. Thus, phantasy signifies a general modification that in itself points back to an unmodified consciousness. We call unmodified consciousness positional

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[174] Is this equivalence of image consciousness and phantasy tenable then? That is certainly not my view at all.

[175] *vorschwebender Schein*

[176] *das Spiel ... weiter spielen*

consciousness; being and modalities of being, which are apportioned to the object in positional consciousness, are serious ones, are positings. Thus, a phantasy-experiencing does not only correspond to experiencing as positional, intuitive consciousness of individual objects, but also, in play, to actual wishing, a phantasy-wishing, a phantasizing into a wishing. A phantasy-desiring [corresponds] to an actual desiring and willing, etc. The correlates of phantasy are fictions, "phantasy images," the correlates of positionality are actualities, meant or true actualities: actual object, actual deception, actual probabilities, etc. In phantasy, all of this is meant with the term play, non-being and being alike.

On the other hand, even phantasy has its constitutive accomplishment. Namely, the counter-image of a thing, which is being attested to seriously in experience in the corresponding nexuses of concordant fulfillment, is a fiction, a fiction that in play, being concordantly maintained, yields precisely the image of a concordant being, the image of a true existing thing. And thus corresponding to each type of truly existing objectivity is an image typical of it, a concordant, fictitious objectivity. A fictitious objectivity as fictum, an image as image, yields a kind of objectivity, an ideal, noematic one insofar as what the ego has formed in this manner in play can be identified in the repetition of play and in maintaining the constituted sense, and can then be explicated in cognitive acts. Every such formation, which nevertheless first crystallizes into a firm unity in free activity, is called a free possibility, a possibility of phantasy.

Up to now we spoke of phantasies purely in themselves, free [14]
phantasies with their playful actualities, and we conceived of them without any tie to the current actuality of the respective ego. But it is also a common occurrence, and an extremely important type of connection between positional and phantasy consciousness, that a positional actuality is refabricated, that, for example, a red house that is given to us in positional experience is reconceived, fabricated as green in conflict with the red that was experienced.

The synthesis is carried out in the form of the on set or the assumption of a unique modalization of original consciousness of being, a modalization that presupposes phantasy. The actual

positing of the house forms the basis [of this modalization] and remains in effect, but it is transformed in the following way: "assuming that this house were green." In this case, the new positional accomplishment of assumption is an accomplishment of spontaneous activity. Still, a non-spontaneous phantasy-play can also allow formations to arise that insert themselves into our world of experience and obfuscate it—not of course without repressing matters given in experience. In this insertion, they have a tie to actuality and a piece of solid ground of actuality underlying them, and in tolerating them, we also already have in them a kind of beginning, only that we have not generated them in synthetic acts and have not formed hypotheses. We certainly do not have to go into this. What we have presented suffices to contrast playful and positional consciousness, and to distinguish pure phantasy and phantasy that is imbued with positional consciousness.

<Chapter 1: ACTIVE OBJECTIVATION> [15]

<§52. Cognitive Interest and Striving for Knowledge>[177]

If we now delve into our investigation of active objectivation, the latter, as we know, necessarily refers us back to realms of objects[178] that are already pre-constituted, realms of objects that are contained in the potentiality of the background. They will be, in part, well-known objects that we got to know little by little in previous acts. They have sunken into the background with their structure constituted in activity, and if we are able to take note of them again, we then encounter them with the character of familiarity <in order> to be reconfirmed in the mere renewal of activity as the ones with which we are familiar. In part, they will be objects that are strange to us, objects that nevertheless can have the apperceptive mint of actively constituted objects insofar as the apperception already followed in the background, so to speak, the

[177] Editor: See Appendix 29: <Theme and Theoretical Interest> pp. 548ff.
[178] *Objektitäten*

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[178] *Objektitäten*

E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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model of the previous activity. No object can be given to developed consciousness without such a prefiguring. An object that exercises an affection from the background, but that does not yet bear any traits that stem from active accomplishments, is actually a limit-concept for us, an abstraction, but a necessary one, since we see necessarily that whatever exercises an affection must already be a unity of constitutive manifolds, and that where a unity is constituted in this blind way, many kinds of occurrences of disruptive inhibition, and hence preliminary stages of modalization, must already occur as well. But certainly, despite all of its ties through [passive] positionality, so long as the ego has not actively formed its world, we cannot expect the firm path of knowledge given by a teleological relation to guiding ideas, and even the constitution of firm unities of identity, which unities, as genuine objectivities, give to the ego an environing-world and a rule for its further activities. And the ego must continually intervene with ever new formations; it must not allow the objectivities that are already formed to be abandoned in the passive background and, so to speak, allow decay to rule. The [16] organization of the realms of being, the realms of truth for the ego, especially of an objective world as the environing-world of the ego, is an accomplishment acquired only through its activity and in higher formations through its fully conscious positing of goals and goal oriented activity. What concerns us is understanding the levels of this accomplishment, the originally prefigured system of their typical strides forward, and in this typicality, their necessary strides forward.

Pregiven are not only positional actualities, naturally, meant actualities, but also the play of phantasy, emergent fictions, however they may have arisen, pure or alloyed. We do not consider them initially even though they do play quite an encompassing role in the path of knowledge, for all eidetic knowledge rests on them.

Let us take as a natural point of departure positional pregivennesses, [i.e.,] any kind of individual objects. We assume that they are given in perception, that they are unfamiliar, or more clearly, unrecognized; the active objectivation, which we call cognition in the broadest sense, is not yet exercised with respect to

them, the memory of them is not attached to them in the manner of a re-cognizing. And still more restrictively: Such an object emerges, we follow the affection, *we turn toward it, we grasp it.* In a special way, we now live through the continual unity of the objective sense, that is, the continuity of the streaming and varying consciousness, a continuity in which the continually unitary self is constituted. We are continually directed to this self, to the object of experience; we actively carry out the continual consciousness of the experiencing: The consciousness of existence is hereby a *living awareness, a living belief. But in this firm directedness toward the object*, in the continuity of its experiencing, there is an *intention* that *intends beyond* what is given and beyond its momentary mode of givenness toward a progressing *plus ultra.* It is not only a progressive conscious-having in general, but a *striving onward* to a new consciousness. This striving is founded in an *interest* in the enrichment of the self [of the object] that is *eo ipso* being augmented with the grasping, according to its content streaming toward the ego. Interest is a feeling and a positive feeling, but only [17] apparently is this feeling a sense of well-being with respect to the object.[179]

It can be that the object itself also stirs our feeling, that it is of value to us and that we therefore turn to it and dwell upon it. Indeed, it can just as well be that it is not of value to us, and that it awakens our interest precisely by its repugnance. The interest of which we are speaking here is a feeling, but one that is directed in a very peculiar manner. Namely, even if an object motivates our turning toward it through a value that we feel in it, the sense-content of the object is necessarily enriched as soon as we grasp it, in part, by its merely intuitive persistence in perception, in part, by the ensuing awakening of its obscure horizons: for instance through our involuntary eye movements and head movements, and through which ever new appearances of the object make ever new sides of it intuitive. Here, the object given to consciousness is the same, but its sense is enriched in the varying mode of the manner of givenness, and at the same time this process now bears with it a

[179] Theoretical interest. Cf. the more precise exposition on content and object of theoretical interest <see below p. 548f.>.

constant open horizon, related to possibilities and expectations for ever new enrichments of this sort. Connected to this is a distinctive feeling, the joy in this enrichment, and in relation to this horizon of expanding and increasing enrichment, a striving to get "closer and closer" to the object, to appropriate the self [of the object] ever more completely. This striving can of course also take on the form, then, of a genuine volition that becomes the will to knowledge in higher, and then intelligible levels. The interest that we have described is the motive of active objectivation, of "knowledge or cognition" and is therefore called "*cognitive interest*." And accordingly the striving toward knowledge that is also usually meant under the concept of cognitive interest is also a peculiarly directed striving that is not to be confused with a "desiring-the-known-object."

Cognitive interest can be fleeting and secondary insofar as it is [18] obscured by other interests, and where it reigns, <it can> also have from the very beginning the character of a transference of feeling. But the extent to which it is at work as being directed toward knowledge, it fashions pre-conditions for levels of newer and newer cognitive accomplishments that have different forms.

<§53. Explicative Acquisition of Knowledge>

For the sake of simplicity, we want to leave all other kinds of interest entirely out of consideration and operate with the idea of a pure and unbroken cognitive interest by which the ego (which is conceived of as the subject of the acts to be described) is guided and, as it were, is guided as long as we attribute [this] to the ego. We also determine the concept of *theme* now. It designates the *object* as the substrate and center of a *unitary interest*, more precisely, the entire object toward which the ego is constantly directed in the mode of attentiveness, while its cognitive interest is satiated by its richer and richer givenness, but which also strives onward toward newer and newer givenness.

Let us now turn back to the formation of knowledge in perception. We have just thematically grasped a perceptual object and have pursued it for a time through the unity of intuition with interest and in active grasping. As long as nothing else takes place,

the object is indeed only "the indeterminate object of empirical intuition," to speak with Kant. But the matter cannot rest here very long. The "examination," as the fitting German word suggests,[180] goes immediately onward, and when we use this word, we immediately think of a "more" as well. The continuity of examining necessarily falls into discrete, distinct steps. The examining that would continually stream forth in a serial fashion would become a mere staring at if it would not take shape in distinct shapes and pass over into a chain of single graspings, of single acts, acts that would form an internally connected unity, a poly-thetic unity that binds the single theses together. Examining the object, the first thing to strike my eyes especially, for instance, is its luster, then its surface color, then its shape, then a portion of [19] the object, for instance, the roof of the house, then for instance the special features of this portion, the color, the shape, etc. (In this case we take the object as a world for itself and do not let the attentiveness spread to the rest of the world, to its neighbors. What would happen here will occupy us later.) Thus, single acts follow one after another. The object, every object, has properties—so runs the self-evident ontological talk. The object is given to consciousness—at least on the level of higher developed consciousness—in such a way that it has (or will immediately gain) its inner prominence, its inner affections, and the examination follows them. In this way it comes to the progressing acquisition of the knowledge of its inner determinations. More precisely: If the object, the house, is called *S*, and these so-called inner determinations, α, β, γ, then the process generated by the cognitive interest in *S* does not simply issue in the sequence: grasping *S*, grasping α, grasping β, etc., as if the graspings, the first one and [then] the other ones, would have nothing to do with one another, as if a change of *themata* were to occur: like when cognitive interest in an object has grown weary, or has been overcome by the interest in a second object, and then again by a third one, where, in these instances, attentiveness is provoked by the corresponding powerful affection. Rather, in the entire *process*

[180] Translator: "*Betrachtung*." Husserl is referring here to the antiquated sense of the term as "trachten nach etwas": endeavoring or striving after something.

of single acts, which lead from the grasping of *S* to the graspings of α, β, ..., we get to know *S*. The process is an unfolding examination, a unity of articulated examination. Throughout the entire process the *S* keeps the character of the theme, and by gradually getting a hold of it, moment by moment, part by part, it is precisely "moment," "part," generally speaking, property, determination. In this way it is nothing for itself, but rather, it is something of object *S*, something from it and in it. We get to know it by grasping the properties. In the developmental process, the indeterminate theme *S* becomes the substrate of the emergent properties and they are themselves constituted here as its determinations.

But how is it that the ego, in grasping α, is aware of recognizing *S* in it? Why is the α given to consciousness in a manner that is different from the *S* or from any other *S'* toward which the ego [20] turns right after having turned toward the *S*? What we will think about initially does not suffice: The *S* must be held onto in the transition to the other one rather than simply relinquishing the hold on it, and that means that the cognitive interest in *S'* represses that of *S*, not in the sense that it simultaneously annuls it, destroys it. It only pushes it out of the central place, out of the place of primary attentiveness and examination; it becomes something noticed in a secondary fashion. It is still held onto actively, only that it has the shape of what has retreated due to the pressing nature of the *S'*; it has the shape of what has retreated but is still maintained.

All of this designates significant noematic modifications, but they are just as possible for the cases in which the grasping and examination of a concrete-unitary object passes over to another object as when it passes over from an object to its properties.

Certainly, the designated modifications essentially belong to the process of the explicative acquisition of knowledge, and with this we have thus accomplished the beginning of our description. But what is required now are more differentiated, further descriptions, as is evident from the cases that run counter to these. We realize here that the consciousness of something like a determination of the object and correlatively of the substrate—the subject of determinations in such processes, whose description we now

attempt—only now arise at all; we notice that in the articulated activity and in the unity of the encompassing synthesis, which synthesis connects the succession of the acts grasping *S*, α, β, ..., an original formation of sense is constituted with respect to the objective sense of *S* and the emergent α, β, ..., a formation of sense by virtue of which the terms "subject" and "determination" originally gain their significance. The corresponding concepts have their foundation of abstraction in these sense-forms. In other words, we are standing at the place where the first of the so-called logical categories originate; and proceeding from here the primordial sources of all other categories will be opened in a similar way. We will fully clarify what this means.

<§54. The Active Synthesis of Identification. The Most Strict Sense of Objectivation>[181] [21]

Now back to our description, and <we> are guided back to it by the following questions: How is it that the *unity of the theme* S *does not get left behind*, indeed, that *S* remains the dominating theme and not merely the theme that is held onto, namely, when we pass over to the graspings of α, β, ...? How is it, when the latter are grasped in their turn and therefore have become *themata* in a certain respect—how is it that they do not have the same "weight" as *S*, that they are merely *themata* in which the dominating theme *S* is efficacious and the thematic interest in *S* is not decreased in them, but is increasingly fulfilled? How is it that we speak of an explication as the unfolding of *S* in its determinations? How, on the other hand, is it that the *S* is determined as α, as β, etc.? If a thing is initially grasped in undifferentiated generality, and further in its specificity according to shape, color, according to any kind of element coming into relief, then this way of grasping is different from the way in which a thing, then a sound, then a smell, are grasped synthetically in succession. In the first case, the synthesis with respect to the objective senses is a synthesis of continual coinciding that runs

[181] Editor: See Appendix 30: <Determining as Cognitive Act> pp. 549ff.

clear through it, running clean through the sharply differentiated steps of the act. But in the other case the coinciding is lacking. In both cases, and in all possible cases taken together—in which the ego progresses from grasping to grasping in a synthetic operation, in the combining unity of one cognitive interest—in both cases, I say, is a certain intellectual[182] overlapping of all things grasped. An overlapping is carried out with each synthesis, even if entirely different objects are observed in a unitary fashion. The ego functions as continually active in and through the sequence of steps; it is still directed toward the object of the first step with the second step, and in spite of the privileged place that the new one occupies as being something that is grasped in a primary manner, it is now directed toward both together with the new one and through the new one toward the previous one. Both together are actively taken up in the ego, the indivisible ego is in both. The succession of the rays of attentiveness and rays of grasping has become a double ray. [22]

But now there is an essential difference whether a synthesis of coinciding takes place in accord with sense in this synthetic activity, and especially a synthesis of identity for instance, or whether this does not take place. If we pass from a color over to a sound, this is not the case. If we pass from a color over to another color, always in a synthetic manner, we will already have syntheses of coinciding that coincide by overlapping in the manner of uniformity or similarity. But even if we take our case of the thing and the property of the thing, and generally, the case of the object and the property of the object, then an entirely peculiar synthesis of coinciding that forms identity arises. It is not a total identity, like when we pass over synthetically from one presentation to other presentations in the consciousness of the same object, and actively identify it with itself. Instead, it is precisely a peculiar identification, precisely that identification in which an object and its determination coincide, in which the consciousness of the substrate of sense and <of the> determination (property) originally arises.

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[182] *geistige*

Yet we must add that a modification of the corresponding coinciding must also already ensue passively, already when the passive affection of *S* and the passive affection of α meet in the passive ego, or, even in the case of the wakeful ego, when the *S* is abandoned while the interest falls to one of its properties, so that the latter becomes a unique theme and *S* has relinquished its thematic character. The living *S* that is still fresh, still exercising an affection, coincides with the property that has been drawn from it. But then we do not have a unity of knowledge, then the *S* is not characterized as the substrate of determination for the ego, and the determination itself is not characterized as a determination. Should this be the case, then the identification must be one that is actively carried out, it must be an act running through the thematic unity of both terms, an act that we can describe in the following way: The *S* as theme initially undergoes a general examination that is lacking any determination. An affecting moment α, which is passively "enclosed in *S*," now penetrates to the active ego. But this ego is abidingly interested in *S*; as such it "concentrates" its interest, that is, its *S*-interest in α. The fullness of givenness of the [23]
S is enriched in the grasping; but this takes place because it itself is given to consciousness as *S* only in its particularity. The concentration on the particularity therefore fulfills and enriches the interest in *S*.

In this discursive activity, however, an active synthesis of identification is carried out between *S* and α, and it founds the active fulfillment of the thematic intention. The *S* in this case has passed from the beginning mode of undetermined generality over to the noematically new form of a *S*, a *S* that in the explicit identification with α and in the concentration on α has become the determinate *S*, has become the subject of the determination, α.

If the cognitive movement passes over <from> α to β, then the regard that is concentrated on α is expanded in order to be deepened in the concentration on β. But the acquisition of the first partial knowledge has precisely not been lost. After it is carried out, *S* is from now on the *S* determined as α for all further cognitive steps. With this it has a new mode again. The moment when the active two-fold synthesis *S*-α has come about, we have the *S* in the mode of the original acquisition of its determination

by α. But afterwards the acquisition remains as the acquisition in retentional modification. The *S* held onto goes with the new sense formation S_α into the new determinations. The S_α is determined further as β, the $S_{\alpha\beta}$ as γ, etc.

After the current processes of knowledge acquisition, processes of explication, the object is constituted abidingly as the object determined by the respective determinations, even if it has sunk into passivity. It has internally taken up, *as habitual knowledge*, the sense formations constituted originally in the described acts. In the initial view of a later new perception, this view is given to consciousness of course with the empty horizon of acquired knowledge, and every new explication has the character of a repetition and of a reactivation of the association of the "knowledge" that was already acquired. *Even similar objects* are now apprehended according to familiar laws in an analogous sense, and the apprehension has to be verified in the actualization of its cognitive intentions by the corresponding explicative syntheses actually coming to light. The developed consciousness, the consciousness of the subject that has already operated with respect to all types of objects as explicating consciousness, will [24] hardly be able to have objects given that are not already apprehended in such a "logical structure," that is, that are not already apprehended at least in the empty form of determinability, as the substrates of properties that are prefigured in protentional indeterminacy as chains of properties that can be explicated.

Every object now harbors, in apprehension, an implicit horizon of properties, of familiar and unfamiliar ones. But this implication is entirely different from that of objects that we must conceive as found in a still undeveloped consciousness, as entering into the first original determinations. An essential difference is alluded to by our use of symbols: Whether an *S* already arises in the shape of apprehension, $S_{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, whereby this shape, however, only lies as the empty prefiguring in the protentional horizon, or whether the *S* arises without such a horizon. In the latter case, the activity of explicating *S* yields a first, fully original chain of determination for *S*, in the former case, however, it also yields an original chain, but as filling-out in this entirely different sense as determining more closely an already prefigured horizon and possibly as

bringing-to-givenness-once-again a horizon that is already familiar. What is familiar here is the *S* as it is shaped by property-like determinations.

But it is precisely here that we must begin. Let us once again clearly draw our attention to the fact that the determination of *S* through its gradual emergent properties, a determination that is carried out in the continuity of thematic interest within the activity of the ego, is an accomplishment that is in the process of being brought about, being built up here in the mode of originality, that it, then, like everything that is constituted in consciousness, passes over into corresponding non-original modes, since precisely consciousness itself can take on the mode of retentional modification, finally, the mode of property sedimented in the horizon of memory, and from there can take on the mode of the re-emergence.

Let us add that rememberings are of course also possible, namely, those rememberings that give back all such modes reproductively; in this case, however, there is also the possibility that an object *S* is remembered, in relation to which <we> now first grasp certain properties in a determinative manner that we [25] had not grasped before, that is, that are not remembered as determinations of the previous determining processes. But whether we operate now on the basis of perception or reproduction, the difference remains that determinative explications of a *S* have their basic shape of originality in a manner that is entirely analogous to how we speak in a modified way in another context of originality in perception or, in other modes of self-giving. And, in fact, we see that original activity, so far as its unity reaches, possesses the character of the unity of self-giving. What comes about in synthetic activity is once more noetically speaking a consciousness that, as a consciousness, has its What, its objectlike formation, and in the progressive intermeshing, even has an ever newly formed objectlike formation. It is a progressive creation of sense, a progressive constitution of the object, specifically, an original and self-giving one, precisely in the course of actually creative activity. But in the unity that is being constituted in manifold ways, there are several constitutive accomplishments. The one that is for us initially the most important accomplishment

we designate as *objectivation in the most strict* sense. "Object" in the complete and genuine sense is identical with itself and is originally constituted as the thematic object for an ego in identifying activity. There are as many fundamental formations of identification that we have for a theme as there are modes and, as it were, sides of objectivation. (But we will soon see that all these modes of objectivation are necessarily related, and are found there ready as possibilities, even if only one of them is carried out.)

<Chapter 2: THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURES AND FUNDAMENTAL FORMS OF JUDGMENT> [26]

<§55. The Possible Objectivation of Judgment and of its Components. Syntactic Matter, Syntactic Form, and Syntagma>[183]

We have chosen as our point of departure the explication of a *S*. *S* is determined by partial self-identification as α, β, γ, and thereby it remains the one and the same *S* in the unity of this multiform activity, in the progression to newer and newer concentrations under mediating distinctions. Initially [this unfolds] in a continual fashion. But we will soon be able to take a further step whereby even this ipseity can be brought to a higher objectivating form in a synthetic activity.

Just as the *S* can only be given in this process as object, namely, in the form of a substrate, so too can the determination, the property as property (namely, of a *S*), only be given in this process. And further: The *S*, constituted in this form of substrate, is non-independent, as α, constituted in the form of determination, is non-independent; both are constituted in relation to one another. And in fact not only subject and determination (or a plurality of determinations) are constituted, but both together constitute a connecting, harmonizing unity. We have already said previously, and we say it now in a still more precise manner: With every self-contained step that is carried out, the entire synthetic deed of the

[183] Editor: See Appendix 31: Syntactic Formation, pp. 551ff.

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E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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ego makes up a consciousness, a self-contained intentionality; corresponding to the entire synthetic deed of the ego is a self-contained noema, a self-contained objective sense with a mode of being. But precisely the constitutive whole as whole—this is what we have not yet observed more closely.

If we call the *objectivating process a process of judging*, here, a process of a unitarily determinative judging, and [if we call] every self-contained determinative process that has the character of an act, a *judicative act*, then corresponding to it correlatively as its [27] What, specifically, as its objectivity, is *the judgment* or also, *the proposition*. "Judgment" is ambiguous, since it designates judicative lived-experience, evident in the predilections of contemporary psychological and logical discourse, but not proposition. But apart from the grammatical resonnances, we also use the term for more general cases. Thus where we require complete clarity, we say judicative proposition (*propositio*). We will also have to distinguish the objective sense contained in it and its mode of being: We speak of *propositional sense* and *propositional mode of being*.[184] But do these ascertainments not come into conflict with our understanding, since we did say that constituted as an "object" is something that is actively identified as theme, and in determinative judgment this is the *S*, the subject of determination, and no longer the constituted property (no matter the degree to which it is constituted in a differentiated manner in the form of the property accruing to the constituted property), and even to a lesser extent is it the judicative proposition (no matter the degree to which it is found noematically as a self-contained and articulated unity)?

How the conflict is remedied is clear. What "is found" in this way, what is in this way co-contained in the framework of our active constitution of an object is an index for essential possibilities for new active objectivations whose theme is thus the property and, on the other hand, the judgment itself. In determinative judging, the *S* is objectlike; in the progression of the determination it is altered noematically, in a certain respect it also

[184] Cf. <332 ff.> concerning proposition distinguished from state-of-affairs. Editor: See §14: The Distinction between State-of-affairs and Judicative Proposition.

takes on sense-structures that are being annexed, sense-structures that are also transformed in the mode of givenness. It is subject in a newer and newer way, and subject in the judgment, "*S* is α, β, γ...." Or actually, the chain of judgments "*S* is α," "$S_{(\alpha)}$ is β," "$S_{(\alpha, \beta)}$ is γ," etc. But the respective judgment itself is not given to consciousness as an object in the judging, it is not itself constituted as an object, but in the appropriate change in attitude it can at all events become a theme and subject of determination in a new judging, and this is likewise the case where the determinations are concerned. What is there for itself can exercise an affection for itself, but it must first be "there." The primary judgment "*S* is α" must first be constituted where *S* is objectlike, then the judgment can itself become objectlike, like when for [28] instance it becomes a subject in the following way: when it contains the "*S*" as subject and the α as predicate. This path of objectivation is prefigured *a priori*. Likewise a determination that is constituted originally in our judging, but is not objectlike in the active sense, as for example the bodily shape, can become a theme in its own right. In grasping it, the *S* does not determine itself now; [rather,] this very *S* gets determined, and now has taken on the form of the subject. And now its previous form of determination does not belong to the sense. We have yet to treat the cases in which even here the path is prefigured.

Let us note that *S* as the subject of judgment has the form of the subject, but during the judicative process, *S* is the object, and not *S* in this [subject] form. For this we need quite another step that grasps its component, the subject of judgment, in a determinative manner on the basis of judging that produces objects.

Now, one could still raise the following objection. There is certainly much that is ready for possible objectivation; but not everything is equal, and especially in judging, to be sure, the subject may be distinguished as the theme of the determination; but the determinative predicate is also distinguished, and in a manner similar to *S*. By the *S* being determined by it, by α, α itself does indeed belong to the theme and is itself in a thematic hold, albeit in service of the *S*. In a certain, general way, it is thus also "objective," and if it is made independent as subject, it has only

changed the form of objectivity; it has assumed the distinguished form of subjectivity, the form of substratum.

This is completely correct. Everything that lies in the thematic regard when we judge has in a broadened sense the distinguishing trait of something given to consciousness as an object, in contrast to what does not lie in the thematic hold. And we already recognize that everything given to consciousness as an object in this sense can be given to consciousness in this way in a varying mode, and within this in a possible mode of substrate as well. In this way, in the judgment, "This tree is green" (leaving out of consideration the general conceptual and the verbal expressions), "green" is there "objectively" as predicate; in the judgment, "This green is brighter than that other green of the object over there," "green" is an independent subject, but abstracting from the forms, it is objectively the same, and can also be identified as the same. [29]

We have gained important knowledge from this; we encounter fundamental distinctions now that must be carried over from determinative judgment to all types of judgment. They are distinctions that we gain of course in reflective attitudes, all of which refer back to a normal attitude, that of the execution of judgment itself.

If we judge that *S* is α, is β, is γ, then we now distinguish: (1) the identical *S*, the α, the β, etc., in their objective ipseity, just as they are found and are maintained in the thematic regard (2) from the *S* in the form of the subject, from the α in the form of determination, etc., just as they belong to the content of the judicative proposition. The *S* itself, α, β themselves can be given in different shapes of this type.

If we pass over to other forms of judgment, we will distinguish the form of the subject and that of the object, for example, the tree as subject, and the tree as object, whereby the thematic content of different forms can be the same. And we previously saw the same thing already with respect to the α, β ... as well. Accordingly, two <or rather three> concepts are determined:

(1) The form as the component of the form of judgment or as the form that makes the content adaptable to a judgment, we call the *syntactic form*.

(2) Its content, what is thematic and maintained identically in different syntactic forms, we call the *syntactic matter*[185] or *judicative core*.

(3) What is formed syntactically as the unity of matter and form we call the *syntagma*. The judgment is a *syntactic unity* that is completely self-contained; it has in itself syntactically formed matters, and it can only have syntactically formed matters; and the matters that are formed in this way in particular divisions have their encompassing syntactic unity that contains still further "forms" of judgment: To be sure, for them, the talk of form is less suitable; for the correlate of identification, what is expressed in the "is" and many in other forms proper to it, *do not form* the matters, *S*, α, β etc. *in a similar fashion*.

Traditional logic always spoke of the *termini* of a judgment, [30] without ever bringing it to phenomenological clarity, for example, "Socrates is tall." Seen precisely, these *termini* are not, for instance, subjects, predicates, and the like, but the syntactic cores in the subjects, in the predicates. We indicate here general structures of judgment, but now it is necessary above all to ascertain the general ideality of judgment and <to determine> its relationship to time.

<§56. The Ideality of the Judicative Proposition in the Sense of Omni-Temporality>

In the progressive process of determining, judging essentially builds upon judging; it is not only added on externally, but builds the unity of a new judging, and it correlatively builds a judgment as a constitutive accomplishment out of the already constituted judgment. Just as judging is a process of becoming, so too what is originally pre-constituted as objective—what we call judgment—is a unity of becoming; the becoming is a becoming created on the part of the subject from materials of passivity, of course. The original core of judgment's being, that of constitution, is a being in the mode of created being, that is, a being in the form of temporality.

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[185] *Stoff*

Certainly, this temporal being is nothing less than the being of an *individuum* or of the individual event. A judgment is not an *individuum*. The difference that arises between the two signifies *fundamental types in the mode of temporality as the form of the objectlike formation*. Now, when we arrive at vindicating the *a-temporality* of judgments and of the entire realm of cognitive structures that are built out of them or are contained in them, this *a-temporality will itself be brought to light as a distinctive shape of temporality*, a shape that a-temporality fundamentally distinguishes from individual objectlike formations. If we rest provisionally with our presently delimited sphere of determinative judging, and even continue holding firm to intuitive individuals as the point of departure, the difference already appears to us here in a certain way. If the object is an intuitive one, for instance, given [31] in its duration as red, then the judgment that brings this fact to light through the explication of the object, as the judgment carried out now, is constituted in the process of becoming and is referred to the Now, that is, to a certain stretch of time belonging to the judgment itself, a stretch of time that is different from the duration of the object.

If we repeatedly carry out the same judgment in arbitrary rememberings that yield the unitary consciousness of the same object in their concatenation, then each time it will have its new constitutive becoming of self, its new duration, and possibly even the judicative tempo will be a very different one. And yet the judgment as the judicative proposition is one and the same. This is to say that all such judging actions essentially enter into the unity of an encompassing complete identification; there are manifold acts, but identically one propositional sentence in all of them. It achieves original givenness only in a temporal act that has its determinate temporal locus, possibly in several [or] in any number of temporal acts with many [or] even any number of temporal loci. But the proposition itself does not have any binding temporal position; and its process of becoming built up that belongs inseparably to it does not have the individuality of the arbitrary act. The ideality of the proposition as the idea of a synthetic unity of becoming is the identity of something that can emerge in individual acts at each temporal position; at each temporal position in which it emerges, it

emerges necessarily in a temporal manner [as] becoming in a temporal manner, and yet is the same "omni-temporally." Thus, running through the temporal manifold is a supra-temporal unity found in it. *Supra-temporality signifies this omni-temporality.* Found in each of these manifolds is the same unitary structure, and in this way it is found in time, and of course as given to consciousness. If I make a judgment now, then the What of the judging, the judicative proposition, is given to consciousness in the mode of the Now, and yet it is not bound to any temporal position, it is not bound to any judicative action found there, and it is not represented in any action by an individual moment, by an individual particularization. It is itself at each position and becomes itself at the position where a corresponding judicative act is unfolding. But while the individual element has "its" temporal position and its temporal duration, beginning at a position and passing away at a position, and is past, such an ideality has the temporal being of supra-temporality (it is contained in individual acts, in individual temporalities that can emerge at any position, and nevertheless [32] [remains] identically the same in all of them); it has the being of omni-temporality, which is however a mode of temporality. We will hear later that this holds similarly in a certain way for all ideal objectlike formations. But only similarly. We will hear later that the ideality of the objectlike formations of sense and the objectlike formations of the proposition is not the ideality of the species that is particularized as the *eidos* in individual moments.[186]

<§57. The Forms of Judgment Issuing from Determinative and Complete Identifications>

Given this, we can proceed in two directions. The nearest direction is the one in which we systematically pursue the shapes of judgment that are opened by our point of departure: We will go down this path. But I would like to point out from the very start that all of our discussions are burdened with a limitation that can

[186] The judicative proposition has no restriction? See accompanying page. Appendix 32: <The Ideality of the Objectlike Formations of Sense and the Ideality of the Species> pp. 553f.

still essentially influence the concept of judgment itself. We had an experiencing as our point of departure and, at all events, a positional consciousness. But it is clear from the very start that even phantasy, multiform play-consciousness, <can> bring to us objectlike formations [in their] pregivenness, and that we can freely and actively exercise entirely similar processes of an attentive turning toward, of grasping, of explicating a substrate in terms of its properties in relation to a world of phantasy that is already constituted in the background. But we will have to pose the fundamental question concerning which character these judgments have, judgments that operate on the basis of play, on the basis of the "as if," more precisely, not phantasized judgments, but judgments about phantasy objectlike formations and, in contrast to these, which character the judgments have that operate on the basis of positing, judgments not about actualities posited [in the modality of] "as if," but about actualities posited in all seriousness. We will have to ask to what extent the difference between founding positionality and quasi-positionality, between seriousness and play, approaches the conception of a concept of [33] judgment in the strict sense. By this we have in mind, of course, the concept of judgment that lies at the basis of traditional logic, which is completely in the dark concerning its phenomenological origins. I would not like to delve into this problem here so that we can initially slake our thirst on the shape, on the systematic development of the forms of judgment, and therefore on the development of the forms of active objectivation. But first I had to point to the problem so that you will keep in mind that our concept of judgment that relates to the ground of positing has its limits precisely with this distinction, and must obtain its final demarcation only by drawing the necessary contrasts.

Let us make one more observation. We started with explicative determinations, with individually intuitive objects. But the idea of the objectlike formation was expanded in and of itself. For we saw that after something has been judged, the judgment itself, this ideal objectlike formation, can just as well become the subject of determination, and then in like fashion its ideal components, etc.

We explicitly recall that no matter what and no matter <how> something is there as ready-made and exercises an affection—that

is, even every objectlike formation that arises as the constitutive accomplishment of egoic activity—this "something" can be the subject of determination and can deliver up features in the form of a property; this in turn, then, occasions judgments that themselves can in turn become substrates from which we can in turn draw judgments: an ideal-unending process.

Let us first observe the forms of judgment that are immediately contained in the framework of the determination. The conceptually most simple form of the determinative judgment is "*S* is *p*." Its most universal significance is certain. According to what we have previously said, whatever *S* stands for, no matter what exercises an affection on the cognitive ego, whatever is in the position of being noticed, can become the subject of determination, and the process of determining can obviously be concluded for itself with its first step. If the determinative movement goes on in this direction—which is another possibility—then the form "*S* is *p*, *q*, *r*," etc., arises, and depending upon the particular conclusions, [we will have] the particular forms "*S* is *p*, *q*," "*S* is *p*, *q*, *r*"; *S* is etc.

Indeed, there are different things to be noted here: In the most [34] simple determinative judging, *S* goes throughout the entire movement of judgment in the unity of a firm thematic hold. It is that which lies at the basis, the substratum, which runs throughout and without regard to the determinations set off in relief.

Where the *p*, *q* is concerned, the *p* is grasped, then *q*, while *p* becomes something secondary, but remains firmly held onto. Let us note now that in this case *q* enters into a special synthetic unity with *p*. By *S* being a theme that is held onto throughout, a determination is continuously being prehended; now the new one is not only prehended for itself, but at the same time grasped along with it. The intellectually prehending hand that already possesses *p*, grasps *q* next and holds onto it along with the other, etc. With this, a separate form occurs for the unification of what is held onto singly, forming an encompassing hold, the collective form, which is linguistically expressed by the "and." For this reason, we must express "*S* is *p* and *q*," etc., in a more precise manner. In this case belonging to every term is a separate synthesis of identity with the *S*; identifying rays, as it were, run from one *S* to *p*, *q*, etc. They are not however only connected in the *S*, but have the collective

relation on the side that is determined. The one thematic interest grasps them together in their successive ordering that however is ideal, since the ideality of the proposition does not harbor any individual temporal loci. Only the ordering is constituted.

But still another form occurs to us. If we take the judicative process in the middle of its movement and we allow it to be interrupted, two things are possible according to the kind of thematic interest [in play]. It can be limited to the *p* or to the *p* and *q*; it is not a limitless interest in *S* or it does not maintain it as such. It limits itself. Or the determinative movement breaks off, but the thematic interest, the cognitive intention, is maintained in its limitlessness. In one case, we have the forms, "*S* is α," "*S* is α and β," and further similar forms that get richer with respect to its terms; in the other case, [we have] the forms "*S* is α, etc.," "*S* is α and β, etc."

The curious "etc." appears here [as] a fundamental form in the sphere of judgment. It can be and will be pre-constituted in general, even with limited judgments, but not as taken into the form of judgment itself. Namely, an open horizon for the new properties to be expected will have arisen as the determining process progresses according to the protentional laws, naturally, [35] beyond the succession of the currently constituted determinations. Every articulated[187] intellectual movement progressing in a uniform style brings with it such an open horizon: an open one; *for it is not the next term as a single one that is prefigured, but the progression of the process*, one term and then another, etc. But it is precisely a matter of fixing this style of an open process and the peculiarity of a consciousness constituting it: what is expressed in the "etc.," in the "and more of the like." Obviously, however, this "etc." may or may not enter into the shape of judgment depending upon the thematic interest; thus, it creates differences in the forms of the judgment itself.[188]

We have therefore designated, at root, an infinity of forms. The term "infinity" itself means as much as the "etc.," only that it says more, namely, it continues to give the further *plus ultra*. When we

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[187] *gegliederte*

[188] This should have already been said in the context of protentional laws.

use the concepts of number here for the purpose of a characterization, we can say: The forms cultivated with and without the coda, "etc.," can have one, two, three terms, and so forth. But certainly, we cannot therefore say *a priori* that any kind of determinate object will yield or can yield infinitely many property-like determinations, or even, in the sense of objective truth (of which we have not yet spoken here), that every object must have infinitely many properties.[189]

New forms arise if we conceive of the determination carried out in such a way that the *S*, after the determination by *p* is carried out, shifts in turn into the primary grasping and then issues in a new determination, but in a thematically coherent manner—this is something that is possible *a priori* at any time. Thus, not merely in the form "*S* is *p*," and "*S* is *q*." Naturally, neither of these judgments have any unity in themselves, and let alone a unity of judgment, even if they be carried out by the same ego, which could indeed also ensue at different times and without any interconnections. [36]

If both are carried out in a present, possibly even by means of remembering one of them, the *S* that is given to consciousness twice in different modes arrives at a passive coinciding without further ado, even if there is a division between them due to an interruption of interest. But if the unity of theoretical interest remains unbroken, then not only will the succession of both judgments, "*S* is *p*," "*S* is *q*," be bridged through a passive coinciding of *S*, but the thematic activity will run throughout this bridging in the *S*, and then we will have a judgment that is built up out of two judgments. Thus, if the identification of the *S* with itself reaches into the unity of thematic activity, we will have two identifying activities with the one identifying activity running though them. "*S* is *p*" and "the same *S* is *q*."

We get contrasting forms when we allow the identifying connection to be carried out on the side of the determination. We judge, "*S* is *p*." We imagine that now a thematically determinative interest in *p* is awakened, and this is determined as α, while the

[189] Editor: See Appendix 33: <Main and Subordinate Determination and the Division into Main and Subordinate Clause>.

interest in *S* remains the secured and overriding interest. We will then have a new formation of form. Above all, the transformation of the form of the determination *p* into a substrate of determination, is for itself already a principle of the formation of forms in judgment. In this regard, lacking a fitting expression, I spoke of nominalization in my *Logical Investigations*, but only in relation to non-independent features. Here I want to use the more general expression, "becoming independent."[190] The *p* becomes independent in becoming the substrate. This is accordingly already a universal formation of form; for we can distinguish forms of judgment in general where there is a determination that has become independent and, in another case, where it has not.

Let us observe an important, special group of forms of judgment that belong here. Granted that we judge "*S* is *p*" and if the becoming independent of *p* leads to the judgment "*P* is α," then, if a unity of thematic interest encompasses both, an identifying synthesis ensues that produces a unity of judgment. [37] Initially, one will begin: "*S* is *p*, and this, namely, this *P* is α." For example, "This thing is red, this red is saturated." But this second proposition must assume the form of a subordinate clause, since the interest belonging to the second judgment is subordinated to that of the first; in other words, since the dominating interest is the determination of *S*, the second proposition in turn gets the form of the attribution. This thing is saturated-red, it is saturated existing red. The closer determination of red co-determines the *S*. The form of a determination arises that is now determinate and as determinate is determinative.

In the present context we have seen different identifications function in connection with determinative, that is, with partial identifications. They were obviously complete identifications. But complete identifications can also determine forms of judgment in a different way, initially, in an entirely independent manner. If this is the case, they will yield peculiar judgments that are on a par with determinative ones. Finally, we could have begun with completely identifying judgments instead of with determinative

[190] *Verselbständigung*

ones. Indeed, the determinative ones seem to me to merit a priority genetically.

What is identified will normally already be determined to some extent, even if minimally. In this case we must distinguish: the continual fusion formative of identity—*S* is recognized and immediately explicated in a progressive manner, for instance, by reappropriating the interest and the previous "conviction"—or distinctions are made and actively identified. We never speak of acquired convictions, of their reanimation, reappropriation, etc. It is nevertheless quite conceivable that a thematically grasped *S*, still prior to being explicated, reaches a unity of identity with an *S′* that is given in another mode of givenness. We would then have the identifying judgment, "*S* is identical to *S′*." The form becomes fruitful through its tie to determinations. And here all emergent forms of syntactic terms, in the framework of determinative objectivations, give to us many (ideally prefigured) possibilities to shape more richly the identifying judgment: thus, for example, "*S*, which is α, is identical to *S′*, which is β," or "S_α is identical <to> [38] S_β," or " S_α, which is β, is identical to *S′*, which is β and γ," and so on, in many regulated combinations that can easily be derived from it. Further, we can once again bring to the unity of judgment several identity-judgments through overarching identifications, for example, "*S* is identical to *S′*, and the latter is identical to *S″* as well," etc.

<Chapter 3: THE SYNTACTIC AND THE OBJECT-THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS OF EXAMINATION> [39]

<§58. Sensible and Intellectual Objects. Substrate-Objects and Determination-Objects. Independent and Non-Independent Objects>[191]

In the formations of form that we have carried out up to now, we are thoroughly concerned <with> those things that are ideally iterable; that is, the principle of each particular formation of form can repeatedly be in operation. In this way, the series of property-like determinations, which can be connected to a subject collectively in the form "*S* is α and β and γ," is ideally infinite; likewise the series of subordinate clauses connected attributively to a subject is ideally infinite. This is likewise the case with the principle of the formation of forms; [this principle says] that a determination can be made into a subject of determination for a new determination. Etc. I refer to this because it can be seen in a like fashion where the futural formations of forms are concerned.[192]

Let us note further that our point of departure from a single concrete individual object as the main substrate was merely an exemplary one, or can be taken as such in retrospect. For no matter what exercises a unitary affection, no matter what enters into the attentive regard, we can make it a substrate, then conceptualize the idea of a substrate as such and now intuitively see the possibility of all such iterable forms of the total and determinative identification that we also called forms of judgment. Accordingly, in the generality of this mode of observation, the concept of substrate can leave open whether or not it is a matter here of substrates that have arisen from the thematic becoming independent of a determination. This having arisen in no way [40]

[191] Editor: See Appendix 34: <Absolute Substrates and Substrates as Determinations that have Become Independent> pp. 556ff.

[192] Cf. <314> concerning what we will treat subsequently. The distinctions of the *termini* of judgment according to the origin in the sphere of judgment itself, etc. Eidetic generalization of the distinctions that have been won.

E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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needs <to> mean something that is merely arbitrary and relative, as we will immediately see.

This holds likewise for the distinction between the substrates that stem from passivity and those that stem from activity. There is nothing prejudiced in the generality of our forms of judgment even for this distinction, and even this distinction has behind it an absolute distinction. Let us now elucidate this distinction here. If the ego pursues an affection, it grasps it and makes what was already constituted passively an explicit object. It exercises receptivity, an actively self-giving intuition, and if it exercises further determination, if it carries out total and partial identifications with respect to the received object, and thus [carries out] other activities that interconnect, then arising now in the sphere of synthetic activity itself will be new objectlike formations, the judicative objectlike formations, states-of-affairs, which themselves can then in turn become substrates of identity and of determination.

But everything that is actively constituted sinks into the background and is transformed into a passivity; emerging from memory, it can similarly exercise an affection like other types of passivity. And yet it continually bears within itself *the stamp of its origin* and its essential peculiarity. It can actually be received only in the explicit execution of the same multiform activity from which it has arisen. Only then is a *grasping of the self* [of the object] possible. The self-giving constitution of such objectlike formations is essentially a synthetic activity. Thus, this must have already taken place so that what was constituted in a multiform fashion can be grasped in a grasping of the self and so that it can become a theme. By contrast, there is an *original passivity*, an *originally passive constitution* of objects, whose activation is *sheer reception*: the sensible objects. All objectlike formations that have arisen from activity—which can only become passive after they themselves, or ones similar to them, had been actively "engendered"—point back for their part to founding objects that were originally constituted in a passive manner. *The intellect* is a name for constitutive accomplishments of objects that the ego has given to itself through the activities of identification. The self-giving is a creative self-giving. *Sensibility* is the contrary, <it is a [41]

name> for constitutive accomplishments without the participation of the active ego; the grasping of such objects is indeed an activity, but it is a mere receiving of a pre-constituted sense, and further explicating, judging already presupposes this sense.

The difference is not a mere relative one, although even intellectual objects, as ideas, can exercise an affection from [the sphere of] passivity and can then be received. Precisely this receptivity is fundamentally different for both; in order to be an actual grasping of the self it needs to be an active-synthetic accomplishment where intellectual objectlike formations are concerned, and where sensible objectlike formations are concerned, this is not the case.

Also belonging here is the distinction between *original substrates* and *original determinations*. What has emerged in the judgment as a determination can become independent thematically, it can become a substrate. Thus, the same substrate can appear now in this form, now in that form. And yet there is an absolute difference even here in the background. There are objects that can occur in original self-givenness in the form of substrate only by having occurred previously as determinations. And, on the other hand, there are objects for which this is not the case. Functioning as determinations is not essential for the latter; we call them *original substrate-objects*. For the other ones, the form of determination is essential, namely, their *a priori* original form; we call these objects *original determination-objects*. A shape, a color, is to be given originally only as the determination of a concrete object. A shape cannot become prominent without the shaped object becoming prominent, and the object is grasped first, even if the interest immediately passes over it, and then the object's color is grasped, which may perhaps immediately usurp the main thematic interest.

So it is with respect to all non-independent moments: Their *concretum* is grasped earlier than they are themselves, and prior to this they occur in the form of determination, in that of the "on something" before they become the substrate. This is otherwise when we have a pile of stones that are strewn about, given in an intuition that brings it into relief, or when we have an articulated whole like a series of markedly different houses: The particular

affections of the members here are contained in the unity of the whole affection. But from the very beginning the plurality or the [42] whole (the unity of the street) can be grasped and become the substrate, and any particular thing can become the substrate just as well.

These distinctions about which we have just spoken, the distinctions in judicative objectlike formations of course also signify universal distinctions in judgments that we can also meaningfully characterize as formal distinctions of judgment. But those universal forms of judgment that we have enumerated up to now have a universality and so encompass all such distinctions of judicative objectlike formations, and are insensitive to all such distinctions.

We can also characterize this *dual differentiation of forms of judgment* in the following way: If we imagine objectlike formations as objective sense, as they are always constituted and ready to occupy our thematic interest, then judicative activity can come into play from different directions, and these objectlike formations, together with those that are formed out of them or together with them, become the *termini*, the syntactic matters for syntactic forms whose possible system of forms is prefigured *a priori*, irrespective of the particularity of the *termini*. The judicative activity creates newer and newer objectlike formations through these syntaxes themselves that are constituted in them. As objectlike formations in general, they can also become the *termini* of syntactic forms, and these forms belong again and again to the same system of forms. *Accordingly, the difference between the syntactic matter and the syntactic form is relativized.* The theoretical-logical interest can (1) *go purely to the syntactic formation of forms*. Without concerning ourselves with this relativity, by leaving the *termini* indeterminate, one can ask: Which forms of judgments are possible for objects as such, grasped as thematic substrates no matter how they are constituted? The extent to which the objects remain indeterminate, and with them all *termini* in the forms, which is evident in the mere statement of the letters *S S'*, *p*, *p'* etc., is the extent to which the judgment, as objectivation, itself leads to particular formations of *termini*, like to the form of the determination in contrast to that of

the substrate; but this form belongs here in the very form of judgment. It forms something that abides in an indeterminate manner.

(2) On the other hand, then, one can (and one must even [43]
necessarily), however, pass over to another direction of observation, namely, *posing questions concerning the syntactic matters*, particularly of such a kind that can be posed with regard to all matter in general, and which are therefore formal characteristics as well. One arrives, then, at the *general questions of the origin of the judicative objectlike formations*, at relativities of the type just mentioned, and at the absolute lying *a priori* behind them. That designates a *system of forms that is prefigured a priori for the indeterminate "objects" of possible judgments*; after the exclusion of the relativizing syntaxes that could be included in the *termini*, there remains a general typicality of the absolute syntactic matters to which all judgments in their *termini* point back as relative matters, in other words, *a typicality of the ultimate object-senses* that contain nothing more stemming from intelligibility. They are *types of the most original objects* that can be *thought* as objects of possible judgments, *as objects of possible knowledge*.

Guiding distinctions for this are the distinctions that we made previously between sensible objects and intellectual objects, or, as they are also called, *categorial objects*; further, between original substrate-objects and original determination-objects, likewise the distinctions in concert with them between the *independent objects* and *non-independent* objects, between concrete and abstract objects, etc.

We call *concepts* that grasp scientifically *the elements of determination that belong to the form of possible judgments, logical categories*. Accordingly, *distinguished* for us, and corresponding to the two directions of examination, are *syntactic categories* and *core-categories or object categories*—like, then, the one logical direction of investigation that is specifically syntactic, and the other that is object-theoretical. In transcendental logic, even the examination that is directed toward the *a priori* of the objectlike formation is naturally transcendental; it treats all of the essential distinctions and laws proper to this direction in [44]

essential connection with judgment, in connection with constituting consciousness.

<§59. Whole and Part. Sets as Special Cases of Wholes>[193]

At the conclusion of the last lecture, we were right at the point of continuing the development of judicative forms a bit farther in a purely syntactic direction. We had won the first group of forms from a single center of objectivation. An affection [stemming from] an objectlike formation led to the grasping of an object *S*; the thematic interest belonging to it led to explication and was satisfied in certain partial ident<ifications>, i.e., with respect to the properties that were won. This yielded different modes of identifying interconnections here. To this we added the total identification and the syntactic forms arising through the connection of both functions. Let us expand our horizon. *Instead of one thing exercising an affection, we will take a multiplicity.*

Of course, there are many things that will exercise their affective force, partly originating from a living present, partly arising from memory. We are considering only a plurality in which the special affections are combined to form the unity of an entire affection. Such a combination is already based—in the realm of passive pre-constitution—on commonalities of pre-constituted single senses. With this, pathways are prefigured for thematic interest, as well as for courses of interest and courses of judicative syntheses that are connected in the unity of an encompassing interest. Indeed, we see a constant variation here already within passivity to the extent that the intensities of the affective forces can change; something new can push to the fore, something else can weaken and can become submerged; and likewise, when a thematic interest is activated for an object, we see a constant variation in the thematic horizon. But such a horizon will always be there; and what is alien to the theme will always separate off from what belongs together with the theme when an object breaks through to attentiveness. The former has [45] nothing to do with our present thematic substrate, it is alien to it;

[193] Editor: See Appendix 35: Multiplicity and Judgments of Multiplicity, pp. 559ff.

the latter, which is grasped thematically, does not alienate us from the previous theme, but rather, by fulfilling its new thematic interest it also enriches our previous interest, fulfills it along with it. This is just a correlate of saying that in the process of grasping and explicating the one theme, a common element comes to light along with what is self-contained in the other theme and along with what gets explicated from the standpoint of it. Active operation and fulfillment of objectivating interests bring commonalities to light, which is to say, it consists in continuously interrelating syntheses of identity. That which is common, and in the broadest sense, that which is identical, is disclosed in judicative syntheses, and in very different forms.

Yet certainly judging as an objectivating process is an unending one, and one that is infinitely enriched because not only is an ever new objectlike formation pre-constituted within passivity (and everything that is pre-constituted can be combined precisely with such a pre-constituted objectlike formation [leading] to new reconstituting accomplishments), but because even the process of activity does not only "make manifest," but at the same time accomplishes constitution and thus fashions ever new themes in which it does justice to the previous determinative ones.

We can also make the following general statements. If thematic interest is realized, that is, fulfilled, it necessarily branches out into a manifold of thematic interests that are, however, organized in the unity of one interest. The corresponding judicative activity proceeds in judicative steps, each step is a judgment, but it is connected with the other judgments that are already carried out, forming a unity of judgment. It does not matter here whether we take as a guiding theme a single substrate, at least in fictive isolation, or whether we have a manifold of substrates. If we look at this more closely, we will recognize—precisely as an essential peculiarity of a thematic-unitary process—that no matter how many objects may thematically exercise an affection and coalesce in the unity of a theme, a satisfaction of interest is however only possible through concentrations [of interest] in which an object becomes a substrate each time and with this a subject of determination.

Every judgment, out of which the thematically unitary movement of judgment is built, has the necessary bipartite structure: subject and determination. If, in the reorganization of the form, the determination (as we see in the case of relative clauses) is adjuncted to the subject, if likewise a determination itself in turn gets a similar annex through its own determination, a central caesura remains in the whole advancement of the determinative process in every judgment, namely, what separates the subject of determination from its determination. [46]

If several objects that cohere thematically are there from the very beginning or enter into the thematic unity successively, then each one will demand becoming the thematic main subject successively, that is, a concentration of interest that pushes its companions back into the provisionally secondary position. To be sure, we have to consider the two possibilities here: Namely, the one possibility is that in a movement of judgment several thematic objects are necessarily equally valid in the thematic interest; the other possibility is that one of them or particular ones hold, so to speak, the royal interest, so that only they should become the subjects of determination, while the interest in the other objects only leads to determining the subjects or the dominant subject through them.

And this is the way it is already in the explication of a single subject. The singularity that we presupposed in our first considerations was obviously this singularity of domination from the very outset. The subject cannot remain the singular object, the subject develops; that is, precisely new objects, the subject's properties come to the fore. But these objects are interesting in this connection only as determinations; their function is to serve. But they could also have an interest coordinated in their previous substrate, or they could gain it after they have arisen. And now we would have not only the path of its explication through <which> the *S* would also be determined mediately, but also <the path> of a new mode of determination that we have not yet considered, not where *S* is determined by *p* as we previously considered, but where *p* is determined by *S*.

This will become immediately intelligible if, in a formal and general manner, we call the property-like determination a *part*,

and say that an object—*speaking in the formally most broad sense*—is *a whole* that has its properties within it. The whole is [47] determined in that grasping that grasps each part. We had alluded to the originally unitary mode of determination with the terms "*S* is *p*"; we could just as well have said "*S* has *p*." Conversely, however, the part is also determined through the whole. The *p*, taken as substrate (and perhaps already grasped as substrate before the *S* was grasped), leads to an identification in the transition to *S*, but naturally not to a complete one. *P* is contained in *S*, the interest in *p* is also enriched with this. Every identification determines its subject. It determines it here not in a property-like manner or, as we also say, through an *inner determination*, but through an *outer* one. Already by virtue of the *constitutive community with its whole* prior to the judgment something has, so to speak, made an impression on the part due to the fact that it is precisely not for itself, but rather is constituted in an affective coinciding with *S*. This coinciding is unfolded in the thematic activity in the form of a peculiar identification. Thus, we have counterparts here. Let us alter our characterization in order to remove the priority of the place of the predicate, a priority alluded to by the letter *p*. If we have two objects, *S* and S_1, they can stand in a relationship of parts, and depending upon which one is the main substrate, we will have on the side of the determination the "has S_1," or the "contains *S*." And in both cases here, the object on the side of the determination has the *correlative form of determination*, that of the *inner* or the *outer*.

If we call the *substrate-object*, *subject*, and the *determination-object*, *object*,[194] the former will always have the same form of function as subject; that is, being such a form of function, it is not differentiated. Only other annexes, like attributions, can provide the subject with further forms without altering it as such. On the side of the determination, however, we have different modes of determination within the general form of function, determination, and then also supplementing this are possible attributive annexes. Every new form of determination *eo ipso* fashions new forms of attributes, for example, "*S* which contains *S'*." These forms of

[194] *den Bestimmungsgegenstand Objekt*

determination, however, are not the only ones, and even not the only ones looked at from the standpoint of the community of parts.

In accord with a self-evident ont<ological> consideration, two objects can stand not only in the *relationship of the containing and the contained*, but can also stand in the relationship of *intersection*. Even this develops in a peculiar form of identification. In [the relationship of] intersection, *S* is identical with *S′* (according to a common part *S″*), which is explicated differently: "*S* contains *S″*," and "*S′* contains the same *S″*." Or in the new, plural form: "*S* and *S′* contain *S″*," in which the determinative object *S″* only appears once, and diverging from it are two rays of identity, the one to *S* and the other to *S′*. [48]

We can and we must understand these forms of judgment here in the most universal and syntactic generality, and this means that we leave it open whether the respective objects themselves are unitary or multiple. Surely, the concepts that appear here, concepts like *the containing* and *the contained*, *whole* and *part* are *cat<egories>*. No object is conceivable that is not part or whole, and the universality of our formation of these concepts allows us <to call "wholes"> even the loosest of sets, [including] all the multiple unities that we call, following a more restrictive concept of whole, "mere sets" and do not want to call a "whole."

We do not yet have such restrictive concepts here, but we do have the "having-within-itself" and the "being-contained." It suffices that we have in mind several objects in indeterminate generality, objects that stand in the corresponding community of parts, and then the active judicative activity yields judgments of new elementary forms we characterized, elementary forms that obviously make possible ever new forms. On the one hand, this takes place through iteration, since we conceive the objects functioning as the point of departure in turn as parts of objects that lie further back, and we can continually imagine their splitting into parts. On the other hand, the thematic synopsis requires the conjunctive connection of particular judgments, and besides this, the reconfiguration of determinations into attributions is always possible.

Let us add here at once the discussion of the differences between the unity of sets and the whole in the special sense.[195] *Objects that do not stand in a community of parts* are not therefore devoid of community. Their affective and active community can be given to consciousness in an original manner; they can possess their affective and active community from entirely different means, and can accordingly constitute a judicative community. If we call such objects *separate*, *disjunctive*, it is clear that such objects are also given in separate intuitions and that in the transition from one to the other, an entirely different consciousness comes about, like when the identifying coinciding that we described here would become manifest.[196] [49]

Now, it can be that disjunctive objects, regardless of the affective force that each one exercises, coalesce to form the unity of one affection, and that initially this unity awakens the activating interest. Then the disjunctive multiplicity as unity, a set, is grasped, and it is explicated by going through the particular members and in the conjunctive collection of them: set T is m[ember]$_1$ and m_2 ...m_n. Every single step is an identification of "the containing." If the series of the steps is finished and if every contained member is manifest, then a complete identification occurs.

The entire set enters member by member into an identification with itself, and every member is given to consciousness in a two-fold manner, in implicit and explicit form. The set as the subject of determination is resolved into the sum of it members. The set that is grasped in a single ray of attention as the subject of determination is completely identical with <the> collection that is constituted in multiple rays of attention, with the entire totality of individually grasped members, each one of which has the form of determination, "the contained." Noteworthy is that in this collective form of sets, "m_1 and m_2 ... m_n," the "and" as a summary "and" carries the sense of separation, the sense of the connection of disjunctive objects. Yet, on the other hand, we have the indirect

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[195] The following presentation was not immediately successful. See the appendices that contain improvements, and see the next lecture.

Editor: See Appendix 36: Set and Whole, pp. 562ff.

[196] Does this suffice?

construction when we say that it would consist in the members not standing in a community of parts. There is no talk here of negation. The set is given as objectivated accordingly in a completely identifying judgment of the structure indicated, in a plural judgment if we understand under this general rubric, every <judgment> in which many rays of identity coalesce into one member and are thereby connected—be the judgment on the side of the object or the side of the determination. [50]

A set, explicitly objectivated, that is, completely determined, is a collective combination of disjunctive objects: Yet the objects can themselves be sets once more, only that they must be disjunctive sets. Ultimately, every intuitively pre-constituted set leads to final members, to particularities that are no longer sets. For belonging to the idea of such a set is that in the first givenness of the substrate, the set <as> an already pregiven manifold of special affections is there that we only activate. But certainly this does not rule out that "in bringing something closer," the intuition brings new affections into play, affections that were not already there, and that resolve the unites once more into multiplicities: so that the concept of the unity of sets becomes relative. It[197] hardly needs to be said that within the unity of a set different part-sets are to be delimited through affective special connections, that overlapping sets are possible here and that in this general way, sets in relation to other sets can offer all the possible relations of containment. Naturally, the concepts of set and unity of sets are also logical categories.

Sets are special cases of wholes. Now, what distinguishes a set and a whole in the restrictive sense, and in an original way? We carry out all of our considerations in such a way that we appropriate the cat<egorial> forms, forms in which objectivity is constituted on an intellectual order, to t<he> acts that give in an original manner.

In order to have a set "intuitively," in order to have the unity that unfolds its sense in a collection through total identification, the mere unity of an affection of separate elements must come first. How this unity comes about otherwise, what lends to the [51]

[197] Insufficient.

particularities their community—this remains fully open. If, for example, a memory reminds me of several other melodies that I had heard in an entirely different context, their similarity suffices to produce a connection. They can be of interest unitarily as a combination and can yield a set; we say here that they do not have any "real" tie; they do not form any real, general whole, no whole bound in a materially relevant manner, like what holds for tones and figures of a melody, or for houses and streets, but also for the parts of a proposition, for the propositions of a judicative framework, etc. If we compare the *self-givenness* of a set with that of a whole in the narrower sense, it is clear that the *whole* is *constituted* in the *unity of a continually harmonizing intuition* and as correlate.

<§60. Non-Independent Members of Judgment, Independent Judgments and Interconnections of Judgment>

At the end of our last lecture, I began to clarify the categorial concepts of whole and set, concepts that arise around the judgments of containment, and initially the concept of set. I should not dwell upon this any longer, and for this reason I will not pursue my treatment of it further *in extenso*; rather, I only want to say briefly that our point of departure from pure passivity and from the described multiplicity of affections that coalesce to form the unity of an affection, should not mean that like the sensible objectlike formations, the set-objectlike formations are also already actually pre-constituted in passivity and are objectivated only in categorial activity for the intellect.

A closer investigation shows that a set as such only arises at all in categorial action, put more precisely, in colligating, in the "and-synthesis" of thematically grasped, separated objects. Wherever, and no matter from what motives, the thematic interest passes over from one object to other disjunctive ones, and leads to an encompassing "and-synthesis," a new objectlike formation is thereby constituted (namely, purely by virtue of this synthetic activity); because this object has arisen from such a synthetic accomplishment, it is called an intellectual object, a categorial object. Every objectlike formation that is generated from the ego [52]

synthetically, that is, with many members, has two constitutive stages. The categorial synthesis, in our case, the S_1 and S_2 and S_3, is noetically a unity of consciousness, to be sure, but not yet a unity of one object in the genuine sense, which is to say, a theme. Thematically, the S_1 is found in it, and again, S_2, S_3, but not yet the *collectivuum*. Likewise in the case of all categorial synthetic actions: The thematic element is what every self-contained step has given to consciousness as a thematic object. Synthetic consciousness encompasses several objects in a unity, but it does not have a single object having many members. However, a new object—precisely the object having many terms—is essentially pre-constituted through every synthetic, unitary consciousness, and this requires only one thematic grasping that is possible at any time in order to render this pre-constituted [objectlike formation] a thematic object, and thus to become an object[198] in the full sense.

In particular: Colligating is a synthetic accomplishment through which a *collectivuum* is essentially pre-constituted. It becomes a thematic object through a reverting grasp that takes place after the completion of the colligating process; this grasping is possible at any time and it is only with it that the set is first given as object, as an identifiable object for the ego itself. Afterward, it is an object like any other; it can not only become completely identified as the identical object of many modes of givenness, it can also become the subject of a judgment in a different way, for example, in relations of containment. It is not necessary to explain that sets colligate, in turn, with other disjunctive sets; thus, sets of a higher order can be pre-constituted and then thematically objectivated, etc. Standing in contrast to pre-constituting sensibility is pre-constituting intellect, which, by unifying thematic objects synthetically in different ways, brings about through this a pre-constituting accomplishment, a categorial pre-constituting one: an accomplishment that brings with it *a priori* the possibility of making, through a "reverting grasp," the pre-constituted [objectlike formation] into a new theme, a new object that in itself has many terms and points back to the preceding categorial action with every member and with the form. And only because this is [53]

[198] *Objekt*

the case, can one speak of synthetic categorial objectlike formations as such. Yet we have to add that we will also get to know non-synthetic categorial objectlike formations that carry out an accomplishment that is executed in several steps, not as tying them together. But otherwise, what we have said holds, namely, that a pre-constituting activity precedes an objectivating grasp.

Where the concept of the *whole* is concerned, it also has a categorial character and is very closely related to the concept of set. The restrictive concept of the whole is the concept of an object—*no matter how* it has arisen, whether sensibly or categorically—an object that can be *completely*[199] explicated in a multiplicity of *disjunctive* parts, as in the form of a set. Part means here that which is merely contained. Corresponding to every whole is the set of its parts, but it is not itself this set. We need not belabor this point here.

More important for us now is to take *the doctrine of categorial objectlike formations* somewhat further here. They are named after "predicative statement" (cat<egoria>)[200], which is the expression of judgment. What this term should actually mean is "judicative objectlike formations." It is to be understood as the objectlike formations, which, through judicative activity, that is, through objectivating activity, first arise in the shape of an accomplishment that pregives activity in contrast to the merely receptive objectlike formations stemming from pregiving sensibility. Every categorial objectlike formation is either that of the full judicative category, or it is an objectlike formation occurring in the judicative context as an element, being actively pre-constituted in it. This requires some explanation.

Once a thematic interest is put into play—be it by one or several objects exercising an affection in a thematic solidarity and being grasped—then an open infinity of thematic interconnections is unfolded from there, interconnections that are all connected thematically in the form of an open, unending unity of a thematic interconnection. From the ever new objects that break through to [54]

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[199] The "completely" would have to be clarified. The parts taken together make up the "whole," etc.

[200] Translator: *Aussage*. Husserl is referring to the Greek sense of κατηγορία, namely, as accusation or form of predication.

attentiveness, only those objects in their thematic acts, their judgments, are connected to the thematic feature that is already put into play, expanding its unity—only those objects that have something in common with the previous ones and that have something to do with them. This already shows up in the affection in the form of combinations of affection, and something is developed in the judgments that produce judicative interconnections between the individually grasped objects. The thematic objects are juxtaposed to one another and, at the same time, they are internally determined; they are explicated individually whereby the explicated objects themselves in turn have a direct or indirect thematic connection to all the previous substrates.

Thematic action is intensive and extensive, or what is also said in place of the latter, discursive (likewise we could also say, analytic and synthetic, if these terms were not so philosophically burdened). It belongs to the essence of thematic activity that it begins again and again with acts of a single ray of attention that we call graspings, with straightforward objectivatings, or rather it begins with one of them; and further that it demands such objectivations in particular "concentrations" again and again, but that straightforward objectivation cannot be thematically independent, although it can stand alone for itself. It stands alone if the thematic movement breaks off, but breaks off before it has accomplished something. Then the thematic interest is left completely unsatisfied. The first satisfaction is carried out in the form of a determination of a completed judgment, and it is carried out in ever new judgments, which for their part are thematically interconnected with those that have preceded. Every judgment is an accomplishment contained within itself, that is, thematically a self-contained satisfaction. However, the fact that ever new thematic interests are aroused in this [thematic] interconnection and are then satisfied in new judgments does not speak against this. In any case, every judgment has a thematic completion, is something thematically complete. And yet it is an element[201] of an open interconnection, and according to an ideal possibility, a

[201] *Glied*

constantly expanding thematic interconnection, and is thus not self-contained. This interconnection is built completely out of judgments, and with every new judicative step, fashions a unity of [55] accomplishment out of particular accomplishments, a unity of satisfaction from satisfactions that have already been gained.

Accordingly, in each relative completeness, that is, with a final judgment conceived of as relatively self-contained, a thematic interconnection has divisions in a very different sense. First is the division from the standpoint of thematic independence. It leads back to judgments as elements. And where judgments in turn contain judgments, the final elements are in turn judgments. They are the final cells of the thematic system, cells which, however, <are> also functional elements of terms[202] of a higher level, relative cells for higher judgments or judicative combinations.

If, secondly, we now go back to judgments in which each thematic interconnection is divided according to the current standpoint, they themselves will have a division; they will have a subject-side and an determination-side, they will have a caesura: This new division has an entirely different character; it provides thematically non-independent elements: be there already a combination on each side, for example, through collection or attribution (which always rests on previous accomplishments that has further implications). Thus, every judicative element (every judicative element that is to be divided up through the immediate partition of a judgment) is in any case thematically non-independent. For good reasons, a house may be called an independent object, something real existing independently for itself; but in thematic activity through which such an object is first constituted for us, namely, as an independent one, the house as a judicative object, as a thematic substrate, is non-independent. Only a judgment in which the object occurs as a thematic element, for instance, as a subject-element, is independent. In concert with this, naturally, is the fact that a mere name, like this house, does not yield a complete proposition. A complete proposition is the expression of something thematically complete, the expression of a complete judgment.

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[202] *Glieder*

If judgments are inserted into an interconnection of judgments, after they are constituted in independent self-containment, they themselves in turn certainly take on the form of the interconnection and lose their independence. Independent unities arise again and again only as judgments of a higher level, which judgments are founded in founding judgments. In this way, every [56] theoretical judicative unity is to be disclosed as a unique judgment of a higher order, which judgment is quite inextricably founded in judgments, which are themselves founded in judgments, etc. Where judgments become connections that do not fashion a judgment of a higher order, like for example, "*A* is *B*, and *C* is *D*," the connection has the same thematic non-independence as the connection of two simple substrates, *A*, *B* forming the *collectivuum A* and *B*. On the other hand, belonging to the essence of the thematic variation, which inserts a judgment into the syntaxes and makes it thereby non-independent, is the fact that the originally independent judgment can be reproduced at any time as a thematic independence in itself. Looking ahead, we can use an example whose sense is sufficiently familiar to you: If we have the connection "Because *A* is *B*, then *C* is *D*," we can gain from it in turn the independent judgments that are precisely complete unto themselves: "*A* is *B*," "*C* is *D*."

<§61. Logical Sense>

But now we want to supplement this with a fundamental distinction. We wanted to speak about categorial objectlike formations and we spoke about judgments, their elements and their interconnections. Surely, all categorial objectlike formations are contained in them. But are, or in what sense are, judgments themselves categorial objectlike formations? And the elements of judgments?

Here the *concept of categorial objectlike formations* is in need of *an essential delimitation*. If we give the name of categorial objectlike formations to all objectlike formations *simpliciter* that are constituted through judicative activity (excluding, of course, judicative lived-experiences themselves as objects of the inner sense), then naturally judgments are to be characterized as

categorial objectlike formations. But if we look more closely we come up against a *radical distinction*: Not only <is> the judgment constituted in the activity of judging, or rather, not only [is it] there as a pre-constituted unity (and not only an even more encompassing noema, a variable mode of givenness of the one and [57] the same judgment), *but a still quite different objectlike formation is pre-constituted*, a categorial objectlike formation found in the *judgment*, and yet not the judgment itself.

The objectivating activity as a unitary consciousness, which we called judging in the most general sense, has a "What"; specifically, in different noematic modes, it has something identical, a unitary sense, the judgment as something judged, as we would say even more clearly, the judicative proposition. For example, judging on the basis of the perception: this (the roof) is contained in the house, is a part of the house.

Thus, on the basis of a repeated perception through which our standpoints vary, the modes of appearance can be different; or retroactively on the basis of multiple memories, the judgment can be absolutely, identically the same despite the differences of the modes of givenness; it is identical despite the noematic differences. Imagine now how the subject of the judgment executed at the outset is determined in a newer and newer way through progressive judicative activities, and through this, takes on ever new attributive contents. Let us compare, for instance, the judgments "S is a part of S_1," "S_α is a part of S_1," "$S_{\beta+\gamma}$ is a part of S_1." Here it is a matter, we say, of the same S; this is to say that in these transitions to new judgments, and in going back to the previous subjects as thematic substrates, we say and we judge "*the same*" S, we may also say, the same subject. Yet, the judgments are indeed different; in the first element, the *subject-element*, the judgments now have the S without attribution, then S_α, then $S_{\beta+\gamma}$, etc. The same interplay can also take place with respect to the object-position: the same object on the side of the determination, but with different attributions, whereby different, new syntactic matters occur which we however do not take into account when we say that it is the same object. Subject and object, even the self-determining subject and its determination itself is accordingly *ambiguous*.

The distinction is an ultimate one, at the heart of the essence of objectivating activity. Belonging to its essence is the fact that every taking notice and grasping bears on a grasped Something, a Something which, in the alteration of the progressive objectivating activity and in the synthetically identifying return to the same something, can show up precisely *as the same theme* despite the [58] manifold changing logical shapes that have been appropriated to the theme through the accomplishments of judgment. A finished judicative structure is a system of *thematic poles, each one* entwined with shapes of significance, and all of this is connected by syntactic forms. Judging means posing *themes*, determining themes, connecting themes with themes, *giving to them ever new shapes of significance through this process* and, as it were, *guilding* themselves with the significances already made: *The themes remain the same* and yet they have varied according to the judgment; they have *taken on a varying thematic sense* of predicative significance.

The identity of the theme does not mean the identity of the *thematic sense*. For instance, thanks to the judicative activity relating to the theme, a theme can be laden with products of the accomplishment of this activity, products that signify for the sense a new, that is, a specifically *logical sense-giving*; a variation of sense, which, I say, *does not alter anything with respect to its thematic identity*. Like, for example: this, this red, this house, this red house, etc., continually the same, but with a varying *logical* sense. In a certain way, a sense is self-evidently and necessarily there wherever something is a theme, and already when something becomes a theme for a judging for the first time. Already within pure sensibility, we have distinctions of objective sense in the alteration of appearances under continual or discrete coinciding in "the same."

If this variation of sensibility takes on the mode of attentiveness, then "the same" is what remains singularly One through the variation, the thematic object; thus it already has its variable objective sense even before the determinative activity with the theme carries out logical accomplishments. But the objective sense is *not a logical sense*, that is, is not a product of intellectual activity. What arises through it under the rubric of

altering logical sense, logical significance, is something essentially new. It is something that does not at all take up into itself the alteration in the passively constituted sense. Both of them have the following in common: when an object is the theme, the sense in which the object is given as the pole of identity is not the theme. But sense as logical significance means something new and not something connected to and intermeshed with that sensible sense. If the intellect has appropriated from sensibility something [59] constituted as the continual unity of manifolds of passive sense-giving and worked on it, then this One is a theme in the starting point, to be sure, but a logically undetermined theme. In the progression, and already by the first step, it is determined logically; it becomes the subject of judgment and perhaps later the object of judgment; that is, in the first judgment "*S* is *p*," the *S* is the One that is still logically undetermined in the subject-position—but the undetermined that gets determined in these judgments and has its determination on the side of the predicate. However, by the attributive activity adjuncting to the subject the determination carried out in the first predication, holding on to the *S* as being *p* in the following predications and subjecting them to further determinations in new activities, we no longer have an undetermined logical substrate, but rather a substrate encumbered with a logical significance.

Thanks to logical activity, every substrate takes on logical encumberments, ever new contents of logical significance in an ideally infinite number of ways. One can say that every judging concerning a thematic object alters the consciousness of this object itself and habitually imparts to it an ever new sense as well. The ever new determinations do something to it on the order of consciousness; but, on the other hand, the fact that the predicate, which has been made manifest as the sense acquired for the subject, is added to the sense attributively, and pos<sibly> joining this, even a habitual volition to want to conceive the *S* persistently as determined only in this way, as the *S* of this sense (like in the case of the *definition*)—this is something specific, it is something to be accomplished first of all in a specifically active procedure. Here, the *S* is not given to consciousness in the manner of mere sensibility with varying content; *through conceptual processes*,

that is, thematic activity, it has taken on not merely expansions of its passive content of sense; but in the full light of the intellect, in the creative activity of the ego which abandons itself to the *themata* and to the work for them, *the creation of logical structures is carried out*, the creation of judgments as a whole or in particular, and thus everything that we call the alteration of logical significances as well.

But how is it that we come to speak of an alteration of logical significances in a way that is similar to speaking of an alteration of objective sense within sensibility, pre-logically of course, with respect to the same object? And how will the *concept of logical significance (= logical thought)* itself be determined? We say that logical significances: "this," "this red," "this red house," "this school building," etc.—are different, and that the subject is the same. The subject is the subject of judgment or a theme functioning in one way or another in the judicative context. It is completely beyond the scope of our investigation [to consider] through which objective sense the subject is given from case to case in an extra-logical manner. The identity of the judgment is not oriented according to the objective sense. [60]

In order to speak more clearly and to avoid entirely using the term "sense" for something extra-logical, let us now say "*presentational content*"[203] for that objective sense. Thus, differences of the presentational content are now irrelevant. Only the theme, the presentational *object*, the sensible One, the house, is consciously meant in the judgment. But when the house is the thoroughgoing theme, it is the identical object in the context of thematic actions, no longer as the unity of its sensible manifolds and of its changing presentational contents, but as the identical element precisely of these thematic actions and of the accomplishments arising through them for the theme itself. It is the identical element in the manifold of active identifications that manifest *the theme as a point of intersection of manifold judgments* and then as the point of identity of corresponding *attributions*, as the same again and again. No matter which of the attributive structures we take: "this," "this house," "this red," etc.,

[203] *Vorstellungsinhalt*

each one of these structures is a thematic judicative element. Each one (no matter how different its content may be), has, as the judicative element, its theme and each one evidently has the same theme. We take the "this," so to speak, as the What of attribution in this series.

<§62. The Distinction between State-of-affairs and Judicative Proposition>

In general we say that all judgments necessarily have in themselves a thematic division, every element has its theme. Wherever <there is> a manifold of different judicative elements and wherever <the latter> are identical according to their thematic content, we say that they deal with the same theme in different logical significances, or that in them the same object is conceived in different logical significances, or is also conceived in different logical thoughts. Yet, we are not to think immediately of an individual object when speaking of the same object, and if the realm of generality, the realm of "as such"-*themata*[204] had already come into view for us, then all of this would be transferred to them, as well. The term *themata* is the most correct expression for this: the object as object, that which is judged in the judgment, does not mean the presentational object, but rather, the conceptual object, that is, what functions in the judgments as theme, no matter what shape or what level the judgments have, and therefore that which is the content of a judicative element. For a theme is nothing for itself; it is the judicative element just like, conversely, every judicative element is self-contained as an element by virtue of it possessing its unitary theme. [61]

One could now say: A judgment is a thematic structure through and through, it is a structure made up of syntactic matters and united by syntactic forms, like we ourselves have already shown. If, in judging, I speak of a house that is roofed with shingles, the house is my theme, but the shingles are too, etc. Yet, one must not overlook what is decisive here, what necessitates precisely the distinction between logical object and logical significance, and

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[204] *"überhaupt"-Themata*

then further, the difference between the *state-of-affairs of the judgment* and *the judgment itself* (the judicative proposition).

Let us treat the matter at hand noetically. In every judging we have our themes, for example, an "*S* is partially identified with S_1"; "*S* has S_1"or "*S* is in S_1." Judging means carrying out this identification. But now an integration of acquisitions of judicative activities that were previously current (judicative activities that refer to the same themes) into the thematic consciousness of the judicative elements can be intertwined with the current judging to form a thematic unity. The annexes are no longer actual judgments, actually executed identifications, but modifications of them given to consciousness. The predicate that is added on attributively is no longer the actual theme (the theme as actually functioning) in the current judgment, but rather a modification of [62] it—a theme that points back to a previous judging that we can also restore at any time, but which now is no longer carried out. The theme that is given to consciousness in the modified manner, the annexed theme, does stand in our regard to be sure, it is indeed also something that is grasped, it also has a thematic character in a broader sense. But there is an obvious difference, a tremendous one, between a functioning theme, the theme of the determination that is actually carried out in the present judgment (with the current object-theme on the side of the determination itself), and the themes that are no longer functioning and that are only drawn into the unity of the judicative consciousness, i.e., of the consciousness of the respective element [of the judgment].

If we have attributively packed into the subject and into the predicate of a simple judgment however many objects and predicates from other judgments (newly carrying out the judgment of the previous form, under the co-execution of all of these thoughts that are packed into it) this does not at all change the fact that we carry out the same determinative identification, and only carry *it* out presently; whereas we do not carry out with the attributions any predications indicated by them. What we do carry out are precisely attributions, mere modifications in the form of supplements. What we actually judge again and again is "*S* has *p*," the one substrate contains the other, however many other contents of thought from earlier judicative accomplishments *S* may be

conceived as having. *What we have described noetically* has its *correlate* in the judicative proposition, in the identical judgment, that is, in the object being constituted in the thematic activity. We see here *that it belongs to the essence of judicative action to constitute two types of objectlike formations in an integrated unity.* Judging as a *thematic action* is *intending*, thinking, positing something in the present as theme, drawing new themes from it through the process of explication, and positing them in a unity with the main theme, drawing in an external theme and relating one to the other, etc. Every conceptual intending has its intended object, every synthetically relating and connecting [act of] intending has its synthetic intended meaning.

The objectlike formation constituted in this way, which makes up the primordial essence of the judging as present judging, is the *state-of-affairs.*[205] It is the pure synthetic *unity of the themes* and the theme here is everything that is *currently* grasped thematically in the corresponding execution of judgment, and currently *posited* in each and every relation to precisely such an execution. If the themes are *individual things, they go into the state-of-affairs*, they are the *termini* that *"relate" themselves within it.* When we speak of relationships, relationships of part, relationships of similarity, relationships of elements, etc., here relationship is only another word for state-of-affairs. The points of relation of the relationship are single objects that have an objective unity in a certain syntactic form. States-of-affairs, relationships, are objective correlates of judgments, that is, they are originally constituted only in judgments. [63]

Every state-of-affairs is a complete categorial objectlike formation, and all elements of the state-of-affairs or *termini* that are not simple *termini*, thus, are not thematically simple, are themselves categorial objectlike formations in their turn. Thus, when we take a plural judgment, " S_1 and S_2 are p," or even "S is p_1 and p_2 ...," a collectivity is contained in the state-of-affairs; at least we can form sets by easily reconstructing single themes, and distributive predicates relating to them would then have as a

[205] Editor: <See pp. 298f.>

thematic element a categorial objectlike formation that contains within itself single themes of a second order.

We make the following distinction: [1] *a first sense of the word "Meinung"* in which these categorial objectlike formations and above all, the complete *states-of-affairs* make up the "*intended meaning*" in a judgment, and [2] *the second sense of the word "Meinung"* as the judgment itself [understood] "*as the intending" of the one judging*. The intended meaning, *which the one judging intends or means*, is now the *judicative proposition* as the complete *unity of significance* that harbors all logical significances of the corresponding judging.

I do not need to explain in much detail how this is to be understood. In the transformation that takes place by drawing the conclusions of manifold judicative activities in relation to the momentary, present determination-themes into the new judgment [64] that is being carried out, the state-of-affairs, the intended meaning in the first sense, remains untouched.

Every current theme can become the substrate not only for the current judicative accomplishments, but at the same time can become the substrate for the modified connection of previous acquisitions of accomplishment. This does not alter the state-of-affairs, which is constituted thematically, but is does alter the mode in which it is conceived. In this "mode" it is the thematic product, not only of the present judgment, but also of the implicit judgments. Or the current thematic product has an embellishment of formations that point back intentionally to the intermeshed judgments. Every such formation can be extricated, the explication of the judgment according to all of its significances leads to a connected system of primitive judgments that no longer contain anything of the intermeshings, that is nothing of the like, like attributions. This unraveling is not the resolution of complex judgments into simple judgments; for a judgment is not genuinely complex by having appropriated an attribute in a thematic element. The expanded judgment is not a judgment that contains two current judgments as parts, as intimately inherent components. Yet in a certain sense it is certainly true that the expansion is the same thing as a complex composition, for if the predication after being transformed into an attribute is also no longer currently a

predication, then it is certainly found analytically in the attribution. This points toward a special form of identification and belongs to the theory of analytical deductions.

Let us now consider the limit-case of judgments that, in this direction, are analytically simple insofar as their thematic elements do not contain any co-intended meanings that exhibit sedimentations of an earlier actuality. *In the case of such judgments* it is clear that *we do not distinguish between the state-of-affairs and the judgment itself.* In the case of judgments, the state-of-affairs is the unity of significance itself. Nevertheless, we even have to speak of these judgments in two ways, taking into account the fact that they are mere limit-cases and that unending manifolds of judgments accord with every such limit-judgment in the state-of-affairs. The concept of state-of-affairs characterizes from the very beginning the identical thematic framework that precisely all judgments have in common, judgments that have identically the same current themes and that connect these themes [65] in the same categorial forms (i.e., the synthetic forms of function). The limit-proposition is the pure proposition proper to such a group, and is a correlate of the pure determinative actuality. The objective element in judging, the state-of-affairs, which itself should be a judgment and in particular a limit-case, looses its paradoxical status if we remind ourselves that we are speaking here of objects in quotation marks and thus of states-of-affairs in quotation marks, as well.

<Chapter 4:
THE GRADATION OF OBJECTIVATION>

<§63. Two Dimensions of the First Level of Objectivation: Mere Intuition and the Dimension of Explicative Examination>[206] [66]

The insights that we have gained into the structure of judgments are important in many respects. They are insights into the internal

[206] Editor: See Appendix 29: Theme and Theoretical Interest, pp. 548f., and Appendix 37: <Object and Content of Interest> pp. 556ff.

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E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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construction, into the structure of judgments as ready-made formations of determinative action, and insights into the *a priori* genesis according to which every ideal possible continued construction of judgments and intertwining of judgments of higher and higher complexity is carried out systematically and according to fixed laws. Accordingly, all judgments ultimately lead back to fundamental shapes of primitive judgments and to principles of syntactic reconstruction and intertwining. What strikes us here is the variation in thematic consciousness, thus, the different way in which the *termini* in the state-of-affairs, that is, in the logical main clause, and the *termini* in the subordinate clauses are given to consciousness, and accordingly are even characterized in a categorially different way, and moreover, even the difference of thematic form of the subject of determination from the object determining it. And it strikes us that the wholly other distinction in thematic consciousness, which consists in the fact that in a certain way the entire judicative accomplishment, the entire state-of-affairs in its syntactic shape, stands in the brightest light of thematic interest, while only the *termini* are thematic objects. Required is a new attitude, which is a change in thematization so that, for example, the state-of-affairs or the judgment becomes a theme in its complex shape of significance, namely, becomes something grasped thematically and even becomes the subject-theme.

We recall here our doctrine of interest[207] that we have placed at the beginning of everything having to do with the theory of judgment; already prior to all determinative judging we have the following distinction: the object of interest—the One within the objective sense that varies in manifold ways, what gets grasped, what is thematic *simpliciter*, which we more clearly also call the thematic object—and the content of interest, that is, the varying objective sense of the What-content of the object in its persistence [67] or even in its variation, which lies necessarily in the field of interest, but is not the thematic object. If a simple, unchanged tone becomes the object of interest, if it is perceived in a simple manner, then the interested regard rests in each moment on the

[207] Editor: <See above 288f.>.

tonal phase that is sounding right now, and what has just sounded is also still held onto in a modified way; in these relations we have something different from moment to moment. But running through it is the perceiving of the one tone. It is the object of intuition, and it does this only by the interested examination running throughout all tonal phases and tonal components, throughout the intuitive content. *This difference between object and content is repeated on all levels of thematic activity* and takes on newer and newer shapes.

Our chief aim, which is to understand objectivation as a genetic gradation of thematic accomplishments, must be carried out consistently to the very end, and the exposition that we have presented up to now already makes intelligible for us a gradation of objectivation and the sense of such a gradation. The doctrine of the *genesis of logical significance with respect to the substrates of determination* is especially illuminating. It even shines back to our beginnings, with respect to which, as we now see, we would have to introduce the distinction between the activity of mere intuition and of the merely synthetic examination, and the genuine determination as a unique genetic distinction of levels. Let us survey the gradation of objectivation, and let us append the supplementation to which we alluded.

The example of the tone illustrates for us *the first* conceivably most primitive level. It is the level of the intuition that examines prior to all explication. [Examined here is] the thematic *object*, the one *enduring tone*, thematic *content*, the flowing What-content of the tone. *The second level* is that of the examination that delves into and the examination that extends beyond, two types of examination that do not have any essentially prefigured order. The former thus concerns delving into the content of a thematic object [68]
S; it is explicated. The progressive objectivation consists only in the fact that what was previously merely a thematic content now becomes a thematic object in a particular way, whereby what has become the special theme enters step by step into partial unity of identity with the *S* still being held onto, and precisely through this connection remains firmly held onto in the progression. The interest in the object running through this is fulfilled in this way in concentrated form in every partial theme.

Upon closer inspection we distinguish here: that which is the matter <of> activity, namely, the process of making the object thematic, which will be explicated afterward, then the process of making the components of its content thematic; and on the other hand that which is the matter of passivity, namely, the occurrence of partial coinciding and the occurrence of the enrichment of sense which is carried out with respect to the beginning thematic object.

We will have to say that the determinative identification, the activity of judgment is not yet carried out. It demands a new step in order to transform what passivity has prepared into an activity, into a judging in which the state-of-affairs is first constituted.

Before we make this clear, let us point to the second form of examination, the one that extends beyond, the examination that is not constricted by delving into the content, but rather expands by passing over to different objects. Commonalities are constituted here in passivity through connecting syntheses that can guide interest and can expand it into the unity of an overarching interest. By passing from object to object, passive synthetic unities are thus produced again; in this are found excitations for possible determinations, but that is still not the activity of determinative synthesis, not judging. Thus, for example, not first when an object has become a theme and after it, a whole encompassing it. The inverse partial identification is constituted passively. Likewise, where syntheses of uniformity and similarity are concerned.

<§64. The Second Level of Objectivation: Active Relating and Determining. The Task of a Universal Theory of Relation>[208] [69]

Up to this point we had considered two levels of the lower activity of objectivation under the general rubric of an examining intuition. In contrast to this, we posit as the *second main heading*, "the level *of judgment*." By this we mean now *the determining process found prior to conceptualization*, that is, prior to the function that constitutes the universal for us; we mean the activity of relating one theme to another theme, and then further all the

[208] Editor: See Appendix 37: <Object and Content of Interest> pp. 556ff., and Appendix 38: <Categorial and Non-Categorial Connections and Relations> pp. 573ff.

activities that give a higher synthetic unity to such determinative accomplishments. The *level of conceptualizing thinking is then a fundamentally new and higher level.*

The distinction of the *relating process of objectivating*, of *actively* determinative objectivating, *in contrast to mere examination*, e.g., to explicating, becomes clear if we describe clearly the actions that lead upward: If in the transition from one object *S* to a moment of its content, *m*, the coinciding that forms identity has occurred passively, then with this, as we had said, something is done to the object, it has an increase of sense in this synthesis. If this enters into the circle of the content of interest, that is, if the *S* (which is different at the end of this process than it was at the beginning, the *S* that has receded and is only being held onto, yet no longer in the focal point)—if this *S* [now] enters into the focal point of interest as the *S* that is expanded in sense, then this is only possible in such a way that *S* again becomes the primary object of the grasping in a new grasp; and now an active intention, in the active transition to *m*, is concerned with originally and actively generating what is accruing to the *S*. Only now do we have a subject-theme as *terminus a quo* and a counter *terminus* as the *ad quem* at which the activity is striving; only now [do we have] the consciousness actually constituted only in the synthetic activity, the consciousness that the *S* undergoes determination through *m* in the mode of "*S* contains *m*."

Likewise in the inverse case: "*m* is a part of *S*." If the interest in the object passes over from the part to the whole—precisely by virtue of the inner commonality and of the coinciding that forms identity, which sets in passively—then remaining in the second [70] element is the first that is still held in the interest's grasp. But what is new is the active intention toward determination, the activity that directs its aim at *m* to determine it with respect to *S*, thus, the activity with an eye to *m* and electing it as the subject-theme driving at the *S* and, in carrying out the process of identification, determines *m* as a part of *S*.

The progress of objectivation of this higher level consists in the accomplishment of determining and is seen in the active formation of new thematic forms: subject-theme and determination-theme. We no longer have thematic objects like [we had] on the first level

where the thematic shape is the same everywhere; rather, we have new thematic shapes harmonizing with one another that have arisen from new activity. Each one has a syntactic formation, and they are connected to a syntactic unity, a unity of an state-of-affairs.

This is likewise the case (to hint at new judicative shapes), if we have wholes that are pre-constituted in passivity, if we have unified combinations in the broadest sense or in some more narrow sense, unities in which different particular objects are divided off from each other, now being elements that intersect, now being elements that are disjunctive. Every two elements of such a unity can enter into a determinative relation. But the active grasping of them in passing from one to the other is still not an active process of relating, although the transition can yield a passive product that points the way to active determination.

If we have an intuitive configuration before us, for example, in the most simple scenario, a pair of balls in a sensible unity of position, then lying in the possible horizon of examination is the concrete unity, the pair of balls in its position: initially unexplicated. Then grasping the single balls individually and then grasping them together. Then the form of connection as a non-independent moment. This is not a third part that is on a par with the others; rather, the grasping presupposes the explicit grasping of the balls, and in this respect it is essentially a mediate, non-independent moment.

All of this provides the foundation for different possible determinative judgments, the relationships between the whole and immediate parts, between the whole and the form of connection of [71] parts, between the combination of parts and their form of connection, finally: relationships between the elements as connected in these forms. In this relation of connection, the elements participate in the same whole and have a commonality in it. If we pass over from the one to the other, (if each one is given to consciousness with the direction of interest toward the connection), then a coinciding takes place in the elements that share something in common, and therefore an enrichment of sense that can give occasion in turn to activities of determining which form relations. Determinations arise in this way, like "*a* is in a

particular position to *b*." Relations of a higher order can also arise in this way, like relationships of positions between positions, etc.

You see here that one may not confuse the connection of parts to a whole and the relation of a part in relation to another part. The relation is an state-of-affairs and originally has two elements. (A relation having several elements is a connection of several relations taking place in judgment.) But a whole is, in general, not a state-of-affairs, although every state-of-affairs, every judgment, is a whole insofar as it can be divided up.

Let us note further that relationships between whole and part, between parts of a whole, thus, in principle all types of relation that belong most generally to the idea of a possible objectlike formation as such, does not only concern sensible objects and wholes that are connected sensibly, but also categorial objects. Judicative action fashions wholes that are structured by being generated from elements. But that they are given as elements, that they are given as parts of the whole, and that the relationships of every other kind are given among them as parts of this whole—this presupposes that the constituted judgment is first made into the subject-theme by a reverting grasp, that from here its parts are brought into relief by dividing them up; these parts are being related to one another in determinative actions, actions that are entirely different from those in which the judicative whole in question would be constituted.

In accordance with the general path that we have sketched out, a systematic theory of relation would have to outline, at first in formal generality, the types of relation (types of state-of-affairs on the level of pre-conceptual judging) proper to the most general [72] idea of the objectlike formation as such. The development of all forms of judgment and forms of judicative interconnections yielded by the intertwining of significance leads in this case to an infinity of types of wholes, which examined under the formal idea of the objectlike formation, are special forms of objects with special forms of elements and connections, with special forms of relations. They are forms of objects called categorial objects that relate back to all objects as such, that is, even to themselves. The universal investigation into the categorial realm, according to its forms, and the pure laws determined by these forms, laws of true

existence of states-of-affairs, make up a self-contained discipline, "*formal logic*."

Let us note here that when one treats as objects states-of-affairs, and the formations of the states-of-affairs themselves, the relations proper to them are not only those that can also occur with other objects, with objects of all types in general. Rather, it belongs to the essence of states-of-affairs and of categorial objectlike formations in general to ground relations of this kind as well. Thus, the relations are divided into specifically categorial relations, into relations belonging specifically to the essence of categorial formations, and into non-categorial relations. In this way, the relationship between a relation and its inversion is a categorial relation; the relationship "*a* is a part of *b*" is, as one says, included in the relationship "*b* is the whole of *a*," and *vice versa*. And this holds for every relation and its inversion, and for every instance of a judgment being contained "analytically" in another judgment, for every instance of an state-of-affairs being contained "analytically" in another state-of-affairs.

In the formal logic of the second level of objectivation, the level that relates to the *states-of-affairs*, the relations, *inhabiting* the judgments of all possible forms, the main theme is the systematic disclosure of the radically different genera of relations that are possible for objectlike formations as such, in formal generality, that is, forms of states-of-affairs—forms, since the *termini* here are conceived in an undetermined, general manner. Accordingly, it is a matter here *of a formal classification of relations*, while a *logical theory of relation as such* makes differentiations even where the *idea of the objectlike formation* is concerned, and gives an account [73] of all differences of this idea, i.e., the *fundamental types of objectlike formations* that are sketched out precisely through the essence of the objectlike formation itself. The difference between *individuum and eidos*, between *categorial and non-categorial objectlike formations*, is sketched out in this way.

We have already suggested that categorial objectlike formations have their peculiar forms of relations, and that not all objectlike formations can enter into them; they, the objectlike formations, only have sense for these forms of relations. Likewise, *individuals* have their *peculiar individual-relations*; these relations have their

foundation in so-called *individuating determinations* and in the forms of connection that are rooted in them: thus, the *relations of temporal position* related to the absolute temporal loci, and likewise, the spatial position for external objects. Genera and species in turn have their specific relations. The said *types of objects are logical ones*, because every such type refers to every other one, and there is no *objectlike formation conceivable* that is not related back to all of these types. Even the *topic*, *"consciousness,"* belongs here, for not every object is consciousness, to be sure, but each one is an object of a possible consciousness and, constitutively, has a relation to the interconnections of consciousness. *Consciousness, further, has specific, peculiar relations*. Considered here are relations that have their foundation in *essential connections* that *intertwine* with one another the objectlike formations of these types of objectlike formation, which are prefigured "*a priori*", that is, the intentional relations between object and consciousness, ultimately between *individuum* and consciousness, the relation *between individuum and eidos* as the genus-universal, between *individuum* and the non-categorial object and the categorial object as such, etc.

Thus, the great task of a universal theory of relation consists in *establishing all fundamental shapes of relations, taking the fundamental shapes of objectlike formations as objectlike formations*. The result is a theory of the forms of relations. The establishment of the affiliated fundamental laws of relational truths like, for example: that the true subsistence of "*a* temporally after *b*" and "*b* after *c*" contains the true existence of "*a* after *c*"— all of this is yielded by the so-called *axioms* of relations that are assigned to every radical type of objectlike formation for itself and in an intertwining, for example, axioms of individuality, axioms for genus and species, etc. [74]

But preceding all of this is a theory of the forms of those relations, a theory that has a formal universality in a still higher sense. We have precisely relations into which the objectlike formations as such can enter, be they individuals or genera, etc., so that in the disclosure of these forms of relations, the *termini* remain fully undetermined and thus indicate nothing concerning

whether the objects belong to this or that radical object-type or, as one also says, to this or that category of objectlike formation.

As you see, the universal *relationship of part and whole* and *vice versa* (or better, the universal relationship of containment and of what is contained, of part to part, and much else) naturally belongs in this realm of the *most general, formal universality*, a realm contained in itself.[209]

<§65. The Third Level of Objectivation. Conceptualizing Judgment on the Basis of the Consciousness of the Universal>

<a. Relations of Comparison, Association of Similarity as its Foundation, and Direction of Interest toward the Universal>

Of interest to us now, however, is a new topic, the topic of relations of comparison, as we call them, the relations of uniformity and similarity, which serve us as the transition to the third level of objectivation, that is, to the higher judicative level, that of the logically conceptualizing judgment.

The peculiar place of these relations shows up in the following exposition: We have directed our whole undertaking up to now to [75] the sphere of positionality, even in the realm of self-givenness. We conceived of various objects as being self-given, and posited them in a relation which, in turn, was also self-given. The opposite of positionality is quasi-positionality, phantasy, be it perceptual or reproductive. If we transfer an objectlike formation (so to speak) into the sphere of phantasy, we will also have the states-of-affairs belonging to it in the mode of the "as if"; thus, it appears that we can dispense with the consideration of phantasy, since corresponding to each type of positional givenness is a quasi-type of phantasy givenness; both share the same essential content.

However, phantasy is Janus-like, so to speak. Leaving the ground of actuality, we can situate ourselves completely in phantasy, and as subjects immersed in phantasy, live in the "as if"; thus, we can have a phantasied actuality given as if it were an

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[209] <See the> parallel exposition, Appendix 39: <The Task of a Theory of Relation> pp. 575f

actuality. But, secondly, we can keep our footing on the positional ground as actual subjects, as the subjects of actual, current experience peering into the world of phantasy, and then comport ourselves positionally to it in a unique way. In other words, now the phantasy formations are for us something given as existing, namely, precisely phantasies, fictions, characterized as modifications of actuality and insofar as this is the case, as non-actualities. But not non-actualities in the sense of actualities that are crossed out, like in the case of an illusion as a negated illusory appearance. From certain perspectives, then, we also characterize these objectlike formations that are constituted by phantasy, these "phantasy images" (whose essence it is "to imagine" objects together with their mode of being in a phantas<ma>tic manner), as possibilities, possibilities of objects.

I now need merely to point to the fact that relations, like those between whole and part, part and part, cannot exist in principle between actualities and such possibilities, that is, that they cannot be constituted in self-givenness, where the one *relatum* is given to consciousness as actual and the other as a fictum. If a whole is actual, then the part is too, and a fictum cannot be connected to something actual to form a whole. However, actualities and fictions can obviously be compared with one another; they can [76] stand in a relationship of similarity and uniformity to one another.[210] Closely related to this is the following distinction which likewise characterizes the essential division of both fundamental types of relations. Even if they do occur in the unity of one consciousness and in a living present and achieve an overarching unity, every intuition that gives an actuality, and every phantasy-intuition *do not, as intuitions, form a cohesive connection.* The very *same thing* holds for a perception and for *a remembering* and for several rememberings that do not make up a continual unity of remembering from the very start. *A memory*

[210] We distinguish: Relations of materially relevant ties (relations of connection) and relations of comparison. Relations of comparison can not only place actualities in relation to actualities, but also actualities in relation to possibilities. Or alternately: What they place in relation does not need <to> be constituted as connected in a continually cohesive intuition.

irrupts into the perceptual present without any connection, or [we can have] a different memory rupturing a memory.

An objectlike formation is constituted in the continual unity of an intuition as the unity of a giving consciousness. What is constituted in several intuitions, intuitions that do not form a cohesive connection, is constituted as not forming a cohesive connection in a materially relevant manner. *But there is a kind of connection that can even connect what is given without a connection. Association* can unite each and every thing that is given to consciousness together in a present of consciousness, whether connected or unconnected in materially relevant ties. A whole as whole of its parts, the connection of parts as parts of a whole, can only be given in the unity of a cohesively connecting intuition of the whole, of the connection. However, this does not effect uniformity or similarity at all. And they are unaffected precisely because uniformity or similarity have their *original source* purely in the connection that is pre-constituted by the unity of the so-called *association*. No matter how much efficacy the association may have for the formation of unitary intuitions, and no matter how constantly it is efficacious for them, like for the constitution of unitarily, cohesively connected objects, it also has [77] efficacy where objects, so to speak, are floating down into the present of consciousness without a cohesive connection; they fashion a tie between them, and specifically as an association of similarity.[211]

This connection entering into thematic view is the *fund<amentum> relat<um>* for the active constitution of a relation, of the relation of similarity and of uniformity. Now, if I say, further, that this connection is at once the source even of the consciousness of the universal, and therefore of conceptualizing judgment, of judgment in the full sense, then I mean by this that a primordial form of association is this source, which is to say, it functions as a specific *a priori* of passive pre-constitution upon which a new level of activity can build, which level of activity not

[211] Accordingly, sensible uniformity and similarity are thus also an original association and a unity of affection. Does the affection of one element pass over to the other, or conversely, does the coinciding in a unity give an increased force of affection?

only yields the universal as object, but lends to all judgments (in the sense given to them up to now) a new, a specifically logical shape.

The universality of the accomplishment of comparison and formation of concepts rests on the fact that everything, no matter how it is constituted as an object in actuality or possibility, can emerge precisely in an *a priori* fashion as the *terminus* in relations of comparison, and can be grasped conceptually by the activity of eidetic identification and by the activity of assuming it under the universal.

An excellent form of the relation of comparison is uniformity; a multiplicity of objects that are merely *repetitions* of one another precedes and is internal to the unity of the consciousness of a present, and this means an *associative form of unity of a peculiar* type, already constituted prior to the active process of relating. A coinciding that forms uniformity enters into the particular grasping of a *terminus*, with the transition to a second *terminus* that is grasped individually, and in the active relating, the one *terminus* is determined in the form of the subject as uniform to the other: *a* = *b*. And *vice versa*, as well.

The peculiar feature of this synthesis of two uniform objects consists in the fact that it indeed seems quite similar to a synthesis of identity, and yet is not one. It is so similar to it that, in passing [78] from one uniform object to the next, we are virtually inclined to say that it is indeed the same thing. The uniform objects, however, are two separate objects and not one and the same. And yet, in every such duality and in every manifold of uniform elements whatsoever, there actually is a unity and ipseity in the strongest sense. It arises originally in the synthesis of the coinciding that forms uniformity, it is constituted through it originally as object. Naturally, this original constitution means pre-constitution. An ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, the unity of a universal, can only first be given to consciousness for the ego *a pr<iori>*, can only first be ready for possible thematic grasping by carrying out the activity of grasping uniform objects separately in the synthetic transition [from one to the next]. A relating judgment of comparison is not required; this occurs in a different attitude. The direction of interest toward the universal, toward the unity as opposed to the

manifold, is not that of determining the one uniform object in relation to the other as being uniform to it; rather, what awakens interest is the One being actively constituted in the coinciding of individually grasped uniform objects; the One is the same, and is the same over and over, no matter what direction we may pursue in passing from one to the next. Obviously, what we carried out here is not anything like an explication of uniform objects where the One is not found as part, as something partially identical in the uniform objects; otherwise the One would only be something that is everywhere uniform, and the uniform elements would be in the relationship of intersection. The One does not repeat itself in something uniform; it only occurs one time, but is given in the many.

The original grasping of this One has a different field of interest, a different "content" that the interest must move through, different from the case of a sensible object, an object on the level of the individual. For now the interest, the ray of attentiveness must pass clear through the individual objects that are already constituted, and by traveling along the path of uniformity and carrying out the coinciding, the One that is constituted becomes thematic.

<b. The Universal as a Novel Intellectual Object>[212] [79]

It may initially seem that it does not require the open infinity with the form of the "etc."[213] Two repetitions already suffice to grasp the unity. But we note that with the pure directedness toward the unity, the existence of the objects that are elements [of the unity] is immaterial, that the potential positings of existence do not play a founding role, and that as long as we do not have the particular objects in the consciousness of the whatsoever,[214] in the consciousness of the exemplary, we do not have pure self-giving.

We achieve the highest grade of self-giving in the free passing from the given manifold into the realm of free possibilities and in

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[212] Editor: See Appendix 35: Multiplicity and Judgments of Multiplicity, pp. 559ff.

[213] Yes, for pure universals.

[214] *Beliebigkeit*

going through an open manifold in consciousness, a manifold of any possibilities whatsoever as any example whatsoever in the form of the "etc." We encounter the universal as a novel objectlike formation, as an intellectual objectlike formation, an objectlike formation from the original well-spring of activity: although, of course, on the basis of sensibility, insofar as the activity of "going through," of grasping the individual, of bringing into a coinciding, is necessary so that the universal as such can be pre-constituted, and then later can become a thematic object. If we take independent, concrete objects as our point of departure, this *universal of repetition* (with open unending scope) is the *concrete eidos*, from the Latin, the *concrete species* or the concrete essence. Where the *non-independent moments* of the concrete object are concerned, the lowest non-independent species are given, the lowest abstract species: if "abstract" only serves as a counter term to "concrete." Now different species among these abstract and concrete species can themselves be compared; like all objects, they can also have their associative unity in consciousness; in it we grasp, in a still higher intellectual activity, a specific-universal as the unity of manifolds that are already species, a universal of a higher order. We arrive at species and genera.[215] [80]

In going from uniformity to similarity, we would have to expound upon related matters. *Similarity is a fundamental shape of association*, and the transition yields <here> an analogue of partial identity, a coinciding and yet not a complete coinciding. The elements of the similarity that overlap (which, by the way, need not be separate) have a *distance*; different similarities can have different distances, in fact, they themselves can be compared. Thus, *similarity has a gradation*, and the *limes is uniformity* without any distance in the coinciding of elements merely being repeated. Nevertheless, something in common also comes to light here in the *coinciding at a distance*, or, as we could put it perhaps in a better way, it shines through originally as a universal.[216] It

[215] All of this would have to be given more thoroughly, above all, the pure *eidos*, what is purely exemplary, etc., would have to be grounded more thoroughly and be set in contrast to the empirical universal.

[216] Thus, it is apparent that by virtue of the *limes*-relation, the universal of similarity is the universal of uniformity.

achieves complete givenness in the process that we have described previously, namely, that of the transition from the lowest species of similar elements to the corresponding higher species. In this disclosive process, the universal of mere similarity is given as a higher *species*, as a *species-universal*.

If we carry out a determinative attitude, *a fundamentally new mode of determination* is given *after the constitution of the universal*. The object that is the subject[217] *a* is not determined in a manner uniform to *b*, but as *an a*. The thematic grasping of the universal requires moving through the open manifold of any singularities whatsoever lying in the circle of interest concerning content. *Positionality*, where it occurs, *is not carried out* for these singularities, *the mode of being is irrelevant* and can also be a phantasy mode of being from the very outset.[218] If we focus thematically on such singularities, they will have a *unique relationship to the universal*, precisely *that of the species to its particularizations*. What exists as actual, as what is actually posited is then determined as the actual particularization of the *eidos*, what is possible, a possible particularization. The new judgment that arises is "*This is an a*," which is to say, it is a particular of the species *a*. [81]

There are other essentially different forms, and not only *the forms* that arise from the previous ones, by, so to speak, *dressing them with concepts*. Up to now, we had placed determined constituted objects in relation [to one another], and had determined relations between determined objects. Each object can be grasped conceptually. If we have judged that *S* is a part of S_1, and in this way relating them, then "*S* and S_1" can now absorb conceptual determinations by attribution, and this can take place in all cases.

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[217] *Subjektgegenstand*

[218] For pure universals! For pure *eidé*!

<*c. As Such-Judgments*[219]>

But thinking in general takes on still different and more significant forms. *Thinking, in the form of the function of the "as such,"* governs the entire judicative thinking of the higher level. The universal is constituted, we said, in relation to a field of openness, and with this we have already unleashed *the function of the "whatsoever."* Yet, in a certain way, it is actually already prepared from the very start for judging as a thematic activity: If we have objects pregiven, we can choose any "this" or "that" whatsoever as the determinative theme, we can relate it to this or that other object whatsoever. But the whatsoever, the choosing, and correlatively the indifference also enters as a thematically *formative* activity into the judging itself; it also constitutes, it fashions new forms of objectlike formations, new forms of state-of-affairs and of judgment. Not only do species emerge as objects, but correlative to the species, new thematic formations are constituted. They are As Such-objects and *As Such-relations*, i.e., *universal and particular judgments*. The concept of the *objectlike theme* certainly *also* takes on with this *an essential modification*. For it is fundamentally different <to> have this table here before us thematically and <to> determine it—even if it be determined [82] conceptually as a table—and <to> make a judgment about a table as such. It is, I say, something completely different: instead of making a judgment about this table, even if it stand before us and stand in the illuminated field of interest as a thematic focal point, to make a judgment about any table whatsoever, regardless of which one, to make a judgment about a table as such, whereby the "whatsoever," the "as such," belongs to the thematic center. Now this table is characterized here as example, this whatsoever attaches to it, it is given to consciousness here as this table, but indifferently. It is only a "*representative*," and the theme—and *in a modified way, the subject-theme—is a table as such*. Thus, here the *judging is fundamentally modified*, it is a *positional* activity that operates on an entirely different level, on an altered and complex thematic substratum.

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[219] *Überhaupt-Urteile*

If we have a multiplicity given in the manner of experiencing positionality, and by moving through it, a universal comes to the fore, we will have the determinative attitude, "This is an *A*," "This is an *A*, etc." But also: *anything whatsoever that has been extracted, anything whatsoever to be extracted, is an A*; in moving through it, I have the consciousness of the "*A* again and again," each and every time an *A*, but also the consciousness of anything whatsoever to be extracted, of "*every whatsoever.*" Likewise with two universals occurring together: *An A as such is B, each one.*

But, *on the other hand* (e.g., when at first a *B* occurs now and then), the thematic interest can also be directed toward the occurrence of a *B* as such. Even here the function of the whatsoever plays a role, but in a second form. It is immaterial that *this here* is *B*, but that *one there is B*. Obviously here again is the particular, "an *A*," and likewise the indeterminate universal, "some *A's*," that stand in the subject-position, not an object in the genuine sense, to which object (like a determined table) one would attribute a predicate; and yet it is a theme, a theme being constituted by the higher functions of activity; the entire judgment, and all functions of judgment as relating functions take on a new shape in the consciousness of the "as such," and by assuming the "as such" into a theme. It is evident that the function of the "as such," to which the specification is bound, is a conceptualizing function, that of universal and particular conceptual grasping. [83]

If we sever the *tie to <a> realm of experience*, to a pregiven sphere of constituted objects, if we operate in a scope of pure concepts, in a manifold of possibility in which possible actualities remain indifferent according to their positionality, we gain *pure "as such"-judgments*, judgments that have the character of *judgments of laws*, like, "A triangle has as such three angles"; "An extended object is as such qualified [in some way]"; "A red object as such is colored." The *particular* judgments are expressed as *judgments of possibilities*: "A triangle can have a right angle."

All such judgments thus operate on the ground of pure possibility and say nothing about actuality. If I imagine an extended object in pure possibility, I will find it colored or qualified in some other way. But by modifying in free variation and by holding firm to the extended object, in the free transition

from the one fiction to any other one whatsoever, and where it is a matter of indifference to me which other it is, I find both the conceptual determinations united, I see them in the transitional consciousness as united as such in lawful regularity. With this, the realm of universal judging is opened up, the realm of law-giving, the knowledge of law-giving for itself and for all judgments as such, and therefore for all possible objectlike formations.

<Supplementary Texts>

<Section 1.
FIRST VERSION OF MAIN TEXT PART 2 (1920/21)>[1]

<1. The Misunderstanding of Modalities of Being by Logicians and Epistemological Psychologists> [225]

Thanks to the phenomenological analyses that we have undertaken, we now understand the origin of modalizations arising in the sphere of perception. We find modal distinctions purely with respect to the objective sense of every perception, and the same perceptual object can potentially present itself one time in this modality, another time in that modality, or in variable modalities, now as existing in pure and simple certainty, now as problematically possible in conflict with other problematic possibilities, and then as not existing or as existing in fact. On the other hand, the perceptual object is inconceivable without one of the modalities we just mentioned, just as it is inconceivable without open possibilities, since the perceptual object moves into an open future. If we go from the noematic attitude to the noetic one, the perceptual lived-experience will likewise be inconceivable without what makes up the modalizing accomplishment in the perceptual lived-experience; and this is completely clear to us.

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[1] Translator: The difference between this first version of Part 2 and the one published above under the heading of "Main Text" concerns §12 through §40. The italicized sections of this text are repetitions of the former. Like the editor of the German edition, I include them here for the sake of coherence.

The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XI.

E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*
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We are therefore in the position to be able to comprehend the bad mistakes into which philosophical logicians and epistemological psychologists have fallen by having believed it necessary to distinguish between the so-called mere presentation and judgment for every perception (and correspondingly for every other consciousness of an object), thus, in this case, to distinguish between the perceptual presentation and the perceptual judgment; here, under the rubric of judgment, one would distinguish between active acceptance and rejection as more specific differentiations. They obviously carried over the quite evident distinction between the perceptual object and its modal modes of givenness to the perceptual lived-experience and—since the sense of constitutive [226] analyses were still completely hidden, and since they were even lacking the fundamental distinction between noema and noesis—they made a real distinction in a lived-experiential consciousness out of an irreal distinction; indeed, they even divided a lived-experiential consciousness into separable elements of lived-experience. If an object appears in the flesh in the perceptual lived-experience, and is thereby characterized in this or that mode of being, this does not mean that perception consists of two elements or layers of which the one constitutes the object in its presentation in the flesh and the other, building upon it, apportions to the object "being" or "non-being," etc. According to Brentano and his school, with which Meinong was also affiliated, there is supposed to be one unique perceptual presentation that presents[2] the object in the flesh, and in addition to this a judgment that now actively accepts, now rejects, affirming or denying what is presented. In principle, however, those judgments do not have to be supplemented, and in this case we would have a mere presentation.

But according to our analyses, it is clear that there is not anything, and there cannot be anything, on the order of mere perceptual presentations, neither as particular lived-experiences nor only as sublayers in lived-experiences that are self-contained in an intimately inherent manner. A perceptual presentation would certainly be a consciousness, a consciousness that gives an object

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[2] *vorstellig macht*

originaliter. But such a consciousness would not be anything other than that system of intentions of the structure described, and it would be entirely inconceivable if it were anything but that. Such a system, however, is necessarily a system in which the intentions run their course either in original concordance and are unbroken, and if this is the case then this mode is called nothing other than perceptual faith, and the object, existent. Or a rupture ensues and then we have the other possibilities that have been prefigured; the intentions themselves undergo a thorough internal recasting of their concordance, even though the systematic structure may be the same as the systematic structure that constitutes its presentation in the flesh. Belief and the modification of belief is not something added to intentions. The fact of being non-inhibited and of being inhibited by parallel and partially coinciding intentions is not something that is juxtaposed to intentions; it is not a new supervening lived-experience called belief, judgment, but precisely a recasting of concordance, a modification that makes possible the nature of consciousness as consciousness, and in fact, as we will hear, makes possible every consciousness. Thus, [227] belief as being certain, as negation, as affirmation, etc., is to the so-called perceptual presentation as the timbre is to the tone or as the tonal intensity is to the tone. One cannot separate the tone and then add the tonal intensity to it, although the analogy is naturally precarious and to be taken *cum grano salis*. One should not treat the perceptual object as such and the object as such presented in a different manner, that is, one should not treat what we termed either the objective sense or the noema, as a piece in consciousness, as generally happens in the traditional literature that is still unaffected by phenomenology. One must not ignore all the multifaceted and actually demonstrable structures of lived-experience in which sense is constituted in the process of perceiving as an intentional unity, and inseparably from this, the being-modality of sense. And one must consequently not pass off the mode of being as something that the judicative ego adds to the sense which would, as it were, already reach the ego in advance as ready-made.

But if one pursues a deeper analysis, it will be clear that corresponding to the unitary element of the object in the noema is

a manifold of intentions in the course of the lived-experience; these intentions in all of their elements are a consciousness through and through, and as a consciousness they have those uninhibited concordances or inhibitions and conflict; and it will become clear that this modalizing process that recasts the hue of the whole of consciousness is what necessarily constitutes the mode of being in relation to sense. Accordingly, in the case of the modality of problematic [possibility], one will also not interpret, as does happen, indecisiveness as a cessation of the putative perceptual judgment, and will not altogether reduce this merely to positive and negative believing or even only to active acceptance and rejection. Positive belief designates: (1) the primordial mode of consciousness, consciousness that is unbroken, but that is also still unaffected by any breaks. (2) Active acceptance, confirmation is that consciousness of unbroken concordance that is restored after undergoing a break; it is a concordance after overcoming the inner bifurcation. This overcoming is carried out in the original form in the perceptual progression of concordant fulfillment as the resolution of inhibition from the side of the one party of the conflicting intentions, whereby the other simultaneously gets annulled in the form of being crossed out, in the form of negation. Every affirmation also entails a negation. [228]

The one thing that we have not taken into consideration and that will yet play its role is the participation of the activity of the ego. If the ego executes an act of affirmation (of active acceptance), it activates, it lives through those particular intentions, those of concordance, while the annulment of the opposing intentions, as suppressed, takes place precisely in the implicit form of emptiness, as a modalization in subconsciousness. On the other hand: Negation as an act is the activation of this crossing out in the transition from the activation of the opposing intentions to the living through of concordance or vice versa. There isn't the slightest reason to exclude the mode of being undecided, the mode of question, or what amounts to the same thing, the mode of the consciousness of enticement and of probability from this set in which the latter consciousness always plays a part as an intermediate stage with a corresponding accomplishment of sense, questionable, problematically possible sense. Even here we have

different forms of execution on the part of the ego. None of this excludes the fact that decisions have a priority over the indecisive uncertainties for logic as a normative science. But one must first bring it to light, and then also do justice to the modes of indecisiveness and to their norms.

<2. Non-Prominence and the Prominence of Sense and Modes of Being for Consciousness>

Before we advance beyond the realm of perception in which our analyses were carried out, let us develop the results of our analyses a little bit. The distinction between the perceptual sense and its modes of being did not imply a separation for either perceptual lived-experience or the perceived object. In this respect we have to consider the following. There is no rupture in the origin of perception where naive perception is concerned; it is simply a consciousness of the perceptual object. If the ego is active, that is, if it grasps [objects] in an attentive manner, it will grasp the object *simpliciter*, and here mere objective sense and mode of being are not distinguished at all for consciousness, and the objective sense and the mode of originality are distinguished just as little; and in general they are distinguished just as little as the results of our reflective analyses and our scientific conceptualizations of perception would themselves become an [229] object [of perception]. In the normal attitude of the act, of the "I perceive," the grasping bears on the unity that is constituted in a continuous coinciding as this object becoming there. In this case, [we call] the objective sense in the original mode of being that which is in a continual coincidence, that which is, so to speak, continually identified in the process of constitution; it is the correlate of the unbroken concordance of original intentions. It is only in a transition to discordance and therefore to modalizing transformations that sense and modality of being are first set apart from each other in a relation of contrast; we recognize this when we look back at the perceptual object as it was given prior to the break, and when we also look at the objects that were then given together with this and as conflicting. Seen more precisely, under the rubric of "mere" object-sense, something takes on the

character of an object that previously did not have this character; it was itself not there like an object in the simplicity of perceptual consciousness. A coinciding and an identification take place that had not existed before; a consciousness of an object is established that had not previously existed: If the pure and simple external This-Here, the external perceptual object, has already been constituted, then the sense of this object and its mode of being will now be constituted, and this constitution is not itself an external perception, but rather a consciousness founded in external perception. It is likewise an originarily giving consciousness if it has arisen in the way that we are taking it here, namely, fashioned from the reflective attitude on the perceptual object as such. But even though it is a consciousness that fashions its object in its full originality, it is not a perceiving, not a grasping *originaliter* of an individual object or even of a thing. To be sure, senses are not things. We will have something to say about this consciousness later, for its objects are also the principle themes of interest for us logicians. If the disruptive discordance has been overcome, a contrast between sense and modality arises, "being" gets the new character, "it is actually so"; but then in the active perceiving that now once more devotes itself to the object and to its acquisition of knowledge, the object will once again be given as an object in a straightforward manner; that is, as we continue to perceive, a constant sameness is given in an original mode of being, but [230] without the distinction between sense and mode of being. Once again, we have the same object in a straightforward manner, just as if a break had never occurred.

One can still sense a remnant of unclarity. We have an original shape of continuous perception as a system of concordance. Perception has its perceptual object, the existing object, the unity of just this concordant ratification of the self, which proceeds in an unbroken manner.

If a break occurs, [through] doubt, [or through] crossing out, we will have a "revaluing," a cancellation of this concordant nexus that no longer proceeds in an unbroken manner; rather [we will have a nexus that] becomes modified through the break itself. What is crossed out there is nothing other than the object *simpliciter* as "being." And we see that the spared, remaining

object does not consist of two components, "sense" or content and "being," but rather is precisely existing object or object *simpliciter*. A perception and a crossed out perception having the same "content" now have something in common, and that is precisely the content of the perceptual lived-experience and of the negation of perception. But this is not something general that is differentiated; it is not a part that gets a supplementary part through the "quality of belief." The noetic content of the negation of perception also "contains" the perceptual belief, but as crossed out, or rather, "being," but as crossed out. Can more still be said about this?

In the case of other modalizations, like negation for example, we do not have an object *simpliciter* from the very beginning without inner differentiations of sense and the mode of being, but rather the negated object, or in problematic consciousness, the problematic object. It seems that a bifurcation is essentially situated here in the dyad of sense and modality corresponding to the fact that in general the consciousness of such modal transformations is indeed more intricate than pure and simple perceiving.

<3. The Modalization of Immanent Objects>

Let us get first get clear about what can be used from our results vis-à-vis immanent perception. We see without further ado that the [231] discourse of the being of an immanent object and the characterization of immanent perceiving as a certainty of being essentially leads back to the same sources as the discourse of the being of the external object and perceptual belief. Even the immanent object is constituted in internal consciousness and is constituted through the systems of intentionality, the systems of primordial impression, retentions, protentions, which pass over into each other in steady concordance. Correlative to the unbrokenness of these original intentions is again "being" situated in the consciousness of the object. We are conscious of every one of our lived-experiences as being; we are certain of them in a straightforward manner, and this certainty means the same thing as the certainty of the external object in unbroken external

perception. But now we understand the difference and the reason why we could not profitably link the doctrine of modalities to immanent perceptions. An immanent object can in principle only be given with certainty. Original constitution, which lets it arise as an *esse* in *percipi*, does not in principle admit of any modalization, of any dual apprehension in conflict. There is not an apperceptive apprehension here in the same sense as there is in external perception; apperceptive apprehension already presupposes immanent constitution as its foundation. But this is, by its very nature, a steady, passive process of intentional concordance in the succession of primordial impression and retentions.

Still, we must be more careful: On the one hand, seen more precisely, modalization is indeed possible for immanent objects. The extent to which they are already constituted in the flux of their becoming (and they are certainly objects of immanent perception only as becoming), is the extent to which there is no way of speaking of modalization. The lived-experience, which has already been constituted as present and together with it as just past, cannot be subject to doubt and therefore cannot be negated, either. How should an overlapping doubling and a reciprocal inhibition of intentions arise here? A primordial impression can only fade away in a single sense, can only sink back into retention in a single sense. It is inconceivable that it become doubled. The necessity is absolutely unequivocal. But the constancy of protention also belongs to the constitutive process; what is already constituted [232] motivates an indication of something that is to come through its own content; it prefigures an empty horizon of the future, but one equipped with an indeterminately general sense. For example, the thought brewing in me (coming to me without my aid) has a prefiguring horizon of expectation through its style, and that issues in something like open possibilities that are being determined more closely. But also an interruption of the thought or a turning against the expectation, that is, possibilities for the consciousness of the thought's non-being. This becomes even more clear when we take a tone or a tonal formation purely as an immanent datum, as a pure sense-datum, without any transcendent apperception. It becomes questionable which tonal phrases will occur there now, how the tonal figure will be pictured—questionable insofar as an

ambiguity of protention develops. There are also, therefore, modalities here in this protentional direction. Thus, our results in relation to the latter also hold *mutatis mutandis* for immanent perception, whose indubitability, that is, whose inability to be modalized is only valid to the extent that it actually accomplishes an original constitution. That concerns the immanent lived-experience that is in the process of becoming to the extent that it moves into the process of becoming in every moment and that it has been given to consciousness as a duration that has just become by virtue of the retentional continuity. No disappointment of the anticipation can summon changes of sense in the backward direction and bedazzle what is actually constituted.

<4. "Types of Lived-Experience" are not Empirical Facts, but Formal Structures of Consciousness as Such>

Going beyond the perceptual sphere, let us now turn to other, non-original lived-experiences. We will be able to expand upon our insights here in an important way. I would like to mention a general observation at the outset. If an external, naturalistic psychology and transcendental philosophy approach the life of consciousness, they will be presented with perceptions, memories, expectations, imaginings, and then further, with judgments, feelings, desires, volitions as special names for types of experiences, and they will appear here as factual types in the realm of human and animal consciousness, similar to biological, [233] psychological occurrences as empirical facts of organic nature.

But if one has learned to see phenomenologically and has learned to grasp the sense of intentional analysis, if one has—expressed in the form of the Goethian myth—found the way to the mother of knowledge, to its realm of pure consciousness in which all being arises constitutively and from which all knowledge as knowledge of beings has to fashion its ultimate comprehensible clarification, then one will initially make the quite astounding discovery that those types of lived-experience are not a matter of arbitrary special features of an accidental life of consciousness, but rather that terms like "perception," "memory," "expectation," etc., express universal, essential structures, that is, strictly

necessary structures of every conceivable stream of consciousness, thus, so to speak, formal structures of a life of consciousness as such whose profound study and exact conceptual circumscription, whose systematic graduated levels of foundation and genetic development is the first great task of a transcendental phenomenology. It is precisely nothing other than the science of the essential shapes of consciousness as such, as the science of maternal origins.

Thus, the knowledge that perception is an absolutely universal essential structure of consciousness as such has already come to the fore with our analyses of the original constitution of temporal objectlike formations the moment we had distinguished between immanent and transcendent objects: There is no lived-experience conceivable, and there is no nexus of consciousness for lived-experience conceivable, without them being subjected to the law of time-constitution; that is, it is only insofar as it is constituted in the steadily prefigured lawful nexus of primordially impressional, retentional, and protentional intentions. Lived-experience is not only given to consciousness, it is also given as being *originaliter* and as being in the process of becoming and having-just-become. External perception has a certain universality, but one that is noticeably completely different from that of immanent perception. That external perceptions arise in the stream of lived-experience of which we are conscious immanently as perceptually given is a universal fact insofar as an external world of perception is constantly there for us, namely, in the form of some kind of perceptually given external surroundings of a continually co-constituted lived-body. But the necessity that external perceptions must arise in the immanent stream and must arise from this continually integrally cohesive accomplishment is obviously not a necessity in the same sense: as if consciousness would not be conceivable at all without the like. On the contrary, our intentional analysis here leads us to understand all external perception and all organization of external perceptions; these constitute an infinitely open spatio-temporal-causal world as a developmental whole, and this leads back to a consciousness "before" this development, for which no external being-in-itself can be given at all. Moreover, we see that this development is tied to conditions that signify

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facticities for every empirical ego and its individually determinate stream of lived-experience which is examined in pure possibility. Without determinate courses of hyletic data spatial objectlike formations cannot be constituted.

<5. Presentifications as Necessary Components of Perceptual Lived-Experience>

Yet we prefer to pursue the path of absolute necessities which takes its point of departure from the necessity of perception as a title of shapes of consciousness, without which no consciousness itself can be. The structure of immanent objects in immanent originality highlights for us the curious fact that we are lead back to elementary, but non-independent components, non-independent as mere phases that present the headwaters of a most pure originality under the rubric of primordial impression. The original consciousness of immanent perception and of every perception is only a most purely original consciousness with respect to a phase; next to that we have components that are not original, no longer originally giving, and here we encounter two types, both presentifications—if this term characterizes precisely a conscious-having of something that is not present in the original. On the one hand, we have the character of "still being conscious of," on the other, "not yet conscious of." The one, the retentional, becomes immediately empty, non-intuitable, but it maintains the primordially instituting knowledge, it maintains the sense in its full determination and mode of being. The other expects, anticipates the acquisition of knowledge and has leeways of [235] indeterminacy. In this shape, presentification thus belongs to the original stock of every concrete perceptual lived-experience, and therefore to every lived-experience in general with respect to its immanent constitution; it belongs as a type of function that is non-independent and that makes possible concrete perception.

<6. Presentifications as Independent (Concrete) Lived-Experiences. Concrete Retention and its Modalization>

But we also certainly have concrete lived-experiences of presentification; we have memories and concrete expectations, and we have here under this rubric intuitive and empty consciousness. Further, we also have concrete empty retentions and not merely non-independent retentional components and continua in the nexus of a perception that is in the process of unfolding.

Let us first consider this kind of concrete presentification. It necessarily attaches to each perception; namely, we no longer speak of a perception after the last phase of the originality of perception has flowed-off, e.g., the moment when the resounding tone ceases, and when this has also become transformed in the retentional phase; we have a momentary continuum of retentions that reproduce in the Now the entire course of the preceding perception in all their phases, and this entire continuum undergoes further transformation at one and the same pace; and as it continually coincides, we become conscious of it as something that has just flowed-off and as something that is simply being pushed back further and further.

Naturally, such a retention, too, has a universal necessity for consciousness insofar as it must be regarded as a continual, immanent perceiving. Necessarily linking up to each lived-experience that has flowed-off is a concrete retention of that very lived-experience. This takes place incidentally in pure passivity in the same manner that original time-consciousness in general (to which this retention belongs), runs its course in steady passivity. The original accomplishment of retention consists solely in helping the emergent consciousness of the temporal objectlike formation to advance, even though with respect to the appearance it does permit this accomplishment to shrivel up ever so quickly and to pass over into an empty, undifferentiated distance. Just as in [236]
the change of orientation of spatial distance an outermost distant horizon always presents a "vanishing point"[3] in which all phenomenal differentiations of proximity and distance (like all

[3] *Abschluß*

other phenomenal differentiations) fade away and disappear, so too [does this occur] in the process of sinking back into the past. All differentiations of succession and the differentiations that are formed in them with respect to content—differentiations that shrivel up more and more—fade away into a temporal distance that has finally effaced all phenomenal differentiations. And yet they are intentionally contained in it in a concealed manner. Out of the distant horizon that is given to us in a non-intuitive manner (and unlike the distant horizon in the consciousness of space that is still intuitively given), this or that can exercise a special allure from something implicit, affecting the ego, steering the ego's interest in a certain direction; and now what is distant emerges once more in the form of a remembering that brings what is distant closer in the form of "re-" or "again."

This can certainly occur without the [active] participation of the ego; a clear remembering can suddenly break through. As we shall soon see, this is certainly something essentially new. But we must say phenomenologically that what presents itself to consciousness in remembering within intentionality and in explicit intuitability gives itself as the same thing that is found *implicite* in retention by virtue of an identifying coinciding of sense with the corresponding accentuated components of retention. The emptiness that seems to be entirely undifferentiated only discloses its hidden sense-manifold in this way: through the transformations that occur when intentional, special moments surface in their particularity from the abiding emptiness, and then through the transition to presentifications that explicitly bring something to intuition. But all such transformations and transitions are in their very sense connected through syntheses of coinciding.

If after this structural analysis we inquire into what happens in the retentional sphere with respect to the belief of being and its modalizations, it will be clear that what holds for the modalization of concrete perceptions must also hold for the modalization of concrete retentions. The intentionality that is put into play does indeed become modified in the retentional transformation, and if perception ceases, then we will have a pure retention and ongoing change. But this change is not an inhibition of the intentions that are put into play; they continue to run their course in the

concordance of coinciding; the objective sense has the mode of straightforward being, but in accordance with the retentional transformation, [it has] the altered mode of being-past. A becoming-discordant is likewise impossible for the immanent objectlike formation in concrete retention, just as in concrete perception. That is, doubt and negation are essentially precluded. On both accounts we will find that a theory which would limit the so-called "evidence" of the givenness of individual being only to inner perception, and would deny evidence for concrete retention, indeed, a theory that would go so far as to allow actual evidence to hold only for the punctual Now of the primordial impression is pure non-sense. Where doubt is essentially precluded, and negation too, the evidence of being is included. [237]

Let us now continue to consider concrete retentions that follow transcendent perceptions. What about modalization with respect to them? We see that doubt, that is, a bifurcation in sense-giving, can occur in the perceptual sphere by an immanent lived-experience; a concrete lived-experience within immanent time carrying out within itself a transcendent sense-giving, i.e., "points" beyond itself in an anticipatory manner, and is therefore dependent upon possible fulfillments in the progression to new such lived-experiences. These immanent data can undergo doubled apperceptions that are motivated from different sides, and these can be mutually inhibiting. In this case, we also speak of a radiating back of an inhibition occurring in the course of perception, a radiating back into the intentions that were previously uninhibited; put more precisely, we speak of its radiating back into the retentions and therefore into the past of consciousness that is concealed in them. Of course, this holds for the concrete retention that endures after perception ceases. Accordingly, such a retention can have all modalities insofar as it harbors a transcendent intentionality. Indeed, even if it emerges from an unbroken perception in unbroken concordance, it can subsequently pass over into the mode of doubt and therefore into all affiliated modes of being. In order to make this clear, let us point out, for example, that an external perception of a thing is not something isolated, that it does not constitute existence in an isolated manner for itself, but does so in the universal, [238]

transcendental nexus of constituting being—initially in the nexus that does not only constitute this one thing in an intuitive manner, but intuitively constitutes a far reaching spatio-material surrounding. Thus, a discordance can occur in the environing-worldly apprehension of the environing-world at the place of this or that thing, and this, then, will motivate reinterpretations of meaning or doubt beyond this place and with respect to givennesses of a past that is still retained in consciousness. For example, during a break we hear several piano pieces and have the apperception that someone in the next room is playing the piano. Suddenly we wonder whether it is not really coming from a mechanical apparatus (of a baby grand piano). Doubt is immediately carried over into the retentional sphere, namely, to the pieces that were previously heard.

<7. Empty, Concrete Expectation. Its Modalization>

We can also gain insight into empty concrete expectations in a manner that is quite similar to concrete retentions, both as to the necessary universality of their function in consciousness as well as in relation to the way in which so-called anticipatory belief (as consciousness constituting existence) is to be understood and how the corresponding modalizations are to be understood in them.

We distinguish the intentions of expectation that belong immediately to the constitution of every perceptual givenness, the non-independent protentions, from the concrete expectations that present the futural concrete nexuses to consciousness in an empty manner—to be sure, always referring conjointly to other perceptual spheres. The former naturally belong to each moment of consciousness, since every lived-experience is co-constituted in inner consciousness by protentions. Even concrete expectations, as empty, have their latent intentionality that is made explicit in intuitive presentifications, parallel to remembering of something past; even here we see that the intuitive, explicit presentification, the intuitively pictured expectation, is a secondary form: The picturing already presupposes empty-consciousness.

Where the modalities of being are concerned, obviously nothing else can be said to hold for concrete expectations than what is said

to hold for expectations which, as protentions, link up to the perceptions themselves. The essentially possible reproductions [239] that are intuitively presentified verify the fact that a transition to negation and to problematic possibilities can only take place through diremptions and overlappings of sense in a way that is entirely similar to what we have studied with respect to perceptions, only that [in the former case] this transition arises precisely in a reproductive form. We observed here as well the difference between [a] the implicit and, as it were, the inauthentic constitution of sense and being regarding empty expectation, and [b] the authentic and explicit sense-constitution of the corresponding expectations that are intuitive and that picture: That we attribute the same sense to the corresponding acts, that we do this takes place by virtue of the synthesis through coinciding in which emptiness is fulfilled. What is intuitable arises here as the intuitive expectation with the character of anticipatory fulfillment. This is obviously a different kind of fulfillment than the fulfillment occurring with the process of bringing empty retentions to intuition; here it is not anticipating but again presentifying. We will certainly have to treat this in a more precise manner.

<8. Concrete, Empty Presentifications of What is (Temporally) Present. Its Modalization>

We must finally point to the fact that there is still another type of empty presentification, namely, the presentification of something present, temporally speaking, but not of something present in the sense of original intuitability. We are familiar with such presentifications as components of all external perceptions; they are connected to the latter as empty horizons. But they also arise in an independent, concrete form, namely, as empty presentations of concrete things surrounding us. For example, if we glance around this room, the view of the windows and doors will awaken in us, immediately, images of the street or of the foyers, but generally in a shape that remains empty. It also belongs to the essence of such empty presentations that they can pass over into intuitive presentifications. Thus, we can at any time make intuitively present the back side of the thing of which we are

emptily conscious, as well as the concrete spatio-material surroundings of which we are emptily conscious; we can do this by imagining that we are walking around the thing or passing through the door to the foyer and then that we are walking out into the street, and now that we are allowing the co-connected series of [240] appearances of all these non-visible sides of the object and of all these objects [themselves] to run their course, namely, the sides and objects in which the present actuality of the thing is exhibited. The series of appearances, which conform to every path of kinaesthetic systems that are given to consciousness as freely at our disposal, can in this case be motivated in an unambiguous or ambiguous manner, that is, the corresponding intentional nexuses can run their course concordantly and in an uninhibited way; or the series of appearances disturbing one another can overlap, thus allowing conflicts to set in; and in this way modalizations are possible. This is intelligible because all of the intentions that are at issue here are reproductions of anticipatory intentions [linked] to reproduced perceptions; these are connected to hypothetical kinaesthetic courses as demanded successions. What is disclosed by bringing something to intuition in a reproductive manner is found *implicite* in the empty presentifications of something present, and this "*implicite*" has its sense precisely in the mode of essentially possible explication.

We could still point to a shape of presentifying something present, and a quite curious shape indeed. I mean empathy as the consciousness through which an alien psychic life can be given to an ego in its life of consciousness. Empathy necessarily arises in its original form in connection with transcendent perception. It is based on the perception of the alien lived-corporeality as a physical thing-like body, by this thing being apprehended through its similarity to my own lived-body as lived-body. In a manner similar to the way in which I become co-conscious of the non-visible aspects of a thing through the empty intentions of perception, through "empathy" I become co-conscious of the alien psychic life, an alien psychic life that is inaccessible to direct perception as such, and for the most part in an empty manner. Thus, empathy means here a level of founded presentation that is connected to the perception of the lived-body-thing, a presentation

which, when brought to intuition, has its own mode of bringing to intuition and its own mode of fulfillment. It is an empty making co-present, a presentification of a consciousness that is made co-present and that belongs to the lived-body, a consciousness, however, whose process of bringing to intuition certainly has to embark upon quite different paths than those peculiar to the non-visible aspects of the thing-like body. Even here it can result in modalizations by means of doubt. The lived-experiences of consciousness that are indicated through the medium of lived-corporeality and of expression that is conveyed in a lived-bodily manner emerge in an ambiguous and discordant way. We will not [241] go into this here; our only concern is to give examples of the empty presentifications of something present.

<9. Even the Presentifications of Something Present are Universal Occurrences of Consciousness>

They are nevertheless examples from the sphere of transcendence, and so it appears that we are not dealing with completely universal occurrences here. In fact, one might like to maintain that if every conceivable consciousness should contain the shapes of empty-presentifications of something present, this would also have to be manifest if we were to bracket all transcendent world constitution from the immanent realm. But an immanent present is indeed *eo ipso* given in the flesh, constituted in inner consciousness, that is, not merely in a presentified present. However, this is not a conclusive argument. Immanent perception and the presentification of something perceived are perhaps compatible in a certain way. I mean in this way: Everything that we designate by the term association is characterized phenomenologically as a connection of consciousness concerning the process of one thing recalling another, a connection that exists between the so-called associates. It is not a mere objective fact that the thought of "Vesuvius" reminds me of the thought of "Naples"; and when given to consciousness, both thoughts are not merely juxtaposed or in succession; rather, one of them refers to the other; within the consciousness of one of them, there is a pointing to the consciousness of the other. But "pointings" do not

merely occur within the consciousness of transcendence, but also within immanence, and among them even those that go from one simultaneous thing to another, and from one present thing to another. For example, if color data occur together with olfactory data once or even often, these colors and these smells will not only be there together again in the new case, but will have their integral togetherness given to consciousness: Connected to immanent data are indicators[4] of something simultaneously given, and the givenness is not an obstacle to an indicating consciousness connected to another [datum]. But if the indicated data do not emerge along with the others, they will be "lacking" for [242] consciousness; the indications are then empty and at the same time, inhibited. I mean, in other words, that even this kind of presentification of something present has its universal significance and is a matter of concern for us here.

<10. Fundamental Types of "Presentations">

We have spoken of several types of empty modes of consciousness of something individual, each one of which referred us back to intuitions; for we could only genuinely speak of their intentional content and their modalization through the explication of the corresponding intuition. We will have to reflect upon these now. Let us first review the general typicality of the presentations of something individual, that is, the typicality of all the shapes of the passive consciousness of something individual, just as we have already come to see them. All activity of the ego and its special accomplishments, above all those of theoretical thought, of identifying, of differentiating, of predicating, etc., were outside of our thematic interest in our previous considerations. The following fundamental types can be distinguished:

(1) The radical distinction between intuitive or full presenting and the non-intuitive, empty presenting. Empty presenting is an implicit, inauthentic presenting; it only contains within itself sense and modes of being *implicite*, and further it contains precisely everything that can actually and genuinely be found only within

[4] *Vordeutungen*

explicit consciousness. "Actually finding" is precisely the intuition-of-the-self and taking something constituted in a living manner from the vivacity of a process of intuitive constitution. What empty consciousness harbors within itself *implicite* is not actually constituted in a process of manifold intentions that carry out within themselves a unity of sense-giving accomplishment. One can therefore also designate the opposition [between intuitive and non-intuitive, full and empty] as the opposition between genuine and non-genuine consciousness or between explicit and implicit consciousness. But as we know, the mode of the non-genuine, of empty intentions, is indeed essentially fundamental for making every explicit and concrete consciousness possible. No concrete object can be constituted for consciousness without the co-functioning of empty horizons; what is required is a constant intertwining of fullness and emptiness.

(2) If we consider empty consciousness, we can distinguish, in general, between empty retentions and empty protentions. From now on, we use the latter term in general for any type of consciousness that is not only an expectation in the customary sense, but also for everything that is essentially related to it. Although we had distinguished between expectations and presentifications of something present, there is a unitary character of the term, protention. This unitary character of protention, and its radical distinction to the type, retention, will be attested to by its features which are in principle distinctive—distinctive features with respect to the corresponding processes of bringing to intuition and fulfillments, as well as modalizations. [243]

(3) Therefore, when we consider intuitive consciousness, which in its very typicality corresponds in a certain way to empty presentations to which intuitive consciousness can refer, we encounter the radical difference between perception and reproduction. Perception is a giving consciousness *originaliter* of something individual. The object is constituted and, if you will, produced in its very sense and mode of being in the primordial mode, in originality. But reproduction reproduces, reconstitutes; it carries out constitution in a peculiar modification, in the mode of "after a fashion," whereby it gives itself in itself as modification,

and refers back to original consciousness according to all its components and accomplishments.

But that is also possible in a different way: One peculiarly characteristic way is the mode of remembering that we analyzed earlier in detail and in relation to which we clarified what is peculiar to a reproduction in general. It is a reproduction in the narrow sense; its peculiar nature is to refer to something that was previously perceived in the same immanent stream. Its object is characterized as an object that has been, an object of a perception that has been in the same stream of consciousness. The more general character of reproduction as a modification of perception and something perceived in the mode of "after a fashion" however also occurs in another form, which, as we will see is essentially different: in the form of anticipatory, intuitive presentification of something futural and in the form of the intuitive presentification of something present. One usually understands by the term "rememberings" intuitive reproductions in the narrow sense, that [244] is, more or less clear reproductions of the past, memories of the past. One could be tempted to use this term broadly to refer to all reproductions, and to speak of memories of the future and memories of the present. In any case, we lack an unequivocal, generally encompassing term, unless we use the term presentification. Or the term, phantasy. The latter, however, is dangerously ambiguous; but the former term is also the only useful term at our disposal if we should deal with all modes of consciousness of individual being, modes of consciousness, that is, that stand in contrast to perception: the intuitable as well the non-intuitable lived-experiences. All of them "presentify" insofar as they make something present to consciousness, but not in an original conscious-having.

One must become quite familiar with their essential differences, and one must initially guard against taking empty presentifications for merely obscure reproductions, as if, in the gradation of the clarity of reproduction, emptiness would only signify the lowest level of clarity and even within this level of clarity, e.g., intuitive phantasy would be nuanced. The object in question is actually constituted there if the "phantasy" is cloudy, as long as the phantasy is, in general, an intuition in a precise mirroring of the

intentional process of perception. The object is structured, as it were, before the reproductive eye as an intentional unity of its manifolds. If the phantasy is intermittent, then the constitutive processes will cease, and an empty consciousness will step in in order for it then to be transformed once more into an actual reproductive constitution. Nothing happens in empty consciousness; it does not contain any constitutive structure; there is nothing to look for in it. What can be said about it can only be said by reason of its process of bringing to intuition. If we clearly recognize, essentially and universally, that every empty presentation has its process of bringing to intuition and does not at all accord with just any intuition, and if we clearly recognize what this accord means, then we will realize that an empty presentation in general is only the potentiality of what lies in the corresponding intuition as actuality. The process of bringing to intuition itself (disclosure), the transition from empty presentation in its corresponding intuition is the actualization of the potentiality of constitution which lay in the empty presentation precisely as mere potency. In the latter, sense was not a given sense, not an appearing sense. [245]

The phenomenon of transition is characterized as a synthesis through coinciding of the empty presentation and intuition, of the potency of a constitution and of the corresponding actual constitution; thus, with respect to sense, it is the agreement between potential and actual sense, or again, object. The presented object in its sense and being is not a doubled one, but rather a single object that, on the one hand, is now merely and emptily presented, emptily meant and, on the other, completely intuitive. Because there is in this way a possible empty presentation corresponding to each intuition, a possible intuiting corresponding to each empty presentation, and with this essential kind of synthesis, we witness not only an essential characteristic of the realm of presentation, but generally, of the realm of consciousness as such with respect to all levels, no matter how high they may be (as will be demonstrated). Here, where presentations are concerned, one must initially become completely clear about what is peculiar to this "emptiness," to this implicit sense-giving, or better yet, to this potentiality and its disclosure in actuality. This

will turn out to be a point of decisive significance for logic. For (privileging only the theoretical sphere of thought) linguistic thinking in the mode of emptiness plays a constant and entirely essential role. And the logical central questions, the normative ones, those concerning verificatory grounding are related to this linguistic empty thought in a special way. But here I am getting way ahead of myself. First and foremost, what has not at all come to light (but it must now be shown) is the fact that not every adaptation to an intuition shares the same fundamental character, not all of them are giving in the strict and genuine sense.

<11. Fulfilling and Merely Disclosive Intuitions>

Let us consider the mode of remembering. Rememberings are intuitions that are classed among empty presentations belonging to the type, retention. Here, the synthesis is one of disclosive, clarificatory bringing to intuition. We can contrast it with the protentional reproductions that, on first glance, appear to be completely equivalent to the reproductions that turn backward, distinguished only by the fact that they are directed ahead to a [246] coexistent present or to a future. But here we will recognize the curious feature that empty protentions as corresponding to intuitive protentions have a dual mode of bringing to intuition, on the one hand, as a fulfilling process of bringing to intuition, and on the other, as non-fulfilling, merely clarificatory. And the expression, bringing to intuition, is appropriate only here. For example, an expectation of the future is intuitively fulfilled if what is expected transpires in perception; but even without that it can be brought to intuition. The intuition is then a mere anticipation of a futural perception. Inversely, an empty retention or, if you will, an emptily emerging memory is brought to intuition only in one way. That is, an intuitive remembering will occur if an appropriate intuition is affixed to the empty retention in general.

This distinction between fulfillment and the merely disclosive process of bringing to intuition gives us something to consider. Actually, we are already familiar with this difference from our analyses of perception with respect to their empty horizons. There

is a difference between merely presentifying in intuition the non-visible side of a perceptual thing in a suitable reproduction, and bringing it to an actually giving perception by walking around it, which is to say, bringing to fulfillment the empty intentions of expectation as perception progresses. In both cases, in both the disclosive process of bringing to intuition and fulfillment, the synthesis is carried out in unbroken concordance. At least, this is the normal case. That something else is also possible, that the disclosure of the empty intention, that the explicating actualization can also bring to light hidden discordances, certainly remains to be seen. But if we stay with the normal case, we will then have in both cases—in both the process of bringing to intuition and fulfillment—precisely an unbroken consciousness of being. Then this means here as well: Where there is no break, there is a thoroughgoing consciousness of being.

But on the other hand we have the great difference that the empty presentation (as an empty intending into the future, so to speak) is "verified," ratified in the fulfillment, while in the other case, this intending has only been clarified, made intuitive. [In the latter case,] standing here before our eyes is only what was "genuinely" intended [in the intending]. The discourse of the mere disclosure of sense is the most suitable way of speaking here. At all events, intending still remains merely intending. In our way of [247] speaking, the term "intending" often serves to characterize any type of consciousness that is in need of fulfillment, regardless of whether it is an empty or intuitive consciousness. In this concept of intending there is the idea of a claim, demanding precisely fulfillment. Thus, even intuitions can have this indigence; in this case they make mere "claims." What that means is also at issue here. We grasp an aspect of it now, initially with the statement that not all intuitions can assume the function of entering into a synthesis of fulfillment, that is, of filling it in a verifying manner in their coinciding with empty presentations. Intuitions that have the character of "intendings" cannot fulfill in a verifying manner, and on the other hand, there are indeed intuitions that do not have this character. But insofar as one and the same intuition has a double faceted structure, which is a universal possibility, on the one hand, mere intending, on the other, the opposite, the statement

is naturally valid, namely, that in the former instance the intuition cannot serve to fulfill if it itself requires fulfillment, while in the latter, it very well can.

This characterizes an essential distinction peculiar to intuition (and potentially to the components of intuition, too), and it is a distinction that becomes evident precisely in the dual syntheses of bringing to intuition, now as the fulfilling process of bringing to intuition, now as a mere disclosive process of bringing to intuition, and in the respectively distinctive accomplishments of these processes of bringing to intuition. In order to elucidate this let us first advance the following: Perceptions, but rememberings, too, can fulfill, can serve actual verification, but never (even if very clear) intuitively pictured expectations, a memory of the future, or even an intuitive presentification of something present, a memory of the present. What is intuitively seen is given in the first group of intuitions, in the other group, it is not given. What does this distinction mean? Naturally it concerns the essentially distinctive way in which the objective sense is constituted in the respective cases, and accordingly the way in which the objective sense is characterized noematically. It is in perception that the object, the object itself, is given, and perception constitutes the object in the mode "itself," itself in a primary and most original sense, in the [248] sense of being presented in the flesh. In contrast to this, the intuitively pictured expectation does not give the object "itself," or as we can say in a straightforward but less clear manner, it does not bring the object to givenness. And this is just what we also alluded to when we said that "it anticipates," it anticipates a self, but it does not give it. A synthesis of fulfillment can take place between an expectation and a perception: What is expected happens. The relationship is one-sided. It is not the perception that is fulfilled in the expectation, but rather, the expectation [that is fulfilled] in the perception. Furthermore, with respect to something expected, an expectation cannot, in principle, be fulfilled in another expectation: The new cannot give anything because it does not itself have anything. What is delivered over in a fulfillment to a consciousness in need of fulfillment, as what should be given appropriately to it, is precisely the self of the object. It thus requires a consciousness that possesses this self. But

it does not only possess it in the form of an original acquisition, namely, in the form of perception, but also in the form of remembering. Even remembering is an intuition that gives. Standing before our eyes in remembering is the object itself, to be sure, in the temporal mode of being-past, and this mode is originally given here. But would it make any sense to deny the possession of the self of the object of remembering because it lacks within itself the privilege of being present in the flesh? Does not this self belong to remembering's own most phenomenological character? How then would evident identification be possible—through which the object is recognizable as identical, recognizable as one and the same subject of its predicates—if not on the basis of repetitive memories? The individual self is thus *a priori* the title for the connectedness of primordially instituting perceptions and the chains of rememberings belonging to them, connectedness through the commonality of the self that is given in all of them as accessible.

<12. Further Clarification of the Difference Between Fulfillment and Disclosure>

There are problems that arise here now. We have worked out a clear distinction in intuitions between self-giving and non-self-giving (but merely intuitively presentifying) ones. And at the same [249] time we distinguished within empty presentations (which as such have this in common with the reproductive intuitions, namely, that what they make present to consciousness is not present *originaliter*) those that are disclosed in self-giving reproductions, and those that are disclosed in non-self-giving ones. Empty anticipations are disclosed in intuitive expectations, and both of them can obtain, through suitable perceptions, an entirely different adaptation to a corresponding intuition, that of fulfilling verification, that of an adaptation to a self-giving consciousness. Where empty retentions are concerned, there is only a disclosive process of bringing to intuition, there is only the adaptation that provides a fullness, namely, the adaptation to a remembering, to a self-giving presentation.

But we must pose a question here. Is not the empty retention fulfilled insofar as it really does take on the fullness of intuition in remembering? Certainly. But according to what has become apparent to us in the meantime it has become clear that we must take hold of a more precise concept of fulfillment. Should fulfillment mean a synthetic consciousness only because one consciousness leads into a corresponding self-giving consciousness and coincides with it, then the disclosure of a retention would naturally also be a fulfillment. On the other hand, if we think of our explication of the concept of intending and the fact that "intending" characterizes a consciousness, which as it were raises a claim that is to be verified in the fulfillment; or, in other words, if we think that the fulfillment of intendings means verification—if we think of the like, then we may not say that retentions find their fulfillment, namely, their verification in the corresponding remembering. Are retentions as such really "intendings" in the sense we have indicated, in the sense of being capable and in need of verification? Certainly, they can also be intendings. But are they not so, then, merely because perceptions, which had been sedimented in them, were already not mere self-givings, but encumbered with anticipations? And is this not shown precisely by the fact that even disclosive remembering is indeed self-giving but at the same time also intending? Thus, this would mean that if a retention can be an intending, then it is also a [250] remembering that discloses the retention, as was the case with the preceding perception. Insofar as this remembering merely discloses, however, it in no way fulfills the empty retention; rather, the fulfillment would have to take place now more than ever; the remembering would have to bring to fulfillment its intending, it would have to bring to fulfillment what, in the intending, is not actually self-giving, but instead [only] points beyond, above all, to new self-giving presentations. The decisive test cases are the purely immanent, fresh retentions that are naturally free from all components of co-intending and their disclosive rememberings that we want to think of as immediately connected to them. An immanent tone that I hear right now breaks off; if I actualize the fresh retention immediately it will become disclosed, but it does not get verified, the intended meaning was

lacking. And the remembering is likewise free from the intended meaning, hence its renewed repetition does not carry out any further accomplishment of verification either.[5] We also recall the fact that immediate retention can never be encumbered with doubt and therefore is incapable of modalization; and at the same time we recall that in the case of verification, and not without reason, we think of the opposite, namely, of a possible rejection; we recall that opposing the corroboration occurring through the self that fulfills the intending is also the possibility of the abrogation of the intending through a self that contests it. We keep in mind that the great theme of a fulfilling verification and thus also, so to speak, of a disappointing, abrogating crossing out stands in an essential relation to our theme of modalizations with which we began.

In any case, we have now attained a deeper insight into disclosure and genuine fulfillment. We see that only what we called protention construed in an extremely broadened manner, regardless whether it is intuitive or not, is an intending intention, that is, corresponds to the concept of a consciousness that admits of fulfillment in the sense of verification. Let us not get confused by the fact that even self-giving presentations of any kind (while precisely as self-givings, they are not intendings), can still be intendings, and we understand this by virtue of the fact that self-giving can be imbued with components of intending. Then the [251] presentation will be precisely in need of fulfillment, or if you prefer, open to verification according to facets of its intendings; on the other hand, however, this does not apply with respect to the facets of its actual self-giving. In relation to this latter facet, as we have already recently remarked, it can itself exercise a verificatory accomplishment for the other intendings to which the self-giving can be suited.

With respect to the empty intention we must accordingly establish that while it is not a self-giving consciousness, it is still a consciousness that has the self *implicite* within itself. The disclosure discloses what we already find here in empty

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[5] Thus, it was incorrect to speak in the *Ideas* of memories of the future and memories of the present. We must distinguish between memories and expectations, in the broadest sense, retentions and protentions with their intuitions.

potentiality, and here the self is already potentially in it. But where there is already precisely an "intending" in the form of *potentia* in the empty presentation, precisely this intending is disclosed and is now intending in the disclosed form: It is then a reproductive intuition, but an intending, protentionally anticipating intuition.

Having clarified the distinction between disclosure and fulfillment we also see the essential ambiguity in speaking of potentiality and actuality. In the disclosure, or as we also put it, clarification, the intentional content hidden in emptiness gets "effectively realized"; it is laid bare, clarified. An intending is effectively realized in the fulfillment, and that is an entirely different sense of effective realization; it is an entirely different accomplishment. The self that was anticipatorily meant, but that was not contained at all in the intending, neither in a concealed nor in an unconcealed form—exactly this self emerges in fulfilling intuition. The fulfilling self lies in the direction of intending, like the target lies in the direction of the arrow. But the intending must first approach what is meant; the arrow must first make its way toward the target, and that takes place in the synthesis of fulfillment. Therefore, the self-giving intuition follows the protention as a new one, while the self-giving intuition follows the retention as a familiar one, as a mere resumption of the self-giving perception from which the retention has arisen.

Intention, directed toward a retentional past, is "fulfilled" in a certain way, too, while an intention into the future, a protention, is not fulfilled. Even here we must be able to distinguish in a protention between what in it is empty consciousness, and what in [252] it is intention. It is intention through kinaesthetic motivation.

<13. The Passive Processes of Experience>

These observations have enabled us to gain an understanding for a most universal structure of consciousness in general. All life of consciousness is constantly carried out, in a dual life-form irrespective of all intervention of egoic activity; it is constantly consciousness of something in a dual mode, now self-giving, and to be sure actually and potentially self-giving, and, on the other hand, it is anticipatory, expectant. In the first respect, it is in part

continually perceptual, and together with this it is in part held retentionally, and with regard to the latter, now disclosive retentionally of this, now of that. In another respect (where everything functions within passivity according to the essential laws of passivity), the life of consciousness develops protention together with self-givings, constitutes relative self-givings of a higher level in the connection of self-givings and intendings, as we came to understand with respect to external perceptions, and in this case lives through the passive processes of fulfillment, but also in processes of disappointment whose universal possibilities we will still have to trace out in some detail. We can characterize all these processes of the passivity of cognition as processes of passive experience, on the one hand, as processes of expanding, verifying experience, but also as processes of experience that determine more closely, and on the other hand, processes of bracketing intendings of experience that are unfitting, processes of rectifying experience. In passing through a schism, through modalization, consciousness achieves unanimity once more by means of a negating crossing out. The divergent possibilities, the privileged probabilities, get resolved through positive decisions, etc. We come to understand newer and newer portions of this and reach a deeper and deeper understanding. But we must pursue this even further in order to be able to get at least a rough overview of the main structures of pure consciousness, where consciousness is to be understood throughout as a stream that constitutes objects and that is subject to pure essential laws; and we must understand that this still takes place on the founding level of passivity. For [253]
that is the soil upon which the free activity of the ego moves and without the knowledge of which the higher accomplishments of this activity must remain for us completely unintelligible. For otherwise, what would remain unintelligible above all would be the sense and extent of the logical norm, which is nothing other than the universal legislative norm according to which all free accomplishment (like all consciousness, again unfolding along the lines of the essential distinctions between self-giving and merely intending consciousness) can be brought down the path of concordant fulfillment.

<14. Transcendental Logic (Comprehensive Reiteration)>

After this lengthy Christmas Break[6] let us go back to where we left off in our lectures. Our method was essentially Socratic-Platonic. Guided by vague, completely indeterminate and general thoughts about the sense of logic as the science of *logos*, and drawing on the meanings of this word, we took up concrete analyses and organized them in such a way that we could simultaneously get from them, along with the concrete understanding of the particularities, the general, but now quite determinate thoughts and set goals, and in such a way that progressing further these could be developed in ever new, appropriately ordered and materially relevant analyses. Logic points us from *logos* as linguistic expression to thinking, to the multifarious consciousness that is capable of expression.[7] And along with this, it points us to the intelligible sense that is intrinsic to thinking, to something meant in thinking and something that is posited in different forms of positing. By harboring sense, consciousness refers in and of itself to objectlike formations, that is, it refers to the identical element in diversely varying sense. This reference to the objectlike formation, which occurs within consciousness, however, can be a reasonable or a non-reasonable one: Logic should be the general science of reason. What is meant in consciousness, the sense and proposition, can be true or false, correct or incorrect, the meant object is actually existent or truly existent, or in truth non-existent.

What characterizes consciousness (and what characterizes the sense immanent to it), respectively, as something that bears within [254]
itself truth and true being? How is this to be understood? In the beginning we engaged in concrete investigations, though in this regard still in a completely unclear manner: investigations into passive and active, slumbering and wakeful consciousness and egoic-consciousness, and then further into original time-consciousness, into immanent and transcendent perception, memory, and expectation, into the differences between

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6 Editor: Christmas Break, 1920.

7 Translator: See Main Text, Part 1, especially §§1-2.

intuitability and non-intuitability, into the way in which the concordance of sense-giving, i.e., the constitution of an objectlike formation is carried out initially on the founding level of passivity, and on the other hand, into the way in which this concordance is ruptured through modalizations—all these organized, particular investigations contained and awakened ever new general insights. What became clear to us was the distinguished feature of the transcendental formulation of questions and research, and of the special attitude peculiar to them. While natural-naive knowledge and research bears on pregiven objects and regions of objects that are taken for granted in their existence: knowledge and research that bears on self-evidently existing nature, on the human world, on the self-evident givenness of the series of numbers, self-evident givenness of geometrical constructive formations and the like, we realized the possibility of a wholly different and extremely necessary knowledge and research that holds in abeyance every naive pregivenness in order to make such pregivenness problematic in the most universal generality. And we recognized this as the mode of research that every philosophical logic invariably requires, every one that makes thinking and thought, reason, reality, truth, and at the apex, scientific truth—that makes all this scientifically intelligible in a radical manner.

It became clear to us that consciousness within itself (and that means, by its very nature) carries out sense-giving and thereby the legitimate as well as the illegitimate relation to an object; and [it became clear to us] that if naive-dogmatic knowledge and science accept objects as pregiven realities, it is already a consciousness, and a highly multiform consciousness through which those objects have been constituted for the knower, and have been constituted in a distinctive way as evidently given. A study of consciousness must be possible with respect to its pure immanence through which we are able to comprehend how consciousness, within itself and according to all its fundamental kinds and fundamental forms, [255] carries out the sense-giving of objects, and how consciousness itself structures its world and its true world and true theories, theories that methodically explicate this world in its truth. It must be understood step by step, and in this pure immanence, how manifold lived-experiences of consciousness form a synthetic

unity, how such a unity essentially and intelligibly maintains the identity of sense, and then further how an identical object as the substratum of varying determinations in and through manifold sense can be given to consciousness, and thus can be given to consciousness as the same, but determined differently. And further, how consciousness within itself can, on the one hand, undergo transformations of concordance and discordance and, on the other, can produce that special concordance with special essential necessities that are called here norm-giving truths, and how, correlatively, the essential features of those discordances are characterized, discordances that "in themselves" must count as falsities with respect to the norm. From there one must understand the orders of foundation concerning the accomplishments of reason, the structure of the methodological ascension from truths to theories.

The phenomenological reduction gave us the evident method for our purely and necessary immanent research, and really determined the genuine sense of this research for the first time. It availed us of pure consciousness and the pure ego of this consciousness, and the method of pure and universal research into essence had to be linked to it, an investigation into essence that does not bear on consciousness that is reduced to something that is momentarily arbitrary, as a single fact, but rather that bears on the general essential types of consciousness and the essential necessities proper to them, for example, under the noetic heading, perception as such, or transcendent perception as such, under the correlative heading, perceptual sense as such, the present in the flesh as such, etc. Thus, transcendental logic does not want to be a dogmatic science juxtaposed to other sciences, not a science in the customary sense; it does not want to be, like the dogmatic sciences, directed toward a pregiven realm of objects, naively taking them for granted as pregiven. It wants to be the ultimate science that goes back to ultimate givennesses, namely, to those givennesses that are already presupposed in all other givennesses, in all naive givennesses. That is, it wants to be the science of [256]
consciousness, the science of consciousness as pregiving in general, and specifically, the science of consciousness that pregives meant reality, and grounded upon this the ultimate

elucidating science of theoretical accomplishments and of all accomplishments under the ideas of reason. Indeed, it wants to be the universal and pure science of *logos*, the science of the essence of *logos* as *logos*, that is, of knowledge as knowledge, of the known objectlike formation as objectlike formation, of truth as truth; accordingly of science as science, too, and of all scientific types that the idea of science includes. But [it wants to be] this according to the corresponding essential correlations of scientifically cognizing consciousness, science as the theoretical system of true propositions, and the realm of science as the realm of truly existing objects and of objects determined within the theories, objects that are investigated in scientific thinking.

Thus, pure logic must yield essential insight into how consciousness as such contains sense, in which structures, in which noetic and noematic modes, how within itself it makes objects present to consciousness as its intentional accomplishment, and then how it necessarily makes [them] present to consciousness as the objectlike formation of this and that sense-content and of these and those modes of appearance. It must inquire into the essential typicality of consciousness as such, and for each one of those types, disclose the modes of accomplishment that give sense and constitute objects. And it especially aims, finally, at those essential typicalities that make intelligible the constitution of truly existing and not merely meant objectlike formations, and likewise makes intelligible for us true theory, true theoretical science and the true life of reason of every kind as a certain methodological accomplishment, with norms, whose original source is to be illuminated in every last detail. But for this we require extremely encompassing investigations that initially investigate, prior to all inquiries into truth, the general types of transcendentally pure consciousness with the types of their sense-giving, their relations to objects in noetic and noematic regard—still more primitively, investigations that distinguish consciousness with respect to the difference between passivity and activity, and initially pursue the intentional accomplishments that are carried out within passivity, accomplishments that are already presupposed as the constant foundation of all egoic activity.

Our last considerations were still carried out within the framework of passivity; these considerations dealt with the modalities of belief and following this, the considerations that dealt with disclosure and genuine fulfillment, the latter representing confirmation on the level of passivity. At issue in all of this are the eidetic descriptions of the nexuses of the consciousness of concordance and discordance, and of the modal occurrences of the "problematically possible," of the "dubitable," of the "null" which occur along with the latter with regard to their sense; then at issue are the distinguished cases of concordant or discordant annexes of consciousness to consciousness in which (like in the fulfillment or the disappointment of an expectation or of a protention in the sphere of memory), the intending is verified or annulled through a decision making process, [and this was seen] in contrast to the cases of mere disclosure in which an intending into the future is merely clarified, like, for instance, in the mere picturing of an expectation prior to its fulfillment through perception. [257]

<15.> Corroboration and Verification

Before we proceed, we must first supplement what we have said. We distinguished intuitive presentations from empty presentations, and within the intuitive ones we distinguished between self-giving presentations, as those which are alone capable of verificatory accomplishments, and those that are not self-giving, like, for example, those merely intuitively pictured expectations. They only refer, as it were, beyond themselves, to a self that is not given in them, to a presenting against which they are measured, a presenting in which the self, verifying the intending into the future, would be given. Or they are also intuitions, but merely as anticipating other intuitions. It now becomes clear that belonging to the essential character of all individual presentations, even the self-giving ones, is the fact that they are, at the very least, encumbered with components of protention, with components of intending into the future, yielding in this case possible nexuses of corroboration that we will distinguish from verification. If we consider connected

presentations, regardless whether they are intuitive or empty, and specifically ones that do not undergo a rupture, that is, are in themselves concordant, then they are *eo ipso* of the mode of belief, namely, with respect to their protentional side. They anticipate in belief, be it according to certain components, like in the perceptual course of a process with respect to expectations that are directed [258] ahead, be it thoroughly, like when they thoroughly have the feature of anticipations, for example, when we expect a thunderstorm on the basis of various indices. Now, where these several intendings into the future are connected in the unity of a coinciding of sense, and where they harmonize with respect to what is intended into the future, this harmony does not provide any verification, but essentially the consciousness of corroboration. Every intending into the future is motivated; we have already alluded to this when we closely examined the structure of perceptions and memories (that is, the structure of the fundamental kinds of self-giving presentations). On the side of primordial impressions and retentions we find the original constitution that has resulted in an institution, a constitution of a self and of its original acquisition of knowledge, and it essentially motivates an anticipatory belief that is directed ahead—the further path of events is expected according to the respective constellation of knowledge in more or less determinate sense-giving. This does not only hold here, but everywhere: The course of experiential knowledge also motivates a course of intending into the future, and in this way all intending into the future is motivated belief. Now where intendings into the future of the same sense arise from several motivational sources and result in a coinciding, they corroborate each other, or the new one corroborates the current one. In a certain respect there is, by the way, also something like corroboration for the acquisition of knowledge, namely, for knowledge fashioned out of repetitive acquisitions of knowledge that have the same sense. It has a dimension of intensity, knowledge is deepened, fortified. Now, where the corroboration of belief in the sense of an intending into the future is concerned (of "belief" in the strict sense), this corroboration is not to be confused with verification, and is never to be equated with it. And this holds likewise for the opposing occurrences. An intending

into the future can undergo a rupture and therefore modalization by a motivation radiating from the realm of acquired knowledge—a motivated experiential belief that, by virtue of a partial harmony, coincides with the belief already given, but on the other hand, partially conflicts with it.[8]

<16. The Question Concerning the Verifiability of Experiential Belief> [259]

But when we articulate and think through such principles, we notice first of all that we have not yet acquired concepts like truth and falsity here in the full sense, and that speaking of the norm, of a norm of correctness and incorrectness had an incomplete sense. In immanent time-consciousness we have the stream of givennesses in lived-experience, givennesses that are strung together temporally with their anticipations which have the character of an anticipatory believing that is directed-ahead. A spatio-temporal world is given in the stream that is contained in immanent time-consciousness, in the stream of transcendent experiences, the intuitive and non-intuitive. And constantly referring to this spatio-temporal world are manifold lived-experiences of a transcendent believing that is in need of fulfillment. In both respects, belief is not only directed toward the present, but also toward the anticipated future and toward the memorial past; manifold memory-beliefs and expectant-beliefs emerge that can be verified or rejected.

What happens now with the verifiability or refutability of experiential belief in all these respects? What is to be meant by the axiom we tested that every such belief is either positively or negatively verifiable? To be sure, it does not just mean that the mere possibility of one or the other belongs to the essence of such a believing, and that when the one possibility is taken up as realized, the other would thereby be annulled. It is certainly evident from the principle of contradiction that positive and negative verification, fulfillment and disappointment, are mutually exclusive. But if we want to say that every belief is verifiable in the

[8] Editor: There is a gap in the text here.

sense that it is valid or invalid in the usual sense, as it is in the view of the traditional principle of the excluded middle, then quite a bit more is being said here.

Let us get clear about this by drawing a parallel to mathematical judgment, to a judicative believing that bears on what is mathematical. Either it is valid, it is verifiable, or it is not valid, it is verifiable in a negative manner. This certainly implies that whether we ever will or are even able to carry out a verification or not, even without thinking about whether it may ever become a decision of the positive or negative sort, it is surely decided in itself whether the judgment is verifiable or whether it is refutable, already in advance and thus for all actual and possible [260] *consciousness in the future. Only we do not know in advance how it is decided; we only first know this in the actual, intuitive verification as the current decision. It is determined in advance, as it were, how the die is cast, whether on the positive or the negative side. If we actually and positively confirm the judgment, then we will know that it was already established beforehand that only a positive confirmation could take place and that the opposite was excluded (and for every conceivable ego).*

Let us now turn to the spheres of our external experience as they had been constituted in passivity, and so far as we are able to understand them from there up to this point. We ask with respect to these spheres: Is it an actually intuitable, essential law to be drawn from the structure of the intentionality of experience that every belief, no matter how it arises in the stream of consciousness and its motivations, is decided in advance according to the possibilities of verification and refutation? How can this "in advance" be understood? Certainly, if a fulfillment occurs, then belief is decided as valid; a prehension of the self has emerged from mere anticipating, the anticipation has been ratified. But as long as the verification has not taken place, both of the open possibilities do exist. Must it be determined in itself and in advance what alone can occur there, if it is ever to be decided at all and regardless of whether a decision takes place or not? To elucidate the structure of truth or validity is to elucidate this "in itself," and perhaps there are fundamental differences there. In fact, truths of the mathematical kind and other essential truths are

fundamentally different from truths like experiential truths. This in-itself is divided according to the correlations: As correctness in itself it belongs to believing, as truth in itself, truth in the strict sense of the word, it belongs to sense or rather to a proposition. The object in itself corresponds to the truth in itself. Now the in-itself belongs to the object.

Thus, we have brought the problem of the empirical in-itself clearly into relief by drawing a parallel to the mathematical in-itself where it is easiest to detect the peculiar trait of validity in itself. And we were able to understand that we are in no way in the [261] *position of fashioning in an original manner the axioms of the sort that we previously tested relating to the empirical in-itself. This concerns no less the immanent sphere despite its privilege through the evidence of the ego. In fact, if we conceive of a consciousness that has sounds, colors, and similar hyletic data given in passivity in immanent time-consciousness, and these data are being constituted in the process of becoming, then it is not clear in the least how it should be decided in itself, in advance, whether precisely this new tone, or whether a new tone at all should follow a previous tone. And even if an anticipatory belief in a new determinate tone were motivated by the preceding immanent experience, we cannot tell in advance that it should be decided in itself, whether it will actually occur, or instead will fail to appear, or will take place in an entirely arbitrary and altered manner.*

What happens with respect to transcendence, that is, the spatio-material world, at least when we conceive of it constituted purely passively in a consciousness? Naturally, proper to the constitution of a spatio-material environing-world is not only a super-abundance of prefigurings of inner horizons for every thing that is actually experienced, but also of outer horizons—which are reciprocally interwoven with one another, and ultimately all things of experience are connected in the unity of an environing-world with a unitary outer horizon—and thus a superabundance of prefigurings for the path of further possible experiences. But there are precisely prefigurings, there is motivated experiential belief, superabundantly corroborated and ratified through innumerable accordances; but in the final analysis is it not possible for the further experience with its ever new self-givings to

continue as it will? Contrary to each and every expectation, contrary to all the overwhelming preconvictions and probabilities? Can it not continue such that everything becomes a confused muddle, such that the entire perceptual world-order is destroyed, such that this world as the unity of experience is no longer even maintained, such that it becomes unstable for consciousness, such that all sense-data lose their apperceptive apprehensions, which themselves only actually grasp appearances in concordant believing? But we have held that there would be the world in itself, and every experiential belief would be valid in itself, would be in itself true and false.

In the last lecture[9] we made plain the peculiar virtue of the [262] verification of the self as opposed to mere corroborations, of the verification arising through self-giving acts of belief. This was the view where corroborations are concerned: A belief that does not arise as such, that resides in a self-giving unbroken presentation, can be connected with another one whose very sense is similarly directed; it can undergo a fortification and thus in a broader sense, verification, like the expectation of a coming event through a new *indizium*, through a new similarly directed protention. But no matter how rich this intensification may be, as long as the expectation is unfulfilled, it has, aside from all emotional interests, a deficiency; a mere ratification does not occur in fulfillment in the manner of an intensification of force; rather, the event itself is there now—for consciousness, of course. And this consciousness accomplishes a verification in the transition to fulfillment, a verification that gives itself as definitive, so to speak: And so it is; I have the existing thing itself, I do not only mean it; the being of the sense-content in question is not only a meant being, but "actual." Just as sense thus has a new and superior mode in self-giving belief, so too does being, the correlate of the unbroken character of the presentation. Further, in the transitional synthesis, belief has the character of a belief being demonstrated as correct, and its noematic correlate, the character of actual and true being as opposed to merely intended being. Correspondingly, decisions made concerning questions, doubts, or problematic possibilities

[9] Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

are also diverse according to whether they take place through self-giving unbroken presentations, or through non-self-giving ones. The self-giving decision is so to speak the one through the *terminus ad quem.* And the expression is also fitting insofar as the life of consciousness in its entire scope is permeated with continuously connected tendencies toward universal concordance, not only toward concordance in general, however, but toward one suited to self-givennesses, one resolved with respect to the self-givennesses.

In this way we had obtained preliminary concepts of truth, correctness, norm, and with respect to being, of "true being." We [263] can immediately add: We had obtained a preliminary and original concept of evidence as the consciousness of verification and decision about something self-given; but here we had already presupposed working out the radical difference between an arbitrary belief and its modalities as opposed to belief in the mode of a self-giving and concordant presentation.

I paused there in order to make clear to you that the concepts of truth, correctness, etc., that we obtained in the context of our studies up to this point are not yet those concepts that guide us in customary and scientific discourse and that we also ascribe to the traditional logical law of contradiction.

There is a moment here for which we can find no model, namely, being resolved, as it were, being prejudicial concerning what is true and what is false, in advance of [or] prior to all actual experience; what is true is true in itself, and that is to say, it is not open whether positive or negative confirmation is possible.

If it is a matter of the future, for example, then it is decided, even where I lack a decision. To our mind, every belief directed toward the future has its truth or its falsity prefigured in advance, once and for all.

However, if we remain in the framework of pure consciousness and consider the immanent and transcendent given matters that are constituted within it in passivity, then as I said, what we have shown has not yet accounted for the clarification of the idea of that in-itself. Where the immanent given matters are concerned, and especially the sense-data, every Now brings with it new ones. But in spite of all aroused anticipations, it cannot be foreseen why

it must necessarily be decided which data will occur in the future. And this also holds no differently where the transcendently constituted spatio-temporal world is concerned.

Perhaps some clarification is still required here. This world is given to us originally through external perceptions. Generally speaking, they cohere with one another in continual concordance, and they are likewise intertwined concordantly with self-giving rememberings that potentially span gaps like those of sleep. To be [264] *sure, occasionally discordances do also occur. We speak of illusions, experiential belief being ruptured, passing over into doubt; but in the progression of experience, which never undergoes breaks in each and every respect, a thoroughgoing concordance is indeed restored through the changes in meaning and the crossings out just described; that is, running through our consciousness is a sustained unity of world-certainty that is produced again and again over against the disturbances. "The" one world is constantly there, only it is determined more closely and occasionally determined somewhat differently.*

The first problem arises here, however: Must it then remain just as it was up to this point, according to the testimonies of our memory? Must an external experience be continually adjoined to another external experience in this way? Can it not be that an external experience is the last one, while consciousness endures? An external experience is assuredly a complex structure of consciousness that emerges in the nexus of consciousness as naturally motivated. Still, must the motivations proceed in such a way that a perception has to be connected up with another perception? We have kinaesthetic courses with which the appearances of things are connected in accordance with associative motivation: thus, certain exhibiting sense-data (in the case of the visual appearance, that is, visual data) along with their apprehensions. By motivation we mean that certain data and their protentional horizons are demanded as co-emerging along with the emergence of other data in our lived-experience. But such associative demands can be annulled in the course of present experiencing. The series of sensation must actually arrive in a certain way in order for the apprehension of a thing to be experienced according to the kinaesthetically aroused pre-

demands, and in order for the consciousness of an existing thing to be maintained. If the sense-data were suddenly to begin appearing in a muddle, if our visual field were suddenly to be filled with a confused muddle of colors, the kinaesthetic motivations would lose their force. What was formerly linked up to the kinaesthetic courses in an expectant manner would no longer be able to occur in the otherwise firmly regulated manner in anticipatory believing, and it would therefore be an end to the [265] *play of external perceptions. Their emergence means precisely a regulated functioning and a continuous further development of cultivated motivations, and this essentially depends upon the actual course of sensations. Yet this is always conceivable as an entirely different course, and as a completely unregulated one. That it is not an unregulated course, but is such a course that makes a continual perceptual flow possible, that is simply a fact. However, if we inquire into the truth of this fact and more precisely, if we ask why what was previously so must still be or will be so, this truth will obviously not be such that it could be decided by recourse to one of those passive confirmations of which we were alone able to speak.*

Secondly, even if we do presuppose the truth of this fact, and thus assume that for us, that for the particular experiencing pure ego, external experiences will continually be adjoined in its stream of consciousness and will also issue in concordance every time, this would only be to say that for this ego the unity of a true world will be continually maintained in ratifying judicative intendings. But this is not to say that this world, beyond our present experience of it, is a world determined in advance, determined in itself, such that the decision of true or false would be univocally prefigured for every believing that is directed toward any temporal situation, or for a corresponding believing that is produced hypothetically.

This is illustrated most simply by referring to the difference between the world-view of that part of humanity that is influenced by modern natural science, and alternately, the world-view of the rest of humanity. This world is constantly and self-evidently there for all human beings, and they believe that it will also continue to endure. In their conscious lives they live into a world-future. But

by far most human beings do believe that what will come depends to a large extent upon accidents that cannot be ascertained, or that gods decide the world's course according to a momentary whim. Only roughly is there an order that can be foreseen, according to which one can be practically directed, but only roughly. A conviction was indeed forged quite late in a causality that lawfully and absolutely determines each and every thing occurring in the world; and the sense of this conviction is none [266] *other than precisely this: that each and every temporal being (and in the natural attitude this means all beings in the world) is determined in itself, determined as truths in themselves. From the very beginning, nothing is open in order to have to wait and see first how the Fates of destiny will decide.*

Our question rested in this consideration, namely, whether we already attain definitiveness (in the mode of experiential ratification) should an intending into the future actually be ratified by experience. Here, then, the other, last mentioned difficulty comes into play, and in a way that is very touchy where external experience is concerned. Does not external experience evidently lead eo ipso into infinity? Each experience is still itself an open intention; it has dimensions that are unfulfilled. Must, indeed, can a synthetically progressing acquisition of knowledge come to an end?

Let us turn back to the immanent sphere.

<17.> The Problem of the In-Itself of One's Own Past. Evidence in Remembering

One's own past of consciousness with its noetic and noematic components is for us a field of possible remembering, and furthermore is a field of at least *idealiter* possible, complete memory, true and valid. Extremely large stretches [of the past] may be forgotten; they may never re-emerge involuntarily in a current memory or be at our disposal in a deliberate memory: Yet we are sure of the fact that there was actually a past of consciousness and that it can be restored unequivocally in the form of rememberings—both are obviously equivalent. Belonging to the empty horizon of the past, which brings every present of

consciousness to a close, is a belief of the past that is essentially fulfillable through chains of rememberings and nothing else. Put more precisely, belonging to the essence of this empty belief of the past is the fact that as a positive belief it cannot in principle be annulled; to measure this empty belief of the past against a self-giving intuition can never lead to nothing. As the horizon of belief, it holds up [and] is always and necessarily there in an unbroken manner. A horizon of belief that is adequate to any self-giving intuition is a remembering, and yields a portion of it, that is, it yields a portion of one's own past going back indeterminately. It [267] can indeed be the case that the remembering in question does not hold up; it can be that it winds up as a memorial illusion. But this very thing is only possible because a memory is pitted against other memories, that is, because something past endures as self-giving, and this past served as the regulating measure for the memorial belief that was dismissed. It is inconceivable that there would be nothing behind my present of consciousness, that every one of my rememberings would be null, since this nullity can *a priori* only be demonstrated again through other rememberings. I might be convinced on occasion that my actual rememberings here were null; the new authoritative rememberings may also assume the character of nullity once more; but what is evident is that every remembering is either already complete, which is to say that it is purely self-giving with respect to that section of my past that revives it in a clear and intuitive manner, or that a purely self-giving remembering of this completeness is possible; and it is clear that this possibility is not a mere possibility of phantasy, and that it is not a problematic possibility either, but rather a possibility that characterizes an ideal limit to be intuitively discerned in evidence for all incomplete and deceptive rememberings, a limit that thus always prescribes an in-itself to rememberings. The intuited idea guides us, even in our futile attempts to bring a remembering to perfect clarity and concordance, even when, with respect to the repeated object, we become cognizant of the fact that remembering has taken up moments in a deceptive way, moments that did not exist and that could not have existed in this way—we still firmly maintain that the past lived-experience is to be regarded as determinate in itself

and that the disclosure of a true memory is to be regarded as a goal that is to be sought in practice. This true remembering, as a purely self-giving consciousness of the past, is thus an idea that is necessary and [is something] to be discerned intuitively; experiential belief is decided in advance here; every empty protention is actually verifiable in a predetermined sense. It may be dubious to me as to how it actually was, I may now be obliged to leave it open. But in itself, it was how it was, something determined in itself.

<18. Consciousness of the Memorial Illusion> [268]

If we pursue a deeper clarification of this situation, we would initially have to view more precisely how a remembering, even though it is a self-giving consciousness, can nevertheless turn out to be a deception for consciousness, that is, how it can split into a conflict and then pass over into unbelief, into negation. The order is prefigured, the beginning can essentially only be such that a remembering in the primordial mode of belief emerges from the obscurity of memory as the retentional distant horizon. Likewise, it is clear *a priori* that doubt and negation are not possible in just any fashion, but are possible only in a certain way such that the memory that was at first unbroken comes into conflict with other memories. Memories can be more or less vivacious, more or less unclear; by being intermittent they can transmit expanses of intuitability through empty expanses of non-intuitability. At the same time (and these are essential possibilities that can be drawn purely from examples), empty intentions can arise anew in conflict with intentional moments that were first established in the initial memory, be they intuitive or already non-intuitive; but there is no doubt that they are still memorial intentions that can only pass over into clear self-giving rememberings in a fulfilling manner. In this way a consciousness of a memorial illusion can arise, one that is in itself evident and clear, and we can recognize how it must necessarily look here. Every such consciousness, every evident annulment of a remembering (which is precisely the evident consciousness: "it was only an illusion") has the typicality of disclosing a muddle of diverse rememberings, and this disclosure

has the form of a certain transition of the initial memory into a multiplicity of discrete, completely clear memories that, phenomenologically [understood], are related to one another, and in this relation, are completely concordant.

We now describe this transitional phenomenon in the following way—a phenomenon that can also contain in its intermediate stages an empty phenomenon of doubt and of negation, in order then to ground the evidence of negation, of deception with bifurcation: Our point of departure is the remembering that is [269] initially unruptured. With the transition to a sufficient level of clarity, the originally unitary memorial image falls apart into several images, and finally into several clear rememberings, [that are] in themselves unbroken [and] that belong to different temporal loci. For example, the memory of Sils-Maria surfaces, and I see a young author before me, and we are engaged in a lively conversation. It concerned Gundolf's "Shakespeare."[10] But now a doubt is "stirring," and if I give into it, a second image will appear; I am now with the same young man in his apartment in a small room in the country in Fextal; he is reading to me from Gundolf's "Shakespeare," and we are speaking about it there. If I go still deeper now into the image that I first remembered, I will note that a piece of its memorial continuity remains purely self-giving and unruptured. But there was a small break in continuity, a break that was previously inconspicuous where I listened to the young man speaking and intuitively honed in on what we spoke about; the reproduction changed there, unnoticed, into the other image which as it were remained concealed visually through the first situation, falsely imputing the second conversation to the first. And seen precisely, the same person in the one situation along with his external modes of appearance was at the same time, or was actually already falsely imputed to the one in the other situation. It is evident that this duality in fact, just not noticed, already lay in the initial image giving itself in a unitary manner, an image that was then subject to a divergent duplication by virtue of

[10] Translator: The reference here is to Friedrich Gundolf, author of *Shakespeare und der deutsche Geist* (Berlin: Georg Bondi, 1914), and translator of Shakespeare into German.

a peculiar overlapping in which parts of the one memorial image covered over parts of the other.

The divergence into two discrete memories is not a theory, but rather a situation that is intelligible in its intentionality. The discrete rememberings arising in this process are not two arbitrary memories, but memories that are characterized in a certain way. What is evident above all is that they do not arise anew, but were already there for consciousness, and that they have assumed only an altered mode of intuition and an altered nexus of relations. There is a justification in speaking of a splintering of a combined memorial image into its combining elements. We find both of the [270] memorial situations in this combined memorial image, though certainly not both of them developed in a completely intuitive manner; rather, only a part of each one is represented by intuitive parts in the entire intuitive image; but the supplementary portions of the situations are also there *implicite*; they are only "suppressed," "eclipsed." It is entirely analogous to the overlapping of two perceptual apprehensions that stand in conflict, where they are likewise grounded in a commonality and where, when the one perceptual apprehension (e.g. of a mannequin) prevails and the other, the apprehension of a person with its own peculiar perceptual moments, is suppressed, but is however grasped in a peculiar manner, only non-intuitively, only hidden.

<19. Remembering and Association>

That which makes overlapping and fusion possible, and on the other hand, that which makes the dehiscence or the divergence of memories possible is also intelligible to us phenomenologically. If we consider the pair of discrete memories [just discussed], we will recognize that they are essentially not two arbitrary memories, but two memories that are related to one another in a certain way, and that this reciprocal relatedness, or rather, the connection of consciousness did not first accrue to them in clarity. Both of them are "associated"; the one situation recalls the other, and this is not an expression of some kind of objective psychological fact, but a purely phenomenological matter concerning essential structures. It is also contained in the fusion that forms a unitary image, only that

here it has assumed just this special shape. It is not for nothing that I say in my example that the reproduction of the conversation in Sils was the first; it recalled the conversation in Fextal, and both became conflated in a partially intermingled image for me. In separating them out, we can describe what is peculiar to association. Generally, we can say that every event of recalling something (to conduct our description noematically) is essentially a noematic nexus of synthetically united memorial givennesses under the rubric of association. This noematic nexus entails two moments: an immediate and a mediate recalling something. In every association we necessarily find a pair of immediately [271] complementary elements: An element of the one situation immediately reminds us of a similar element of the other.[11] If we call the one situation associative or awakening, and the other the associated or awakened, then in the former instance what is primarily awakening is a prominent moment, even if not yet noticed, a moment that awakens something similar. This pair of similarity is situated in a special unification that we will discuss shortly. It fashions a bridge between both pasts or even between a perceptual present and a past. The similar moment that is immediately awakened awakens something coexisting with it, and then this has the character of being associated mediately. An *a* recalls an *a'* and thereby a coexisting *b*. Yet seen more precisely, we must say: The awakening spreads out from the complementary element of similarity to the entire realm of something that is coexistent with it, and from there further to the continuous temporal sequence. In other words, what is awakened through the similar moment is not only the individuated similar moment in the sphere of memory, but with regard to the inseparable empty horizons of the past stream of consciousness, the entire present of consciousness to which the similar moment belonged. It <spreads out> through it, but then further to the continuous, subsequent, concrete streaming course. Yet this awakening does not imply an explicit process of bringing to intuition; what is awakened can be

[11] The general theory of association, by the way, is expounded upon here. Something recalling something else that is similar? The synthesis of coinciding can also be the coinciding that forms identity—i.e., also something recalling something else that is identical.

entirely or partially obscure, and there are still special motives for the special reproduction of images. Thus, contained in every association as a primary and founding association is an association of similarity, but it is contained as a non-independent element, and then further association through contiguity, namely, at first the association according to coexistence, and then according to succession.

But there are still supplementary principles of association that come into view as phenomenologically demonstrable, namely, insofar as everything that produces a special unity (that is, produces a prominence of constituted objects) in an original consciousness of the present according to coexistence and succession, thus everything that constitutes passive multiplicities is reawakened in the reproduction that was already awakened elsewhere through similarity, and can give rise to special [272] associative connections between present and past prominent elements. In fact, one would have to expand the concept of association phenomenologically and not only speak of association as the association involving the connection of the present consciousness and a memorially submerged consciousness, but also speak of analogous connections within a consciousness of the present. Uniformity, contrast, for example, belong here, together with everything that, in general, renders a prominent multiplicity given to consciousness as a unity within passivity.

What should be constituted as a unity in the present for itself, as present in the flesh, is a for-itself as a unity of prominence for the ego, understood as a unity of the affecting allure. Where several prominent elements are connected into the unity of a group, of a passively constituted multiplicity, there is the unity of an allure as a whole, of an affection as a whole that distinguishes it as a for-itself. In this case, either the particular affections flow into the unity of the affection as a whole such that they only function as a moment of the affection as a whole, or this or that exercises yet another special affection, its voice especially comes through the chorus. It is a special problem to investigate what creates multiplicities, what organizes multiplicities themselves into multiplicities, how uniformity and similarity everywhere play a role there in different directions, how rhythmatizations arise

whereby something uniform in relation to something else that is uniform, something relatively the most similar in relation to something else that is most similar, shows an especially awakening force, and in the awakening, an affectively binding force for consciousness. In this way, a special unity is fashioned through affective force, especially in succession for instance; it does this in such a way that a tone as affectively unitary appears for itself, and in such a way that a new tone and then another new one do not merely appear in the same way, but rather forthwith takes hold of what has just past, as bestowing an affective salience on an object uniform to it or similar to it, imparting to the pair an affection as a whole; and special fusions occur with this and summon for themselves a unity of prominence of several of them. But then, for instance, after *a b c* have flowed-off in a unitary manner, another *a* occurs once more and then *b*, and then *c*; here the uniform *a* awakens the uniform *a*, and the course, a repeated [273] course, a rhythmatization arises as the unity of a cyclical multiplicity. But this implies that the second *a b c* does not allow the retentionally submerged element to sink down placidly into its retentional grave, but lifts it up and holds on to it (in spite of its submersion) in its particularity and ties it to life. On the other hand, the uniform element that is running-off awakens an expectation of something uniform to it, a cycle running-off, the anticipation of the continuation of a cyclical becoming. In my view, these are primordial forms of association, originary impressional associations, so to speak, and they become efficacious once more in remembering. What was connected in original (we also say, impressional) consciousness through principles of original association, those that <unite> the discrete unities into connected coexistent or successive multiplicities, is also efficacious in reproduction; this is not only to say that it evidently has a corresponding connection in the reproduction that is already intuitive—but that before the unity of the reproduced intuition is produced, it induces the awakening to become an intuition.

If we now examine the primary association of similarity more closely, we unmistakably recognize that it is its nature to produce a certain coinciding. Two pasts can be brought to a complete

intuitive memory, one after the other, but never in the shape of an ensemble, never in a consciousness that lets both images run-off together in a intuitive manner. If we have a memorial situation and it remains vivacious, then another memorial situation awaked by it cannot be there completely and intuitively in a similar manner. But a consciousness of both pasts being there together is, nevertheless, carried out with the awakening, and this obviously occurs in the mode of repression under partial coinciding. What are coinciding are the similar members, namely, the associating member covers over the associated, the awakening member of the first intuitive situation [covers over] the awakened. The coinciding is intimate according to the degree of similarity, and where what is awakened is an object that is constituted as the same identically, the coinciding is also a coinciding of sense according to identity. What is connected with these terms of similarity or identity, then, exists in a tension, in a kind of struggle. One could speak here of positive and negative coinciding. If the first situation is completely vivacious, the associated situation that is radiating out from the [274] awakened term will remain repressed. Yet the force of the single partial awakening can become stronger, and then two things become possible here: Either the rupture on the part of an association of contiguity makes the entire past come to life and, radiating back, tears the term of similarity loose from the awakening term. Then the entire associative situation, the entire image of it, becomes repressed and we live entirely in a new past. Or the images are interspersed with each other, resistant elements of the first reproductive past are combined with elements of the other past to form a unity of one image; here however the interspersing must also consist in the fact that what has not [explicitly] appeared in the image is still there in the mode of a repressed consciousness. It is like what happens in the "rivalry of the visual fields," in the stereoscopic combination of pictures that do not fit together: Elements of both are connected, but they can potentially alternate such that the consciousness of one of them remains continually repressed. The unity of the image is produced through a unity of the apperceptive interpretation with a unity of the constituted sense; this is analogous to similar cases where similar components were constituted as an unbroken unity. But, in

their succession, as soon as the two situations diverge from one another intuitively by the affective force of the suppressed one winning out and the development of the image progressing—after this, as soon as each of the two situations flows-off successively in an uninhibited manner in its discrete unity and concordance, the dual stratification of the combined image and the connection of its conflicting parts becomes evident. It becomes clear that only the discrete reproductions were actually self-givennesses and that they belong together in intentionality with respect to all their parts and with respect to all the combinations of their parts. It belongs essentially to every memory that it admits of being brought to progressive clarity, to the clarity of the process of the presentified present running-off again, and to the clarity of unraveling the interlacings [that have occurred] through overlappings with other memories, and to the clarity of the elimination of apperceptive superimpositions. And however much that belongs together with the accomplishment of the ego that is active and purposively occupied here, the ground of the evidence of a true past being will [275] consist in the evidence that every memorial deception can be elucidated only by means of memory, and that elements of a genuine past sense can necessarily play a part in every such deception only in the mixtures, and that the pure fulfillment of sense and pure explication of the concordant lines of memory is an idea lying in the finite[12]. Note that when we speak about an idea, we are speaking about a *limes*, about a limit that lies in the finite, and also about a limit that is to be discerned in evidence and yet not seen in the customary sense—there where we do not suspect a memory of any alloy. The sensible qualities and the entire clarity of memory already wavers, and the true qualities of the true memory are ideal limits.

We have gained quite a lot with this, notably and above all, a deep look into the origin of deceptions, of "errors" in passivity, and particularly in the field of memory as a field of the in-itself.

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[12] *im Endlichen*

<20. Kant's Doctrine of the Synthesis of Productive Imagination>

Our problem is the clarification of the idea of the in-itself to the extent that passivity can account for it. In the full sense of the term, we [can] only speak of validity, correctness, and truth, and of evidence in which it first comes to original givenness in consciousness, in the sphere of judicative cognition, that is, in the sphere of the free rational activity of the ego. But we already have pre-levels of evidence and their correlates in the sphere of passivity as that which fashions the founding soil for all activity. Thus, fundamental investigations must begin here.

It is of historical interest to recall here Kant's brilliant insights that are expressed in his profound but obscure doctrine of the synthesis of productive imagination, above all in his transcendental deduction from the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. When Kant in his great work speaks of an analytic synthesis, he means cognition deployed there in explicit forms of concepts and judgments, and this points back, for him, to a productive synthesis.

But, in our view, that is nothing other than what we call passive constitution, nothing other than the team-work (disclosable by our [276] phenomenological method) of the constantly higher developing intentionalities of passive consciousness in which an extremely multiform process of immanent and transcendent sense-giving is carried out passively and is organized into encompassing formations of sense and formations of being, as is the immanent unity of the stream of lived-experience, and with respect to transcendence, the unity of the world with its universal forms. Since Kant was not in the position to recognize the essence of passive production as intentional constitution, and could not yet see the actual task of making systematically intelligible the essential necessities of the constitution of all objectlike formations and the path of their order of foundation, he also understandably missed the problem of evidence. Of course, this is likewise lacking in its genuine phenomenological shape for those who followed, and for the same reasons.

<21. Development of the Problem of the In-Itself for the Immanent Sphere>

Let us limit the problem of truth in itself, or rather, of evidence to the immanent sphere, and naturally for good reasons, because it must first be clarified there. Every self-giving presentation carries out a certain accomplishment in relation to a non-self-giving one [and] with which it reaches a synthetic coinciding, an accomplishment that the term fulfillment intimates: It brings the fullness of the "self" to the non-self-giving presentation *qua* mere intending. The meant being is now there as true being, as the object as actually there. But now it happens (as we have already said earlier) that a self-giving presentation in general can become dubious and can be annulled through negation; protentions are intertwined with it. Even where we distinguish between genuine and non-genuine self-giving, like with external perception, we see that disappointment is possible, also allowing for something that is actually appearing to be crossed out.

Let us directly pose the question with respect to immanence whether self-givenness here cannot be something that is entirely relative, that does not contain any definitive self at all or that does not have this definitive self supporting it as a persistent norm. Can [277] *it not be that every self-giving is to be rendered invalid through a conflict with other self-givings, and these again in conflict with others, and so on in infinitum? More explicitly, can it not be the case, when any kind of presentation is verified by a corresponding self-giving, that the latter is forthwith annulled through negation, whereby now what is presented would also be given as not actual; that then, however, the self-giving functioning as norm is also negated once again, and so the actual and the non-actual are always only something momentary, something belonging arbitrarily to the process of fulfillment? Or when we take any kind of presentation, is it decided in itself that corresponding to its meant being, to what is given in it in the mode of belief-certainty, is a definitive being of the self as true and as incapable of being crossed out for all time?*

To be sure, at first we see that immanently constituted being in its living present is not only self-giving as being, but that this

being is essentially incapable of being crossed out. The moment we assert that it is not, like we can do at any time, we see that apodictically this assertion is annulled with respect to what is given. Here the indubitable, the indefeasible validity is clear. But what good is it, since its validity is only momentary? What is immanent flows off and is gone. But where we speak of a true self and of a presentation that is verified definitively, there we reach beyond the momentary consciousness through rememberings in which we repeatedly come back to the same presentation and to its same meant object; and in which, on the other hand, we can repeatedly secure for ourselves and potentially do secure for ourselves the verified self as an identical self, and one that is not capable of being crossed out. Surely, we do have the momentary lived-experiencing (e.g., of an immanent sense-datum that we see in its present becoming) in a certainty that is not capable of being crossed out. But the being that we grasp there is only meant as being in itself when we not only take it as a momentary datum in the mode of the present, but also as the identical dabile that could be given in arbitrarily iterated rememberings—that is, when we take it as a temporal datum, for instance, as the tonal datum in its temporality, a temporality that is identically one as opposed to possible orientations like those that are given through variable rememberings.[13] [278]

We see that the temporal form is the form of objects which, as objects, pretend to have their in-itself. All talk of objects thus leads back to remembering. Thus, this does not only hold for immanent objects. Even when we consider a noema, even when we consider that which is momentarily present as sense in the mode of the present and make an objective assertion about it, we grasp it as such a [noema or present object] that can be presentified to us and identified in iterated memories, namely, with this reproductively presentified character, "momentary present." We learn from this consideration that the question concerning how an objectlike formation, an objectlike formation in itself, is

[13] *I am not entirely satisfied with this. The object is surely constituted from the very beginning as something temporal, and the momentary phase is an abstraction that we must first construct. The incapability of being crossed out peculiar to the moment is thus not primary.*

constituted, how it can show itself as such originally, leads overall and from the very start initially to the problem of the constitution of an in-itself of remembering, thus, to the question concerning how remembering can be justified and to what extent it can become a source for definitiveness. We must first of all become clear about it.

Indeed, seen more precisely, we are still lacking an intermediate term for a completely systematic exposition. The living present which is structured immanently is as we said not capable of being crossed out so long as it unfolds in constitution; doubt is not possible here. This also concerns, therefore, the span of the living retention proper to it. To make ourselves explicitly clear: Every progressing retention that continues to exist in a living fading-away cannot be modalized. But once again we must add that we still cannot identify an in-itself here. I can keep a hold on a sound fading away attentively, yes even hold onto it more tightly. Here is something of the most primitive activity. But it can also be the case that I am not even attentively aware of it, that I do not actively turn toward it and toward the series of sounds, and yet it exercises a special allure. By virtue of an associative awakening, it gets the character of an intention. In both cases, and in an entirely spontaneous fashion this provocation (this affection) is possibly discharged in a remembering that not only arises in [279]
general, but arises as the fulfillment of the intention.

Note that this remembering is something essentially different from a retention, and is not for instance a mere reanimation of it in the sense of an increase in the level of clarity. A clear retention whose essence we grasp in the retentional levels lying most closely to the primordial impression always remains a retention. Every retention is what it is and has its intentional mode only at the place of the streaming perceiving at which it stands. But remembering is a kind of re-perception, that is, it is not a perception to be sure, but a being constituted anew, a beginning anew with the primordial-Now, and a retentional fading-away, but precisely in the mode of reproduction. Thus, in remembering all retentional levels emerge "once again," reproductively modified. If such a remembering now occurs in connection with a retention harboring an allure that is just past, it necessarily occurs in a

coinciding of sense and in a coinciding of being with the retention. The same sound that has just sunk back and just faded away appears once more on the scene, and I live through its being once more. This can be repeated; I either deliberately or involuntarily reproduce the tone or an entire tonal phrase once more, even an entire melody. What happens here to the incapability of being crossed out peculiar to remembering? Is it to be rejected out of hand? Are we speaking in epistemology from time immemorial about the general possibility of deception in remembering? And does this not hold as well for the immanent sphere?

<§22. Rememberings as the Source for an In-Itself of Objects>

We will obviously have to make distinctions here between close memories and distant memories, (1) between rememberings that are awakened through the retention that is still primordially living, still articulated in itself and found in constitutive flux, and (2) between rememberings that reach into the distant horizon of retention, like with those of an entire piece of music.

1) Rememberings as Arisen from the Awakening of Primordially Living Retention [280]

Where the first are concerned we will say: For what has just past and is still sinking back, which remembering intuitively grasps once again, we have what is absolutely incapable of being crossed out—and we have this even if remembering is repeated, whereby the second now creates its evidence from the first and no longer from the retention that has, in the meantime, completely faded away. In spite of all that, we certainly do not grasp the self and the identity of the self in such a repeated coinciding of the self without incompleteness and degrees of completeness. For we know indeed that remembering can essentially waver in its clarity, and can even be intermittent. The different moments of content are more or less veiled, as it were, as if by a fog of unclarity. And yet, it is not one of those concealments in the usual sense, namely, of objects by other objects. The fog of unclarity does not blacken out objects, it is not a real fog. And yet it does conceal, renders the

self-giving incomplete. And yet, what is just past as past is absolutely secure, it is incapable of being crossed out, indubitable, and it is absolutely secure with respect to everything that is given from it according to quality, intensity, timbre. It is itself there passing through the fog of unclarity, in all relative unclarity, but just not in an entirely obvious manner, just not as realized ultimately. Accordingly, something is lacking with respect to this incapability of being crossed out. Essentially belonging to this situation is the necessary coinciding that forms identity, the coinciding of given matters throughout the alteration of different levels of clarity, and a certain enhancement in the direction toward an ultimate, most genuine self, the self that is completely evident in its appearance but which is only an idea to be discerned intuitively, an ideal limes.

But what is peculiar here is that it does not first require something like approaching this ideal limit in order first of all to confirm a less clear reproduction. In this connection with the living present, it has its original justification in itself, continually. And "original justification" means that it contains a self that is inviolable, although it only stands in a gradation of degrees against a limes which in its very nature would alone completely [281] *exhibit the "self." The less clear remembering is less saturated, the clearer one is more saturated, it is a "more intensive" self-givenness, but if it is an intuitive remembering at all, it will give just one self and not give any other self, or any of its moments.*[14] *However, empty remembering is not actually a remembering, but an awakening or an affective allure of a retentional sedimentation that is emerging as prominent from the immersion of memory. In a certain sense there are also gradual differences of proximity and distance here.*

One must say then that we still have another gradation, namely, with respect to reproductions that reach into the outermost

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[14] *During the course of our lectures the following was added: The justification of close memory does not yield any elucidation of the possibility of the knowledge of an immanent object as being in itself. For we are still bound here to the chain of rememberings, rememberings which adhere to a living retention, which had a departure from it, and were carried by its self-giving evidence. Only when we have first justified the distant memory do we have the possibility of recognizing at any time an immanent temporal object as existing.*

horizon of immersion, even with respect to those reproductions that draw near to it. Namely: Self-givennesses arise here that are indeed actual self-givennesses and are incontestable in this connection, while it is left gradually undetermined how far the actual self-givenness reaches, and what can yet actually be ascribed to it with respect to determinate moments.

2) <Rememberings of a Submerged Past of Consciousness>

The systematic path leads then further to rememberings that do not have their retentional connection to the immediate realm of the present, but rather, that revive a distant, long submerged past of consciousness. We speak here of distant memories as opposed to close memories. Even here, for distant memories, I hold that every remembering has its original justification, and this means that we are to understand essentially that corresponding to every [282] *remembering, even to this group, is a necessary idea, the idea of a self that is incapable of being crossed out. My guiding thought here is the following: An intuitive distant memory, when it is not one that fleetingly flashes forth, but is a steady one and is synthetically iterable and identifiable, has with respect to its objectlike formation essentially only one possible way of passing over into doubt and then turning out to be null, namely, as a confused muddle of rememberings. Thus, becoming discordant, inhibition, and annulment of the belief that is initially unbroken in the self-given past, necessarily leads to the phenomena of bifurcation in which the distant memory in question splits into several distant memories. And it does so in such a way that the unitary objectlike formation of an undivided memory is disclosed as the fusion of single objects, single features and events that belong to the separated memories and are self-given there with partially different objectlike determinations. In the same way it could now happen that every one of the splintered memories lose their character of unbroken concordance, and undergo a crossing out by splitting into yet other memories that are in themselves concordant.*

But on the one hand it is still the case that the content of every memory that is characterized as false is only false with respect to

the unity of the combined whole, but it remains correct with respect to its parts. What is crossed out is always the whole that has arisen through a commingling, but the elements that issued in the commingling remain self-given, only they belong to different nexuses. On the other hand, however, this process of splitting cannot continue in infinitum; it is a muddling up of discrete matters, and thus it must come to an end. Indeed, it suffices that what appears in a memory, essentially, cannot as remembered be completely empty, that its self-giving cannot be an empty title, but rather that it has its source in actual self-givings such that we are necessarily referred back to the idea of a chain of pure self-givennesses that are no longer capable of being crossed out, but are only identifiable with respect to their content and repeatable [283] *in complete identity and concordance. Naturally, even here we have degrees of clarity for every portion of genuine self-givenness, and in this respect the idea of the most complete self-givenness as limes. Thus even this type of saturation <has> differences of evidence. In both relations we are certainly referred to the active ego and its free activity in which it is guided, precisely, by the experience that memory can turn out to be deceptive, and that, in particular, clouds of unclarity can conceal the comminglings. Accordingly, the ego strives to check its memories thoroughly, to clarify them deliberately, to investigate the intentional nexuses with respect to memories' parts, to disclose the illusion by analyzing, and thus to advance to the true self.*

But still necessary for our further understanding is the elucidation of the origins of error in passivity, and in particular of error in its most original shape of commingling. This problem leads us to a radical portion of the analysis of passive consciousness, namely, as genetic analysis: to the phenomenology of association.

<23. Immediate and Mediate Awakening>

The rubric "association" characterizes for us a form and a lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general; but it does not characterize, as it does for psychologists, a form of objective, psychophysical causality; it

does not characterize a regulated manner in which the emergence of reproductions, of rememberings, is causally determined in human and animal psychic life. For we are working within the framework of the phenomenological reduction in which all objective reality and objective causality is "bracketed." What is there for us is not the world taken as reality with its psychophysical beings and its causalities, but only the phenomena of them, thing-phenomena, human-phenomena, etc., in their intentionality. In this framework of pure consciousness, we find the streaming present of consciousness, we find constituted in every case a perceptual reality constituted as in the flesh. But [284] *pasts can also enter into present consciousness through remembering. Put more precisely, in the unity of a consciousness that is streaming in the present, we find concrete perceptions with their retentional components, as well as concrete retentions—all of that in the flow of retention fading away into the distant horizon of retention. But in addition to this, emergent rememberings as well. Between the noematic components of something present and something remembered we find a phenomenologically peculiar connective trait that can be expressed in the following way: Something present recalls something past. Likewise, a second remembering can occur while a remembering runs-off; the second remembering can occur along with the first one in a nexus that is characterized noematically by the fact that the first recalled event recalls the second recalled event. A perceptual consciousness, that is, a consciousness that is constituted originarily can accordingly be characterized as a consciousness that awakens, awakening a reproductive consciousness, and this consciousness can function as awakening in its turn as fetching a past of consciousness, as it were.*

Let us consider this nexus in broad strokes. If an *a* that is given to consciousness reminds us of a *b*, then the associative awakening is either immediate or mediate, and immediate and mediate associations are always intertwined with one another, even if it is only the mediate one that is able to obtrude for itself upon us. For example, in a conversation we are having, a thought is expressed that reminds us of a friend. The thought belongs to the unity of the present conversation; the conversation reminds us immediately of

a previous conversation with the friend in which the same thought was expressed. The association between *a* and *b*, thought and friend, is a mediate one. What is immediately connected is *a* with *a'* and *a'* with *b*, i.e., the immediate awakening goes from something that is identical, uniform, or especially similar to something that is similar to it; that is, the bridging member, we say, connects the present consciousness with the previous one. Something uniform, and something quite especially strong, something identical in the sense, the identical thought, awakens a memory of something uniform, and the awakening goes further from here to the other previous content of consciousness. Then the [285] awakening goes still further in the steady series of memories or pasts that advance forward in the direction of the present, but also discretely toward the previous pasts or even discretely toward the future. Still, several questions arise here when we examine this more closely.

<24. Association in the Impressional Sphere. Its Significance for Remembering and Analogizing Protention>

The multiplicity is in relief for itself, it exercises an affection as a multiplicity and, at the same time, it affects a term with a special force, one that drowns out opposing terms. It is a special problem, and surely also an important one, to investigate what the general and essential conditions are for terms of a multiplicity to be capable of reaching a phenomenological union, to investigate what then allows multiplicities to connect with multiplicities and thus in general what produces unities for consciousness, unities that are not original singularities. "Original singularities" are objects that must first come into relief essentially as a whole, and then require analysis in order for parts or moments of the object to come into relief on or in them, while a multifaceted object is precisely a multiplicity that is essentially preceded by prominent singularities. The general conditions of singularity and of multiplicity lead us to certain essential relationships of uniformity and similarity, and integrally related to it, of contrast and the like. But all of this concerns, I contend, conditions of the possibility of intention and affection that are carried over in an intensified form from

something that is prominently uniform to something that is uniform to it, from something that is relatively most similar to something that is most similar to it, and together with the one-sided or mutual transference or awakening for consciousness, they have a connective force that links the special affections.

"Recalling something" is an evident nexus: thus, for example, in the constitution of successions forming multiplicities as connected unities, for instance, in a connected sequence of tones. A tone initially arises for itself; that is, the tonal phases that are continually melded together through an internal continual similarity form an enduring unity for itself by virtue of their contrast in the point of departure and in the terminal point to the [286] tonal series, to the phase; they are affective as one. Then a new tone arises, and then another new one. But each new one that arises here does not arise in the same way as the first one does, as if no tone had arisen prior to it. The new one enters forthwith into the unitary relation with the one that has just past, with the one that has sunken back retentionally. By virtue of the similarity of intentional objects, the affection of each one is connected in a unity as the affection on the same ego. But there is still more. The object sinking back retentionally, and which as such loses something of its affective force, obtains through this connection an increase of force, and so forth with every new tone.

Not only do similarities and relations of similarities of qualities, intensities, in short, of moments with respect to content contribute to unification and to the efficacy that reawakens the sinking force, but also temporal and spatial relations contribute to them. Rhythmatizations and cycles are especially instructive examples. Let us take a simple repetition: *a b c* and again *a′ b′ c′* with the same content and the same temporal relations. The new *a′* reaches back to *a*, likewise *b′* to *b*, *c′* to *c*, and in addition to this also the connection *a′ b′ c′* to *a b c*. In this affective coinciding what has already sunken back in the first group undergoes a new intensification and unification; every new repetition is of benefit to the previous ones; what has retentionally grown old and fallen in the grave is, so to speak, still tied to life with the creation of a unity of a higher order, [i.e., with the creation] of a cyclical unity of succession. These are all processes of phenomenal formations

of unity that seen from within are processes of affective connection, and affective connection is at the same time the awakening peculiar to affective force. This is why I am obligated to see primordial forms of association here, so to speak, originary association, association within the impressional sphere.

For in other cases as well (that is, also in the series formed out of reproductive associations at a distance), it seems to me that the most essential feature of this process consists in affective interconnections.

But first we must point to the fact that the same principles that institute a connection, principles that are originally efficacious in the impression, get a hearing again in remembering. I mean it in this way: It is evident that when a remembering is developed in a completely intuitive manner, all the single prominent elements and multifarious connections are there once again reproductively, which connections were constituted in the corresponding original perception. But in the case of a remembering that is revived associatively by a present, this revival is a process there; accordingly, what is similar in the present initially provokes a reproduction of something similar in the past, and the path of the awakening of an ever broadening intuition now follows the connections between which the bridging term is trestled. If a present thought recalls a past one, there is a tendency toward awakening the series of thoughts. If the thought exists in an apperceptive unity with the person who expressed it, and the person stands in a multiple relation with other persons forming a society, then all such unities are unfolded in intuition, or there is a tendency toward this unfolding. So much for the question we are treating here. [287]

It is a primordial law that one similar thing is originally connected to another similar thing through a "fusion," and in addition to this, there is the further essential law that every awakening of a member, every augmentation of the force of affection that proceeds from it, also augments the affective force of all members connected to it. Moments in the present that have their special prominence in consciousness and thus their current force of affection on the ego not only awaken something similar to the past, but in accordance with a further law, also awaken

something that is continuously connected with them in the temporal nexus according to coexistence and succession (this is the law of association). And in addition to this, there is for us the law of analogizing protention whereby an analogue of the associatively awakened past is projected into the present, and an analogue of the becoming that is past, that is, of the past "having-become" (of the past processes)—which were in the process of becoming in the corresponding situation of consciousness—are projected into the present as those that are quasi-becoming. And in this way a consciousness of an analogue of a becoming arises in the present that is however not a memorial consciousness, but rather an analogue of a memorial consciousness; and on the other hand, just as the memory of a becoming that is past is directed ahead into a familiar future—familiar because it has already [288] become an epistemic acquisition—so too is the analogue directed ahead into the future, which is not familiar to be sure, but is analogous to one that is familiar.

<25. The Lawful Regularity of Retention>

But if one asks (and this would be our other question) how we are to understand the fact that the present retrieves the distant, submerged past through similarity, and that the past, which is certainly no longer anything, can determine the path of reproductive awakening in the past's affective nexuses (nexuses that only had significance once for the past ego) the answer would run as follows: The present turns into the past as the past that is constituted for the ego through the lawful regularity of retention; and finally, everything that is retentional turns into the undifferentiated unity of the distant retention of the one distant horizon, which extinguishes all differentiations. However, this extinguishing is to be understood in the following way: The affective force is necessarily decreased with the submersion, which is to say, it decreases the force that makes possible the special prominent elements, the unities for themselves even within the non-intuitability of retention, be they singularities or multiplicities or even multiplicities of a higher level, for instance, cyclical multiplicities. What is given there broadly in near-

retention as something extended and as a unity of continuously connected affections, and likewise, what exists there as a multiplicity of elements given together or that follow one after the other, but as largely diverse—[all of this] moves closer together; I would say that corresponding to the temporal perspective, to the phenomenal moving-closer-together of those matters that have just been, is an affective perspective; flowing is a flowing together of affections. All of this holds, we must add, as long as the opposing forces, retroactive affective animations, do not originate from the living impression that issues forth. These are present in the form of repetition, of cycles and the like. What would have otherwise already flowed-off and become unnoticeable will continue to be retained by virtue of a fortifying awakening, of an increase in the force of affection that radiates back. But not to infinity. Finally, the awakening force becomes powerless, and the undifferentiated horizon assimilates everything that is on the verge of sinking back into a steady retention. In addition to this there is the [289] supplementary law that this distant horizon, the horizon of the distant retention that is already dead, can be reawakened from the current present in such a way that a stimulating force issuing from the present can go into the horizon in a discontinuous fashion and can effect a prominence in it. This prominence is then propagated further according to the awakening force itself that issues from the awakened element, for example, from the force of the awakened obscure memory of a lecture in a series of similar lectures. This retentional awakening, then, functions in such a way that it brings with it a tendency toward remembering that could then be realized in an actually occurring remembering.

This certainly creates new problems that pressingly await further work. It requires a phenomenology of tendencies and the demonstration of laws that govern the realization of tendencies, the fulfillment of tendentious intentions. Lacking is the association of mere simultaneity and succession as pure temporal association, which serves as the framework for all association taking place through fusion.

<26.> Expectation and Association

We have touched upon the phenomenology of association from the perspective of remembering and in my view it must be tackled from there and not by drawing on just any kind of reproductive phenomena, like the phenomena of intuitive expectation and, especially, the phenomena of free phantasy. We have already repeatedly employed and touched upon what concerns the lawful regularities of expectation. They will also be enriched and clarified through our present genetic analyses. We called protention a shadow that is projected ahead, an inverted memory. Let us now say with more clarity that as the most original protention, namely, as that of the impressional sphere, it is initially a modification of retention motivated by the near-retention, and the same holds further for distant-retentions as well. When a tendency to bring something to intuition attaches to the expectation just like it does with respect to a retention, and when this process of bringing to intuition occurs with the appropriate awakening force, then the awakened intuitive element is indeed [290] not a pure and simple remembering, but a peculiar and original modification of a remembering. When, for example, a tonal sequence, which is running-off at a sufficiently slow pace, is repeated and we become precipitate, so to speak, during its repetition; and instead of the empty anticipatory intention, an image of what is to come appears that illustrates it, then this is evidently the remembering of the corresponding element of the tonal sequence, but in a new mode, with a new function; what is given in memory gives a picture of what is to come; what is to come is not what has past, but what is expected, which has its prototype in the past. We do not have a consciousness of the past in the expectation, although the past appears here with it; it is transformed into an anticipation, and one can read that in it.

Let us examine the situation in the sphere of the living present more closely. The occurrence of something futural is expected through its similarity to what has occurred in the past, like already happens in the most primitive case of a steady protention.

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